**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
**FOI/PA**
**DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET**
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**Total Withheld Pages = 13**

| Bates Page Reference | Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.) |
|---|---|
| FBI(19cv1278) 623 | b3, b6, b7C, b7E |
| FBI(19cv1278) 624 | b3, b6, b7A, b7C, b7E |
| FBI(19cv1278) 625 | b3, b6, b7A, b7C, b7E |
| FBI(19cv1278) 626 | b3, b6, b7C, b7E |
| FBI(19cv1278) 4410 | b3, b6, b7C, b7E |
| FBI(19cv1278) 4411 | b3, b6, b7C, b7E |
| FBI(19cv1278) 5215 | b6 - per DOJ/OIP, b7A, b7C - per DOJ/OIP, b7E |
| FBI(19cv1278) 5216 | b6 - per DOJ/OIP, b7A, b7C - per DOJ/OIP, b7E |
| FBI(19cv1278) 5217 | b6 - per DOJ/OIP, b7A, b7C - per DOJ/OIP, b7E |
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

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 05/10/2018

Richard Gates, was interviewed at 395 E Street SW, Washington, D.C. Present for the interview were SA [redacted] ASAC [redacted] [redacted] Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Greg Andres, SASC Jeannie Rhee, SASC Andrew Weissmann, Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, and IA [redacted] After being advised of the official identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, Gates provided the following information:

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Gates began the interview by advising [redacted] [redacted] were not happy with Gates's cooperation with the Special Counsel's investigation.

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**Jerome Corsi**

Gates advised Jerome Corsi was trying to schedule a meeting with Donald Trump in the May/June 2016 timeframe, but Gates did not believe the meeting took place. Corsi had written a book that Trump had read. Corsi claimed he had information pertaining to Hillary Clinton's emails, Roger Stone was aware of these claims. Stone had originally asked Paul Manafort to meet with Corsi, after which Manafort told Gates about Corsi.

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Investigation on 04/10/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 04/24/2018

by [redacted]

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**Roger Stone**

Gates indicated Stone's involvement in the campaign was renewed in April 2016, however, Corey Lewandowski was actively trying to block Stone's participation. Obtaining Clinton's missing emails and attacking the Clinton Foundation were both focuses of Stone's strategy. Stone said in or about April 2016 the emails were out there, a reference to the approximately 33,000 alleged missing emails from Clinton's private server. Stone regularly expressed a need to obtain the missing emails. Stone also wanted to implant more of his people on the campaign team.

Gates said Manafort had always intended to use Stone as an outside source of information. Manafort relied on Stone to do operative work and dig up opposition material. Manafort had conveyed to Gates that Stone was in the hunt for Clinton's emails prior to the Crowdstrike report dated 06/14/2016. Gates said Manafort relied on Stone for derogatory information pertaining to the emails, the Clinton Foundation, and Clinton campaign contributions. Candidate Trump also spoke with Stone on a regular basis.

Gates recalled Stone said he had information directly from Julian Assange that indicated Wikileaks was in possession of Clinton's missing 33,000 emails prior to the 06/12/2016 announcement. Stone told Gates and Manafort something major was going to happen and that a leak of information was coming. [Note: On 06/12/2016, Assange stated he had "upcoming leaks in relation to Hillary Clinton... We have emails pending publication."].

Gates opined Stone possibly had knowledge a foreign government was involved in obtaining the missing emails. Gates said as of May 2016, he (Gates) was not aware of the source of the hack.

Gates did not recall if Wikileaks came up in a 20 minute call with Stone that took place on 06/13/2016. Gates said there was no discussion on 06/13/2016 about weaponizing the Wikileaks data and added Stone rarely discussed strategy with Gates, only Lewandowski and donor list matters.

Gates advised Stone was trying to talk to Kushner about the Crowdstrike report that was issued on 06/14/2016 regarding the breach of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) servers. Stone had asked Gates for Kushner's contact information on 06/15/2016 [Note: Agent notes (enclosed) indicate Stone asked Gates for Kushner's contact information on 06/14/2016, however, this request was made in an email (enclosed, 16) dated 06/15/2016 to which Gates replies with Kushner's email address] because he

wanted to take credit for doing something big, and also wanted to brief Kushner on issues related to getting Lewandowski fired [Note: Lewandowski was fired from the campaign on 06/20/2016].

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Gates recalled a phone conversation between Manafort, Gates, and Stone on or about 06/15/2016 in which Stone mentioned he had contact with Guccifer 2 (G2). Gates said he had no idea who G2 was at that time.

Gates said that during a "family meeting" on or about 06/20/2016, Stone was not a topic of conversation. Gates added the family was very wary of Stone. Manafort would often take credit for Stone's work and not bring up Stone's involvement at these meetings. Gates did not know if Manafort tasked Stone to make efforts to obtain the emails.

Gates recalled that on or about 06/23/2016, Manafort and Stone had lunch together. Gates indicated he had be the one to put the lunch on Manafort's calendar. Gates was not asked to attend the lunch because Gates was told the purpose of the lunch was for Manafort and Stone to catch up. Gates said there were numerous meetings between Manafort and Stone where it was implied Gates should not attend.

On 06/26/2016 there was a call between Gates and Stone. Gates does not recall Stone making any predictions regarding future leaks at that time [Note: On or about 06/27/2016, DNC emails were posted by DCLeaks]. Gates recalled Stone repeatedly taking credit for the overall event [Note: For context, "the event" is a reference to the continuous leaks throughout the summer and fall of 2016].

Manafort told Gates that he (Manafort) received a call from Stone in which Stone said emails were going to come out a day prior to Stone's tweets about, "Podestas time in the barrel." [Note: On 08/21/2016, Stone tweeted, "Trust me, it will soon (be) Podesta's time in the barrel."]

According to Gates, almost all of his contact with Stone was by phone, save for one or two times in person. Gates said most of his calls with Stone were to relay something to Manafort.

[redacted] b6 b7C

**Campaign Response to Hacked Emails**

[redacted] b6 b7C

Gates said there was also an inside job theory about how the emails were obtained fueled by the death of Seth Rich [Note: Seth Conrad Rich was an employee of the DNC who was fatally shot in Washington, D.C. on 07/10/2016]. Gates said he was never present at any talks suggesting the campaign push the inside job theory. The Trump campaign team also thought the Democrats were pushing the Russia narrative.

Gates said Donald Trump Jr. would ask where the emails were in family meetings. Michael Flynn, Kushner, Manafort, [redacted] Lewandowski, Jeff Sessions, and Sam Clovis expressed interest in obtaining the emails as well. Gates said the priority focuses of the Trump campaign opposition research team were Clinton's emails and contributions to the Clinton Foundation. Flynn, Kellogg, Sessions, Kushner, and Trump Jr. were all focused on opposition topics. b6 b7C

Gates said interest in the emails was ratcheting up in the April/May 2016 timeframe because it was likely the emails could help Trump's campaign. [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

Trump Jr. never communicated anything about the 06/09/2016 meeting with Gates. After the news broke about the 06/09/2016 meeting, Manafort asked Gates if he (Gates) was there. [Note: The 06/09/2016 meeting is a reference to a meeting that took place at Trump Tower arranged on the

pretense that documents and information that would incriminate Hillary Clinton would be provided to the Trump campaign by a Russian government attorney later identified as Natalia Veselnitskaya]

Gates said that at a "family meeting" the Monday after the 06/12/2016 announcement by Assange, Manafort had suggested to, "let it play out." Gates said Manafort didn't want the campaign to overplay its hand. Manafort's suggestion was to let the Republican National Committee (RNC) go after the emails because the campaign would still benefit. Trump Jr. never indicated he was going to do anything on his own. Gates said he never knew what Kushner was going to do because Kushner held his cards close. Gates said Trump was interested in the emails but remained composed with a healthy skepticism.

Gates recalled communication with Reince Preibus and The RNC was energized by Assange's announcement on 06/12/2016. Gates indicated that based on a conversation with Manafort, Gates knew the RNC was going to run the Wikileaks issue to ground, they had more resources to commit to this effort. Trump and Kushner were initially skeptical about cooperating with the RNC, but the Wikileaks issue was a turning point. b6 b7C

Gates said Trump Jr. was ecstatic about the release of the Crowdstrike report. Gates described the campaign response to the report as euphoric. Gates said the campaign did not have the resources to go out and get the emails and therefore maintained a more passive posture. Gates added there was a feeling of skepticism regarding Wikileaks given their track record. b6 b7C b7E

Gates said the RNC would put out press releases that would serve to amplify the Wikileaks releases. The RNC also indicated they knew the timing of the upcoming releases, Gates did not specify who at the RNC knew this information. Gates said the only non-public information the RNC had was related to the timing of the releases.

Gates recalled a time on the campaign aircraft when candidate Trump said, "get the emails." Flynn said he could use his intelligence sources to obtain the emails. Flynn was adamant the Russians did not carry out the hack. To support this theory Flynn advised, based on his experience, the United States Intelligence Community (USIC) was not capable of figuring it out. Gates opined that Flynn's assessment of the USIC derived from the negative way in which Flynn departed the USIC. Gates said Flynn had the most Russia contacts of anyone on the campaign and was in the best position to ask for the emails if they were out there.

Gates advised Trump Jr. and Manafort also had contacts with, "Russia types." Gates clarified by saying Manafort's connection with Russians was minimal aside from his relationship with Oleg Deripaska. Gates said Manafort primarily had contacts with Ukrainians. Gates recalled Manafort saying the hack was likely carried out by the Ukrainians, not the Russians, which parroted a narrative Kilimnik often supported. Kilimnik also opined the hack could have been perpetrated by Russian operatives in Ukraine.

Gates said based on prior business dealings, Kushner had the best China contacts. Manafort and Gates had discussions pertaining to Kushner's Chinese contacts. Gates said there were numerous foreign requests to meet Trump after the nomination was secured.

At some point, there was speculation the Mossad might have the emails. Gates said there was never any mention of the Saudis or the Emirates having the emails. Manafort was generally skeptical of any offers of information coming to the campaign's attention.

For example, Gates said there was a group of realtors from Kyrgyzstan claiming to have information that may be of use to the campaign. The information pertained to foreign contributions to the Clinton campaign.

Gates said he never heard about the emails or dirt from George Papadopoulos.

Gates said, during the campaign, Trump and Manafort talked to Sean Hannity in their offices often.

[redacted] b7E



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

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 06/26/2018

Stephen K. Bannon was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at Patriots Plaza I, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC. Bannon was accompanied by his attorneys [redacted] Present for the interview were Special Agent (SA) [redacted] SA [redacted] Intelligence Analyst [redacted] Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles, Counselor to the Special Counsel Michael Dreeben, Senior Assistant Special Counselor Andrew Goldstein, Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky, and Assistant Special Counsel Elizabeth Prelogar. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, Bannon provided the following information: b6 b7C

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Investigation on 02/14/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/26/2018 b6 b7C

by [redacted] b7E

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After Sessions recused, Trump screamed at McGahn about how weak Sessions was. b6 b7C

Trump was as mad as Bannon had ever seen him. b5 per DOJ/OIP

Bannon told Trump Sessions' recusal was not a surprise. He said they had talked about it back in December. b5 per DOJ/OIP

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Trump wanted a lawyer like Roy Cohn. He wanted an Attorney General like Bobby Kennedy. He thought of them as b5 per DOJ/OIP people who really protected their President. Trump thought Holder always stood up for Obama and said Holder even took a contempt charge for Obama and that Bobby Kennedy always had JFK's back.

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Trump thought he was a winner, he was a fixer, someone who got things done.

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[redacted] Bannon heard

about conflicts with the Special Counsel from Trump. Trump told him there were issues involving Mueller and Trump's golf course in Northern Virginia, because Mueller had been an equity member at the club but moved and wanted to be cashed out; Mueller was former law partners with [redacted] and Mueller was the first person they talked to about serving as the FBI Director. Bannon thought those issues were raised soon after Mueller was named Special Counsel. [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

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**June 2016 Trump Tower Meeting**

Bannon had no knowledge of the June 2016 Trump Tower meeting at the time it happened. It was before his time on the campaign. He thought he heard about it from Mark Corallo on a Saturday morning when Trump was en route back to the United States from an overseas trip, or possibly even a day or two before. He heard about it in relation to a media story. Bannon added that before Trump left on the trip, Corallo was in good standing with Trump and Bannon had considered making him Communications Director.

Bannon heard there was an email from Corallo, who mentioned in passing "the lawyers" had an email, or possibly that Marc Kasowitz had gotten an

email from a server. Bannon did not go to the G-20 with Trump. He stayed back to work on the outside law firm. He eventually learned not just their lawyers had the email but instead "everyone" had it.

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Bannon reviewed a document Bates stamped SB_00006329. The Guardian and the Financial Times did articles at the same time linking Felix Sater and Kushner. Bannon knew [Special Counsel prosecutor] Andrew Weissman had put Sater away previously for money laundering.

Bannon knew Kushner was on vacation off the coast of Croatia with a Russian billionaire when Bannon took over the campaign. Kushner was with Wendy Deng, the Russian billionaire, and the Russian's girlfriend. Bannon said his friends in the intelligence community said the girlfriend was "questionable." Bannon called Kushner and told him to come back from vacation. They had 85 days to go, no money and they needed Kushner to come back and fire Paul Manafort.

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Bannon first met Trump in August of 2010. Their first meeting was approximately 2 hours long. David Bossie was present and said that Trump was thinking of running for president in 2012. Bannon said "for what country?" It was a 2 hour presentation on a possible presidential run in

2012. After that, Trump went on Bannon's radio show and did some things for Breitbart. Bannon had spent approximately 30 minutes combined with Trump outside of Bannon's radio show approximately 3-4 times.

In 2015 Bannon got to know some of the "outsiders" in the 2016 presidential race, and at that time he got to know [redacted] and began to talk with him quite a bit. Bannon never spoke to [redacted] one on one, just over the phone. At one point Bannon had spoken to [redacted] for approximately 5 minutes, close to June 2016, on a topic related to immigration or something similar. Bannon eventually became more in touch with the presidential campaigns of Ted Cruz, Ben Carson, and Trump. Bannon did have some conversations over the phone with Corey Lewindowski. Bannon's news organization was anti-establishment, so they interacted with that brand of candidate.

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When the presidential primaries ended, Bannon had the same type of relationship with Trump. Bannon and Trump rarely spoke besides setting up an interview or Trump coming onto Bannon's show. Bannon was interacting with populist, anti-establishment camps such as Cruz.

Bannon had read a NYTimes article describing the Trump campaign being in disarray, so he started to make a few phone calls. At the time, Trump was 12-16 points down, there was talk of the Republican National Committee (RNC) cutting Trump loose, and the Republicans were talking about distancing themselves from Trump for fear of losing control of the House of Representatives. Bannon called [redacted] and there was worries that if Bannon became involved in the Trump campaign, Breitbart could be blamed if Trump lost. Bannon had previously talked to [redacted] back in June 2016 in an effort for them to make peace with Trump. The [redacted] had a Super PAC that was anti-Hillary Clinton and the [redacted] asked how they could help. Bannon wanted to bring KellyAnne Conway and David Bossie in to help as well. Bannon flew out to Woody Johnson's house and talked to Trump that night when he arrived. Bannon told Trump he would take the position as Campaign Chief Executive.

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At the time Trump was 16 points down, the campaign had no organization, no money, 75% of the population thought the country was in decline, they were working with the "deplorables," and Bannon had a 100% certitude that they would win. Bannon believed the big task was to give people permission to vote for Trump as commander in chief.

The next day Bannon met with Manafort, which was the same time that the news about the "Black Ledger" was breaking. Bannon was at campaign headquarters when Manafort told Bannon to come up to Trump Tower. When Bannon arrived, Manafort showed him something about a NY Times story about the "Black Ledger" and $15 million dollars from the Ukraine. Bannon asked

when this story was coming out. Manafort replied that he had known about the story coming out for approximately 2 months and had not gotten involved in it. Bannon subsequently told Trump to keep Manafort, to not fire him, and to keep him around for a couple of weeks. Bannon called Kushner, and asked him to get back in order to do something publicity wise to counteract the negative press surrounding the story. Trump had asked Bannon at one time about "what was this thing with Manafort out of the Ukraine," and they talked for approximately 15 minutes on it. Trump was never linked with other Russian news stories at the time, and he believed Manafort was a promoter. Trump was more worried about how they story made them look. Bannon believed that Trump talked with Manafort about the story.

Bannon was involved in all aspects of Trump's debate preparation. Bannon helped Trump talk and think through various topics related to national security and foreign policy. The idea of working with Russia to fight ISIS was "thrown out there". Flynn or Keith Kellogg might have come up with the idea, with the reasoning that since Russia was dealing with similar problems in Chechnya, they might be an ally to help. Bannon never specifically remembered hearing the phrase "knock the hell out of ISIS," but that could have become a catch phrase. Overall, Trump had a non-interventionist stance. During the campaign they were mainly trying to play defense, it was a very basic strategy, and they were trying to get Trump to not say something "insane." Flynn might have brought up the idea of partnering with Russia on fighting ISIS, but not on a geo-strategic level. Trump's stance was more or less that Russia did not have to be an enemy.

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

Bannon first met Erik Prince 8 to 9 years ago. Bannon made a film about Fallujah and he asked Prince to be involved. Bannon wanted to show the film to Prince for accuracy. The next time Bannon spoke to Prince was when he came out with a book, "Warrior something." It was approximately 2014-2015 and Prince had started coming onto Bannon's show.

Bannon and Prince would talk about Islamic radical terrorism. Prince knew the Middle East, Asia, and sub-Sahara Africa. Prince was a former Navy SEAL, contractor for the government, and ran his own mercenary company. Bannon described Prince as a "smart guy." Bannon never really had a foreign policy talk with Prince for the Trump Campaign, but Prince was not shy about sharing his ideas.

Bannon was shown Document #1, email dated 9/8/2015 from Prince to Bannon, subject "Talking Points, second attempt". Bannon stated that he did not remember passing it along, but it sounded like something he would do. Bannon was in daily contact with [redacted] until he was let go in August. After that, Bannon would contact Lewandowski nearly every day. Bannon did not remember discussing the memorandum attached to the email, but said he would have sent something forward like it. b6 b7C

Bannon reviewed a document Bates stamped SB-00018818. Bannon stated he did not remember the email, but it would be something he could have done. Bannon could not remember if Prince briefed the candidate, but Bannon did put Prince in contact with Flynn.

Bannon was not in regular contact with Prince. Bannon spoke with Prince a couple times a month by phone. Prior to Bannon joining the campaign, he spoke with Prince infrequently. Bannon estimated it to be once a week to once every couple of weeks. Bannon and Prince would generally talk about international affairs.

Bannon was shown Document #3, email dated 12/12/2015 from [redacted] to Bannon with [redacted] cc'd, subject "Re: Breitbart News." Bannon stated that [redacted] was Breitbart's [redacted] Bannon introduced [redacted] to [redacted] in order for [redacted] to be a source for the article referenced in the email about data collection. b6 b7C

Bannon was shown Document #4, email dated 1/14/2016 from Bannon to Prince, subject [redacted] Bannon explained that Prince said he knew people from his new company. Bannon knew a quality guy from [redacted] and he [redacted] Bannon thought that if Bannon could connect him to some security guys, this guy might be of help. Prince b6 b7C

had connections in the intelligence community that might be looking for his talents. Bannon did not think that Prince followed up on it.

Bannon was shown Document #5, email dated 3/17/2016 from Prince to Bannon, subject "Re." From this email, Bannon did not remember if Prince actually came on his show. Prince was "on the right" and was a highly thought of guy.

Bannon was shown Document #6, email dated 5/23/2016 from Prince to Bannon, [redacted] cc'd, subject "Fwd: Recommended meeting." Bannon did not remember the email exchange. Bannon doesn't remember meeting with Oleg. Prince viewed Bannon as someone with a good relationship with Trump. b6 b7C

Bannon was shown Document #7, email dated 10/18/2016 from Prince to Bannon, subject "Russia/US election." Bannon did not remember this email or whether he prepared a speech as referenced in the email. Bannon stated that Prince was not short on ideas. Bannon though the email was more in reference to Clinton than the Russian influence issue. Bannon thought the email might be on changing the narrative to Clinton as an alternative to the stories in the news about Russian election influence. Bannon did not remember talking to Prince about the email or about talking to Prince about Russian influence.

Bannon described the 14th floor as "loosy goosy" and Prince might have come through from August to the Election Day, but he was not certain. Prince would often have ideas on how he could help them with the debates. Bannon did not specifically remember how many times he met with Prince at Trump Tower during the campaign, but estimated it to be a couple of times. A couple of times Prince would email his ideas to Bannon. Bannon might have asked for Prince's ideas on a certain issues. Prince knew Conway, Bossie, [redacted] Bannon did not know if Prince provided advice for any of them. Prince was a known entity in the campaign and might have walked around and met people and have come through the 14th floor. Once someone was on the 14th floor they could walk around freely. Prince could contact [redacted] or someone in security in order to gain access. b6 b7C

Bannon was shown Document #8, email dated 11/16/2016 from Prince to Bannon, subject "Fwd: Bannon." Bannon didn't remember this email. Bannon did not know whether Prince was in touch with Mark Corallo. Prince had just offered his help.

After the election, during the transition timeframe, Bannon continued to interact with Prince. Prince had come by to speak with Flynn and Bossie approximately 3 to 4 times. Prince came to New York approximately 5 to 6

times to speak to people other than Bannon such as Flynn, K.T. Mcfarland, Bossie, Kellogg, Conway, [redacted] Sebastian Gorka and [redacted] Bannon remembered walking by and seeing Prince in the "war room" with [redacted] Prince would tell Bannon who he was seeing. Prince would not officially schedule meetings with them. Flynn, Kellogg, Bossie, and Conway had known Prince before then. Prince would come in and sit down and talk about foreign policy. Prince would suggest people they should be getting on board and people to include in the administration. Bannon would bounce ideas off of Prince and talk about such people as Mike Pompeo. The things Prince said were not too crazy and people respected him. Prince had other contacts within the intelligence community. Bannon, Flynn, Bossie and Kellogg had spoken of Prince. Bannon and Flynn had talked with each other about Prince saying he was a good guy.

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Prince came by to see Bannon approximately 3 to 6 times. Prince would come by and talk to one of Bannon's assistants in order to get in. Security at Trump Tower was not overbearing. When they talked, Bannon did talk to Prince about ISIS. Bannon did not particularly remember talking to Prince about Russia in regard to ISIS, but would not be surprised if it came up. Prince did not meet with then candidate Trump, but Bannon thought Prince was close to Eric Trump and Trump Jr. Bannon remembered Prince stopped by during the campaign and asked if Trump Jr was there. Bannon knew Prince would go hunting with Eric Trump and Trump Jr. During the campaign, Prince might have met with Trump Jr, and Bannon remembered that one time Trump Jr might have walked Prince down. Prince met with [redacted] during the campaign as well. Prince always had ideas on what was going on, but Bannon did not remember any of Prince's policy papers making it to Eric Trump or Trump Jr.

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Bannon stated he didn't know Rick Gerson.

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Bannon was involved in the September 2016 meetings with Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and Benjamin Netanyahu. It was Kushner's idea to work toward a summit with Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia and that Trump would go to this summit in the 1st 6 months of his presidency. MBZ came over as a way to

get to know the incoming administration. It was obvious to Bannon that Kushner was told of the meeting prior and had helped set it up. Kushner had talked to MBZ's guys in the U.S. in order to set it up. They met with approximately 25 of the UAE attendees in the lobby, including UAE Ambassador to the U.S. Yousef Al Otaiba, and after approximately 6 to 7 minutes they went up to the penthouse of the Four Seasons. When Bannon walked into the penthouse, he saw another 15 UAE attendees already in the room. Bannon wondered what this meeting could be about. Bannon saw a guy who looked like Sean Connery and realized it was MBZ. MBZ was in jeans and a t-shirt, dressed in casual attire. It was apparent to Bannon that Kushner knew Otaiba and that it wasn't the first time they had met. Bannon believed that the Obama administration had disengaged from the Middle East, which is similar to what El-Sisi and Netanyahu had said. During the meeting with MBZ they discussed the ISIS threat to the area. Bannon did not remember if they discussed Russia, but if they did, it was targeted to the Persian Gulf area. Bannon remembered they talked about Persian expansion, Iran, Baghdad, Beirut, and Hezbollah. The meeting was approximately 2 hours long. Bannon thought that Nader was one of the group of 15 or 25 guys they met as MBZ "held court" for a couple hours. If Nader was there, Bannon believed they just introduced themselves, and shook hands.

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOD

had at one time come to Bannon and said he wanted to do something Bannon asked if was a good guy, Bannon wanted to know if Bannon asked Bannon later found out that Bannon did not recall talking about then. Bannon discussed was going to go over to meet with

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Bannon had been working on a proposal to move the Israeli capital to Jerusalem, the Christian right movement, putting money into a 501(c)(4) using UAE money or "those guys" which didn't end up happening, and putting together a security conference over in the Middle East in the Spring /Summer of 2017. Bannon last saw Nader 2 to 3 months ago. Bannon had too much going on with the C4 and life in general. Bannon had seen that the Special Counsel's Office had called Nader to the Grand Jury, but Nader had not reached out to Bannon.

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOD

b5 Per DOD

[redacted]

When shown a photo of Rick Gerson, Bannon stated that this was the college roommate of Kushner, and that he was pretty sure he was the hedge fund guy he referenced earlier. Gerson had a hedge fund on Madison Ave in New York City at Barneys Tower. His office was 2 blocks from Trump Tower on 60th and Madison Ave. Gerson knew a lot about the Middle East and said many intelligent things about it. [redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted]

Bannon thought he heard that Nader was being called into the Grand Jury for the Special Counsel's Office in the newspaper, but then said that he could be wrong.

[redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Bannon was familiar with the story of Prince's meeting in the Seychelles from what he read in the paper. Bannon thought he discussed the article with Prince after it came out, and he might have discussed it with him around the time of the inaugural. Prince did not tell Bannon prior to the

meeting in the Seychelles. After the article came out Bannon asked Prince about the meeting. Prince said he was over in the Seychelles and it was suggested he meet at a bar with these guys, and it was blown out of proportion. Prince did not say, and Bannon did not ask, if it was set up in advance. During the inauguration, Prince did not say anything about meeting with the Russians. Bannon did not recollect receiving a text from Prince around the time of Prince's trip to the Seychelles in January 2017. Bannon did not have prior knowledge of Prince going to the Seychelles and meeting with a Russian. Bannon was not aware of Nader's involvement in setting up Prince's meetings in the Seychelles. Bannon did not know that Prince would be meeting with MBZ or officials from the UAE. Bannon had not discussed the Seychelles meetings with Prince after the 2nd time he spoke with Prince about it after the article came out in April 2017. Bannon did not discuss Prince's Seychelles trip with anyone in the administration, and was not aware of Prince reporting his trip to anyone in the administration following his return. Bannon did not know Kirill Dmitriev nor had he ever heard of him. Bannon did not know of the Russian Domestic Investment Fund (RDIF). Bannon read Prince's testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), in which he read about "a Russian guy at the bar," but he did not discuss Prince's testimony with anyone in the administration. Bannon did not anticipate his name coming up in Prince's HPSCI testimony. One of the newspapers said Bannon setup the Seychelles meeting, but Bannon did not discuss that with Prince or anyone else. Bannon stated he was not involved in sending Prince to the Seychelles. Bannon did not know where the leaks came from on Bannon sending Prince to the Seychelles. Bannon might have commented on it publicly. Bannon had not had knowledge of the UAE sovereign wealth fund or the RDIF. Bannon was not aware of any conversations or discussions on sanctions of Russia with the UAE. Bannon was not aware of Mubadala but during one of the visits he might have been a person that Bannon had met. Nader never told Bannon anything about the Prince meeting in the Seychelles and never talked about that meeting with Bannon. Bannon had not had any discussions with representatives from the UAE about Prince's meeting in the Seychelles.

[redacted]

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b5 Per DOD

[redacted]

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b5 Per DOD

[redacted]

b4 per DOD
b5 per DOD
b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Michael Cohen was one of the lawyers on Trump's staff. Bannon described Cohen as a fixer and a problem solver. In 2010, Cohen came down to the first meeting Bannon had with Trump and introduced himself as a political advisor. When Bannon was on the Trump Campaign, Bannon did not want Cohen wandering around the Trump Campaign organization. Bannon thought it could get them in a lot of trouble since Cohen goes off "halfcocked" a lot. Cohen kept trying to get involved in the Trump Campaign. Bannon described Cohen as the kind of guy who thought it would be a good idea to send $130,000 to Stormy Daniels.

Bannon reviewed a document Bates stamped SB-00013127. Bannon was told "zero" deals involving Russia and the Trump Organization. Candidate Trump would say he didn't know any Russians and there was no collusion. This came up during the campaign a couple of times. Bannon never asked Trump about any Russian business deals. In regard to the emails reference to Felix Sater, Bannon stated that this went back to the House Intelligence Committee, that they had a signed term sheet in December 2015 on Trump Tower Moscow. This was a big deal to Bannon, and Bannon described it as a "big reveal." [redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
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[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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Bannon was not aware of any financial agreements to Daniels, other accusers, or other relationships of Trump. Bannon talked to Breitbart guys about the $130,000 payment, but not to anyone in the administration. Bannon was not aware of any other payments made. When asked to speculate about the $130,000 payment Bannon thought it might be David Pecker, since he did not think anyone around "Trump.org" would be dumb enough, and they would have worried about the impact to the election.

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Bannon never heard of Cohen arranging for Trump to give a speech on an online platform or talk about Cohen's concepts for "Trump.org". Bannon had

read a New York Times article about business dealings with Russia and the candidate/"Trump.org". Bannon was aware of the article before he became involved in the Trump campaign. When Bannon was on the Trump campaign, he never discussed the stories that came out involving then candidate Trump during March/April of 2016. During the later stages of the campaign, when the story broke about Trump's house in Palm Beach, Bannon discussed it with Trump and Trump had a plausible explanation. The story never gained any traction. Bannon never talked with Trump on how he thought all these stories on his business dealings with Russia was absurd. The story about Cohen reaching out to Putin's office in January 2016 in order to ask for help on Trump Tower Moscow was a big deal to Bannon and it countered what Bannon heard about Sater by candidate Trump. Bannon did some inquiries about it with his contacts at the Intercept, Fox, the Guardian and ABC News. There was no further information on this, which did not surprise Bannon.

Bannon was shown an email dated 9/28/2016 from Bannon to Cohen with Conway, Kushner, [redacted] Stephen Miller, and [redacted] cc'd, subject "Re: request from the ft." Bannon did not remember getting an email from Cohen about Sergei Millian, and doesn't remember any conversations about Millian. Bannon never had any conversations with the campaign on the Millian issue. b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

Bannon reviewed a document Bates stamped SB-00018384. Bannon did not think this email referenced Cambridge Analytica. Bannon stated that as a private citizen, and lead of Breitbart, he was interested in finding Clinton's

33,000 missing emails. The Government Accountability Institute (GAI) analysis was that the 33,000 missing emails were tied directly to the influence peddling of the State Department. Barbara Leeden knew someone who could work on finding the 33,000 and they had a half a dozen meetings on how to find them. They ascertained that if they would be able to find the emails, they still would not be able to validate their authenticity. They never obtained any emails or any samples and stopped the search. The 33,000 was related to the Clinton Cash book and the pay for play scheme.

Bannon reviewed a document Bates stamped SB-00018418. The green light referenced in the email was for a data operation for voter targeting. There was a presentation about it given to Lewandowski but the data operation people were not retained. Cambridge Analytica then became involved after Ted Cruz officially withdrew in May 2016. In June 2016, [redacted] offered an introduction for Bannon to Jared Kushner and Ivanka Trump. Bannon agreed and that was the first time he met Kushner and Ivanka. b6 b7C

Bannon was shown Document #14, email dated 6/12/2016 from Bannon to [redacted] with [redacted] cc'd, subject "Re: Defeat Crooked Hillary | [redacted] Bannon did not remember sending the email and he never went to the United Kingdom. Bannon did not remember talking to [redacted] about meeting with [redacted] in general. Bannon would not characterize his response in the email, "Love it," as an approval to [redacted] suggestion to meet with [redacted] Bannon did not know if [redacted] or anyone from Cambridge Analytica, ever reached out to [redacted] Bannon thought they probably dropped the idea. Bannon had no idea where [redacted] of Cambridge Analytica and he was focused on getting their data business growing in the U.S. [redacted] had a lot of "James Bond" ideas like this idea on [redacted] and characterized it as [redacted] saying he "knows a guy, who knows a guy." b6 b7C

George Papadopoulos had emailed Bannon during the campaign in an effort to setup a meeting with Egypt. The campaign had decided to take a couple days off during a visit to the U.N. in order to meet with foreign leaders. Bannon was initially against it. Bannon thought Trump's biggest challenge was selling the public that Trump could be Commander in Chief, so therefore he decided to do it and limit the meetings to a few key leaders such as Egypt, Israel, and maybe a couple of others. Kushner wanted a meeting with Israel, and Bannon and Flynn were pushing for a meeting with Egypt. Bannon never worked with Papadopoulos on setting up the meetings despite Papadopoulos's offers through email. Bannon would generally blow off Papadopoulos and thought to himself "I don't need this guy." Flynn would be on the hook for the meetings Papadopoulos was suggesting, and Bannon did not need Papadopoulos. Papadopoulos never told Bannon about the

Russians having dirt on Clinton, and Bannon never heard Papadopoulos tell anyone else in the campaign, such as Sam Clovis, that the Russians had dirt on Clinton. Bannon had all the dirt he needed from Clinton Cash and Uranium One, he didn't need any more dirt. Bannon didn't need any more dirt from "clowns" like Papadopoulos and Clovis.

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Bannon first met Stone by email or by phone in 2013-2014 while he was working for Breitbart. In 2015, during Stone's involvement with the campaign, Stone would come on Bannon's radio show every so often, write articles, and do interviews. Stone was in Trump's orbit. At the time, [redacted] was running the campaign, and Bannon described it as a "one man band." Bannon thought [redacted] had done "a damn good job." Bannon thought Stone was a guy with a "sketchy background" and who could "blow you up." Bannon did not think Stone had a relationship with [redacted] but [redacted] was trying to get business from Stone. Bannon did not remember introducing [redacted] to Stone, but stated he might have.

Bannon was shown Document #15, email dated 1/7/2016 from [redacted] to Bannon, Stone, and [redacted] subject "Data Guy in Trump Tower." Bannon thought [redacted] got the wrong name in the email, [redacted] who they got rid of. Giles Parscale had a little data center on the 15th floor. Bannon was introduced to a "data guy" there in January 2016, but Bannon didn't remember the name. Bannon speculated that maybe Stone had some ideas about it, but Bannon did not think it was [redacted] who was involved.

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Bannon was shown Document #16, email dated 5/4/2016 from Stone to Bannon, subject "Re: Congrats." Bannon described the email as "kind of an Atta boy." Stone is a guy you want to keep happy. Lewandowski pushed Stone out, and Trump's kids hated Stone. [redacted] Bannon believed it was best to make these guys feel that they were a part of this.

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Bannon was shown Document #17, email dated 5/7/2016 from Stone to Bannon, subject "I am." Bannon did not remember receiving this message, and believed the "highest level" reference was about some [redacted] type" backers. At the time, Stone was of the guys who was "kind of banned."

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In August 2016, Kushner was in charge of the digital campaign and fundraising. Bannon was the CFO of the campaign with Jeff Dewit. The campaign had almost no cash and they were receiving only a small amount from online contributions. The campaign was losing cash at the time and they were down by a double digit lead with the 1st debate coming. They needed $50 million from Trump, which eventually became $10 million. Afterwards, they were still down by 3 ½ points.

Bannon was shown an email dated 4/20/2016 from [redacted] to Bannon and Stone cc'd, subject "Re: Cambridge Analytica." Bannon did not remember this email. b6 b7C

Bannon was shown an email dated 5/04/2016 from [redacted] to Bannon, subject "[No Subject]." Bannon though this looked like the same $20 million from the email in Document #17. Cambridge Analytica claimed they could help micro-target voters on Facebook. Stone tried to raise $20 million and it might have been for a project for Cambridge Analytica.

Bannon was shown Document #18, email dated 8/19/2016 from Stone to Bannon, subject "Initiative-debates." Bannon thought there was an effort, which he heard were funded by some high net worth republicans, to get Jill Stein on the ballot. Bannon was unaware of Stone and Manafort's efforts were in regards to this, which is referenced in the email.

Bannon was shown Document #19, email dated 8/18/2016 from Bannon to Stone, subject "Re: Congratulations." Bannon did not remember, but he might have talked to Stone about this email. Bannon did not recollect the plan Stone referenced in his email. Stone took credit for taking the Bill Clinton accusers to the 2nd debate. Bannon did not have a conversation with Stone on how to "play the new media" as referenced in the email.

Bannon was shown Document #20, email dated 8/26/2016 from Bannon to Stone, no subject. Bannon stated that Stone was a guy that he wanted to keep happy. Bannon did not remember what the ideas were that he wanted to talk to Stone about referenced in the email. Bannon described Stone as a "nasty piece of work", who got rid of Lewandowski by leaking stories, and Bannon wanted to keep him happy.

Bannon was shown Document #21, email dated 8/30/2016 from Ted Malloch to Bannon with Stone and the email address [redacted] cc'd, subject "The debate." In reference to the email, Bannon stated he had no contact with Jerry Corsi. Bannon was not going to touch Corsi, who was blaming Bannon saying Breitbart was dead and he blamed Bannon for it. Malloch was a writer and professor at a faculty in London. Bannon knew him from Breitbart London. Bannon did not meet with Stone personally during the campaign, and Bannon felt if he ever would have needed to sit down with Stone, it would have been to just keep Stone happy. Bannon didn't recollect any Stone conversations about WikiLeaks and Assange. b6 b7C

Bannon was shown Document #22, email dated 10/4/2016 from Stone to Bannon, subject "Re:" Stone had an obsession with the [redacted] story and was asking [redacted] to give him some money to help him with it. Bannon did b6 b7C

not remember his Assange statement as referenced in the email, but it might have been in relation to what Assange said that day. Bannon did not remember what they were discussing in that email with Stone, but in regards to the "load" referenced in the email, Bannon thought it might have been Assange's promised emails.

Bannon was shown Document #22 again, the email dated 10/4/2016 from Stone to Bannon, subject "Re:" Bannon suspected that Boyle told Stone to forward this information to Bannon, and Bannon did not have time for this. Bannon thought the information came off some Drudge Report link, or maybe Stone was telling what he knew about Assange. Bannon believed that Assange was a "non-event." Bannon wanted to keep Stone happy, and Stone was upset that Bannon was not calling him enough, and he was making threats that there were scores to be settled. Stone did not get this information from Bannon. Bannon thought if Assange had the 33,000 verified emails, he would have put them out. Bannon believed that Assange was bluffing and there was nothing there. Bannon never put much stock in what Assange said, because he thought if he had the 33,000 missing emails, they could never be verified. The question from Bannon in that email, "What was that this morning???" Bannon did not remember what he was talking about for sure, but it was probably about Assange. Bannon did not know if Stone had a relationship with Assange or not, but at the time, Bannon believed he did not. Bannon did not remember if Assange had a press conference the day of this email. Bannon believed that was kind of a sideshow, and Bannon was busy running a campaign. Stone said he had some relationship with Assange and he told that to Bannon by phone. Bannon could not remember, but it was plausible, that Stone called and talked to Bannon about WikiLeaks. Bannon did not remember what the "load" Stone referenced in his email was, but it sounded like email payloads and he thought he was going to drop information on emails.

Bannon was always interested in the missing 33,000 emails, but was not interested in the John Podesta information since he believed it was not going to impact the election. Bannon clarified that he was talking to Stone about Assange in these emails. There was a belief that Stone had a relationship with Assange, Stone was public about it, and was telling reporters. Stone may have told Bannon about it, and it was implied that Stone has some inside information. Bannon was interested in the verified missing 33,000 emails and how it related to Uranium One. Bannon might have talked with Stone, at one time, about the 33,000 emails. Bannon did talk to Candidate Trump about the 33,000 missing emails. After Bannon came onto the campaign, it got into Candidate Trump's "head" that the 33,000 emails might be important. Trump was focused on "crooked Hillary" and the Uranium One story, and thought the 33,000 missing emails might unlock it. They never discussed that the Russians might have them. Bannon thought that

some hackers in Bulgaria might have them. There was not much of a response from Trump and every now and then he would bring up the 33,000 emails. One time when the Podesta emails were released, Trump asked if it was a big deal. Bannon never discussed Stone or Assange with Trump. Flynn or Kellogg might have had a disc on finding the 33,000 emails. Bannon thought Flynn might have had an idea about using an outside company and finding the 33,000 missing emails. If it was anything cyber related, Bannon would always refer them to Parscale and the Cyber guys. Bannon did not think the WikiLeaks releases were that big of a deal, the important information was the 33,000 missing emails. Kellogg thought the same thing, and he was not a cyber guy. Priebus and Miller had talked about the 33,000 missing emails.

After the Billy Bush story broke, one hour later the Podesta emails were released. Bannon never talked to Stone about his quote "it will be Podesta's turn in a couple of weeks." Bannon might have discussed the Podesta releases with Stone, but Bannon never thought the Podesta releases were a big deal and they would not have a big impact on the campaign. Bannon never gave Stone information to give to Assange and was not aware of anyone else on the campaign giving information to Stone in order for him to give it to Assange.

Bannon knew [redacted] had sent some emails to Bannon. Bannon described [redacted] Bannon didn't take any action in relation to [redacted] emails. Bannon did not remember talking to [redacted] while he was on the campaign. b6 b7C

Bannon never heard of the Committee for American Sovereignty Education Fund. Bannon didn't have any direct involvement in Stone's 501(c)(4) fund, but he might have helped introduce Stone to others, such as the [redacted] Bannon thought Stone's 501(c)(4) and Super PAC were involved in helping the candidate with commercials and "anti-Hillary stuff." Bannon thought Stone was pushing more [redacted] related information and he might have sent Bannon some spots he was running. Bannon didn't remember discussing any of Stone's strategies with him, but Stone might have run some [redacted] stuff by Bannon. Bannon thought that Stone's [redacted] efforts were a "crack-pot idea." b6 b7C

Bannon was shown Document #23, email dated 9/28/2016 from Stone to Bannon, subject "Fwd: DW - The Plan." Bannon didn't know the demographics Stone was targeting, but they did have a discussion how to influence the African American vote.

Bannon was shown Document #25, email dated 9/28/2016 from Stone to Bannon, subject [redacted] There was an idea to invite [redacted] to the last debate and make a big deal about it. Stone had put up a link to a video in relation to the [redacted] story, which is what was referenced in the email. b6 b7C

Bannon might have discussed Stone's 501(c)(4) with him via phone, but Bannon did not want to be associated with the [redacted] story. Bannon didn't want to cross Stone, so he was trying to be cordial about it. Bannon was not even sure if he talked to Prince about Stone's ideas for the [redacted] story. b6 b7C

Bannon was shown Document #26, email dated 10/21/2016 from Stone to undisclosed recipients, with Bannon, Prince, [redacted] bcc'd, subject "Re: DW analytics update." Bannon did not remember this email, although he recognized the email addresses for Prince, [redacted], and people would often go to him in an attempt to get something to candidate Trump. Bannon did not remember discussing [redacted] with candidate Trump, [redacted] or anyone else on the campaign. Stone stated that he was in regular contact with candidate Trump, although Hicks had said Stone was not in regular contact with Trump. b6 b7C

Bannon was shown Document #27, email dated 10/22/2016 from Bannon to Stone and [redacted] no subject. Bannon talked to [redacted] about Stone's 501(c)(4) and told her that Stone was looking for money. Bannon recommended Stone, although he thought the chances that the [redacted] donated money would be remote. This was again Bannon's attempt to keep Stone happy. Bannon did not know if Prince provided money to Stone, but he was pretty sure the [redacted] did not. Prince was going to have fundraiser for Trump and considered it his commitment to the campaign. Bannon did not remember introducing Stone to any other donors. Bannon did not remember helping any other find funding besides Stone. Bannon was weary of involving himself with a 501 (c)(4) and was only helping out Stone because he did not want to be "lit up" by Stone. Bannon did not see it as a potential coordination issue working with Stone's 501(c)(4). No other 501(c)(4) was giving Bannon advance notice like Stone's and no other 501(c)(4) was Bannon putting in touch with donors like Stone's. b6 b7C

Bannon was shown Document #29, email dated 9/21/2016 from Trump Jr to Bannon, Conway, Kushner, Bossie, and [redacted] subject "Wikileaks." Bannon did not remember receiving this message, but it was during the campaign timeframe. Bannon did not remember anyone else in contact with WikiLeaks or trying to get in contact with WikiLeaks. There was discussion during the campaign on how WikiLeaks would impact the race. Bannon did not think anyone had any ideas on where WikiLeaks had got their information. Bannon did not remember anyone reaching out to Stone, WikiLeaks, or any other intermediary to see what information might be coming. b6 b7C

Bannon was shown Document #32, email dated 11/5/2016 from Bannon to Kushner and Bossie, subject "Re; Securing the Victory." Bannon stated that Manafort had zero involvement in the campaign after he left. Bannon thought if they responded to this email from Manafort, Manafort would be telling that to everyone. Bannon was not aware of any instances of Manafort advising, or being involved in the campaign after his ouster. Hicks said he was not involved, and she would have a sense on who Trump talked to. Candidate Trump never said to Bannon that he was in contact with Stone or Manafort. Bannon knew they were going to win, and in this email he wanted to avoid Manafort because Bannon believed that if people could link them to Manafort, they could then try to link them to Russia.

Bannon had three cell phones. He did not use the campaign issued phone or the "secure phone." The iPad he was issued in the campaign he did not use much. Bannon was not aware that his cell phone was set up to not archive text messages, and someone else had setup his phone for him. It was a surprise to Bannon that his text messages were not archived. During the campaign and transition timeframe Bannon did not use secure apps. When Bannon got close to leaving the administration, he got ProtonMail and Signal. [redacted] helped him set up the ProtonMail which Bannon believed provided increased security. Bannon did not use ProtonMail to send or receive email from people in the administration. Bannon did not have a Slack channel and never used Slack. Breitbart used Slack, but they were trying to shut that down. Bannon setup a Wickr account after he left the administration after Prince talked to him about it being more secure. Prince talked with Bannon about using Wickr Pro for Breitbart. Bannon used Wickr with Prince and Signal with [redacted]. Bannon only started using Wickr and Signal after he left the administration. While Bannon was in the administration, he never heard of anyone using 3rd party apps. They received a briefing on how their communications needed to be kept for federal records. Bannon was not sure if his text messages were supposed to be kept under the federal records act. Bannon did not remember using his personal phone for White House business. Bannon did not remember using texting on his government devices, although he might have. Bannon did not remember any discussion of how his text messages should be saved, or his personal device texts should be saved. Bannon primarily used the white house email while he was in the administration. If Bannon received an email to his "arc-ent" email while he was in the White House, he would respond to it from the "arc-ent" account. He gave full access to his "arc-ent" email account to [redacted] in order for her to send them to the White House account to be archived. [redacted] might have helped with that as well.

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**Administrative:**

The agent notes and documents shown to Bannon will be maintained in the 1A section of the case file.

General Record

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 11/02/2018

Paul J. Manafort, date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street SE, Washington, D. C. Participating in the interview were Special Agent (SA) [redacted] SA [redacted] Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Jeannie S. Rhee, SASC Andrew Weissman, SASC Andrew Goldstein, and Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky. Manafort was accompanied by his attorneys, Richard Westling and Thomas Zehnle. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, Manafort provided the following information: b6 b7C

**Roger Stone:**

Roger Stone took a "victory lap" after WikiLeaks published Podesta's emails. Manafort remembered it because he had teased Stone the week prior about it, because Stone said every day that something was coming. Manafort told Stone that if it had not come out, Stone would still be saying something was coming.

Toward the end of September or beginning of October 2016, [redacted] Stone told [redacted] and mentioned more was coming out on Podesta. There were no substantive conversations about what specifically was coming out. The only thing Stone said substantively was that it was going to be Podesta's turn and that Manafort would be vindicated. [redacted] b6 b7C

Manafort was familiar with the statement Assange made on October 3, 2016, but he did not independently remember it. He may have discussed it with [redacted] but he was not sure. b6 b7C

Manafort had a clear impression that Stone said things would come out related to Podesta. He did not recall that Stone specifically mentioned Podesta's emails, just that Stone said it related to Podesta. Manafort related it to the hacking, so he related it to emails, since he knew the

Investigation on 10/01/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/05/2018

by [redacted]

b6 b7C b7E

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previous releases had been emails. Manafort assumed Stone was talking about emails.

Manafort had the impression Stone was talking to someone connected to WikiLeaks, but Stone never gave a name. Stone indicated it was a male, not a female, connection. Stone never told Manafort he was talking to Julian Assange.

Until the July 22, 2016 release of emails, Manafort was not confident Stone really knew what was going to happen [redacted] b6 b7C

After the initial release, Stone said he had been right and there was more coming, and his source told him it would be damning.

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

Manafort did not recall Stone connecting the release of Podesta emails to the Billy Bush/Access Hollywood release of information. He did not recall Stone saying he got the Podesta release to happen in order to blunt the impact of the Billy Bush tape. They talked about the impact of both, but not a causal connection.

Manafort did not know, but thought Stone probably talked to [redacted] about the Podesta emails and the Billy Bush tape. Manafort would have been surprised if Stone did not talk to Trump about them. b6 b7C

Stone did not give Manafort any indication he was going to weaponize the Podesta information. [redacted] Their conversations were more along the lines of "it's coming," not that Stone would make it happen or had made it happen.

Manafort said [redacted] the Eliot Spitzer scandal, and the way he talked about the Podesta emails was different. [redacted] the hookers in the Spitzer case to go public. [redacted] before Spitzer was Attorney General. Manafort recalled the time [redacted]

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Stone thought the Podesta emails showed a deeper involvement in Russian business on Podesta's part than Manafort had. Manafort did not remember Podesta's emails specifically, but thought Podesta's connection to Russia vindicated him. Manafort was not interested in Podesta as a comparison to himself, but rather Podesta as Podesta, and how it related to the Trump campaign in general and whether it would help Trump win.

Stone did not point to specific emails in the Podesta release, just generally that Manafort went down for something that Podesta would also go down for. [redacted]

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Manafort was not sure if his memory of the Russia/Uranium One deal was from the Podesta emails or from the Clinton Cash book.

Manafort clearly remembered two different conversations with Stone about the Podesta emails. In neither conversation did Stone take credit for making the release happen.

[redacted]

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Manafort did not recall conversations with Stone after the election about the Podesta emails or Russian involvement in the hacks. Manafort was out of the country a lot post-election and did not recall speaking with Stone on any of his trips.

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Manafort recalled speaking to Stone after the dossier came out at a dinner with Stone, [redacted] at The Palm. Manafort thought the dossier was outrageous as the driver of the investigation. At the dinner, someone brought up [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

Manafort and Stone did not discuss Stone's September 2017 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) subpoena or testimony. They did speak after the fact, and Stone complained about the process, that it was costing him a lot of money, was outrageous, and unfair. Manafort did not want to get involved.

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[redacted]

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Manafort thought Stone had a contact through some relationship he had that was the source of information on WikiLeaks. [redacted]

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Stone never suggested to Manafort that Manafort should decline to discuss Stone's claims of a source of information on WikiLeaks back in 2016. [redacted] Manafort did not think Stone thought Manafort would be asked about Stone's advance knowledge of the WikiLeaks releases. Manafort said he always intended to say Stone had advance knowledge of the WikiLeaks information, because it was true.

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In their conversations, Stone defended himself to Manafort. Stone walked Manafort through it, saying he had a contact with WikiLeaks that gave him advance notice that there would be leaks of Clinton and DNC emails. Their conversations were more process-related than substantive.

Manafort and Stone did not talk about the specific information that was leaked as much as they talked about Stone's contact and how that contact had been distorted in the media. Stone complained to Manafort that it was being represented he had links to Guccifer and the Russians. Stone said he had a WikiLeaks contact, not a Guccifer contact. Stone told Manafort that WikiLeaks and Guccifer were totally separate and they talked about the distinctions between the two.

Stone did not tell Manafort that he had only confirmed what was already public. In their discussions in 2018, Stone did "not exactly" confirm that in 2016 he had a contact that gave advance knowledge that Podesta's emails were coming out. Stone said his contact gave him information prior to the releases. Stone did not have to ask his contact exactly what was coming because he already knew from previous discussions.

Stone said he did not orchestrate the release of emails but only communicated what he knew.

Manafort recalled his own awareness in 2018 of Stone's denials to the media about his advance knowledge and that he thought the media was very

accusatory toward Stone. Manafort also recalled there was a distinction between the media story and what he himself believed. Manafort did not think Stone was involved in the hack itself, just that he knew in advance the information was coming. Manafort knew it was not true that Stone had no advance knowledge of the leaks.

Manafort and Stone have not talked since June 2018.

Stone never described his intermediary to WikiLeaks. He never mentioned Randy Credico to Manafort.

**Congressional and Special Counsel Investigations:**

Manafort probably first learned the campaign was being investigated around the time the dossier came out. Manafort was first aware of Congressional interested in him in February or March 2017. He hired counsel in February 2017, because he assumed it would come up.

No one from the administration reached out to Manafort and Manafort did not contact the administration. No one at the White House offered any guidance on counsel Manafort should retain. Rick Gates was the only one related to the campaign or the administration that reached out to Manafort.

Between March 20, 2017 (the date then-FBI Director Comey testified about the existence of an investigation on Russian interference in the election and the campaign's links to the interference) and May 9, 2017 (the day Comey was fired), Manafort deliberately did not have any contact with anyone related to the campaign. He had no indirect or direct contact with anyone associated with the campaign. He was on a separate track and had built a wall between himself and them. Manafort had his own counsel and did not reach out to anyone. Gates may have been talking to people in the campaign, but Manafort did not.

Manafort purposely did not talk to Tom Barrack. Barrack was very risk averse. He did speak to [redacted] but [redacted] was not part of the administration. b6 b7A b7C

Manafort recalled he discussed Comey's July 2016 press conference about Clinton with Trump, Reince Priebus, and Jared Kushner. He recalled that Trump said it was totally inappropriate for Comey to announce the position of the Department of Justice and that Comey was operating way outside of his space. Trump said it was a rigged system and signaled the politicization of the Department of Justice. They talked about how to use it in their campaign, saying that the fix was in between Loretta Lynch and

the Clintons. It happened before the Republican National Convention, and Manafort remembered they considered how to use it in the convention. He talked to a lot of people about it around then.

The focus on Comey was that the Department of Justice should not have let him make a statement, and the FBI should not have done it alone, as if it was Comey's decision alone. Trump called it a rigged system based on the fact that the Department of Justice and the White House let Comey make the statement.

Trump talked to Manafort about the propriety of publicly discussing the investigation and thought everything about it was unusual. Trump mentioned the way Clinton was interviewed and the fact that her aides were granted immunity and were allowed in the room during her interview.

Among those that advised Trump about what was appropriate or inappropriate were a number of people with prosecutorial experience, like Rudy Giuliani, Chris Christie, Donald McGahn, and Jeff Sessions. Everyone had the same message about it and it was Manafort's job to figure out what to do about it.

Manafort truly believed the system was rigged. The fix was in and the Clinton investigation's outcome was predetermined. It surprised everyone when Comey sent a follow up letter after his initial press conference. Manafort was gone by then, but counseled everyone to be careful in case it was a "wolf in sheep's clothing." He advised the campaign to use it but not to get too caught up in it or let it become the close of the campaign. Manafort thought he relayed his message through Kushner, Gates, and maybe Stephen Miller. He did not speak directly to Trump about it.

When the second letter came out, they were focused on what the close of the campaign should be and the letter was not a central part of it.

Manafort and Trump did not discuss Comey's status. Manafort did not hear anything about Trump's view of Comey. Manafort thought Trump was not a fan of Comey after the election because he had not been a fan during the campaign and nothing had changed. Manafort did not expect Trump to keep Comey on.

Manafort and Trump had conversations in which they said Comey was a political partisan. Trump thought it was a joke when people said Comey was a Republican and never viewed him as a Republican. Trump thought Comey had made his bed with the Obama administration and was part of the other team. Trump thought Comey's allegiance was to the Obama and Clinton administrations.

Manafort thought that Comey still came across as a partisan in spite of his negative statements about Clinton in the press conference because the lead up mattered less than the conclusion. Manafort thought the negative lead up to the conclusion only showed the absolute absurdity of the conclusion.

Manafort truly believed that Lynch and Bill Clinton's meeting on the tarmac was engineered in order for Lynch to give Bill Clinton the questions that would be asked in the interview of his wife. It did not make sense that they wanted to talk about their grandkids. Manafort thought there was no way their meeting was happenstance and had to have been pre-organized. Lynch had been a subordinate to the Clintons. They thought they would not get caught.

Sometime after the Special Counsel's Office was stood up, close to the end of June, Manafort's counsel told him about the email chain that set up the June 9, 2016 meeing at Trump Tower. He recalled the conversation was before the search executed at his apartment.

Manfort recalled his counsel raised the meeting and that he himself did not remember it at first. Manafort asked Gates if he (Manafort) had been at the meeting. The emails were the trigger for asking Gates about it. At some point after the meeting was public, Manafort found his notes of the meeting. In the process of downloading his material, his notes were found in the "deleted notes" section of the cloud. It was his practice to delete notes when he no longer needed them.

Manafort did not initially remember if he knew the story was coming out before it did. Manafort reviewed a July 8, 2017 New York Times article titled "Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign" that said Manafort had disclosed the meeting to congressional investigators. Based on that, he thought it was possible his counsel found the email and directed him to it and told him they planned to speak to the congressional committees about it, not that he first learned about it in the media.

Manafort stated that the article refreshed his memory and he recalled that the documents were sent to Congress and were given to Manafort's attorneys because of the disclosure to the Hill. After that, the stories came out in the press. Manafort's memory was that he got an email either from someone on the Hill or from someone else's attorney that the story was coming out. The information in the story did not come from Manafort.

Manafort assumed the June 9, 2016 meeting would be of interest to the Special Counsel's Office.

Manafort did not have access to his [redacted] email account after he left the campaign, per campaign policy. He only had access to his gmail and DMP email accounts.

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Manafort did not discuss the June 9, 2016 meeting with Alan Futerfas or Alan Garten. He did discuss it with Sean Hannity, a close personal friend, after the meeting had been made public. Manafort thought he probably just complained about it. They did not talk about strategy, just the facts.

Manafort did not talk to Donald Trump, Jr. directly. Their respective counsel spoke to one another. Manafort watched Trump, Jr. on the Hannity show talk about the June 9, 2016 meeting. Manafort agreed with what Trump, Jr. said, which was that it was a nothing meeting. Trump, Jr. represented the meeting the way Manafort remembered it, not as a meeting on dirt on Clinton. Manafort did not have any concerns about Trump, Jr's statement.

The meeting was about the Magnitsky Act, which in turn made it about adoptions. Manafort knew before the meeting that the Magnitsky Act was a human rights act enacted because of torture of Bill Browder's attorney that resulted in sanctions for Russians. As a result, Vladimir Putin put a halt on US adoptions of Russian children as a way to pressure the United States to get rid of the sanctions. Manafort was familiar with the Magnitsky Act prior to the meeting and had read Browder's book on the Magnitsky Act.

Around the time of the public disclosure of the meeting, Manafort did not speak to Trump, Marc Kasowitz, Mark Corallo, or anyone affiliated with Trump's or Kushner's legal teams. All discussions were with counsel and through counsel, other than his discussion with Hannity. He did not talk to Sean Spicer, Hope Hicks, or Reince Priebus.

Trump, Jr. did not tell Manafort in advance he planned to release the emails on Twitter. Manafort was surprised Trump, Jr. did it, but understood why he did it.

Manafort did not hear from anyone that Trump or anyone else tried to stop the emails from coming out, other than what he read publicly.

Between the July 2017 search at Manafort's residence and his October 2017 indictment, Manafort did not recall any direct or indirect contact from anyone in the White House. He spoke to Hannity, who was "certainly a back channel," but also a personal friend. Manafort knew Hannity was speaking to Trump around then because Hannity would tell Manafort to hang in there, that he had been talking to Trump, that Trump had his back, and things like that. Manafort understood his conversations with Hannity to be a

message from Trump. Manafort did not remember specifically when the conversations happened, but it was the "natural kind of text messaging" they would do. They also spoke on the phone. The frequency was dependent on what was going on at the time; sometimes they spoke twice a week, some weeks not at all.

If Manafort wanted to send a message to Trump, he would have gone through a mutual friend of theirs, like Chris Christie, [redacted], Tom Barrack, or [redacted] but he never did so. b6 b7C

After Rick Gates was charged, Manafort and Gates discussed money, because Gates was concerned about financing his defense. Manafort thought they would qualify for funding from an RNC fund that had been set up. Mike Glassner sent something to Manafort's lawyer saying Manafort and Gates would qualify for the fund. Manafort and Glassner had known each other for twenty years. Ultimately, it turned out the fund would only benefit people who were unindicted.

Manafort did not talk to John Dowd, but his attorney did. Manafort did not think Dowd had contributed to their defense fund.

The conversation between Dowd and Manafort's attorney happened around th same time Manafort's attorney received the communication from Glassner about the RNC fund.

Gates and Manafort discussed getting new counsel for Gates, because Gates' counsel was not appropriate for what was going on. Gates' original counsel, [redacted] was hired because Gates needed someone the day of arraignment and [redacted] was available. [redacted] another of Gates' attorneys, was recommended by [redacted] Tom Green was friends with [redacted] which was how Gates ended up hiring Green. b6 b7C

Manafort does not believe Trump will pardon him.

Gates raised the issue of pardons with Manafort during a conversation about money. Gates said Manafort would get a pardon and Gates would not. Manafort did not specifically recall other conversations, but said it may have come up once or twice. Manafort did not tell or suggest to Gates that he had talked to Dowd or Trump and that they would be taken care of. Manafort never told Gates he talked to Trump or Dowd. It was possible he told Gates that his lawyers had talked to Trump or Dowd, but it would have been in relation to money.

Talking about a pardon was not going to give Gates any comfort. Manafort told Gates they would find a way to resolve things and raise money, but he did not offer to take on Gates' legal bills.

Manafort was hopeful for a pardon but did not discuss one directly with Trump. He noticed Trump's public comments about pardons. Manafort never received any sort of assurance from Trump about a pardon. They did not discuss how best for Manafort to situate himself.

Manafort thought it was probably best to fight until the end but ultimately decided he wanted to deal with taking care of his family. When he saw the jury pool questionnaire for the trial [in the District of Columbia], Manafort knew it was over. He struck 90 of the 120 potential jurors based on their answers and thought the rest were lying. He thought that between that jury and Judge Jackson, he had no chance at trial. Manafort did decide to plead guilty to avoid the negative press of fighting it out, since the bad stuff was already in the plea. He knew he was going to lose, and it was not worth the agony or the money to continue to fight.

No one from the White House or the campaign sent a message after his plea. He did not recall telling Gates that Trump was watching their case, but it sounded like something he would say. If he said it, it was based on reading the newspaper; he did not get any private information from Trump.

Manafort had never talked to Robert Costello. He had not spoken with or received messages from Giuliani since his indictment.

Manafort was not told anything about what happened to Mike Flynn in the lead up to Flynn's termination. All Manafort knew about Flynn's calls to Kislyak was based on public reporting.

Manafort was aware that Flynn had Turkish and Middle East business connections. On a trip to the Middle East in April 2017, [redacted] approached Manafort and asked if he was interested in more work in Turkey. [redacted] explained part of the work was related to getting a cleric back to Turkey. Manafort said he was not interested and asked if the work was associated with Flynn, and [redacted] said yes. Manafort was later led to believe Flynn [redacted] had done something for [redacted] and the Turkish government.

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Manafort turned it down because he was not comfortable with it. He had decided not to deal with the administration until all of his issues were cleared up and did not want to lobby them.

**Administrative:** The original agent notes and document shown to Manafort will be maintained in the 1A section of the case file.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2042
DATE: 10-07-2019

[redacted]



General Records

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

~~SECRET~~

Date of entry 03/05/2018

Kathleen Troia "K.T." McFarland was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street SW, Washington, D.C. McFarland was accompanied by her attorneys, [redacted] and [redacted] of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. Participating in the interview were FBI Special Agent (SA) [redacted] SA [redacted] Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles III, Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Andrew Goldstein, and SASC Brandon Van Grack. Pursuant to the execution of a proffer agreement, McFarland provided the following information:

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Investigation on 12/22/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/29/2017

by [redacted]

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Transition period:

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Mar-a-Lago Trip:

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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December 28, 2016

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

On December 28, 2016, Flynn and McFarland spoke on the telephone [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

December 29, 2016

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP b6 b7C

McFarland learned about the sanctions on the news that afternoon.

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP b6 b7C

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP b6 b7C

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP b6 b7C

McFarland and Bannon met on December 29. [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP [redacted] but they also talked about sanctions. [redacted] Bannon told McFarland the sanctions would hurt their ability to have good relations

with Russia. [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP Bannon thought a Russian escalation would make things more difficult. McFarland thought she told him Flynn was scheduled to talk to the Russian ambassador later that night. [redacted]

McFarland stated that she may have run into Priebus and given him a short version of her conversation with Bannon about the sanctions. [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP She may have told Priebus that Flynn was scheduled to talk to the Russian ambassador that night, but was not sure. [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

McFarland and Flynn spoke on the telephone at around 4:00 pm on December 29. [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] She noted that it was implicit in their discussion that no one wanted things to escalate. [redacted]

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

McFarland knew before the Flynn's call that Flynn was going to feel out the Russian ambassador on the overall relationship, knowing that the sanctions would influence it. [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Trump, [redacted] Priebus, Bannon, Spicer, [redacted] and maybe one or two others attended. [redacted] At some point, Trump asked her if the "Russians did it" and she said yes. [redacted] Trump repeated he was not sure [redacted] He said he had reason to doubt it was the Russians [redacted]

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] She went through the [redacted] possible responses [redacted] and said they would have to see what happened. She told Trump the response would be an indicator of what the Russians wanted going forward. Trump said [redacted] since Trump had leverage to use with the Russians. [redacted] She thought someone may have mentioned Flynn's scheduled call with Kislyak as they were ending the meeting and leaving the room. [redacted] she [redacted] did not recall a response from Trump before he walked out of the room.

McFarland and Flynn had a telephone call the evening of December 29, which followed the call between Flynn and Kislyak after the sanctions

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Flynn told McFarland he talked to the Russian ambassador [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] He told McFarland the Russian response was not going to be escalatory because they wanted a good relationship with the Trump administration. [redacted]

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

December 31, 2016

Flynn and McFarland spoke on the phone [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP [redacted] Flynn told her Putin's response was an indication they wanted a better relationship with the United States. He may have said his telephone call with Kislyak may have made a difference. Flynn conveyed things were back on track. [redacted]

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

When Flynn and McFarland spoke on December 31, Flynn told McFarland he talked to the Russian ambassador again. He said something to the effect of "Well, they want a better relationship. The relationship is back on track." Flynn said it was a good call and he thought his own call had made a difference but not the only difference. [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP [redacted] McFarland congratulated Flynn for his work.

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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Post-Inauguration:

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

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[redacted] (S) b5 Per DOJ/OIP b1 b3 b7E

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

On Wednesday, February 22, 2017, McFarland was called to Priebus' office, and when she got there, Bannon was also there. [redacted] He told her Trump wanted her to resign. [redacted]

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] Priebus asked if she wanted to be an ambassador, [redacted]

[redacted] Bannon suggested Singapore, [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] Priebus called McFarland back to his office and said b5 Per DOJ/OIP words to the effect of "The President would like you to send me an email saying [redacted] could she say the President never directed Flynn to call the Russians about sanctions."

[redacted]

McFarland did not say yes or no to this request. She called Eisenberg and told him she had been fired from her job as Deputy NSA and offered the job in Singapore, but they wanted this letter from her. [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP However, he offered his opinion it was a bad idea for her to write the letter because it was awkward and looked like a quid pro quo situation. [redacted] Priebus [redacted] he came to her office and told her not to do the email and to forget he even mentioned it.

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP b6 b7C

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

March - May 2017

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

She talked to Trump [redacted] One time was in late March or early April. [redacted] He asked her to pass a message to Flynn [redacted] to stay strong; and that Trump felt bad for him. [redacted]

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Other Campaign/Administration contacts:

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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McFarland reviewed an email from Paul Manafort dated January 15, 2017 at 1:12:21 pm [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP



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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 05/15/2018

THEODORE ROOSEVELT MALLOCH, [redacted] The interview was surreptitiously recorded by the interviewing Agents. MALLOCH was advised of the voluntary nature of the interview and that the interview could end at any moment of his choosing. MALLOCH was further advised that lying to an FBI Agent was a federal offense. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, MALLOCH provided the following information. The below is a summary of the recorded statements made by MALLOCH:

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[redacted]

When asked if MALLOCH had performed any duties for the 2016 Trump campaign, official or informal, MALLOCH indicated he had only ever made appearances on television and that those appearances were done voluntarily.

MALLOCH said his main contacts on the campaign were STEVEN MILLER and STEPHEN BANNON. When asked if MALLOCH had contact with PAUL MANAFORT, MALLOCH advised he had, "never even met PAUL MANAFORT." MALLOCH also indicated he had never met RICK GATES.

MALLOCH said he had contact with ROGER STONE but added that STONE was not part of the campaign. MALLOCH was introduced to STONE by JEROME CORSI. MALLOCH said he maintains current contact with STONE as it relates to media. MALLOCH said he saw STONE for dinner in New York once before the convention [Note: the 2016 Republican National Convention took place July 18-21, 2016]. MALLOCH said he also saw STONE at the Presidential inauguration [Note: the 2017 Presidential inauguration took place January 20, 2017]. MALLOCH indicated he also saw STONE in Oxford, United Kingdom approximately two weeks prior to the captioned interview. MALLOCH said his current relationship with STONE could be described as cordial and no formal relationship existed. When asked if MALLOCH ever worked with STONE on any campaign related projects, MALLOCH replied in the negative. When asked if MALLOCH had ever worked for the COMMITTEE FOR AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY, a super-PAC STONE was involved in, to include being part of



Investigation on 03/27/2018 at Boston, Massachusetts, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 04/18/2018

by [redacted]

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an advisory board, MALLOCH replied in the negative. MALLOCH said he had exchanged emails with STONE and the nature of the communication typically involved MALLOCH sending STONE news articles, some of which MALLOCH wrote himself. When asked if MALLOCH knew of any relationship STONE had with ASSANGE, MALLOCH replied, "it's not something we have discussed." MALLOCH said he only communicates with STONE via email. MALLOCH said STONE never discussed having advanced knowledge of Wikileaks related material during the campaign timeframe.

[redacted] MALLOCH said he met CORSI through CORSI's work at a publishing firm called WND [Note: WorldNetDaily (WND) is an American news and opinion website and online news aggregator]. [redacted] MALLOCH said he communicates with CORSI through email and Facetime. MALLOCH was not aware of any relationship CORSI may have with ASSANGE.

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MALLOCH advised he had never communicated with anyone associated with Wikileaks directly or indirectly. MALLOCH said he had never been to the Ecuadorian Embassy.

MALLOCH advised he had never discussed anything Wikileaks related with STONE and/or CORSI.

MALLOCH said he never discussed having access to JULIAN ASSANGE and/or Wikileaks.

MALLOCH was not aware of anyone having access to JOHN PODESTA's hacked emails prior to the public disclosures made by Wikileaks.

MALLOCH advised his conversations with STONE never related to Wikileaks or things that may be in the possession of Wikileaks. MALLOCH said STONE never asked him to reach out to ASSANGE. When asked whether CORSI had ever asked him to reach out to ASSANGE, MALLOCH replied, "I have no way to do it."

[redacted] b6 b7C

MALLOCH provided his email address, [redacted] MALLOCH said he did not use any other email addresses to communicate with STONE and CORSI. b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

MALLOCH advised he was currently writing a book of which STONE would be writing the foreword. MALLOCH said the subject matter of his book was, "the plot to destroy TRUMP."

[redacted] b6 b7C

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FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)





**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 01/16/2019

Theodore Roosevelt Malloch, [redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, Patriots Plaza 1, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC 20546. Malloch is a United States citizen who resides in the United Kingdom. Malloch's address in the United States is [redacted] Present during the interview were Malloch's attorneys, [redacted] and [redacted] Present from the Special Counsel's Office were Associate Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, FBI Special Agent (SA) [redacted] FBI SA [redacted] and FBI Intelligence Analyst (IA) [redacted] b6 b7C

Malloch was provided with a proffer letter for this interview. ASC Zelinsky confirmed the proffer letter was identical to one previously provided to Malloch's attorneys. Malloch and his attorneys reviewed the letter and Malloch signed it. Malloch was advised intentional false statements during this interview would be a violation of federal law. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, Malloch provided the following information:

[redacted] Corsi had been writing articles for WorldNetDaily (WND) [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

Investigation on 06/08/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 06/12/2018

by [redacted] b6 b7C b7E

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Malloch was advised WikiLeaks began releasing emails hacked from the Democratic National Committee (DNC) on or about July 22, 2016. Malloch remembered having a FaceTime conversation with Corsi around that time, because Malloch had just authored a book entitled, Common Sense Business. Corsi asked Malloch, since Malloch was cognizant of the Wikileaks incident, if he could help facilitate an interview with Julian Assange. Malloch believed Corsi was under pressure from his publicist to cover more breaking news stories at the time. Corsi asked Malloch if he knew of anyone in Nigel Farage's orbit who could help facilitate an interview with Assange. Malloch had no inclination if, or how, Farage and Assange were associated at the time. His response to Corsi was an "eye roll" because Malloch didn't know anyone in Farage's circle. Malloch explained that he met Farage much later in time, on November 22, 2016. Malloch also recalled having breakfast with Farage on the morning of November 23, 2016, at Farage's club. Malloch's conversation with Corsi subsequently reverted

back to discussions about their writing projects and the subject of Farage was dropped.

Malloch did not remember Corsi ever having mentioned Stone in his initial request to get in touch with Assange through Farage. However, after Malloch saw the news surrounding the Glenn Simpson testimony he believed Corsi's request likely came from Stone, because Stone was interested in what Wikileaks had. Malloch remembered having a FaceTime call with Corsi about the Simpson testimony but did not remember Corsi ever mentioning that Stone wanted to reach Assange through Farage. Malloch never made any attempts to get in touch with Assange through Farage nor did Corsi ever indicate he had an ability to reach Assange.

[redacted]

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Malloch never asked Corsi if he did anything with Wikileaks which could potentially get them in trouble. Malloch said it was possible he may have had a FaceTime call with Corsi where they had that discussion or they may have exchanged an email about it. Malloch relayed that most of what he knew about Wikileaks came from the news.

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The dinner was not the first time Malloch discussed WikiLeaks with Corsi. Malloch exchanged various emails and FaceTime calls with Corsi about the topic. Malloch assumed Stone was behind it and that Corsi's request for Malloch to contact Assange ultimately came from him. Malloch did not have any direct communications with Stone about Assange.

When asked if Corsi ever mentioned the name Podesta prior to the release of his emails, Malloch recalled speaking with Corsi about Podesta around that same time. Before they were released, Malloch had the impression, from his conversations with Corsi, that Stone had a connection to Assange.

Given that, Malloch believed Stone likely would have known about the Podesta emails in advance.

Malloch mainly communicated with Corsi, via FaceTime and emails. The two spoke about a variety of matters and Corsi would often boast about how they would soon be in the driver's seat. Malloch thought Corsi was very happy when the Podesta emails were released because he thought they contained a treasure trove of information.

Malloch believed the timing of the Podesta release was of some consequence. He believed the information was released as a counter-narrative to the Access Hollywood tape, however Malloch did not remember having specific discussions about who controlled the timing of the release. Corsi did not tell Malloch when the emails would be released but he did say they created a counter-narrative. Malloch had conversations with Corsi about future releases and Corsi believed that everything Assange had would be released before the election. Malloch added that he didn't believe Corsi's claims were just post-dump boasts, designed to steal credit.

Malloch was not aware of anyone else who may have had similar conversations with Stone and Corsi about advanced knowledge of the release. Malloch knew Stone had many other associates but Malloch did not interact with any of them. Malloch primarily had FaceTime conversations with Corsi, just the two of them. Malloch met with Corsi at the Inauguration in Washington, DC. Malloch remembered having a similar conversation with him there, and Corsi boasted about how he and Stone had gotten Trump elected. [redacted] b6 b7C

When asked if it seemed as if Stone and Corsi had an accurate prediction of what would be released by WikiLeaks, as if it was a called-shot, Malloch said that would be valid.

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[redacted] b6 b7C

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[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b3 b7E

[redacted] b3 b7E

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

Malloch was not aware of Corsi having any direct contact with Assange. Corsi told Malloch that Stone had those contacts. Corsi credited Stone for the work with Assange more than himself. Malloch explained that in his dealings with Stone and Corsi, Stone seemed to dominate the conversations. Malloch provided percentages, based on his assessment of their body languages, in the amounts of 70% Stone and 30% Corsi. Malloch thought Corsi would defend Stone until the end.

Malloch did not have any discussions with Stone or Corsi about where the WikiLeaks emails came from. Additionally, Malloch did not recall having any discussions with Corsi about Stone's tweet about Podesta. Malloch had a general recollection that Corsi said the hack had been an inside job, but not until after the emails were released.

[redacted] b6 b7C

A copy of the proffer letter is enclosed for the file as a digital 1A attachment to this FD-302. The original will be maintained in a physical 1A envelope, along with the hand-written notes taken during this interview.



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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 11/09/2018

Paul J. Manafort, date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agents [redacted] FBI Intelligence Analyst [redacted]; and Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Greg Andres, Andrew Weissmann and Andrew Goldstein. Present representing Manafort were attorney Thomas Zehnle and paralegal [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, Manafort provided the following information: b6 b7C

Manafort believed that the news articles about him all originated from one source of information. Manafort asked [redacted] to explain how news articles could appear to come from several sources, and look unconnected, but really trace back to a single source. They created a document that [redacted] gave to Manafort during their in-person meeting in the U.S. [redacted] did not want to send the document electronically. Manafort does not know why [redacted] did not want to send it. The document was an example of how such an operation could be run, not how the one against Manafort was run. b6 b7C

Manafort sent the hard copy document to his attorney [redacted] so that [redacted] would be aware of the [redacted] work, background and access. The [redacted] had recommended an international accounting firm to research issues related to Manafort's bank accounts in Cyprus. [redacted] worked with the international accounting firm on the Cyprus bank account project. When Manafort switched attorneys, Kevin Downing took over managing the project. b6 b7C

Manafort reviewed messages between Manafort and [redacted] wrote on 07/18/2018 that he was "going to discuss with my US colleagues." [redacted] "US colleagues" were [redacted] but [redacted] did not tell Manafort their names. b3 b6 b7C

On 02/02/2018, Manafort messaged [redacted] "[i]s it possible to do a superficial check on someone for me. I would need bt Tuesday." Manafort does not recall who he asked [redacted] to check out. [redacted] responded on 02/05/2018 that "I did ask about ur guy. [redacted] b6 b7C

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Investigation on 10/16/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/17/2018 b6 b7C

by [redacted] b7E

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[redacted] Can't get any further then that I'm afraid." [redacted] did not tell Manafort any connections that he had [redacted] Manafort does not recall asking [redacted] to do a [redacted] b6 b7C

On 02/02/2018, Manafort messaged [redacted] "I am getting solid support from my former team." "My former team" referred to people in the Trump Administration. Manafort did not talk directly with anyone in the Administration. [redacted] told Manafort about the support. [redacted] had been Reince Priebus's [redacted] told [redacted] that Priebus was supportive and [redacted] told Manafort. Manafort did not hear any word of support from Jared Kushner. b6 b7A b7C

On 02/02/2018, Manafort messaged [redacted] "[k]ey is to keep JK informed." Manafort was opining to [redacted] that Talal should keep Kushner informed because Kushner, not Rex Tillerson or the U.N., was the best way to get a message to President Donald Trump. b6 b7C

On 03/04/2018, Manafort messaged [redacted] "Q is still pushing and playing with Mueller." Manafort does not recall any connection between Qatar and Mueller. Manafort does not recall why he wrote the message. Manafort was simply associating the UAE's enemy with Manafort's enemy. It was a self-serving statement, Manafort had no facts to support the connection. After his second indictment, Manafort wanted reassurance from [redacted] that he could still work for the UAE. b6 b7C

Manafort had no communication with anyone in the Administration while they were in the Administration. Manafort never asked anyone to try to communicate a message to anyone in the Administration. Manafort spoke with Priebus after he left the Administration. Manafort communicated with Larry Kudlow before Kudlow joined the Administration.

Manafort has traveled once to Cyprus. Manafort traveled to Cyprus because the oligarchs wanted to send his payments to bank accounts in Cyprus rather than wiring money directly to the U.S. Manafort met with [redacted]. Oleg Deripaska introduced Manafort to [redacted] helped Manafort set up bank accounts and shelf companies in Cyprus. Manafort distinguishes between the shelf companies that accepted payments for Manafort's Ukrainian political work and the shelf companies that were used as Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) to purchase cable companies. Manafort may also have spoken with [redacted] about [redacted] planned presidential campaign. Manafort believes that [redacted] set up bank accounts in Cyprus for Deripaska. Deripaska definitely had a presence in Cyprus, b6 b7C

which may have been bank accounts or businesses, Manafort does not know. Manafort does not know if Rinat Akhmetov has Cyprus bank accounts or who he would have used to set up the accounts.

Manafort reviewed two documents, one showing he owned 100% of DMP International and one showing that he owned 50% and [redacted] owned 50%. Manafort does not know any reason for the difference. Manafort believes that the 100% document was created first. Philip Ayliff may have suggested the change for tax purposes. Manafort has no information on how or why the document was changed. Manafort does not recall any conversation about the change. Rick Gates may have given [redacted] the 100% document without knowing that Ayliff made the change. Manafort 100% operated DMP, [redacted] was not involved in any decision making. b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

Trump did not like a policy speech drafted by Dimitri Simes. Manafort and Kushner agreed that Simes could not save the speech and Stephen Miller would re-write it. After Trump rejected the speech, Simes was not involved in anything else for the campaign.

Manafort reviewed a 08/10/2016 e-mail from Simes forwarded from Kushner to Manafort and others regarding "Russia Policy Memo." Manafort recalls the e-mail but no follow-up. Simes was not the type of person that Trump embraced. Simes and Trump did not interact well when Trump practiced Simes's draft speech. Kushner wrote in the e-mail that it was a "suggestion only," meaning he was not pushing the policy memo. Kushner would have suggested a meeting if he was pushing it.

Manafort reviewed a 08/10/2016 and 08/11/2016 e-mail chain from Manafort to Simes wherein Manafort first wrote "Dimitri Lets chat" and ended with an e-mail to Manafort's assistant "Pls call Jarred's assistant to get the time and location of my meeting on August 17 with Jared and Dimitri Simes." The meeting never happened. Manafort does not recall why he responded to Simes "lets chat." Manafort probably talked with Kushner that day. Manafort guesses that Kushner must have wanted the meeting. Manafort would not have responded to Simes based on Kushner's "suggestion only." In order of likelihood, Kushner may have wanted the meeting because Henry Kissinger recommended it, because of Simes's information on the Clintons and Russia or because someone liked the policy information in the memo. Simes worked for a think tank that believed the U.S. needed to be firm but also to work with Russia. Simes's ideas were very specific, Trump did not like that sort of detail to box him into a position. Trump and Manafort agreed to focus foreign policy on Iran, North Korea and the U.S. Allies's lack of payments to NATO and the U. N. These policies were easy, Russia and China were more difficult. Simes would have gained Trump's attention with the Clinton information, which was red meat, not the nuances of foreign policy. Manafort and Kushner were both very busy at this time. Manafort was dealing with the [redacted] Manafort's issues in the news and preparing the campaign strategy in case he left. Kushner was dealing with social media, scheduling for Trump and Trump's debate practice. b6 b7C

Collusion between Russia and Trump was not really a campaign issue. Robby Mook's charges of collusion were not taken seriously within the Trump Campaign because they were wrong. The Campaign's only response was to release Manafort.

From the time he left the Campaign until the election, Manafort met once or twice with Kushner and spoke five or six times with him on the telephone. They both reached out to each other. Trump and the Family knew that Manafort and Kushner were talking. Kushner thought it would be good for Manafort to call Trump. Manafort and Trump talked a few times before the election. As to the substance of their calls, Manafort only recalls that once he gave Trump advice on Trump's performance in the second debate and gave Trump ideas for the third debate.

On November 5, 2016, Manafort e-mailed a "Securing the Victory" document to Kushner. Kushner acknowledged getting the document. Manafort does not recall discussing it with Kushner. Manafort described Trump as vulnerable to attack because people would not understand how Trump won and would be looking for reasons. Manafort had no information that Russia hacked voting machines. Manafort presumed it would be a claim by

Clinton's Campaign. Manafort sent the memo to Hannity because he wanted Hannity to pass the message on television and through the media. Manafort did not expect Hannity to talk with Trump about it. Manafort sent the memo to Trump's executive assistant.

On the day that the Steele dossier came out, Manafort told Trump that the information in the dossier about Manafort was not true, including the payments in the cash ledger. Trump told Manafort that the information about Michael Cohen in Prague and Trump in Moscow was similarly not true. Trump was generally upset that his victory was being undermined. Manafort had first called Priebus to say that the information was false. Priebus arranged a time for Manafort to call and speak with Trump. Manafort did not tell Trump about any of the Steele dossier research by [redacted] b6 b7C

Manafort does not know why Yanukovych fled to Russia instead of somewhere in Europe. Manafort believes that after Yanukovych did not sign the Vilnius Agreement that the West aligned against him. Putin had pressured Yanukovych not to sign the Agreement. Yanukovych fled to Russia because he felt Putin owed him. Yanukovych did not sign the Agreement because of the economic pressure that Putin placed on him. Manafort and Serhiy Lyovochkin expected Yanukovych to stand up to Putin. Kilimnik believed that Georgian mercenaries, hired by the West, committed the violence in Maidan because Yanukovych did not sign the Association Agreement. Kilimnik sent Manafort several documentaries on the issue.

Manafort asked Kilimnik to research evidence related to the claims against Manafort in the Steele dossier. Manafort was more concerned with how the information in the Steele dossier was collected than its substance.

[redacted] worked with Kilimnik at the International Republican Institute (IRI). [redacted] brought Kilimnik to Davis Manafort. Kilimnik started as a translator and someone with local knowledge. Kilimnik rose to manager. Kilimnik lived in Russia when Ukraine split from the Soviet Union. Kilimnik declared himself Russian instead of Ukrainian. Kilimnik understood Americans, had language skills and was smart, outgoing and witty. Manafort and Kilimnik worked long hours and often went to dinner together. Manafort sometimes went to Kilimnik's house for dinner. Manafort knew Kilimnik's [redacted] Kilimnik was [redacted] Kilimnik now has residences in [redacted] and travels back and forth. After Kilimnik was indicted, Kilimnik told Manafort that [redacted] b6 b7C

Kilimnik did not believe that he was suborning perjury when he contacted [redacted] In Kilimnik's mind, he was only communicating information. Kilimnik did not feel that he exerted any pressure. Kilimnik believed that the Hapsburg Group was a European project. To Kilimnik, Europe was the fulcrum of the project. Kilimnik did not work on the Hapsburg Group's project in the U.S. Kilimnik did not understand why the Hapsburg Group violated the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). Manafort does not recall talking about FARA with Kilimnik while they performed the work. b6 b7C

Manafort talked with Kilimnik after Kilimnik was indicted. Kilimnik thought it was crazy that he had been indicted. Manafort agreed that it was outrageous. Manafort offered to help Kilimnik retain an attorney. Kilimnik called back a couple of days later and said he was not going to deal with it.

During a break, Manafort spoke with his attorney.

Manafort conspired with Kilimnik. At the time he pleaded guilty, Manafort understood the elements of the conspiracy. Manafort and Kilimnik agreed to get [redacted] to say something that was not true. Kilimnik knew that the Hapsburg Group performed work in the U.S. Kilimnik messaged [redacted] to get him to say that the Hapsburg Group was Europe focused. [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

Manafort first met Trump in 1982 in Trump's office. Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly had been hired to represent Trump. Roger Stone was hired and Manafort came along. They were hired to lobby against FAA approval for fly over rights at Mar-A-Lago. Their firm knew most of the Reagan Administration. Stone and another associate handled the account. At different times, Manafort saw Trump at social and political events in New York City. Manafort saw Trump at Stone's wedding. They had social, not business, conversations. Trump requested VIP status at the Republican conventions worked by Manafort in 1988 and 1996. Manafort is not aware of any other lobbying efforts by Stone on behalf of Trump. Manafort is not aware of any lobbying efforts for Trump's casinos. From about 1980 to 1991, Stone counseled Trump on which candidates to meet and financially support.

In 1981, President Reagan appointed Manafort to the Oversea Private Investment Corporation's Board of Directors. Manafort resigned sometime before Reagan left office. It was a part-time job.

Manafort helped fifty or sixty people get inauguration tickets. Manafort reviewed a series of e-mails regarding requests of him for inauguration tickets. [redacted] and good friend. The other people listed in the same e-mail are friends of [redacted] helped with the Vice-Presidential search. [redacted] Manafort's friend and golf professional, recommended the people from Korea and China. [redacted] and wanted to bring his family. Manafort met [redacted] through a third party in the 1990s. [redacted] brought business deals to Manafort periodically, such as a marijuana drink. Manafort never did any of the deals. [redacted] was a former stock broker that wanted to be a businessman. Manafort is not aware of any connection between [redacted] and Trump. [redacted] told Manafort that [redacted] but Manafort does not have any other information regarding criminal activity by [redacted] Manafort knows that [redacted] owned sex clubs. Manafort met [redacted] at [redacted] club a number of times. Manafort did not participate in the activities at the club. Manafort does not know of any underage women at the sex clubs. [redacted] considered Manafort a member of his club. Manafort has never been a member or participated in a sex club. b6 b7C

[redacted] introduced Manafort to President Kabila's representatives. Kabila had extended his presidency in Congo by two terms. Kabila wanted credit from the West if he gave up power. Manafort met twice in the U.S. with Kabila's representatives. They met around the time of Manafort's indictment in 2018. [redacted] attended the first meeting. President Kabila wanted to install a puppet in the Presidency so Manafort refused to help. A local businessman in California connected [redacted] with the opportunity. In 2018, [redacted] needed money and talked with Manafort about different opportunities. [redacted] and Manafort did not discuss whether representing Kabila would require filing under FARA. b6 b7C

Some people in the Party of Regions thought Manafort worked for the CIA and Kilimnik for the KGB. Gates joked with Kilimnik about Kilimnik going to meet with his KGB handler. Upfront, Manafort told Yanukovych that he should have Kilimnik checked out so that they would not have to hold back during their discussions with Kilimnik translating. Manafort and Yanukovych discussed sensitive issues such as NATO and surveillance along the Russian border. Serhiy Lyovochkin translated Manafort's suggestion that Yanukovych have Kilimnik checked out. Yanukovych had Kilimnik checked out in 2010. [redacted] did not believe Kilimnik was an intelligence officer. [redacted] said that Rinat Akhmetov did not believe it either. No one at the U.S. Embassy expressed a concern about meeting with Kilimnik. Kilimnik was irate when such allegations came out in the news. Kilimnik was not in the military branch that moved into the b6 b7C

KGB. Kilimnik worked in the branch that went into foreign service. Manafort does not have any information about Kilimnik's military service. Kilimnik never talked about being in combat. After his military service, Kilimnik worked as a translator, then at IRI and then for Davis Manafort.

When he stopped working for the Opposition Bloc, they owed Manafort about $4 million. They paid Manafort $1.5 or $2.0 million at the end of 2014 or in 2015.

Manafort does not know [redacted] or the PSY Group. Manafort does not recall any proposal to use false online personas for the Campaign. Manafort does not recall any proposal to pay bloggers for the Campaign. b6 b7C

Manafort reviewed again a 07/18/2017 message from [redacted] to Manafort. [redacted] wanted to use tweets to get out the Daily Mail story. [redacted] "US colleagues" were [redacted] Manafort never provided or discussed the [redacted] research with Trump. [redacted] "findings" were in a document that traced a media report and how the opposition got the story circulated. [redacted] had no smoking gun on Manafort's case. Manafort does not recall the name of the [redacted] company. b3 b6 b7C

Manafort does not know Bob Foresman at UBS Bank. Manafort's point of contact with UBS was [redacted] b6 b7C



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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 11/07/2018

Paul J. Manafort, date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agents [redacted] Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Jeannie S. Rhee, Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres; and Assistant United States Attorney [redacted] Present representing Manafort were attorneys Richard Westling, Thomas Zehnle and Kevin Downing and paralegal [redacted] FBI SA [redacted] advised Manafort of his rights. Manafort stated that he understood his rights and that he was willing to answer questions. Manafort signed a FD-395, Advise of Rights. ASC Weissmann reviewed the terms of a letter setting forth the agreement upon which Manafort made himself available for interview. Manafort, Downing and ASC Weissmann initialed the letter agreement. After being advised of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, Manafort provided the following information: b6 b7C

During 09/11/2018 and 09/12/18 interviews, Manafort did not recall meeting with Kilimnik in Madrid. Manafort did not review any documents in order to help him recall meeting with Kilimnik.

Manafort met Konstantin Kilimnik in Madrid in February 2017. In response to Manafort's request, Kilimnik had been putting together background on what was occurring in Kyiv. Reporters and investigators in Kyiv were asking questions about Manafort. Kilimnik came to Madrid to update Manafort on the work of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, information from a ledger found with Manafort's name written in it and activities by Petro Poroshenko. They met for an hour and a half at Manafort's hotel. Kilimnik reported that the criminal investigation in Ukraine was going nowhere.

Manafort did not ask Kilimnik to Madrid in order to talk about the peace plan but Kilimnik would have raised it. Because of his legal problems, Manafort would not have approached the Trump Administration about the Ukraine. At this time, Manafort did not believe that Trump had a position on the Ukraine and Russia's involvement. Manafort, however, was concerned that Trump would not be strict enough on Russia regarding the Ukraine.

UNCLASSIFIED/~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 09/13/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/17/2018 b6 b7C

by [redacted] b7E

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While Manafort chaired Trump's campaign, Stone brought Manafort good speech writers and policy people. Stone was also good at bringing in the Catholic vote. With Stone, Manafort had to [redacted] Manafort knew that Stone talked to Trump because soon after Manafort told Stone that [redacted] then Trump suggested the same idea. b6 b7C

Stone told Manafort that a source close to WikiLeaks confirmed that WikiLeaks had the e-mails from Clinton's server. Stone said the e-mails would be released soon but he did not know when. If WikiLeaks had the e-mails, [redacted] Manafort told [redacted] In June, Manafort had Trump making policy speeches and meeting members of Congress. Manafort did not want Trump distracted by the titillation of a WikiLeaks's release. [redacted] b6 b7C

In June, when the WikiLeaks information became public, Manafort thought that Stone had been right. Manafort felt he could then use the information because it had been confirmed. Manafort was confused though because Stone had said WikiLeaks had e-mails from Clinton's server. [redacted] Manafort still used the fact of the hack and the substance of the e-mails including Donna Brazile's leaking of questions to Hillary Clinton to attack Clinton.

The Friday morning after the Republican Convention, Trump was supposed to give a press conference thanking the party and the people who worked to put on the convention. Trump instead attacked the party. Manafort had to deal with angry party members. The same day, WikiLeaks released more e-mails, including e-mails from Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Manafort and Reince Preibus, from the Republican National Committee (RNC), agreed that the RNC would handle press on the Wasserman Schultz e-mails.

Trump and Manafort talked Friday afternoon. Trump and Manafort discussed how to use the Wasserman Schultz e-mails. Trump told Manafort to follow-up with Stone to see if there were more e-mails coming out. Manafort talked with Stone sometime during the week of the Democratic National Convention. Stone did not know what else may come out or when it may come out. Stone said he would follow-up but did not say how he would follow-up. Manafort does not know if Trump spoke with Stone about WikiLeaks but assumes they did during this week.

[redacted] b6 b7C

Manafort recalls Trump stating "Russia, if you're listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing." Manafort was surprised by the statement. Manafort and Trump had several conversations on Saturday, Sunday and Monday about the hacked e-mails. They never discussed that it was Russia. Manafort believes it was a spontaneous statement by Trump. Manafort does not know why Trump asked Russia as opposed to another country. In prior speeches, Trump had identified different countries as responsible - sometimes Russia, sometimes China and sometimes other countries. Over the weekend, Trump had probably talked to a lot of people about the hack and Wasserman Schultz e-mails. Trump would have been talking with his "kitchen cabinet." Manafort guesses that more people than not were identifying Russia so that stuck in Trump's head.

Robby Mook held a press conference at the end of the DNC's convention week where he talked about Trump and Russia working together. Before the press conference, Manafort does not recall any discussion of Russian collusion. Manafort viewed the statement as absurd and a sign that the Clinton campaign was desperate. b6 b7C

[redacted] Manafort did not, and does not, believe Stone was managing the process. [redacted] Manafort viewed the drops as a gift but one that they could not control. Manafort was concerned that the next drop could contain RNC information.

b6 b7C

Around the time of the first debate between Trump and Clinton, Stone told Manafort that [redacted] Stone said that there were going to be leaks of John Podesta's e-mails. Stone knew [redacted] had supposedly released the story about Manafort's Ukraine work. On or about October 7, 2016, when the Podesta e-mails came out, Manafort [redacted] Manafort told [redacted] Manafort recalls that the Podesta e-mails came out on the same day as the Access Hollywood Tape but he cannot recall which came first. Trump acknowledged to Manafort that Stone had information in advance.

Manafort does not know if Trump or the Trump Organization had any business in Russia. Manafort does not know if Trump or the Trump Organization owed money to anyone in Russia. Manafort did not have a conversation with Trump or anyone else as to whether there was anything negative that Manafort should know as Campaign Chair. Manafort already had the RNC book on Trump.

Interviewers read to Manafort text messages between Manafort and Stone [redacted] Manafort does not believe that Stone's text message relates to WikiLeaks or hacked e-mails. Manafort believes Stone's message may be about [redacted] Kushner called Manafort. [redacted] b6 b7C

Subsequent to Kushner's call, Manafort received a call from Stone. Stone [redacted] Manafort never discussed whether Stone had a solution. Manafort did not want Stone involved. Manafort told Stone that it had been handled. Manafort did not tell Stone who handled it. b6 b7C

Manafort submitted false documents to obtain loans. Manafort is not aware of any bank personnel that knew the information was false. [redacted] understood that Manafort had no income. [redacted] said that we invest in people. b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

The Advice of Rights and Letter Agreement will be maintained in the 1-A section of this casefile.

General Records Schedule 16 Facilitative Records Content Varies Apply to Agency Business Use Only

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FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2042
DATE: 11-27-2019

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 10/25/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

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(U/~~/FOUO~~) Kathleen Troia "K.T." McFarland, date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] telephone numbers [redacted] (cell); [redacted] home) & [redacted] home) was interviewed by SA [redacted] & SSA [redacted] in a conference room at Debevoise & Plimpton, 919 3rd Avenue, New York, NY. Also present was [redacted] attorney [redacted] of [redacted] telephone numbers [redacted] (cell) & [redacted] (office direct line). McFarland was acquainted with the interviewing agents from previous interviews. She provided the following information:

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(U/~~/FOUO~~) News that the Obama Administration planned to impose sanctions on Russia started to come out on December 28, 2016, but they had not been officially announced and specifics were unknown. Sanctions were just one of "several and many things" going on at that time. McFarland, who was in Mar-a-Largo with the President-elect, did not recall what specific conversations she had at which times or to whom she spoke, but sanctions were in the news, so it made sense to her they were among the topics discussed.

(U/~~/FOUO~~) McFarland reviewed Email #1, which was from [redacted] She did not specifically remember the email, but recalled she had asked [redacted] for information about sanctions because he was an

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international lawyer. His initial response was too detailed and complicated, so she asked for something simpler. [redacted] thinking on the topic was in line with hers.

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(U~~//FOUO~~) Email #2 was McFarland's take on the sanctions, replying to incoming Homeland Security Adviser Tom Bossert.

(U~~//FOUO~~) While in Mar-a-Largo, [redacted] which [redacted] gave to the President-elect. [redacted] McFarland never discussed the specific terms of the sanctions with anyone. She would have told Michael Flynn about how the session with the President-elect went during one of their phone calls.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(U~~//FOUO~~) McFarland provided a printout of a December 29, 2016 newspaper article headlined "After Obama sanctions Russia, Trump says it's time 'to move on to bigger and better things.'" She pointed out the President-elect's statement in the story, "I think we ought to get on with our lives" and recalled it was a quick comment to reporters after he met with boxing promoter [redacted]

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(U~~//FOUO~~) [redacted] She recalled the difficulty communicating with him at that time because of the telephone connections. She did not have specific recollections about the times of the calls with Flynn or what was discussed in which call. Flynn mentioned several issues he intended to discuss with the Russians, and McFarland believed she would have given him her theories about the sanctions.

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(U~~//FOUO~~) McFarland had no reason to think Flynn was in contact with the President-elect or anyone at Mar-a-Largo other than her. Nothing the

President-elect or Flynn ever said gave her reason to believe they had been in contact with each other during this time. She did not participate in any calls with the President-elect and Flynn or convey any messages between them. Flynn did not seem particularly well-informed when they spoke, and she had the impression he had been spending the time on the beach with his wife rather than closely following current events. She never heard the President-elect direct anyone to do anything regarding the sanctions, including communicate with anyone from Russia or talk to Flynn. She was never tasked to research, communicate with anyone or do anything related to the sanctions and the opinions she provided on the subject were unsolicited.

(U~~//FOUO~~) Email #3 contained McFarland's sanctions analysis. [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

[redacted] (S) b1 b3

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S) b1 b3

(U~~//FOUO~~) McFarland was given printouts of press pool reports from May 4, 2017 through May 8, 2017 when she traveled with the President to New York and New Jersey. She read the printouts and recalled the events of the weekend. This was her last trip with the President as Deputy National

Security Adviser. She went on the trip because National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster was in Arizona and Chief of Staff Keith Kellogg was in North Carolina.

[redacted]

b7E Per DOJ/OIP
b7F Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(U~~//FOUO~~) After the meetings and dinner, they flew on Air Force One to the small airport at or near Bedminster, New Jersey. They arrived at the Trump National Golf Club, which was John DeLorean's former estate, at about midnight. Most of the staff had to stay "off campus," but the McFarland and [redacted] had a hotel room at the club. Attached is the sketch they drew of the facilities.

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(U~~//FOUO~~) The club facilities include a club house, restaurant, hotel and two golf courses. It was functioning all weekend with club members, guests and people with a private party all around the facility. The Trumps and Kushners have their own detached houses on the grounds, and McFarland did not see or have any interaction with the President on Friday, May 5 until she saw him at dinner at the club. The McFarlands bought dinner for [redacted] whom they introduced to the President. The President seemed to be in high spirits, talking to people who approached him and people sitting at different tables in the dining room. He is also the golf club president, and he appeared to be enjoying the company of his friends.

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(U~~//FOUO~~) Saturday, May 6 was rainy at times, but the President played golf with friends and the McFarlands walked around the golf course. There was a 4:00 p.m. telephone call scheduled with the President of Peru, but it was delayed until 6:00 p.m. McFarland's only duties with the President that day were preparing him for the call and taking notes of his side of the conversation. They saw him that night at dinner and he again appeared to be in good spirits and enjoying interacting with all the people around. One of the nights the President had brownies sent to all the tables.

(U~~//FOUO)~~ [redacted] and McFarland spent the day catching up on reading and working in the SCIF. At the end of the day, she rode in the motorcade back to the airport where they boarded Air Force One for the return trip. McFarland drew a sketch of the inside of the plane which is attached. The President has a private area at the front of the plane and a conference room behind that. Behind the conference room are sections of seats separated by bulkheads. The nicest seats are closest to the front. She was sitting in the first area of seats with [redacted] and the White House photographer. She did not recall where Stephen Miller was, but Dan Scavino was around her most of the time. Ivanka Trump and Kushner and their children sat nearby as well, although McFarland thought Kushner may have gone up to the President's area a couple times during the trip. She did not see the President before they landed and did not know who rode with him.

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(U~~//FOUO)~~ After they landed, the passengers got their things together and were ready to leave, but they were not allowed to get off the plane. McFarland did not know the reason, but it may have been for protocol or security reasons that they had to wait for the President. When shown a report that the Kushners and their children got off the plane after about 15 minutes, McFarland did not recall when that happened or why they were allowed to go, but she remembered how restless the kids were when they were all waiting to get off the plane. Eventually the President came out of the front suite or conference room and when he looked toward the back of the plane seemed surprised to see the passengers waiting. She thought he did not know they were all being held to wait for him. He called McFarland forward for a brief conversation. They did not discuss policy issues. They talked about how it was her last trip and he remarked that Singapore was a good place to go. He invited her to come by his office for a picture with him before she left the country. She did not notice anything unusual about his demeanor then or at any time that weekend.

(U~~//FOUO)~~ McFarland never heard the President or anyone else mention then-FBI Director James Comey during this weekend. She had no indication the President was considering dismissing Comey.

**Administrative**

(U~~//FOUO)~~ McFarland drew a sketch of the west wing of the White House placing everyone's offices. The sketches and other documents mentioned in this 302 are attached in a 1-A envelope.

(U~~//FOUO)~~ This interview covered subjects discussed in previous interviews, some of which is documented in this FD-302. McFarland did not say anything considered inconsistent.

(U~~//FOUO)~~ The interview took place at Debevoise & Plimpton at the McFarlands' request [redacted] greeted the agents at the beginning of the interview, but left after exchanging pleasantries. Neither he, nor anyone from the firm, participated in the interview.

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

UNCLASSIFIED~~//FOUO~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 12/07/2017

**DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS**

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

The evening of December 5, 2017, K.T & [redacted] attempted multiple times to reach SSA [redacted] by telephone. [redacted] so there were difficulties establishing a telephone connection. After failed calls to/from both K.T. and [redacted] telephones, eventually SSA [redacted] connected with them on K.T. McFarland's ("McFarland's") telephone, [redacted] was able to listen in, as he could be heard contributing to the conversation. b6 b7C

[redacted] They were aware of the significant media attention which McFarland was receiving. SSA [redacted] told McFarland that with her involvement with the General Mike Flynn situation through the Special Counsel investigation and now inquiries from the United States Senate, she was entering "choppy legal waters" and he would give her the same advice he would give a friend or family member in a similar situation, which was that she should retain an experienced attorney to help her navigate through the situation. SSA [redacted] said she should not draw any inferences from this advice, but that a professional with the proper experience would be useful to her since the situation had become more complicated. McFarland said they had reached the same conclusion and were in discussions with an attorney about representation. [redacted] said they expected to finalize retention of an attorney the next day (December 6, 2017), but they did not want to identify the attorney until that was done. b6 b7C

[redacted] said he had been in email contact with Special Counsel attorney Brandon Van Grack. They still planned to keep appointments with the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. on December 14 and 15, 2017. b6 b7C

McFarland asked whether SSA [redacted] could provide two emails which he and SA [redacted] had shown to her in her interviews. She did not have the emails, b6 b7C

UNCLASSIFIED~~//FOUO~~

Investigation on 12/05/2017 at Arlington, Virginia, United States (Phone) b6 b7C b7E

File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/06/2017

by [redacted]

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but they were now apparently widely held, including by the New York Times, which published, but grossly misrepresented them. The emails were one from her dated December 29, 2016 in which she discussed President Obama's three political objectives in imposing sanctions and mentioned Flynn's scheduled call with the Russian ambassador that evening; and an email from Flynn to her the next day, December 30, 2017, in which Flynn reported on his conversation with the ambassador. McFarland felt she was at a disadvantage since "everyone in the world" had copies of the emails except for her. SSA [redacted] said he would see what he could do, but that may be a matter best handled through the attorneys. b6 b7C

McFarland said that documents related to Flynn's plea mentioned a transition team official, which others were identifying as her. She asked SSA [redacted] what this meant. SSA [redacted] told McFarland that as long as she told the truth, she should not worry about anything anyone else said. He reminded her that when people did not tell the truth they were opening themselves up to problems and as long as she was truthful, she was fine. McFarland said she understood and wanted to make sure that she was still viewed as a witness. SSA [redacted] said she was. b6 b7C

At a later point, the connection was lost abruptly, and an effort to call McFarland back was unsuccessful.

Original Record

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FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2042
DATE: 11-27-2019

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 09/20/2017

(U~~//FOUO~~) Kathleen Troia "K.T." McFarland, date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] telephone numbers [redacted] (cell); [redacted] home) & [redacted] home) was interviewed by SA [redacted] & SSA [redacted] in a conference room at Debevoise & Plimpton, 919 3rd Avenue, New York, NY. Also present was [redacted] attorney [redacted] telephone numbers [redacted] (cell) & [redacted] (office direct line). McFarland was acquainted with the interviewing agents from a previous interview. She provided the following information:

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(U~~//FOUO~~) At the onset, McFarland wanted to correct what she said in her previous FBI interview about the timing of one of her trips to Washington D.C. during the 2016 transition. The trip, which included a meeting with outgoing National Security Adviser Susan Rice was the week after the Army /Navy football game, not the week before.

(U~~//FOUO~~) After her last interview, McFarland looked on the internet for media stories to jog her memory. She found information that on December 22, 2016, the President-elect tweeted urging a veto of the United Nations (U.N.) resolution condemning Israel and followed that up with a written statement. McFarland said if the President is tweeting about something, that is a good indication about exactly what he is thinking at that time. He made no secret of his position on the U.N. vote.

(U~~//FOUO~~) Interviewing agents showed McFarland several emails (numbered and maintained in a 1-A). While she had no recollection of some of them, she did not dispute any of their authenticity.

(U~~//FOUO~~) Email #1 was from [redacted] who was on the Presidential Transition Team (PTT) staff and had previously worked for the National Security Council (NSC). McFarland did not have a specific recollection of the email, nor did she know exactly who Michael Flynn was referring to when he mentioned the "inner circle." She identified [redacted] as a Fox New Channel (FNC)colleague who was a former United Nations

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spokesman. He wanted a job in the incoming administration. She had known



Investigation on 09/14/2017 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/15/2017

by [redacted]

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spokesman. He wanted a job in the incoming administration. She had known [redacted] for over a decade and "everyone" would have known him. b6 b7C

(U~~//FOUO~~) Email #2 she did not specifically recall. She thought it was after the President-elect's tweet and statement on the U.N. vote, which she previously mentioned, and whatever actions Flynn took. They wanted a result different from what the Obama Administration had wanted. When the resolution was pulled, it appeared the President-elect's position prevailed, and the resolutions' failure would have reflected the traditional American position regarding Israel. She considered their work against the resolution a team effort.

(U~~//FOUO~~) Email #3 was an update on what Flynn was doing as he "worked the phones" on the UN resolution. It was sent to her as background information since she was not engaged on the issue. This was Flynn's area of expertise, and she did not have any responsibilities in this area. In fact, when this email was sent, she was already on Christmas vacation in [redacted] She did not know if Flynn was in New York or Washington when he sent the email. She did not know where Flynn got his information, but she was not aware of anyone else helping him on this. She could not recall any conversations about the email, although if she was involved in discussions, they would have been general talks about whether the President-elect should issue a press release. b6 b7C

(U~~//FOUO~~) Based on her study of prior presidential transitions, McFarland believed the sorts of things Flynn did were not unusual. She cited Richard Nixon's involvement in Vietnam War peace talks and Ronald Reagan's purported dealings with Iran to free American hostages during their transitions as precedent for proactive foreign policy engagements by an incoming administration. Most incoming administrations did similar things. No "red light" or "alarm bells" went off in her head when she heard what Flynn was doing. The President-elect made his support for Israel very clear during the campaign and contrasted his position with President Obama, who he believed had not treated Israel fairly.

(U~~//FOUO~~) McFarland was generally familiar with the Logan Act, but she had not thought deeply about it. She knew it dated back to 1799 and nobody had ever been prosecuted for violating it. Many of the people involved in the incoming administration had no government experience, so they would not be familiar with the Logan Act. She did not recall any discussions that what Flynn was doing was inappropriate.

(U~~//FOUO~~) Email #4 she did not specifically recall. It would be fair to say Flynn was working the phones with his contacts to try to get a vote in

b7E

favor of Israel. She seemed to be telling Flynn to take credit for the critical role he played in doing what the President-elect wanted. She was probably at home with her grandchildren when she sent it.

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] Around this time, the President-elect had also just nominated David Friedman to be U.S. Ambassador to Israel. [redacted]

(U~~//FOUO~~) It is possible Flynn was working with someone from the Washington D.C. team on the U.N. vote, but McFarland could not think of who it might be. She was not aware that he had engaged any Middle East or Israel experts, and as far as she knew, he was working alone.

(U~~//FOUO~~) The only foreign counterpart McFarland spoke to during the transition was Paddy McGuiness, her counterpart in the British government. She did not ask him to do anything and did not discuss the U. N. vote with him.

(U~~//FOUO~~) Email #5 dealt with her trip to Mar-a-Largo with the President-elect. She and Flynn agreed that there should always be an NSC "duty officer" with the President/President-elect to staff him if needed. In addition to being duty officer, she had two other jobs: attending the Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs), which would be given by Ted Gistaro from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and providing the President-elect national security background information she thought he needed. The President-elect lacked a national security background and the email discussed experts who might be able to provide him useful information.

(U~~//FOUO~~) During the Mar-a-Largo trip, McFarland was accompanied by [redacted] b6 b7C [redacted] She only saw the President-elect two or three times on work matters during this trip, as well as a few times in the dining room. She sketched the layout of the main public areas of the hotel for the interviewing agents. [redacted] b7E Per DOJ/OIP b7F Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] NSC transition staffer [redacted] was there with her, although [redacted] did not have a room in the hotel. The two of them took over a small area in an overflow dining room as their work area.

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b7E Per DOJ/OIP
b7F Per DOJ/OIP

(U~~//FOUO~~) The President-elect did not have a "door keeper" with him and seemed to make his own scheduling decisions. At various times McFarland recalled seeing Preibus and Spicer and the President-elect's wife and young son, but she did not know exactly who was there and when they were there. There were no structured staff meetings, although there may have been discussions about logistics, such as when to have the PDB. [redacted] That meeting may have been in the bar/tap room.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(U~~//FOUO~~) During this time, when McFarland was in Florida and Flynn was in the Caribbean, they did not have regularly scheduled interactions. There were no set times for calls. She recalled them trying to check in with each other once or twice a day, but there were challenges with the telephone connections and their availabilities.

(U~~//FOUO~~) McFarland was shown a calendar entry for December 28, 2016 and confirmed the entry would have represented a PDB. She sat in the briefing, but did not recall who was there besides Gistaro. It was a small number of people and it took place in a basement studio apartment in the hotel.

(U~~//FOUO~~) [redacted] There were many cut off and interrupted calls, and she could not remember a call that went on that long. A long call could have covered a range of topics such as [redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(U~~//FOUO~~) Email #6 was an email to [redacted] a Los Angeles attorney who wanted a job in the administration. He was smart and she read a book he wrote about arms control. [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP b6 b7C She did not recall a telephone call with [redacted] and while they might have discussed sanctions if they had a call, because he is an expert in the area, they also could have talked about [redacted] potential job.

(U~~//FOUO~~) McFarland did not recall any conversations she may have had with Flynn the day the sanctions were announced. [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP and Russian President Putin's desire for a congratulatory video conference after the inauguration.

(U~~//FOUO~~) Email #7 was from Tom Bossert, who had been named Homeland Security Adviser designee or was close to being named. She did not know if Bossert sent the original email to Flynn or not. [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP [redacted] Her focus at that time was on nuclear weapons and North Korea. McFarland and Flynn were speaking on a non-secure telephone line, so it's reasonable that they would speak somewhat vaguely on purpose, although McFarland did not specifically recall talking to Flynn about being careful on the phone. [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b7E

(U~~/FOUO~~) Email # 8 was an email from Flynn which she forwarded. She and [redacted] left Mar-a-Largo that morning, and did not get home until early afternoon, so she forwarded it while she was still en route to [redacted] She did not recall being concerned that Flynn did not mention sanctions in this email.

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP
b1
b3
b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] (S)

Egypt

(U~~/FOUO~~) McFarland visited Egypt in July 2014, the year after Mohamed Morsi was removed as Egypt's president. She was working for FNC at the time. The trip was arranged by the Westminster Institute, a non-profit foreign policy organization, and she traveled with about ten other people, most of whom were former military members. The institute paid their (coach class) travel expenses.

(U~~/FOUO~~) [redacted] was the Egyptian point person and was instrumental in setting up the group's meetings and arranging accommodations. [redacted] ran the largest travel agency in the Middle East and appeared to be very well-connected. The trip included a series of meetings with members of Egypt's defense department; student groups involved in the overthrow of Morsi; business leaders; foreign ministry representatives, including the Minister of Defense; the American Chamber of Commerce; and even the Coptic

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b7C

Pope. They thought they were just having a photo opportunity with Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the former defense minister and acting Egyptian leader, but they wound up having a two and a half hour meeting with him. McFarland considered the trip a great opportunity as both a person in the national security field and a journalist. After coming home she stayed in touch with [redacted] via general emails. b6 b7C

(U~~//FOUO~~) A year or year-and-a-half later, McFarland had another opportunity to travel to Egypt. El-Sisi was now elected leader of Egypt. He had never been interviewed by an American media outlet and had agreed to be interviewed by FNC's Brett Baier. [redacted] again served as point man on the Egyptian side and McFarland was heavily involved in FNC's logistics in making sure the interview came off. b6 b7C

(U~~//FOUO~~) [redacted] called McFarland and told her he was passing through New York around Christmas 2015, and they met for a social engagement. He also may have called with congratulations after the 2016 Presidential election. b6 b7C

(U~~//FOUO~~) After McFarland began as Deputy National Security Adviser, [redacted] asked her to meet, and she agreed to do so. She set up the meeting, but someone noticed his name on her calendar, and the NSC staff advised her not to meet with [redacted] so she canceled the meeting. b6 b7C

**Administrative**

(U~~//FOUO~~) The interview took place at Debevoise & Plimpton at the McFarlands' request. [redacted] b6 b7C arranged for the room and greeted the agents at the beginning of the interview. After exchanging pleasantries, [redacted] left. Neither he, nor any attorneys from the law firm participated in the interview.

General Records

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 11/14/2018

Jerome Corsi, date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street SW, Washington, D.C., in the presence of his attorney, [redacted] Present for the interview were FBI Special Agent (SA) [redacted] SA [redacted], Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Jeannie S. Rhee, SASC Andrew Goldstein, Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, and FBI Intelligence Analyst [redacted] ASC Rush Atkinson was present for portions of the interview. Prior to the interview, Corsi signed a proffer agreement, originally signed on 9/21/2018. After being advised of the purpose of the interview and identities of the interviewing agents, Corsi provided the following information: b6 b7C

Corsi thanked the interviewing individuals for the opportunity to think about his testimony overnight and said he did a lot of soul searching. Corsi said he did not remember a lot of what had been shown to him the previous day and realized that the way he wanted to remember things was not actually how things happened. Fundamentally, Corsi self promoted himself to Stone and made it sound like he knew what he was talking about and had sources to WikiLeaks. Corsi realized that he was willing to do whatever Stone wanted when Stone wanted to see if there was a way to make sure no one knew Stone had advance knowledge of the WikiLeaks information. [redacted] b6 b7C

Corsi knew it was a lie to say he had been [redacted] and was pretty sure Stone knew it was a lie. [redacted] Corsi was willing to maintain the lie at all costs. [redacted] b6 b7C

Investigation on 11/01/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/04/2018

by [redacted] b6 b7C b7E

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[redacted] b6 b7C

After Ted Malloch was approached by the FBI, Stone wanted to know [redacted] which Corsi relayed to Stone. Stone relaxed when he heard it. Stone had been concerned [redacted]

Corsi recalled that Stone had said that Malloch knew Nigel Farage [redacted] and questioned why Malloch did not ask them for help. Corsi was sure he passed Stone's comment to Malloch in a FaceTime call. [redacted] b6 b7C

When Stone made public comments about Assange and WikiLeaks in August 2016, Corsi thought at the time that he (Corsi) had to be the source of that information. He thought Stone was not in touch with anyone else.

When Stone and Corsi talked on August 15, 2016, Corsi probably said he was thinking that something about Podesta was coming out, but Corsi knew he had previously said something from the Clinton Foundation was coming out, so he did not object to that being in the article. Corsi deduced that since Assange said something damaging to Clinton was coming out, it meant something related to Podesta.

When Stone made public comments and Corsi realized he was the source of Stone's information, Corsi stopped talking. Corsi probably [redacted] b6 b7C

Corsi remembered that Stone told him [redacted] b6 b7C

Corsi could not remember the exact date he [redacted] Corsi did not tell Stone that the information he had previously given Stone about WikiLeaks was self-promotion.

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Corsi said the Special Counsel's Office interview was the first time he came to terms with the truth. He had been lying to himself to believe his own cover story. Corsi apologized it had taken him so long to come to terms with the truth. He needed to admit to himself that he was lying.

When Stone sent Corsi an email on July 25, 2016 that said "Get to Assange," Corsi thought Stone wanted Corsi to get the word to Malloch, since Corsi was Stone's connection to Malloch. They both knew that Malloch knew Farage and other "Brexit" people, and that Malloch was in Great Britain.

Corsi first met Malloch in July 2015, when Malloch was thinking about publishing his memoirs. They spent two or three days together. Corsi thought Malloch had credentials, as he had worked at the State Department, in the United Nations, in Davos, and had other globalist affiliations. Malloch wanted to apply Christian values to business ethics and believed in sovereignty. Malloch relayed to Corsi his views on the evils of the EU and said he had connections to Farage before the summer of 2016. Corsi told Stone that Malloch had connections to Farage.

Corsi sent an email to Malloch about getting to Assange but did not tell Stone he had asked Malloch to do it. Corsi wanted Stone to think he could get to Assange himself and did not need to go through Malloch. Corsi was trying to please Stone because Stone said he spoke to [then-candidate] Donald Trump every day. Corsi wanted Trump to be President and wanted Stone to be his connection to Trump. Corsi believed Stone would help him [redacted] Corsi did not recall that Malloch wrote back, but he thought they had a FaceTime call. Corsi was sure he would have suggested Malloch go through Farage and others to get to Assange. He thought he left the FaceTime call thinking Malloch would do it, but Malloch never got back to him to say he had done it.

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Corsi sent an email to Stone on August 2, 2016 that relayed "word is friend in embassy" in an act of self promotion. Corsi wanted to suggest he had reached Assange and wanted to advance himself as a source. It was a lie. Corsi wanted to create the impression he had sources.

Corsi did not recall writing the August 2, 2016 email but after reviewing it the previous day was sure it was authentic. He was positive he wanted to get in touch with Assange and wanted to motivate Malloch to get to Assange. Corsi did not relay to Stone that he had asked Malloch to get to Assange because he wanted himself to be important to Stone. It was self promotion.

Corsi thought he suggested to some people at WND that he had a connection to Assange, but thought he was vague about, using terms like "word is" and "sources are." Corsi thought he suggested as much to [redacted] when he told him that he would go to London if WND bought him a ticket. b6 b7C

When Corsi and Stone spoke on the telephone when Corsi [redacted] there were a couple of points Corsi wanted to convey to Stone. First, that he was moving forward with thinking the next thing to come was related to Podesta. Second, Corsi wanted Stone to think he had sources, not that he came up with the information on his own. Corsi thought it was more believable that he had sources than he came up with it on his own. b6 b7C

Corsi did not recall whether he told Stone whether Malloch did or did not go see Assange. He thought Stone could have concluded Malloch went. Corsi did not know why Stone did not ask more questions about Corsi's pivot from the next dump of information being about the Clinton Foundation to being about Podesta.

Corsi did not want to state that Malloch had seen Assange, because Malloch may not have. Corsi had talked to [redacted] and others, all who were speculating about what WikiLeaks had, so when he said "word is" he was being intentionally vague because had had spoken to people that were smart about that sort of thing. Corsi really had figured it out but wanted Stone to say he had sources. Corsi did not recall telling Stone that Malloch had gone to see Assange or that he himself had seen Assange. b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
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[redacted]

b6
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[redacted]

[redacted]

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On August 16, 2016, Stone said his source to WikiLeaks was a "mutual acquaintance who is a fine gentleman." Corsi thought Stone had to be talking about him since they had just talked the day before about Podesta and Corsi's sources of information. Corsi never heard Stone suggest he had any other source.

Corsi did not remember sending Malloch an email on August 16, 2016 about Putin.

Corsi published the August 31, 2016 memo on October 6, 2016. At that time, he still held himself out as the connection to WikiLeaks. The trigger for the release of the article was the publication of an article about [Paul] Manafort and [Viktor] Yanukovych. Corsi wanted to counter it with a story about Podesta, but he really wanted to provide stimulus to Assange to release whatever he had on Podesta. Corsi was angry with Assange for not releasing emails on October 4, 2016. [redacted]

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October 7, 2016 was a busy day for Corsi. He watched all day to see what Assange would do. Stone alerted Corsi to the fact that the Billy Bush tape was going to come out before it actually came out and wanted the Podesta

stuff to balance the news cycle. Stone wanted the Podesta stuff to come out right then or at least coincident with the Billy Bush tape. Corsi was pretty sure Stone was the one that told him about the tape. He had an overwhelming impression it was Stone, but could not remember if their conversation was in person, on the telephone, or by email.

Corsi did not recall exactly when he learned about the Billy Bush tape, but was very sure it was before it was public. He remembered the line about Trump "grabbing by the genitals" and being shocked by it. When it came out publicly later that day, Corsi was not shocked by it because he expected it.

Corsi initially thought he told people on a WND conference call on October 7, 2016 that the Billy Bush tape was coming and that he sent out a tweet about whether anyone could get to Assange, but then reflected and said maybe he did nothing.

Corsi reviewed his telephone records for October 7, 2016 and noted that Stone called him three times that day. He thought Stone wanted him to pull out all the stops and get to Assange, because Corsi had led him to believe he (Corsi) could do it. Corsi thought, after reviewing his telephone records that Stone called at 1:42 pm it had to be when Stone told him about the Billy Bush tape. [redacted] Corsi thought [redacted] and Malloch were on that conference call and that he told them about the Billy Bush tape and it was a problem. Corsi thought he told Malloch to get to Assange if possible. Corsi thought he told Stone in a second phone call that day that he (Corsi) had pushed Malloch as hard as he could to get to Assange, but did not have a distinct memory of it. When the Podesta information dropped that afternoon, Corsi thought to himself that Malloch finally got to Assange. b6 b7C

Corsi did not know why he did not call Malloch right after the WikiLeaks dump on Podesta. He did not reach out to Stone because he was not sure if Malloch had done it. Corsi did not really think Malloch was an effective mechanism to get to Assange. Corsi did not really think Malloch had gotten to Assange.

Corsi repeated that he had the strong impression Stone told him in advance about the Billy Bush tape and that he told a conference call about it. He could not rule out that it was the WND conference call [redacted] b6 b7C

Corsi did not have a specific memory of anything beyond the fact that he had advance knowledge of the Billy Bush tape, that he mentioned it on a conference call, and that he represented to Stone he would reach out to his contacts because Stone wanted him to do so. Corsi added it was actually "BS" because he did not have any contacts.He did not have a clear memory he had told Malloch to get to Assange.

Corsi took credit for the WikiLeaks dump of Podesta information, but he did not deserve it. He remembered he clearly wanted to get credit for it and thought he sent a message of some sort to Stone that they should get credit for it. Corsi did not recall the first time he contacted Stone to take credit for the Podesta release.

Corsi did not reach out to Stone on October 7, 2016 after the Podesta release because he did not want to be grilled about what he had done, since he knew he had done nothing.

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

Corsi did not recall any conversations about WikiLeaks, Stone, or Assange during a dinner he had on January 7, 2017 with Malloch and [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] Corsi knew Stone was under congressional scrutiny at the time.

Corsi went through the "Blame Me!" article and said paragraph two of the article was a lie because Stone did have advance knowledge and that the advance knowledge had come from Corsi. [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] Paragraphs three through six were pulled from the Schweizer report. [redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] They would both be able to say neither of them had advance knowledge. Stone did not want to be the tie to WikiLeaks and Trump and be implicated in any collusion issues. Stone kept pointing it out to Corsi, but he didn't have to point hard because Corsi already knew. Corsi did not recall if Stone said they would protect each other around the time [redacted] but it was always on his mind. He distinctly remembered it was the impression Stone left him with. b6 b7C

[redacted] In January, Corsi left WND and went to work at InfoWars, where he [redacted] Corsi to DCI, where he got a [redacted] At DCI, Corsi wrote articles either in his own name or for DCI to use however they wanted. He wrote about Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and other various policy issues. Corsi thought [redacted] was a lot of money, but it was not hard work and did not take a lot of time. The number of articles he wrote a month varied from zero to one per day. He also wrote opinion pieces that were published in someone else's name. b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] It never occurred to Corsi on his own to work for Alex Jones. Stone told Corsi that WND was not big enough for him and he should work for Jones, who had a bigger audience. InfoWars also paid more than WND. Corsi wrote three articles a week or so, and did some broadcasts. [redacted] b6 b7C

Corsi recalled that as the election cycle was wearing down, Malloch made a contact in Turkey and wanted to deliver a lobbying contract to DCI. Corsi would have worked on the contract with him, but it did not work out.

Corsi was still working for InfoWars [as of the interview] but was not paid by InfoWars directly. He did very little for InfoWars but still got [redacted] He had recently discussed the terms with InfoWars and talked about several new projects. b6 b7C

Corsi stopped working for DCI in March or April 2018. [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted]

**Administrative**: The interview notes and documents shown to Corsi will be maintained in the 1A section of the case file.

[redacted] b7E

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)





**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 11/07/2018

Jerome Corsi, date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street SW, Washington, D.C., in the presence of his attorney, [redacted] Present were FBI Special Agent [redacted] [redacted] Senior Assistant Special Counsel Jeannie S. Rhee, Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky, and FBI Intelligence Analyst [redacted] Prior to the interview, Corsi signed a proffer agreement, originally signed on 9/21/2018. After being advised of the purpose of the interview and identity of the interviewing agent, Corsi provided the following information: b6 b7C

Corsi and Roger Stone were in contact at the end of 2016 and in early 2017, but Corsi did not recall specific discussions. They were in touch by telephone, email, and text message. At that time, Corsi did not know whether Stone really perceived Corsi as a source to WikiLeaks. However, Corsi held himself out as a source to WikiLeaks and he thought Stone believed it. Corsi never did anything to lead Stone to believe otherwise. Corsi had figured it out and had sources that helped him figure it out, and had locked in on Podesta. He thought he was right and the information was helpful, and Stone thought the same thing. Corsi did not want to dissuade Stone from believing Corsi had been right.

[redacted] Stone was looking for an open forum to tell the facts the way he wanted to and thought people would believe him if he had a chance to get the information out there. Stone was plagued by dates and inconsistencies related to WikiLeaks and wanted to be able to explain that his big important statements had actually happened after other events. For example, that Stone had reached out to Guccifer after Guccifer had already gone public. b6 b7C

In May and June 2017, Corsi continued to do research on Podesta for Stone. Corsi consulted with Ted Malloch, a banking expert, as part of this work. Corsi told Stone there was a great body of information that Hillary Clinton and Podesta were actually very close to [Russian President Vladimir] Putin themselves. Corsi believed Stone thought it was a very effective counter to the narrative that Trump had connections to Russia. [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

Investigation on 11/02/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/04/2018 b6 b7C

by [redacted] b7E

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[redacted]

b6
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At that time, Corsi did not know who Stone thought the connection to Wikileaks was, but was "sure it was me." Corsi did not recall what he said to Stone at that time about being the connection to Wikileaks or on what basis Stone would have based his belief.

**Administrative**: The original interviewing notes will be maintained in the 1A section of the case file, along with the signed proffer agreement.

[redacted] b7E

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



General Records

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 10/29/2018

Jerome Corsi, date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street, SW, Washington, D.C. Also present during the interview were Corsi's attorney [redacted] Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Jeannie Rhee, SASC Andrew Goldstein, FBI Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] and FBI Intelligence Analyst [redacted] b6 b7C

Corsi was advised his participation in the interview was voluntary and the interview could be terminated at any moment of his choosing.

Corsi was also advised that multiple Special Agents of the FBI were present in the interview and it was a crime to lie to them.

Corsi said he was sure he and Roger Stone had discussed Corsi's ability to get to Julian Assange prior to an email dated 07/25/2016 where Stone instructed Corsi to "Get to Assange." Corsi said the email from Stone did not come as a surprise. Corsi said communications prior to this email would have occurred in person or over the phone. Corsi thought Assange would know who Corsi was based on Corsi's writings. Additionally, Corsi stated he and Stone had prior discussions regarding having Ted Malloch get to Assange. Corsi said his conversations with Malloch usually took the form of Facetime calls because Malloch liked Facetime. Malloch and Corsi would sometimes communicate via phone calls, however. Corsi did not recall exactly what Malloch said in response to Corsi's forwarded message from Stone suggesting Malloch should get to Assange. Corsi did recall Malloch was reluctant to do it, but got the impression he would try. Corsi said Stone was pleased as a result. Corsi did not recall Malloch ever providing information from Assange.

Corsi said [redacted] he was told Assange had in his possession the emails of John Podesta. Corsi was also made aware that Assange would release the emails seriatim and not all at once. When asked who provided Corsi with this information, Corsi responded [redacted] b6 b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 09/17/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/18/2018 b6 b7C

by [redacted] b7E

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[redacted] he gave the information to Stone. Corsi said Stone was pleased to hear this information. b6 b7C

Corsi was asked who else he told about Podesta's emails. Corsi [redacted] b6 b7C

Corsi added that the "likely suspects" of whom he told about the Podesta emails were [redacted] b6 b7C

Corsi said many people were interested in Corsi getting in touch with Assange. Corsi advised he did not get to Assange directly.

Corsi said his connections to the Donald Trump campaign included Kellyanne Conway and Stephen Miller. Corsi had known Conway from her time with the Council for National Policy (CNP) and Miller from Miller's time serving as an aide to Senator Jeff Sessions. Corsi said he would publish articles and send them to both the campaign and the White House. Corsi indicated he would often not receive a response to his emails.

Corsi recalled two instances where Stone called Corsi after Corsi told Stone about Podesta's emails. [redacted] b6 b7C

Corsi does not recall Stone saying Randy Credico was the source [redacted] Stone said he had no advance knowledge of Assange's possession of Podesta's emails to the House Permanent Select Committee of b6 b7C

Intelligence (HPSCI). Corsi indicated that during Stone's HPSCI testimony, Stone said Corsi was the reason for Stone's Podesta tweet [Agent Note: On or about 08/21/2016, a Twitter account associated with Stone posted "Trust me, it will soon the Podesta's time in the barrel"]. Corsi thought Stone was pinning the tweet on Corsi. [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C b7E

Corsi said he had received emails from Stone the weekend prior to the captioned interview. [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C b7E



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 10/29/2018

Jerome Corsi, date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed at the E. Barrett Prettyman United States Courthouse, located at 333 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C., 20001. Also present during the interview were Corsi's attorney [redacted] Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Jeannie Rhee, SASC Andrew Goldstein, FBI Special Agent [redacted] and FBI Intelligence Analyst [redacted]. After being advised of the purpose of the interview and identity of the interviewing agent, Corsi provided the following information:

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Corsi was advised his participation in the interview was voluntary and he could terminate the interview at any time. Corsi was further advised that intentionally providing false statements to FBI Agents was a violation of federal law.

Corsi confirmed his statements from a previous interview conducted on 09/17/2018 that he told Roger Stone (Stone), in or around August 2016, that WikiLeaks had the emails of John Podesta (Podesta) and would later release them seriatim. Corsi advised this information was new to Stone, and Stone was happy to hear it. Stone wanted Corsi to go into more detail regarding when the emails would be released. Corsi and Stone discussed how the emails would be very damaging Hillary Clinton (Clinton).

Corsi said, as of August 2016, he had watched and seen Podesta for a long time. Corsi thought WikiLeaks would release Podesta's emails serially in order to continually feed the news cycle, as opposed to dropping all the information at once. Corsi also thought Julian Assange (Assange) would design the release of Podesta's emails to be an "October surprise."

Corsi said there had to have been a lot of conversations with Stone between August 2016 and 10/07/2016. During these conversations, Stone was asking for further information regarding the timing and content of the Podesta email release. Corsi assumed at that time that Stone would relay this information to senior members of the Donald Trump campaign (the campaign).



Investigation on 09/21/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/21/2018

by [redacted]

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[redacted] Corsi said some of the conversations between Stone and Corsi had been recorded by Corsi. [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

Corsi said after Assange did not release the Podesta emails on the date expected in October 2016, Corsi was disappointed. Corsi thought he may have posted a tweet saying something akin to "what's the drumbeat for nothing?" Corsi was still confident Assange had the information despite the delay.

Corsi recalled the day the Billy Bush tape was announced, WikiLeaks also began dropping Podesta's emails. b6 b7C

[redacted]

Corsi recalled he or Stone saying "Trump should reward us for what we have done."

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[Agent Note: At approximately 10:50 AM, attorney's from the SCO entered into a verbal proffer agreement with Corsi and [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b6
b7C

Ted Malloch

[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] b3 b6 b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] b3 b6 b7C

[redacted] b3 b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

** Agent Note: Restroom break **

[redacted] Dinner [redacted] b6 b7C

Corsi was asked to describe his relationship with [redacted]. Corsi described [redacted] as a crook, but admitted he had no basis for saying that. Corsi confirmed he was in attendance at a dinner with [redacted] in New York on [redacted]. Corsi described the food as "B quality at best." Corsi said the dinner party included Corsi, Malloch, and [redacted]

Corsi said [redacted] wanted to [redacted] b6 b7C (EU). [redacted] was representing that Corsi could make a lot of money if he were to also come along, however, Corsi thought the offer was nonsense and was therefore not interested. Corsi said the offer felt like a "con-job" and got the impression Malloch was in on it.

Corsi was advised that after the dinner, [redacted] b6 b7C Corsi said [redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7C

**** Agent Note: At this time, (2) identical written proffer agreements were executed, a digital copy of which is included in a digital 1A ****

[redacted]

Corsi was asked about his relationship with [redacted] Corsi described [redacted] Corsi did not recall how long he has known [redacted] or how they were introduced. Corsi added he has never met [redacted] in person. Corsi advised [redacted] sends him [redacted] b6 b7C b7E Corsi said his (Corsi's) Russian language ability is "pretty primitive" and is often assisted by 'Google translate' when reading Russian text. Corsi said [redacted] sometimes contacts him [redacted]

Corsi said many people contact him and he doesn't always know who they are. Corsi said it's as if [redacted] has taken the [redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7C b7E

October 7, 2016

Corsi advised he had a long conversation with Stone prior to the release of WikiLeaks information on 10/07/2016 and prior to the public release of the Billy Bush tape (the tape). Corsi said Stone must have told him what would be in the tape because Corsi knew the content of the tape, including the quote about grabbing women, prior to its release. Corsi initially recalled instructing Stone to have WikiLeaks release information to counteract the effect of the tape. Corsi recalled Stone saying that was a good idea and would get it done. Stone subsequently said he completed the task. Corsi recalled Stone being congratulatory and saying things like "we did this" and "we succeeded" and "this will diffuse it" after the WikiLeaks release. Corsi took "we" to mean Stone and Assange.

Corsi subsequently recalled the aforementioned set of events differently.

Corsi said Stone called Corsi prior to the release of the tape and the WikiLeaks publications. Stone advised Corsi the tape was coming out. It was at this time Corsi learned about the exact quote contained within the yet to be released tape regarding grabbing women. [redacted] and thinking it would make an impact on sexual issues in the election. Stone told Corsi to have WikiLeaks drop the Podesta emails immediately. Corsi said he would do it. Because Corsi had no direct access to Assange or WikiLeaks, Corsi said he may have sent out public tweets because Corsi knew Assange was reading his tweets. b6 b7C

** Agent Note: [redacted] ** b7E

Corsi said after 10/03/2016, Corsi was blasting Assange on Twitter saying how the absence of an expected release was a "big letdown." Corsi said the intent of his tweets was to communicate to Assange to drop the emails immediately, intimating "now is the time."

Corsi was asked what other action he took to initiate the release of WikiLeaks material on 10/07/2016. Corsi said there was a daily 1:00 PM EST conference call at WorldNetDaily (WND) to talk about the news of the day. The WND daily call was often attended by [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted]. Corsi said sometimes various WND writers would attend the conference call. b6 b7C

Corsi said on 10/07/2016, on the conference call, and because Corsi had no direct means to get to Assange, Corsi instructed anyone who could reach Assange should get to him immediately. Corsi said the pressure was enormous and recalled telling the board the tape was coming soon.

Corsi did not recall anyone telling him they successfully communicated with Assange subsequent to the conference call. Corsi was convinced, however, it was through his efforts that WikiLeaks released Podesta's emails when they did. Corsi recalled telling people he and Stone were responsible. Corsi was very happy about the WikiLeaks release and remembered contacting Stone who was also very happy. Corsi and Stone discussed making sure both got credit from Trump for the release. Corsi wanted Stone to make sure Trump knew Corsi was involved. Stone assured Corsi that Trump would get the message.

[redacted] b3 b6 b7C

Corsi said [redacted] called him the night prior to the captioned interview. [redacted] has called Corsi multiple times since Corsi [redacted] Corsi has told [redacted] he would [redacted] indicated to Corsi that a report has been given to Trump regarding what Corsi had been doing. Corsi said [redacted] has a meeting with Trump for approximately 15 minutes every Monday/Tuesday. Corsi does not know if this is true.

[redacted] told Corsi to remember [redacted] talks to Assange. Corsi said [redacted] was feeding him an excuse to use with investigators. [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

[redacted]

b3
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[redacted]

b3
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Corsi advised his wife recently said that in 27 years of marriage, Corsi has never lied to her.

Corsi said he and Trump have had a cordial relationship over time.



**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 10/29/2018

Jerome Robert Corsi, date of birth (DOB) [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, 395 E Street SW, Washington DC 20024. Corsi was accompanied by his attorney, [redacted]. Present during the interview was FBI Special Agent (SA) [redacted] FBI SA [redacted] FBI Intelligence Analyst (IA) [redacted], Assistant Special Counsel, Aaron Zelinsky, Senior Assistant Special Counsel, Andrew D. Goldstein, and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Jeannie Rhee. b6 b7C

Prior to the interview, [redacted] asked if the Special Counsel's Office planned to record the interview. [redacted] was advised it would not be recorded and [redacted] inquired as to whether or not he could record the interview. [redacted] was advised that he could not and that all electronic devices needed to placed outside of the interview location for security purposes. SA [redacted] then inquired as to whether or not [redacted] and/or Corsi had recorded the conversation in SA [redacted] Bucar, during the transport of Corsi from The Mayflower hotel to the Special Counsel's Office. Both [redacted] and Corsi denied recording the conversation and stated that they would have needed to have asked SA [redacted] for permission prior to doing so. b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C b7E

Investigation on 09/06/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person) b7E

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/11/2018

by [redacted] b6 b7C

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[redacted] b6 b7C b7E

Corsi was advised the interview was entirely voluntary and that he could discontinue it or take a break to speak with his attorney at any time. Corsi was further advised that intentional false statements during this interview would be a violation of federal law. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents, Corsi provided the following information:

Corsi began by providing a brief description of his background. Corsi worked for WorldNetDaily (WND) from approximately 2004 to 2017. Corsi quit working for WND shortly after the election, at the encouragement of Roger Stone. Stone told Corsi that WND was not visible enough and that Corsi should go to work for Alex Jones at Infowars instead. Stone believed Jones had a much more visible platform with videos and a strong Internet presence. Corsi continues to work for Infowars and they still pay him. Corsi initially started at Infowars as the Washington Bureau Chief and had an office near the Metro Center.

Shortly after joining Infowars, Corsi sought to obtain press credentials for the White House. He ultimately received them, but only for a day. Corsi tried to visit the White House after his first visit and was turned away at the West gate. A Secret Service Agent told Corsi that his credentials were no longer valid so he went to a coffee shop across the street and telephoned a subordinate at the White House. Corsi's contact advised him that Infowars was not recognized as an official news organization by the White House. Corsi believed it was a result of a previous interview that Jones did with Donald J. Trump. Corsi became frustrated because his former organization, WND, was also trying to get him press credentials at both the White House and Congress. Corsi would have received the credentials because WND was officially recognized as a news organization by the White House.

Corsi first met Trump's father, Fred Trump, in 1985. Corsi had been working in the financial services sector at a company called Marketing One, based in Portland, Oregon. Corsi was a frequent visitor of The Plaza Hotel in New York and was virtually living out of one of their hotel rooms. Corsi was such a frequent guest that the hotel staff granted him a private dining table in the Edwardian Room. When Trump purchased The Plaza Hotel he often paid personal visits to the prominent guests, like Corsi. That is how Corsi initially met Trump and Corsi has remained in contact

with him ever since. Trump always treated Corsi as a paying customer and the two have maintained a business-like relationship with one another over the years.

In 2008, Corsi started the "birth certificate issue," which was a conspiracy theory alleging that Barack Obama was ineligible to be President of the United States because he was not a natural born citizen of the United States as required by law. Corsi had been working to publish a book entitled, "Where is the Birth Certificate," when Trump became interested in the topic. Trump often called Corsi to speak about the birth certificate issue. Corsi described his conversations with Trump as being one-sided, where Trump would often ask Corsi for his opinion and once Corsi began to speak, Trump would cut him off and tell Corsi what he thought about the topic. Corsi often left the phone calls feeling as if he had said a lot, but said nothing at all. Corsi remembered having approximately six phone calls with Trump about the birth certificate issue. Corsi was in Florida when Obama publicly released his birth certificate. Corsi received a call from [redacted] who told Corsi he better put the television on. Shortly after, Corsi got a phone call from Trump. Trump told Corsi he saw the birth certificate and that he was finished with the topic. Corsi did not hear from Trump again about that issue. b6 b7C

In June 2016, Corsi visited the campaign headquarters at Trump Tower in New York. He visited the office on the 7th floor, which was tiny and completely empty. Corsi saw Corey Lewandowski and Hope Hicks there but did not see or interact with Trump. Corsi tried to engage Lewandowski in conversation but Lewandowski had his head buried in a computer and only made short verbal acknowledgments to Corsi such as, "uh huh." Corsi was introduced to one of the assistants at the campaign, a lady named, [redacted] Last Name Unknown (LNU). [Agent Note: Corsi used the name [redacted] LNU but this individual may be identifiable to Rhona Graff.] [redacted] LNU took Corsi to buy a Make America Great Again (MAGA) hat and then took him to see to Michael Cohen. b6 b7C

Corsi rarely engaged with Trump directly and relayed messages to Trump through Cohen. Corsi could call Cohen for anything but Cohen was often "disconnected" and Corsi's messages to Trump were sometimes relayed and sometimes they were not. Cohen's desk was full of memorabilia, documents, papers, and junk. Corsi described Cohen as a "casino guy" who often dealt with matters haphazardly, only to get pulled into a separate conversation by the next person who entered the room.

Corsi described the first time he met Cohen. [redacted] took Corsi to Cohen's office and Cohen immediately invited him in. Cohen was in the b6 b7C

middle of a conversation with another man in his office and Corsi felt as if the other man was annoyed because he had interrupted their conversation. Shortly thereafter, Cohen received a phone call from a representative from the New York Yankees. Cohen took the phone call and spoke loudly to the representative, in front of both Corsi and the other man. A short time later, another individual came into Cohen's office and pressed Cohen to sign some papers that urgently needed to be completed. Cohen did so and then looked at Corsi and said, "let's go meet some people." Cohen then took Corsi around the office to meet everyone. Corsi felt as if Cohen was unable to focus on anything.

[redacted] b6 b7C b7E

[redacted] b6 b7C b7E

[redacted] b6 b7C b7E

Corsi has known Stone since early 2016. Corsi began interviewing Stone for WND and Corsi recorded his initial conversations with Stone as a means of taking notes for the interviews. Corsi only recorded the initial conversations, up until March 2016, and stopped when he and Stone began to develop a working relationship with one another. Corsi relayed that he spoke with Stone frequently, but not a lot. Corsi relayed that Stone seemed to only speak to Corsi when he needed something researched or

published. [redacted] b6 b7C

From open source articles, Corsi knew Stone had quit the Trump campaign in 2015. [redacted] b6 b7C

Corsi introduced Stone to Theodore Roosevelt Malloch. [redacted] Malloch was well-connected [redacted] Malloch wanted to meet Trump and become involved in the campaign, so Corsi introduced him to Stone. [redacted] b6 b7C

Around the same time, Corsi told Sam Clovis about Malloch. Clovis was being ignored by the campaign and his foreign policy team was failing. Corsi never met with Clovis in person, but Clovis knew of Corsi's work.

Corsi was asked about his discussions with Stone during the 2016 election, specifically about Julian Assange and the release of information by WikiLeaks.

Corsi remembered Stone being desperate to talk with Assange, to find out what he had. Stone asked Corsi to put him in touch with Assange and Corsi denied his request. Corsi told Stone that he could be collaterally investigated by association if he did such a thing and Corsi did not want to contact Assange in fear of being investigated himself. Corsi refuted Stone's request and relayed that the two of them should just wait until WikiLeaks released the materials.

When asked if Stone was ever successful in reaching Assange, Corsi stated that he believed Stone likely went to others in attempt to reach Assange, but since Corsi had refused Stone's initial request, Corsi would not have known what Stone was doing after that.

Corsi was asked if he ever told Stone that he had an indirect contact with Assange. Corsi stated that he had not. When asked if Stone ever asked Corsi to ask anyone else to get in touch with Assange, Corsi stated that he had not.

Corsi was aware of Stone's public statements in Broward County, Florida on our about August 15, 2016, where Stone publicly stated he was in contact with Assange. Corsi remembered having a phone call with Stone on the day before, during which Stone told Corsi he was in contact with Assange. b6 b7C

[redacted]

Corsi was aware of additional public reporting about Stone having an indirect contact with Assange through a radio personality. Corsi never spoke with the radio show host and could not recall "any information about that guy."

When asked if he ever represented to Stone that he had information from Assange, Corsi stated that he did not. Corsi explained that he did not want to speak about Assange in general because he did not want to be under investigation about it at a later time. Corsi recalled that after June 2016, Stone asked him to get in touch with Assange and Corsi said, "I'm not doing it." Corsi never indicated to Stone that he had a sub-source who could get information from Assange, nor did Corsi ever indicate that he would try to get in touch with Assange, either directly or indirectly. Corsi never tried to contact a sub-source to get information from Assange.

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

At the conclusion of this interview, Corsi and his attorney were driven back to The Mayflower in SA [redacted] Bucar. During the transport, Corsi made several statements to SA [redacted] b6 b7C b7E

[redacted]

[redacted]

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The following items have been enclosed for the file as digital 1A attachments to this FD-302: 1) One copy of hand-written notes provided by Corsi; [redacted]

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted] b6
ON 12-10-2019 b7C
b7E

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 10/20/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

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(U~~//FOUO~~) On October 19, 2017, SSA [redacted] contacted K.T. McFarland by telephone and left messages at her home [redacted] and on her cell phone [redacted] McFarland returned SSA [redacted]'s call from her cell phone, saying she was on the street in Manhattan, on her way to meet a [redacted] who was a former FBI employee recommended by [redacted] b3 b6 b7C

(U~~//FOUO~~) SSA [redacted] told McFarland that [redacted] b3 b6 b7C

(U~~//FOUO~~) McFarland explained that [redacted] [redacted] SSA [redacted] told McFarland that as b3 b6 b7C

~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~
~~Derived From: National Security Information SCG~~
~~Declassify On: 50X1-HUM~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 10/19/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone) b6

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/19/2017 b7C b7E

by [redacted]

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[redacted] b3

(U~~//FOUO~~) McFarland said she would be back in contact with SSA [redacted] b3 b6 b7C

[redacted]

b3
b7E

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)





UNCLASSIFIED/~~/NOFORN~~[redacted]/~~/LES~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 12/03/2018

On 11/27/2018, SA [redacted] IA [redacted] Special Counsel Prosecutor Andrew Weissmann and Assistant US Attorney [redacted] interviewed WILLIAM "SAM" PATTEN at the DC US Attorney's Office. PATTEN was represented by his counsel, Stuart Sears. After being advised of the identities of the interview team, PATTEN provided the following information:

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b7C

**Before the start of the interview, PATTEN was advised of his obligation to be truthful with federal investigators.**

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED/~~/NOFORN~~[redacted]/~~/LES~~

Investigation on 11/27/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/27/2018

by [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] was supposed to have a meeting with MICHAEL FLYNN that had been arranged by [redacted] but PATTEN believed that it fell through. The purpose of the meeting had been to make contact with the new administration.

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PATTEN did not know of anyone else that [redacted]

The last time PATTEN recalled seeing [redacted] was the night of the inauguration.

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PATTEN had no knowledge of [redacted]

**PATTEN latest contact with** [redacted]

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PATTEN last spoke to [redacted] and PATTEN did not consider it a business expense.

[redacted]

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PATTEN had been a participant in a Threema chat with Opposition Bloc (OB) member until 2 months ago when they removed him.

[redacted]

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**Ukraine**

PATTEN discussed [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

PATTEN recalled [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

PATTEN believed that [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

PATTEN and [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] When conducting polls, PATTEN would occasionally include YANUKOVYCH's name in a poll as a way to gauge other candidates. PATTEN did not consider YANUKOVYCH a viable candidate. [redacted] PATTEN polled on various approaches to a peace deal in Ukraine. PATTEN never heard discussion of YANUKOVYCH running an autonomous region in Ukraine.

The last poll that included YANUKOVYCH was conducted in the Fall of 2017. The purpose of the poll had been to support YURII BOYKO.

[redacted]

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**Miscellaneous**

[redacted]

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PATTEN had worked with [redacted] PATTEN had him place some articles in European press regarding OB. [redacted] had placed an article in The Hill in late 2016. PATTEN had ghostwritten the article on behalf of [redacted]

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[redacted]

b6 per FBI and DOS
b7A per FBI
b7C per FBI

[redacted]

b6 per FBI and DOS
b7A per FBI
b7C per FBI

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6 per FBI and DOS
b7A per FBI
b7C per FBI

PATTEN and [redacted]

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PATTEN met with [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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PATTEN did not know [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

Following his testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), PATTEN recalled [redacted]

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[redacted]

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PATTEN thought he had likely been referring to [redacted]



**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 08/06/2018

Sam Patten was interviewed at the Office of Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. Present at the interview were SSA [redacted] IA [redacted] and Senior Special Prosecutor (SP) Andrew Weissmann. Patton was represented by attorney Stuart Sears, Schertler & Onorato, LLP, and parallegal [redacted] Patton was presented with a proffer agreement which he and his attorney signed and dated. SP Weissmann explained the proffer agreement to Patton and his attorney, and they stated they had no questions regarding the agreement. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, Patten provided the following information:

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Presidential Inaugural Committee (PIC)

In January 2017, sometime in the teens (days), [redacted]

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Patten advised that in 2000, while he worked on the Bush campaign, he obtained tickets for the PIC and this was his first "orientation" to the PIC. Patten personally believed that paying for PIC tickets was a waste of money, but pursued the matter because his client, [redacted] wanted the tickets.

Patten contacted his friend [redacted] to see if he had any contacts at the PIC who he could leverage to get tickets. [redacted] advised that he did have contacts at the PIC and eventually he was able to procure four tickets.

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Patten, at the time he was attempting to procure PIC tickets for [redacted] was aware that foreign nationals were prohibited from providing monetary

Investigation on 05/22/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/25/2018

by [redacted]

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contributions to the PIC. Patten was aware of this rule from an email that [redacted] sent him from the PIC, which stated that the PIC could not accept contributions from foreign nationals. However, the email stated that a foreign national could attend the PIC as long as they did not provide any financial contribution.

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Patten stated that [redacted] was utilized as the straw purchaser for the PIC tickets so it would conceal that the tickets were being paid by a foreign national. Patten's expectation was that [redacted] would pay Patten back for the tickets and Patten would then pay back [redacted] Patten stated that he understood that disclosing that a foreign national, [redacted] was actually paying for the PIC tickets was illegal and wrong.

Ultimately, [redacted] contributed money to the PIC and obtained four tickets. [redacted]

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Patten attended one of the PIC events with [redacted] Patten and [redacted] stayed for one drink and one dance, and then they both departed the event. This was the last time Patten saw [redacted] during this trip to Washington, D.C.

FARA

[redacted]

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[redacted]

b6
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Patten also has registered under the LDA exemption for the work he conducted Patten's client, instructed him not to register under FARA and register under the LDA exemption. Patten advised that he initially examined the FARA and LDA requirements, and then consulted with an attorney (Patten was advised by SP Weissmann not to provide any communications he had with his attorney). After Patten consulted with his FARA attorney, he was concerned that he had not register under FARA for his work. However, Patton did not seek FARA legal advice from an attorney regarding his work.

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was a company set up by Patten and for their overseas political consulting work. Patten and They were combining eastern expertise with Patten's western expertise to create a political consulting company. The name

Patten referred to the website as an online business card.

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Patten understood that OB supporters were generally Russian speakers, and that OB's voter blocks were mainly in the East and South of the country. During the Viktor Yanukovych (VY) administration, the Party of Regions (POR) was controlled by VY. However, after VY fled Ukraine to Russia, the OB, which was the successor party to the POR, was much more divided with four or five political leaders vying for control.

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first project was in 2015 when they worked on the Kiev mayoral election. The last time Patten travelled to Ukraine was October 2017.

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Patten, at direction,

[redacted] did not have a written contract for the work they conduct for [redacted] [redacted] provides [redacted] with Ukrainian political advice. In 2015, Patten worked on [redacted] mayoral campaign. Patten was paid from an offshore entity, [redacted] utilized to pay Patten. However, [redacted] told Patten that the money came from him. Patten understood that payments from an offshore account was considered "clean money" which was accountable. Patten had seen other people in Ukraine being paid in cash provided in brown paper bags. Patten stated that this was not "clean money."

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[redacted]

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Konstantine Kilimnik

Patten's relationship with Kilimnik dates back to 2001 when Kilimnik worked for Patten at the International Republican Institute (IRI) in Russia. [redacted] was the IRI employee who hired Patten. Prior to IRI, Patten worked for Senator Collins. At IRI, Patten first reported to [redacted] and then [redacted] Patten was the only expat who worked at IRI's Russia office. IRI's mission in Russia was to engage with all political parties in Russia, but Patten focused on the Russian liberal parties. Kilimnik was the most senior foreign national working at IRI when Patten arrived. Patten did not know how Kilimnik ended up working for IRI. While at IRI, Kilimnik sometimes traveled to other IRI offices in other countries to help train employees. Patten left Russia to work for IRI in Iraq in 2004. During his time at IRI, Kilimnik and Patten became a friends.

b6
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[redacted] had Patten's position at IRI prior to Patten's arrival. Kilimnik told Patten that [redacted] introduced Kilimnik to Manafort. Kilimnik worked for Manafort while also working at IRI which violated IRI's policy. Ultimately, this is why Kilimnik was fired from IRI. While working for Manafort, Kilimnik worked with the "bad guys" i.e. VY. Conversely, IRI supported the Orange Revolution [redacted] fired Kilimnik from IRI. Patten never heard that Kilimnik was fired because of his connections to Russian intelligence.

b6
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Patten stated that people joked that Kilimnik was a Russian intelligence officer. Patten stated that Kilimnik was a translator when he was in the Russian army for 7 years and then he worked in the Russian

armament industry selling arms/military equipment. Kilimnik had special language training in English and Swedish. [redacted]

After Patten left IRI, [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

After Manafort was fired from the Trump campaign in August 2016, [redacted] was fired by Rick Davis when he worked for the McCain campaign.

Patten stated that [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

Kilimnik's Trips to the U.S. During the Trump Campaign

Kilimnik's first trip to the U.S. was in May 2016 and Patten does not believe Kilimnik stayed at his house. Kilimnik was busy with other business and Patten did not see him a lot. Patten was shown an email dated 05/07/2016 from Kilimnik to Patten. Patten did not recall where Kilimnik stayed when he was in D.C. Patten did not recall setting up any meetings for Kilimnik while he was in D.C. Kilimnik did have a meeting with Department of State (DoS) desk officer [redacted] LNU. Patten stated it was possible he (Patten) set up this meeting, or it could have been [redacted] After the meeting, Kilimnik told Patten that the people he met with at DoS were "in outer space," which Patten took to mean that they were out of touch regarding what was happening in Ukraine. Kilimnik visited Manafort in NY during this trip, and Manafort may have dispatched a private plane to pick up Kilimnik from D.C. [redacted] Upon further reflection, Patten was not sure if the trip to visit Manafort happened during this trip to the U.S. or the one in late July/early August 2016. Patten recalled that Kilimnik traveled to New York to visit Manafort during the trip where Kilimnik stayed at Patten's house. Subsequently, Patten recalled that

b6 per FBI and DOS
b7C per FBI

during one of these trips, Kilimnik went to New York to meet Manafort at a cigar bar. This refreshed Patten's recollection that there were two trips to New York by Kilimnik in the spring and summer of 2016.

[redacted]

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The second trip Kilimnik made to the U.S. was in late July 2016 or early August 2016. Patten thinks Kilimnik stayed at his house for one night. The next morning, Kilimnik traveled to New York to meet with Manafort.

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)

Patten stated that he intentionally did not provide documents or testimony to the SSCI regarding the PIC tickets because he did not want to incriminate himself. Moreover, he did not want to expose his friend, [redacted] to SSCI or law enforcement scrutiny.

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[redacted]

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Patten stated he knew he crossed the line and should have registered for his FARA [redacted] work. Patten stated that when he testified to the SSCI regarding his FARA work, he knew he was in the grey but at the time he did not want to believe he crossed the line. This is why he told the SSCI that he did not represent foreign governments in the U.S. Patten stated that he

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now knows that he did violate the FARA statute and what he told the SSCI was intentionally false.

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

After his SSCI testimony, Patten deleted emails from his account. Patten stated that he did this because he was having computer issues and he needed to delete stuff from his computer to fix the problem. Patten considered the SSCI matter closed because a couple of months had passed and he had not heard back from anyone from the SSCI. Patten acknowledged that he never checked back with SSCI to confirm that matter was closed. Patten stated he knew he was destroying emails and documents that were responsive to the SSCI letter that he had not produced.

Patten found a hard copy document related to Manafort which he did not know he had in his possession at the time he provided documents and testified before the SSCI.

Oleg Deripaska

Patten has never met Deripaska, but he is aware of who he is and that he was one of the wealthiest oligarchs in the world, as well as Deripaska had a connection to Kilimnik. Patten was aware that Kilimnik has met with Deripaska and Deripaska's associates including Victor Boyarkin - who is Deripaska's foreign affairs/political advisor. [redacted] b6 b7A b7C Deripaska was interested in Ukranian politics because of the natural resources in Ukraine.

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted]

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[redacted]

Regarding the SSCI's question related to whether Patten knew who Victor Boyarkin was, Patten stated that he did not lie to the SSCI because he didn't realize at the time that the name they asked about was the Victor who he had previously met online via Skype.

Patten stated that he read a Washington Post article that published an email exchange between Manafort and Kilimnik regarding Deripaska. However, Patten and Kilimnik did not discuss this article very much. Patten stated that when Kilimnik visited Manafort in New York in 2016, during the Trump campaign, and they discussed the money that was owed to Manafort by the Ukraine.

Viktor Yanukovych (VY)

Patten referred to VY [redacted] and that VY went "North," which he stated was a reference to Russia. Patten was aware of VY's criminal past and stated that VY betrayed his political mandate to move Ukraine to the West. Patten also stated that VY had corruption issues. Patten stated that [redacted] was the ring leader of the the [redacted] [redacted] Kilimnik had a different viewpoint of VY than Patten.

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On March 24, 2015, Patten and Kilimnik had a Skype call with VY. Kilimnik was in Moscow with VY during the Skype call. Patten felt VY was testing Patten's knowledge of Guinea during the call.

Patten met [redacted] and he told Patten that he gave money to both the Democrats/Clinton and the Republicans.

Payments to Journalists/Bloggers

Patten stated that paying journalists/bloggers in the Ukraine to write an article on your behalf is common. Patten has paid journalists to write articles not only in Ukraine, but also in Europe and the U.S. Specifically, Patten paid the following people/entities to write and place of articles: (1) A Brussels PR firm - [redacted] based in London; (2) a French PR firm; (3) [redacted] and utilizes various aliases to place articles as well assists with social media strategy; and (4) A U.S. journalist, [redacted] from [redacted] who was paid [redacted] to write an editorial supporting the [redacted] policy agenda. [redacted] introduced Patten to [redacted] and Patten then offered to pay [redacted] to write the editorial. The money came from the [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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Tabs 1-3, 6 and 15

Patten reviewed the emails in tabs 1-3, 6 and 15, and stated that these emails show that Patten [redacted]. Patten explained that at the time of these emails, he tried to draw a distinction in his mind

between setting up meeting with U.S. government officials and engaging in a full-fledged U.S. campaign where the goal was to change U.S. policy. The latter being more of what he thought of as FARA work.

Patten was then shown an email from him to [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
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b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7A

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
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[redacted]

Steve Bannon

Patten was introduced to Bannon in July or August 2016 by [redacted] while Bannon was still the head of Breitbart. [redacted] was a friend of Patten and Bannon. Subsequently, Bannon offered Patten an opportunity write an op-ed to be published by Breitbard as well as to appear on a Breitbart radio show. Later, [redacted] was the interlocutor who arranged a meeting between Patten and Bannon when Bannon was working at the White House.

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Patten was shown a text between [redacted] and Patten where [redacted] made a reference to Bannon and knowledge of the DNC leaks prior to their release. Patten stated he does not remember any conversations about the DNC or the foundation referenced in the text. Patten stated he never had any substantive conversations with [redacted] or Bannan about WikiLeaks (or any

advance knowledge of the information prior to the release) or the DNC hacks.

The last time Patten spoke to [redacted] was approximately two weeks ago. Patten told [redacted] and Bannon that [redacted] Bannon asked [redacted] b6 b7C b3

Patten utilized Proton Mail, Skype, and iPhone texts to communicate with [redacted]

Patten's last outreach to the Executive Branch was in August 2017 when he met with Bannon to discuss Patten's work on [redacted] Patten did file an LDA for his work for the [redacted] He decided to file under the LDA exemption because it was easier to comply with the LDA requirements, and the filing was not as onerous as a FARA filing. b6 b7C

Patten had dinner with Bannon at Bannon's house approximately during Easter 2018.

FBI Visits

After the first visit by what Patten believed to be the FBI (because [redacted] spoke to these individuals and told Patten that two men in suits stopped by the house), he deleted more emails. Some of these deleted emails related to Patten's work for Cambridge Analytica (CA) in Mexico. CA told Patten that this engagement was off the books. Patten also intentionally deleted chats he had on Threema. b6 b7A b7C

During the search warrant executed at Patten's home, [redacted]

Patten told [redacted] about the SSCI and FBI matters. b6 b7C

Patten told [redacted] a former reporter, about the FBI's first visit to his house.

[redacted]

Patten spoke to [redacted] after [redacted] contacted Patten and asked to meet. They met at Union Station. [redacted] told Patten that the FBI called him. Patten told [redacted] that he [redacted] had not done anything wrong and to tell the FBI the truth. They b3 b6 b7C

discussed the tickets [redacted] purchased from the PIC for Patten, and they both stated to each other they did not do anything wrong. They never discussed the issue of who actually paid for the tickets. Patten stated that he did not believe he ever told [redacted] that the true source of the funds were from a foreign source, or that this issue was one of the legal issues.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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b7C

Kilimnik told Patten that the Russia investigation is ridiculous, and that they were chasing their tail. Kilimnik often sends Patten press clips about the Russia investigation.

Official Record

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 08/06/2018

Sam Patten was interviewed at the Office of Special Counsel (SCO) in Washington, D.C. Present at the interview were SSA [redacted] and Senior Special Prosecutor (SP) Andrew Weissmann. Patten was represented by attorney Stuart Sears, Schertler & Onorato, LLP, and paralegal [redacted] Patten was presented with a proffer agreement which he and his attorney signed and dated. SP Weissmann explained the proffer agreement to Patten and his attorney, and they stated they had no questions regarding the agreement. SP Weissmann advised Patten that it was a federal crime to knowingly make any false or fraudulent statement to federal law enforcement including the FBI and DOJ. Patten advised he understood. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, Patten provided the following information:

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2007

In 2007, Patten was a contractor for Greenberg, Quinlan, and Rosner, and worked on a campaign in Ukraine for Yushenko. Patten's job was to develop adds for the campaign. Patten did not know how the firm was paid by Yushenko, but there were rumors that one of the Ukrainian oligarchs, potentially Akhmetov, provided the funding. [redacted]

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Patten's First Engagement in Ukraine with [redacted]

Patten and Kilimnik talked about working together in Ukraine for about one year. [redacted]

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Investigation on 05/30/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/31/2018

by [redacted]

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[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

During this time period, Manafort was working for the Opposition Block (OB) in Ukraine and was referred to as the "old owl" because he was known for providing big picture advice. Kilimnik ran Manafort's office, DMP, in Ukraine and set up Patten to work out of DMP's office. The support staff at DMP's office were made up of local Ukrainians. [redacted] b6 b7C Rick Gates also frequently worked out of DMP's Ukraine office, and he and Manafort lived [redacted] was western leaning - he would inject western leaning comments into his translations, and also worked on the production of media adds they developed. Manafort was aware of Patten's work for [redacted] Kilimnik had his own office and Manafort's office had a picture of a trained monkey, which according to Kilimnik was a reference to VY.

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C Manafort told Patten that he was proud of being involved in Ukrainian politics and the East versus the West conflict. The initial meeting was a breakfast meeting at the Hyatt Kiev. Manafort asked Patten about his background and spoke highly of Kilimnik referring to him as a "powerful little dude." Manafort advised Patten to fight every battle with Ukrainians. He stated that he is considered one of them (Ukrainian) and they trust him like he is one of them. Manafort stated his job was to work on long term campaigns [redacted] Moreover, he stated that [redacted] was the boss and that Patten should do what he says. b6 b7A b7C

The second meeting with Manafort was on Ukrainian election night and Patten had dinner with Manafort and Gates. [redacted] The results of the election were positive for Manafort and Patten because the OB doubled its expectations regarding the number of seats they won in the election. The discussion at dinner was broad and mostly discussed the election results. Patten brought up that someone, Patten could not remember who, was working for an oligarch. Manafort asked Patten

how he knew that information, and Patten told him because the person registered under FARA (Patten often reviewed FARA registrations to see who was working in the Ukrainian space). Manafort stated he was surprised Patten knew about FARA. Manafort told Patten that "you've earned your money kid." Patten does not recall any discussions about what Patten was going to work on next. Manafort paid for the dinner.

During this engagement, Patten met with [redacted] three or four times and the meetings were in English. At the first meeting, they discussed the assignment, [redacted] The second meeting was about halfway through the engagement and Patten gave him an update on his work. The third meeting was at the end of the engagement. [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

After the election, Patten returned to the U.S. [redacted] Patten got a sense over time that Manafort had two limitations: (1) he would not get involved in the weeds regarding implementation of his ideas - the Ukrainians wanted him more involved in this process; and (2) Manafort was very expensive. There was a view by some Ukrainians, including [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

Patten OB Polling at the End of 2014

Patten was hired by [redacted] to look at some post-electoral strategies. Patten thought this was a test project. Patten did not believe he traveled to Ukraine for this work. [redacted] Patten thought that Manafort's work in Ukraine was waning and Manafort's idea was to create a shadow government (a government in waiting) for the OB. b6 b7A b7C

2015

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

b6
b7A
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Patten made approximately 20 trips to Ukraine in 2015.

was set up during the

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b6
b7A
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted]

Patten worked on a project [redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

2016 - Current U.S. Policy to the Ukraine and Russia

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] Patten told [redacted] that he was not interested.

The last time Pattten was in Ukraine was in October 2017. [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] did not like [redacted] because [redacted] thought that [redacted]

Over the past three months, Kilimnik and Patten have been working on preparing for the anticipated spring 2019 Ukrainian elections. Patten stated that the OB was disjointed and not focused, and were figuring out what the future holds for them. [redacted] They also worked on a poll which focused on Boyko's potential presidential campaign. [redacted] for the work they did over the past three months. b6 b7A b7C

Patten and [redacted] to Patten. Moreover, [redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] contacted Patten this past week to travel to Ukraine. Patten declined because Boyko was not in Ukraine. Now Patten is scheduled to travel back to Ukraine on 06/07/2018 or 06/08/2018. [redacted] b3 b6 b7A b7C

2017

Patten also worked for [redacted] on OB matters, which he was paid approximately [redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7C

Presidential Inauguration Committee (PIC)

*Patten was shown an* [redacted] *(Tab 35)*

Patten was not aware that a Ukrainian politician was working to get tickets to the PIC, and did not know who [redacted]

*Patten was shown a* [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] Patten where they discussed the tickets to the PIC and who they were for.

[redacted] Patten called [redacted] and she told him that they were having trouble obtaining tickets to the PIC and asked Patten for help securing tickets.

*Patten was shown an email from* [redacted] *which stated, "we are unable to accept contributions from foreign nationals. . . Yes. The donor has to attend."* b6 b7C

Patten initially stated that he only focused on the part of the email which stated the donor has to attend and not that they were unable to accept contributions from foreign nationals. At this point in the interview, Patten's attorney asked to take a break and spoke in private with his client. After the break, Patten stated that he was letting the justifications he came up with in his mind get in the way of the truth. Patten stated that this was a "wink and a nod sort of thing" and at the time he did not think it was a big deal to illegally use foreign money to pay for PIC tickets. Patten stated he knew foreign nationals could not donate to the PIC, and that he utilized [redacted] as a straw donor to hide the fact that the true donor was a foreign national which was illegal.

*Patten was shown an email from* [redacted] *to Patten dated* [redacted]

Regarding the statement "other avenues", Patten was asking [redacted] if he had other avenues to get more tickets to the PIC. When SL found out that Patten was able to secure tickets to the PIC, he wanted more tickets. [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

*Patten was shown an email he sent to* [redacted]

*Patten was shown the email chain in Tab 1*

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] Patten has met [redacted] once. Patten did not know who [redacted] is that is referenced in the email. b6 b7A b7C

Patten had a conversation with [redacted]

[redacted] Patten stated there were two components to Patten'a analysis of whether it would be worthwhile to register under FARA: (1) Patten would need to make a significantly more money if he was going to register under FARA; and (2) there was a potential negative to filing under FARA because your opponents can use it against you. Patten stated that both times he registered under FARA it resulted in him losing a client and the press wrote negative articles about Patten's work. b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

Patten stated that VY's [redacted] set up a Brussels' based company to help lobby.

*Patten was shown an email from Patten to* [redacted] *(Tab 3)*

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

Patten stated that he violated FARA by not registering for these activities. Patten stated he understood he needed to register under FARA, but he justified not registering to himself by creating excuses in his head such as this was not his core business.

*Patten was shown documents related to DoS outreach (Tab 15)*

Patten stated that he drafted the letter After Patten finalized the letter, Patten's understanding was that reviewed the letter, approved the letter and sent it to Nuland.

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*Patten was shown documents in Tab 25*

Patten stated that Threema was a preferred communication tool but not used exclusively.

*Patten was shown documents in Tab 26*

Patten stated that he wrote the actual letter and believed that the letter was delivered to Nuland.

The Hapsburg Group

Patten has never heard of the Hapsburg Group. Patten was familiar with the name who was part of Manafort's core group.

b6
b7C

Alex van der Zwaan

Alex van der Zwaan.

b6
b7A
b7C

b6
b7A
b7C

After Manafort was fired from the Trump Campaign,

[redacted] b7E



[redacted] b6 b7A b7C



**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 06/07/2018

Sam Patten was interviewed telephonically by the Office of Special Counsel (SCO) in Washington, D.C. Present at the interview were SSA [redacted] [redacted] and Senior Special Prosecutor (SP) Andrew Weissmann. Patten was represented by attorney Stuart Sears, Schertler & Onorato, LLP. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, Patten provided the following information:

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Prior to beginning the interview, SP Weissmann advised Patten and his attorney that this telephonic interview was being conducted pursuant to the previously signed proffer agreement and all the protections and requirements under the proffer agreement still applied. Patten and his attorney stated that they understood and concurred.

Patten stated that [redacted]

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Patten stated that he may have [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted]

Investigation on 06/12/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 06/22/2018

by [redacted]

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

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 08/07/2018

Sam Patten was interviewed at the Office of Special Counsel (SCO) in Washington, D.C. Present at the interview were SSA [redacted] and Senior Special Prosecutor (SP) Andrew Weissmann. Patten was represented by attorney Stuart Sears, Schertler & Onorato, LLP, and paralegal [redacted] Patten was presented with a proffer agreement which he and his attorney signed and dated. SP Weissmann explained the proffer agreement to Patten and his attorney, and they stated they had no questions regarding the agreement. SP Weissmann advised Patten that it was a federal crime to knowingly make any false or fraudulent statement to federal law enforcement including the FBI and DOJ. Patten advised he understood. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, Patten provided the following information:

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Patten was advised that [redacted] Weissmann advised Patten that he [redacted]

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Patten has received many inquiries from the media. [redacted]

[redacted] contacted Patten to see if Patten was available to work on a campaign for a Ukrainian candidate. She did not tell Patten the name of the candidate. Patten advised he was not available but referred her to [redacted] - Patten's friend who was a political consultant.

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[redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

Investigation on 06/06/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 06/22/2018

by [redacted]

b6
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[redacted]

b7E



[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

Patten thinks he may have contacted another lobbying firm to work for [redacted] but he cannot remember the specifics. b6 b7C

Patten and [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

Patten recalled a conversation [redacted]

Patten understood that if he was going to file an accurate FARA registration, he would have to disclose the work he did for the OB[redacted] However, Patten did not give a lot of thought as to whether he would have to disclose which oligarch paid for which project. b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

Department of State (DoS)

[redacted] b7E



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b7C

[redacted]

General Records

UNCLASSIFIED/~~FOUO~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 10/31/2018

William Samuel Patten, date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Andrew Weissmann and Jeannie S. Rhee. Present representing Patten was attorney Stuart Sears. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, Patten provided the following information: b6 b7C

Patten posted a statement about his guilty plea on his restricted FaceBook page. Patton believes that [redacted] b6 b7C

Patten reviewed a [redacted] to [redacted] regarding travel information. [redacted] Patten does not know why [redacted] Yanukovych referred to Paul Manafort and his consultants [redacted] Patten came to the Ukraine to assist with the snap elections. Patten worked for [redacted] in the interests of the Opposition Bloc. After Patten entered his guilty plea, [redacted] wrote Patton saying that all of Patten's work was for the Opposition Bloc, [redacted] Patten had not met Manafort before this travel to Kyiv. [redacted] Patten had worked for Yushchenko's party in Ukraine's 2007 Parliamentary elections. b6 b7A b7C b7E

UNCLASSIFIED/~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 09/06/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/06/2018

by [redacted]

b6 b7C b7E

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[redacted] b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of (U/~~/FOUO~~ Interview of William Samuel Patten 09.06.2018, On 09/06/2018, Page 2 of 3

Patten reviewed a [redacted] to Patten. While in Kyiv, Patten [redacted] Gates and Manafort. They ran parallel campaigns but there was very little coordination. Patten sent his materials through [redacted] Patten does not know if the materials were shown to Manafort or Rick Gates. Patten prepared his materials based upon publicly available information. b6 b7A b7C

Manafort was the big idea guy while Gates was the operations guy. Manafort stayed at the hotel most of the time and did not often come to the office.

Patten reviewed a [redacted] and Manafort that [redacted] forwarded to Patten. Patten understood that [redacted] PP was Petro Poroshenko, the President of the Ukraine, who had come out of the elections weaker than expected. b6 b7A b7C

Patten reviewed a [redacted] between Patten and [redacted] regarding "my edits." [redacted] was editing Patten's [redacted] is an oligarch. Patten would describe an oligarch as someone with economic and political power. [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

Patten reviewed a [redacted] that had been forwarded to Patten by [redacted] for Davis Manafort. Former Party of Regions members felt that they were being politically persecuted. [redacted] probably sent it to Patten for ideas on how to get coverage of the issue. [redacted] might have been for a proposed press tour to get media coverage. b6 b7A b7C

Patten reviewed a [redacted] between Patten and [redacted]

[redacted] b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of (U/~~FOUO~~) Interview of William Samuel Patten 09.06.2018, On 09/06/2018, Page 3 of 3

[redacted] Patten did not report his work or contact under FARA. b6 b7C

Patten reviewed a [redacted] in response to a news article that Patten had sent him [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

Patten reviewed a 01/05/2017 e-mail chain between Patten and [redacted] and other people at the BGR Group. Patten wrote the newsletter and BGR sent it out. Patten included the FARA disclaimer language because he assumed that BGR distributed the newsletter to U.S. Government officials.

[redacted]

b3
b7E

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)





UNCLASSIFIED/~~/FOUO~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 06/22/2018

On or around 5/31/2018 at 6:30 PM, SA [redacted] went to the residence of WILLIAM SAMUEL PATTEN. PATTEN welcomed SA [redacted] into his home and handed SA [redacted] his iPhone. The iPhone was unlocked [redacted]

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SA [redacted] used his DOJ-issued iPhone to photograph [redacted] Images of [redacted] are attached here in a 1A.

UNCLASSIFIED/~~/FOUO~~

Investigation on 05/31/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 06/21/2018

by [redacted]

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[redacted]

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

UNCLASSIFIED/~~FOUO~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 09/26/2018

On 9/19/2018 at 12:15 PM, WILLIAM SAMUEL PATTEN's counsel, Stuart Sears sent SSA [redacted] a PDF containing screenshots of what appears to be [redacted] The PDF was [redacted] and PATTEN [redacted] The PDF of these screenshots is attached here as a 1A.

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UNCLASSIFIED/~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 09/19/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Email)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/26/2018

by [redacted]

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[redacted] b7E

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)





UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 10/10/2018

Paul J. Manafort, date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agents [redacted] DOJ Attorney James Mann; and Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres. Present representing Manafort were attorneys Richard Westling and Thomas Zehnle. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, Manafort provided the following information: b6 b7C

Manafort met [redacted] during the campaign. [redacted] worked as a [redacted] Manafort believes [redacted] was introduced to the campaign through Corey Lewandowski. Manafort recalls meeting [redacted] three times: in the campaign offices in April or May 2016; at Thomas Barrack's California house during a fundraiser; and at the Republican National Convention. Manafort did not have any business dealings with [redacted] Manafort does not have any information regarding [redacted] investments. b6 b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 10/01/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/02/2018

by [redacted]

b3 b6 b7A b7C b7E

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[redacted] b7E

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)





UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 10/04/2018

Paul J. Manafort, date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agents [redacted] DOJ Attorney James Mann; and Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres. Present representing Manafort were attorneys Richard Westling and Thomas Zehnle. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, Manafort provided the following information: b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 10/01/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/02/2018

by [redacted]

b6 b7A b7C b7E

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[redacted] b7E

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)





UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 11/07/2018

Paul J. Manafort, date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agents [redacted] FBI Forensic Accountant [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres. Present representing Manafort were attorneys Richard Westling and Thomas Zehnle. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, Manafort provided the following information: b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] b7A

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 10/01/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/02/2018 b6 b7C

by [redacted] b7E

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[redacted]

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Manafort planned campaign mailings during the primaries. The campaign had previously used a company associated with Corey Lewandowski. Manafort thought that the company's rates were too high because, in part, Lewandowski and others were taking a cut. [redacted] had dealt with mail vendors while he worked at the Republican National Committee (RNC) so Manafort asked him to recommend a group. [redacted]

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Manafort reviewed an e-mail [redacted] from Gates. [redacted]

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[redacted] Manafort had been upset about the money paid to Lewandowski from the other mailings so [redacted]

Text messages between Manafort and Sean Hannity were read to Manafort. Excluding conversations with his attorneys, Manafort received information on possible leaks of information by the Department of Justice (DOJ) regarding his case from Jason Maloni, Roger Stone, Sean Hannity and [redacted] None of these individuals had first hand knowledge of the leaks. They repeated information learned from their contacts in the press. Manafort has no specific facts or allegations regarding any leaks from the DOJ regarding his case.

On 1/24/2018, Manafort wrote to Hannity "[p]er our conversation this morning, my attorney - Kevin Downing - will call you at 11:30 am tomorrow. He will update you on what we are doing and how it connects to your reporting." Downing spoke with Hannity. Manafort asked Downing to speak with Hannity because he wanted Hannity to understand his case. Hannity also served as an outlet to the public and the White House. Downing also spoke with Greener, Doug Davenport and Gay in order to educate them about Manafort's case.

On 5/4/2018, Manafort messaged Hannity that "I am told DT is pumped." The comment is in response to Judge Ellis's courtroom criticism of the Special Counsel's Office. Manafort's legal counsel told him that DT was pumped.

Many of Manafort's text messages are based on his belief that the investigation of him began before July 2016. Serhiy Lyovochkin heard from Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko that the U.S. Embassy was pressuring Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau for information on Manafort. Manafort had a series of problems with his phone leading him to believe that he was being intercepted.

The document reviewed by Manafort will be maintained in the 1-A section of this casefile.

[redacted] b7E

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)





UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 11/07/2018

Paul J. Manafort, date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agents [redacted] DOJ Attorney James Mann; and Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres. Present representing Manafort were attorneys Richard Westling and Thomas Zehnle. After being advised of identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, Manafort provided the following information: b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 10/01/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/02/2018 b6 b7A

by [redacted] b7C b7E

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[redacted]

Manafort did not know that the FBI was investigating anything related to [redacted]

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
ON 12-10-2019

[redacted]



FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

General Records

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 02/01/2017

(U) (~~S//NF~~) GEORGE DEMETRIOS PAPADOPOULOS (PAPADOPOULOS), date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was initially met by the interviewing Agents at his residence, located at [redacted] Chicago, Illinois 60625. PAPADOPOULOS' cellular telephone is [redacted] and his email address is [redacted] Also present at the residence during the initial contact with PAPADOPOULOS was [redacted] PAPADOPOULOS was requested to accompany the interviewing Agents to the FBI Chicago Field Office in order to further conduct the interview in secure and private environment. PAPADOPOULOS was told that the interview was voluntary on his part and that he was not under arrest. PAPADOPOULOS was further advised that the nature of the interview was to discuss a contact of his, who currently resides in New York.

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(U) (~~S//NF~~) PAPADOPOULOS agreed to accompany the Agents back to the Chicago Field Office and was driven to that location in Special Agent [redacted] [redacted] Bureau-issued vehicle. PAPADOPOULOS was interviewed at the Chicago Field Office and was then returned to his residence in SA [redacted] vehicle.

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(U) (~~S//NF~~) [redacted]

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(U) (~~S//NF~~) Subsequent to the interview, PAPADOPOULOS sent SA [redacted] two email communications. Those email communications are documented for the file as a digital 1A attachment to this communication.

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~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20421231~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 01/27/2017 at Chicago, Illinois, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/01/2017

by [redacted]

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

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 02/03/2017

(U) (~~S~~//~~NF~~) GEORGE DEMETRIOS PAPADOPOULOS (PAPADOPOULOS), date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed at GEORGE'S ICE CREAM & SWEETS, located at 5306 North Clark Street, in Chicago, Illinois 60640. PAPADOPOULOS resides at [redacted] Chicago, Illinois 60625. His personal cell phone number is [redacted] and his email address is [redacted] PAPADOPOULOS was aware of SA [redacted] FBI affiliation from a previous interview on January 27, 2017. PAPADOPOULOS was advised that the nature of this interview was to seek his potential cooperation in an on-going national security matter, directly related to the information that he provided during the interview on January 27, 2017. PAPADOPOULOS was then advised that this interview was entirely voluntary and that he could discontinue speaking with SA [redacted] at any time. PAPADOPOULOS agreed to the interview and stated that he wished to hear more about how he could potentially help the FBI.

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(U) (~~S~~//~~NF~~) SA [redacted] relayed that the FBI was seeking out PAPADOPOULOS' cooperation specifically in an attempt to obtain further information about his London-based contact, JOSEPH MIFSUD, at the LONDON CENTRE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PRACTICE.

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(U) (~~S~~//~~NF~~) PAPADOPOULOS provided that subsequent to the interview on January 27, 2017, he conducted several GOOGLE searches for MIFSUD. In doing so, PAPADOPOULOS identified many open source Internet articles that related MIFSUD to both Russia and the Kremlin. Additionally, PAPADOPOULOS knew MIFSUD to be an associate of a Russian discussion club of some sort.

(U) (~~S~~//~~NF~~) SA [redacted] then asked if MIFSUD had ever introduced PAPADOPOULOS to a Russian Ambassador or to VLADIMIR PUTIN's niece. To that, PAPADOPOULOS responded that the individual who was reportedly PUTIN's niece was the female who PAPADOPOULOS identified in his follow-up email to SA [redacted] on January 27, 2017 [OLGA VINOGRADOVA]. PAPADOPOULOS recalled this female was initially introduced to him as one of MIFSUD's students, but PAPADOPOULOS

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~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~
~~Derived From: FBI~~
~~NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20421231~~

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

Investigation on 02/01/2017 at Chicago, Illinois, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/02/2017

by [redacted]

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had later heard grumblings from NAGI IDRIS (IDRIS) that she was actually PUTIN's niece; or a relative in some capacity. PAPADOPOULOS stated that he has never met with any Russian government officials and that the meeting with teh Russian Ambassador never happened. PAPADOPOULOS identified IDRIS as being the Director of the LONDON CENTRE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PRACTICE.

(U) (~~S~~//~~NF~~) PAPADOPOULOS recalled that MIFSUD was often attempting to act as a middle-man, and coordinating all things related to Russia at the LONDON CENTRE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PRACTICE. PAPADOPOULOS could not provide any further specifics on what those activities were, but remembered that he seemed to be actively trying to coordinate all the Russian activities. PAPADOPOULOS stated that in his opinion, he believed MIFSUD was doing side-business activities of some sort in order to make money on the side. PAPADOPOULOS recalled meeting with MIFSUD on a few occasions, possibly a total of three times.

(U) (~~S~~//~~NF~~) SA[redacted] then asked if PAPADOPOULOS had mentioned anything to the TRUMP team regarding MIFSUD's statements about having prior knowledge of the Russian's intent to release HILLARY CLINTON's emails during the 2016 Presidential campaign. To this, PAPADOPOULOS recalled that he may have thrown MIFSUD's name out during the campaign, as he knew him to be a middle-man for all things Russian. PAPADOPOULOS then added that it was his job as a Foreign Policy Adviser for DONALD J. TRUMP, to connect with foreign governments on behalf of the campaign. When asked if he could recall the time frame in which he may have thrown MIFSUD's name out during the campaign, PAPADOPOULOS stated that it probably would have occurred somewhere circa February or March of 2016.

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(U) (~~S~~//~~NF~~) MIFSUD recently reached out to PAPADOPOULOS and indicated that he may be traveling to Washington, DC in February of 2017. PAPADOPOULOS could not recall the exact date, but stated that it may be on or about February 11, 2017.

(U) (~~S~~//~~NF~~) PAPADOPOULOS will be traveling to London in approximately three weeks, to give a talk at a university that he was formerly affiliated with. PAPADOPOULOS stated that during this travel, he could potentially meet with MIFSUD. PAPADOPOULOS provided that he is no longer seeking a job with the Presidential Administration and that he is now focusing on his new career, which is providing talks and presentations such as the upcoming event in London. PAPADOPOULOS stated that he is now "GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS private citizen". Additionally, PAPADOPOULOS expressed his interest in attending law school in the future.

(U) (~~S~~//~~NF~~) When asked about his contact, SERGEI MILLIAN (MILLIAN),

PAPADOPOULOS stated that he has ultimately cut ties with MILLIAN and that it may seem odd if PAPADOPOULOS were to reach out to MILLIAN now that he's no longer affiliated with the administration. Without being prompted, PAPADOPOULOS stated that to the best of his knowledge, MILLIAN had no prior knowledge of the Russian's possession of CLINTON's emails, like MIFSUD did. In fact, PAPADOPOULOS recalled MILLIAN once mentioning to him that MILLIAN doesn't do business with Russia anymore, but that he's focused rather on doing business with China. Additionally, MILLIAN told PAPADOPOULOS that he had no knowledge of the information that surfaced through the recent TRUMP dossier, even though MILLIAN was allegedly sourced in that document. PAPADOPOULOS recalled MILLIAN telling him that none of the information in that dossier, specifically related to MILLIAN, was true. PAPADOPOULOS stated that he believes MILLIAN is strictly a Russian business man.

(U) (X/~~NF~~) SA [redacted] told PAPADOPOULOS that his position as a Foreign Policy Adviser for a Presidential Administration may have made him a target of foreign adversaries, specifically that of foreign intelligence services. PAPADOPOULOS stated that to the best of his knowledge, he has never met anyone who is member of a foreign intelligence service, but that he has had many dealings with high-ranking government officials from a variety of different countries. PAPADOPOULOS then requested assistance from the FBI in helping him to identify any individuals that he is currently in contact with, who may be affiliated with a foreign intelligence service. b6 b7C

(U) (X/~~NF~~) SA [redacted] inquired about PAPADOPOULOS' cellular telephone and whether or he not still wanted the FBI to analyze the the phone for malware and cyber threats. PAPADOPOULOS stated that he has since replaced that particular cell phone, but that he would like to provide the FBI with his old phone for analysis. b6 b7C

(U) (X/~~NF~~) PAPADOPOULOS directly asked SA [redacted] if he was the subject of an FBI investigation. To this, SA [redacted] responded that his name had surfaced through the course of a national security investigation, and that was the reason that SA [redacted] had spoken with him on the morning of January 27, 2017. SA [redacted] then relayed that the information provided by PAPADOPOULOS during that interview is what prompted this follow-up interview. PAPADOPOULOS was again advised that the purpose of this interview was to obtain further details about MIFSUD and to seek out PAPADOPOULOS' potential cooperation with this matter. b6 b7C

(U) (X/~~NF~~) On several occasions during this interview, PAPADOPOULOS stated that he would like to speak with an attorney, prior to entering into any official agreement with the FBI. On those occasions, SA [redacted] relayed to b6 b7C

PAPADOPOULOS that this interview was voluntary, and that his future cooperation would continue to be voluntary and confidential in nature.

(U) (X/~~NF~~) PAPADOPOULOS stated that, for his protection, he would be seek out legal advice from an attorney on the following day, and that he would contact SA [redacted] after speaking with that attorney. When asked who his attorney was, PAPADOPOULOS stated that he would be getting one tomorrow. PAPADOPOULOS then provided that he would be telling the attorney that he wanted to cooperate with the FBI.

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(U) (X/~~NF~~) At the conclusion of the interview, PAPADOPOULOS provided that he would be meeting someone for dinner downtown, at an Armenian restaurant near Michigan Avenue and Ohio Street. SA [redacted] offered PAPADOPOULOS a ride into the city, which he accepted. PAPADOPOULOS was driven to downtown Chicago in SA [redacted] Bureau-issued vehicle and was dropped off near the corner of East Chicago Avenue and North Miles Van Der Rohe Way. Upon exiting SA [redacted] vehicle, PAPADOPOULOS stated that he would be speaking to his attorney and then he wanted "to get something going with this in the future".

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DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
ON 12-16-2019

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



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~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 02/02/2017

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ On February 1, 2017 at approximately 3:45 PM, Special Agent [redacted] telephoned and spoke with GEORGE DEMETRIOS PAPADOPOULOS. PAPADOPOULOS was reached on his personal cell phone number of [redacted]

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ SA [redacted] requested to meet with PAPADOPOULOS as a follow-up to his interview with the FBI on January 27, 2017. PAPADOPOULOS was further advised that SA [redacted] wished to discuss future opportunities with PAPADOPOULOS regarding his potential cooperation in matters that were discussed during the previous interview.

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ PAPADOPOULOS agreed to meet with SA [redacted] and suggested a meet time of 5:00 PM later that evening. PAPADOPOULOS suggested the meeting occur at the GEORGE'S ICE CREAM & SWEETS coffee shop, located at 5306 North Clark Street, Chicago, Illinois 60640. SA [redacted] confirmed the meet time and location and the call was ended.

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~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20421231~~

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

Investigation on 02/01/2017 at Chcago, Illinois, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/02/2017

by [redacted]

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


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~~SECRET~~/~~ORCON~~/~~NOFORN~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 02/03/2017

(U) ~~(S)~~/~~(NF)~~ On February 2, 2017, FBI Special Agent [redacted] exchanged several text messages, telephone calls, and e-mails with GEORGE DEMETRIOS PAPADOPOULOS. b6 b7C

(U) ~~(S)~~/~~(NF)~~ At approximately 4:15 PM, SA [redacted] placed a phone call to PAPADOPOULOS' cell phone number of [redacted] A voicemail notification stated that the mail box was full and could not receive any more messages at that time. b6 b7C

(U) ~~(S)~~/~~(NF)~~ Beginning at approximately 4:22 PM, SA [redacted] exchanged several text messages with PAPADOPOULOS. The following is a replication of the text message exchanges: b6 b7C

SA [redacted] - 4:22 PM: b6 b7C
Hey George give me a quick call when you get a second

PAPADOPOULOS - 4:58 PM:
Hey [redacted] a bit busy at the moment. Having discussed the matter with a lawyer, have been advised not to engage in this matter any longer, including what was floated yesterday. I truly feel proud that was able to do my part to assist with everything I know but as you saw yesterday there was nothing else to add and we had a nice coffee but nothing of substance. Am not in the administration and am simply moving on with my life in the private sector in Chicago. You guys are the professionals and am sure you can deal with that person if he truly is a threat. Can't help anymore than I have. If there is something directly related to me then that's another matter. I'll be free in a couple hours if you have to call about me directly. Thanks.

SA [redacted] - 5:00 PM: b6 b7C
Yeah if we could talk directly that would be good. No problem on what we discussed yesterday. I do need to speak with you about one last issue though

~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~
~~Derived From: FBI~~
~~NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20421231~~

~~SECRET~~/~~ORCON~~/~~NOFORN~~

Investigation on 02/02/2017 at Chicago, Illinois, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/03/2017 b3 b6

by [redacted] b7C b7E

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PAPADOPOULOS - 5:01 PM:
Ok let me give you a call in about 45 minutes when I get alone

SA [redacted] - 5:01 PM:
I'll hang out up north. If you can call me when you're free that'd be great. I'd like to meet up with you one last time to clear up this last issue tonight

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SA [redacted] - 5:01 PM:
Sounds good

(U) (~~S~~/~~NF~~) At 5:48 PM, SA [redacted] received a call from PAPADOPOULOS. SA [redacted] requested to meet with PAPADOPOULOS for an interview that evening. PAPADOPOULOS stated that he was willing to meet with SA [redacted] at the same location as the previous meeting, and proposed a time of 6:30 PM that evening. [The previous interview location was the GEORGE'S ICE CREAM & SWEETS coffee shop located at 5306 North Clark Street, Chicago, Illinois 60640.]

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(U) (~~S~~/~~NF~~) At 5:59 PM, PAPADOPOULOS telephoned SA [redacted] and stated that he had spoken to an attorney, who advised that he didn't meet with the FBI that evening. SA [redacted] advised PAPADOPOULOS that the attorney could be present for the interview. PAPADOPOULOS then inquired about the nature of the interview. PAPADOPOULOS was advised that was to seek additional information about what was provided during the previous two interviews. PAPADOPOULOS stated that he wanted to meet with SA [redacted] that evening and that he would speak to his attorney and return a call to SA [redacted]

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(U) (~~S~~/~~NF~~) At 6:08 PM, PAPADOPOULOS telephoned SA [redacted] and stated that he was advised by his attorney not to meet with SA [redacted] that evening. PAPADOPOULOS proposed to meet with SA [redacted] on Monday at the FBI Chicago Field Office with his attorney present. PAPADOPOULOS agreed to contact his attorney and arrange for a time on Monday to conduct the interview.

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(U) (~~S~~/~~NF~~) At 6:39 PM, SA [redacted] sent one email message to PAPADOPOULOS, stating the following: Per our telephone call, please let me know what time you will be coming in on Monday. We will also need the name of your attorney(s) ahead of time in order to facilitate access in our building.

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(U) (~~S~~/~~NF~~) At 7:15 PM, PAPADOPOULOS responded with the following message: Will do, [redacted] Looking forward to getting to the bottom of this finally. I'll let you know when I know.

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[redacted]

(U) (X//~~NF~~) Text messages, telephone calls and e-mails exchanged with GEORGE DEMETRIOS PAPADOPOULOS.



(U) (X//~~NF~~) Enclosed for the file as a digital 1A attachment are screenshots and copies of the messages that were exchanged with PAPADOPOULOS.

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
ON 12-10-2019

General Records Schedule 4.2, item 130
and 131, or comparable agency records
schedules or General Records Schedule 20,
item 1c and 2 for electronic records

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 02/17/2017

(U) (~~S~~//~~NF~~) GEORGE DEMETRIOS PAPADOPOULOS (PAPADOPOULOS), date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed at the BREEN AND PUGH Law Office located at 53 West Jackson Boulevard, Chicago, Illinois 60604. Present during this interview were PAPADOPOULOS' Attorneys, [redacted] and [redacted] Also present during this interview were FBI Chicago Chief Division Counsel, Darryl J. Rossini, FBI Chicago Associate Division Counsel, [redacted] and FBI Headquarters Office of Division Counsel Representative, [redacted] Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] and Special Agent [redacted] PAPADOPOULOS was advised that the nature of this interview was to seek additional clarification on information that was provided by PAPADOPOULOS during two previous interviews with the FBI. After being advised of the nature of the interview and the identities of the interviewers, PAPADOPOULOS provided the following information:

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(U) (~~S~~//~~NF~~) PAPADOPOULOS was asked to recall the details surrounding his knowledge of Russia's intent to release information during the 2016 Presidential campaign, which he had previously reported hearing from UK-based foreign national, JOSEPH MIFSUD (MIFSUD).

(U) (~~S~~//~~NF~~) PAPADOPOULOS initially met MIFSUD during a business trip to Rome. At the time, PAPADOPOULOS was working for the LONDON CENTRE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PRACTICE and MIFSUD was a board member at a university that PAPADOPOULOS had formerly attended. His introduction to MIFSUD was facilitated by a middle-man, who was then the Director of the LONDON CENTRE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PRACTICE's Washington, DC-based office. PAPADOPOULOS recalled that MIFSUD was also involved in a think tank of some sort at the time. PAPADOPOULOS had lunch with MIFSUD in Rome, and recalled that MIFSUD was gloating about his past positions. One of those positions was a former diplomat in Malta. PAPADOPOULOS assessed that MIFSUD was trying to impress him, given that PAPADOPOULOS had recently come off of his advisory position for the BEN CARSON (CARSON) campaign.

~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20421231~~

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

Investigation on 02/10/2017 at Chicago, Illinois, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/14/2017

by [redacted]

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(U) (X/~~NF~~) Upon returning to London, MIFSUD reached out to PAPADOPOULOS and stated that he wanted to get to know him better. PAPADOPOULOS could not recall if he was still involved with the CARSON campaign or if he was with the DONALD J. TRUMP (TRUMP) campaign at that point, but recalled that MIFSUD always seemed to be very vocal about TRUMP's future relations with Russia. PAPADOPOULOS then recalled that approximately one week after his meeting with MIFSUD in London, PAPADOPOULOS decided to work for the TRUMP campaign. PAPADOPOULOS recalled that that event happened subsequent to his meeting with SAM CLOVIS (CLOVIS) in London. MIFSUD began talking himself up more at that point, once he became aware of PAPADOPOULOS' affiliation with the TRUMP campaign. Specifically, PAPADOPOULOS recalled that MIFSUD began "blowing up his contacts" during their meetings. PAPADOPOULOS estimated that he met with MIFSUD on approximately ten occasions.

(U) (X/~~NF~~) PAPADOPOULOS recalled having breakfast with MIFSUD at a five star hotel, near LIVERPOOL STATION in London. PAPADOPOULOS could not recall the name of the hotel. During the breakfast, MIFSUD and PAPADOPOULOS discussed HILLARY CLINTON's (CLINTON) Presidential campaign. During that conversation, MIFSUD told PAPADOPOULOS that CLINTON had a lot of problems, and then made a specific reference to her having problems with her emails. At one point, MIFSUD told PAPADOPOULOS that the Russians had her emails. PAPADOPOULOS recalled that he inquired to MIFSUD about how he knew the Russians had her emails, to which MIFSUD strangely chuckled and responded "they told me they have them." Although PAPADOPOULOS viewed that comment as being strange in nature, he didn't believe it was true and "didn't think about it again."

(U) (X/~~NF~~) PAPADOPOULOS recalled another meeting with MIFSUD in London, which occurred at the five star, HOLBORN HOTEL. During that meeting, PAPADOPOULOS was introduced to one of MIFSUD's female students, a Russian female [OLGA VINOGRADOVA]. PAPADOPOULOS believed that MIFSUD was trying to impress the student by introducing her to PAPADOPOULOS. PAPADOPOULOS recalled that the introductory conversation with her seemed to focus on the discussion of US relations with Russia. PAPADOPOULOS further recalled that MIFSUD introduced himself as a Maltese citizen, who was then residing in the United Kingdom. To the best of his recollection, PAPADOPOULOS recalled that this meeting took place in either March or April of 2016.

(U) (X/~~NF~~) When asked if he ever spoke with the Russian female again, PAPADOPOULOS stated that he only met with twice, once with MIFSUD once without, and that he never met with her subsequently. PAPADOPOULOS then added that his relationship with her was entirely platonic in nature. When asked if the Russian female was VLADIMIR PUTIN's (PUTIN) niece, PAPADOPOULOS stated that he had heard rumors of that from other individuals

at the LONDON CENTRE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PRACTICE, but that those rumors turned out to be false. PAPADOPOULOS recently conducted several GOOGLE searches for PUTIN and found that he doesn't actually have a niece. PAPADOPOULOS has maintained e-mail communication with the Russian female, but his last communication with her occurred "months ago". PAPADOPOULOS and his Attorneys agreed to provide the interviewing Agents with her email address and phone number.

(U) (~~S~~//~~NF~~) When asked if PAPADOPOULOS had ever met a Russian Ambassador during his time in London, PAPADOPOULOS stated that he never did. PAPADOPOULOS then added that he had lied to the TRUMP about having a meeting with a Russian Ambassador. When asked why he lied to the TRUMP organization, PAPADOPOULOS stated that he was a young, 28 year old who was trying to impress the other members of the TRUMP team with his connections. PAPADOPOULOS added that he may have sent an email about meeting a Russian Ambassador to the members of TRUMP's foreign policy advisory team, which was not true. When asked who the members of that team were, PAPADOPOULOS provided the names of SAM CLOVIS, KIETH KELLOGG, WALID PHARES, JOSEPH SCHMITZ, CARTER PAGE, and possibly CORY LEWANDOWSKI. When asked whether or not MICHAEL FLYNN and PAUL MANAFORT were part of that team, PAPADOPOULOS stated that he didn't believe either of those two individuals were part of the campaign during that time period.

(U) (~~S~~//~~NF~~) When asked if PAPADOPOULOS had told any foreign government officials, either from hostile or friendly countries, about the Russians intent to disclose information during the 2016 Presidential campaign, PAPADOPOULOS stated that he did not. PAPADOPOULOS then elaborated and stated that he never thought about the comments that MIFSUD had made ever again, until his interview with the FBI on January 27, 2017. When asked if PAPADOPOULOS told anyone about the Russians intent to disclose information during the campaign, PAPADOPOULOS stated that he did not, and that he was "sticking to that story."

(U) (~~S~~//~~NF~~) When asked if he told anyone in the TRUMP campaign about his knowledge of the Russian's intent to disclose information during the campaign, PAPADOPOULOS stated that he did not. When asked if he was made aware of any other suggestions that were made by the Russians to assist the TRUMP campaign team during the 2016 election, PAPADOPOULOS stated that he was not. When asked if it was possible that PAPADOPOULOS could have had a discussion with someone regarding the Russians intent to disclose information during the campaign, and that PAPADOPOULOS could have inadvertently forgotten that conversation, PAPADOPOULOS stated that it was not possible and that he never spoke to anyone about that issue. PAPADOPOULOS was then asked if it was possible that he had such a

conversation with someone at a social gathering, a nightclub, or perhaps at a cocktail party of some sort, to which he again denied the possibility of such an occurrence.

(U) (~~S~~//~~NF~~) PAPADOPOULOS recalled that he threw out MIFSUD's name to the TRUMP team during the campaign, circa March or April of 2016. When asked whether or not anyone in the TRUMP team had reached out to MIFSUD subsequent to that event, PAPADOPOULOS stated that to the best of his knowledge no one from the TRUMP campaign had reached out to MIFSUD. PAPADOPOULOS relayed that during March or April of 2016, PAPADOPOULOS was proposing that the TRUMP team take several foreign policy trips like he had done in support of the CARSON campaign. PAPADOPOULOS threw out MIFSUD's name as a potential intermediary for the campaign, who could introduce the TRUMP team to European diplomats in support those foreign policy trips. The trips ultimately never came to fruition however, as the TRUMP campaign was instead focused on moving their campaign activities back into the United States, and was moving away from foreign policy trip discussions at that time.

(U) (~~S~~//~~NF~~) When asked whether or not he was aware of any other individuals in the TRUMP team who had received a suggestion by the Russians to assist the campaign, PAPADOPOULOS stated that if that happened, he was not privy to it.

(U) (~~S~~//~~NF~~) PAPADOPOULOS provided that MIFSUD recently reached out to him via email, and advised that he was in Washington, DC at the time of this interview. PAPADOPOULOS remembered that MIFSUD had also reached out to him several months ago, regarding a potential business deal, but PAPADOPOULOS never took him up on it.

(U) (~~S~~//~~NF~~) PAPADOPOULOS further recalled that MIFSUD had introduced him to a former HARVARD graduate, who was an expert on Saudi Arabian matters. PAPADOPOULOS could not recall the name of this individual, but remembered that he spoke about banning Muslims in the United States. PAPADOPOULOS recalled having several meetings with this individual, beginning in approximately March of 2016. PAPADOPOULOS denied ever discussing the topic of the Russian's possession of CLINTON's emails with this individual.

(U) (~~S~~//~~NF~~) When asked whether or not PAPADOPOULOS received any form of compensation from the TRUMP campaign, PAPADOPOULOS stated that he was a volunteer and that he never received any form of payment or reimbursement from the TRUMP campaign.



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 03/08/2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) On Thursday, February 16, 2017 at or around 4:37PM EST, FBI Assistant General Counsel (AGC) [redacted] of the National Security and Cyber Law Branch (NSCLB) contacted attorney [redacted] of the BREEN AND PUGH law firm via e-mail [redacted] in order to facilitate a follow up interview for FBI Chicago with GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) At or around 5:44PM EST, [redacted] responded to the e-mail and requested [redacted] call his mobile phone at [redacted] Two calls to the number led to a voicemail with a female speaking what [redacted] believed was Arabic. After exchanging another e-mail with [redacted] to confirm the number, at or around 5:48PM EST, [redacted] reached [redacted] and informed him that the FBI had follow up questions from the February 10, 2017 interview with PAPADOPOULOS. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] asked [redacted] what the unresolved questions concerned, to which [redacted] responded that the FBI had a [redacted] PAPADOPOULOS met with foreign representatives [redacted] [redacted] explained that it was important to resolve these inconsistencies to Special Agent (SA [redacted] In addition, [redacted] mentioned that PAPADOPOULOS' [redacted] made resolution of the inconsistencies time sensitive. [redacted] then responded that he would reach out to PAPADOPOULOS and relay the request and follow up with [redacted] b6 b7C b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) At or around 6:20PM EST, [redacted] returned the call to [redacted] After noting that he had "Assistant General Counsel [redacted] on the line, [redacted] informed [redacted] that PAPADOPOULOS was also on the call. [redacted] then summarized the information [redacted] provided during the earlier call and then prompted PAPADOPOULOS to discuss. b6 b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) PAPADOPOULOS began by restating his willingness to cooperate with the FBI. PAPADOPOULOS then informed [redacted] When asked for further information, PAPADOPOULOS clarified that he actually b6 b7C b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 02/10/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/22/2017

by [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

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[redacted] b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) PAPADOPOULOS stated [redacted] b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) When asked, PAPADOPOULOS initially could not confirm whether he was with the Trump Campaign or Carson Campaign [redacted] PAPADOPOULOS speculated that this [redacted] [redacted] then interjected and asked PAPADOPOULOS when he went on vacation to Greece, to which PAPADOPOULOS replied mid-April 2016. [redacted] speculated that [redacted] b6 b7C b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] asked PAPADOPOULOS what was discussed during the meeting with [redacted] PAPADOPOULOS said that he could not remember everything discussed, but stated that the only reason he would be meeting with them would be for campaign purposes. PAPADOPOULOS then stated that the [redacted] were seeking his perspective on the U.S. presidential election and experience with the campaign. PAPADOPOULOS then recalled [redacted] b6 b7C b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] PAPADOPOULOS' meeting with JOSEPH MIFSUD. PAPADOPOULOS responded that he could not recall, [redacted] his breakfast with MIFSUD. PAPADOPOULOS then made a point to reiterate his statement from the February 10 interview that he did not believe MIFSUD's claims that the Russians had HILLARY CLINTON'S e-mails. b6 b7C b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] then mentioned that Clinton also was being investigated for her private e-mail server e-mails [redacted] those news stories with PAPADOPOULOS. PAPADOPOULOS denied [redacted] b6 b7C b7E

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(U//~~FOUO~~) then interjected to remind PAPADOPOULOS that the FBI was aware PAPADOPOULOS stated that he would not respond to any media requests.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) then advised that he would discuss these responses with SA and that PAPADOPOULOS would likely need to discuss these matters again with SA as well as follow up questions, because was not a Special Agent. and PAPADOPOULOS were receptive to the request and asked to e-mail him with details. The call ended at or around 6:22PM EST.

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

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 08/03/2017

On July 27, 2017, GEORGE DEMETRIOS PAPADOPOULOS (PAPADOPOULOS) date of birth (DOB) [redacted] social security account number (SSAN) [redacted] [redacted] United States passport number [redacted] was arrested at the DULLES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT in Dulles, Virginia. PAPADOPOULOS was arrested based on probable cause of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and 18 U.S.C. § 1519. This arrest was directly coordinated with the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL (DOJ SPECIAL COUNSEL). b6 b7C

At approximately 7:27 PM, FBI Agents observed PAPADOPOULOS taking an airport pedestrian taxi moving between two terminals at DULLES AIRPORT. Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted] identified themselves to PAPADOPOULOS and escorted him to the US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION AGENCY area in the international terminal. PAPADOPOULOS was taken into custody by FBI Agents at approximately 7:43 PM. PAPADOPOULOS was made aware that he was being arrested for false statements provided to the FBI during his interview on January 27, 2017. b6 b7C

PAPADOPOULOS was allowed to finalize his US CUSTOMS paperwork documenting his return to the United States. A photograph of that paperwork was taken and is enclosed for the file as a digital 1A attachment to this FD-302. FBI Agents coordinated with US CUSTOMS representatives to retrieve PAPADOPOULOS' checked luggage; however, the Agents were informed that PAPADOPOULOS' luggage was not on-board with him on his flight from Germany. PAPADOPOULOS was then informed that his luggage would likely be delivered to either Dulles or Chicago on the following day. FBI agents relayed that information to PAPADOPOULOS who seemed baffled that his luggage did not make it on the flight.

At approximately 7:50 PM, SA [redacted] read the Advise of Rights Form [FD-395] aloud to PAPADOPOULOS. PAPADOPOULOS affirmed that he understood his rights and advised that he was still represented by his attorney, [redacted] with respect to this matter. SA [redacted] then advised PAPADOPOULOS that the Agents would not ask PAPADOPOULOS any further b6 b7C

Investigation on 07/27/2017 at Dulles, Virginia, United States (In Person) b3 b6

File # [redacted] Date drafted 07/31/2017 b7C

by [redacted] b7E

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questions about this investigation, without his attorney being present. A copy of the Advice of Rights form is enclosed for the file as a digital 1A attachment to this FD-302. The original document will be maintained in a physical 1A envelope.

PAPADOPOULOS was then advised that representatives from the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ) OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL were attempting to contact BREEN about PAPADOPOULOS' arrest and that PAPADOPOULOS would be allowed to speak with [redacted] upon the conclusion of the standard booking and processing procedures. b6 b7C

PAPADOPOULOS then made several unsolicited statements to the Agents. PAPADOPOULOS stated that he had provided all of his information to the US SENATE regarding this matter, in the form of a written statement. PAPADOPOULOS then conveyed that he would like to cooperate with the United States Government and that he's not trying to hide anything. PAPADOPOULOS conveyed that he had previously assisted the interviewing Agents by providing the names of certain individuals who he deemed to be of interest for this matter and that he was only able to provide the information that he remembered. PAPADOPOULOS then stated that if he had forgotten something, that doesn't necessarily mean that he's lying.

SA [redacted] then reminded PAPADOPOULOS that he was represented by an attorney, and that the Agents would not be engaging with PAPADOPOULOS on this matter without his attorney being present. PAPADOPOULOS stated that he understood, and then added that he has a tendency to over-exaggerate a lot of things and that he was only twenty-eight years old when he was thrust into the national spotlight with all of this. PAPADOPOULOS again relayed that he had all of that information in his statement to the US SENATE. b6 b7C

Subsequent to the arrest, Agents seized various items from PAPADOPOULOS which were on his person at the time of his arrest. Those items are depicted in the attached Receipt for Property [FD-597] forms, which are enclosed for the file as a digital 1A attachment to this FD-302. The original forms are being maintained in a physical 1A envelope.

Agents present at DULLES AIRPORT at the time of PAPADOPOULOS' arrest were SA [redacted] SA [redacted] SA [redacted] [redacted] FBI ASAC [redacted] SA [redacted] SA [redacted] SA [redacted] SA [redacted] SA [redacted] SA [redacted] SA [redacted] US CBP TFO [redacted] b6 b7C

PAPADOPOULOS was transported from the DULLES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT to the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI), WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (WFO), NORTH VIRGINIA RESIDENT AGENCY (NVRA), located at 9325 Discovery Boulevard, Manassas, Virginia 20109. PAPADOPOULOS was transported in SA [redacted] FBI-issued vehicle. Transport began at approximately 8:09 PM with a beginning mileage of 17757.9. b6 b7C

During the transport to WFO/NVRA, PAPADOPOULOS again made several unsolicited statements to the FBI Agents. PAPADOPOULOS stated that he wished to contact another attorney, [redacted] regarding this matter. PAPADOPOULOS stated that [redacted] was not officially representing him, but PAPADOPOULOS wished to consult with [redacted] about this matter. Agents denied that request but relayed that PAPADOPOULOS would be allowed to contact [redacted] upon arrival and processing at WFO/NVRA, as [redacted] was representing him for this matter. Subsequently, PAPADOPOULOS stated that he didn't understand why he was in the current situation that he was, when both FLYNN and MANAFORT are not. SA [redacted] again reminded PAPADOPOULOS that the Agents could not engage with him in a conversation about the matter, without his attorney being present. b6 b7C

Transport to WFO/NVRA concluded at approximately 8:39 PM with an ending mileage of 17781.5. FBI Agents present during the transport were SA [redacted] SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] b6 b7C

At WFO/NVRA, PAPADOPOULOS was booked and fingerprinted in accordance with standard FBI arrest procedures. Corresponding paperwork for PAPADOPOULOS' arrest is enclosed for the file as digital 1A attachments to this FD-302. The original documents will be maintained as a physical 1A item.

At approximately 8:30 PM, FBI Agents provided PAPADOPOULOS with a food, water, and coffee; while he was waiting to speak with his attorney. PAPADOPOULOS was informed that DOJ/SPECIAL COUNSEL had made contact with his attorney regarding his arrest. At approximately 9:50 PM, PAPADOPOULOS spoke with [redacted] on the telephone. b6 b7C

During processing and booking at WFO/NVRA, PAPADOPOULOS was primarily seated in an interview room by himself. Agents attempted to enable standard audio and video collection equipment for that interview room per FBI policy; however, subsequent attempts to

retrieve the evidence identified that the equipment failed to produce any audio or video evidence during that time period.

At one point while PAPADOPOULOS was waiting in the booking room he expressed concern with the fact that he was just a small fish and yet he was going to look like the fall guy for this investigation. PAPADOPOULOS did not clarify his statements any further and was again reminded of his representation by [redacted] b6 b7C

At approximately 10:40 PM PAPADOPOULOS was provided with coffee and water and PAPADOPOULOS thanked the agents for treating him very well. PAPADOPOULOS made an additional telephone call with [redacted] from a private room, which occurred between approximately 10:46 PM and 10:57 PM. b6 b7C

On July 28, 2017 at approximately 12:58 AM, PAPADOPOULOS was transported from WFO/NVRA to the ALEXANDRIA DETENTION CENTER (ADC), 2001 Mill Road, Alexandria, Virginia 22314, where he was housed for the remainder of the morning. PAPADOPOULOS was transported in SA [redacted] FBI-issued vehicle. Beginning mileage for the transport was 17781.8. FBI Agents and PAPADOPOULOS arrived at the ADC at approximately 1:41 AM. Ending mileage for the transport was 17820.2. Agents present during this transport were SA [redacted] SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] b6 b7C

Upon arrival at the ADC, custody of PAPADOPOULOS was relinquished to ADC personnel. Documentation related to PAPADOPOULOS' processing at the ADC is enclosed for the file as a digital 1A attachment to this FD-302. The original paperwork is being maintained in a physical 1A envelope for the file.

[redacted] b7E



FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 09/28/2017

GEORGE DEMETRIOS PAPADOPOULOS (PAPADOPOULOS), date of birth (DOB) [redacted] Social Security Account Number (SSAN) [redacted] was interviewed at the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI), Chicago Field Office, 2111 West Roosevelt Road 60608. Present during the interview were PAPADOPOULOS' Attorneys [redacted] and [redacted] FBI Special Agent (SA) [redacted] FBI SA [redacted] FBI Intelligence Analyst (IA) [redacted] Special Counsel Attorney AARON ZELINSKY, and Special Counsel Attorney, ANDREW GOLDSTEIN. b6 b7C

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP b6 b7C

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP b6 b7C

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP b6 b7C

Investigation on 08/10/2017 at Chicago, Illinois, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/14/2017

by [redacted] b6 b7C b7E

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

PAPADOPOULOS obtained an interview with the BENJAMIN CARSON (CARSON) campaign and ultimately received a position in that campaign. PAPADOPOULOS was paid

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

In early March of 2016, PAPADOPOULOS had a one-hour telephone interview with CLOVIS for a position in the TRUMP campaign.

PAPADOPOULOS recalled the topic of Russia came up during his phone call with CLOVIS, in the context that CLOVIS had mentioned that Russia would be a very important aspect of the TRUMP campaign.

Towards the end of the call, CLOVIS asked PAPADOPOULOS if he was ready to be publicly brought on to the TRUMP campaign as part of the foreign policy team.

During the approximate dates of March 12, 2016 to March 17, 2016, PAPADOPOULOS took a trip to Rome with several other members of the LCILP. The purpose of that trip was to meet with individuals at the LINK CAMPUS

UNIVERSITY in Rome. [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b6 b7C

It was during that trip that PAPADOPOULOS first met JOSEPH MIFSUD (MIFSUD), [redacted] PAPADOPOULOS confirmed that although MIFSUD worked for the LCILP, this was the first time PAPADOPOULOS had met him.

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

MIFSUD told PAPADOPOULOS he was a former diplomat with access to European leaders. MIFSUD offered to help introduce PAPADOPOULOS to the right people through his contacts. [redacted]

PAPADOPOULOS met with MIFSUD again in London, [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP During that meeting, MIFSUD was accompanied by a Russian female named OLGA POLONSKAYA (POLONSKAYA), [redacted] MIFSUD introduced her as being a former student of his, who had connections to Russian president VLADIMIR PUTIN (PUTIN). During their meeting, POLONSKAYA offered to help PAPADOPOULOS establish contacts in Russia and relayed that the Russian Ambassador in London was a friend of hers. [redacted]

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6 b7C

On or about March 30, 2016, PAPADOPOULOS traveled to Washington, DC to attend a foreign policy meeting with the TRUMP campaign. The meeting was held on March 31, 2016 at the TRUMP hotel in Washington, DC. Both TRUMP and JEFF SESSIONS (SESSIONS) were at the meeting, which was the first time PAPADOPOULOS had met either TRUMP or SESSIONS in person. [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

The March 31, 2016 meeting began with each person at the table providing a brief description of their background and what they brought to the table for the foreign policy team. PAPADOPOULOS spoke about his previous work in the Mediterranean energy sector and brought up a potential meeting with the Russians. [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

In response to PAPADOPOULOS' proposal for meeting with the Russians, TRUMP stated he was interested [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP [redacted] SESSIONS stated he was also interested and relayed his support to move forward with the idea. It was PAPADOPOULOS' overall impression that

TRUMP was supportive of the idea and SESSIONS was even more supportive than TRUMP. b5 Per DOJ/OIP PAPADOPOULOS was never reprimanded for proposing a meeting with the Russians, therefore he began organizing a foreign policy trip to Russia.

Later in the campaign, MIFSUD introduced PAPADOPOULOS to a member of the RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL (RIAC), named IVAN TIMOFEEV (TIMOFEEV). PAPADOPOULOS b5 Per DOJ/OIP The second call seemed strange to PAPADOPOULOS, in that there was static noise on the call and it seemed as if TIMOFEEV was being supervised or that the call was being monitored in some capacity.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

The Agents then asked PAPADOPOULOS who he told about the Russians having dirt on CLINTON. PAPADOPOULOS stated to the best of his recollection, he did not tell anyone that information. b5 Per DOJ/OIP PAPADOPOULOS stated he did not recall telling anyone on the campaign.

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 10/04/2017

GEORGE DEMETRIOS PAPADOPOULOS (PAPADOPOULOS), date of birth (DOB) [redacted] Social Security Account Number (SSAN) [redacted] was interviewed at the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI), Chicago Field Office, 2111 West Roosevelt Road 60608. Present during the interview were PAPADOPOULOS' Attorneys [redacted] and [redacted] FBI Special Agent (SA) [redacted] FBI SA [redacted] FBI Intelligence Analyst (IA) [redacted] Special Counsel Attorney AARON ZELINSKY, and Special Counsel Attorney, ANDREW GOLDSTEIN. b6 b7C

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP b6 b7C

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP b6 b7C

**INFORMATION FROM JOSEPH MIFSUD**

Investigation on 08/11/2017 at Chicago, Illinois, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/18/2017

by [redacted]

b3 b6 b7C b7E

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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They discussed MIFSUD's European and Russian contacts and the two had a general discussion about Russia.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

PAPADOPOULOS met with MIFSUD sometime after his initial meeting with MIFSUD in March of 2016. During the subsequent meeting, MIFSUD introduced PAPADOPOULOS to OLGA POLONSKAYA (POLONSKAYA)

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

**FOREIGN POLICY MEETING**

the March 31, 2016 meeting b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

PAPADOPOULOS brought up the proposal of meeting with the Russians, b5 Per DOJ/OIP

PAPADOPOULOS' ultimate takeaway from the meeting was that TRUMP was supportive of his idea and that SESSIONS was more supportive than TRUMP.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted] PAPADOPOULOS stated to the best of his recollection he remembered CLOVIS being upset after PAPADOPOULOS said, "Sam, I think they have her emails." PAPADOPOULOS then reiterated he was not certain if that event actually happened or if he was wrongfully remembering an event which did not occur.

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

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

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 11/07/2017

GEORGE DIMITRIOS PAPADOPOULOS, date of birth [redacted] Social Security Account Number (SSAN) [redacted] was interviewed at the BREEN & PUGH law office, 53 West Jackson Street, Suite 1215, Chicago, Illinois 60604. Present during the interview were PAPADOPOULOS' Attorneys [redacted] and [redacted] FBI Special Agent (SA) [redacted] FBI Intelligence Analyst (IA) [redacted] Special Counsel Attorney AARON ZELINSKY, and Special Counsel Attorney ANDREW GOLDSTEIN.

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[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Investigation on 09/19/2017 at Chicago, Illinois, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/21/2017

by [redacted]

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[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

April 12, 2016

After reviewing the timeline, PAPADOPOULOS remembered meeting with MIFSUD at the ANDAZ HOTEL in London on this date. [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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PAPADOPOULOS was advised he had a Skype conversation with TIMOFEEV

PAPADOPOULOS remembered hearing static noise on the call and it seemed as if TIMOFEEV may have been recording the call. PAPADOPOULOS thought TIMOFEEV was acting overly official during the call.

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[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

May 23, 2016 to May 26, 2016

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

When specifically asked, PAPADOPOULOS confirmed he told KOTSIAS what [redacted] about the Russians having emails related to CLINTON. [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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July 12, 2016

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] the TRANSATLANTIC GROUP (TAG) meeting he attended in July 2016. [redacted]

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

PAPADOPOULOS recalled discussing foreign policy trips with CLOVIS and PHARES during this event. [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP b6 b7C

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[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP b6 b7C

PAPADOPOULOS' notebook / hand-written notes

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] PAPADOPOULOS then stated he could not read his own handwriting and, therefore he could not assist the interviewers with further identifying what his notes referenced.

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP b6 b7C

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP



**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 11/02/2017

Immediately following the court hearing for GEORGE D. PAPADOPOULOS on October 5, 2017, PAPADOPOULOS's attorney, [redacted] requested a business card from SA [redacted] so he could provide it to PAPADOPOULOS. [redacted] told SA [redacted] that PAPADOPOULOS would be contacting SA [redacted] directly regarding an issue he had been having with his email account. Later that afternoon, SA [redacted] received a missed telephone call and a corresponding voicemail from PAPADOPOULOS. In the voicemail, PAPADOPOULOS stated [redacted] without his authorization and requested a return call from SA [redacted] PAPADOPOULOS called from telephone number [redacted]

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On October 6, 2017 at approximately 1:00 PM, SA [redacted] attempted to return PAPADOPOULOS's phone call and spoke with PAPADOPOULOS. While PAPADOPOULOS was in Washington, D.C., he was unable to access his [redacted] Given PAPADOPOULOS was in Washington D.C. when the activity took place, PAPADOPOULOS viewed it as strange and wanted to report it to the FBI.

b6
b7C

PAPADOPOULOS was encouraged to take general cyber precautions such as changing his password and ensuring the account settings had not been modified to forward new incoming mail to another account. PAPADOPOULOS confirmed he would take those actions. PAPADOPOULOS further advised his [redacted] had been in contact with SA [redacted] in Chicago regarding [redacted]

b6
b7C

On October 28, 2017 at approximately 2:00 PM, SA [redacted] placed a telephone call to PAPADOPOULOS and inquired as to whether or not the media had attempted to contact him. PAPADOPOULOS stated they had not and advised he was maintaining strict confidentiality with regards to this matter. SA [redacted] then inquired as to whether anyone from the TRUMP CAMPAIGN had attempted to contact him and he stated they had not. PAPADOPOULOS agreed

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Investigation on 10/31/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/01/2017

by [redacted]

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to keep the FBI and the Special Counsel aware of any future attempts to contact him by either of the two.

On October 31, 2017 at approximately 12:45 PM, SA [redacted] placed a phone call to PAPADOPOULOS. PAPADOPOULOS subsequently returned SA [redacted] call and advised several news media organizations were parked outside of his residence and were attempting to contact him through social media applications. PAPADOPOULOS did not respond to those requests and he believed the media did not have his current telephone number. PAPADOPOULOS stated he was not staying at his residence but did not provide any further details about his location during this call.

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Enclosed for the file as digital 1A attachments are three photographs of screenshots which depict call details for the telephone calls listed above.

[redacted] b7E

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)





**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 11/14/2017

On November 7, 2017 at approximately 5:50 PM Eastern Time, Special Agent (SA) [redacted] placed a telephone call to GEORGE D. PAPADOPOULOS, date of birth (DOB) [redacted] social security account number (SSAN) [redacted] The phone call was made to telephone number [redacted] PAPADOPOULOS was advised the nature of the call was to speak with him about recent media reports which mentioned persons of interest in this investigation. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, PAPADOPOULOS provided the following information: b6 b7C

PAPADOPOULOS advised he had recently sent SA [redacted] several text messages in an attempt to provide further information. He sent those messages to a phone number previously used by SA [redacted] PAPADOPOULOS was advised his messages were not received and that PAPADOPOULOS may have unknowingly sent them to a phone number associated with a land line. b6 b7C

PAPADOPOULOS' text messages were in attempt to again voice his concerns about an individual named, [redacted] DONALD J. TRUMP at DEUTSCHE BANK. PAPADOPOULOS was introduced to [redacted] by an individual named, [redacted] who in turn had introduced PAPADOPOULOS to RICK DEARBORN and ANTHONY SCARAMUCCI. PAPADOPOULOS viewed [redacted] as being overly interested in him during his introduction to SCARAMUCCI. b6 b7C

**RECENT NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE**

Since the unsealing of his plea agreement, PAPADOPOULOS has seen a large amount of media coverage reporting that JEFF SESSIONS had shut down his idea of arranging for a meeting between TRUMP and VLADIMIR PUTIN. PAPADOPOULOS conveyed he would stick to his original story about the whole incident because he believed SESSIONS was supportive of his proposal. PAPADOPOULOS remembered handing SESSIONS a business card after the meeting and stated he wouldn't have done so if SESSIONS had told him to stand down. PAPADOPOULOS further relayed he was a newcomer on the campaign when he proposed the idea and he wouldn't have continued his attempts to arrange for a such meeting if he was told to stand down by a senior leadership figure in the campaign.

Investigation on 11/07/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/08/2017

by [redacted]

b6 b7C b7E

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PAPADOPOULOS also saw recent news reports where STEVE BANNON was quoted as having never met with PAPADOPOULOS. PAPADOPOULOS confirmed he had in fact met BANNON and exchanged phone calls with him. PAPADOPOULOS remembered specifically coordinating with BANNON when he was arranging the meeting between TRUMP and Egyptian president, ABDEL FATTAH EL-SISI. PAPADOPOULOS saw similar news reports where MICHAEL GLASSNER was quoted saying similar things to what BANNON said.

PAPADOPOULOS advised many media outlets had also recently attempted to contact him directly and have requested statements about PAPADOPOULOS' plea agreement and the unsealing of his court documents. PAPADOPOULOS has not provided any statements to the media; however, he stated his willingness to do so in a coordinated fashion if it suited both the Special Counsel's Office and the FBI.

**CARTER PAGE**

PAPADOPOULOS was aware of CARTER PAGE's recent testimony to the U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES on November 2, 2017. PAPADOPOULOS only read approximately 5% of the transcript that was produced for PAGE's testimony, but stated his intentions to read the remainder in the future.

PAPADOPOULOS remembered having one Skype call with CARTER PAGE. During that call, PAGE told PAPADOPOULOS to "stop showing off." PAPADOPOULOS did not remember exactly why PAGE had told that, but surmised it was likely a result of PAPADOPOULOS' efforts to coordinate with the Russians in late March 2016. PAPADOPOULOS remembered having a bad impression when the call ended and he felt as if PAGE may have been perturbed or jealous of him in some way. PAPADOPOULOS described the call as being pretentious and unfriendly. PAPADOPOULOS thought PAGE may have viewed him as a competitor because he was attempting to arrange a meeting with the Russians.

After the Skype call with PAGE, PAPADOPOULOS tried to stay away from him. PAPADOPOULOS remembered seeing PAGE at another campaign event, at the CAPITOL HILL CLUB. PAPADOPOULOS remembered PAGE had engaged in a lengthy conversation with KEITH KELLOGG at that event. PAPADOPOULOS was also aware of PAGE having attended another campaign event, which was a social gathering at KELLOGG's house. PAPADOPOULOS did not attend that event, but recalled it was either a pool party or a barbeque at KELLOGG's home.

PAPADOPOULOS further recalled PAGE had attended a social event for the campaign, which was held at KELLOGG's house. PAPADOPOULOS remembered the event was either a pool party or a barbeque.

PAPADOPOULOS agreed to search through his Skype messages and his email messages in attempt to find further information about PAGE.

[redacted] b7E



General Record

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 08/03/2017

On July 28, 2017, Special Agent (SA) [redacted] SA [redacted] [redacted] and SA [redacted] met with GEORGE D. PAPADOPOULOS (PAPADOPOULOS) subsequent to his release from the US MARSHALL SERVICE at the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTHOUSE, 401 Courthouse Square, Alexandria, Virginia 22314. b6 b7C

PAPADOPOULOS was allowed to use SA [redacted] FBI-issued Samsung to place a phone call to his attorney, [redacted] in Chicago. That phone call lasted several minutes and PAPADOPOULOS removed himself from the Agents location during the call. b6 b7C

The Agents returned multiple belongings to PAPADOPOULOS which were seized from him at the time of his arrest on the previous day. PAPADOPOULOS signed two Receipt for Property Forms [FD-597] for the return of his belongings. A copy of the forms executed by PAPADOPOULOS are enclosed for the file as a digital 1A attachment to this FD-302. The original forms are being maintained for the file as a physical 1A item. PAPADOPOULOS was advised that the remainder of his belongings, including his cell phone and his two passports, would remaining in the FBI's possession for the time being.

During the course of standard booking and processing procedures on the previous day, PAPADOPOULOS relayed to the Agents that he had lost his wallet and his driver's license a while ago and never obtained a new form of State identification. Given that PAPADOPOULOS had no form of official identification, the Agents offered to assist PAPADOPOULOS with travel arrangements for his return to Chicago, Illinois. The Agents advised PAPADOPOULOS that he was no longer in custody and that he was free to make his own arrangements if he wanted.

PAPADOPOULOS stated that his intention was to return to Chicago via airline. The Agents then offered to meet PAPADOPOULOS at the airport, or provide transportation for him. PAPADOPOULOS requested to be driven by the Agents to the airport. PAPADOPOULOS was then driven directly from the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTHOUSE in Alexandria to WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT [DCA] in Arlington, Virginia.

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Investigation on 07/28/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 07/31/2017 b3 b6 b7C b7E

by [redacted]

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b3
b7E

Upon arrival at airport, the Agents assisted PAPADOPOULOS with his purchase of a United Airlines ticket from Washington, DC to Chicago, Illinois. That purchase was made online, through the use of SA [redacted] FBI-issued Samsung device. PAPADOPOULOS then requested that the Agents contact [redacted] to meet him upon his arrival in Chicago. SA [redacted] then placed a phone call to SA [redacted] in Chicago who contacted and relayed PAPADOPOULOS' flight information to [redacted]

b6
b7C

The Agents then afforded PAPADOPOULOS with temporary access to his US Passport in order to facilitate his entry through airport security. Agents then met with PAPADOPOULOS in the secure area of the terminal and recovered his US Passport. Agents then provided PAPADOPOULOS with his attorney's telephone number and a granola bar for his travel back to Chicago. Additionally, PAPADOPOULOS was provided with SA [redacted] business card in the event he was questioned by airport security or additional authorities without any form of State identification.

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[redacted]

b7E

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)





**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 11/01/2017

On October 30, 2017 the FBI received a copy of an email communication sent from SERGIO MILLIAN to GEORGE D. PAPADOPOULOS. The email was provided to the Special Counsel's Office though PAPADOPOULOS's attorney, [redacted] [redacted] In the email, MILLIAN stated the following: b6 b7C

*Hello George,*

*I'm not sure if you have any access to this email but I wanted to write to you to say that I read sad news today about your current ordeal. I watched documentaries about McCarthy committee and about people who lost their jobs, careers and reputations and even jailed over Senator's investigations. You did not even go to Russia and they brought you into this terrible trial. I'm so sorry to hear about this. It's simply unbelievable what is happening nowadays.*

*Many innocent people were persecuted and, the good news, later rehabilitated after the politically motivated wave of persecutions vanished. I'm sure the American people and history will correct the unfair treatment you received.*

*People who know you know who you really are: a good, innocent, decent American who wanted nothing but the best for the USA.*

*Best regards,*
*Sergei*

A copy of the aforementioned email is enclosed for the file as a digital 1A attachment to this FD-302.

Investigation on 10/30/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Email)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/01/2017

by [redacted]

b3 b6 b7C b7E

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[redacted]

b7E

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)





**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 01/29/2019

Stephen K. BANNON was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at Patriots Plaza I, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC. Bannon was accompanied by his attorneys [redacted] Present for the interview were Special Agents (SA) [redacted] Intelligence Analyst (IA) [redacted] Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles, Senior Assistant Special Counsels Jeannie Rhee and Andrew Goldstein, Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky. During the second half of the interview, Senior Assistant Special Counsel Zainab Ahmad and Staff Operations Specialist (SOS) [redacted] were present. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, BANNON provided the following information:

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b7C

Roger STONE had told BANNON, by phone and other methods, that he had a relationship with Julian ASSANGE. STONE had been bragging about his relationship with ASSANGE on Twitter, during interviews, etc. The conversation where STONE told BANNON he had a relationship with ASSANGE was about other things and STONE had brought up his relationship with ASSANGE. This was prior to BANNON joining the Trump Campaign. STONE was kind of a "braggart" and the conversation might have been around a time when STONE came on Breitbart Radio. STONE described the nature of his relationship with ASSANGE in a way that STONE knew him or had a personal relationship. It was implied that STONE knew ASSANGE and knew what ASSANGE was doing. BANNON was sure that some part of that conversation with STONE was about [redacted] ASSANGE was an internationally known figure at the time. STONE was known to brag about who he knew, such as Trump or other people. BANNON did not have a recollection of STONE telling him that STONE knew what ASSANGE had. [redacted]

b6
b7C

On 10/4/2016 ASSANGE was supposed to have a press conference which didn't happen and was a non-event. BANNON didn't remember if STONE told him that ASSANGE had damaging information on Hillary CLINTON coming out prior to ASSANGE's press conference.

BANNON's relationship with STONE prior to 8/13/2016 was one where STONE would brag to BANNON while he was at Breitbart. STONE was known as the "Trump whisperer". [redacted]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 10/26/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted]SM-2284941, [redacted] Date drafted 10/29/2018

by [redacted]

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[redacted] b6 b7C STONE was going around to everyone saying ASSANGE was going to have fantastic stuff and nothing happened at the press conference. STONE potentially had "inside baseball" information since he knew ASSANGE. STONE didn't say he had any connections to the Russians, just ASSANGE and WikiLeaks. STONE said WikiLeaks "have stuff" but he was never specific. STONE gave a heads up on the ASSANGE press conference, but STONE was a "bullshit artist" so BANNON was very cautious about it. STONE never gave BANNON, or anybody else, a heads up about the content of the press conference causing BANNON to ask "how dialed up could the guy be?" BANNON thought the ASSANGE press conference was a "nothing burger". BANNON was not paying STONE any attention. BANNON was trying to keep STONE happy or else STONE would "blow him up". STONE didn't know the details of ASSANGE's press conference, and went around saying this was going to be it, then it turned out to be nothing.

As far as what WikiLeaks had, the implication from STONE was that it would be good for Donald TRUMP. The implication that it would be stuff damaging or embarrassing to the CLINTON camp. BANNON wondered how tey could verify the authenticity. If it was somehow linked to the 33,000 missing emails, that would be the "money shot". BANNON thought the white whale was the 33,000 missing emails from CLINTON. BANNON spent the spring of 2016 trying to find them. BANNON thought the 33,000 missing emails were the Holy Grail, but even if they found them, there was no way to verify that they were real. STONE's contact with BANNON typically regarded [redacted] STONE bragging. STONE never talked about the 33,000 missing emails. [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

The weekend after the 10/7/2016 WikiLeaks release somebody was trying to take credit for the timing of the release of the Podesta emails after the "Billy Bush thing". BANNON described the events surrounding 10/7/2016 as the sum and substance of the campaign. BANNON could not remember who it was, but someone on the campaign was relaying that someone who was not on the campaign was trying to take credit for the timing of the WikiLeaks releases and getting ASSANGE to release the information. [redacted] BANNON speculated it could have been [redacted] b6 b7C The person trying to take credit for the timing of the WikiLeaks releases was likely STONE. STONE was the only person, to BANNON's knowledge, who was claiming to have a relationship with ASSANGE and WikiLeaks.

BANNON was shown an email dated 10/04/2016, Bates stamped SB_00068079. When BANNON wrote "What as that this morning???" and "He didn't cut deal

b7E

w/ Clintons???" he was referring to ASSANGE. [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

BANNON didn't have a professional relationship with [redacted] during the summer of 2016. BANNON could barely remember [redacted] during his time on the Trump Campaign during the fall of 2016. [redacted] was a volunteer and he could remember seeing her coming in and out of the "war room". BANNON described [redacted] as "another person walking around". [redacted] was working on [redacted] [redacted] was not a senior level person and she would help to put people in touch with BANNON. [redacted] BANNON couldn't remember any instances that occurred during the campaign time frame. During the campaign, BANNON knew [redacted] through BOSSIE and [redacted]. BANNON described [redacted] BANNON couldn't remember ever talking with [redacted]. BANNON couldn't remember [redacted] BANNON couldn't remember ever talking with [redacted], but he wouldn't be surprised if he did.

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6 b7A b7C

On 10/7/2016 [redacted] might have been on the 14th floor at Trump Tower, but BANNON didn't specifically remember seeing her there. BANNON could remember a lot of women associated with the Trump Campaign being there, such as Kellyanne CONWAY and Hope HICKS, and [redacted] might have been one of those. BANNON had be preparing to shoot a film with candidate TRUMP that would be posted on Facebook. The plan was to have the movie posted by 7 p.m., but it ended up being done at 12:00 a.m. BANNON wouldn't be surprised if he got a text from [redacted] saying "well done", since he thought the film was well done.

b6 b7C

[redacted] STONE would pester BANNON. STONE talked about what he was trying to do in order to be put in touch with donors. BANNON was giving the impression that he would, but didn't remember ever doing it. STONE had contacted BANNON in order to be put in touch with the [redacted] BANNON thought he put STONE in touch with the [redacted] lawyers. STONE might have sent some spots to BANNON regarding the information he was putting out, or sent him some online videos, but BANNON doesn't recall looking at them.

b6 b7C

BANNON was shown a text dated 8/27/2016, from BANNON to STONE. BANNON didn't remember this text message. BANNON never heard of the [redacted] plan referenced in the text and BANNON didn't remember a [redacted] project. BANNON was aware of a plan [redacted] not involved in this plan, but BANNON was upset that STONE was taking credit for it. [redacted] came to BANNON 10-14 days after BANNON took over the Trump Campaign. There were ideas on how to do this, and to get Fox News and Sean HANNITY to do it, but Fox News and HANNITY waived off. The film was to be done on "Billy Bush day" with it going to the news shows that weekend. STONE tried to take credit for the effort which BANNON thought was lunacy and "B.S." [redacted] Breitbart did not follow up on it. b6 b7C

BANNON was shown an email dated [redacted] b6 b7C

BANNON was shown an email dated [redacted] b3 b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] BANNON barely knew [redacted] at the time of this email. BANNON talked with [redacted] about meeting with the Special Counsel's Office (SCO). [redacted] BANNON was aware that [redacted] but wasn't aware of the content [redacted] The only thing [redacted] told BANNON [redacted]

BANNON described Jerome CORSI as a Harvard guy who works at World Net Daily. BANNON thought CORSI was [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] BANNON called CORSI and said [redacted] because now [redacted]

[redacted] During the campaign, BANNON didn't remember talking to CORSI although CORSI may have reached out. b6 b7C

BANNON was shown an email dated [redacted] b3 b6 b7C BANNON didn't recall any conversations about [redacted] At the time, BANNON was unaware of Ted MALLOCH's relationship to [redacted] Before the election win, BANNON didn't know MALLOCH or hear about him. BANNON thought that [redacted] were all "wing-nut promoters". BANNON did have contact with MALLOCH once BANNON was in the White House. BANNON didn't know if MALLOCH had a relationship with [redacted]

In 2010, BANNON came up with BOSSIE to talk to TRUMP about possibly running for president. The meeting lasted approximately two hours on the 26th floor of Trump Tower. Michael COHEN was there. At the end of the meeting TRUMP asked BANNON what he thought about STONE. BANNON said he didn't know STONE very well but thought [redacted] b6 b7C TRUMP asked if STONE was connected. BANNON replied that STONE is [redacted] While BANNON was at Breitbart in 2013-2015, BANNON had a strong relationship with [redacted] BANNON heard from [redacted] STONE was still talking to TRUMP and was an advisor. STONE subsequently made those statements to BANNON as well. BANNON was suspect and upset. BANNON believed you had to keep TRUMP "on program". While BANNON was on the Trump Campaign he never heard any mention of STONE from TRUMP or anyone else on the campaign. Corey LEWANDOWSKI had said that STONE was not part of the Trump Campaign. After the win, STONE tried a full court press in order to get a meeting with TRUMP. [redacted] eventually set up a meeting with TRUMP and STONE in early December 2016 on the 26th floor of Trump Tower. TRUMP didn't want to take the meeting with STONE. TRUMP told BANNON to be in the meeting and that after 5 minutes, if the meeting hadn't concluded, to throw STONE out. STONE came in with a book he wrote and possibly had a folder and notes. [redacted] TRUMP didn't say much to STONE beyond "Thanks, thanks a lot". To BANNON, this reinforced STONE [redacted] After five to six minutes, the meeting was over and STONE was out. STONE was [redacted] due to the fact that during the meeting TRUMP just stared. This reinforced what BANNON thought about STONE, that STONE was a [redacted] BANNON never heard TRUMP talk about STONE. The 2010 conversation with TRUMP about STONE was the only time, to the best of BANNON's recollection. BANNON never heard that STONE was talking to candidate TRUMP while BANNON was on the campaign. BANNON never asked then candidate TRUMP if he talked with STONE. Candidate TRUMP could have talked to STONE, without BANNON knowing about it, and he had the opportunity to do so. BANNON was not aware of who TRUMP talked to in

the evenings and they could have had a phone call. BANNON was not aware of who TRUMP was talking to in the evening, but he was definitely talking to people. BANNON did not have visibility into that. TRUMP was not shy about throwing names out of people he had talked to, and he never said STONE.

[redacted] that BANNON fired at Breitbart. [redacted] who was doing research on Barack OBAMA's time at Harvard. At ANDREW BREITBART's funeral, [redacted] was saying how he had a solution to OBAMA's birth certificate. BANNON was not interested in OBAMA's birth certificate and was interested in how the Harvard research was going. While [redacted] he was calling BANNON saying he heard from kids at a madrassa that OBAMA was a Muslim. At that point, in April 2012, BANNON fired [redacted] BANNON didn't want a story out saying that Breitbart was asking kids at a madrassa about OBAMA being a Muslim. Breitbart was not interested in OBAMA's birth certificate, only the research about OBAMA's time at Harvard from the files at NYU. BANNON's contact with [redacted] was only occasional texts and emails from [redacted] to BANNON in which BANNON did not respond. b6 b7C

BANNON was shown an email dated [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

BANNON was shown an email dated [redacted] subject: [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

During the transition timeframe, [redacted] reached out and sent emails to BANNON offering help, for example saying he knew the Polish Prime Minister. BANNON didn't remember any outreach from [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

BANNON knew [redacted] and described him as a [redacted] BANNON was not aware of [redacted] but he wouldn't be surprised if he did. [redacted] was into stuff like that. [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b6 b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b6 b7C

BANNON was shown an email dated [redacted] When BANNON wrote "Love it" in the email, he was saying he thought it was fantastic, epic, and that he wasn't going to get back to you. There would be no follow on. BANNON described it as a "quasi blow-off". [redacted] b6 b7A b7C When BANNON wrote "Love it" he was not approving it, or else he would say he was approving it. It also did not indicate that he was going to do something. At that time, in June 2016, BANNON was going to go over to cover Brexit for Breitbart. BANNON had spent a lot of time and effort trying the find CLINTON's 33,000 missing emails. At the time, BANNON did not think that was dangerous as he was part of a media company. In 2017, [redacted] was totally blown out of proportion to the point where it was purported that [redacted] was TRUMP's [redacted] BANNON believed this story metastasized into something that was totally misconstrued and it made a tacit connection to the Trump Campaign. When BANNON wrote "Love it", he was not saying not to do it. In June 2016, there wasn't any reason why doing it would be wrong. In his role at a media company it was a good idea.

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b6 b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b6 b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

The "FLYNN thing" caught them by surprise and

It concerned BANNON since he had dealings with foreign governments. Back then talking with a foreign government was ok. The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) was a part of the indictment. BANNON was concerned he would be investigated for dealing with foreign governments even though he did nothing wrong. The Special Counsel's Office had an "open writ" and was a fishing expedition.

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

BANNON was shown an email dated 11/05/2016, from BANNON to Jared KUSHNER and BOSSIE, subject: Re: Securing the Victory. After BANNON came onto the Trump Campaign he didn't interact with Paul MANAFORT. BANNON didn't know who MANAFORT was talking to on the campaign after his departure. At one time BANNON heard that candidate TRUMP was still meeting with MANAFORT and taking his calls. BANNON thought he might have heard this from BOSSIE, [redacted] or Reince PRIEBUS. BANNON was unaware of the content of the calls, and assumed that they were campaign related. BANNON didn't hear candidate TRUMP talk about MANAFORT. On 8/13/2016 to 8/14/2016 BANNON didn't want MANAFORT fired, just kept on with no power or authority. After the New York Times article came out about MANAFORT, BANNON knew MANAFORT was done. BANNON told TRUMP and KUSHNER that no one should have contact with MANAFORT, [redacted] BANNON never talked with MANAFORT during the transition timeframe. BANNON "picked up in the ether" that the Russians were working with WikiLeaks. BANNON was 100% convinced they would win the election. BANNON had no knowledge of MANAFORT providing advice to KUSHNER. KUSHNER was the one who fired MANAFORT. After MANAFORT was fired, BANNON was unaware of any meetings between KUSHNER and MANAFORT. The last BANNON had spoken with MANAFORT was around 8/14/2016 to 8/15/2016. MANAFORT sent BANNON an email around the debates, and a congratulatory email after the win. There was no other conversation surrounding this email. When BANNON came onto the Trump Campaign, they were in a "free fall" and were down 20 points. BANNON had gone up to visit MANAFORT [redacted] in Trump Tower. The New York Times story had come out that associated MANAFORT with Russia, since the story was about MANAFORT taking money from Ukraine/Russia and that MANAFORT was [redacted] BANNON thought MANAFORT was [redacted] and could see it in the operations. BANNON did not associate WikiLeaks with Russia but believed that it was a narrative that was derived from media stories. BANNON did not discuss the topics of this email with anyone else in the campaign, besides this email itself. There were no discussions on the Trump Campaign during this timeframe on whether WikiLeaks was working with the Russians. BANNON believed that this was "noise" and he was more worried about the fact that they were 6 to 7 points down. BANNON couldn't remember if there were any conversations from when he joined the Trump Campaign in August 2016 to Election Day on whether Russia and WikiLeaks were working together. BANNON couldn't remember, but he wouldn't be surprised if those conversations may have occurred. GIULIANI, FLYNN, or Chris CHRISTIE might have talked about it, and that it was in the "realm of possibility". BANNON had no recollection on preparing for answers to debate questions that the Russians had hacked a political opponent.

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

BANNON didn't remember meeting with Erik PRINCE during early January 2017. BANNON did remember PRINCE coming in three to four times during the

transition timeframe. BANNON has no memory of discussing George NADER with PRINCE. BANNON met NADER months later. BANNON didn't remember PRINCE telling him that he would be travelling to the Seychelles prior to his trip. PRINCE did not tell BANNON that he would be meeting with a Russian individual in the Seychelles. PRINCE didn't tell BANNON about Kirill DMITRIEV prior to PRINCE meeting DMITRIEV in the Seychelles. PRINCE didn't talk with BANNON about an individual associated with the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) prior to PRINCE travelling to the Seychelles. PRINCE didn't tell BANNON about a Vladimir PUTIN associated individual that he would be meeting with prior to PRINCE's trip to the Seychelles. PRINCE didn't show the CV of a Russian individual to BANNON prior to his trip to the Seychelles. It is possible that BANNON talked with PRINCE about sanctions on Russia, but he wasn't sure about it. BANNON didn't remember any contact with PRINCE on 1/11/2017. PRINCE didn't tell BANNON that he was in the Seychelles and that he was meeting with a Russian individual. BANNON did not talk to PRINCE about the Russian aircraft carrier Kuznetsov docking at a port in Libya while PRINCE was in the Seychelles. BANNON did talk with PRINCE about Libya. PRINCE had advocated for working with the "good guys" in Libya, in November/December 2016, after they won the election. PRINCE never talked about working with the Russians, just the UAE. BANNON didn't recall meeting with PRINCE on 1/16 /2017. PRINCE never told BANNON he met with a Russian government official. PRINCE never told BANNON he met with an individual from the RDIF. PRINCE never told BANNON he met with a representative of PUTIN. PRINCE never gave a business card of an individual associated with Russia to BANNON. BANNON didn't say anything to PRINCE about following up with the Russians. BANNON didn't say anything to PRINCE about setting up another line of communication with Russia that he remembers.

BANNON was shown a text dated 9/8/2016, Bates stamped SB_00068078. This conversation with PRINCE was not regarding PUTIN. The text from PRINCE was in regards to debate prep. BANNON heard PRINCE say the phrase in this text a bunch of times. BANNON used the phrase as well. BANNON believed this was a concept on the campaign.

BANNON reiterated again that PRINCE never gave BANNON a business card from a Russian who wanted to meet with the President and he didn't remember that happening. BANNON again said PRINCE never told him he met with a Russian associated with the RDIF and didn't remember that happening. PRINCE did say he met with Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nahyan (MBZ) of the UAE, but not in the Seychelles. PRINCE had said he met with MBZ to discuss PRINCE's Afghanistan concept, and talked with him about his ideas on the Arab League and Libya. PRINCE told BANNON he met with MBZ after the meeting happened, not before. BANNON passed these things onto FLYNN. PRINCE was a business guy and BANNON didn't know that PRINCE had a relationship with MBZ. BANNON met MBZ in December of 2016. PRINCE travelling to the Seychelles wouldn't have stood out to BANNON. If PRINCE had told BANNON he had a meeting with Russians and given BANNON a business card from the Russians, BANNON would have remembered it. PUTIN had called TRUMP the first morning after TRUMP took office and therefore you wouldn't

need a back-channel or "other guys running around". In January 2017 there were stories in the press that Russia was trying to help TRUMP win. BANNON believed that TRUMP had to see the documents that OBAMA had seen which convinced him to throw the 29 Russian diplomats out of the country. On 1/4/2017 BANNON was consumed with the upcoming intelligence briefing they had on 1/6/2017. PRINCE meeting with Russians would have stood out to BANNON. Receiving a business card from a Russian, through PRINCE, would have stood out to BANNON. BANNON believed that guys shouldn't run around freelancing in a meeting such as that. PUTIN and TRUMP had called each other one to two times, so why would they need a back-channel. BANNON would have had an issue with PRINCE meeting with a Russian.

BANNON did read PRINCE's testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). BANNON discussed it with PRINCE because he thought it was wrong for PRINCE to not hire a lawyer or prepare for his testimony. PRINCE believed that it was a political witch hunt, he would tell them what happened, and he didn't need a lawyer. PRINCE considered his testimony before HPSCI a "chat". BANNON never asked PRINCE if his testimony was truthful.

BANNON is in touch with PRINCE frequently. [redacted] BANNON and PRINCE never discussed the DMITRIEV meeting in the Seychelles. b3

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

In regards to the texts with PRINCE on BANNON's blackberry, BANNON didn't know what was kept or not kept. In regards to archiving his messages, BANNON didn't do anything different in regards to his texts with PRINCE and just gave his phone to his secretary. BANNON did use his personal email for White House business. BANNON did not make any attempts to preserve the White House record information from his personal accounts.

BANNON met Bob FORESMAN through Mark BURNETT. BANNON thought FORESMAN might have been [redacted] BURNETT said he had a guy who was trying to save Christians in the Middle East and Russia. FORESMAN knew people in Russia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. BANNON rolled him over to FLYNN. There was zero talk about giving FORESMAN a position in the administration during the meeting with BANNON. To BANNON, FORESMAN didn't seem [redacted] b6 b7C

BANNON's "phone guy" is located in Los Angeles. BANNON has known him for 15 years, but didn't remember his name. BANNON met him during his time in L.A. One of BANNON's secretaries is in L.A. BANNON's "phone guy" is the one who sets up his devices.

b5 per DOJ/OIP

When the Special Counsel was setup there was talk about conflicts of interest right away. [redacted] b6 b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP [redacted] b6 b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP [redacted] BANNON thought all of the stated conflicts were ridiculous, [redacted] TRUMP did not respond when BANNON pushed back on the stated conflicts of interest. [redacted] the issue about [redacted] having [redacted] as an attorney was not a conflict in the legal community. [redacted] they had invited MUELLER in to give TRUMP a perspective on what the FBI was and thought they might beseech him to take the job as FBI Director. MUELLER did not come in looking for the job as FBI Director. [redacted] The purpose of the meeting was to give TRUMP a perspective on the institution of the FBI [redacted] BANNON told TRUMP why he thought all these conflicts were ridiculous. b6 b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP [redacted] BANNON

b5 per DOJ/OIP

explained it as it was not go get rid of MUELLER,

BANNON told TRUMP he didn't think that these were conflicts.

BANNON told TRUMP that that's ridiculous and petty.

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MCGAHN and PRIEBUS pushed back on the conflicts of interest TRUMP raised.

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

BANNON never talked to TRUMP or KUSHNER about injecting money into the campaign. Jeff DEWIT, PARSCALE, KUSHNER, and BANNON were going through the cash flow. They realized that they were going to need $15 million dollars. They would need to generate more money or the candidate would have to write a check. KUSHNER said, as far as the candidate writing a check, that was not going to happen. KUSHNER said he was not a guy who while six to eight points down, was going to write $25 million dollar checks. They were not even in the hunt. Coming out of the last debate, they were in fantasy land, they were so far behind. TRUMP is a probability guy, and if it's not a dead lock, don't expect $25 million. Since KUSHNER said there was no way this was going to happen they worked to get it down to $10 million. Steve MNUCHIN came up with a cash flow plan. MNUCHIN called it a cash advance. They had enough money coming from small donors that it would lag to it and this money would eventually come in. Just this last $10 million was needed to come in to buy the television time. MNUCHIN would structure it like a loan and he had a term sheet, but it was like a cash advance. They had a five hour conversation with TRUMP. MNUCHIN, BANNON, KUSHNER, and TRUMP were present. MNUCHIN turned over the term sheet, which was structured as a loan, and he had the wire instruction documents for the $10 million. TRUMP didn't know that MNUCHIN had the documents ready. It was ten days to two weeks ahead of Election Day and they couldn't do the final television spot without it. BANNON didn't think TRUMP even read the documents. TRUMP wasn't thrilled that MNUCHIN had the wire instructions ready. BANNON didn't think that TRUMP talked to [redacted], MCGAHN, or DEWIT from the Trump Organization. The conversation about the $10 million with TRUMP started on the 26th floor of Trump Tower, with MNUCHIN, BANNON, KUSHNER and TRUMP. They were flying to a campaign stop so they continued the conversation on the plane. They kept working on TRUMP until he couldn't take it anymore, and then MNUCHIN pulled out the sheets with the wire instructions. TRUMP was convinced the cash would be there. TRUMP understood the logic of it. [redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

As far as the messages on his phone being deleted prior to 2/23/2017, BANNON was told all of his stuff was deleted. BANNON never deleted the

PRINCE messages himself. BANNON never discussed with anyone about deleting his messages with PRINCE. BANNON didn't know why they were deleted and didn't tell anyone else to delete the PRINCE messages. BANNON was told everything was deleted before a certain date. BANNON never deleted his messages with PRINCE or instructed, asked, or told anyone to delete his messages. BANNON never set up a function to not to retain his messages. BANNON didn't discuss with his tech guys on why these messages were missing. The only other person who had access to BANNON's Blackberry was [redacted] and that was only once or twice. BANNON had "no earthly idea" on why the messages were deleted. b6 b7C

BANNON did not have a lot of contacts with [redacted] during the election. BANNON didn't remember what his interactions with [redacted] during the campaign consisted of. From approximately March to May of 2016 [redacted] had come up with a concept to show that [redacted] BANNON was just making sure that [redacted] didn't blow him up. BANNON thought that [redacted] was another guy who was better [redacted] BANNON didn't think he responded to [redacted] message about WikiLeaks. BANNON didn't remember what they were discussing. It wasn't a big enough deal for BANNON to remember, he got texts from a lot of people. BANNON thought [redacted] BANNON thought that if you don't keep guys like STONE [redacted] happy they eventually would settle scores in their books. When investigator detailed the amount of calls and messages BANNON had during the campaign, BANNON didn't know what the messages with [redacted] were about, but BANNON said they were likely talking about the election or ideas [redacted] had. BANNON didn't know anything about WeSearchr or anything about using crowd sourced funds for bounty information. BANNON didn't know anything about getting [redacted] getting hacked or leaked information. BANNON didn't remember anything about passing deep web or hacked information. BANNON didn't remember anything about [redacted] getting any information from WikiLeaks. [redacted] was always talking about his relationship with [redacted] [redacted] talked about the dark web/deep web, but BANNON didn't remember the specifics. BANNON was not interested in dark web information. [redacted] was telling BANNON about his theories about [redacted] or an idea of what district he should be in. [redacted] would say that he knows stuff from the dark web. [redacted] would come up with stuff like helping on social media and helping to find stuff on the dark web. [redacted] might have mentioned the 33,000 missing CLINTON emails while BANNON was looking for them. [redacted] might have talked to BANNON about his efforts to get in contact with WikiLeaks. BANNON didn't remember the information that [redacted] was trying to get from WikiLeaks or the access. The only time [redacted] spoke to BANNON about his meetings with WikiLeaks were the two emails. On the campaign, [redacted] might have mentioned the dark web. [redacted] would have outside the box ideas like getting the DNA for [redacted] [redacted] would text with BANNON about these things. The dark web was always something [redacted] would talk about. It was likely [redacted] had told BANNON he had a contact with WikiLeaks in only these two emails. [redacted] possibly texted BANNON about WikiLeaks. b6 b7C

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FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2043
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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 06/13/2018

Stephen K. Bannon was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at Patriots Plaza I, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC. Bannon was accompanied by his attorneys [redacted] Present for the interview were Special Agent (SA) [redacted] SA [redacted] Intelligence Analyst [redacted] Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles, Counselor to the Special Counsel Michael Dreeben, Senior Assistant Special Counselor Andrew Goldstein, Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky, and Assistant Special Counsel Elizabeth Prelogar. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, Bannon provided the following information:

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**ADMINISTRATION TRANSITION PERIOD:**

In the immediate aftermath of the 2016 presidential election and Donald Trump's unexpected win, things were disorganized. Bannon, Reince Priebus, and Jared Kushner split up the workload amongst themselves. The weekend after the election, President-Elect Trump announced Priebus as Chief of Staff and Bannon as Chief Strategist. Priebus was always going to be the Chief of Staff, as he was from the GOP establishment, while the rest of the campaign was from "the land of misfit toys."

There was no real transition team in place. People in the campaign thought it was not necessary to have a strong transition team going into the election, in part because they were so far down in the polls. Trump was also superstitious about things like that. Bill Hagerty, the director of the transition, had scheduled a trip to the Bahamas for after the election, assuming they would not win.

Bannon learned that they would need to identify 4,000 political appointees, 1,000 of which required Senate confirmation. Also, they would need to have 400 people in place on day one of the administration. One of Bannon's chief responsibilities was personnel. Another was day one executive orders. One of Kushner's main responsibilities was to have relationships with foreign governments, while Priebus coordinated everyone's efforts.

During the transition, Bannon worked out of Trump Tower in New York City. Bannon had a desk on the 14th floor of Trump Tower during the campaign,

Investigation on 02/12/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/26/2018

by [redacted]

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but moved to a conference room on the 26th floor during the transition. Trump's offices were on the 26th floor and he was the heart of the transition. The 14th floor conference rooms were turned over to [National Security Advisor-designate] Mike Flynn and the national security staff during the transition.

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Early on in the transition, [redacted]

Bannon did not have much of a role in foreign policy. No one expected them to win and the responsibilities of the administration came as a shock to a lot of people. His real focus was on personnel, not policy. [Former transition head] Chris Christie had people in mind who were "Never Trump" people and "Anyone but Trump" people, and they were never going to get billets.

Bannon was surprised at the number of calls and in person meet-and-greets that were scheduled. Kushner and Flynn took the lead on foreign leader contacts. It was initially chaotic, with Hope Hicks serving as essentially Trump's "body man" and handling the scheduling. This was not an ideal situation, and sometimes went poorly, such as when Bannon learned from the media Trump agreed to meet with the Japanese Prime Minister. At some point, it was decided foreign leader engagement would run through Kushner and Flynn.

Bannon had a good working relationship with Kushner during the campaign. Kushner was able to calm Trump down or deliver bad news. Kushner ran the digital operation and raised money during the campaign. When there was no overlap in their roles, they got along well. Bannon thought they never would have won if he and Kushner were not getting along during the campaign. Later, when their roles and responsibilities overlapped, they clashed.

Then-Senator Jeff Sessions was a foundational member and leader of the populist movement. Sessions' early endorsement of Trump was huge and it was an unwritten rule that people like Sessions, Flynn, and Keith Kellogg, who had all been on board early, would get administration jobs.

Sessions and [former NYC Mayor] Rudy Giuliani both wanted to be Secretary of State. Bannon tried to talk Giuliani into taking the Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland Security positions, but he wanted Secretary of State or nothing at all. Bannon really wanted Giuliani as Attorney General and spent at least three hours once trying to talk him into it, but Giuliani said he was 70 years old and had no energy for the position. Bannon thought Giuliani would have issues in his confirmation if he was nominated as Secretary of State, however, because of some of his companies and foreign contacts.

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

Bannon thought discussions of the Russia investigation immediately after the election were the result of Democrats being in shock over losing. He thought Democrats raised Russia as a way to delegitimize the win. It was not really about the investigation, but the Democratic excuse for losing and a way to make it so that Trump could not govern.

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b6 b7C

Bannon was invited to half a dozen or so meetings with foreign leaders during the transition, but he did not remember specifically the invitation

to the meeting with Kushner, Flynn, and Kislyak in November. He thought the meeting was set up just because they met with everyone who asked for a meeting at the time. Every nation on earth wanted a meeting. They were inundated with foreign contacts.

Bannon said Flynn went to see [then-National Security Advisor] Susan Rice and [her deputy] Ben Rhodes early on in the transition to talk about how to do things. He did not recall discussions about the "one president at a time" policy. They were not very organized and made it up as they went along.

Bannon did not get the sense Russia's reach outs to the transition were any different than any other country's. For example, the Japanese Prime Minister wanted to fly over and have a cup of coffee.

Bannon was not happy when the media reported that Kushner attempted to establish a back channel for communications with Russia during the transition. Neither Kushner nor Flynn mentioned the meeting. Bannon did not speak to Flynn after the story came out; he had not spoken to Flynn since Flynn left the White House. He did not speak to Kushner after the story came out, either. They were "not exactly speaking at the time." b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

To Bannon, the notion of security was more troubling than that of the back channel itself. Bannon questioned why they would need anything more secure than what the government already had. A back channel was not necessary. They did not need a big "cloak and dagger" deal. When the meeting with Kushner, Flynn, and Kislyak happened, they had eight weeks to go before inauguration and had no one on the team, and they needed to focus.

**LTG (Ret) MICHAEL FLYNN**

It was evident to Bannon there would be issues with Flynn. In the fall of 2016, Trump and Obama met and Trump reported the meeting went well and they got along. The meeting was longer than expected. Trump told Bannon

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

After the meeting with Obama, Trump attended the Army-Navy football game. He did an interview with Chris Wallace that weekend. Wallace brought up Flynn's son's tweets, which Trump had not heard about. It was embarrassing for Trump, and Fox agreed to cut out that part of the interview. [redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Flynn was not that organized. Bannon knew he needed to work on Flynn's organization. [Deputy National Security Advisor-designate] KT McFarland and [redacted] were solid Trump people, but were only second or third tier performers. Flynn and Trump had tension from the beginning.

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**DECEMBER 2016/MAR-A-LAGO**

Bannon went on the trip to Mar-a-Lago with the transition team in December 2016. He went down around December 15 and made a trip back home for Christmas before returning to stay through New Year's Eve. Present the week before Christmas along with Bannon were Priebus, Kushner, Flynn, [Deputy Chief of Staff-designate] [redacted] [White House Spokesperson-designate] Sean Spicer, and Hope Hicks. After Christmas, Flynn left on a trip with his wife and Kushner went skiing, so McFarland joined them in Flynn's absence. Priebus, Spicer, and Hicks remained.

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McFarland served as a stand-in for Flynn. Flynn checked in with her a lot. Bannon did not recall conference calls with Flynn but thought Flynn was definitely keeping his hand on things while he was away.
When the news broke of the Obama administration sanctions on the Russians because of election interference, Bannon was not concerned with the sanctions themselves but more the linkage between Russian interference and the election results. He had no idea what the sanctions would be, but knew they would be in office in five weeks and could do something about them then. He was more concerned with the drumbeat of delegitimizing the election. Bannon asserted the Trump win had nothing to do with Russia. He said, "I ran the campaign. We won because we hustled."

Bannon was nervous about McFarland. She had never had a senior level job and had been a Fox News Analyst prior to joining the administration. She had been an intern for Henry Kissinger. By late December, Bannon looked around and realized they had "no heavies."
Bannon did not have a clearance at the time, so he did not attend PDBs [Presidential Daily Briefings]. He made sure Flynn and McFarland had it

together regarding national security briefings, even though he did not attend. Bannon received his clearance in mid-to-late January.

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

Bannon reviewed an email with subject line "Russian hacking Obama" from McFarland to himself, Flynn, and others, dated 12/29/2016 (Bates stamped SB_21384). He did not remember receiving the email. He used his transition email and his personal email accounts at that time and acknowledged it went to him, but added, "If someone sends me an email this long I'm not reading it."

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Trump's posture on Russia at that time was he did not want the United States to have any more enemies. He wanted to end the Cold War, put America first, address the fact that the government had spent $6B on wars they had not won, and address ISIS, which was on the rise. Trump thought it unwise to pick a fight with someone else.

Bannon added they were not a policy heavy group; they had campaigned on slogans like "Drain the swamp," "Build a wall," and "Lock her up." Trump used better relations with Russia as a campaign point and said the United States did not need another enemy. He thought it would resonate with the "deplorables," the blue collar people, the people paying the price for the wars, whose kids were dying in the war. They did not need another Cold War or to pick another fight, even with a bad guy. The reason Trump won was because people agreed with the campaign, not because of Putin.

Bannon did not recall whether he knew Flynn was going to talk to Kislyak the night the sanctions came out. McFarland may have said it but he was not sure.

Bannon reviewed an email dated 12/30/2016 at 7:03 am (Bates stamped SB_00021214). He did not recall the 12/29/2016 meeting referenced in the email. He did not remember whether McFarland told him anything about Flynn-Kislyak calls. He recalled he told McFarland she needed to get a little more engaged. Trump was not happy with some briefings he had received from Flynn and Bannon suggested McFarland get better control of things.

Bannon did not recall knowing about the Flynn-Kislyak calls while he was down at Mar-a-Lago. He could not say they did not happen, just that he did not remember them. They were not a big deal to Bannon. However, what did concern Bannon was he thought they were getting things dropped on them by the previous administration, such as an issue in the UN and drawing a link between Russia and the election.

When Putin put out a statement that Russia would not respond to the sanctions and Trump subsequently sent out a tweet calling Putin "smart," Bannon thought it was possible Trump sent that tweet out from the golf course, depending on the time of day. Bannon added Trump would often see something on the news or in the newspaper and tweet about it. There was no strategic discussion of his tweets.

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted], but it did not matter to Bannon what Putin did. What mattered to Bannon was that Obama had said there was a direct link between Russia and the election. He thought it was designed to delegitimize the government. Bannon was "pissed" and thought the Obama administration was "playing cute." He thought it was wrong that [then-Homeland Security Advisor] Lisa Monaco had not told [Homeland Security Advisor-designate] Tom Bossert in advance and that Priebus barely got a heads up. Bannon thought that's when he decided it was time to get the facts for themselves and asked that briefings with the intelligence people be set up.

McFarland or someone may have told Bannon on December 29, 2016 that Flynn planned to speak to Kislyak that night. McFarland did not tell Bannon what Flynn planned to talk about with Kislyak. Bannon had no concept of the likely topic of discussion between Flynn and Kislyak. He remembered hearing something about the assassination of a Turkish ambassador, but was not sure when he heard it. He thought he heard it from Spicer. He thought either Spicer or Hicks had asked Flynn, or that Flynn had offered it.

Bannon reviewed emails dated 12/31/2016 (not Bates stamped) between himself and McFarland. He explained the emails were giving her an "atta girl" in response to how the sanctions played out.

Bannon reviewed the December 29, 2016 transition statement about sanctions and said that was when they decided they needed to get briefings on

election interference from the Intelligence Community. Up to that point, Bannon may have had some briefings on Russian involvement in the election. He thought there may have been three or four briefings Christie and Giuliani had with the FBI, but he did not recall the election or Russia coming up.

The January 3, 2017 briefing on Russia was a big deal and an all hands on deck situation. Mike Pompeo had already been named CIA director, they had talked to NSA Director Mike Rogers, and agreed they needed to find out what was going on. Bannon was surprised by the scale of the sanctions and thought the United States had not even kicked out people in such a manner during the Cold War. They set up an official briefing with ODNI, CIA, NSA and the other intelligence agencies, because they thought Trump and Pence needed to be briefed. Some of the agencies had told them they needed to take things seriously and get briefed up on it.

During the campaign, Bannon thought the "Putin stuff was not a big deal." Trump admired certain strong personality types, like those of Putin, Xi, and Erdogan, but he did not talk to Bannon at any length about Putin. When Bannon joined the campaign, there were 85 days to go, they were 16 points down, and they had no money. Putin was not his priority. He added Trump was not a big policy guy, but rather a personality guy. Trump talked about Putin in the context of not needing any new enemies.

Trump was drawn to certain historical people. Trump ran on a populist campaign platform and Bannon told him to think of himself as Andrew Jackson. Bannon did not think Trump desired approval from Putin. With Trump, it wasn't about Putin himself, but that strong men like Putin embodied his view of leadership.

They campaigned on bringing an end to endless foreign wars, but Syria was only a tangential part of it. The focus was mostly on Iraq and Afghanistan. It was not until GEN Mattis came on board that things shifted to focus on ISIS in Syria. Mattis' strategy was annihilation versus attrition. Flynn may have brought up the idea of working with Russia against a common enemy during the campaign. He recalled a conversation with Flynn in passing either on a plane or late at night, coming back from a trip where it came up. Bannon wrote something about rejuvenating old allies and eradicating radical Islam from the face of the planet down at Mar-a-Lago during the transition. The idea really formed around then. The Syria part was really informed at first and then the ISIS component came about when Mattis came on board, maybe the second weekend after the election.

By mid-December, Mattis had a role in the plan to destroy ISIS. Syria itself was second or third order priority. Bannon did not recall any

discussion about a shared interest between the United States and Russia regarding the destruction of ISIS. He did not hear Trump discuss it, either. Bannon did not recall any detailed national security policy discussions during the campaign or the transition.

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

Bannon left Mar-a-Lago on Christmas Eve and went back after Christmas. He left Mar-a-Lago the second time late on December 30. He stayed in DC for a few days and then went to New York on the first or second of January.

Bannon met with Flynn in DC the first week of January. [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP [redacted] Bannon was sure Flynn did not mention telephone calls with Kislyak. Flynn never mentioned sanctions.

Bannon did not attend the January 3 or January 6 Russia briefings at Trump Tower in New York City, because he did not have a security clearance at the time.

After the briefings, he got the sense from other people [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP [redacted]

Bannon thought the unclassified ICA "laid an egg" in that it insinuated a lot but did not say much. A lot of people, except partisan Democrats, read the report and thought it was not a big deal.

Trump, Priebus, and McGahn, told Bannon what had happened during the January 6 ICA briefing in a short meeting after the briefing. Bannon learned Comey had pulled Trump aside and given him something that was not part of the original presentation. Bannon was "hot about it." He thought

he should have been at the briefing and if he had been there, he would not have allowed it to happen.

Bannon heard Comey asked for a private moment and Priebus, McGahn, and Pence all knew about it when it happened. [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

Bannon thought someone told him Comey had relayed there was some "disgusting stuff" out there about Trump. He did not get the impression that the other IC leaders at the meeting knew what Comey was going to share. Bannon was suspicious of that process, not suspicious of Comey specifically.

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

Bannon was upset when Buzzfeed leaked the dossier on January 10. He did not know the media had the material and did not think Hicks or Spicer knew, either. If Comey had told Trump the media had the dossier and Trump had told Bannon, Bannon would have been "all over it." Bannon did not recall any conversations prior to the Buzzfeed article that indicated others had the dossier. He was surprised when Buzzfeed published the story.

Bannon thought the dossier was a joke. It showed people were ready to leak anything to make the incoming administration look bad. He thought the salacious nature of the content was driving the conversations, not the idea of sanctions relief.

Bannon recalled Tillerson's confirmation hearing was around the same time as the Buzzfeed article. He remembered there were a lot of questions about sanctions and that Tillerson did not have a lot of good answers, but he also thought at the time there was plenty of time to think about those things later.

Bannon first learned Flynn spoke to Kislyak about sanctions [redacted] Bannon heard it from Hicks or Spicer. [redacted] (S) He thought if it was true, it meant Flynn had unauthorized conversations about sanctions and it played into the narrative that the campaign had some sort of backdoor deal with the Russians. If it was not true, and no one thought it was true, they need to get the story out. b1 b3

Bannon knew a request for comment about the coming article had gone to Hicks, who then sent it to Monica Crowley, who dropped the ball. She missed the response deadline and the story went out without their comment. Flynn had said the call had been about Kazakhstan, a call with Putin, and another thing Bannon could not recall [redacted] He remembered there was also a push to get talking points to the people who were scheduled to be on the Sunday shows [redacted] (S) Bannon knew Spicer and Pence spoke to Flynn before the Sunday shows that weekend.

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(S)

Before the article, Bannon knew in passing Flynn had calls with Kislyak. He heard something in passing about passing condolences. Bannon did not know if Flynn talked directly to Trump. Flynn could have given Trump a direct read out of the calls. Bannon thought Flynn would have "at least told Jared [Kushner]" if the reason Putin chose not to retaliate to the sanctions was because of Flynn's calls. Bannon thought Kushner may have told Trump. Foreign policy and reach outs to foreign leaders was Kushner and Flynn's responsibility and they worked together on it.

Bannon had no direct knowledge of the first time anyone talked to Flynn directly about the content of the calls, but he knew Spicer talked to him before the Sunday shows. Bannon thought the story should have been no big deal. When the article came out, Bannon did not ask Flynn what he talked about on the calls with Kislyak and did not hear anyone else ask him, either. Bannon did not talk to Flynn about the article or the Sunday show preparations. He was only involved related to the process of getting things done. He added it was clear to him then Monica Crowley was not competent and amateurish.

Bannon said if Flynn had said he had told people early on he had discussed sanctions, they would have had a meeting and talked about it. It would have been a big thing. Bannon thought if it had come up when Priebus, Pence, or Spicer had asked, he would have thought it was a big deal. He added that was why it was a big deal when Yates told McGahn later.

It was beneficial to have Pence and Priebus go on the Sunday shows and talk about the content of the calls on the Sunday shows because they were straight shooters and their statements confirmed what the transition team had already said. Bannon later spoke to Priebus and Spicer about how the events unfolded and understood what they said publicly was what they were told.

Bannon thought that in his first memory of a call between Flynn and Kislyak, the call had something to do with condolences. He thought he heard it in passing from McFarland. He did not know when [redacted] (S) [redacted] (S)

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(S) [redacted] Bannon had a discussion with [redacted] Hicks, Spicer, Pence and Priebus. People were upset about the media reporting. [redacted] They were concerned because if Flynn had spoken to Kislyak about sanctions, they would have wanted people to be read into the situation. Bannon did not know where Flynn was in these conversations. Bannon thought [redacted] (S)

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(S) [redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] Bannon did not speak to Trump [redacted] (S)

(S) [redacted]

The suggestion Flynn talked about sanctions surprised Bannon because he thought people would have talked about it if it had happened. When Flynn denied speaking about sanctions, Bannon believed him. [redacted]

b1
b3 (S)
b5 per DOJ/OIP

Bannon acknowledged the incoming administration probably wanted the Russians to not react to the sanctions, but people were not breathlessly waiting to see the reaction. [redacted] (S)

Bannon speculated Flynn had been freelancing. Bannon thought Flynn did not want to admit he had been freelancing and did not want to talk about it after the fact because he had not asked for permission in advance. Further, Flynn's standing with Trump by the end of December was not good.

With regard to whether it could be considered "freelancing" if Flynn communicated what he was going to do in advance to McFarland, Bannon said he was not sure if it was just McFarland Flynn talked to or if anyone else responded.

Bannon was not sure if he was surprised Flynn did not take credit for Putin's reaction. There was no organized set of events or process in place prior to a foreign leader call. There was no system in place to clear talking points for Flynn prior to a foreign leader call. There were no formal meetings but Flynn would mention in informal meetings what was going to be covered in a call. Bannon thought it was understood by Flynn that he should not make policy but he did not know if it was specifically communicated to Flynn.

**YATES NOTIFICATION:**

b7E

On January 26, 2017, Bannon was in Priebus' office when McGahn came in and [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] (S) b1 b3 b7E

(S) [redacted] b1 b3 b7E

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] (S)

McGahn told them Yates was coming back the next day. [redacted] (S) b1 b3 b7E

The FBI had been in to interview Flynn the third day of the new administration and the Acting Attorney General came over to tell them [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

Bannon knew there was a lot going on and everyone was busy at that time so he thought it had to be a big deal for Yates to take the time to come talk to them. [redacted] (S) b1 b3 b7E

Bannon was not aware of anyone saying in those first few days that Flynn should be fired. [redacted] (S) b1 b3 b7E it was probably time for Flynn to go. Bannon thought Flynn would probably lose his security clearance anyway, so it was inevitable he would have to go.

[redacted] (S) b1 b3 b7E

[redacted] (S) b1 b3 b7E

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

Bannon did not know why Pence was not told. He thought he was brought into the loop shortly after the Yates meeting [redacted] (S) b1 b3 b7E

(S) [redacted] Bannon was not sure why he thought that, but it had never come up that Pence did not know.

Bannon did not recall whether Trump expressed any reason he would not want to fire Flynn. [redacted]

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] (S) b1 b3 b7E

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] (S) b1 b3

[redacted]

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] Bannon

thought the point of the article was to say the new administration was not on top of things. [redacted] (S) b1 b3

The weekend before Flynn was fired [February 11-12], Trump was in Mar-a-Lago for the [Japanese Prime Minister] Shinzo Abe visit. Bannon remembered a meeting the week immediately prior to the trip [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] Bannon said it had been a central tenet of the campaign to give the American people permission to vote for Trump as Commander in Chief and things were off to a rocky start. b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

Bannon talked to Trump on the plane [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

Bannon reviewed SB_111393. He had no awareness of the interview mentioned in the email. He was not aware if Trump told Flynn he should do more

media. He had no recollection of [NSC Spokesman] Michael Anton asking about the article. Regarding Flynn's quote "cross no lines," Bannon thought Flynn meant he did talk about sanctions but he had crossed no lines.

Bannon added there was enough kicking around in the morning [of February 13] that it was not a done deal first thing. He acknowledged Conway had said Trump had full faith in Flynn early in the day. [redacted] He thought maybe someone in the communications shop asked Flynn to do press. He was not the kind of guy to go out and do press on his own. b5 per DOJ/OIP

At some point in the early afternoon, they told Flynn it was time to go.

Bannon thought it was pretty scary when you looked around and McFarland was the National Security Advisor. Bannon knew they would get a new person in to take over for Flynn and that person would pick his own deputy and McFarland would leave. Bannon never heard anything about McFarland's resignation letter. He had never heard about McFarland documenting her interactions with Flynn. Bannon did not have personal contact with Flynn after he left, nor did he have direct knowledge of anyone else having any, but it would not surprise him if someone reached out to him. People were upset about it. Bannon did not remember if Trump wanted to send a message to Flynn, but thought he would go through [Flynn's temporary replacement] Keith Kellogg if he wanted to do so. Bannon was not aware of any conversations about pardoning Flynn.

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE ORDER:**

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

Bannon had no interest in the NSC. He added he never went to NSC meetings when he was actually on the NSC, but had attended some after he left it. He was surprised it was such a big deal to people.

It was "not really" true that Bannon was there to baby-sit Flynn, which was what had been reported in the media. During the transition, Bannon did have to baby-sit Flynn somewhat, especially when Trump and Flynn's relationship was not as strong.

**FORMER FBI DIRECTOR JAMES COMEY:**

Bannon had some conversations about Comey early on during the transition, but they were very general. [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

Bannon did not recall long conversations, just bits of them in snatches over time.

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] Bannon did not connect Trump's dinner with Comey to the Yates notification, even though it happened the same day Yates had her second meeting with McGahn. Bannon never thought to be concerned about a link between the Yates notification and the dinner with Comey.

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

A few days after the dinner, McCabe and another FBI official came to the White House for a meeting with Bannon. [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

Bannon was present at the February 14 homeland threat briefing in the Oval Office. After the meeting concluded, Trump gave a hand signal or something to indicate he wanted Comey to stay behind. Sessions was there, as well; Bannon thought Sessions kept walking when Comey stayed behind. Bannon did not notice what Kushner did.

Bannon did not know Trump intended to have a long meeting with Comey. He thought it would just be a minute or two. If he had known otherwise, in keeping with the "Don McGahn rules of the road," Bannon would have said something to Sessions or someone about it. Bannon did not speak to Trump right after the meeting. The first time he really learned about the meeting was when it was reported in the New York Times in May after Comey was fired. Bannon also remembered Comey testified about nine different times he talked to Trump and the meeting was mentioned. Bannon also remembered he saw Comey at a law enforcement event on January 22 at the White House.

Bannon remembered that at some point before Comey was fired, Trump said to Bannon [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

**FBI INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN 2016 ELECTION:**

Bannon was not aware of the FBI's investigation into Russian interference until Comey announced it in Congressional testimony [in March 2017]. Bannon knew about the House and Senate investigations earlier. Senator Burr had come over to the White House to talk about the Senate investigation generally. Bannon thought McGahn and Priebus were also there for the discussion.

Bannon knew [House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence] Chairman Devin Nunes pretty well. Nunes was known as a Tea Party guy. Over at Breitbart, Pompeo and Nunes were seen as stars of the House of

Representatives. Bannon got to know Nunes [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP He did not recall either Burr or Nunes saying what the FBI was doing. Bannon was not aware of what led Comey to make the announcement of the FBI's investigation. He may have heard something about Senator Grassley holding up nominations around then, but was not sure.

Bannon was not sure if Trump watched Comey's March 20 testimony. [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP Bannon thought the existence of an investigation should not surprise anyone.

[redacted] (S) b1 b3

On May 22, the Washington Post published an article that said Trump asked the intelligence chiefs to push back on the investigation. Bannon was not aware of Trump's calls to any of them at the time. He thought the story was pretty explosive when it came out, but he did not remember if he talked to anyone about it. He did not hear anyone say it was false. Bannon did not recall whether anyone asked Trump about the calls. He did not remember any conversations about pushing back harder on the investigation. At the time he learned of them, the calls did not concern Bannon because there was so much going on. Bannon did not specifically recall talking to Spicer, Priebus or McGahn, but may have talked to Priebus.

Between Comey's March 20 testimony and May 3 testimony, Bannon and Trump [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

**MAY 3 SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HEARING:**

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP Bannon did not know in advance that Comey would testify. He thought Trump watched parts of the testimony. Bannon watched parts of the testimony.

On May 3, Bannon went to the Oval Office, where a meeting between Trump, McGahn, Sessions, and maybe Jody Hunt was in progress. Bannon did not remember whether Kushner was present. [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP [redacted] Bannon thought they could actually fundraise off of Comey if he was still in place.

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

**JARED KUSHNER:**

Bannon and Kushner stopped getting along close to the beginning of the administration, even though they got along during the campaign. They worked well together when arranging the Riyadh summit but then it pretty quickly turned to not working well together. Bannon thought Kushner, Ivanka, and Gary Cohn were progressive Democrats and the opposite of what the Trump campaign ran on. The people who elected Trump did not vote for that. Bannon wanted to "drain the swamp." They would lose their base if they did not work toward ending DACA and building a wall.

Bannon recalled a time during an overseas trip to Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the Vatican when he left the trip early. He skipped going to Israel. At the time, the Special Counsel had been named and Trump did not have a personal attorney yet. [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP [redacted] Priebus also came back from the trip early. At that time, they were getting crushed on the international TV stations.

Bannon, Trump, Priebus, McMaster, and Powell were having a meeting when Kushner came in [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP [redacted] Priebus and Bannon decided they were leaving the trip then. [redacted]

Bannon reviewed a document Bates stamped SB_00003977 and said the second bullet point was not true. The bullet point said: "During transition you had an IT guy do email search of trump servers and discovered Jared met with Anbang and Qataris to raise money for 666 Fifth. You viewed the email that connected the dots. Those meetings left Jared exposed to Comey."

**BEDMINSTER:**

Bannon did not travel to New York with Trump the weekend after the May 3 testimony. Trump was fully occupied and Priebus and Bannon decided not to go.

Bannon got no indication from anyone on the trip to Bedminster Comey's termination was being planned. He had a feeling something was going on, but he did not know anything for sure. He was totally out of contact with everyone that weekend.

**MAY 8-9, 2017:**

The week of Monday, May 8, Bannon did not enter the Oval Office until the evening of Tuesday, May 9. Bannon did not participate in any meetings about Comey on Monday. Bannon suspected something was going on but wanted no part of it. Bannon did not think he should go and try one more time; he had already said his piece. History would show Bannon had no part of it. [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] Bannon thought firing Comey posed an existential threat to the Presidency. All the same, he did not go in and take one more shot at trying to stop things. He had the feeling if he went in and gave it another try, he would lose. He was "Dr. No," always saying no to crackpot ideas, such as sending 50,000 troops to Afghanistan, or staying in the Paris Accord, DACA, and prison reform. b5 per DOJ/OIP

On May 8 and 9, the West Wing was tense. Bannon was not sure if firing Comey was a done deal at that point. Bannon did not see Sessions in the West Wing, even though Sessions usually stopped by to say hi when he was in the building. [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

Bannon learned Comey was being fired when he saw it on TV while in Priebus' office. Spicer came in to the office, followed by Kushner. [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

Bannon reviewed a document Bates stamped SB 00003978. He did not know if it was true. [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP [redacted] Bannon did not tell any journalists that firing Comey was Kushner's idea.

b5 per DOJ/OIP [redacted] The FBI's interview of Flynn did not come up with Kushner in the context of Comey's role. Bannon thought two FBI agents had come over to talk to Flynn and had the authority to do so.

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP [redacted] Bannon thought the talking points were absurd; even if the rank and file hated him, to fire Comey would turn him into a martyr. They could never raise any money off of it. Bannon thought firing Comey would bring on a firestorm that would burn the place down.

Bannon reviewed SB_00003675, an email inquiry from a reporter that said: "I hear DJT is pissed at Jared. POTUS has told people he blames Jared for Comey and Manafort." [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP [redacted]

Regarding the Clinton investigation as rationale for firing Comey, Bannon said "we knew all of this on January 20." The DOJ memo was "ridiculous on its face." Bannon did not know why Trump was in a rush to fire Comey, but assumed someone got him worked up about something.

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Bannon heard from McGahn [redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

**MAY 10, 2017 KISLYAK/LAVROV MEETING:**

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

**MAY 11, 2017 LESTER HOLT INTERVIEW:**

Bannon thought Trump was prepped for the Lester Holt interview late at night on Wednesday night. Bannon was there while Hicks and Spicer prepped Trump. [redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

**POST-COMEY TERMINATION:**

When the New York Times published an article about the January 27, 2017 dinner between Comey and Trump, Bannon knew Trump had already said he called Comey to invite him over for dinner, not the other way around. Bannon did not bring up the concept of loyalty with Trump specifically after the article came out, [redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Regarding whether Trump valued people who stood by him, Bannon said "yes and no." Trump definitely remembered people who were loyal, but the loyalty was one way and transactional. Bannon pointed out that all of the people who stood by Trump during Billy Bush weekend had all been "served up."

Bannon recalled the May 16, 2017 New York Times article regarding the existence of a memo by Comey detailing the February 14, 2017 Trump-Comey meeting in the Oval Office. [redacted] Bannon always doubted the story. He thought the meeting was not that long and the door was open. He added if the door had been closed, Sessions would have said something and would not have allowed it.

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Bannon's understanding of the meeting was that it was not a long discussion and the door was open. As he remembered it, Comey hung back to talk to Trump and there were people there waiting for the next meeting. Sessions and Bannon hung out for a second but Bannon did not wait.

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Bannon speculated Trump sent the tweet to "freeze Comey in place." Trump would do things like that when he was in the mood. Bannon remembered Trump was pretty proud of that tweet and thought it was a good thing to do. Bannon thought Trump probably knew there was no taping system.

Trump called people all night long. He would either call on landline through the switchboard or use his cell phone.

**Administrative:**

The agent notes and emails shown to Bannon will be maintained in the 1A section of the case file.



**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 05/01/2018

Erik Dean Prince, date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, Washington, D.C. Present representing Prince were [redacted] and [redacted] The interviewing team were FBI Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsels Jeannie Rhee, Zainab Ahmad and Aaron Zelinsky. b6 b7C

Prior to the start of the interview, ASC Zelinsky verbally reviewed the terms of a letter setting forth the agreement upon which Prince made himself available for the interview (Document 1). Prince stated that he understood the terms of the letter agreement. Prince and [redacted] signed the letter. After being advised of the identities of the interview team and the nature of the interview, Prince provided the following information: b6 b7C

Prince was not initially a Donald Trump supporter. As the campaign heated up, Prince found that he agreed with many of Trump's positions. Prince spoke with [redacted] about holding a fundraiser for Trump. [redacted] told Prince that the Campaign had rejected Prince's request to hold a fundraiser because Prince was too controversial. Prince did not speak with anyone else in the Campaign about the fundraiser. b6 b7C

Prince contributed money directly to the Trump Campaign. Prince also donated at a Las Vegas event, to a Political Action Committee (PAC) run by the [redacted] and to Roger Stone's ads and social media efforts regarding [redacted] b6 b7C

Prince met Steve Bannon in 2013 at an event held at Breitbart for Prince's book. Bannon and Prince hold similar beliefs on many issues. Bannon knew Prince's experience and respected Prince's knowledge of certain matters. Bannon had Prince as a regular call-in guest on Bannon's radio show. During the campaign, Prince sent Bannon mostly unsolicited policy papers.

Prince was introduced to Donald Trump, Jr. at Trump Tower. [redacted] may have introduced Prince to Trump, Jr. The first meeting was brief, Prince expressed his support and encouragement b6 b7C

Investigation on 04/04/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 04/05/2018

by [redacted] b6 b7C b7E

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for the Trump Campaign. Prince met Trump, Jr. approximately two more times at Trump Tower before the election. At one of the meetings, Trump, Jr. asked if Prince had met Trump. Prince said no. Trump, Jr. walked Prince into a room and introduced Prince to Trump. Trump and about ten other people were in the room and Mike Pence was on the telephone.

Prince organized a meeting between [redacted] and Trump, Jr. to discuss Iranian civil rights issues. [redacted] introduced Prince to [redacted] Prince met [redacted] in the Brussels Airport a year or two before their meeting with Trump, Jr. At the airport, [redacted] b6 b7C Prince is not aware of any attempts by [redacted] to get money from foreign governments. [redacted]

During their airport meeting, [redacted] provided Prince with some documents pitching his project. Prince does not recall the details of [redacted] project. [redacted] b6 b7C

Sometime before the election in 2016, [redacted] requested that Prince set up a meeting with a high level person connected to Trump. [redacted] did not request anyone in particular. Prince knew Trump, Jr. and Bannon. Prince knew Bannon better and Bannon was a policy guy. Prince does not recall why he arranged the meeting with Trump, Jr. instead of Bannon. Bannon may have been unavailable because, at this time, he was very busy and often traveling with Trump. [redacted] did not say that he wanted to pitch Trump, Jr. for money, only that [redacted] wanted to discuss Iranian issues, such as the Obama administration's nuclear deal with Iran and payment of cash to Iran. b6 b7C

[redacted] arrived for the meeting with George Nader. Prince had not expected Nader to be with [redacted] Prince had worked with Nader in Iraq around 2006. In 2006, Nader was a courtesan for the Vice-President of b6 b7C

b7E

Iraq. Prince, and Nader met with Trump, Jr. in Trump Jr.'s office. Prince introduced to Trump, Jr. as an Iran policy person. Prince introduced Nader as a person with knowledge of the Middle East. Prince also told Trump, Jr. that Prince had known Nader in Iraq ten years earlier. took the lead on explaining why the nuclear agreement with Iran was wrong. gave a brief synopsis of his communications project but only as a way to bolster his position for a change in Iran policy. Trump, Jr. said that it was interesting information and that he would take it onboard. Trump, Jr. had no time or interest for a granular discussion. During the meeting, never said anything about using his company to help the Trump Campaign. did not discuss anything with Prince about the Trump Campaign's social media activities.

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Prince does not recall anyone else attending the meeting. Prince does not recall Stephen Miller attending the meeting. Prince believes that Nader was helping meet potential investors. Prince does not recall Nader speaking at the meeting with Trump, Jr. Prince does not know if Nader had a separate agenda for attending the meeting. Prince does not recall whether he was with and Nader throughout the entire time that they were upstairs at Trump Tower.

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Prince does not know other business interests. Prince has heard of the PSY Group as an Israeli technology and communications company. had mentioned the PSY Group to Prince, but Prince does not recall the context. Prince does not know if was associated with the PSY Group.

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In July or August 2016, Prince had breakfast with Bannon. Bannon understood the union mentality of Trump's supporters. Bannon had been in contact with them through his radio show. Prince and Bannon discussed policy at the breakfast. Two days later, the Trump Campaign hired Bannon.

Prince sold Blackwater in 2010. Prince's main policy desire was to have a president that would be open to private contractors conducting stability operations. Prince helped the UAE successfully combat Somali pirates. Prince has focused on "peripheral" areas where the Department of Defense does not have a significant presence, such as Yemen, Somalia and Libya. Prince has also focused on Afghanistan. Prince sent Bannon a policy paper "Update on Problem Areas." Prince also sent Bannon his "Case for a Private Option." Prince got the impression that Bannon had more important policy matters on his plate.

Prince met Bannon a couple of times at Trump Tower before the election. Prince set up the meetings by texting Bannon or communicating with Prince and Bannon discussed foreign policy and

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trade. Prince does not recall the subject of Russia coming up during any of their discussions.

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] introduced Prince to Roger Stone. [redacted] told Prince that Stone was working on a 501(c)(4) Fund. [redacted] did not say that Bannon or the Campaign approved of Stone's fund. [redacted] b6 b7C

Stone mentioned WikiLeaks a few times. Prince began one conversation by asking what Stone thought would be released next. Prince does not recall anything that Stone said about WikiLeaks. Stone did not give Prince any inside information on the WikiLeaks release of Democratic National Committee e-mails nor any information on Stone's contacts with Julian Assange. Prince was not aware of Stone's public statements about WikiLeaks or Stone's contacts with Assange.

Barbara Ledeen had a trove of e-mails from the dark web that were purportedly deleted e-mails from Hillary Clinton's server. Ledeen wanted to authenticate the e-mails. Prince provided funding so that [redacted] could hire a tech advisor to determine whether the e-mails were b6 b7C

real. [redacted] reported to Prince that the tech advisor had determined the e-mails were not authentic. [redacted] returned the unused portion of Prince's money. Prince does not believe that anyone from the Campaign knew of the effort.

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Prince spent election night at Trump Tower watching the voting returns. [redacted] cleared Prince into the event. When it appeared that Trump would win, Prince and other people walked over to the Hilton to hear Trump's speech.

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Prince met Bannon in Trump Tower a few days after the election. Prince advocated for people to fill key National Security positions. Prince wanted people that would support his private approach and support disentangling America from foreign conflicts. [redacted] Prince returned a few weeks later and met again with Bannon. Prince again discussed personnel decisions. Trump did not select any of the individuals that Prince recommended. Prince never sought a position for himself. On one occasion, Prince rode the train back from New York to Washington, D.C. with KellyAnne Conway. They did not have any substantive conversations during the train ride.

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Prince met Flynn in June 2016, before the Republican convention, for breakfast in Alexandria. [redacted] introduced the two men. Prince and Flynn discussed foreign policy. Flynn had not yet become active in Trump's campaign. Prince does not recall any other substantive interactions with Flynn until after the election. Post-election, Flynn and Prince had a quick meeting at Trump Tower regarding which people should fill National Security positions. Another time, Prince and Flynn met at an Irish Pub and talked about how to put out fires in peripheral areas. Prince never talked about the role of Russia with Flynn.

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Prince met Trump three times. The first time was the introduction by Trump, Jr. in Trump Tower. The second time, Prince met Trump during a campaign event in Las Vegas before the last debate. The third time, Prince met Trump at a [redacted] Prince never spoke for more than a minute to Trump. The substance was always Prince expressing his support and encouragement.

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Prince has Trump's phone numbers in his cell phone. [redacted]

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[redacted] briefly introduced Prince to Jared Kushner while they were in Trump Tower. Prince and Kushner did not have any substantive conversations. b6 b7C

Prince discussed National Security appointments with Dave Bossie. Prince and Bossie also discussed Robert Levinson, a former FBI Agent, that disappeared in Iran.

Prince briefly met K.T. McFarland. Prince said hello to McFarland while she was in an office talking with Judge Jeanine Pirro.

The earliest text messages in Prince's cell phone are from March 2017. Prince used his cell phone prior to March 2017. Prince does not know why the text messages do not go back farther than March 2017. Other than housekeeping, such as deleting spam messages, Prince has not deleted any text messages from his cell phone. [redacted] b6 b7C

Prince did not know in advance about the December 15, 2016 meeting in New York between Trump representatives and UAE officials. During the meeting or shortly after it, Prince met Nader in the coffee shop of the Four Seasons Hotel where the meeting was taking place. Nader said that Kushner, Flynn and Bannon were at the meeting with Mohammed Bin Zayed (MBZ) and other UAE officials. Nader said that they discussed Middle East issues including Iran, Syria, Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood and terrorism generally. Prince does not know who set up the meeting.

Prince reviewed a series of text messages that he and Nader exchanged on December 15, 2016 (Document 2). In the first message, Nader asked Prince when they could meet at the Pierre Hotel where Nader was staying. Prince responded that he had been asked to come straight to Trump Tower upon arriving in New York. [redacted] had probably told Prince that Bannon had a window to see him. Prince ended up meeting Nader in the lobby of the Four Seasons Hotel. Prince agreed to give Nader a policy paper on the Muslim Brotherhood to pass on to MBZ. Prince probably went somewhere to print the paper, then returned and left it at the front desk for Nader. After their meeting in the lobby, Nader messaged Prince that Nader "told Steven that we just met and he was delighted." Nader always stated things in the superlative. Prince had told Nader that Prince had met with Bannon. In another message on December 15, Nader writes that he cannot wait to "[f]ollow upon our excited mission." Prince assumes that the mission is getting the UAE and Saudi Arabia (KSA) to financially support Prince's solution to end the fighting in Yemen. Prince's solution b6 b7C

involved a smaller, more-focused, and perhaps private, armed force. Prince was confident that the UAE or KSA would go forward with this solution if Prince could get permission from the U.S. Government. Prince met with Bannon on December 16, 2016. Bannon said that Prince was right about MBZ being a great guy. Prince had told Bannon about a 2010 conference on freedom and Islam that Prince hosted in the UAE and that MBZ had attended.

After Trump won the election, Nader wanted access to as many people as possible. One time, Nader and Prince were waiting outside of Bannon's office. Prince does not believe they came to Trump Tower together. Prince does not recall any meetings that he attended with both Bannon and Nader. Trump, Jr. walked by and Nader attempted to talk with him. Trump, Jr. told Nader not to contact him anymore because he no longer handled policy matters. Trump, Jr. separately told Prince that he wanted Nader to stop texting him all the time. Nader received inauguration tickets from somebody at the stratum of Kushner. After inauguration, in May or June 2017, Prince ran into Nader in the White House. Nader did not say who he was meeting in the White House.

Prince reviewed messages between himself and Nader (Document 3). On December 20, 2016, Nader messaged Prince about Nader visiting the "neighboring country." Prince interpreted the "neighboring country" as Saudi Arabia and that Nader would be meeting with Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). Prince interpreted Nader's reference to going "big real hunting," as Prince's solution to end fighting in Yemen. Prince had discussed his ideas for ending fighting in Yemen with Nader but provided no detailed operations plan. Prince and Nader did not discuss the Trump administration and UAE working together. Prince does not know why Nader sent Prince an image of Nader and Putin together, other than the fact that Nader always likes to show off his connections.

[redacted] Prior to this interview, Prince reviewed records showing that he travelled to New York on January 3, 2017. Prince does not recall the travel. The trip was probably to see Bannon. Prince does not recall checking whether Bannon or Trump, Jr. would be available before he travelled to New York. Prince reviewed messages exchanged between him and Nader from December 31, 2016 to January 4, 2017 (Document 4). Based on the messages, Prince believes that he planned to meet Nader in New York on January 3. Nader was pushing for a meeting with anyone from the Trump team. Prince does not know why Nader wanted to meet with someone from the Trump team. Prince does not recall setting up any meetings for Nader with the Trump team.

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Prince reviewed a message that he sent at approximately 1:36 p.m., on January 3, wherein he wrote that he would be at the Pierre Hotel restaurant in 10 minutes to meet Nader (Document 4). Prince does not recall meeting Nader. Prince and Nader probably planned to meet so that Nader could download the information from Nader's meetings with MBZ and MBS. Prince reviewed a set of messages arranging a later meeting at the Pierre Hotel restaurant, the messages ended with Prince writing "[a]m in the restaurant" at 7:32 p.m (Document 4). Prince does not recall the second meeting with Nader either. It was probably a continuation of the same issues as the first meeting.

Agents showed Prince images of the Pierre Hotel and its restaurant. After viewing the images, Prince recalled meeting Nader in the restaurant (Document 5). Prince does not recall what they discussed. They may have discussed Prince's upcoming meeting with MBZ. Prince does not recall them discussing Russia, Dmitriev or contacts with the Trump administration.

Prince does not recall going to Trump Tower on January 3. Prince may have been trying to meet Bannon. Prince had spoken with former U.S. intelligence people about his plan and may have wanted to update Bannon. Prince often sat in the Starbucks in the Trump Tower lobby hoping that Bannon would have an opening to see him.

Prince does not know why Nader sent Prince information on Kirill Dmitriev - a link to a Wikipedia page, "Quotes KD_DT.pdf," and "Kirill DMITRIEV.pdf" - on January 3 and January 4 (Document 4). Nader may have sent the information because it came up during their dinner. Prince would be surprised if Nader sent the information without any discussion. The first time that Prince heard of Dmitriev was at Prince's meeting with MBZ in the Seychelles. At the end of that meeting, MBZ or one of his brothers said that there was a Russian guy that the UAE had done business with and that Prince should meet him.

Prince does not recall opening the attachments sent by Nader on January 4, which contained the information on Dmitriev (Document 4). Prince does not recall calling [redacted] shortly after the attachments were opened. Prince would have called [redacted] to see if Bannon had time to meet with Prince. Prince probably did not meet Bannon on January 3 because Prince would not have come back on January 4 if he had met with Bannon the day before. There were other times when Prince went to Trump Tower trying to meet with Bannon and never got in to see him. Prince does not recall whether he met with Bannon on January 4. Prince does not recall telling Bannon or anyone else with the Trump Transition team about Dmitriev before the meeting in the Seychelles.

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Prince was like a kid at Christmas about his meeting with MBZ, he could only focus on the presents under the tree. Prince had previously conducted significant business with the UAE and he hoped to gain business for the future. Prince does not recall when he first learned that his meeting with MBZ would be in the Seychelles rather than the Middle East. Prince does not recall communicating to Bannon or anyone else that Prince would be meeting with MBZ. [redacted]

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When Prince landed in the Seychelles, one of MBZ's men walked Prince through customs and drove him to the Four Seasons Hotel. MBZ owns the resort so Prince did not have to pay for his room. Prince met separately with Nader before meeting with MBZ. Nader warned Prince about the atmospherics of MBZ's court and the rent-seeking behavior of its members. Prince and Nader took a golf cart to MBZ's villa. Prince talked with MBZ about problems in peripheral countries where the UAE had troops, like Somalia, Libya and Yemen. MBZ was exasperated by the Obama administration. In Prince's mind, Prince was not there on behalf of the upcoming Trump administration. Prince did not play up his relationship with Bannon or anyone else close to Trump. MBZ asked though whether Prince thought that the Trump administration would support the ideas that they were discussing. In response, Prince cited Trump's campaign promises and what Prince had heard from Trump's Strategic Policy Advisor, Bannon, on the issues. Prince spent about an hour and a half with MBZ. MBZ offered Prince a ride back to Abu Dhabi on MBZ's airplane. At the end of the meeting, one of MBZ's people said that there was a Russian guy at the resort, that the UAE had put money into his funds, and that he would be a useful guy for Prince to meet.

After the MBZ meeting, Prince went back to his room and napped. Prince then went to dinner, he believes Nader ate dinner with him. After dinner, Prince and Nader walked over to the bar and met Dmitriev. Dmitriev's wife was with him but soon walked away. Dmitriev spent the first six or seven minutes discussing his hope that their countries could work better together. Prince responded that if Roosevelt could work with Stalin to defeat the Nazis then Trump and Putin could work together to fight terrorism. Dmitriev also talked about the two countries resuming normal trade relations, but Prince does not recall Dmitriev specifically mentioning sanctions. Dmitriev knew Prince had been a loud advocate for Trump but Prince does not recall Dmitriev speaking as if Prince was a contact to the Trump people. Dmitriev did not say when he had been asked to meet with Prince or who asked him to meet with Prince. Prince understood that Dmitriev was in the Seychelles to meet MBZ. Prince and Dmitriev spent most of their time discussing oil prices. Prince owns a

geoscience business that searches for oil. Prince explained to Dmitriev how the Saudis failed to put the U.S. fracking companies out of business by increasing production to keep prices low because the companies continued to operate under U.S. bankruptcy laws. Dmitriev insinuated to Prince that he wanted Prince to pass along the message of better relations to people in the U.S. Dmitriev emphasized wanting to get past the past. Prince does not recall any discussion of potential Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential election. Prince had a beer during their conversation.

Prince went back to his room after the meeting with Dmitriev. Prince got a message from a Libyan friend that the Russian aircraft carrier Kuznetsov had been toured by Khalifa Haftar of Libya. Prince contacted Nader and asked to meet with Dmitriev again. Prince initially told investigators that the second meeting also occurred in the bar. After Agents showed Prince images of Villa [redacted] at the Four Seasons Seychelles (Document 6), Prince stated that his second meeting with Dmitriev was in Nader's villa. Prince pointed out to Dmitriev that Dmitriev had talked about wanting to work together but that Prince personally thought that the Kuznetsov incident would be offensive to the Trump administration. Dmitriev answered that he did not know about the incident and that the Russian armed forces sometimes got ahead of themselves.

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Prince told Nader that he would let Bannon know that Prince had talked with Dmitriev. Prince would pass along to Bannon that someone in the Russian power structure was interested in better relations.

Prior to meeting Dmitriev, Prince read Dmitriev's biography that Nader had previously sent him. Prince cannot recall how he knew to look in his cell phone for Dmitriev's information. Prince posits that Nader must have told him that Dmitriev is the person about which I previously sent you information. Even given the fact that Nader had sent the information earlier, Prince is not sure whether the meeting between him and Dmitriev was pre-arranged. Having read the biography and knowing that Dmitriev managed Russia's sovereign wealth fund, Prince knew before the meeting that Dmitriev had strong political connections in Russia.

[redacted]

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On the plane back to Abu Dhabi, Prince spoke alone with MBZ for about an hour. They mostly talked about planes and Prince's idea for using a modified crop duster as a counterinsurgency plane. MBZ is a

gearhead. Prince does not recall discussing Dmitriev with MBZ. Prince landed in Abu Dhabi and went to China the next day. Prince spent three or four days in China before flying back to the U.S. on January 15.

The next day, on January 16, Prince met with Bannon at the Breitbart house. [redacted] Prince also told Bannon about his meetings with MBZ and Dmitriev. Prince said that MBZ was interested in his solution to the fighting in Yemen and other areas. Prince described Dmitriev as a Western educated, sovereign wealth fund manager. Prince told Bannon that Dmitriev wanted an improved and more cooperative relationship with the U.S. On the morning of January 16, before visiting Bannon, Prince captured a screenshot of Dmitriev's Wikipedia page on his cell phone (Document 8). Prince believes that he captured the image so that he could remember Dmitriev's name when he met with Bannon. Prince cannot recall whether he showed Bannon the screenshot. Likewise, Prince cannot recall whether he told Bannon that the meeting was in the Seychelles.

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Prince reviewed a January 17, 2017, message from Nader asking if Prince had time to meet with [redacted] (Document 9) Prince replied yes. Prince does not know who [redacted] is. Nader then messaged "[w]hat about Kirill?" (Document 9) Prince does not think he responded to this message. Prince does not recall communicating with Nader about Dmitriev after they left the Seychelles. Prince does not recall sending a message to Nader stating Prince had been contacted by the Senate Intel Committee "all thanks to the Russian guy you wanted me to meet." Nader would not take any action unless it was approved by MBZ. Prince does not know why he would have wrote "you" wanted me to meet when it was one of MBZ's other people that suggested the meeting unless it was because Nader walked Prince into the meetings with MBZ and Dmitriev. Prior to the Washington Post article in April 2017, only Bannon, Nader, Dmitriev and the UAE officials knew that Prince had met with Dmitriev. Prince may have told Flynn but he does not believe that he told Flynn.

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On the day of his testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Prince believed that he was only going to speak with Devin Nunes about illegal unmasking of Americans and the wrongful use of SIGINT. Prince agreed to the release of his HPSCI testimony because, after speaking with [redacted] Prince did not believe that he had a choice.

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[redacted] MBZ would have arranged the meeting for strategic reasons such as chipping away at the relationship between Russia and Iran.

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[redacted] b7E





**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 01/04/2019

[redacted] b7E

Jerome Robert Corsi, date of birth (DOB) [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC in the presence of his attorney, [redacted] Present for the interview were FBI Special Agent (SA) [redacted] FBI SA [redacted] FBI Intelligence Analyst (IA) [redacted] Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Jeannie S. Rhee, SASC Andrew Goldstein, and Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky. Prior to the interview, Corsi signed a proffer agreement, originally signed on September 21, 2018. Corsi was advised that intentional false statements during this interview would be a violation of federal law. After being advised of the purpose of the interview and identities of the interviewing Agents, Corsi provided the following information: b6 b7C

Corsi had remained silent on his media platforms, for approximately two months, and since he was first approached by representatives from the Special Counsel's Office. He will eventually return to those activities because he depends on them for income.

Corsi spent the evening prior to this interview trying to reconstruct events that were discussed in previous interviews. Corsi wanted to remember certain things but could not and he became frustrated as a result. Corsi had a hard time determining whether or not he was actually remembering things or if he was inventing them. Corsi forgot a lot of events given they happened over two years ago.

[redacted] b7E

Investigation on 10/31/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person) b6 b7C

File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/19/2018 b7E

by [redacted]

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[redacted] b7E Corsi said he would do his best in this interview and try to remember key events in this interview.

Corsi began working for Roger Stone in February 2016. He became an operative for him.

Corsi did not remember the topics of Wikileaks and Assange as being a constant subject of discussion with Stone. Rather, he remembered having a lot of conversations with Stone about Hillary Clinton's missing 30,000 emails. Corsi did not start watching Assange until after Assange created a search engine for his information and therefore, he did not believe Wikileaks was a large topic of discussion for him in February 2016.

Corsi cited the New York Times v. United States case and remembered telling Stone that, as a journalist, he could talk to Assange and it wouldn't be a crime. Corsi thought he could also bring things to Assange for Stone. Corsi believed he may have discussed that with Stone over a dinner, perhaps sometime in February 2016. Corsi has had multiple dinners with Stone.

When asked what intent Corsi had when he told Stone he was a journalist who could reach Assange, Corsi said his impression was that he was trying to let Stone know he could get to Assange. When asked who else he may have told, Corsi said he may have also told [redacted] Corsi and [redacted] had discussed the possibility of contacting Assange through their organization, WorldNetDaily (WND). If [redacted] would have sent Corsi to meet with Assange he would have gone. [redacted] did not do so. Corsi thought he might have audio recordings with [redacted] where they discussed the possibility of meeting with Assange. b6 b7C

When asked if he had reservations in making attempts to contact Assange, Corsi said he had two. First of all, Corsi did not believe he would be breaking the law if he contacted Assange but he did not want to surface on the radar of any intelligence agencies as a result of doing so. Secondly, even if Assange had wanted to meet with him, Corsi did not believe Assange would have shared information with Corsi about what would be coming in future releases of information.

On or about July 22, 2016, Wikileaks released a series of emails belonging to Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Corsi remembered the event and referred to it as "the Schultz drop." A day after the Schultz drop, Assange publicly stated he had more information to come and Corsi wanted to know what it was. Corsi began reviewing the information from the Schultz drop immediately, which was approximately 40,000 emails released over a two-day

period. Corsi examined the senders and recipients of each email. Corsi also compiled a list of the emails which he posted online. What jumped out to Corsi was that all of the emails pertained to operatives in the Democratic National Committee (DNC). Corsi looked for emails from John Podesta and did not find any. From that, Corsi deduced that Assange's next release of information would likely pertain to Podesta. Corsi said he likely shared what he had deduced with Stone.

[redacted]

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Corsi was asked if he also looked at what was released by DCLeaks and he confirmed that he had. Corsi downloaded the DCLeaks release and put them into a file. He remembered downloading a compressed [.zip] file and going through each file one by one. Corsi remembered seeing files with the initials NGP on them. Corsi knew those to be the initials of [redacted]

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Corsi said he believed there were two ways to hack a computer. First, having the username and password credentials for a legitimate user on a system. Second, having access to a server where the emails passed through. Corsi believed the information from the Schultz drop seemed they were obtained from a server where they had passed through. In addition to the lack of emails from Podesta, Corsi also noticed that the last email had been sent in late May 2016. Therefore, Corsi believed the emails were likely to have been stolen around that time.

Corsi advised that he knew Seth Rich had been killed at 4:30 AM on July 10, 2016. The circumstances surrounding Rich's death were suspicious to Corsi. Specifically, he wanted to know where Rich's laptop went. Corsi then explained there had been speculation as to whether or not Rich had actually stolen the emails from the DNC, rather than them having been hacked.

Corsi's source, [redacted] told Corsi she is crazy, but Corsi continues to rely on her for information because her reporting is good. Corsi provided an example of how [redacted] had tracked down [redacted] who was involved in setting up a private server for Clinton.

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Corsi knew [redacted] to be obsessed with another individual, [redacted] b6 b7C
Corsi has shared information from [redacted] with Stone. When Corsi relayed information from his sources he usually told people in a way that portrayed, "this is the way it is." Corsi does not usually cite his sources by name.

Corsi was asked what Stone understood his connection to Assange to be in July 2016. Corsi said he did not know what Stone thought at the time and he did not remember having any discussions with Stone about it. Corsi was sure he and Stone had discussed Wikileaks however, because everybody was talking about it.

Corsi was shown an email [Document 1] he received from Stone on July 25, 2016. In the email, Stone told Corsi to "Get to Assange." Corsi did not know what was going through Stone's mind when he sent the email but surmised that the two of them likely had prior discussions about Assange. Corsi and others were constantly talking about Assange after the Schultz drop. Corsi said it seemed as if the world had stopped after the Schultz drop and he did nothing but review the emails for several days to see what Assange had.

Corsi was shown an email [Document 2] where he forwarded Stone's initial request of "Get to Assange" to Ted Malloch on July 25, 2016. After reading it, Corsi said he must have also had prior discussions with Malloch about Assange. Corsi added he may have also had a FaceTime call with Malloch about Assange but he did not remember the details of what was discussed. Corsi said it would have made sense if they discussed how they could reach Assange. Malloch was a professor at the University of Oxford and Corsi thought Malloch might be able to reach Assange, possibly through a direct message on Twitter. Stone also wanted to investigate Bill Clinton's activities at the University of Oxford. Stone and Corsi believed Malloch could be useful with that effort.

When asked whether he and Malloch ever discussed Nigel Farage, Corsi said they had but not at the time he forwarded the email from Stone to Malloch. Corsi rather remembered having discussions with Malloch about Brexit at the time and believed the discussions about Farage occurred later in time. When asked if they ever discussed getting in touch with Assange through someone in Nigel Farage's orbit, Corsi said it would have made sense if they had but he didn't remember doing so. Corsi then immediately said, "I'm sure I must have."

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Later in the interview, Corsi said he did not remember having any discussions with Malloch about reaching Assange through Farage. Corsi explained that he viewed Malloch as [redacted]
Corsi was sure he had discussions with Stone about Malloch reaching

Assange [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] Corsi also knew Malloch had an extensive rolodex of well-placed contacts. Corsi first met Malloch through an introduction from [redacted] over the telephone.

Corsi spent a lot of time thinking about Podesta during his flight to Italy on July 26, 2016. Various pieces came to him on the flight and Corsi deduced that the upcoming emails would likely be related to Podesta. Corsi could not explain exactly how he came up with the idea that they would pertain to Podesta but he distinctly remembered thinking, "this is what they're going to do." Corsi said it was compilation of information he had learned over time, through sort of an asteroid belt analogy. Corsi believed [redacted] could verify his deduction because he told her about it while they were in Italy. b6 b7C

Corsi thought he may have had a conversation with Stone prior to his trip and Stone told him the upcoming leaks would pertain to the Clinton Foundation. Several times during this interview Corsi re-iterated that he thought Stone was out in left field in that belief and while on the plane to Italy, he deduced that the upcoming information would rather pertain to Podesta.

**07/31/2016 EMAIL FROM ROGER STONE**

Corsi was shown an email he received from Stone [Document 3] on July 31, 2016 where Stone wrote to Corsi, "Malloch should see Assange." After reading the email, Corsi said he was sure they had a bunch of conversations about Malloch getting to Assange and that he and Stone likely had prior conversations about it before he received the email. Stone wanted Malloch to see Assange and Malloch wanted a job with the Trump campaign. Stone told Malloch if he wanted a job with the campaign then he needed to do something of value. Corsi assessed Stone to be very transactional in nature.

[redacted] b6 b7C

Corsi explained that by forwarding Stone's email request to Malloch he was merely complying with what Stone wanted him to do. Corsi did not expect Malloch to actually do anything with the request which was why he only wrote something to the effect of, "Ted, from Roger," and included no additional instructions for Malloch. Corsi generally had much more detailed discussions with Malloch and provided two examples; when he tried to get Malloch a job on the Trump campaign and when he introduced Malloch to Sam Clovis. Corsi did not actually think Malloch would do anything to reach Assange.

When asked if he ever remembered having a FaceTime conversation with Malloch about what Assange had planned to do, Corsi said he only remembered having such a discussion with [redacted] Corsi believed that discussion occurred sometime before he left for Italy, possibly on July 25, 2016. Corsi has known [redacted] since approximately 2004. [redacted] also thought Rich stole the emails from the DNC and believed the British and John Brennan were behind the Fusion GPS dossier. [redacted] also believed the upcoming Wikileaks information would pertain to Podesta. [redacted] told Corsi he believed Assange was smart and strategic, and that if Assange didn't drop all of the emails at once then there would be a second drop sometime in October. b6 b7C

**08/02/2016 EMAIL TO ROGER STONE**

Corsi was shown an email [Document 4] he sent Stone on August 2, 2016. In the email he told Stone, "Word is friend in embassy plans 2 more dumps." Corsi read the email and said he had never seen it before. [**Agent note:** Corsi was then afforded time to review the email privately with his attorney.] Corsi read each line of the email out loud and provided an explanation for each one.

Sentence 1 [redacted] Return home Aug 12." Corsi was with [redacted] Italy, [redacted] Corsi advised [redacted] and would be returning to the United States on August 12, 2016. b6 b7C

Sentence 2 - "Word is friend in embassy plans 2 more dumps. One shortly after I'm back. Impact planned to be very damaging." Corsi used the phrase "word is" in his email because he was boasting and inventing that he had a source who was providing him information. Corsi said it was the only explanation because he did not recall having anyone else. Corsi remembered Assange had publically stated that he had more information on Clinton, and Corsi speculated that it would likely come in the form of two more dumps, but that ultimately did not happen. Later in the interview, Corsi said

Stone had been pushing the idea of the possibility of two dumps but Corsi ultimately moved away from that.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
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[redacted]

b6
b7C

Sentence 6 - "Time to let more than Podesta to be exposed as in bed w enemy if they are not ready to drop HRC." [redacted]

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Sentence 7 - "That appears to be the game hackers are now about. Would not hurt to start suggesting HRC old, memory bad, has stroke - neither he nor she well. I expect that much of next dump focus, setting stage for Foundation debacle." Corsi was not sure why he wrote the sentence beginning with, "That appears to be the game the hackers are now about." Corsi wrote, "I expect that much of next dump focus, setting stage for Foundation debacle" because he believed Assange's next dump would focus on the Clinton Foundation. Corsi then added that he had been wrong about that belief.

[redacted]

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[redacted] b6 b7C

Corsi was asked what he was referring to when he used the phrase "friend in embassy" in his email. Corsi said he was referring to Assange but he did not want to use his name because Stone may have thought Corsi was being boastful. When asked if Corsi wrote the email to suggest that the information was coming from Malloch, Corsi stated he did not remember that being the case, nor did he remember having any discussions about Malloch with Stone at that time.

Later in the interview Corsi advised he was being deliberately oblique in his email, using "secret squirrel stuff," because he did not want the information to be decoded. Corsi admitted he was using suggestive language with Stone to portray that Corsi was a source of information for Stone.

Corsi explained that when he figured something out, sometimes out of left field, he often used the phrase "word is" to provide validity to his statements. Corsi said it seemed likely that he wanted Stone to believe he had the information from Assange. Corsi then added that he was likely relaying three things to Stone; 1) there would be more upcoming information released, 2) it pertained to Podesta, and 3) it would be released in seriatim. When asked if he shared that information with Stone upon his return, Corsi stated that he believed he had, in a follow-up phone call with Stone after Corsi had returned from Italy.

Later in the interview, Corsi said he did not remember receiving any information from Wikileaks or Assange, but he was not saying that it did not happen.

**08/10/2016 EMAIL TO [redacted]**

Corsi was shown an email he sent to [redacted] b6 b7C

**RETURN FROM ITALY 08/12/2016**

Corsi [redacted] returned from Italy on August 12, 2016. [redacted] b6 b7C

**08/15/2016 EMAIL FROM CORSI**

ASC Zelinsky read Corsi an email that Corsi sent to [redacted] and [redacted] on August 15, 2016. In the email Corsi said, "Despite MSM drumroll that HRC is already elected, it's not over yet. More to come than anyone realizes. Won't really get started until after Labor Day." When asked what he was referring to, Corsi said, "must have been Podesta emails." b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] Corsi added that he never did anything to dissuade Stone from thinking he had a source of information, nor did Corsi ever say that he didn't have a contact for information.

Corsi recalled having a phone call with Stone where he discussed the fact that Wikileaks had Podesta's emails and that they would be released seriatim. Corsi deduced that information himself, [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

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COVER-UP OPERATION

Corsi recalled that on October 7, 2016, Access Hollywood released a recording of Trump having a conversation with Billy Bush during which Trump spoke about grabbing women by the genitals. On or about that same day, Wikileaks released the information about Podesta. [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7C

Corsi remembered sitting at his computer, looking for materials and seeing Podesta at the top of the document. The purpose of the article was to plant sources in the paragraphs of the article, which was 8 pages long, so

that they could be sourced as being derived from open source materials.

[redacted] b6 b7C

Corsi felt like he had solid research. Corsi then said he had no distinct memory of looking at public sources, doing any research at that time,

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] Corsi recalled the articles related to Viktor Vekselberg as being difficult to read. Corsi could not recall where he was when he read those papers.

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

Corsi reviewed an email dated November 30, 2017 from Stone to Corsi [[Document 10] in which they wrote about Randy Credico and Stone wrote "Credico will take the 5th—but let's hold a day—-".Corsi did not think the email had anything to do with protecting Corsi's identity. Corsi did not recall Stone indicating Corsi was a source for Stone. Corsi added he thought Stone talked too much.

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

Corsi remembered when [redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

Corsi thought he told [redacted] Malloch, Stone, [redacted] [redacted] about Assange having the Podesta emails.

[redacted] b7E





**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 02/17/2019

On 02/15/2019 Special Agent [redacted] Intelligence Analyst [redacted] Senior Assistant Special Counsels Greg Andres, Jeannie Rhee, and Andrew Weissman interviewed RICHARD GATES (GATES) at the Special Counsel's Office. Present for the interview was GATES's counsel, Tom Greene. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, GATES provided the following information: b6 b7C

GATES has never seen FD-302s written related to his interviews with the Special Counsel's Office.

**Polling Data Sent to KONSTANTIN KILIMNIK**

MANAFORT directed GATES to send internal polling data from the DONALD J. TRUMP CAMPAIGN to KONSTANTIN KILIMNIK (KILIMNIK), and GATES did so. The internal polling data was provided by TONY FABRIZIO (FABRIZIO). GATES utilized WHATSAPP to forward the "top line" internal polling data to KILIMNIK. [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

GATES understood KILIMNIK would send the internal polling data on to Ukrainian oligarchs at MANAFORT's request [redacted] MANAFORT wanted to show Ukrainian oligarchs that he was doing "wonders" with the TRUMP Campaign in securing the nomination. OLEG DERIPASKA was also in the mix. GATES recalled, however, that the letter to DERIPASKA was related to MANAFORT's and DERIPASKA's legal dispute. GATES does not specifically know if MANAFORT sent internal polling data to DERIPASKA. b6 b7C

[redacted] The majority of polling was done in battleground states. [redacted] GATES recalled there would be a list of five or six states per poll. b6 b7A b7C

Investigation on 02/15/2019 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/15/2019

by [redacted] b6 b7C b7E

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As an example, GATES recalled that some in the campaign were concerned if TRUMP could have won Georgia. So, though not a battleground state, Georgia would appear on the list of polled states and drop off periodically. Additionally, the campaign strategy did not rely solely on the polling data. TRUMP felt he would win Virgina without the need for polling.

GATES deleted the WHATSAPP messages as soon as they were sent to KILIMNIK. MANAFORT did not ask GATES to do this. GATES deleted the messages because he was concerned about KUSHNER finding out GATES had sent the data.

[GATES was shown Document ID 0.7.4249.179465 (Document 1)]

GATES recalled Document 1 and did not believe it was "polling data" as viewed in campaign terms, but a media market document instead. MANAFORT wanted to put MIKE PENCE (PENCE) in areas where the media market was borderline on TRUMP. This is different than a "poll." Document 1 did, however, identify polling data to show states that were pro or anti TRUMP to assist the campaign in scheduling PENCE's appearances.

[GATES was shown Document ID 0.7.4730.110442 (Memo)]

[redacted]

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b7C

GATES specifically recalled seeing the data based on the cities identified in Document 1. GATES was asked if he recalled the subject of an email "VP DMA list." GATES recalled Document 1 by the cities and because it was the one time they discussed PENCE's travel scheduling. PENCE's team came back to them a couple weeks later and said the devised schedule was not working for them.

MANAFORT, GATES, [redacted] had access to the Document 1. GATES recalled using it to create the master schedule with [redacted] GATES printed the top copy of the Document 1.

Document 1 contained relevant campaign information because it informed decision making as to where PENCE was to travel. GATES recalled the Document 1 had value to the internal strategy of the campaign. MANAFORT's strategic decision of where to send PENCE was based on that document.

**Meeting with KONSTANTIN KILIMNIK**

GATES did not recall bringing Document 1 to the meeting, or any other documents. GATES does not know if documents were passed to KILIMNIK at the 08/02/2016 meeting with MANAFORT and KILIMNIK. GATES arrived late and did not see any documents passed during the portion at which he was present. When GATES arrived he received a brief recap of topics previously discussed including the legal issues with DERIPASKA. GATES does not know if everything discussed prior to his arrival was recapped.

At the 08/02/2016 meeting with GATES, MANAFORT, and KILIMNIK there was a much more detailed discussion of internal polling data compared to the data GATES sent to KILIMNIK via WHATSAPP. At the dinner meeting, GATES, MANAFORT, and KILIMNIK discussed internal polling from FABRIZIO which included battleground states. GATES recalled Pennsylvania, Wisconsin,

Minnesota, and Michigan as states MANAFORT discussed. [redacted] GATES recalled MANAFORT discussed internal polling from other sources including CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA. The information provided in this meeting by MANAFORT to KILIMNIK was based on internal information and polls; it was a synthesis that included internal polling data. b3 b6 b7C

GATES stated they did not discuss the PENCE scheduling information with KILIMNIK. GATES said that Vice Presidential Candidates did not win elections, so there was no point in discussing PENCE's scheduling with KILIMNIK.

[redacted] b7E

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

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 03/09/2018

RICHARD GATES III (GATES) was proffered at the Office of the Special Counsel, Washington, D.C. Present for the proffer were FBI Special Agent [redacted], DOJ Senior Financial Investigator [redacted], and Special Counsel Attorney Andrew Weissmann. Also present was GATES' attorney Tom Green with the law firm Sidley Austin LLP. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the proffer, GATES provided the following information: b6 b7C

GATES initially discussed the hiccup of signing the plea agreement over the past few days. GATES explained the prior five days have been very difficult for him and his family. He spoke at length to [redacted] about the ramifications of pleading guilty to the charged offenses. b6 b7C

Over the past several days, GATES spoke to a number of other individuals about whether to sign the plea agreement. He first spoke to [redacted] who GATES considered a mentor. GATES asked [redacted] for advice about what to do. b6 b7C

GATES also spoke to PAUL MANAFORT (MANAFORT) three times. He spoke to MANAFORT on the phone. On Tuesday February 20, 2018, GATES told MANAFORT he was not going forward with the plea agreement. They also spoke about getting their lawyers together to talk; however, their lawyers never spoke to each other. GATES also asked MANAFORT about tapping into the Legal Defense Fund resources to help pay for some of his mounting legal expenses. MANAFORT told him to apply for the funding.

GATES also had two calls with MANAFORT on Wednesday February 21, 2018, both concerning the Legal Defense Fund. GATES told MANAFORT the Legal Defense Fund would receive his application by the end of the week. GATES was hopeful to get money from the fund before signing the plea agreement. To date, GATES had not submitted the application. GATES also contended there was nothing said between he and MANAFORT about GATES not cooperating with the Special Counsel because GATES could not afford it. MANAFORT did not know GATES intended to sign the plea agreement.

Investigation on 02/22/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/23/2018

by [redacted]

b6 b7C b7E

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GATES stated he would like to tell MANAFORT he would be signing the plea agreement. GATES would also have his attorney with him when he called MANAFORT.

In the past couple days, GATES stated the only person he has spoken to associated with President DONALD TRUMP's (TRUMP) Administration was [redacted]. In particular, GATES and [redacted] discussed past inauguration activities and the filing of IRS tax form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax. [redacted] was specifically soliciting GATES' historical knowledge with the PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURAL COMMITTEE (PIC). b6 b7C

GATES also spoke to [redacted]. [redacted] was with the [redacted] and worked with GATES on [redacted] [redacted] They discussed GATES' situation generally. b6 b7C

On Tuesday February 20, 2018, GATES spoke to [redacted] about [redacted] At the time, GATES had departed ways with his attorney so he and [redacted] also spoke about hiring another defense attorney. b6 b7C b7A

GATES spoke with [redacted], who he described as a business partner and someone he shared an apartment with. Together, he and [redacted] made up a white board with pros and cons for him signing the plea agreement. He and [redacted] have also spoken in the past, generally, about the possibility of a Presidential Pardon. b6 b7C

GATES also stated he and MANAFORT have spoken in the past about the possibility of receiving a Presidential Pardon. MANAFORT told GATES of his relationship with TRUMP's personal attorney, JOHN DOWD (DOWD). DOWD suggested an opinion that TRUMP was watching the case closely.

He also spoke to [redacted] and [redacted] about a Presidential Pardon. GATES stated no one has told him he would be pardoned by TRUMP. b6 b7C

[redacted] b7E



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

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 02/25/2019

On 02/22/2019 Special Agent [redacted] Intelligence Analyst [redacted] Senior Assistant Special Counsels Greg Andres and Andrew Weissmann interviewed RICHARD GATES (GATES) via telephone. GATES's counsel THOMAS GREEN (GREEN) was not present on the call, however, the attached email communication indicated Green approved the direct contact. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agent and the nature of the interview, GATES provided the following information: b6 b7C

[SASC Weissmann admonished GATES that any questions were not intended to reveal any communications with GREEN or anyone from GREEN's office. Weissmann further admonished GATES to not discuss any attorney-client privileged information of any kind during the interview; which included any information from which GATES's sole knowledge came through GREEN or GREEN's office.]

[GATES was admonished to not discuss communications between GATES and [redacted] [redacted] b6 b7C

When asked if since it had become publicly known that the U.S. Government was alleging that [redacted] had GATES had any conversations, excluding privileged, with anyone regarding the substance of the suspected violation, including the topics of KONSTANTIN KILIMNIK (KILIMNIK) or the sharing of polling data [redacted] b6 b7C

GATES recalled [redacted] alerted GATES to the allegation discussed above, as well, but their communication had no substance. b6 b7C

GATES was not contacted by, nor did he have any substantive discussions regarding the allegation with, [redacted] or anyone in [redacted] GATES did not receive any messages from these people. b6 b7C

Investigation on 02/22/2019 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/22/2019

by [redacted] b6 b7C b7E

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GATES stated that his counsel GREEN had been mistaken in indicating to the Special Counsel's Office that GATES

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[redacted] b7E



FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2043
DATE: 10-20-2020

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

~~SECRET~~ (U)

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Date of entry 11/08/2018

Paul J. Manafort, date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agents [redacted] FBI Intelligence Analyst [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres. Present representing Manafort were attorneys Kevin Downing and Thomas Zehnle and paralegal [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, Manafort provided the following information: b6 b7C

Manafort met Konstantin Kilimnik in the United States twice during 2016 - once in the Havana Room in New York and once at the Four Seasons in New York. The Four Seasons meeting occurred sometime before the Havana Room meeting but after Manafort became Trump's Campaign Chairperson. At the Four Seasons, they talked primarily about the Trump Campaign, events in Ukraine and the money owed by Ukrainian oligarchs to Manafort. [redacted] Their meeting lasted about an hour and a half or two hours. Manafort, through Rick Gates, arranged and paid for Kilimnik's train ticket from New York to Washington, D.C. and back. Manafort did not pay for Kilimnik's airfare to the U.S. b6 b7A b7C

At the time they met, Kilimnik was working for Serhiy Lyovochkin. During the meeting, Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the Trump Campaign. Manafort intended for Kilimnik to pass the information back to individuals in Ukraine and elsewhere. The Opposition Bloc members recognized that Manafort's position on the Campaign offered them a good opportunity. Kilimnik, however, did not ask for anything based on Manafort's position with the Campaign. Kilimnik updated Manafort on Ukraine. They mostly talked about how to get people in the occupied zone to participate in elections. These people are part of the Opposition Bloc's base. According to Kilimnik, Yuriy Boyko, the face of the Opposition Bloc in 2016, said he could get them to participate in the elections. Boyko was part of Lyovochkin's faction of the Opposition Bloc.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

Investigation on 10/11/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/12/2018

by [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~ (U)

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While Kilimnik worked for Manafort, Kilimnik met two or three times a month with the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) Schultz and the Political Director, First Name Unknown (FNU) Last Name Unknown (LNU) at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv. Kilimnik briefed Manafort after Kilimnik's meetings. Kilimnik also dealt with the German, French and Italian Embassies in Kyiv. Kilimnik was especially close with the German Embassy. Kilimnik did not deal with the British Embassy because it was not as important for Ukraine's integration into the European Union. During his 2016 trip, Manafort believes that Kilimnik was meeting in Washington, D.C. with DCM Schultz. Manafort is not aware of any other trips that Kilimnik took to the U.S. in 2016.

[redacted] Someone told this to Manafort. [redacted] and may have told Manafort. Manafort told Kilimnik. (S)

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If Manafort had something urgent to discuss with Jared Kushner during the Transition, it would have been either appointments or personnel concerns about the Transition staff itself. Chris Christie ran the Transition until after the election. During the Campaign, an Executive Committee for the Transition was set up that included Manafort, Kushner, Christie and Rick Dearborn. Within the Transition itself were teams for each Department or Agency. Christie staffed the teams with Washington insiders that knew how to deal with these Departments and Agencies. Kushner and Christie were not close. Kushner engineered the Transition away from Christie and his people. Christie asked Manafort to try to repair his relationship with Kushner. Christie was also concerned that the next level of people, below top level, were not getting appointed fast enough. Manafort had four or five telephone calls with Kushner during the Transition. Manafort had no success in talking with Kushner about these issues.

Manafort reviewed NOSC00021598-599. Manafort does not recall what he wanted to discuss with Kushner that was "important and time sensitive." It would have been either appointments or personnel concerns. Manafort wanted to meet in person so he could get more time and attention from Kushner than would have occurred during a telephone call. Manafort wanted "total discretion" for the meeting because of the media scrutiny on him. Manafort was not concerned about anyone in the Transition learning about their meeting. It was the meeting itself, not the topics, that needed secrecy. Manafort never spoke with Kushner about Ukraine.

Manafort reviewed a 01/19/2017 e-mail chain between Manafort and [redacted] regarding "Names." In the first e-mail, Manafort wrote "fire drill time." Secretary of State had been one of the last cabinet positions filled. Manafort and [redacted] were concerned that Rex Tillerson would not bring on the right people. Steve Beguin was a key guy as far as [redacted] was concerned. Beguin brought the necessary knowledge but he was not part of Washington. Manafort anticipated recommending people for positions but he had not been asked. Manafort planned to aggressively fill the vacuum caused by the Transition's failure to select people. [redacted] really liked [redacted] a Russian/Eastern European think tank expert. Manafort has met [redacted] once or twice. [redacted] set up a meeting between [redacted] Manafort and [redacted] and [redacted] wanted to get Ukraine into Europe and were willing with deal with Yanukovych. David Kramer, on the other hand, is an idealogue who would not have dealt with Ukraine if Yanukovych was there. As to the people that [redacted] recommended in the e-mail, Manafort did not work with any of them in Ukraine. In addition to the people [redacted] recommended, Manafort pushed [redacted] for Head of Protocol. [redacted] did not get the position. Manafort knew [redacted] from the Bush and Reagan days. [redacted] worked for Manafort on the Trump convention. [redacted] had been involved in business activities in Ukraine, maybe for an energy company. [redacted] dealt with Ukraine during the Obama years. [redacted] wrote that [redacted] asks me every day when RA is going to get a visa to visit America." [redacted] has a relationship with Rinat Akhmetov. [redacted] worked for Akhmetov. [redacted] worked for a major Russian company. Manafort thought that if Beguin became Deputy Secretary of State, they could try to [redacted] Manafort did not know why [redacted] Akhmetov owned a metallurgy company in the U.S. Manafort never worked for or with Akhmetov's U.S. company.

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[redacted] came to the U.S. in early 2018 and met with Manafort. They met in Kevin Downing's law offices in Washington, D. C. First Name Unknown (FNU) Last Name Unknown (LNU) asked Manafort to represent [redacted] in Ukraine's 2019 presidential election. FNU LNU lives in the U.S. [redacted] connected Manafort with FNU LNU. After first hearing from FNU LNU, Manafort called Kilimnik. Kilimnik said [redacted] was not a first tier candidate and could not get enough support from the Opposition Bloc and their supporters. Manafort first said no to FNU LNU because [redacted] was not a real prospect. FNU LNU asked again and Manafort agreed to meet [redacted] did not speak English. They discussed money for Manafort and possible coalitions that would support [redacted] candidacy. Manafort agreed to audit [redacted] chances and give him an answer in June 2018, at which point they could both decide

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whether to go forward together. Manafort planned to start with a poll but did not actually conduct it because [redacted] did not send the money. Manafort ended up assessing [redacted] potential candidacy based on information Kilimnik collected by talking with people in Ukraine. In June 2018, Manafort told [redacted] that he should not run. [redacted] paid Manafort about [redacted] from a business account. Manafort does not recall in which country the business account was located. The money probably came into Steam Mountain. Manafort performed about 25 to 30 hours of work.

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[redacted] purchased a boost mobile phone at the beginning of 2018. Manafort wanted to talk securely with Kilimnik. Manafort may also have called Rick Gates on the phone. Manafort did not send any messages on the phone. Kilimnik was collecting materials from Borys Kolesnikov and [redacted] for Manafort's defense. Kilimnik sent the materials to Manafort's hushmail account.

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Victor Boyarkin had been impressed with something Manafort did [redacted]

b7A

Boyarkin worked for Deripaska. Manafort met Boyarkin only once. Manafort met Boyarkin in Deripaska's offices in Moscow sometime between 2006 and 2008. Manafort was there to meet with Deripaska. Manafort does not recall whether Boyarkin was in the meeting or introduced separately. Manafort and Boyarkin talked for about thirty minutes. Boyarkin does not speak or write English. Manafort used a translator whenever communicating with Boyarkin. Boyarkin was a bland guy, 5'10", overweight with gray hair. Boyarkin coordinated Deripaska's projects on which Manafort worked [redacted] Boyarkin relayed messages from Deripaska but did not speak for him. [redacted]

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[redacted] Kilimnik, Akhmetov and Serhiy Lyovochkin told Manafort that Poroshenko and [redacted] were business partners. b6 b7A b7C

Rick Davis hired [redacted] to work in Ukraine on matters related to Deripaska. When Manafort took over the lead on the Deripaska account, [redacted] began working for Manafort. [redacted] ran the operation in Ukraine from about 2005 to 2010. Kilimnik worked as number two. [redacted] left Ukraine right after Yanukovych became President. Manafort and [redacted] talked about once a month after [redacted] left. Manafort does not know any of [redacted] clients after he left. In 2017, [redacted] worked for Manafort in Kurdistan. Manafort was advising the Prime Minister on the referendum and other matters of U.S. and European policy. Manafort selected [redacted] to work in Kurdistan because he was available and Manafort trusted him. [redacted] worked for about two months during the September to December 2017 timeframe. Manafort was introduced to the Kurdish Prime Minister by Manafort's friends in Dubai. The Kurdish Prime Minister directly hired Manafort. Payment for Manafort's work in Kurdistan came into Steam Mountain. Manafort has not used offshore accounts since 2014. Gates said he shut down all of the offshore accounts. Manafort paid [redacted] about [redacted] Kurdistan paid [redacted] expenses. Manafort did not pay [redacted] in cash. b6 b7C

Manafort did not encourage [redacted] to talk with the press or media on behalf of Manafort. Manafort did not try to use [redacted] to get around the court's gag order. b6 b7C

[redacted] introduced Manafort to [redacted] has a consulting business but Manafort does not know what type of consulting that [redacted] does. During their meeting, Manafort and [redacted] talked about opportunities to work together. [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] introduced Manafort to the UAE's Head of Security, Talal. Talal recommended Manafort for work with a Crown Prince in Saudi Arabia and the b6 b7C

b7E

Emir in Bahrain. [redacted] Manafort never talked to any U.S. government official regarding his work for the UAE.

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Manafort last spoke with [redacted] in May 2018. Manafort communicated with [redacted] through WhatsApp or possibly Signal. Manafort used whatever application that [redacted] wanted to use. Manafort gave [redacted] advice on what to tell Talal about Manafort's issues in the U.S. Manafort talked with [redacted] about Manafort's case. Manafort did not ask [redacted] for any assistance related to his charges, the trial or the media.

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Manafort met [redacted] in the U.S. in 2017. Manafort believes that they met in New York, maybe at the Peninsula Hotel. There was no need to meet in person and nothing in particular that they did not want to discuss on the phone. They talked about work in Kurdistan and Iraq. [redacted] was in New York on other business. Manafort does not know why [redacted] was in the U.S.

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Manafort asked [redacted] if he knew Christopher Steele. [redacted] talked with [redacted] relayed to Manafort from [redacted] Manafort does not know [redacted] source of information.

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All of the information in the Steele dossier about Manafort is untrue, including the trips to Russia.

[redacted]

b6 b7C

During their meeting in the U.S., [redacted] updated Manafort on their projects. Manafort never met [redacted] in the U.S. Manafort did not ask [redacted] or [redacted] to do any work to check out the allegations in the Steele dossier. [redacted] introduced Manafort to an international firm that could conduct due diligence regarding Manafort's various accounts in Cyprus. The firm did not do any work because Manafort did not pursue it.

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Manafort reviewed messages between Manafort and [redacted] Manafort told [redacted] about his case. Neither [redacted] ever provided Manafort anything that he did not ask for. Manafort reviewed a message from [redacted] on 07/20/2017 stating that: b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

Manafort does not believe that the first sentence is [redacted] Manafort does not recall getting [redacted] spoke in flowery language and [redacted] saying a lot about nothing. Manafort does not know what [redacted] meant by [redacted] Manafort does not know who Oleg Erovinkin is. [redacted] b6 b7C

Manafort met with his attorneys during a break.

Manafort and [redacted] met in a hotel room in Washington, D.C. [redacted] talked about Christopher Steele, Talal and Kurdistan. After their meeting, [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

Manafort's only assignment to [redacted] was to [redacted] [redacted] Manafort talked with them about all elements of the investigation against him. They must have connected the dots and investigated further on their own initiative. b6 b7C

Manafort and [redacted] talked about the newspaper reporting on the dossier and the cash ledger. [redacted] knew that GPS Fusion had operations in Russia. They talked about how the June 9 meeting had no substance and thus may have been a setup. Manafort figured that the meeting was arranged to create questions about whether the Trump Campaign was working with the Russian government. The Russian government, or someone else, encouraged the Agaralovs to request the meeting with the plan that it would blow up into an allegation of collusion. Manafort's last question was who originated the setup plan. Manafort asked [redacted] to see [redacted] Manafort does not know why whoever set up the meeting did not make it public until after the election. b6 b7C

At their meeting, [redacted] and GPS Fusion's ability to work in Russia. [redacted] said GPS Fusion had clients in Russia and GPS Fusion had worked for the Russian government. [redacted] did not draw any conclusions regarding efforts to undermine the Trump Campaign. [redacted] also talked about Kurdistan and [redacted] b6 b7C

Manafort never paid [redacted] for any work. [redacted] message about [redacted] did not relate to any work that [redacted] were doing for Manafort. Manafort did not relay any information regarding GPS Fusion from [redacted] to anyone else. b6 b7C

Manafort wrote "[p]ls block some time for me to review this and another project." "This" would have been [redacted] and the other project may have been in Cyprus. b6 b7C

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[redacted] did not bring Manafort a hard copy of anything related to [redacted] Someone had a court order to go into Manafort's Cyprus bank account information. The international firm recommended by [redacted] got Manafort a copy of the court order. From the order, it did not look like the U.S. government was involved. Manafort thought it may have been the Associated Press or other media. Manafort did not pay the international firm. Manafort does not know if [redacted] paid the international firm.

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Manafort reviewed messages between Manafort and [redacted] on 07/20/2017. [redacted] wrote that "I know [redacted] has spoken to you about the intel we have to assist your side." The intel was the Cyprus project. Manafort then wrote "[n]ew VIP topic that I want to discuss." Manafort may have been talking about Afghanistan. Manafort reviewed messages between Manafort and [redacted] on 07/21/2017. In one message, Manafort asked [redacted] if he had access to "a very good international forensics accounting firm." This message was about the international firm that ended up conducting the Cyprus work for Manafort. Thus, the "VIP topic" was Cyprus. As to the earlier message, Manafort cannot recall what would have been the "intel we have to assist your side."

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[redacted]

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Manafort asked people, including [redacted] to donate to his Legal Defense Fund. In asking for donations, Manafort detailed the amount of his bills and where to send the money. Manafort also explained why he thought the government investigation was unfair.

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Manafort does not recall if [redacted] asked Manafort to talk with anyone in the U.S., including the Administration or the Hill, on behalf of their overseas clients. Given his circumstances, Manafort would have identified people and someone else would have contacted them.

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[redacted] works for Talal. [redacted] called [redacted] an action officer. [redacted] organized their trips. Manafort told [redacted] about his case. Manafort tried to raise money by proclaiming his innocence and criticizing the process.

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Manafort wrote that "HOUSE Intel committee has the stuff exposing Dossier, FBI AND Illegal Fisa searches coming." Manafort based this

statement on public reporting. Manafort did not seek, nor did he receive, any information from anyone on the House Intel committee or anyone else with access to confidential information.

When Manafort wrote that the [redacted] Manafort was stating his own conclusion for which he has no evidence.

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

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 09/02/2014

PAUL J. MANAFORT (MANAFORT), date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed at MILLER & CHEVALIER CHARTERED, 655 15th St., NW, Washington, D.C. 20005. Present for this interview were Department of Justice Attorneys Daniel Claman and [redacted] FBI Supervisory Special Agents [redacted], FBI Special Agent [redacted] FBI Forensic Accountant [redacted] and Defense Attorneys [redacted] and [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, MANAFORT provided the following information:

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b6 per CRM
b7C per CRM
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MANAFORT recalled meeting RINAT AKHMETOV in June 2005. MANAFORT was asked to step in and help AKHMETOV on political matters. AKHMETOV hired [redacted] with Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP, a law firm in Washington D.C., to assist with an asset the Ukrainian government claimed AKHMETOV illegally privatized. AKHMETOV introduced MANAFORT to VIKTOR YANUKOVYCH in August 2005.

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The company DAVIS, MANAFORT, and FREEDMAN was incorporated in 1995. The company was composed of RICK DAVIS, PAUL MANAFORT, and [redacted] In 2005, [redacted] left and the company became DAVIS-MANAFORT. There was a transition in 2008, and by 2009 the company was named DMP INTERNATIONAL. Neither [redacted] nor DAVIS worked in the Ukraine.

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When MANAFORT began working with AKHMETOV, he would only take advance payment for his services. AKHMETOV recognized the need to lobby the United States Government. MANAFORT advised AKHMETOV to get all of his assets in order.

In 2006, MANAFORT put a strategy together for the Parliamentary Elections. MANAFORT advised his client was the PARTY of REGIONS (POR). For example, there could be 150 candidates but MANAFORT's only client was the POR. MANAFORT did not recall who specifically wired him money for his services to the POR.

MANAFORT did significant work for both OLEG DERIPASKA and RINAT AKHMETOV. MANAFORT acknowledged that he received [redacted] from an account in the name of VEGA HOLDINGS for services he did for either

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Investigation on 07/30/2014 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 07/30/2014

by [redacted]

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DERIPASKA or AKHMETOV. He then received an additional [redacted] dollars from VEGA HOLDINGS within a year of receiving the original [redacted] MANAFORT recalled that the work he did was for AKHMETOV and he would need to verify whether VEGA HOLDINGS is associated with AKHMETOV or DERIPASKA. MANAFORT worked with DERIPASKA on an initiative to democratize countries. Montenegro was the first success. b6 b7C

All of the money from Ukraine or Ukrainians that has been transferred into MANAFORT's accounts, personal and/or business were for his services. AKHMETOV never directed MANAFORT to put money anywhere and MANAFORT did not do business deals with anyone.

ANTES MANAGEMENT CORP OST WEST sent money to MANAFORT's account in July, August, September and December 2006, totaling over [redacted] dollars. MANAFORT did not recall this company but stated this money could have come from POR as he was very active in the elections and polling. POR paid MANAFORT directly, but he was not in charge of the billing contracts or the invoices. There was one contract in the beginning with AKHMETOV, but after that MANAFORT did work for AKHMETOV without a specific written contract. b6 b7C

MANAFORT stated KONSTANTIN KLIMINIK worked for MANAFORT's firm, occupied an office in Kiev and generated paperwork for services. KLIMINIK and RICHARD GATES were in charge of collecting and tracking all monies coming in for MANAFORT's services.

MANAFORT was then questioned about certain individuals:

BORYS KOLESNIKOV, a.k.a. BVK, was MANAFORT's principal contact in the POR.

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

When asked, MANAFORT stated PERICLES INVESTMENTS LLC was set up to do business in the United States and may have been used as a vehicle to do the [redacted] deal. b6 b7A b7C

MANAFORT provided a detailed history of his work with the elections in the Ukraine. MANAFORT conducted a poll and saw a way for YANUKOVYCH to succeed. MANAFORT set up a series of meetings with YANUKOVYCH. The first meeting MANAFORT listened to YANUKOVYCH and the next few meetings MANAFORT briefed him on the campaign strategy for the next 5 years where the goal was for YANUKOVYCH to take the lead on judicial and economic reforms. MANAFORT worked on behalf of AKHMETOV and campaigned for YANUKOVYCH.

In February, 2007 MANAFORT ran the election as YANUKOVYCH's campaign manager and to public surprise, won in Parliament. YANUKOVYCH became Prime Minister of Ukraine. MANAFORT had lawyers involved to insure there was no voter fraud and briefed U.S. Ambassadors in succession; John Herbst, William Taylor, John Teft, and Geoffrey Pyatt, on a regular basis.

The Ukrainian government then tried to create a SNAP election because they didn't like the fact the POR had won. The west pressured YANUKOVYCH to accept. As a result, there was another election within a year.

There were many factions in the POR. Towards the end of his presidency, YANUKOVYCH replaced cabinet members with members of "The Family", which included SERGEI ARBUZOV and [redacted] MANAFORT is not friendly with anyone in the Family. MANAFORT met SERGEI ARBUZOV once and they became fast enemies. ARBUZOV became the Central Bank President and then the Prime Minister of Ukraine. b6 b7C

MANAFORT explained the POR as being divided into two groups: the AZAROV group which included the international economic experts and the older generation of the POR, and the LEVOCHKIN group which were the reformists who handled negotiations. MANAFORT worked with the LEVOCHKIN group on the successful IMF deal during the first year of YANUKOVYCH's presidency.

ANDRIY KLYUYEV managed the crises within the cabinet and often YANUKOVYCH would look to him for advice and to help negotiate. MANAFORT interacted with KLYUYEV on a regular basis.

MIKHAILOVYCH AZAROV met with MANAFORT in 2005. AZAROV was part of the party leadership.

MANAFORT denied any direct knowledge of business dealings with the

following individuals:

[redacted] - MANAFORT never did business with him. b6 b7C

YURIY BOIKO - the Minister of Energy. MANAFORT dealt with him on energy policy issues only, never did business with him.

[redacted] - MANAFORT met him twice but no business dealings. b6 b7C

KLYUYEV brothers - MANAFORT did not know anything about their involvement with Activ Solar and never did business with them.

MANAFORT never met with YULIA TYMOSHENKO and does not know [redacted] b6 b7C

Towards the end of his Presidential term, YANUKOVYCH began replacing cabinet members with members of the "Family", and [redacted] began consolidating power. ARBUZOV became the Central Bank President and then the Prime Minister of Ukraine. b6 b7C

In the summer of 2013, PUTIN realized YANUKOVYCH planned to sign the Ukraine/European Union Association Agreement deal and started to squeeze PETRO POROSHENKO on the chocolate industry. POROSHENKO's chocolate plants are in Russia and PUTIN told YANUKOVYCH if he didn't sign the deal, PUTIN would cause economic ruin on Ukraine.

MANAFORT currently feels the local level corruption is crushing the Ukraine economy.

MANAFORT once asked BOYKO about the oil rig. The registered Agent was the same who signed off on something for TYMOSHENKO. MANAFORT and BOYKO had a good relationship.

When asked, MANAFORT stated he talked to YANUKOVYCH about corruption as a liability but never spoke about specific names. MANAFORT demonstrated it using factual data like the polling numbers. MANAFORT feels local level corruption is responsible for damaging the economy in Ukraine.

According to MANAFORT, the only person outside of PUTIN who benefited from the European Association Agreement not being signed was [redacted] The Oligarchs, such as AKHMETOV, [redacted] BOYKO and [redacted] supported the signing. YANUKOVYCH would have signed the agreement if the Europeans had come up with the $3 billion dollars of economic support for Ukraine, prior to the signing. In September 2013, MANAFORT organized a meeting between STEFAN FULE, the European Commissioner of Enlargement, JOSE BARROSA, the European Commission President, and b6 b7A b7C

YANUKOVYCH to work towards an economic safety bridge for Ukraine. In November 2013, the Germans and Dutch realized YANUKOVYCH would not sign the agreement, but by then it was too late. YANUKOVYCH is currently in Russia.

MANAFORT advised he only met with YANUKOVYCH once in Mezhyghyria, when it was just a small house. YANUKOVYCH said he had purchased it but he and MANAFORT never met there again.

In 2008, around the time of the elections, MANAFORT acknowledged he knew of several companies established in Cyprus. He advised that GATES and KLIMINIK worked with BOYKO to do what the Ukrainians wanted. Their direction came from KOLESNIKOV. MANAFORT maintained he didn't know who specifically set up the Cypriot accounts but verified he was never a signator on the accounts. MANAFORT said the reasoning behind the company nomenclatures was because he was high profile. The accounts were vehicles used to pay him. MANAFORT stated there was no concealment necessary when these companies were established because he was providing political services in the public eye.

When asked about CMZ VENTURES in New York, MANAFORT advised he was [redacted] This was the one instance MANAFORT stepped out of the political world and attempted a business deal. [redacted] idea was to raise money overseas and buy real estate in the United States. [redacted] MANAFORT backed out of the project and never got involved in business dealing. [redacted]

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MANAFORT has never heard of NEOCOM or GLOBAL ENDEAVOR. GLOBAL HIGHWAY LTD and LEVIATHAN sounded familiar and any money flowing from those companies would have been money he earned from his services. MANAFORT has never been to the Seychelles and stated he had an accounting firm that would have records of all the companies. MANAFORT advised that LILRED LLC has nothing to do with Ukraine.

In response to switching banks, MANAFORT stated he switched from [redacted] because the average American bank does not like money coming from the Ukraine or other foreign jurisdictions, such as Cyprus.

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In closing, MANAFORT hasn't spoken with YANUKOVYCH since December 2013. He feels YANUKOVYCH lied to him and remains committed to helping the

current leaders in power in the Ukraine. Currently MANAFORT is working with POROSHENKO, Ukraine's President, and [redacted] b6 b7C

In reference to the Oligarchs, MANAFORT advised DERIPASKA left Ukraine at the beginning of YANKUKOVYCH's presidency, AKHMETOV remained a part of the EU faction and [redacted] did not choose a side and lives off his Russian business. b6 b7A b7C

Notes taken during the interview, an outline, and a bank account chronology is maintained in a 1A envelope.

Original Record

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 11/07/2018

Paul J. Manafort, date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agents [redacted] Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Jeannie S. Rhee, Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres; and Assistant United States Attorney [redacted] Present representing Manafort were attorneys Richard Westling, Thomas Zehnle and Kevin Downing and paralegal [redacted] FBI SA [redacted] advised Manafort of his rights. Manafort stated that he understood his rights and that he was willing to answer questions. Manafort signed a FD-395, Advise of Rights. FBI SA [redacted] advised Manafort that it was a crime to lie to the FBI. Manafort stated that he understood. ASC Weissmann reviewed the terms of a letter setting forth the agreement upon which Manafort made himself available for interview. Manafort, Downing and ASC Weissmann signed the letter agreement. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, Manafort provided the following information: b6 b7C

Manafort read from a typewritten statement regarding his conduct as it related to the Counts alleged in the Eastern District of Virginia and the District of Columbia. The statement will be maintained in the 1-A section of this casefile. In addition to the acts in his statement, Manafort (1) caused money to be paid to [redacted] and Skadden Arps (Skadden) knowing that the monies were, in part, payments for lobbying in the United States; (2) did not reveal to his bookkeeper and accountants the income that went from his bank accounts in St. Vincent and the Grenadines and the United Kingdom to vendors in the U.S. for his personal benefit; and (3) caused his accountants to fail to file annual FBAR forms from prior to 2010 through 2014, knowing that he was required to file them. b6 b7C

At the end of February or beginning of March 2016, Manafort and Tom Barrack were in California. Manafort told Barrack things that he thought the Trump Campaign was doing wrong. Barrack asked Manafort if Manafort was interested in running the Campaign. Barrack and Manafort had a series of calls during the next couple of weeks. At the middle or end of March 2016, Donald Trump called Manafort to discuss Manafort joining the

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Investigation on 09/11/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/17/2018 b6 b7C b7E

by [redacted]

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Campaign. Manafort and Trump met privately in Florida around Easter. Manafort then met with Corey Lewandowski and Hope Hicks in Florida.

Roger Stone thought it was a good idea for Manafort to join Trump's Campaign. [redacted] Barrack told Manafort that [redacted] Stone might have called Trump about Manafort. b6 b7C

Manafort was hired as Campaign Chairperson, while Lewandowski remained as Campaign Manager. Manafort did not take a salary because he would then "work" for Trump and Trump would boss him around. Manafort understood that his role would focus on delegates at the convention. Neither Trump nor his staff had understood that Trump did not win the delegates simply by getting the most votes in a state. Trump was winning on the issues with no infrastructure for his Campaign. Manafort ended up having to put together the structure and staff to win future primaries. Manafort's initial core team included Rick Gates, staff secretary; Tony Fabrizio, pollster; [redacted] political advisor; Jason Miller, communications director; Rick Dearborn, liasion to Congress, RNC and think tanks; and Brad Parscale. Manafort later used Stephen Miller to write policy speeches. Michael Caputo came in the second wave of hiring and dealt with communications. [redacted] Manafort brought on [redacted] to run Trump's Pennsylvania campaign. Lewandowski fought some of the people that Manafort wanted to hire including communications directors and state managers. Manafort did not get involved with the Campaign's finances. b6 b7C

Manafort started Family Meetings as a way for Trump's children to help with the Campaign. The children wanted to help and Manafort appreciated their efforts. The Family Meetings were each Monday. Eric, Donald Trump, Jr., Ivanka, Jared Kushner, Hicks, Lewandowski, Gates and Manafort typically attended the Family Meetings. Among the children, Kushner took the lead on policy issues. Kushner was also interested in the digital part of the Campaign. To some extent, Kushner took over working with Parscale. The other family members spent more time running the Trump business. Trump wanted Manafort to travel to the campaign events. Trump traveled almost every day. Manafort did not have time to travel. Manafort spent most days in New York, while sometimes taking day trips to Washington, D.C.

Manafort tolerated fights with Lewandowski but Manafort could not tolerate when Lewandowski started leaking inaccurate information that hurt the campaign. Manafort told Trump that Lewandowski was undercutting Manafort's efforts and Trump needed to choose between them. Trump was

loyal and asked Manafort to work with Lewandowski. The Family wanted Lewandowski out. Trump and the Family met privately about it and Lewandowski was out the next day. Manafort did not fill Lewandowski's Campaign Manager position. Manafort was able to work more efficiently after Lewandowski left. Manafort trusted Fabrizio's numbers and judgment. They put together a core campaign strategy. Manafort built forward for upcoming primaries while catching up on state delegate conventions for primaries that were complete. Manafort had all the state managers, budgets, schedule and campaign themes in place before he resigned.

Trump effectively wrapped up the Republican nomination with his win in Indiana. By mid-June, Manafort started focusing on the general election. Reince Preibus built strong research, media and metadata operations at the Republican National Committee (RNC). Manafort gave Parscale profiles of individuals likely to vote for Trump. Parscale then targeted those individuals with the messages that Manafort recommended.

Manafort attended a June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower at the request of Trump, Jr. Trump, Jr. also asked Kushner to come, which was common. Manafort cannot recall how or when Trump, Jr. first brought up the meeting. Manafort recalls that Trump, Jr. reminded Manafort of the meeting during the Family Meeting on June 6. Trump, Jr. said that people involved with the Miss Universe competition in Moscow had contacted him because they had dirt on Hillary Clinton. Manafort knew that the people were coming from Russia. Trump, Jr. did not tell Manafort what was the expected dirt. Manafort had low expectations for the meeting. In prior campaigns, Manafort had received calls or known of calls from foreign individuals offering information against an opponent. The information was usually unhelpful.

Trump, Jr. commonly networked Manafort with people that Trump, Jr. thought could be helpful to the campaign, including [redacted] Manafort does not know why Trump, Jr. accepted the June 9 meeting but Trump, Jr. would not have asked Manafort to attend unless Trump, Jr. thought the meeting had the potential to be important. Trump, Jr. setup meetings to be helpful and show his father that he could be helpful. Trump, Jr. was all-in on the campaign. Manafort would have said no to most people, but Trump, Jr. and the other children did not often ask for his time and, after all, it was the candidate's son. Manafort was in the offices anyway for a meeting with Preibus about a convention coordinator. b6 b7C

The June 9 meeting was held in the 25th floor conference room. When Manafort entered, the table was filled with Russians and their

interpreters. The interpreter had a heavy accent that was difficult to understand. Manafort did not bring a pen and paper or laptop so he took notes on his iPhone. The female began the meeting by talking about the crimes that Browder committed. Manafort's notes are in regard to her statements about Browder. She pitched that Trump should call for the repeal of the Magnitsky Act. She said that the Act hurt U.S./Russia relations. In exchange, she offered to push to re-open adoptions in Russia to Americans. Manafort believes that Kushner and Trump, Jr. had no idea what she was talking about. Kushner took a fake call from his assistant and left. Manafort does not recall any discussion of Hillary Clinton during the meeting. No one at the meeting asked about the Hillary dirt. The meeting lasted about half an hour. After the meeting, Trump, Jr. said it was a waste of time, but no one talked about why they had not heard about the Hillary dirt.

Manafort does not know whether Trump, Jr. told his father about the meeting before or after it happened. Manafort does not believe that Trump, Jr. told Trump. Trump, Jr. did not bring things to his father when they were uncertain. Manafort saw Trump in Trump Tower that day. Manafort believes Trump would have asked Manafort about the meeting if he knew about it. Manafort does not know the strength of the relationship between the Agalarovs and Trump. Manafort does not know whether the June 9 meeting request came from the Kremlin.

On August 2, 2016, Manafort and Konstantin Kilimnik met at the Havana Room in New York City. Kilimnik had communicated via e-mail to Manafort that he had a message from Viktor Yanukovych that he needed to convey in person. Manafort did not know the substance of the message until Kilimnik arrived. Kilimnik talked about a peace plan that would create a semi-autonomous region in Eastern Ukraine. Yanukovych would get elected to head the Eastern Ukraine and then reunite the country as its leader. Kilimnik talked for about fifteen minutes. Manafort told Kilimnik that the idea was crazy and the discussion ended. Manafort did not trust Yanukovych after Yanukovych put off signing the Association Agreement and later fled to Russia. Manafort believes that if he agreed to the plan then Kilimnik would have next asked Manafort to develop a strategy for implementing it. Kilimnik would also have undoubtedly asked Manafort to get Trump to come out in favor of the plan. Finally, Yanukovych would have expected Manafort to use his connections in Europe and the Ukraine to support the plan.

Manafort reviewed a 07/29/2016 e-mail from Kilimnik wherein Kilimnik wrote to Manafort that "[Kilimnik] met with the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar several years ago." The guy is Yanukovych. Manafort has not had direct contact with Yanukovych since

2014. Kilimnik also wrote that "[he] had several important messages from him to you." Kilimnik's messages from Yanukovych all revolved around the peace plan. Kilimnik did not discuss any other topics. Kilimnik did not mention anyone else with which the plan was discussed. Kilimnik did not say that it had been discussed with any of the oligarchs. Manafort believes the message was "urgent" only because it would benefit Yanukovych. Manafort does not know any other reason that the message was urgent. Manafort does not recall Kilimnik asking Manafort to reconsider the peace plan after their August 2 meeting.

Rick Gates showed up at the Havana Room about ten or fifteen minutes after Manafort. Gates may not have been there for the Yanukovych peace plan discussion. After Kilimnik delivered Yanukovych's message, Kilimnik updated Manafort on what was happening with Serhiy Lyovochkin, Rinat Akhmetov and their other friends in Kyiv. Manafort told Kilimnik the state of the Trump Campaign and Manafort's plan to win, including poll data and messaging. Manafort normally would have talked about which coalitions were necessary to win the election. Manafort did not share information with Kilimnik which Manafort did not otherwise share publicly.

During the time that Manafort was Chairperson of Trump's Campaign, Kilimnik was working for Manafort [redacted] b7A Manafort did not communicate directly with Deripaska. Instead, Manafort communicated with Kilimnik, who communicated with Victor Boyarkin, who worked for Deripaska. When talking with Kilimnik during this time, Manafort would have naturally discussed the U. S. election. Manafort offered, through Kilimnik, to brief Deripaska on the Trump Campaign. The oligarchs wanted intel on the Trump Campaign.

Kilimnik left the Havana Room meeting first. Manafort and Gates then left together. The media had been tracking Manafort so he did not want them asking why he was meeting with Kilimnik. Manafort's concern was more that Kilimnik was Ukrainian than that he was Russian. Manafort does not believe that Kilimnik is a spy for the Russian government. Kilimnik translated during meetings between Yanukovych and Manafort wherein delicate matters were discussed. [redacted] b6 b7C

Manafort originally got involved in the Ukraine in 2005 to help Akhmetov protect his assets. Deripaska had introduced Manafort to Akhmetov. In Ukraine, when you win political power then you seize shares in economic assets. Akhmetov and the Party of Regions had lost the election so Akhmetov wanted to protect his assets. In time, Akhmetov asked Manafort if Manafort could help the Party of Regions gain

power. Akhmetov set up meetings between Manafort and possible candidates for the Presidency. The U.S. and Europe supported Yulia Tymoshenko. Manafort was looking for the most Western-leaning candidate in the Party of Regions. Manafort met Yanukovych. Manafort initially opposed Yanukovych because Yanukovych had been tainted by the 2004 elections. Over time, however, Manafort came to believe that Yanukovych had the willingness and strength to commit to join Europe.

Manafort reviewed a 12/08/2016 e-mail [redacted] that began "[h]ad a meeting with BG today. He asked me to pass the following to you." BG is Yanukovych. Kilimnik would not have been addressing the information in this e-mail to anyone but Manafort. After reading point 1, Manafort believed that he had seen this e-mail. After continuing to read, Manafort does not believe that he saw the rest of the e-mail. Nevertheless, the content of the rest of the e-mail is what Kilimnik told Manafort during their Havana Room meeting. [redacted] is [redacted] did not reach out to Manafort. Manafort was not aware that Carter Page was authorized to speak for Trump. Manafort did not know who Page was until the dossier came out in the press. At the time of this e-mail, in December 2016, Manafort was not willing to do any work on behalf of the Ukraine including Kilimnik's request in point 6.

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Manafort reviewed a 03/30/2016 e-mail from Gates to Kilimnik with an attached press release about Manafort working on the Trump Campaign and memos to four individuals. OVD is Oleg Deripaska. BVK is Borys Kolesnikov. RA is Rinat Akhmetov. SL is Serhiy Lyovochkin. Manafort sent the memo to show them that he was still in the game in the U. S. Manafort knew that these men would see value in that. Manafort had been trying to collect money from all of them except Deripaska. Manafort briefed Trump on his work in the Ukraine. Manafort would have explained the Tymoshenko situation and why Yanukovych fled to Russia. Manafort wanted Trump prepared in case Manafort's Ukraine work or Deripaska issues popped up. Manafort thought this may happen because some Republicans had been on the other side of the Ukraine issue. Manafort did not go into detail because Trump was not interested. When information about Manafort's work in the Ukraine came out in the press, Trump was upset. Manafort briefed Jason Miller when the press started coming out.

Manafort reviewed again the "black caviar" e-mail. "Our biggest interest" is a solution to the Pericles issue. If Trump won, Deripaska would have wanted to use Manafort to advance whatever interests Deripaska had in the U.S. and elsewhere. For example, Deripaska could not get a visa to the U.S. Manafort never gave Deripaska a private briefing. Manafort was willing to brief Deripaska on strategic decisions such as why Trump selected Mike Pence as a Vice-Presidential running mate.

In January 2017, Manafort met Georgy Oganov in Madrid. Oganov represented Deripaska. Originally, Oganov was supposed to meet Manafort's lawyer, [redacted] in Canada. Kilimnik must have communicated Oganov's name to Manafort. Manafort traveled to Madrid for Telefonica business that he had with [redacted] Manafort and Oganov had a one-hour breakfast meeting with no one else present. Oganov said that Manafort needed to meet Deripaska in person to finally resolve the Pericles matter. Manafort agreed but said he would not travel to the Ukraine or Russia for the meeting. Manafort never heard from Oganov again. Manafort does not know why a new lawsuit was filed against him last year, purportedly by Deripaska, or why it has been held in abeyance. Manafort was completely truthful during his deposition in the earlier case including his testimony regarding [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b7A

Manafort reviewed a January 15, 2017 e-mail from Manafort to KT McFarland regarding "Get Together." Manafort's "important information" regarded Cuba. Manafort wanted to discuss Trump's policy position on Cuba. [redacted] who had been part of opening Cuba during the Obama Administration, arranged a meeting between Manafort and Castro's son in Havana, Cuba. Cuba was not a client but Manafort saw an opportunity. Manafort never had a meeting with McFarland. Manafort never followed up with anyone else in the Administration. Manafort contacted McFarland because they had a good relationship and it was easier than contacting Michael Flynn. b6 b7C

Manafort returned to Madrid shortly after his January 2017 trip. Manafort followed up on Telefonica business. The trip was partly social and [redacted] came along. Manafort went on to Dubai. Manafort did not meet with Oganov or Kilimnik during this second trip. b6 b7C

Manafort met Kilimnik and Lyovochkin at the Westin hotel in Washington, D.C. around the time of Trump's inauguration. They talked about happenings in Ukraine. Manafort would probably have talked about the Trump Administration. Manafort asked Lyovochkin about money. Lyovochkin said that Akhmetov owed Manafort the money for the Opposition Bloc work. Kilimnik and Lyovochkin did not come to Washington, D.C. to see

Manafort. Manafort does not know any other meetings that they had scheduled while they were in the U.S. Lyovochkin did not ask to meet with anyone in the Administration.

The Advice of Rights, Letter Agreement, Manafort's proffer statement and the documents reviewed by Manafort will be maintained in the 1-A section of this casefile.



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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 11/07/2018

Paul J. Manafort, date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agents [redacted] Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Jeannie S. Rhee, Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres; and Assistant United States Attorney [redacted] Present representing Manafort were attorneys Richard Westling, Thomas Zehnle and Kevin Downing and paralegal [redacted] FBI SA [redacted] advised Manafort of his rights. Manafort stated that he understood his rights and that he was willing to answer questions. Manafort signed a FD-395, Advise of Rights. ASC Weissmann reviewed the terms of a letter setting forth the agreement upon which Manafort made himself available for interview. Manafort, Downing and ASC Weissmann initialed the letter agreement. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, Manafort provided the following information: b6 b7C

Manafort knew that if Trump got elected, there would be opportunities for him to make money. After Trump was elected, Manafort traveled to the Middle East, Cuba, Korea, Japan and China where he got paid to explain what a Trump presidency would be like. In mid-2017, a Ukrainian candidate for President, [redacted] approached Manafort about political consulting. b6 b7C

Manafort asked Konstantin Kilimnik to track down documents related to the indictments against Manafort, including contracts and ECFMU brochures. Manafort and Kilimnik communicated using encrypted applications such as Viber, Signal, WhatsApp and others. They started using the applications over a concern that people in the Ukraine and Russia were hacking their accounts. [redacted] After he was indicted, Manafort purchased a "pay" phone to talk with Kilimnik and Gates. The pay phone did not have any applications on it. About six months ago, Manafort got a cellphone [redacted] In September or October 2017, a BBC reporter, First Name Unknown (FNU) Woods, called Manafort on his [redacted] or [redacted] phone number. [redacted] b3 b6 b7A b7C b7E

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Investigation on 09/12/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/17/2018

by [redacted] b6 b7C b7E

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Manafort knew Congressman Rohrabacher from their days working for Reagan. Manafort had no contact with Rohrabacher for several years before their 2013 meeting. Manafort asked [redacted] to set up the meeting because Rohrabacher had taken over the subcommittee on Russia and the Ukraine. At the meeting, they spent 20%-30% of the time talking about Reagan. The rest of the time, they talked about Putin and Russia. Manafort did not want Rohrabacher to send any signals to Putin that Russia's meddling in the Ukraine was acceptable. The signal may have undermined Ukraine's movement towards Europe. Manafort surely would have told Rohrabacher that Manafort worked for Yanukovych. [redacted] knew that Manafort worked for Yanukovych. Manafort and [redacted] did not discuss whether the meeting triggered Foreign Agents Registration Act's (FARA) reporting requirements. Manafort does not recall but is sure that he would have reported the meeting back to Yanukovych. b6 b7C

Manafort did not talk with [redacted] in 2016 or 2017. Manafort has not talked with [redacted] since their Ukraine work came out in the news. Manafort and [redacted] were good friends. They met about once a month in the 2000s. [redacted] In 2016, Manafort asked Gates to talk with Mercury/Clark & Weinstein (Mercury) and the Podesta Group (Podesta) about the FARA issue. Gates reported back to Manafort. At the time, Manafort believed that the ECFMU was legitimate and wanted to know if Mercury and Podesta felt differently. The ECFMU was not created by or with Manafort's knowledge. Manafort now understands that he incorrectly viewed the ECFMU's role. Manafort and Gates had a significant role in passing the Party of Regions instructions on to Mercury and Podesta. [redacted] knew that Manafort and Gates were giving direction on behalf of the Party of Regions. The ECFMU personnel did not understand U.S. politics. Manafort directed activities in the U.S. because he did not want the ECFMU freelancing and causing problems. b6 b7C

The roll-out of the Skadden Report was supposed to educate the international media in Kyiv, Europe and the U.S. Greg Craig's main role was going to be in Kyiv. Unbeknownst to Manafort, Craig decided that he would not meet with media stakeholders. In late August or early September 2012, Manafort, Craig and others met at the Harvard Club in New York to finalize the planned roll-out of the Report. Yanukovych and Serhiy Lyovochkin were in New York for U.N. week. Gates and Jonathan Hawker made Manafort aware before the Harvard Club meeting that Craig was resisting talking to the media. Part of the reason for the Harvard Club meeting was

to convince Craig to help with the media rollout. Craig said he was not doing any media but he would get the Report to a New York Times reporter that he knew. The goal was to get the report out before the October elections to shape the international view of the elections. Lyovochkin, however, did not want to publish the Report because it was not a glowing review. Manafort thought the Report was balanced but it was not what the client wanted or expected. Finally, in December, Lyovochkin accepted the Report. Craig got the Report to Sanger at the New York Times. Craig explained the Report to several reporters that called him. Craig told Manafort that Craig took calls from reporters but that he did not make any calls - this distinction was important to Craig.

The Ukrainian Government was originally supposed to fund the Skadden Report. With the high price tag, the procurement process could not have been completed and the Report issued before the elections. The Ministry of Justice therefore approved a third party paying for the Report in order to avoid the procurement process. The Ministry of Justice paid a small amount and [redacted] a Ukrainian oligarch, paid the remainder. b6 b7C

Manafort reviewed a 07/29/2016 e-mail wherein Kilimnik wrote to Manafort that "[Kilimnik] met with the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar several years ago." Manafort and Yanukovych had lunch to celebrate their success in the 2010 election. After lunch, Yanukovych gave Manafort a large jar of black cavier that was worth about $30,000 to $40,000.

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] Manafort and [redacted] socialized but had no business dealings. [redacted] Manafort and [redacted] then had no contact until sometime around 2010. [redacted] so Manafort asked Gates to hire [redacted] Manafort directed [redacted] to lobby on behalf of the Ukraine, including lobbying against the Durbin resolution. Manafort does not recall what that lobbying entailed.

In 2016, [redacted] setup a meeting between Manafort, on behalf of the Campaign, and the head of the AFL-CIO. [redacted] Manafort did not know that Gates and [redacted] were working together on other projects. In early 2018, Manafort and [redacted] talked as friends. The last time they talked was in April or May 2018. [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] tried to get Manafort involved with other clients. Manafort did not ask [redacted] to do anything on Manafort's behalf. Manafort did not ask [redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7C

Manafort and Roger Stone are friends. They had been in and out of each other's lives but re-engaged with the Trump Campaign. [redacted] b6 b7C Stone recommended people for Campaign positions and asked for tickets to the convention. Manafort valued Stone's strategic advice.

Manafort thought Yanukovych's request, delivered by Kilimnik at the August 2, 2016 meeting, was outrageous. Yanukovych had not contacted Manafort since he fled and, now that Manafort was the Trump Campaign Chair, Yanukovych asked for something. Yanukovych thought that, as Campaign Chairman, Manafort could convince Trump to agree to the peace plan. Manafort told Kilimnik that Manafort would not participate in Yanukovych's plan. Rinat Akhmetov was desperate for peace because his businesses were in the occupied zone and suffering. Yanukovych was located in Russia. Kilimnik ran the plan by someone in the Russian government for approval. At least, Manafort believes that Kilimnik would have run the plan by someone in the Russian government for approval. During the meeting, Kilimnik focused on the plan. Kilimnik did not need to state the obvious - that is, Manafort could benefit financially. At the time of the meeting, Manafort was not earning any money.

Manafort reviewed a 12/08/2016 e-mail [redacted] that began "[h]ad a meeting with BG today. He asked me to pass the following to you." Manafort does not know why the plan came up again in December when Manafort had made clear to Kilimnik in August that he would not support it. Possibly, the media coverage of Carter Page in Russia prompted Yanukovych to raise the issue with Kilimnik or Yanukovych was frustrated that he was not getting his hands into the Trump Administration like other people. Manafort does not recall responding to Kilimnik about the e-mail. Manafort never agreed to work for the Ukraine but always left the b7E

door open when talking with Kilimnik. Manafort did not intend to work in the Trump Administration. Manafort always felt that he could make money working for the Administration from the outside. Manafort had valuable knowledge of Trump and his Administration. In the Middle East, Manafort talked with the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia about the Trump Administration's view of their conflict with Qatar and Iran.

In about January 2017, Kilimnik told Manafort that Cohen put a Ukraine peace plan on Trump's desk. Manafort does not know who was behind the Cohen peace plan. Manafort told Kilimnik that the peace plan would not go anywhere. When Manafort and Kilimnik last discussed the peace plan in March or April 2017, they discussed who would control the peace plan rather than what the plan was.

After Manafort left the campaign, he kept in regular contact with only Gates. Manafort had occasional contact with Stephen Miller, Steve Bannon, Jared Kushner, Tony Fabrizio and Brad Parscale.

[redacted] b7E

Manafort reviewed text messages from Kilimnik to Manafort stating, in part, that "V understands where you can potentially come and is working with his boss to get a meeting organized. My understanding is that it will be about recreating old friendship and talking about global politics, not about money or Pericles." V is Victor Boyarkin. Kilimnik's message is wrong because the meeting between Manafort and Georgy Oganov was about the Pericles matter. [redacted] Manafort's attorney, set up the meeting with Oganov in Madrid. [redacted] said the meeting could finally resolve the matter. With regard to Deripaska's recent lawsuit, Manafort suspected that Deripaska brought the suit to gain favor with the U.S. Government while it was investigating Manafort. b6 b7C

Manafort traveled to Madrid in February 2017. Manafort has no memory of meeting Kilimnik in Madrid. Agents showed Manafort flight records of Kilimnik traveling from Moscow to Madrid on 02/26/2017 and returning to Moscow on 02/27/2017. Manafort does not recall meeting Kilimnik, but if Kilimnik traveled to Madrid, then it was to meet with Manafort. After Madrid, Manafort traveled to Dubai for 24 hours before going to China.

Michael Caputo announced his Go Fund Me legal fund on Hannity and immediately got donations. Manafort wanted to do the same thing. Manafort could not announce his legal fund on television because

of the court's gag order. [redacted] b6 b7C
[redacted] worked on starting up the account. Manafort does not believe that it ever went live.

[redacted] brought Manafort two potential clients in spring 2017 - Dostum and Kabila. Dostum was an Afghan Vice-President that fled Afghanistan and wanted backing from the U.S. Government to return. Kabila's term had expired as Congolese president but he wanted to stay in power. Manafort met with representatives of both potential clients. Manafort declined to work for either client. b6 b7C

Kilimnik contacted [redacted] of the ECFMU only to get documents. Manafort did not ask Kilimnik to send her a message or discuss her possible testimony. Manafort did not direct or suggest that Kilimnik have Oleg Voloshyn reach out to [redacted] Manafort was not aware that Voloshyn reached out to [redacted] Manafort did not try to persuade Cindy LaPorta, Philip Ayliff or Heather Washkuhn not to testify nor did he try to influence their testimony. b6 b7C

In January or February 2018, Manafort asked [redacted] to dissuade Gates from accepting a plea agreement. Manafort and Gates regularly discussed their case. Manafort and Gates discussed the possibility of a Presidential pardon. Manafort did not intentionally ask Gates to lie to investigators. Manafort talked with Gates while Gates was proffering to the Special Counsel's Office. Gates had, however, denied to Manafort that he was proffering. The Republican National Committee raised money for a defense fund. Manafort asked John Dowd if Manafort and Gates were eligible for any of the money. Dowd said yes. When Manafort told Gates, Gates said Manafort should have asked Dowd about a pardon. Manafort has not had any conversations with anyone from the White House, or with access to the White House, about a pardon. Manafort has no commitment from the White House regarding a pardon. b6 b7A b7C

Manafort is not aware of any violations of the court's gag order. Jason Maloni, Manafort's public relations agent, has been reactive to the press. Manafort has not talked to Maloni since June 2018. Manafort talked with Hannity as a friend, not because he expected Hannity to use the information during his show. Manafort felt Hannity was the only person he could talk to about his situation. Manafort understands that Hannity may have used the information from their conversations during his show.

Manafort did not receive any information regarding his investigation, directly or indirectly, from anyone in the Department of Justice or law enforcement.

The Advice of Rights, Letter Agreement and the documents reviewed by Manafort will be maintained in the 1-A section of this casefile.

General Record

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 11/07/2018

Paul J. Manafort, date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agents [redacted] FBI Forensic Accountant [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres. Present representing Manafort were attorneys Richard Westling, Thomas Zehnle and Kevin Downing and paralegal [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, Manafort provided the following information: b6 b7C

Manafort used encrypted applications to communicate, typically at the recommendation of Rick Gates. Manafort does not recall his usernames or passwords for the applications. [redacted] Manafort will work with his counsel to prepare a list of usernames and passwords for his communication accounts. b6 b7C

Manafort primarily used two iPhones to communicate. The phones were assigned telephone numbers [redacted] Manafort purchased a pay-as-you-go Boost phone last year. Manafort does not recall its assigned number. b6 b7C

Manafort had WhatsApp on his [redacted] cellphones. Manafort used WhatsApp to communicate with people in Europe. At Gates's suggestion, Manafort downloaded Telegram but he never used it. Manafort used Wickr for communications with people in the Middle East. Manafort recently used Signal to communicate with Konstantin Kilimnik. Manafort used Threema to communicate with [redacted] and individuals in China. Manafort did not recall whether he used Threema to communicate with Gates. Manafort used Skype for personal communications with his family members. Manafort used Snapchat only for social networking. Manafort used Viber in Ukraine. Manafort also used Viber for communications related to the Trump Campaign. Manafort used Hushmail to communicate with Kilimnik and Gates. Manafort used WeChat to communicate with people in China. At [redacted] suggestion, Manafort used Voxer, but only for a couple of days in 2017. Zello sounds familiar but Manafort does not recall using it. [redacted] b6 b7C b7E

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Investigation on 09/20/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/20/2018

by [redacted] b6 b7C b7E

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[redacted] b7E

Manafort used iPads at his home for various home-automation functions. He did not use these iPads to communicate. Manafort had one iPad in Alexandria that he used when traveling abroad. Manafort had a MacAir laptop that is currently in the possession of his attorney. [redacted] b7E during the July 2017 search of his home. Manafort had desktop computers and portable flash drives in his Florida, New York City and Bridgehampton homes. Manafort has not deleted any materials from these devices since the July 2017 search. Manafort and his attorneys will provide investigators with Manafort's devices.

Manafort reviewed a document captioned "Paul Manafort, Income by Year, 2005-2015." Cindy LaPorta, his accountant at KWC, created the document. Manafort did not have any input into its creation.

Manafort first worked in Ukraine in 2005. Manafort worked for Rinat Akhmetov's company, Systems Capital Management (SCM). Rick Davis, Manafort's business partner, was friends with [redacted] b6 b7C introduced Davis to Oleg Deripaska. Around 2003, Davis was the Davis Manafort's point of contact for Deripaska. Manafort was then introduced to Deripaska and eventually took over as client manager. Deripaska introduced Manafort to Akhmetov.

[redacted] b7A

[redacted] Manafort met the liberal elites in Russia. Manafort never visited the Kremlin. Until 2008, Deripaska saw himself as the future after Putin. [redacted]

In 2005, the Party of Regions had two factions. Akhmetov and Borys Kolesnikov ran one faction while Serhiy Lyovochkin ran the other faction. For Manafort, Gates handled the billings and Kilimnik handled the collections.

Among the receipts listed for 2006, the first two lines are work for the Party of Regions and the rest of the lines are work for Deripaska. A Russian Non-Governmental Organization was set up to [redacted] b7A The Russian NGO ended up focusing on Russian strategy and merged into the Green Party.

In the receipts listed for 2007 is "K.C. Presidential Campaign." Manafort was paid to consult on Kypros Chrysostomides's campaign for President of Cyprus. Chrysostomides was Deripaska's lawyer.

Several of the 2008 receipts are under Pericles Emerging Markets (Pericles) and/or Management Fees. Lawyers for Pegasus Capital Advisors (Pegasus), a U.S.-based investment fund, set up Pericles. [redacted] b6 b7A b7C Manafort and Davis planned to transition out of political consulting and work full-time managing the investment fund.

[redacted] b7A

Manafort does not recall why Davis Manafort Partners, Inc., John Hannah, LLC and Jesand Investment Corp were paid management fees from Pericles in 2008. The receipts for EVO Holdings may also have been Pericles management fees. Manafort believes that [redacted] b4

The 2008 receipts for LOAV, Ltd. were consulting fees for work for Deripaska. Manafort and Davis transferred part of these fees to a 501(c)(4) Political Action Committee. LOAV, Ltd. is a U.S. investment fund set up by [redacted] in the late 1990s. Manafort got [redacted] to invest $5 million to $10 million in the fund, although [redacted] had promised $50 million. b6 b7C

[redacted] The listed 2008 receipts are not for work performed for the McCain campaign. Manafort does not know why the line reads "Reimbursed Campaign Expenditures." b6 b7C

Jesand Investment Corp is for Manafort's and Gates's personal investments.

All of the money that came in during 2008 came from either: (1) consulting fees for work in Ukraine; (2) consulting fees from Deripaska for (a) work in Russia with the Green Party or (b) work in other countries where Deripaska had assets; or (3) management fees for Pericles (paid by Deripaska). Any payment in any year that came into LOAV, EVO or Jesand came from Deripaska.

Manafort's relationship with Deripaska and work for the Green Party (paid through Russian NGO) ended in 2009. Manafort does not know why there are payments from Deripaska in 2010. The K.C. Presidential Campaign was over so the payments listed under that heading must have been for other work.

In 2010, the "bonus" was from Yanukovych. Manafort does not know where the funds for the bonus came from.

In 2011, the "Leviathan Advisors" receipts were probably from the Ukraine consulting contract that focused on European Union activities rather than campaigns in Ukraine.

In 2012, Gates made sure enough receipts came into DMP International, LLC (DMI) to pay its vendors. Mercury/Clark & Weinstock and the Podesta Group were not a problem because they were paid directly from the Cypriot accounts.

In 2013, Smythson, LLC was an entity that Manafort created because they were having a difficult time getting money into DMI's account in the U.S. Manafort also opened a bank account with HSBC hoping that they could transfer money from a London account to a U.S. account.

The 2014 receipts were for Opposition Bloc work. Some of the receipts were probably for work performed in previous years that they had a difficult time collecting. [redacted] b6 b7C

The 2015 receipts were for Opposition Bloc work. The Peranova Holdings Ltd receipts were income, not a loan.

Manafort reviewed a document captioned "Paul Manafort, Loans from Wire Transfer, 2005-2015." Cindy LaPorta, Manafort's accountant at KWC, created the document. Manafort did not have any input into its creation.

Deripaska and Akhmetov paid a large advance at the beginning of Manafort's work. Manafort does not know how his accountants booked these payments. Deripaska never loaned Manafort money. Deripaska was not involved in Manafort's purchase of the Trump Tower condominium.

Yiakora Ventures Limited was controlled by Manafort. Manafort does not know why the $8,000,000 transferred on 6/4/2008 from Yiakora Ventures to Jesand was paid to Yiakora originally. The money came from Deripaska so it was either for consulting work or Pericles management fees.

[redacted] The payments were for work in one of the three categories identified earlier but Manafort does not know specifically what the payments were for. b6 b7A b7C

In 2008, Manafort and Davis made personal contributions to a 501(c)(4) Political Action Committee that supported the McCain presidential campaign. [redacted] founded the PAC. The contributions came from LOAV, Ltd. Manafort is listed as the owner of LOAV, Ltd. Manafort does not know if the PAC had to disclose the contribution. Davis was involved with the McCain campaign. Manafort assumes Davis told McCain about the contribution. b6 b7C

As Trump's Campaign Chair, Manafort knew that he could not coordinate with PACs. Manafort told Trump that Trump needed a favored PAC. Trump did not like the idea of a PAC. Finally, Trump agreed, in part, [redacted] Corey Lewandowski and Ed Rollins also ran PACs supporting Trump. b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] ran the political messaging for the PAC. Manafort was not aware of any communications between the Campaign and the PAC regarding political strategy. [redacted] and Gates were friends [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

Manafort set up Steam Mountain LLC for his more recent consulting work. Manafort had a series of consulting contracts after Trump was elected. Manafort met with a group of Koreans that wanted to start an infrastructure investment fund. Manafort worked in Spain with [redacted] [redacted] for Telefonica. A British Company hired Manafort to advise its clients in Dubai on Trump trade policy and investing in the U.S. In China, there were two groups. The first group wanted to start a construction company in the U.S. The second group wanted to start an investment fund in New York and Shanghai that would invest in medical and educational interests. DCI Group is a U.S. consulting company that Manafort advised on the Trump Administration. b6 b7C

Manafort believes that the black ledger found in Ukraine is phony. Some of the payment entries to him are accurate but he never received cash payments. People in Ukraine may have been trying to discredit Manafort. Viktor Yushchenko is corrupt and wanted to undermine Manafort's work with Trump. Manafort spoke with [redacted] from the Campaign when the information came out in the news. [redacted] advised Manafort not to respond. b6 b7C

[redacted] managed DMI's office in Kyiv. Kilimnik spoke to [redacted] in August 2016 about the documents supposedly found in the office's safe. [redacted] said it was untrue because the safe was empty. [redacted] now lives in [redacted] Manafort last talked with [redacted] around January 2017. [redacted] by the FBI. Kilimnik subsequently told Manafort that [redacted] also told Manafort that [redacted] Separately, she said that it was not Manafort's signature on the safe documents because she had the stamp at her home. Manafort had responded to an e-mail from [redacted] Manafort did not initiate the contact with [redacted] Manafort did not ask Kilimnik to initiate contact with [redacted] b6 b7C

Manafort reviewed an e-mail chain beginning with a 03/21/2017 e-mail from [redacted] wherein Manafort wrote "Are you free to speak today?" Manafort believes that [redacted] reached out to Manafort because of the Washington Post article identified in the e-mail chain. Manafort cannot explain why he sent the first e-mail in the chain. Kilimnik may have given Manafort [redacted] e-mail address. Manafort recalls speaking with [redacted] twice on the telephone, once around January 2017, he cannot recall the timing on the other call. Manafort does not recall talking with [redacted] on the day of these e-mails. b6 b7C

Manafort reviewed a set of documents that were allegedly found in DMI's office safe in Kyiv. One of the documents is [redacted] Manafort does not recognize any of the other documents. Another of the documents showed an invoice from Davis Manafort to NEOCOM SYSTEMS LIMITED. NEOCOM was a vehicle used by Kolesnikov to pay Manafort. Manafor t did not sign this document. Davis Manafort created invoices like this one purporting to sell computer equipment in order to avoid paying Europe's Value Added Tax (VAT). b6 b7C

Manafort placed several people on his company's payroll and health insurance even though they never worked for the company, including: [redacted] b6 b7C

Manafort recalls renting a yacht three times. Two of the rentals were for pleasure. The third rental, in the Caribbean, was for a business meeting with an island Prime Minister.

Before the Republican National Convention, Manafort and Rick Dearborn met with Senator John Barrasso about the party's platform. Barrasso used the 2012 platform as a guide. Rick Dearborn headed Convention Committee

Operations for the Trump Campaign. Manafort reviewed the 2012 platform and suggested changes based upon Trump's views on immigration, trade, NATO, North Korea and Iraq. Manafort did not suggest any policy changes on Ukraine or Russia. Manafort did not see the platform again until after the final version was submitted. Barrasso sent the revised platform to Stephen Miller and, maybe, Dearborn.

On Sunday after the convention, Preibus and Manafort held a press conference where a reporter asked about changes to the Ukraine plank of the platform. Manafort did not know the issue. When he asked Dearborn, Dearborn said there had been no changes. Dearborn finally reported to Manafort that a Cruz delegate had recommended a change in the subcommittee but it was voted down when it came before the full committee.

Manafort reviewed several memos prepared at his request regarding the situation. The platform originally had no language on assistance to Ukraine. The Cruz delegate recommended adding support for "lethal assistance." Mashburn and J.D. Gordon interceded to change "lethal" to "appropriate." Mashburn, Gordon and Matt Miller worked at the convention for the Trump Campaign but Manafort did not consider them decision makers for the Campaign. Mashburn and Gordon should not have made the language decision without consulting Manafort or Dearborn. Manafort believes the word "appropriate" represents a harsher stance against Russia than "lethal."



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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 11/07/2018

Paul J. Manafort, date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agents [redacted] FBI Forensic Accountant [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres. Present representing Manafort were attorneys Richard Westling, Thomas Zehnle and Kevin Downing and paralegal [redacted] After being advised of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, Manafort provided the following information:

b6
b7C

Manafort talked to [redacted] to get the story out regarding the Ukraine platform fight at the Republican National Convention. Manafort briefed Trump about the issue along with other post-convention matters. Manafort does not believe that Trump knew about the floor fight until after the convention. Konstantin Kilimnik asked about the platform language at some point, but Manafort does not recall the details of their conversation.

b6
b7C

Trump publicly stated that the people of Crimea wanted to be part of Russia. Trump and Manafort had not talked about Russia policy before Trump made this statement. Trump follows the news a lot and probably read this view somewhere and then repeated it. Manafort told Trump that Manafort disagreed with the statement. Manafort gave Trump a brief history on Ukraine. Trump does not generally like to commit on foreign policy issues until a specific scenario arises. Trump believes that he can solve foreign policy disputes by avoiding the bureaucratic logjam and having face-to-face meetings.

Trump and Manafort did not have a lot of policy discussions. Manafort and Trump sometimes spoke on the plane but it usually revolved around issues in the news. Manafort and Trump spoke on the plane about whether Obama's sanction against Russia were working. Manafort did not have any other policy discussions with Trump regarding Russia or Ukraine.

Dimitri Simes wrote a foreign policy speech for Trump. Henry Kissinger had recommended Simes to Kushner. Trump did not like the speech, so Stephen Miller redrafted it.



Investigation on 09/21/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/21/2018

by [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

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[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

Manafort reviewed a document headed "Basel Presentation." The document is a framework for dealing with the political situation in the Ukraine and creating a campaign strategy for the Party of Regions. The framework could be used in other countries where Oleg Deripaska had assets as well. The government in Ukraine dictates business. Deripaska owned businesses in Ukraine. [redacted] b7A The Orange Revolution was more gray than black and white in that it was less about freedom than it was about a different group of people seizing power in government. [redacted] Manafort included a step to "Brief Kremlin on Program" in recognition that Deripaska was Russian and dealt with the Kremlin. The briefing was not meant to coordinate any of Manafort's efforts for Deripaska with any efforts by the Kremlin. [redacted] Manafort did not work for any client whose positions conflicted with U.S. interests.

In supporting a candidate in Ukraine, it was a dealbreaker for Manafort if the candidate would not bring Ukraine into Europe. Manafort believed Yanukovych would lead Ukraine in a direction different than most people in the West thought Yanukovych would lead Ukraine. Yanukovych denuclearized, pushed toward the Association Agreement, passed rule of laws reforms and increased surveillance along the border with Russia. Manafort objected to Yanukovych when Yulia Tymoshenko was arrested. Manafort, however,

sometimes had to concede certain issues while advancing the greater goals consistent with Western reforms. Manafort told Trump that Trump should not call for Hillary Clinton's arrest.

Manafort reviewed a 06/23/2005 memorandum from Manafort and Richard Davis to Oleg Deripaska and [redacted] Rothschild. The document is tailored to a paying client. Deripaska needed talking points to rationalize his plan to Putin. There will be specific talking points to convince Putin that Deripaska's actions in Ukraine are not a threat to Russia's interests. For example, Deripaska would bolster the power of Eastern, ethnically Russian, Ukrainians against U.S. influence in Ukraine. b6 b7C

Manafort reviewed a 03/30/2016 e-mail from Gates to Kilimnik with an attached press release about Manafort working on the Trump Campaign and memos to four individuals. Manafort does not recall any responses. Manafort has not received any money for Ukraine, directly or indirectly, since March 2016. Manafort's only communication with Serhiy Lyovochkin was at a January 2017 meeting between Manafort, Kilimnik and Lyovochkin. Manafort assumes Kilimnik had been working for Lyovochkin since Manafort left Ukraine. Manafort would have told Lyovochkin that he believed Trump favored reuniting Ukraine, including Crimea. Kilimnik had previously relayed to Manafort that Yanukovych thought he could deal with the militants in Eastern Ukraine. Manafort knew that Russian support would be key to dealing with the militants. Lyovochkin also would have been interested in Petro Poroshenko's standing with Trump. Manafort did not have any interaction with the Trump Transition but may have implied to Lyovochkin or Kilimnik that he did. Lyovochkin and Kilimnik did not ask for tickets to the inauguration. Lyovochkin did not present a plan for Ukraine or ask Manafort for anything.

Manafort does not recall making any recommendations for positions in the Administration other than [redacted] Some people approached Manafort to recommend them but he cannot remember any of them. b6 b7C

[redacted] b7E



FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 11/07/2017

GEORGE DIMITRIOS PAPADOPOULOS, [redacted] Social Security Account Number (SSAN) [redacted], was interviewed at the BREEN & PUGH law office, 53 West Jackson Street, Suite 1215, Chicago, Illinois 60604. Present during the interview were PAPADOPOULOS' Attorneys [redacted] and [redacted] FBI Special Agent (SA) [redacted] FBI Intelligence Analyst (IA) [redacted] Special Counsel Attorney AARON ZELINSKY, and Special Counsel Attorney ANDREW GOLDSTEIN. b6 b7C

At the beginning of the interview, GOLDSTEIN advised PAPADOPOULOS that the same rules applied for this interview as they did in the previous proffer interviews on August 10, 2017, August 11, 2017, and September 19, 2017. PAPADOPOULOS was provided a copy of the agreement he signed on the dates prior, acknowledging his understanding of the continued proffer agreement. PAPADOPOULOS initialed and signed the agreement for this interview. His signature was witnessed and initialed by [redacted] After being advised of the nature of the interview and the identifies of the interviewers, PAPADOPOULOS provided the following information: b6 b7C

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6 b7C

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Investigation on 09/20/2017 at Chicago, Illinois, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/31/2017

by [redacted]

b6 b7C b7E

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[redacted] PAPADOPOULOS never told anyone the campaign about [redacted] the Russians having dirt on HILLARY CLINTON (CLINTON). b5 Per DOJ/OIP

PAPADOPOULOS was never told to cease his attempts to arrange a meeting between the TRUMP campaign and the Russians and he believed JEFF SESSIONS (SESSIONS) was fully supportive of those efforts. [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

of hand-written notes taken from PAPADOPOULOS' journal.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted] b7E



FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 08/22/2018

Erik Dean PRINCE, date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, Washington, D.C. Present representing Prince were [redacted] and [redacted] of Boies Schiller Flexner, LLP. The interviewing team were FBI Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] FBI Intelligence Analyst [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsels Jeannie Rhee, and Aaron Zelinsky. FBI Special Agent [redacted] was present for a portion of the interview. b6 b7C

Prior to the start of the interview, ASC Zelinsky verbally reviewed the terms of a letter setting forth the agreement upon which Prince made himself available for the interview. Prince stated that he understood the terms of the letter agreement. Prince and [redacted] signed the letter. After being advised of the identities of the interview team and the nature of the interview, Prince provided the following information: b6 b7C

PRINCE wanted to clarify information that he provided during his first interview with the Special Counsel's Office (SCO) on April 4, 2018. PRINCE previously stated he had met with Donald TRUMP JR twice prior to the election, and he remembered a 3rd meeting at the end of the Las Vegas debate. The 3rd meeting was at TRUMP HOTEL and nothing substantial was discussed. PRINCE also wanted to try to explain why his cell phones did not have SMS messages prior to a certain date. PRINCE has a [redacted] [redacted] which when he changed out with his regular cell phone SIM card, may have wiped the previous SMS messages prior to that date. Last, in trying to recall the events of January 4, 2017, PRINCE remembered having lunch at Cipriani's Restaurant, two blocks north of Trump Tower, in New York City [redacted] The lunch occurred at 11:45 a.m., and it was the day he left for Texas. b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

Investigation on 05/03/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 06/08/2018 b6 b7C

by [redacted] b7E

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[redacted] PRINCE never worked for the Trump Campaign in any official capacity. [redacted] PRINCE was informally advising the campaign, and he described it as him pushing, not them pulling. [redacted] If a person was on the approved list, they could then go up. PRINCE did not have an access pass so he would call [redacted] The only time PRINCE would call [redacted] would be for a meeting with BANNON. To meet BANNON, PRINCE would also try calling [redacted] or text BANNON. There was a bar/restaurant area in the lobby to the right, and up a nearby escalator was a Starbucks and sitting area.

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PRINCE was shown an image of the business card of [redacted] which was obtained from PRINCE's phone, and a photo of [redacted] PRINCE thought he met [redacted] one of the times he was on the floor at Trump Tower where the transition people were located and where BANNON's office was. PRINCE thought it was an approximately 15 second meeting and [redacted] PRINCE usually tries to take a picture of, or attempts to scan, business cards depending on the photo. PRINCE didn't know if [redacted] met BANNON or not. PRINCE met him in the hallway outside a conference room. [redacted] had just been in that conference room with Michael FLYNN, Jared KUSHNER, or both of them. BANNON had been very busy that day and PRINCE had waited around to see him. PRINCE went around and talked to other people on the floor while he waited for BANNON and ended up being late [redacted] If PRINCE saw BANNON that day it was only very briefly and would have been a 5 minute meeting. On either January 3 or January 4, PRINCE remembers talking to Judge Jeanine PIRRO, Kellyanne CONWAY, Secretary Wilbur ROSS, Steve MNUCHIN and [redacted] while he was waiting around for BANNON. It was possible he met with other

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b7C

people as well. BANNON had blinds in his office that PRINCE believed were installed by January 2017. PRINCE was cleared to "get into the queue" with BANNON but he did not feel like he was getting guaranteed access. PRINCE does not recall, but it is possible that he met with BANNON on January 4 and discussed Kirill DMITRIEV.

When PRINCE met with BANNON on December 22, 2016 at Teterboro airport, [redacted] PRINCE used [redacted] to fly up to Teterboro to deliver a document to BANNON. [redacted] It was part of PRINCE's effort to change the foreign policy approach. b3 b6 b7C

When George NADER sent him the text on DMITRIEV, PRINCE opened it within an hour of being on the transition team floor. It is possible he discussed it with BANNON, PRINCE didn't remember seeing BANNON then, but it is a possibility. PRINCE didn't believe that he passed DMITRIEV's information to anyone else, but he might have passed it to FLYNN, but not in a long substantial meeting. PRINCE believed he was perceived to be someone in the transition whose main contact was BANNON.

NADER was Mohammed Bin Zayed's (MBZ) man and was currently clashing with Yousef Al OTAIBA. PRINCE did have some type of conversation about DMITRIEV at the dinner with NADER. NADER became a conduit to MBZ for PRINCE. PRINCE was focused on getting in the good graces with MBZ and NADER's main interest was meeting someone in the transition team. NADER setup the meeting between PRINCE and MBZ. NADER viewed PRINCE as an access point and was using PRINCE as a messenger to the Trump Transition Team. PRINCE didn't remember affirming to NADER that he would pass information onto the Transition Team, but he thought it was a fair inference for NADER to think that he would pass the DMITRIEV information onto them. PRINCE wasn't NADER's sole access point to the Trump Transition Team. The DMITRIEV information was important to NADER and contact with MBZ was what was important to PRINCE. It was possible that PRINCE met with BANNON and possible that he spoke about DMITRIEV with BANNON. PRINCE also thought it was possible that he was just paying lip service to NADER and did not follow through. The only time PRINCE could remember being at Trump Tower after Christmas was 3 and 4 January 2017.

When PRINCE arrived in the Seychelles on January 11, 2017 he was greeted at the airport by a representative of the UAE. He was taken to his hotel room where he cleaned up. He had an initial meeting with NADER in his villa. Afterward he went to MBZ's villa and met with MBZ. PRINCE described the rest of the attendees as "all Arabs". The meeting took about an hour and a half. When the meeting concluded, he had dinner with NADER,

and then PRINCE was reminded that there was a person MBZ's people thought he should meet. PRINCE thought the initial meeting with DMITRIEV was at a bar. PRINCE distinctly remembers it being a bar and remembers DMITRIEV's [redacted] After an approximately 30 minute meeting with DMITRIEV, PRINCE went back to his room. At that point, PRINCE saw the news about the Russian aircraft carrier Kuznetsov sailing into Tobruk, Libya, so he called NADER in order to meet with DMITRIEV again. They then met in NADER's villa. PRINCE told DMITRIEV that this was not the way to improve relations. PRINCE was not telling DMITRIEV this in an official capacity, but as his experience as a former Naval Officer. PRINCE told DMITRIEV this because DMITRIEV had links to the Russian Government. DMITRIEV said that sometimes the Russian military gets ahead of themselves.

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DMITRIEV believed, if anything, that PRINCE knew people in the transition, and was either officially or unofficially associated with the transition. PRINCE didn't remember BANNON specifically being raised during the conversation. PRINCE said that BANNON was effective if not conventional. PRINCE indicated he provided policy papers to BANNON. DMITRIEV was not surprised that PRINCE was linked to BANNON. DMITRIEV appeared to know that he would be meeting with PRINCE and knew something about PRINCE. PRINCE believed he was a diligent and audible campaigner for Donald TRUMP. DMITRIVEV appeared to know that PRINCE was tangentially related to the Trump Campaign. It could have come up that PRINCE provided updates to BANNON and BANNON knew PRINCE was meeting a fund manager. [redacted] PRINCE told DMITRIEV that he would let BANNON know that he had met with DMITRIEV. If there was an interest BANNON, or someone else in the transition, would take it from there. PRINCE was not interested in being the middle man. DMITRIEV was interested in improving relations between the U.S. and Russia. PRINCE thought he told NADER he would relay the DMITRIEV information back to BANNON. PRINCE would have conveyed to BANNON the DMITRIEV information regardless of whether NADER requested it or not. NADER wanted to be the "perpetual middleman" and PRINCE described the meeting with DMITRIEV as a date you didn't know you were being setup with. PRINCE described it as a fair assessment that NADER setup the meeting ahead of time. There were indications from DMITRIEV that he knew he was meeting with PRINCE. It appeared that DMITRIEV had read a little bit about PRINCE's background with Blackwater and the U.S. Navy SEALS. PRINCE thought it was probably both the UAE and NADER's idea to set PRINCE up with DMITRIEV. There was no indication given from PRINCE that BANNON sent PRINCE to the Seychelles. DMITRIEV was aware that PRINCE knew people connected to the administration.

b3

There was no conversation between PRINCE and DMITRIEV of Russian interference during the 2016 presidential campaign. PRINCE described

himself as a student of intelligence and covert action. PRINCE believed that Russia's intent was to sow chaos and in that effort they succeeded. PRINCE didn't think the Russians affected the 2016 presidential election, but that they affected the first year after the election. DMITRIEV gave no indication that the Russians helped TRUMP or any gloating that they played any role in getting him elected. Right before the meeting with DMITRIEV, PRINCE asked NADER what DMITRIEV was looking for. NADER stated that he was looking for any way to communicate with the new administration.

DMITRIEV presents himself very well, is educated, and understood the U. S. system very well. [redacted] b6 b7C

PRINCE subsequently met with BANNON at the "Breitbart Embassy". PRINCE talked through his Teterboro paper on the private option, briefed BANNON on his southern border trip, [redacted] b3 At the last minute, PRINCE said that he had met with DMITRIEV. He explained that DMITRIEV was looking at improving relations with the U.S., was the head of a Russian sovereign wealth fund, and the UAE wanted PRINCE to meet him. PRINCE probably held up a picture of DMITRIEV to show BANNON who he met. PRINCE didn't know if he had any contact information, such as a phone number, for DMITRIEV. It was possible PRINCE handed over to BANNON a business card, or wrote down an email address or a phone number for DMITRIEV. PRINCE subsequently said he presumed he conveyed how to get in contact with DMITRIEV, it could have been a card or number. PRINCE informed BANNON, and then it was up to him to follow up. BANNON told PRINCE to not follow up. BANNON wasn't interested and PRINCE could tell from his body language. PRINCE described it as on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being highly interested, BANNON was a 7 on his reaction. If it was a priority, PRINCE would have gotten a 1 from BANNON. The 7 in reaction PRINCE got from BANNON was not unusual, but it was more negative then PRINCE thought it would be. PRINCE didn't get a 10 either, meaning BANNON was "pissed off" about it. BANNON didn't verbalize why he lacked interest. PRINCE was not the conduit going forward.

PRINCE got a text response from BANNON when asking for feedback on PRINCE's proposed private option. PRINCE had done radio interviews with BANNON on certain topics and the first one he did was in 2013.

PRINCE was shown a screenshot from his phone which was captured from a video of TRUMP on CNN. The headline of the video was "Trump: I have no dealings with Russia in Business". If PRINCE had sent or received the video, WhatsApp automatically dumps it into the queue. PRINCE didn't know

why he would have been filming the show and doesn't know why he had the video.

[redacted] b6 b7C

PRINCE used the business card reader in his phone, but he never used it with DMITRIEV. PRINCE now remembered that DMITRIEV gave PRINCE a business card, or PRINCE wrote down his information. PRINCE remembered that he gave DMITRIEV's contact information to BANNON. PRINCE didn't remember what BANNON did with it.

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] At the time there was a lot of noise about WikiLeaks and what they would next be reporting. PRINCE asked STONE to speculate and STONE said that he bet they had more stuff coming. STONE said he had a contact at WikiLeaks, but PRINCE didn't recall how he said he had a contact, and he didn't press on sources and methods. STONE said "more bombshells coming" but provided no further context. [redacted] b6 b7C

PRINCE stated it was fair to say the WikiLeaks topic was similar, but PRINCE didn't recall them saying how they would use the WikiLeaks information. PRINCE thought that public attention was on the WikiLeaks information, [redacted]

PRINCE said it was possible he was disappointed that ASSANGE didn't release information on October 4, 2016. PRINCE might have sent STONE a "WTF" text or something similar since he was rooting for that team. PRINCE might have asked STONE [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted]

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From what PRINCE remembered, his conversations with STONE were mainly through text. STONE alluded to having confidence that there was a bombshell coming from WikiLeaks. STONE didn't specify how he knew and did not say if he had communication with ASSANGE or not. After the ASSANGE press conference, it shook PRINCE's confidence in STONE. PRINCE thought [redacted] STONE claimed to have knowledge, which was above average, on what ASSANGE was up to. STONE claimed he was in touch with ASSANGE, either directly or through a cut-out, and STONE might have alluded to that at their first meeting. STONE amplified his connection after the ASSANGE press conference. PRINCE didn't remember STONE giving a more detailed qualifying statement. STONE stated that there was more material coming out from ASSANGE, but PRINCE didn't remember to what level he described it to that date. After the ASSANGE press conference, STONE said more was coming and described it as being from the CLINTON inner circle or CLINTON staff. PRINCE further refined it to say STONE might have said CLINTON world, or CLINTON campaign and that it was damaging to the other side. PRINCE didn't remember a phone call with STONE or not, but the conversation must have coincided in order to push the last amount of funding. PRINCE couldn't remember STONE's exact tone, but he remembers STONE said [redacted]

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[redacted] When PRINCE first met STONE, STONE made a fundraising pitch and claimed to have above average knowledge of what WikiLeaks has or will do in the future. After the disappointment following ASSANGE's October 2016 press conference, and PRINCE's "WTF" message, STONE again asserted he had almost "insider stock trading" type information. STONE had been in touch with London, or someone in London, and heard more were coming out in relation to senior CLINTON world people.

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PRINCE didn't know what type of secure communications STONE used, but believed it was possible STONE suggested WhatsApp or Signal. PRINCE didn't remember STONE pushing insider advanced information, as far as a bombshell coming up, but maybe he called on WhatsApp. PRINCE supposed STONE could

have asked to switch to secure communication means, but PRINCE never got advanced notice of a data dump by secure means. PRINCE thought he remembered STONE wanting to use a secure platform and by implication it was a "sensitive newsworthy platform". PRINCE didn't think STONE was that secretive and presumed he sent around advanced WikiLeaks knowledge to others. PRINCE did remember an email from STONE making some assertion about future events to come.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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PRINCE stated he didn't know a [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

b6
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PRINCE told a couple of [redacted] that the FBI had seized his phone. These [redacted] PRINCE described them as "not dumb people" and they could see what was going on in the media. PRINCE told the immediate guys he was working with, but he did not tell anyone the questions that were asked. PRINCE described the phone seizure as not really an interview. BANNON and [redacted] did not know that PRINCE's phones were seized by the FBI.

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

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 11/30/2017

ALEX VAN DER ZWAAN (VAN DER ZWAAN), [redacted] mobile telephone numbers [redacted] office telephone number [redacted] email addresses [redacted] [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel, Washington, D.C. Present for the interview were FBI Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] Special Counsel Attorneys Andrew Weissmann and Brian Richardson. Also present were VAN DER ZWAAN's attorneys [redacted] and [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, VAN DER ZWAAN provided the following information:

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VAN DER ZWAAN was advised his participation in the interview was voluntary. VAN DER ZWAAN was also advised that he needed to be truthful in his answers and lying to a Federal agent could constitute a Federal crime.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] He qualified as a lawyer in 2009 and started working for SKADDEN at that time.

Investigation on 11/03/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/06/2017

by [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Ukraine MOJ/TYMOSHENKO Engagement

VAN DER ZWAAN was assigned to the MOJ/TYMOSHENKO engagement in 2012.

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VAN DER ZWAAN was eventually assigned to work the SKADDEN engagement full-time. He devoted several months of work to the engagement. VAN DER ZWAAN described his and SKADDEN's role in the engagement in 2012 to be primarily responsible for preparing, interviewing, and writing up interviews of witnesses associated with the TYMOSHENKO trial. VAN DER ZWAAN's role, in addition to above, was to be a linguist and cultural conduit and for communication purposes. He made things happen on the ground in Ukraine and ensured expectations were being met. He also described his role as handling the nuts and bolts of the engagement and taking care of the people on the team. In 2013, VAN DER ZWAAN stated the engagement involved the report roll out. Specifically, SKADDEN presented their report and their conclusions were conveyed. [redacted] b6 b7C

E-Mails

VAN DER ZWAAN was shown a number of emails, many with attachments, and was asked to clarify information within the emails.

1. [redacted] b3 b6 b7C

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] VAN DER ZWAAN played a passive role in the report roll out, to include defending the report and making certain the work SKADDEN did in the report was properly portrayed. This also included VAN DER ZWAAN traveling to Poland to guide European Union (EU) officials there through the report and explain the findings. [redacted]

2. [redacted]

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The client for the SKADDEN engagement was the Ukrainian MOJ. [redacted]

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3. [redacted]

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4. [redacted]

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5. [redacted]

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7. [redacted]

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8. [redacted]

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9. [redacted]

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10. [redacted]

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11. [redacted]

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12. [redacted]

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13. [redacted]

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18. [redacted]

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19. [redacted]

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20. [redacted]

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21. [redacted]

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28. [redacted]

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29. [redacted]

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30. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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VAN DER ZWAAN was not involved in the substantial writing of the report. [redacted]

31. [redacted]

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32. [redacted]

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33. [redacted]

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VAN DER ZWAAN knew of news reporting MANAFORT resigned from the Trump campaign in August 2016. He did not remember having any conversations with MANAFORT after the news reporting. Nor did he remember having a conversation with GATES after MANAFORT resigned but he would not be surprised if he had. If he did communicate with GATES, it would have likely been less than five times and through a phone call, WhatsApp, email, or Viber. VAN DER ZWAAN recalled a text message sent to him by GATES some time after mid-August 2016, perhaps six weeks after

MANAFORT resigned, which simply stated, "U.S. politics suck." VAN DER ZWAAN did not recall any post mid-August 2016 communications concerning work on the SKADDEN report. Nor did he remember any communications with [redacted] post mid-August 2016. VAN DER ZWAAN admitted to staying in cordial contact with [redacted] after the SKADDEN engagement ended. The last time VAN DER ZWAAN and [redacted] communicated was in 2014 when [redacted] He also remained friendly with GATES. VAN DER ZWAAN recalled speaking with GATES in May 2016, [redacted] This was the last time they spoke to each other.

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34. [redacted]

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35. [redacted]

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36. [redacted]

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37. [redacted]

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38. [redacted] VAN DER ZWAAN always thought KILIMNIK was a former Russian spy [redacted]

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39. [redacted]

b3
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b7C

40. [redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

41. [redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

[redacted]

b3
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42. [redacted]

b3
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43. [redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

[redacted]

b3
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b7C

44. [redacted]

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b7C

45. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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46. [redacted]

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b7C

47. [redacted] VAN DER ZWAAN knew not to speak with the media. [redacted] VAN DER ZWAAN never spoke to the media concerning the SKADDEN report.

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b7C

48. [redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

49. [redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

50. [redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

51. [redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

[redacted] b3 b6 b7C

52. [redacted] b3 b6 b7C

53. [redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] b3

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
ON 02-11-2020

General Records Schedule 16.2 Item 20 Destroy when 25 years old, but longer retention is authorized if required for business use

b6
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FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

~~SECRET~~//~~ORCON~~/~~NOFORN~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 05/18/2017

(U) On or about 5/16/2017 Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] and Special Agent [redacted] interviewed [redacted], DOB [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

(U) Administrative

(U) The 05/16/2017 interview was established through a series of phone calls to [redacted] and [redacted] on 05/15/2017 and 05/16/2017. On 05/17/2017 SA [redacted] contacted [redacted] and conducted a brief telephonic clarifying interview which is included at the end of this FD-302.

b6
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(U) [redacted]

b6
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(U) [redacted]

b6
b7C

~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~
~~Derived From: National Security Information SCG~~
~~Declassify On: 50X1-HUM~~

~~SECRET~~//~~ORCON~~/~~NOFORN~~

Investigation on 05/16/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person, Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/17/2017

by [redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

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[redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [redacted] (DOB [redacted]), On 05/16/2017, Page 2 of 3

[redacted] b6 b7C

(U) [redacted] b6 b7C

(U) [redacted] b6 b7C

(U) [redacted] b6 b7C

(U) [redacted] b6 b7C

(U) [redacted] b6 b7C

(U) [redacted] b6 b7C

b3
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b7C
b7E

[redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [redacted] (DOB [redacted]), On 05/16/2017, Page 3 of 3

[redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) 05/17/2017 Telephone Call

(U) SA [redacted] called [redacted] at [redacted] to clarify his email address and to ask clarifying questions.

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(U) [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] b7E

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)





**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 09/24/2018

**FEDERAL GRAND JURY INFORMATION**

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(U) On 08/28/2018 Special Agents (SA) [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] requested a voluntary interview and served the attached subpoena upon [redacted] at his residence at [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

(U) The below is an interview summary. It is not intended to be a verbatim account and does not memorialize all statements made during the interview.

[redacted] b7E

(U) [redacted] did not want to volunteer for an interview without his attorney. b6 b7C

Investigation on 08/28/2018 at [redacted] United States (, Other (Service of Subpoena))

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/04/2018

by [redacted]

b3 b6 b7C b7E

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[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



General Records

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
ON 06-25-2020

Date of entry 11/06/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

On November 3, 2017 K.T. [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b3 b6 b7C

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~
~~Derived From: National Security Information SCG~~
~~Declassify On: 50X1-HUM~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 11/03/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/03/2017

by [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

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FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2042
DATE: 02-12-2020

~~SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

General Records Schedule 4.2 Information Access and Protection Records

b6
b7C
b7E

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 09/12/2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) Kathleen Troia "K.T." McFarland, date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] telephone numbers [redacted] (cell); [redacted] home) & [redacted] home) was interviewed by SA [redacted] & SSA [redacted] in her home at [redacted] Also present for a substantial portion of the interview was [redacted] attorney [redacted] telephone numbers [redacted] (cell) & [redacted] (office direct line). After the agents identified themselves and briefly described the purpose of the interview, they explained to McFarland the potential criminal consequences of lying to the FBI in the course of an investigation under 18 U.S.C. 1001. McFarland acknowledged that she understood and then brought up the case of Martha Stewart. McFarland then provided the following information:

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

Investigation on 08/29/2017 at [redacted] New York, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/30/2017

by [redacted]

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b7C
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b7E

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
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[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b6
b7C

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

b7E

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

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[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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(S) [redacted]

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[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted]

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[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

General Record

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 12/19/2017

ALEX VAN DER ZWAAN (VAN DER ZWAAN), date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel, Washington, D.C. Present for the interview were FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Special Counsel Attorney Andrew Weissmann. Also present were VAN DER ZWAAN's attorneys William Schwartz, Laura Grossfield Birger, and [redacted] with the law firm Cooley LLP. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the Proffer, VAN DER ZWAAN provided the following information: b6 b7C

VAN DER ZWAAN was advised his participation in the Proffer was voluntary. VAN DER ZWAAN was also advised that he needed to be truthful in his answers and lying to a Federal agent could constitute a Federal crime. Additionally, the terms of the proffer agreement were explained to VAN DER ZWAAN, which he and his attorney signed and is attached hereto as a 1A.

VAN DER ZWAAN stated some of his prior statements to the FBI/Special Counsel were knowingly false. In particular, statements made about the last time he spoke with RICK GATES (GATES) and [redacted] In prior statements, VAN DER ZWAAN stated he last spoke to GATES in May 2016 [redacted] Likewise, VAN DER ZWAAN stated in his prior interview he last spoke to [redacted] in 2015. VAN DER ZWAAN, however, spoke to both GATES and [redacted] in September 2016 concerning the Ukraine MOJ/YULIA TYMOSHENKO (TYMOSHENKO) engagement. Specifically, VAN DER ZWAAN stated on or about September 7, 2016 [redacted] he received a call from GATES on [redacted] VAN DER ZWAAN did not recall the subject or content of the conversation but remembered GATES telling him to contact [redacted] concerning Ukraine. After the call, GATES sent VAN DER ZWAAN [redacted] documents via the app Viber. He and GATES would generally communicate via Viber. One of the [redacted] documents was a preliminary criminal complaint from Ukraine. VAN DER ZWAAN did not remember seeing his name or [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] VAN DER ZWAAN called [redacted] and recorded the conversation. After speaking with [redacted] he called [redacted] and made a partial recording of the conversation also. [redacted] b6 b7C

A few days later, VAN DER ZWAAN spoke to GATES and recorded the conversation also. VAN DER ZWAAN did not recall any additional conversations with [redacted] after September 2016. VAN DER ZWAAN recalled speaking to GATES again later in 2016 but described the conversation as b6 b7C

Investigation on 12/01/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person) b6 b7C

File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/05/2017 b7E

by [redacted]

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[redacted] VAN DER ZWAAN did not have any additional contact with PAUL MANAFORT (MANAFORT). b6 b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted]

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[redacted]

b6
b7C

## Other Recorded Communications

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

## Other Omissions

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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Moonlighting/Freelance Legal Work

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Emails

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Final Report

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Non-Produced or Destroyed Documents

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Hand Written Notes

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Media Communications

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[redacted] b7E

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



General Records

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 11/14/2017

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DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

(U~~//FOUO~~) [redacted] was contacted on his home telephone in [redacted] He provided the following information: b6 b7C

(U~~//FOUO~~) [redacted] b3

(U~~//FOUO~~) McFarland's confirmation as U.S. Ambassador to Singapore is still pending and they did not know the reason for the delay. Once she is confirmed, McFarland is supposed to receive multiple State Department briefings before reporting. [redacted] thought much of that would be unnecessary given McFarland's previous position as Deputy National Security Adviser, so they would be able to move fairly quickly. b6 b7C

(U~~//FOUO~~) [redacted] b6 b7C

UNCLASSIFIED~~//FOUO~~

Investigation on 11/13/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/13/2017 b6 b7C

by [redacted] b7E

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[redacted] b7E

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



General Record

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 04/04/2018

**FEDERAL GRAND JURY INFORMATION**

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During an interview with [redacted] at [redacted] on March 27, 2018, Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted] served [redacted] with a Federal Grand Jury subpoena [redacted] b3 b6 b7C

A copy of the subpoena is enclosed for the file as a digital 1A attachment to this FD-302.

Investigation on 03/27/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person) b3 b6 b7C b7E

File # [redacted] Date drafted 04/03/2018

by [redacted]

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[redacted] b7E

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



General Records

UNCLASSIFIED/~~/FOUO~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 04/04/2018

[redacted] DOB [redacted] was interviewed telephonically by Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky and Special Agent [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b3 b6 b7C

[redacted] had contacted the Special Counsel's Office prior to the captioned phone conversation and spoke with SA [redacted] and advised he could be reached [redacted] The captioned interview took place at approximately 1:15 PM EST. b3 b6 b7C

[redacted] ASC Zelinsky advised [redacted] ASC Zelinksky further advised [redacted] b3 b6 b7C

[redacted] the subpoena given to him by Agents on the evening of March 27, 2018. ASC Zelinksy advised [redacted] ASC Zelinsky, SA [redacted] b3 b6 b7C

ASC Zelinksy advised [redacted] he would be sending a revised subpoena for [redacted] confirmed the aforementioned as a [redacted] at which he could be reached. b3 b6 b7C

UNCLASSIFIED/~~/FOUO~~

Investigation on 03/28/2018 at [redacted] United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 03/29/2018

by [redacted]

b3 b6 b7C b7E

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[redacted] b7E



FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



UNCLASSIFIED/~~FOUO~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 03/18/2013

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] home address [redacted] was interviewed at the law offices of [redacted] In attendance was [redacted] attorney, [redacted] Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) [redacted] and [redacted] of the AUSA's office. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agent, the AUSA and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b3 b6 b7C

[redacted] b3 b6 b7C

[redacted] as requested by subpoena served by the AUSA's office [redacted] b3

[redacted] b3 b6 b7C

[redacted] b3 b6 b7C

UNCLASSIFIED/~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 03/13/2013 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 03/18/2013

by [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

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b3
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[redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of [redacted], On 03/13/2013, Page 2 of 2

[redacted]

b3
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[redacted]

b3
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[redacted]

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[redacted]

b3
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[redacted] was not aware of [redacted]
was not aware of [redacted]
[redacted] was not aware [redacted]
[redacted]

b3
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[redacted] b7E



FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 10/30/2018

Paul J. Manafort, date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agents [redacted]; Assistant United States Attorney [redacted]; and Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Andrew Weissmann, Greg Andres and Zainab Ahmad. Present representing Manafort were attorneys Richard Westling, Thomas Zehnle and Kevin Downing and paralegal [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, Manafort provided the following information: b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b3 b7A

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 09/25/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/25/2018 b6 b7C

by [redacted] b7E

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[redacted] b3 b7A

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] b7A

[redacted] b7A

[redacted] b7A

[redacted] b7A

[redacted] b7A

[redacted] b3 b7A

[redacted] b7A

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] b7A

[redacted] b7A

[redacted] b3 b7A

[redacted] b7A

[redacted] b7A

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

[redacted] b6 b7A b7C

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General Records

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 10/25/2018

Paul J. Manafort, date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted]; Assistant United States Attorneys [redacted] DOJ Attorney [redacted]; and Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres. Present representing Manafort were attorneys Richard Westling, Kevin Downing and Thomas Zehnle and paralegal [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, Manafort provided the following information: b6 b7C

Manafort opposed the arrest of Yulia Tymoshenko. Regardless of her guilt, the arrest restricted Ukraine's ability to join the European Union (EU). Manafort himself developed the idea for an audit and report on her trial. Manafort wanted a reputable firm to perform the audit. Manafort got Viktor Yanukovych to approve the creation of the report. After the audit, Manafort planned for the firm to work with the Ministry of Justice to correct any problems found during the audit.

The purpose of the report was to defend the trial process and result to stakeholders, particularly in Europe but also in the United States. Ukraine was considering filing an application to join the EU which required Ukraine to meet certain European standards. U.S. opinion could have influenced European decisionmakers. Manafort planned to target European embassies in Kyiv with the report.

After conversations with [redacted] Manafort decided to use Greg Craig to supervise the report. Craig worked for a well-known firm, had political sensibilities and had legal ability. Craig also had connections to the Clinton and Obama Administrations. Manafort reached out to Craig through [redacted] Manafort met Craig in Craig's office in Washington, D. C. [redacted] had already explained the project to Craig. Manafort told Craig that Manafort's goal was getting Ukraine into the EU. Tymoshenko's imprisonment was a setback to that goal. Manafort said he wanted an audit of the trial and justice process. b6 b7C

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Investigation on 09/26/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/02/2018 b6 b7C b7E

by [redacted]

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Manafort planned for the report to be submitted to European embassies in Kyiv. There would be presentations on the high points of the report to stakeholders in Berlin, Paris, Brussels and the United States. The presentations would also highlight other reforms and advances being made in the Ukraine. Manafort told Craig that the report would be published, disseminated and explained but Manafort cannot recall whether he gave Craig any details on these steps. Craig was intrigued but wanted to think about it. Manafort does not recall whether the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) came up during this initial meeting. Manafort does not recall discussing billing costs or payments at this first meeting. In the meeting, or at least prior to the agreement, Manafort told Craig that Craig needed to communicate the report's findings. Because of his background and experience, Craig was a credible spokesperson. Craig resisted but Manafort felt he could overcome the resistance and establish a role for Craig.

Manafort made clear to Craig that the client was the Ukrainian government. With the government as the client, Craig would have access to its officials. Craig made the point that he needed independence. Manafort told Yanukovych that the report could not be a whitewash, its credibility depended on it being fair and independent. In other words, it would be a Western-like report not a Russian-like report.

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A formal contract between the Ukrainian government and Skadden was needed for Skadden to have access to government officials for the interviews. The Ministry of Justice and Ukrainian government could not pay Skadden's rate without issuing a formal tender which would have opened the process up to competition. Manafort had picked the person and firm he wanted and did not want the contract going to the lowest bidder. Also,

the tender process would have taken longer than Manafort wanted. Lyovochkin or Yanukovych got [redacted] to pay for the report. The amount of the formal contract between Skadden and the Ministry of Justice was set at the ceiling for a non-competitive procurement. Manafort wanted a non-public process for additional reasons. First, if opponents knew about the report before it was complete, they would criticize it as a whitewash without giving it a fair read. Second, the government would need to disclose the price of the report which would be unpopular and undermine its credibility. b6 b7C

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Manafort reviewed SAU 000399-402. Manafort forwarded the Kuzmin interview to Craig to alert him to a problem that he would have to deal with. Deputy Kuzmin was very political and hated Tymoshenko. Manafort sent comments to Craig throughout the process to push a finding of a fair trial in the report but that was not the purpose here. Manafort was not sending this interview in order to get negative information about Tymoshenko in front of Craig to bias him against her. Regarding the payment, [redacted] ended up paying the other $500,000. Manafort expected this result but wrote that "some is coming a different way" in order to buy time. All the money paid for the Skadden Report came from [redacted] b6 b7C

Phase Two of the project - training prosecutors and judges on the reformed laws and regulations - intrigued Craig. Manafort does not know why Phase Two did not go forward, perhaps it was because the government did not like the report or because Craig was worn out with the Ukraine work. Manafort did not believe, and he did not discuss with Craig, that the government needed to be satisfied with the report in order for Phase Two to go forward.

[redacted] b3

Manafort reviewed a 04/10/2012 Retainer Memorandum to the Ministry of Justice from Gregory B. Craig. The letter came from Skadden. Craig dictated its terms. The FARA language did not bother Manafort because he believed Craig's promotion work could still focus in Kyiv. Manafort was not happy about the limitation but the report would still have Craig's name on it which could be used by Manafort's lobbyists in D.C. The Skadden Report was part of a larger campaign to influence Western views of the Ukraine and its reforms. Skadden's filing under FARA would have required them to disclose the amount of money it was being paid and the source of the funds.

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Jonathan Hawker of FTI developed the plan to rollout the Skadden Report. Manafort and Rick Gates reviewed and had input into the rollout plan. The plan was ambitious and a lot of it did not get executed. They ended up having no one to speak about the report because Craig and Pshonka would not.

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Manafort reviewed a document titled "Master Control Grid." Craig did not sign off on his role identified in this document. Craig had made clear to Manafort that Craig would not make political contacts. Manafort is not aware of Craig contacting any politicians.

Manafort met with Hawker, Gates and perhaps Alex Van Der Zwaan in Manafort's New York apartment to discuss the rollout plan. The next day, Manafort, Gates, Van Der Zwaan, Hawker, Craig and maybe Kilimnik met for brunch at the Harvard Club. They ate in the main dining room, it was not the right environment for an organized meeting. Manafort talked one-on-one with Craig in the buffet line. Manafort pressed Craig to be part of the rollout. Craig resisted. Craig agreed to entertain doing a New York Times interview with David Sanger. Their conversation continued at the table. After the lunch, Manafort was not happy, he had a rollout plan but no face. The New York Times / Sanger piece replaced the Bloomberg placeholder in the plan. Manafort does not know why later versions of the rollout plan do not list the New York Times or Sanger.

It was not cemented that Craig would talk with Sanger until right before the report's release. Gates told Manafort that Craig agreed to deliver the report to Sanger. Manafort believes that Van Der Zwaan told Gates this. Gates told Manafort that Craig physically dropped off the report with Sanger because they were neighbors. Gates said Craig had talked to Sanger when he dropped off the report.

Manafort reviewed FTI-027120-124. Manafort knew Craig's talking points for reporters if they called. Yanukovych wanted a finding of no political motivation for the prosecution, not just a finding that there was no evidence of political motivation. Craig and Manafort went back and forth on this point.

Manafort reviewed FTI-026144-146, a document titled "Key Points About the Skadden Report." The document was to be given to people that spoke out on behalf of the Report. The points track the conversations between Manafort and Craig on what Manafort wanted stressed and what Craig was willing to say. The points are consistent with Craig's points in the New

York Times article. Craig never said that the New York Times article would be favorable. Manafort assumed it would be favorable because Craig and Sanger were friends.

Manafort used Van Der Zwaan as a backchannel to communicate with Craig. Craig trusted Van Der Zwaan. Manafort asked Gates to get Van Der Zwaan to convince Craig to give the Report to the New York Times. Manafort planned to be the final hammer to convince Craig if necessary. Manafort did not need to talk with Craig after the Harvard Club because Gates told Manafort that Craig agreed to do it.

Craig used FARA to push back at the Harvard Club. Craig said he would not meet with government officials or the media. Manafort focused on the New York Times as a way to get his foot in the door with Craig. Craig said he would explain the findings to Sanger.

Manafort reviewed DOJSCO-400587848-849. Manafort created the document. Under 2.a., Manafort was responsible for convincing Craig to do more with the media.

In October 2012, the Ukrainian language version of the Report was being created. During this time, Manafort and Craig had several conversations about the Report's key findings. Manafort was trying to find an agreement between what the Ukrainian government wanted and what Craig would say. Craig explained his decision to find no selective prosecution, as opposed to using the term political prosecution. Craig explained that selective prosecution included a finding that there was no evidence of political motivation.

Manafort reviewed SAU 143424. [redacted] is listed as the [redacted] contact because he was the [redacted] No one had a relationship with him. b6 b7C

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Manafort briefed Yanukovych several times on the potential media positives and negatives from the Report. The New York Times article was consistent with what Manafort told Yanukovych to expect.

Van Der Zwaan briefed [redacted] on the key points of the Report. b6 b7C

[redacted] b3

Manafort reviewed ES 00012-015. Manafort is not aware of Craig communicating with John Kerry about the Report. Manafort does not recall ever discussing Kerry with Craig. At this time, Mercury's and Podesta's principal activity was lobbying against the Senate Resolution.

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Manafort reviewed FTI-025220-223. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs distributed the Skadden Report, Manafort does not know why the plan said Skadden would send it. Manafort expected the Skadden Report to be distributed to these individuals through their embassies in Kyiv.

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

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 10/31/2018

Paul J. Manafort, date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street SE, Washington, D. C. Participating in the interview were Special Agent (SA) [redacted] SA [redacted] Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Jeannie S. Rhee, SASC Andrew Weissman,and Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky. Manafort was accompanied by his attorneys, Richard Westling, Thomas Zehnle, and [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, Manafort provided the following information:

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Roger Stone was informally involved in the Donald J. Trump presidential campaign in April or May of 2016. Stone had been involved in the campaign in the beginning, while Manafort was not, so Manafort used Stone for institutional memory and knowledge of the campaign. Stone used Manafort for informal access back into the campaign.

Stone recommended that Manafort bring on Michael Caputo, which Manafort did. Caputo initially came on to help with the April primary in New York, and then Manafort brought him on full time after that. Caputo had worked with Stone in the past and Manafort had met him years prior. Stone also recommended [redacted]

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Manafort said Stone gave him information about Corey Lewandowski and Hope Hicks, two members of the campaign that Manafort did not know well. Stone hated Lewandowski, who undercut Manafort in the campaign. Stone thought he was helping Manafort by undercutting Lewandowski in the press, but it did not actually help Manafort much.

Manafort explained that "the Count of Monte Cristo" was a nickname given to him during the Dole campaign period. [redacted] made that nickname up for Manafort because of the way Manafort wore his overcoat over his shoulders like a cape.

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Stone was an effective advocate from outside of the campaign. He was effective with both the mainstream and the alt-right media. Stone could also do things from outside the campaign that the campaign may not want to

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File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/30/2018

by [redacted]

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be directly associated with. For example, when Stone attacked Lewandowski, he thought he was being helpful from the outside. Manafort did not ask or need Stone to do it, as he did not think it was helpful.

Stone tried to get [redacted] involved in the campaign at one point because he thought it would help with [redacted] Manafort wanted nothing to do with it and killed it, but Trump later brought it up himself. Manafort thought Trump raised it because Stone brought it up to him.

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Stone had a PAC that was not well funded and he wanted Manafort to designate it as the favored PAC for the campaign, but Manafort did not want to. Lewandowski also had a PAC and wanted the same thing, and Manafort did not want to deal with internal politics related to their PACs. He thought it was a good idea to have a designated PAC, he just did not want it to be either Stone's or Lewandowski's.

Stone asked Manafort for the RNC's internal lists and access to the list of users who had "liked" Trump on Facebook and Twitter, and Manafort told him he could not do it. Manafort explained that while Stone had some ability to build his own lists and raise money, Stone would have had to build off of old lists. Stone would need the lists of people that were currently supportive of the candidate.

Manafort was not sure how Stone made his money. Manafort knew Stone wrote books and gave speeches and did some consulting. Manafort knew Stone was working on a book about the Trump campaign and consulted with different candidates and on various referenda. Manafort did not know Stone's client base. Manafort was not familiar with the company Citroen.

Manafort and Stone communicated by telephone, email, and text message. Usually the emails and text messages were just to set up phone calls. They did not use encrypted apps to talk on the phone. Manafort did not know Stone's phone number off the top of his head, and said he just used whatever number was in his phone. Stone called Manafort from the same number every time, because it came up with his name on Manafort's phone when Stone called. Stone and Manafort did not talk on a regular schedule. Sometimes Manafort had Rick Gates call Stone if Manafort was busy. Stone and Gates did not get along; Stone thought Gates was a liar. If Gates and Stone talked, Gates would report back to Manafort about the call. Gates and Stone would only talk if Stone needed something or needed something passed on to Manafort.

Manafort reviewed an article from The Guardian dated June 12, 2016, entitled "WikiLeaks to publish more Hillary Clinton emails - Julian Assange." Manafort recalled he had a conversation with Stone before that article came out where Stone said WikiLeaks had Clinton's emails. At that

time, Clinton's emails were a big thing in the news and Trump liked to say that she had been hacked and that she had put the country at risk with her private server. It was part of Trump's speeches.

In late May or early June, Stone said he had spoken to someone and had good information that WikiLeaks had access to the emails on Clinton's server. It was a very self-serving comment from Stone. Manafort did not listen with enough specificity to be able to recall distinctly whether Stone said WikiLeaks had the emails in their possession or if he said WikiLeaks had access to the emails. Manafort thought Stone brought it up in context to something Trump was saying at the time.

Manafort did not convey Stone's information about the emails to Trump. He did not want to deal with a "fire drill" and be sent to go after the emails. Stone always had theories and ideas, some were true and some were not, and Manafort had no basis to know if this one was true. Manafort knew Trump would want him to do something and he did not want to. Manafort asked Stone not to convey it to Trump, and Stone agreed. Manafort thought Stone would keep his word, but he was not convinced he would. Manafort did not have any indication of whether or not Stone told Trump regardless of Manafort's request. Manafort did not have a contemporaneous memory that Stone had told Trump about the emails, because he did not recall a conversation with Trump about it back then, which he would have expected if Trump knew.

On June 12, 2016, when Julian Assange had a big press event about Clinton, Trump was excited. It allowed Trump to move his discussion about Clinton up in his campaign speeches. Whereas before that day, Trump could only speculate about whether the emails were hacked, the fact that WikiLeaks had the emails allowed Trump to say that if WikiLeaks had them, it was possible a foreign adversary had them too. Manafort said there was no real fire drill after June 12, 2016 because the information was already out there. The fire drill would have been if Stone had been the only one saying it and Trump wanted more. Manafort recalled Trump said he looked forward to seeing what Assange had.

Stone was probably talking to others about the emails at the time, but Manafort was not aware at that time who. It was Manafort's understanding that Stone was the guy that had some connection or ability to contact WikiLeaks because Stone had been proven right.

Manafort and Stone talked after the June 12, 2016 article, and Manafort said he was looking forward to seeing what came out and asked Stone if he knew what Assange had.

Gates knew about the fact that Stone had mentioned the emails prior to the June 12, 2016 story. Gates and Manafort talked about it before and after the story. Stone may have told [redacted] about it. Manafort thought he spoke to Trump and said Stone had it right, and that Trump was happy and looked forward to what WikiLeaks had. Trump asked Manafort if Stone knew what was in the emails and Manafort told him no. Manafort and Trump talked first about how to use the information that WikiLeaks had the emails in the first instance and then talked about what the content of those emails might be second. Manafort told Trump he would let Trump know what he learned from Stone about the emails.

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Manafort believed Stone told him he was working to find out what the emails included. Manafort thought Stone was using the Clinton emails to stay relevant to the campaign. At that point, Manafort could not rely on Assange. Manafort told Stone to keep him posted.

Manafort did not ask Gates to ask Stone to get in touch with Assange. Manafort did not get really interested until something was released, which happened between the two conventions.

Manafort was not sure if he talked to [redacted] about WikiLeaks. He thought if Miller was on the campaign at that time, he would have had him track it.

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Manafort used Caputo to keep track of Stone, but by around June 15, 2016, Caputo left the campaign.

Manafort discussed a breakfast he had with Stone during the RNC, which was visible briefly in the "Get Me Roger Stone" documentary. They discussed convention speeches at that breakfast. Stone also complained about Ted Cruz. They discussed the DNC, because Manafort planned to go and give some speeches during it. WikiLeaks would have come up in that breakfast in reference to what they would be doing and how the campaign could use it. Manafort did not recall whether Stone said he knew when the WikiLeaks information was going to come out. They discussed Clinton's server, WikiLeaks, and the DNC hack. They focused more on the DNC hack because it had current political value at that time. Manafort summarized the breakfast as a discussion about the the DNC hack, when WikiLeaks planned to release the material, Manafort trying to understand the attack lines that would be used during the DNC and in the month of August, and the thematic strategy for the campaign.

Stone "went dark" on WikiLeaks in late June. Manafort initially thought Stone's advance knowledge was more of a guess. It was not until the information about Debbie Wasserman-Schultz came out that Manafort realized

the real value of the information. Stone did not tell Manafort the Wasserman-Schultz information was coming out in advance, but he was pleased when it did. That was the first time Manafort thought Stone's connection to WikiLeaks was real.

Stone led Manafort to believe that the DNC information leaked would be helpful to the campaign. Stone said the information was coming and it would be helpful to the Republicans. Stone was the only one Manafort heard from regarding WikiLeaks.

After the Wasserman-Schultz information came out, Manafort told Stone he was impressed and that it was useful. Manafort recalled he told Stone he would be using the information the upcoming weekend in Philadelphia. Stone said there was more coming, and it would be good, but he did not specify when Manafort asked him for more information. At that point, Manafort thought Stone had a connection, but he did not think Stone had a direct connection to WikiLeaks.

After the July 22, 2016 dump of information by WikiLeaks, Manafort thought he talked to Trump first. It was a busy day and they had to deal with a press conference that day. At the end of the day, Manafort talked to Trump and Reince Priebus about the information and how Trump would use it. Manafort did not think they talked about Stone. Manafort recalled that at some point that weekend, he raised with Trump that Stone had predicted the WikiLeaks dump and Trump responded that Stone should stay on top of it.

Manafort thought the conversation with Trump about Stone was probably on Saturday, July 23, 2016, because he recalled saying he planned to use the information in a press conference on Sunday, July 24, 2016. Manafort thought that by Sunday, he and Priebus had scripted out what to say about the WikiLeaks dump.

Manafort did not tell Stone specifically that Trump had asked that he stay on top of it. He would have just told him to stay on top of it. Manafort did not want to get into a cycle with Stone where Stone used him as an errand boy to get to Trump.

Manafort did not have any indication Trump heard from Stone directly, but he thought he would have. Trump would not have told Manafort if he was talking to Stone. Trump compartmentalized; it was just the way he was.

Manafort told Stone it was good stuff and to keep him posted, and Stone offered no indication he knew any more specifics.

Manafort and Stone did not discuss Stone's August 8, 2016 speech in which he said more was coming from WikiLeaks. Manafort recalled from the press

coverage that Stone was confident more was coming in the fall. Stone never told Manafort he was dealing with Assange directly. Manafort assumed Stone had a contact of some sort. Stone's August 8, 2016 comment was not out of character for Stone.

Manafort did not recall any specific conversations in August 2016 with Stone about WikiLeaks. At that time, people on the campaign expressed interest in what Assange had, but they were more curious than they were setting up an operation to proactively find out. That was the same week Manafort was dealing with [redacted] and trying to convert a primary operation into a general election operation.

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Manafort was not certain when the next Monday morning meeting was, but it was either July 31 or August 7, but thought it was probably August 7, 2016. Manafort was sure WikiLeaks was raised and the discussion was about how useful the information was and when they could expect the next dump. Manafort thought it was probably a topic of many conversations. Trump was fixated on it.

At that time, opposition research was not being done by the campaign, but by the RNC. [redacted] was linked up with the RNC to work on that, so [redacted] and Manafort may have also discussed WikiLeaks.

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Manafort and Trump talked about how to use the information already out there. More in depth conversations about WikiLeaks would have probably come in September, closer to the election. In August, Manafort had a set of specifics points on specific topics, but WikiLeaks wasn't the most important thing then, because they didn't know anything else specific.

No one, such as Priebus or Kushner, had a specific interest in the WikiLeaks issue. Miller was interested because it was in his wheelhouse to pay attention to those issues.

The Monday family meetings had a two-fold agenda. One, they discussed relevant "gossip" for the campaign. As an example, they discussed the fact that Lewandowski accused Manafort of leaking, but Michael Cohen eventually obtained the administrative rights to the emails on the server and determined that Lewandowski had been leaking. Donald Trump, Jr., who had made sure Lewandowski left the campaign, liked hearing it. The meeting also covered scheduling. Manafort would lay out Trump's travel schedule and they discussed how to integrate the family into events. Manafort said that when WikiLeaks was in the news, it would have been covered in the gossip section of the meeting. He remembered a discussion in which people said the Wasserman-Schultz stuff was helpful because it allowed Trump to say Clinton rigged the election against Bernie Sanders.

Manafort was sure he mentioned in a Monday meeting that Stone predicted the WikiLeaks dump. The reaction was something along the lines of "that sounds like Roger" and wondering about what else was coming. Stone had been putting it out there, but Manafort did not know if the family knew Stone had predicted it in advance.

Family meetings were attended by Manafort, Gates, Trump, Jr., Eric Trump, Hope Hicks, and sometimes Jared Kushner and Ivanka Trump.

Somewhere in that same week, things started to fall apart for Manafort personally and he had to put together a campaign plan.

Manafort thought the campaign would have started to more aggressively look for more information from WikiLeaks in late August, and by that time, he was gone. They had what they needed for a couple of weeks in the first instance and wouldn't have needed to get more until September.

Manafort told Gates to stay in touch with Stone on the WikiLeaks stuff; that was Manafort's way of following up on it. Based on what Stone learned, they would decide what to do next. The difference between Manafort's reaction in June and his reaction after the July 22, 2016 release was that it became real when it happened. Manafort had a more proactive interest and told Stone to report back to him what he heard. Manafort tasked Gates to stay in touch with Stone even though they did not get along because it was the best way for Manafort to stay in touch with Stone.

Manafort's memory was clear that Stone said he had a contact before July 22, 2016. In August or September, Stone said he was talking to Assange directly, but Manafort did not believe him. Stone did not tell Manafort any characteristics of his intermediary, but Manafort thought the contact was male. Stone did not say where the person was, whether the person was a supporter of Trump, or whether the person was witting or unwitting. Stone did not say how he communicated with his contact.

Manafort did not specifically recall when he heard about or saw Stone's tweet on August 21, 2016 that said "Trust me, it will soon the Podesta's time in the barrel. #crookedHillary." Manafort's memory of that day is that he was focused on his own issues, not Stone's Twitter feed.

Manafort was sure he had at least two conversations with Stone prior to the October 7, 2016 leak of John Podesta's emails.

In the one conversation between Stone and Manafort, Stone told Manafort "you got fucked." Stone's comment related to the fact that Manafort had been fired. The conversation was either the day Manafort left the campaign or the day after.

In the other conversation, Stone told Manafort that there would be a WikiLeaks drop of emails with Podesta, and that Podesta would be "in the barrel" and Manafort would be vindicated. Manafort had a clear memory of the moment because of the language Stone used. Stone also said Manafort would be pleased with what came out. It was Manafort's understanding that WikiLeaks had Podesta's emails and they were going to show that [redacted] Manafort would be vindicated because he had to leave the campaign for being too pro-Russian, and this would show that Podesta also had links to Russia and would have to leave.

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Manafort's best recollection was the "barrel" conversation was before he got on the boat the week of August 28, 2016.

Manafort and Stone had other conversations about WikiLeaks in September and October 2016, but they were not that substantive. They reaffirmed the previous conversations about Podesta and WikiLeaks and Stone would tell Manafort that "it was going to come out soon." Manafort said they touched on the issue two or three times in September and he knew they talked about it at least one time in October before Podesta's emails were released. The early October conversation was similar to others and Manafort got the impression the emails would come out soon.

On October 7, 2016, Manafort was in Florida. Manafort did not know in advance that the tape of Trump and Billy Bush was going to come out. Manafort thought he learned of the tape on the news. Manafort and Gates spoke that day, but he thought it was after the tape came out. Gates asked Manafort's opinion on how damaging the tapes were, and Manafort asked him what people on the campaign thought. Gates told Manafort that some people thought Trump had to quit, but Manafort thought that was ridiculous. He considered calling Kushner or Priebus but ultimately decided not to. Kushner was the person Manafort would contact on issues related to Trump himself, and Priebus was the person Manafort would deal with on issues in general. Manafort was very nervous about Priebus; Priebus could be "very Washington" about this sort of thing.

Manafort did not recall speaking to Gates about the Podesta emails. The conversation was focused on the Billy Bush tape. He thought if the Podesta emails were out, they would have talked about them. He did not recall talking to Gates about how to spin the Podesta emails. He recalled

a conversation with Gates about the Podesta emails, but he did not think it was the same day.

Manafort did not recall a conversation about how to use the Podesta emails. That discussion would have gone through Steve Bannon, and Manafort did not talk to him about it. Manafort did not have tactical discussions with Stone about the Podesta emails.

Manafort made a conscious decision to sit back and not inject himself into the campaign. He did not engage with the campaign again until the last couple of weeks of the campaign. Manafort was not happy with the campaign at that point.

Stone followed up with Manafort after the Podesta emails came out. The conversation tied the Podesta emails to the Billy Bush tape; Manafort said the Podesta emails were very helpful. Stone was glorying in the moment, and thought he was screwing Clinton and that Podesta would have to quit her campaign. Stone said the Podesta emails buried the Billy Bush tape and would end up being more damaging for Clinton than the Billy Bush tape was to Trump.

Stone did not indicate he or anyone he knew had a role in the timing of the release of the Podesta emails. Stone said he had been predicting the emails would come out and took credit for them. Stone thought the emails inoculated the Trump campaign and changed the narrative. Stone did not indicate a consciousness on the part of WikiLeaks regarding the significance of the timing, but continued to say he told Manafort it was coming and that he (Stone) was right. They talked about the value of the emails as it related to changing the narrative.

Stone led Manafort to believe more was coming from WikiLeaks after the Podesta leaks. Manafort talked to Gates after the emails came out and recommended that Gates talk to Priebus and Kushner.

Manafort wondered at the time who was trying to block whom. He thought the Clinton campaign may have leaked the Billy Bush tape because they knew the Podesta emails were coming. On the other hand, Manafort did not credit the Trump campaign with being that clever and leaking the Podesta emails because they knew the Billy Bush tape was coming. That said, Stone was not part of the campaign and he was capable of it. Stone had told Manafort about WikiLeaks previously and had the ability and motivation and contact to pull it off.

Manafort agreed that he appreciated the significance of the timing of the two events, but he did not remember thinking about it at the time. Manafort did not recall whether Stone indicated he knew the Billy Bush

tape was coming out in advance. Manafort did not ask Stone about his connection to WikiLeaks or ask where the information came from; Manafort did not need to know who Stone spoke to.

Stone's statement of denial on October 11, 2016 that he had advance knowledge of the leak of the Podesta emails was "inconsistent with what he told" Manafort. Manafort believed Stone knew in advance Podesta's emails were coming out.

Manafort and Stone did not have a conversation in which Stone said Manafort should not tell anyone what he knew about the timing of the Podesta emails. They did not talk about Stone running away from what Stone had told Manafort.

In approximately the last six months, Manafort and Stone have had conversations in which Stone told Manafort he was being targeted by the Special Counsel's Office and that the investigation was costing him a lot of money. Stone said the Special Counsel's Office was accusing him of effectively controlling the timing of the leaked Podesta emails. Manafort thought it was some time in May or June 2018 that Stone told him the Special Counsel's Office thought he had a role in the Podesta emails. Stone did not expressly remind or tell Manafort what he (Stone) knew about the emails. They did not discuss the fact that Stone did actually have advance knowledge of the Podesta emails.

Stone said to Manafort that he was not the decision maker or the controller of the information. Stone said he may have had advance knowledge, but he was not the decision maker. Stone was making clear to Manafort that he did not control the emails or make decisions about them. Stone said he received information about the Podesta emails but was a conduit, not someone in a position to get them released. Manafort was confused as to the various people and hacks. Manafort asked Stone to go through the narrative of Assange, Guccifer, the DNC hack, and Seth Rich so that Manafort could understand it.

Stone knew Manafort knew that Stone's public statements were false, but Stone "confused" Manafort.

Stone did not advise Manafort to punch back or discredit the Special Counsel's Office. Stone did not raise any desire to respond to the Special Counsel's Office investigation by planting media stories.

Manafort was not aware of any attempts on Stone's part to contact Manafort after Manafort was incarcerated.

Stone did not tell Manafort whether he passed the Podesta email information to anyone else on the campaign or associated with the campaign. Manafort speculated Stone may have passed the information to Bannon, since Stone and Bannon had a relationship.

Stone and Bannon knew each other before the campaign. Manafort believed they were in touch throughout the campaign. Manafort had the impression Stone passed information and ideas to Bannon, some of it Bannon used. Stone would get frustrated with Bannon if he did not think all of his information was being passed on to Trump or used in the campaign.

One of Stone's "harebrained" ideas involved using [redacted] in the campaign. Stone alleged [redacted] Stone did not indicate to Manafort that he tried to get Bannon to do anything with [redacted] b6 b7C

Manafort credited Stone for the "war on women" part of the campaign, in which women who alleged Bill Clinton sexually assaulted them showed up to a debate. Stone had previously raised the issue with Manafort on the campaign trail, and Manafort said no.

Manafort thought Stone gave messaging ideas to Bannon, but did not think Stone was a source of information for Bannon. Manafort thought Stone used Bannon as a way to get into the campaign, similar to the way Stone used Manafort to get into the campaign.

**Administrative:**

The documents shown to Manafort and the original interview notes are being maintained in a 1-A envelope in the case file.

[redacted] b7E

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



General Records

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 07/31/2017

[redacted] home address [redacted] [redacted] cellular telephone number [redacted] [redacted] was interviewed in his residence. Also present for a portion of the interview was [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b6 b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b6 b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b6 b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b6 b7C

Investigation on 07/27/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person) b3 b6 b7C

File # [redacted] Date drafted 07/28/2017 b7E

by [redacted]

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[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[redacted] b7E

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



General Record

UNCLASSIFIED/~~/FOUO~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 04/24/2018

On 3/20/2018 at approximately 4:00 pm, SA [redacted] and SSA [redacted] [redacted] attempted an interview of SAM PATTEN at his residence at [redacted] b6 b7C

After agents knocked, [redacted] opened the door and informed agents that PATTEN was [redacted] and would be home soon. b6 b7C

Agents observed the home for approximately 2 hours and Patten was not seen.

UNCLASSIFIED/~~/FOUO~~

Investigation on 03/20/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person) b6

File # [redacted] Date drafted 04/13/2018 b7C b7E

by [redacted]

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