FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Harbo
Tele. Room
Miss Gandy

TO : Director, FBI

SECRET

DATE: January 27, 1950

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

AIR MAIL - SPECIAL DELIVERY

SUBJECT: CONFERENCE WITH INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES
Plan proposed by Director of Intelligence, Alaskan Command, to place network of sleeper agents in Alaska.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 bjc/hbw
ON 5/31/94 #34225

On January 25, 1950 Captain MINOR HEINE, U. S. Navy, Director of Intelligence, Alaskan Command, called at my office stating that he had received a memorandum [redacted]

He suggested a conference on the morning of January 27, 1950 in his office at Fort Richardson, Alaska. ASAC FRED A. FROHBOSE and myself attended. Those present at the meeting in Captain HEINE's office were:

Captain MINOR HEINE, U. S. Navy, Director of Intelligence, Alaskan Command.
Colonel WALLIS S. PERRY, U. S. Army, head of G-2 in Alaska.
Lieutenant Colonel DONALD L. SPRINGER, U. S. Air Force, Wing Intelligence.
Lieutenant Colonel ANDREW J. CHOOS, J-2, U. S. Army, who works under Colonel PERRY.
Special Agent in Charge JOHN H. WILLIAMS, Anchorage Division.
Assistant Special Agent in Charge, FRED A. FROHBOSE, Anchorage Division.

DECLASSIFIED RECORDING

After Captain HEINE reiterated the reason for the meeting, Lieutenant Colonel CHOOS advised that [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Memo: Visit to HBC 2-3-50 Confidential

0 Inquiries by Army for intelligence purposes and action by Army and FBI

CLASSIFIED BY sp4 bjc/hbw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
Per OGA
Exempt Category 7/20/98
7/1/94

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

66-82
JHW:vw

COPIES DESTROYED
R 584.07 21 1960

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Referral/Consult

Anchorage File 66-82

[redacted]

Captain HEINE stated that the proposed plan had been brought to the attention of General TWINING and his aide, Brigader General FRANK A. ARMSTRONG, Jr., U. S. Air Force, at a recent staff meeting. At that time, as Captain HEINE states, "They went for it."

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

~~SECRET~~

As is pointed out above, Lieutenant Colonel CHOOS is being separated from service in the U. S. Army. He is undoubtedly on a look-out for a job and it is believed that [redacted] — (U)

The above plan, even if approved, does not appear to be feasible for a number of reasons, but the merits of the plan were not discussed.

These data are being passed on for the Bureau's information for such action as is necessary. The Anchorage Office is in constant contact with Captain HEINE and will obtain information concerning any developments and make it available immediately.

SAC, Anchorage

February 15, 1950

The Director, FBI

CONFERENCE WITH INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES
Plan proposed by Director of Intelligence,
Alaskan Command, to place network of sleeper
agents in Alaska.

65-51264-X1
INDEXED - 3

Reference is made to your letter to the Bureau dated January 27, 1950, regarding the above-captioned matter. An inquiry at the Office of Naval Intelligence headquarters, Washington, D. C., has reflected that this agency knows nothing of the "sleeper network" as mentioned in referenced letter.

EX. - 66

It is desired that you keep the Bureau constantly advised of any further developments in this matter.

CDD:hb

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/27/94 SP12 BY SP2 ALM/KSR

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FBI

FEB 16 7 23 PM '5

FBI

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

MAILED 15
FEB 16 1950
COMM - FBI

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. H. B. FLETCHER

DATE: February 3, 1950

FROM : V. P. KEAY

SUBJECT: CONFERENCE WITH INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES
Plan proposed by Director of Intelligence, Alaskan Command, to place network of sleeper agents in Alaska.

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Referral/Consult
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Sandy

Pursuant to your instructions, Mr. DeLoach contacted Captain S. W. DuBois, Office of Naval Intelligence, on February 2, 1950, regarding the captioned matter. Captain DuBois advised that details of this matter had not been made available to either the ONI or the Chief of Naval Operations. He stated that ONI was [redacted]

Captain DuBois suggested that this matter be referred to the Working Committee of IIC for discussion. He additionally stated that [redacted] Captain DuBois was advised that his views on this matter would be brought to the attention of the Bureau.

Referral/Consult

ACTION:

That the above matter be considered for discussion by the Working Committee of IIC.

CDD:slm

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-31-94 BY SP2 BEJ 1280

ADDENDUM: 2/15/50

After consulting you regarding this matter it was considered advisable to withhold this matter from the Standing Committee of IIC until further developments warrant such action. A letter to the SAC at Anchorage advising him that Navy knows nothing regarding this matter and that he should keep the Bureau fully advised of any further developments.

CDD:hb

65-59264-X1

RECORDED - 39

INDEXED - 39

FEB 21 1950

EX. - 66

Ltr SAC, Anchorage 2-15-50 CDD:hb

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Ketta
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mo...
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 3/7/50

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: CONFERENCE WITH INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES
Plan proposed by Director of Intelligence Alaskan Command, to place network of sleeper agents in Alaska.

Re Anchorage letter dated 1/27/50 and Bureau reply dated 2/15/50.

At the intelligence conference in the office of Captain MINOR HEINE, U. S. Navy, at Fort Richardson, Alaska on March 2, 1950, Captain HEINE advised that the document proposing the network of sleeper agents in Alaska had been submitted by his office to the Office of General NATHAN F. TWINING, U. S. Air Force, Commander in Chief, Alaskan Command, but to date it had not been sent to Washington for the consideration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

DIRECTED RECORDING

This matter will be watched closely and any further data received concerning it will be passed on immediately to the Bureau.

JHW:MR
66-82

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 8TSIS
ON 5/27/94
342251

RECORDED - 64

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~~MAR 10 1950~~
13-27

EX-136

Proposed plan for Intelligence Espionage in Alaska
Chief of Staff

(COPY)
MS

RANDUM . UNITED STATES

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: MAY 8, 1950

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

~~SECRET~~

7/1/99
CLASSIFIED BY SP4bjc/4hs
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
PER DOJ letter dtd 7/20/98 #342251

SUBJECT: IIC WORKING COMMITTEE MEETING,
May 10, 1950

~~EBM:12~~

A meeting of the IIC Working Committee is scheduled for 2:00 p.m., May 10, 1950, in the office of William E. Carpenter, Room 4E1081, Pentagon Building.

Attached hereto is the agenda for instant meeting.

In connection with the second item on the agenda, you will recall that the Director, in commenting on

[redacted]

~~(S)~~ - (U)

Referral/Consult

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved by you, copies of agenda will be distributed via liaison to the other Working Committee members.

Attachment

ESS:hke

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~~EBM:12~~

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SEP 26 1950

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN 65-56403-1

OPY)
ms

~~SECRET~~

7/1/99 #342251
CLASSIFIED BY SP4bjc/tdw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
Per OGA letter dtd 7/24/98

AGENDA FOR WORKING COMMITTEE
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
MAY 10, 1950

A meeting of the Working Committee, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, is scheduled for 2:00 p.m., May 10, 1950, in the office of Colonel William E. Carpenter, Room 4E1081, Pentagon Building.

The order of business will be as follows:

[redacted] Referral/Consult

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DATE 3/99 BY SP2/BJTS/LSC 34225/1

[redacted]

[redacted] Referral/Consult

[redacted]

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

ENCLOSURE
65-59264

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Port Security Program For The
Protection of Vessels, Harbors,
Ports, And Water-Front Facilities

By letter dated March 6, 1950, the IIC advised ICIS that there is presently available in the files of the investigative and intelligence agencies a considerable amount of information concerning Communist and other subversive infiltration into the various water-front facilities and longshoremen's unions. This letter pointed out that there is presently no appropriate and responsible agency or agencies empowered to use this information in a realistic and aggressive manner.

By letter dated April 13, 1950, ICIS has acknowledged receipt of the March 6, 1950 letter and has advised that various phases of this problem are being considered by the ICIS Subcommittees on Industrial Security, Exit and Entry, and Defense Against Unconventional Attack. The April 13, 1950 letter states, "If you believe that any of the file material mentioned in your letter might be of assistance to the subcommittees working on the problem, the ICIS would be glad to receive it for reference, in whole or in part, to the appropriate subcommittees."

The Working Committee may wish to decide whether such subversive information will be furnished to ICIS subcommittees or held until such time as the appropriate agency or agencies are empowered to use it.

Attachment

(COPY)
ms

OFFICE MEMORANDUM . UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD DATE: May 15, 1950

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: IIC WORKING COMMITTEE MEETING,
MAY 10, 1950

Attached hereto are the minutes of the IIC Working Committee meeting held on May 10, 1950.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved by you, it is recommended that copies of these minutes be furnished to the other members of the IIC Working Committee.

Attachment

ESS:hke

65-59264-1
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119 SEP 23 1950

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CLASSIFIED BY 7/1/98
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X #342251
PER DOA letter dtd 7/20/98

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

MINUTES OF MEETING
WORKING COMMITTEE
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
MAY 10, 1950

A meeting of the Working Committee, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, was held on May 10, 1950, in the office of Colonel William E. Carpenter, Room 4E1081, Pentagon Building. The meeting began at 2:05 p.m. and those in attendance were as follows:

For the Department of the Army	Colonel Ernest A. Barlow
For the Department of the Navy	Captain S. W. DuBois Captain H. E. Keisker
For the Federal Bureau of Investigation	Mr. D. M. Ladd
Secretary	Mr. Edward S. Sanders

The points for discussion were as follows:

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

Referral/Consult

Port Security Program For The
Protection Of Vessels, Harbors,
Ports, And Water-Front Facilities

Colonel Carpenter pointed out that by letter dated March 6, 1950, the IIC advised ICIS that there is presently available in the files of the investigative and intelligence agencies a considerable amount of information concerning Communist and other subversive infiltration into the various water-front facilities and longshoremen's unions. This letter pointed out that there is presently no appropriate and responsible agency or agencies empowered to use this information in a realistic and aggressive manner.

By letter dated April 13, 1950, ICIS acknowledged receipt of the March 6, 1950 letter and advised that various phases of this problem are being considered by the ICIS Subcommittees on Industrial Security, Exit and Entry, and Defense Against Unconventional Attack. The April 13, 1950 letter from ICIS states, "If you believe that any of the file material mentioned in your letter might be of assistance to the subcommittees working on the problem, the ICIS would be glad to receive it for reference, in whole or in part, to the appropriate subcommittees."

Colonel Carpenter stated that he sees no particular reason why this subversive type of information should be furnished to ICIS subcommittees

~~SECRET~~

inasmuch as they have been advised of the existence of such information and the information would not apparently help ICIS in its responsibility for setting up an agency or agencies empowered to use it.

Mr. Ladd pointed out that much of this information is of a highly sensitive character and should not be distributed any more than is necessary.

It was agreed that the information would be furnished to the appropriate agency or agencies when properly established or empowered by ICIS but should not at the present time be furnished to ICIS subcommittees.

* * * * *

There being no further business to come before the Committee, the meeting was adjourned at 3:30 p.m.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM . UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: June 2, 1950

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: IIC MEETING, JUNE 8, 1950

Attached hereto is the proposed agenda for the IIC meeting scheduled to be held in your office at 2:30 p.m., June 8, 1950.

"I THINK ROTATION IS DESIRABLE." H.

In connection with the third item on the agenda, pertaining to the selection of an IIC Chairman for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1950, Special Agent Sanders has advised that Colonel Barlow, of the Army, has remarked that he and General Irwin feel that you should continue as Chairman due to the fact that you are permanently in Washington and not subject to transfer as are military personnel. Sanders has advised that Captain DuBois, of the Navy, has expressed similar views and that General Carroll has indicated a desire that you continue as Chairman.

"I AGREE" H.

Although the Bureau has agreed to furnish a permanent secretary for the IIC, it may be desirable, as indicated in item three on the agenda, to have the secretary from the same organization as the Chairman. As you know, Special Agent Edward S. Sanders has been the secretary since April 26, 1949.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved by you, it is recommended that copies of the attached agenda be furnished to the other IIC members through liaison.

Attachment

(2) Proposed Plans for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in the event of trouble

ESS:hke

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ON S-31-94

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AGENDA

INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE MEETING

JUNE 8, 1950

A meeting of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference is scheduled for 2:30 p.m., June 8, 1950, in the Office of the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Room 5633, Department of Justice Building.

The following are topics for discussion:

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
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OTHERWISE

ENCLOSURE

Referral/Consult

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~~SECRET~~

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

Election Of IIC Chairman
For Fiscal Year Beginning
July 1, 1950

At the April 26, 1949 meeting of the IIC, Mr. Hoover was elected to serve as Chairman until July 1, 1950, and it was agreed that a Chairman would be elected to serve for each fiscal year thereafter, as provided in the IIC Charter.

At the same meeting, Mr. Hoover offered to furnish a permanent secretary from the personnel of the FBI. The IIC may wish to consider, however, that it might be desirable to have a secretary from the same service as the newly-elected Chairman in order to facilitate the work of the Chairman and the Secretary.

Joint Informal Meeting
With ICIS

The Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security has formally invited the IIC members, members of the IIC Working Committee and the IIC secretary to attend a joint informal meeting with ICIS to be held from 4:00 to 6:00 p.m., June 8, 1950, at the Officers Club, Fort McNair.

This invitation has been accepted by the IIC, and it is contemplated that the IIC representatives indicated will attend the joint informal meeting subsequent to instant IIC business meeting.

Attachment

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

To : MR. D. M. LADD

6-23-50

From : MR. A. H. BELMONT

Subject : AGENDA FOR WORKING COMMITTEE, IIC, JUNE 28, 1950

Attached is the propsed agenda for the Working Committee, IIC, scheduled for 2:00 p.m., June 28, 1950 in the office of Colonel John W. Middleton, Room 2E516, Pentagon Building.

The members of the Working Committee have been contacted and have no suggestions or additions to this agenda.

If this agenda meets with your approval, copies will be disseminated to the Working Committee, IIC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/22/91 BY SP2 BAW 15C

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AGENDA
FOR WORKING COMMITTEE
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
JUNE 28, 1950

A meeting of the Working Committee, IIC, is scheduled for 2:00 p.m., June 28, 1950 in the office of Colonel John W. Middleton, Room 2E516, Pentagon Building.

The order of business will be as follows:

[redacted]

[redacted]

Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee
~~On~~ Internal Security - Neutralizing
Espionage and Subversive Activities
of Foreign Diplomatic and Official Personnel

Referral/Consult

7/1/99
CLASSIFIED BY SP4 bjw/ldw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
PER OGA letter dated 7/20/98
#34225

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OTHERWISE

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-99 BY SP2 BETJ/SC

34225

ENCLOSURE
65-59264

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~~SECRET~~ ~~EMOZ~~

The Chairman of the IIC received from the Chairman of the ICIS a report of a subcommittee of ICIS on foreign diplomatic and official personnel. This problem, #1, entitled, "To neutralize so far as possible espionage and subversive activities of personnel of foreign diplomatic, consular or other missions, including international organizations" was referred to the ICIS by the IIC by letter dated August 4, 1949. The Chairman of the ICIS desires any comments the IIC may care to make on the report. The report has been disseminated to the IIC members.

Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security - Subcommittee Report - Restrictions on Representatives of Foreign Countries Handling Classified Work Within the United States

The Chairman of the IIC received a communication from the Chairman of the ICIS which attached a report of a Standing Committee of the ICIS dealing with restrictions on representatives of foreign countries handling classified work within the United States.

At the IIC meeting on June 8, 1950, Mr. Coyne advised the IIC that the ICIS has been preparing this report and that it would be submitted to the IIC for approval prior to final action by ICIS. The IIC members agreed that such action was desirable in order that each of the IIC agencies would have a chance to review information to be obtained in the questionnaire disseminated to the IIC members.

Referral/Consult

~~SECRET~~ ~~EMOZ~~

~~SECRET~~

SAC, Anchorage

June 20, 1950

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION

INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE; STAY-BEHIND AGENTS

The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference is considering a plan for the development of individuals who could act as agents for the United States in the event that Alaska is occupied by a foreign power. You should immediately confer with the local representatives of the Office of Special Investigations, U. S. Air Force, in Alaska to determine what action has been taken toward the development of prospective stay-behind agents.

You should advise the Bureau immediately subsequent to this conference as to the results of the conference in addition to your comments as to the action you believe the Bureau should take in this connection. You should give consideration as to whether or not any of the informants of your office would fit the requirements of a stay-behind agent.

RECORDED - 104 INDEXED - 104

65-59264-X3

JUN 21 1950

This information is desired by the Bureau for the Bureau's assistance in discussing this further with the members of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference. Please answer by radiogram.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Candy

NOTE: This problem will be placed on the agenda of the Working Committee of the IIC for the meeting to be held on June 28, 1950.

JUN 28 1950

JUN 29 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/27/91 BY SP2 STAFF

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Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (4)

FROM ANCHORAGE (6-24-50) NR 240200 3:03 A.M.

DIRECTOR URGENT

INTER DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE STAY BEHIND AGENTS RE BUREAU MEMORANDUM TWENTIETH INSTANT. CONFERENCE HAD WITH HEADS OF OSI, MIS, AND CAPTAIN MINER HEINE, U.S. NAVY, WHO IS DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE ALASKA COMMAND. THE IDEA CONCERNING STAY BEHIND AGENTS FORWARDED BY CAPTAIN MINER HEINE TO JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF IN FEBRUARY, 1950, AND LETTER RECEIVED IN REPLY IN APRIL, 1950, TELLING HIM TO TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION HERE, INASMUCH AS MATTER IS BEING CONSIDERED IN WASHINGTON. SEE ANCHORAGE MEMORANDUM DATED JANUARY 27, 1950, ENTITLED CONFERENCE WITH INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES, PLAN PROPOSED BY THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, ALASKAN COMMAND, TO PLACE NETWORK OF SLEEPER AGENTS IN ALASKA. ALSO SEE GENERAL SECURITY SURVEY OF TERRITORY OF ALASKA DATED MAY 9, 1950, SUBMITTED BY THIS OFFICE. IT IS BELIEVED THAT WHILE BUREAU SHOULD AID AGENCY DESIGNATED TO ESTABLISH SUCH A NETWORK IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE, IT SHOULD NOT ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PROJECT ITSELF, INASMUCH AS THE SUGGESTION WAS PROJECTED TO OBTAIN POSITIVE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IF AND AFTER ALASKA IS HELD BY AN ENEMY. ANCHORAGE INFORMANTS PRESENTLY PREVAILING NOT BELIEVED TO BE TYPE SUITABLE FOR THIS PROJECT, ALTHOUGH OFFICE HAS CONTACTS WHO POSSIBLY COULD FUNCTION IN SUCH A PROGRAM.

RECEIVED (6-24-50) 4:25 A.M. GW

CORRECTED (6-24-50) 9:21 PLM.

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SP3-BNJ/sm

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If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

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CONFIDENTIAL
USIR IDENTIFIED

TO: MR. D. M. LADD

~~SECRET~~

June 27, 1950

FROM: A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: IIC WORKING COMMITTEE MEETING
JUNE 28, 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-31-94 BY SP2 6TTW

Attached is the agenda for instant Working Committee meeting. Following your instructions, copies of the agenda have been distributed to the other members of the Working Committee.

Referral/Consult

The following information is submitted for your use at this meeting:

[redacted]

Interdepartmental Committee On
Internal Security - Neutralizing
Espionage and Subversive Activities
of Foreign Diplomatic and Official Personnel

CLASSIFIED BY sp4 bja/ldw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
Per OGA letter dtd 7/20/98

The report referred to under this heading, with a memorandum dated June 16, 1950 summarizing the report, is attached hereto. (Tab 2)

Attachments
ESS:lae

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SEP 26 1950

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Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security - Subcommittee Report - Restrictions on Representatives of Foreign Countries Handling Classified Work Within the United States

On June 8, 1950, the Standing Committee of ICIS adopted a report in connection with this problem.

You will recall that at the last IIC meeting the Director expressed a desire to have the Working Committee review the ICIS report prior to its final adoption in order that the IIC agencies would have a chance to make suggested changes in the procedures or in the questionnaire developed for use in connection with this problem.

The report adopted by the ICIS Standing Committee provides generally for the following:

(1) The foreign government must transmit to the United States a personal history statement concerning the individual to be working in the United States.

(2) A foreign country must certify that it has information corroborating the questions in the personal history statement and that such representative will not endanger or constitute a threat to the security of the United States and that classified government data of the United States will be safeguarded in a manner acceptable to the United States.

(3) Fingerprints and a photograph of the proposed representative must be submitted.

(4) Copies of the personal history questionnaire will be distributed to the FBI, IDA, OSI, ONI [redacted] and other likely sources of information. (S) — (U)

(5) Fingerprints will be transmitted to the Bureau for processing.

(6) The Department of State and [redacted] will be requested to furnish pertinent information. (S) — (U)

(7) The proposed procedure should apply to all representatives of foreign governments who will have access to classified government data.

Referral/Consult

(8) These papers will be filed in an appropriate agency within the United States in order that venue would be established in the event false information is furnished.

You will recall that originally it was planned that the foreign government would supply a summary of the information in its possession respection such representatives, or in the alternative the information itself. This requirement has been dropped. At the last IIC meeting it was indicated

[redacted] The personal history statement appears to be complete.

The report proposed for adoption by ICIS is attached hereto. (Tab 3)

RECOMMENDATION

The foregoing is for your use during instant meeting.

Referral/Consult

OFFICE MEMORANDUM - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 3, 1950

FROM: D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: IIC MEETING, JULY 6, 1950

An IIC meeting is scheduled to be held in your office at 2:30 p.m., July 6, 1950.

Attached hereto is the proposed agenda for the meeting.

Also attached in connection with the problem pertaining to the Neutralizing Espionage and Subversive Activities of Foreign Diplomatic and Official Personnel is a memorandum analyzing the ICIS report in connection with this problem. (Tab 1)

In connection with the problem of Restrictions on Representatives of Foreign Countries Handling Classified Work Within the United States, there is attached hereto a copy of the report submitted for approval by ICIS. The report has been outlined in the agenda and there appears to be no objection to the policy outlined in the report other than the fact that it excludes all officially accredited diplomatic or consular representatives. The Working Committee has suggested that the State Department designate only certain diplomatic representatives to be excluded. (Tab 2)

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved by you, copies of the agenda will be distributed by liaison to the other IIC members and Pat Coyne.

Attachments

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MINUTES OF MEETING
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
JULY 6, 1950

A meeting of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference was held in the office of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Room 5633, Department of Justice Building, which meeting began at 2:40 p.m. on July 6, 1950. Those in attendance were as follows:

For the Department of the Army	Major General S. LeRoy Irwin Colonel John W. Middleton
For the Department of the Navy	Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson Captain Emory P. Hylant
For the Federal Bureau of Investigation	Director John Edgar Hoover Assistant to the Director D. M. Ladd
For the Department of the Air Force	Lieutenant Colonel Walter R. Graalman Mr. Gilbert Levy
For the National Security Council	Mr. J. Patrick Coyne
Secretary	Mr. Edward S. Sanders

The following was the order of business:

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[redacted]

Mr. Levy advised that he would keep the Bureau advised in this regard.

ICIS - Neutralizing Espionage and Subversive Activities of Foreign Diplomatic and Official Personnel

Mr. Hoover advised that the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security has considered this problem and has furnished for IIC comment a report of its sub-committee, which report had been adopted by ICIS.

It was pointed out that ICIS advised that, due to the variable factors of each case, it has not been possible to establish definite overall policy to be followed when it is shown that a foreign diplomat or official representative is engaged in subversive or espionage activities. The report provides that each case, with all relevant facts, should be brought to the attention of the Secretary of State who will consider the case and advise concerning the individual's official status, whether his alleged activities are relevant to his official duties, whether action against an individual who does not enjoy complete diplomatic immunity would injure this country's foreign relations, and, in the case of a person enjoying diplomatic immunity, whether those activities warrant his being declared persona non grata.

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It was noted that the Working Committee had recommended that the ICIS be advised by letter that the report had been reviewed and that the IIC has no objections to the report.

The Working Committee prepared a suggested letter to ICIS in this connection which further referre to related problems being considered by ICIS and asked that the IIC be informed of decisions made in connection with the related questions.

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Mr. Hoover stated that he felt that the related problems of detention of diplomatic personnel, diplomatic establishments, [redacted] and other related matters should receive early consideration by ICIS, inasmuch as there is a definite need for a policy to be followed immediately upon outbreak of hostilities. He pointed out that highly secret plans have already been made in connection with the suspension of habeas corpus and other related matters, and that such plans have been implemented to the point where the IIC agencies can move immediately, in the event of hostilities.

The other members of the IIC agreed and Colonel Graalman suggested that the letter to ICIS definitely point out an immediate need for having such policy established.

Referral/Consult

Mr. Coyne advised that this matter had been the subject of several discussions in the ICIS Standing Committee and that [redacted]

Mr. Hoover stated that, as in the case of Pearl Harbor, he was afraid there would be so much confusion that delay would result which would place the intelligence agencies in the same position as they found themselves in subsequent to Pearl Harbor. Such delays would materially and adversely affect the operations of intelligence agencies and might endanger the internal security of the country.

The members agreed that the letter to ICIS should contain a paragraph setting forth the IIC feelings and stressing the urgency of early consideration and decision in connection with these related problems.

The suggested letter is being prepared by the Secretary and the approval of each of the IIC members will be obtained prior to the forwarding of the letter to ICIS.

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ICIS - Subcommittee Report - Restrictions on Representatives of Foreign Countries Handling Classified Work within the United States

Mr. Hoover advised that the ICIS Standing Committee has adopted a report of its subcommittee in connection with this problem. Copies of the report were furnished to the IIC Secretary and thereafter distributed to the IIC members. The report has not as yet been adopted by ICIS inasmuch as it was felt necessary to clear this report with various interested agencies prior to its final adoption by ICIS.

The report pertains to representatives of foreign governments working within the United States and its territories and possessions on specified programs or projects of this government and provides generally for the following:

1. The foreign government must transmit to the United States a personal history statement concerning the individual to be working in the United States.

2. The foreign country must certify that it has information corroborating the answers in the personal history statement and that such representative will not endanger or constitute a threat to the security of the United States and that classified government data of the United States will be safeguarded in a manner acceptable to the United States.

3. Fingerprints and a photograph of the proposed representative must be submitted.

4. For the purpose of checking the name through the various intelligence files, copies of the personal history statement will be distributed to the FBI, IDA, OSI, ONI [redacted] and other likely sources of information.

5. The fingerprints will be transmitted to the FBI for processing.

Referral/Consult

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6. The Department of State and [redacted] will be requested Referral/Consult to furnish pertinent available information obtained in the country represented by the individual.

7. The proposed procedures should apply to all representatives of foreign governments who will have access to classified government data.

The report states that this does not apply to officially accredited diplomatic or consular representatives.

The Working Committee recommended that a letter be addressed to ICIS, which letter would advise that the report has been reviewed by IIC and that there is no objection to the report other than the exclusion from its provisions of all diplomatic or consular representatives. The Working Committee was of the opinion that if all the diplomatic and consular representatives are excluded, steps would immediately be taken by many foreign individuals to be included on the official diplomatic or consular list in order to escape the requirements contemplated by the report. The Working Committee suggested that the State Department designate a list of diplomatic personnel that should be excluded. The Working Committee felt that all individuals with the exception of top-ranking diplomats should be included within the provisons of instant report. Referral/Consult

[redacted]

A general discussion of this problem revealed that there is apparently [redacted] General Schmidt is a member of ICIS and will report to ICIS.

[redacted] It was agreed that no action in this connection will be taken by IIC until such time as this problem

Referral/Consult

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[redacted]

Conferences Covering Internal Security Matters

Referral/Consult

During the course of the discussion concerning restrictions on representatives of foreign countries handling classified work within the United States, reference was made to the [redacted]

Mr. Hoover advised that he had ascertained that [redacted]

[redacted])(U)

Referral/Consult

Mr. Coyne stated that he desired that the IIC records of this meeting indicate that subsequent to the June 8, 1950, IIC meeting, he had contacted [redacted]

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Referral/Consult

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[redacted]

Mr. Hoover stated that in spite of the fact that IIC inquiries concerning the conferences had met with the receipt of such information, the conferences nevertheless did touch on matters pertaining directly to the internal security of the country. He stated that the Fuchs case was investigated entirely by the FBI; that there are additional related cases under investigation by the Bureau and that there are several cases awaiting prosecution in connection withthe Fuchs case.

Referral/Consult

He stated that he was concerned over the fact that such meetings and conferences are being held and that representatives from the agencies charged with the internal security responsibilities are not being requested to attend the conferences. Mr. Hoover stated that although [redacted]

Referral/Consult

Admiral Johnson inquired as to who called the conferences and under what authority. He was advised that apparently the conferences had been [redacted]

Referral/Consult

General Irwin suggested that a letter be directed to Mr. Coyne or to the National Security Council objecting to such procedures and urging that steps be taken in order that such conferences cannot be called in the future without the appropriate representation from IIC or ICIS. General Irwin further stated that he did not think such conferences were authoritative or fruitful without such representatives.

It was agreed that such letter should be addressed to the National Security Council. A letter is being prepared in this regard by the Secretary

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and approval thereof will be obtained from each of the IIC members prior to its transmittal to the National Security Council.

Issuance of a Presidential Directive Regarding Investigative Work in Matters Pertaining to Espionage, Sabotage, Subversive Activities and Related Matters

Mr. Hoover called attention to the fact that, by letter dated July 5, 1950 addressed to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, a suggested Presidential Directive had been forwarded which set forth the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation pertaining to investigative work on matters pertaining to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters. Mr. Hoover pointed out that for the most part this is a reissuance of prior Presidential Directives but that the prior Directives are brought up to date and contained in one suggested directive.

Copies of this suggested directive and the letter to the Executive Secretary, NSC, have been previously furnished to each of the IIC members and to Mr. Coyne.

Request of NSC for Preparation of Papers on "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security"

Mr. Hoover pointed out that the FBI had received on July 3, 1950 a memorandum from Mr. Coyne transmitting copies of a report made by the Secretaries of State and Defense, a copy of the request made to NSC by the President in connection with the report and a suggested draft copy of a paper concerning the Internal Security Program which had been prepared by Mr. Coyne. Mr. Hoover pointed out that the IIC and ICIS have been requested to prepare papers covering the Internal Security Program in order that the combined reports from IIC and ICIS may be included in an over-all report to be furnished to the President by NSC.

Mr. Hoover also stated he was concerned with the short period of time in which the IIC is supposed to prepare the report, it being noted that

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the report is due back to Mr. Coyne by July 20, 1950.

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Mr. Coyne advised that it was not until June 30, 1950, that a decision was reached by the National Security Council Staff that a request be made of the IIC and ICIS agencies to prepare the portion of the report pertaining to their respective responsibilities in the internal security field.

Mr. Hoover stated that FBI personnel are presently working on the FBI portion of the report and suggested that the other IIC agencies designate representatives to meet with Bureau representatives for the purpose of preparing instant report. Each of the IIC members advised that a representative would be designated.

Mr. Hoover stated that he felt that the coordination of the IIC and ICIS reports should be made probably by Mr. Coyne inasmuch as he did not feel the IIC had time to prepare an adequate report and correlate it with the ICIS report by July 20.

Mr. Coyne suggested that he would be glad to meet with representatives of IIC and ICIS after each had completed the necessary report. Mr. Coyne stated he felt that would probably be the most desirable way in which to handle the coordination if the plan met with the approval of the IIC members.

It was agreed that the IIC should compile its report, approved by each of the IIC members, and that the report could then be correlated with the ICIS report with Mr. Coyne's assistance and that the report, after correlation, should again be approved by each of the IIC members.

Mr. Coyne suggested that if at all possible the joint memorandum to be included for the President should not exceed more than four or five pages. He suggested, however, that any material desired could be placed in an appendix.

Mr. Hoover stated that it would not be possible to write the report in four pages, but that a summary of the report could be reduced to the desired number of pages and the IIC and ICIS reports attached in the appendix.

FBI Special Agent to be assigned to Panama Canal Zone for liaison duties.

General Irwin referred to previous discussions with Mr. Hoover concerning the designation of an agent of the FBI to serve in a liaison capacity with the armed services in the Panama Canal Zone and inquired as to whether Mr. Hoover had received his letter in this regard. Mr. Hoover stated that he had just received the letter and that a Special Agent would be designated immediately.

****

There being no further business to come before the conference, the meeting was adjourned at 3:40 P.M. The next regular meeting is scheduled for August 3, 1950.

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OFFICE MEMORANDUM UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: THE DIRECTOR DATE: July 7, 1950

FROM: D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: IIC MEETING
JULY 6, 1950

Attached hereto are the minutes of the IIC Meeting held in your office on July 6, 1950.

If approved by you, it is suggested that the attached letter to General Irwin forwarding a copy of the minutes be dispatched. Copies of the letter to General Irwin with copies of the minutes are attached for the other members of the IIC and Mr. Coyne.

Attachment

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SAC, Anchorage

July 7, 1950

Director, FBI

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
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ON 5/27/94
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At the June 8, 1950, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, it was pointed out that the Alaskan Joint Command is preparing a plan which will provide for a means of obtaining intelligence information in the event Alaska or a part of Alaska is occupied by enemy forces. The plan contemplates the selection, training and equipping of selected United States citizens who are long established residents of the section of Alaska for which they would be expected to provide coverage. The plan further contemplates that these individuals would have no previous military record.

Referral/Consult

On July 6, 1950, at the IIC meeting it was agreed that the FBI should set up and provide for the operation of the stay-behind agents who would obtain intelligence information if all of Alaska or a portion thereof might be occupied by the enemy.

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

You are instructed to draft a proposed program for the operation of stay-behind intelligence agents in Alaska in the event of an emergency. Your plans for this project are to be submitted to the Bureau for review at the earliest possible date. The Bureau is likewise studying this problem and you will be promptly informed of any pertinent developments in this regard.

You should bear in mind at the outset the objectives of this program, namely:

1. The type of intelligence information desired from Alaska in case of conquest by the enemy.
2. Methods of communication with stay-behind agents whereby the desired information and reports can be received.
3. Location of strategic areas and vital facilities where immediate coverage would be of first and paramount importance, such as the coast line, shipping lanes and other transportation and communication centers.

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Special consideration should be given by you to that portion of the proposed plan dealing with the selection, training and equipping of stay-behind agents. In this connection the question of payment of funds to stay-behind agents should be explored.

The importance of this proposed plan cannot be over emphasized. It is one in which good imagination must be used, and practical results are expected.

You are to give this matter your personal attention. It is imperative that the Bureau fulfill its commitments in regard to this program and an early reply to this communication is expected.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 7/24/50

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PIAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION ESPIONAGE - R

Referral/Consult

Rebulet July 7, 1950.

Immediately upon the receipt of the Bureau communication, this matter was discussed with [redacted]

[redacted]

Unless advised to the contrary, [redacted]

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OFFICE MEMORANDUM • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: August 7, 1950

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: IIC WORKING COMMITTEE MEETING
AUGUST 9, 1950

A meeting of the IIC Working Committee is scheduled for 2 p.m., August 9, 1950, in the office of Captain Hylant, Room 5C611, Pentagon Building. Attached hereto is the agenda for instant meeting.

Item Number 3 on the agenda pertains to Public Law Number 513, and it is contemplated that the discussion on this law, dealing with communications intelligence, will be general. There is attached for your use, however, a copy of a recent Bureau Bulletin pertaining to this law.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved by you, this agenda would be distributed to the other members of the Working Committee by liaison.

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AGENDA ~~FOR~~
FOR WORKING COMMITTEE
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
AUGUST 9, 1950

A meeting of the Working Committee, IIC, is scheduled for 2 p.m., August 9, 1950, in the office of Captain Emory P. Hylant, Room 5C611, Pentagon Building.

The order of business will be as follows:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/27/99 BY SP4 BJW/KDW 342251

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

Clearances For Red Cross Representatives

Colonel Carpenter has advised that representatives from the Red Cross have contacted the military services for the purpose of determining what arrangements, if any, can be made for the clearances of new employees of the Red Cross, who will be assigned to duty with the armed services or any position to see classified material. Colonel Carpenter has pointed out that he has discussed this matter with Red Cross representatives who have pointed out that Red Cross is extremely desirous of maintaining proper liaison and proper security in connection with its employees. Colonel Carpenter has advised he will brief the Committee in connection with this problem at instant meeting. He has advised that the total number of such new employees will be approximately 250.

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Public Law Number 513,
81st Congress

Colonel Middleton has pointed out that Public Law Number 513 of the 81st Congress makes it unlawful for any individual to transmit, use, or publish information concerning the communications intelligence of this Government. He has advised that while it is realized that violations of this law are within the primary jurisdiction of the FBI, it is the feeling of certain individuals within the Defense Establishment that efforts should be made to publicize the existence of this new law in order that the appropriate individuals will be aware of its existence and thereby not violate the law. He has stated that the Defense Department is very anxious that steps be taken in order to prevent violations rather than to prosecute such violations after they occur. Colonel Middleton will discuss this matter at instant meeting in order to determine whether the Committee has any objections to the appropriate officials of NME publicizing instant law.

[redacted]

The Committee may wish to refer this matter to ICIS inasmuch as it would appear to be within the jurisdiction of that Committee. Referral/Consult

Psychological Warfare

By letter dated March 6, 1950, the IIC forwarded to ICIS a letter pointing out certain types of propaganda being distributed throughout the United States. By letter dated July 17, 1950, ICIS has furnished a copy of a report dated May 17, 1950, concerning public morale and education. This report reaches the following conclusions:

a. That the establishment of a Domestic Information program is outside the province of the ICIS.

b. That there exist adequate media consisting of the Public Relations Officials or Offices in the several agencies and departments of the Government through which internal security educational and informational material can be released.

c. That the advantages and disadvantages of publicizing the projects and programs resulting from their deliberations may be considered by the subcommittees of ICIS in their recommendations.

d. That in reviewing reports, including progress reports from other agencies, the ICIS may consider and recommend to the responsible agency such public dissemination of information in regard thereto as ICIS deems appropriate.

This matter has been included on this agenda inasmuch as the Working Committee may wish to take cognizance of this report in the minutes for instant meeting.

Conferences Concerning
Internal Security Matters

As agreed at the IIC meeting of July 6, 1950, an approved letter dated July 12, 1950, was forwarded to Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, protesting the fact that conferences are being called by other Government agencies, during which conferences matters of an internal security nature are discussed without representatives of IIC or ICIS being present or invited.

By letter dated July 13, 1950, Mr. Lay advised that the IIC letter had been forwarded to [redacted]

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

[redacted] No members of the IIC or ICIS were present.

This matter is placed on the agenda at this time in order that the IIC agencies will be aware of the action taken in this matter to date.

ICIS Ad Hoc Committee
Concerning Industrial Security

By letter dated August 7, 1950, ICIS advised that ICIS recognizes that there appears to be overlapping of interests in the industrial security field. The letter states that the overlapping appears to be in the interests of the NSRB, the Department of Defense, the ICIS, and the IIC.

The letter states it is believed that problems relating to personnel security investigations of plant employees and the availability of information resulting from such investigations are matters which are, of course, within the province of the IIC interests and responsibility.

ICIS suggests that the IIC designate a representative to sit on an Ad Hoc Committee concerning the over-all problem of industrial security, which Committee is to have representatives from the Department of Defense, the Civil Defense Office of the NSRB, the Munitions Board of the Department of Defense, the IIC, and the ICIS. Colonel George W. Hanson of OSD is to be the Chairman of this Committee.

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MINUTES OF MEETING
WORKING COMMITTEE
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
AUGUST 9, 1950

A meeting of the Working Committee, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference was held on August 9, 1950, in the office of Captain H. F. Hylant, Room 5C611 Pentagon Building. The meeting began at 2:10 P.M. Those in attendance were as follows:

For the Department of the Army	Colonel John W. Middleton
For the Department of the Navy	Captain Emory P. Hylant Captain H. E. Keisker
For the Federal Bureau of Investigation	Mr. V. P. Keay
For the Department of the Air Force	Colonel William E. Carpenter
Secretary	Mr. Edward S. Sanders

The points for discussion were as follows:

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE

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Referral/Consult

[redacted]

CLEARANCES FOR RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVES

Colonel Carpenter advised that the Air Force had been contacted by Mr. Roy Johnson and Mr. Jack Prosser of the Red Cross, who had advised they had previously contacted the Army and Navy in connection with establishing a close liaison in the services for the purpose of securing the necessary clearances for Red Cross personnel, who would be assigned to the armed services and who might necessarily need access to certain classified information in order that the appropriate Red Cross planning could be conducted. The plan is for such Red Cross representatives to be cleared in the manner that other individuals are cleared for classified military information and the the clearances of the individuals would be in such manner as to be accepted by all three services.

Colonel Carpenter advised that a discussion of this matter indicated there would probably be 150 individuals who would be handling rather highly classified information and who would be working in administrative positions for the Red Cross. In addition, there would be a maximum number of approximately 1,000 that would need some type of clearances. The latter group would be assigned in hospitals, Army camps, etc.

Mr. Keay inquired as to whether actual investigations were required.

Colonel Middleton suggested that the clearances would have to follow the same rule as for any other individuals having access to classified

material - a background investigation for those requiring access to any top secret material, but only a national agency check for the majority of the individuals. It was estimated that the 150 individuals would need to be cleared for top secret.

Referral/Consult

Colonel Carpenter pointed out that arrangements had been made whereby [redacted]

It was suggested that the investigations would be handled under the provisions of the Delimitations Agreement in the same manner as followed concerning employees of industrial concerns handling classified contracts.

It was pointed out by Colonel Carpenter that the Red Cross is to appoint the Security Officer who would handle this entire program for the Red Cross and that information would be supplied only to the Security Officer. It was pointed out that one exception to this rule might be a request from General George C. Marshall.

Mr. Keay pointed out that the FBI has conducted name checks for the Red Cross in the past and is presently handling a few of the name checks. It was suggested that this program be handled entirely through the military services in the future in order to prevent duplication of work. Mr. Keay further stated it is of interest to the Bureau that the Red Cross is planning to appoint a Security Officer.

It was agreed that this matter should be placed on the next IIC Agenda and when final decisions are made a letter should be addressed to the Red Cross by the IIC Chairman advising of the procedures to be followed.

PUBLIC LAW NUMBER 513,
81st CONGRESS

Colonel Middleton pointed out that Public Law Number 513 of the 81st Congress makes it unlawful for any individual to transmit, use or publish information concerning the Communications Intelligence of this Government. He stated that this matter [redacted]

Referral/Consult

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[redacted]

This matter was discussed briefly at instant meeting and action thereon deferred until the next meeting of the Working Committee in order that the members might study the report and make appropriate recommendations for the next IIC meeting.

[redacted]

After a general discussion of this, it was agreed that a letter be written to ICIS furnishing this information to ICIS for what value it may have. It was noted that ICIS is considering related problems at the present time. It was agreed that this matter should not be held for the IIC Agenda and that a letter should be prepared in this connection by the Secretary for the signature of the IIC Chairman. The military members of the Committee gave approval of the letter at instant meeting. A letter is being prepared by the Secretary.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

By letter dated March 6, 1950, the IIC forwarded to ICIS a letter pointing out certain types of propaganda being distributed throughout the United States. By letter dated July 17, 1950, ICIS has furnished a copy of a report dated May 17, 1950, concerning public morale and education. This report reaches the following conclusions:

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a. That the establishment of a Domestic Information program is outside the province of the ICIS.

b. That there exist adequate media consisting of the Public Relations Officials or Offices in the several agencies and departments of the Government through which internal security educational and informational material can be released.

c. That the advantages and disadvantages of publicizing the projects and programs resulting from their deliberations may be considered by the subcommittees of ICIS in their recommendations.

d. That in reviewing reports, including progress reports from other agencies, the ICIS may consider and recommend to the responsible agency such public dissemination of information in regard thereto as ICIS deems appropriate.

The members of the Committee suggested that the minutes of the meeting reflect that this matter has been noted and suggested that it be placed on the next IIC Agenda in order that the official minutes of IIC will reflect the receipt of instant report from ICIS.

CONFERENCES CONCERNING
INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS

As agreed at the IIC meeting of July 6, 1950, an approved letter dated July 12, 1950, was forwarded to Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council protesting the fact that conferences are being called by other Government agencies, during which conferences matters of an internal security nature are discussed without representatives of IIC and ICIS being present or invited. Referral/Consult

By letter dated July 13, 1950, Mr. Lay advised that the IIC letter had been forwarded to [redacted] for any consideration and action deemed appropriate. It is to be recalled that the [redacted] No members of the IIC or ICIS were present.

It was agreed that the minutes of instant meeting should reflect that the receipt of the letter from Mr. Lay has been noted.

ICIS AD HOC COMMITTEE CONCERNING INDUSTRIAL SECURITY

Captain Hylant advised that by letter dated August 7, 1950 ICIS advised that ICIS recognizes that there appears to be overlapping of interests in the industrial security field. The letter states that the overlapping appears to be in the interests of NSRB, the Department of Defense, the ICIS, and the IIC.

The letter states it is believed that problems relating to personnel security investigations of plant employees and the availability of information resulting from such investigations are matters which are, of course, within the province of the IIC interests and responsibility.

ICIS suggests that the IIC designate a representative to sit on an Ad Hoc Committee concerning the over-all problem of industrial security, which Committee is to have representatives from the Department of Defense, the Civil Defense Office of the NSRB, the Munitions Board of the Department of Defense, the IIC, and the ICIS. Colonel George W. Hanson of OSD is to be the Chairman of this Committee.

The members of the Working Committee agreed that the ICIS letter is of such general character that it cannot be determined just what problems are concerned. It was agreed that the IIC Secretary should contact the ICIS Secretary for additional information and that the matter should be considered at the next IIC Working Committee meeting.

* * * * * * * *

There being no further business to come before the Committee, the meeting was adjourned at 3:45 P.M.

(COPY)
ms

OFFICE MEMORANDUM . UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

DATE: August 11, 1950

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: IIC WORKING COMMITTEE MEETING
AUGUST 9, 1950

Attached hereto are the minutes of the IIC Working Committee meeting, which was held on August 9, 1950.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved by you, it is recommended that copies of the minutes be furnished to the other members of the Working Committee via Liaison.

Attachment

ESS:ilw

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED 34225
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/27/94 BY SP2 BEW ICE

65-59264-

RECORDED
AUG 25 1950

SEP 26 1950

Best Copy Available

RECORDED - 2

INDEXED - 2

AUGUST 15, 1950

62-57214-2X

CRD, ANCHORAGE (4)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR [illegible] AND [illegible] CONTACT IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF EMERGENCY.

RE [illegible] (4) [illegible] (4) OCI, ANCHORAGE, [illegible] (4)

[illegible], ENDORSE [illegible] TO [illegible] (4)

[illegible] CHAIN, ALASKAN COMMAND, COLONEL [illegible] OCI AND [illegible]

[illegible] AND ADVISE [illegible] CONTACTED [illegible]. YOU ARE [illegible]

TO CONTACT OCI. [illegible] OF OCI AND IN COLLABORATION WITH [illegible]

[illegible] DELAY AND ADVISE [illegible] OBTAINING OF STAY-BEHIND AGENTS IN ALASKA

[illegible] OF EMERGENCY. ADVISE THE BUREAU WITHIN TEN DAYS OF [illegible]

[illegible]. IT IS [illegible] THAT IMMEDIATE AND PERSONAL ATTENTION AND

[illegible] IN THIS [illegible] SHOULD ENSUE [illegible].

(4)

(OICT-1212 EDL)

(4)

(4)

[illegible]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/31/96 SP2 BTJ/lm

(AUG 15 7 40 PM '50)

DIRECTOR FBI

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

(4)

C. H. Stephens

Classified by SP2 BTJ/lm

Declassify on: OADR 4-19-2000

(4)

(4)

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

DATE: August 14, 1950

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

Referral/Consult -

Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

SUBJECT: STAY-BEHIND AGENTS AND ESCAPE AND EVASION PLANS FOR ALASKA

Subsequent to the July 6, 1950, IIC meeting it was agreed that [redacted] Bureau would develop a network of stay-behind agents to be used by the Commanding General in Alaska in the event a portion or all of Alaska is occupied. [redacted] the Bureau field offices in Alaska were notified to proceed with plans for these stay-behind agents. The plan is to be closely coordinated with the desires of the Alaskan Commander.

Referral/Consult

Also under consideration was the plans for escape and evasion procedures for Alaska. This plan contemplates a system whereby U. S. air men brought down in Alaska during a period of occupation would be able to escape and return to U. S. forces. You will recall that [redacted]

At the August 9, 1950, IIC Working Committee meeting the Air Force representative advised that no decision has as yet been reached in connection with the escape and evasion program, [redacted] Air Intelligence is a member of the IAC and not of the IIC. Colonel Carpenter advised further that this matter will be brought up at the IAC meeting on August 18, 1950, and that the discussion will include stay-behind agents even though that portion of the question is settled and being handled by the IIC. The OSI representative feels that only confusion could result should [redacted] enter the picture for either of these programs. It was agreed that IIC members who also belong to IAC will take the position that the stay-behind agents program in Alaska is strictly an internal security matter and is presently being handled by the IIC.

Referral/Consult

RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Consult

It is recommended that the Bureau representative at the IAC meeting take the position that no problem exists insofar as the stay-behind agents program is concerned inasmuch as that problem is receiving the appropriate attention by [redacted] the Bureau.

RECORDED - 2 INDEXED 65-59264-2X 62-84407-116

It is further recommended that the Bureau representative take the position that escape and evasion plans in Alaska are also an internal security matter, the coordination of which is the responsibility of the IIC. In this connection it is recommended that IAC be advised that the IIC will, of course, coordinate this matter closely with Air Intelligence and give early consideration to any suggestions on the part of Air Intelligence or other IAC members.

AUG 18 1950

24

ESS:raw

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/31/94 BY SP2 BTJ/SC 34225

FBI/DOJ

Proposed plan for intelligence operations in the event of invasion

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

DATE: August 15, 1950

FROM : MR. BELMONT

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/31/95 BY SP2 [illegible]

PURPOSE:

To advise of the present status of the captioned program in which the Bureau is participating.

BACKGROUND:

Referral/Consult

It is recalled that at the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference meeting on July 6, 1950, it was agreed that the FBI [redacted] should set up and provide for the operation of stay-behind agents who would obtain intelligence information if all Alaska or a portion thereof might be occupied by the enemy.

By letter dated July 7, 1950, the Special Agent in Charge of the Anchorage Office was instructed by the Bureau to [redacted] draft a proposed program for the operation of stay-behind intelligence agents in Alaska in the event of an emergency.

The problem of "escape and evasion plans for Alaska", (a system whereby US air men brought down in Alaska during a period of occupation would be able to escape and return to US forces), was not discussed in the Bureau's letter of July 7, 1950, to Anchorage, in view of the fact that no decision at that time had been reached as to which agencies of the US Government would be responsible for directing such a program.

Referral/Consult

By letter dated July 24, 1950, advice was received from the SAC at Anchorage that immediately upon receipt of the Bureau's communication, the matter of stay-behind agents was discussed with [redacted]

The SAC at Anchorage added that the completion of the draft of the proposed program would be held up until [redacted]

[redacted]

WTB:ADS

RECORDED - [illegible]

AUG 21 1950

63 OCT 6 1950

RECOMMENDATION:

The above is for your information.

There is attached a proposed radiogram to the Anchorage Office, and if same meets with your approval, it is recommended it be transmitted to Anchorage.

Attachment

COPY
ms

ORANDUM . UNITED STATE

TO : MR. D. M. LADD DATE: August 17, 1950

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: PROGRESS REPORT ON INTERNAL SECURITY
PREPARED BY MR. COYNE OF NSC

By memorandum dated August 8, 1950, Pat Coyne has furnished to the IIC members a copy of a Progress Report which he proposes to make on August 21, 1950, to the National Security Council. The Progress Report covers the activities of the IIC and ICIS for the period, February 18, 1950 to July 31, 1950.

In so far as the IIC is concerned the report favorably comments upon the following items which have been handled by the IIC:

Referral/Consult

1. Delimiting the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI [redacted] in security matters in the Military Sea Transportation Service.

2. Agreement concerning [redacted] FBI responsibility in the setting up of a "stay-behind agent" program in Alaska.

3. Designation of FBI Agent to serve in a liaison capacity in the Panama Canal Zone.

4. Generally providing for additional intelligence coverage.

5. Discussions concerning the ramifications of the Fuchs Atomic Energy Case.

The foregoing matters are all of record in the minutes of the IIC.

Coyne has, in his report, pointed out the close coordination between IIC and ICIS and has mentioned that a coordinated plan for the acceleration of internal security measures is being prepared to be included in an over-all report to the President. This coordinated report concerning an accelerated internal security program has been completed by IIC and ICIS and referred to Coyne.

Coyne, in his report, likewise discusses the various accomplishments of ICIS during the pertinent period.

There is nothing in the report which reflects unfavorably upon the Bureau or upon the IIC. The other IIC members have advised Special Agent Sanders, IIC Secretary, they have no comments or objections concerning the report.

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SEP 13 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 3-31-94 BY SP2 BTS/KSP

SEP 26 1950

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the minutes of the next IIC Working Committee meeting and of the next IIC meeting take note of the mentioned report. No reply to Coyne is necessary.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

DATE: August 21, 1950

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: IIC WORKING COMMITTEE MEETING
AUGUST 23, 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-31-94 BY SP2BTP/SC

A meeting of the IIC Working Committee is scheduled to be held in your office at 2:00 P. M. August 23, 1950.

Attached hereto is the agenda for instant meeting. In connection with the item concerning Public Law No. 513, which makes it unlawful for any individual to transmit, use or publish information concerning the Communications Intelligence of this Government, it is noted that the

[redacted]

that [redacted] would not react unfavorably upon the Bureau or IIC, that the decision as to [redacted] should be left entirely to the [redacted]

It is recommended that the Bureau take this position at instant meeting of the IIC Working Committee in connection with this problem.

Referral/Consult

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved by you, it is recommended that the copies of the agenda be distributed by Liaison to the other members of the Working Committee.

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115 SEP 25 1950

53 SEP 26 1950

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August 10, 1950

CONFIDENTIAL
VIA LIAISON

Mr. J. Patrick Coyne
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Pat:

In reply to your letter of August 7, 1950, with which you enclosed a copy of a letter from Mr. Carlisle H. Humelsine, Acting Deputy Under Secretary, Department of State, addressed to Mr. Lay, I desire to point out that Mr. Humelsine's letter is not responsive to the letter of July 13, 1950, which was submitted by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference.

It will be recalled that referenced letter raised the point that in the future where matters dealing with internal security are discussed, it was felt that representatives of the appropriate intelligence agencies should be in attendance. Mr. Humelsine's reply does not indicate whether steps will be taken to see that representatives of either the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference or the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security are in attendance at future meetings of this nature.

Sincerely yours,

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

Attachment No. 2

DECLASSIFIED BY SP1 2BTT/50
ON 5/31-94
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-31-94 SP12BTG 15C

MINUTES OF MEETING
WORKING COMMITTEE
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
AUGUST 23, 1950

A meeting of the Working Committee, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, was held on August 23, 1950, in the office of Mr. D. M. Ladd, Room 5736, Department of Justice Building. The meeting began at 2:10 p. m. Those in attendance were as follows:

For the Department of the Army	Colonel John W. Middleton
For the Department of the Navy	Captain Emory P. Hylant
For the Federal Bureau of Investigation	Mr. D. M. Ladd Mr. V. P. Keay
For the Department of the Air Force	Colonel William E. Carpenter
Secretary	Mr. Edward S. Sanders

The points for discussion were as follows:

Escape and Evasion Program for Alaska

Mr. Ladd, the acting chairman, advised that [redacted] FBI are presently preparing a stay-behind agent program to be put into effect in Alaska in the event a portion or all of Alaska is occupied. It was noted that [redacted]

Mr. Ladd pointed out that to date no decision had been made in so far as to which agencies would handle the escape and evasion program and that apparently [redacted]

Referral/Consult

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Referral/Consult

[redacted] Colonel Carpenter pointed out that this matter has been pending since April or May and that the question still seems to be unsettled in so far as [redacted] He pointed out that, inasmuch as [redacted] he is of the opinion that the IIC should assert its jurisdiction and go on record as being ready, willing and able to coordinate the preparation of the escape and evasion program as well as the stay-behind agent program in Alaska.

Colonel Carpenter pointed out that, if IIC takes this positive stand, everyone concerned will be cognizant of this stand and, if anyone has any objections, it will bring the matter to a head.

Mr. Ladd advised that the FBI will be glad to go along with that recommendation and that in his opinion the matter needs to be settled in the immediate future inasmuch as the need for such programs is at present rather than in the future. Referral/Consult

This matter was generally discussed, and it was agreed by the members of the committee that the recommendation be made to the IIC at its next meeting that the Air Force be advised that it is the view of the IIC that this is a problem that should be worked out in Alaska by [redacted] the FBI. If there is no objection raised, the appropriate instructions can then be forwarded to Alaska and work can be instituted looking towards the completion of this escape and evasion program.

Public Law Number 513
81st Congress

Referral/Consult

Colonel Middleton at the August 9, 1950 meeting of the Working Committee pointed out that recently passed Public Law Number 513 makes it unlawful for any individual to transmit, use, or publish information concerning the Communications Intelligence of this Government. He advised that the matter was [redacted]

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

The matter was discussed at the August 9, 1950 meeting briefly and action thereon deferred until instant meeting of the IIC Working Committee. It was pointed out at the August 9th meeting that [redacted] would not react Referral/Consult unfavorably in all probability upon the IIC agencies in connection with their enforcement of Public Law Number 513. There was some belief, however, that should [redacted] It was agreed that further consideration would be given this matter at instant meeting.

Mr. Ladd suggested that it might be appropriate to refer this matter to the National Security Resources Board, Referral/Consult which is charged with censorship matters, inasmuch as the [redacted]

This matter was discussed by the members of the committee, and it was agreed that it be recommended to the IIC that this matter be [redacted] with the comment that it is believed more damage might ensue [redacted] Referral/Consult

Conferences Concerning
Internal Security Matters

Mr. Ladd pointed out that as agreed at the IIC meeting of July 6, 1950, an approved letter dated July 12, 1950, was forwarded to Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, protesting the fact that conferences are being called by other Government agencies during which conferences matters of an internal security nature are discussed without representatives of IIC and ICIS being present or invited.

By letter dated July 13, 1950, Mr. Lay advised that the IIC letter had been forwarded to the [redacted] for any consideration and action deemed appropriate. It is

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

to be recalled that [redacted] No members of the IIC or ICIS were present.

Referral/Consult

By memorandum dated August 7, 1950, Mr. Coyne forwarded to the IIC Chairman [redacted]

Also attached hereto, marked Attachment No. 2, is a copy of letter dated August 10, 1950, addressed to Mr. Coyne by the IIC Chairman, which points out that [redacted] to the IIC letter of July 13, 1950, inasmuch as [redacted]

Referral/Consult

It was agreed that this matter should be noted in the minutes of instant Working Committee meeting and should be placed on the agenda for the next IIC meeting in order that this correspondence may be noted in the minutes of the IIC.

Progress Report on Internal Security
Prepared by Mr. Coyne of NSC

By memorandum dated August 8, 1950, Mr. Coyne furnished to IIC members a copy of a Progress Report, which he proposed to make on August 21, 1950, to the National Security Council. The Progress Report covers the activities of the IIC and ICIS for the period of February 18, 1950 to July 31, 1950.

In so far as the IIC is concerned, the report favorably comments upon the following items which have been handled by the IIC:

1. Delimiting the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI [redacted] in security matters in connection with the Military Sea Transportati Service.

Referral/Consult

2. Agreement concerning [redacted] FBI responsibility in the setting up of

a "stay-behind" agent program in Alaska.

3. Designation of an FBI Agent to serve in a liaison capacity in the Panama Canal Zone.

4. Generally providing for additional intelligence coverage.

5. Discussions concerning the ramification of the Fuchs Atomic Energy Case.

The foregoing matters are on record in the minutes of the IIC.

Coyne has, in his report, pointed out the close coordination between IIC and ICIS and has mentioned that a coordinated plan for the acceleration of internal security measures is being prepared to be included in his over-all report to the President. This coordinated report concerning an accelerated internal security program has been completed by IIC and ICIS and referred to Coyne.

In his report, Coyne likewise discusses the various accomplishments of ICIS during the pertinent period.

The members of the Working Committee agreed that there is no objection to Coyne's report and agreed that the minutes of the Working Committee should reflect that this report has been noted. It was also agreed that this matter should be placed on the agenda for the next IIC meeting in order that the IIC minutes will reflect the approval of this report.

* * * * * *

There being no further business to come before the committee, the meeting was adjourned at 3:05 p.m.

Attachments

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-1-94 BY SP12BTP5/SC
34225/

AGENDA
FOR WORKING COMMITTEE
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
AUGUST 23, 1950

A meeting of the Working Committee, IIC, is scheduled for 2:00 P. M. August 23, 1950, in the office of Mr. D. M. Ladd, Room 5736, Department of Justice Building, The order of business will be as follows:

[redacted] Referral/Consult

The [redacted] FBI are presently preparing a stay-behind agent program to be put into effect in Alaska in the event a portion or all of Alaska is occupied. At the August 9, 1950 meeting of the Working Committee, it was pointed out by the OSI representative that no agreement has as yet been reached in connection with the escape and evasion program to be used in Alaska in case of such an emergency. It was pointed out that [redacted] The decision was made however that [redacted] FBI should prepare the stay-behind agent program and that further discussions would be held looking towards a solution for the escape and evasion program.

[redacted] Referral/Consult

Public Law Number 513
81st Congress

Colonel Middleton at the August 9, 1950 meeting of the Working Committee pointed out that recently passed Public Law Number 513 makes it unlawful for any individual to transmit, use, or publish information concerning the Communications Intelligence of this Government. He advised that the matter

ENCLOSURE

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Referral/Consult

was [redacted]

The matter was discussed at the August 9, 1950 meeting briefly and action thereon deferred until instant meeting of the IIC Working Committee. It was pointed out the August 9th meeting that [redacted] would not react unfavorably in all probability upon the IIC agencies in connection with their enforcement of Public Law Number 513. There was some belief, however, that should [redacted] they would react unfavorably and might consider the receipt of [redacted] It was agreed that further consideration would be given this matter at instant meeting.

Referral/Consult

Conferences Concerning
Internal Security Matters

As agreed at the IIC meeting of July 6, 1950, an approved letter dated July 12, 1950, was forwarded to Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, protesting the fact that conferences are being called by other Government agencies during which conferences matters of an internal security nature are discussed without representatives of IIC and ICIS being present or invited.

By letter dated July 13, 1950, Mr. Lay advised that the IIC letter had been forwarded to [redacted] for any consideration and action deemed appropriate. It is to be recalled that the [redacted]

Referral/Consult

2. Agreement concerning [redacted] FBI responsibility in the setting up of a "stay-behind" agent program in Alaska. Referral/Consult

3. Designation of an FBI agent to serve in a liaison capacity in the Panama Canal Zone.

4. Generally providing for additional intelligence coverage.

5. Discussions concerning the ramification of the Fuchs Atomic Energy Case.

The foregoing matters are on record in the minutes of the IIC.

Coyne has, in his report, pointed out the close coordination between IIC and ICIS and has mentioned that a coordinated plan for the acceleration of internal security measures is being prepared to be included in his over-all report to the President. This coordinated report concerning an accelerated internal security program has been completed by IIC and ICIS and referred to Coyne.

In his report, Coyne likewise discusses the various accomplishments of ICIS during the pertinent period.

The members of the Working Committee were contacted by the Secretary and it was determined that there was no objection to the report, inasmuch as nothing in the report reflected unfavorably upon the activities of the IIC.

It is suggested that the minutes of instant meeting reflect the receipt and approval of Coyne's report.

(COPY)
ms

August 10, 1950

CONFIDENTIAL
VIA LIAISON

Mr. J. Patrick Coyne
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C.

Referral/Consult

Dear Pat:

In reply to your letter of August 7, 1950, with which you enclosed a copy of a letter from [redacted] addressed to Mr. Lay, I desire to point out that [redacted] letter is not responsive to the letter of July 13, 1950, which was submitted by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference.

Referral/Consult

It will be recalled that referenced letter raised the point that in the future where matters dealing with internal security are discussed, it was felt that representatives of the appropriate intelligence agencies should be in attendance. [redacted] reply does not indicate whether steps will be taken to see that representatives of either the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference or the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security are in attendance at future meetings of this nature.

Sincerely yours,

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

DWL:dad:ljt

DECLASSIFIED: DSP 12-8-77 (JSC)
BY: 5-31-94
342257

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OFFICE MEMORANDUM . UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD DATE: August 25, 1950

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: IIC WORKING COMMITTEE MEETING,
AUGUST 23, 1950

Attached hereto are the minutes of the IIC Working Committee meeting which was held in your office on August 23, 1950.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that copies of the minutes, if approved by you, be distributed by liaison to the other members of the Working Committee.

Attachment

ESS:hke

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 3-31-81 SP12 BTC 1

65-59264-

RECORDED
SEP 25 1950

INDEXED

SEP 26

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Rosen
Tracy
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Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTS/SM
ON 4-19-2000 -D-E-C-O-D-E-D COPY
00-1164

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

FROM ANCHORAGE 8-25-50 NR 252050 6-08 P.M.

DIRECTOR URGENT

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION. REBU RADIOGRAM AUGUST 16. LETTER BEING SUBMITTED TODAY WITH OUTLINE TENTATIVE PLAN.

RECEIVED 8-25-50 8-14 P.M. GW

Classified by ~~SP12B-TS/SM~~ 57364 18
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~ 34225

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EX-105

bvf-59264-3
AUG 31 1950

SECRET

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

SWB

65-59264

SEP

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SEPTEMBER

RADIOGRAM

URGENT

CONFIDENTIAL

SAC, ANCHORAGE

(CODE) (X) (C) (4)

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION,

ESPIONAGE - R. REURLET (JULY TWENTY-FOUR) (X) (C) (4) FURNISH IMMEDIATELY COPY

REFERENCED BULET (JULY SEVEN) (X) (C) (4) REURLET (AUGUST TWENTY-FIVE) (X) (C) (4) FURNISH

IMMEDIATELY COPY REFERENCED BULET (JULY TWENTY-SEVEN) (X) (C) (4)

HOOVER

LM:MAR

NR 21 0022

(Enc 22
0025-0047) (C) (4)

(Clerical 0050-0105) (C) (4)

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DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTJ/sm
ON 4-19-2000
00-1164

Classified by SP1-8TJ/SC
Declassify on: OADR 34225

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C.F. 5

ANY ATTACHMENT CONTAINED
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Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Candy

Seattle Phila (9/20/50) (X) (C) (4) 9:11 P.M. Rev

65-59264

5 OCT 18 1950 (X) (C) (4)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Neaso	
Miss Gandy	

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 8-25-50

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR ~~INTELLIGENCE~~ COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION ESPIONAGE - R

DECLASSIFIED BY 34227 SP2 BIS/SC ON 5/31/94

Re:

1. Anchorage letter to the Bureau dated 1-27-50 entitled, "Conferences with Intelligence Authorities; Plan Proposed by Director of Intelligence, Alaskan Command, to Place Network of Sleeper Agents in Alaska."

2. Bulet dated 2-15-50 to Anchorage entitled as No. 1 above.

3. Bulet dated 6-20-50 to Anchorage entitled "Inter-Departmental Intelligence Conferences; Stay-behind Agents."

4. Bureau radiogram dated 6-23-50 titled as No. 3 above.

5. Bulet dated July 27, 1950 entitled "Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in Event of Invasion; Espionage - R."

Referral/Consult Bureau radiogram dated 8-16-50 to Anchorage titled as No. 5.

[redacted]

The following documents, which were made available to this office by [redacted] on a confidential basis, are being submitted to the Bureau for aid in its study of this proposal. It should be pointed out that all of these documents are labeled "Top Secret" [redacted] It is suggested that direct reference to them should not be made by Bureau officials in conferences with other agencies.

It is noted that copies of the [redacted]

These documents are: [redacted]

RETURNED 108 INDEXED 108 66-1605-95

Enclosure [redacted]

JHW:MR

R 58 NOV 21 1950

EX-71

b6
b7C

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

Also as of possible aid to the Bureau in the contemplation of this proposal the following observations of this Division are being set forth:

1. It is noted that all information to be obtained by the Agents of the proposed network will be of a military nature.

2. The best possible means of communication between principal and agent in this network would appear to be contact by airplane. This infers a dominance of the Air Force in this particular phase of the operation.

3. The training of the Agents in this network must necessarily be profoundly influenced by the military authorities to teach agents such subjects as identification of planes; identification of weapons; interpretation of troop movements and activities and other matters of interest only to the military.

4. All agents located in isolated areas must be taught arctic survival, provided with appropriate gear and weapons. These facilities are available at the present time only to the military, which would infer that they would dominate this phase.

Referral/Consult

5. It is noted that in the enclosure from [redacted] However, no outward manifestation of such reluctance has come to my attention.

6. It is believed that an operation of the type proposed can be more efficiently effected by a single agency handling requests from the various services and passing on data obtained to the interested services. A joint enterprise would lack the necessary speed of decision and fixing of responsibility.

Any suggestions which the Bureau may have in the furtherance of this matter will be sincerely appreciated by the Anchorage Division.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 9-20-50

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION ESPIONAGE - R

Rebutel 9-20-50.

Copies of the referenced Bulet of July 7, 1950, referred to in Anchorage letter of July 24, 1950, are being transmitted herewith.

The referenced Bureau letter of July 27, as noted in Anchorage letter of August 25, 1950, was dated inadvertently. The correct date should have been Bulet of July 7, 1950. Hence, it is the same letter referred to in paragraph one above.

Enclosure

JHW:MR
65-298

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTT/LP
ON 5-31-94
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RECORDED - 42

SEP 23 1950

2 ENC

63 SEP 29 1950

C
O
P

TO: SAC, Anchorage

FROM: Director, FBI

July 7, 1950 Y

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
ESPIONAGE - R

At the June 8, 1950, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, it was pointed out that the Alaskan Joint Command is preparing a plan which will provide for a means of obtaining intelligence information in the event Alaska or a part of Alaska is occupied by enemy forces. The plan contemplates the selection, training and equipping of selected United States citizens who are long established residents of the section of Alaska for which they would be expected to provide coverage. The plan further contemplates that these individuals would have no previous military record.

Referral/Consult

On July 6, 1950, at the IIC meeting it was agreed that the FBI [redacted] should set up and provide for the operation of the stay-behind agents who would obtain intelligence information if all of Alaska or a portion thereof might be occupied by the enemy.

[redacted]

You are instructed to [redacted] draft a proposed program for the operation of stay-behind intelligence agents in Alaska in the event of an emergency. Your plans for this project are to be submitted to the Bureau for review at the earliest possible date. The Bureau is likewise studying this problem and you will be promptly informed of any pertinent developments in this regard.

You should bear in mind at the outset the objectives of this program, namely:

1. The type of intelligence information desired from Alaska in case of conquest by the enemy.

2. Methods of communication with stay-behind agents whereby the desired information and reports can be received.

3. Location of strategic areas and vital facilities where immediate coverage would be of first and paramount importance, such as the coast line, shipping lanes and other transportation and communication centers.

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COPY

Special consideration should be given by you to that portion of the proposed plan dealing with the selection, training and equipping of stay-behind agents. In this connection the question of payment of funds to stay-behind agents should be explored.

The importance of this proposed plan cannot be over emphasized. It is one in which good imagination must be used, and practical results are expected.

You are to give this matter your personal attention. It is imperative that the Bureau fulfill its commitments in regard to this program and an early reply to this communication is expected.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

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Mohr
Tele. Room
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Gandy

DECODED COPY

FROM ANCHORAGE 9-25-50 NR 252105 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL. RE BUREAU LETTER SEPTEMBER 19 RE POSSIBLE VISIT COLONEL JUSTICE MARION CHAMBERS. CAPTAIN MINOR HEINE, PROGRESSIVE, DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, ALASKAN COMMAND, TELEPHONICALLY INFORMED, JUSTICE MARION CHAMBERS AND WALTER R. WALSH, PROGESSIONAL REPRESENTATIVES, PREPAREDNESS SUB COMMITTEE, SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, WHO PRECEDED SENATOR HUNT OF WYOMING, SALTENSTALL OF MASSACHUSETTS AND MORSE OF OREGON, REQUESTED INTERVIEW WITH ME 11 AM, 26TH INSTANT. THEY ARE CHECKING DEFENSE NEEDS OF ALASKA AND WILL PROBABLY QUERY ME REGARDING GENERAL INFO ON INTERNAL SECURITY. CAPTAIN HEINE STATED THEY HAD LETTER CHIEF OF STAFF OF AIR FORCE REQUESTING FULL COOPERATION. INTERVIEW WILL BE HELD ~~WHITE GUARD~~ TODAY. GENERAL QUESTIONS WILL BE ANSWERED, BUT REQUESTS FOR CONFIDENTIAL INFO WILL BE REFERRED TO BUREAU. DATA RE INTERVIEW WILL BE SUBMITTED IMMEDIATELY AFTER SAME HELD.

UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED

UNDERLINED PORTIONS ACTUAL DECODE. AWAITING CORRECTIONS.

G.I.R.-6

RECEIVED 9-25-50 6-41 PM TED

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ON 4-19-2000
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Classified by SP2BTJ/SC
Declassify on: OADR 5/31/225/

RECORDED - 127

65-59264-6

cc: Mr. Belmont

INDEXED - 127

OCT 3 1950

12

EX-29

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

SECRET

SAC, Anchorage

September 21, 1950

Director, FBI

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA
ESPIONAGE - R

65-59264-7

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ON 5-31-94
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Referral/Consult

Reurlet dated September 13, 1950.

RECORDED - 86

EX-16

The proposed plan for intelligence coverage in Alaska in the event of an invasion submitted by you has been reviewed. You should now [redacted] present concrete proposals for putting into effect the various parts of the program. Hereinafter the various points in your plan will be commented upon and instructions issued with regard to each.

Administration

You should make immediate recommendation as to the agency which should administer the plan.

Selection of Agents

You should make known to the Bureau immediately the number, identity, and location of each person now under consideration by you as a logical individual to be utilized in this plan. You should also advise the Bureau promptly concerning the number, location, and occupation of individuals being considered by OSI in connection with this plan.

You should also advise the Bureau promptly regarding your proposals for a program of recruitment of additional individuals.

You should take into consideration in connection with the utilization of any person the fact that he may be immobilized or liquidated or deported immediately by the Soviets in the event he falls within any of the categories known to have been deported or liquidated by the Soviets in their occupation of the Baltic States and Eastern Poland. You will recall that those areas were originally Czarist territory as was Alaska.

RECEIVED - DIRECTOR
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SEP 25 1950
FBI

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COMM-FBI

In this regard, you should bear in mind that individuals singled out for arrest by the Soviets in the Baltic States and Eastern Poland included members of non-Communist Political Parties, members of the State Police, Gendarmerie and prison staffs, officers, military judges and volunteers of national armies, persons expelled from the Communist Party, Trotskyites, Anarchists, refugees, representatives of foreign firms, persons who have travelled abroad, Government officials and civil servants, staff members of the Red Cross, persons active in local Religious Parishes, clergymen and their secretaries, "Aristocrats," Land owners, wealthy merchants, small traders and merchants, bankers, industrialists, hotel and restaurant proprietors, university professors, teachers, doctors, engineers, employees of the Forestry Service, farmers, skilled workmen, trade union officials, students, and employees of Transportation Services. (61-7559 Sub 2 Serial 5182 62-60950 Sub 25 Serial 28)

You will note from the forgoing list that the best "stay behind" Agents in urban areas from the standpoint of long range survival would be unskilled or semi-skilled workmen not engaged in any of the occupations indicated above and who were not officials of labor unions. You should also take into consideration the fact that wives and children of men deported were likewise deported.

Another point for consideration is the possible use of women as Agents. You are, of course, aware that in the Soviet Union women are assigned tasks involving heavy labor under guard and able-bodied female survivors of any invasion would probably be placed in labor battalions.

Location of Agents

You indicated in your plan that Southeastern Alaska has less strategic value than other parts of the territory. Consequently, efforts in developing a network of "stay behind" Agents should be concentrated in the most strategic areas.

In your letter of May 8, 1950, captioned "General Security Survey, Territory of Alaska" you indicated that

Referral/Consult

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You should determine immediately through OSI and other available military sources the most likely targets for invasion for the ensuing months of this year and concentrate your efforts toward recruiting Agents so as to appropriately cover those areas first and then extend your activities to other less strategic sections of Alaska.

You should submit to the Bureau immediately your plans in this regard.

Training of Agents

Referral/Consult

[redacted] you should recommend immediately a program of training indicating where, by whom, and under what circumstances the training would be given. You should also submit a suggested curriculum.

Payment of Agents

With regard to the payment of Agents you, of course, realize that possession of U. S. currency in occupied territories will be illegal and all U. S. money of any description will probably be confiscated by the Soviets for their own purposes. You should determine what can be used in lieu of money payments to Agents, bearing in mind that under Soviet occupation barter will probably be the most useful means of subsistence. Your recommendations in this regard should be specific.

Types of information to be obtained

Referring to the training of Agents, the types of information to be obtained should be clearly spelled out to the trainee so that there will be no confusion or as little confusion as possible in his mind as to the type and quality of data which he should risk communicating.

Communications

Your specific recommendations regarding the type of communications necessary in the various strategic areas in which you intend to establish your intelligence network should be carefully thought out and presented to the Bureau. It is realized that each area may present a different problem in communications. You should bear in mind the utilization of the most reliable and most loyal amateur radio operators in the territory.

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Referral/Consult

[redacted] clearing such assistance as is necessary from other military agencies, you should make [illegible] recommendations regarding the choice and method [illegible] of equipment which should be given to Agents in [illegible] and to Agents in [illegible] areas. You should bear in mind that any such equipment or kit of equipment should be compact, simple, reliable, and susceptible of concealment.

These matters should be handled promptly by you. It is noted that in your letter of May 8, 1951, regarding the "General Security Survey, Territory of Alaska," it was indicated that the needs of Alaska may be best for the Bureau in a world-wide campaign which would include all attacks upon Alaska. You should not consider that we have an Alaskan problem to meet. Your planning should be related toward the broader future.

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Sandy

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: September 21, 1950

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION ESPIONAGE - R

Tolson
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Glavin
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-31-91 BY SP2 STP/STP

Referral/Consult

Purpose:

To advise that under date of September 13, 1950, the Anchorage Office submitted a proposed outline of a program for intelligence coverage in Alaska in the event of an invasion, which was the result of [redacted] to advise that the program merely states a recognition of the problems involved, namely, administration of the program, selection and training of "stay behind" agents to be located in areas of strategic importance, the problem of payment and communications, the types of information to be obtained and equipment to be issued such "stay behind" agents. To submit for your approval a letter to Anchorage instructing that a detailed working plan be submitted promptly to show how they intend to cope with the problems pointed out in their letter of September 13; to recommend that these matters be discussed at the Seat of Government between FBI Liaison [redacted] after which additional suggestions and instructions will be issued to Anchorage.

Details:

Referral/Consult

Under date of September 13, 1950, the Anchorage Office submitted a proposed plan for intelligence coverage in Alaska in the event of invasion which had been prepared as a result of [redacted] This is attached for your information. The program sets forth the bare outlines of such activity and does not present any concrete proposals for putting into effect the selection and training of "stay behind" agents.

The proposed plan does, however, point out the problems which must be considered.

Hereinafter will be set forth a summation of the various problems raised and suggested comments on each:

Analysis of Plan

EX-16

The plan would provide an organization within Alaska designed to obtain and transmit such intelligence information as may be of value to the United States, to the Commander in Chief of the Alaska Command or to whatever other command may be charged with responsibilities for operations in the Territory of Alaska in the event that a part or all of that territory is invaded and occupied by the Armed Forces of an enemy.

RECORDED - 89
EX-16

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COMMENT: This statement of purpose is adequate.

The plan should be administered by an agency designated by the proper United States authorities having its headquarters outside of combat territory but the individual or individuals charged with liaison with the agents should be accessible to the Commander in Chief of the Alaska Command or to whatever other command of the United States as may be charged with responsibilities for operations in the Territory of Alaska.

Referral/Consult

COMMENT: The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference has already agreed that the FBI [redacted] should embark upon the program of selection and training of such an intelligence organization as may be required. The agency to administer the program when invasion of Alaska occurs should be decided upon now at the Seat of Government.

The person or persons responsible for selecting, training, paying and maintaining communications with the "stay behind" agents should be chosen with the aid and advice of representatives of the FBI and interested military and naval officials in Washington, D. C.

COMMENT: The person or persons directly responsible for selection, training, etc. of the agents should be under the direct supervision of the agency assigned to the execution of the plan. There should be at all times a complete chain of responsibility once the program has been definitely set. The FBI, if not the administering agent, should nevertheless have a voice in the selection of the persons mentioned since it is contemplated that the FBI will have had a hand in the selection of the "stay behind" agents themselves.

Agents selected should be residents of Alaska with established means of livelihood and logical reasons for being placed where they intend to operate and consideration should be given to businessmen, farmers, trappers, fishermen and "bush pilots." Selection of agents from the native groups, Eskimos, Indians, Aleuts, should be avoided because of their basic unreliability.

COMMENT: In making selection of agents, one should bear in mind the lessons of the Russian occupation of the Baltic countries and Eastern Poland which were areas originally owned by the Czar and which were occupied by the Soviets for incorporation into the USSR. Alaska was likewise a Czarist territory which the Soviets in line with their imperialistic policy might well occupy in the same manner that they occupied the Baltic states and Poland.

Depending on the individual situation of a community occupied by the Soviets, they might shoot the entire male population of a community. On the other hand, they might seize and deport to forced labor under guard to the Soviet Union or to some other portion of occupied Alaska a third or more of the population. For example, in the Baltic states and in Eastern Poland the following categories which would have equivalents in Alaska were seized and deported: Members of non-Communist political parties, members of state police, gendarmerie and prison staffs, war veterans, officers and military judges of national armies and volunteers of national armies, refugees and political emigres, representatives of foreign firms, persons who have traveled abroad, officials of national Government, Red Cross representatives, persons active in local religious parishes, clergymen and their secretaries, "aristocrats," landowners, merchants, bankers, industrialists, hotel and restaurant proprietors, university professors, teachers, Doctors, engineers, members of the Forestry Service, well-to-do-farmers, some poor farmers, skilled workers and anyone considered anti-Soviet and socially undesirable. (62-60950sub-25-28)

Assuming that such a list as that above would be given special attention in Alaska, the "stay behind" agents should be chosen unless compelling circumstances dictate otherwise from categories not so included. It should also be born in mind that non-Communist officials of labor unions were also given special attention in this regard by the Soviets. (62-60950sub-25-28)

Referral/Consult

At the present time, the number of individuals contemplated for use in this program by FBI, Anchorage [redacted] who would fall outside of the above-mentioned categories is not known.

"Stay behind" agents should be placed in strategic areas in Alaska with particular emphasis on the areas where airfields and ports are located. In this regard, Southeastern Alaska is of less strategic value then other parts of the territory for the placement of agents.

COMMENT: Because of the time element involved and the vast expanse of Alaskian territory to be covered, there should be a positive and immediate statement of priorities as to areas obtained from the military both in Alaska and at the Seat of Government.

Referral/Consult [redacted] priority in selection and training of agents should be given to these communities and their adjoining areas.

Agents should be trained singly and their identities withheld from each other and in addition to normal intelligence training, they should be trained in arctic survival, air drop and pick-up techniques, scouting, patroling, map reading and sketching.

COMMENT: Because of the emergency, it may not be practicable to train such individuals singly. However, it is sound intelligence technique to conceal identities of agents from each other so that the minimum amount of damage would be done if one was caught and broken by the Soviets.

Referral/Consult A proposed training program should be set up by FBI [redacted] and responsibility for the training fixed immediately.

The payment of agents will be handled by the person or persons operating them and worked out on an individual basis.

COMMENT: It should be recognized that under the Soviets occupation, American money would be called in and the use of it in Alaska made illegal. The matter of payment should be carefully worked

Referral/Consult out by FBI [redacted] and suggestions made since populations under Soviet control might likely subsist on a barter basis.

Agents should furnish military or non-military information as requested or indicated by their principals. They should also furnish information which would be of value which comes to their attention.

COMMENT: The type of information to be furnished or which would be considered desirable should be carefully spelled out in the training program so that there would be no confusion in the mind of the individual agent as to what he was to furnish.

Communications should be handled solely between principal and agent and never between agents. The types of communications would include short wave radio, either stationary or mobile to stationary or mobile listening posts. They might on occasion be handled by courier or by airplane pickup.

Referral/Consult

COMMENT: The type of communication best suited for each area in which it will be necessary to establish "stay behind" agents should be carefully thought out now by the FBI [redacted] Consideration should be given to utilizing the most loyal and reliable individuals among the numerous amateur radio operators in the territory.

Equipment to be placed at the disposal of an agent will depend entirely upon his physical location. Referral/Consult

COMMENT: There should be determined immediately by FBI [redacted] the minimum and maximum urban and rural equipment to be issued to "stay behind" agents. Under all circumstances, the equipment should be simple, workable and susceptible of careful concealment.

ACTION:

Referral/Consult

Attached for your approval is a letter to Anchorage setting forth the Bureau's observations on the various points covered above in the proposed plan and instructing Anchorage to [redacted] supply the desired information to the Bureau. It is also recommended that liaison discuss the proposed plan [redacted] at the Seat of Government in line with the comments made above and thereafter, the results of the observations [redacted] and such additional instructions as are necessary for the Anchorage Office should be submitted to Anchorage.

OK.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 9-13-50

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
ESPIONAGE - R

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

Referral/Consult

Re Anchorage letter to Bureau dated 8/25/50.

There are transmitted herewith two copies of a blind, undated memorandum captioned as above, which is the result of conferences [redacted] The participants in these conferences were ASAC JOHN F. DESMOND and myself representing this Division [redacted]

It is pointed out that the members of the intelligence conferences of this Division are cognizant of this plan and have been apprised of the context of the attached blind memorandum. These individuals represent the Director of Intelligence of the Alaskan Command, Captain MINOR HENIE; Director of G-2, Colonel WALLIS PERRY; Head of ONI, Kodiak Naval Base, Captain WILLIAM A. KAITNER, U.S.N.

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 RTTISC
ON 5/31/94
34225/

2 389 JHW:MR
65-298

EX-16

Memo Ladd 9-19-50 LW

MEMO DIR LET. ANCHORAGE 9-21-50 LW

ENCLOSURE

RECORDED - 89 | 65-59264-7

EX-16 SEP 18 1950

34

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SECRET

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY

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FROM ANCHORAGE 9-27-50 NR 271600 3:43 P.M.

DIRECTOR URGENT

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL. RE BUREAU RADIOGRAM SEPTEMBER 19, RE POSSIBLE VISIT COLONEL JUSTICE MARION CHAMBERS. REFER TO MY RADIOGRAM 25TH INSTANT, MAJOR WALTER R. WALSH, FORMER BUREAU AGENT, PROFESSIONAL STAFF REPRESENTATIVE, PREPAREDNESS SUB-COMMITTEE, SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, CALLED ON ME TODAY IN COMPANY OF CAPTAIN MINOR HEINE, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, ALASKA COMMAND. NO REQUEST FOR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION MADE BY WALSH. CHAMBERS NOT PRESENT.

RECEIVED 9-27-50 4:45 P.M. LL

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65-51264-8

OCT 6 1950

Classified by SP2-BTJ/JM
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTJ/JM
ON 4-19-2000
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SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

OCT 18 1950

SAC, Anchorage

October 4, 1950

Director, FBI

ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

RECORDED - 64

65-57[illegible]-9

Referral/Consult

It has now been agreed that [redacted] the Bureau have the responsibility for the development of an Escape and Evasion Program in Alaska.

Referral/Consult

You should immediately contact [redacted] in this regard and initiate the necessary conferences for the purpose of determining the needs in connection with this program in Alaska. Particular attention should be paid in this regard to the desires of the Commanding General of the Alaskan Command.

For your information, representatives of the Bureau [redacted] are presently making the appropriate arrangements for the obtaining of instructors for individuals to be utilized in the Stay-Behind Agent Program and the Escape and Evasion Program in Alaska. Special attention is also being given to special types of equipment which can be obtained for use in these programs. You will be kept advised of the results of conferences in Washington. You should however continue, [redacted] your study of the two programs and the Bureau should be kept advised of your needs, ideas and suggestions.

Referral/Consult

ESS:eb

CC: Mr. Whitson
Mr. Baker

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-31-94 BY SP12BTJ/sr

34225

RECEIVED DIRECTOR FBI OCT 5 1950 4 27 PM DEPT OF JUSTICE

OCT 5 4 27 PM 1950 RECEIVED U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE FBI

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

52 OCT 19 1950

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. M. Ladd

FROM : A. H. Belmont

DATE: October 4, 1950

SUBJECT: STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM AND ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM IN ALASKA

Tolson
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Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

Referral/Consult

On October 2, 1950, [redacted] discussed the Stay-Behind Agent Program in Alaska with Special Agent Sanders.

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

[redacted] you know at the IIC Working Committee Meeting on September 27, 1950.

[redacted] should also handle the Escape and Evasion Program in Alaska.

[redacted]

Attachment

ESS:eb

65-59264-9

RECORDED - 64

INDEXED - 64

OCT 10 1950

Referral/Consult

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-31-94 BY SP2BTJ/SC

34225

RECOMMENDATION: Referral/Consult

It is recommended that the attached letter to the Anchorage Office be forwarded which advises that the Escape and Evasion Program is now a responsibility of IIC to be administered by [redacted] the Bureau. The letter instructs that the SAC should immediately contact [redacted] in order to make plans in this connection.

It is further recommended that a Bureau representative be designated to coordinate these two programs [redacted] on a headquarters level and that Liaison immediately arrange for joint discussions concerning these programs. Referral/Consult

(OCTOBER 11, 1950) RADIOGRAM

CAC, ANCHORAGE

U. SENT

SP3-BIJ/SM

4-19-2000

65-11164

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA, REBULET SEPTEMBER TWENTY-ONE. ADVISE BY RADIOGRAM IMMEDIATELY (ONE) NUMBER AND LOCATION OF STAY-BEHIND AGENTS DEVELOPED TO DATE (TWO) MOST LIKELY TARGETS IN ALASKA FOR INVASION DURING ENSUING MONTHS OF THIS YEAR (THREE) WHAT STEPS YOU HAVE TAKEN TO DATE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDED TRAINING PROGRAM FOR STAY-BEHIND AGENTS. IN CONNECTION WITH BUREAU LETTER OCTOBER FOUR ENTITLED ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM ADVISE BY RADIOGRAM NO LATER THAN OCTOBER SIXTEEN SUMMARY OF ACTION TAKEN TO EFFECT DEVELOPMENT OF THE ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY ANCHORAGE WILL ADVISE THE BUREAU BY RADIOGRAM EVERY FOURTEEN DAYS OF PROGRESS BEING MADE IN CONNECTION WITH THESE TWO PROGRAMS. THIS MATTER MUST RECEIVE YOUR CONTINUOUS PERSONAL ATTENTION AND NO DELAYS IN HANDLING WILL BE PERMITTED. MAINTAIN CLOSE AND EFFECTIVE LIAISON [redacted] AND KEEP THE BUREAU CURRENTLY ADVISED OF ALL PERTINENT DEVELOPMENTS BY RADIOGRAM.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HOOVER

Referral/Consult

65-59264

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U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE
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Tele. Room
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Candy

Sent via Radio

Per Tel

CC-150

L BUREAU OF INVESTIG
TATES DEPARTMENT OF

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION. October 16, 1950 RADIOGRAM
URGENT
CONFIDENTIAL

Transmit the following message to: SAC, ANCHORAGE

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA. REUR RADIOGRAM OCTOBER THIRTEEN. ADVISE BY RADIOGRAM TOTAL NUMBER OF STAY BEHIND AGENTS NECESSARY FOR ADEQUATE COVERAGE THIS PROGRAM IN ALASKA WITH BREAKDOWN AS TO GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF PROPOSED AGENTS. ADVISE IMMEDIATELY IDENTITY OF EIGHT INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED YOUR RADIOGRAM OCTOBER THIRTEEN AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS, TOGETHER WITH SUMMARY OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE IN FILES OF ANCHORAGE OFFICE CONCERNING THEM. TO FACILITATE ADMINISTRATIVE HANDLING AT BUREAU, DATA CONCERNING STAY BEHIND AGENTS SHOULD BE REPORTED UNDER INSTANT CAPTION. INFORMATION CONCERNING ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM SHOULD BE REPORTED IN SEPARATE CASE FILE ENTITLED QUOTE ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM - ALASKA. UNQUOTE. THESE MATTERS ARE TO RECEIVE YOUR IMMEDIATE PERSONAL ATTENTION.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE

HOOVER

WTB:de

Classified by
Declassify on:

RECORDED - 90

Tolson
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BUFILE 65-59264

CLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTS/M
DECLASSIFY ON: 4-19-2000

SENT VIA Radio 10/16/50 9:46 P.M Per

RECORDED - 30

65-59[illegible]

SAC, Anchorage

November 7, 1950

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

Re your radiogram October 19, 1950.

A review of the files of the Bureau reflects no information, derogatory or otherwise, which is not already in the possession of the Anchorage Office concerning the following persons suggested by you as being potential stay-behind agents:

1. Frank B. Moore
2. [redacted]
3. Dr. Howard G. Romig
4. [redacted]
5. Antonio Polet
6. Sam Romack, aka Sinun Benich Skojo
7. Joe Danich

b6
b7C

You should immediately furnish the Bureau with the names of additional individuals who are being considered for development in connection with the Stay-Behind Agent Program.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-31-94/BY SP-12 BTP/STP

WTB:lfc:mod

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
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DECLASSIFIED BY SP3 BTJ/SM
ON 4-19-2000 00-1164

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F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

(DECODED COPY) (4) (4) (4)

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FROM ANCHORAGE (10-19-50) NR 190605 4-2[illegible]

DIRECTOR URGENT

PROPOSED PLANS FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA. REBURAD SIXTEENTH INSTANT. PRESENT ESTIMATES OF AGENTS NECESSARY FOR COVERAGE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS ARE: ANCHORAGE 10, FAIRBANKS 6, NOME 2, SEWARD 2, KOTZEBUE 1. IDENTITY OF INDIVIDUALS WHO POSSIBLY COULD MATURE AS AGENTS IN FOLLOWING LOCATIONS TOGETHER WITH CERTAIN DATA CONCERNING THEM FROM ANCHORAGE FILES AND PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE SET OUT BELOW: AT ANCHORAGE - FRANK B. MOORE, ALASKAN RESIDENT SINCE 1939, LICENSED HUNTING GUIDE, PRESENTLY EMPLOYED AS CARPENTER, APPROXIMATELY 45 YEARS OF AGE, FILES HERE REFLECT NOTHING CONCERNING HIM BUT PERSONALLY KNOWN TO SEVERAL AGENTS THIS OFFICE [redacted] HAS COVERED MUCH OF ALASKA, OWNS PLANE; [redacted] ANCHORAGE FILE REFLECTS NOTHING CONCERNING HIM; DOCTOR HOWARD G. ROMIG, NATIVE BORN ALASKAN, WORKED IN ANCHORAGE, LICENSED GUIDE, OWNS PLANE, HAS TEMPERAMENT AND DESIRE OF OUTDOOR LIFE, PERSONALLY KNOWN TO AGENTS THIS OFFICE, HAS BEEN CONTACTED FOR NUMBER OF YEARS BY AGENTS ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS. NOTHING DEROGATORY IN FILES THIS OFFICE. AT FAIRBANKS - [redacted] POSSIBLE AGENT. HAS BEEN IN TERRITORY FOR NUMBER OF YEARS AND WORKED AS [redacted] AND HAS GIVEN INFORMATION THIS OFFICE CONCERNING INDIVIDUALS BELIEVED DISLOYAL TO U.S.; NO DEROGATORY DATA IN ANCHORAGE FILES. AT NOME - ANTONIO POLET, BORN CAROLEW, ITALY 1881, CAME TO NOME DURING GOLD RUSH ABOUT 1900. OPERATES NATIVE CRAFT SHOP [redacted] WELL ACQUAINTED WITH ALASKA AND PEOPLE ON SEWARD PENINSULA, NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION IN FILES ANCHORAGE. AT SEWARD, SAM ROMACK BORN SINUN BENICH, SKOJO AT DALMATIA, 1892, NATURALIZED SEWARD, ALASKA, 1939, HAS BEEN IN ALASKA APPROXIMATELY 30 YEARS, WAS REPORTEDLY BOOTLEGGER DURING PROHIBITION AND ALLEGATIONS RECEIVED, UNVERIFIED AND UNCORROBORATED, THAT HE WAS PRO-NAZI DURING WORLD WAR TWO, HAS WORKED AS FISHERMAN, BRISTOL BAY AREA DURING SEASON FOR APPROXIMATELY TWENTY FIVE YEARS, NOW BAR PROPRIETOR AND HOTEL OWNER, HAS AIDED THIS OFFICE IN INVESTIGATIONS, INQUIRIES MADE CONCERNING HIM AND REPORTED IN MATTER ENTITLED QUOTE SAM ROMACK, WA, IS - UNQUOTE. CLOSING REPORT

RECORDED - 45
INDEXED - 45

165-5726A-12

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

SECRET

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

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PAGE 2

SUBMITTED TO BUREAU BY SPECIAL AGENT HAROLD F. DODGE, MAY 31, 1941 AT JUNEAU, ALASKA. AT GIRDWOOD ON ALASKA RAILROAD - JOE DANICH, POSSIBLE PROSPECT FOR AGENT, BORN ~~ANDREW GOSLAVLA~~ Yugoslavia, APPROXIMATELY FIFTY TWO YEARS AGO, CAME TO UNITED STATES AT AGE OF TWO, HAS BEEN IN ALASKA APPROXIMATELY THIRTY YEARS. VOCATION INCLUDES COAL MINER, COAL MINE OPERATOR, PROPRIETOR OF BAR AND NOW OWNS ONLY HOTEL AND BAR IN GIRDWOOD AREA, AS WELL AS GOLD MINE IN THAT AREA, IS WELL ACQUAINTED WITH THAT AREA AND PERSONS RESIDING THERE, HAS BEEN ARRESTED. IDENTICAL WITH F.B.I. NUMBER 5113769, HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY AGENTS THIS OFFICE IN PAST AND GIVEN FULL COOPERATION PARTICULARLY IN CRIMINAL MATTERS IN AND AROUND ANCHORAGE. AT KOTZEBUE [redacted] WAS BEING CONSIDERED BUT HE APPEARS UNSTABLE AND LOQUACIOUS, LIKEWISE OPINIONS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED THAT HE WOULD POSSIBLY DEAL WITH ANY ENEMY IF IT SERVED HIS OWN ENDS. ATTEMPTS WILL BE MADE TO OBTAIN OTHER PROSPECT THERE. CONFERENCE WAS HELD WITH [redacted] SIXTEENTH INSTANT AT WHICH TIME [redacted] CONFERENCE WAS HELD EIGHTEENTH INSTANT WITH [redacted] PROGRESS ON DETAILED PLANS WILL BE SUBMITTED WITHIN NEXT WEEK. (4)

RECEIVED 10-19-50 4:50 P.M. LL

Referral/Consult

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. Baker

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If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: October 17, 1950

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM IN ALASKA

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Referral/Consult

Reference is made to radiogram from Anchorage October 13, 1950, which set forth the extent of planning to date in connection with the Stay-Behind Agent Program and which stated that

[redacted]

The Director's notation on reference radiogram was, "Can't we get this settled one way or the other soon. H."

Referral/Consult

SA E. S. Sanders has been in constant touch with [redacted] in connection with these programs.

[redacted]

Immediately upon receipt of this paper it will be analyzed for your information.

RECOMMENDATION

The foregoing is for your information.

ESS:lae

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-31-94 BY SP2 BTP/JC

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INDEXED - 45

RECORDED - 45

65-59564-13

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37

56 OCT 31 1950

SERVICE UNIT
SEARCH SLIP 4-22a

Supervisor @BAKER Room 4243

Subj: SAM ROMACK

___Exact Spelling
_X_All References
___Subversive Ref.
___Main File
___Restricted to Locality of

Searchers
Initial Lyne
Date 10/21/50

FILE NUMBER	SERIALS
100-29746	1 Anchorage
105-9780-21-1	1
62-62736-2-15 44	1
Samuel Romack	
NR	
S. Romack	
NR	
one Romack	
62-56547-204	NI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-31-74 BY SP2 BCT 3/225 150

Complete (3)

Initialed

SERVICE UNIT O 4-22a

SEARCH SLIP

Supervisor Baker Room 4243

Subj: One Romig

✓ Exact Spelling
✓ All References
___ Subversive Ref.
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Date 10/21/50

FILE NUMBER	SERIALS
~~65-38185-2~~	NY
~~25-48~~	NY
~~97-1362-63~~	NY
~~26-38699-13~~	microfilm
~~97-13735-23~~	microfilm
~~100-2978-1-1 HQ~~	NY
~~29-11578-4~~	NY

Wpatter

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SERVICE UNIT 8 4-22a
SEARCH SLIP

Supervisor BAKER Room 4243

Subj: [redacted] b6 b7C

✓ Exact Spelling
X All References
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Searchers Initial JD
Date 10-12-50

FILE NUMBER	SERIALS
NR.	
[redacted]	
~~47-33133~~	NI
D.	
~~40-40579~~	NI
[redacted]	
~~70-9098~~	NI
[redacted]	
~~94-4-39-218~~	NI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-31-94 BY SP2 34225

13

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SERVICE UNIT 0 4-22a
SEARCH SLIP

Supervisor BAKER Room 4243

Subj: DR. HOWARD G. ROMIG

X Exact Spelling
X All References
___ Subversive Ref.
___ Main File
___ Restricted to Locality of

Searchers Initial [illegible]
Date 10/21/50

FILE NUMBER

SERIALS ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-31-94 BY SP2 [illegible]

NR
Howard Romig
NR
Mrs Howard G. Romig
~~100-119857-1~~ Wife-Deny
H. G. Romig
~~100-117920-25 pg 1~~ NT
~~100-130726-4~~ NT
~~100-119776-8~~ Nordenz.
~~100-130331-6~~ NI
~~100-124687-27 p 34~~ N.I.

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SEARCH SLIP

Supervisor BAKER Room 4243

Subj: [redacted] b6 b7C

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34-3225

~~100-243140-86~~ NI

~~100-7660~~ ~~NI 6-15-75~~ NI

~~100-243140-29~~ NI

[redacted]

~~116-7863-6~~ NI

[redacted]

~~100-34421-4~~, L, C.

[redacted] H.

~~64-37001-1-9, 24~~, NT

[redacted]

~~44-1486~~ I; [redacted] Fan-

~~92-21870-9~~ NI Mex

~~100-3057-20~~ 1-New Orleans

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Supervisor Baker Room 4243

Subj: [redacted]

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Date 10-21-80

FILE NUMBER	SERIALS
~~[redacted]~~	NI
~~[redacted]~~	NI
~~[redacted]~~	I-nonclerical
[redacted]	
~~[redacted]~~	NI
[redacted]	
~~[redacted]~~	NI
[redacted]	
~~[redacted]~~	NI
[redacted]	
~~[redacted]~~	NI
[redacted]	

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Supervisor BAKER Room 4243

Subj: ANTONIO POLET

___ Exact Spelling
X All References
___ Subversive Ref.
___ Main File
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Searchers
Initial
Date 12-21-50

FILE NUMBER ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-31-91 BY SP2 BJS/KC

~~100-15849-1~~ Nil

~~145-7-6446-16~~ Not deroy.

~~Ant. Tom. Polet (var)~~

~~145-5932-25~~ Not deroy.

~~145-9705-25~~ Not deroy.

~~100-9602-25-6~~ I - anarchy

A. Polet

~~100-53824-1~~ N. I

~~100-15846-3~~ Not deroy

~~100-8698-1~~ " "

~~100-55-1987-3~~ Not deroy.

~~100-65891-527~~ " "

Cor. of Ltr.

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SERVICE UNIT 0 4-22a
SEARCH SLIP

Supervisor BAKER Room 4243

Subj: [redacted] b6 b7C

___Exact Spelling
X All References
___Subversive Ref.
___Main File
___Restricted to Locality of

Searchers Initial md
Date 10-21-58

FILE NUMBER SERIALS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-31-94 BY SP2BTJ 150

NR - 34225

[redacted]

~~100-1-43~~ NT

[redacted]

~~100-348393-35, 1029~~ NT

One

~~100-1546~~ NI

~~100-1745-13~~ NI

~~100-56402-1-1316, 1333~~ NT

~~9-607-1~~

~~100-1647-293, 367~~ NI

~~100-8467-40~~ NI

~~100-175-38~~ NI

~~100-56495-2~~ NI

100-8467-44 NI

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SERVICE UNIT 0 4-22a

SEARCH SLIP

Supervisor Baker Room 4243

Subj [redacted]

Exact Spelling
All References
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Restricted to Locality of

Searchers
Initial
Date 10/21-58

FILE NUMBER	SERIALS
~~[redacted]~~	NT
[redacted]	
~~44-1486~~	1, 2, 3
~~100-344321-9~~	NT
~~100-126719-3~~	not dereg.
[redacted]	
~~100-344321-4~~	NT

12

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SERVICE UNIT 4-22a
SEARCH SLIP

Supervisor Barber Room 6263

Subj: SIMON BENICH SKOJO

✓ Exact Spelling
___ All References
___ Subversive Ref.
___ Main File
___ Restricted to Locality of

Searchers Initial CHC
Date 11-13-50

FILE NUMBER	SERIALS
NR	
SIMON BENICK SKOJO	
100-29746	1 X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-31-94 BY SP1 JRB/RSW 34525/1

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SERVICE UNIT O 4-22a
SEARCH SLIP

Supervisor Baker Room 4243

Subj: Al Polet (Alaska)

✓ Exact Spelling
All References
Subversive Ref..
Main File
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Searchers Initial Jmm
Date 10/21/42

FILE NUMBER	SERIALS
~~56-8700-1-11~~	Not dervog.
~~62-79036-1~~	Not dervog.
Alvin Polet (Alaska)	
~~65-37209-1-23~~	Not dervog.
~~66-8900-1-21~~	Not dervog.
Tony Polet	
~~65-53824-1~~	L. L.
Tony Polet	
NR	

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F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

DECODED COPY

FROM ANCHORAGE (10-13-50) NR 120150 11:43 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

RE PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA. REBURAD OCTOBER 12. EIGHT INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE SCHEDULED TO REMAIN IN ALASKA IF SAME INVADED ARE BEING CONSIDERED AS STAY-BEHIND AGENTS. CONTACT HAS BEEN MADE WITH THEM BUT NO DIRECT OFFER OR REQUEST MADE FOR THEM TO ACT AS AGENTS. THEY ARE LOCATED IN SEWARD, GIRDWOOD ON ALASKA RAILROAD, ANCHORAGE, FAIRBANKS, NOME AND KOTZEBUE. MOST LIKELY TARGETS IN ALASKA FOR INVASION DURING ENSUING MONTHS OF YEAR ARE NOME, FAIRBANKS, ANCHORAGE, SEWARD. WITH REFERENCE TO RECOMMENDED TRAINING PROGRAM FOR STAY-BEHIND AGENTS, IT IS NOTED

[redacted]

BOTH OF THESE MATTERS ARE BEING GIVEN CONTINUED AND VIGOROUS ATTENTION AND THE BUREAU WILL BE CURRENTLY ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS AS DIRECTED.

RECORDED - 45

OCT 27 1950

RECEIVED: 10-13-50 12:43 AM
CORRECTED: 10-13-50 6:00 PM MW 37

Referral/Consult

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

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CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 10-25-50

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA
ESPIONAGE - R

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2BTR/SC
ON 5-31-94

Referral/Consult

Ltr 9-21-50 and Anchorage radiogram to Bureau 10-18-50.

Enclosed herewith are two copies of a memorandum [redacted]

This memorandum was prepared [redacted] ASAC JOHN F. DESMOND and SA JAMES T. MORELAND were present.

The points covered in the memorandum and in the referenced Bureau letter follow the same order and it is desired to comment upon them as follows:

Referral/Consult

I. ADMINISTRATION

[redacted]

In connection with the administration of the instant program, it should be noted that due to the enormous size of Alaska (1/5 the size of the Continental United States) a great amount of travel will be required and a relatively large number of Bureau personnel will have to be assigned to inaugurate the plan for the purpose of recruiting agents, studying terrain, local communities, overland communications, etc. Also, additional office space in Anchorage will be necessary in order to properly set up the work of administering the program in its initial stages. It appears at the present time that

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

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65-298

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the administration headquarters could be in Anchorage, Alaska, thereby being easily accessible to the Commander in Chief of the Alaskan Command.

Referral/Consult

II. DEFINITIONS

[redacted]

III. SELECTION OF PERSONNEL

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

With regard to the number of agents to be recruited in each community, it is believed that [redacted] It is believed that for a population of 5,000 there should be one principal and five or six agents who would be required at the appropriate time to develop their own confidential informants. Even this number is relatively large. For example: In the Anchorage area, which has a population of 40,000, there would be 8 principals and 40 agents. [redacted]

The writer does not concur.

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

With regard to [redacted] it is believed that food caches, etc. are desirable for all "principals", but in the event of enemy occupation it would not necessarily follow that all principals should proceed to such caches. Some of them could remain in their natural habitat.

Also in connection with the selection of agents, it is desired to point out that there are many sections in Alaska which Bureau agents have not visited for two years or more and in some of these areas desirable agents might be developed among trappers, bush pilots, ham radio operators, etc. Canvassing such possibilities will require additional Bureau personnel.

[redacted] The writer does not believe that women should be excluded and that in some instances women may prove most useful.

Referral/Consult

IV. LOCATION OF AGENTS

[redacted] additional agents should be established in Seward, Kodiak, the Aleutian Islands, the Alaska Peninsula, along the route of the Alaska Railroad and along the Alaskan highways. Establishment of agents in these places will facilitate the transmission of communications in the event contemplated radio communications break down.

In all probability, agents established in isolated sections of Alaska will be more likely to evade capture by occupation forces and consequently should be more valuable. For example: In the event the community of Nome, Alaska (because of its location) is taken by the enemy, most, if not all of the population (1200) will be liquidated or transported to Siberia. This would mean the loss of all agents in Nome.

V. TRAINING OF AGENTS

[redacted] but that some agents will be in key positions and will be of greater importance than others. It is recommended that the most important agents, whether they be called principals or agents, be trained first and that all agents be trained as soon as possible.

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

With regard to [redacted] this is considered just as objectionable as training two or three agents from the same community. In order to insure the security of the program, each agent and principal should be trained individually. However, it may be necessary to dispense with this requirement because of the enormous expense that would be involved and the great amount of time that would be consumed in such a program.

3. In addition to the subjects set forth in the enclosed memorandum, it is recommended that the following matters also be included:

Aircraft and ship recognition	20 hours
Basic training in use of Russian dictionary	16 hours
Firearms training	16 hours
First aid training	20 hours
Bacteriological warfare	8 hours

The amounts of time specified for each subject will vary according to the ability and previous training of the agent.

Referral/Consult

VI. PAYMENT OF AGENTS

The enclosed memorandum [redacted]

It is believed that receipts should be required for certain expenditures where the obtaining of receipts will not jeopardize the security of the agent.

It is further recommended that payment be made by depositing salaries to agents' accounts in various banks in the United States, both during standby periods and during active duty. It would be unwise to pay agents by check in Alaska even during standby periods, because such checks or deposits would be immediately noted in small communities in which the agents reside and would cast suspicion upon them. For that reason, it is recommended that each agent have an account set up in some stateside bank to which payments could be made.

VII. TYPES OF INFORMATION TO BE OBTAINED

VIII. COMMUNICATIONS

In addition to the recommendation set forth in the enclosed memorandum,

it is recommended that communications also be made by radio to submarine or ship and by courier. For example: Agents stationed in Seward, Kodiak and other ports would be able to communicate with nearby submarines or ships according to a prearranged schedule by radio or signal flashes.

Consideration should also be given to overland couriers in the event that radios become inoperative. For example: Agents in the vicinity of Nome could transmit communications across country by courier if suitable contact points were established.

IX. EQUIPMENT

To the list in the enclosed memorandum should be added a compass.

In connection with this program as well as with the Escape and Evasion Program, a discussion is contemplated with Col. BERNT BALCHEN, Arctic Expert, concerning desirable equipment.

It should be emphasized that for the successful execution of the instant program, as well as the Escape and Evasion Program, it will be necessary to establish caches of food and equipment and "hide outs" throughout the Territory of Alaska.

It has also been noted that many people in the Anchorage area have indicated that in the event of hostilities they will do everything possible to leave Alaska and others have indicated that they will "take to the hills." Referral/Consult

[redacted]

This being so, it will be natural that a relatively large percentage of the population will endeavor to flee from the immediate vicinity of hostilities and take to the hinterlands. Agents will have to be suitably equipped so as to be able to contact these individuals living in such out of the way places.

The enclosed memorandum was discussed in detail [redacted] both prior and subsequent to its preparation. The foregoing comments were made during the course of the discussions with [redacted] and they are cognizant of the writer's opinions.

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

The Bureau's advice would be appreciated concerning the suggestions and recommendations submitted in this letter and in Anchorage letter dated 9-13-50. Instructions are also requested as to what active investigation is desired looking toward the development of agents.

SAC, Anchorage

November 27, 1950

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

Bulet 10-25-50.

In order to definitely fix responsibility in connection with the captioned program, additional conferences have been held by the Bureau with [redacted] at the Seat of Government.

Certain proposals were discussed [redacted] setting forth the Bureau's position relative to the Escape and Evasion Program and an agreement was reached which is outlined below setting forth the specific responsibility recognized by the Bureau in this matter.

[redacted]

SELECTION OF CONTACTS

[redacted]

The FBI will assist in this program, however, by making available [redacted] names of possible contacts and informants. The FBI will make name checks and will conduct appropriate investigation where necessary to determine the background, reliability and loyalty of these potential contacts.

[redacted]

[redacted]

TRAINING OF CONTACTS AND [redacted]

The FBI will participate [redacted] in the training of these contacts.

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Referral/Consult

The FBI will be responsible for furnishing training relative to security, cover, informant nets and communications except radio communications. The FBI will furnish training in the preparation of coded messages and secret writing. [redacted]

OPERATION AFTER INVASION

Referral/Consult

It is envisioned that after Alaska is invaded, martial law would be declared which would bring that portion of Alaska not already occupied under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Alaska Command. After invasion, the Bureau will render such assistance as may be required by orders of the Commanding General. [redacted]

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

It is noted in referenced letter, Bureau advice was requested as to what immediate steps should be taken by the Anchorage Office to initiate the Escape and Evasion Program.

The Anchorage Office should immediately take the following action:

1. Confer [redacted] in order to ascertain [redacted] in connection with the selection of contacts and informants under this program.

Referral/Consult

2. Determine the areas in Alaska where, either by jurisdiction or location of installations, [redacted] can presently develop the necessary contacts under this program.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 10-25-50

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM - ALASKA

Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage for Alaska in the Event of Invasion.

Referral/Consult Bulet 10-4-50 and Anchorage radiogram to Bureau 10-12-50.

On 10-24-50 this matter was again discussed with

[redacted]

[redacted]

In view of the foregoing, the Bureau is requested to advise as to what immediate steps should be taken by the Anchorage Office to initiate the Escape and Evasion Program.

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JFD:MR

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ON 5/31/94

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 10-25-50

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA
ESPIONAGE - R

Referral/Consult

Enclosed herewith is a memorandum entitled [redacted]

This memorandum was furnished to this office by [redacted] and is being forwarded to the Bureau as it may be of possible interest in connection with the "Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska."

Referral/Consult

65-298
JFD:MR

Enclosure

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ON 5-31-94
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65-59264

OCT 30 1950

55 NOV 30 1950

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: October 24, 1950

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: Proposed Plans for
INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA; In The Event
STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM; of Invasion
ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

Tolson ✓
Ladd ✓
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont ✓
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Candy

Referral/Consult

Special Agent E. S. Sanders received a telephone call from

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 3-31-94 BY SP1 2 BTJ 180

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I agree DML.

I see no need DML.

ESS:lae

I agree with Ladd.

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Referral/Consult

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. HENNRICH

DATE: October 23, 1950

FROM : L. L. LAUGHLIN

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLANS FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (including)
STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM
ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

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Tele. Room
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Gandy

The Director instructed that a memorandum be prepared on the above programs in Alaska, showing the advantages and disadvantages from the following three positions on this problem:

(1) The Director stated that he presently understands that the Bureau is to have the responsibility for this program and that [redacted] The Director wants set forth the advantages and disadvantages of this position.

Referral/Consult

(2) The Director wants set forth the advantages and disadvantages of the reverse of this plan, namely, that [redacted] that the Bureau [redacted]

(3) The Bureau's pulling out of the problem entirely and leaving it to be handled [redacted] should be similarly discussed.

LLL:tlc

Killed Div 10-24-50 CETH

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EX-71

Referral/Consult

3. Thereafter the Anchorage Office should immediately assist [redacted] by making available [redacted] the names of possible contacts and informants who can be utilized [redacted] under this program in the remaining sectors of Alaska.

Referral/Consult

4. The Anchorage Office should make name checks and conduct investigation desired [redacted] along the lines set forth above under Selection of Contacts. When appropriate name checks and investigations have been conducted by the Anchorage Office on these individuals, the names of the potential contacts should be furnished to the Bureau for checking through indices at the Bureau. Administrative case files bearing the 66 classification should be opened on every potential contact or informant and the results of the investigations should be submitted in report form. All confidential sources should be adequately protected and one copy of the report should be indicated for [redacted]

Referral/Consult

5. Determine what training is deemed necessary [redacted] under this program and advise the Bureau as to your specific recommendations in this regard. You should submit to the Bureau immediately a proposed curriculum setting forth suggested topics to be covered in this training for Bureau approval.

This matter is to receive your personal, immediate and continuous attention until such time as this program is ready for operation.

As you were previously informed, it is imperative that the Bureau fulfill its commitments in regard to the Escape and Evasion Program and you are being held strictly responsible to see that the Bureau's part in this program is properly handled.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: October 25, 1950

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLANS FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM
ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

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In accord with the information set out in my memorandum of October 24, SAC Williams, together with Supervisors W. T. Baker and E. S. Sanders, conferred with [redacted] at 9:00 A.M. today.

The proposed plan for intelligence coverage in Alaska was generally discussed and there appeared to be no problems or points of difference. Referral/Consult

[redacted] was advised that the Bureau agrees in principle with the basic plan which has been drawn. [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

No action. The foregoing is for your information.

JHW:ESS:mer

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EX-71

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65 NOV 24 1950

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Foran
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 11-13-50

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

"CONFIDENTIAL"

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
(ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 BTR/RP
ON 5/31/94

Rebulet 10-24-50.

Referral/Consult

On 11-10-50 a conference was held in the offices of the Anchorage Division attended by [redacted] SAC JOHN H. WILLIAMS and ASAC JOHN F. DESMOND at which time the following matters were discussed:

Referral/Consult

[redacted] This will be attended, of course, by SAC WILLIAMS.

Referral/Consult

[redacted] and SAC WILLIAMS will inspect several places on 11-13-50 to determine whether they would be suitable for this purpose.

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Referral/Consult

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With reference to the above outline concerning housing, it is believed that the tentative plans stated will work out to the satisfaction and in the best interests of the Bureau. It is contemplated, of course, that in the discharge of the Bureau's responsibilities we will very materially aid in setting up necessary files, indices, etc;

JHN:MR
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cc 65-298

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that an agent will be present to work in the administrative office; that all conferences will be attended by SAC WILLIAMS and representatives of the Bureau to consider matters of administration, policy and detail.

done

Any suggestions or observations of the Bureau concerning the implementation of the administration of both of these programs will be appreciated.

See bulets to Anchorage 11-27-50, 11-29-50 ; WTB;
and 12-18-50, ESS!

SAC, Anchorage

December 13, 1950

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM
ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

PERSONAL ATTENTION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 3-3-94 BY SP2 AGENT/SC

Referral/Consult Reurlets 11-16-50 and 11-30-50.

For your ~~confidential~~ information, this is to advise that

[redacted]

Referral/Consult As it was pointed out in Bureau radiogram of December 4, 1950, to your office, the Bureau recognizes the existing problems relative to the administrative details which must be worked out by you with [redacted] nevertheless, temporary delays experienced in this regard should not hinder your office in developing Stay-behind Agents, contacts and informants necessary under these programs.

Referral/Consult Specific reference is made to the comments in urlet of 11-16-50 to the effect that there appears to be [redacted]

[redacted]

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EX-52

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Referral/Consult

Your attention is directed to Bulets of 11-27-50 and 11-29-50 wherein it was set forth that certain proposals had been discussed [redacted] on a headquarters level definitely fixing the responsibility [redacted] the Bureau concerning these programs. The specific responsibilities of the Bureau in connection with these programs were set forth in Bulets to Anchorage of 11-27-50 and 11-29-50.

Referral/Consult

As a result of committments made at meetings of the IIC on 7-6-50 and 9-27-50, it was agreed that [redacted] the FBI should set up and provide for the operation of the Stay-behind Agent and Escape and Evasion Programs respectively. From its very inception, the captioned matter has been considered somewhat in the nature of a "joint venture," however, every effort has been made in the past to definitely fix responsibility in this regard, and the same will be done in the future as additional problems arise.

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

The Bureau is maintaining close liaison with [redacted] and you will be advised of the results of the [redacted]

You should continue to keep the Bureau informed on every phase of this matter, especially as to the degree of cooperation the Anchorage office is receiving [redacted] in instant matter.

Referral/Consult

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 11-2-50

FROM: SAC, Anchorage

65-59264

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION;
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
(ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

Rebulet 10-24-50 with which was enclosed a draft entitled "Proposed Alaskan Covert Operations."

Referral/Consult

The referenced draft has been discussed with [redacted] However as of this date [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

cc - 62-227

JFD:MR
65-298

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DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 STP/CP
ON 5/31/94
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EX-123

51 DEC

SAC, Anchorage

December 29, 1950

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 3/29/94 BY SP2 BTS/BS

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Referral/Consult

Reurlets 10-25-50 and 11-3-50.

For the express purpose of definitely fixing responsibility in connection with the Stay-behind Agent Program, several conferences have been held by the Bureau [redacted] at the Seat of Government.

After having reexamined the Bureau's position in this matter, certain proposals were discussed [redacted] and an agreement was reached which is outlined below setting forth the specific responsibility recognized by the Bureau relative to the captioned program.

Referral/Consult

ADMINISTRATION

A representative of the FBI (SAC, Anchorage) will be in charge of this program in Alaska.

Referral/Consult

SELECTION OF AGENTS

The FBI, [redacted] will develop potential Stay-behind Agents in Alaska.

Referral/Consult

LOCATION OF AGENTS

[redacted] It will be the responsibility of the FBI in Alaska to place or develop agents [redacted]

ADEQUACY OF COVERAGE

It will be the responsibility of the [redacted] in Alaska to determine what coverage in this regard is adequate, bearing in mind needs should Alaska be invaded.

Referral/Consult

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TRAINING OF AGENTS

The FBI will participate in the training of Stay-behind Agents.

The FBI will be responsible for furnishing training relative to security, cover, informant nets and communications except radio communications.

The FBI will furnish training in the preparation of coded messages and secret writing.

Referral/Consult

SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT

It will be the responsibility of [redacted] FBI in Anchorage to determine what supplies and equipment will be necessary for purposes of training and the stocking of caches for Stay-behind Agents.

Referral/Consult

PAYMENT OF AGENTS

Stay-behind Agents during the recruitment and training stages will be handled on an individual basis and paid as are regular confidential informants in the field.

The SAC, Anchorage, will make appropriate recommendations in connection with expenditures when it has been determined what expenses will be necessary in connection with recruitment and training.

Referral/Consult

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Referral/Consult

[redacted] This appears to be unreasonable and [redacted]

Referral/Consult

The question of financial responsibility is being explored at the Bureau and you will be advised of the results of further conferences held [redacted] on a headquarters level in this regard. For your confidential information, [redacted]

OPERATIONAL AGENT INVASION

It is recognized that the actual utilization of agents under this program would only occur in the event of invasion by the enemy. Upon invasion, a part or all of Alaska would undoubtedly be placed under martial law and the affected region would be placed directly under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Alaska Command.

As presently interpreted, the immediate plan of action for the Anchorage office, is to properly and adequately develop our part in this program prior to invasion. At the time Alaska might be invaded, the program would be placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, Alaska Command. Thereafter the Bureau will render such assistance as may be required by orders of the Commanding General, Alaska Command.

In connection with the specific questions raised in Anchorage letter of October 25, 1950, to the Bureau, the following observations are being made under the appropriate captions.

ADMINISTRATION

The Bureau is in agreement, as set out above, that the FBI will be responsible for the development and administration of the Stay-behind Agent Program in Alaska.

The Bureau is likewise in agreement that administration headquarters in this connection should be Alaska and preferably in Anchorage, thereby, as you pointed out, being easily accessible to the Commander-in-Chief of the Alaska Command.

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Referral/Consult

SELECTION OF PERSONNEL

As pointed out above, it is the responsibility of the Anchorage office [redacted] to determine what coverage in this regard is adequate. It is not believed that any hard and fast rule can be laid down basing the number of agents to be selected in a given community upon the population of the area. Your thinking and planning in this regard should be in terms of efficiency of coverage. For instance, what will be the anticipated attrition? In what manner can we avoid a terrific loss of agents and informants in the event of invasion? These are questions of paramount concern in this matter. More emphasis should be placed on the immediate selection of potential Stay-behind agents rather than theorizing upon the possible number of agents which should be developed. As it has been pointed out before, the Bureau feels that the success or failure of this entire program depends upon the selection of agents and the training which they will receive. It would be much better to have ten well selected Stay-behind Agents who can be of service to the United States after invasion, than a hundred poorly selected Stay-behind Agents who may be shot on sight by the enemy after invasion. Every effort, therefore, should be made to select Stay-behind agents who will not be removed or molested by the enemy and who will be capable of developing sub-agents and informants from the remaining population.

The Bureau is in agreement with you that "saturation" is not the answer to the question of adequacy of coverage. A program based merely on numbers will be vulnerable from the standpoint of security and security.

The Bureau is also in agreement with your comment that women should not be excluded as possible potential Stay-behind Agents. Your attention is called to Bulet dated September 21, 1950, in this matter, wherein it was pointed out that in the Soviet Union women are assigned tasks involving heavy labor under guard and that able-bodied female survivors of any invasion would probably be placed in labor battalions.

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TRAINING OF AGENTS

The Bureau is of the opinion that the training of the Stay-behind Agents, if at all possible, should be handled within the Territory of Alaska. This procedure would be beneficial financially and from the standpoint of conservation of time.

The Bureau concurs with your views to the effect that Stay-behind Agents should whenever possible be trained individually. If individual training can be effected, it would appear that the use of assumed names on the part of the agents would be unnecessary.

At the time you were at the Bureau during October, 1950, for conference, it was pointed out that the Bureau should be furnished with a proposed training program which can be utilized as a basis for planning the instruction to be given to the Stay-behind Agents. This matter was likewise called to your attention by Letels of September 21, 1950, and October 20, 1950. It is noted that to date you have not complied with Bureau instructions in this regard.

Referral/Consult

You are instructed, therefore, to submit a suggested curriculum in this regard to reach the Bureau within 15 days from the receipt of this communication. It is recognized that the training given will probably vary with every agent who receives training, nevertheless, the Bureau desires to have a complete over-all picture of the proposed training program. The curriculum should be broken down into two sections, one listing the subjects which will [redacted] and the other setting forth the topics which will be handled by Bureau instructors.

A short summary should be included for every course on the curriculum showing in general terms the instruction to be covered and the number of hours to be utilized where necessary in the study of the individual subjects.

The Anchorage office should immediately take the following action:

1. Administrative case files should be opened on every potential Stay-behind Agent who is being considered for development. These files should bear the CS classification. In the future when an individual is being considered as a potential Stay-behind Agent, the indices of the Anchorage office should be checked and a report should be submitted summarizing all data available to the Anchorage office. Upon receipt of every report, the files

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at the Bureau will be reviewed for any additional information concerning the individual in question and a communication will be directed to the Anchorage office setting forth the results of the file search. Where pertinent information is available in Bureau files but not in the possession of the Anchorage office, it will be necessary for a supplemental report to be submitted incorporating the additional data. These reports should be prepared in form suitable for dissemination and confidential source should be adequately protected. Copies of these reports should not be indicated for [redacted] during the development stage.

Referral/Consult

2. After conferring with representatives [redacted] determine what training is deemed necessary under this program and advise the Bureau as to your specific recommendations in this regard. You should submit to the Bureau within fifteen days a proposed curriculum setting forth suggested topics to be covered in this training for Bureau approval.

Referral/Consult

3. Immediately advise the Bureau as to the identities of additional potential Stay-Behind Agents developed to date. Your attention is directed to the fact that since your radiogram of October 10, 1950, furnishing the names of seven potential Stay-Behind Agents, no further advice has been received as to the progress being made in this phase of the investigation. Specifically, your attention is called to Bulet of November 7, 1950, instructing that you immediately furnish the names of additional individuals who are being considered for development under this program.

Referral/Consult

In order to avoid unnecessary correspondence between the Anchorage office and the Bureau, it is suggested that you confer regularly with [redacted] and in [redacted] work out the problems involved in this undertaking on a local level wherever possible. Your proposals and recommendations should then be submitted to the Bureau. In those instances where there is disagreement, lack of understanding or question of procedure, you should

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Referral/Consult

promptly inform the Bureau and express your views. After review, the matter will be discussed with [redacted] and thereafter, appropriate joint instructions will be issued, by the Bureau to Anchorage, and [redacted]

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. C[illegible]
Mr. F[illegible]
Mr. T[illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Miss Gandy

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 11-3-50

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN AIASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
(ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

Rebulet Anchorage 10-24-50, and Anchorage letter to the Bureau dated 10-25-50.

Referenced Bureau letter instructs that a final draft of proposed action be submitted to the Bureau. Before this is submitted, advice is requested as to whether or not a reply will be received to the Anchorage letter to the Bureau dated 10-25-50 with which were submitted two copies of a

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

JFD:MR
65-298

cc - 62-227

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ON 5-31-94
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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: November 9, 1950

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION:
*STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM
*ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-31-94 BY [illegible]

PURPOSE:

To submit proposed recommendations fixing the responsibility of the FBI in connection with the captioned programs.

BACKGROUND:

Referral/Consult

At the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference meetings on July 6, 1950 and September 27, 1950, it was agreed that the FBI [redacted] should set up and provide for the operation of the Stay-behind Agent and Escape and Evasion Programs respectively.

On July 7, 1950, the Anchorage office was instructed to begin work on the Stay-behind Agent Program and on October 4, 1950, instructions were issued to the Anchorage office on the Escape and Evasion Program.

Referral/Consult

[redacted] on October 25, 1950, was advised that the Bureau agreed in principle with [redacted] A copy of the [redacted] is attached.

Referral/Consult

The Executives' Conference by memorandum dated October 31, 1950, summarized the question of the Bureau's participation [redacted] in developing and operating the Stay-behind Agent and Escape and Evasion Programs. It is to be noted that the following notation appears on this memorandum: "I concur most reluctantly. We must really see that our part of it is promptly and adequately developed and supervised. H"

PROPOSALS:

There are set out below proposals to definitely fix responsibility in connection with the Bureau's part in these

Attachment

65-59264

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Referral/Consult

two programs. It is proposed that discussions will be reopened [redacted] on a headquarters level so there will be a complete working agreement as to the responsibility recognized by the Bureau in connection with these programs.

STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM

1. ADMINISTRATION

A representative of the FBI (SAC, Anchorage) will be in charge of this program in Alaska.

Referral/Consult

2. SELECTION OF AGENTS

The FBI, with the [redacted] will develop potential Stay-behind Agents in Alaska.

Referral/Consult

3. LOCATION OF AGENTS

[redacted] It will be the responsibility of the FBI in Alaska to place or develop agents [redacted]

4. ADEQUACY OF COVERAGE

Referral/Consult

It will be the responsibility of the SAC at Anchorage [redacted] to determine what coverage in this regard is adequate, bearing in mind military needs after Alaska has been invaded.

5. TRAINING OF AGENTS

The FBI will participate in the training of the Stay-behind Agents.

The FBI will be responsible for furnishing training relative to security, cover, informant nets and communications except radio communications.

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

The FBI will furnish training in the preparation of coded messages and secret writing.

It is proposed that the FBI Laboratory work out such codes and be prepared to provide suitable instruction in secret writing.

Referral/Consult

6. SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT

It will be the responsibility of [redacted] FBI in Anchorage to determine what supplies and equipment will be necessary for purposes of training and the stocking of caches for Stay-behind Agents.

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

7. PAYMENT OF AGENTS

Stay-behind Agents during the recruitment and training stages will be handled and paid as are regular confidential informants in the field.

The SAC, Anchorage, will make appropriate recommendations in connection with expenditures when it has been determined what expenses will be necessary in connection with recruitment and training.

[redacted]

It is proposed that the question of financial responsibility under the captioned programs be discussed [redacted] on a headquarters level through liaison with the suggestion that consideration be given to requesting the necessary funds for these programs from the Department of Defense, since both programs are strictly for the benefit of the military.

Referral/Consult

ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM Referral/Consult

[redacted]

2. SELECTION OF CONTACTS Referral/Consult

[redacted]

The FBI will assist in this program, however, by making available [redacted] names of possible contacts and informants. The FBI will make name checks and will conduct appropriate investigation where necessary to determine the background, reliability and loyalty of these potential contacts. Referral/Consult

[redacted] Referral/Consult

[redacted]

5. TRAINING OF CONTACTS AND INFORMANTS Referral/Consult

The FBI will participate [redacted] in the training of these contacts along the same lines as set forth above under TRAINING OF AGENTS, Stay-behind Agent Program.

[redacted]

 Referral/Consult

OPERATIONS AFTER INVASION

It is recognized that the actual utilization of agents, informants and contacts under these two programs would only occur in the event of invasion by the enemy. Upon invasion, a part or all of Alaska would undoubtedly be placed under martial law and the affected region would be placed directly under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Alaska Command.

As presently interpreted, the immediate plan of action for the Bureau, in light of prior committments resulting from decisions reached at the IIC, is to promptly and adequately develop our part in these two programs prior to invasion. At the time Alaska might be invaded, the two programs would be placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, Alaska Command.

Referral/Consult

It is noted that [redacted] therefore, it is proposed that the actual operation of the Stay-behind Agent Program and the Escape and Evasion Program after invasion be recognized as [redacted] and that the Bureau will render such assistance as may be required by orders of the Commanding General, Alaska Command.

RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Consult

It is recommended that the above proposals be approved for discussion [redacted] through liaison on a headquarters level. Thereafter, the Anchorage office should be informed of the specific responsibilities recognized by the Bureau in these programs so that appropriate and immediate action can be taken to put the above recommended proposals into effect in order to bring these matters to a logical conclusion.

11-24-5[illegible]

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: October 24, 1950

FROM : D. M. LADD

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SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION - STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM; ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-31-94 BY SP2BTS/RC 34225-1

PURPOSE:

Referral/Consult

To advise that in accordance with IIC decision the FBI [redacted] will be jointly responsible for the implementation and administration of both the Stay-Behind Agent Program and the Escape and Evasion Program in Alaska.

[redacted] it is proposed that joint responsibility in these two programs will be assumed by the FBI [redacted] The administration will be basically handled by [redacted] an associate principal (FBI representative), both in Alaska and responsible to their respective Directors, the plans to be carried out in accordance with general requirements laid down by the Commanding General, Alaska Command. It is further proposed that under the direction of the principal and associate principal four organizational sections will be set up to administer both programs with administration of the individual sections by [redacted] FBI representatives under the direction of the principal as follows:

[redacted] Referral/Consult

Covert Intelligence (Stay-Behind Agents) - FBI;

[redacted]

Training and Supply - [redacted] FBI.

The proposed organization places equal responsibility on [redacted] FBI for all phases of both programs. Mr. Williams is in agreement. Referral/Consult

Advantages

The principal advantage to the FBI in assuming joint responsibility in these two programs is that it will preclude any other intelligence agency, such as CIA, getting into the intelligence field in Alaska at this time.

Referral/Consult

It will also provide for the FBI being aware of the activities [redacted] in the recruitment of Agents to be used in connection with both programs.

It will provide for the utilization of the joint energies

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Attachment

CEH:hke

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Referral/Consult

of the FBI [redacted] in developing informants at this time which will insure additional intelligence coverage, and further insure that all intelligence coverage at this time will be channeled through FBI and will continue to be so channeled after invasion.

Disadvantages

The participation of the FBI in these programs will entail a tremendous expenditure of manpower and funds in the recruitment of Agents in training and in supply. It will place on the FBI a heavy responsibility for intelligence coverage in the event of invasion both from the viewpoint of securing intelligence data for military purposes, which is primarily a military objective, and from the viewpoint of rescue under the Escape and Evasion Program, which is strictly military in character. In fulfilling our share of responsibility, it will be necessary for us to make available a large number of our contacts, confidential sources, and informants. Estimated four (4) agents could handle.

OBSERVATIONS:

It is noted that, if we do not participate in these programs, it would probably become necessary when an invasion occurred for us to turn over to the Commanding General all of our informants, contacts, etc. In this event, they would not have been trained and would be of less value.

It is felt that basically complete direction of such programs could be more efficiently handled by one organization to avoid delays incident to joint responsibility and joint authority in both programs.

Position of Bureau If We Assume Total Responsibility for Escape and Evasion and Stay-Behind Agent Programs

Advantages:

Bureau responsibility would ensure our retaining in confidence our sources and informants.

Disadvantages:

This situation would place on us the responsibility for programs which are primarily military in nature, and in connection with escape and evasion, would make us primarily responsible for the lives and welfare of the air crews of the Strategic Bomber Command.

The Bureau in this position would necessarily be placed in the position of expending a maximum amount of manpower and funds for the complete operation of these programs.

Referral/Consult

Position of Bureau If [redacted] Assumes Responsibility for Escape and Evasion and Stay-Behind Agent Programs

Advantages: Referral/Consult

In the event [redacted] assumed total responsibility for both programs, with our incidental assistance, the expenditure of manpower and funds would be minimized.

Disadvantages: Referral/Consult

It would be necessary for the Bureau to either make available to [redacted] our sources and informants in Alaska, or they would engage in a recruitment program. We would not have under our control intelligence information gathered by the agents under [redacted] direction.

Position of Bureau If We Withdraw from Both Programs

Advantages:

There would be no expenditure of manpower and funds.

Disadvantages:

Should we withdraw completely from participation in these programs, the Air Force would, in all probability, bring in CIA or other intelligence agencies to participate in setting them up and administering them. This would definitely place CIA in the domestic intelligence field.

An analysis of the proposed joint responsibility administrative setup for the handling of both the Escape and Stay-Behind Agent Programs is attached.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

FROM : MR. H. H. CLEGG

SUBJECT:

DATE: 10-27-50

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-31-94 BY SP2 [illegible]

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room

Concerning the request for a review of the proposed plan for intelligence coverage in Alaska in the event of an invasion, there follow the views which I have on this matter.

Referral/Consult

(1) Here is a dual responsibility which under normal circumstances in administration and operations is bad. Especially in a military operation where a part of American territory is invaded, do I think it would be doubly bad. Although there is some division of program as between [redacted] FBI, the statement is made nevertheless that "the proposed organization places equal responsibility on [redacted] FBI for all phases of both programs." This, I believe, should be avoided. Dual responsibility permits buck passing and finger pointing. In a matter as important as intelligence operations in an invaded area, there should be no chance for doubt as to fixed responsibility either in administration or operations.

(2) The proposed intelligence coverage plan is to be effective and productive in the event of invasion. This makes it subject to the control of the Commander in Chief of the military forces and any plan agreed upon at this time would be subject to the whims and the desires of the Commander in Chief based upon the condition which he finds at the time of the invasion. Thus, we don't know whether any plans such as those proposed would actually be applied in case of invasion or whether there would be any shifting of responsibility or change in operations. So, why should the FBI get involved in such a scheme where there is largely all brunt and no credit. If it goes bad, the FBI would be accused of failure. If it works, the military would get the credit. This is too vulnerable and undesirable a position for the FBI to get in.

After invasion or when the plan becomes operative, the information collected of an intelligence type, dealing with order of battle, disposition of forces, food supply, weather, morale, equipment, civilian attitude, etc., is information needed by the military. This is military intelligence. Therefore, why should the FBI get involved in having a responsibility for military intelligence in the field where there is military operation. This whole scheme is a scheme of operation in a combat area and the so-called "stay behind Agents" and the system of escape and communication is for the direct benefit of military operations. The Bureau's jurisdiction of counterespionage, countersabotage and internal security measures of a counterintelligence type is not designed for a combat area or an area that has already been invaded and this plan relates to the areas already invaded.

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(3) The suggestion that [redacted] would call in CIA if the Bureau did not assume [illegible] responsibility would reflect seriously upon the

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HHC:DMG

Referral/Consult

Delimitations Agreements. If they are that weak, shouldn't an attempt be made to strengthen them? It would seem that the same rule and procedure should apply to Alaska as Hawaii, California, Florida, Washington State or Minnesota, if they were to be invaded. Would we now consent to such a plan of joint operation and joint responsibility for a prospective invaded area elsewhere? I would not think so and the only difference in jurisdiction in Alaska is it is probably more likely to be invaded first by the Russians in the event of war.

(4) Although the detailed plan does call for individual training as much as possible, there are further indications of a plan for classes or group training, or even training by individual networks. In a situation of this kind where the invaders would use torture and every other method to cause one spy to disclose the identity of others in his network, I do not believe that even if such a plan were put into effect that it should permit the undercover informants, referred to as "Agents," to know more than one contact. It would endanger the entire network otherwise. Thus, the training, it appears, should be largely individual training with others having no knowledge of the identity of any other person save the one contact in any network.

(5) Even if such a plan should be put into effect, the idea of 20-odd or even 50 such informants being able to supply adequate information with the setting up of concentration camps, purge lists, and other methods by the invaders would seem to be grossly inadequate for such a large area of territory, including all of Alaska and all of the Aleutian Islands.

Referral/Consult

(6) If [redacted] desired to prepare such a program as of this time, I do not feel that it would be necessary for the Bureau to disclose its contacts, confidential sources and informants. They could remain in tact until an invasion occurred and their identities need never be disclosed. A new and separate program not including our contacts and informants could be developed [redacted]

CONCLUSION:

I find nothing desirable about this from the standpoint of FBI advantage. Every phase of it I consider objectionable from an FBI standpoint.

Referral/Consult

To be of such helpfulness as may be needed, perhaps our Agents could make recommendations of proposed undercover Agents to be left in Alaska in the event of an invasion and they could be developed [redacted] Perhaps the FBI could assist in some of the training in such matters as codes, ciphers, secret inks and the like. Yet, it is quite obvious that most of the training needed would be of a military type. The FBI should not be charged, I believe, with establishing food and supply caches and should not have any responsibility or obligation in connection with this program except an indicated

Referral/Consult

willingness to cooperate wholeheartedly in any manner requested in the field of training within the scope of our knowledge and recommending potential invasion or "stay behind Agents" and furnishing any information which our Agents can obtain which would be helpful to [redacted] *in setting up this program. In the event of an invasion which is successful, I fear that all the finger pointing or accusation would be against the FBI if the proposed system did not work and, yet, we would not have any administrative control or direction after the invasion came, which is when the plan goes into operation. It seems to be a military or Air Force intelligence function.*

I suggest Hadd bring this matter before Executive Conference

10-27 H.

See Ex. Conf. memo to Director 10-31-50 HB:

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: October 31, 1950

FROM : THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in the Event of Invasion

Tolson ✓
Ladd ✓
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy
Belmont

At a meeting of the Executives' Conference on October 31, 1950, attended by Messrs. Tolson, Clegg, Harbo, Mohr, Laughlin, Sizoo, McGuire, Tracy, Rosen, Glavin and Ladd, the question of the Bureau's participation with OSI of the Air Force in developing stay-behind Agents and Agents for use in an escape and evasion route in the event of an invasion of Alaska, was discussed.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Referral/Consult

The Conference was advised that this matter had been originally instigated by [redacted]

The Conference was advised that this was called to the attention of the IIC and that at the meeting on June 8, 1950, you advised the IIC that the plan contemplated the selection, training and equipping of selected U. S. citizens who were long-established residents of that section of Alaska for which they would be expected to provide coverage and that you had pointed out to the IIC that the [redacted] FBI informant coverage existing today in Alaska could be trained in detail along the lines needed in the instant proposal and that such informant networks could be turned over to the Commanding General for operation if and when such emergency in Alaska is encountered. It was further pointed out to the IIC that CIA had no authority to operate in Alaska and should not be permitted to so operate. - (U)

CLASSIFIED BY SP4 [illegible]
DECLASSIFY ON #34225

This matter was further considered at the July 6, 1950 meeting of the IIC, at which time [redacted] in view of the fact that [redacted] the FBI had agreed to [redacted] work this program out. - (U)

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The Conference was advised that their views were desired as to whether the Bureau should continue its participation in this program. It was pointed out that this placed dual responsibility; that when the program is placed in effect, namely, following an invasion, the control of the program would pass to the Military; that if the program goes badly, the FBI could be accused of failure and if it works, the Military would get credit.

65-57214-2

DML:dad

cc - Mr. Clegg
Mr. Mohr

~~SECRET~~

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Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

~~SECRET~~

I went over the objections raised in Mr. Clegg's memorandum to Mr. Tolson with reference to this program and pointed out that the Bureau had originally [redacted] and had at the intelligence conference agreed to take it over. It was also pointed out to the conference that this would appear to be an intelligence operation and as such, should be handled by the Bureau. Further, that [redacted] if the Bureau did not handle this intelligence function. ~~(S)~~ - (U)

It was pointed out that Alaska is no different from the rest of the United States; that in the event of an invasion of California or New York or any other portion of the United States, that this problem would also arise and that the development of informants within the civilian population was a function for the FBI even though their job would not require them to function until after an invasion.

Referral/Consult

Messrs. ~~Tolson~~, Clegg, Harbo and Mohr were opposed to the Bureau's participation [redacted] in the stay-behind Agents and escape and evasion Agent program. They felt that the Bureau should merely advise [redacted] by furnishing the names of individuals whom they might contact for the purpose of developing informants for use in this program and possibly furnishing an instructor to help train any such informants [redacted] in subjects which the Bureau would normally handle in a training school.

Referral/Consult

Messrs. Glavin, Tracy, Rosen, McGuire, Sizoo, Laughlin, and Ladd recommended that we continue to participate [redacted] in the development of this program and in this connection they indicated that in the event the Bureau stays in this program it should be carefully reviewed and a program drafted for the development of the existing OSI and FBI informant coverage in order that they might be properly trained in detail with the ultimate idea that they would be turned over to the Air Force in the event of any invasion of Alaska.

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

Respectfully,
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson

While this seems to be a 95% military operation I agree most reluctantly. We must realize that our prior commitments are such that I believe we will have to go along with it. 11-1 ↩

I agree that some part of this program should be undertaken by the Bureau. H.

SAC, Anchorage

November 20, 1950

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
(ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

Reurlet 11-3-50 requesting advice as to whether or not copies of Bureau letters and letters from the Anchorage office to the Bureau in this case could be furnished by you to [redacted]

Referral/Consult

In view of the fact that communications between the Anchorage office and the Bureau in connection with the captioned programs contain matters of an Administrative nature, copies of the communications in question should not be furnished to [redacted]

Referral/Consult

It is imperative that you maintain close liaison with [redacted] concerning these programs. The Bureau, however, should not be placed in the position of serving as an intermediary between [redacted]

Referral/Consult

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 3-19-97 SP2BTT/KS

WTB;ljh

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

U S DEPT OF JUSTICE
FBI
NOV 21 7 27 PM

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: November 3, 1950

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM) (ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

Referral/Consult

With regard to future correspondence in connection with the instant matter, advice is requested as to whether or not copies of Bureau letters and letters from this office to the Bureau may be furnished to [redacted]

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

If it is permissible for copies of such correspondence to be given to [redacted] extra copies of letters will be made marked "cc: [redacted]" except when such letters contain information which should not be disseminated outside the Bureau.

Referral/Consult

65-298
cc: 62-227
JFD:vw

DEFERRED RECORDING

memo to Anchorage 11-20-50 WTB

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 BTC/ISC ON 5/31/94

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: October 23, 1950

FROM : A. H. Belmont

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Candy

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (including)
STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM
ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 3-1-94 BY SP12 34225 (illegible)

PURPOSE:

Referral/Consult

To analyze [redacted] to submit for your approval additional instructions for Anchorage.

BACKGROUND:

Referral/Consult

At the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference meeting on July 6, 1950, and on September 27, 1950, it was agreed that the FBI [redacted] should set up and provide for the operation of the stay-behind agent and Escape and Evasion Programs respectively in Alaska in the event that territory is occupied by the enemy. The Bureau has issued detailed instructions to the Anchorage Office to draft a proposed program, [redacted] for the operation of the stay-behind agents, and to initiate the appropriate action [redacted] to determine their needs with respect to the Escape and Evasion Program.

In connection with the Bureau's joint responsibility in setting up these two programs, Anchorage has been instructed to:

1. Determine the total number of stay-behind agents necessary for adequate coverage in Alaska in the event of hostilities.

2. Ascertain the most likely targets in Alaska for invasion during ensuing months of 1950.

Referral/Consult

3. Commence [redacted] preparation of a definite program for the appropriate training of the stay-behind agents.

As to point #1, the Anchorage office advised by radiogram on October 19, 1950, that twenty-one stay-behind agents, according to present estimates, would be sufficient for immediate coverage in Anchorage (10), Fairbanks (6), Nome (2), Seward (2) and Kotzebue (1).

6 FNCL

ENCLOSURE BEHIND FILE
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Comments:

The Anchorage Office to date has submitted the names of seven prospective stay-behind agents. It is not believed that twenty-one stay-behind agents are sufficient for immediate coverage. In the event Russia might occupy these cities in Alaska, a large number of the twenty-one individuals might be liquidated or removed to an area where their usefulness would be terminated. To cope with this possibility, it is being recommended that efforts be made to develop approximately fifty potential stay-behind agents in the strategic areas mentioned above.

As to point #2, Anchorage has advised that the most likely targets in Alaska for invasion during the ensuing months of 1950 are Nome, Fairbanks, Seward and Anchorage.

As to point #3, the Anchorage office has not as yet submitted a recommended program of training for the stay-behind agent program due to the [redacted]

Referral/Consult

Comments:

Referral/Consult

It is believed that the success or failure of the stay-behind agent program will depend upon the quality of the agents chosen and the training they receive to assist them in efficiently carrying out their assigned duties. It is further believed that, if possible, all training should be given in Alaska. [redacted] A recommendation is being made that the Anchorage Office immediately submit to the Bureau for approval a suggested curriculum for this training program which should include a clear-cut recommendation regarding the Bureau's responsibility in this training program.

FBI Liaison has maintained continuous and close contact [redacted] on a headquarters level so as to expedite the formation of a working plan which can be used as basis for setting up these two programs and effecting their operation.

Referral/Consult

November 29, 1950

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
X Stay-behind Agent Program
X Escape and Evasion Program.

Referral/Consult

At the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference meetings on July 6, 1950, and September 27, 1950, it was agreed that the Federal Bureau of Investigation [redacted] should set up and provide for the operation of the Stay-behind Agent and Escape and Evasion Programs respectively.

STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM

This program will provide for a means of obtaining intelligence information in the event Alaska or a part of Alaska is occupied by enemy forces. The plan contemplates the selection, training and equipping of selected United States citizens who are long established residents of the section of Alaska for which they would be expected to provide coverage. The plan further contemplates that these individuals would have no previous military record.

Referral/Consult

A representative of the FBI will be in charge of this program in Alaska. The FBI [redacted] will develop potential Stay-behind Agents in Alaska. [redacted] The FBI will place or develop agents [redacted]

The FBI will participate in the training of the Stay-behind Agents, and will be responsible for furnishing training relative to security, cover, informant nets and communications except radio communications.

The FBI [redacted] presently determining what supplies and equipment will be necessary for purposes of training and the stocking of caches with supplies which can be utilized by the Stay-behind Agents when the operation of the program is put into effect, namely, after Alaska might be invaded.

Referral/Consult

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ENCLOSURE
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-31-94 BY SP2 [illegible]

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It is anticipated that the selected Stay-behind Agents during the recruitment and training stages will of necessity have to be renumerated.

ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

This program provides for the setting up of a system whereby United States Air Force personnel shot down in Alaska during a period of occupation by the enemy would be able to escape and return to United States territory. In order to provide for such a system, it is necessary to develop contacts, informants and agents presently residing in Alaska who would be able during a period of occupation by the enemy to assist "downed" airmen to return to the U. S. lines over escape routes. Referral/Consult

Under the present plan, [redacted] the FBI will assist by making available [redacted] names of possible contacts and informants. The FBI will make appropriate name checks and will conduct appropriate investigation where necessary to determine the background, reliability and loyalty of these potential contacts and informants [redacted]

The FBI will also participate in the training of these contacts along the same lines as set forth above under the Stay-behind Agent Program.

OPERATION AFTER INVASION

It is envisioned that after Alaska is invaded, martial law will be declared which would bring that portion of Alaska not already occupied by the enemy under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Alaska Command. After invasion, the Federal Bureau of Investigation will render such assistance as may be required by orders of the Commanding General under both the Stay-behind Agent Program and the Escape and Evasion Program.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

FROM : C. E. Hennrich

DATE: November 29, 1950

SUBJECT: BUDGET MATERIAL

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

Attached hereto, as requested, is a memorandum relating to the Bureau's plan for intelligence coverage of Alaska in the event of an Alaskan invasion.

It is pointed out that this info and the Bureau's activities in this field are very confidential, and that any public disclosure would work to the detriment of the program. It is, therefore, suggested that the confidential nature of this material be given consideration prior to its use in any budget hearings.

ETT:eas

Attachment

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3

Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage of Alaska in the Event of Invasion

Included as part of Director's 1952 Budget material per instructions of Mr. Tolson.

WRG/J
12/6/50

52 DEC 16 1950

ETT

SECRET

December 4, 1950 URGENT

SAC, ANCHORAGE CIPHER PAD CODE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RE PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA. REBULET NOVEMBER SEVEN, LAST INSTRUCTING NAMES OF ADDITIONAL INDIVIDUALS ALASKA BEING CONSIDERED DEVELOPMENT STAY BEHIND AGENTS BE FURNISHED BU IMMEDIATELY. COMPLY WITH INSTRUCTIONS BY RETURN RADIOGRAM. TENSE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION DEMANDS IMMEDIATE ACTION BY BUREAU TO COMPLY WITH COMMITMENTS THIS REGARD. NO DELAY HANDLING THESE PROGRAMS CAN BE JUSTIFIED. HANDLING STAYBEHIND AND ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAMS MUST RECEIVE PRIORITY YOUR OFFICE. ADVISE BU IDENTITIES SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED INSTANT PROJECT AND NUMBER MAN DAYS SPENT CAPTIONED MATTER DURING NOVEMBER. URGENCY THESE PROGRAMS SHOULD BE CALLED ATTENTION ALL BUREAU PERSONNEL ASSIGNED THIS MATTER ALASKA. BUREAU RECOGNIZES PROBLEMS RELATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS [redacted] THERE CAN BE NO DELAY IN LOCATING AND DEVELOPING STAY BEHIND AGENTS. SUBMIT RECOMMENDATIONS WHETHER SEVEN INDIVIDUALS LISTED REFERENCED BULET SHOULD BE UTILIZED AS AGENTS. ALSO SUBMIT ALL ADDITIONAL NAMES UNDER CONSIDERATION. SUBMIT RADIOGRAM TODAY AND EACH THIRD DAY THEREAFTER DEVELOPMENTS PROGRAM UNTIL YOU ADVISE AND BUREAU CONCURS COVERAGE ADEQUATE.

Referral/Consult

DEC 7 1950

HOOVER

WTB:ljh:mes

Classified by SP2 BTJ/lsc

Declassify on: OADR

Tolson
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Gandy

SECRET

55 DEC 20 1950

Sent via Radio 12/5/50 5:10 P.M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
CONFIDENTIAL
Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 11-30-50

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
(ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

G.I.R.-1

Referral/Consult

Reference is made to Anchorage letter dated 11-16-50.

On several occasions, the last one being November 29, 1950, I have had occasion [redacted] and inquired concerning any developments regarding the two captioned programs. On each occasion [redacted]

[redacted]

In view of the situation as it is, this office cannot proceed with its part in the implementation of these programs.

Contact will be maintained with [redacted] and any information obtained will be immediately passed on to the Bureau.

Referral/Consult

HANDLED - STOP DIST.

JHW:MR
65-298

cc 62-227

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12B TSLSC
ON 5-31-94
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Left Anchorage 12-12-50 WB

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GRAM

DECEMBER 12, 1950 URGENT

SAC, ANCHORAGE

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA. REURADIOGRAM DECEMBER SIX. AUTHORITY GRANTED CONTACT SEVEN INDIVIDUALS LISTED BULET NOVEMBER SEVEN. SUBMIT REPORTS PROMPTLY THESE INDIVIDUALS ACCORDING INSTRUCTIONS BULET NOVEMBER TWENTY NINE. ATTACH ROUTING SLIP ON REPORTS SUBMITTED THIS REGARD WITH NOTATION QUOTE ATTENTION RECORDS SECTION, STOP DESK, UNQUOTE. INCLUDE ON ROUTING SLIP COMPLETE TITLE CAPTIONED MATTER. BUREAU FILES WILL BE REVIEWED NAMES LISTED URADIOGRAMS DECEMBER SIX AND EIGHT ON RECEIPT REPORTS YOUR OFFICE REFLECTING BACKGROUND INFO. SUBMIT REPORTS DAY TO DAY BASIS TO AVOID BACKLOG OF WORK.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-3-91 BY SP2 BTJ/jm

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Tolson
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Radio 12/13/50 5:03 PM

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: December 12, 1950

FROM : C. E. Hennrich

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (Stay-behind Agent Program)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 3-31-81 BY SP12 BLT AR 3425

PURPOSE:

To authorize the Anchorage office to contact Frank B. Moore, [redacted] Dr. Howard G. Romig, [redacted] Antonio Polet, San Womack and Joe Danich, all of whom have been recommended by Anchorage as potential Stay-behind Agents.

b6
b7C

BACKGROUND:

By radiogram 10-19-50 Anchorage submitted the names of seven Alaskan residents as potential Stay-behind Agents whose names are set out below. Bureau files were checked and it was ascertained Anchorage was in possession of all pertinent information relative to these persons and Anchorage was so advised by Bulet 11-7-50. By radiogram 12-6-50 Anchorage recommended these persons as potential Stay-behind Agents and requested authority to approach them in this regard.

A thumbnail sketch of these individuals follows:

Frank B. Moore

Alaskan resident since 1939, licensed hunting guide, presently employed as carpenter, approximately 45 years of age, personally known to Anchorage office personnel. Nothing derogatory.

[redacted] has covered much of Alaska, owns [redacted] plane, nothing derogatory.

b6
b7C

Dr. Howard G. Romig

Native born Alaskan, presently a M.D. in Anchorage, licensed guide, owns plane, has temperament and desire of outdoor life, personally known to Special Agents of Anchorage office, has been contacted for number of years by Special Agents on official business, nothing derogatory.

Attachment

WTB:bjc

RECORDED - 21 65-59264-34

DEC 15 1950

25

b6
b7C
b7D [redacted]

Has been in territory for number of years, has worked as [redacted] Has given information to Anchorage office concerning individuals believed disloyal to U.S. No derogatory information.

Antonio Polet

Resident of Nome. Was born in Carolew, Italy in 1881, came to Nome during gold rush about 1900, operates native craft shop. [redacted] well acquainted with Alaska and people of Seward Peninsula. No derogatory information.

b6
b7C

Sam Romack

Resident of Seward. Born Sinun Benich Skojo at Dalmatia, 1892, naturalized at Seward, Alaska, in 1939. Has been in Alaska approximately 30 years, was reportedly bootlegger during prohibition days and allegations received, unverified and uncorroborated, that he was pro-Nazi during World War II. Has worked as fisherman, Bristol Bay area during season for about 25 years, now operates bar and hotel of which he is owner. Has aided the Anchorage office in investigations.

Joe Danich

Born in Yugoslavia, approximately 52 years ago. Came to USA at age of 2. Vocation includes coal miner, coal mine operator, proprietor of bar and now owns only hotel and bar in Girdwood area, as well as a gold mine in that area, is well acquainted with that area and persons residing there. Has been arrested and is identical with FBI #5113769, has been contacted by Special Agents in past and given full cooperation particularly in criminal matters in and around Anchorage. The arrest referred to was for vagrancy at Valdez, Alaska, on July 5, 1938. He paid a fine of $100.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended, subject to your approval, that the attached radiogram be sent to Anchorage authorizing that office to contact the above individuals in order to attempt their development as Stay-behind Agents.

RADIOGRAM

DECEMBER 15, 1950 - URGENT

RECORDED - 112

65-59264-35

SAC, ANCHORAGE

PROPOSED PLAN INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE ALASKA. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY FUTURE RADIOGRAMS INSTANT MATTER USE CODE WORDS QUOTE STAGE UNQUOTE FOR STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM AND QUOTE ESCAPE AND EVASION UNQUOTE FOR ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM.

HOOVER

WTB:JVS

Classified by SP2 BTS/JM
Declassify on: OADR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-31-94 BY SP2 BTS/JM

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3 BTS/JM
ON 4-19-2000
00-1164

DEC 15 7 36 PM '50
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Sent Ofc Radio 12-15-50 9:07 PM

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: December 13, 1950

FROM : C. E. HENRICH

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM
ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

Due to the large volume of radiogram traffic between the Anchorage office and the Bureau in connection with instant matter, it is suggested that the following code words be utilized to save time in coding and decoding:

CODE WORDS

STAGE for Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in the Event of Invasion (Stay-behind Agent Program)

ESCAPE AND EVASION for Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in the Event of Invasion (Escape and Evasion Program)

b6
b7C [redacted] of the Code Room, after checking with [redacted] of the Records Section, has advised that the code words are satisfactory and have not been previously used.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended, effective immediately, that the above code words be used in radiogram traffic between Anchorage and the Bureau. If the code words are approved, appropriate instructions will go forward to Anchorage in the next radiogram prepared in instant matter.

If you approve, it is recommended this memorandum be brought to the attention of the Communications Section.

HANDLED BY SUP DESK

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-31-94 BY SP12 BTS ISC

SE 1

65-59264-35

56 DEC 19 1950 RECORDED - 112

DEC 16 1950

5-US

SAC, Anchorage

December 14, 1950

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
Stay-behind Agent Program
Escape and Evasion Program

Referral/Consult

There are transmitted herewith two photostatic copies of a report marked "confidential" which was received at the Bureau on December 1, 1950, [redacted] together with one copy of their letter of transmittal.

The above is submitted for your information in connection with the captioned matter.

Enclosures

65-59264-36

RECORDED - 112

WTB:VJM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-31-94 BY SP2 BT/STP

Tolson
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Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Sizoo

DEC 14 1950
COMM-FBI

59 DEC 22 1950

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : C. E. Hennrich

DATE: December 14, 1950

FROM : W. T. Baker

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM
ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-31-94 BY SP12 BTS/KS

Belmont

As you know, the Anchorage office is actively engaged in developing Stay-behind Agents as well as informants and contacts to be used in connection with the captioned programs.

Thus far approximately 100 names of potential Stay-behind Agents have been submitted by the Anchorage office in this regard.

Referral/Consult

In order to assist with the administration and supervision of instant project, it is proposed that a record be maintained in SA W. T. Baker's office of these potential agents and contacts. This record would be in the nature of an assignment card box, broken down into three sections, with 3 x 5 index cards filed alphabetically. The cards would merely reflect the identity of the individual agent, informant or contact involved, together with corresponding case file number. One section would contain a list, alphabetically filed, of potential Stay-behind Agents; one section would contain a list of the contacts or informants [redacted] the third section would contain a list of the developed and approved selected Stay-behind Agents. There would be no duplicate cards and the clerk assigned to this office would handle the clerical work involved.

Referral/Consult

It is believed that the above procedure is desirable in order to have at hand ready reference material on this project. It would also be beneficial from a statistical standpoint and could be used as a basis for answering inquiries of Bureau officials [redacted] at headquarters as to the exact and present status of the programs.

Permission is also requested to maintain tickler copies of all Bureau correspondence in this matter for an indefinite period. On July 7, 1950, a letter of instructions was directed to Anchorage. It took approximately one month

WTB:bjc

RECORDED - 96 65-59264-37
DEC 21 1950
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WB

65-59264

to locate the yellow out going. Another letter of instructions was forwarded to Anchorage under date of October 24, 1950. The yellow copy of this outgoing communication has been on locate since about October 27, 1950, and is still on locate.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the above proposed and suggested action be approved.

SECRET

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Candy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

DECODED COPY

FROM ANCHORAGE 12-8-50 NR 082100 10:30 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA. RE ANCHORAGE RADIOGRAM 5TH INSTANT. ADDITIONAL NAMES OF POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS ARE:

[redacted]

CASES OPENED AND ASSIGNED ON ALL POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS RECEIVED TO DATE. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED, DATA IN FILES ANCHORAGE OFFICE BEING COMPILED AND REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.

RECEIVED: 12-9-50 2:23 AM
CORRECTED: 12-9-50 7:03 PM MW

Classified by SP12 BTS 5-3194
Declassify on: OADR 5-2251

RECORDED - 22 65-59264-38

EX-100

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTJ/sm
ON 4-19-2000
00-1164

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

65-59264

CONFIDENTIAL

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

50 JAN 3 1951

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 12-5-50

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

CONFIDENTIAL

Referral/Consult

Rebulet dated 11-27-50.

[redacted]

Referral/Consult [redacted] fully concerning the program of this office in connection with the Stay-Behind Agent Program and offered our aid in developing agents for the Escape and Evasion Program. He was also advised that this office would conduct any investigations of proposed contacts at this time.

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

It is suggested that the Bureau may desire to contact [redacted] in order that the implementation of this program can go forward.

Referral/Consult

This was done. See Bulet to Anchorage 12-18-50 ESS:hw

JHW:MR
62-227

RECORDED : 22 165-59264-39

DEC 1950

50 JAN 3 1951

EX-100

DECLASSIFIED BY SP 12 BT/AS
ON 5-31-94
34225

S. Baker

4-42a

SECRET

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Candy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

DECODED COPY

FROM ANCHORAGE 12-11-50 NR 111950 5:19 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA, STAY - BEHIND AGENTS. RE ANCHORAGE LETTER DECEMBER 5 AND ANCHORAGE RADIOGRAM DECEMBER 8. ADDITIONAL NAMES POTENTIAL STAY - BEHIND AGENTS ARE

b6
b7C

DOCTOR JOSEPH F. SHELTON, PRESENTLY CONCENTRATING ON OBTAINING POTENTIAL COVERAGE IN STRATEGIC SECTIONS WHERE SAME IS WEAK, NAMELY, MCGRATH, GALENA AND NOME AS WELL AS COMPILING AND SUBMITTING PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS ON POTENTIAL AGENTS ALREADY SELECTED.

RECEIVED: 12-11-50 5:38 PM GLA

UNDERLINED PORTIONS OBTAINED FROM GARBLES, AWAITING CORRECTION.

Classified by SP2 BTS/SC
Declassify on: OADR 5/31/94 5/22/51

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

RECORDED - 22
INDEXED - 22

45-59264-40
DEC 28 1950
27

5-MB

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTS/SM
ON 4-19-2000
00-1164

EX-100

CONFIDENTIAL

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

50 JAN 3 1951

SECRET

4-42a

Nolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nicholas
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

TRANSMITTED BY SP3-BTS/JM
ON 4-19-2000
00-1164

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL (DECODED COPY) SECRET

FROM ANCHORAGE 12-6-50 NR 060600 1:05 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

Classified by SP2 BTS/JS
Declassify on: OADR 3/4225

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA. REFERENCE YOUR RADIOGRAM DECEMBER 5 LAST. ADDITIONAL NAMES OF POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS ARE:

[redacted]

SPECIAL AGENTS PRESENTLY ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO MATTER: [redacted] AND EDWARD A. PLEVACK. IN ADDITION, FOLLOWING AGENTS WORKING PART TIME IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER ASSIGNMENTS: [redacted] FIND THAT MAN DAYS SPENT ON MATTER NOVEMBER 17 DAYS PLUS PART OF 5 OTHER DAYS WORKED BY AGENTS ON AIR TRIPS AS THIS REGULAR WORK. IN ADDITION I HAVE WORKED ON MATTER PART OF EVERY DAY SINCE MY RETURN TO ANCHORAGE NOVEMBER 9 LAST. ALL AGENTS THOROUGHLY BRIEFED ON THIS MATTER AND DIRECTED TO GIVE IT TOP PRIORITY. THE 7 NAMES PROPOSED BEFORE RECOMMENDED TO BE UTILIZED IF NO ADVERSE DATA DEVELOPED IN COURSE OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. AUTHORITY IS REQUESTED TO CONTACT THESE 7 AND ALL NAMES HEREIN IF BUREAU RECORDS CHECK INDICATES NO ADVERSE INFORMATION. DETAILED LETTER SUBMITTED TODAY TOUCHING ALL ASPECTS OF PROGRAM INCLUDING FACT [redacted] ON EITHER PHASE OF SAME. IN EVENT AUTHORITY TO CONTACT POTENTIAL AGENTS GRANTED AND PROGRAM

COPIES DESTROYED

JAN 1951

RECORDED - 23

EX-43

Referral/Consult

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

52 JAN 8 1951

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

What about this?

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Candy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DECODED COPY (4) SECRET

PAGE TWO

ACCELERATED, ADDITIONAL AGENT PERSONNEL WILL BE NEEDED INASMUCH AS THIS PHASE WILL ENTAIL MUCH TRAVEL, INCLUDING BUSH AND BACK COUNTRY TRAVEL IN CASE OF TRAPPERS, HUNTERS, MINERS, ETC. HOLGER LARSEN, HEAD OF FISH AND WILD LIFE SERVICE, ANCHORAGE, HAS OFFERED TO FLY SPECIAL AGENTS TO ANY POINT NECESSARY TO CONTACT POTENTIAL AGENTS. WILL BE AVAILABLE AFTER PRESENT MOOSE SEASON ON 10TH INSTANT. (4) THIS WOULD BE IN CONNECTION WITH REGULAR TRAPPERS PATROL AND NO ADDED BURDEN ON FW SERVICE. LARSON ABOVE REPROACH AND DESIRES TO PARTICIPATE IN PROGRAM IN ANY CAPACITY.

RECEIVED: 12-6-50 1:55 PM MET (4)

cc: Mr. Baker

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (4)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : M. Ladd

DATE: December 11, 1950

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA
IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM
ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-31-94 BY SP2 BTS/tm 34225

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Room
Tele.
Jones

PURPOSE: Referral/Consult

To inform you that SAC John Williams of the Anchorage office has advised that [redacted]

BACKGROUND: Referral/Consult

As you are aware, the Bureau as a result of decisions reached at IIC meetings is committed, [redacted] to develop instant programs in Alaska.

By radiogram the Anchorage office on December [redacted] advised [redacted]" By letter dated December 5, 1950, which has just been received at the Bureau, the Anchorage office has advised as follows:

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

WTB:bjc

RECORDED - 23 65-59264-42

JAN 2 1951

EX-73

52 JAN 8 1951

Referral/Consult

For your information, it has been ascertained through [redacted]

Referral/Consult *It has been ascertained through* [redacted]

Referral/Consult *The SAC at Anchorage has suggested that the Bureau may desire to contact* [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Consult

It is recommended that the above matters be brought to the attention of [redacted]

SAC, Anchorage

December

FBI

SECRET

AIR MAIL

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION;
STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM
ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

RECORDED - 23 65-59364-43

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-31-84 BY SP1 BTR/RS

Reur radiogram dated December 6, 1950

which indicated that

Referral/Consult

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED BY 7/1/99
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1
per DOE letter dtd 11/20/98

#34225?

ESS:lw

JAN 8

SECRET

FBI
U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE
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FBI
U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE

SECRET

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

You will be kept advised of any developments in connection with these programs coming to the attention of the Bureau, and you should continue to keep the Bureau advised of such developments in Alaska.

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: December 8, 1950

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION; STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

Tolson
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Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Sandy

Referral/Consult

PURPOSE:

To advise you that with respect to the Stay-Behind Agent and Escape and Evasion Programs, [redacted]

Referral/Consult

BACKGROUND:

At the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference meetings on July 6, 1950, and September 27, 1950, it was agreed that FBI [redacted] should set up and provide for the operation of the Stay-Behind and Escape and Evasion Programs in Alaska. Appropriate instructions were forwarded to the Special Agent in Charge at Anchorage by the Bureau immediately following the respective meetings. SAC John Williams at Anchorage immediately [redacted] were studied and analyzed at the Bureau conferences were held with [redacted] and as a result, [redacted] The Bureau has agreed in principle [redacted] were furnished to Anchorage.

By radiogram dated December 6, 1950, the Anchorage Office advised of the progress being made in the Bureau's part in these programs and included this statement: "Detailed letter submitted today (12-6-50) touching all aspects of program, including fact [redacted] With respect to this you inquired: "What about this?"

Referral/Consult

The above-mentioned letter has not as yet been received from the Anchorage Office, therefore, it is not possible to completely answer your inquiry concerning this matter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-31-91 BY SP2 BST

34225

RECORDED - 23 65-59264-43

JAN 2 1951

WTB:jvs

COPIES DESTROYED

R584 NOV 21 1960

Referral/Consult

For your information, however, this is to advise

that [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

ACTION:

~~*None.*~~ *For your information.*

Referral/Consult [redacted]

We must press on this because even if we fulfill our responsibility locally, the programme treasonable activities are so interlocked that in the

[illegible] Project [illegible]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1296733-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 21
Page 4 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 11 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 12 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 20 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 21 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 58 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 59 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 60 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 62 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 63 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 64 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 73 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 74 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 103 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 116 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 121 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 122 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 123 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 164 ~ b7D;
Page 165 ~ b7D;
Page 174 ~ Referral/Consult;

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1/19/51

SAC, Anchorage

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

PROPOSED PLAN FOR
INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

Referral/Consult

For your confidential info, there are transmitted herewith two photostatic copies of a

65-59264 — 44

RECORDED - 81

Enclosures

WTB:eas.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-21-94 BY SP 2 BT 1/50

EX-52

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

6 FEB 5 1951

COMM - FBI
JAN 20 1951
MAILED 19

JAN 19 3 49 PM
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

Tolson
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Clegg
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Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY

FROM ANCHORAGE 12-16-50 NR 162200 8:20 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

PROPOSED PLAN FOR [redacted] GOV [redacted] IN ALASKA

[redacted]

RECEIVED: 12-16-50 8:44 PM MW Referral/Consult

6-2-94 SP3 BTJ/JM 30225

SP3-BTJ/JM
6-14-2000
00-1164

RECORDED - 101 65-59264-45

EX-113

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

62 JAN 9 1951

65-59264

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY

FROM ANCHORAGE 12-22-50 NR 222100 7:36 P.M.

DIRECTOR URGENT

Referral/Consult

STAGE. ACCELERATED PRELIMINARY PROCESSING OF RECOMMENDED POTENTIAL AGENTS GOING FORWARD.

RECEIVED 8:05 P.M. LL

Referral/Consult

SP3-BTS/SM

6-14-2000

00-1164

RECORDED - 94

EXCISED

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

SECRET

DATE: December 18, 1950

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION; STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

Tolson
Ladd
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Glavin
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Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

Referral/Consult

Re my memorandum to you dated December 8, 1950, which advised that information has been received from Alaska that

Reference memorandum stated that

Supervisor Edward S. Sanders on December 12, 1950, met with the following individuals for a discussion of the programs in question: Colonel Perry, G-2, U.S. Army, Alaska; Lieutenant Colonel Easton, U.S.A.F., Assistant Director of Plans and Operations, Alaska Command; Lieutenant Colonel Bird, U.S.A.F. Director for Plans for Alaska Air Command; Lieutenant Colonel Kelly, U.S.A.F. Operations Headquarters, U.S.A.F.; Major Giblo, Directorate of Intelligence, Headquarters U.S.A.F., (Escape and Evasion); Major Joseph Cappucci, Headquarters OSI; Mr. Gilbert Levy, Counter-intelligence, OSI Headquarters.

Referral/Consult

A thorough discussion of the Escape and Evasion Program and the Stay-Behind Agent Program, which have been prepared by FBI Headquarters and coordinated at Air Force Headquarters, revealed that while the basic plans have been agreed upon at Washington, they were not completely handled in Alaska inasmuch as Lieutenant Colonel Easton from the Alaska Air Command was not familiar with these plans. The Alaska Command is the over-all Command headed by an Air Force Officer and has under it in Alaska, an Air Command, an Army Command, and a Navy Command. Everyone agreed that the two basic plans prepared by the Bureau are sound, and the only problem was the implementation of these plans.

Colonel Easton, Assistant Director of Plans and Operations for the Alaska Command, suggested, and the others agreed, that the Alaska Command instruct the Alaska Air

RECORDED - 23 62-93264-47
INDEXED - 23
JAN 6 1951
56 JAN 11 1951
ESS:pjb
FIVE

~~SECRET~~

Referral/Consult

Command to prepare plans for escape and evasion in Alaska and stay-behind Agents in Alaska. The plans which have been prepared by [redacted] the Bureau could then immediately be put into effect and included in the over-all military plans for Alaska. Supervisor Sanders was advised that the order should reach the Alaska Air Command from the Alaska Command within a week and that these plans would then be in the proper channels and approved by everyone concerned. In other words, the Commanding General, Alaska Command, will instruct the Alaska Air Command to prepare the plans (which are already prepared) and supervise the implementation of these plans for him.

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

There was some discussion concerning [redacted]

[redacted]

This would appear to be of no concern to the Bureau inasmuch as it does not affect operations within Alaska. ~~S~~ - (U)

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

REMAINS CLASSIFIED PER 06/6 TELEPHONE CALL SP7 CL 3/25/98

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

Supervisor Sanders has been advised [redacted]

[redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Consult

The foregoing is furnished for your information. It is recommended that the attached air mail letter be forwarded to the SAC, Anchorage advising him of the results of instant conference.

All urgent info put thru plan interception plans procedures.

K.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 1-8-51

FROM : SAC, ANCHORAGE

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

Personal and Confidential

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2BTP/LSC
ON 6-21-94
34225

Rebulet 1-2-51.

With reference to paragraphs 6 and 7 of this letter, every effort is being made to obtain the type of potential stay-behind agent suggested by the Bureau for urban areas. However, it is pointed out that the only settlement in Alaska encompassed in this program which may be referred to as an urban area would be Anchorage. It has a white population of approximately twenty thousand people. The other areas to be covered have populations from less than 100 persons to only a few thousand. Every effort is being made and will continue to develop persons in the category of unskilled or semi-skilled workmen engaged in occupations which possibly would be of the least interest to an invading force.

With reference to the obtaining of full names and descriptions of potential stay-behind agents for inclusion in the first report submitted to aid the Bureau in searching their names, we are attempting in every instance to get sufficient data to aid the Bureau in this project. In some cases it has been difficult to obtain such information while still obtaining the discretion necessary to keep this project secret. However, upon authority of the Bureau to interview these individuals, full names, date and place of birth and description has been and will continue to be obtained.

With reference to the last paragraph of Bureau letter, all seven individuals on whom authority had been granted by the Bureau to interview have been interviewed or eliminated. Five of these individuals have consented to participate as stay-behind agents. The other two, ANTONIO POLET and SAM ROMACK, have been eliminated because of information received from confidential informants.

INDEXED - 13
RECORDED - 13
100-382141-48
JAN 10 1951

b6
b7C

Reports have been submitted on all of these individuals except [redacted]. Reports on these individuals are being prepared and will be submitted immediately.

15

[redacted]

JHL:MR
(5)

COPIES DESTROYED
1984

60MAR 14 1951

Referral/Consult

AN File CS-238

[redacted]

By way of recapitulation on the action taken by this office with reference to stage, approximately 65 reports on potential stay-behind agents have been submitted to the Bureau with recommendations that authority be granted to interview them. Five individuals have been interviewed upon the authority of the Bureau and all have agreed to participate. Authority was granted to interview two more, but these were not interviewed inasmuch as information came to our attention which eliminated them as potential agents. Preliminary reports on additional individuals are being compiled and will be submitted at the earliest possible moment.

These projects are receiving priority in this division and continued diligent attention will be given them.

SAC, Anchorage

1/8/51

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

Referral/Consult

RECORDED - 13 65-59264-49

Reur radiogram 12/29/50 informing that

[redacted]

For your confidential info. [redacted]

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

WTB:eas

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-21-94 BY SP12 BTC/TC 34225

FBI FIRESCOPE

JAN 6 2 03 PM

Tolson
Ladd
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Harbo
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Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

MAILED 10
JAN 8 1951
FBI

65-59264-49

52 JAN 13 1951

65-59264-

4-42a

Tolson
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Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (C)(U)

FROM ANCHORAGE (12-29-50) (C)(U) NR 292045 6:14 P.M.

DIRECTOR

Referral/Consult

URGENT

STAGE. (C)(U)

REPORTS REGARDING FORTY POTENTIAL AGENTS HAVE BEEN DISPATCHED TO BUREAU. OTHERS WILL BE SUBMITTED AS QUICKLY AS SAME CAN BE TYPED. (C)(U)

RECEIVED (12-29-50) (C)(U) 6:19 P.M. LL

Referral/Consult

RECORDED - 13 (C)(U)

(JAN 11 1951) (C)(U)

cc: Mr Belmont

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (C)(U)

65-59264

Tolson
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Nease
Gandy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY

FROM ANCHORAGE (1-6-51) NR 070115 10:17 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

STAGE. REBULET (SECOND) INSTANT LAST PARAGRAPH. FRANK B. MOORE, [redacted] HOWARD G. ROMIG, AND JOE DANICH HAVE AGREED TO ACT AS STAY BEHIND AGENTS. ANTONIO POLET AND SAM MCMACK NO LONGER BEING CONSIDERED BECAUSE OF STATEMENTS MADE RE THEM BY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT(S). REPORTS RE THESE SIX HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED. [redacted] HAS BEEN UNAVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW BUT SAME BEING HANDLED AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. REPORT SUBMITTED ON FIFTY OTHERS IN WHICH BUREAU AUTHORITY IS REQUESTED FOR INTERVIEWS. OTHER REPORTS BEING SUBMITTED AS SOON AS SAME CAN BE TYPED. LETTER RE [redacted] AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWS.

RECEIVED (1-6-51) 10:33 PM LH

Referral/Consult

b6
b7C

[redacted]

6-21-94
SP2 BTJ/lm
6-14-2000
00-1164

RECORDED - 101
INDEXED - 101

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

SAC, Anchorage

January 11, 1951

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

I desire again to call to your attention the absolute necessity of utilizing extreme caution, discretion and sound judgment in the handling of this Program.

It is imperative that you impress all Bureau personnel at Anchorage with the security measures which must be taken in developing instant Program.

A review of the reports recently submitted by Anchorage on individual potential Stay-behind Agents in some instances reflect statements to the effect that identified reliable and confidential informants "have recommended _____ as a potential Stay-behind Agent under this Program," or "_____ has been interviewed concerning instant Program."

Referral/Consult

It is recognized that the wording of the reports in this connection may merely reflect the Special Agent's general description of matters discussed with the individual potential Stay-behind Agent. It is further recognized that it has been necessary for you to personally discuss instant matter with reliable and well-established contacts of the Anchorage Office in order to identify and determine the reliability and background of various individuals being considered under this Program. Under no circumstances, however, should it become general knowledge in Alaska that the Bureau [redacted] are engaged in the development of this Program. Individual Stay-behind Agents should not know the identity of one another. When Special Agents are interviewing potential contacts in this regard, no indication should be given that an "espionage net" or "Stay-behind Agent Program" is being developed in Alaska.

RECORDED - 99

In all contacts with potential Stay-behind Agents, the matter of security should be stressed by the interviewing Special Agents. The individual should be cautioned not to discuss the subject matter with other persons. It might be pointed out that an indiscreet remark on the part of a potential Stay-behind Agent might very possibly, in the event of invasion, endanger his own life.

WTB:EHW

JAN 20 1951

Referral/Consult

It is suggested that you may also desire to discuss the security features of this Program with [redacted] with the thought in mind of discreetly bringing this matter to his attention so that the personnel under his jurisdiction may become aware of the importance of the security measures involved in instant matter.

Advise the Bureau what action you have taken in order to insure that captioned Program in Alaska will be handled on a confidential and secure basis.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 1-12-51

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM) (ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

Reference is made to Anchorage letter dated 1/8/51 and specifically to Page 3, Paragraph 3 thereof.

On 1/11/51 a conference was held in the Office of Operations, Alaska Command at Fort Richardson. Those present were:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Col. L. R. TORRANT
U. S. Army
Director of Plans and Operations
Alaska Command

Lt. Col. H. Brooks Wilson
U. S. Air Force
Asst. Director of Plans and Operations.
Alaska Command

CLASSIFIED BY SP7 Cw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
Pgs 2 Paras 2&5 REMAIN CLASSIFIED PER OGK TEL CALL.

Lt. Col. C. W. Bird
U. S. Air Force
Alaskan Air Command
Attached to Office of Director of Plans and Operations

Captain Minor Heine
U. S. Navy
Director of Intelligence
Alaska Command

COPIES DESTROYED
R584 NOV 21 1980

Lt. Col. Edwin A. Hartley
Director
Office of Special Investigations in Alaska

John H. Williams
Special Agent in Charge
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Anchorage, Alaska

INDEXED - 20

EX - 38

JAN 27 1951

Referral/Consult

MAR 1 1951

62-227

AN File 65-298
62-227

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

The Bureau will be kept advised in this regard.

As was pointed out in Anchorage teletype of January 10, 1951, 101 persons have been considered by this office as potential stay-behind agents. To date 14 have been eliminated because of information received from confidential informants. Closing reports have been submitted on these 14 stating that they were no longer being considered. Five persons have been interviewed upon the authority of the Bureau and all have consented to participate. Preliminary reports have been submitted on the remaining 32 recommending that Bureau authority be granted to interview them.

SAC, Anchorage

January 15, 1951

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

It is noted in reports being submitted by the Anchorage Office on potential Stay-behind Agents, that Bureau permission is being requested to interview these individuals and that requests of this nature are being included on the administrative page of the individual report submitted. Due to the urgency of this program and in order to save stenographic and typing time, the Bureau has no objection to your continuing this practice instead of directing a cover letter to the Bureau setting out the specific request. In all other types of cases, of course, the Anchorage Office should be guided by Part I, Section 53 (d) of the FBI Handbook in setting out leads for the Bureau.

65-59264

WTB:dar:nff

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-21-94 BY SP2 BTP/PHS

JAN 16 11 02 AM '51 RECEIVED PLANNING ROOM FBI DEPT OF JUSTICE

RECORDED - 9 65-59264- JAN 19 1951 80 DEPT OF JUSTICE FBI REC'D-10 DEPT OF JUSTICE

EX-123

Tolson
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JAN 22 1951 COMM - FBI JAN 16 1951 MAILED 20

FEDERAL BUREAU OF I[illegible]ESTIGATION
RECORDS SECTION
1 - -1949 1950

STOP SPECIAL

For STOP DESK ✓

For NUMBERING _____

For RECORDING 2-2

ROUTE TO

Mr. [illegible] Room: 4[illegible]

Mr. _____ _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED 34225
DATE 6-21-91 BY SP12 B Tal SC

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Gandy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY)

FROM ANCHORAGE (1-11-51) NR 110330 2:14 P.M.

DIRECTOR

URGENT

G. I. R. -8

STAGE. TO DATE 101 PERSONS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY THIS OFFICE. TO DATE 14 HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED BECAUSE OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS. CLOSING REPORTS INDICATING THESE NO LONGER BEING CONSIDERED HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED. 5 PERSONS RECOMMENDED HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED WITH BUREAU AUTHORITY AND ALL AGREED TO PARTICIPATE. CLOSING REPORTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED ON THESE 5. PRELIMINARY REPORTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED ON REMAINING 82 RECOMMENDING BUREAU AUTHORITY BE GIVEN TO INTERVIEW THEM.

RECEIVED (1-11-51) 2:40 P.M. GW

6-14-2000 SP3-BTJ/jm 00-1164

RECORDED - 10 65-59264-54

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

59 JAN 26 1951

65-59264

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: January 22, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF AN INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
(ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTS/LSC
ON 6-21-94
34225T

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 BTS/LSC #34225T
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
per DOJ letter dtd 7/10/92
7/1/99

Reference is made to Anchorage letter dated January 12, 1951.

[redacted]

RECORDED - 50

62-[illegible]-7-53

65-298
cc:27-227

COPIES DESTROYED
R584 NOV 21 1980

JAN 25 19

MAR 15 1951

~~SECRET~~

Referral/Consult

[redacted] Referral/Consult

Anchorage File 65-298

[redacted]

This office is continuing to give attention to the recruitment of potential stay-behind agents and interviews with those authorized by the Bureau and reports on the same will be forwarded at the earliest possible time. Referral/Consult

As has been done in the past, this office will continue to hold conferences with [redacted] and keep him abreast of all developments in the SBA Program.

It is noted that [redacted] However, in line with the instructions received from the Bureau in its letter dated Nov. 29, 1950, (Bu file 65-59264), Paragraph 1, Page 6, no reports have been given to him. Referral/Consult

This matter will continue to receive diligent attention and the Bureau will be kept advised of all developments.

[redacted] SECRET

NDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED S GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 1-17-51

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-21-94 BY SP2 BTS/JC

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (Stay-Behind Agent Program)

DEFERRED RECORDING JAN 20 1951

Rebulet 1-11-51.

Concerning Paragraph 3 of that letter, the wording of certain reports in these cases indicating that a confidential informant has recommended a certain person as a potential stay-behind agent represents the Special Agent's general description of the discussion had with the confidential informant. At no time are the Special Agents working on these matters in conversations with confidential informants or with the potential agents themselves telling them the exact nature of the program. The confidential informants merely know that we are interested in certain individuals in the Territory with particular reference to their loyalty, character, intentions if war comes and ability to participate in certain patriotic activities. In no instant has a confidential informant been told the exact nature of this program.

In discussing this matter with a potential agent after authority has been granted by the Bureau, he is first impressed with the confidential nature of the interview. He is then asked what his intentions are if war comes in order that our subsequent suggestions will have no undue influence upon him. He is then given enough information to allow him to make up his mind as to his participation. The identity of no other potential stay-behind agent is discussed with him. At the end of the interview the absolute security of this matter is again impressed upon him.

Concerning the penultimate paragraph in referenced letter, the security features of this program have been discussed with [redacted] on numerous occasions. He has advised me [redacted] However, continued attention will be given the security of the program through [redacted] and by the Special Agents of this office.

Referral/Consult

65-298
JHW:MR

RECORDED - 48

65-59264- 56

JAN 26 1951

5 Bureau

53 JAN 30 1950

65-59264-

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: February 1, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF AN INVASION (STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

Rebulet January 30, 1951, wherein the Bureau directed that the names of additional prospective agents under consideration be submitted by letter.

In addition to the names which have already been submitted, the following have been proposed and preliminary inquiries are being made concerning them. Preliminary reports concerning these prospective agents will be submitted at the earliest possible time.

[redacted]

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-21-94 BY SP2 STP/SC

As the Bureau knows, in addition to those new prospective agents listed above, this office presently has a number concerning whom preliminary reports have been submitted, Bureau authority to interview has been received and they are presently assigned for interview. The results of these interviews and the recommendations of the Anchorage Office will be submitted to the Bureau at the earliest possible time.

JHW:MMA
65-298

RECORDED - 104
INDEXED - 104

65-57264-57

FEB 6 1951

5 FEB 9 1951

CC-150

...RAL BUREAU OF INVEST...
...STATES DEPARTMENT OF...

CONFIDENTIAL

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

January 29, 1951

DEFERRED

Transmit the following message to: SAC, ANCHORAGE CIPHER PAD CODE

STAGE. REURAD JANUARY ELEVEN LAST. ACTION TAKEN BY BUREAU ALL ANCHORAGE REPORTS SUBMITTED ON INDIVIDUAL SBA-S RECEIVED TO DATE. ADVISE BY RADIOGRAM NUMBER AND IDENTITIES INDIVIDUALS CONTACTED WHO HAVE AGREED TO ACT AND ARE RECOMMENDED BY YOU. SUBMIT BY LETTER NAMES ADDITIONAL PROSPECTIVE SBA-S UNDER CONSIDERATION. TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS MENTIONED RECENT ANCHORAGE COMMUNICATIONS BEING DISCUSSED [redacted] ND YOU WILL BE NOTIFIED RESULTS PROMPTLY. EFFECTIVE FEBRUARY ONE NEXT AND EVERY THURSDAY THEREAFTER SURAD SUMMARY PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENTS INSTANT PROGRAM.

HOOVER

Referral/Consult

WEB:VJM

65-59264

Classified by SP2 BTT/SM
Declassify on: OADR 3412251

DECLASSIFIED BY SP1-BTT/SM
ON 6-14-2000
00-1164

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Tolson
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Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

RECEIVED
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
JAN 29 3:20 PM
TELETYPE UNIT

RECORDED - 20

65-59264-58

JAN 31 1951

CONFIDENTIAL

FEB 12 1951

SENT VIA Bureau Radio (1-29-51) 7P M Per

4-42a

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

Tolson
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Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

DECODED COPY (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE (1-31-51) (u)

NR 311810 4:23 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. REBURAD (JANUARY 30, 1951) (u) FOLLOWING PERSONS HAVE AGREED TO ACT AS STAYBEHIND AGENTS, HAVE BEEN RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED. JOE DANICH, GIRDWOOD, ALASKA, [redacted] FRANK BERTON MOORE, ANCHORAGE, [redacted] HOWARD GLENMORE ROMIG, ANCHORAGE, [redacted] (Corrected) SEWARD, [redacted] DOCTOR JOSEPH HARRISON SHELTON, [redacted] FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED, AGREED TO ACT AS AGENTS AND RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING REPORTS BEING SUBMITTED JANUARY 31 [redacted] LETTER SETTING OUT NAMES OF ADDITIONAL PROSPECTIVE AGENTS BEING SUBMITTED. ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS BEING MADE DAILY AND CLOSING REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME.

b6
b7C

RECEIVED (1-31-51) (u)

4:48 PM LH

SP3:BTJ/SM

6-14-2000

00-1164

RECORDED - 20

INDEXED - 20

165-5[illegible]-59

FEB 6 [illegible] (u)

5-WB

6-24-94

SP2BTJ/SC

Declassify on: 311225

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems (u)

6 FEB 12 [illegible] (u)

ARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: February 7, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

Reference is made to Anchorage letters dated 12/5/50 and 1/12/51 and particularly to Page 4 of the latter reference.

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

In attempting to develop stay-behind agents, emphasis will be placed on getting them in the vicinities of strategic areas.

It is noted in investigating and interviewing the potential agents that many of them live in the back country where they are not accessible by any means other than a bush plane on skis in the wintertime and bush plane on pontoons in the summertime or afoot. This has materially slowed down the overall program. However, every effort is being made to contact those individuals concerning whom the Bureau has authorized an interview.

When this program has developed sufficiently to institute the training phase as much time as possible should be given this office to contact the various persons to attend particular classes inasmuch as many of them will have to be sought out individually, and the same will consume a considerable amount of time.

65-298
JHJ:vf

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12BTW/LSC
ON 6-21-94 34225

RECORDED - 43

65-59264-60

FEB 10 1951

65-59264

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Harbo

FROM : Mr. Bowles

DATE: January 25, 1951

SUBJECT: The Steky II
Miniature Camera
Photographic Research

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-21-94 BY SP2 BTS/SC

Reference is made to my memorandum dated December 8, 1950, setting forth details concerning the Steky II camera and suggesting certain uses for this camera. An addendum was added to this memorandum on December 13, 1950, by Mr. C. E. Hennrich of the Security Investigative Division in which it was suggested that consideration be given to the use of this camera in the Bureau's Alaska Stay-Behind the Agents Program. It was also suggested that the Bureau purchase two of these cameras and that the Laboratory conduct sufficient tests in order to express an opinion as to the use of this camera in subzero temperatures such as might be encountered in Alaska.

Two of the above cameras, including two telephoto lens, have been received. The camera has been tested at subzero temperatures and has been found to operate satisfactorily at temperatures ranging down to 20 degrees below zero. On the basis of these tests, it is not believed that any difficulty should be encountered in the use of the Steky II camera at low temperatures.

The two cameras referred to above have been turned over to the Photographic Laboratory where they are available for assignment.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the results of the Laboratory tests made with the Steky II camera be furnished the Security Investigative Division for their information.

RAM:mdp

80-687

RECORDED - 48

165-59264-61

FEB 16 1951

34

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 80-687-17

SEVEN cards
FIVE
THREE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: February 6, 1951

FROM : C. E. Hennrich

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED 34225 DATE 1-21-94 BY SP2 BTSAC

Referral/Consult

PURPOSE

To recommend that [redacted] be informed of the results of tests made by the FBI Laboratory concerning the miniature camera, The Steky II, which camera is available commercially.

Referral/Consult

BACKGROUND

As you are aware, the training program for Stay-behind Agents is presently being prepared at the Bureau [redacted]

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

There are attached self-explanatory memoranda dated December 8, 1950 and January 25, 1951 from Mr. Bowles to Mr. Harbo reflecting results of tests made by the laboratory concerning the use of the miniature camera, The Steky II, especially as relates to the use of this camera at low temperatures.

It is noted that The Steky II is available on the commercial market.

RECORDED - 48 65-59264-62

JAN 1951

RECOMMENDATION

Referral/Consult

It is recommended that [redacted] tests made at the FBI Laboratory reflect that instant camera can be operated at temperatures ranging down to twenty degrees below zero.

65-59264
Attachments
WTB:LJB:mhf

Referral/Consult

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

1951

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: February 13, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM) (65-59264) Stay-

DECLASSIFIED BY KP12 BTT/ISC ON 6-21-94 342251

There is set out hereinafter a recapitulation of the Stay Behind Agent Program in this office, including information of an administrative nature, as well as data concerning agents who have been recommended and on whom closing reports have been submitted to the Bureau, together with certain problems encountered and the approach that is being made to this assignment.

There is transmitted herewith

I. STAY BEHIND AGENTS

Referral/Consult

In considering individuals in the territory as potential Stay Behind Agents, accent has been placed on enlisting those who have as many of the following qualifications as could be found.

1 - Persons with good health, loyal to the United States and who intend to stay in the territory in case of war or invasion.

2 - Persons with an intimate knowledge of the territory or the locale in which they reside.

3 - Persons with a knowledge of short wave radios.

4 - Persons who own short wave radios and have "ham" licenses.

5 - Persons who are airplane pilots.

6 - Persons who own airplanes.

7 - Persons with the ability to survive in the back country of the territory of Alaska under the most severe conditions for protracted periods of time.

ENCLOSURE BEHIND FILE

RECORDED - 48

INDEXED - 48

65-59264-63

FEB 16 1951

JHW:MMA
65-298
Enclosure

APR 9 1951

8 - Persons who have had some experience in caching food, clothing, arms and ammunition, gasoline and other survival gear.

9 - Persons who have had experience mushing dog teams.

10 - Persons who have had experience with small boats and who know the waters of Cook Inlet, Prince William Sound and the coast of Alaska between Shelikof Strait and Prince Rupert.

11 - Persons who own or have access to cabins located in areas which necessarily will be utilized in this program.

12 - Persons who live in and around the strategic areas listed.

13 - Persons who live on and can observe the highways of Alaska.

14 - Persons who live on and can observe the railroad.

15 - Persons who can assist in the operation and maintenance of a "life and supply line".

II. NUMBER OF STAY BEHIND AGENTS

As has been noted heretofore in correspondence with the Bureau, it is impossible to set a number of Stay Behind Agents who would be adequate in giving ample and comprehensive intelligence coverage during an invasion or occupation. However, the project of obtaining Stay Behind Agents will be continued until the Bureau is satisfied that the strategic areas and all items referred to in I above appear to be sufficiently covered.

There is being set out hereinafter the names and locations of persons who have been investigated, interviewed and recommended as Stay Behind Agents for the Bureau's ready reference:

LAWSON FORBES BAKER, Fairbanks - 62-93600
[redacted] - 62-93639
[redacted] 62-93602
[redacted] - 62-93482
[redacted] 62-93646
[redacted] - 62-93636
JOE DANIGH, Girdwood
[redacted] - 62-93483

b6
b7C



b6
b7C

All other cases on which preliminary reports have been submitted and Bureau authority requested to conduct an interview, numbering 36 at this writing, have been assigned and Agents are presently on road trips attempting to locate and interview them.

Preliminary reports on 30 additional potential Stay Behind Agents have been submitted to the Bureau with a request for authority to interview them.

Cases on 31 individuals have been closed and the individuals themselves not recommended in view of information contained in the Bureau files, information received here from confidential informants or information contained in the Anchorage files.

As is noted above, continued efforts will be made to obtain additional potential Agents but in the interests of completing as many as possible in the least possible time with the limited personnel at hand, this is being deferred until those concerning whom we have had authority to interview have been contacted and closing reports submitted.

It is noted that we have been able to make several interviews in such towns in strategic areas as Seward, Fairbanks, Anchorage and Palmer. However, we are now finding that persons to be interviewed reside in isolated sections and must be sought out one by one. This is consuming a considerable amount of time. In a number of instances, such persons do not live in areas covered by the established airlines and it is necessary to contact bush pilots on a charter basis so that the Agents can be flown in, waited for and flown out. In some cases it will be necessary to wait until trappers, hunters or other persons in isolated sections come into Anchorage or Fairbanks, where we have resident agencies, to be interviewed. Such persons have no contact whatsoever with the outside world and Agent personnel would not be utilized efficiently if it were detailed to spend a protracted period of time hunting them up one at a time.

It is noted also that this office has been hampered in its efforts to make contacts and interviews in the country surrounding Glenn Allen, Tok Junction and Big Delta by the severe cold. In this area in the past several weeks the temperature has been between 50 and 60 degrees below zero, making travel extremely hazardous.

III. TRAINING

Referral/Consult

Comments concerning training in this program have been made in Bureau letter of November 29, 1950, Anchorage letter of December 5, 1950, and Anchorage letter of January 8, 1951. In the last letter mentioned it is noted that [redacted]

Also with reference to training of the agents when this program reaches that stage, it is contemplated that all agents be fingerprinted and photographed in order that this identifying data will be available to the Bureau and to the administration of this program.

Referral/Consult

IV. COMMUNICATIONS

Proposed method of handling radio communications was set out in Anchorage letter of December 18, 1950, and comments concerning a review of it by the radio experts in the FBI Laboratory were returned by Bureau letter of January 31, 1951.

[redacted]

It is noted that almost all radio installations in the territory of Alaska will be in isolated and rugged terrain and it is suggested that possibly more than one man should be detailed to operate each radio. This suggestion is augmented by the fact that in almost every case the radio will need a power unit inasmuch as electricity will not be available. It is felt that more than one man will be needed to make such a radio installation mobile or, if it is stationary, to man it for protracted periods of time. Likewise, it is felt that two men would have a better opportunity for survival, both against an enemy and against the rigors of this climate if they were able to work together.

Referral/Consult

In addition to radio communication, it is possible that a ground to air radio contact may be set up. However, in view of the fact that

[redacted]

Communication by courier has been considered but it is pointed out that such relays will be slow to the point of being almost useless. In addition to this, in the winter courier by snowshoes and dog teams will be impossible in many sections.

Referral/Consult

It is noted that considerable time and effort will be necessary to transport radios, power units and necessary accessories to each point of location. The summer is the only season which lends itself to this function. In view of this, it is suggested that the Bureau may desire to point out to the [redacted] that almost a whole year will be lost if something is not done in this respect during the summer of 1951.

Likewise, it is noted that summer is the best and only practicable time to carry in materials, build caches and draft maps of the same. If this project is not started in 1951, it will almost necessarily have to be put off until 1952.

V. CACHING

Inasmuch as considerable caching of supplies, arms, ammunition, gasoline, radios and other Arctic survival gear will have to be done, this office is in the process of compiling a dossier on this activity. It is noted that though contact has been made with the Army and Air Force here in the territory, no written material on it has been found. Hence, we are compiling our information from various sources such as Fish and Wildlife Service; Arctic Survival Unit of the Army, particularly the Big Delta, Alaska, section; hunters, trappers and other individuals who have spent much time in the back country. This dossier will contemplate the following:

A - Essential items to be cached

1 - Radio parts and equipment
2 - Arms and ammunition and other weapons
3 - Clothing
4 - Medicines
5 - Foods
6 - Gear and supplies necessary for agents' cover such as traps, prospectors tools
7 - Photographic equipment
8 - Gear necessary for operation of agents such as field glasses, cameras where necessary, flashlight, signal panel, signal mirror and signal flags
9 - Snowshoes and skis where necessary
10 - Gasoline when and where necessary
11 - Explosives
12 - Camp gear

B - Places for caching

1 - In lakes, streams and rivers
2 - In caves
3 - In ground
4 - Stilted caches
5 - In trees
6 - In cabins

C - Manner of sealing or making weather tight the cached materials

1 - In sealed cans
2 - In water and moisture proof foil

3 - In boxes where cache is not exposed to the elements
4 - Canvas or burlap where suitable and cache is not exposed to the elements

D - Mapping and marking caches

1 - Marking same on detailed maps
2 - Marking same by directions based on natural terrain barriers and bounds
3 - By personal knowledge of person making cache

E - Amount of caching materials

1 - Amounts necessary to sustain life of one person for an arbitrary term of 2 years

F - Choosing cache locations

1 - General knowledge of the Stay Behind Agent
2 - Aid of an expert examining the locale in which a cache is desired

G - Methods of transporting supplies to cache location

1 - Flying them in
2 - By railroad in certain instances
3 - By water
4 - By packing them in

H - The building of caches

1 - By the Stay Behind Agent himself
2 - By experts in this field

Referral/Consult

It is realized that quite possibly the [redacted] However, this phase is being considered by this office inasmuch as it appears that time is of the essence and if the program in this respect is not accelerated and something done on it during the summer of 1951, it will have to be deferred until the summer of 1952 because of weather, terrain and other evident obstacles natural to this territory.

VI. LIFE AND SUPPLY LINE

As has been noted in the reports received by the Bureau in connection with interviews of those individuals who have been recommended as Stay Behind Agents, it is set out whether such individual is able to operate or owns an airplane. In this regard consideration has been given to the establishment of a lifeline for the Stay Behind Agents. It will be necessary, of course, to supply them from time to time with arms, ammunition, food, clothing and other gear necessary to the success of this endeavor and essential to the existence of the agents.

This office is making a study of the most logical mountain passes, air routes and logical spots for landing by pontoons, skis and wheels. These routes, of course, will necessarily emanate from positions in the territory of Alaska and possibly later in Canada which will be out of the zone of occupation.

While an effort has been made to obtain any type of written material on such a project, none has been found. Hence, our sources thus far have been the Fish and Wildlife Service, which habitually flies over all of this country in bush type aircraft. We are also contacting the CAA here which has detailed maps of all of the country in which we are interested. In addition, we are also obtaining information from bush pilots, big game guides who own planes and prospectors who own planes in order that we may ultimately have a complete dossier on this field.

Referral/Consult

In this regard, it is probably contemplated that [redacted] it is felt that such a study should be made even though it is discarded at a later date.

In connection with this project or if the Air Force provides the plane service, necessary gasoline caches will have to be made at various places in the territory inasmuch as the type of plane (bush aircraft) will not be able to fly sorties to all Stay Behind Agent locations and return to its base without refueling.

Also with reference to this life and supply line, it is pointed out that gasoline caches will have to be made during the summer months in a great part of the territory. If something is not done on this phase of the program during the summer of 1951, it necessarily will have to be deferred until the following summer.

This matter will continue to receive priority attention and the Bureau will be advised of all developments.

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY

FROM ANCHORAGE (2-8-51) NR 081800 3:08 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

STAGE. SUMMARY OF PROGRAM. TO DATE 134 PERSONS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS IN THIS PROGRAM. OF THIS NUMBER 30 HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED WITH BUREAU AUTHORITY, CLOSING REPORT SUBMITTED AND THESE PERSONS RECOMMENDED FOR INCLUSION IN PROGRAM. AUTHORITY HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM BUREAU TO INTERVIEW 42 OTHERS. THESE INTERVIEWS ASSIGNED, BEING MADE AT EARLIEST TIME, CLOSING REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE MADE. OF TOTAL NUMBER CONSIDERED 24 ADDITIONAL PRELIMINARY REPORTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO BUREAU WITH RECOMMENDATIONS THAT BUREAU AUTHORITY BE GRANTED FOR INTERVIEWS. EIGHT MORE PRELIMINARY REPORTS BEING SUBMITTED WITH REQUEST TO INTERVIEW. OF TOTAL NUMBER, CASES ON THIRTY HAVE BEEN CLOSED BECAUSE OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN BUREAU FILES OR INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS. THESE THIRTY NO LONGER BEING CONSIDERED.

RECEIVED: (2-8-51) 3:21 PM GLA

Referral/Consult

COMM-FBI

NOV 21 1950

SP3-BIS/SM

6-14-2000

00-1164

RECORDED - 48

65-57264-64

FEB 1 1951

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

59 FEB 19 1951

cc: Mr. Belmont

"The Journal" (Editorial), Ottawa, Ontario
January 18, 1951

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Quinn
Miss Gandy

Alaska and the Russians.

Amid all our concern about Korea and Western Europe there has been less talk about the possibility of invasion of this continent. The Sweetbriar and Musk-ox operations engaged in by the Canadian Army proved, above all, that war in the Arctic and sub-Arctic will be incredibly difficult and wasteful in men and resources. The Russians being as well aware of these conditions as the Canadians and Americans, the feeling seems to have grown that the battle of Democracy vs. Communism, if it has to be fought, will be decided elsewhere.

The trouble with the Russians is that their way of thought does not always follow what appears a logical pattern to Western eyes. In recent months, too, we have learned from the Chinese Communists that threats and warnings may be followed by action, as witness the surge of Red soldiers from Manchuria after declarations of their leaders this was about to happen unless the United Nations' forces withdrew.

These facts in mind, it is to be hoped that military authorities in Washington and Ottawa have paid attention to an article in the Russian *Literary Gazette*—Russian declarations appear in the strangest places—which claims the Americans have turned Alaska into a "land aircraft carrier" and a military springboard for aggression against the Soviet Union and the countries of the Pacific. In brief, the Russian publication considers American Alaska a menace, and in unkindly thoughts towards that territory it need not be expected that Northwestern Canada is excluded.

And just to prove that its readers will believe anything about Alaska, the *Literary Gazette* goes on to declare that since the purchase of Alaska by the United States in 1867 the high standards of culture, industry and technique established there by the Russians have disintegrated under the "notorious Western civilization" brought to the region by "Yankee militarists".

This forces us to recall ALEXANDER BARANOF, the Russian dictator of old, Alaska, seated in state in his great wooden castle, cannon frowning down on the Thlinket Indians who knew too well the power of his guns and the weight of his knout, old BARANOF who received with rum or oaths, as the spirit moved him, the Canadian and American fur traders who came to his territory, some of them having eaten their snowshoe thongs and moccasins en route. If BARANOF represented culture, industry and fine technique we are prepared, here and now, to declare we are sodden clods and Russia should have Alaska and all the Barrens.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-21-91 BY SP12878/80
34225/

65-59264-68

5 WD

Liaison Office,
Ottawa, Canada.

65-59264

SAC, Anchorage

February 3, 1951

DIRECTOR, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA
IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

As of possible interest in connection with the planning and development of instant program in Alaska, there are enclosed two photostatic copies of a self-explanatory article which appeared in the January 18, 1951 issue of "The Journal," Ottawa, Canada, which article was made available by the Bureau's liaison representative in Ottawa.

The above is furnished for your information.

65-59264

Enclosures

WTB:LJB

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-21-96 BY SP2BTS/SC

1 ENC.

FEB 3 2 13 PM '51

U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE
RECORDED - 38 B I 65-59264-65
RECEIVED-MAIL ROOM
FEB 8 1951

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FEB 20 1951

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F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (4)

FROM ANCHORAGE (1-31-51) (4) NR 312046 5:21 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

RE STAGE. REBULET (JANUARY 12) ON [redacted] (4) AND BULET (JANUARY 16) ON [redacted] AND BULETS (JANUARY 22) ON [redacted] AND BULETS (JANUARY 26) ON [redacted] IN THESE LETTERS BUREAU STATES IN EVENT PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES CONDUCTED BY ANCHORAGE REFLECT NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION AUTHORITY GRANTED TO CONTACT AND INTERVIEW. INACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED POLICY PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES WERE MADE IN LINE WITH DISCRETION AND SECURITY OF THIS PROJECT AND REPORT SUBMITTED. BUREAU ADVICE REQUESTED WHETHER INDIVIDUALS MAY BE INTERVIEWED WITHOUT FURTHER PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION INASMUCH AS SAME ALREADY MADE. SUREP. (4)

RECEIVED (1-31-51) (4) 5:25 PM LH

6.2.94 SP2 BTJ/SC 34225

SP3-BTJ/M
6-24-2000

100-1164 RECORDED - 68 65-59214-66 5-UB

FEB 8 1951 (4)

INDEXED 68

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (4)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FEBRUARY 19, 1951 (4)

RADIOGRAM
DEFERRED
CIPHER PAD CODE (4)

RECORDED - 68 65-59264-66

SAC, ANCHORAGE

STAGE. REURRAD JANUARY THIRTY ONE LAST. REVIEW ANCHORAGE REPORTS SUBMITTED SEVEN INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED URRAD REFLECTS PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS INCOMPLETE AND CONSISTED OF CONTACTING VARIOUS INFORMANTS. IN EVERY INSTANCE ONLY ONE INFORMANT FROM PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE FURNISHED INFORMATION REGARDING INDIVIDUAL POTENTIAL AGENT. DISCREETLY CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES AS INSTRUCTED. IF NOTHING DEROGATORY DEVELOPED, AUTHORITY GRANTED TO INTERVIEW.

WTB:BJW
65-59264

HOOVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTW/JM
ON 6-14-2000
00-1164

G.I.R. - 7 6-51-94
Classified by SP3 BTW/JM 24225
Declassify on: OADR

FEB 5 10 04 AM '51
FBI

FEB 5 11 03 AM '51
FBI

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Tele. Room
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Gandy

370
51 FEB 23 1951

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

via Bureau Radio (2-2-51) 2:32 P.M.

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

Tolson
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Clegg
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Nichols
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Belmont
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Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

(DECODED COPY) (4)

FROM ANCHORAGE (2-15-51) (4) NR 151930 3:29 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

G. I. R. -7

STAGE. SUMMARY OF PROGRAM. TO DATE 41 INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED WITH BUREAU AUTHORITY AND CLOSING REPORT SUBMITTED RECOMMENDING THEM FOR INCLUSION IN STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM. 29 AUTHORIZED INTERVIEWS STILL TO BE MADE. 30 PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES HAVE BEEN MADE AND ALL BUT 6 OF THESE SUBMITTED TO BUREAU IN REPORT FORM WITH RECOMMENDATION THAT BUREAU AUTHORITY BE GRANTED FOR INTERVIEWS. 34 ADDITIONAL PERSONS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED FOR THIS PROGRAM BUT RECOMMENDED UNFAVORABLY IN VIEW OF INFORMATION IN BUREAU FILES, INFORMATION IN ANCHORAGE FILES OR DATA RECEIVED FROM CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS. LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 13 LAST GIVING RECAPITULATION OF STATUS OF PROGRAM EN ROUTE. PROGRAM CONTINUING TO RECEIVE PRIORITY.

(4)

RECEIVED: (2-15-51) (4) 4:06 PM RTL

65-59264 67

(4)

6-21-

RECORDED - 25

EX-4

SP3-BTJ/JM

6-14-2000

00-1164

c.c. Mr Belmont

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (4)

(4)

65-59264

Tolson
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Nease
Gandy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (4)

FROM ANCHORAGE (2-23-51) NR 231845 2:38 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. STATUS OF PROGRAM. FORTY FIVE PERSONS HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED, RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU TO DATE. TWENTY FOUR ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS AUTHORIZED BY BUREAU AND ATTEMPTS BEING MADE TO LOCATE AND HANDLE. PRELIMINARY REPORTS ON TWENTY THREE ADDITIONAL PERSONS HAVE BEEN FORWARDED TO BUREAU WITH RECOMMENDATION THAT AUTHORITY BE GRANTED TO INTERVIEW. THIRTY FIVE PERSONS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AND NOT RECOMMENDED.

RECEIVED: (2-23-51) 2:45 PM RTL

RECORDED - 122

65-59264-68

FEB 22 1951 (4)

SP3-BTJ/JM

6-14-2000

00-1164

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (4)

65-59264

22 MAR 2 1951 (4)

Referral/Consult

(4)

RADIOGRAM

FEBRUARY 20, 1951 - U GENT

DIRECTOR

SAC, ANCHORAGE

STAGE. REBULET JANUARY ELEVEN AND ANCHORAGE LETTER JANUARY SEVENTEEN LAST. INSTRUCT AGENT PERSONNEL TO UTILIZE MORE CARE [illegible] AND SCREENING RELO TO INDIVIDUAL STAGE PROSPECTS. CEASE USING PHRASEOLOGY SUCH AS INFORMANT RECOMMENDED BLANK AS POTENTIAL AGENT UNDER THIS PROGRAM, BLANK HAS BEEN INTERVIEWED CONCERNING INSTANT PROGRAM, BLANK RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL AGENT, BLANK COULD MAKE A GOOD MAN FOR INSTANT PURPOSE AND SIMILAR WORDING. CONTEMPLATED REPORTS ON INDIVIDUAL AGENTS WILL BE [redacted] AND UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD REPORTS ERRONEOUSLY REFLECT INSTANT PROGRAM OF ESPIONAGE NOT BEING DEVELOPED IN ALASKA HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH VARIOUS INFORMANTS AND CONTACTS. EACH REPORT BEING RETURNED ANCHORAGE IN CONNECTION THIS PROGRAM. CAREFULLY REVIEW ALL LETTERS SUBMITTED ON RECOMMENDED STAGE CONTACTS AND MAKE SURE ABOVE PRESCRIBED PHRASEOLOGY DOES NOT APPEAR.

HOOVER

NB:JVS

SP3-BTJ/sm

65-59264

6-14-2000

00-1164

cc — Foreign Service Desk

RECORDED - 136

Sentence Bureau Radio 2/20/51 7:15 P.M. Pew

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Harbo
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Tele. Room
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Gandy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY)

FROM ANCHORAGE (2-1-51) NR 012200 5:36 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

STAGE. SUMMARY OF PROGRESS. AUTHORITY TO INTERVIEW VARIOUS PROSPECTIVE STAYBEHIND AGENTS HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE BUREAU AND ALL ASSIGNED FOR IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION. TWENTY PERSONS HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED WITH BUREAU AUTHORITY, RECOMMENDED BY THE ANCHORAGE DIVISION AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. OTHER INTERVIEWS BEING MADE DAILY BY THREE AGENTS WORKING FULL TIME AND TWO ADDITIONAL AGENTS WORKING PART TIME. IT IS NOTED MANY INTERVIEWEES ARE TRAPPERS, PROSPECTORS OR OTHERWISE ENGAGED IN VOCATIONS WHICH NECESSITATES THAT THEY RESIDE IN BACK COUNTRY WHERE INACCESSIBLE EXCEPT BY CHARTER PLANES, FISH AND WILD LIFE PLANE OR SNOW SHOES. BITTER COLD AND DIFFICULT FLYING WEATHER MAKE CERTAIN OF THESE TRIPS HAZARDOUS AND SLOW. CLOSING REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF ANCHORAGE OFFICE WILL BE SUBMITTED AS SOON AS ADDITONAL INTERVIEWS MADE. ADDITIONAL PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS BEING MADE ON NEW PROSPECTIVE AGENTS, REPORTS BEING COMPILED AND WILL BE SUBMITTED IMMEDIATELY

RECEIVED (2-1-51) 5:53 PM

RECORDED - 119

FEB 27 1951

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
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Nichols
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Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE (2-23-51) NR 232145 5:32 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

Referral/Consult

STAGE.

[redacted]

BUREAU ADVICE REQUESTED RE THIS MATTER.

RECEIVED: 2-23-51 5:38 PM MW

UNDERLINED PORTION OBTAINED FROM GARBLE. AWAITING CORRECTION.

SP3-BTJ/JM
6-14-2000
00-1164

RECORDED - 73

65-59264-71

cc: Mr. Belmont

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

AL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
STATES DEPARTMENT OF J

To: COMMUNICA ON. CONFIDENTIAL

FEBRUARY 24, 1951

Transmit the following message to:

SAC, ANCHORAGE

RADIOGRAM
URGENT

RECORDED - 73 65-59264-71

EX-35 STAGE. REURAD (TWENTY-THIRD)

NOT DEEMED NECESSARY YOU PARTICIPATE AND NO BUREAU REPRESENTATIVES WILL PARTICIPATE AT THIS END.

Referral/Consult

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

HOOVER

ESS:hke

HANDLED BY STOREY DESK

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTS/sm
ON 6-14-2000

Classified by SP1 BTS/sm
Declassify on: OADR

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FEB 24 1951

CONFIDENTIAL

SENT VIA Bur Radio 2/24/51 M Per

6 MAR 10 1951

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: February 26, 1951

FROM : V. P. Keay Referral/Consult

SUBJECT: STAY-BEHIND AGENTS PROGRAM IN ALASKA

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-21-94 BY SP2 BTS/KS 34225

[redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Consult It is recommended that the attached letter be forwarded to the SAC, Anchorage advising him that the

[redacted]

The letter also advises of other [redacted] in connection with the Escape and Evasion Program.

Attachment
ESS:hb

59 MAR 9 1951

RECORDED - 59

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED S[illegible] GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
[illegible]

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: February 28, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM) (Bufile (65-59264)

DECLASSIFIED BY 5912 BTW/LTD
ON 6-21-94
54225/

Referral/Consult

Reference is made to Anchorage radiogram dated February 23, 1951 concerning a [redacted]

Attachment

65-298
JHW:vf

2 ENCL

RECORDED - 114

EX-3

65-59264-73

66 MAR 12 1951

65-59264

REGISTERED AIR MAIL

Date: February 23, 1951

To: [redacted]

b7D

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: [redacted]

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

There are transmitted herewith two photostatic copies of a [redacted] - (U)

b7D

The information contained in the enclosure should be brought to the attention of the [redacted]

b7D

You should, of course, be alert to report to the Bureau any information which may be brought to your attention by the [redacted] which relates to the subject matter of the enclosure.

65-59164

Enclosures
cc-Foreign Service Desk

7/1/99
CLASSIFIED BY SP4bja/tdw
DECLASSIFY ON: 1
#342251
PER OGA letter dtd 7/20/98

MTB:ow

cc - 100-343824-18

Tolson
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Sandy

FEB 24 1951

SAC, Anchorage

February 27, 1951

Director, FBI

[redacted] b6 b7C

ADMINISTRATIVE - SBA PROGRAM

There are transmitted herewith two copies of the report of SA [redacted] dated 2-6-51 at Anchorage. b6 b7C

Instant report should be rewritten, in accord with Bureau instructions contained in Bulet 1-11-51 and Burad 2-20-51 entitled "Stage", in order to delete the objectionable phraseology contained in the synopsis and paragraph two, as underlined, on page one of the report. As you are aware, it may be necessary to disseminate copies of this report in the future and under no circumstances should the report erroneously reflect that instant program has been discussed with various informants and contacts. Furnish an original and two copies of the corrected report to the Bureau immediately. All incorrect copies of the report should then be destroyed by the Anchorage Office.

There are also enclosed two copies of a Loyalty Form received at the Bureau during July 1948, which contains background information concerning [redacted], who may possibly be identical with captioned individual. b6 b7C

Your attention is directed to the report of SA Albert Rundbaken dated 10-19-48 at Anchorage, entitled "Detention of 17 Little Diomede Island Eskimos By Russian Authorities on Big Diomede Island, August 6, 1948; Security Matter - R." On page 8 of the cited report, information is set forth to the effect that the Little Diomede Eskimos had been questioned by the Russian authorities concerning [redacted] operator of a small freight ship and questions were asked concerning the places to which he sailed and if he ever went to Point Barrow. It is noted questions were asked about individuals who were friendly with [redacted] and inquiries were made relative to the tonnage of his vessel. b6 b7C

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NOT RECORDED
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Enclosures

62-93862
cc- 65-59264

WTB:ow;vjm

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As it appears that [redacted] is possibly identical with captioned individual, and as it is apparent that the Russian authorities know his identity and have expressed an interest in his activities and associates, authority is not being granted to contact [redacted] and he should not be given further consideration in connection with instant program.

b6
b7C

It is imperative that the indices of the Anchorage Office be thoroughly checked prior to submitting reports of this type. You should immediately call this matter to the attention of the Special Agents handling this program so that the initial report submitted will contain all information of relevancy concerning the individual under consideration as a Stay-behind Agent.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. T. Harbo

DATE: December 29, 1950

FROM : Mr. I. W. Conrad

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in Event of Invasion

Tolson
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Reference is made to the attached letter from Anchorage dated December 18, 1950, transmitting a map outlining a proposed method of handling radio communications from various Agents located around strategic areas in Alaska to a central control station.

The above mentioned letter requests views touching on the radio aspects of this problem from the Radio and Electrical Section.

This Section observes that a mobile radio headquarters unit would afford (1) additional security over a fixed station from the direction finding standpoint, (2) closer physical operation to the actual stay-behind Agents than a permanently located fixed station and (3) less desirable technical facilities than that afforded by a fixed station. This means that receiving antennas will be inferior to those which could be provided at a fixed station and outgoing messages would not have the advantage of higher power transmitters which could be utilized from such fixed locations. However, it appears that the weight of advantage is in favor of a mobile type operation, working as close to the stay-behind operators as possible in order to shorten the length of their communications lines, it being pointed out that they will probably [redacted]

Referral/Consult

As a suggestion for the SAC, it is pointed out that the possibilities of these Agents working into fixed locations at least while such fixed military locations exist, should not be overlooked inasmuch as such operations would prove to be more satisfactory from a purely technical standpoint.

Regarding equipment, this is to advise that the Bureau has no stock on hand which is suitable for equipping a considerable number of undercover radio operators. In the event such a program is envisioned which would necessitate the FBI acquiring such equipment, it is believed that immediate steps should be taken to put such planning into effect inasmuch as our ability to acquire electronic equipment during war time will be necessarily limited. It would appear, however, that the military would be in the best position to handle all equipment including a variety of radio crystals which would assist in not only extending the time during which they could operate without being detected and located by direction finding equipment but also it would assist in establishing radio contact with the headquarters station.

In connection with the possibility of enemy detection of undercover radio operations once the location is overrun, it is my opinion, based on past

Attachment

RECORDED - 11 65-59264-74

RLM:AB

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ON 6-21-94

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experience that these Agents will be highly expendable inasmuch as initial detection by military radio receivers operating in the area would be followed immediately by portable direction finding operations which are capable of pin pointing the operating transmitter with a high degree of accuracy. I am assuming that the Russians will have basic knowledge of direction finding operations which is comparable to our information and that which was available to the Germans during the past war.

Finally, there is no doubt in my mind that radio jamming operations by the Russians would follow an actual invasion, if not immediately, certainly shortly thereafter. The enemy's objective would possibly be primarily concerned with the jamming of military communications networks and secondarily radar networks. Inasmuch as this stay-behind Agent operation would be on a more limited scale and actual time on the air would be of fairly short duration, it can be assumed that the jamming process might not be applied for some time. The most vulnerable part of the operation from the jamming standpoint would be that of the central station by virtue of the fact that it would be on the air more of the time thus making detection easier by Russian radio receiving equipment and further, that it would be employing higher power which would add to the ease of detection. Once the enemy has established that this circuit was a military or closely allied operation then it can be assumed that it would become a target for both direction finding work, with a resultant search by personnel or by bombing planes and secondarily assuming that these methods failed jamming procedures would be applied. In this event jamming would be resorted to in an effort to disrupt any communications attempted over the established circuits.

These comments and observations are based upon the present rather limited knowledge which I have of the contemplated operations.

ACTION: Referral/Consult

Supervisor W. T. Baker is handling this program at the Seat of Government, however, prior to his answer to the attached letter it will be necessary to (1) add comments from the Cryptanalysis Section regarding (a) call letters and (b) codes. (2) [redacted] as well as [redacted] regarding the use of such a mobile radio station [redacted] Referral/Consult

b7D

It is our belief that such programs should be taken up with our Field Units.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 12-18-50

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

Referral/Consult

There is transmitted herewith [redacted]

Referral/Consult [redacted]

Referral/Consult

In selecting potential stay-behind agents, we have endeavored to pick persons living in close proximity to [redacted]

Referral/Consult

It is suggested that the [redacted]

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Referral/Consult

An additional reason for [redacted]

The distance from Whitehorse to each of the strategic areas is shown in air miles.

Referral/Consult

The following observations and suggestions are being noted in order that this letter [redacted] may be studied by the radio experts in the FBI Laboratory for their comments, observations and criticism concerning its feasibility.

Enclosure

65-59964-74

EX-37

JHW:MR
65-298

Ltr & Encls 1-31-51 WB

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1. Equipment

Referral/Consult

It is noted that some of the potential agents already contacted have radio equipment. Accent will be given to choosing other agents who have such equipment. This likewise can be used. For those agents who do not have equipment, the same will necessarily have to be furnished by the [redacted] FBI.

2. Frequencies

It is suggested that a minimum of four frequencies be given each agent. This will entail furnishing all agent radio transmitting sets with at least four crystals. It is further suggested that two of these crystals be for day transmission and two for night transmission, it being noted that transmission and reception in the Territory of Alaska is very inconsistent and quite probably more than one frequency will have to be used during one transmission from various points in the territory. Likewise, it is noted that the frequencies more adaptable to the various locations will have to be determined by tests which can be run after the system is installed.

3. Call Letters

It is suggested that different call letters be given to all stations and that these call letters be changed on a daily basis in order that any monitor or any station will not become well acquainted with a fixed call signal.

4. Codes

It is suggested that a uniform code cannot be used for all stations inasmuch as action of a quisling nature, corruption of one agent or capture of one station will place the code in the hands of the enemy. It is suggested that possibly this could be circumvented by the use of pads similar to those presently in use by the Bureau or a different code for each station.

5. Initiative in Calling

It is suggested that in considering the correspondence between the agents and the Control Station that the agents make the initial call with the control station monitoring the agents radio frequencies. In this manner the agent will only call when he has something to report. Otherwise he can make a sign of life call periodically on possibly a weekly basis.

b7D

6. Use of [redacted]

It is suggested that discussions be had [redacted] at the Washington

Referral/Consult

b7D

level and with the [redacted] in order that the mobile unit can be used [redacted] This will not be necessary at the inception of this program, inasmuch as all necessary tests, trial runs, etc., can be made from various points on [redacted] listed above on the Alaskan side. However, it is pointed out that tests should be made at as many points as possible on the [redacted] the Alaskan side to determine the quality of reception and transmission.

It is requested that this entire matter of radio communication be studied by the radio men in the laboratory and for criticisms, comments, and observations made available to this office.

It is requested that in making the comments the radio experts touch on the point of the danger of the enemy detecting and locating clandestine radio stations which are well hidden in the roughest kind of mountainous and wooded terrain, which terrain will not be accessible by roads or otherwise.

It is also requested that the radiomen touch on the point of the possibility of the enemy jamming the agents station or the control station.

SAC, Anchorage

January 2, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

62-94-SPABTJ(3425)

Teurlet 12-5-50 and Bulet of 12-18-50.

It is noted that urlet of 12-5-50 was an interim report on the progress being made in instant program and that Bureau comments were solicited as to the selection of agents and the proposed training program submitted by your office for Stay-behind Agents.

The proposed training program is being reviewed and modified at the Bureau and the FBI Laboratory is making the necessary preparations for appropriate instruction in secret inks and coded messages. You will be promptly informed of the Bureau's planned training program in this regard.

In connection with the selection of Stay-behind Agents, you made inquiry as to whether individuals should be considered as potential Stay-behind Agents if they have had prior military service or been employed by the U. S. Government. It is observed you recommended that men with prior military service not be excluded from consideration since it has come to your attention that many of them have the essential knowledge, stamina and experience in Alaska required for Stay-behind Agent material.

In previous correspondence, you were instructed to take into consideration the fact that a selected Stay-behind Agent may be immobilized, liquidated or deported immediately by the Soviets in the event he falls within any of the categories known to have been deported or liquidated by the Soviets in their occupation of the Baltic States and Eastern Poland. Individuals singled out for arrest by the Soviets after the invasion of the Baltic region of Europe included, among many others, employees of the forestry service, Government officials and civil servants as well as officers, military judges and volunteers of national armies.

Your attention has been called to the fact that the best Stay-behind Agents in urban areas from the standpoint of long range survival would be unskilled or semi-skilled workmen not engaged in any of the occupations indicated above and who were not officials of labor unions.

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EX. 37 WTB:jvs

57 MAR 30 1951

It is suggested, therefore, that consideration of individuals as Stay-behind Agents in urban areas who have previous military service or have previously been employed by the U. S. Government be held in abeyance until this program of recruitment has progressed further. If it is determined that adequate coverage cannot be obtained without utilizing individuals in these two groups, the Bureau should be advised. You may possibly desire to consider these individuals, however, in the "reserve pool" of Stay-behind Agents, those who would be evacuated from the area of invasion and returned to the area of occupation at a later date for a specific assignment. The Bureau interposes no objection, however, to your considering the selection of Stay-behind Agents with prior military or government service in rural areas.

In connection with the reports which are being submitted currently by the Anchorage Office on individual potential Stay-behind Agents, every effort should be made to submit the full and complete name of the individual involved instead of merely using initials for the first and middle names. Bureau file searches can also be accelerated if the initial report submitted in these cases contains a complete personal description. When Bureau authority is granted to contact a potential Stay-behind Agent, and if a complete description is not previously available, same should be included in the subsequent report covering the interview of the individual.

By Bureau radiogram of December 12, 1950, the Anchorage Office was authorized to contact seven individuals whose names had previously been submitted as potential Stay-behind Agents. Advise Bureau identities of those who agreed to serve as Stay-behind Agents in the event of invasion.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. LADD

DATE: January 6, 1951

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (Stay-behind Agent Program)

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Tele. Room
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-2-94 BY SP2 BTJN 34225

PURPOSE:

To advise that the proposed training program for selected Stay-behind Agents in Alaska submitted by the Anchorage office has been reviewed by representatives of the FBI Laboratory, the Training and Inspection Division and the Espionage Section.

To submit proposed recommendations fixing the responsibility of the FBI in connection with instant training program.

BACKGROUND:

Referral/Consult

As you are aware, the Bureau [redacted] developing Stay-behind Agents in Alaska. These agents are presently being selected and will thereafter be trained. These individuals, it is contemplated, in the event Alaska is invaded by Russia, will remain in the enemy occupied area of Alaska and will be used to secure and supply intelligence information to the American Armed Forces.

Referral/Consult

In order to definitely fix responsibility in all phases of this matter, certain recommended proposals have been discussed with [redacted] on a headquarters level through the liaison section of the Bureau. In this connection, the Bureau to date has agreed to the following with respect to the training phase of captioned program:

1. The FBI will participate in the training of Stay-behind Agents.

2. The FBI will be responsible for furnishing training relative to security, cover, informant nets and communications except radio communications.

3. The FBI will furnish training in the preparation of coded messages and secret writing.

EX-37

Attachment

WTB:bjc

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2-13-51 ENCL

The Anchorage office was instructed to furnish a proposed training program to the Bureau in this regard for review and approval. By letter dated December 5, 1950, a copy of which is attached, the Anchorage office submitted a recommended training schedule.

The proposed program submitted has been reviewed by representatives of the Training and Inspection Division, FBI Laboratory and the Espionage Section.

BASIC RECOMMENDATIONS

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1. [redacted] as a result of a conference among the Supervisors in the Training and Inspection Division, pointed out that the training program should be based on the primary objectives of the Stay-behind Agents, namely:

   a. How to avoid detection.
   b. Knowing what intelligence information is desired and how to get it.
   c. Becoming acquainted with methods of communications to be used between the Stay-behind Agents and their principal.

Referral/Consult

2. It was also proposed that consideration be given to the Bureau's training [redacted] to be used in connection with instant program instead of utilizing Bureau personnel to handle the direct training of the Stay-behind Agents.

   In the event the Bureau's part of the training program is to be handled by Bureau personnel, it was pointed out by the Training and Inspection Division that at the present time there are only three qualified police instructors assigned to Anchorage, two of whom are the Special Agent in Charge and the Assistant Special Agent in Charge.

3. Representatives of the Training and Inspection Division and the Espionage Section have pointed out that Stay-behind Agents should be trained on

an individual basis. It was agreed that individual training for Stay-behind Agents is sound training technique from the standpoint of security and is essential for the protection of the potential informant nets.

Referral/Consult

It is proposed that through liaison with [redacted] on a headquarters level it be suggested [redacted] that consideration be given to the Bureau's [redacted] training of Stay-behind Agents in the subjects listed hereinafter. It could be pointed out that the operation of the program will be of paramount interest to the military and since it is believed that the training should be on an individual basis, the direct training of the Stay-behind Agents [redacted] In this regard, it is observed that [redacted] It is also pointed out that a substantial saving in manpower would accrue to the FBI if the instruction of the Stay-behind Agents [redacted]

4. In every phase of the training program, the element of security will be emphasized.

Referral/Consult

5. It is contemplated that the training of individual Stay-behind Agents will be effected in Alaska at a location agreed upon by [redacted] in Alaska and the SAC, Anchorage.

6. It is recognized that the recommended curriculum set out below will serve only as a basis for the training to be given by the FBI but that the extent of training in specific subjects will depend upon the background and capabilities of the individual Stay-behind Agent.

The proposed curriculum of the training to be handled by the FBI, as suggested by the Anchorage office, is set forth below, with accompanying comments and observations of reviewing Supervisors at the Bureau:

RECOMMENDED CURRICULUM

1. Indoctrination of Agents

a. Give purpose of Stay-behind network
b. Obligation of agents to the country
c. Necessity for the network
d. Determination of the country, the military and the principal to hold Alaska
e. Suggested number of trainees -- all agents
f. Suggested time for training -- 1 hour

Comments

It is believed that nothing should be said about "informant networks" to the Stay-behind Agent except as relates to his own personal sub-agents and informants. The over-all contemplated informant espionage set-up, as a security measure, should not be called to the attention of the individual Stay-behind Agent. The Training and Inspection Division suggested that the [redacted] It is so proposed.

Referral/Consult

2. Organization of Espionage System

a. General background of informant networks
b. Outline of the various types of espionage systems
c. Suggested number of trainees -- all agents
d. Suggested time of training -- 5 hours

Comments

The Training and Inspection Division has questioned the need of this instruction. It was pointed out that a knowledge of "various types of espionage systems" would be of little value to the Stay-behind Agents and that the more information of this nature imparted

through instruction, the greater would be the security risk in the event one or more of the Stay-behind Agents were captured. It is proposed that this topic be deleted from the curriculum.

3. *Russian Military System of Ferreting out Espionage Agents and How to Avoid Same*

   a. Background of Russian Internal Security System
   b. Background of Russian formed espionage system
   c. Russian military procedure in invaded territory
   d. Soviet personalities
   e. Suggested number of trainees -- all agents
   f. Suggested time of training -- 8 hours

Comments

The Training and Inspection Division has questioned the need of this training and has suggested that the topic be changed to "Russian Military System of Ferreting Out Espionage Agents," and that emphasis be placed only on Russian military procedure in invaded territory. Further, that the balance of the suggested subject matter under Part 3 above be omitted. It is believed, however, that basic instruction should be given to Stay-behind Agents so they may be able, for example, to recognize the activities of the MGB, the GRU (Red Army Intelligence), and the MVD (Russian Internal Security Police). By being prepared to identify the presence of a Russian intelligence service in an occupied territory and to report on their activities would without question be of benefit to the Armed Forces of the U.S. From a practical standpoint, the presence of important Soviet personalities in an occupied area would certainly be of value to the Air Force which could possibly, upon receipt of the identity and location of a well known Soviet personality from a Stay-behind Agent, bomb the indicated target or location. It is proposed, therefore, that the topics in this category be included in the instruction to be given to Stay-behind Agents.

4. *Basic Training in Use of Russian Dictionary*

a. *Provide the trainees with inexpensive but adequate Russian-English dictionaries*
b. *Place accent on Russian military terms*
c. *Suggested number of trainees -- all agents*
d. *Suggested time of training -- 16 hours*

Comments

Supervisor P. A. Napier of the Translation Unit has pointed out that basic training in the use of the Russian dictionary is of limited value unless extensive language training is given; further, that it would be necessary to know the Russian alphabet before the dictionary could be used; that the printed letters of the alphabet are different from the script letters; and that the possession of identical dictionaries would constitute a security hazard. Mr. Napier does not believe this training is feasible considering the time element available. He pointed out that an average student would require at least two weeks of concentrated study to merely become acquainted with the Russian alphabet.

It is doubted that great numbers of Russian troops would be used in an invasion of Alaska. In observing operations in Korea at the present time, it appears that Chinese troops make up the bulk of the enemy attacking forces.

Due to the proximity of Siberia to the Territory of Alaska, it is assumed that Russia might probably utilize troops from the Siberian area which would include the Mongol, Uzbek, Kazakh, etc. As these groups do not necessarily speak Russian but have their individual languages and dialects, it is not believed that training in the use of the Russian Dictionary would be practical.

Special attention, however, is directed to point (b) above suggesting instruction on Russian military terms. It is proposed that instruction be given on Recognition of Standard Soviet Markings on Equipment and materials and Recognition of Uniforms and Insignia.

Referral/Consult

It is proposed that basic training in use of Russian dictionary be omitted, but that through

[redacted]

5. Codes for Radio Correspondence

a. Radio correspondence ground to plane
b. Radio correspondence between agent and principal
c. Suggested number of trainees -- selected agents
d. Suggested time of training -- 10 hours

Comments

In previous discussions

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

6. Secret Writing and Written Codes

a. Types of secret inks
b. How agent can manufacture secret inks
c. Use of reagents
d. Suggested number of trainees -- selected agents
e. Suggested time of training -- 8 hours

Comments

This subject matter has been discussed with Mr. D. J. Parsons of the FBI Laboratory. Mr. Parsons advised that the Laboratory is now prepared to give the necessary instruction and various inks are being prepared in this regard. Mr. Parsons pointed out that 8 hours instruction per selected agent would be sufficient for this course of training and that in the event

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

approximately 5 days would be needed for secret inks and an additional period of 5 days for written codes. In the actual

instruction given to Stay-behind Agents, the practical aspects of this topic should be emphasized, that is, actual practice in coding and encoding messages and use of inks. Stay-behind Agents should also receive instruction as to the proper manner of preparing a summary type, effectively worded message.

7. Cover Stories, Pretexts, Deception and Security

a. Need for identity and necessary reason for agent's presence in a particular locality.

b. Methods of advising principal if agent has been identified as such, corrupted and forced to operate as double agent

c. Methods of concealing secret codes, maps, implements and supplies

d. Methods of destroying espionage gear to avoid detection and same falling into hands of enemy

e. Suggested number of trainees -- all agents
f. Suggested time of training -- 8 hours

Comments

The subject matter of this topic is pertinent, however, the title of same is being changed to "Deception and Security." The Training and Inspection Division has suggested that in connection with instant topic, a short lecture be included on "What can be concealed on the person?"; further, that a short discussion on "How to detect and lose surveillances" be added. It is proposed that instruction be included on "What can be concealed on the person", however, that the discussion of "How to detect and lose surveillances" be limited to a discussion of what the Stay-behind Agent should do and how he should act in case he is placed under surveillance by the Russians. Hunters and trappers will be used as Stay-behind Agents in rural areas where surveillances would not be a problem. The urban areas will probably be decimated and limited to Russian Army establishments which would also limit any problems arising from surveillances.

8. *Methods for Agents to Use in Selecting and Training Sub-agents and Informants*

a. *Necessity for security*
b. *Careful direction for exact mission*
c. *That agent divulge no data regarding the Stay-behind Agent network*
d. *Care in selecting sub-agents and informants*
e. *Availability of desired information to sub-agent*
f. *Methods of transmitting information from sub-agent to agent*
g. *Suggested number of trainees -- all agents*
h. *Suggested time of training -- 10 hours*

Comments

For effective operation of the Stay-behind Agent program and in order to provide for the necessary resulting adequate coverage, the subject matter of this topic is probably one of the most important. It is proposed, however, that point (c) above not be mentioned during the course of instruction. As previously pointed out, Stay-behind Agents should not know one another's identity, and should not be informed of the existence of the Stay-behind Agent or "espionage network". It is proposed that a discussion on "What to do when someone approaches agent with proposition to act as a sub-agent or informant?" be included.

It is also proposed that in connection with this subject matter, instruction should be provided on action to be taken when the Stay-behind Agent is "uncovered" by the Russians in order to continue the use of the sub-agents and informants that the Stay-behind Agent has developed.

The necessity of security will be emphasized in this matter especially as relates to the "contacts" effected by the Stay-behind Agent to develop his individual informant or sub-agent network.

9. *Administration of Plan from Agents Point of View*

a. Data re food caches to which he will have access
b. Data re materials needed
c. How to request needed equipment and supplies
d. Suggested number of trainees -- all agents
e. Suggested time of training -- 1 hour

Comments

The Training and Inspection Division has pointed out that the items to be covered in instant topic should be limited to subjects taught by the FBI and

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

10. *Suggested additions to Curriculum*

a. The Training and Inspection Division has suggested that the

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

Comments

It is proposed that inquiry be made through

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

b. Instructor N. A. Watson of the Training and Inspection Division has informed that there is presently available a brilliant dye, which, when placed in water, is clearly visible from the air and could possibly be used by Stay-behind Agents to indicate their location. The dye, for example, placed in a section of a small lake, could indicate to the pilot of a small amphibious plane a landing area where the Stay-behind Agent could make contact with the pilot for receiving supplies, information, or exchange of personnel.

Referral/Consult

Comments

It is proposed that this matter be discussed with

[redacted]

c. *It is noted the suggested curriculum submitted by Anchorage does not reflect instruction on what information of an intelligence nature would be desired in the event Alaska is invaded. It is proposed, therefore, that an additional topic be included in the training program entitled "Intelligence Information Desired from Enemy Occupied Area", since transmittal to the agent of requests on specific intelligence targets may not be possible at the outset of the occupation.*

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

It is further proposed that [redacted]

[redacted]

d. *No mention is made in the suggested curriculum submitted by Anchorage relative to the subject of "Photography".*

In previous discussions [redacted]

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

ACTION: Referral/Consult

It is recommended that the above proposals be approved for discussion [redacted] *through liaison on a headquarters level. Specifically, it is recommended that the Bureau.* [redacted]

Referral/Consult

It is recommended that the FBI [redacted]

Thereafter, the Anchorage office should be informed of the specific responsibilities recognized by the Bureau in connection with the training phase of this program and provided with the curriculum approved by the Bureau in this regard.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 12-5-50

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 RTS/SC
ON 6-21-94

Reference is made to Bulet dated 11-29-50. 34225

There is set out hereinafter an interim report on the Stay-Behind Agent Program, indicating its status in this Division, progress being made and certain difficulties which have been encountered.

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

With Anchorage letter of 11-16-50 there were transmitted two enclosures: (1) [redacted]

(2) [redacted]

memo Belmont to Ladd 12-11-50
memo Ladd to Director 12-13-50
Ltr to Clegg 12-13-50

[redacted]

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65-298

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SELECTION OF AGENTS

There has been no intention to set or limit the number of potential agents selected, inasmuch as it is well-known that a number of our prospects upon contact will decline to act; a number will be found to lack qualifications which we desire; and some, no doubt, will be qualified and agree to act and then later change their minds.

It is recommended that men with prior military service not be excluded from this program inasmuch as in considering the best prospects who

AN File 65-298

have come to our attention we find many of them have had military service. Likewise, these men have the qualifications, stamina and knowledge which is being sought. Also, certain of them are bush pilots and own airplanes; certain of them own shortwave radios and are able to operate the same; and some are licensed big game guides or have other qualifications from which excellent results could be expected. Also a number of these ex-military men are located in the wilderness as hunters, trappers, etc., and would be caught there in case of invasion and would have to stay in the Territory. This they know. It is the opinion of the military and other individuals with whom I have talked and in whose judgment I have confidence, that it will be virtually impossible to clear out all inhabitants from the interior or even find them and such persons could be used to excellent advantage. It is requested that the Bureau comment on this particular angle. A loss of ex-servicemen would probably deprive the program of some of its best material.

It is also recommended that persons who are or have been employed by the Federal Government not be excluded from participation in the Stay-Behind Agent Program. It is noted that probably such persons as employees of the Fish and Wildlife Service, CAA and other federal employee groups have the best knowledge of the interior of the Territory of Alaska as compared with any other persons. By the same token, a number of the Fish and Wildlife men with whom I am personally acquainted fit the qualifications of prospective agents better than any persons we have considered thus far. It is recommended that the Bureau comment concerning this group.

The selection of prospects for stay-behind agents has been made and will continue to be made from personnel known to the agents assigned to this division and with the advice of individuals whose integrity is thought to be unimpeachable. This latter group includes such persons as Judge ANTHONY J. DIMOND, Federal Judge, Anchorage, Alaska; Judge HARRY PRATT, Federal Judge, Fairbanks, Alaska, and HOLGER LARSEN, Fish and Wildlife Agent, in charge of the Anchorage Office, Fish and Wildlife Service. In contacting these men, the real purpose of our inquiry has not been divulged. However, it is noted here that HOLGER LARSEN has spent much of his life in the interior of the Territory of Alaska, is possibly as good a woodsman as there is here, is a man of the highest integrity and who I am sure would be more than willing to participate with us in any manner in this program. The services of such a man should not be lost.

Administrative files are being opened on each prospect obtained under the 66 classification, using the character "Administrative". It is believed that some more identifying designation should be used in the character and is suggested that the Bureau may desire to note the full character as "Administrative - SBA" or "Administrative - EE". In this manner the reports can be more easily routed in the Bureau. Any information contained

in the files of the Anchorage Division or obtained from persons who are contacted on the highest confidential basis will be included in the report in accordance with instructions from the Bureau in referenced letter.

There is set out hereinafter a complete list of the persons who are being considered at this time as prospective stay-behind agents. It is noted that none of these individuals has been contacted by agents here in connection with this program and it is recommended that they not be contacted until the preliminary investigative report is sent in, the program has progressed further and the training phase of the program is ready.

[redacted]

b6
b7C

FOSTER R. SIMS

[redacted]

AU File 65-298

[redacted]

-- b6
b7C

TRAINING

Referral/Consult

Inasmuch as both the Bureau and this office feel that the training in the interest of economy and efficiency should be done in the Territory of Alaska, it is felt that its best location would be at Fort Richardson which is located at Anchorage, Alaska. However, in this regard [redacted] It is pointed out that setting up training schools in Anchorage proper is not deemed advisable. All locations which are suitable would, of course, be known to too many persons in town. The agent trainees in many instances will be well-known to the citizens of Anchorage and to each other to be in Anchorage for any length of time without the entire plan and its participants being of general knowledge in the Territory of Alaska. It is felt because of the size of Fort Richardson and the fact that most of its inhabitants are military personnel and strangers to the Territory, the agent trainees could come and go there without creating too much curiosity and speculation. However, inasmuch as it is impossible to obtain housing for the training school on Fort Richardson Base at the present time, attempts will be made to obtain the same in Anchorage or its proximity if the Bureau so desires.

It is recommended that the Bureau discuss the matter [redacted] The time of conducting the training school, can not be decided upon, of course, until the names of proposed agents have been obtained, checked through the files of the Anchorage Division [redacted] central files of the FBI in Washington, [redacted] and any other files that the Bureau may deem necessary; a preliminary investigation has been made by the Anchorage Division and they have been interviewed.

Referral/Consult

AN File 65-298

With reference to the investigations conducted concerning the prospective agents, it is recommended that it be limited in scope in the communities in which the agents live, particularly if such communities are small. This will avoid the entire community obtaining knowledge that the Bureau is interested in such individual and ultimately in their knowing all concerning the program.

With reference to the number of persons in a training class, it is, of course, believed that the agents should be trained individually if possible. However, this does not appear to be possible in view of a lack of sufficient time and a lack of a sufficient number of qualified instructors. Also it would prove to be very expensive. It is felt that instruction could be given in classes of from 12 to 20. Agents in any particular class could be selected from various sections of the Territory so that there would be no two agents from the same section. In addition, if there were several instructors available, they could break the class of 12 down to groups of 2 or 3 and give the training in several different buildings, thus keeping the agent trainees separated.

With reference to the length of the class necessary to train the agents, it is noted that a curriculum is set out below and the length of time estimated to be consumed by the Bureau is approximately 67 hours. However, this time may be changed after the curriculum is reviewed by the Bureau Laboratory experts who possibly will revise the estimates. It is felt that all agent trainees can work a ten-hour day, classes continuing from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m., with appropriate lunch and dinner hour.

Referral/Consult

The curriculum of the training to be handled by the FBI is as follows:

Begin here

1. Indoctrination of Agents

   a. Give purpose of stay-behind network.
   b. Obligation of agents to the country.
   c. The necessity for the network.
   d. The determination of the country, the military and the principal to hold Alaska.
   e. Suggested number of trainees --- all agents.
   f. Suggested time for training --- one hour.

2. Organization of Espionage System

   a. General background of informant networks.
   b. Outline of the various types of espionage systems.
   c. Suggested number of trainees --- all agents.
   d. Suggested time of training --- 5 hours.

3. Russian Military System of ferreting out Espionage Agents and How to Avoid Same.

   a. Background of Russian Internal Security System.
   b. Background of Russian formed espionage system.
   c. Russian military procedure in invaded territory.
   d. Soviet personalities
   e. Suggested number of trainees --- all agents.
   f. Suggested time of training --- 8 hours.

4. Basic Training in Use of Russian Dictionary.

   a. Provide the trainees with inexpensive, but adequate Russian-English dictionaries.
   b. Place accent on Russian military terms.
   c. Suggested number of trainees --- all agents.
   d. Suggested time of training --- 16 hours.

5. Codes for Radio Correspondence

   a. Radio correspondence ground to plane.
   b. Radio correspondence between agent and principal.
   c. Suggested number of trainees --- selected agents.
   d. Suggested time of training --- 10 hours.

6. Secret Writings and Written Codes

   a. Types of secret inks.
   b. How agent can manufacture secret inks.
   c. Use of reagents.
   d. Suggested number of trainees --- selected agents.
   e. Suggested time of training --- 8 hours.

7. Cover stories, Pretexts, Deception and Security

   a. Need for identity and necessary reason for agents presence in a particular locality.
   b. Methods of advising principal if agent has been identified as such, corrupted and forced to operate as double agent.

c. Methods of concealing secret codes, maps, implements and supplies.
d. Methods of destroying espionage gear to avoid detection and same falling into hands of enemy.
e. Suggested number of trainees --- all agents.
f. Suggested time of training --- 8 hours.

8. Methods for Agents to Use in Selecting and Training Sub-Agents and Informants

a. Necessity for security.
b. Careful direction for exact mission.
c. That agent divulge no data regarding the stay-behind agent network.
d. Care in selecting sub-agents and informants.
e. Availability of desired information to sub-agent or informant.
f. Methods of transmitting information from sub-agent to agent.
g. Suggested number of trainees --- all agents.
h. Suggested time of training --- 10 hours.

9. Administration of Plan from Agents Point of View

a. Data re food caches to which he will have access.
b. Data re materials needed.
c. How to request needed equipment and supplies.
d. Suggested number of trainees --- all agents.
e. Suggested time of training --- 1 hour.

Tolson

It is suggested that the Bureau review the above outlined curriculum to determine whether in its opinion all subjects for which the Bureau is responsible have been covered and elaborate upon or delete from the subjects set out.

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

Supplies and Equipment

With reference to supplies and equipment for that portion of the training for which the FBI is responsible, it is suggested that the curriculum contained in this memorandum be reviewed with the Laboratory experts who are qualified to advise concerning such matters.

The supplies and equipment necessary for stocking caches for stay-behind agents will, of course, vary according to the needs of the individual agent. This matter [redacted]

Referral/Consult

Payment of Agents

It is believed that the payment of agents should be handled individually and every effort should be made to obtain their services at the least possible expense to the Bureau [redacted] However, the first thing to be considered in the way of expenditures of this nature is for transportation of agents to the training school, housing and board while the agents are in school and in a number of instances the agents will have to be reimbursed

Referral/Consult

for money lost during the time they are away from their respective businesses. In Bureau letter of reference dated November 29, 1950 it was stated that during recruitment and training stages of the program expenses could be handled on an individual basis and paid as are the regular confidential informants in the field. In this regard it is noted that the [redacted] This, of course, is not adequate. By way of giving the Bureau an insight on possible expenditures, a few necessary items and their expense are noted below:

b7E

Plane fare from Nome to Anchorage and return ---- $108.00 without tax.
Plane fare from Fairbanks to Anchorage and return -- $60 without tax.
Plane fare from Kodiak to Anchorage and return --- $63 without tax.
Hotel reservations in Anchorage --- $5.00 to $7.00 daily.
Meals in Anchorage (average) --- $6.00 to $8.00 per day.

It was [redacted]

This office is continuing to give this matter diligent attention.

Referral/Consult

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: February 13, 1951

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-22-94 BY SP2 BTJ/SC 34225

Referral/Consult

PURPOSE

To advise of [redacted] concerning the Stay-Behind Agent Program and the Escape and Evasion Program in Alaska.

Referral/Consult

BACKGROUND

As you know the Bureau [redacted] responsible for the developing of a Stay-Behind Agent Program and an Escape and Evasion Program in Alaska. The Anchorage Office is presently recruiting Stay-Behind Agents to be used in the event of an invasion of Alaska. Plans for the Escape and Evasion Program are in- [redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJ/LDW
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
DECLASSIFIED 9/20/98
7/1/99

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

A series of conferences have been held by Supervisor Edward S. Sanders and [redacted]

RECORDED - 114 65-59264-76

ESS:lae

EX-31

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Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

Referral/Consult My memorandum to you dated January 6, 1951, discussed in detail the recommendations made by the Anchorage Office concerning training for Stay-Behind Agents. Reference memorandum recommended this matter [redacted] and made certain comments concerning each of the proposals of the Anchorage Office. Supervisor Sanders has discussed this suggested curriculum [redacted]

Referral/Consult [redacted]

Referral/Consult In connection with the suggestion of the Training Division that the Bureau [redacted] to give that portion of the training which the Bureau has agreed to furnish,

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

The SAC at Anchorage has noted that [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Referral/Consult



RECOMMENDATION

Referral/Consult

The foregoing is for your information. It is noted that instructions have been given to Supervisor Sanders to place this matter on the next IIC Agenda in order that the Director can advise the other IIC members of the progress made. This matter will be closely followed and you will be kept advised of developments.

SAC, Anchorage PERSONAL ATTENTION February 27, 1951

Director, FBI AIR MAIL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-22-94 BY SP2 BTS/SC

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
V ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION

Referral/Consult

RECORDED - 114 65-59264-77

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[redacted]

Referral/Consult If not already done, you should [redacted] contact [redacted]

Referral/Consult For your information, [redacted]

Referral/Consult A conference was held with [redacted]

Tolson
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Clegg
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Nichols
Rosen
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Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

You will be kept currently advised of the developments of this program insofar as it pertains to Headquarters coordination.

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COMM-FBI

65 MAR 13 1951

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: February 26, 1951

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION

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Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-22-76 SP12 BTP

34225

PURPOSE:

Referral/Consult

To advise that [redacted] To recommend that the Bureau interpose no objection to [redacted]

BACKGROUND:

Referral/Consult

As you are aware, [redacted] on October 25, 1950, was advised that the Bureau agreed in principle [redacted]

As of today, 41 individual residents of Alaska have been investigated, recommended and have agreed to act as Stay-behind Agents in the event Alaska is invaded. This ground work has been done by the Anchorage Office. The development of this phase of the program is continuing until such time as [redacted] the Bureau agrees that the coverage is adequate.

Referral/Consult

It will be necessary to train these persons in order to prepare them for operations, and the Bureau has agreed to participate in the training [redacted] The majority of the subjects considered, because of the military nature of this undertaking, [redacted] the Bureau has agreed to furnish instruction relative to "Russian Military System of Ferreting Out Espionage Agents," "Secret Writing and Written Codes," "Deception and Security," and "Methods for Agents to Use in Selecting and Training Sub-agents and Informants." The subject matter for which the Bureau has recognized responsibility can be given in Alaska. Conferences are presently being held [redacted] through the Liaison Section as to whether the Bureau will [redacted] to handle the Bureau's subjects, or whether the Bureau will provide FBI personnel to give the instruction directly to the selected Stay-behind Agents in Alaska.

Referral/Consult

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RECORDED - 114
EX-37

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Referral/Consult

In the above [redacted]

Referral/Consult The above examples are being brought to your attention so that you will be aware of the proposed action on the part of [redacted]

Referral/Consult It has been the Bureau's position since the inception of this program, that Stay-behind Agents should be trained individually and that they should not know the identity of one another.

Referral/Consult [redacted] the Bureau's opinion that these agents should be trained individually in order to preserve security and identity.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the Bureau interpose no objection to the proposed plan of [redacted] as long as these persons are transported and instructed individually.

Referral/Consult

SAC, Anchorage

January 31, 1951

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

Referral/Consult

Bureau letter December 13, 1950 transmitting [redacted] It is noted that you requested that the entire matter of radio communication be studied by the radio men in the FBI Laboratory and that their comments and observations be made available to the Anchorage office.

There are transmitted herewith two copies of a blind memorandum reflecting results of the study made of this matter by the Radio and Electrical Section of the Laboratory.

Referral/Consult

Your attention is directed to Bulet to Anchorage dated November 29, 1950 wherein you were advised that [redacted]

In connection with your suggestion that discussions be held with [redacted] in order that the mobile unit can be used [redacted] this is to advise that instant matter will not be discussed [redacted] at the present time. The suggestions made by you relative to proposed radio communications for Stay-behind Agents will be [redacted] at SCG and you will be advised of the [redacted] in this regard.

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SAC, Anchorage

March 6, 1951

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN
EVENT OF INVASION

There are transmitted herewith two photostatic copies of an article entitled "The Russians in Alaska's History" which appeared in the February 24, 1951 issue of The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, a weekly publication prepared by The Joint Committee on Slavic Studies.

The above is submitted for your information and as of possible interest in connection with captioned program.

65-59264

Enclosures

WTB:mem

RECORDED - 25

INDEXED - 25

MAR 7 1951

EX-22

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MAR 16 1951

The Russians in Alaska's History

THE TRUTH ABOUT ALASKA. (By G. Agranat and M. Cherenko. Literaturnaya gazeta, Jan. 9, p. 2. Complete text:) A voluminous book lies before us. Published: Stuttgart, 1950. Author: Fritz Bartz, professor at Kiel University. Theme: Alaska, past and present.

The interest in Alaska manifested in Stuttgart may appear rather strange at first glance. Really, don't the professors of Trizonia have more vital food for speculation closer at hand? But upon dipping into Bartz' book it becomes quite evident that it was made to order. The guise of a "scholarly work" conceals American propaganda's current forgery.

Distorting history with the zeal of a lackey, Bartz disputes the generally recognized priority of the Russians in the original discovery and exploration of Alaska and defames the Russian settlers. He asserts without a shade of embarrassment that, in alleged contrast to the Spaniards (?!) and the Anglo-Saxons (?!), the Russians left nothing in Alaska, after a rule of more than a century, except wretched huts for fur collection.

In recent years the U.S. press has reverted time and again to the subject of Alaska. Having turned Alaska into a "land aircraft carrier" and a military base for aggression against the Soviet Union and the countries of the Pacific, the American imperialists are not averse to adorning themselves in the toga of civilizers and patrons of culture.

Revising history in retrospect, the American imperialists portray matters as though the Yankees had saved Alaska from "Russian barbarism," brought it the benefits of notorious "Western civilization" and developed the Alaskan economy.

It is for this purpose that the learned lackey from Kiel University has now been enlisted.

But authentic history and the true facts are not on the side of the Yankees and their lackeys.

I. —When the Russian Grigory Shelikhov founded the first Russian settlement on Kodiak Island in Three Saints Bay at the end of the 18th century, no West European had set foot in the vast northern expanses of the American continent beyond the 140th meridian.

From the very first days of their settlement in Alaska, the Russians began to show the indigenous inhabitants the "potentialities and advantages" of agriculture and of Russian buildings, dress and food. From the Russians the Indians learned to cultivate gardens and sow grain. Shelikhov opened a school in Alaska for children of the Indians and Aleuts. "I must render this people their due for their keen intelligence," he wrote, "for their children have quite rapidly... learned to speak Russian so that they can be understood without difficulty."

Shelikhov was the first to found large civilized settlements in the American North and to develop crafts and trades. Alexander Baranov, the first governor of the Russian American possessions, succeeded in carrying out Shelikhov's plans. He founded Russian settlements in various places in Alaska and built the city of Novo-Arkhangelsk, the capital of Russian America, on Sitka Island.

The beginnings made by Shelikhov and Baranov were followed up by Kupreyanov, Wrangel, Tebenkov and other rulers of Russian American possessions.

"A considerable amount of iron ore has been found," wrote Baranov in one of his reports, "and iron has been forged as an experiment. There is thus hope of creating iron foundries useful to the fatherland." Later coal was discovered; in the middle of the 19th century more than 20,000 poods were mined monthly. Mica was found in Kenai [Cook] Inlet and copper along the Copper River. Bells cast by the Russians of Alaskan copper still hang in California churches.

Numerous workshops in the Russian settlements smelted metals and forged all sorts of tools. Cloth was produced from native raw materials. Sawmills, flour mills and tanneries were in operation. Ships that sailed to Hawaii, China and the Philippines were built in the dockyards. Steamships, the first built on the entire Western coast of America, were turned out in Novo-Arkhangelsk in the 1830s. Not a single part was imported for these vessels; everything, including the engines, was produced on the spot.

The Russians tirelessly studied the country in which they lived. Fearless explorers, accompanied by Indian warriors, crossed the mountain ranges and penetrated deep into Alaska. By the middle of the 19th century the Russians had produced maps and atlases of the northwestern coast as far as San Francisco.

Pharmacies, a hospital, a theater, an extensive library and a large picture gallery existed in Novo-Arkhangelsk as early as the beginning of the 19th century. From 1841 an observatory was in operation here; the reports of its observations were published in the Annals of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences.

It is characteristic that Indians and Creoles (children of mixed marriages) studied along with the Russian children in the schools of Russian America. In addition to providing a general education, the schools gave training in crafts, trades and business. The more gifted youngsters, including Creoles, were sent to St. Petersburg for further study. It is also illuminating that Creoles occupied important positions in the service of the company, even as heads of departments (districts) and ships' captains.

Even foreign visitors, not in the least interested in singing the praises of the Russians, were obliged to write:

"I was pleasantly surprised when I saw the peace and harmony in which the Russians live amidst these uncouth children of nature. Having conquered them, the Russians exercised their influence not by instilling [in the natives] fear of their conquerors, but, on the contrary, by gaining their love through favorable treatment*** The Russians are on a quite friendly footing with all the inhabitants of this land***" (Vancouver, the British explorer of the end of the 18th century.)

Of course, there were also dark sides to the life of Russian America. The directors and the aristocratic grandees ensconced in the St. Petersburg administration wallowed in speculative operations and took little interest in the everyday life of a handful of Russians forsaken across the ocean.

There were two Russias: the Russia of the serf-owning landlords and the Russia of the people, the democratic Russia. The settlers who came to the Russian overseas possessions belonged overwhelmingly to this second Russia. Those who emigrated across the ocean came from the northern provinces, where there was no serfdom, or were Siberian peasants of soldiering folk, with a considerable number of runaway serfs among them who had suffered under serfdom and hated it fiercely. The settling of Alaska by the Russians bore a clearly marked laboring and democratic character dissimilar to the trading and plundering colonization by the Anglo-Saxons, who recruited their agents from among tramps, adventurers and criminals.

II.—Bartz is silent about the fact that by the middle of the 19th century Alaska lay athwart one of the chief routes of American expansion. The Russians were obstructing American capitalism from consolidating its positions in the Pacific. That is why the Russian possessions in America became a mote in the eye of the American states. The history of Russian Alaska is also the story of how the Yankees

drove northward to menace Russia, China and Japan from the North.

The foreign pirates and poachers, mostly British and American, incited the Indians against the Russians. Schooners were dispatched to the coasts of Russian America. There was not a single pound of grain aboard these vessels. Their cargo consisted of rum, alcohol, whiskey and guns. Foreign merchants flagrantly violated the trade agreements that pledged them to deliver food and various goods. American whalers arrogantly descended upon the banks frequented by sea animals.

The Tsarist diplomats pursued a policy of concessions with respect to Russia's overseas possessions. In 1867, taking advantage of the weakening of Russia as a consequence of Tsarism's defeat in the Crimean War, the United States bought Alaska for a paltry sum—five cents a hectare.

As far back as in 1868 Congressman R. G. Walker declared that "in the final struggle for world domination the Pacific will hold the deciding role. The acquisition of Alaska and the Aleutians brings America halfway to China and Japan. Only shortsighted individualists and cranks who wish to see the U.S. western frontier on the Ohio can object to this acquisition."

From the moment they took possession of Alaska, the Americans treated it as a conquered and occupied colony. Alaska was completely turned over to the military. Companies of whalers and trappers worked hand in hand with the military. The slaughter of whales brought mass starvation and caused the Eskimos to die off. The herd of many million fur seals in the Pribilof Islands was reduced to 125,000 by the beginning of the 20th century. The sea otter was almost entirely killed off. The manufacturing and farming enterprises created by the Russians were almost completely put out of existence. "In Sitka," writes Bancroft, "many buildings turned into ruins*** The port was likewise ruined*** The arrival and departure of the mail boat were the only events breaking the lethargy of the inhabitants of once flourishing Novo-Arkhangelsk."

The noted American historian Dole had every reason to write: "There are few who will read the history of Alaska between 1867 and 1897 without indignation."***

Even in those years Alaska interested the Americans primarily as a political-military springboard, as a base for expansion to be used against the countries of the Pacific and, above all, Russia. From Alaska, back at the end of the 19th century, smugglers, traders' agents and all manner of spies, not infrequently disguised as "Arctic explorers," carried out their marauding on Chukotka and Kamchatka. From Alaska the U.S. railway magnates, headed by the elder Harriman, father of the notorious warmonger, early in the 20th century wished to extend a railroad trunk line into Siberia (via a tunnel under the Bering Straits) in order, first economically, then by military seizure, to detach the very rich regions of northeastern Russia. From Alaska, in the Soviet era, the American-Canadians sought to seize the Soviet island of Wrangel.

III.—Bartz devotes more than half his work to the present-day economy of Alaska. He is enthusiastic about the "friendship" between the American colonizers and the indigenous population, evidently meaning by this word "friendship" the ruthless racial discrimination and the gradual extermination of the Indians and Aleuts.

It is futile to seek in this book an answer to why Alaska's economy has been steadily degenerating since the famous "gold rush" and "copper boom." The Americans themselves note that in the past ten or 15 years gold mining has dropped 66% and the fish catch 50%. Has Alaska's natural wealth been exhausted? Or is the U.S.A. short of manpower to exploit these natural resources?

No, these are not the reasons. The riches of Alaska, in the past as today, interest the American monopolies only insofar as they can be looted unhindered and without contributing to the economic development of the land. Today the monopolists see no profit in development of Alaska's economy because the transformation of this territory into a military camp promises to be infinitely more profitable. Even before the beginning of the American adventure in Korea, according to data of the Alaska Weekly, 54% of the able-bodied population was engaged in nonproductive branches of the economy associated with military requirements.

Dozens of air bases and airfields equipped for bombers have been created in Alaska. Annual maneuvers are held in which large units of the army and navy take part.

Latterly the Americans have turned from plans for using Alaska as a base of aggression to direct action: troops and military cargo are now being shipped to Korea via airfields in Alaska and the Aleutians. According to information in the Alaskan press, more than 120 four-motored transports are engaged in these shipments.

Alaska thus has already become in fact a "land aircraft carrier," a springboard of aggression, in the gory adventure precipitated by the American fascists on the fields of Korea.

Such is the truth about Alaska, its past and present, the truth which the Yankees and their obliging lackeys strive to conceal.

SAC, Anchorage

February 28, 1951

Director, FBI

~~SECRET~~

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION

There is transmitted herewith one photostatic copy of a self-explanatory communication, marked "Secret," dated [redacted] together with one photostatic copy of the enclosure referred to in that communication. (U)

The above is forwarded as of possible interest in connection with captioned program.

Enclosure

65-59264

WTB:jpa

~~cc - 100-343044-718~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/28/98 BY SP2 TCLP 342-251

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CLASSIFIED BY SP6 bjl/tlw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 342251
Per OGA letter dtd 7/20/98.

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NOT RECORDED
144 MAR 30 1951

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~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL COPY FILED

Referral/Consult

MR. A. H. BELMONT

MR. C. E. HEVRICH

MAJOR SAMUEL P. BORZILLERI

February 28, 1951

34225
2-7-94 SP2BTS1SC

SAC Foster of Indianapolis advised me today that while he was in Washington he contacted an old friend and classmate, Major Samuel P. Borzilleri, who can be reached through Government Code 131, extension 65494, or at his home, ORdway 4543. Borzilleri, according to Foster, during World War II was in charge of an Escape and Evasion Program operating out of Italy which was active in recovering downed flyers in enemy territory, much of which is Iron Curtain country.

Referral/Consult

Borzilleri indicated to Foster that he was recently contacted [redacted]

[redacted]

Foster stated that Borzilleri is dependable, although tempermental, and some of the stories that he tells sound bizarre. Foster said, however, he does not believe Borzilleri would relate any stories which were not factually correct. He believes Borzilleri has a wealth of information regarding escape of evasion tactics; that he gained the impression that Borzilleri expects to be contacted by American Intelligence Agencies in order that the information in his possession may be utilized.

Foster stated that he indicated to Borzilleri the Bureau would probably be interested in information in his possession and stated that if an Agent contacts him that it should be specifically stated that the contact is a result of his previous conversation with Foster.

OBSERVATIONS

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In connection with the Bureau's Stay Behind Agent and Escape and Evasion Programs of Alaska, and further in view of the allegations regarding [redacted]

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[redacted] it is felt that Borzilleri should be interviewed by a well-qualified Agent in order to obtain from him such information as he may have.

It is noted that the Field generally is not cognizant of the Bureau's activities in the Stay Behind Agent and Escape and Evasion Programs. For this reason, it is felt that the Supervisor in the Espionage Section handling this Program should conduct the interview with Borzillert.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that Supervisor William T. Baker be authorized to contact Borzilleri and interview him without disclosing to him the fact that the Bureau is conducting a Stay Behind Agent Program in Alaska. At the same time he should obtain from him any information regarding [redacted] together with information which he mentioned to Foster regarding [redacted]

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

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F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (4)

FROM ANCHORAGE (3-8-51) (4) NR 081945 5:22 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

STAGE, STATUS REPORT. REBURAD (FEBRUARY 20) (4) LAST. ALL REPORTS CONTAINING PHRASES TO BE DELETED HAVE BEEN CORRECTED AND RE-SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. FIFTY-ONE PERSONS HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED TO DATE, RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. AUTHORITY HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM BUREAU ON 30 OTHERS. THESE HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED AND AGENTS PRESENTLY ON ROAD TRIP ATTEMPTING CONTACTS. IT IS NOTED A NUMBER OF THESE ARE UNAVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEWS AT THIS TIME, BEING IN THE STATES OR IN SOME ISOLATED SECTION. REPORTS ON 13 ADDITIONAL INDIVIDUALS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU AND AWAITING AUTHORITY TO INTERVIEW. REBULET (FEBRUARY 27) LAST DIRECTING DISCUSSIONS WITH [redacted] MATTER WILL BE HANDLED IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING HIS RETURN.

SP3-BTJ/sm 6-14-2000

RECEIVED (3-851) (4) 5:26 PM VAM CO-1164

Referral/Consult

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If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

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F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

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FROM ANCHORAGE (3-1-51) NR 012115 7:16 P.M.

DIRECTOR

URGENT

RE STAGE. STATUS REPORT. 49 PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. AUTHORITY REQUESTED TO INTERVIEW 21 ADDITIONAL PERSONS, CASES ASSIGNED AND EFFORTS BEING MADE TO CONTACT AND HANDLE. PRELIMINARY REPORTS SUBMITTED ON 26 OTHERS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUREAU AUTHORITY TO INTERVIEW. ANCHORAGE MEMORANDUM DATED 27 INSTANT (4) FORWARDED SETTING OUT DATA REGARDING [redacted]

Referral/Consult

RECEIVED: (3-1-51) 7:32 P.M. MML

6/25/94

SP3-BTS/jm
6-14-2000
00-1164

RECORDED - 92

65-5[illegible]-82

5-UB

48

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

MAR 27 1951 (4)

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F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

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FROM ANCHORAGE 3-15-51 NR 151826 2:24 P.M.

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE, RE STATUS REPORTS. 60 PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. RESULTS OF CONFERENCE WITH [redacted] (U)

RECEIVED 3-15-51 2:30 P.M. LL Referral/Consult

6-22-94 SP12BTJ/SC 342251

6-14-2000 SP3-BTJ/JM 1 per OGA LETTER 7-20-98 #00-1164

MAY 28 1951 (U)

1-83

CLASSIFIED BY 7/14/04 SP4 BTJ/JM/LW
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PER OGA letter dtd 7/20/98.
6-14-2000 SP3 BTJ/JM 00-1164

5-UB

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (U)

60 APR 4 1951 (U)

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F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (4)

FROM ANCHORAGE (3-22-51) NR 230005 8:41 P.M.

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE, STATUS REPORT. 65 PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS RE THEM SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. 50 ADDITIONAL PERSONS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AND CASES RE THEM CLOSED AS BEING NOT QUALIFIED. 13 ADDITIONAL PERSONS REMAIN ON WHOM BUREAU HAS GIVEN AUTHORITY TO INTERVIEW BUT THESE HAVE BEEN UNAVAILABLE FOR VARIOUS REASONS SUCH AS BEING IN STATES OR IN COMPLETELY ISOLATED AREAS. CONTINUED EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO CONTACT THESE. 6 ADDITIONAL PRELIMINARY REPORTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO BUREAU AND THIS OFFICE AWAITING FURTHER AUTHORITY TO INTERVIEW. MATTER CONTINUES TO RECEIVE PRIORITY.

RECEIVED (3-22-51) (4) 8:51 P.M. LL

6-28-94

SP3 BTS/sm

6-14-2000

80-1164

MAR 29 1951 (4)

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If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems (4)

60APR4 1951 (4)

65-59264

SAC, Indianapolis

March 15, 1951

Director, FBI

MAJOR SAMUEL P. GORDILLERI
SOURCE OF INFORMATION

There is attached a copy of a memorandum prepared at the Seat of Government which reflects the results of an interview conducted with the above-captioned individual. This is being furnished to you for your information.

Enclosure

~~(5 Spcl)~~

WAB:jo

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : C. E. Hennrich

DATE: March 2, 1951

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-22-94 BY SP2 BTW/RD 34225

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OSI-3

PURPOSE:

To summarize progress being made by the Anchorage Office, and to suggest that the observations of SAC Williams relative to the necessity of implementing this program during the summer months of 1951 be brought to the attention of OSI headquarters.

BACKGROUND:

By letter dated February 13, 1951, the Anchorage Office set forth a recapitulation of the Stay-behind Agent Program as follows:

Strategic Areas

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

Stay-behind Agents

In considering individuals as potential Stay-behind Agents, the Anchorage Office is enlisting the assistance of persons who are in good health, loyal, and who are, according to confidential informants and contacts, reliable. Their knowledge of the territory where they reside and their ability to survive in the "back country" are taken into consideration. Where possible, those individuals who have had experience in operating short wave radios, have "ham" licenses and who either own or can fly airplanes are considered. Persons who have had experience in caching supplies, mushing dog teams, and who are experienced in handling small boats are being sought. Persons who own or have access to cabins located in secluded and strategic areas, those who live on and can observe highway and railroad traffic are likewise being considered for use in connection with the captioned matter.

Referral/Consult

A numerical goal has not been set, however the enlistment and development of Stay-behind Agents will continue in Alaska until the Anchorage Offices of FBI [redacted] determine that coverage is adequate and the Bureau [redacted]

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Forty-one Stay-behind Agents have been investigated, agreed to act and have been recommended by the Anchorage Office for use in this program. Thirty-one individuals under consideration have not been recommended due to reasons of health, personal habits, security or indications reflecting they intend to leave the territory in the event of invasion.. Authority has been given to Anchorage to contact approximately 65 additional prospects and the development of this phase of the program is continuing. The Anchorage Office has pointed out that 60 degree below-zero weather has hampered operations somewhat in effecting some contacts, and in some instances, it will be necessary to make contact with these individuals when they make their annual visit to "the city."

The Anchorage Office has recommended that during the period of training, efforts be made to fingerprint and photograph these Stay-behind Agents. This procedure appears to be sound and will be considered in connection with the training program.

Referral/Consult

Communications-Radio

As you are aware, [redacted]

The Anchorage Office has pointed out that considerable time and effort will be necessary to transport radios, power units and necessary accessories to points of location in Alaska; that the summer is the only season which lends itself to this function. The Anchorage Office has further advised that almost a whole year will be lost if something is not done in this respect during the summer of 1951. SAC Williams likewise indicated that the only practicable time to carry in materials, build caches and draft maps of same is the summer season. It was stressed that if this project is not begun in the summer of 1951, it will necessarily have to be put off until 1952 with the resulting loss of approximately one year's time. SAC Williams has suggested that these matters be brought to the attention of [redacted]

Caching

The Anchorage Office is in the process of compiling a dossier on the caching of supplies, arms, ammunition, gasoline, radios and other Arctic survival gear. The dossier will include the following:

1. Essential items to be cached

2. Places for caching
3. Manner of sealing cached materials
4. Mapping and Marking caches
5. Amount of caching materials
6. Choosing cache locations and methods of transporting supplies to cache location
7. Building of caches.

Referral/Consult

SAC Williams stated that [redacted] nevertheless, he believes that time is of the essence and if the program in this respect is not accelerated and something done on it during the summer of 1951, it will have to be deferred until the summer of 1952 because of the weather, terrain and other evident obstacles natural to the territory of Alaska.

Life and Supply Line

Referral/Consult

The Anchorage Office is giving consideration to the establishment of a "lifeline" for the Stay-behind Agents. It is contemplated that it will be necessary to supply them from time to time with arms, ammunition, food, clothing and other necessary gear essential to their existence. The Anchorage Office is making a study of the most logical mountain passes, air routes and logical spots for landing by pontoons, skis and wheels. SAC Williams has pointed that although it is contemplated that [redacted] the Anchorage Office, nevertheless, is going ahead compiling data on the subject which can be utilized at a later date.

Liaison between FBI [redacted] in Alaska

SAC Williams has informed that [redacted]

Referral/Consult

Comment: Referral/Consult

By Bulet to Anchorage 2-27-51, it was pointed out that

[redacted]

RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that through the Liaison Section, the observations of SAC Williams relative to the necessity of accelerating captioned matter in Alaska during the summer months of 1951 be brought to the attention of [redacted] to avoid the loss of a period of one year in its development and implementation. Referral/Consult

It is likewise recommended that the observations and comments [redacted] be obtained in this regard, and that inquiries be made as to

[redacted]

also in this regard, see Bulet to Anchorage 4-6-51 WS.

Referral/Consult

SAC, Anchorage

April 5, 1951

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

There are transmitted herewith two photostatic copies of an article entitled "Russia Can't Take Alaska" written by Father Bernard R. Hubbard, S. J., with Bill Davidson, which article appeared in the March 31, 1951, issue of Collier's Magazine.

The enclosures are submitted for your information.

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

Attachment

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MTB:emr

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Russia Can't Take Alaska

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 17

British Columbia or the state of Washington.

The difficulty posed by an air attack would leave just one other alternative open to the enemy—to land forces on the barren coasts or in the wilderness, with the objective of advancing overland to take Anchorage and Fairbanks. *And this, I contend, is absolutely impossible.* Aside from the few inhabited areas, the Alaskan wilderness is so wild, so impenetrable, so deadly, that any military force would be engulfed and destroyed in it without our having to fire a single shot.

The Russians know this. The Alaskans know this. But the armchair strategists look at the map and continually discover easy avenues of invasion to the Anchorage-Fairbanks defense perimeters. Often, for instance, they hit on the undefended Alaska Peninsula which stretches invitingly toward Siberia and originates at Cook Inlet, at the head of which sits Anchorage.

This will give you some idea of what this "easy" invasion route is like:

Peninsula Expedition Fails

In the summer of 1928, I headed an expedition which tried to traverse the narrow neck of the peninsula for a distance of only 100 miles. For three months I went into training with a Swiss-American giant named Jack Koby and Santa Clara University football star Roderick Chisholm, and then we attempted to penetrate to the Valley of Ten Thousand Smokes, the site of a 1912 volcanic eruption. It had been visited by human beings only once before, when a National Geographic Society expedition broke through in 1916.

We cut inland from the Gulf of Alaska, intending to strike across the Katmai area and emerge on the Bering Sea slope of the peninsula. From the very first day, we got bogged down in a morass the like of which no modern army ever has seen.

We struggled through deserts of volcanic ash in which we sank to our knees with every step, and we nearly strangled from the constant dust in our nostrils. When we got through the ash, we fell into quicksands up to our armpits; and then we inched our way up uncharted precipices and across treacherous glaciers. We crawled through ghost forests destroyed by showers of volcanic acid, and every day we were drenched by torrential rains and flung about by sudden 100-mile-per-hour gales that rushed through the mountain passes from the Bering Sea. All this time there wasn't a trace of living game, and we existed on canned foods from the 120-pound packs we carried.

Finally we had to give up and turn back. We had spent the months of June, July, August and September on the expedition, and in all that time we had covered a grand total of *30 miles*. We were three husky, well-trained men, unimpeded by extra equipment. A military force never could have penetrated beyond the first 10 miles!

Another favorite pastime of the armchair strategists is to look at the map and discover wide, flat, invasion corridors along the great east-west rivers of Alaska. They see the mighty Yukon, particularly, and wail that a mechanized enemy could land at the river mouth on the Bering Sea and roll directly up the flatlands to Fairbanks.

In 1939, I led an expedition up a similar Alaska river, the Noatak, which empties into Kotzebue Sound on the west coast and flows roughly west and south like the Yukon. The object of this expedition was to find out if the headwaters of the Noatak originate anywhere near the Colville River which flows north to the arctic. Such a discovery would provide a pipe-line route down the two river valleys, and enable us to tap fully our potentially great oil fields at Point Barrow. This would prove invaluable to our defense, because Barrow is ice-locked 10½ months out of the year, while Kotzebue on the Bering Sea is open as a port all summer.

Again I rounded up the strongest men I could find and we started up the river in a flat-bottomed boat. This trip was pure torture. We ran aground on innumerable mud bars, and the river had so many tributaries that we never knew whether we were on the Noatak or on some dead-end branch. We turned around and hunted for the main channel time after infuriating time, and nearly every day we suffered an ice-water bath in a rapids or a whirlpool.

After six weeks of this, we made 150 miles—with the help of two trips back to the river mouth for additional gasoline and supplies. Then we set out on foot across the tundra. And this was where the real nightmare began.

The tundra or muskeg which covers about one fourth of Alaska consists of waist-deep water with long-rooted clumps of vegetation growing out of it. When you move across this swampland, you try to step from one clump of vegetation to the next, but more often than not you slip and fall into the water with your 100-pound pack.

While you are struggling along thusly at the rate of about a half mile a day, you are constantly surrounded by clouds of mosquitoes. These insects are so vicious that in the days of Russian rule in Alaska, a form of capital punishment was to stake a convicted criminal out in the wilds and allow the mosquitoes to bite him to death. There also are black gnats and tiny invisible insects, called "nosee-ums" by the Indians, which burrow into the skin around the hairline and cause violent infections.

In addition to this, the 100-mile-an-hour arctic storms hit you when you least expect them, pelting you with sleet and rain and loose rock, and knocking you flat with the fury of their blasts. In the face of all these tribulations, we made 20 miles in two months—and again the expedition had to be abandoned.

Problems That Confront an Enemy

Multiply that mileage figure by 30, and you will have some idea of the problems that would beset an enemy if he landed at the mouth of the Yukon and tried to roll up the "flat, open corridor" to Fairbanks—more than 600 miles upstream, with swamp and tundra nearly all the way.

Some armchair strategists have suggested that mechanized equipment could use the tundra like a highway when it freezes in winter. But again the map studiers are wrong. A thin coating of ice forms on the tundra with the first frost in September, but then the early snows act as insulation and the water underneath rarely freezes. As our own armed forces found out when they strayed more than a few yards from the Alcan Highway on the Operation Sweetbriar maneuvers last winter, the frozen tundra often can scarcely hold a sled, let alone a tank.

If Russian paratroopers were to land on the Kenai Peninsula and move up the Alaska Railroad to Anchorage, they would again face the tundra, plus some of the roughest mountains in the territory, with only one easily defensible route, Moose Pass, leading through them. If they kept to the railroad tracks, they would be totally exposed to our air forces and could be bombed and strafed to destruction. The same thing would happen if they dropped on the Alcan Highway and moved toward Fairbanks from the rear. On the narrow strand of the road they would be bombed; off the road there would be the tundra and the mountains and the impenetrable forests.

They would find, moreover, that even the immediate vicinity of our cities and military bases is impassable. Just across Knik Arm from Anchorage, for example, the Susitna River marshes are as wild as the Yukon tundra, 500 miles away.

Elements Create Real Peril

In 1935, I was investigating unmapped volcanoes with an expedition just a few miles from Cold Bay in the Alaska Peninsula, now the site of a military airfield. Suddenly the sky turned pitch-black between the spires of the Aghileen Pinnacles. It was one of Alaska's terrifying, unpredictable storms, and the rains came down by the bucketful. Before we had time to think, whole mountainsides of rock and alder brush moved down on us, and the entire six-mile-wide valley where we were standing became a rushing torrent of water, 20 feet deep. We escaped because we managed to clamber onto a gravel bar, but a regiment caught in that valley would have perished—within artillery range of the airfield.

Even the long-settled Panhandle area paralleling British Columbia has terrain that is unbelievably wild, with uncharted mountains towering right down to the ocean's edge.

In 1927, for example, I was the first man to cross the Taku Glacier and discover what is now known as the Juneau Icecap, stretching all the way to Canada. This little expedition, into an area forbiddingly called "the Spirits' Home" by the Indians, took 76 hours, during which I had no sleep and lost 28 pounds. We were burned by the sun; we nearly were killed a dozen times in broken-rock masses; and we finally had to be rescued by a Captain William Strong who courageously sailed up the savage Taku River to the point where he had guessed we would emerge.

The weird thing about all this is that it took place in a region just a few miles outside Juneau—in an area that was settled in the late 1700s.

It is no wonder that when the U.S. Navy set up a base on 100-mile-long Kodiak Island, it did so without fear of attack from the rear. For the interior of the island is so impenetrable that no enemy would possibly launch an attack across it.

When the Japanese occupied undefended Attu and Kiska in the Aleutian Islands in World War II, they were still 2,500 miles from Anchorage and they got no farther, despite the fact that the territory was wide-open to any major attack.

We abandoned our air base at Nome, on the Bering Sea, recently, knowing that it would mean nothing to the Russians if they took it. With hundreds of miles of tundra and swamp between them and our Anchorage-Fairbanks fortress, they would be up a dead-end street—and they would be no more than 20 minutes' flying time beyond their own bases in Siberia.

The trouble with most American thinking about Alaska's military problems is that we consider them in terms of past wars, most of which were fought in inhabited

areas that had roads, farms and villages. From the time of Alexander the Great, armies have lived on the land as they advanced, hijacking vast quantities of food and booty from conquered populations. Even in World War II, communiqués contained lines like, "The Red Army advanced 50 kilometers in the direction of Dresden today, capturing 53 villages." It was the villages that were important—not the kilometers.

In most of Alaska, however, there are no villages to speak of, no food, and no roads—until you get to the built-up Anchorage-Fairbanks area. Alaska is about two and one half times the size of Texas; yet you could put the territory's entire population into Soldier Field, Chicago, and still have plenty of seats left over for general admission.

Alaska comprises 586,400 square miles. Scarcely 1,000 square miles, or less than one fifth of 1 per cent, are inhabited; and, according to Department of the Interior figures, only 12,000 acres, or the incredibly low total of *18 square miles,* are under cultivation. Some 200,000 square miles consist almost wholly of impassable mountains, and 150,000 square miles are equally useless swamp and tundra.

Alcan Highway Construction Costly

There are only 591.1 miles of railroad in the entire vast area, and a miserly 2,926 miles of roads (compared with 195,812 miles of rural roads in Texas). Most of the roads are part of the Alcan Highway system—one of the most expensive experiments in the history of engineering. We used the best road-building equipment in the world and spent millions of dollars in constructing the Alcan, yet much of it still washes away when the arctic thaws descend on it each spring.

With all this, it is no wonder that of Alaska's 128,643 people, nearly all live within our Anchorage-Fairbanks defense perimeters, or in the Panhandle far to the southeast. Less than 1,000 Indians and 100 whites are strung out along the entire length of the Yukon River Valley in Alaska, and some 5,000 Eskimos are scattered in settlements along the Bering Sea and the Arctic Ocean coast lines.

These Eskimo communities, more than anything else, tend to prove my point. In 1938, I piled nine King Island Eskimos into a primitive walrus-skin boat called an umiak and traveled 2,000 miles in the open sea visiting every Eskimo settlement between Nome and Barter Island—to help prove scientifically that all Eskimos speak a common language.

A startling feature of this trip was that *I found not a single Eskimo living more than 10 miles inland.* After generations of experience, the natives have found that the interior of Alaska is too much of a death-trap even for them: in an area three times the size of Korea, there is not a single pound of food to be found.

And that's why I say an invading army would starve here in a week. To be sure, there might be an effort to supply it by air. But such an unprecedented air lift would be almost impossible. The supply aircraft would have to fly over 1,000 miles, through the most treacherous flying weather in the world, and it would be a simple matter for us to harass them with planes based in southeast Alaska and throughout the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.

Suppose, however, that the impossible did occur, and the Communists took over Alaska and managed to subsist in a region that produces only 5 per cent of its own food. What would they do then? Presumably, their object would be to invade the United States from there, or bomb our big industrial centers. For either project, they would have to bring in military equipment in the same difficult manner. And there would be other, even more awesome, obstacles.

An invasion of the United States from Alaska could be launched over only one possible land route: the Alcan Highway—1,523 miles of exposed road winding through an impenetrable tangle of tundra and mountain, in Canada as well as Alaska. From Dawson Creek, British Columbia, the southeastern end of the Alcan Highway, there is another 470 miles before the invaders would reach the first town of any consequence—Edmonton, Alberta.

This means that for 1,993 miles—more than twice the distance from Berlin to Moscow—the invading army would be strung out over a narrow ribbon of road, exposed to air attack every foot of the way, and unable to take cover because of the tundra and mountains and forests on either side. And they still would be many miles from the heartland of North America.

It is scarcely credible that the Russians would want to use Anchorage and Fairbanks to bomb our industrial cities. A look at the map shows why. There are dozens of bases in continental Russia that are only a couple of hours farther by air from Detroit, Chicago and Seattle—with railroads and other arteries running directly from the Communist factories to the bombing planes.

It is equally incredible that the Reds would want to seize Anchorage and Fairbanks to keep us from using those bases to bomb Russia. A high-ranking Air Force general recently told me that Alaska is so difficult to supply that in the event of offensive war we would use it mainly as a rescue station and emergency-landing base for planes returning from bombing missions. "It actually would be easier," he said, "to bomb Russia from Omaha than from Fairbanks."

This general agrees with me that the Russians are not likely to strike in Alaska. So do other authorities with whom I spoke when I was in the Territory a short time ago.

These experts are American Eskimos, who, in admirable defiance of Soviet edicts, paddled across the Bering Sea last summer to visit their relatives on the East Cape of Siberia. They told me that there are no offensive preparations at all in this area, which is immediately opposite Alaska. They saw antiaircraft batteries in the low-lying hills behind the coast, and they heard of purely defensive short-range fighter-plane airfields—with not a single major air base closer than Kamchatka, 1,000 miles away.

Moreover, their relatives told them that the Russians are afraid to build important installations in the East Cape area because it is too near large camps of slave laborers who might revolt and seize the bases in the event of war.

Why We Need Alaska

This leads to an important question: If Alaska is so worthless, why do *we* want it?

In the first place, it is absolutely necessary, from the purely defensive point of view, for us to maintain a solid line of outposts away from our shores. Today, our so-called Western Defense Perimeter begins at the North Pole and runs through Alaska and then down through Japan, Okinawa, Korea and Formosa. This protective belt consists of: (1) naval bases from which we can patrol our Pacific approaches against atom-bomb-carrying submarines; (2) air bases, to assist the naval patrol and provide fighter opposition against attacking enemy planes; and (3) in the case of Alaska, at least, a base for our great radar screen. The Russians don't need Alaska for their defense because they get even better protection, for their purposes, from a similar defense perimeter along the Siberian coast line.

In the second place, we must retain Alaska because of its future potentialities, which have been demonstrated so dramatically in the modern cities of Anchorage and Fairbanks and in the agricultural miracle that is the Matanuska Valley. There we now can raise almost anything that grows in New York State (with the exception of corn). In the 22-hour arctic summer daylight, moreover, the crops grow twice as fast, and huge specimens of melons and vegetables have been produced, despite the short three-month growing season.

Today, there are plans afoot that can convert several million additional acres of wasteland to this phenomenal agricultural production. I have proposed a project, for example, to dig a canal reuniting the great Kuskokwim and Yukon Rivers, which once were one stream similar to the Mississippi-Missouri river system. This would drain the surface water from the tundra and swamp of the vast Yukon basin and open up untold acres of rich bottom land, like the Mississippi delta, to the farmers. It also would stimulate settlement and road building up to the arctic mountain ranges, so that the now inaccessible mineral wealth of that region could be tapped for the first time. All these monumental plans, however, would take at least 100 years to fulfill.

The Russians, therefore, could conquer Alaska if they cared to wait until a century from now, when the territory could support a population of 15,000,000 people *(and* invading armies) as the result of the aforementioned projects.

Today, however, I would like nothing better than to see the entire Red Army attempt to conquer Alaska. The Russians would be swallowed up by the wilderness as surely as Almighty God caused the Egyptian army to be swallowed up by the Red Sea.

THE END

AL TARTER

Russia CAN'T *Take Alaska*

By FATHER BERNARD R. HUBBARD, S.J. with BILL DAVIDSON

"The Alaskan wilderness is so wild, so impenetrable, so deadly, that any military force would be engulfed and destroyed in it without our having to fire a shot," says the famed Glacier Priest

Father Hubbard is a Santa Clara University geologist who has spent the last 25 of his 62 years exploring the unknown areas of Alaska and other polar regions. He is considered one of the world's foremost experts on the arctic. Recently he has been teaching survival techniques to armed forces personnel.

The subject of Alaska's military vulnerability is a controversial one. A great many authorities—including General Dwight Eisenhower and the Territory's Governor Ernest Gruening—feel that it is wide open to attack. Gruening last year testified in the Senate that "we could be taken by an airborne invasion of not more than two divisions."

Father Hubbard strongly opposes this view. Collier's presents his opinions here in the belief that his wide experience in the area entitles him to be heard.

ALASKA'S delegate to Congress, E. L. Bartlett, recently stated on a television broadcast that Russian paratroopers poised in Siberia could conquer Alaska's great air bases in 48 hours. At about the same time, there was a report from Taihoku, Formosa, that the Russians had massed 300,000 crack troops opposite Alaska, and were ready for an irresistible blitzkrieg on the territory.

This is tommyrot.

Such glorified rumors have become more and more persistent of late. Many of them are demonstrably silly.

A short time ago, an American pilot flew up the international date line in the Bering Sea along the 2¼-mile-wide strait separating Russian-owned Big Diomede Island from American-owned Little Diomede. It was an exceptionally clear day and the pilot took an aerial photograph of the Soviet territory. The picture, published in Alaska's newspapers, caused international panic. For, according to the analysts, the photograph showed a military airfield across the sugar-loaf top of Big Diomede! The headlines screamed that this meant there were bombing planes and some 2,000 Russian soldiers massed just 2¼ miles from vital U.S. territory!

While the Big Diomede jitters were at their peak, I went to Little Diomede Island to fill in as a missionary for the famous Father Tom Cunningham, who had just been called back to service with the U.S. Army. With me was an Eskimo boy from the

The Territory is just a jumble of lofty mountain ranges and impassable tundra, Father Hubbard declares. What appears to be an easy invasion route to Anchorage along the Alaska Peninsula is actually a volcanic morass; the "corridor" from the Bering Sea to Fairbanks is even worse; Alcan Highway is a deathtrap

mainland, a member of the Alaska Territorial Guard named Edward Magaluk. We kept staring at the bulk of Big Diomede, and one day Magaluk said, "I smell a big fog coming. A good man could sneak across to Big Diomede, have a look around, and get back before the fog lifts."

A half hour later, Magaluk was in his kayak, paddling silently through the pea-soup Bering Sea mists, toward the ominous humpbacked island that is Russia's closest outpost to the United States.

He hit the Big Diomede shore and hid his kayak among the rocks. Then he scaled a 700-foot cliff and slipped between the two sentry posts we had studied through our binoculars. He cut back and forth over the grassy, three-square-mile area on top of the rocky hump of the island, and he peered into the island's sole government building, a stone hovel in which a handful of Russians were reading or working on weather reports. Just to be sure, Magaluk bisected the top of the island again, slipped into the Eskimo village on the far side of the hump, and counted the Russians in their sentry posts.

Finally, he paddled back across the narrow strait as stealthily as he had come. His report was what I had expected.

No Airstrip on Big Diomede

"There is no airstrip on the island," he said, "and there are only 28 Russians, most of them civilian weather technicians." Later, government experts re-examined the aerial photograph and discovered that the airstrip was merely a light streak across the negative.

This incident typifies the fear complex we have built up about the Russians and Alaska. Scarcely a day goes by that someone does not claim the Soviets could walk in and take our great northern bastion at will in the event of war. I am not a military expert, but Alaska has been my scientific laboratory for 25 years—and to all of these scare stories I can only deliver a one-word answer: "Nonsense!"

For one thing, I do not think the Russians could capture Alaska if they wanted to. Secondly, I don't think the Reds are foolish enough even to want to invade the huge wasteland. For, contrary to general belief, the territory is not a land of gold and furs for the taking, but a subcontinent that is more than 99 per cent uninhabited wilderness. Gold and fur production, in fact, have declined by nearly half since their peak years earlier in the century, and the great natural resources are still untapped and undiscovered. Science unquestionably will change all this in future generations; but for the time being, Alaska as an offensive base is more a financial liability than an asset, even to us.

These statements may shock most Americans and I know they will bring down the wrath of the civilian military sages and politicians on my head—but they are opinions founded on a lifetime of exploration in a part of the world that has never even been visited by many of the armchair strategists.

My basic contention is this: our two mighty air bases at Anchorage and Fairbanks are the only Alaskan targets presently worthy of an enemy attack. Because these areas are so limited in size, Lieutenant General William E. Kepner has been able to draw all his forces into formidable, radar-protected defense perimeters around them. A direct airborne assault on either would be as suicidal as dropping paratroopers into the cone of an active volcano. The same thing holds true of bombing attacks—with the added factor that any bombed airfield normally can be put back into action in a matter of two or three days.

I firmly believe that if the Reds were strong enough in the air to attack Anchorage or Fairbanks, or the distant Juneau Panhandle region, they would be strong enough to by-pass Alaska altogether and land on the coast of *(Continued on page 80)*

PHOTO BY FATHER HUBBARD

U.S. Little Diomede Island (foreground) is less than three miles from Soviet Big Diomede (rear)

JOHN FLOREA

Father Hubbard says Reds would find Alaska a liability if they did succeed in invading it

PHOTO BY FATHER HUBBARD

Coast line at Tracy Arm shows problem confronting an enemy attacking by sea

Alaska Peninsula is tangled wilderness; 30-mile trip here once took Father Hubbard four months

U.S. ARMY PHOTO



Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (4)

FROM ANCHORAGE (3-29-51) NR 292315 7:33 P.M.

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. 66 PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS RE THEM SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. 6 ADDITIONAL PRELIMINARY REPORTS BEING SUBMITTED AS SOON AS SAME CAN BE TYPED. EFFORTS CONTINUING TO LOCATE AND INTERVIEW PERSONS AUTHORIZED FOR INTERVIEWS.

RECEIVED 3-29-51 7:39 P.M. LL Referral/Consult
CORRECTED 3-29-51 9:43 P.M.

(4)

SP3-BTJ/SM
6-14-2000
00-1164

RECORDED - 55 65-59264-89
APR 6 (4)

EX-123

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems (4)

APR 14 (4)

65-59264

SAC, Anchorage

April 4, 1951

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

A review of the following case files reflects that the Anchorage office was granted authority to contact the individuals named below in connection with this program as indicated but that no reports have been received at the Bureau indicating that the desired contacts have been made:

[redacted]

b6
b7C

Bufile	62-93581	Bulet	1-17-51
"	62-93525	"	2-9-51
"	62-93527	"	1-12-51
"	62-93517	"	1-11-51
"	62-93522	"	1-11-51

Expedite these contacts and advise Bureau results immediately by submitting a report in the individual case file.

65-59264

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/22/94 BY SP2 TP/RS 34225

RECORDED - 107 62-93581-90

cc - 62-93581
62-93525
62-93527
62-93517
62-93522

EX. - 48

APR 9 1951

HANDLED BY STOP DESK

WTB:jef

U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE
FBI
RECEIVED READING ROOM
APR 4 3 36 PM '51

MAILED 15
APR 5 1951
COMM - FBI

APR 14 1951

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: March 15, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
(65-59264)

Referral/Consult

34525
6/22/94

Declassified ~~Classified~~ Released

CLASSIFIED BY Sgt 7 cl
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

THIS INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN

JHW:MMA
65-298

COPIES DESTROYED
EX-86

RECORDED - 121

65-59264-97 ~~SECRET~~

MAR 19 1951

HANDLED BY STOP DESK

61 APR 14 1951

65-59264

Letter to the Director, FBI
March 15, 1951
P & C

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

[redacted]

This matter continues to receive priority attention in this office.

Referral/Consult

SAC, Anchorage April 4, 1951

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

Relet Anchorage to the Bureau dated 12-5-50 listing the names of the following individuals as potential Stay-behind Agents:

[redacted] b6 b7C

Reference is also made to Anchorage radiogram to the Bureau dated 12-8-50 advising that the additional persons named below are being considered under this program:

[redacted] b6 b7C

Expedite submission of preliminary reports on the above-named individuals.

65-59264

WTB:jef

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/22/94 BY SP2 A/S/SC

RECORDED - 69

65-59264-92

APR 9 1951

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Candy

61 APR 14 1951

APR 5 1951
COMM - FBI

APR 4 3 36 PM '51

SAC, ANCHORAGE PERSONAL ATTENTION

April 6, 1951

DIRECTOR, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF EVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/22/91 BY SP1 AJS/SC 54525

Re Bulet January 2, 1951.

The proposed training program for the Stay-Behind Agents has been [redacted] and the suggestions made in your letter of December 5, 1950, were considered.

[redacted]

It is contemplated that the following training would be given these individuals during a two-weeks' period while in Washington at the rate of ten hours per day, six days per week:

RECORDED 66 APR 9 1951

Total Hours

1. Radio training, codes, ciphers and practice - [redacted] hours per day. (USAF)

2. [redacted] FBI

Indoctrination [redacted] and administrative procedures.

MAILED 16 APR 6 1951 COMM-FBI

ESS:hke

65 APR 16 1951

Referral/Consult

Total Hours

[redacted]

3. FBI Training:

Russian system of detection and how to effect counter-measures.	3
Secret writing, codes, etc.	8
Deceptive cover and security.	6
Selection and training of Sub-Agents and informants.	3
Disarming methods [redacted]	Referral/Consult

It is contemplated that the above schedule should be flexible enough to adapt to the background and capabilities of the individuals involved. It is also contemplated that each individual will be available to the Bureau for training at the rate of four hours per day for one week of his two-weeks' stay in the Washington area. [redacted]

In connection with your suggestion for basic training in the use of a Russian dictionary, it has been determined that,

due to the difficulty of the language and the fact that invasion forces in Alaska would probably be made up of groups from the Siberian area who do not necessarily speak Russian, it is more feasible to substitute a course in the marking and identification of Soviet equipment, uniforms, etc.

Inasmuch as it is contemplated that a considerable number of Stay-Behind Agents who are developed will be pulled out of Alaska in the event of an invasion to be used at a later date for special assignments in Alaska, it is considered necessary that training in parachute jumping be given to as many as possible of those individuals who will be sent back into Alaska.

The Bureau has been advised that [redacted]

Your specific recommendations are desired relative to the financial aspects involved during the training phase of this program. It should be discreetly determined as to what type of short-term life and accident insurance is available in Alaska and the approximate cost involved. You should bear in mind that the maximum period of training for the Stay-behind Agents will not exceed six weeks in duration. Your comments are desired relative to the security involved in securing the insurance policies, that is, whether consideration should be given to taking out these policies in the United States or in Alaska. You should be most circumspect in making these inquiries and under no circumstances should you recommend a specific insurance company in subsequent contacts to the Stay-behind Agent.

It is likewise desired that you consider the question of remuneration and personal expenses involved for the individual Stay-behind Agent while he is receiving training. It is believed that no hard and fast rule can be set up in this regard but will depend upon the financial condition, family responsibilities, etc., of the individual involved. Transportation costs from residence in Alaska to the airport (USAF-Anchorage) and return, salary in lieu of customary earnings, personal expenses and insurance costs should be included in your study of this problem.

Referral/Consult Advise the Bureau immediately of your observations, suggestions, and recommendations concerning the financial arrangements which you feel should be effected in this matter.

In the meantime, the administrative case files of the recommended Stay-behind Agents should be carefully reviewed to determine which individuals should first receive the necessary training, which ones will agree to come to the U. S. to receive same and which ones will be agreeable to receiving the parachute jump training. All factors should be carefully considered in this connection, especially the age, physical condition, and educational background of the individual. It is suggested in this regard that a representative number of Stay-behind Agents who are easily accesible be contacted relative to the proposed training program and efforts be made to determine their reactions relative to the proposed training in the U. S. and when they might possibly be available to receive the training. You should thereafter advise the Bureau immediately whether arrangements can be perfected by you with the Stay-behind Agents, whereby these individuals can proceed to Washington at the rate of two per week, traveling separately, beginning on or about April 25, 1951.

It is recalled that in your letter to the Bureau dated 2-7-51, information was set forth reflecting that military authorities in Alaska had informed you that the strategic areas in Alaska are Anchorage, Fairbanks, Seward, McGrath, Galena and Nome.

You are instructed to re-examine the problem of coverage in line with the recently defined strategic areas and submit your observations and recommendations to the Bureau as to whether the Stay-behind Agent coverage in the vicinities of the above named localities is adequate.

Referral/Consult

You should also prepare a list of the Stay-behind Agents who have been recommended by the Anchorage Office, contacted and agreed to act in connection with this program, said list being broken down geographically, and thereafter, discuss [redacted] the question of adequacy of coverage. The Bureau should be furnished with a copy of the list prepared in this regard [redacted] should be informed of the number of Stay-behind Agents developed to date in the strategic areas and apprised of their general qualifications. It will not be necessary to inform [redacted] concerning the identities of the individuals involved at this time; however, you should immediately inform the Bureau of your views as to when their identities should be made known to [redacted]

It is imperative that you give this matter immediate attention. A reply to this communication should reach the Bureau within six days of its receipt in the Anchorage Office, and should include your views, observations and recommendations in connection with the training program which is outlined herein.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 4/7/51

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

SUBJECT: [redacted]
ADMINISTRATIVE - SBA PROGRAM

b6
b7C

Rebulet to Anchorage 4/4/51 entitled "Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in the Event of Invasion (Stay Behind Agent Program). Bureau File 65-59264.

It was determined the correct name of this individual was [redacted] However the case in this office has been closed. Upon receipt of reliable information that he [redacted] and was also hospitalized in [redacted] for [redacted]

b6
b7C

In addition it was reported he was extremely talkative, likes to impress people with his importance by talking, and it was suggested that he not be contacted regarding any confidential matter for this reason.

In view of this information no further consideration should be afforded this individual under this program.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/22/94 BY SP2 BTS/SC 34225

66-396
SSP:HCW

RECORDED - 49

INDEXED - 49

65-59264-94
APR 11 1951
15

HANDLED BY

60 APR 18 1951

~~DIRECTOR~~
~~SPECIAL DELIVERY~~

RADIOGRAM

APRIL 6, 1951 (E)(4) CIPHER PAD CODE (E)(4)

SAC, ANCHORAGE DEFERRED

STAGE. REURAD APRIL FIVE LAST. ADVISE DATES REPORTS AND (E)(4)

IDENTITIES SPECIAL AGENTS SUBMITTING SAME ON [redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7C

SEE BUDETS MARCH TWENTY SIX LAST RE [redacted]

SURAD.

HOOVER

RECORDED - 66

WTB:JRH

65-59264 - 94

C.O. Downing D

[redacted] SP3-BTJ/SM
ON 6-14-2010

00-1164-210

AW 211 - 25

FA 061917

ck 7 mo

2050 - 2120 (E)(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

APR 6 1 33 PM '51 (E)(4)
RECEIVED - COMMUNICATIONS ROOM
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

Bureau Radio (4-6-51) 4:58 P.M. JSS (E)(4)

~~Classified by SP2 BTJ/SP~~ 6/20/94
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ 34225

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

APR 18 1951 (E)(4)

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Lease
Gandy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY

FROM ANCHORAGE 4-5-51 NR 052016 7:15 PM

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

RE STAGE STATUS REPORT. SIXTY-SEVEN PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS REGARDING THEM SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. LETTER DATED (SECOND) INSTANT WENT FORWARD OUTLINING PROGRAM OF [redacted] REQUESTED BUREAU EXPEDITE CONSIDERATION OF FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS ON WHOM PRELIMINARY REPORTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED SO THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. [redacted]

RECEIVED: 4-5-51 7:53 PM GLA

RECORDED - 66

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: April 7, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

SUBJECT: [redacted] b6 b7C

ADMINISTRATIVE - SBA PROGRAM

Rebulet to Anchorage dated April 4, 1951 entitled Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in the Event of Invasion (Stay Behind Agent Program). Bureau File 65-59264.

The case in this office has been closed and no further consideration may be given to [redacted] as he is now deceased. b6 b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/22/94 BY SP2 BTS/RC 34225/

66-407
SSP:HCT

RECORDED - 49
INDEXED - 49

APR 11 1951

15

APR 18 1951

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 4/7/51

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

SUBJECT: [redacted]
ADMINISTRATIVE - SBA PROGRAM

b6
b7C

Rebulet to Anchorage dated April 4, 1951 entitled Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in the Event of Invasion (Stay Behind Agent Program). Bureau File 65-59264.

The case in this matter has been closed by the Anchorage Office because of information received that [redacted] is the brother to [redacted] who is associated with [redacted] Anchorage File 87-185, who appears to be connected with a narcotics traffic in Fairbanks and is a known prostitute.

b6
b7C

In view of this information no further consideration should be afforded [redacted] under the instant program.

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/22/84 SP2BT515C

34225

66-384
SSP:HCW

65-57214-96

RECORDED - 49
INDEXED - 49

APR 11 1951

APR 18 1951

98

SAC, Anchorage

[redacted]

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

RECORDED - 19

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

[illegible] 34225/
6/22/94 SP12B TS 150

Bulet 4-11-51.

The suggestions and observations submitted in referenced letter have been reviewed, and based upon an analysis thereof, the following instructions are being issued:

1. The individuals residing in the strategic areas of Nome, Fairbanks and Seward, who have been recommended by the Anchorage office as Stay-behind Agents for inclusion in this program, should be recontacted. The proposed training program should be briefly outlined and efforts made to determine when these persons will be available to receive training in the United States. It should be determined whether they will agree to participating in the parachute jump training.

   The financial aspects of instant program should be explored. Although no specific offer, as such, should be made to these agents, it is suggested that their reaction be obtained concerning the following financial arrangements:

   A. Remuneration of $150.00 per week basic pay plus $4.00 per diem for incidental expenses, if no jump training taken. This would include a period of approximately two weeks in Washington, D. C., plus air travel time from Alaska to the U. S. and return.

   B. If participating in jump training, same as above for the first two weeks in Washington, D. C.

      $175.00 per week basic pay, plus same per diem as above, for the approximate 2-1/2 weeks during the jump training course.

Tson
Mohr
Nease
Tele. Room

6 MAY 11 19

WTB:bjw

2. The same action as set forth above should be taken in connection with the Stay-behind Agents in Galena and McGrath, Alaska, as soon as the initial contacts have been made with these individuals.

3. Forward to the Bureau prior to May 10, 1951, a list of the reports on the Stay-behind Agents which you propose to disseminate to [redacted]. The identical dissemination will be made to [redacted]. You should personally deliver copies of the pertinent reports to [redacted] on the latter date. It is suggested in this regard that you discreetly inform [redacted] of the necessity of maintaining these reports in a safe and secure place, and that the contents of the reports be made available only to limited personnel in [redacted] which he may designate.

Referral/Consult

4. Continue the development of potential Stay-behind Agents. It is not believed that a decision can be reached at this time as to whether the coverage is adequate, but will depend upon the number of agents already developed who will agree to come to the United States for training. It is quite possible that during the training some of these individuals will decline to act, either because of fear, or personal reasons. Although every effort must be made to keep this number to the minimum, it is believed such a possibility exists which would, therefore, perceptibly affect the adequacy of coverage.

For your information, arrangements are being made to photograph and fingerprint all trainees at the Bureau. The Anchorage office will be advised of the results of fingerprint checks and will be provided with copies of the photographs of the agents.

With reference to your suggestion that the Bureau consider the possibility of contacting the superiors of potential Stay-behind Agents in Government service, or in private industry, in order that requests can be made for

them to receive a leave of absence to attend training school, this is to advise that the Bureau recognizes the merit of your suggestion, however, it is believed that such procedure would possibly jeopardize the security of instant program. As you are aware, the Bureau has proceeded with this matter on the theory that the fewer people who are cognizant of the project, the better the chances are to maintain the development of this program confidential and keep the operation secure. The action suggested by you in this regard is not being approved. In the event one of the individuals selected cannot come to the U. S. for training without securing some type of clearance from his superior, the Bureau would only consider such action under unusual circumstances and in case the services of the individual are essential for the implementation of the program. Under no circumstances should a Stay-behind Agent be informed that the Bureau could intercede with his employer to secure such a desired clearance.

In the future, in submitting information reflecting contact with a Stay-behind Agent, the Bureau should be advised of the results thereof by a separate communication on every Stay-behind Agent so that all pertinent data relative to the individual will be contained in his administrative file. Information set forth in referenced letter, specifically pages 2, 3 and 4, which reflects contacts with the seven individuals mentioned therein, should be incorporated in the appropriate case files maintained in the Anchorage office. The same action is being taken at the Bureau.

You should continue to give all phases of this program your personal attention and keep the Bureau advised of all developments.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: April 11, 1951

FROM: SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION (STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM) (65-59264)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 STB/LP
ON 6/22/94
34225

Rebulet April 6, 1951.

There is set out hereinafter the information requested in referenced letter and observations concerning the training program.

It is believed that training the Agents in Washington and singly has a distinct advantage from a security angle, although it is quite possible that it will be a more expensive proposition.

With reference to caching, this office has advised the Bureau in Anchorage letter dated February 13, 1951, that we are presently compiling a dossier with reference to this operation. It will be accelerated and submitted to the Bureau at the earliest possible moment.

b6
b7C

With reference to the short term insurance policy which the Bureau suggested in favor of each potential agent who goes into Washington for training, contact was had here with [redacted] Life and Accident and Health Department, Edward D. Coffey Agency for the Continental Casualty Company and Continental Assurance Company in Anchorage. He was not, of course, advised in any way of the particulars of this program but was merely asked concerning short term insurance. He stated that it could, of course, be written but that his company as well as any other insurance company, would have to know the names of the insured, the age of the insured, as well as the risk involved. He said that his company would have to know if the insurance written was a program involving unusual risks or unusual circumstances. He said that insurance policies could be written on a confidential basis, in which event they could all be handled through one person. He continued that the shortest standard term insurance presently written by his company (and probably by other companies) is 5 years. The price of such insurance would, of course, depend on the risks involved and the age of the insured. It is suggested that insurance such as that contemplated by the Bureau, which will be of a confidential nature, could be best handled by a company in the States and probably in Washington, D. C.

COPIES DESTROYED

With regard to expenses during training, all potential Stay Behind Agents in the Anchorage area who were available were contacted and information obtained which would reflect on the cost of their training to the Government. These data are as follows:

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

JHW:MMA
65-298
Enclosure

memo to Belmont 5/4/51
Ltr to Ladd 5/4/51
memo to Nichols 5/4/51

RECORDED - 108

INDEXED - 108

APR 14 1951

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

1 - FRANK B. MOORE, 621 15th Street, Anchorage

He advised that he is presently making a little over $600 a month for a 6 day week, which days consist of 8 to 10 hours. He continued that he could go to Washington for training school consisting of 6 weeks at any time. He said that his family consists of a wife only. He owns his home here and is making payments on it. Hence, he felt that he should receive as much money for the time away from his job as he would earn if he were working. He has at the present time a $15,000 life insurance policy. He stated that he would take parachute jump training if necessary. It is noted that he was born March 30, 1908, being 43 years of age. In addition to the remuneration noted above, he stated that he felt he should get approximately $3 or $4 daily for incidental expense money.

b6
b7C

2 - [redacted] Anchorage

Upon inquiry he stated that his only dependent was a wife. He said he would participate in parachute jump training if the same were included in the training program. He stated that his present income is approximately $1000 per month. He is the proprietor and only attendant at his [redacted] and if he were called away from it he would have to [redacted] or get his wife to attend it while he was gone. If he could do this, he continued, she would have to obtain a leave of absence from her job with [redacted] to operate [redacted] With reference to the date on which he could go to Washington, he said he could go at any time.

3 - [redacted] Anchorage

b6
b7C

[redacted] upon contact stated that his dependents are a wife and one child. He said that he could go to Washington at any time for training if he received two weeks notice. He said that he was willing to take parachute jump training but it is noted that he has a bad ankle. This probably would prevent him from participating in this training. With reference to expenses, he said that it would take $700 per month to cover his expenses in Anchorage and his salary loss from his job as manager o[redacted]

4 - [redacted] Anchorage

[redacted] informed that his income as proprietor of [redacted] is approximately $10,000 per year. He said his family responsibilities are a wife and 3 children. He continued that he could go to Washington at any

b6
b7C

time but that his expenses would vary depending upon the time of year he went. He said if he went during June, July, August or September, which he would do if the request was urgent, he would lose an income of approximately $1500 per month. He said that if he went during the month of October he would lose an income of approximately $500 to $750 per month. He said that if he went during the months of December, January and other winter months he would lose an income of approximately only $300 per month. However, as stated above, he said that he would go at any time he was called, with the loss of income quoted. [redacted] stated that he presently has a $12,000 life insurance policy and a $1200 life insurance policy as well as a $5000 and a $10,000 aviation accident policy, the $10,000 amount to be paid if he is killed in a commercial aircraft. [redacted] also advised that he felt that a $10,000 insurance policy should be taken out on his life if he travels by military plane. With reference to parachute jump training, [redacted] said that he would take such training but that if he has a choice he would not participate in this phase. b6 b7C

5 - [redacted]

[redacted] advised that his income at present is approximately $8000 to $10,000. His family consists of a wife and 2 children who would stay here during the training period. He said he felt his personal incidental expenses would be $3 to $5 daily but would accept any amount which the Government felt to be fair. With reference to the date of his training, he said that he had [redacted] beginning May 15 which would last approximately two weeks and would gross him approximately $1800. He did not desire to go during that period. It is noted the bear season is over June 20, after which he has [redacted] scheduled. With reference to parachute jump training, he said that he would jump on occasion if absolutely necessary but at this time does not desire any such training. It is noted he is employed by [redacted] and if he went into Washington for training he would either have to obtain a leave of absence without pay, in which event he would want to be paid the amount of money lost, or obtain paid leave. It is noted that he will use most of his annual leave [redacted] hence, he probably will have to obtain leave without pay. b6 b7C

6 - [redacted] Anchorage

It is noted he has opened [redacted] in Anchorage on [redacted] and does not know what his income will be. However, he said that during 1950 he made approximately $6500. He said that he expected to make more than

b6
b7C

this [redacted] He said that he would rather not go into Washington for training until he had gotten his [redacted] business on its feet and if he had a choice would wait till the latter part of 1951. His dependents are a wife and one child who would stay in Anchorage while he was in training. He stated that in addition to receiving the amount of money he would lose by being away from his business, he felt he should have approximately $3 a day for incidental expenses. He stated he did not desire to participate in the parachute jump training. b6 b7C

7 - [redacted]

[redacted] stated that his income at present is approximately [redacted] per year. He has a [redacted] to [redacted] It is noted that most of his income is made between April and November. He said he felt he could go to Washington for a period of training in October or November gratis. Although he could go during this period, it was pointed out by him that during the time he was away he could have earned approximately [redacted] a week here. With reference to parachute jump training, [redacted] commented that he was patriotic enough to jump on occasion if necessary but he did not desire such training. b6 b7C

By way of observation concerning the above comments of the individuals contacted, it is noted that the expenses would be considerable. From these contacts, it could be noted in the case of most of the potential Stay Behind Agents that their income is derived mainly during the months between April and November of each year. The cost to the Government in replacing their incomes between November and April would be very materially decreased if the training could be had at that time.

With reference to those agents who should be the first to go, it is believed that they should be chosen for the training that they would receive in the most important phases, namely, those who would operate radios and receive radio training should be among the first. It is believed that those of sufficient youth and vigorous health should be chosen among the first. Also, of necessity, those who can get away from their businesses or jobs will necessarily have to be chosen at the time when they can most expeditiously go.

With reference to the [redacted]

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

With reference to the Bureau's direction that a list of the agents already recommended be compiled geographically and alphabetically, there are being transmitted herewith 5 x 8 cards on each of the 67 agents recommended to date. A copy of each of these cards has been maintained here for current use. As each additional agent is recommended and closing reports submitted to the Bureau, cards will be made up similar to those enclosed and forwarded for inclusion in the Bureau's file. It is suggested that the Bureau official supervising this program may desire to maintain these cards for ready reference.

Referral/Consult

[redacted] were informed during the conference on April 10, 1951, of the number of agents we have developed in each strategic area and their general qualifications but identities of the same were not divulged to them.

Referral/Consult

It is recommended that the identities of the agents who have been recommended be given to [redacted] at the same time they are given to [redacted] and that copies of the reports compiled here be given to [redacted] at that time. It is also recommended that this be done immediately.

By way of general observation concerning the training phase of this program, the following is noted:

1 - As observed above, in the polling of a cross section of the potential agents it is noted that the cost of the training would be very materially decreased if it were given during the winter months, inasmuch as is the case of most persons in the territory of Alaska, the potential agents are receiving most of their income during the months between April 1 and November 1 of each year.

2 - Inspector T. E. HAUGHTEN was in attendance at the conference on April 10, 1951, as was noted above, and has thoroughly reviewed the Stay Behind Agent Program in the Anchorage Office.

3 - It is recommended that photographs and fingerprints be obtained from each trainee at the time he arrives in Washington for training.

4 - It is suggested that the Bureau may desire to consider the possibility of contacting the superiors of potential Stay Behind Agents in Government service or in private industry in order that they can receive a leave of absence in which to attend training school.

ENCLOSURE TO THE BUREAU

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED


ARCTIC
CHUKCHI SEA
RESTRICTED
ANADYRSKIY KHREBET
ANADYRSKIY ZALIV
BERING SEA
RESTRICTED
NORTON SOUND
ST LAWRENCE ISLAND
RESTRICTED
YUKON RIVER
KUSKOKWIM BAY
RESTRICTED
ST MATTHEW I
NUNIVAK ISLAND
ST PAUL I
ST GEORGE I
PRIBILOF ISLANDS
BRISTOL BAY
RESTRICTED
KODIAK ISLAND
RESTRICTED
ALEUTIAN ISLANDS
RESTRICTED
UNALASKA
RESTRICTED
FOX ISLANDS
NEAR ISLANDS
RESTRI

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (4)

FROM ANCHORAGE (4-6-51) NR 070105 9:51 PM

DIRECTOR [redacted] DEFERRED (4)

STAGE. REFERENCE YOUR RADIOGRAM APRIL 6. FOLLOWING LISTS TITLES, AGENT AND DATES OF REPORTS SUBMITTED BY THIS OFFICE: [redacted] DATED APRIL 3 LAST; [redacted] DATED APRIL 2 LAST; [redacted] DATED APRIL 2 LAST; [redacted] DATED APRIL 2 LAST; AND [redacted] DATED APRIL 2 LAST, (4) ALL REPORTS BY SPECIAL AGENT EDWARD A. PLEVACK.

b6
b7C

RECEIVED (4-6-51) (4) 10:01 PM LH

(UNDERLINED PORTION IS ACTUAL DECODE.) (4)

Classified by SP2 BTS/SC
Declassify on: 6/26/94
3/225/1

SP3-BTS/SM
6-14-2000
00-1164

RECORDED - 50

65-59264-99

(4)

EX-86

COPIES DESTROYED
MAY 23 1980

5-WB

cc: Mr. Nease

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (4)

(6) APR 28 1951 (4)

65-59264

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 12-22-2010

6-13-01 SP3-B7545M
00-1164 PAGE 1

(U) Inspector G. H. Bayfield

TOP SECRET

March 28, 1951

RECORDED - 63

SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE IN EVENT OF WAR

(U) Reference is made to your memorandum dated March 21, 1951, Division file No. 100-11 (950), H.Q. file No. G 11-1-131. (U)

For your information discussions are under way with military authorities regarding planning for sources of intelligence in event of war but those discussions are being confined to the territory of Alaska and have not contemplated any such plan in the continental United States [redacted] b7D

SP3-B7545M 6 00-1164

Should there be any indications of discussions regarding possible planning involving North American areas other than Alaska, we will, of course, notify you. We would appreciate hearing from you in the event similar discussions take place [redacted] b7D

These data are solely for the information of [redacted] (U)

(U) [redacted] b7D

CEH:gmu

cc [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

REGISTERED AIR MAIL

b7D

cc - Foreign Service Desk

6/25/94
SP1-B7545C
54225

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (4)

FROM ANCHORAGE (4-12-51) NR 122017 5:37 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE, STATUS REPORT. SIXTY-EIGHT PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY-BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS RE THEM SUBMITTED TO BUREAU.

[redacted] AND LETTER COVERING SAME SUBMITTED APRIL 11TH. (4)

RECEIVED: (4-12-51) 5:45 PM GLA

Referral/Consult

SP3-BTJ/SM
6-14-2000
00-1164
RECORDED - 118

(APR 14 51) (4)

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (4)

(50 APR 24 1951) (4)

65-59264

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: April 11, 1951

FROM : MR. D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (Stay-behind Agent Program)

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/22/94 BY SP2 BTS/SC

34225

PURPOSE:

(1) To advise that it is estimated approximately 50 individuals in Alaska will be selected to serve as Stay-behind Agents in the event that Territory is invaded; (2) to inform that the question of adequacy of coverage this regard in Alaska has not been definitely resolved and is presently being examined by the SAC at Anchorage [redacted] Referral/Consult

BACKGROUND:

You will recall that during the past few months the Anchorage Office has given top priority to the development of individuals in Alaska who will remain there and serve as Stay-behind Agents in the event that Territory might be attacked and occupied by the Russians. By memorandum from V. P. Keay to Mr. A. H. Belmont dated March 31, 1951, a plan for the training of these agents was presented for approval. In connection therewith, you inquired: "Just approximately how many such agents is it planned to have. H."

Referral/Consult

OBSERVATIONS:

As of today, the Anchorage Office has developed 66 persons who are being considered as possible agents. The development of these individuals is continuing until such time as the SAC at Anchorage and [redacted] agree that coverage is adequate and the Bureau concurs in their recommendation. From the group developed, it is estimated that approximately 50 individuals will be selected to serve as Stay-behind Agents and be afforded appropriate training [redacted] by [redacted] FBI.

As you are aware, the [redacted] By letter dated April 6, 1951, the SAC at Anchorage was instructed to again confer with [redacted]

Referral/Consult

Upon receipt of the results of the conference between FBI [redacted] you will be advised.

Referral/Consult

ACTION:

RECORDED - 116

APR 11 1951

This is for your information.

WTB:bjc

60 APR 20 1951

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Alden
Belmont
Laughlin
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

DECODED COPY

FROM ANCHORAGE 4-19-51 NR 192022 6:21 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. SEVENTY-TWO PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORT SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. FOURTEEN INDIVIDUALS REMAIN ON WHOM PRELIMINARY REPORTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED AND BUREAU AUTHORITY RECEIVED TO INTERVIEW. THESE ARE ASSIGNED AND EFFORT BEING MADE TO CONTACT THEM. TWO PRELIMINARY REPORTS SUBMITTED AND AWAITING BUREAU AUTHORITY TO INTERVIEW. RE ANCHORAGE LET 11TH INSTANT PAGE 5 LINE 2. GULKANA SHOULD BE GALENA.

RECEIVED 4-19-51 6:27 PM VAM

SP3-BTJ/SM
6-14-2006
00-1164

RECORDED - 50
65-59264-103
EX-22
APR 21 1951

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

65-59264

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

DECODED COPY (4)

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Alden
Belmont
Laughlin
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

FROM ANCHORAGE (4-26-51) NR 262022 4:23 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. SEVENTY-TWO PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY-BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. TWELVE ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS AUTHORIZED AND ATTEMPTS BEING MADE TO HANDLE SAME CERTAIN OF THESE PERSONS UNAVAILABLE AT PRESENT. ONE CASE PENDING AWAITING INVESTIGATION ANOTHER FIELD OFFICE. ONE CASE PENDING AWAITING AUTHORITY OF BUREAU TO INTERVIEW.

RECEIVED: (4-26-51) 4:57 PM GLA

b6
b7C

SP3-BTJ/SM

6-14-2000

00-1164

62-93831

RECORDED - 3

65-59264-104

MAY 5 1951 (4)

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (4)

65-59264

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: March 31, 1951

FROM : V. P. KEAY

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/22/94 SP12B75 34225

Tolson, Ladd, Clegg, Glavin, Harbo, Rosen, Tracy, Gurnea, Mohr, Nease, Sandy

Trotter

Winterrowd

Beckwith

PURPOSE:

To present for approval a plan for the training of individuals to be used as Stay-Behind Agents in Alaska in the event of invasion. To submit for approval a letter to the SAC at Anchorage advising him of the plans for instant training and requesting his comments in connection therewith.

BACKGROUND:

Referral/Consult

My memorandum to you dated January 6, 1951, analyzed the suggestions of the SAC at Anchorage for the training of the individuals to be used as Stay-Behind Agents. The memorandum of January 6, 1951, also recommended that it be determined whether

[redacted]

G. I. R.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:

Referral/Consult

This matter has been discussed by Special Agent Edward S. Sanders on several occasions with

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Attachment

ESS:hke

RECORDED - 134

65-59274-105

MAY 4 1951

34

5-Baltimore

Referral/Consult



It is contemplated that the following training would be given these individuals during a <u>two-weeks' period</u> while in Washington at the rate of ten hours per day, six days per week:

Referral/Consult

<u>Total Hours</u>



Referral/Consult

	Total Hours
[redacted]	

3. *FBI Training:*

Russian system of detection and how to effect countermeasures.	3
Secret writing, codes, etc.	8
Deceptive cover and security.	6
Selection and training of Sub-Agents and informants.	3
Disarming methods [redacted]	3Referral/Consult

It is contemplated that the above schedule should be flexible enough to adapt to the background and capabilities of the individuals involved. It is also contemplated that each individual will be available to the Bureau for training at the rate of four hours per day for one week of his two-weeks' stay in the Washington area. He will be available to [redacted]

Inasmuch as it is contemplated that a considerable number of the Stay-Behind Agents who are developed will be pulled out of Alaska in the event of an invasion to be used at a later date for special assignments in Alaska, it is considered necessary that training in parachute jumping be given to as many as possible of those individuals who will be sent back into Alaska. In this connection, [redacted]

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

EXPENSES:

Referral/Consult

As noted above [redacted]

[redacted]

It has been suggested that the Bureau pay, as they would on a confidential informant basis, these Stay-Behind Agents while they are receiving their training. The amount of such pay would, of course, be determined on an individual basis and considerations such as the individual's family, loss of income during training, and individual expenses should be considered and recommendations made by the SAC at Anchorage. It has also been suggested that the Bureau pay for a short-term insurance policy on each of the Stay-Behind Agents while he is in training.

[redacted]

[redacted]

DATE OF INSTITUTION OF TRAINING PROGRAM:

[redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Consult

It appears that the plan outlined herein is feasible and provides a maximum of security with a minimum of expense. It is recommended that the Bureau approve this plan of training for

these individuals and that the attached letter to the SAC in Anchorage advising him of these plans for training be forwarded with instructions that he immediately make available his comments concerning the plan. The attached letter also instructs that the SAC in Anchorage advise whether arrangements can be perfected for these individuals to proceed to Washington at the rate of two per week, traveling separately, beginning on or about April 25, 1951.

Sent
On

ADDENDUM: Referral/Consult

Subsequent to the preparation of this memorandum, SA Edward S. Sanders again conferred with [redacted] It was suggested [redacted] that since the Stay-behind Agents would be [redacted]

EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION: April 7, 1951

On April 5, 1951, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Ladd, Clegg, Glavin, Harbo, Rosen, Quinn Tamm for Mr. Tracy, Mohr, Nease, and Belmont, considered the above program with particular reference to the training listed for the FBI and expense which will be involved in connection with a short-term insurance policy for each Stay-Behind Agent and reimbursement to these Agents for loss of money while they are away from Alaska. The Conference recommended that the Bureau proceed on the basis that we will conduct this training and will meet the necessary expenses of reimbursement and insurance, each to be on an individual basis dependent on the necessary reimbursement to the individual Agent.

AHB:tlc

O.K. - Just approximately how many such agents is it planned to have - L.

memo Winterrowd 4-11-51 WB.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: April 26, 1951

FROM : C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (Stay-behind Agent Program)

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 9-22-84 BY SP12 STJ SC

PURPOSE:

To set forth an analysis of the observations and suggestions of the SAC, Anchorage, relative to developments in instant program.

To submit proposals concerning the financial aspects of the training phase of this project.

To recommend that the Anchorage office be instructed to continue the development of potential Stay-behind Agents and to contact agents already developed in the strategic areas of Alaska (except Anchorage) to determine when said individuals will be available for training to be given by [redacted] FBI at Washington, D.C.

Referral/Consult

BACKGROUND:

Referral/Consult

You will recall that V. P. Keay's memorandum to you dated March 31, 1951, set forth for approval a plan for the training of Stay-behind Agents. Summarily, the plan provided that [redacted] FBI would provide the training previously agreed upon by the Bureau. On April 5, 1951, the Executives' Conference considered this phase of the program with particular reference to the training responsibilities of the Bureau and expenses involved in connection with a short-term insurance policy for every Stay-behind Agent and reimbursement to these agents for loss of time and income during the training period. The Conference recommended that the Bureau proceed on the basis that we will conduct this training and will meet the necessary expenses of reimbursement and insurance, each to be on an individual basis. It is noted that the Director made the following comment thereon: "Ok. Just approximately how many such agents is it planned to have. H." (The latter inquiry was answered by Mr. Ladd's memorandum to the Director dated 4-11-51. It was approximated that possibly 50 agents would receive training.)

RECORDED - 53 100-5-9464-106

MAY 9 1951

WTB:bjw

62 MAY 18 1951

HANDLED BY STOP DESK

COPIES DESTROYED

R584NOV 21 1960

By letter dated 4-6-51, the SAC at Anchorage was advised of contemplated plans for instant training and his comments were requested. He was instructed to contact a representative number of individuals recommended by the Anchorage office, who were readily available, to determine their reaction to the proposal of being brought to the U. S. for training; to determine what type of short-term insurance was available which could be secured by these agents to cover their period of training; and, to explore the financial aspects of this undertaking in order to determine what reimbursement would be expected by these agents for loss of time and income during the period of training.

ANALYSIS OF SAC WILLIAMS' (ANCHORAGE) OBSERVATIONS

By letter dated 4-11-51, SAC Williams pointed out as follows:

1. The training of agents at SOG will have a distinct advantage from a security angle, although it will be a more expensive proposition.

2. A representative of the Continental Casualty Company and Continental Assurance Company in Anchorage stated that short-term insurance could be written, but it would be necessary to know the name of the insured, his age as well as the risk involved; further, that the company would have to know if the insurance written involved unusual risks or unusual circumstances. The shortest term insurance presently written by the company is 5 years.

SAC Williams suggested that the insurance, such as is contemplated by the Bureau which will be of a confidential nature, could be best handled by a company in the U. S., probably in Washington, D. C.

Referral/Consult

Comments:

[redacted] It is contemplated that those agents who will agree to take

the parachute jump training [redacted] This undoubtedly would be considered an "undue risk" or an "unusual circumstance" as far as insurance coverage is concerned. The insurance originally considered was only to cover the risks involved in transporting the agent from Alaska to the U. S., the period of his training, and return trip to Alaska. This means a period of about 3 weeks if jump training is excluded, and 6 weeks if jump training taken.

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

Supervisor E. S. Sanders, Liaison Section, Security Division, who has been maintaining contact with [redacted]

PROPOSED ACTION (a)

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

It is further proposed that thereafter, Supervisor Sanders make discreet inquiries of reputable insurance firms in Washington in order to determine what specific coverage can be secured, and the costs involved. Sanders has indicated he has sources from whom the desired information can be obtained.

3. *Seven recommended Stay-behind Agents readily available in the vicinity of Anchorage have been recontacted in order to secure their reaction to being brought to the U. S. for training, and efforts made to determine what financial arrangements could possibly be worked out in this regard. These individuals have incomes varying from $600. to $2,000. monthly. Besides being reimbursed for possible loss of income, everyone considered he should also receive $3. to $5.00 extra per day for incidental expenses. The majority of those contacted indicated they did not desire to participate in the parachute jump training but would do so if they had no choice in the matter.*

It was further pointed out that some of these individuals make the most, or at least the larger part, of their income during the summer months, that is, from approximately April to October. It was stated that if these individuals could receive their training later on in the season, the cost to the government would be considerably decreased.

Comments:

It is noted these seven individuals have an average income of about $935. monthly. Removing the two high-salaried ones, 1 of $1000. and 1 of $2,000. monthly, the average income is roughly $685. monthly. This latter figure amounts to about $160. weekly. It is not believed that the Bureau should consider reimbursing a $10,000 or $25,000. a year man for his loss of time and income. The cost would be prohibitive.

PROPOSED ACTION (b)

It is proposed that the Bureau consider reimbursing the Stay-behind Agents during their training period, as follows:

No jump training

$150.00 per week basic pay plus $4.00 per diem for incidental expenses.

If jump training included

Same as above for two weeks training in Washington, D. C., and $175.00 per week

basic pay (plus same per diem as above) for the approximate 2-1/2 weeks extra during the jump training course.

At first glance this proposed plan of reimbursing the Stay-behind Agents might appear to be excessive. It is pointed out, however, that rates of income in the Territory of Alaska are much higher than they are in the United States. The basic proposal of remuneration being considered is to reimburse these individuals for loss of income and time while undergoing training. It is observed that the Bureau has taken into consideration the cost of living in Alaska with Bureau personnel assigned there, and that they receive a 25% differential in cost of living which is in addition to their base pay. Bearing these factors in mind, and considering that these Stay-behind Agents are being selected and trained to carry out a very important and dangerous assignment, in the event of invasion, which may even effect the security of the United States, it is not believed that the rates of pay suggested are excessive.

It is further proposed that the SAC at Anchorage be instructed to bear the above proposed payment plan in mind when recontacting the Stay-behind Agents to work out the training schedule.

4.

Referral/Consult

Comments:

It is not believed that the Bureau can completely concur in SAC Williams' recommendation that coverage is adequate in spite of the fact that, according to Anchorage radiogram 4-19-51, 72 persons have been recommended as Stay-behind Agents. The problems involved are (1) How many who have agreed to act will agree to coming to the U. S. for training purposes?; and, of those agreeing to come, How many will take the parachute jump training? Although

a large number has agreed to act, if only a representative number can be prevailed upon to take the necessary training, our coverage will decline perceptibly. In view of this, consideration should be given to continuing the development of potential Stay-behind Agents.

PROPOSED ACTION (c)

It is proposed that the SAC at Anchorage be instructed to continue the development of potential Stay-behind Agents until such time as it can be more definitely determined if coverage is adequate.

5. The Anchorage office has suggested that the Stay-behind Agents be photographed and fingerprinted during the time they are in Washington, D. C.

Comment:

It is believed this is a sound suggestion.

PROPOSED ACTION (d)

It is proposed that Mr. R. C. Renneberger, Mechanical Section, Administrative Division, effect arrangements so that these agents can be photographed at the Bureau during their course of training. Six copies of each photograph will suffice.

Noted DMK

It is also proposed that the Identification Division handle the mechanics involved in fingerprinting the Stay-behind Agents. It is suggested that the prints be searched through the criminal files and the Espionage Section, Security Division, be informed of the results of the search.

6. The Anchorage office has suggested that the Bureau may desire to consider the possibility of contacting the superiors of potential Stay-behind Agents in Government service or in private industry in order to request that their superiors permit them to receive a leave of absence in which to attend training school.

Comment:

Although this suggestion has considerable merit, it would possibly cause a soft-spot in the general security of the entire program. We have proceeded on the theory that the fewer people who are advised about this program, the better the chances are to maintain the project in confidence and keep the operation secure.

PROPOSED ACTION (e)

It is proposed that the Anchorage office be advised that this action is not being approved as a general procedure, but that in the event the individual selected cannot come to the U. S. for training without securing some type of clearance from his superior, that in unusual circumstances, the Bureau will consider a specific request of this nature if the SAC at Anchorage so recommends.

7. The SAC at Anchorage has suggested that the identities of the Stay-behind Agents who have been recommended be given to [redacted] *and that copies of reports prepared on the Stay-behind Agents in Alaska be given to* [redacted] *at that time. He further recommended that this be done immediately.*

Referral/Consult

PROPOSED ACTION (f)

It is proposed that the SAC, Anchorage, be instructed to disseminate copies of reports prepared in these cases to [redacted] *further, that he submit to the Bureau prior to May 10, 1951, a list of the reports to be disseminated, and that identical dissemination be effected at SOG and in Anchorage on May 15, 1951.*

Referral/Consult

RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that proposal (a) be approved for discussion with [redacted]

It is further recommended that [redacted] *be advised* [redacted] *of the reaction concerning the proposed training on the part of the Stay-behind Agents in the Anchorage area as set forth above under background. It should be*

Referral/Consult

pointed out [redacted] that the Anchorage office is presently recontacting all the remaining individuals who have been recommended for use by the Anchorage office in an effort to determine their reaction to being brought to the United States; and that we are now in the process of determining by what dates the agents can arrange their personal and business affairs in order to be available for the scheduled training. It should, therefore, be brought to the attention of [redacted] that the [redacted] FBI [redacted] training program will of necessity have to be temporarily delayed until definite commitments can be obtained from the Stay-behind Agents as to their availability.

It is recommended that proposal (b) be approved only as a basis for consideration by the SAC at Anchorage in making contact with the selected Stay-behind Agents to determine their reaction to being brought to the U. S. for training.

It is recommended that proposals (c), (e) and (f) be approved and that ~~the~~ Anchorage be advised accordingly.

It is recommended that proposal (d) be approved for handling at the Bureau and that this memorandum be routed to the Administrative Division for the attention of Mr. Renneberger, and to the Identification Division, for their information at this time.

If you approve of this action, the attached letter of instructions embodying the above will be forwarded to the Anchorage office.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: May 4, 1951

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (Stay-behind Agent Program)

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

The attached memorandum sets forth recent developments in connection with the Stay-behind Agent Program in Alaska, the background of which is familiar to you, and suggests proposals for further action re training and coverage.

The following recommendations are made therein:

1. That [redacted] be contacted and requested to:

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/22/94 BY SP2B-[illegible]

Referral/Consult

2. That [redacted] of the reaction concerning the proposed training on the part of the Stay-behind Agents in the Anchorage area and it should be pointed out [redacted] that the Anchorage office is presently recontacting all the remaining individuals who have been recommended for use by the Anchorage office in an effort to determine their reaction to being brought to the United States; further, that we are now in the process of determining by what dates the agents can arrange their personal and

Referral/Consult

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Attachment

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business affairs in order to be available for the scheduled training. That it be brought to [redacted] attention that the [redacted] FBI [redacted] training program will of necessity have to be temporarily delayed until definite commitments can be obtained from the Stay-behind Agents as to their availability.

Referral/Consult

3. That Supervisor E. S. Sanders, Liaison Section, Security Division, make discreet inquiries of reputable insurance firms in Washington in order to determine what specific coverage can be secured, and the costs involved. (Sanders has indicated he has sources from whom the desired information can be obtained.)

4. That the Bureau consider reimbursing the Stay-behind Agents during their training period at the rate of $150. per week for those agents not taking jump training, plus $4. per diem; and $175. per week for those agents taking jump training, plus $4. per diem.

5. That Stay-behind Agents be photographed and fingerprinted during the period of their training in Washington, D. C.

6. That the SAC at Anchorage be instructed to continue the development of potential Stay-behind Agents until such time as it can be more definitely determined if coverage is adequate.

7. That the Anchorage office be instructed to disseminate copies of the investigative reports on Stay-behind Agents to [redacted] on May 15, 1951, and that identical dissemination be made at SOG.

Referral/Consult

8. That the Anchorage office be advised that the Bureau does not approve their suggestion to obtain clearance from employers of Stay-behind Agents so they can get leaves of absence to come to Washington for training; further, that the Bureau would consider taking such action only in unusual circumstances where the individual's services would be essential for the implementation of this program.

9. That the attached letter of instructions embodying the above be forwarded to Anchorage.

RADIOGRAM

MAY 10, 1951 (4)

CIPHER PAD CODE DEFERRED

SAC, ANCHORAGE

STAGE. REURLET (LAY EIGHT) LAST. ADVISE DATE PRELIMINARY REPORTS AND THOSE COVERING INTERVIEWS ARE DISSEMINATED TO OSI ANCHORAGE. DISSEMINATION BEING MADE THIS WEEK TO OSI HERE ALL REPORTS LISTED URLET. AFTER SECURING BUREAU AUTHORIZATION AMOUNT TO BE PAID AGENT, EFFECT ARRANGEMENTS PAY AGENT IN ALASKA PAYABLE UPON COMPLETION OF TRAINING. WHERE FINANCIAL STATUS AGENTS REQUIRES ADVANCES YOU SHOULD SECURE BUREAU APPROVAL. HANDLE BY BLUE SLIP. SURAD IMMEDIATELY RECOMMENDATION NECESSARY INCREASE CONFIDENTIAL FUND ANCHORAGE NEXT FY[illegible]S. MAINTAIN CONTACT COL. BARTLEY AND SURAD WHEN FUNDS AVAILABLE TO HIM TO PAY TRANSPORTATION COSTS SO ARRANGEMENTS RE TRAINING CAN BE CORRELATED WITH OSI WORK. SURAD ON EVERY AGENT AS RECONTACTED SUBMITTING DATES WHEN AVAILABLE FOR TRAINING, IF TAKING JUDO TRAINING AND FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED INCLUDING YOUR RECOMMENDATION RE SAME. INITIATIVE TRAINING AGENTS BEGIN SOON AS POSSIBLE AND SCHEDULE ARRANGED. REURLET (MAY FIFTEEN) (4) LAST ENTITLED FOSTER RAYBOLD SIMS. [redacted] THIS RECOMMENDATION FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR SIMS. HE CAN BE AFFORDED TRAINING SIX WEEK (JULY NINE) NEXT IF [redacted] FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR HIS TRANSPORTATION COSTS. HOOVER

SP3-BTS/sm

6-14-2000

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[illegible]:dmd

cc - 62-93603

00-1164 (4)

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[redacted]

[redacted]

FBI

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U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

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Tracy
Carroll
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Sandy

Referral/Consult

6/22/94

Send Via Bureau radio 1146/A Per AL

STANDARD [redacted]

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: May 8, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/22/94 BY SP2 BTP/RSP

ReBulet May 4, 1951, page 2, numeral 3. Referral/Consult

There are transmitted herewith two copies of a list of Stay-behind agents who have been recommended for inclusion in this program and on whom closing reports have been submitted. These reports are the ones that should be disseminated [redacted] on May 15, 1951. Referral/Consult

(1) [redacted]

With reference to the delivery of the reports [redacted] it is noted that the closing reports contain almost all information concerning the proposed stay-behind agent and the same was obtained from him by interview. It is suggested that the Bureau may desire to deliver the closing report only inasmuch as the data contained therein is more likely to be accurate and the same is sufficient for their purposes. Referral/Consult

With reference to page 1 of Bureau letter dated May 4, 1951, steps have been taken here to contact all recommended potential stay-behind agents to obtain from them the dates on which they can attend training; whether or not they will participate in the parachute jump training; and whether or not the proposed remuneration or some part thereof is sufficient. Likewise, these questions will be put to all proposed stay-behind agents who are interviewed in the future. The contacts with all proposed stay-behind agents to obtain this information will be given priority here, completed immediately, and passed on to the Bureau with no delay whatsoever.

Encl.

65-298
JHW:vf

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EX-121

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In this regard it should be noted, however, that some of these persons will be hard to locate in view of the fact that they will be on construction jobs far into the interior or will be engaged in fishing in the Bristol Bay area.

Referral/Consult

With reference to the training of these individuals, [redacted]

(2)

[redacted] It is also requested that this office be advised as to the manner and time that the proposed (3) agent's remuneration or training will be paid in order that questions concerning this may be answered. In this respect it is suggested that a portion of it be made upon his arrival at Washington and the remainder paid upon his departure from Washington.

already rec'd

(A memorandum concerning caching is presently in typing and will be submitted to the Bureau immediately upon its completion.)

This matter will continue to receive priority in this office and the Bureau kept advised of all developments.

Referral/Consult

STAY BEHIND AGENTS CONCERNING WHOM REPORTS WILL BE DISSEMINATED [redacted] AS OF 5-15-51.

Name	Bufile	Anchorage File
[redacted]	62-93581	66-336
	62-93600	66-395
	62-93639	66-408
		66-430
	62-93523	66-393
	62-93481	66-420
	62-93602	66-368
	62-93857	66-435
	62-93482	66-313
	62-93646	66-405
	62-93501	66-421
	62-93586	66-418
	62-93636	66-404
	62-93879	66-446
	62-93992	66-415
DANICH, JOE		66-340
		66-344
[redacted]	62-93483	66-316
	62-93384	66-334
	62-93524	66-332
	62-93498	66-314
	62-93635	66-331
	62-93634	66-410
	62-93597	66-308
	77-31169	66-309
	62-93858	66-429
	62-93859	66-428
	62-93631	66-390
	62-93630	66-389
	62-93628	66-327
	62-93867	66-437
	62-93870	66-438
	62-93526	66-324
		66-343
	62-93626	66-360
	62-93625	66-411
	62-93624	66-387
	62-93496	66-311
	62-93623	66-363
	62-93881	66-445
	62-93495	66-318
	62-93647	66-373
		66-345
MOORE, FRANK BERTON	62-93622	66-385
[redacted]	62-93621	66-372

Name	Bufile	Anchorage File
[redacted]	62-93565	66-348
	62-93868	66-439
	62-93517	66-323
	62-93855	66-349
	62-93619	66-371
	62-93860	66-431
	62-93648	66-365
		66-342
ROLIG, DR. HOWARD GLENMORE	62-93489	66-312
[redacted]	62-93494	66-322
SHELTON, DR. JOSEPH HARRISON, M.D.	62-93518	66-321
[redacted]	62-93603	66-366
SILS, FOSTER RAYMOND	62-93877	66-443
[redacted]	62-93617	66-367
	62-93861	66-432
	62-93869	66-442
	62-93480	66-353
	62-93670	66-354
	62-93520	66-357
	62-93994	66-417
	62-93613	66-377
	62-93522	66-310
	62-93568	66-358
	62-93672	66-369
	62-93863	66-375
	62-93643	66-374
	77-44306	66-315
	62-93644	66-359

b6
b7C

SAC, Anchorage

May 7, 1951

Director, FBI

b6
b7C

[redacted]

SPECIAL ATTENTION

ADMINISTRATIVE-STAY PROGRAM

Bulet 1-11-51 granting authority to contact [redacted] for the purpose of developing him as a Stay-behind Agent, and Bulet 4-4-51 entitled "Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in the Event of Invasion" wherein you were instructed to expedite this contact and submit a report reflecting the results of this phase of the investigation.

b6
b7C

Submit an explanation to the Bureau by return mail as to why this matter has not been handled promptly, and advise when a report may be expected at the Bureau.

As you are aware, it is essential that the recruiting phases of the Stay-behind Agent Program receive prompt and vigorous attention. You are again instructed to impress this fact upon the Special Agents engaged in the handling of instant program in Alaska and afford the supervision of same your personal attention.

62-93517

cc 65-59264

WTB:vas

6/22/94 SP12BTJ/jr
34225

cc Administrative Division

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Gen
Acy
Mr. Tamm
Room

ORIGINAL FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: May 8, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)
(Bureau file 65-59264)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 12-22-98 BY SP2 BTP/SC

Referral/Consult

ReBulet May 1, 1951.

[redacted]

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Contact was had with [redacted] of the Robinson Studios, which establishment has the photographic contract for this office. [redacted] although not advised of the purpose of the contact, informed that Consumers' Research listed the Kodak Flash Banton-828 as one of the most serviceable and efficient cameras in the low price range. Likewise he said it was small, compact and easy to operate.

b6
b7C

[redacted] also stated that the Kodak Tourist-620, equipped with a F-4.5 lens which takes 2¼ by 3¼ exposures, was an excellent conventional type camera for all around use. It has flash attachments. This camera retails in Anchorage for $71.00.

[redacted] knew nothing of the Stecky II.

b6
b7C

If a conventional type camera is to be used in this program, it is believed that a 35 m.m. camera would be preferred. A Leica, Contax or less expensive Kodak 35 would be used in most any assignment. Telephoto equipment can be used with Leica or Contax but not Kodak 35. Kodak 35 has built in flash.

65-298
JHW:vf

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Referral/Consult

It is noted that the use of miniature cameras is so limited in the Territory of Alaska that very little is known concerning them by the experts here.

The extent of the use of the camera by stay-behind agents, of course, is not known at this time but it is felt that the same will be limited. Likewise, the use of some type of flash equipment or infra-red would be quite limited in my opinion.

From the above, it is believed that a small, simple but efficient camera similar to the described Stecky II is sufficient for the needs of any stay-behind agent who could utilize a camera.

SAC, Anchorage

Mar 1, 1951

Director, FBI

[redacted]
(Stay-behind Agents Program)

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

You are instructed to confer with [redacted] thereafter, you should submit your recommendations to the Bureau as to the conventional type camera which would be most practical for the use of Stay-behind Agents in Alaska.

Referral/Consult

A reply to this communication is desired by Mar 9, 1951.

65-59264

WTB:mod

NOTE: [redacted]

Referral/Consult

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EX-576

MAY 2 1951

MAY 3 1951

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: May 7, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION (STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

34225 1 C

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 BTM/sc
ON 6/22/95

Rebulet April 6, 1951, and Anchorage letter April 11, 1951, specifically paragraph 4 of page 1 which makes reference to caching.

There is transmitted herewith a dossier on caching of food, radio equipment, gasoline and survival gear for possible use in the establishment of caches which will be necessary in connection with this program.

ENCLOSURE BEHIND FILE

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MAY 11 1951

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EX. 24

15

5-Bureau

JHW:MMA
65-298
Enclosure

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : C. E. HENNRICH

DATE: March 21, 1951

FROM : W. T. Baker

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

[redacted]

ACTION

It is suggested that this memorandum be routed to Supervisor ~~E. M. Gregg~~ for possible assistance in connection with the lecture outlines he is preparing for the training program involved in the captioned matter.

Attachments

WTB:ow

65-59264

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/22/94 BY SP2BTJ/SC 34225

ENCLOSURE BEHIND FILE

RECORDED - 26

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65-57126

MAY 11 1951

EX-72

5-WB

RADIOGRAM

CIPHER PAD CO.

MAY 29, 1951 (C) URGENT (C) (4) (4)

SAC, ANCHORAGE (4)

Referral/Consult

STAGE. REURLET (MAY ELEVEN) (C) (4) LAST. TRAINING AGENTS INSTANT PROGRAM SCHEDULED BEGIN (JUNE ELEVEN) (C) (4) NEXT FOR TWO AGENTS PER WEEK ONE BEGINNING (JUNE ELEVEN) (C) (4) AND OTHER (JUNE TWELVE). (C) (4) [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] EFFECT ARRANGEMENTS SO YOU OR ASAC [redacted] CAN INTERVIEW EVERY TRAINEE PRIOR LATTEN DEPARTURE. STREET SECURITY FEATURES AND BRIEF [redacted]

65-59264

WTB:JEF

(Note) [redacted] (C) (4)

(4) (4)

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Lacy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

RECORDED 49

Referral/Consult

PAGE TWO

THOROUGHLY. INSURE THAT TRAINEE UTILIZES APPROPRIATE COVER STORY TO EXPLAIN ABSENCE FROM ALASKA SO TRUE PURPOSE OF TRIP TO WASHINGTON DC WILL NOT BE DIVULGED. WHEN TRAINEE INSTRUCTED THEN SCHEDULED FOR TRAINING, SECURE NAME OF BENEFICIARY DESIGNATED BY HIM SO ACCIDENT INSURANCE POLICY CAN BE SECURED AT SOG AMPLE TIME PRIOR TO TRAVEL. TRAINEE SHOULD NOT DEPART ALASKA UNTIL INSURANCE POLICY OBTAINED AND TRAVEL AUTHORIZED BY BUREAU. DETERMINE IF FOLLOWING CAN ARRANGE BE AT SOG BEGIN TRAINING EIGHT AM AS INDICATED [redacted] JUNE ELEVEN, [redacted] JUNE TWELVE, FRANK BERTON MOORE INCLUDING JUMP TRAINING JUNE EIGHTEEN, [redacted] JUNE NINETEEN, DR. HOWARD ROMIG JUNE TWENTY FIVE, [redacted] INCLUDING JUMP TRAINING JUNE TWENTY SIX, DR. FOSTER R. SIMS JULY TWO, [redacted] XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX JULY THREE. [redacted] MAINTAIN CLOSE LIAISON WITH [redacted] IN EFFECTING ARRANGEMENTS. CURAD ON INDIVIDUAL STAGE AGENT INCLUDING IDENTITY BENEFICIARY AS SCHEDULED TRAINING DATES CONFIRMED.

b6
b7C
Referral/Consult

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: May 11, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM) (BuFile 65-59264)

Stay

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/22/94 BY SP2 BTS/SCP

34225/

Reference Bureau letters April 6 and May 4, 1951 and Anchorage letter to the Bureau dated May 8, 1951, pertaining to training.

Bureau letter of April 6, 1951, Page 5, indicates that possibly the training of Stay Behind Agents for the captioned program would begin on or about April 25, 1951. At Bureau direction this office is soliciting all potential Stay Behind Agents to determine (1) whether they will go to Washington for two weeks training (2) whether they will go for three additional weeks parachute jump training (3) the date on which they will be able to proceed to Washington (4) a period of three months during which they can leave for two weeks at the FBI's option for the training (5) whether they are amenable to the remuneration of $150 per week plus $4.00 a day expenses for training in Washington, D. C., or $175 a week and $4.00 a day expenses for the parachute training, and other questions pertaining to their attendance.

The assignments to contact all potential Stay Behind Agents have been made and Agents in this office are presently seeking these persons out.

(1) It is requested that the Bureau advise the date that the training will begin and the date on which the first potential Stay Behind Agents should report in order that this office can be guided in its contacts.

(2) It is also requested that the Bureau advise the number of Agents which it desires per week so that a tentative schedule may be set up here as a basis on which to work.

Referral/Consult

65-298
JHH:HCW

Radiogram to Omaha 5-29-51 WS

RECORDED - 134

EX-65

MAY 14 1951

15 5-WB

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

With particular reference to Bureau letter of April 6, 1951, wherein it is stated on Page 3 that [redacted]

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

With reference to travel, it is suggested that the potential Stay Behind Agents be directed to contact this office upon his arrival in Anchorage where he will be briefed. It is further suggested that he be met at Seattle by one of our Agents there and aided in effecting transportation to Washington, D. C. This will insure that he makes connections and does not stop-over in Seattle for any protracted period of time.

It is also suggested that upon his departure from Seattle, the Seattle Office advise the Bureau in order that he can be met in Washington and escorted to the training base.

Referral/Consult

If the Bureau concurs with these suggestions, it is requested that the Seattle Office be advised of the plans in order that they will be able to carry out their assignments upon advice from the Anchorage Office that a certain potential Stay Behind Agent will arrive there on a certain date.

In making contacts with potential Stay Behind Agents with reference to the parachute training, they have brought up the question whether such training entails one or more parachute jumps. Certain of them who were in the Army or acquainted with the Air Force training feel that some parachute jumping courses are merely for the safety of fliers and while it teaches them the rudiments of jumping, no jumps are made. It is requested that the Bureau advise this office in this regard. It is also requested that the Bureau advise this office of the physical requirements which will be necessary for the potential Stay Behind Agents to take parachute training. Certain of them have indicated

a willingness but it is obvious that from their age and physical condition they should not be allowed to do so.

The Bureau will be kept advised of all developments in this matter.

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

Tolson
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FROM ANCHORAGE 5-3-51 NR 032014 6:51 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE, STATUS REPORT. 73 PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. 10 ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS AUTHORIZED AND CASES ON THESE PERSONS ASSIGNED FOR HANDLING. MATERIAL RE REPORTS BEING COMPILED AND WILL BE SUBMITTED AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.

RECEIVED: 5-3-51 6:52 PM MAP

RECORDED - 134

EX-65

SP3-BTS/SM

6-14-2000

00-1164

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1296733-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 43
Page 18 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 20 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 21 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 22 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 25 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 34 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 48 ~ b6; b7C;
Page 49 ~ b6; b7C;
Page 60 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 61 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 69 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 72 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 73 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 74 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 75 ~ Referral/Direct;
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Page 92 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 93 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 94 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 95 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 96 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 97 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 108 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 109 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 111 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 199 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 200 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 268 ~ b7D;

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May 4, 1951

SAC, ANCHORAGE

DIRECTOR, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION

There are enclosed two photostatic copies of an article which appeared in the Washington Star, April 27, 1951, entitled "The Defense of America's Back Yard," by Keyes Beech.

The above is submitted for your information.

Attachments

65-59264

WTB:gmu

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/29/94 BY SP2 STS/SC

HANDED BY
STOP DESK

RECORDED - 81 65-59264 115
MAY 10 1951
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EX-24

MAY 14

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FROM ANCHORAGE 5-10-51 NR 101830 4:02 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. SEVENTY-THREE PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS, CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED. ALL PERSONS RECOMMENDED BEING RECONTACTED IMMEDIATELY FOR DATA RE TRAINING AS DIRECTED BUREAU LETTER FOURTH INSTANT. DOSSIER RE CACHING SUBMITTED TO BUREAU SEVENTH INSTANT.

RECEIVED: 5-10-51 4:16 PM MRC

6-29-94 SP3-BJJ/JM 4-20-2000 00-1164

RECORDED - 37 MAY 12 1951

EX. - 25

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

[redacted] MAY 21 [redacted]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : H. H. Clegg

DATE: May 10, 1951

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (Stay-behind Agent Program)

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-29-94 34225

Stage

PURPOSE:

To submit for your approval an outline of a lecture on Soviet counterintelligence, in connection with the captioned program.

DETAILS:

Reference memorandum dated April 27, 1951 from Mr. Hennrich to Mr. Belmont in which there is set forth proposals for a course of training to be given at the Bureau in connection with the captioned program. It was proposed that Supervisor J. J. Ward prepare lecture material on Soviet counterespionage organization and methods in this connection.

There is attached herewith an outline.

ACTION:

It is requested that the Training Division review the attached outline of a lecture on Soviet counterintelligence and, if approved, it is recommended that the attached copies be forwarded to SA W. T. Baker in the Espionage Section, who is correlating this program.

1 ENCL 63

Attachment:

JJW:ev

RECORDED - 63

65-57914-117

MAY 19 1951

5-Bufiles

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 65-57914-117

SECRET

SOVIET COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

A. Origin and development of Soviet Secret Police.

1. Brief account of the establishment and purposes of the extraordinary Commission (Cheka) 1917.

2. Successors to the Cheka, the United State Political Administration (OGPU) 1923, and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, (NKVD) 1934.

3. The Chief Directorate of State Security, (GUGB), a department of the NKVD. Established in 1934, and containing the intelligence and counterintelligence functions of the former OGPU.

4. Establishment of the State Security service as an independent ministry, first as NKGB in 1943 and MGB in 1946, and continuous increase in importance, until today it has assumed all security functions in the USSR except forced labor camps and work projects.

* Material: The Ministry of State Security of the USSR; FBI, November, 1950

B. Brief account of the structure of MGB, and the counterintelligence organs.

(U)

1. Chief Directorates and Directorates, with division of functions.

2. The Chief Directorate of Counterintelligence.

a. originated as the Special Sections of NKVD, (OO/NKVD) to insure loyalty and security in Soviet Armed Forces.

b. In 1941 OO/NKVD transferred from NKVD to People's Commissariat for Defense (Russian War Ministry-NKGO) becoming 3rd Chief Directorate, NKGO. Nicknamed: Smersh.

c. Wartime head of Smersh: Victor Semenovich Abakumov, who in 1946 became Minister of State Security. At the same time Smersh was reincorporated into the MGB as a chief directorate.

SP3-BTS/SM
7-17-2000
00-1164

JJW:mab

d. The Smersh organization is now Chief Directorate for Counterintellegence of MGB (GUKR/MGB)

* Material: The Ministry of State Security of the USSR; FBI, November, 1950.

C. Structure and Functions of the GUKR/MGB.

1. Chief of GUKR, Lieutenant General Korolev, Moscow Headquarters.

2. Operating units, i.e. field organization, are known as UKRs. UKRs established at every headquarters of an army, military district, naval establishment or air force headquarters. In turn, UKRs function thru:

   a. UKR staff and operating sections

   b. Subordinate OKRs (Counterintelligence Sections) which are attached to Army divisions, and lesser units, naval bases, Air Fields, etc. Every unit, down to the smallest, will have concealed OKR Representatives.

3. The Chief of a UKR will have equal or nearly equal rank with the highest ranking military commander: i.e. Major General or Lieutenant General. The UKR chief will answer only to GUKR in Moscow, not subordinate to military commander.

4. Function of UKR:

   1. Police Soviet Armed personnel against disloyalty, subversion, defeatism, desertion, etc.

   2. To protect Soviet Armed forces from penetration by foreign agents and to prevent resistance movements in a military area.

5. UKR Headquarters structure:

   a. Staff, i.e. Chief, two or more deputies and Secretariat (stenographers, linguists, typists)

   b. Operating Sections:

      1st Section: run agent and informer networks.
      2nd Section: conduct searches and make apprehensions. Location of deserters and wanted persons.

SECX

3rd Section: Supervises operation of the subordinate OKR units scattered thru military units.

4th Section: Investigations section. Conducts interrogations and investigation of cases after Sections 1 and 2 have initiated cases and made arrests.

In addition to the foregoing numbered sections (Note: these numbers are subject to change easily and cannot be relied upon for accuracy) there are a number of administrative sections:

Administrative and Supply Section

Code and Cipher Section

Motor Pool

Finance Section

6. UKR Personnel

a. The deputy chiefs of UKR and chiefs of the sections outlined above will have, usually, the military rank of Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel or Major, with assistants ranking down to lieutenants junior grade. An officer staff up to 150 men may be assigned to UKR headquarters, depending on its strategic importance. These men are Russian elite from standpoint of Communist Party loyalty, education and training. They even now are referred to as "Chekists," from the old Cheka. These are the men the Soviet Government must trust to stamp out all opposition movements.

(S) (U)

b. Non-Commissioned, enlisted personnel. Selected from Soviet Army and Communist Party Ranks. Politically trustworthy, and promising officer material.

c. Stenographic help and Translators are usually selected because of special qualifications and training. Usually uniformed enlisted personnel. Note: because translators are selected on the basis of urgent need, frequently they do not meet the standards of other UKR loyalty requirements.

d. Agents and Informers. Several layers and grades of these.

(1) Secret agent-informers in all units of Soviet armed forces. Trusted Soviet personnel.

(2) Secret agents recruited from civilian native population, gathering information from their sources.

X

SECRET

(3) Informers in selected political, religious, educational, professional groups, in prison camps, in forced labor batallions; briefly, in every walk of life. These likewise are recruited from the native, civilian population.

7. Uniforms

Officer and enlisted personnel of the UKR will wear the regular Soviet Army uniform, with no special insignia. This personnel is authorized to wear any insignia of the Army which is suitable to its purpose; for example, engineers, artillary, etc. In the USSR, GUKR personnel wears the regular Soviet Army uniform with special trimmings: dark blue cap tops with crimson band, dark blue stripe on trousers, dark blue background on epaulets, etc. This cannot be worn outside of the Soviet Union.

8. Work Routine

UKR personnel receive the best food and living accommodations available in the occupied area. Officer and clerical personnel work from 10 AM to 4 PM, with four hours for dinner, and from 8 PM to 12 Midnight, six days a week. It is said that the officials usually remain at their desks until at least 2 AM just in case a higher official should call; therefore, interrogations and investigations are most frequently carried on during the early morning hours.

(S)/(U)

D. Operating Procedure

1. When a Soviet Army occupies an area, UKR will follow within a matter of hours. A headquarters will be established in a courthouse or other suitable public building. Quarters will be commandeered as living space for officer and enlisted personnel. The officers will have individual rooms and enlisted personnel will be housed in barracks or dormitories. Public buildings and private residences will be commandeered for this purpose. Community mess halls and recreational facilities organized for UKR personnel.

2. The UKR building or buildings will be heavily guarded by their own personnel.

3. A reign of terror will be established to cow the civilian population in the occupied area. Arrests will begin immediately and the first to be arrested will be:

a. Active elements of the native political parties (exclusive of course of the Communists), and local government officials.

b. Active elements of religious groups, clergy andlay persons.

X

c. Leaders in civic, educational, professional and merchant classes. In other words, the leaders in all walks of life.

4. Those arrested will be subjected to interrogation, rigorous and violent, for the purpose of eliciting information on active or potential anti-Soviet resistance. Most of those arrested, unable to resist the rigors will tell what they know and even invent information to satisfy the UKR. Organized resistance will be unlikely to survive this treatment, since the leaders will be uncovered.

5. Agent-informer program

Following this initial dragnet the UKR will begin its program of systematically infiltrating the community with agent-informers. Each racial, religious, and social group will be penetrated. Each industrial, agricultural, mercantile and professional group will have its informers. Even the prison camps will be infiltrated with those who will report to the UKR. Past political convictions and social background will mean little. It will be a struggle for survival. Opportunists, those who have been weakened by the dread of UKR interrogation, and those driven by necessity will agree to cooperate. Urban communities especially will be susceptible to UKR penetration in all walks of life.

6. Tribunals

(4)

A three man tribunal, composed of ranking UKR officials will pass judgment on these arrested. This tribunal serves only to make formal the matter of sentence. The arrested will not normally be brought before this tribunal, such proceedings being conducted on the basis of reports submitted by the interrogating and investigating officials, nor will the arrested be represented before the tribunal.

7. Certificates of Identity

Each adult will be required to obtain a certificate of identity, which will be issued by an official of UKR. Such a certificate will be essential to any sort of legal existence, and without it one will not be able to live or travel in an area policed by UKR. After such cards have been in circulation for a time it may be possible to acquire a false one, but in the beginning it will be necessary to provide an ostensibly

valid personal history to obtain a card. It should be presumed that the UKR will acquire all local and territorial records including vital statistics, voting registers, police records, school records, tax rolls and the like, with which they will be in a position to verify statements made by applicants. (S)(U)

8. (Travel Regulations) (S)(U)

No travel will be permitted between communities without passes issued by UKR and road blocks will be established to enforce this regulation. For practical purposes normal means of conveyance will be taken over for military purposes and travel will be out of the question except by foot. (S)(U)

* Source Material: CIC Interrogation Reports from Soviet Defectors who were associated with UKR: 100-351413-8,9,11,14, Smersh; by Nicola Sineversky, Henry Holt & Co., 1950. (S)(U)

General Observations

One who intends to survive and remain free to operate in territory policed by the UKR should take these things into consideration:

1. He should have not identified himself with non-Communist political activity, local or federal government, civic, religious or educational groups. Or, having such connections, must give consideration to covering them completely and assuming a new and fool-proof identity on the UKR's arrival.

2. A member of a persecuted or oppressed race, or an oppressed worker, will have an advantage over a member of the middle or upper strata of capitalist society.

3. He should have no connection with an organized resistance movement since exposure of the leadership which is to be expected, will result in the exposure of many of the members.

4. He cannot safely disclose his confidence to anyone, no matter how devoted that person may be. In the event that person is confronted with the terrors of an interrogation by the UKR he cannot be counted upon to resist and retain the confidence.

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

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(DECODED COPY) (4)

FROM ANCHORAGE (5-17-51) NR 171805 6:07 P.M.

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. 74 POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS INTERVIEWED AND AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN PROGRAM; CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED IN THESE CASES. IN CONNECTION WITH CONTACTING ALL POTENTIAL AGENTS WITH REFERENCE TO TRAINING 13 HAVE BEEN CONTACTED AMENABLE TO PROCEEDING TO WASHINGTON. MEMORANDA RE THESE CONTACTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. LEADS TO CONTACT ALL OTHERS ASSIGNED AND PRESENTLY BEING HANDLED.

RECEIVED (5-17-51) 6:25 P.M. LL

6/29/94 SP2 BTS/SM 342257

RECORDED - 37 65-59264-118

MAY 24 1951 (4)

13

EX-30

SP3-BTS/SM 4-20-2000 00-1164

HANDLED BY STOP BY

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (4)

2MAY 28 1951 (4)

65-59264

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

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DECODED BY SP3-BTJ/SM
ON 4-20-2000
00-1164

FROM ANCHORAGE (5-18-51) NR 180144 2:51 P.M. 6/20/94

DIRECTOR DEFERRED

(4)

STAGE. RE BUREAU RADIOGRAM (SIXTEENTH) INSTANT. CLOSING REPORTS IN CASES LISTED ANCHORAGE LETTER (EIGHTH) INSTANT BEING DISSEMINATED [redacted] ON (EIGHTEENTH) INSTANT.

(4)

RECEIVED (5-18-51) 3:08 P.M. LL

Referral/Consult

RECORDED - 10

(4)

(4)

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (4)

cc: Mr. Baker

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

SP3-BTJ/SM
4-20-2000 00-1164

DECODED COPY (C) (U)

6/29/94 SP2 BTJ/SM 00-1164

FROM ANCHORAGE (5-18-51) (C) (U) NR 180145 2:46 PM

DIRECTOR DEFERRED

STAGE. RE BUREAU RADIOGRAM (16TH) (C) (U) INSTANT. DATA RE RECONTACT OF AGENTS TO DATE FOR TRAINING HAVE BEEN FORWARDED TO BUREAU IN LETTER. RESULTS OF CONTACTS FROM NOW ON WILL BE FORWARDED BY RADIO.

RECORDED 2 42

(U) (C)

RECEIVED: (U) (C) 5-18-51 4:33 PM ME

65-59264-125 WB

(MA) (C) (U) CC - Inv Baker

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (C) (U) 65-59264

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65-59264-121

RECORDED - 34

SAC, Seattle

May 23, 1951

Director, FBI

EX-118

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12BTS/ltc
ON 6/29/94
34225/

Reurtel 5-19-51.

Referral/Consult

For the information of the Seattle and Atlanta offices, this is to advise that the Bureau, [redacted] is presently engaged in the development of a group of individuals in Alaska who are being designated as "Stay-behind Agents." These persons are civilian residents of Alaska who have indicated that they intend to remain in Alaska even though that Territory may be invaded and occupied by the Russians. It is contemplated that their services will be utilized for the purpose of gathering intelligence information for the U. S. government in the event a part or all of Alaska is occupied by the enemy.

Referral/Consult

Plans have been effected to afford these Stay-behind Agents appropriate training in Washington, D. C., by [redacted] the Bureau. They will be in Washington, D. C., approximately two weeks. A representative number of these agents will proceed to Ft. Benning, Georgia, for an additional period of approximately three weeks for training in parachute jumping.

Referral/Consult

To date 74 persons have been recommended by the Anchorage office under this program. They are presently being recontacted as to when they will be available to come to Washington, D. C., for the necessary training. [redacted] It is contemplated that Stay-behind Agents will be en route to Washington from Alaska every week. They will travel alone and receive training separately so that they are not to know the identity of one another. Training will probably begin during June, 1951.

Attachment

cc: Atlanta (Attachment) P&C
cc: Anchorage (Attachment) P&C

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65 JUN 11 1951

mjc

COMM - FBI
MAY 24 1951
MAILED 20

FBI
JUN 1 1951

It is contemplated that insurance policies will be secured by the Bureau on every Stay-behind Agent to cover the risks involved during the time he is traveling and in training.

The Anchorage office will advise the Bureau and the Seattle office by radiogram of the identity of the Stay-behind Agent and travel plans prior to the latter's departure from Alaska. The airline and flight number will be designated. The Seattle office will maintain close liaison [redacted] and will promptly advise the Bureau in the event any difficulties are encountered by the Stay-behind Agent in Seattle, and of any changes in his travel plans.

Referral/Consult

The Atlanta office will maintain liaison with [redacted] In case of any difficulties at Ft. Benning, or in the event of any accident during training, the Bureau should be promptly advised by teletype or telephone, depending upon the urgency of the situation.

Referral/Consult

The code word to be used in teletypes in this matter is "Stage."

I desire to impress upon you the necessity of maintaining this matter in confidence. The security features of this program are paramount issues and it should not be discussed outside the Bureau except [redacted]

Referral/Consult

As of possible interest, there are attached two copies of a self-explanatory communication dated [redacted]

Referral/Consult

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/29/94 BY SP2 BTS/SR

WASH 15 FROM SEATTLE VIA SAN FRAN 5-19 -51 4-27 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

WHO ARE THESE PEOPLE AND WHAT ACTION IF ANY DO YOU DESIRE ME TO TAKE.

HOLD Referral/Consult

RECORDED - 34 65-59264-11

MAY 29 1951

EX-118

24

CC: Mr. Tolson

65-59264

b6
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F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

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FROM ANCHORAGE (C) (4) 5-24-51 NR 242000 6:02 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

STAGE, STATUS REPORT. 77 PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED. OF THESE, 34 HAVE BEEN RECONTACTED WITH REFERENCE TO TRAINING AND RESULTS FURNISHED TO BUREAU. ALL RECONTACTED EXCEPT ONE AMENABLE PROCEEDING TO WASHINGTON. LEADS TO CONTACT ALL OTHERS ASSIGNED AND PRESENTLY BEING HANDLED.

RECEIVED: (C) (4) 5-24-51 6:05 PM ME

6/20/94

SP3-BTJ/SM

4-20-2000

00-1164

EX-118

RECORDED - 45 (C) (4)

HANDLED BY STOP DESK

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (C) (4)

(C) (4)

62-59264

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-10-2011

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: May 25, 1951

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

(U) SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH [redacted] RE SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE EVENT OF WAR

b7D

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 09-19-2011 BY 34225

b7D You will recall we have previously discussed with [redacted] the problem with which the United States [redacted] will be faced, in the event of an invasion, in the securing of information of an intelligence nature in territory occupied by a potential enemy. We have been informed that [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

b7D [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

b7D

(U) Classified by [redacted]
Declassify on: OADR 34225

RECOMMENDATION

(U) It is recommended that [redacted] be informed that the Bureau has no objection whatever to the [redacted] provided [redacted] is not based upon a knowledge of our operations. In the event it is later desirable to do so, we can then secure clearance from the Air Force.

If you approve, [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

(U) b7D [redacted]

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS PERTAINED BY DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY COMMITTEE (DRC) DATE: 6-13-01 PAGE 1 OF 1

CLH:LL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

6 JUN 8 1951

FBI - NEW YORK DESK

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

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SP3-BTJ/SM
4-20-2000 CO-1164

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FROM ANCHORAGE 5-31-51 NR 311805 3:29 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

STAGE. RE ANCHORAGE LETTER TO BUREAU MAY 11 LAST. TO ASSIST IN INTERVIEWING STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND IN ANSWERING THEIR INQUIRIES, ADVICE REQUESTED AS TO DATE TRAINING DUTY IS TO COMMENCE.

RECORDED - 31

RECEIVED: 5-31-51 3:58 PM MW

JUN 11 1951

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

65-59264

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: June 9, 1951

FROM : SAC, SEATTLE

SUBJECT: STAGE
(Bufile 65-59264)

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

b6
b7C

Re Anchorage letter 6/2/51 requesting that an interview of [redacted] be made.

Please advise specifically whether you desire that such interview be conducted by this office.

JBN:LM

AIR MAIL

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2BTS/SC
ON 6/29/94
34225!

RECORDED - 132
INDEXED - 132

65-59264-128

JUN 11 1951

15

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM
DATE 6/29/94 SP2BTS/SC

34225!

CONFIDENTIAL JUNE 14, 1951 (4) URGENT

(4) SAC, SEATTLE

ENCODE UNDERLINED

STAGE. REBULET (JUNE NINE.) (2) SEE BULET (JUNE EIGHT) (2)(4) CAPTIONED [redacted]

[redacted] ADMINISTRATIVE DASH ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM. EXPEDITE INVESTI- b6 b7C

GATION.

HOOVER

RECORDED MCC:DJB

[redacted] 965-59264 — 1 Dec 8

EX - 120 cc - 62- [redacted]

ADM - E & E Program

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Classified by SP2 BTJ/SM 6/22/94 3422251

Reclassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTJ/sm
ON 4-20-2000
00-1164

Enc. 1 to RC
62-5-1648
(4)

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1 - 44 - 62 - 69

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FBI
RECEIVING ROOM
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TELETYPE

JUN 14 1951

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

1-24 P.M. Per DBD

m e c

Sent via

Tolson
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RADIOGRAM
URGENT
CIPHER PAD CODE

JUNE 7, 1951

SAC, ANCHORAGE

STAGE. REURAD (JUNE SIX.) AGREEABLE FOR YOUR OFFICE AND [redacted] TO INTEGRATE SCHEDULES WHEREBY ESCAPE AND EVASION AGENTS WILL RECEIVE TRAINING AT SOG. SCHEDULES OF STAGE AGENTS PREVIOUSLY ARRANGED AND APPROVED SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED. IT WILL BE NECESSARY THAT [redacted] AND FOR YOU TO FURNISH SAME TO BUREAU FOR NAME CHECKS AT OUTSET OF CONSIDERATION. NECESSARY [redacted] WASHINGTON FURNISH REPORTS TO BUREAU IN SAME MANNER IN EFFECT AS TO STAGE AGENTS. WE MUST HAVE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER SECURITY ASPECTS PRIOR TO DEPARTURE OF AGENT FOR TRAINING.

Referral/Consult

HOOVER

62-59264

RECORDED

SSC:NJF

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT

Referral/Consult

Note: SA Sanders discussed this matter [redacted]

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-B15/sm
ON 4-20-2000
00-1164

Classified by SP2 CTR/SC
Declassify on: OADR 342251

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CONFIDENTIAL

FBI

JUN 13 1951

RECEIVED READING ROOM

Sent Via Radio 6-8-51 1:46 AM

FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 7, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
(Bufile 65-59264)

Remylet May 8, 1951 regarding copies of reports to be disseminated [redacted]

Referral/Consult

The following is a list of reports which have not been disseminated to date and the Bureau is requested to furnish the date upon which same will be disseminated [redacted]

[redacted]

Bufile 62-94199	ANCH file 66-461
Bufile 62-94196	ANCH file 66-457
Bufile 62-93525	ANCH file 66-416
Bufile 62-94001	ANCH file 66-383
Bufile 62-94204	ANCH file 66-460
Bufile 62-93491	ANCH File 66-379
Bufile 62-94203	ANCH file 66-462

b6
b7C

65-298
SSP:vf

RECORDED - 34
INDEXED - 34

129

JUN 12 1951
15

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12B1 ALS
ON 6/29/94
342251

SAC, Anchorage

June 21, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

STAGE

Referral/Consult

Reurlet 6-7-51.

You are authorized to disseminate copies of reports [redacted] in the following cases:

[redacted]

Bureau file 62-94196
Anchorage file 66-457

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[redacted]

Bureau file 62-94203
Anchorage file 66-462

Individual letters are being addressed to you with regard to the other potential SBAs listed in relet. You have been previously instructed to submit further recommendations concerning [redacted] your file 66-379.

b6
b7C

RECORDED - 135
65-59264 - 129

EX. - 43

MCC:djb djb

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-29-94 BY SP2 STP/BC 34225

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
F.B.I.
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RECEIVED READING ROOM
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

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COMM - FBI

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June 9, 1951

SAC, Seattle

Director, FBI

AIR MAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY
PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-Behind Agent Program, Escape and Evasion Program)

You have been previously advised, in part, in regard to the above program. For your further information and the information of Minneapolis and Detroit, the following is set forth.

Referral/Consult

The Bureau, [redacted] is presently engaged in a program whereby a number of civilians will be brought from Alaska to Washington for special training. These persons have indicated they intend to remain in Alaska even though that Territory be invaded and occupied by the Russians. It is contemplated that their services will be utilized for the purpose of gathering intelligenc information in the event a part or all of Alaska is occupied by an enemy and will assist in the operations of underground routes for the escape of military personnel or perhaps others from Alaska to safe territory.

Referral/Consult

Plans have been effected to afford these persons appropriate training in Washington, D. C., [redacted] the Bureau. They will be in Washington, D. C., for approximately two weeks. A representative number of these persons will be given additional training in parachute jumping at Fort Benning, Georgia, for approximately three weeks.

[redacted] These individuals are not to know the identities of one another. Two persons are currently en route.

Referral/Consult

The Anchorage Office has advised that it is expected the following schedule will be adhered to in most instances:

1. Persons to begin training at 9 A.M. on Monday will leave Anchorage via flight 820, Northwest Airlines, at 1 P.M. on the preceding Friday, arriving Seattle at 3:50 P.M. the same day. They will leave Seattle on

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65-59264

RECORDED - 34 65-59264-130
JUN 12 1951

cc: Anchorage (AM)
Minneapolis (AMSD)
Detroit (AMSD)

62 JUN 18 1951

COMM - FBI
JUN - 9 1951
MAILED 20

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3 STSBC
ON 6/29/94
34225/

MMC:dba:dar

Saturday morning at 7:30 A.M., arriving in Minneapolis at 3:30 P.M., transfer to a plane which departs from Minneapolis at 4:10 P.M., arriving in Detroit at 7:30 P.M., transfer to another plane which leaves at 8:10 P.M. and arrives at Washington, D.C., at 11:40 P.M., Saturday Night.

2. Persons to begin training at 8:00 A.M. on Tuesday will leave Anchorage on Northwest Airlines Coach Flights 832 or 830, departing at 8:30 A.M. or 9:30 A.M., respectively, on the preceding Saturday, arriving in Seattle at 6:00 P.M. or 7:00 P.M., respectively. They will leave Seattle on Sunday via Northwest Airlines at 7:30 A.M. and will follow the same schedule indicated above, arriving in Washington at 11:40 P.M. on Sunday night. All times indicated are Standard.

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

Each person will be instructed, prior to departure from Anchorage, that he should call Bureau offices wherever he may be, in the event he needs emergency assistance in connection with travel, accommodations and relative matters. All offices should be alert to such calls and should render every possible assistance. Upon determination of probable schedules for these persons on their return trips to Alaska, you will be advised of the details. It is possible that some of the persons will spend time in the States for personal reasons prior to return.

You are specifically instructed that the program is of the most confidential nature and is not to be discussed under any circumstances. You should, of course, brief appropriate personnel of your office to insure the handling of any problems which may arise. The Bureau should be informed of any problems which require Bureau attention.

The code word to be used in teletypes in this matter is "STAGE". Any telephone or radio communications should be encoded in such manner to provide full security.

Minneapolis and Detroit refer to Bureau teletype of June 8, 1951, in the above connection.

CONFIDENTIAL

JUNE 8, 1951

URGENT
ENCODE UNDERLINED WORDS

SAC, MINNEAPOLIS
DETROIT

STAGE. FOR STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, BUREAU, [redacted] PRESENTLY ENGAGED IN PROGRAM WHEREBY CONSIDERABLE NUMBER CIVILIANS BEING BROUGHT FROM ALASKA TO WASHINGTON FOR SPECIAL TRAINING. PRESENT ITINERARY INCLUDES PLANE STOPS SEATTLE, MINNEAPOLIS AND DETROIT. SUCH PERSONS INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT BUREAU OFFICES FOR ANY EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE NECESSARY. TWO PRESENTLY ENROUTE. BE ALERT TO POSSIBLE CALLS AND RENDER ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE. ADVISE BUREAU PROMPTLY OF ANY PROBLEMS. LETTER FOLLOWS.

HOOVER

MCC:bjw

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTJ/jm
ON 4-20-2000
00-1164

Referral/Consult

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Classified by: 6129144
Declassify on: OADR 24225

FBI READING ROOM
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

JUN 9 12 32 PM

RECORDED - 34

65-59264-1333

JUN 12 1951

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JUN 9 10 PM '51

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
RECEIVED - DIRECTOR

TELETYPE

JUN 9 1951

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 14 1951

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 9, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM) (Bufile 65-59264)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12BTS/SC ON 6/29/94 54225/

The following information is being set forth so that the Bureau may be cognizant of the manner in which [redacted]

b6
b7C
Referral/Consult

[redacted]

The writer has indicated to [redacted] lack of concurrence in the foregoing procedure for security reasons.

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

In view of the large amount of money already being spent on this program, particularly for security reasons, it is believed that [redacted]

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

could nullify all the other efforts which have been and are being taken to insure the security of this program.

Possibly the Bureau may desire to call this matter to the attention of [redacted] so that specific instructions may be issued to [redacted] if the present procedure does not meet with the approval of the Bureau [redacted]

Referral/Consult

65-298
JFD:vf

RECORDED - 34
INDEXED - 34

JUN 13 1951

JUL 3 1951

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

URGENT (4) RADIOGRAM (4)

JUNE 2, 1951 (2) (4) CIPHER PAD CODE (2)

RECORDED - 138 65-59264-1355

SAC, ANCHORAGE

STAGE. REURAD JUNE TWO.

[redacted] INSURANCE INCLUDES TEN THOUSAND DOLLAR ACCIDENTAL DEATH COVERAGE, FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS FOR MEDICAL ATTENTION RESULT OF ACCIDENT AND PROVISIONS PRORATED PAYMENTS FOR DISMEMBERMENT RESULT OF ACCIDENT. TERM POLICY NINETY DAYS.

[redacted] IF ANY QUESTION ARISES THIS REGARD SURAD.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

HOOVER Classified by SP2 BTS/SM 6/29/99
Declassify on: OADR 30 YEARS

65-59264

(Note: Info referred to above from [redacted]

WTB:jef

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTS/SM
ON 4-20-2000 # 00-1164

#02-2048 (4)

RECEIVED 2:04 PM FBI ANCHORAGE

65-59264-2250-222 Enc-NTRD
65-59264-2155-2851 CSU-CNS

F145 JUN 21 1951 (4)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sent via Bureau Radio (6/2/51) 9:19PM

cjs

SAC, Anchorage

June 7, 1951

Director, FBI

[redacted] INTERNAL SECURITY

(CRIME [redacted])

The Bureau has approved final arrangements for the travel and training of [redacted] training to begin on June 11, 1951, and of [redacted] training to begin on June 12, 1951. b6 b7C

The following are tentatively scheduled, pending final arrangements for insurance and definite travel schedules, for training to be in on the dates indicated:

b6
b7C

[redacted] June 19, 1951
[redacted] June 26, 1951
[redacted] July 2, 1951
[redacted] July 9, 1951

6/29/94 SP12BTT5JC 342257

Certain names have been suggested for training to be in on intervening Mondays and Tuesdays of each week. These persons and others suggested by you are under consideration for such dates.

Effective immediately, it will be the direct responsibility of your office, on your own initiative, to make possible arrangements with previously approved [redacted] Agents whereby one Agent will be available at the seat of government on each Monday and each Tuesday. Every effort should be made to have the schedule called for a minimum of thirty days in advance. In each instance the Bureau should be definitely advised of the identity, beneficiary and exact travel schedule of each person at least two weeks in advance of the date on which training is to begin. Your immediate objective should, therefore, be the completion of the schedule for the immediate future.

You should give due regard to obtaining wide geographical coverage as soon as possible, taking into consideration the age, individual qualifications, and convenience of persons in question. You should, if at all possible, avoid sending two persons from the same immediate area during the same week in order to give further security to the program.

RECORDED - 41
65-59284
EX-130
JUN 11 1951

MCC:dmd

COMM — FBI
JUN 8 1951
MAILED 26

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JUN 5 2 26 PM '51
FBI
ANCHORAGE
JUN 8 4 29 PM '51
RECEIVED - FBI
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F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

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DECODED COPY

FROM ANCHORAGE 6-2-51 NR 020202 3:28 AM

DIRECTOR URGENT

STAGE. REURRAD MAY 29 LAST. [redacted] UNABLE TO BE AT SOG JUNE 11 DUE TO UNEXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN PROFESSIONAL [redacted] WILL BE AVAILABLE AFTER AUGUST 15. ATTEMPT BEING MADE TO SECURE SUBSTITUTE FOR JUNE 11 AND BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED. [redacted] BENEFICIARY IS [redacted] WIFE, ANCHORAGE. [redacted] CAN BE AT SOG JUNE 12. DESIRES TO LEAVE ANCHORAGE BY NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. ON JUNE 9 ARRIVING WASHINGTON NIGHT OF JUNE 10. BENEFICIARY IS [redacted] WIFE, [redacted] ANCHORAGE. FRANK BERTON MOORE UNABLE TO BE AT SOG JUNE 18 DUE TO COMMITMENTS AS HUNTING GUIDE. CAN BE AT SOG JUNE 25. MOORE-S BENEFICIARY IS RUTH ELLEN MOORE, WIFE, ANCHORAGE. ATTEMPT BEING MADE TO CONTACT DOCTOR HOWARD ROMIG PRESENTLY IN KETCHIKAN, ALASKA, TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER HE CAN BE AT SOG ON JUNE 18 AS REPLACEMENT FOR MOORE. CONTACTS CONTINUING WITH OTHERS MENTIONED IN BUREAU RADIOGRAM. RE BUREAU LETTER MAY 4 LAST, PARAGRAPH NUMBER ONE A. ADVICE REQUESTED AS TO WHETHER OR NOT RATE OF PER DIEM FOR INCIDENTAL EXPENSES IS TO INCLUDE MEALS AND LODGINGS. ADVICE ALSO REQUESTED AS TO AMOUNT OF INSURANCE BEING TAKEN ON AGENTS AND TERMS OF INSURANCE. SOME STAY BEHIND AGENTS PLAN TO SPEND ADDITIONAL TIME IN STATES ON PERSONAL BUSINESS. ADVICE ALSO REQUESTED AS TO WHETHER [redacted] BUREAU IS TO PAY FOR COST OF TRANSPORTATION FOR STAY BEHIND AGENTS FROM THEIR HOMES TO ANCHORAGE PRIOR TO DEPARTING FOR SEATTLE. SUGGEST THAT TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR TRAINEES ATTENDANCE IN WASHINGTON BE SET UP AS FAR AS POSSIBLE IN ADVANCE IN ORDER TO FACILITATE CONTACTING THEM HERE.

RECEIVED 6-2-51 4:29 AM SLH

SP3-BTS/SM

4-20-2000

00-1164

Referral/Consult

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

b6
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DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-10-2011

7-17-2000 SP3-BTJ/SM 6 00-1164

REGISTERED AIR MAIL

SECRET

Date: June 6, 1951

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/29/98 BY SP2BTJ/SC 34225

To: [redacted]

(U)

b7D

From: J. Edgar Hoover, Director - Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (Stay-behind Agent Program)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Classified by SP2BTJ/SC 8/25/98
Declassify on: OADR 34225

O (Stage)

For your confidential information, the Bureau, [redacted] is presently engaged in the development of a group of individuals in Alaska who are being designated as "Stay-behind Agents." These persons are civilian residents of Alaska who have indicated that they intend to remain in Alaska even though that Territory may be invaded and occupied by the Russians. It is contemplated that their services will be utilized for the purpose of gathering intelligence information for the U. S. Government in the event a part or all of Alaska is occupied by the enemy.

Referral/Consult

Plans have been effected to afford these Stay-behind appropriate training in Washington, D. C., [redacted] and the Bureau. A representative number of these agents will proceed to Ft. Benning, Georgia, for training in parachute jumping.

Referral/Consult

During March, 1951, [redacted] was informed by the Bureau that discussions were under way with military authorities regarding planning for sources of intelligence in event of war but that these discussions were being confined to the territory of Alaska and that we have not contemplated any such plan in the continental United States or in the contiguous areas of Canada.

b7D

(U) [redacted]

b7D

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC) DATE: 8-13-01 SP3-BTJ/SM 00-1164 pgs 1, 2

65-59264

MAILED 9 JUN 8 1951 COMM-FBI

JUN 21 1951

cc - Foreign Service Desk

SECRET

(U) [redacted] (S) b7D

[redacted] b7D

was informed that the Bureau has no objection whatever to the [redacted] in this regard by the [redacted] provided the introduction of such

(U) [redacted] is not based upon a knowledge of our operations. (S)

The above information is being called to your attention at this

(U) time so you will be aware of the discussions between [redacted] and Bureau officials. (S) (U) (S)

b7D

I desire to impress upon you the necessity of maintaining this matter in confidence.

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0-9a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

Transmit the following message to: JUNE 7, 1951 (4) RADIOGRAM
URGENT
CIPHER PAD CODE (4)

RECORDED - 34 137 SAC, ANCHORAGE

STAGE. IMMEDIATELY CONTACT [redacted]

[redacted] SHOULD EXTEND TO PERSONS

DEPARTING FROM ANCHORAGE THIS WEEK. SURAD RESULTS OF CONTACT [redacted]

[redacted] AND ACTION TAKEN.

Referral/Consult

MCC:dba

6/27/94
SP2 BTJ 15
34225?

HOOVER
JUN 7 12 36 PM '51
RECEIVED READING ROOM
FBI
DEPT OF JUSTICE

(4) (4)

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4-20-2000
00-1164

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(4) (4)

SENT VIA Radiogram (6-7-51) M Per

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 7, 1951

FROM : C. E. Hennrich

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (Stay-Behind Agent Program)

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PURPOSE: (Stay-Behind)

Referral/Consult

To recommend that SAC, Anchorage be instructed to contact

[redacted]

DETAILS:

Referral/Consult

Anchorage has questioned each prospective STAGE agent to determine whether he has disqualifying physical defects. It is believed desirable that each person selected for travel to SOG for training [redacted]

[redacted]

As you know, we are in each case attempting to protect the Government's interest by accident insurance on each STAGE agent for the periods of travel and training.

RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Consult

Attached for approval is a radiogram to SAC, Anchorage

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/29/94 BY SP12BTS/SP 34225/

65-59264

MCC:dba

RECORDED - 34

65-59264-137

JUN 15 1951

21

Attachment

FIVE MCC

7 MCC

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

FROM : C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: STAGE

DATE: June 11, 1951

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Attached is a schedule for training of STAGE agents, effective June 11, 1951. Agent (A) will begin at 8:00 A.M. 6-11-51, Agent (B) at 8:00 A.M. on 6-12-51. The same schedule will prevail for succeeding weeks until further notice, holidays included.

All personnel who will come in contact with trainees have been appropriately briefed as to the confidential nature of the program, that each person is to receive individual training and is under no circumstances to be aware of the identities of other trainees or, in fact, that other persons have been, are or will be trained. You will note the schedule is so arranged that (A) and (B) will never be in the same building simultaneously.

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

The Identification Division will, in accordance with arrangements made, provide personnel each Monday and Tuesday at 9:45 A.M. at Room 2334, IB, to fingerprint and photograph each STAGE agent.

Attachment
MCC:bjw

RECORDED - 34

65-59264-138

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/29/91 BY SP12B55/JC

34225

60 JUN 26 1951

FIVE

Supervisor Manning C. Clements, Security Division, will handle the administration of this program. He will be in Room 1533, Justice Bldg., Ext. 2107, alternate Room 2334, IB, Ext. 2209. Other personnel concerned with the program should contact Supervisor Clements as to schedules and related matters if problems arise. A clerical employee will be trained to assist in handling such calls if Mr. Clements is temporarily absent. Names and background information concerning the persons to arrive during a forthcoming week can be obtained from Mr. Clements or the clerical employee in his absence.

Referral/Consult

TOPIC	INSTRUCTOR	LOCATION	EXTENSION	MONDAY	TUESDAY		WEDNESDAY		THURSDAY		FRIDAY	
				A	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
	Mr. Clements	2334, I.B.	2209	8-10		8-10						
Deception and Security	"	"	"	1-1 ~~10-2:30~~		1-1 ~~10-2:30~~						
Codes and Ciphers	Mr. Newpher		"	1-6 ~~2:30-6~~		1- ~~2:30-6~~			1-4 ~~2:30-6~~			1-4 ~~2:30-6~~
Defensive Tactics	Mr. Meyers	Gym, DJ Bldg.	464				8-11			8-11		
Secret Writing	Mr. Magee	7407, DJ Bldg.	497				11-3			11-3		
Sub-Agent Selection and Training	Mr. Clements	2334, I.B.	2209						1-6 ~~8-11~~			9-10 ~~8-11~~
Soviet Methods of Counter-Intelligence	"	"	"						1-4 11-2:30			1-1 11-2:30

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 12/22/75 BY SP1 STP/STP

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 1, 1951

FROM : V. P. KEAY

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-Behind Agent Program)
(Bureau File 65-59264)

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Referral/Consult

INDEXED - 34

[redacted]

It is contemplated that by Monday, June 11, 1951, the Bureau will have the individuals developed as Stay-Behind Agents scheduled for training at this school beginning on June 11, 1951.

INDEXED - 34 65-57214-139
RECORDED - 34

ESS:hke

JUN 25 1951

Referral/Consult

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/29/94 BY SP2AB STP/STP 342257

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that [redacted] *be advised that the Bureau will go over with* [redacted] *the outlines of the courses to be given by the Bureau in the* [redacted] *FBI School for the Alaskan programs. It is noted that schedules can be arranged for the convenience of all concerned and need not necessarily follow the schedule set up for the actual school, it being contemplated that to discuss the general outlines of the courses with* [redacted] *would require considerably less time than to give the full lectures contemplated in the school.*

Referral/Consult

b6
b7C



Referral/Consult

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 9, 1951

FROM : SAC, Atlanta

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION.
(Stay-behind Agent Program)
(BuFile 65-59264).

Referral/Consult

Reference Bureau let to Seattle, cc Atlanta and Anchorage, dated 5/23/51. Pursuant to the Bureau instructions, appropriate arrangements have been made with the

[redacted]

EXPEDITE PROCESSING

This matter will be followed in this office.

JCB:CM
65-1385

cc: Seattle (P&C)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 BTW/RC
ON 6/29/94
34251

RECORDED 15
65-5[illegible] - 140
JUN 1[illegible]
2[illegible]

60 JUN 19 1951

HANDLED BY STOP SLIP

June 29, 1951

SAC, Anchorage

Director, FBI

STAGE

PERSONAL ATTENTION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/29/94 BY SP2 RTS/STP

Reurlet 6-14-51.

1. Training Schedules

As you have been advised previously, schedules for training of SBA's and E&E agents should be integrated to permit simultaneous progression of the two programs.

While the Bureau concurs in your conclusion that completion of training of SBA's will be thus delayed, the Bureau also has responsibilities in the development of the E&E program. Although it would be desirable to bring additional trainees to SOG weekly to speed up training, the Bureau does not have the facilities or personnel available for such expansion at this time. [redacted] Consideration will, however, be given as the programs progress to possible means for expediting the training.

You have stated few SBA's will be able to proceed to SOG in September. Radiograms in individual cases have indicated a number of persons have stated they would be available at any time. It is recognized that changes of plans of these individuals will present difficulties. It is imperative, nevertheless, that the scheduling of trainees be continuous and that there be no gaps in scheduling. This should be facilitated by the integration of the training of E&E agents.

It is again pointed out that [redacted] prior to beginning actual investigations of potential agents. In this connection, reference is made to your letter of June 16, 1951, in which you advised that [redacted] Separate files have been opened in the Bureau as to each of the individuals mentioned in relet and separate files should be opened in your office.

MCC:dar

Tolson
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Clegg
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Tracy
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Alden
Belmont
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Tele. Room
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Gandy

COMM - FBI
JUL 3 - 1951
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RECORDED JUL 12 1951

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

You are again reminded that every consideration must be given to the quality of agents scheduled for training. You should, of course, schedule those persons best qualified first, where it is at all possible.

2. Transportation

Referral/Consult

It is noted you have subsequently advised

advise promptly.

Referral/Consult

Two principal factors are involved in connection with the expressed desires of some trainees to travel by automobile to SOG. While the Bureau are hardly in a position to positively prohibit such persons from traveling by automobile, such procedure should be diplomatically discouraged wherever possible. It is obvious that these persons would likely carry families, friends or perhaps strangers to the States and would perhaps make stops en route with relatives or others. It can be seen that the security of the program might be endangered unless every possible precaution is taken. Traveling companions and others would have natural curiosity as to the travel plans of the trainees and would perhaps have to communicate with the trainees as to return schedules, etc. Secondly, it would be essential, particularly in fall, winter and spring months, for such travel to begin well in advance of training dates. Weather conditions, in the States as well as in Alaska, would have to be considered fully. It would be necessary in each instance for the Bureau to brief various offices through whose territories these persons would travel in order to expedite their arrivals at SOG in the event of difficulties en route. As previously stated, it is positively necessary that these persons arrive as scheduled for training.

3. Salaries and Expenses

You will be advised by separate memorandum concerning your recommendations for increased per diem.

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4. Physical Examinations

Your assumption that your office has authority to cancel the schedule of a trainee who is found to be physically unfit for air travel or to engage in normal physical activity is correct. The purpose of the examination, of course, is to determine whether the individual in question would be adversely affected by air travel, or the normal activities which would be expected during the training period. If he is unfit for such, he is obviously unfit for the entire program. You should inquire into the physical condition of an individual in detail before recommending him.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 14, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
(Bureau file 65-59264)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 12958 3.3(b)(1)(b)
ON: 6/29/94
34225

In connection with the development of the instant program, the following information is being submitted and the Bureau's advice is requested with regard to certain matters as indicated:

Referral/Consult

1. Training Schedules

[redacted] The balance of the dates in July are being filled by this office and as soon as the trainees have been contacted and the specific dates confirmed, the Bureau will be advised.

If the E & E Program is to be integrated with the training of the SBA's and only two trainees per week can be handled in Washington, D. C., considerable delay will ensue in handling those trainees already recommended in the SBA Program. It will be noted that few SBA's will be able to be in Washington during September. However, many have indicated that they are available commencing October 1, 1951. It is suggested that the Bureau may desire to arrange for the handling of additional trainees in Washington, D. C. commencing October 1, 1951.

Referral/Consult

2. Transportation

[redacted]

COPIES DESTROYED
584 NOV 21 1966

RECORDED - 119

65-298
JFD:vf

JUN 18 1951

AN 65-298

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

Some trainees have indicated that they desire to drive to Washington, D. C. in their privately-owned automobiles. It is requested that the Bureau advise as to whether or not there is any objection to this mode of travel. [redacted]

[redacted]

3. Salaries and Expenses

Referral/Consult

The Bureau by radiogram dated June 11, 1951 advised that "schedule for remuneration and per diem approved". It is assumed that the schedule referred to is the one mentioned in Bureau letter dated May 4, 1951, namely, $150.00 per week basic pay plus $4.00 per diem for incidental expenses and $175.00 per week basic pay plus same per diem as above for the approximate 2½ weeks during the jump training course.

Referral/Consult

In view of the fact that it is necessary for trainees to come to Anchorage a day or two in advance of their departure schedule to undergo physical examinations and [redacted] Bureau authorization is requested to pay them the basic weekly rate of $150.00 commencing at the time they leave their homes, which in most instances will not be more than two days in advance of their departure date from Anchorage. Also, Bureau authorization is requested to pay the trainees $11.00 per day per diem in Alaska, $6.00 per day per diem for travel between Alaska and the United States, and $9.00 per day per diem in the United States, except during the time they are in Washington, D. C. and at Fort Benning, Georgia.

The foregoing proposed schedules of payment of per diem will, of course, not include time spent by the trainees in the United States or in Alaska on personal matters.

The Bureau by radiogram dated June 11, 1951 advised that payments should be made to the trainee on his return to Anchorage and that the Bureau will advise as to the amount due. Inasmuch as

some of the trainees reside at great distances from Anchorage and in sections which are difficult and expensive to reach, it is suggested that arrangements be made so that the trainees may be paid in Anchorage immediately upon their return and prior to their departure to their respective homes.

In Bureau radiogram of May 16, 1951 it is stated that "where financial status agents require advances you should secure Bureau approval". Advice is requested as to whether or not Bureau radiogram of June 11, 1951 authorizes the advance of a portion of payments prior to departure from Anchorage without previous Bureau authority. It will be noted that in most instances a request from the trainees for such advances will not be received until immediately prior to their departure and time will not permit the obtaining of authorization from the Bureau.

4. Physical Examinations

Referral/Consult

The Bureau's instructions as contained in radiogram of June 8, 1951 are being complied with. A certification signed by the examining physician is being obtained and kept in the trainee's file in this office together with the reports of laboratory examinations. However, it is not possible to have the same doctor perform all the examinations as there is

[redacted]

It is assumed that this officehas authority to cancel the schedule of any trainee who is reported by the examining physician as being in such a condition that flying would be hazardous or who would not be able to engage in normal physical activity.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 16, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM) (65-59264)

Referral/Consult

Classified by SP1 BTW/RC
Declassify on: OADR 34225

[redacted]

Inasmuch as copies of the same reports are being forwarded to [redacted] for distribution to the Bureau, no copies are being forwarded with this letter.

Referral/Consult

The only information in the files of this office identifiable with the above-named individuals concerns [redacted] A report concerning him was submitted to the Bureau by the Anchorage Office dated June 28, 1947, entitled [redacted] Departmental Applicant, Field Deputy Marshal, Nenana, Alaska."

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b7C

62-227
JFD:vf

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTW/RC
ON 10/29/94
34225

RECORDED - 109 65-59264-142
INDEXED - 109 JUN 18 1951
15
EX. - 32

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 CLS
ON 3/25/98
DEL OGA, LHL 2/27/97

JUN 23 1951

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: STAGE

DATE: June 9, 1951

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
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Referral/Consult

ASAC Powers called from Minneapolis on the morning of June 9 and stated that [redacted] the Bureau were bringing certain individuals from Alaska to Washington who might land by plane in Minneapolis and that [redacted] Powers asked for information as to what the [redacted] inquiry was all about.

You will recall that we have directed a letter to Seattle previously in this matter and, upon learning yesterday [redacted] we directed a letter to those offices informing them of the background of this case.

Referral/Consult

I advised Powers of the background of this matter and instructed that it should be kept on a highly confidential basis in the Minneapolis Office, and I told him that should [redacted] such assistance should be given.

Referral/Consult

While talking with Acting ASAC Bradley of the Detroit Office on another matter on June 9, I also informed him of this program and told him that should [redacted]

Referral/Consult

ACTION:

For your information.

CEH:LL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/29/94 BY SP1 BTS/BC 34225

RECORDED - 110 65-59264-143

EX. - 119

HANDLED BY STOP DESK

62 JUN 26 1951

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Tele. Room
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Gandy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (U)

FROM ANCHORAGE 6-14-51 NR 141807 3:34 P.M.

DIRECTOR URGENT

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. 79 INDIVIDUALS RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED. 64 RECONTACTED ON TRAINING AND RESULTS FURNISHED TO BUREAU. LEADS TO RECONTACT OTHERS BEING HANDLED. (U) 9 INDIVIDUALS SCHEDULED FOR DEFINITE TRAINING DATES THROUGH JULY 9. 2 TRAINEES PRESENTLY IN WASHINGTON, IN ATTENDANCE AT SCHOOL. BALANCE OF DATES IN JULY BEING FILLED BY THIS OFFICE. (U)

Referral/Consult

RECEIVED 6-14-51 3:44 P.M. LL

RECORDED - 125

65-59314-144

JUN 19 1951 (U)

24

6/29/94 SP3 BTS/JM 84225

4-20-2000 00-1164

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (U)

SAC, Anchorage

June 15, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

STAGE

Referral/Consult

The question of cover names to be assigned to Stay-Behind Agents and Escape and Evasion Agents has been discussed [redacted]

You should give immediate consideration to this matter and thereafter discuss same in detail [redacted] The results of your discussions should be made known to the Bureau, together with any tentative plan or system evolved, which is mutually acceptable in order that any plan may be jointly approved at SOG.

Referral/Consult

Cover names should be most simple and such that they will be easily remembered. Consideration should be given to selection of names which will, in themselves, readily indicate whether the particular agent is a Stay-Behind Agent or an Escape and Evasions Agent. For example, cover names for SBA's might be restricted to words suggesting animate things, E and E's to inanimate, or vice versa. Similarly, names assigned might well, because of the presence of certain letters or combinations of letters, locations of certain letters in words, numbers of syllables, and otherwise, indicate the particular areas in which agents are operating. Obviously, any plan devised should be such that the enemy could not, even by close study, detect patterns. It is likewise obvious that no agent should be told the reason for selection of a cover name for him, particularly if such name fits into a plan.

6/29/94 SP2BTS/SO 34225/1

65-59264

MCC:jgf

RECORDED - 132

JUN 18 1951

FBI

JUN 15 5 12 PM

COMM — FBI

JUN 16 1951

FBI — ANCHORAGE

SAC, Anchorage

June 16, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

STATE

34225/
6/29/94 SP12BTTSR

While it would be premature at this time to assess the potential value of the two State agents who reported at SOG during the first week of training, initial contacts with these individuals point up the necessity for giving considerable attention to the native intelligence and educational backgrounds of persons to be selected for training.

As you are aware, training is being afforded in codes and ciphers, radio communications, and other subjects having technical aspects. A limited amount of time is available for training at SOG in the individual subjects. One of the persons in question has seemed to grasp readily the training afforded to date; mental processes of the other person appear to be considerably slower.

Training schedules will permit some flexibility whereby additional time can be spent in training on particular subjects, where warranted. You will be advised by individual memoranda of the evaluation given to persons trained at SOG, with particular reference to individual needs for further training. As previously instructed, arrangements must be effected for regular training and practice on return of trainees to Alaska.

It can be seen that a tremendous burden will be placed on the Bureau and on your office in attempting to train persons whose capacities to learn are unusually limited. It is fully realized that you cannot in all instances obtain the services of persons of good education who, at the same time, have knowledge of Alaska, experience, and equipment available to them which are considered prerequisites. You must, however, determine that a person has sufficient education, native intelligence, and ability to learn before recommending him for this program.

Personnel handling these matters in your office should be promptly instructed in the above regard in order that the qualifications in question will be fully predetermined. Inquiries should be made and practical devices used where required to determine the extent of education and ability of the individual in question to read, write, think and learn quickly and clearly. Specific statements should be made in this regard in reports of investigation. You should consider these factors, of course, in arranging schedules for training, in order that persons of higher mentality, all other considerations being equal, will be trained first if at all possible.

65-59204

RECORDED - 132

JUN 18 1951

14 8

MCC:njf

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CC-150

RECORDED - 90

CABLEGRAM

URGENT

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

JUNE 8, 1951

Transmit the following message to: ANCHORAGE

EX - 97

STAGE. REURAD JUNE SEVEN STATING TRAINING DATES FOR NINE INDIVIDUALS CONFIRMED BY ANCHORAGE OF WHICH FOUR CONFIRMED BY BUREAU. BUREAU RECORDS REFLECT DEFINITE DATES FOR EIGHT PERSONS FURNISHED BY YOU AS FOLLOWS: [redacted] JUNE ELEVEN, [redacted] JUNE TWELVE, [redacted] JUNE EIGHTEEN, [redacted] JUNE NINETEEN, [redacted] JUNE TWENTY-SIX, FOSTER R. SIMS JULY TWO, [redacted] JULY THREE, [redacted] JULY NINE. NOTE SCHEDULE FOR JUNE TWENTY-FIVE OPEN. ADVISE WHETHER JUNE TWENTY-FIVE FILLED AND IF SO IDENTITY OF PERSON. ADVISE ALSO IDENTITY OF NINTH PERSON REFERRED TO BY YOU. SCHEDULES OF ABOVE EIGHT HEREBY CONFIRMED. INDIVIDUAL RADIOGRAMS WILL BE SENT WHEN INSURANCE ARRANGED AS TO EACH. INSURANCE WILL BE PURCHASED ONLY LIMITED NUMBER OF DAYS PRIOR TO SCHEDULED TRAVEL TO AVOID LAST MINUTE CHANGES IN POLICIES. LETTER EN ROUTE AUTHORIZES YOU TO ARRANGE DEFINITE SCHEDULES ON YOUR OWN INITIATIVE AND ADVISE BUREAU FOLLOWING WHICH BUREAU WILL ADVISE IN EACH CASE RE INSURANCE. RE PHYSICAL EXAMINATION QUERY. [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

Mr. Tol
Mr. E.
Mr. Cle
Mr. Gla
Mr. Lad
Mr. Nic
Mr. Rose
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

HOOVER

MCC:mab
65-59264

HANDLED BY STOP DESK

SENT VIA Radio 6-8-51 11:03 PM Per

Referral/Consult

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (U)

Hennrich

SP3-BTJ/SM
4-20-2000
00-1164

FROM ANCHORAGE (6-7-51) (U) NR 080155 10:55 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT (U) Referral/Consult

STAGE. REURRAD (JUNE 7) RE PHYSICAL EXAMINATION. CONTACT MADE

[redacted] (U)

RECEIVED: (6-7-51) (U) 11:15 PM TAR

6/28/94 SP3 BTJ/SM 225

cc: Mr. Baker

(6/11/51) (U)

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B58 NOV 21 1980

RECORDED 06 - 165-51264-1
EX. - 97 (JUN 15 1951) (U)

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (U)

HANDLE VIA STOP

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Mohr
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 2, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM) (65-59264)

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

EXPEDITE PROCESSING

For the information of the Seattle Office, the Escape and Evasion Program is being set up by [redacted] in cooperation with the Bureau for the purpose of aiding military personnel, especially fliers, who might be forced down in enemy or occupied territory in the event of hostilities with a foreign power. This program is being held in the utmost confidence and no indication should be given to anyone being interviewed as to the purpose of the interview.

Referral/Consult

Unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau within 3 days after receipt of this communication, the Seattle Office is requested to interview [redacted] and furnish the results promptly to the Anchorage Office in report form suitable for dissemination.

b6
b7C

The Anchorage Office will, unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau, forward a copy of the report received from [redacted] immediately upon receipt in view of the fact that [redacted]

JTM:MMA
62-227
cc: Seattle

Ltr to Seattle 6-8-51 MCC

RECORDED - 24 62-59264-150
JUN 5 1951
INDEXED - 8
EX. - 120

Referral/Consult

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 BTS/SC ON 6/29/94 3422SI

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

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Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (4)

FROM ANCHORAGE (6-7-51) NR 071905 5:27 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. 79 INDIVIDUALS RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING REPORT SUBMITTED. 59 RECONTACTED ON TRAINING AND RESULTS FURNISHED TO BUREAU. LEADS TO RECONTACT OTHERS BEING HANDLED. TO DATE DEFINITE TRAINING DATE FOR 9 INDIVIDUALS CONFIRMED BY ANCHORAGE OFFICE, OF WHICH 4 HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED BY BUREAU.

RECEIVED: (6-7-51) 5:54 PM CYS

6/29/94
SP2 BTS/SC
342251

SP3-BTJ/SM
4-20-2000
00-1164

RECORDED - 90
EX. - 97

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

cc: Mr. [illegible]

SAC, Anchorage

June 18, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

STAGE
(Your file 65-298)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/29/94 BY SP2BTS/SC 34225/

Reurlet 6-5-51.

[redacted] Referral/Consult

You indicated that [redacted] Referral/Consult

[redacted]

In this connection you, [redacted] should determine from each individual prior to his departure from Alaska, what he has told his immediate relatives, employer, or associates, as to his destination in explanation of his absence. It is noted that the first individual sent to SOG has advised that he told his relatives nothing of his destination. It has been agreed with him that he will, on his return to Alaska, represent that he visited in San Francisco. Any explanations given by such trainees should be completely logical. It is obvious that few would have a legitimate reason to travel to Washington. [redacted]

[redacted]

In accordance with previous instructions, you should advise each person, prior to his departure, that he can and should call the nearest FBI office in the event he finds himself in difficulties with regard to transportation schedules and otherwise during his travel to and from SOG. It is, of course, [redacted]

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RECORDED - 43

65-59264-152

ECC:djb

COMM - FBI
JUN 19 1951
MAILED 20

62 JUN 26 1951

HANDLED BY STAGE

Referral/Consult

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 5, 1951

FROM: SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM) (Bufile 65-59264)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2BTS/STP ON 6/29/94

ReBurad dated May 29, 1951.

Referral/Consult

[redacted] This matter is being called to the Bureau's attention in the event the Bureau desires to advise the Detroit Office concerning the instant program. However, it does not appear essential that the trainees be met at Detroit nor desirable from a security viewpc

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

On June 4, 1951 [redacted] trainee, was interviewed by [redacted] ASAC JOHN F. DESMOND. During this interview [redacted] inquired as to how his mother could contact him in the event of an emergency. He stated that she would not know where he was going and would not be unduly curious about it. However, he desired that she have some means of communicating with him in the event of illness, etc. [redacted] was furnished with the unlisted telephone number of this office and the name of DESMOND to give to his mother to be used only in case of emergency.

[redacted] EXPEDITE PROCESSING

COPIES [redacted]

Also on the same date, June 4, 1951, [redacted] was interviewed by [redacted] ASAC DESMOND and th question arose. At [redacted] suggestion, [redacted] is b furnished with the following address to which his wife may

RECORDED - 43

65-298
JFD:vf

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b7C
Referral/Consult

letters or wires: [redacted] stated that his wife will assume b6
that he is in the States on a business trip for his insurance b7C
company and it will not be unusual for him to give her the above address so that she can communicate with him.

Unless advised to the contrary, arrangements will be worked out in individual cases so that the trainees may be contacted by their families in the event of an emergency.

None of the trainees who have been contacted to date have indicated that they desire advances prior to leaving Anchorage. However, they have been advised that they will be paid in Washington, D. C.

For the Bureau's information, it is expected that the following schedule will be followed in most instances:

1. For trainees due to commence training at 8:00 A. M. on Mondays, they will leave Anchorage via Flight 820, Northwest Airlines, 1:00 P. M. on Friday, arriving in Seattle, Washington at 8:50 P. M. They will leave Seattle, Washington on Saturday morning via Northwest Airlines at 7:30 A. M., arriving at Minneapolis 3:30 P. M., transferring to another plane which departs Minneapolis at 4:15 P. M., arriving at Detroit 7:30 P. M., transferring to another plane which leaves at 8:10 P. M. and finally arriving at Washington, D. C. at 11:40 P. M. Saturday night.

2. For those trainees due to commence training at 8:00 A. M. Tuesdays, they will leave Anchorage on Northwest Airlines Coach Flights 832 or 830, departing Anchorage 8:30 A. M. or 9:30 A. M. respectively, arriving Seattle at 6:00 P. M. or 7:00 P. M. respectively. They will leave Seattle on Sunday morning via Northwest Airlines Stratocruiser Flight at 7:30 A. M. and will follow the same schedule as indicated above, arriving in Washington, D. C. 11:40 P. M. on Sunday night.

It was suggested to [redacted]

[redacted]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

TO : C. E. Hennrich

DATE: June 11, 1951

FROM : W. T. Baker

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (ESCAPE AND INVASION PROGRAM)

Classified by SP2 BTS/JC 6/29/94
Declassify on: OADR 30/225

Tolson
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Gandy

As you recall, I have contacted Major Samuel P. Borzilleri several times for the purpose of securing information from him relative to Escape and Evasion techniques. Major Borzilleri is a friend and former classmate of SAC H. G. Foster of the Indianapolis office. Major Borzilleri can be reached through Government code #131, extension 65484, or at his home, ORdway 4543. His office is located at the Moses Building, Washington, D. C. Major Borzilleri is an attorney and is attached to the Air Judge Advocate's Office of the Air Force.

A summary of the information obtained from Major Borzilleri was submitted in a memorandum dated March 12, 1951, (Hennrich to Belmont). At no time was it indicated to Major Borzilleri that the Bureau is interested in captioned matter as relates to Alaska or the Stay-behind Agent Program. The approach to Major Borzilleri was for information of a general intelligence nature which is in his possession as a result of his activities with the Air Force during World War II. He was in charge of their E. and E. Program in northern Africa and in Italy.

[redacted]

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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

65-59264

RECORDED - 49
INDEXED - 49

JUN 19 1951

EX-130

WTB:brg

Attachment

HANDLED BY STOP DESK

JUN 28 1951

Referral/Consult

~~SECRET~~ CLOSE

Referral/Consult

Major Borzilleri also pointed out that he had [redacted] Two photostatic copies of this document were made, however, and are attached. The fact that copies have been made should not be divulged outside the Bureau. It is believed that the data contained in the attachments should be brought to the attention of SAC John Williams of the Anchorage office before he leaves Washington, D. C. It is also believed that the information will be of possible value to SA [redacted] in connection with the training program of the Stay-behind Agents. b6 b7C

I took Major Borzilleri to lunch on June 7th, 1951. At that time [redacted] ~~(S)~~ (U)

[redacted]

ACTION:

Referral/Consult

The above is for your information.

It is suggested that this memorandum be routed to SA Manning C. Clements for his information.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

FROM : C. E. HENNRICH

DATE: June 7, 1951

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (Stay-Behind Agent Program - Escape and Evasion Program)

Tolson
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/29/94 BY SP12B-TS13

PURPOSE:

To advise that space has been arranged in the Department of Justice and Identification Buildings for individual training with a maximum of security. Schedule begins June 11, 1951.

DETAILS:

Training of Stay-Behind Agents will begin on June 11, 1951, to be handled by Bureau personnel at the places indicated:

TOPIC	PERSONNEL	LOCATION	TIME
Referral/Consult			
Indoctrination	SA M. C. Clements Security Division	Room 2324 IB.	Approx. 2 hrs.
Deception and Security	"	"	" 4 hrs.
Selection and Training of Sub-agents and informants	"	"	" 3 hrs.
Russian System of Ferreting Out Espionage Agents	"	"	" 2½ hrs.
Codes and Ciphers	SA. I. W. Newpher FBI Laboratory	"	" 6½ hrs.
Secret Writing	SA J. W. Magee FBI Laboratory	F.B.I. Laboratory	" 3 hrs.
Defensive Tactics	SA H. A. Myers Training and Inspection Division	Gymnasium	" 3 hrs.

The first trainee will be available on Monday, June 11, 1951; the second on Tuesday, June 12, 1951, and two per week on succeeding Mondays and Tuesdays. The schedule is devised so that individual training will be given in each subject and two trainees will not be in the same building simultaneously.

65-62-59264

RECORDED - 127 1 65-59264-154

JUN. 21 1951

MCC:vas

ACTION:

Details connected with preparation of quarters, lecture material, and schedules are proceeding on the above basis.

July 5, 1951

SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Director, FBI

STAGE
(Your file 65-2958)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/29/94 BY SP12B TJS/C 34225/

Referral/Consult

Reurlet 6-21-51.

[redacted] Your office should, however, give immediate consideration to the desirability for establishing files on STAGE and E. and E. agents which would be available to the principal in the event of attack. It appears such files would also be necessary for practice under simulated operating conditions. It would be necessary that such files be maintained in such a manner and in such a location that they would not fall into enemy hands and could be removed on short notice to headquarters of the principal, wherever such headquarters might be.

Items in such files would undoubtedly include physical description, fingerprint classification, photographs, handwriting specimens, a recording of the individual's radio "fist," cover name, recognition signals, distress signals, copies of codes, communication schedules, location of agent, capabilities of agent, and equipment available to him.

Following discussions [redacted] with regard to the above, you should submit plans for approval by the Bureau [redacted]

With regard to cover names to be assigned to STAGE and E. and E. agents, the Bureau did not mean to infer that persons leaving Alaska for training should use other than their real names en route to Seattle. It is known, however, that [redacted]

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

MCC:brg:jgf

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EX.-52

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COMM - FBI
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
1951
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The question of cover names referred to in Bulet dated June 15, 1951, is concerned with the activities of trainees after they have returned to Alaska. Such names, it was indicated, might well indicate the type of agent and the area in which he would operate. It is recognized that an individual might conceivably live in the Mt. McKinley area, for example, and later operate in the vicinity of Seward. Notwithstanding, it is highly probable such an individual would operate in the general area of his residence where he would presumably be best equipped to operate through his knowledge of the country. Such cover names, as was stated, would have to be simple and readily remembered; examples, "Table," "Strawberry," "Pittsburg," "Walrus." Such cover names would, after assignment, be suitable for use in communications between your office and the Bureau and between [redacted] as well as in practice communications and actual operatic[redacted]

Referral/Consult

The Bureau has noted [redacted]

Referral/Consult

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 21, 1951

FROM: SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM) (Bureau file 65-59264

SP12 BTJ NSC
6/29/94
34225/

Re Anchorage letter to the Bureau dated June 14, 1951, Bureau letter to Anchorage dated June 15, 1951, and Bureau letter to Anchorage dated June 16, 1951.

1. Transportation

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

2. Dissemination of Reports

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

3. Cover Names

Referral/Consult

In Bureau radiogram of May 29, 1951 it was stated that [redacted]

[redacted]

In accordance with Bureau instructions contained in referenced letter of June 15, 1951 the question of cover names was discussed [redacted]

This matter was previously discussed in Anchorage letter to the Bureau dated May 11, 1951.

Referral/Consult

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65-298
JFD:vf

AN 65-298

The Bureau's advice is requested as to whether or not the use of cover names is contemplated during the trainees' travel and training or whether such cover names are for use after the trainees return to Alaska.

With regard to the manner of supplying cover names to agents, the system of assigning names so as to indicate locations of agents was discussed. However, inasmuch as it is not known in what areas or particular locations the agents will operate, it would not be possible at this time to work out a system of cover names based on geographical locations. Referral/Consult

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 23, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM) (Bufile 65-59264)

ReBulet to Anchorage dated June 18, 1951.

In the referenced letter it was suggested that Special Agents of this office working on the instant program be recommended for training at the Seat of Government.

Special Agent [redacted] is to commence In-Service training in Washington, D. C. on June 25, 1951. It is recommended that he be given appropriate training for use in developing the instant program after he completes his present In-Service class which terminates on July 7, 1951.

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b7C

65-298
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cc: 67-313

[redacted] 6/29/94
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EX-155.

JUN 26 1951

156

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REC'D JUN 28 1951

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED 342257
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F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY

FROM ANCHORAGE 6-21-51 NR 210455 3:38 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. 79 INDIVIDUALS RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED. 64 RECONTACTED ON TRAINING AND RESULTS FURNISHED BUREAU. 1 PREVIOUSLY RECOMMENDED AND RECONTACTED, DELETED BY BUREAU. LEADS TO RECONTACT OTHERS BEING HANDLED. 4 TRAINEES PRESENTLY IN WASHINGTON IN ATTENDANCE AT SCHOOL. 2 OTHERS PREPARED TO LEAVE THIS WEEK AND TO COMMENCE TRAINING MONDAY AND TUESDAY OF NEXT WEEK. TRAINEE SCHEDULED FOR JULY 2 LEAVING TERRITORY THIS SATURDAY FOR SEATTLE AND ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR HIM TO BE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON ON THE REQUIRED DATE.

RECEIVED: 6-21-51 4:13 PM MAP

RECORDED - 93

b6
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If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

65 JUL 3

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 25, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
Bufile 65-59264)

Re Anchorage letter to Bureau dated May 8, 1951 listing names of Stay-behind Agents concerning whom reports were [redacted] Referral/Consult

On June 22, 1951 all of the reports listed in the referenced letter were [redacted]

65-298
JFD:vf

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2BTJP/LP
ON 6/29/94 Referral/Consult
34220

65-59264-160

RECORDED - 93

JUN 28 1951

15

SPECIAL MAIL

4-97

	Received Date	Received Time	Forwarded Date	Forwarded Time
ROUTING				
CLASSIFYING				
SEARCHING				
NUMBERING				
RECORDING				
EXAMINING				
CONSOLIDATION				

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/29/94 BY SP2BTJP/LP 34225

6 JUL 5 1951

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

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(DECODED COPY) (4)

4-20-2000 SP3-BTS/jm

00-1164 (4)

FROM ANCHORAGE (5-18-51) NR 180147 2:48 P.M.

DIRECTOR DEFERRED

(4)

STAGE. RE BUREAU RADIOGRAM (SIXTEENTH) INSTANT. RECOMMENDED [redacted] BE INCREASED TO MEET ADVANCE REQUESTED BY AGENTS PROCEEDING TO WASHINGTON FOR TRAINING. ESTIMATED TOTAL BUREAU COST FOR TRAINING IN WASHINGTON PER MONTH APPROXIMATELY THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS. ALSO ESTIMATED APPROXIMATELY ONE HALF OF THIS AMOUNT WILL BE REQUESTED AS ADVANCE. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT EXPENSE VOUCHER WILL LAG AT LEAST ONE MONTH RECOMMEND [redacted]

b7E

(4)

RECEIVED: (5-18-51) 3:10 PM RTL

6/29/94

b7E

(4) (4)

(5-23-51)

6/9/51

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65-59264-161

JUN 25 1951

(4)

(4)

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

(4) 65-59264

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

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FROM ANCHORAGE 5-18-51 NR 180149 2:54 PM

DIRECTOR DEFERRED

STAGE. RE BUREAU RADIOGRAM (SIXTEENTH) INSTANT. (U)

RECEIVED: 5-18-51 3:15 PM ME

Referral/Consult

SP3-BTJ/JM
4-20-2000
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JUN 23 195

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (U)

65 JUL 3 195

SAC, Anchorage

Director, FBI

STAGE

June 18, 1951

PERSONAL ATTENTION

b7E

Re Bureau radiogram dated June 9, 1951.

A check was dispatched to your office on June 9, 1951, increasing your [redacted] in accordance with your recommendation. If it is found the fund will not be sufficient to handle payments under this program, you should advise promptly and submit further recommendations for an additional increase.

In accordance with instructions in referenced radiogram, it is desired that all payments be made by you, preferably that the full amount due each trainee be paid on his return to Alaska. If the trainee so requests, you should advance a portion of the total payment. Upon the completion of training, and the departure of a trainee, you will be advised of the amount due him, based on the schedule set forth below and his travel schedule. In the event a trainee desires to stop for personal reasons while in the states, such periods will be deducted in calculating the amount due him.

Payment will be made in accordance with the following schedule:

No jump training.

$150.00 per week base pay, beginning with the day of departure from Alaska and ending on the day of return to Alaska, plus $4.00 per diem for incidental expenses during the same period.

If jump training taken.

Base pay will be $175.00 per week during the period of the jump training course, per diem being calculated as above.

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MCC:djb

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JUN 19 1951

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65 JUL 3 1951

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : V. P. KEAY VPK

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION, STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM

DATE: May 14, 1951

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/29/94 BY SP2BTK

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Referral/Consult

[redacted] The details of the proposed training program have been brought to your attention previously. The program is presently awaiting a designation from the SAC in Anchorage as to the identity of the individuals and the dates on which they can begin arriving in the Washington area for training.

In connection with this program, Special Agent Edward S. Sanders has contacted [redacted] who is [redacted] and the matter of insurance for the Stay-Behind Agents has been discussed with [redacted] None of the details of this plan have been discussed with [redacted] he is not aware of the fact that these individuals are in Alaska, and knows only that a number of individuals will be in the Washington area for a period of two-weeks' training and that some of them will receive an additional two and one-half or three weeks' training in parachute jumping at Fort Benning, Georgia. He has been advised that these individuals will travel by commercial airlines with the exception of their parachute training at Fort Benning, Georgia, which will utilize military aircraft.

[redacted] has advised that the Continental Insurance Company will insure these individuals on the following basis for a three-months' period.

b6
b7C

Those Not Taking Parachute Training

$10,000 accidental death coverage;
$500 medical attention as a result of an accident;
Provisions for prorated payments for dismemberment as a result of an accident;
Cost - $21.60.

Those Whose Training Includes Parachute Training

Same coverage as above;
Cost - $43.00.

65-57264-163

ESS:hke

RECORDED - 93 MAY 28

65 JUN 5 1951

EX-33

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This insurance coverage can be obtained by the furnishing to [redacted] of the names of the individuals to be covered, their ages, and the names of their beneficiaries. The policies can be staggered as the individuals are designated for the training and they can all be given a local Washington area address.

It is contemplated that one more contact in this connection will be made by Special Agent Sanders in order to split such insurance between at least two insurance men in order that no one individual will have the names of all of the individuals to be trained. [redacted] stated, however, that, if it is so desired, the individual can be given a cover name and [redacted] It is noted that the insurance referred to above covers accidents only. Should a man die from natural causes, he would not be covered by this insurance.

b6
b7C

RECOMMENDATION:

The foregoing is for your information. It is recommended, however, that every effort be made to expedite the designation of these individuals by the SAC in Alaska and the dates upon which they can begin to arrive.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. LADD

DATE: May 23, 1951

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/29/94 BY SP2 BTJ/KSC 36225

PURPOSE:

To submit recommendations for the handling of the financial aspects of captioned program.

BACKGROUND:

As you recall, the Anchorage office for the last six months has been developing Stay-behind Agents in Alaska. It is contemplated that these individuals will remain in Alaska in the event that Territory is occupied by the Russians, and will furnish information of an intelligence nature to the military authorities of the United States.

It has been recommended, and approved, that the Bureau will, [redacted] train these agents so they will be able to more effectively carry out their assignments in case of hostilities and enemy occupation. [redacted]

The Bureau has agreed [redacted] to participate in Referral/Consult training of the Stay-behind Agents while they are in Washington, D. C. [redacted] a schedule is presently being prepared to arrange for the individuals designated by the Anchorage office to travel to Washington, D. C., at the rate of two per week beginning during the first part of June, 1951.

Referral/Consult

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:

The Anchorage Office is presently recontacting the 74 individuals who have been developed to date in connection with this program in order to determine when the individual Stay-behind

65-59264
WTB:mh

RECORDED - 93
65-59264-164
MAY 28 1951

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62 JUL 6 1951

Agent will be available for training for the two week period in Washington, D. C; whether he will agree to taking the additional three weeks parachute jump training at Ft. Benning; and, what financial arrangements can be effected in order to reimburse the Stay-behind Agent for loss of time and income during the training period.

Based upon an analysis of the incomes of seven Stay-behind Agents in Anchorage, by Mr. Hennrich's memorandum to me dated April 26, 1951, it was recommended that consideration be given to reimbursing the Stay-behind Agents during their training period as follows:

No jump training

$150.00 per week basic pay, plus $4.00 per diem for incidental expenses.

If jump training taken

Same as above for two weeks training in Washington, D. C., and $175.00 per week basic pay, (plus same per diem as above), for the approximate two and one half to three weeks during the jump training course.

The SAC at Anchorage by Bulet May 4, 1951 was instructed to bear the above-proposed payment plan in mind when recontacting the Stay-behind Agents to work out the training schedule. All of the 20 individuals thus far recontacted in this regard have been satisfied with the above-proposed financial arrangements.

By Bureau radiogram to Anchorage May 16, 1951, the SAC at Anchorage was instructed to effect arrangements to pay the Stay-behind Agents in Alaska, preferably upon completion of training, after first securing Bureau authorization amount to be paid agent. He was further instructed that where financial status of agent requires an advance of funds he should secure Bureau approval. He was further told to submit his recommendation as to the necessary increase of the confidential fund at Anchorage to meet expenses in connection with this program. By radiogram May 18, 1951 Anchorage requested that [redacted] to handle the financial aspects of this matter.

b7E

PROPOSED ACTION (A)

It is proposed that the Anchorage Office handle the payment of funds to the Stay-behind Agents in Alaska, and that where possible, payment be made upon the completion of training when the agent returns to Alaska; further, that all claims for reimbursement be made by blue slip.

It is also proposed that all Stay-behind Agents be reimbursed for their time and loss of income during the training period on the same basis, and that the amount to be paid will be determined on whether the agent does or does not take the parachute jump training course. It is likewise proposed that the specific amounts as set forth above be approved for payment.

b7E

It is further proposed that [redacted] to handle commitments under this program.

INSURANCE

You will recall that consideration has been given to securing a short term insurance policy to cover possible risks to be incurred by the Stay-behind Agents during their training.

By memorandum from Mr. Keay to me dated May 14, 1951, information was set forth reflecting that [redacted] who is [redacted] was contacted by Supervisor E. S. Sanders of the liaison section relative to insurance costs. [redacted] represents the Continental Insurance Company and stated that said company will insure these individuals (Stay-behind Agents) on the following basis for a three-months' period:

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Referral/Consult

Those not taking parachute jump training

$10,000 accidental death coverage;
$500 medical attention as result of accident;
Provisions for prorated payments for dismemberment as result of accident;

COST $21.60.

Those whose training includes parachute jump training

Same coverage as above;

COST $43.00.

You will also recall that it has been recommended and approved that the Bureau will meet the necessary expenses for the insurance policies secured on the Stay-behind Agents.

PROPOSED ACTION (b)

It is proposed that the above insurance coverage be arranged through the Continental Insurance Company and that arrangements for payment be handled by the Security Division and effected by blue slip.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that proposed action (A) (financial payments covering salary, expenses, and advance to Anchorage Office) be approved and that this memorandum be referred to the Administrative Division for appropriate action.

It is recommended that proposed action (B) (insurance) be approved for handling by the Security Division.



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. M. Ladd

DATE: May 10, 1951

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (Stay-behind Agent Program)

Tolson
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PURPOSE:

To recommend that Supervisor Hanning C. Clements, presently assigned to the Investigative Division, be instructed to report to the Security Division immediately in order to handle the instruction of Stay-behind Agents at SOG and to supervise the entire training program in this regard.

BACKGROUND:

As you are aware, the Anchorage office for the past several months has been developing Stay-behind Agents in Alaska whose services can possibly be utilized, in the event Alaska is occupied by the Russians, by furnishing intelligence information to representatives of the U. S. government. To date 73 individuals have agreed to act and have been recommended by the Anchorage office for this program. The captioned matter is a [redacted] operation by the Bureau [redacted] and plans for the training of these Stay-behind Agents are presently being made by FBI [redacted] having agreed as to the division of responsibility in connection with the training program. A portion of the training will be provided by [redacted] the Bureau has agreed to handle that portion of the training which is of a security nature. Details relative to the scope of the training program were set forth in Mr. Hennrich's memorandum to me dated 5-3-51 which is attached.

Referral/Consult

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted] Basic training will be afforded by the Bureau [redacted] at SOG and [redacted] All training will be on an individual basis to assure the greatest degree of security possible.

Referral/Consult

OBSERVATIONS:

It is contemplated that the handling of the instruction of the Stay-behind Agents will be a full time assignment for at least one Special Agent of the Bureau for a minimum period of

Attachment

RECORDED - 93

65-57264-165

MAY 23 1951

WTB:bjc

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/29/84 BY SP1 2AMK/RS

six months. The Bureau instructor should be fully cognizant of the scope of the training [redacted] in order to properly correlate all phases of the training program. It will likewise be necessary for the instructor to become personally acquainted with these agents in order to evaluate and determine their limitations and capabilities for a probable specific assignment in the future. In this connection, it is pointed out that the program as such, as well as the training phases of same, will of necessity be of a continuing nature as it is based upon a future operation which will be instituted upon a possible occupation of Alaska by Russia.

It is believed that the instructor designated by the Bureau to handle the over-all training program for these agents should have a good background knowledge of Alaska. It is suggested that a Special Agent who has a good knowledge of Alaska and prevailing conditions in that Territory, and who is a qualified Bureau instructor, would have the qualifications necessary to successfully handle the training program to the best interests of the Bureau.

PROPOSED ACTION:

It is proposed that consideration be given to designating SA Manning C. Clements to handle the instruction of the Stay-behind Agents (Security Subjects), and to supervise the entire training program for these agents. SA Clements is presently assigned to the Investigative Division as a supervisor. He was designated ASAC in Anchorage on 2-28-46 where he remained until November, 1947. His personnel file reflects that during 1944 he was commended for the excellent manner in which he had handled an informant in an important espionage case; also, it was pointed out that he had demonstrated ability to competently develop and handle confidential informants in various walks of life. He is an approved Bureau speaker and a qualified Bureau instructor.

A brief of SA Manning's personnel file is attached.

Returned to personnel file

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the above proposed action be approved, and the necessary instructions issued to SA Manning C. Clements to report to the Security Division of the Bureau immediately for the proposed assignment.

OK 5/13

OK 5/12

OK

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: May 3, 1951

FROM : C. E. Hennrich

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (Stay-behind Agent Program)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/29/94 BY SP1 28 TS 15 34225-1

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Gandy

Purpose:

To briefly summarize the scope of the Bureau's participation in the training program of Stay-behind Agents.

To recommend that either SA F. A. Frohbose, SA M. C. Clements or SA George R. Fletcher be instructed to report to the Security Division of the Bureau immediately for a temporary assignment of approximately six months duration in order to handle the instruction (Security Subjects) of the Stay-behind Agents at SOG.

To recommend that Supervisor J. J. Ward, Central Research Desk, be designated to review lecture material now available to be covered by the Security Division in the Bureau's part of the training of these agents, and to assist the selected Bureau instructor in the research necessary to implement this material.

Background: Referral/Consult

As you are aware, it is contemplated that selected Stay-behind Agents will be brought to Washington, D. C., from Alaska, [redacted] for training purposes. It is contemplated that while these individuals are at SOG, they will be available to receive the training which the Bureau has agreed to impart. It has been recommended and approved that the Stay-behind Agents should be trained individually. [redacted]

It is contemplated that Stay-behind Agents will be in Washington, D. C., for a two weeks' period. They will be available for training at the rate of ten hours per day, six days per week. During this time, they will [redacted]

Attachment
WTB:dmd

RECORDED - 93

Referral/Consult

EX-33

See Belmont's memo to Ladd dated 5/10

6 JUL 25 1951

EX-33

PERS. FILES

The FBI's training includes:	TOTAL HOURS (Approx.)
Russian System of Ferreting out Espionage Agents	3
Deception and Security	4½
Selection and Training of Sub-Agents and informants	4½
Secret codes, secret writing, etc.	8
Disarming Methods	3

DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRAINING AT THE BUREAU:

b6
b7C

Upon my instructions, Supervisor W. T. Baker of the Espionage Section has conferred with [redacted] and K. R. McIntire of the Training and Inspection Division, and D. J. Parsons of the FBI Laboratory, concerning the over-all problems involved in this training program.

Mr. McIntire advised that the Training Division will handle the subject of Disarming Methods and details have already been worked out with Coach H. A. Meyers.

Mr. Parsons has advised that the Laboratory is ready to handle the subjects of secret writing, written codes and related matters.

Mr. McIntire stated that the subjects of a security nature should be worked out by the Security Division, and submitted to the Training Division for final review and approval.

The topic entitled "Russian System of Ferreting out Espionage Agents" has been discussed with Supervisor J. J. Ward, Central Research Desk, Internal Security Section, Security Division. Mr. Ward advised that he has the material available for the preparation of lecture material on this subject. The attached general outline on this topic willshow the proposed subject matter to be covered.

Supervisor Baker has prepared rough-drafts of suggested material to be included in the topics of "Deception and Security" and "Selection and Training of Sub-agents and Informants." Copies are attached.

PROPOSED ACTION: (A)

It is proposed that Supervisor J. J. Ward be delegated to prepare lecture material on the subject of "Russian System of Ferreting out Espionage Agents."

It is likewise proposed that Supervisor Ward be designated to review the lecture material (copies attached) now available to be covered by the Security Division in the Bureau's part of the training of these agents and to assist in the research necessary to implement this material.

Referral/Consult

INSTRUCTION OF STAY-BEHIND AGENTS AT THE BUREAU:

It is contemplated that the handling of the instruction of the Stay-behind Agents will be a full time assignment for at least one Special Agent of the Bureau. It will be necessary for the Bureau instructor to be fully cognizant of the scope of the training [redacted] for these agents and he will have to maintain [redacted] in order to properly correlate the training program. It is further believed that the Bureau instructor designated should become completely familiar with the training provided to the agents by the Laboratory relative to secret codes and secret writing. A plan should be worked out whereby these agents submit test messages after their return to Alaska. If this step is not taken, after a few months, they may very well become "rusty" on this technique and may possibly forget some of their basic instruction in this regard. It will likewise be necessary for the instructor to become personally acquainted with these agents in order to evaluate and determine their limitations and capabilities for a probable specific assignment in the future.

It is pointed out that the Stay-behind Agent Program in Alaska, including the training phases of same, will of necessity be of a continuing nature. These men may be called upon to start operations (in the event of invasion) within a period of a few months, or years. Until such time as it is believed that the program is no longer essential, it will be necessary to periodically keep in touch with them, and in all probability, to augment their training in Alaska at a later date.

The instructor designated by the Bureau to handle the over-all training program for these agents, it is believed, should have a good background knowledge of the Territory of Alaska. The objective of the training program is to provide the agents with the basic principles of intelligence operations in order to provide the background information which can be utilized in preparing for, and executing, future specific assignments, and is not intended as a specific and definite instruction as to how to operate in a given set of circumstances. In other words, only basic instruction can be provided at this time.

It is suggested, therefore, that a Special Agent who has a good knowledge of Alaska and prevailing conditions in that Territory, and who is a qualified Bureau instructor, would have the qualifications necessary to successfully handle the training program to the best interests of the Bureau. It is believed, nevertheless, that the amount of experience and extent of the Special Agent's knowledge of the Territory should be the determining factor in his selection.

PROPOSED ACTION: (B)

It is proposed that consideration be given to instructing either SA F. A. Frohbose, SA M. C. Clements or SA George R. Fletcher to report to the Bureau (Security Division) immediately for a temporary assignment of approximately six months duration in order to handle the instruction (Security Subjects) of the Stay-behind Agents at SOG and to be responsible for the entire training program in this regard.

SA Frederick A. Frohbose

SA Frohbose, assigned to the Honolulu office since 3-20-50, was formerly assigned to Anchorage from June, 1946 to March, 1950. He was designated ASAC at Anchorage on 7-7-48. His personnel file reflects that he is 32 years of age, a qualified firearms instructor, qualified police school instructor and lecturer, and extremely proficient in judo and disarming methods. He planned and handled instruction, according to his personnel file, in police training schools in the five major cities in the Territory of Alaska during his assignment there.

SA Manning C. Clements

SA Clements is presently assigned as a supervisor in the Investigative Division at SOG. He became a Special Agent in 1940. SA Clements is 42 years of age and single. He was designated ASAC in Anchorage on 2-28-46 where he remained until November, 1947 when transferred to Miami. His personnel file reflects that during 1944 he was commended for the excellent manner in which he had handled an informant in an important espionage case; also, it was pointed out that he had demonstrated ability to competently develop and handle confidential informants in various walks of life. His personnel file reflects that he is an approved Bureau speaker and a good lecturer. Bureau records show that he is a qualified Bureau instructor.

SA George Richard Fletcher

SA Fletcher, presently assigned to the Richmond office (senior resident agent at Roancke) is 42 years of age, has been a Special Agent since 1940 and was assigned to the Anchorage office on 5-29-46 and designated ASAC at Anchorage on 10-25-47. He was transferred to Richmond from Anchorage during July, 1948. His personnel file reflects that he handled Communism investigations and investigations concerning Soviet activities in Alaska. Bureau records fail to reflect that he is a qualified police instructor.

Upon completion of this assignment at the Bureau, consideration might possibly be given to assigning the selected instructor to the Anchorage office and giving him the responsibility, under the direction of the SAC, of handling all continuing phases of the Stay-behind Agent Program in Alaska.

SUGGESTIONS RE SECURITY:

It is suggested that the instructors handling all phases of the training program stress the security features of this operation.

It is suggested that the Stay-behind Agents be permitted to take notes, but that all notes be collected upon the completion of the course for every individual Stay-behind Agent.

It is suggested that the Stay-behind Agents during the course of instruction be referred to as "informants", ~~"agents"~~, or "contacts", but that they not be referred to as "Stay-behind Agents" or "spies."

It is suggested that the Stay-behind Agent be cautioned (1) to divulge to no one any aspect of his training in the U. S.; (2) that he is not an employee of the FBI; (3) that a slight indiscretion on his part relative to instant matter might very easily cost him his life should Alaska be occupied by the enemy.

DEADLINE:

May 15, 1951, has been set as the tentative deadline date for having all details of the Bureau's part in the training program completed.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that the above suggestions of procedure re security be approved.

It is recommended that proposal (A) be approved for appropriate attention by Supervisor J. J. Ward.

It is recommended that proposal (B) be approved, and the necessary instructions issued to either SA F. A. Frohbose, SA M. C. Clements or SA George R. Fletcher to arrange to report to the Security Division of the Bureau immediately for temporary assignment as outlined.

Supra + I recommend Clements be made as the instructor.

5/9.

ROUGH DRAFT

Basic Proposed Outline
for 3 hours informal
discussion.

RUSSIAN SYSTEM OF FERRETING OUT ESPIONAGE AGENTS

I. Background of Russian Internal Security System

II. Background of Russian formed Espionage System

III. Russian Military procedure in occupied territory

1. Smersch

IV. Soviet Personalities

V. Russian system of interrogation

VI. Suggested security precautions

34225/
6/29/94 SD12BT5150

ROUGH DRAFT

Basic proposed outline for
4½ hours informal discussion

April 18, 1951

DECEPTION AND SECURITY

I. Introduction

1. Purpose of this study is to suggest how the informant may carry out his assignment so the enemy will not be aware of his true activities.

2. To stress the necessity of taking all possible security precautions to insure self-preservation and continuous operation.

b7E

II. The task of survival; and possible use of cover stories and pretexts.

[redacted]

[redacted]

b7E

5. Point out that it is highly probable the Russians will place a large percentage of the civilian population in urban areas in labor camps where they will be compelled to do forced labor by the Russians and allowed no freedom of movement.

[redacted]

III. The informant. [redacted]

b7E

[redacted]

IV. Detecting and losing surveillances

1. Define "surveillance"
   a. A surveillance is a close watch over a person or person with a definite purpose.

2. If the enemy suspects that the informant, in an urban area, is more than a mere civilian, he may be placed under surveillance.

[redacted]

b7E

3. Possibility of surveillance in rural area considered too remote for consideration.

V. Concealing property on the person

[redacted]

b7E

[redacted] b7E

The above are set forth as possibilities where secret codes, maps, etc. may possibly be concealed where it is necessary to have them on the person.

VI. Suggestions for destroying "espionage gear" in the event of emergency to avoid capture or having it fall into enemy hands.

1. Destruction by fire (codes, ciphers, notes, documents, written material)

2. Destruction by dismantling (E & E gear, radio, etc)

3. Followed by burying or sinking in lake, river or other available water supply.

4. Destruction by explosives

5. Acts of destruction should be carried on during period of darkness to avoid detection, except by burning.

VII. General security precautions - discussion of.

VIII. Review; question and answer period.

ROUGH DRAFT

Basic Proposed Outline
for 4½ hours informal
discussion.

April 18, 1951

SELECTION AND TRAINING OF SUB-AGENTS AND ASSOCIATES

I. It is essential that every precaution be taken to insure the security of the operation.

(Particular stress should be placed on the security features of the operation)

II. Examination of the over-all purpose or objective of the operation
1. To survive the initial attack by the enemy and the hazards of the first days of the subsequent occupation

2. To know what intelligence information is desired by the U. S. military authorities

3. To be in a position to secure the desired data through personal observation or through trustworthy associates.

4. To transmit the information by the most expeditious means possible to the designated U. S. military headquarters.

III. Usaaà methods used to secure information

1. By personal observation
   a. Stress necessity of being alert; self-disciplining and training to improve power of observation
2. By interviews
   a. That is, by informal conversations
3. Through use of personal friends, contacts and associates

IV. Selections of associates (as sub-agents and informants)
1. In urban areas, associates may be developed through:

[redacted]

b7E

2. How to maintain informants

[redacted] b7E

V. Reliability

1. An unreliable person seldom furnishes information which is reliable.

2. A person well-known for his reliability, can very easily be mistaken, especially when under pressure.

3. It is essential, unless time is of the essence, to determine the reliability of person furnishing information and if possible to verify through investigation; or corroborate the information received.

4. Information received and transmitted to headquarters should reflect identity of source, and degree of reliability of informant:
   a. Examples: reliable, reliability unknown, unreliable, etc.

5. Where possible, headquarters should be advised of the identity of all sources of information being utilized.

VI. Individuals who may possibly be in a position to furnish information and who should be considered as potential informants:

[redacted] b7E

Caution:

It should always be borne in mind, that a source of information who may be in a position to assist you in your operations, is likewise in a position to help the enemy.

VII. Brief discussion of double-agent operations, and [redacted] in securing information of an intelligence nature. b7E

VIII. Where to meet informants or how to make contact

1. Usually will depend on circumstances

[redacted] b7E

IX. What action should be taken if you are approached and requested to act as an informant or sub-agent for some one else, believed by you to be acting in the best interests of the United States.

[redacted] b7E

X. What action should be taken if you are "uncovered" by the enemy; that is, if they strongly suspect that you are acting as an agent for the United States and you expect your freedom of movement to be curtailed to such an extent that your further operation will be seriously hampered.

b7E

XT. Review - discussion; question-answer period.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUNE 9, 1951

RADIOGRAM
URGENT
CIPHER PAD CODE

SAC, ANCHORAGE

STAGE REBULET MAY FOUR, BUREAU RADIOGRAM MAY SIXTEEN AND URLET JUNE FIVE, ALL CONCERNING ADVANCES AND PAYMENTS. SCHEDULE FOR REMUNERATION AND PER DIEM APPROVED. FUNDS FOR INCREASE OF [redacted] EN ROUTE. BUREAU DESIRES ALL PAYMENTS BE MADE BY YOU, PREFERABLY FULL AMOUNT ON RETURN OF TRAINEE. HOWEVER, YOU CAN ADVANCE PORTION OF PAYMENT PRIOR TO DEPARTURE IF TRAINEE SO REQUESTS. BUREAU WILL ON COMPLETION OF TRAINING AND DEPARTURE OF TRAINER ADVISE YOU OF AMOUNT DUE BASED ON TIMES OF DEPARTURES, PERIODS OF TRAINING AT TWO POINTS, WITH TIME SPENT IN STATES FOR PERSONAL REASONS DEDUCTED.

HOOVER

65-59264

MCC:NJF

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3 BTJ/tm
ON 4-20-2000

Classified by SP3 BTJ/tm
Declassify on: OADR 4/225

RECORDED - 31

EX-92

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Alden
Belmont
Laughlin
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Sandy

Sent via Bureau Radio 6/11/51

JUL 10 1951

FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
RECEIVED READING ROOM
JUN 11 12 33 PM

DEC-D - 59264-167

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY

FROM ANCHORAGE 5-31-51 NR 312100 5:57 PM

DIRECTOR DEFERRED

STAGE, STATUS REPORT. 77 INDIVIDUALS RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED. 49 RECONTACTED ON TRAINING WHO AGREED TO SAME AND RESULTS FURNISHED TO BUREAU. LEADS TO RECONTACT OTHERS BEING HANDLED.

RECEIVED 5-31-51 6:12 PM LH

65-59264-166X Duluth

RECORDED - 3

EX. - 37

cc: Mr. Belmont

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

65-59264

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SP3-BTG/jm 4-20-2000

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F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (4)

FROM ANCHORAGE (6-28-51) NR 280750 5:07 P.M.

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. 77 INDIVIDUALS RECOMMENDED, CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED. 64 RECONTACTED ON TRAINING AND RESULTS FURNISHED BUREAU. ONE PREVIOUSLY RECOMMENDED RECONTACTED, DELETED BY BUREAU AND ANOTHER VOLUNTARILY WITHDREW DESIRING NOT TO ATTEND TRAINING PROGRAM. LEADS TO RECONTACT OTHERS BEING HANDLED. TWO TRAINEES PROCEEDING TO WASHINGTON THIS WEEK TO COMMENCE TRAINING JULY 2 AND JULY 3. FIVE HAVE ALREADY REPORTED WASHINGTON FOR TRAINING. (4)

RECEIVED (6-28-51) 5:40 P.M. LL

6/29/94 SP2 BTS/SC 34225/

SP3-BTJ/SM

4-20-2000

00-1164

RECORDED - 31

65-51264-168

JUN 30 1951 (4)

EX-92

JUL 6 1951 (4)

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (4)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 28, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (ESCAPE & EVASION PROGRAM) (BuFile 65-59264)

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED BY 34225 ON 6/29/95

Inasmuch as copies of these reports are being forwarded [redacted] for distribution to the Bureau, no copies are being forwarded with this letter.

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

The records of this office contain no information identifiable with the foregoing.

In Bureau letter to Anchorage dated June 18, 1951, it is stated [redacted] should furnish to the Bureau all requests for name checks prior to the beginning of an actual investigation. This has been called to the attention [redacted] but as yet no requests for such name checks have been received in advance of investigation.

Referral/Consult

62-227
JFD:HCW

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 RDS/LS ON 6/29/95 34225

RECORDED - 57 65-59264-169 JUL 2 1951

Classified by P2BJW
Declassify on: OADR 34225

F-145

JUL 2 - 1951
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65-19264-170

CHANGED TO

62-94808-1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/29/94 BY SP2 BTS 18

3 4225 1

SAC, Anchorage

July 11, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Referral/Consult

Reurtel 6-20-51 concerning the question of [redacted]

Referral/Consult Unsuccessful effort was made to arrange a conference with [redacted]

You should discuss this matter [redacted] promptly in order that the Bureau may receive definite advice as to the [redacted] This will simplify the training being afforded at SOC by the Bureau.

Referral/Consult Inasmuch as additional training will be afforded Sioux personnel after return to Alaska, you should also arrange whereby [redacted] can be furnished to your office for practice purposes. The question of [redacted] should not be delayed.

RECORDED - 45

65-59264 - 171

MCC:mem

6/29/94 SP12B55/5 (C)

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FBI

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MAILED 19

FBI

JUL 15 3 00 PM '51

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

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DECODED COPY (4)

FROM ANCHORAGE 6-26-51 NR 270042 9:39 PM 6/29/19

DIRECTOR URGENT

STAGE

SUGGEST BE CONTACTED

AT

(4)

RECEIVED 6-26-51 RECORDED - 93 9:46 PM LH

(4)

Referral/Consult

[redacted] the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (4)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

FROM : Mr. C. E. Hennrich

DATE: June 19, 1951

SECRET

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM, ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

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Sandy

Stay-B

Referral/Consult

PURPOSE:

To advise that [redacted] (S)

Referral/Consult

DETAILS:

[redacted]

The Anchorage Office has advised that [redacted] (S)

65-59264

MCC:mhf

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 BTW/RC ON 3/25/98 PER 06 & LTR 2/27/97

Classified by SP2 BTW/RC (34225)
Declassify on: OADR

RECORDED - 93

65-59264-172

JUL 9 1951

Mr. R. T. Harbo

June 19, 1951

C.F. Downing

STAGE: [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED 7-18-94 BSP 128 TSLC 34225

b6
b7C

PURPOSE:

[redacted] To set forth results of cipher training given [redacted] in the STAGE program.

b6
b7C

DETAILS:

This individual was afforded approximately 3½ hours of cipher instruction 6/11/51 and approximately 5 hours 6/14/51 by I.W. NEMPHER of the Cryptanalysis Unit. The following three cipher systems were explained and practice messages enciphered and deciphered.

1. One Time Pad.
[redacted] was instructed in the use of the DIANA CRYPTOSYSTEMS (Literal One-Time Pad), following procedures set forth in AFSAG 1213 and inside top cover of enciphering and deciphering pads. One change was made - that of the use of Indicator groups. [redacted] was told to use three indicators, prefixing each message; the first an open 4-digit group showing the pad number, the second an open 3-digit group showing the pad page and the third an open 5-letter group being the first (and used) 5-letter key group appearing on the line of key used to be in the encipherment. This 5-letter row indicator is in accordance with AFSAG 1213 instructions. [redacted] was instructed in the use of large size pads but small pads were also described to him. Security precautions and aids for degarbling messages were discussed.

b6
b7C

2. Emergency Key Book Cipher.
As an emergency source of keys when pads have run out or are not available, [redacted] was instructed in the use of a Popular Library edition "Home Guide to Repair, Upkeep and Remodeling". Enciphering and deciphering procedure is identical with the one time pad system noted above excepting that key letters are taken from some arbitrary page in the book as follows. After choosing arbitrarily some previously unused page, and writing this page number down for use as an open indicator, [redacted] is to write down the initial letter of each line, regardless of indentation and beginning at the top left. Following this, he is to take off the 5th letter of each line on the same page, then the 10th letter, followed by the 15th, the 20th, etc. in multiples of five. After copying down a sufficient number of these key letters to encipher the message, these key letters are divided into 5-letter key groups and procedure followed exactly as with the one time pad system, using the same alphabet chart. Chapter titles

62-93626
cc - 65-59264
cc - Security Division (M.C. CLEMENTS)
IWN:EDJ

55 AUG 1

65-59264

NOT RECORDED
131 JUL 25 1951

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

and digits in the text are to be disregarded in developing keys. The only indicator - and this providing a method of differ ntiating Key Book from one time pad - is a three-digit open number showing the pa,e used. No marks of any kind are to be put on the key book but a separate and independent check-off list should be set up and used to prevent reuse of identical pages for keying, enciphering or deciphering.

3. Open Code - Double Meaning.

For use when other types of secret communication are not feasible, [redacted] was provided with a set of double meaning terms which can be incorporated in an innocuous appearing note or letter, or even passed on verbally. There follows the list of phrases to be used:

	Plain Text	Double Meaning Terms
1.	What are my instructions?	Weather
2.	Adopt Plan A	Ants
3.	Adopt Plan B	Bear
4.	Adopt Plan C	Coyotes
5.	I am controlled	Snow
6.	Do not contact me until further notice	Coal
7.	I need medicine	Saw/s
8.	I need men	Axe/s
9.	I need food	Nails
10.	I need 7/8/9 above urgently	Saw/, axe/ nails mentioned three
11.	Forced to Move	Shoes

[redacted] was told to rehearse these meanings mentally each day in order to remember them, and that any mention of the double meaning terms, regardless of context, constituted a double meaning signal representing the plaintext as shown above. One Time Cipher Pads are to be issued to [redacted] by the Air Force in Alaska. The Key Book is also to be issued in Alaska. Two copies of this Key Book are attached.

A method of indicating by radio transmission that he is operating under enemy control was given [redacted] He was told to send an incorrect letter in the initial 5-letter group in two successive cipher messages. This incorrect letter may be any letter in the first group and the procedure can be repeated later on to insure the contact station's receipt of this signal. He was also given a false "recognition" signal in the event he was pressed for such by the enemy. It was suggested to him that he say he was told to abbreviate his signature as such a signal indicating working under control.

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b7C

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b7C

[redacted] was accompanied by [redacted] during this cipher training.

Referral/Consult

OBSERVATIONS:

The amount of training thus far given [redacted] is not adequate. He is not a very adept pupil, being handicapped by what appears to be low general intelligence and poor reading and writing capacity. It is doubtful whether this man will ever be proficient in the use of secure ciphers. It will be necessary for him to constantly review his cipher systems through supervised practice if any degree of success is to be hoped for.

b6
b7C

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That [redacted] be afforded an additional 8 hours of training by the Cryptanalysis Unit. This is a reiteration of my recommendation to you on this individual by memorandum dated 6/13/51.

2. That [redacted] be required to practice his cipher systems under supervision, at frequent intervals, after his return to Alaska.

b6
b7C

3. That all communication sent to [redacted] be in the simplest possible language. He exhibits poor ability to piece together the plaintext of communications after the cipher has been stripped off.

b6
b7C

4. That consideration be given to using "X" word separators in messages sent to him - this might help him in his reading difficulties.

5. That the attached two copies of the key book "Home Guide to Repair, Upkeep and Remodeling", Popular Library , New York, March 1951, be forwarded to Alaska for use with [redacted]

b6
b7C

6. That a summary of the results of [redacted] training, as set forth above, be supplied the Bureau's Anchorage Office.

b6
b7C

ADDENDUM:

In connection with recommendation #1 above, 4½ hours additional time had been afforded [redacted] for cipher training purposes. This however alters in no way any of the other recommendations or the observations set forth above.

b6
b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : C. E. Hennrich

SUBJECT: STAGE

DATE: June 19, 1951

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/29/94 BY SP2 BTS/KP

Tolson
Clegg
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Rosen
Tracy
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Tele. Room
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Candy

Purpose:

To record the procedures which will be followed with respect to fingerprints and photographs of STAGE and Escape and Evasion Agents.

Details:

b6
b7C

Arrangements have been made with [redacted] Single Fingerprint Section, Identification Division, whereby a representative of Identification Division will fingerprint and photograph each STAGE and E. and E. Agent on his first day of training at SOG. This will take place in Room 2334, IB at 9:45 A. M., on each Monday and Tuesday.

Referral/Consult

Fingerprints will be taken on "Personal Identification" cards. Same will be searched against criminal files and permanently filed in the Criminal Section. If no prior criminal record is located, Form 1-276 will be executed in the Identification Division and routed to the Espionage Section for inclusion in the individual case file. If a prior record is located, four copies of the transcript will be furnished to Espionage Section: One for the individual case file, copies for FBI, Anchorage [redacted] Permanent stops will be placed in fingerprint files as to all Agents in favor of Espionage Section. The individual case file number and the word "STAGE" will identify the purpose of the stop. A notation will appear as to each stop that Espionage Section must be advised before any dissemination of the record is made to outside contributors. No record of the fingerprints taken at SOG will appear in the transcript of record furnished to outside contributors.

Referral/Consult

Three photographs of each individual will be taken: Close-up bust, close-up profile, and full length. Six copies of each photograph will be printed. One print of the close-up bust will be attached to the individuals fingerprint card, other prints being routed to the Espionage Section. Two copies of each photograph will be furnished to FBI, Anchorage, [redacted] and remaining prints and negatives will be placed in the individual case file.

Action:

RECORDED - 111 65-59264-178

JUN 28 1951

Record purposes only.

MCC:dmd
65-59264

76 JUL 9 1951

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 27, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM) (Bufile 65-59264)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP1 2 B TAS ON 6/30/94

34225

b6
b7C

ReBurad dated June 25, 1951 and Bureau rad dated June 27, 1951 concerning allegations of [redacted]

Assistant Special Agent in Charge JAMES T. MORELAND and Special Agent [redacted] have advised as follows: b6 b7C

They were in Seward, Alaska on January 25, 1951 in connection with this program and other Bureau work and attempted to hire an automobile to proceed down the Kenai Peninsula by themselves. However, the weather was severely cold, automobiles operating were few, and none could be rented. While interviewing [redacted] on the night of January 25, 1951 at the New Seward Hotel concerning instant program, he advised the agents that he was proceeding on the following day in his personally-owned automobile to his home [redacted] In the absence of other means of travel the agents requested [redacted] permission to accompany him [redacted] telling him that they had some work in that vicinity. [redacted] agreed to this and the trip was made the following day. At that time the agents did not know that the cabins of [redacted] and [redacted] were located [redacted] and learned of this for the first time on arrival [redacted]

On arrival [redacted] the agents interviewed [redacted] concerning the instant program and also interviewed [redacted] were all interviewed privately and no one other than the two Bureau agents were present for each interview. b6 b7C

[redacted] standing and have identical interests since they are [redacted] Inasmuch as they [redacted] they are able to observe who contacts one another. b6 b7C

The above-named Bureau agents state that while working at Seward, Alaska and other points along the Kenai Peninsula, they

65-298
cc: 66-314
cc: 66-313
cc: 66-311
JFD:vf

RECORDED - 51

EX. - 11

65-59214-174

JUL 2 1951

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have observed that the residents of that section of Alaska are keenly interested in Civilian Defense matters since they consider themselves to be residing in a vulnerable area in the event the United States should become involved in a war. These people frequently discuss various programs and measures to be taken in connection with Civilian Defense in the event of an attack and the use of the term "Civilian Defense" would not necessarily indicate any connection with the Stay-behind Agent Program.

ASAC MORELAND and SA [redacted] have advised that all three of the above-named Stay-behind Agents were clearly instructed at the time they were interviewed concerning the absolute necessity concerning secrecy in connection with the matter discussed and none of them were advised at any time of the identity of any other Stay-behind Agent. b6 b7C

[redacted] prior to departing from Anchorage, Alaska for the Seat of Government, stated that he told people in his community that he was proceeding to the States to take additional flight instruction and at no time did he indicate to personnel of this office that he had told anyone that he was proceeding to Washington, D. C. in connection with Civilian Defense matters or to contact Fish and Wildlife headquarters. b6 b7C

In accordance with Bureau instructions, all personnel have been re-briefed as to all security aspects of the instant program.

File # 65-59264

June 23, 1951

Mr. R. T. Harbo

C. F. Downing

STAGE: [redacted] b6 b7C

On June 20, 195[redacted] was afforded four and one-half hours additional training time in ciphers, as indicated in the addendum to my memorandum to you dated June 19, 1951. This additional training period covered a review of the three cipher systems given to [redacted] plus additional instruction in degarbling messages and the use of an alternate method for one time pad indicators. It was explained to him that some pads carry a five-letter System Indicator which signifies the particular pad in use, thus taking the place of the four-digit pad identifier. This five-letter System Indicator is to be placed at the beginning of each cipher message followed by the five-letter open key group indicator appearing at the beginning line of cipher key used for the message. These two indicators are sufficient to properly locate keys for the deciphering operation, and this procedure is in accordance with AFSAC 1213 instructions. [redacted] has less difficulty in deciphering messages when "X"s are used between words as word separators and this procedure is recommended for all cipher messages sent to him. b6 b7C

62-93626
IWN:jen

Oc - 65-59264

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 12-28-94 BY SP2 BTJ 34225

65-59264-

NOT RECORDED
131 JUL 27 1951

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

SAC, Anchorage

July 5, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

STAY

6/29/94 SQ12 BTS/SC 34225/

It is necessary, in the light of our experience to date, to reiterate instructions heretofore issued in order to completely safeguard the security of the Stay-Behind and Escape and Evasion programs.

You should specifically instruct each employee of your office, including investigative, clerical and radio personnel, that all phases of the programs are strictly confidential. The divulging of information to unauthorized persons, careless conversation, or the slipshod handling of any detail can endanger the effectiveness of the programs and the lives of persons recruited to participate. The programs must be protected, not only from the enemy, but from the public as well. It must also be remembered that the manner in which your responsibilities are fulfilled will be subject to close scrutiny of other intelligence agencies.

You can be assured individuals who complete training at SOG will have no illusions as to personal danger involved in participation, even if all security precautions are strictly adhered to. It is certainly incumbent on Bureau personnel to handle all phases of the programs in such a manner that these persons will not be subjected to unnecessary danger. They are due every possible protection we can give them. Any indiscretions of Bureau personnel which come to their attention will undoubtedly affect their morale adversely.

You and the Special Agents participating in the planning and implementation of the programs are in position to assure full security by careful planning and the exercise of utmost discretion and good judgment. There are set forth hereinafter instructions and observations which should receive your very careful attention. You should immediately discuss with each Special Agent in detail every phase to positively insure there is no misunderstanding in your instructions. It is necessary, of course, that you implement instructions to Special Agents in the light of local conditions and circumstances which will arise in individual cases.

Tolson
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Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Alden
Belmont
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Mohr
Tele. Room
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Gandy

RECORDED - 49 65-59264-175

65-59264

X-35

JUL 9 1951

MCC:njf

Contacts with Informants

It is noted your office has used individuals you consider reliable to obtain names and preliminary facts concerning potential SBA agents. It is unnecessary and undesirable that informants, however reliable, be informed as to any aspects of the programs. There should be no inference whatsoever that a person concerning whom inquiry is made may be contacted for purposes of recruitment. It should be relatively easy to obtain the desired information through casual conversation or by disguising the true purpose of inquiry.

The Bureau has noted that certain individuals used as informants have themselves been recruited. This procedure is obviously dangerous. Your attention has been directed to circumstances in the cases of [redacted] neither of whom has been scheduled for training at SOG to date. It is noted that [redacted] in particular, appears, on the basis of information supplied to the Bureau, to be eminently qualified to participate as an SBA, better qualified, perhaps, than the individual concerning whom he supplied information. The latter, [redacted] has been scheduled for training. Some of the individuals concerning whom [redacted] supplied information have also been scheduled. b6 b7C b7D

You are instructed to immediately review all files on SBA's to determine all such instances in which persons used as informants have themselves been recruited as SBA's. You should, in each instance, determine from Special Agents who have contacted such persons the exact extent of information supplied to them, the bases given, if any, for inquiries concerning other persons, and all other factors which may affect further consideration of informants and/or persons concerning whom they have been interviewed. You should advise the Bureau promptly of the results and of your recommendations in the individual cases involved.

Recruitment

It is obvious from our experience to date that quality rather than quantity must be the controlling factor in selecting SBA personnel. You must, of course, consider an individual's loyalty, trustworthiness, availability, physical condition, knowledge of the Territory, experience with planes, boats, dog teams, mountain climbing, radio, availability of equipment and similar factors. Notwithstanding that an individual may be well-qualified in the categories mentioned, it is equally essential that he be mentally equipped to absorb training, some of which is of a technical nature. You must give all due consideration to the age of the person, extent of formal education, extent of self-education, native intelligence, and other factors which will influence his ability to grasp the training quickly. All of the questions should be definitely resolved before an individual is given any information in connection with recruitment and/or scheduled for training.

It has been observed that, in some cases, further investigation has been conducted after an individual has been openly recruited. Checks of criminal records and the obtaining of other obviously desirable information must in all instances be handled prior to interview for recruitment. In short, no potential recruit should be given any information whatsoever concerning the program until all possible reasons for elimination have been explored. It is recognized that interviews with potential recruits may be desirable in order to obtain some of the necessary information and evaluate him. In such instances, suitable pretexts should be used, and no indication of the true purpose of interview with the potential recruit should be given to him until it has been definitely determined there is no reasonable basis for his elimination.

It is obvious that utmost discretion must be exercised by Special Agents in making contact with potential SBA's for recruitment purposes, for arranging schedules for training and otherwise. It is natural that residents, particularly in small communities, will attach significance

to the appearance of FBI Agents in their areas. Every effort must be made to minimize the attention given to the presence of Agents. It is undoubtedly known to most persons that the FBI conducts investigations in criminal and applicant matters. Suitable pretexts, such as investigation of fictitious persons alleged to have formerly resided in the areas involved, might well be used as means of justifying the presence of the Agents and contacts with potential recruits. In such cases, it is obvious that a number of the residents should be interviewed and that the SBA be appropriately briefed in order that he may infer to curious persons that he was interviewed in the same connection with which they were interviewed. Such precautions must be repeated for recontacts.

There are, of course, inherent dangers in the recruiting of two or more persons in a small community. There should be no action or conversation on the part of Special Agents from which one recruit might have any justification whatsoever for believing that another person has been recruited. SBA's and potential SBA's should be given no indication of immediate travel plans of Agents from which inferences might be drawn. Obviously, such persons should not be directly queried concerning other SBA's. It is elementary to state that conversations with an SBA should not be conducted in the presence of other persons, including other SBA's. It is probable that in many cases these individuals can be contacted for recruitment or for other purposes in Anchorage or at other points distant from their home communities.

There are likewise inherent dangers in the scheduling of persons from the same communities or who are known to be well acquainted. Such schedules should be so arranged that two or more SBA's under these circumstances will not be absent from their communities at the same time. The possibilities of such persons seeing each other at the departure point in Alaska or encountering one another in travel will be thus eliminated or minimized.

Briefing Persons Recruited

Persons who have arrived at SOG to date for training have indicated they were given little information prior to departure from Alaska as to the nature of the program and training to be afforded. Such procedure of furnishing these persons a minimum of information is desirable. If it is later discovered they have been indiscreet they can be eliminated from further consideration for training at SOG or other phases of the program with less danger to security. It is obvious from your experience to date, however, that persons recruited must be further impressed with the absolute necessity for complete secrecy, that they must not by word, action, written communication, telephone, or otherwise, indicate to any persons, including wives, girl friends, employers, associates in business or others, in Alaska or elsewhere, that they have been contacted by the FBI for recruitment of any nature whatsoever, have any connection with the FBI, are employed by the FBI, intend to leave the Territory at the request of the FBI, or are in any way concerned with any responsibility of the FBI. It should be specifically explained to these individuals at the time of recruitment that any violations of the confidence imposed may endanger the security of the country, their personal safety, and necessarily eliminate them from further consideration.

The precautions taken and discretion exercised by your personnel in connection with recruiting these persons, contacts for scheduling them for training and otherwise will no doubt have a direct bearing on their conduct. We can not expect them to abide by instructions if conduct of our personnel is not exemplary.

Cover Stories to Explain Absences for Training

SSA's who travel to SOG for training must have cover stories to explain to relatives, associates, friends and employers their absences from their communities and jobs.

This question should be worked out in detail with each SBA on the occasion of the interview when he is first recruited and advised of the necessity for training.

The cover story must be entirely logical and foolproof. It is natural that individuals residing in the community of an SBA will be curious as to his absence and will ask questions both before and after his travel. The SBA must be thoroughly briefed in this respect in order that his departure, absence and return will appear entirely normal. It is undesirable that SBA's indicate they are travelling to Washington, notwithstanding ostensibly good explanations.

The supposed destination and purpose of travel of the SBA must be logical and in keeping with his status in the community, financial situation, past experience, past residences, location of relatives and friends in the States, and other considerations which might have bearing. The possibility that an SBA may encounter other Alaskan acquaintances en route must always be considered and the SBA briefed as to a suitable explanation if such is required. The possibility that relatives of an SBA in the States may disprove his cover story through correspondence with relatives and friends in Alaska must not be overlooked.

It is recognized that SBA's may desire to leave addresses through which they may be reached in the event of emergency. Each individual should be specifically questioned in this regard in order that you can provide a suitable address in the States, in keeping with the cover story, to which emergency communications might be directed. Communications, except in extreme emergency, should be discouraged because of the ramifications which are involved in arranging for forwarding. In this connection, the Bureau [redacted] will accept from trainees in Washington or Fort Benning, as the case may be, letters which trainees desire to send to relatives or others in Alaska. Such letters are censored with the knowledge of the trainee and are forwarded to appropriate points, in keeping with the trainee's cover story, for posting.

Referral/Consult

Schedules for Training

Every possible precaution must be taken in connection with scheduling persons for training at S G. You should, in accordance with previous instructions, attempt where possible to schedule persons who appear to be best qualified first, giving due regard to geographical coverage. You must take all possible precautions to prevent the possibility that two trainees scheduled for departure during the same week will encounter each other while standing by for physical examinations and actual departures. Similar precautions must be taken on return of trainees from Washington.

It is evident that there are inherent dangers involved in contacts by Bureau personnel with these individuals in Anchorage. Such contacts should be held to a minimum. Although it is recognized that you are obligated to expedite the travel of these individuals it is highly undesirable for Special Agents to personally escort SBA's to and from airports and otherwise under circumstances which would make it evident to bystanders that an unusual interest exists.

[redacted]. You should continue to scrutinize [redacted] to insure that such practices are adequate from a security standpoint. Any insecure methods should be brought to the attention [redacted] in order that they may be corrected. The Bureau should be informed in such instances and, specifically, whether [redacted] has taken corrective action.

Referral/Consult

Future Training

SBA's are being advised they will be afforded additional training after return to Alaska. Such training will require periodic, regular contacts with these persons. You must realize the security factors which will be involved in meeting and communicating with SBA's for training and practice. Here again, the required presence of Agents in the various communities involved must be fully justified by pretext, or otherwise.

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Tele. Room
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Gandy

You should, in accordance with previous instructions, give immediate attention to the question of assignment and training of sufficient personnel who can carry out the necessary training of SBA's. You should not delay long range planning in this regard. All security factors should be thoroughly understood by both Special Agents and trainees. You will be furnished, at an early date, outlines of the various courses of basic instruction which are being given at SOG.

Sub-agents and Informants

As you are aware, a course of instruction is being given at SOG in the basic principles involved in the selection and training of sub-agents and informants. SBA's are being advised that they should give thought to the question of persons who might assist them in the event of actual operations, and under different circumstances which might obtain at the time. They are being advised that they should, in giving consideration to the question, think of potential assistants in terms of unquestioned loyalty, trustworthiness, availibility, physical condition, intelligence, family situation, ability to contribute experience, knowledge of particular areas, and equipment. They are being instructed they should, after consideration of all factors and without contacting any such persons, submit names and identifying data to your office for consideration.

SBA's are being specifically instructed that they must not under any circumstances, prior to actual operations, give any person any information of whatsoever nature concerning their activities in regard to the program, contact any person for purposes of recruitment or for any other reason in connection with the program, without the specific authority of your office. It is being pointed out to them that there are persons in Alaska, possibly included among their acquaintances, who are past or present members of the Communist Party, that there may be persons actively engaged in collection of information for an enemy country, and that there must for these and other security reasons be no deviation whatever from this instruction. They are being advised that even under operating conditions it will be highly desirable to clear with the principal, if at all possible, before recruiting particular persons.

It is imperative that all Special Agent personnel be fully advised of these instructions which are being afforded to SBA's and that SBA's be rebriefed at frequent intervals in this regard.

Caching

It can be foreseen that many security problems will be involved in connection with caching of equipment and supplies. This activity will, in the absence of extreme care, attract the attention of persons not connected with the program, including Alaskan natives. It is probable that the advice and services of certain of the SBA's can be utilized in this regard.

In view of the [redacted] in this connection, it is imperative that all security factors be thoroughly [redacted]

Referral/Consult

De-briefing

It is elementary that the security and success of any intelligence operation depends largely on restricting to an absolute minimum the number of individuals who are aware of its existence. It may become necessary, as in the case of persons previously recruited who are eliminated from further consideration, or in the event of discovered leaks, to take active steps to "de-brief" individuals involved. Steps in this direction will require your utmost good judgment. You should specifically instruct all personnel they must always advise you promptly of any information they receive indicating conceivable necessity for action of this type.

It may suffice in some instances to advise an individual that the activity or project for which he was being considered has been abandoned. In other cases it may be desirable to lead persons to believe that they have formed erroneous conclusions, that some alleged remark was the product of imagination, or that the reason for some action was entirely different from that suspected. It may be desirable that certain persons be removed from the Territory in the event of emergency.

* * *

The importance of this program should be recognized by all personnel. There should be no misconception on the part of your employees that any part of the activity is child's-play. It is essential that each employee discharge his responsibilities in strict accordance with instructions and with the utmost intelligence, discretion and resourcefulness of which he is capable.

MR. R. T. HARBO

July 5, 1951

C. F. DOWNING

STAGE;
ALEXANDER BOLAM

Approximately 14 hours of cipher training were afforded [redacted] a STAGE trainee, and [redacted] June 19, 22 and 27, 1951, by [redacted] W. NEITHER and P. A. NAGER of the Cryptanalysis Unit. This completes the scheduled Washington cipher training for [redacted] and [redacted]

b6
b7C
Referral/Consult

Attached is a summary of the cipher training given, and our observations, also an envelope containing two copies of the emergency key book "Trouble on the Border" by Gordon Young, a Popular Library edition published March 1951. A copy of the attached summarized training and the two key books should be forwarded to the Anchorage Office.

1-ENCL

INM:jg

62-931482
~~cc~~ = 65-59264
cc - Security Division (Clements)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-18-94 BY SP2 STP

ES AUG 4 1951

65-59264-
NOT RECORDED
131 JUL 25 1951

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

One time pad MANA CRYPTOSYSTEM with AFSAP literal key pads, Emergency Key Book System and Double Meaning System, as set forth in the July 2, 1951 comprehensive memorandum on STAGE cipher training, given to [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b7E

OBSERVATIONS:

[redacted] was extremely slow in operating these cipher systems and made numerous errors. He seemed to be confused at times and had considerable difficulty in reading the plaintext of deciphered messages. He has very limited capacity to work out garbles and will need extensive additional supervised practice and review if he is to be expected to remember these sytems. It is doubtful whether he will ever be proficient in the use of ciphers, and any use by him of the double meaning terms will have to be seriously questioned for accurate double meaning association.

b6
b7C

[redacted] participated satisfactorily in the cipher training.

Referral/Consult

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-18-97 BY SP2 28TSTB

34224

ENCLOSURE 65-1264-V

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That all messages sent t[redacted]in cipher have "X" word separators in the plaintext; and the plaintext be in the simplest (one-syllable) words.

2. That extensive and periodic supervised training be afforded [redacted] in Alaska.

b6
b7C

MR. E. T. HARBO

July 5, 1951

C. F. DOWNING

STAGE;
DYTON ABB GLILLILAND

Approximately 14 hours of cipher training were afforded [redacted] a STAGE trainee, also [redacted] by I. W. MEWHER of the Cryptanalysis Unit, June 25, June 28 and July 4, 1951. This completes the scheduled Washington cipher training for these men.

Attached is a summary of the cipher training given and our observations, also an envelope containing two copies of the emergency key book "Powdersmoke Justice" by William Colt MacDonald, a Permabooks publication. A copy of the attached summarized training and the two key books should be forwarded to the Anchorage Office.

2-ENCL.

IWN:jg

62-93498
cc - 65-59264
cc - Security Division (Clements)

b6
b7C
Referral/Consult

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-18-94 BY SP2 STS/TSC

31225

65-59264-

NOT RECORDED
131 JUL 28 1951

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

One time pad DIANA CRYPTOSYSTEM, with AFSAP literal key pads, Emergency Key Book System and Double Meaning System as described in the July 2, 1951 comprehensive memorandum on STANO cipher training, given to [redacted]

[redacted]

OBSERVATIONS:

[redacted] was a fair student during this period of cipher instruction. He is slow and seemed to be unaccustomed to tedious writing required in this type of operation. He successfully enciphered and deciphered messages but with a considerable number of errors; he has limited capacity to work out garbled messages. Continued practice under supervision is necessary for this man to retain capacity [redacted] these ciphers.

[redacted] participated satisfactorily in the cipher training [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That additional practice and training be afforded [redacted] periodically, under competent supervision, after his return to Alaska.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2-18-94 BY SP12BTJ/PC 34225/

ENCLOSURE

65-59264-

b6
b7C
b7E

b6
b7C

Referral/Consult

b6
b7C

RADIO ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUNE 25, 1951 URGENT

SAC, ANCHORAGE CIPHER PAD CODE

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTJ/ST
ON 4-20-2000
00-1164

STAGE. [redacted] REPORTED AT SOG FOR TRAINING JUNE TWENTY FIVE.

HE ALLEGES TWO FBI AGENTS, ACCOMPANIED BY [redacted] CONTACTED

HIM IN CONNECTION WITH HIS RECRUITMENT AND THEIR CONVERSATIONS

TOOK PLACE IN [redacted] STATES IT WAS EVIDENT TO HIM

b6 THAT [redacted] HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY RECRUITED FOR THIS PROGRAM.

b7C STATES IT IS GENERAL KNOWLEDGE IN [redacted]

[redacted] COMMUNITIES THAT HE, [redacted] ARE TO BE

GIVEN TRAINING OF SOME SORT OUTSIDE ALASKA AND THAT OPINION

SEEMS TO BE SUCH IS IN CONNECTION WITH CIVILIAN DEFENSE. [redacted]

HAD PREVIOUSLY STATED HE TOLD PERSONS IN HIS COMMUNITY WAS COMING

TO WASHINGTON CONCERNING CIVILIAN DEFENSE MATTERS AND DESIRED TO

CONTACT FISH AND WILDLIFE HEADQUARTERS. SUBMIT IMMEDIATELY DETAILS

OF RECRUITMENT OF [redacted] IDENTITIES OF PERSONS

PRESENT DURING INTERVIEWS AND FULL FACTS WHICH ARE NECESSARY TO

DETERMINE APPROPRIATE FUTURE ACTION RE THESE THREE PERSONS. SUBMIT

BY SEPARATE MEMORANDUM YOUR RECOMMENDATION ANY PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUIRED. POSITIVELY ESSENTIAL ALL PERSONNEL BE IMMEDIATELY

DEBRIEFED AS TO ALL SECURITY ASPECTS.

Classified by SP2 BTJ/ST 34225 ROUTER
Declassify on: OADR

RECORDED 3 65-58836-3

JUN 25 1951

FBI

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

HANDLED BY SPECIAL DESK

JUL 18 1951

Bureau Radio (6-26-51) 5:32 P.M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUNE 26, 1951

RADIOGRAM
URGENT
CIPHER PAD CODE

SAC, ANCHORAGE

STAGE. DETERMINE PROMPTLY [redacted] AND ADVISE WHETHER QUOTE

[redacted]

[redacted] INFORMATION WILL GREATLY FACILITATE TRAINING IN SUBJECT BY BUREAU PERSONNEL.

HOOVER

65-59264

MCC: BJC

Classified by [redacted]
Declassify on: [redacted]

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTS/SM
ON 4-20-2000
00-1164

HANDLED BY STOP DESK

EX-33

RECORDED - 3

65-59264-177

JUN 9 1951

FBI
JUN 11 92 AM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Referral/Consult

CC-150

BUREAU OF INVESTIGAT
DEPARTMENT OF JU

To: COMMUNICATION

JUNE 27, 1951

URGENT

Transmit the following message to: SAC, ANCHORAGE (41)

RADIOGRAM
CIPHER PAD CODE

CONFIDENTIAL

STAGE. REBURAD CONCERNING ALLEGATIONS OF GILLILAND. EXPEDITE SUMMARY IN RADIOGRAM AND SUBMIT DETAILED MEMORANDA BY MAIL EARLIEST PRA PRACTICAL TIME.

HOOVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

MCC:cem
65-59264

34225/
6/29/94
Classified by SP3-BTV/m
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTV/m
ON 4-20-2000
00-1164

RECORDED - 3 65-59264-178

(41)

CK Wash Ex-33
1810 (41)

87138

(41)

HANDLED BY
STOP DESK

FBI
JUN 27 12 44 PM '51
RECEIVED READING ROOM

CONFIDENTIAL

(41)

(41)

(41)

Tolson
Clegg
Glavin
Ladd
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Egan
Gurnea
Harbo
Hunt
Mohr
Quinn Tamm
Nease
Sandy

SENT VIA Bureau Radio 6-27-51 2:33 PM Per Wash

6 JUL 13 1951

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: July 6, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: STAGE
(Bufile 65-59264)

ReBulet to Anchorage dated June 29, 1951 concerning the authorized increase of per diem to $5.00 per day.

In this connection it is noted that prior to receipt of instant letter only two trainees have been reimbursed, namely, [redacted] Bureau file 62-93565, and [redacted] Bureau file 62-93626, at the previous rate of $4.00 a day. It is felt that in these two instances, the increased per diem should be made retroactive and Bureau advice is requested in this regard.

b6
b7C

It is further noted in my letter to the Bureau dated June 28, 1951 regarding [redacted] that advice was requested concerning reimbursement to him for taxi fare incurred by him in Seattle.

b6
b7C

Reference is also made to your letter of June 29, 1951 regarding [redacted] This matter will be held in abeyance pending receipt of information on the increase of per diem.

b6
b7C
Referral/Consult

65-298
SSP:vf

cc: 66-360
cc: 66-348

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTW/SC
ON 6/29/94

34225-1

RECORDED - 49

JUL 10 1951

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EX-114

179

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

RECORDED - 41

179

SAC, Anchorage

July 19, 1951

Director, FBI

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted], SAA
(Your file CG-300)

Reurlet July 6, 1951, captioned "[redacted] b6
concerning [redacted] b7C
[redacted] Referral/Consult

You may adjust reimbursement to [redacted]
[redacted] in accordance with the revised schedule b6
for per diem and expenses set forth in bulet dated b7C
June 29, 1951. While a receipt should be obtained
from [redacted] for the full amount of the adjustment
the money [redacted] should be withheld and forwarded
to the Bureau.

Referral/Consult

62-93626

MCC:bjw

6/29/94 SPIRITIST

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JUL 19 7 11 PM '51

SP3-BTS/SM
4-20-2000 00-1164

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F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY

FROM ANCHORAGE 6-27-51 NR 272130 8:52 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

STAGE. REFERENCE YOUR RADIOGRAMS JUNE 25 AND JUNE 27 INSTANT CONCERNING ALLEGATIONS OF [redacted] WAS INTERVIEWED ON JANUARY 26 LAST BY ASAC JAMES T. MORELAND AND SA [redacted] AT HIS HOME AT [redacted] ALASKA. MORELAND AND [redacted] ADVISE THAT ON PREVIOUS DAY THEY INTERVIEWED [redacted] IN SEWARD, ALASKA AT WHICH TIME HE ADVISED WAS PROCEEDING ON THE FOLLOWING DAY BY AUTOMOBILE TO HIS HOME [redacted] THE AGENTS TOLD [redacted] THAT THEY HAD OTHER WORK ON THE KENAI PENINSULA AND REQUESTED PERMISSION TO ACCOMPANY HIM TO [redacted] SINCE DUE TO WEATHER CONDITIONS NOT POSSIBLE TO SECURE OTHER TRANSPORTATION. THEY DROVE WITH [redacted] TO [redacted] ON JANUARY 26 LAST AND LEARNED FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT THE CABINS OF [redacted] WERE LOCATED [redacted] WAS NOT PRESENT WHEN AGENTS INTERVIEWED [redacted] AND NO ONE ELSE WAS PRESENT OTHER THAN AGENTS DURING INTERVIEWS WITH [redacted] BOTH OF WHOM WERE RECRUITED AT THIS TIME. AGENTS RETURNED TO SEWARD ON SAME DAY JANUARY 26 WITH [redacted] INTERVIEWING AGENTS ADVISE THAT RESIDENTS OF THAT SECTION OF ALASKA ARE KEENLY INTERESTED IN CIVILIAN DEFENSE MATTERS BECAUSE OF THEIR VULNERABLE LOCATION AND CONNECTION WITH CIVILIAN DEFENSE WOULD NOT DISCLOSE ANYTHING CONCERNING SBA PROGRAM. [redacted] WERE INSTRUCTED WHEN INTERVIEWED CONCERNING ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR SECRECY AND THE IDENTITIES OF OTHER STAY BEHIND AGENTS WERE NOT DISCLOSED TO ANY OF THEM. [redacted] STATED THAT HE TOLD PEOPLE IN HIS COMMUNITY THAT HE WAS

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If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

EX. 32
6/29/94

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F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (U)

PAGE TWO

PROCEEDING TO THE STATES TO TAKE ADDITIONAL FLIGHT TRAINING AND AT NO TIME INDICATED THAT HE TOLD ANYBODY THAT HE WAS PROCEEDING TO WASHINGTON CONCERNING CIVILIAN DEFENSE MATTERS OR TO CONTACT FISH AND WILDLIFE HEADQUARTERS.

RECEIVED (6-27-51) (U) 9:04 PM LH

cc: Mr. Clements

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (U)

SAC, Anchorage

Director, FBI

STAGE

June 29, 1951

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Re Bureau radiograms June 25 and 27, and your radiogram June 27, 1951.

RECORDED - 22 [redacted] 181

EX. 32 [redacted] who made his original allegations in the presence of Air Force personnel, has been reinterviewed in detail, in private. He stated in the Fall of 1950, Phil Harding, former Mayor of Seward, had approached him and others in the Kenai Lake area concerning a plan for civilian defense including caching food, supplies and firearms and the establishments of camps for civilians in the hills should they be forced to flee because of attack or invasion. Subsequently, in January, 1951, SAs [redacted] and Moreland arrived at [redacted] house in the automobile of [redacted] They were introduced to [redacted] by [redacted] as being from the FBI, and [redacted] stated the Agents had a program [redacted] might be interested in. SA [redacted] told [redacted] meager facts of the program and stated he would like to have [redacted] cooperation. [redacted] was said to be present in the same room where the conversation took place. [redacted] stated the Agents knew he had previously been contacted regarding civilian defense and suggested he not proceed too far in [redacted] program which might interfere with the plan with which the Agents were concerned.

[redacted] stated he received the impression that [redacted] had been recruited. It was stated by Agents that [redacted] were provided, [redacted] would be likely to be sent out [redacted] for training. [redacted] allegedly questioned [redacted] as to the time as to how he would like to go "outside." [redacted] replied that he would enjoy same, provided such a trip would not interfere with his means of livelihood, and [redacted] allegedly expressed the same idea. [redacted] stated he offered to prepare coffee for the Agents and he was advised by them that they were going to have dinner at the house of [redacted] had allegedly spent the winter at the [redacted] The Agents were believed to have returned to Seward with [redacted] He expressed the opinion that the incident occurred on a day when [redacted] was not working.

He stated that a few days later one [redacted] an ex-Marine, had told him he understood the FBI had talked to [redacted] stated he told [redacted] he understood the FBI had been checking several people in the area and considered they might be checking up on someone. [redacted] stated he would have liked to talk to the Agents as he had questions concerning civilian defense.

MCC:1fb

COMM-FBI JUL 3 - 1951 MAILED 19

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 28 ITS/SP4 ON 10-30-79

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FBI - DIRECTOR OF JUSTICE RECEIVED 9:38 AM '51

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[redacted] stated it seemed to be the general opinion in the area that the FBI had some civilian defense plan, although knowledge of the real program was not believed to be known. He stated that a few days before he was to depart, the [redacted] persons named [redacted] who have been living with him, a [redacted] were at [redacted] house. [redacted] allegedly told [redacted] that she need not worry about fixing his clothes as a woman (name not recalled), living in a trailer, had already fixed his shirts, etc. Someone allegedly inquired of [redacted] when he was leaving and he replied "about the fifteenth." [redacted] went on to say that he was required to be at the "base" for a day or so before leaving Anchorage. Some discussion ensued as to whether [redacted] would visit a relative in the States. [redacted] stated he received the impression that all present believed [redacted] had been contacted by the FBI in some matter concerning civilian defense.

[redacted] stated that he does not recall overhearing statements indicating that persons in his area believed that he left Alaska for reasons of civilian defense. He stated that it was evident, however, that word had got around through some source, believed by him to be [redacted] that he was going "outside." He specifically mentioned that the [redacted] in Seward had contacted him and told him that one [redacted] had asked the [redacted] to tell [redacted] to be sure and take a case of dynamite to a given location before leaving.

[redacted] stated he had, during the previous winter, indicated an intention of traveling to the States for further studies in aeronautics. He stated as far as he knows people believed he went outside for that purpose. He stated a definite belief, however, that [redacted] was aware of the true purpose. He stated [redacted] had inquired of him on one occasion as to when he was leaving, and he received the definite impression that [redacted] had connected him with instant program.

[redacted] went on to state that the same Agents called on him a second time, possibly in April, having arrived by an automobile presumed to be a Bureau car. He stated the Agents told him the program was shaping up and he would be advised if an appropriation was granted permitting training. He stated he had no information the Agents called on other persons on that occasion. The Agents are said to have inquired as to roads to Kenai and Homer, and indicated that they would stop back to see [redacted] if time permitted.

He stated the same Agents subsequently arrived in a plane of Safeway Airways, apparently chartered out of Seward. He stated the Agents called him aside after locating him in the

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company of [redacted] They told him it was desired that he be in Anchorage on the morning of June 22. He stated they inquired whether he knew if [redacted] was at home, and that he indicated he believed not as he had seen [redacted] go by in a car that morning.

[redacted] stated the same Agents were back at his home on the following day in the same plane and, not finding him at home, left a note with [redacted] stating that he should advise if for any reason he could not reach Anchorage on the morning of June 22nd. He described the note as being open and not in an envelope.

[redacted] stated he arrived at Anchorage on the morning of June 22nd, saw Agent [redacted] and was ushered into the office of the SAC, where a person presumed by him to be the SAC stated that the "other fellow" who was supposed to travel that day could not go, and that it was desired [redacted] proceed on that date instead. He stated SA [redacted] drove him to Fort Richardson, remained with him during his physical examination and assisted him in boarding the plane.

[redacted] advised on his arrival at SOC, that he had explained his trip by stating that he was traveling to Washington to discuss civilian defense matters and to visit the Headquarters of the Fish and Wildlife Service, the latter being a lifetime ambition. [redacted] was advised at the time that he must actually visit the Fish and Wildlife Service and Headquarters of Civilian Defense, and procure literature from both agencies and be in a position to bear out his cover story on his return to Alaska. After [redacted] gave the information indicated, [redacted] was advised that information had been received from Alaska that there had been considerable discussion in his area of the fact that he and perhaps others were to be in training of some sort in connection with civilian defense. He was told that there had been indications that the public has connected the FBI with such program and the travel of him and possibly other persons, such persons being unnamed. He was again specifically instructed and did in fact, on June 20, 1951, visit the Governmental agencies named for the purpose indicated. He has been thoroughly rebriefed as to the absolute necessity for bearing out his cover story, and dispelling any idea that might be brought to his attention that the FBI has any part in the activities in which he is interested, and that he must guard against loose conversation at all times.

[redacted] will proceed to Atlanta, Georgia, and remain there for a short period prior to taking parachute training

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at Fort Benning. Since he gave no definite indication of his destination in the States and indicated he intended to receive aeronautical training, he will advise persons in Alaska upon his return, if questioned, that he received such training at Atlanta. He has been instructed to visit flying schools in that area and secure literature. He has been thoroughly rebriefed as to the absolute necessity for handling all matters in complete confidence and has been assured that every effort will be made to repair any damage which may have been done to the security of this program, and which might affect his personal situation.

In view of the apparent discrepancies in the statements of [redacted] and Mr. James T. Moreland and [redacted] as reflected in your radiogram, you should submit memorandum, if required, in addition to those memoranda which you have previously been instructed to submit. It is imperative that you bring this incident to the attention of all personnel engaged in this program in order that the apparent dangers which have been pointed up can be completely avoided.

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 25, 1951

FROM :MR. C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF ~~EVASION~~ INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM, ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

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Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/25/94 BY SP2 BTC/KSR

PURPOSE:

To advise you of allegations made by [redacted] indicating the security of the SBA program might have been endangered.

DETAILS:

[redacted] who began training at SOG on this date, has advised two agents of the Anchorage Office contacted him at [redacted] Alaska, accompanied by [redacted] of Seward, Alaska. It was plain to [redacted] that [redacted] had been previously recruited himself and conversations between the agents and [redacted] took place in [redacted] presence. It appeared to [redacted] that the agents had used [redacted] to assist in locating him, [redacted] went on to state that it had become a matter of general knowledge in the general area of his residence and in the area of Moose Pass that [redacted] were to leave the territory for some sort of "training." [redacted] expressed the opinion that the public associated [redacted] as having some connection with the same proposition and that it appeared the public believes contacts by the FBI are concerned with "civilian defense." [redacted] attributed public knowledge of at least some of the facts alleged has resulted from talk on the part of [redacted]

[redacted] incidentally, is now in his second week of training at SOG, having begun on June 19, last. [redacted] when asked what reason he had given to persons in his community for leaving Alaska, stated he had told the people in his community that he was going to Washington to talk with civilian defense authorities and that he also wanted to have the opportunity of calling at the Headquarters of the Fish and Wildlife Service. [redacted] indicated that he had positively told no persons of his true purpose and indicated the fact of his recruitment for the SBA program was not known except to the FBI and himself.

65-59264-181

RECORDED - 22 JUL 11 1951

EX-132

MCC:gmu

65-59264

[redacted] although previously recruited, has not been definitely scheduled for training but he has indicated he would be available any time after July 20, next.

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It is essential that we determine full facts from the Anchorage Office in connection with the allegations of [redacted] in order that the extent of danger to the security of the program can be fully determined and appropriate steps can be taken to counteract same. It is to be noted that [redacted] statements were made in the presence of Air Force personnel.

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RECOMMENDATION:

Attached hereto is a radiogram to SAC Anchorage instructing full facts concerning recruitment of the three persons in question be submitted immediately, that he include recommendations as to action which may counteract any danger to the security of the program and that he submit by separate communication his recommendations as to any personnel action required.

Detached and sent 6-25-51 C.K.J.

C.K.J.

Get to bottom of this promptly.

D.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. C. E. HENNRICH

DATE: June 22, 1951

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/30/94 BY SP2 BTS/STP

Referral/Consult

PURPOSE:

To advise that [redacted]

DETAILS:

Referral/Consult

Anchorage memorandum dated 6-14-51 advises [redacted]

Anchorage suggested to [redacted]

Anchorage states it is anticipated that requests be submitted to [redacted] Anchorage is being instructed by letter that such requests should by all means be made.

RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Consult

That SA Sanders, Liaison Unit, bring this question to the prompt attention of [redacted] in order that he may appropriately instruct [redacted]

MCC:dar

165-59264-182

EX.-32

JUL 17 1951

JUL 10 1951

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 22, 1951

FROM : Mr. C. E. Hennrich

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM, ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/30/94 BY SP12 BTJ/SC 34225

① STAGE

Referral/Consult

PURPOSE:

To suggest that immediate discussions be had with [redacted] at the headquarters level with regard to the question of payment to Stay-Behind agents and Escape and Evasion agents in the event of actual operations.

Referral/Consult

DETAILS:

As you are aware, payment to Stay-Behind agents during the periods of travelling and training has been previously authorized. [redacted] it is understood arrangements have been made in that regard. Although the question of possible payments to such agents after the beginning of operations has arisen during discussions [redacted] the matter has not been fully discussed and no agreements have been reached. It is believed desirable this question be resolved at the earliest possible date, in order that potential agents selected for training and who have assured of their desire to cooperate and their definite intention to remain in Alaska can be given some assurance that their families will be provided for in the event of actual operations.

One of the persons who has already arrived for training has pointed out that he is not a man of wealth, and that his wife and children are dependent on his income solely. He also mentioned that, dependent upon circumstances, he would likely be somewhat older at the end of operations, assuming that he survived. He pointed out that while the work he would be performing as a Stay-Behind agent would perhaps be more dangerous than that of a soldier in actual combat, he, as a civilian, would enjoy none of the benefits which are attached to one who has served in the armed forces, including veteran's preference for employment. He stated that he would feel much more secure, and feels that any other persons considered for similar wartime duty would feel likewise, if he had definite assurance, and understood plans which may be in the making for persons in his category.

RECORDED - 65-59264-182X

AUG 24 1951

65-59264
MCC:djb

7-28-51.

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

It can be seen that the question of family maintenance and the future of SBAs and E and E agents may well affect the recruitment for these programs and the morale of persons so recruited. We should be in a position, at the earliest moment, to advise these persons of the manner in which they will be cared for.

Three possibilities suggested are:

1. That consideration be given to commissioning Stay-Behind agents and Escape and Evasion agents in the Air Corps. This arrangement would allow for family maintenance, provision for allotments from pay, cheap insurance, and veteran's benefits. No administrative setup, in addition to those already in existence, would appear to be required for the execution of such plans. Further, persons so commissioned would be under military control and subject to military discipline.

2. Payment to these persons in civilian capacities from funds appropriated for the Air Corps. It appears probable that no special administrative arrangements would be necessary since the Air Corps undoubtedly has many civilians on its present payroll.

3. Payment to these persons from Bureau funds, which it appears would require additional appropriations. This plan would require a considerable amount of administrative handling at a great expense of time and money.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is urgently recommended discussions be had [redacted] as to future plans for payment to SBAs and E and E agents in the event of actual operations in order that the question may be definitely resolved.

Referral/Consult

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 27, 1951

FROM : C. E. Hennrich

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SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM, ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/30/94 BY SP2 BTS/RC

STAGE

Purpose

To recommend that the question of responsibility in affording medical attention to trainees who become ill while at SOG be definitely resolved [redacted]

Details:

It is evident from our experience to date that trainees in the captioned programs may require medical attention while at SOG for training. It can be envisioned that some may require only minor attention from nurses, that some may require services of physicians, and that some may necessarily require hospitalization.

One of the trainees was suffering from a cold when he arrived in Washington. When the circumstances came to the attention of the Bureau Supervisor on the first day of training, the trainee was promptly taken to the Health Unit at Identification Building. He received attention and has from all indications recovered. [redacted] In the meantime, [redacted] was ill and the Bureau Supervisor went to [redacted] and brought [redacted] to a physician downtown. No hospitalization was required. A separate memorandum has been prepared in connection with the incident.

The circumstances cited point up the necessity for resolving this problem immediately. Since the two programs are closely integrated, both being developed for the direct benefit of the military, and since the trainees

RECORDED - 65-59264-1821

MCC: EWT 7-28-51

AUG 24 1951

[redacted]

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Referral/Consult