

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1330840-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 6
Page 11 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 12 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 13 ~ Referral/Consult;
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Page 16 ~ Referral/Consult;

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Jm000/W.350

12/16/91

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FM FBI PHILADELPHIA [redacted] (ARA) [initials]

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b7E

TO DIRECTOR FBI/PRIORITY/

BT

~~SECRET~~

CITE: //3620:4202//

PASS: FBIHQ, [redacted]

b7E

SUBJECT: TARIQ AZIZ; [redacted] (OO: PHILADELPHIA). [initials]

~~THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.~~

RE PHILADELPHIA TELETYPE DATED NOVEMBER 26, 1991, AND
CAPTIONED "IRAQI INTELLIGENCE MATTERS" [redacted]

[redacted] PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING

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b7D
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INFORMATION:

DURING THE PERIOD OF [redacted]
[redacted]

pull-3
OO:PH

[redacted]

JJR: JmΔ
(1)

[redacted]
[initials]

12-16-91

[redacted]

Serialized [initials]
Indexed [initials]

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APPROVED BY: [initials]
JULIAN DATE: 35018
MRI#: 1673 TIME: 0229
ISN#: 76
PER: [initials]

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APPROVED BY: [redacted]
[initials]

^PAGE TWO DE PH [REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

ASSET WAS TOLD THIS INFORMATION IN STRICT CONFIDENCE.

[REDACTED]

^PAGE THREE DE PH

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

CONTACT WITH

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THE BUREAU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED.

~~CL BY G3, DECL ON OADR~~

BT

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~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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It is noted the Bureau has been advised of this information by priority teletype.

~~SECRET~~ (U)

~~SECRET~~

EM6001W. 357

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-09-2017 BY: [redacted]

FM FBI PHILADELPHIA [redacted] (ARA) (P)
TO DIRECTOR FBI/PRIORITY/
BT

~~SECRET~~

CITE: //3620:4202//

PASS: CID, [redacted] SSA [redacted]

SUBJECT: TARIQ AZIZ; [redacted] OO: PHILADELPHIA.

~~THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.~~

REFERENCE PHILADELPHIA TELETYPE DATED DECEMBER 16, 1991, AND
TELCALLS TO SSA [redacted] DATED DECEMBER 17 AND 18, 1991.

[redacted] PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING

INFORMATION:

REGARDING [redacted] ASSET

RECALLS HIS SOURCE IN [redacted]
[redacted]

SA

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① [redacted]

JJR: [initials]
(2)

[Handwritten scribble]

[redacted]

APPROVED BY: RHR
JULIAN DATE: 357
MRI#: 1308 TIME: 2228
ISN#: 13
PER: DRK

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

[redacted]

^PAGE TWO DE PH

[REDACTED]

~~S E C R E T~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THE ASSET ALSO RECALLS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THE ASSET'S LAST CONTACT WITH

[REDACTED]

WAS ON ABOUT

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ASSET ATTEMPTED TO REACH

[REDACTED]

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^PAGE THREE DE PH [REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

ASSET ADVISED [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ASSET IS AWARE OF THE NEED TO IMMEDIATELY REPORT ANY
INFORMATION RECEIVED REGARDING THIS MATTER AND THE BUREAU WILL BE
KEPT ADVISED BY SECURE PHONE AND FOLLOW-UP TELETYPES.

~~C BY GS; D BY OADR.~~

BT

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Jms000w.009
1/9/92

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-09-2017 BY: [redacted]

FM FBI PHILADELPHIA [redacted] (ARA) (P)

TO DIRECTOR FBI/PRIORITY/

[redacted] (INFO)/ROUTINE/

BT

~~SECRET~~

CITE: 113621: 4202//

PASS: FBIHQ, CID, [redacted] SSA [redacted]

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SUBJECT: TARIQ AZIZ, [redacted] (OO: PHILADELPHIA).

~~THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.~~

RE PHILADELPHIA TELETYPE DATED DECEMBER 30, 1991 (NO COPY TO BALTIMORE), AND BUREAU TELETYPE DATED DECEMBER 20, 1991.

[redacted] PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING

INFORMATION:

MEETINGS WITH [redacted]

[redacted] PRODUCED LITTLE NEW INFORMATION

REGARDING [redacted]

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*Correction
made. Jmd*

[redacted]

JTC: Jmd

(11):

APPROVED BY: [signature]
JULIAN DATE: 070
MRI# 2966 TIME: 2351
ISN#: 12
PER: [signature]

[redacted]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] HAD NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING A VISIT TO

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

REGARDING THE MISSION OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HAS BEEN ASKING HIMSELF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

(1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(2)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E

FOR THE INFORMATION OF

[REDACTED]

NO REASON HAS YET BEEN

PROVIDED TO THE ASSET AS TO

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ASSET

HAS ADVISED

[REDACTED]

WOULD BE WELCOME.


WHEN INFORMATION DEVELOPS REGARDING THIS VISIT, THE BUREAU AND

[REDACTED]

WILL BE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED.

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~~S E C R E T~~

~~CL BY G3, DECL ON OADR~~

BT

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FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- SECRET
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

3/3/92

~~SECRET~~

Date

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TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
(ATTN: [redacted] SSA [redacted] ROOM 5438)

FROM: "SAC, PHILADELPHIA" [redacted] (P)

SUBJECT: TARIO AZIZ;
[redacted]
OO:PH

~~This communication is classified "SECRET" in its entirety.~~

Reference Philadelphia teletype dated 1/10/92.

Enclosed for the Bureau are three (3) 8 x 10 and (3) 5 x 7 photos of [redacted]

One 8 x 10 and one 5 x 7 photo are enclosed for the information of [redacted]

Extreme caution should be taken re the dissemination of this photo outside the FBI [redacted]

On [redacted] provided the following information:

The enclosed photo was taken [redacted] in [redacted] are [redacted] and [redacted] at that time.

- 3 - Bureau (Encs. 6) (RM)
(ATTN: [redacted] SSA [redacted])
- 1 - [redacted] (Encs. 2) (Info.) (RM)
- 3 - Philadelphia
- ② - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]

JJR:mlp
(7)

[Handwritten signature/initials]

~~SECRET~~
Classified by G-3
Declassify on: [redacted]

Searched _____
Serialized PD
Indexed PG
Filed PD
Per _____

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ (Number) _____ (Time)

[Handwritten notes and initials on right margin]

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~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] the asset telephonically contacted [redacted] in [redacted] to advise him that the asset will soon be leaving for [redacted] for business and personal reasons, [redacted]

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[redacted]

The asset did not press for additional information

[redacted]

[redacted] no longer works at the [redacted] and no longer resides [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

On [redacted] asset advised business priorities have

[redacted]

Should any information develop prior to this trip

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

EM 013W.066

FM FBI PHILADELPHIA [redacted] (ARA) (P)
TO DIRECTOR FBI/PRIORITY/
FBI NEW YORK/PRIORITY/
LEGAT [redacted] PRIORITY/
BT

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~~SECRET~~

CITE: //3620:4202//

PASS: FBIHQ, SSA [redacted]

SUBJECT: TARIQ AZIZ; [redacted] OO: PHILADELPHIA.

~~THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.~~

REFERENCE PHILADELPHIA AIRTEL DATED MARCH 3, 1992. NO COPY

FOR NEW YORK.

[redacted] PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING

INFORMATION:

[redacted]

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[redacted]

NR: emg emg
(1)

[Handwritten scribbles and a rectangular box with illegible text]

[Handwritten scribbles]

[redacted]

Searched _____
Serialized PG
Indexed _____
Filed PG

APPROVED BY: PCR/OPB/emg
JULIAN DATE: 0616
MRI#: 2175 TIME: 2318
ISN#: 22
PER: [Signature]

^PAGE TWO DE PH [REDACTED]

(ARA) ~~SECRET~~

TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED THE ASSET TO ADVISE HIM THAT TARIQ AZIZ

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

IT IS NOTED

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THE ASSET CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN HIS PRIMARY INTEREST IN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FOR THE INFORMATION OF NEW YORK:

[REDACTED]

RECEIVED

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Vertical text on the left margin, likely a routing slip or administrative markings.

Vertical text on the right margin, likely a routing slip or administrative markings.

^PAGE THREE DE PH

[REDACTED]

(ARA) ~~S E C R E T~~

INFORMATION IN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FBIHQ HAS PROVIDED THIS INFORMATION TO

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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^PAGE FOUR DE PH

[REDACTED]

(ARA) ~~S E C R E T~~

[REDACTED]

PHILADELPHIA HAS NOT BEEN ADVISED OF THE PROGRESS OF THE
INVESTIGATION [REDACTED] REGARDING THE ACTIVITIES OF

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THE DETROIT DIVISION HAS PRODUCED RELIABLE INFORMATION ABOUT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PHILADELPHIA

DOES NOT KNOW IF THIS QUESTION HAS BEEN RESOLVED.

[REDACTED]

||| 2,

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^PAGE FIVE DE PH [REDACTED] (ARA) ~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] THE DETROIT DIVISION HAS
PRODUCED RELIABLE INFORMATION ABOUT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PHILADELPHIA DOES NOT KNOW IF THIS
QUESTION HAS BEEN RESOLVED.

[REDACTED]

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THE BUREAU AND NEW YORK WILL BE ADVISED IMMEDIATELY BY
TELEPHONE AND TELETYPE SHOULD ASSET BE ENLISTED IN ANY PLAN TO

[REDACTED]

BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO CONTACT [REDACTED] WASHINGTON, DC,
FOR ANY INFORMATION REGARDING THIS MATTER AND ADVISE NEW YORK AND
PHILADELPHIA.

~~C G-3, D OADR~~

BT

Jmd 8W. 093

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-09-2017 BY: [redacted]

3/13/92

FM FBI PHILADELPHIA [redacted] (ARA) (P)
TO DIRECTOR FBI/ROUTINE/
FBI NEW YORK/ROUTINE/
LEGAT [redacted]/ROUTINE/
BT

~~SECRET~~

CITE: //3620:4292//

PASS: FBIHQ, SSA [redacted]

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SUBJECT: TARIQ AZIZ; [redacted] (OO: PHILADELPHIA).

~~THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.~~

RE PHILADELPHIA TELETYPE DATED MARCH 6, 1992.

[redacted] PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING

INFORMATION:

ASSET WAS IN TELEPHONIC CONTACT WITH [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

JFK; JMD
(1)

APPROVED BY: [signature]
JULIAN DATE: 003
MRI#: 1005 TIME: 2124
ISN#: 21
PER: D.S.

Searched _____
Serialized POB
Indexed _____
Filed PO

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[REDACTED]

~~S E C R E T~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

THE ASSET ADDITIONALLY ADVISED

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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^PAGE FOUR DE PH [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THE ASSET ADVISED [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

ADMINISTRATIVE: IT IS NOTED THE ASSET [REDACTED] VISIT

[REDACTED]

AND ASSET'S

PROPOSED TRAVEL IS PART OF THAT ROUTINE AND NOT AT THE DIRECTION

OF THE FBI. ASSET USUALLY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

^PAGE FIVE DE PH [REDACTED] ~~S E C R E T~~

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THIS TRAVEL HAS NOT BEEN
ENCOURAGED OR SUBSIDIZED BY THE FBI.

~~C GS, D OADR~~

BT

0023 MRI 01336

PP RUCNFB FBIPH [redacted]

DE FBINY #0026 0792002

ZNY SSSSS

P 191826Z MAR 92

FM FBI NEW YORK [redacted] (P) (I-25)

TO DIRECTOR FBI/PRIORITY/

FBI PHILADELPHIA/PRIORITY/

LEGAT [redacted] PRIORITY/

BT

~~SECRET~~

CITE: //3540//

PASS: HQ FOR [redacted] ATTN: SSA [redacted]

SUBJECT: TARIQ AZIZ; [redacted] ^{Comp.} [redacted] OO:PH.

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~~THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.~~

RE PHILADELPHIA AIRTEL, DATED MARCH 3, 1992 (NO COPY TO NEW YORK), AND PHILADELPHIA TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU, DATED MARCH 6, 1992.

[redacted] PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

[redacted]

PHILADELPHIA
MAR 9 1992
X

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

'IT IS NOTED THAT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PHILADELPHIA FURTHER ADVISE THAT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FBIHQ PROVIDED THIS INFORMATION TO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WHICH WAS APPARENTLY UNAWARE OF THE PRESENCE OF [REDACTED] WAS ALSO VERY

INTERESTED IN THIS INFORMATION BECAUSE OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FOR THE INFORMATION OF RECIPIENTS, [REDACTED] AN EXTREMELY RELIABLE AND SENSITIVE SOURCE WHO FURNISHES INFORMATION ON A CONTINUING BASIS, ADVISED THAT ACCORDING TO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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PAGE FOUR DE FBINY 0026 ~~S E C R E T~~

ACCORDING TO A NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE ON SUNDAY, MARCH 15,
1992, TARIQ AZIZ IS HIGHLY TRUSTED AND ENTRENCHED WITHIN THE
GOVERNMENT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN AND IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT HE
WOULD BE INTERESTED IN DEFECTING.

~~C BY G-3; D ON OADR.~~

BT

*0026

NNNN

XE 001w.090

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-09-2017 BY: [redacted]

FM FBI PHILADELPHIA [redacted] (ARA) (P)

TO DIRECTOR FBI/PRIORITY/

FBI NEW YORK/ROUTINE/

[redacted] PRIORITY/

BT

~~SECRET~~

CITE: //3620:4202//

PASS: FBIHQ, [redacted] SSA [redacted]

SUBJECT: TARIQ AZIZ; [redacted] OO:PHILADELPHIA.

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~~THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.~~
REFERENCE PHILADELPHIA TELETYPE DATED MARCH 6 AND NEW YORK
TELETYPE DATED MARCH 19, 1992.

[redacted] PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFOR-
MATION:

[redacted] ASSET MET WITH [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

JJR:Rmb

(1) eef

Searched _____
Serialized PB
Indexed _____
Filed PB

APPROVED BY: BER/wind/ef
JULIAN DATE: 1090
MRI#: 714 TIME: 1623
ISN#: 1
PER: Rm

^PAGE TWO DE PH

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ADVISED THE ASSET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THE ASSET ADVISED

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ASSET ADVISED THAT

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THE BUREAU,

[REDACTED]

AND NEW YORK WILL BE ADVISED SHOULD ANY

INFORMATION DEVELOP REGARDING THIS MATTER.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ADVISE THE BUREAU,

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^PAGE FOUR DE PH ~~S E C R E T~~

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PHILADELPHIA AND NEW YORK OF RESULTS.

~~C G S, D OADR~~

BT

ALP003W.230

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-09-2017 BY: [redacted]

FM FBI PHILADELPHIA [redacted] (ARA) (TS)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI/ROUTINE/

LEGAT [redacted] ROUTINE/

BT

~~SECRET~~

CITE: //3620:4202//

PASS: FBIHQ, [redacted]

SUBJECT: TARIQ AZIZ; [redacted] OO: PHILADELPHIA.

~~THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.~~

REFERENCE PHILADELPHIA TELETYPE DATED MARCH 30, 1992.

[redacted] ADVISED THAT [redacted]
[redacted]

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THIS CASE IS BEING PLACED IN A CLOSED STATUS. ANY CREDIBLE

[redacted]

JJR/mlp
(1)

[redacted] 8-21-92
PB
8-21-92
PB
8-21-92
PB

[redacted]

Searched _____
Serialized PB
Indexed _____
Filed PB

APPROVED BY: ACA/DAR
JULIAN DATE: 232
MRI#: 2 TIME: 0002
ISN#: 2
PER: [signature]

file put for
F/R 8-20-92??

^PAGE TWO DE PH [REDACTED] ~~S E C R E T~~

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INFORMATION THAT DEVELOPS REGARDING THIS CASE WILL BE
EXPEDITIOUSLY PROVIDED TO THE BUREAU AND LEGAT [REDACTED]

~~C G 3, D OADR~~

BT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-28-2011 BY [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/02/2004

TARIQ AZIZ [redacted], date of birth April 1, 1936, place of birth Mosul, Iraq, was interviewed at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Also present at the interview was [redacted] US Army Representative. After being advised that the interviewing Agents were members of the United States Government from Washington, DC, AZIZ provided the following information in English:

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AZIZ detailed various events precipitating the Iran-Iraq War, fought from 1980-1988.

Beginning in 1975, relations between Iraq and Iran were "normalized" with the signing of the "Algiers Agreement." This agreement, concerning the Shatt-al-Arab Waterway, essentially eliminated the external threat to Iraq from Iran and established "friendly" relations between the two countries.

By 1978-79, however, relations between the two countries changed for the worse. This deterioration was due to the presence of exiled Iranian cleric Ayatollah Khomeini in Najaf, Iraq and the dissension towards the Iranian government resulting from his preachings.

The Shah of Iran asked Saddam Hussein to "turn over" Khomeini to Iran. Hussein refused citing tradition and Arab cultural requirements towards "guests" such as Khomeini. Khomeini remained in Iraq but refused to cease his rhetoric calling for the overthrow of the Iranian government. In AZIZ' opinion, Khomeini was a "political refugee" and was not supposed to act in this manner.

At one point, Khomeini attempted to leave Iraq and enter Kuwait. He was refused entry and returned to Iraq for a short period. Eventually, "arrangements" were made by the Iraqi government and Khomeini departed Iraq to live in Paris, France. AZIZ felt Khomeini "held a grudge" against Iraq because of these events.

Investigation on 02/02/2004 at Baqhdad, Iraq
File # [redacted] Date dictated 02/02/2004
by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of TARIO AZIZ, On 02/02/2004, Page 2

In 1979, Khomeini came to power in Iran upon the overthrow of the Shah. Khomeini attempted to proclaim himself as the "Imam" for the Shia sect of Islam. An "Imam" is supposed to be a direct descendent of Imam Hussein, which Khomeini was not. According to belief, the twelfth Imam, the last one, disappeared and Shias are awaiting his return. AZIZ described this belief as similar to the Christian belief regarding the return of Jesus Christ. Khomeini felt it was not logical to await the return of the "Imam," that it might take thousands of years. Thus, he proposed that he be proclaimed "Deputy of the Imam" and be allowed to conduct affairs as the "Imam" would until his return. He would fulfill this function first for the Shias, then for all Muslims.

For Shias, all of the important "sanctuaries" or religious sites are physically located in Iraq. Thus, in AZIZ' opinion, when Khomeini announced the concept of the "Deputy of the Imam," he was targeting Iraq. Khomeini viewed Hussein as a non-believer in Islam and therefore an illegitimate ruler.

An exchange of communications took place between the governments of Iran and Iraq in 1980, with no success in resolving tensions. Hussein later convened a meeting of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and told members that Iraq would have to go to war with Iran. AZIZ, RCC member since 1977, served as Deputy Prime Minister at the time. He did not "protest" the decision made by Hussein. Additionally, no one else in the RCC spoke out against the war and no formal vote was taken.

AZIZ repeated and added to previous interview information regarding the decision-making process prior to and under Hussein. According to the Iraqi Constitution, the RCC had the power to vote on issues, such as the Iran-Iraq War. Before Hussein's Presidency, RCC meetings were held regularly with minutes recorded for each meeting. After Hussein assumed Iraqi leadership in 1979, he changed this practice and held RCC meetings at irregular times of his choosing, terminated RCC voting, ceased recording of minutes of meetings, and made decisions on his own.

Just prior to the Iran-Iraq War, Hussein convened a meeting of the National Assembly. Hussein presented information regarding the situation vis-a-vis Iran, his perceived "annulment" of the 1975 treaty between Iraq and Iran, and his belief that Iraq had to go to war with Iran. A "vote" took place in support of the war with a simple clap of the hands of National Assembly members. No formal votes were recorded nor was a debate held regarding the

Continuation of FD-302 of TARIO AZIZ, On 02/02/2004, Page 3


war. Ultimately, the final decision regarding fighting the war rested with Hussein.

Hussein sent AZIZ to Moscow just prior to the war to "remind" the Soviets of the "treaty of friendship" between Iraq and the Soviet Union. Soviet officials, including the Deputy Foreign Minister, suggested that Iraq should make peace with Iran. They stated that the Soviet Union could not/would not support Iraq in the war. In AZIZ' opinion, the Soviets thought they could ally with Iran. The Soviets were incorrect, however, as Iran viewed the Soviet Union as the "Second Great Satan" after the United States which was considered the "First Great Satan." Further complicating any Soviet-Iranian alliance was the fact that Khomeini had imprisoned and/or executed communists in Iran. While in Moscow, AZIZ received an official cable from Iraq announcing the war had begun. AZIZ then returned to Baghdad.

Clashes between the two countries began with Iran first entering Iraqi territory in September, 1980. Initially, Iraq lost control of several cities and other territory, especially in the southern portion of the country. These areas were quickly regained, however. Generally, Iraq "was winning" the war, taking some Iranian territory, through 1982. Those early successes, however, changed for the worse as a result of the actions of Hussein.

Hussein "micro-managed" military operations, acting "more like a military officer than a President." To a lesser extent, Adnan Khairallah, Hussein's cousin and Minister of Defense, also managed military operations. Although Military Chief of Staff Nazar Khazraji was a very qualified military officer, Hussein made all the decisions. Hussein traveled to the front lines "hundreds of times" pretending to be a military expert/tactician. In AZIZ' opinion, Hussein "interfered" with military operations and concerned himself with details beyond the scope of his duties and abilities. As an example, AZIZ stated Hussein would sometimes provide direction to the military regarding the preparation of trenches on the battlefield. As a consequence of Hussein's "interference" and incompetence, the Iraqi military suffered huge losses including approximately 10,000 soldiers killed in single battle at Khorramshahr.

In 1982, AZIZ participated in another meeting with Soviet officials to discuss bilateral relations and support for the war. Thereafter, the Soviets acquiesced and began providing military

Continuation of FD-302 of TARIO AZIZ, On 02/02/2004, Page 4

weapons to Iraq. From that point forward, AZIZ considered relations between Iraq and the Soviet Union as "improved."

Despite these Soviet arms shipments to Iraq, Iran appeared to have the "upper hand" in the war after 1982. This included taking back some territory and cities. At this time, it was generally thought that Iraq had lost/would lose the war. As a result, there was significant talk in the Middle Eastern press outside of Iraq regarding replacing Hussein with one of various individuals named as possible successors. However, no internal discussion took place within the government in Iraq regarding a change of leadership.

Iraqi leaders felt that Iran received support from Israel around this time. This assumption was based on the shooting down of an Argentinian aircraft in Iraq that carried a cargo of Israeli weapons.

In 1985, Hussein and AZIZ visited Soviet leader Gorbachev and other Soviet officials in Moscow. AZIZ served as Foreign Minister at this time. From this point through the end of the war in 1988, relations were "good" with the Soviet Union. They continued to provide arms to Iraq. During the earlier years of the war, the Soviets had "closed their eyes" to arms shipments to Iraq from Eastern bloc countries including Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary.

During the war in 1984-85, Iran attacked civilian areas including the city of Baghdad with recently acquired SCUD missiles. Though possibly targeting military facilities, the missiles' poor guidance system caused them to fall on civilian locations. Iraq also targeted Iranian cities, including Doskhut, with missiles. In 1986, Iraq acquired SCUD missiles which were capable of reaching the Iranian capital city of Tehran.

Although strong, the Iranian Air Force had a limited range and generally attacked cities close to the border occupied by Iraqi forces including Abadan, Basra, and Amarah. One focus of these attacks was Iraqi oil production facilities. The Iraqi Air Force, on the other hand, had even greater difficulty reaching into Iran.

AZIZ commented on Iraq and Iran's use of chemical weapons during the war. Around 1984, French President Francois Mitterand sent a letter to AZIZ saying it was not appropriate for Iraq to use

Continuation of FD-302 of TARIO AZIZ, On 02/02/2004, Page 5

chemical weapons. Evidently, the French had learned that Iraq was considering the use of such weapons. According to AZIZ, it was common knowledge in the media that Hussein might decide to use chemical weapons.

Hussein did not convene a meeting of the RCC, National Assembly, or any other Iraqi or Ba'ath Party government entity to discuss recommendations regarding the use of or approval for the use of chemical weapons prior to their deployment. Hussein gave no official written or verbal notification of the use of the weapons after deployment. AZIZ stated the RCC was "informed" and "it was mentioned." He added it was "common knowledge" through the media that chemical weapons had been used. No RCC member protested their use because of fear of reprisals from Hussein and fear that Iraq would lose the war without such a drastic step. At the time, the situation was viewed as dire and "life or death." AZIZ agreed that Iraq, and Iran, violated provisions of Geneva Conventions of 1917 and 1948, signed by both countries, prohibiting the use of chemical weapons.

While AZIZ agreed that it is an undisputed fact that Iraq used chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, he added that according to the Iraqi military, Iran also used chemical weapons at the onset of hostilities. AZIZ reiterated the decision for Iraq to use these weapons was made by Hussein and, at times, Khairallah in consultation with Khazraji.

The war ended in 1988. Many in the Iraqi government considered the war a victory for the country as they were not defeated by Iran, a country three times the size of Iraq with a better trained and equipped military. Many felt that Iraq "forced" Iran to agree to a cease fire. AZIZ pointed out that Iraq accepted the original United Nations cease fire in September, 1980 at the start of the war, while Iran did not. He also added that Iraq agreed in 1987 to UN Resolution 598 calling for a cease fire, while Iran did not. AZIZ feels Iran ultimately agreed to cease hostilities in 1988 due to Iraqi successes at that time in the war including the recapture of the Al-Faw Peninsula.

AZIZ stated the Iran-Iraq War was "the most foolish decision of the two countries." For Iraq, the loss in human lives as well as economic damage was catastrophic. The budget surpluses prior to the war changed to overwhelming debt after the conflict. AZIZ reiterated, despite all this, Iraqis felt victorious. AZIZ believes if Iraq had devoted as much human and financial effort




elsewhere to internal development instead of war, Iraq could have been very prosperous, on the level of other countries such as the United Arab Emirates or Switzerland.

AZIZ provided comments regarding the Kurdish situation in Iraq. He described the situation with the Kurds in 1987-88 as "another serious problem." The two most infamous events regarding the Kurds were the use of chemical weapons at Halabja and the Anfal Campaign (Anfal).

AZIZ agreed that the first confirmed use of chemical weapons in the world against a civilian population occurred at Halabja, Iraq in March, 1988. Although he agreed with speculation that the weapons may have been deployed to deter Iranian forces from occupying Halabja, he acknowledged that, in fact, the city was occupied by Kurds and not Iranians. AZIZ indicated that he learned more about the attack after watching a film on Halabja produced by the media which showed "a few corpses" of men, women, and children dead as a result of the attack. AZIZ claimed that he does not know how many people were killed during the attack.

After the attack, Hussein admitted chemical weapons had been used at Halabja. The authority to use them rested in the hands of Hussein alone at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War. Khairallah and Khazraji asked for and were given this power by Hussein during the war. In early 1988, Hussein withdrew this authority from them. Khairallah, however, told Hussein this would "weaken" the military's ability and his power to act decisively and quickly. Thereafter, Hussein returned the authority to use chemical weapons to Khairallah and Khazraji, and the two of them used these weapons at Halabja. According to AZIZ, Hussein did not specifically order the chemical weapons attack on Halabja but was notified afterwards. Hussein told AZIZ, "Halabja was not my decision. It was in the hands of Khairallah and Khazraji." At one point afterwards, Hussein said the chemical weapons attack was not necessary. Hussein was "bothered" by the attack because of the international ramifications and "outcry" from the world community. AZIZ noted that Hussein did not punish, reprimand, or remove either Khairallah or Khazraji from their positions. Normally, this would have been his response when someone's actions reflected negatively on him. AZIZ is unsure whether the lack of punitive action on Hussein's part implied his post-event approval.

AZIZ stated there is a 1989 Institute of Defense, Pentagon report which indicates Iran used chemical weapons first at

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
Halabja and Iraq used them second. According to AZIZ, this report was published in a "limited manner."

In 1988 after the Iran-Iraq War cease fire in August, Hussein appointed Ali Hasan Al-Majid Al-Tikriti as head of the "north" including Mosul. Majid had served as Minister of Local Affairs prior to this position. This new appointment gave him "exceptional" powers and placed him in charge of Anfal, aimed at "neutralizing" the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq. The decision to appoint Majid to this position was made by Hussein without discussion with the RCC, Council of Ministers, or any other Iraqi government or Ba'ath Party entity. This appointment was viewed as "strange" as other government members already held responsibilities associated with this region. Further compounding the oddness of the decision was the fact that Majid was not even an RCC member. In AZIZ' opinion, this made the appointment unconstitutional. A document informing the RCC of this decision was provided to all members. It was written on behalf of the RCC, without consultation, and signed by Hussein. It announced that Majid was in charge of the northern part of Iraq and gave him the power of the RCC. Thus, Majid reported to Hussein and no one else, including the Military Chief of Staff or Minister of Defense.

The primary purpose of Anfal was to stop the Kurdish insurgency inside Iraq. Most of the Kurdish population lived in Iraq near the northern border with Iran. A decision was made to relocate the population, at least a significant portion, to settlements one hundred kilometers or more inside Iraq. This relocation was accomplished in a "harsh manner." Those who conducted the relocation, including Majid and the Governors of the region, were "idiots." In AZIZ' opinion, they probably felt they had to accomplish the task quickly in order to be viewed by Hussein as successful.

Neither AZIZ nor any other RCC member was informed or asked for an opinion prior to the start of Anfal. No RCC member protested the decision once the details became known, through the media. AZIZ stated, at the time, it seemed "justified for the security of the nation." In retrospect, Anfal was criminal in nature. AZIZ added he "would not have done this" and it was "not his way of doing things."

Through the media, AZIZ heard information about documentation of Anfal provided post Gulf War (1991) by Kurds from

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Irbil. Media reports documented the mistreatment and abuse of the Kurds by the Iraqi government.

There are disputed accounts whether Majid authorized and whether the Iraqi military actually used chemical weapons during Anfal. Some reports indicated "flour" was dropped by aircraft, not chemical weapons, in order to psychologically affect the Kurds making them believe chemical weapons were used or might be used. In later years, an American team arrived and conducted an investigation but could find no evidence of the use of chemical weapons during Anfal.

AZIZ concluded by stating that Majid was "a violent person, and everyone knew it." At the detention facility where AZIZ and MAJID are currently housed, Majid told other prisoners that he (Majid) is "negotiating a settlement" with the Americans. AZIZ told the other prisoners "he is a liar." In AZIZ opinion, an agreement between Majid and the Americans will never occur because Majid has an international reputation for evil and is known throughout the world as, "Chemical Ali."

According to AZIZ, Hussein continued using telephones until August, 1990. This included regular use during the Iran-Iraq War and the Kurdish insurgency campaign previously discussed. Hussein stopped using telephones upon the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

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DATE 12-28-2011 BY [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/30/2004

TARIQ AZIZ [redacted] date of birth April 1, 1936, place of birth Mosul, Iraq, was interviewed at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Iraq. Also present at the interview was [redacted] US Army Representative. After being advised that the interviewing Agents were members of the United States Government from Washington, DC, AZIZ provided the following information in English:

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AZIZ' grandfather's last name was Issa, which is Arabic for Jesus. He does not now nor has he ever used the name Mikhail. AZIZ stated that Iranian/pro-Iranian factions claimed this was once part of his name in order to emphasize or point out that AZIZ is Christian. AZIZ is a Chaldean Christian by religion. His father died when he was six or seven years old. Thereafter, his mother and uncle raised AZIZ in Baghdad.

AZIZ studied English while growing up and through college, obtaining a bachelor's degree from the College of Arts and Sciences in Baghdad in 1958. He continued to study English on his own thereafter.

AZIZ worked as a journalist for two months upon graduation from college. He served in the Army for approximately one year and a half in 1958-59. Later, AZIZ worked at times as an interpreter.


AZIZ joined the Ba'ath political party in the late 1950s. Michael Aflaq founded this political movement. The stated party platforms of freedom, socialism, and Arab Unity appealed to AZIZ. He felt the Ba'ath system would be good for Iraq.

The Ba'ath came to power in Iraq in February, 1963 in a bloody coup d'etat overthrowing then President Qassem. Qassem was a military dictator who persecuted members of the Ba'ath. This Ba'ath government lasted only nine months, however, with President Abd Al-Salam Aref assuming leadership of the country in November, 1963. After dying in a helicopter crash in 1966, President Aref's brother, Abd Al-Rahman Aref, assumed leadership.

Investigation on 01/30/2004 at Baghdad, Iraq

File # [redacted] Date dictated 01/30/2004
by [redacted] *[Signature]*

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Continuation of FD-302 of TARIO AZIZ, On 01/30/2004, Page 2


After the previous government failed in November, 1963, many Ba'ath members, including AZIZ, were "chased" to Syria in 1964. AZIZ remained in Syria until 1967, having been jailed there in 1966-67. Upon release, he traveled back to Baghdad where he taught English from 1967-68. During the reign of the Aref brothers, the Ba'ath was virtually eliminated from Iraq.

In July, 1968, the Ba'ath came back to power in a bloodless coup, or "White Revolution", placing President Bakr in power. Saddam Hussein, a key Ba'ath member, enlisted the support of two of Aref's officials, the Director of Military Intelligence (Nayif) and the head of the Republican Guard (Da'ud), to effect the coup. These two individuals were promised high positions in the new government in exchange for their support. Within a matter of days after Bakr assumed the Presidency, however, both were removed from their "new" positions and given Ambassador posts outside Iraq. Nayif was later assassinated in London. AZIZ characterized his relationship with Bakr as "not strong." This was due to AZIZ' Christian beliefs.

AZIZ served as the editor of the Ba'ath newspaper in 1963 and 1969. He served three years as Minister of Information under the Ba'ath government in the 1970s. He became a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) member in 1977. Created in 1968, the RCC was designed to be the highest policy and decision-making body in Iraq. Saddam Hussein served as Vice Chairman of the RCC beginning in 1969. AZIZ stated Hussein "liked" AZIZ and supported his membership in the Ba'ath and positions he held within the party and government.

From 1969 forward, Hussein worked to eliminate threats to the Iraqi government, both inside and outside the country. These steps include the "March Manifesto" with Kurdish leader Barzani in 1970 which stated the Kurdish population in Iraq would have an autonomous state by 1974. This move apparently appeased Kurdish dissidents within Iraq. The provisions of the agreement never came to fruition, however. In 1975, Hussein reached an agreement with the government of Iran regarding the Shatt-al-Arab Waterway. This agreement, more favorable to Iran, essentially eliminated the external threat from Iran while simultaneously eliminating Iran's support of the Kurds inside Iraq.

Hussein also eliminated threats he perceived from individuals within the government. He incriminated persons in "coups" and held fake trials. In 1973, one such victim was Abdul

Continuation of FD-302 of TARIO AZIZ, On 01/30/2004, Page 3

Khaliq Samarra'i, the Minister of Interior. Samarra'i was "critical and outspoken" against Hussein and Bakr. He was sentenced to death, changed later to life. Ali Hasan Al-Majid, aka "Chemical Ali", stated as long as Samarra'i was alive, coups would continue. Consequently, Samarra'i was removed from prison and executed in 1979. Per AZIZ, Samarra'i was a "humble man" who had no aspirations of power. Hussein and Bakr saw him as an obstacle and a threat to "their wrongdoings." AZIZ stated the treatment of Samarra'i was "ethically and morally wrong" and "weakened the party." In AZIZ' opinion, democracy in Iraq was gone after 1979.

In 1979, Bakr stepped down due to health reasons and Hussein assumed the Presidency. Various factors contributed to Hussein's rise to power. He had served as Vice Chairman of the RCC since 1969. He also served as the Deputy Secretary General of the Ba'ath. Aflaq did not support Hussein at first, but eventually did. Hussein had the reputation of being a strong Ba'ath loyalist. This was due to his participation in the coup attempt against President Qassem in 1963 and his active role in reforming the party after 1963. AZIZ stated Hussein's true power developed after 1968.

AZIZ stated the RCC was the supreme body in Iraq prior to the new regime under Hussein. The RCC made laws and was considered higher than the cabinet. Upon assuming the Presidency, Hussein moved immediately over the next two years, to consolidate power into his hands from the RCC.

Hussein convened a Cabinet meeting in July, 1979, shortly after assuming the Presidency. During the videotaped meeting, details were relayed of a "plot" uncovered three to four days before involving a conspiracy with Syrian officials to overthrow the Iraqi government. Former President Bakr's Chief of Staff, Muhie Abd Al-Hussein Mashhadi, was brought before the group and announced his complicity in the plot. Other "conspirators" were named and taken away from the meeting. AZIZ did not believe the "plot" was true. At the time, AZIZ felt that if one voiced opposition to the proceedings, he would be arrested. Thus, AZIZ remained silent or may have clapped when others clapped so as to not appear to oppose Hussein. The videotape of this meeting was sent to various Middle Eastern leaders including the Syrian President. AZIZ stated Hussein opposed the "almost eighty percent complete" plans for an Iraq-Syria unification, similar to the United Arab Republic which previously temporarily united Egypt and Syria. Shortly thereafter, Hussein created a "fake" court to try the individuals involved in the "conspiracy." He appointed Na'im

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b7EContinuation of FD-302 of TARIQ AZIZ, On 01/30/2004, Page 4

Haddad, a Shiite and Ba'ath member, to serve as the presiding judge. AZIZ believed this was an attempt by Hussein to add credibility to the proceedings. AZIZ did not attend the trial and described the entire event as a "crime against the people and the Ba'ath Party."

Other less dramatic steps occurred pursuant to a consolidation of power into Hussein's hands. Until 1979, the RCC held regular meetings with minutes recording the details. After Hussein became President, the meetings were less frequent and no minutes were recorded. Hussein told the RCC there would be times when he would not be able to consult with them. Thus, according to Hussein, the RCC had to give him power to make decisions alone.

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Universal Case File Number

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Yes No

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Title:

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Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of

TARIQ AZIZ

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Notes of SSA

Armp Rep (1)

SSA

SSA

1/30/04

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✓ Tariq Aziz (Issa) grandtatter

✓ Milhert - Iranian/pro-Iranian faction claimed this was part of his name to point out he was a Christian

✓ Born in 1936, Mosul, Iraq → moved to Baghdad, Chaldea
6-7 yrs old when father died
mother/uncle raised

✓ Studied English - thru high school, then kept up on his own

✓ journalist first →

✓ 1958 - graduated, writes journalist 2 months

✓ Army - year and a half

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✓ editor of Ba'ath party newspaper

✓ "chased" to Syria → 1964 (comp in 1963)

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✓ stayed until 1967

✓ jailed in Syria 1966-67; released, went to Iraq

✓ taught English - 1969-68 - Baghdad; edit Ba'ath paper in 1968-69

✓ joined Ba'ath in late 1960s

✓ broadminded, socialism, Arab unity, appealed to him

✓ family - Michel Aflaq

✓ convinced would be good for Iraq

Qassem

- ✓ military dictator; persecuted Ba'ath
- ✓ coup by Ba'ath in Feb, 1963; lasted until Nov, 1963
- ✓ Aref eliminated Ba'ath Party
- ✓ late killed in helicopter/assault craft crash
- ✓ his brother became Iraq's leader
- ✓ Ba'ath came back in 1968 - President Ba'ker July 17
- ✓ not strong relationship w/ Ba'ker because of Christianity
- ✓ Saddam liked Aref & supported his membership in Ba'ath
- ✓ MoI - 3 years
- ✓ 1977 - RCC member
- ✓ 1979 - Ba'ker stepped down, Saddam became president
- ✗ Saddam gradually became a dictator
- ✓ Became editor again of Ba'ath party newspaper - 1969
- ✓ ↳ Saddam supported
- ✓ RCC created in 1968
- ✓ "White" Revolution ⇒ in bloodshed assassinated in London
- ✓ Saddam used Najib (Dir of Mil Intel) & for coup
- ? (Republican Guard) make Ambassadors
- (Minister of Def.)
- ✓ then removed them

Ba'ath - refused to join gov't
[redacted] - joined gov't

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All leaders of party became members of PCC

- ✓ Saddam became ~~the~~ chairman of PCC
- ✓ became Dep Secretary General of party
- ✓ Michael De laay did not support Saddam at first, eventually did

Saddam had reputation of Ba'ath loyalist

- ✓ participated in coup attempt on Ba'ath
- reformed party after 1963 - very authoritarian

[redacted] b6
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The "End Palace" used in 1965
arrested, tortured, executed many communists
Saddam not powerful at time but close to Ba'ath
because in the same tribe.

✓ his power came after 1965

✓ PCC
✓ Supreme body in new regime - made laws, higher than cabinet
✓ until Saddam came to power in 1979

b6
b7C

✓ First 2 years consolidation of power March 1969?

✓ Saddam attempted to recruit Ba'ath - March [redacted] joined

Communists joined govt front w/ RCL in 1972
only Ba'ath was RCL

Mainly to save Kurds would be autonomous by 1974

Barzani wanted to include Kirkuk - S often disagreed, as did RCL + Azei
Iran + US backed Barzani

Saddam reached agreement w/ Iran - Shatt Al-Arab waterway - divide it
Barzani revolt collapsed (Agrees to room out)

Consolidated power in Iraq at that time → 1975?

The oil of Kirkuk, associated in desecrating and money modernized
And part in of Iraq (Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk - by cities)
→ not viewed by Azei as concession

True right thing to do at the time


security within Iraq (Kurds) and outside (Iran)

Shah had annulled 1937 Shatt al-Arab agreement in 1969

Iran much stronger than Iraq in 70's (1975?)

later developed the Basra - port

b6
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1973

Azei not
Minister until
Eidun at time only

✓ arrested Min of Def + Min of Tax - coup plot

✓ Abdul Karim Samirani - eliminated

Party became weaker, Tikrit is strange

✓ Chemical said as long as alive, coup plots will continue
1979 - rounded + executed

very critical of Barzani
Saddam
sentenced to death; then
life by Barzani then

✓ Abdul Karim had no aspirations of power - p or Aziz
✓ Saddam & Baker saw him as an obstacle, threat to their workings

~~Saddam second capital of Iraq~~

✓ Elimination of him ethically & morally wrong
& w/ cakanda party, democracy weakened, after 1990 gone.

✓ Became member of RCU in 1977 Minister of Interior 1974

✓ ↳ used to have meetings & minutes

✓ after 1990, prominent

✓ Saddam said there are times when I won't be able to consult so give me power to make decisions

✓ Meeting when Saddam came to power - July, 1979 (incident) ^{sent to Arab countries}
[redacted] ⇒ computer ^{Christal stall}

X It was known that Baker wanted to step down b6
b7C

✓ Arrested behind 3-4 days - 'confessed' to conspiracy w/ Syria gov't to topple Iraqi gov't
X he said Baker was healthy, called Saddam traitor

- ① Was Baker's side, did you believe? no
 - ② Did you believe plot? no
 - ③ Did Saddam want Syria/Iraq union? no
- advised 80% complete at time

✓ Ministers & others arrested at meeting
✓ If you voiced opposition, you'd be arrested - Aziz kept silent - others clapped

⑥

✓ Aziz described this event as crime against party / people
he creates a "fake" court & Aziz did not attend; not in trial

✓ Niam Habbab
member of party

End

TARIQ AZIZ -- father's name = ISSA
Jeses

1/30/04
Q 1030 A

Dob 1938 - Mosul

Father died when he was 6 or 7 yrs old.
1950's - while in 2nd day school, joined Baath Party
Journalist - they official of Iraq govt
After graduation
Army 1 1/2

Interpreter until

1958 - Journalist for 2 mos

1963 - Editor of Party newspaper in Iraq

1964-67 went to Syria - blacked by govt
b/c coup against govt
met future intel in Iraq!

1967 - Released
Became teacher

1968 - Baath Party came to power
became lead of party newspaper

In 1950's - I joined Baath Party b/c of its ideology
w. Freedom

Socialism

Arab unity

was attracted also by its leader Akh

our party made first coup against Regime in 1963 but
lasted @ 6 mos.

Nasser was one of the greatest leaders - lots of charisma
Nasser made lots of mistakes
e.g. over-exag. the children of Egypt + Arab
world

- Nasser built his regime gradually
- others were corrupt
- waged war w/ Israel (6-day war)
+ lost
- then he got sick + died

Many Arab masses loved Nasser, nevertheless

1969 - Al Bkr

At the time I was a prominent member - not a
leadership role, but

Bkr was said it, but he didn't like the
thing, Saddam had no problem w/ my
X to my

I eventually moved up to other positions

e 1977 -

1979 - Bkr

In 70's gradually, Saddam became a dictator

Saddam became arrogant + isolated

In 1980's, Saddam picked wrong family members for
wrong jobs.

I became known as a ~~very~~ renowned
arty journalist

Al Bkr was not all that enthused about me
I used to be a good journalist
But Saddam asked by advice to stay home
and I did me

1963
Bloody coup
b/c
Communist
resisted

RCC created and after the corp
on 12 July 68 — the corp, was 9 victs 4
~~lots of blood~~

(1) — became 1st Prime Minister — (Head of Total

(2) — Head of Republic Guard
after 13 days

BUT, ~~SADAM~~ they were eliminated
by SADAM

FAITH OF THE ABOVE TWO

(1) — came to look at Bkr. — SADAM had son, wanted him
and w/ the help of collegian
took him to Spain

(2) He went to Spain

later ~~two~~ 7 members became members
of RCC — SADAM was elected VP

SADAM was military doctor & part of
in the corp. He was Dep Sec Gen
of the PTJ — He was @ 31,
one year younger than me

After thought SADAM would be a good
Battalion but the relationship became closer later
SADAM went to Syria the Egypt then back
in 1963 to IRAQ

1963 - unity b/w Communists + Bahlit

Feb 1963 - communist met to streets against

Baath - 1000's of communists arrested
& executed

During the 9 mos of Baath rule, all
communist had many corps

Case Niyhaya - prison used to torture &
execute prisoners

B/w 1963-68, Saddam moved up fast -
He played a major role in rebuilding the
pty, & became security general

PCC became a powerful body - 3 supreme
powers - AT

After 1979, the PCC became a cover
for Saddam who had all the power.

(The 2 others who played a prominent
role in the corp, 2 were removed -

At that time, I was not a member of PCC.
At that time, their main job was to consult
the party of the pty.

Rev negotiation w/ Ba'ath

Early 70's

Communist, joined the govt but not the PCC

Bayanji revolted against Baathist - Iran used
Barjas to try to topple Baathist

KURDISH ISSE + KARKOOK ~~ISSE~~

Karkook became a very modern city

SADAM

1973 Abkhidid was openly critical

was heady Fikell - was Saddam's henchman b6
b7C

Many Iraqis members of party eliminated

SADAM + Tikrit's became strange + stranger

1973 Elimination of Abdul Hada whom Saddam
thought who was planning a coup.

Hada sentenced to death - commuted to life

In 1979, ~~he~~ ^{Abi} told Saddam that as long as
Hada is alive, there will be coup attempts.

It was very strange + against the
natural ethics of Iraq

Khan's visit trial was fake - Al Bkr and Saddam
created a trial. Bkr + Saddam used opponents
to get rid of those they didn't like.

My opinion is that Abdul Khatlab was a very
humble person, not a power monger

but he was critical + outspoken against
SADAM

Abdul Khaliq Samra'i

Aziz al-Khalid
Said Khir

Waste Speech

One
He

Bkr + SANDAN ~~didn't~~ eliminate Abdul Khadir
b/c he was a threat to their way of doing
SANDAN + Bkr were doing what they wanted
in the name of the party and they don't
like Abdul Khadir our policies.

Khadir's elimination was ethically,
morally wrong. And it changed the
party. Democracy started to
weaken. By 1979,

Prior to 1979, we had weekly meetings + afterwards,
rec'd minutes + papers to sign.

After 1979, no minutes for PCC meetings. SAND
said, will you let me make some decisions on my own -
don't have time to convene meetings all the time b/c of AM
of what's going on.

Then he eliminated meetings of
PCC altogether.

He said the "PCC has decided" but "It was
really ~~SANDAN~~ not true.

Just before 17 July '79, I was asked to write
speech ^{FOR} Bkr who was stepping down.

~~AM~~ was surprised and told SAND HE ^{didn't} see Bkr +
Bkr and thought he looked fine. SAND ^{was not} called him a
traitor, SAND pressed button, guards entered + he told them to
arrest AM. Later, M was accused by S, failure
of organizing a coup.

Then on 17 July a celebration for anniversary

b6
b7c

re: Video of SADAAM

tho many Baath members executed

we all kept our mouths shut
many were not happy w/ Saddam's success after Bkr stepped down, but
they were afraid of being accused so kept mouths shut

He created the court, a fake court

These were good people - shouldn't have been executed
- maybe arrested

SADAM put HADEED in chg of court

~~that~~ Saddam considered criticism as treason.

Many of those ~~executed~~ executed were my friends

I was in a very difficult position at this time -
Sadam appointed me to draft an agreement between
Iraq + Syria. I felt ~~that~~ ^{SADAM} was opposed to the union.

As to my presence at the meeting (which was videotaped),
I clapped at what Saddam said but did not
raise my hand.

wants 100 watt bulb.

wants a lamp so he can
write & work
to go to bed a 1000 S
I taking sleeping pills
& go to bed.

concerned about his glasses

vs

END

1230

Agreed well discuss at
next mtg period

from 1979 →

Universal Case File Number

Field Office Acquiring Evidence BAGHDAD OPERATIONS CTR - FBI

Serial # of Originating Document

Date Received 2/2/04

From

(Name of Contributor)

FBI BAGHDAD OPERATIONS CTR

(Address of Contributor)

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

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By

To Be Returned Yes No

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Yes No

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Yes No

Title:

TARIQ AZIZ

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 12-28-2011 BY

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

Original notes re interview of

TARIQ AZIZ

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2ND
Intw TARIR AZIZ

TMM

2/1/04
10:12 AM
Monday

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Present

SSA	[redacted]	-FBI
SSA	[redacted]	-FBI
SSA	[redacted]	-FOE
	[redacted]	-US Army

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b7C

After 1975 relat b/w Iran - Iraq became
normal w/ w/ its back & forth b/w
Shah & Prime Minister

© 1978 - Khomeni started living in Iraq
Shah asked Saddam to hand Khomeni over
b/c Khomeni was begining to make
statements

Khomeni felt a grudge toward Iraq,
but I'm not sure protected by Saddam
~~but~~ I don't think Khomeni
should have a grudge b/c
Iraq didn't hand him over.
but Iraq did get him to leave

Khomeni to Paris

Khomeini wrote a book before Iran
revolution. He said it was not
right to wait for an Imam —
might take too long.

Ottoman empire — Sultan became a
caliph

Iran begins to criticize Iraq

Iran considered Iraq an atheist ruler

Saddam got Iran documents
revising them 7/1978

Clashes or border began

Saddam liberated small parts

At meeting w/ Recy Sudan
made that Iran a major problem and
had to be dealt with.

Sent me to Moscow to inform
the Russians, to tell them that since
we are friends, we want Russian
support. Although usually not of heady
& late this time, a cool reception.
A couple days later, I met w/ another
official who said we would not

Frog found out that
Israel is providing military aid to Iraq.
" used Argentina Air to bring in
weapons

Soviets were providing Iraq w/ Arms.

1985 Sudan visited Moscow
w/ Aziz. Speeches Gromyko
& Shevardnadze: ~~document~~ ~~with~~ ~~him~~.

In 1980, I didn't disagree
Iraq's plan to ~~use~~ ~~use~~

At RCC, we took a vote

We rarely had to take votes
BATSANON would make a decision
and write it into a book for members
of the RCC to sign.

In 1990, the final decision rested
w/ SADRAN. No one in RCC protested

w/ Iraq initiated hostilities, SADRAN
1. Minister of ^{his} (cousin) - SADRAN'S cousin
2. Chief of Staff
I decided to go to work

Initial success in the Iraq
SADRAN visited the front many
times

1982 King Hussein in Jordan

1982 - Serious talk about ~~replacing~~ replacing SADRAN
~~SADRAN~~

TALK of keeping him to Sec
Chief of Staff ...

↳ but SADRAN sent him as
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia 4

war not going well. Iran targets

1984 Iran used SCUD missiles against Iraq - which they acquired from N. Korea & Libya

Raq did not have long-range planes to attack Tehran

1988 - Iraq attacked Iran w/ SCUD missiles.

Saddam began micromanaging military to the point of telling how deep trenches should be dug.

[redacted] a very qualified officer but Saddam made all the decisions.

b6
b7C

1984 - Iraq used chemical weapons, b/c afraid they would lose.

[redacted] sent me a letter saying it was not appropriate to use chemical weapons. I CC know but didn't

protest. Saddam did not
officially tell the RCE about his
decision to use chemical weapons.

It was common knowledge

He didn't ask the RCE before
using them nor did he tell us afterwards.
But none of us on RCE staff disagreed
w/ its use b/c of fears ~~that~~ that Iraq
was going to lose the war.

The use of chem. weapons was
not a issue in discussion w/
Pres Bush et al.

(he had been capable of
winning the war in 1988.

I was told that ~~that~~ early on
the Iraqis ~~were using~~

were using Chem Weapons on a
smaller scale.

Actually, it was the most
foolish decision of both victors

to go to war.

After the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq's army
it has a victory + lived well

After Gulf war, Iraq's found the
parts of their country destroyed. Despite
SADAM's claim of a victory, no one
in Iraq took this seriously.

Instead of war, if it went into reconstruction,
w/ a lot of doctors, + experts, etc.,
we could have become like
Switzerland.

~~forward and of~~
~~87-88 ~~spending of funds~~~~

S. wanted to take control back of northern
mountainous region to eliminate insurgency

He sent Ali MAJID to north
and gave him exceptional powers

He was given the power of the RCC
And this was not constitutional.

MAJID was not even a member of
the RCC. It was very strange

It was a decision by SADAM

and it allowed
MAJID to use
the military

and printed + circulated to me + other members.

Gradually STORMAN sidelined the PCC.

Q - who was MASSO accountable to?

Anti campaign began + Kurds were relocated.

The border areas b/w Iran + Iraq were seen as being a threat to Iraq b/c Iran ~~was~~ from

It was done in a harsh manner.

Those who made these decisions were idiots, i.e.

1. Ali MASSO

2.

3. ~~STORMAN~~ of the regime
governor

PCC became a paper tiger

~~I~~ As foreign minister I heard
from media & the Kurds

From media, Kurds & Human Rights, I heard
about what was happening in terms of
Attacites, with the Kurds,

I wasn't being ^{informal} ~~that~~ as a politician

That was not my way of doing things.

Acts not criminal but very harsh
& badly b/c it generated
protests from the Kurds & the world.

Khazargh, chief of staff,
would not have been the one making
the decision

On the western media,
I saw a few corpses, men, women
& children — not hundreds &
thousands.

I saw document — ¹⁹⁸⁹ Inst of Defense ~~by~~ in
Pentagon
sent to me by over embassy in N.Y

→ said Iran used chem weapons
first in IRA USAB.

After returning from PARIS etc, I asked

SADAM SAID YES

the use of Chem war
was in hands of CDM & chief (SADAM)

Then, Deputy Min. of Defense asked for
authority to use chem weapons in Iran

war. Later, ~~the~~ SADAM ^{using}
realized they were ^{chemical}
weapons extremely & he said
he withdrew his authority

Later, ^{commander in chief,} Deputy Def Minister asked
SADAM to restore ~~power~~ power
to use chem. weapons & SADAM
agreed.

Subsequently, ~~SADAM~~
and ^{used}
Chem weapons in IRAQIAB and

SADAM said we didn't need to
use chem weapons in IRAQIAB
bc it wasn't that important.

: After cease fire was reached b/w Iran - I, Ali MAJID was put in chg of the north. He was given the ^{Absolute} power of the RCC After the cease fire and after the use of chem weapons on Kurds. MAJID was to eliminate ~~the~~ insurgents in the north.

In 1988, SAADAM was using telephone to speak to heads of state but not after Aug '2, '90.

Special telephone - Gov't phone
in homes of high-ranking officials

SAADAM gave authority to use chemical weapons to the ~~Commander~~ in chief - 11
Minister of Defense) when they
Chief of Staff) both decide

Adnan Khazai

Retracted early 1988

Restored in HAJABAS

in

Heard that MAJID used flow
to scare people in north

He did punish reprimand them for using
Chem Weapons.

Saddam did not think that the
Use of chem was called for in AACADMS
b/c it was not a critical area - He was
upset b/c of the world-wide repercussions.

~~He was not the very brutal in the north.~~
He was known as a violent man.

If people made decisions Saddam
did not like, he would punish or
execute them. But he didn't reprimand
or punish those carrying out the chemical
Attack.

21
END 12 pm

Tariq Aziz - interview #2

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From

(we're here for a specific purpose

not necessarily associated with you / not codes & investigations - TA
related to another investigation/area

we acknowledge understanding / ready to help

✓ Iran-Iraq war (1980)



✓ Iranian incursion into Iraq started

✓ after 1975

Algeria Agreement

Algeria Agreement
referred to by
him in

✓ relations between I & I became normal

✓ 1978-79

✓ things changed - dissension - Khomeini in Iraq (Algeria)

Shah asked Saddam to hand over Khomeini

✓ Saddam refused, cited tradition / "he is our guest"

✓ Khomeini proposed to stay out


✓ by King of France, Khomeini agreed to leave

✓ went to France, Paris

✓ Khomeini felt "grudge" against Iraq

✓ He was "political enemy" but supported by them

✓ Plus 1955 agreement -> detour from by relations



②

✓ 1979

✓ Khomeini came to power in Iran

✓ Iran - direct descendant of ^{Iranian} Islam

✓ 12th Imam - last - disappeared for 40 years

✓ awaiting return - similar to Jesus

✓ Khomeini said his right to wait for Imam

✓ might take thousands of years

✓ Khomeini proposed "deputy of Imam" as himself

✓ who would conduct affairs of Imamant in his system

✓ First, Imam of Shiites, then all Muslims

X Therefore, first target of Khomeini was Iraq

For Basra, all of the important "sanctuaries" or religious sites are in Iraq

✓ When Khomeini declared himself as "deputy of the Imam" he

was targeting Iraq in TA's opinion

✓ viewed Saddam as illegitimate ruler, ^{Iran, Shia} father

✓ an exchange of munitions observed to avoid

✓ clashes started, with Iran in Iraq, ground and air

✓ Treaty of 1975 - ~~abrogated~~

✓ Iraq returns and the ~~official~~ ^{official} to ~~return~~ ^{return}

✓ Saddam convenes RCC - 1980 September?

✓ Said we must ~~stop~~ ^{stop} Iran

✓ TA Dep Prime Minister wrote
RCC 5/11/1979 (see * in 1979)

TA did not prefer ✓
d. consen. from
RCC supported - no ✓
one preferred, but not



3

✓ TA sent to ^{Moscow} Russia

✓ to remind of treaty of friendship w/ Iraq

✓ Russian said must make peace - ^{war?}

✓ ~~Deputy~~ TA could call while in Moscow
"were at war"

✓ Met w/ Deputy Foreign Minister - ^{name?}

✓ Russia said could support war

✓ TA returned to Baghdad - war was on

✓ Iraq takes some Iranian territory until 1982

* ~~Iran~~ Iran took over

✓ Iran took back some cities/territory

✓ ~~Iran~~ Iran had upper hand

✓ Soviets thought Iran could be their ally but wrong

✓ Great Satan - USA

✓ Soviets - second great Satan

✓ Then Khomeini persecuted (imp. rise, ex. cent.) communists
in Iran

✓ Israelis supported Iran at this time

shot down an Argentine plane w/ Israeli pilots

✓ Iraq Soviet ally - relations improved

from lat. 82 forward, incl. arms



④

✓ Saddam + CIA visits Moscow / Baghdad - 1985

✓ Baghdad, Sharabawi

From then ~~the~~ end of war relations good w/ Soviets
provide Iraq w/ arms

Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary etc provide w/ arms & tech

✓ in years (80s) under US & Soviet

✓ Soviets "don't show their eyes to this"

* RCC details

✓ explained minutes of RCC existed before Saddam, under the

✓ according to Constitution, RCC had power to vote on issues ^{also} ^{Iranian}

✓ but Saddam changed this, thus no vote ^{was made by Saddam}

National Assembly "voted" for ~~the~~

✓ "vote" was by clapping. ^{Annulment of 1975 treaty}

✓ final decision rested w/ Saddam for war

✗ RCC did not protest war, no vote took place

✓ Why did war start - Saddam

✗ Minister of Defense Saddam's cousin

✓ Saddam acts more as an "uber" than a president

✓ went to front, probably to be mil gen / tactician



(5)

- ✓ He went "hundreds" of times to the front trenches
- ✓ As a result, Iraq suffered huge losses
- ✓ one battle ~ 10,000 people taken as captives?
- ✓ it was thought Iraq had lost / would lose war
- ✓ 1982 - significant talks about replacing Saddam
- ✓ in Middle Eastern press, not in Iraq
- ✓ names mentioned after succession
- ✓ Chief of Staff under [redacted], based in Iraq
- ambassador to USA at time

b6
b7C

- ✓ Iran attacked civilian areas in & around Baghdad
- ✓ Iraq attacked cities also in dubai, Doha, Iran - vicinity
- ✓ Iranian equipped SCUDs used 1984/85 - Baghdad
- ✓ not accurate, fell on civ. ^{targets} targets
- ✓ Iran AF strong - limited range
- ✓ attacked places like Amman, Basra, Kuwait
- tried to destroy oil production
- ✓ Iraq had trouble reaching into Iran - ^{strikes} strikes
- until 1986 - plane + SCUD ^{missiles} considered best hit Tehran

Both sides directed war by those w/o mil. experience

shows many mistakes on both sides

✓ Saddam gradually introduced more w/ details - trenches, for example

Revolutionary forces - Iran

not great mil force but had lot of stamina

many when captured were angry they had been killed

✓ use of chemical weapons - significant to outside world

✓ first time since WWI

TA Foreign Ministry at time

✓ Saddam's decision alone - 1984

✓ RCC informed "it was mentioned"

✓ dire situation for Iraq "life and death"

X communication w/ France in the end? in 1984

✓ "common knowledge" that chemical weapons were used

✓ did not convene until because of not being able

✓ by RCC member protested "became a crisis of Saddam Hussein's war 1987-1988 (Iran-Iraq signed)

✓ violates Geneva Convention, which Iraq signed

X remaining relations w/ US ~ 1984

it was not brought up by US or other countries diplomatically

X after battle of Al-Fajr, 1988, Iraq expected to surrender

if Basra fell would have tremendous consequences

U

7

✓ Iranians, par military, used chem weapons at beginning war

✓ Undisputed fact that Iraq used chem weapons

✓ Decision made by Hussein & Adnan Chairallah

✓ War ended 1988

✓ Considered a victory for Iraq by many

✓ Iran 3 times size of Iraq

✓ military better trained/equipped

✓ forced Iraq to cease fire

✓ Iraq had accepted

✓ Sep, 1980 UN cease fire, Iraq didn't

✓ UN Res 598 in 1987, Iraq in 1988 (due to Iraqi successes)


War: "Most foolish decision of two countries."

✓ due to Iraq's culture, economic loss - tremendous Iraq debt after
however, feeling of Iraqis in 1988 - victory

Had major supplies going into war

✓ If had not devoted time, money to war, Iraq could have

✓ been very prosperous - like UAE



8

✓ Kurds - 1987-88 - another serious problem ~~XX~~ secretive

1988 after
conflict
w/ Iran

✓ Saddam sent Ali Hasan Al-Majid to north to give "exceptional powers" including Mosul

"Anfal campaign"

✓ No discussion w/ PCC, Council of Ministers, etc regarding Ali

✓ Hasan and his partners "very strange"

✓ Other govt members had power/direction over region they were not used

✓ Ali not ^{from} PCC member

viewed as non-Constitutional

✓ Decision "signed by Saddam" given to PCC

✓ written on behalf of PCC, w/ consultation, signed by Saddam

✓ print on paper & sent copy - PCC members

✓ put in charge of north and given power of PCC

✓ Thus, Ali reports to Saddam and no one else

✓ mail chpt of staff in 1987 at this time

✗ Saddam asked - M.G. from Mosul - name? ~~MS~~ will try to remember
* brought in Nazim Nazem Khazraji later at Halabjah

✓ Powers to Ali

Did not answer to Chpt of Staff, MoD, only Saddam

14

9

- ✓ Relocation of Kurds occurred
- ✓ in the Iraq, near border Iraq/Iran
- ✓ moved up to 700km
- ✓ RCC didn't protest
- ✓ Relocation done in harsh manner^a
- ✓ Those who did that were "idiots" ✓ Had to do that to show success
- ✓ Al-Hassan Al-Majid
- ✓

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Governor of region

- ✓ CIA/RCC not informed and asked opinion
- ✓ Mistreatment/abuse
- ✓ heard details v via media
- ✓ Comments provided post conflict - hear from tribal (Kurd)
- ✓ not by word of their officials, only media
- ✓ TA - "nothing way of doing things" i.e., would not have done this
- ✓ At time, justified for security of nation
- ✓ in retrospect, original in nature



10

✓ Halabja
~~Halabja~~

✓ most infamous incident May 1988

✓ first use of chemical weapons on civilians

✓ they then occupied city, threatened to } agree
✓ fast-foods occupied, just transition

✓ TA saw film w/ few corpses - many women, children

✓ Institute of Defense, Pentagon, 1989 report

✓ indicated Iran used chemical weapons first at Halabja

✓ published in "limited manner"

✓ says Iraq used second

✓ Saddam admitted to TA chem weapons both were used

✓ Saddam - in hands of command or in chest (Saddam)

✓ Hussein chemical war dep command (Iraq + Iran) - audit of staff

✓ asked for this power - Iran-Iraq war

✓ withdrew decision to Saddam alone in 1988 - talk Saddam

✓ Khrushchev said "we will weaken" him at

X TA advised would create "great power"

✓ betrayed
to them that they
used in Halabja
Credibility after

✓ Saddam didn't order chem weapon attack




(11)

* * * Ali Hasan al Majid

✓ given power in north after Iran-Iraq war

✓ ministers of foreign affairs, defence

✓ Khairallah & Khazraji - had power over



b6

b7C

1989-1988

✓ still used phrases (Saddam)

✓ stopped when Gulf War broke out - Aug 2, 1990

✓ 1988 - regularly used phone from Iran-Iraq War

✓ Chem weapons

✓ First w/ Saddam

✓ Then w/ Khairallah, Khazraji

✓ Then Saddam

✓ Then Khairallah, Khazraji - Hedges

✓ Kater Ali Hasan (Anti campaign)

disputed whether it was used

American troops came - no evidence

reports of them used



(12)

✓ Saddam told TA "not my decision" Halabja

✓ in hands of Khawallah / Khawarij

✓ did not punish or imprison or execute

✓ normally would punish or execute

✓ Saddam felt not necessary, especially due to international outcry

Asid imply approval
not sure
no opinion

✓ Anfal - latter part of 1988

✓ after ceasefire, Aug 8, 1988, Iran - Iraq war

✓ Milharam al-Majid appointed

✓ put down insurgency

"he was a lot of person, everyone knew"

Ali told some prisoners he was negotiating w/ Americans

TA told other prisoners "he's a liar"

could have happen

a settlement

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DATE 12-28-2011 BY [redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/06/2004

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On 05/06/2004 TARIQ AZIZ [redacted] was interviewed in Iraq by Federal Bureau of Investigation Supervisory Special Agents [redacted] and Special Agent [redacted]. At the time of the interview, AZIZ was a detainee being held in a Coalition Forces detention camp. After remarking that he was in good health, AZIZ provided the following information:

[redacted]

b6
b7C

AZIZ has been encouraged by some of his interrogators to write a book while he is in prison. The dim lighting, wobbly table, small room and conditions of camp life have dissuaded him from doing so. He would like to eventually write a memoir about his career that revolved around the self-described roles of journalist (1969), Minister of Information and Culture (1974), leader within the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) (1977), Deputy Prime Minister (1979), Foreign Minister (1983) and Deputy Prime Minister (1991). If given his option, AZIZ would choose to move to [redacted] in the United States where there is a large Iraqi population including a Chaldean Christian community. [redacted]

b6
b7C

In the general isolated environment of prison, with no newspapers to read and only old magazines and rumors to consider, it is the natural habit of prisoners to believe all rumors. One of the rumors currently circulating claims that the prisoners will be released on the 18th of May. Another rumor contends that former Ba'ath Party members will be brought back to participate in the future Iraq government. Former Vice President TAHA YASIN RAMADA was promulgating this rumor by stating that some of the prisoners would be released and some would take their positions in the new government. AZIZ did not accept this idea. Firstly he wants to retire and has no interest in participating in future politics. Secondly, this rumor seemed completely unrealistic to him.

Investigation on 05/06/2004 at Iraq

File # [redacted] Date dictated [redacted]

by [redacted]

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b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of Tariq Aziz, On 05/06/2004, Page 2


Many of the prisoners in the camp are sycophants and thugs. The worst of this group are former President SADDAM HUSSEIN's family members. They are almost illiterate, yet they are in possession of PhDs. They were not honest people. They were liars, not clean and real thieves. They confiscated money and land and were multimillionaires in both U.S. and Iraqi currency. They think like villagers. Because they have millions of dollars stashed away in foreign banks, they believe life will go on for them when they get out of prison.

AZIZ liked BARZAN ABD AL-GHAFUR SULTYMAN MAJID. BARZAN was a young man in his early twenties when the Ba'ath Party came to power. He served as a Foreign Minister, then as the Director of the *Mukhabarat* (intelligence service). He was discharged of this job in 1983. During his tenure as the Iraqi Ambassador to Switzerland, he became a changed person for the positive. He became liberal-minded and had good ideas. He was different from the other leaders and became outspoken. He published articles about letting others participate in the political process. He tried to open his brother's (SADDAM HUSSEIN) mind. SADDAM did not like this. BARZAN was asked to take SADDAM's son UDAY SADDAM HUSSEIN with him to Geneva. UDAY was a thug and could not live in a country like Switzerland. People realized this. UDAY attacked the reputation of BARZAN. AZIZ's assignment as the Minister of Foreign Affairs necessitated his travel to Switzerland on several occasions in order to attend Red Cross meetings and other diplomatic requirements. AZIZ would meet with BARZAN and BARZAN's very nice wife who died of cancer. BARZAN had a real education.



[REDACTED] Because AZIZ had a different mentality than most of the leadership, he tried to choose his government friends when he could. He did have an amicable relationship with BARZAN.

b6
b7C

ALI HASAN AL-MAJID, frankly speaking, was a criminal and a thug. He was a Corporal in the military who was given the unearned rank of Major General. AZIZ never had lunch, dinner or recreation with ALI. Their only relationship was their interactions as part of leadership affairs. ALI was a Minister of Home Affairs. Just as the Anfal campaign was beginning, ALI was invested with unprecedented power. Never before in the history of Iraq had that much power been given to one person. AZIZ did not agree in principle about empowering someone who was not an RCC member, it was unconstitutional.

b3
b7EContinuation of FD-302 of Tariq Aziz, On 05/06/2004, Page 3

SABAWI IBRAHIM HASAN AL-TIKRITI as the Director of the Intelligence Service. He would occasionally ask AZIZ about knowledge and advice. On one or two occasions they shared a drink, but never a lunch or dinner or other face to face meetings outside of work.

 was not directly responsible or involved in decision making. He was the  but was in a difficult position. In short he was a coward, or not brave enough to say no. b6
b7C

ABID HAMID MAHMUD is a crook a thief and a thug.

MUHAMMAD HAMZA ZUBAYDI was a poor man and an incapable Prime Minister. He was actually the joke of the town. During the 1991 Party Congress ZUBAYDI had fallen in popularity amongst members and the predicted voting outcome was expected to show this. As he fell, SADDAM decided to bolster him. AZIZ was writing the draft of the expected voting results when he surprisingly found out that ZUBAYDI's career was spared.

TAHA YASIN RAMADAN was not trusted by AZIZ. He was described as a 'yes-man' who eagerly supported all of SADDAM's bad decisions. He was rude and narcissistic, spending the first thirty minutes of any meeting talking about himself.

AZIZ SALIH NUMAN was a good guy who did not have a bad reputation. He was not highly educated nor was he a very capable person. Although he served as the Iraqi Governor of Kuwait, the real power in that situation was invested in ALI HASAN AL-MAJID.

MASOUD RAJAVI, the founder of Mujadin el Kalq used to interact primarily with the Director of the *Mukhabarat* or the Minister of Defense. AZIZ was the first Iraqi official to meet with RAJAVI. They had met in Paris. AZIZ understood that RAJAVI would seek assistance in terms of support from the Iraqi government. The Director of the *Mukhabarat* would prepare reports for SADDAM recommending to help RAJAVI's group, Mujadin el Kalq. AZIZ believed that this group wanted more and more and advised the *Mukhabarat* director that RAJAVI was asking for too much.

ABU ABBAS came to Iraq representing himself as the great leader of a large population of Palestinians. Iraq was helping all Palestinians. But AZIZ saw ABU ABBAS as the leader of the tiniest organization in Palestine. The bad shape of the Iraqi economy prevented the Iraqi government from being able to disburse large

Continuation of FD-302 of Tariq Aziz, On 05/06/2004, Page 4

sums of money to the Palestinian cause. ABU ABBAS was given a farm that he could run. The profits generated from the farm could support the cause. The farm evolved into a camp where ABU ABBAS would train fighters with AK-47s. The AK-47s were provided by the Iraqi government.

In 1987 AZIZ was traveling outside of Iraq, possibly in France, when the chemical attack on Halabja occurred. He asked SADDAM upon his return if the news were true. SADDAM said 'yes'. SADDAM blamed the military Chief of Staff NIZAR KHAZRAJZ, and the Minister of Defense during the Iran/Iraq war. SADDAM made a decision that chemical weapons should not be used unless the Chief of Staff says so. The Minister of Defense, ADNAN KHAIRALLAH, SADDAM's cousin, said that this decision weakened him. SADDAM reversed his decision granting power to the Minister of Defense. He used it without the proper consent. SADDAM did not consult with AZIZ when it came to military and strategic matters. SADDAM said to AZIZ that he was surprised that they were used. Firstly the use of them was maybe not necessary, and secondly the big repercussions that would follow. AZIZ had previously brought to SADDAM's attention the bad repercussions associated with the use of such weapons.

AZIZ readily acknowledged that Iraq used chemical munitions in its war against Iran. These were difficult times. Hundreds of thousands of Iranian troops were being held off from invading Iraq. AZIZ recalled confiding in the German and French Foreign Ministers at that time. He told them about Iranian fanatical fighters called the Mujadin al-Kalq, and the group's capturing of girls. The girls were executed, but not before being inspected for their virginity. Those who were virgins would first be raped before being executed. According to Mujadin al-Kalq's interpretation of the Quran, if a girl dies while still a virgin, she will go to heaven. AZIZ stated that he did not justify using the chemical weapons which was a violation of the Geneva Convention. But as an Iraqi patriot, he would not allow Iran to occupy Iraq. And if the defensive use of these munitions would prevent that from occurring, he would not protest it.

AZIZ said that to be fair to history, Iraq did use chemical weapons against Iraqi citizens. According to his belief, the Kurdish target wasn't a highly populated area. Generally, when hostilities start, people leave. They flee rather than wait. AZIZ did not believe that the Iraqi military had fully circled the Kurdish village. Just those few villagers remained. Iran first

b3
b7EContinuation of FD-302 of Tariq Aziz, On 05/06/2004, Page 5

attacked, most people fled, only a few villagers remained. There were 15 or 20 corpses, from what he saw on the international television program, not hundreds of thousands. The chemical attacks against Iran was army verse army, no civilians, but Halabja there were civilian victims.

There were no meetings that took place during that time. AZIZ was out of the country and did not communicate with SADDAM while traveling. International phones were monitored and AZIZ was in the habit of meeting with SADDAM upon the return of his trip. AZIZ was not aware of the strategic and tactical matters and was not part of the military decision making. Despite his belief that some officers would use more than an extensive amount of force, AZIZ did not protest to SADDAM. AZIZ felt that the use of chemical weapons were unjustifiable not only for moral reasons but for practical reasons. They were not effective weapons. In the war with Iran, they were used only on the front, by both sides. The weapons that had the biggest affect on the war were the long range missiles. These were used against the cities.

In 1990, Iraq released thirty seven or thirty eight thousand Iranian prisoners of war(POW). The Iranian government had told the families of many of their war dead that the Iraqis had actually captured them and were holding them. When all of the Iranian POWs were returned, the Iranian government had a difficult time explaining the lessened numbers to their people. As a result, they withheld releasing all of their Iraqi POWs as a way of posturing in front of their people that more releases were being negotiated.

On 03/04/1991, two days after the Gulf War cease-fire, The RCC signed and released RCC Resolution #54 which gave Governors control of military forces in their territories. All of the RCC members except AZIZ who remained in Baghdad, were in the south of Iraq or outside of Baghdad at this time. AZIZ was working on implementing United Nations Resolutions 687 and 688 which involved the repatriation of POWs. He met with SADDAM on occasion but spent most of his time with the Director of Military Intelligence, General SABAH AL-DURI. AZIZ believed that in actuality the RCC was not consulted on Resolution #54. They may have heard of it. It makes sense to give authority and power to the governors in the times of crisis. But there would have been no voting or feedback, only SADDAM's order.

b3
b7EContinuation of FD-302 of Tariq Aziz, On 05/06/2004, Page 6

AZIZ acknowledged that in the sense of collective responsibility, he should be held answerable for what the government did in general terms. But the man who holds the full accountability is SADDAM. Originally, when AZIZ was in the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), members would receive a typed letter as to what the agenda items for each meeting would be. When decisions were agreed upon, they would be typed up and signed by each member. Each decision was signed and not implemented until all the RCC members signed it. In the early nineteen eighties, SADDAM directed that the Chairman of the RCC can decide matters on behalf of the entire RCC. Later he decided that anything decreed by the RCC would become the law. In addition to these legal measures which relegated the RCC to SADDAM's personal rubber stamp, there was the chilling affect of the July 1979 RCC meeting, where Ba'ath members were killed. This made the proposition of disagreeing with SADDAM a life or death matter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-09-2012 BY [redacted]

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

[redacted]

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

FBIHQ

Serial # of Originating Document

Date Received

5/7

From

TARIQ AZIZ

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

(Address)

(City and State)

By

SA

[redacted]

To Be Returned Yes

No

Receipt Given Yes

No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes

No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes

No

Title:

[redacted]

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

Original notes re interview of

TARIQ AZIZ

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

b6
b7C

b7E

TARIQ AZIZ

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-28-2011 BY [redacted]

10:48

1

b6
b7C

HEALTH ↑

DIZZY, FELL DOWN

Date

No.

MAY JUNE JULY '03

I AM WELL SINCE RECOVERED

b6
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

WRITING BOOK?

- ENCOURAGED BY INTERROGATORS TO DO SO

- DIFFICULT CAMP CONDITIONS: BAD LIGHT

'MEMOIRE'

- ROOM SMALL, SHAKY TABLE, BAD FLOOR

- BECAUSE OF WAR: TOO BUSY, BUT NOW TIME

T.A. 'I KNOW MOST OF THE PEOPLE' [redacted]

MEMBERS OF LEADERSHIP OFFICERS

- LITTLE OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCUSSIONS

b6
b7C

POL CAREER :-

1969 JOURNALIST

1974 MINISTER OF INFO & CULT

77 CSAD RCC

79 DEP PRIM MIN

83 FOR MINISTER

91 DEP PRIM MIN

SEEN THERE NONE THAT!

Date

No.

NOT EVERYTHING

- ISOLATED, NO NEWSPAPERS, ONLY OLD MAGAZINES
- RUMORS / NATURAL HABITS OF PRISONERS TO BELIEVE ALL RUMORS
- 18th WILL BE SET FREE

MR. RAMADAN FORMER V.I.P.

- LET FORMER BATH PART PARTICIPATE
- LATEST RUMOR: LOSA NOT ACCEPTED
- JUNE 1/2 RELEASED 1/2 TO NEW GOV.

COUNSEL IS NOT A REAL GOVERNMENT, IT IS A COUNSEL.

I WANT TO LIVE IN [REDACTED] NO PEOPLE [REDACTED] b6 b7C

- IRAQI COMMUNITY, LARGE CALDIAN CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY
- NOTHING HAS MATERIALIZED, STILL IN PRISON

TOLD MANY U.S. OFFICIALS: MANY PRISONERS PSYCHOFACTS (THUGS) SADAM + RELATIVES "YOU KNOW THEM" I LIKE BARTAN

DIRECTOR OF INTELL CHANGES AS AN AMBAS CHANGES AS A PSYCH COULD LOSAS

SADAM DIDN'T LIKE [REDACTED]
BAGDAD LEFT FROM THE OTHERS

b6
b7C

- BATHAST MORE LIBERAL MINDEN
- TRIED TO OPEN UP HIS BROTHERS MIND
- TALKS RELATIVES OF SADAM
- DIDN'T LIKE BROTHERS (ALMOST ILLITERATE)
- THOUGH THEY HAVE PhD

FRANKLY

ALI IS CRIMINAL

- BAGDAD WAS YOUNG MAN EARLY 20s
- WHEN BA'MIL CAME
- THEN FOREIGN MIN
- THEN INTEL TILL 1983 (DISMISSED)
- AMBO GENEVA ASKED TO TALK ODEH W/
- ↳ BECAME OPEN ↑ HIM
- GOOD CONNECTIONS THUR
- SPOKE ABOUT BORN LIBERAL (OUTSPOKEN)

SADAM HAD DIFFERENSE)

MAPPING TO 10/9/91

SABANI	MIN	OF	INTER	DATE	SADAM SHAKUR
	DIR	OF	SECURITY		SADAM
					SAMIR ABISHAKE

ODEH COULDN'T LIVE IN A COUNTRY OF GEN

PEOPLE
ODEH REALIZED

Date

No.

↳ ATTACKED BARTAN

FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO ATTACK T.A.

THULS

MAHMUD

MULTI S.H. FAMILY



SOME M.I. IS INTERVIEW LATELY
NOT HONEST PERSON, TOLD SADAM HE WAS
A CIA, NOT CLEAN, REAL THIEVES

- CONFISCATED MONEY, LAND
- MULTIMILLIONERS IN IRAQI + US CURRENCY

H.K. → CPL

ALI → CPL BECAME MAJOR GENERAL (SADAM GAVE HIM)

RELATIONSHIP w/ ALI

NEVER LUNCH/DINNER/RECREATION

ALI WAS A MEMBER OF CEASARSHIP ONLY RELATIONSHIP

SABOUMI DIRECT OF INTEC

↳ WOULD ASK T.A. ADVICE + KNOWLEDGE

→ ONE OR 2 TIMES A DAY

HAD RELATIONSHIP WITH BARTAN

TRIED TO CHOOSE FRIENDS WHEN HAD CHOICE

MY MENTALITY DIFF FROM THEIRS

No common grounds

NEVER lunch / dinner ^{Date} on staff

OR

BARZAN ANG TO GENEV. T.A. WENT SEV
TIMES TO SWISS FOR RED CROSS MEETINGS ETC
WENT TO RESIDENCE, NEW WIFE

REAL EDUC

MORE OF SADAT'S FAMILY (SUN + DAUGHTER)

BARZAN: HAD REAL EDUCATION, SPEAKS ENGL + FRENCH

↳ WIFE DIED OF CANCER, GOOD PERSON

1988 HALABSA

China used, T.A. OUTSIDE IRAN, ON TRIP
TO U.N.

NEW APPROV UPON RETURN,

S.H. SAID 'YES'

S.H. BLAMED CHIEF OF STAFF ^{ADONAN} ~~ADONAN~~

S.H. MADE DECISION SHOULD NOT ~~BE~~ BE USED
UNLESS C.O.S. SAYS SO

USED IN IRAN, NOT GOOD

- ADONAN D.C.O. SAID THIS DEC

'S WEAKENING ME

USED w/ out HIS CONSENT

S.H. MIL MATTERS & STRATEGIC MATTERS NOT

ASIC T.A.

Date

No.

T.A. WAS IN FRANCE

S.H. AUTHORITY WAS S.H. FOR CHEM

S.H. SAID TO T.A. HE WAS SURPRISED

- MAYBE NOT NECESSARY
 - 2) BUT REPRESENTATIONS
- } WHY S.H. SURPRISED

CONVERSATIONS BEFORE ATTENTION TO BAD REPRESENTATIONS

DIFFICULT TIMES 100,000 IRAN ATTACK

CHEM USED, DID NOT AS CAPABLE OBJECT

GERM MINISTER

WASHUM

GERM PART

GESHIA

IN IRAN, WHEN GOV ARRESTED GIRLS

MURDERED AL KHALIQ

EXECUTED, VIRGINS RABED THEN KILLED
WILL GO TO HEAVEN

CLAUDE SHISON FRANCE FOREIGN MINISTER

NOT JUSTIFIED TAAHI PARLAMENT WOULD

NOT ALLOW IRAN TO OCCUPY IRAN
DEPENDENT

U.S. TOWMAN, JAPAN NOT THREATENED

CUNDS

Date

No.

T.A. WAS IN GENEVA

TOLD S.H. THAT NOT TRUE

1.)

[Redacted]

2.)

[Redacted]

USED ORDINARY POWERS

AS FOR MIN, LOT OF PUBLICITY, BUT NO MATERIAL PROOF, MY ACCUSATIONS

1989 ARCHIVES, DOO IN US INSTITUTE POLITICAL THAT PUBLISHED MATERIAL, IRANIANS STARTED WS OF CHEN

TO BE FAIR TO HISTORY IRAQIS DID USE
- I DON'T THINK IT WAS HIGHLY POPULATED
- WHEN HOSTILE MANTY BODIES LEAVE
FLEE DON'T WAIT

I DON'T THINK IRAQIS WERE ENCOURAGED UNJUSTIFIABLE MORAL + PRACTICAL

- JUST THOSE FEW WHO REMAINED
- IRANIAN FIRST OF ATTACK, MOST PEOPLE FLEE, ONLY FEW REMAIN, IS, 20
CORPSES MEN + WOMEN NOT 100,000

UNIFORMS

ARMY TO ARMY AS CIVILIANS

DONT HANG ON THEIR USE

b6
b7C

- NO MEETING AT THAT TIME, OUT OF COUNTRY, NO COMM ^{UPDATE} RETURNED NOT MATTERS TO TALK VIA TELEPHONE

- T.A. WAS NOT AWARE OF STRATEGICAL TACTICAL MATTERS, NOT PART OF MIL DECISIONS

M.M. OF DSEEN _____ CUSH

- AS A MEMBER OF GOV WOULD SAY SOMETHING ABOUT THIS ON THAT IRANIAN THREAT

- DIDN'T PROTEST AGAINST SASAN

- SOME OFFICERS WOULD GO MORE THAN EXTENSIVE

CHEM BAO, NOT MORAL + PRACTICAL

- LONG RANGE MISSILES AFFECTED WAR

CHEM USED ON THE FRONT, BOTH SIDES

MISSILES HIT CITIES AFTER WAR

RELEASING PRISONERS 1990: 37,78,000 PRIS.

IRAN SAID MORE P.O.W.

WHEN ~~THE~~ IRANIAN GOV SAID WE TOLD

FAMILIES THEY ARE PRISONERS 35400 P.O.W.

Aug 1988

ALL MAGID NOT IN CHARGE OF DATE N. DEFENSE
ANFAI AFTER ANFAI



ISSUE OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY
EDUCATED

EARLY 80S S.M. MADE DECISION
- PASS OF REP AME LAW
- BRUCE TO THAT CHAIRMAN OF R.C.C.
LAW DECISION FOR THE R.C.C.

WAS TRAVELING

STIPULATION NOT DEFENSE

DECISION 160

DIDN'T HAVE VOTES TRADITION OR PRACTICE

AFTER 1979 PEOPLE COULD NOT ~~PROTEST~~
PROTEST AGAINST S.H. LIFE OR DEATH

ALL WAS MINISTER MIN OF HOME AFFAIRS
NEVER IN HISTORY OF MAAQ WAS
THAT MUCH POWER GIVEN TO ONE PERSON

b6
b7C

S.H.

Co

RCC. WAS A BODY THAT VOTE

SERIES OPINION

Date

No.

DECISION WAS MADE EVERYONE MUST COMPLY

I.E.C.I

DONT AGREE ~ PRINCIPAL ABOUT EMPOWERMENT
SOMEONE WHO IS NOT RCC MEMBER UNCONSTITUTIONAL

ANAL ASSASSIN 1987

WAS VIOLATION OF CONVENTION

- DISSENT AGAINST OUR IRAQI CITIZENS

ALL MEETINGS OF RCC WERE TAPED

- KURDS FORCIBLY REMOVED TO CAMPUS

N. LEADERSHIP HASSAN ALI

CANSA

PROVIDENCE GOOD HUMES, T.A. HAD FAISNA

IN MUHAMMAD AMIN ^{TRUST} AMB F.M., PERSONAL SEC

CAMPAIN ABOUT HOUSSEY NO RUNNING WATER

HASSAN SA.2 O.K. TWO SMALL

PRETEXT OF EMERGENCY →

WITHDRAW MARCH 1989 BY R.C.C. DECREE

WAR w/ IRA - CONNECTED TO KUND

SITUATION IN NORTH

Date

No.

1979 _____ WAS IN PRISON

NOT INVOLVED WAS SUSPECTED

RELEASE MILLIONS OF DOLLARS, THEY
ARE VILLAGERS HAVE MINDSET

MARCH 4th 1991

2 DAYS AFTER CEASEFIRE
RES # 54 RCC SIGNED

PROVISIONAL GOV, GIVEN AUTHORITY OVER

MIL

[Redacted]

ALLMAGIS

SADAM'S DECISION

[Redacted]

1977 WHEN I.A. BECAME

RCC

RESOLVE AGAINST DECISIONS

SIGN DECISIONS

— AFTER 1979 IT DISAPPEARED

ALL WERE SIGNED AND NOT IMPLEMENTED UNTILL ALL

SIGNED 1979 CHAIRMAN ONLY

b6
b7C

NO VOTING

(12)

RCC NOT CONSULTED

MIGHT HAVE HEARD OF 17^{Date} COMMUN
ISSUE TO CIV POWER TO THE GOVERNORS

→ FEEDBACK ONLY SADR

[Redacted]

} NOT IN SADR

NO RCC, SADR

T.A.)

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

→ STILL FOREIGN MINISTER

MET SADR OCCASION 687 + 688 REPARATION
WORKING WITH GEN SABA AL DURI, M.I

LEADERS WERE REPORTING BACK TO SADR

[4 GOVERNMENT MEMBERS

RAMADI, [Redacted]

MET SADR DURING PERIOD FEW TIMES

ESSE FRS, P.O.W. BUT NOT NORMAL

MEETINGS AS ALL MEMBERS OUTSIDE OF
BACHMAN

13

3 THURS

- ALI HASAN MAJID

Date

No.

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

- [Redacted]

- MILITARY INDUSTRIAL

[Redacted]

NOT DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR

b6
b7C

- C.O.S. IN A DIFFICULT SITUATION

- COMMAND, BRAVE ENOUGH TO SAY NO

ABD MAMAN MAMUD

CRACK MEET THUR

HAMAN
2-BA.D.

POUN MAN, INCAPABLE P.M. WAS

TAKE OF TOWN

1991 PARTY COMMANDER MUSSIM HAMAL

CR. 17129 T.A. RAMADAN

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

RAMADAN WON

T.A. VOTES WERE 75%

2-BA.D. 3300.

AS HE FELL S.H. DECIDES TO RESCUE HIM

14

T.A was writing DRAFT

MEETING THE COUNCIL on Date No.

[redacted] SUSPICION TO BE STILLS,
HAMAD DURANI, SHIA

b6
b7C

BECAME MEMBERS OF R.C. AS REWARD

TAKA YASIN DAMADAN

DONT TRUST, YES - MAN SUPPORTED
NARCISST, COULD HIMSELF, RUCS
ALL
ASADAMI BAO
RUMOR.

SALAH AZIZ PUMAN

good guy, didn't use 3/5/1
rep. BUT NOT VERY CAPABLE, GOVERNOR OF
KUNAWI BUT REAL POWER WAS IN
ALI MAJID
NOT HIGHLY EDUCATED

MASOUD RAJAWI → CONNECTION WITH OR ^{Man} of ^{of} DEFENSE
MULHABATHI

WAS IN THE ORIGIN MEET IN PARIS
DRAFT WITH HIM THE 1990S THE SAUDI

KNOWS TO BSAL WITH MAZA
ASK FOR ASSISTANCE, DASHA OF INTER ONLY
RS THERE

DIA OF INTER WOULD WRITE REPORT
RECOMMEND TO HELP MEIK TO SAUDI

15
WANTED MORE AND MORE JULY

INTEL OVER ME AIRLINE ~~FOR~~ TO MARCH

ARE ABOUT

CAME TO INAC, INAC HOLDING ALL
PASSENGERS, T.P. DO NOT TAKE BEANS

- A.P. WAS TRYING TO GO IN PAC
- THINKING OF HIMSELF AS CASUALTY

CAMP + FARM GIVEN BY INAC. COV

TO MAKE MONEY CASUALTY WAS LIMITED

FARM TURNED PROFIT

ALLS / ME PROBLEMS

(Rev. 05-01-2008)

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/09/2009

To: Records Management
Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]
Attn: Admin and Resource Unit

From: Baghdad
Baghdad Counterterrorism Operations Center
Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]
Drafted By: [redacted]

(U) Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] (Pending)

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ To open a subfile regarding Camp Cropper
Detainee ISN 200025.

~~Derived From : Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 191008~~

(U) Details: ~~(S)~~ As part of the [redacted] the following
subfile is being created. This file will track the status of the
local criminal case against detainee ISN 200025.

b7E

(U) ~~(S)~~ The specific detainee is identified as follows:

ISN# 200025
Name: Tariq Aziz
Nationality: Iraq
Citizenship: Iraq

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

To: Records Management From: Baghdad

(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 10/09/2009

b3
b7E

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

RECORDS MANAGEMENT

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) ~~(S)~~ Open subfile 200025 - Tariq Aziz

Set Lead 2: (Info)

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) ~~(S)~~ Read and clear.

◆◆

~~SECRET~~

Scanned doc.
to [redacted]
1/28/2010
slm

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/17/2010

To: Records Management
Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]
Attn: Admin and Resource Unit

From: Baghdad
Camp Slayer Office
Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted]

(Closed) 2
(Closed) 2
(Closed) 1
(Closed) 2
(Closed) 2
(Closed) 2
(Closed) 2

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Title: [redacted]

Synopsis: To close detainee subfiles due to convictions issued from the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) or the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI).

Details: The following detainee Internment Serial Numbers (ISN) have been convicted in either the IHT or CCCI.

200025 - Conviction at IHT, 15 years for Merchant Killing, 7 years for Ethnic Cleansing, and 15 years for 1991 Shia Uprising. Acquitted on Friday Prayers.

[redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Records Management From: Baghdad
Re: [REDACTED] 01/17/2010

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Date of conviction information was not available in the

[REDACTED]

b7E

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Records Management From: Baghdad
Re: [REDACTED] 01/17/2010

b3
b7E

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

RECORDS MANAGEMENT

AT WASHINGTON, DC

The following sub-files should be closed due to convictions at the IHT or CCCI.

200025, [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

Read and clear.

◆◆

UNCLASSIFIED