
ROUTE IN ENVILOPE

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	'n	Re NY airtel dated 8/23,	/65 .	March
20-205	Enclosed herewith for the Bureau and Chicago are translations of the documents set forth in reference airtel concerning the Brazilian Communist Party.			
200	In addition to the translations, Xerox copies of the original documents in the Portuguese language are also enclosed for the Bureau. The original mailing address and personal contact notations are also enclosed for Chicago			
44	to be delivered to CG 5824-S*. The original documents, with the exception of the aforementioned notations of the mailing address and personal contact, were delivered by			
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Ao Combe Lewhal " do labodo Mucha de labodo da Amenica.

Brasil, maio de 1965.

Ao Comitê Central do Partido Comunista dos Estados Unidos.

Queridos camaradas:

Cumprimos o dever de informá-los que o Comitê Central de nosso Partido, em reunião plenária realizada em dias do corrente mês de maio, teve ocasião de prestar especial homenagem à memó-ria da camarada Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, cuja vida de revolucio-nária e de destacada dirigente do movimento comunista internacional foi recordada e exaltada.

Esperamos dentro em breve poder enviar-lhes um exemplar da Resolução Politica aprovada pelo Comitê Central de nosso Partido na referida reunião.

Sauda-os fraternalmente,

Pelo Comitê Central do Partido Comunista Brasileiro

> Luiz Carlos Prestes Secretario-geral.

O COMTTE CEORAL DO PANTIDO COMUNISTA CASTLEIRO, em sua reginiao, aprovou, alem da Resolução Politica, a seguinte

RESOLUÇÃO INTERNA

1. Os acontecimentos de abril de 1964 puseram a descoberto / muitas de nossas mais serias deficiencias, particularmente no trabalho de direção. É o reves político que sofremos ocasionou pesadas portas à organ zação partidaria.

Avança, entretanto, embora/ aomda l'entamente, o trabalho intermediario, embora/ aomda l'entamente, o trabalho intermediarios e das Organizações de ase. O Partido reoganiza suas fileiras, Levando em conta as novas condições existentes e intensifica crescentemente sua atividade, participando das lutas das massas por suas reivindicações e se integrando no agrupa mento das forças políticas que se mobilizam e atuam contra a política da ditadura e pela sua derrota.

A fim de prosseguir com exito por esse caminho, e'indispensa vel enfrentar e reresolver alguns problemas agudos dos quais depende o fortalecimento ideológico, político e organico do nosso Partido.

- 2. E'necess rio levar adiante a profundar, com base nas conclusoes apresentadas no item 1 da Resolução Politica, o processo a auto-critico em que nos encontramos, em busca de nos os erros e das causas que contribuiram para o reves sofrido com o golpe militar de 1. de abril. Desenvolvendo a luta interna no terreno dos principios, devemos combater os desvios de esquerda e de direira que se manifes tam em nossas fileiras.
- 3. Torna-se indispensavel organizar o trabalho de direção de acordo com as novas condições do pris. Nãos descurando nunca da justa combinação do trabalho legal com o ilegal, deve-se ter em mente que, nas atuais condiñoes de cladestinidade, o trabalho idegal predomina na atividade de direção. Adquire destacado relevo a tarefa de se aparelharem as direções, sob os diferentes aspectos e nas su as diversas funções, para que possam atuar com segurança e eficiencia, A reorganização e o reforçamento das ações possibilitam a dinamização do trabalho das direções estaduais, no mesmo tem o que fonstituem uma das formas de aplicação do principioda direção coletiva. Nas condições atuais, amior ainda deve ser o rigor na observancia do metodo de palnificação e controle do trabalho e de concentração de erforços nos princitais pojetivos a atingir. Organizar e desenvolver o trabalho de finanças.

O RESOLUÇÃO SOBRE O VI CONGRESSO

Tendo em vista que não foi possivel realizar o VI CONGRESSO que fora convocado pelo CC e que deveria realizar-se em setembro de 1964 e que nos proprios acontecimentos que nos forçaram a isto tor nam mais imperiosa e urgente sua realização; e considerando a situação de fato em que se encontra o nosso. Partido e a realidade cone creta do momento que atravessamos; o CC.

RESOLVE:

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- 1. Realizar o VI CONGRESSO no menor prazo possivel. tomando como referencia que isto se de, na medida do possivel., dentro dos proximos 12 meses.
- 2. Que a data da realização do VI CONGRES O e a convocação do Partido so sejam feitas na proxima reunião do CC. exaxixamente ouvida com antecedencia a opinao dos CC.EE.
- 3, Que nas autais circunstancias a ORDEM DO DIA do CONGRES SO deve ser reduzida à prestação de contas do CC. e à discussão e aprovação de umdocumento sobre a tatica do P. e a elieção do CC., e que as normas devem ser modificadas no sentido da necessaria reaprovação de umdocumento sobre a tatica do P. e a elieção do CU., e que as normas devem ser modificadas no sentido da necessaria redução do numero de delegados.
- 4. Encarregar a C. Ex. de tomar todas as medidas praticas no sentido da preparação dos aparelhos necessarios a realização do CONGRESJO, ajudando os CC.EE. a tomar identicas medidas no sentido da realização das respectivas Conferencias, de maneira que o CC. / em sua proxima reunião possa marçar com seguranca a data da realização do CONGRESSO.
- 5. Entre as medidas de preparação do CONGRESSO, deve a C. Ex. examinar a possibilidade da publicação de Boletim para discussão (nacional e estaduais),, para que o CC. devidamente informado, possa, em sua proxima reuniao, tomar uma decisao a esse respeito.
- 6. Eleger uma Comissao do CC. para eleborar o documento sobre a tatica do PARTIDO que deve servir de base para a discus ao a travar-se em todo o Partido e no CONGRESSO, o que deve ser apresentado à proxima reuniao do CC. AComissao deve ser de tres (3) membros.
- O referido documento a ser debatido pelo PARTIDO e que constará da ORDEM DO DIA do CONGRE SO, deverá incluir. de modo conciso: o balanço da aplicação da linha do PARTIDO, aprovada no V CONGRESSO e a tatica do PARTIDO, à luz da situação nacional e internacional.

RESOLUÇÃO.

Os representantes dos 19 PARTIDOS COMUNISTAS E OPERARIOS que participaram da reuniao de consulta, realizada entre 1 e 5 de março em Moscou emitiram um comunicado, de cujo texto tomamos conhecimento.

O COMITE CENTRAL DO PCB, reunido em sessao pelenaria, resolve apoiar o comunidado em apreço. destacando a importancia de seu espirito unitario - fruto da amizade e fraternidade que presidiram ao encontro, bem como do elevado empenho pela coesao do movimento comunista mundial.

Ao adotar a presente desisao, dispoe-se a fazer o que de sidependa. dentro do sentido expresso pelo comunicado, a fim de contribuir para que seja as gurada a coesao do movimento comunista / internacional e o fortalecimento de sua unidade, na base do marxismo-leninismo e do internacionalismo proletario e segundo a linha / das Declarações de 1957 e 1960.

O CC do PCB assinala a importancia que dá o comunicado à utilização de todas as possibilidades e caminhos construtivos para a busca da solução dos problemas comuns a todo o movimento comunista, dentro da Maxim plena observancia dos principios de absoluta igual dade e independência de cada Partido, e nao intromissão de uns nos assuntos internos de outros.

Manifestando-se pela cessação da polemica aberta - com seus efeitos de carater hostil e ofensivo para Partidos irmãos - o CC / do PCB considera como recomenda a Comunicado - que e conveniente., em momento oportuno. a realização de uma nova Convenção Internacio nal levado em conta a preocupação com o fortalecimento da unidade marxista-lenista das filérias comunistas em sua luta contra o imperialismo e o colonialismo. pela libertação nacional pela paz e accexistencia pacifica. a democracia, o socialismo e o comunismo.

O Comite Central do Partido Comunista Brasileiro.

Maio de 1965.

RESOLUÇÃO POLITICA

O CC do Partido Comunista Brasileiro reuniu-se no mes de maio /
e, tomando por base o informe apresentado pela CE. fez uma nalise da situacao internacional. da situacao nacional e da atividade o P., no periodo decorrido desde usa ultima reuniao.

Assinala-se ness e periodo,, como acontecimento marcante. o golpe militar reacionario de 1, de abril do ano passado. com a consequente posição do presitente Joao Goulart e a instaruação, no pais, de uma ditadura reacionaria e entreguista. Interrompeu-se. assim, o processo democratico em desenvolvimento, As forças patrioticas e democraticas e. em particular, o movimento operario e sua vanguarda - nosso P. - sofreram serio reves. Mo a movimento operario e sua vanguarda - nosso P. - sofreram serio reves.

As conclusões a que chegou o Cc, apos os debates, estao contidas ma seguinte RESOLUÇÃO POLATICICA:

l - As lutas do povo brasileiro desenvolvem-se no quadro de uma situacao internacional caracterizada pelo fortalecime os de posiçoes do socialismo. pelo ascenso do moivmento nacional-libertador e do movimento /,
operario internacional. pelo crescimento das forcas empenhadas na preservação e consolidação da paz mundial.

A politica de paz realizada pela Uniao ovietica e demias países so cialistas, apoiada em seu avanço economico, tecinico e cientifico e inspirada no principio da coexistencia pacifica. penetra cada vez mai fundo na consciencia de todos os povos, Desenvolve-se com vigor o mobimento de emancipação naci nal na Asia, Africa e America Latina.

A conjuntura economica dos Apaises capitalistas mais decenvilvidos mantem-se. em geral. em ascensao. Aumenta o interesse, no campo capitalista, pela intensificação das relações economicas com os paises do campo socialista, o que amplia as condições objetivas da política de coexistencia pacifica. Mas simultaneamente, e em consequencia também do continuado agravemento da crise geral do capitalismo, aguçam-se as contradinos inter-imperialis as, que se manifestaram especialmente na disputa de mercados e se refletem, com maior de taque, emposições assumidas pelo governo frances em sua política externa.

E nessa situação que o aperialismo, partidularmente o norte-americano. intensifica sua atividade em diferentes regioes do mundo. empreendendo atos de agressão contra paises socialistas. contra o movimento //
operario e contra os povos que lutam pela libertação nacioanl. A situati
ção internacional se agraya sensivelmente.

A intervenção no Congo, por parte das forças ianques e belgas. a / repressao da tidarua portuguesa as lutas do povo de Angola; a mu intervenção da Gra-Bretanha na Guiana Inglesa; as provocações da Republica / Fedeal Alema em torna de Berlim e a tentativa de organizar à Força

Atomica Multilater e criar uma cinturao ato co nas fronteŭras dos países socialitas - todas estas medidas constituem nao apenas violações dos direitos dos povos. Mas também novas ameacas à paz mundial.

Ante a firme resitencia do povo do Vietnã do sul. dirigido pela Frente Nacional de Libertacao (Vietmin). o governo de Washing ton estende a sua agresao ao Laos e ao Cambodge, bombardeia o territorio do Vientan do Norte, ataca sua marinha mercante e de guerra, Para suaforar a luta do povo dominicano contra a reacao e para defender os interesses dos monopolios ianques, desmbarca tropas na Republica dominicana, utilizando a OMA para dar cobertura a essa // monstruosa agressao,

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A intensificacao da agressividade do imperialismo norte-americano expres ao a orgientação da chamada "doutrina Johnson", de esma gamento pela forca dos movimentos democraticos e de libertacao nacional, E tem também objetivo de provocar guerras locais e limitad das. para impedir a distensao internacional. atendendo aos interes ses dos circulos mais agressivos de Wall Streets e do Pentagono, / Tais acoes despertam. entretanto. os protestos e a revolta dos povos do mundo inteiro, inclusive do povo dos Estados Unidos, Contribuindo. assim. de um lodo, para serio agravamento da situação internacional. concorrem, de outro lado, para desmarcarar cada vez / mais o imperialismo norte-americano como opressor e explorador dos povos oprimidos e contra as ameacas de nova guerra mundial,.

Na "merica Latina, torna-se cada vez mais evidente o contraste entre a situacao do povo cubano, que, sob a dir cao de Fidel Castro, prossegue na construcao vitoriosa da sociedade socialista. e a dos demais povos latino-americanos, que padecem sob a crescente exploracao dos monopolios ianques, Aumenta a miseria das massas traba-lhadoras aguca-se a crisc de estrutura e crescem as contradicoes / entre as forcas progressistas de cada pais e. os monopolios norte-americanos, Em alguns paises. como Venezuela. Colobia, Guatemala e Sao Domingos, as lutas antiimerialistas tomam a forma de luta arma da, Os Estados Unidos. proseguindo cabora. na politica da "alianca" para o Progresso", que visa em parte à realização de reformas limi tadas em benegicio das burguesias locais, nao vacilam em intervir diretamente pela forca. ou provocar golpes reacionarios e apoiar / governos, ditatoriais. para assegurar e consolidar seu dominio espo liador, // De marco de 1962 para cá, em sete paises - Argentina, Peru, Equador, Guatemala, Sao Domingos, Honduras e Bolivia - alem do Bra forem dedos colpes de Estado, sob a orientação e como o apoio Equador, Guatemala, Sao Domingos, Honduras e Bolivia - alem do Bra sil, foram dados golpes de Estado. sob a orientação e como o apolo · do goberno de Washington.

Nada disto impede, entretanto, que os povos da America Latina continuem avancando no caminho da democracia e da emancipacao nacional. Na Argentina, os comunistas reconquistaram o direito de

de organizarese e propagar suas rederas. O governo do Chile estade leceu relacoes diplomaticas com a União Sovietica e outros paises socialistas. O Mexico mantem relacoes com Cuba, apesar da resolução en contrario da OEA. Entre as amplas, massas, crescem o odio ao 1m perialismo ianque e a determinação de lutar contra a reaceo internação de lutar contra a reaceo internação de sua acaó conjunta contra o inimizo comum. Os povos latino nue ricanos serao tao invenciveis como o heroico povo irmao de Cuba. Eloria e exemplo para a A.L.

2 - No Brasil. com o go pe de 1. de abril. assenhorearam-se do pod r os representantes das forcas mais retrogradas e antinacionais, agentes do imperialismo norte-americano. latifundiarios e grandes capitlaistas ligados aos monopolios ianques. Constituiu-se uma dita dura militar, reacionaira e entreguista, sendo o governo de fato exercido por um grupo de generais a servico da Embaixada dos Estados Unidos.

A submissao do Pais aos interesses dos monopolios norte-americanos assume porporcoes jamis vistas, Foi praticamente abolida a lei que limitava a remesso de lucros para o exterior, Realizou-se a negociata da compra do acervo da Bond and Share. Duplicou-se o montante do "Acordo do Trigo" como os Estados Undios. Facil ta-se uma política do minorios de acordo com as exigencias da Hanna...

Minninh Co., Foi assinado o "acordo sobre garantias de Trivestimentos Privados". que concede privilegios aos interesses norte-americanos e constitui serio atentado à soberania nacional. Missao militar ianque faz o levantamento aero-fotogrametrico de nosso territo rio. A política economica e financeira e ditada pelo FMI.

pendencia ao governo dos Estados Unidos, Rompe relacoes com Cuba. Serve de instrumento e porta-voz do Departamento de Estado na OEA. Tomá posicia contra os pvos que lutam contra o imperialismo na /// Asia e Africa Apoia a tirania de Salazar. Solidariza-se com a arres sao ianque a Repbublica Democratica do Vietna e com o brutal atenta do à soberania do povo de Sao Domingos, Permite. sob o pretexto da realizacao de experiencias científicas, a construção de bases para foguetes e armas nucleares em territorio nacional.

Apos as violencias e amb trariedades resultantes da aplicacão do Ato Institucional. inclusive a mu Vilacão do Congresso Nacional e de Assembleia Estaduais, prosseguem os inqueritos policiais militares. como o objetivo de perseguir, prender e torturar milhares / de cidadaos. de te trabalbadores e jovens estudantes até professores, magist ados, escritores, actistas, jornalistas, militares, pa dres catolicos, parlamentares e persoas, enfim, de todas as classes e camadas sociais. E aprovada uma lei contra o direito de greve.

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Maiores sofirmentos e privacoas sao impostos aos trabalhadores e a todo o povo, Elevam-se os impostosindiretos. Libera-se o preco dos produtos essencias à alimentacao popular. Nova lei do inquilinato determina a majoracao dos alugueis. Enquanto a carestia aumen ta sem ces ar, o reajustamento dos salarios dos o erarios e dos ven cimentos do funcionalismo publico e contido em nivel inferior ao da elevacao dos precos. O salario minimo subiu em apenas 57%, num periodo em que o custo de vida se elevou em amas de 90%. Aumenta o de semprego.

A politica economico-financeira da ditadura tambem atinge os interesses da burguesia nacional. cada dia mais ameacada pela concorrencia imperialista. Reduzem-se as atividades comercias e industrias, Acumulam-se estoques nas fabricas. Cai a producao. As concordatas e falencias aumenta em numero e valor. Acentua-se o rpocesso de desnacionalização (a industria brasileira.

3 - a política da ditadrua torma mais aguda as contradicoes que dividem a sociedade brasileira, Acentua-se a premencia das reformas de strutura.

Numa tentativa de ludibriar a "acao, a ditadura se mascara / de refordista e chega a apresentar-se como revolucionaria. Procura impingir como reforma agraria um "Estatuto da Terra" que. como excessao dos dispositávos limitadores da taxa de arrendamento - alias de dificil aplicacao - não passa de um plano de colonizacao; Os projetos de Lei Eleitoral e de Estatuto dos Partios Políticos visam / de fato a reduzir o numero e impedir a organizacão burocrtaticas se subordiradas ao aparelho de Estado, aceacam a representação propor cional, tornem praticamente impossível a representação das minorias. A exigencia de maioria absoluta nas eleicoes para presidente / da Republica e governadores de Estado col eia o voto popular direto, transferindo para o Congresso e as Assembleias Estaduais a es-colha final dos eleitos.

Os interesses nacionais exigem a concretização de reformas e fetivas na estrutura da sociedade bresileira, que golpeiem o dominio do imperialismo sobre nossa economiae o monopolio da proprieda deda terra pelos latifundiarios. A ditadrus, que representa exatamente os interesses do latifundio e dos monopolmos imperialistas / norte-americanos nao realizara essas reformas.

A politica da ditadrua fere os interesses da Nacao, Aprofunda-se a contradicao entre nosso povo e a minoria reacionaria e entre da-se a contradicao entre nosso povo e a minoria reacionaria e entreguista que assaltou o poder. Essa contradicao constitui, no momento, a expressao peculiar da contradicao principal da sociedade brasileira, define a essencia de todos os conflitos políticos, some eles atuando como fator determinante.

4 - Comecam a se ampliar e aprofundad as manifestaceos de re. sistencia à ditadura e de opsiçao à sua politica reacionaria e entreguista. Lutam os trabalb dores e contra a reducao de salarios. Reativa-se no campo, embora letamente, o movimento de sindicaliza-os grileiros e as forcas policias, conflitos entre os assalariados do açucar e os usineiros do No deste. Os estudantes so insurgem // contra a Lei 4.464, em defesa da autonomia do movimento estutantil, da UNE e des suas demais entidades. s intelecutuais se arregimentam contra o terror cultural e para exigir a restauração das liber dades democratica e a retormada do desenvolvimento economico do // pais. Amplos cetores da burguesia nacional, principalmente atraves de entidades como a Confederacao "acional da Industria, exigem mod dificacoes nos pontos basicos da politica economica e financeira, denunciam a desnacionalizacao de nossa industria. Avoluma-se o re pudio da opiniao publica 'as violencia e arbitrariedades da policia e dos encarregados dos inqueritos policiais-militares. Há manifestações do Poder Judiciario de condenação a essa violencias e arbitraried des, presos polticios sao libertados, "artidos e conrentes politicos se unem em torno da exigencia do restabelecimento das liberdades gemocraticas e da realização de eleições livres.

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Amplos setores sociais, que menifest/aram apoio ou simpatia ao golpe, senten-se ludibriados e prejudicados pela poltica reacio naria e entreguista da ditadura, tendem a unir-se aos que a ela se opoem. Modifica-se, a favor das forcas democraticas e patrioticas, a conjuntura que, em abril de 1964. Envoreceu a reação e possibilitou a vitoria dos golpistas. Estreita-se a base social da ditadura.

Essa situação leva ao aguçamento das contradições entre os / golpictas e à instabilidade do governo, Insiste o sr. Castelo Branco em suas medidas de instituicionalização da ditadura. procurendo oculta-les atras da fachada da "democracia represent tiva". Mas, / persiste a pres ao dos grupos da extrema direita no sentido da sus pensao total dos direitos e garantias constitucionais, pela instanteção de uma ditadura sem ascara. Apoiando tambem, embora, no essencial, a orientação reacionaria e entreguista da ditadura, outros setores golpistas assumem posição de critica à sua política economico-financeira procurando, assim, capitalizar sem seu beneficio, para fins eleitorais, o crescente descontentamento popular.

A intensificação da resitencia e oposição de nosso povo à ///
ditadura levará a que sua instabilidade aumente, aprofundaraa a di
ditadura levara a que sua instabilidade aumente. aprofundaraa a di
visão entre os golpistas. Crises de governo e novos golpes militame
res podem ocorrer: nesse caso, só a intervenção ativa das massas
nos acontecimentos, levantando suas proprias bandeiras de luta. po

derá impedir uma solução reacionaria, com a simplés substituñão de... golpistas no poder e impor a retomada do processo democratico.

5 - Desde o inicio, os comunistas se colocaram em oposição e combate à ditadura. Atraves de entendimentos com partidos, correntes políticas e personalidades e, praccipalmente, atraves de nossa ação entre os massas, tomos procurado participar ativamente no agrupamento das forças que contra ela lutam, Os fatos comprovam que es te e o caminho acertado.

objetivo tatico imediato a alcançar nessa luta e isolar e derroctar a ditadura e conquistar un governo amplamente representativo das forças antiditatoriais, que a segure as liberdides para o povo e garanta a retomada do processo democratico interrompido pelo golpe reacionario e entreguista. Os comunistas se empenham no sentido de que tal governo seja o mais avançado possivel, mas compeenden que sua composição não podera deixar de refletir o nivel alcançado pelo movimento de massas e a corelação de forças existente no aomento a que se constituir.

O exito dessa luta dependerá fundamentalmente da unidade de ação de todas as froças, correntes e setores políticos que se opoem à ditadara. A formação dessa em la frente de resistencia, oposição e combate à ditadura será possivel atreves de lutas pelas liberdades democraticas, em defesa da soberania nacional, melos direitos e interesses imediatos dos trabalhadores e do povo, pelo desenvolviento de nossa economia, pelo progresso do país. A defesa das li cerdades democraticas constituiu o elo principal dessa luta. Inseperarevel de todas as demais reivindicações constitui, por isso mesmo, a mais ampla e mobilizadora, caraz de unificar e canalizar todos os movimentos reivindicatorios para a ampla frente de combate à ditad dura.

6 - Nas circunstancias acuais, a luta por eleições livres e nossa paraticipação ativa em todas as campahhas eleitorais se reves to de enorme importancia para fazer avançar a luta pelas liberda—des democraticas e pela conquista de um novo governo. Com essa com preensão e que devemos participar das eleições estaduais desse ano, des eleições estaduais e federais de 1966, alem das que se realizam mos municipios. Particular importancia po suem os pleitos eleitora is em estados como Guanabara, Minas Gerais, Goias e Parana, bem co se eleições municipais de Porto Alegre.

Ao participar ativimente das campanhas eleitorais, devem os de comunistas ter em vista que elas se tornem, no processo de sua recomunistas ter em vista que elas se tornem, no processo de sua resilização, um maio para aglutinar forças contra a ditadura, demasca cara-las diente das massas, conquistas postos que sirvam para combate-la, e, afinal, derrota-la. E, portanto, do interesses do prolecariado e das demais forças contrarios à ditadura lutar por elei.

correntes políticas de oposição e o exercicio do direito de probaganda sem sensura, bem como lutar contra todas as discriminações políticas e ideologicas, oriendos do Ato Institucional ou das novas leis sobre incomptivilidades e inelegibilidade, por meio das / quais pretenda a ditadura riscor arbitrariomento, da licta do pos siveis cantidatos, tods os cidadaos que não mereçam sua confiança.

E'essencial dar à campanh, eleitoral um carater de massas, de luta firme pelas liberdades denocrations, de maiera a nao permitir à ditadura utilizar-se das eleições para "legalidar" o poder / usurpado. Nos casos em que este objetivo se tornar praticamente in viavel, podem as forças de oposição à ditadura adoter o voto em %/ branco, como meio de protesto contra a transformação do pâdito numa farsa de tinada a acobertar com uma espuria "legalidade" o gover no do golpe de 1. de abril.

E'fazendo da campnha eleit/oral uma campnha de massas que se rá possivel es egurar a realização de eleições livres e a posse dos eleitos e criar condições políticas para que possam governar.

7 - No desenvolvimento da luta contra a ditadura, devemos //
utilizar as mais variodas formas. Cabe aos comunistas saber estimu
lar a iniciativa das maassas e encorojar a luta por todos os camin
nhos que favoregam a retomada do processo democratico. Para tanto,
devem ser utilizadas todas as possibilidades legais, sem que isto
se reduza 'a "legalidade." concedida pela ditadura. As massas devem
ser estimuladas a nao aceitar as restrições da ditadura aos seus á
direitos de reuniao, de greve, demanifestação publica, de propagan
da etc. O ascenso das lutas poderá levar a choques violentos com a
reação, inclusive a choque armadãos. E dever do Partido preparar-se
e preparar as massas para tais eventualidades.

O esforço principal dos comunistas deve concen rar-se na intensificação do trabalho entre as macras, na defesa e fortalecimen to de suas organizações, na organização e no desnoadeamento-das-alustas polos seus direitos e reivindicações.

Seja qual for a forma que a luta contra a ditadura venha a /. assumir, a ação das massas constituirá sempre o fator decisivo, ...

capaz de assegurar o avanço do processo político de acordo com os interesses do povo. E atraves da ação que o povo ganhará confiança em suas proprias forças. Atraves da ação e sempre possível alcançar exitos parciais, por paor que seja a reação, exitos que ajudarão a encorajar as proprias massas a reforjar suas organizações, estreitar sua unidade e avançar para ações cada vez mais vigorosas. E dever dos domunistas saber colocar-se no nivel de compreensão das massas, para leva-las à ação e ganha-las para as posições políticas de vanguarda.

A passividade frente à ditadura e'o grande perigo ne ameaça as forças populares e o nosso Partido. E'nosso dever combate-la, / tendo em viata que decorre tanto da superestimação da força dos golpistas, como das ilusões de que a ditadura cai por si mesma, minada pelas contradições que a dividem. E'necespario compreander que nos são intervenção em qualquer crise de governo so poderá ter resultado positivo na medida em que formos capaes de mobilizar as massas. Isso significa que devemos ser vigilantes, suber acomplanhar os ma necontecimentos, a s que o mais importante, o premente, o decisivo, e'nosso trabalho de massas, nosso esforço con/stante para nos ligar mos às mas as, esclarece-las, desperta-las, mobiliza-las para a ação, organiza-las c uni-las.

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8 - A fim de ganhar as mas es para a açao, e indispensavel % sater por pulação. Devenos intensificar as lutas pela revogação do Ato Institucional, a anulação dos atentados aos direitos individuais resultantes de sua aplicação, pela libertação dos presos políticos, a solidariedade aos perseguidos e suas familias, pela anistia geral, pela liberdade e autonomia para os sindicatos de trabalhadores, en tidades estudantes e demais organizações populares, contra o terror cultural, pela liberdade de catedra.

Outro elemento mobilizador de mas as e'a luta contra a politica economico-financeira da ditadura, política de carestia, de elevacao de impostos, de desvalorização forçada do cruzeiro em relação ao dolar, de redução do seleccio real. Devemos ter a maior inie ciativa junto a outras forças e lutar por melhores condições de vida para os trabalhadores, contra a caretia e o desempérego, em de fesa dos direitos conquistados, la legislação do trabalho e da pre videncia social. Participar de forma ativa e unitaria das eleições sindiceis e procurando, ao mesmo tempo, organizar os trabalhadores nos locais de trabalho.

Immr Importantea particular deve ter a luta das grandes massas //
trabalhadoras do campo contra a exploração do latifundio e pela re
forma agraria, por suas conquistas e reivindicações imediatas, especialmente pela aplicação do Estaduto do Trabalhador Rrunal.....

garantia ao acesso e a po se da terra, regulamentação e baixa da /~

Devemos dar maior atenção 's reivindicaces espesificas das mulheres. E'de grande valor sua participação na luta em defesa da paz, contra a carestia; pelas liberdades democraticas, pela solidaridades aos presos e perseguidos políticos, pela anistia.

Merece vodo apoio a luta do funcionalismo publico e das autar quias em defesa dos seus direivos e de suas reivindicações, em especial o reajustamento de vencimentes.

A politicia entrequista de disadura fere os sentimentos patrioticos das mais amplas camedas do povo, digo, do nosso povo, que / podera ser mobilizado para a luta em defesa da soberania nacional, contra as concessoes aos monopolios norte-americanes e a submissao do Brasil ao governo de Washington contra a ratificação pelo Congresso do Acordo sobre garantias dos Investimentos Privados. As seri as ameças que pesam sobre as empresas estatais, em particular a // tetrobras, possibilitam ampla mobilização de massas em sua defesa.

A luta pelo progresso do ais, con ra a polticia economicofinanciera que desnacionaliza a industria nacional, que leva à se tagnação economica, que nega recursos às obras pyublicas, ao desen volvimento eonomico/жижимижимижими do Nordeste (SUDENE) e / do Norte (SPEVEA), à instrução do poco e ao desenvolvimento cultural, à pesquisa científica - permetiraá a mobilização de amplos se tores da população.

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Por sua vez. a agressao militar dos Estados Unidos no Vietnà e, agora, à Republica de São Domingos, exige que se intensifique / a luta pela paz, contra a políticia de guerra do governo norte-americano, pela auto-determiração dos povos, pela solidariedade aos / povos agredidos, contra o envio de soldados brasileiros ora o exterior. E dever dos comunistas encontrar formas novas que permitam, na atual situação, reorganizar e ampliar a luta pela paz em nosso pais. A luta permanente rela solidariedade ao povo cubano e pelo restabelcemento de relações com o governo de Cuba dever ser intensificada com a realização do Congresso Latino-americano de / Solidadriedade a Cuba e pela libertação dos povos.

9 - E'intensificando nossa atividade entre as massas, nas //
fabrisas. fazendo e eccolos. nas grandes concentrações populares,
que poderemos forjar a ampla frente unica de luta contra a ditadura. Dando especial atenção à formação da frente unica pela base, /
devemos realizar exitendimenos com personalidades, correntes e partidos políticos : com todos os que se opoem às forças reacionarias
que usurpa am o poder.

À medida que aumenta a instabilitdade da ditadura, que cres-.. ce a ação das massas populares, as varias forças políticas, na

defesa de seus intereses, cuidam do futuro imediato o da eventualidade da substitutição do governo, procurando o caminho a ser trilhado de acordo com os objetivos de oda um. Como representantes do proletariado, devemos apresentar a sea propria visão tatica, buscando ganhar para ela as forças aliados.

Ao mesmo tempo que intermificam a luta pela lerrota da ditadura e a conquista de um coverno rencientativo das forças que a /
ela se opoem, tem os comunistas como erspectiva a conquista de um
governo nacionalista e democratico, capaz de iniciar e levar atian
de as reformas de estretura, aploximando nosso povo dos objetivos
da atual eta a da revolução bresileira. E com essa prespectiva que
os comunistas se colocam à frente das mas as, indicando o caminho,
que conduz à solução dos problemas brasileiros e se empenhando para
que o proletariado, atraves de fortalecimento da sua unidade e organização e da alianças/ com os trabalbadores do campo, passe a ex

ganização e da aliançad/ com os trabalhadores do cam o. passe a exercer papel hegemonico no processo revolucionario.

10 - Ao examinar a situação do Partido e os novos problemas que devemos agorar enfrentar, o CC coloca em primeiro lugar a necessidade de levar adiante a aprofundar o processo autocritico que se manifestou e em que nos encontranos e que deve se4 coroddo com o VI Congresso. O CC sauda a preocupação critica e autocritica que se manifestou em todo o P., em busca dos nossos erros e das causas que contribuiram para o reves sofrido, preocutação em que ve sauda vel espirito revolucionario de amor ao P. e de ardente aspiração pela elevação do nivel ideológico de suas fileiras.

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A fim de estimular esse proces o autocritico, damos conhetimento ao P. das principais conclusoes a que pode cheger . ave agora, o CC, na analise que fez des acontecimentes relaciorades com a vitoria de golge de 1. de abril, a respeito das falhas e des erros / des comunistas.

A vitoria do goles militar pos a descoberto muitas des nosabs mias seimas debilidades. Pomos colhidos de surpresa pelo desfecho dos acontecimentos e despreparados não apenas para enfrenva-los, é como também para prosseguir com segurança e eficiencia em nosass / atividades nas novas condeces criadas no país. Revelou-se falsa / a ce fiança depositada no "dispositivo militar" de Goplart. Também fal e era a perspectiva que entao expesentavamos ao P. e de mas as de uma vitoria facil e imediata. Assas ilusoes de classe, nosso re boquismo em relação ao setor da burguesia nacional que estava no poder, tornaram-se evidentes, Cabe-nos analisar o processo que nos levou a semelhante situação.

Resultado de uma ardua patalha plitica e ideologica, a linha aprovada pelo V Congresso constituiu-se em poderoso instrumento re volucionairo que permitiu ao P. estreitar suas ligações com as ...

massas e participar vamente da vida politica, contribuindo de tal maneira para o avanço do processo revolucionario, que contra / nosso P. se levantaram raivosos os inimigos da revolução. Mas, des de a posse de Goulart, que se deu como resultado de um comprimi so da burguesia nacional com as forças reacionarias, preocupados em lutar contra a conciliação, começamos a nos afastar da linha politica. Esse processo culminou nos ultigos meses do governo Goulart, quando de fato abandonamos a luta pela justa aplicação da linha.

Era, sem duvida, insdispensavel combater com firmeza a politica de conciliação. Foi justa a nossa posição contra o Plano Trie nal, contra a negociata da Bond and Shore. E foi devido à luta con tra a politica de conciliação que fracessaram as tentativos reación narias de abril e outubro de 1963, quando Goulart pretendia, a pre texto de atacam á discita, tomas medidas para conter o avanço do povimento popular. Conduzimos, entretanto, a luta contra a conciliação de forma inadequada.

Nossa stividade em relacao ao governo de Gonlagt era orienta da, na pratica, com se sua política fosse quase inteiramente negata, na pratica, com se sua política fosse quase inteiramente negativa. Desprezavamos seus aspetos positivos, de grande importancia, com em sua política externa, a defesa da paz, da auto-determinacao dos povos, do principio de nao-intervenção, o desenvolvimento de / relações diplomáticas e comerciais com os paises socialistas e, na sua política interna. relativo respeitos às liberdades democráticas, o atendimento de reivindicações dos trabalhadores. Nosta oposição ao governo adquirio o sentido de lata contra um governo entreguista, com o objetivo principal de desasseará-lo perante as massas.

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Atuavamos considerando a luta contra a conciliação como a for ma concreta pela qual devia ser combatido, nas condições entao exig tentes, o maior inimigo de nosso povo - o imperialismo norte-ameri cano. .cmelbante posição politica so Joderia levar ao desvio do / golpe principal, transferindo-o para a burguesia nacional. Ao in-ves de concentrar o fog de nossa luta contra o imperialismo norteamericano e seus agentes internos, nos firigiamos nossos atques fun damentalmente contra a politica de conciliação, atingindo o imperi alismo quase so em conseguencia desses ataques. Dai a despreocupação em combater os amentes descarados do imperialismo norte-americanoz, como Lacerda e Ademar. Dai a despreocupação com as manobrat e articulações do proprio imperialismo, com a intesificação de sua agres vidade contra os povos por ele dominados. Dai a subestima Medo: ri o de golpe de direita considerado mero espantalho para ame drontar as massas. Concentrando nosso fogo no governo exigiamos me didas cada vez mais avançadas, sem lever em conta nos as proprios devilidades e a fraqueza do movimento nacionalista e democrático, bem como a efetiva correlação de forças sociais que então existia,

o que poe a núa persi ente ingluencia do sbujet lismo em nossa atividade.

Deixamos de lado o fato de que o proprio avanço do processo democratico ameaçava os privilegios dos monopolios estrangeiros, / dos latifundiarios e da grande burguesia entreguista, que ainda // possuiam fortes posições. Uma falso a aliação da real dade não nos permitia ver que a correlação de forças acciais, nos ultimos meses do govermo Goulart, tornava-se, dia a dia, menos faveravel às forças nacionalistas e democraticas. Uriam-se os reacionarios e entre guistas, que conseguiam atrair para seu lado amplos setores da bur guesia nacional e da pequena burguesia urbana, descontentes com a situação e que não concordavam com as cresentes ameaças ao regime constitucional existente. As forças da direita armavam-se e preparavam acelaradêmente o golpe.

Em pri cipios de 1964, quando Goulart, movido por seus pro-prios objetivos políticos, procurou aproximar-se das forças popula res, acentuou-se, em nossa ativida, o afastamento da linha politica do V Congresso. Subestimamos a importancia que tinha para o povo / brasileiro a realização das eleições e não cuidamos de aplicar a X Resolução Eleitroral aprovada pelo CC, ao mesmo tempo que estimula vamos o golpismo continuita de Goulart. Ao inves de alertar as mag sas e convoca-las à luta contra a ameça de um golpe de direita, // claramente revelada na ação de Laceida. Ademar o seus sustentaculos militares, lançamos a Nota da Comissão Executiva de 27/3/64, na // qual, ao lado la reivindicação da forgação imediata de um novo go verno, que "pusese termo à política de conciliação", transferiamos o centro do ataque para o Parlemento, exigindo a reforma constitui cional e ameacando o on resmo. " O Plebiscito - dizia a Nota - de verá ser convocado pelo Congresso ou, no caso de omissao, protelação ou recusa deste, pelo proprio Poder executivo". Permitiamos, / de ta forma, que a defesa da legalidade fosse utilizada pelas forças da reação para enganar amplos setores da população e agrasta los ao golpe reacionario. E, na pratica, abandonavamos a orienta-çao tatica contida em nossa linha politica.

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na raiz de nossos erros esta uma falsa concepção, de fundo / Pequeno-burgues e golpista, da revolução brasileira, a qual se tem anisestado de maneria predominante nos momentos decisivos de nosla atividade revolucionaria, independentemente da linha politica, certada ou nao, que cenhamos adotado. E uma concepção que admite l revolução, não como um fenomeno de massas, mas como resultado da a revolução, não como um fenomeno de massas, mas como resultado da a revolução, não como um fenomeno de massas, mas como resultado da caso dascupulas ou, no melhor dos casos, do Partido. Ela imprime à massa atividade um sentido imediatista de pressa pequeno-burguesa, iesviando-nos da perspectiva de uma luta persitente e continuada pelos nossos objetivos taticos e estrategicos, atraves do procesco

de acumulação de forças e da conquista da hegemonia pelo proletari

O exame autocritico de nossos erros e a analise de suas causas mais profundas constituem fator decissivo na luta pela justa / aplicação de nossa linha política.

ll - Com a vitoria do golpe militar e a implantação da ditadura reacionaria e entregu sta, nosso P. enfrenta uma nova sitaução
e novos problemas. As tarefas da sua construção, sob yodos os aspetos, assumem importancia decisiva. Devemos dedicar os maiores esforcos a recuperação das Organizações de Base e à criação de novas,
principalemente nas empresas, fazendas e escolas, e seu fortalecimento político, ideológico e organico, capcitando-as a cumprir suas /
pesadas tarefas.

E'indispensavel que todo o P. adquira a convição de que cabe aos comunistas um papel de vanguarda na luta para derrotar a ditadura, o que exige esprito revolucionario, desprendimento e capcidade de sacrificio. Se devemos compater o aventureirismo, a pressa peque no-burguesa, precisamos tambem compreender que a inercia política não e menos prejudicial à causa da revolução. Más condições atuais, so cumprimemos nosso dever se formos capazes de fazer de nosso P. a força organizadora e dirigente do movimento pela reconquista das liberdades democraticas. Esto requer de cada militante um grande sentido de responsabilidade e não menor combatividade.

Mais de quarenta anos de avividade mostraram que so poderemos intervir com exito nos acontecimentos ma medida em que nos mantiver unidos, procurando aplicar com firmeza a orientação traçada pe lo CC e demais orgaos dirigentes, lutando sem xxix vacilações em defesa do centralismo democratico, pela direção coletiva e pela ma is rigorosa disciplina. E na unidade política, organica e ideologica do P. que reside sua força.

Apoiados na ciencia do proletariado, na doutrina invencibel do marxismo-leninismo, no internacionalismo proletario, nas resoluções do movimento comunista internacional, contidas nas Declarações de Moscou de 57 e 60, saberemos dirigir com exito a luta historica de nosso povo pela completa emancipação nacional, pela paz, a democracia, o progresso e o social smo, pela vitoria mundial do comunismo.

Brazil, May, 1965

To the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.

Dear Comrades:

We dutifully advise you that the Central Committee of our Party, in a plenary meeting held during the days of the current month of May, had occasion to pay homage to the memoria of Comrade Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, whose life of revolutionary and outstanding guidance of the International Communist Movement was noted and extolled.

We hope to be able to send you, shortly, a copy of the Policy Resolution approved by the Central Committee of our Party at the abovementioned meeting.

Fraternal salutations,

For the Central Committee of Brazilian Communist Party.

/s/ Luiz Carlos Prestes Secretary General

Envelope - handwritten address -

To The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the United States of America.

The Central Committee of the Brazilian Communist Party, at its meeting, approved, over and beyond the Policy resolution, the following

Internal Resolution

1. The events of April, 1964, uncovered many of our more serious deficiencies, particularly in the field of leadership. And the political reverse we suffered occasioned serious losses to the Party organization.

Meanwhile, on the other hand, the task of regrouping the leadership organs and the basic units is advancing, albeit sluggishly. The Party is reorganizing its ranks, taking into account the new conditions which exist, and is ever increasing its activity, is participating in the struggle of the masses for their rights and integrating itself into the grouping of political forces which are forming and acting against the policy of the dictatorship and for its overthrow.

In order to proceed, with success, along this path, it is indispensable that we confront and resolve some acute problems, on which depend the ideological, political and organic strengthening of our Party.

- 2. With its basis in the conclusions presented in #1 of the Policy Resolution, it is necessary to delve deeply into the process of self-criticism in which we find ourselves, in search of the errors and the weaknesses which contributed to the reverse suffered in the military coup of April First. Developing the internal struggle, rudimentarily, we must fight the deviationists of the left and of the right who have revealed themselves within our ranks.
- 3. It is becoming indispensable to organize the tasks of leadership in keeping with the new conditions in the country. Never neglecting the correct combination of legal with illegal work, it must be kept in mind that, with the present underground conditions, illegal work predominates in leadership activities. The task of implementation stands out under different aspects and in diverse functionings so that it can be carried out with safety and efficiency. The reorganization and reinforcement of strategy makes possible the energizing of state leadership, at the same

constituting one of the applications of the principle of collective leadership in present conditions, the rigorous observance of the method of planning and controlling the work and concentration of forces on the priciplal objectives to be reached. To organize and to develop the work on finances.

Resolution on the Sixth Congress

Having in mind that it was not possible to hold the Sixth Congress which had been called by the Central Committee and which would have taken place in September, 1964, and that those very events which forced us to this become the most commanding and urgent reason for its realization; and considering the facts of the situation in which our Party finds itself and the concrete realities of the moments through which we pass; the Central Committee,

Resolves:

- 1. To hold the Sixth Congress as soon as possible, in the light of existing conditions, within the next 12 months.
- 2. That the date of the holding of the Sixth Congress and the convocation of the Party be set at the next meeting of the Central Committee, the opinion of the Central Executive Committee having been heard beforehand.
- 3. That, in the present circumstances, the Order of the Day of the Congress must be reduced to the statement of accounts of the Central Committee and the discussion and approval of ta document on the tactics of the P. and the election of the Central Committee, and that the rules (sic) must be modified to allow the necessary reduction in the number of delegates.
- 4. To empower the Executive Committee to take all practical means for the preparation of the instruments necessary to the holding of the Congress, helping the Executive Committees to take identical measures for the holding of their respective conferences so that the Central Committee, at its next meeting, can set with certainty, the date for the holding of the Congress.
- 5. Among the preparatory measures for the Congress, the Executive Committee must examine the possibility of publishing a discussion bulletin (National and State), in order that the Central Committee, duly informed, can at its next meeting, make a decision in this respect.
- 6. To elect a Commission of the Central Committee to work out in detail the document on Party tactics which must serve as basis to be binding on the Party and on the Congress

and which must be presented at the next meeting of the Central Committee. The commission should be (made up of) three members.

Referenced document to be debated by the Party and to appear as the Order of the Day of the Congress, should include, in a concise way, the balance (or rest of) the application of the Party line approved at the Fifth Congress and the Tactics of the Party, in the light of the situation both national and international.

May, 1965

Resolution

The representatives of the 19 Worker and Communist Parties which participated in the consultative meeting held from March 1 to 5 in Moscow, issued a communique, the text of which we note.

The Central Committee of the Brazilian Communist Party, met in plenary session, resolves to endorse the communique, emphasizing the importance of its spirit of unity - fruit of the friendship and fraternity which presided at the meeting as well as of the lofty pledge for the solidarity of the World Communist Movement.

In adopting the present decision, it is planned to do whatever necessary within the meaning expressed by the communique, to the end of contributing whatever might assure the solidarity of the international Communist movement and the strengthening of its unity on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and of Proletarian Internationalism and according to the line of the Declarations of 1957 and 1960.

The Central Committee of the Brazilian Communist Party points out the importance the communique gives to the use of all possibilities and constructive means in the quest for the solution of the problems common to the entire Communist movement with full observance of the principles of absolute equality and independence of each Party, and not allowing the interferece by one in the internal affairs of others.

Calling for the cessation of open controversy - with its offensive and hostile effects on Brother Parties - the Central Committee of the Brazilian Communist Party considers, as the communique recommends, that at the proper time, the holding of a new International Convention is desirable, taking into account the Communist ranks preoccupation with the strengthening of the Marxist-Leninist unity in their fight against imperialism and colonialism, for national liberation, for peace and peaceful co-existence, democracy, socialism and communism.

The Central Committee of the Brazilian Communist Party

POLICY RESOLUTION

The CC (Central Committee) of the Brazilian Communist Party met in the month of May and working from the information presented by the CE (Executive Committee), made an analysis of the international situation, of the national situation and of the activity of the Party for the period since its last meeting.

It recognizes as being a significant event during this period, the reactionary military coup of April 1st of last year, with the consequent status of President JOAO GOULART and the installation in the country of a reactionary and traitorous dictatorship. The developing democratic process was thus interrupted. The patriotic and democratic forces and, in particular, the workers' movement and its vanguard, our Party, suffered a serious reverse (or setback). The national political situation was profoundly modified.

The conclusions at which the CC arrived as the result of the discussions are contained in the following Policy Resolution:

1: The struggles of the Brazilian people are developing within the framework of an international situation characterized by the strengthening of the positions of socialism, by the upsurge of the national liberation movement and of the international workers movement, by the growth of the forces dedicated to the preservation and consolidation of world peace.

The peace policy followed by the Soviet Union and the rest of the socialist countries, supported in its economic, technical and scientific advance and inspired by the principle of peaceful coexistence, penetrates ever deeper into the consciousness of the peoples of the world. The national liberation movement is developing with vigor in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The economic situation of the moment in the more developed capitalist countries is keeping generally on the rise. In the capitalist camp, interest is increasing in intensification of economic relations with the countries in the socialist camp, which augments the end result of the policy of peaceful coexistence. Simultaneously, and also in consequence of, the continued wide-spread worsening of the capitalist crisis, the inter-imperialist disagreements sharpen;

especially those shown in the market disputes, with great (TAQUE-sic), in the positions assumed by the French Government in its foreign policy.

It is in this situation that imperialism, particularly that of the North Americans, is intensifying its activities in different parts of the world, embarking on acts of aggression against Socialist countries, against workers' movement and against the people who are struggling for national liberation. The international situation is worsening appreciably.

The intervention in the Congo on the part of the Yankee and Belgium forces, the repression of the Angolan people by the Portuguese dictatorship, the intervention of Great Britain in British Guiana, the provocations of the Federal Republic of Germany with reference to Berlin and the attempt to form a Multilateral Atomic Force and create an atomic belt at the finitiers of the Socialist countries, - all these acts conditute, not only violations of the rights of the people, but, also, new threats to world peace.

In the face of firm resistence of the people of South Viet Nam directed by the National Liberation Front (Vietmin), the Government in Washington is extending its aggression into Laos and into Cambodia, it is bombing the territory of North Viet Nam, it attacks her merchant fleet and her Navy. In order to crush the struggle of the Dominican people against the reactionaries and in order to defend the interests of Yankee monopolists, troops were landed in the Dominican Republic, using the O.A.S. to conceal that monstrous aggression.

The intensification of the aggression of North American imperialism, a manifestation of the orientation of the so-called "Johnson Doctrine", is found in the forceful crushing of democratic movements and of movements of national liberation. It also has as an objective, the provocation of local, limited wars so as to hinder the international expansion, catering to the interests of the most aggressive circles from Wall Street and the Pentagon. Meantime, these

actions are arousing protests and revolts by the people of the entire world, including by the people of the United States. Thus, on the one hand, as it is contributiong to the serious aggravation of the international situation, on the other hand it contributes more and more to the unmasking of North American imperialism as the oppressor and exploiter of the oppressed people of the world and against the threats of a new world war.

In Latin America the situation of the Cuban people who, under the direction of Fidel Castro, proceed with the victorious construction of the Socialist society, and of the rest of the Latin American people who suffer under the growing exploitation of the Yankee monopolies, becomes more and more apparent. The growing misery of the laboring masses sharpens itself to a structural crisis and the conflicts between the progressive forces in each country and the North American monopolies is growing. In some countries, such as Venezuela, Colombia, Guatamala and in Santo Domingo, the anti-imperialist struggles are taking the form of armed conflicts. Although the United States is proceeding with the policy of "the Alliance for Progress" which is aimed in part at limited benefits for the, local bourgeoisie, they do not hesitate to intervene by force or to instigate reactionary coups and to support dictorial governments in order to safeguard and consolidate its exploitationist domination. From March, 1962, until the present, there were coups dietat in seven countries -Argentina, Peru, Equador, Guatamala, Honduras, Bolivia and Santo Domingo, besides Brazil - which were carried out under the orientation and with the support of the Government in Washington.

However, none of this is hindering the people of Latin America from continuing their advance along the path of democracy and national emancipation. In Argentina the Communists won back the right toorganize themselves and to disseminate their ideas. The Chilean Government established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries. Mexico is maintaining relations with Cuba in spite of a resolution to the contrary. Among the great masses is growing the hate of Yankee imperialism and the determination to fight against internal reactionism. In the way in which they unite themselves and struggles, in which they fortify their solidarity and their co-joined action against the common enemy, the Latin American people will be as invincible as their heroic brother people of Cuba, a glory and example for all Latin America.

2: With the coup of April 1 in Brazil, the representatives of the most backward and anti-national forces seized power, the agent of North American imperialism, the large landowners and capitalists connected with the Yankee monopolies. Being the government-in-fact, run by a group of generals in the service of the Embassy of the United States, it set itself up as a reactionary and intriguistic military dictatorship.

The submission of the country to the interests of the North American monopoly is assuming proportions never before seen. The law which limited the removal of profits from the country was practically abolished. They shady deal for the purchase of the trash heap called Bond and Share (sic) took place. The sumfor the "Wheat Agreement (Accord)" with the United States was doubled. It is easing its mining policies to agree with the requirements of Hanna....Minninh Co. (sic - Hanna Mining Co.). The "agreement on the guarantee of private investments" which concedes privileges to the North American interests and which constitutes a serious criminal assault on the national sovereignty, was signed. The Yankee military mission is making an aerial photogrametric survey of our territory. Politics, economics and financial matters are dictated by the F.M.I.

The dictatorship has begun a foreign policy entirely dependent on the Government of the United States. It broke relations with Cuba. It is serving as an instrument of anspokesman for the Department of State in the O.A.S. It is taking a position against the people of Asia and Africa who are struggling against imperialism. It supports the tyranny of Salazar. It is collaborating with the Yankee aggression on the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, and with the brutal outrage on the people of Santo Domingo. Under the pretext of making scientific tests, it is permitting the construction of bases for rockets and nuclear arms in our national territory.

After the violent and arbitrary application of the Ato Institutional, including the mutilation of the National (Federal) Congress and of the State Assemblies, they proceeded with the military police inquisitions which were designed to persecute, arrest and torture thousands of citizens, workers and young students and even professors, magistrates,

writers, artists, journalists, military men, Catholic Priests, legislators and, finally, persons of every class and social level. It approved a law against the right to strike. It is impeding the free function of the Une (sic-possibly U.N.E. or Uniao Nacional de Estudantes or Estudantil - National Student Union) and many other student organizations.

Great suffering and privation are imposed on the laborers and on all the people. They are raising the indirect taxes. They removed price controls from products essential to the people's diet. A new tenancy law sets a rent increase. While the high prices increase without end, the readjustment of the wages of the workers and public servants is maintained at a level below that of the price increase. The minimum wage climbed only 57% during a period in which the cost of living went up in amis (sic) of 90%. Unemployment is increasing.

The economic-financial policy of the dictatorship is also reaching the interests of the national bourgeoisie who are threatened more each day by the imperialist competition. Commercial and industrial activity is onthe decrease. Products on-hand are accumulating in the factories. Production is falling off. Agreements with creditors and bankruptcies are increasing both in number and in value. The process of denationalization of Brazilian industry is becoming more rapid.

3: The policy of the dictatorship sharpens the contradictions that divide Brazilian society. The pre-eminence of structural reforms is accentuated.

In an attempt to deceive the people, the dictatorship dons the mask of reformer and goes so far as to represent itself as revolutionary. It tries to impose as agrarian reform a Land Statute which as an expression of methods controlling rents—furthermore of difficult application—does not pass beyond a plan of colonization. The plans for an Election Law and a statute on political parties strive in fact to reduce the number and impede the bureaucratic organizations subordinate to the State apparatus, threatened proportional representation, render practically impossible representation of minorities. The demand for an absolute majority in the elections for President of the Republic and State Governors struck at the direct popular vote, transferring to the Congress and State Assemblies the final choice of those elected.

The national interests demand the concretization of effective reforms in the structure of Brazilian society which may strike at the power of imperialism over our economy, the ownership monopoly of land by the landholders. The dictatorship which represents precisely the interests of the landholder and of North American imperialist monopolies will not bring about those reforms.

The policy of dictatorship hurts the interest of the nation. Deepening is the contradiction between our people and the reactionary and traitorous minority which seized the power. This contradiction constitutes at the moment the peculiar expression of the chief contradiction of Brazilian society, defines the essence of all the political conflicts, influencing them as a determining factor.

4: Becoming broader and deeper are the manifestations of resistance to dictatorship and of opposition to its reactionary and traitorous policy the workers are fighting against salary reductions. In the rural areas, although slowly, the union movement is again active, conflicts arise

with the land grabbers and the police force, conflicts between the sugar employers and the sugar workers in the northeast. The students are arising against Law 4.464, in defense of self-rule in the student movement, of the UNE and the rest of the units. The intellectuals are ranging themselves against the cultural terror and demanding the restoration of democratic freedoms and the renewal of the country's economic development. Broad segments of the national middle class chiefly through entities like the National Industrial Confederation demand modifications in the basic points of economic and financial policy, they denounce the denationalization of our industry. Swelling up is repudiation by public support of the violence and the arbitrariness of the police and of those in charge of police-military inquests. There are manifestations by the judicial power of condemnation of that violence and arbitrariness, political prisoners are freed, parties and political movements unite around the demand for the re-establishment of democratic liberties and holding of free elections.

Broad social segments which showed support or sympathy for the coup feel tricked and prejudiced by the reactionary and traitorous policy of the dictatorship. They inclined to join those who oppose it. Modified in favor of the democratic and patriotic forces is the state of affairs which in April 1964 favored reaction and rendered possible the victory of the coup makers. The social base of the dictatorship is narrowed.

That situation sharpens the contradictions between the coup makers and in the instability of the government Senor Castelo Branco persists in his measures to cement the dictatorship, trying to conceal them behind the facade of "representative democracy." But there persists the pressure of the groups of the extreme right along the line of total suspension of rights and constitutional guarantees, for the setting up of an undisguised dictatorship. Supporting also, in the meantime, in essence, the reactionary and traitorous orientation of the dictatorship, other segments of the coup makers assume a position of criticism towards its economicfinancial policy, seeking thus to capitalize without its benefit for electoral ends on the rising discontent of the people.

The intensification of resistence and opposition on the part of our people to the dictatorship will serve to increase its instability, will deepend the division among the coup makers. Government crises and new military coups can come about: In that case, only the active intervention of the masses in the events, carrying their own battle banner and preventing a reactionary solution, with the simple replacement of coup makers in power and imposing the recovery of the democratic processes.

5: Since the beginning the Communists set themselves in opposition to and did battle with the dictatorship. Through understandings with parties, political movements and personalities, and, chiefly, through our action among the masses we have attempted to participate actively in the grouping of the forces which struggle against it. The facts prove that this is the right road.

The immediate tactical objective to win in that struggle is to isolate and overthrow the dictatorship and win a government broadly representative of the antidictatorial forces, which guarantees liberties for the people and guarantees the resumption of the democratic presses interrupted by the reactionary and traitorous coup. The Communists contemplate that such a government may be the most advanced possible, but they understand that its composition cannot fail to reflect the level reached by the mass movement and the correlation of existing forces at the moment in which it is constituted.

The successes of that battle will depend basically on the unity of action of all the forces, movements and political segments which oppose the dictatorship. The formation of that broad front of resistence, opposition and combat against the dictatorship will be possible through struggles for democratic liberties, in defense of national sovereignty, through the rights and immediate interests of the workers and the people, through the development of our economy, through the country's progress. The defense of democratic freedoms constituted the principal link in that struggle. Inseparable from all the rest of the just demands, it stands for that same reason as the broadest and most

moving, capable of unifying and channeling all the movements clamoring for a broad battle front against the dictatorship.

free elections and our active participation in all the election campaigns is vested with huge importance in order to move forward the struggle for democratic liberties and for the winning of a new government. With that understanding, is it, that we must participate in this year's state elections, in the state and federal elections of 1966, in addition to those taking place in the towns. The election campaigns in such states as Guanabara, Minas Gerais, Goias and Parana, as well as the municipal elections in Porto Alegre, hold special importance.

In participating actively in the election campaigns, the Communists should keep in view that they become in the process of doing this a means for binding together forces in opposition to dictatorship, of unmasking it before the masses, victories achieved that may we have to fight it and at last to overthrow it. It is therefore in the interest of the Proletariat and the other forces in opposition to the dictatorship to fight for free elections effectively, to insist upon the free manifestation of all political currents in opposition and the exercise of the right of propaganda without censor, as well as to fight against all political and ideological discriminations arising from the Institutional Act or from new laws about unsuitability and ineligibility by means of which the dictatorship proposes to strike arbitrarily from the list of possible candidates all citizens who do not win its confidence.

The Communists must throw themselves with decisiveness and enthusiasm into the election campaign of the state and municipality in which they are active and think soon after of the 1966 campaign for which already various political movements are going into action. They ought to be the unifying element for excellence; capable of finding in each instance the best way to unite the broadest forces in opposition to dictatorship around unifying platforms and candidates who merit popular confidence.

It is essential to give to the election campaign a mass character of armed struggle for democratic freedoms, so as not to let the dictatorship use the elections so as to legalize the usurped power. In cases in which this goal becomes practically unattainable the forces of opposition to the dictatorship can resort to the blank ballot as a way of protesting against the transformation of the campaign into a tub full of farce, covering with a spurious "legality" the government by coup of April 1st.

It is making of the election campaign a mass campaign which will make possible the assurance that free elections will be held and enable those elected to create political conditions to make it possible to govern.

7: In the development of the struggle against dictatorship we must use the most varied methods. It behooves the Communists to know how to stimulate the initiative of the masses and to encourage the struggle through all ways that favor the regaining of the democratic process. For such, there ought to be employed all legal possibilities without which all this is reduced to the "legality" conceded by the dictatorship. The masses ought to be urged not to accept the restrictions of the dictatorship of their right to meet, to strike, to make public protest, to make propaganda. The heightening of the struggles then present violent conflicts with reaction, including armed conflict. It is the duty of the party to prepare itself and to prepare the masses for such eventualities.

The principal effort of the Communists should be concentrated in the intensification of the work among the masses, in the defense and strengthening of their organizations, in the organization and unleashing of battles for their rights and just demands.

Whatever shall be the form which the struggle against the dictatorship may come to assume, mass action will always constitute the decisive factor, capable of guaranteeing the advance of the political processes in accordance with the people's interests. It is through action that the people will gain confidence in their own forces. Through action it is always possible to win partial successes, for worse though the reaction may be, successes will help and encourage the masses themselves to reinforce their organizations, tighten their unity,

and bring them on to actions, each time more vigorous. It is the duty of the Communist to know how to put themselves on the level of understanding the masses, to lead them to action, and to win them to the political positions in the vanguard.

Passivity in the face of dictatorship is the great danger threatening the popular forces and our Party. It is our duty to fight it, keeping in mind that there happens as much of overestimation of the strength of the coup makers as illusions that the dictatorship may fall by itself, threatened by the contradictions that divide it. It is necessary to understand that our intervention in whatever crises of government can only have positive results in proportion to how capable we are of monopolizing the masses. This means that we must be vigilant, know how to go along with events, but the most important thing, the pre-eminent thing, the decisive thing, is our mass work, our unrelenting effort to tie ourselves to the masses, to enlighten them, to awaken them, to monopolize them for action, to organize them and to unify them.

8. In order to win the masses for action, its indispensable to know how to raise the just claims most in demand in each segment of the populace. We must intensify the struggles for repeal of the Institutional Act, the nullification of the attempts on individual rights resulting from its application for liberation of political prisoners, solidarity for the persecuted and their families, for general amnesty, for liberty and self government for workers' unions, for student groups and other people's organizations, against cultural terror, for freedom of opinion. Another element helpful in mass mobilization is the struggle against the economicfinancial policy of the dictatorship, the policy of scarceness, of tax increases, of forced devaluation of the Cruzeiro in relation to the dollar, of reduction in real earning power. We have to have the greatest initiative together with other forces and fight for better living conditions for the workers, against scarceness and unemployment, in defense of the rights that have been won, employment legislation and social security. We must participate in an active and undivided way in labor union elections, seeking at the same time to organize the workers' locals. Special importance must go to the struggle of the great masses of the farmers against the exploitation of the land holding class and for agrarian reform, for claims and immediate just demands, especially for the application of the Rural Worker Statute, guaranteed to access and to ownership of the land control and lowering of rents.

We must give major attention to the specific just demands of the women. Of great value is their participation in the struggle in defense of peace against scarcity for democratic liberties, for solidarity with arrested persecuted political figures, for amnesty.

Deserving of every support is the battle of the Civil Service and the Government workers in the defense of their rights and just claims, in particular readjustment of wages.

The traitorous policy of the dictatorship hurts the patriotic sentiments of the broadest strata of the people, I say of our people who can be mobilized for the struggle in defense of the national sovereignty, against concessions to the North American monopolies and the submission of Brazil to the Government at Washington, against the ratification by the Congress of the agreement concerning guarantees for private investments. The serious threats which weigh upon State enterprises, particularly Petrobras (Brazilian Petroleum, Inc.) make possible broad mass mobilization in their defense.

The struggle for the progress of the country, against the economic-financial policy which denationalizes the national industry, which leads to economic stagnation, which denies resources to public works to economic development of the Northeast (Sudene) and of the North (Spevea), the instruction for the people and cultural development, for scientific research-will permit the mobilization of broad segments of the population.

In its turn, the military aggression of the United States in Viet Nam and now in the Republic of Santo Domingo demands an intensification of the struggle for peace, against the war policy of the North American Government for the self determination of the people, for the solidarity of the people under attack, against the sending of Brazilian troops abroad. It is the duty of the Communists to find new ways to permit in the present situation the reorganization and broadening of the struggle for peace in our country. The permanent struggle for solidarity among the Cuban people and for the re-establishment of relations with the Government of Cuba are to be intensified with the meeting of Latin American Congress for solidarity with Cuba and for the liberation of the people.

9. There is an intensification in our activity among the masses in the factories, armies and schools, in the great concentration of people which can forged the

broad united battle front against the dictatorship. Giving special attention to the formation of the united front at its base, we must come to undepstandings with personality movements and political parties, with all those who are opposed to the reactionary forces that have usurped power.

To the degree that the instability of the dictatorship increases, that the action of the popular masses increases, the various political forces in the defense of their interests, they pay attention to the immediate future and to the eventuality of replacing the Government, seeking the road to be trod in accordance with the objections of each. As representatives of the proletariat, we must present our own tactical vision, seeking to win for it the allied forces.

At the same time as they intensify the struggle for the overthrow of the dictatorship and the winning of a Government representation of the forces which oppose it, the Communists have as a prospect the winning of a nationalist and democratic Government and capable of initiating bringing forward structural reforms, drawing our people toward the goals of the present stage of the Brazilian Revolution. It is with that prospect that the Communists set themselves before the masses, pointing the way that leads to the solution of Brazilian problems, and pledging for the proletariat through the strengthening of its unity and organization and alliance with the farmers, the possibility of exercising a ruling role in the revolutionary process.

10. In examining the situation of the Party and the new problems which we must now face up to the Central Committee peace in first place the necessity of brinigging forward the deepening of the process of self-criticism which made its appearance and in which we find ourselves and which must be crowned with the 6th Congress. The Central Committee hails the critical and self-critical preoccupation which has manifested itself throughout the

Party, in seeking out our mistakes and the causes which contributed to the setback it suffered, preoccupation in which it sees a salutary revolutionary spirit of love for the Party and of ardent aspiration for the raising of the ideological level of its ranks.

In order to stimulate this that self-critical process we take note for the Party of the chief conclusions at which we can arrive. Up until now the Central Committee in the analysis which it is making of the events connected with the victory of the April 1 coup, with respect to the faults and errors of the Communists.

The victory of the military coup uncovered many of our more serious weaknesses. We were taken by surprise by the outcome of events and unprepared not only to confront them, but aboto carry on with assurance and efficiency in our activities in the new conditions created in the country. There was revealed a false confidence placed in the "military set-up" of Goulart. Also false was the viewpoint that we then presented to the Party and to the masses of a quick and easy victory, our class of illusions, our foot dragging in relation to the segment of the national bourgeoisie that was in power, became evident. It behooves us to analyse the process which brought us to such a situation.

As a result of an arduous political and ideological battle, the line approved by the 5th Congress constituted formed a powerful revolutionary instrument which permitted the Party to strengthen its ties with the masses. That to participate actively in political life, contributing in such a way toward the advancing of the revolutionary process that the furious enemies of the revolution roused themselves up against our Party. But since the tenure of Goulart which came about as a result of a compromise of the national bourgeoisie with the forces of reaction, preoccupied with the struggle against conciliation we began to stray from the Party. This process came to a head in the last months of Goulart's Government when, in fact, he abandoned the struggle for the just application of the line.

It was, without doubt, indispensable to fight with determination the policy of conciliation. Justified was our stand against the Triunal Plan, against the shady bond and share deal. It was due to the struggle against the conciliation policy that reactionary attempts of April and October, 1963, failed when Goulart wanted on the pretext of attacking the right to take measures to contain the advance of the popular movement. We conducted in the meantime the struggle against conciliation in an inadequate way.

Our struggle in relation to Goulart's Government was oriented, in practice, when his policy was almost entirely negative. We disregarded its positive aspects of great importance with its foreign policy, the defense of peace, the self-determination of the people, of the principle of nonintervention, the development of diplomatic and trade relations with the Socialist countries and in his domestic policy, a relative respect for democratic liberties, the attention to the just demands of the workers. Our opposition to the Government acquired the completion of a struggle against a traitorous Government, with the principal objective of unmasking before the masses.

We were active while considering the struggle against conciliation as the concrete form by which ought to be fought, in the conditions then existing, the greatest enemy of our people, North American imperialism. Such a political position could only go to the avoiding of the principal code, transferring it to the national bourgeoisie. Instead of concentrating the force of our battle against North American imperialism and its domestic agents, we directed our attacks fundamentally against the policy of conciliation touching imperialism almost only as a result of those attacks.

Hence the lack of concern in fighting the shamefull agents of North American imperialism like La Cerda and Ademar. Hence the lack of concern with the maneuvers and twistings of imperialism itself with the intensification of its aggressiveness toward the people dominated by it. Hence the underestimation of the danger of a rightist coup considered a mere scarecrow for frightening the masses. Concentrating our fire on the government we demanded measures evermore advanced without taking into account our own weakness and the frailty of the Nationalist and Democratic movement, as well as the effective correlation of social forces which then existed, which put the naked persistent influence of subjectiveism in our activity.

We leave aside the fact that the very advance of the Democratic process was threatening the privileges of foreign monopolies, of the land holders and of the great tratorous bourgeoisie, which still held strong positions. A false analysis of reality did not let us see that the correlation of social forces in the last months of the Goulart government was becoming, day to day, less favorable to the Nationalist and Democratic forces. The reactionaries and the betrayers joined hands and they managed to attract to their side broad segments of the national bourgeoise and the urban petty bourgeoise, dissatisfied with the situation and not in agreement with the rising threats to the existing constitutional regime. The forces on the right armed themselves and prepared quickly for the coup.

Early in 1964, when Goulart moved by his own political goals sought to approach the popular forces, the straying from the political line of the Fifth Congress in our activity was accentuated. We underestimated the importance which the holding of the elections had for the Brazilian people and we did not take the trouble to apply the Electoral Resolution approved by the Central Committee, at the same time we were stimulating the coup making ? (which undid) Goulart. Instead of alerting the masses and calling them to battle against the threat of a rightist coup clearly revealed in La Cerda's action

and the action of Ademar and his military henchmen, we put out the Note of the Executive Commission of March 27, 1964, in which in the way of clamoring for the immediate formation of a new government to put an end to the policy of conciliation, we transferred the brunt of the attack to the Parliament, demanding constitutional reform and threatening the Congress "the Plebiscite, said the Note, must be convoked by the Congress or in the case of omission postponement or a rejection of this, by the Executive Power itself". In this way we permitted the defense of legality to be used by the forces of reaction to win over broad segments of the population and draw them to the reactionary coup and, in practice, we abandoned the tactical orientation contained in our political line.

At the root of our errors is a false conception, petty bourgeoise and coup-ist at base, of the Brazilian revolution, which has manifested itself in a predominent manner at the decisive moment of their revolutionary activity, independently of the political line, right or no, which we had adopted. It is a conception which admits the revolution not as a mass phenomenon, but as the ? action, or in the best of cases result of It presses into our activity a strain of of the Party. petty bourgeoise instancy drawing us away from the prospective of an unremitting and continued struggle for our tactical and strategic goals, through the process of an accumulation of forces and a winning over of hegemony for the proletariat.

The self-critical examination of our mistakes and the analysis of their deepest causes constitutes a decisive factor in the battle for the accurate application of our political line.

11. With the victory of the military coup and the implantation of the reactionary and traitorous dictatorship, our Party faces a new situation and new problems. The building tasks in every aspect take on decisive importance, we must devote the greatest efforts to the recuperation of the basic units and the creation of new ones principally in the factories, farms and schools

and their strengthening, political, iedological and organic, making them capable of fulfilling their heavy tasks.

It is indispensable that the entire Party acquire the conviction that it is fitting for the Communists to have a vanguard role in the struggle to overcome the dictatorship, which demands revolutionary spirit, unselfishness, and the capacity for sacrifice. We must fight adventurism, petty bourgeoise haste, we need also to understand that political inertia is not less prejudicial to the cause of revolution. In the present conditions we shall fulfill our duty only if we are able to make of our Party the organizing and guiding force of the movement for the regaining of Democratic liberties. This requires of every militant a great sense of responsibility and no less a spirit of combativeness.

More than 40 years of activity have shown that we can only intervene with success in events to the degree we keep ourselves united, seeking to apply with firmness the orientation and delineation by the Central Committee and the other leadership programs, struggling without weavering in defense of democratic centralism for the collective leadership and for the most vigorous discipline. It is in the Party's unity, political, organic and ideological, that its strength resides.

Supported in the science of the proletariat, in the invincibility of Marxism - Leninism in proletarian internationalism, in the resolutions of the Communist international movement contained in the Delcarations of Moscow of 57 and 60, we will know how to direct with success the historic struggle of our people for complete national emancipation, for peace, democracy, progress and socialism for the world victory of Communism.

May, 1965

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1982 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 Tolson UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Mohr -DeLoach $\it Aemorandum \; {
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m ENVELOPE}$ Caspet _ Callchan Contad. Gale. DATE: Mr. Conrad August 31, 1965 Trotter Tele. Room C. F. Downing Holmes -Gandy SUBJECT: SOLO INTERNAL SECURITY - C Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio. On 8/31/65, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at which time a message, NR 367 GR 202, was intercepted. The plain text and cipher text are attached. The New York Office is aware of the contents. ACTION: For information. Bolsont 1 - Mr. Conrad 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: - Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam) 1 - Mr. Downing 1 - Mr. Newpher 1 - Mr. Paddock REG-76/00 428891-5049 SEP 2 1965

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together with his family in Toronto nor had he discussed any matters with the CP of Canada in detail.

Chicago Office will cover activities of FREED while in Chicago through CG 5824-S* and the Bureau and New York will be kept advised of all pertinent information developed.

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supplied by sepa	irate communications:	•
Accord	ling to CG 5824-S* on	8/25/65 NORMAN FREED
departed Chicago	as scheduled at 8:15	p.m. (CST) by rail
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	TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637) SUBJECT: SOLO IS-C	. -
,	On 8/23/65, NY 694-S* advised that HELEN WINTER gave him a 92-page report od the Ninth Congress of the Romanian CP, which she had received from ANTON KRCHMAREK, who had returned fabroad, for transmission to GUS HALL. This report was delivered in Bucharest, Romania, by Comrade NICOLAE CEAUSESCU on behalf of the Central Committee of the Romanian CP in July 1965.	com
	NY 694-S* advised that GUS HALL returned to NYC unexpectedly from his vacation this past week end and he will deliver this report to GUS HALL later on 8/23/65. Photostat copies of this report were made and are enclosed herewith for the Bureau and Chicago. 3- Bureau (EngC)2)(RM) 1- Chicago (\$34-46-Sub B)(Enc. 1)(AM RM)	,
	1 - NY 134-91 (INV)(41) 1 - NY 100-134637 (Att. 1)(41) JDO:msb (7) REC 76 /00-428091-5052	

Approved: SEP 3 Special Agent in Charge

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Lall of	language language	Also enclosed for of two documents dated 4/17/65; and dated 7/14/65 of aclosed LHM is a	s: a) letter in nd, b) letter in which the Engli	the Russian the Chinese	r franktion to
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CG 134-46 Sub B

The enclosed LHM is classified "TOP SECRET" in view of the fact that it contains information obtained from CG 5824-S*, a confidential source of continuing value, the unauthorized disclosure of which would seriously jeopardize the security of this source, thus possibly adversely affecting the national security.

The Bureau is requested to expeditiously prepare a full translation of the enclosed Russian language document and furnish the translation thereof to Chicago and New York. It is possible the Bureau may wish to temporarily withhold dissemination of the enclosed LHM pending the translation of the Russian letter and if deemed desirable incorporate the text thereof into one dissemination of both documents. The Bureau is requested to advise the Chicago Office of its desires in this regard at the time the translation is furnished. The Bureau may retain the copies of these documents enclosed inasmuch as Chicago is retaining copies in the 1-A exhibit of this file.

The enclosed LHM has been shown as having been prepared at Washington, D. C., in order to further protect the source.



In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C.

August 30, 1965

TOP SECRET

LETTER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, USER, FROM THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA AND THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA DATED JULY 14, 1965

On August 23, 1965, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

During mid-August, 1965, a representative of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Prague, Czechoslovakia, forwarded to the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), through an intermediary, the text of a letter dated July 14, 1965, which was addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and was signed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council of the People's Republic of China. This letter, in the English language, purported to be a translation of the true text of a letter in the Chinese language sent on July 14, 1965, to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from the Communist Party of China in response to a similar letter dated April 17, 1965, from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Communist Party of China. Attached hereto is a copy of the text of this letter.

Attachment

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TO SENT

July 14, 1965

The Central Committee of the Communist and Party of the Soviet Union 7.

The Council of Ministers of the USSR

Dear Comrades,

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party and the State Council of the People's Republic
of China have received and studied the letter of the
Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated April 17, 1965.

According to the principles guiding relations among fraternal Parties, all Communist Parties are independent and equal. A Party has every right to put forward different views with regard to proposals made by another Party, and it does not have the duty to express agreement in every case. In our letter of reply of April 11, 1965, for a number of reasons the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Government disagreed with your proposal of April 3 for a summit meeting of Viet Nam, China and the Soviet Union. This is quite a normal thing in relations between fraternal Parties. Yet your letter of April 17 arbitrarily attacks and abuses us, and even goes so far as to slander us as "encouraging the aggressors". Where is there any sign in this



of independence and equality in the relationship between fraternal Parties? What is it if not the behaviour of a domineering patriarchal "father party"? In your letter you say:

The very fact of a demonstration of the unity of all the socialist countries, and particularly of the Soviet Union and China, and a joint public declaration of their determination to frustrate the aggressive schemes of imperialism would constitute serious support for the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and cool the ardour of the American militarists.

At a time when U.S. imperialism is stepping up its aggression in South Viet Nam and wildly bombing the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, all socialist countries should have the determination to frustrate the U.S. imperialist aggression and their stand should be one of firm support for the Vietnamese people's patriotic struggle against U.S. aggression. The Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Government have always had this determination and persisted in this stand. It has been our eager hope that all the socialist countries, and particularly the Soviet Union, would have the same determination and take the same stand as we do.

However, what has actually happened is contrary to our hopes. Your actions on the Viet Nam question show that your stand is the diametrical opposite of the principled stand a Marxist-Leninist Party should take.

We note that in January this year the U.S. authorities expressed the hope that the Soviet Government would use its influence so that the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam would accept.



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the following two demands: (1) stop supporting the South, and first of all stop supplying it with guns, and (2) stop the attacks on the cities in the South. Far from expressing any opposition to these preposterous demands of the U.S. authorities, you officially transmitted them to the Vietnamese comrades. This proves that you were acting according to the requirements of the U.S. imperialists and trying to obstruct the Vietnamese people's patriotic struggle against U.S. aggression.

In view of these circumstances, we explicitly told Comrade Kosygin in February this year when he passed through Peking on his visit to Viet Nam that all socialist countries should respect the stand of the Viet Nam Workers' Party and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, support the Vietnamese people in their just struggle to liberate the South, defend the North and reunify their fatherland, and demand the withdrawal of all the armed forces of the United States from Viet Nam, and that the Viet Nam question should be settled by the Vietnamese people themselves. We expressed the hope that the Soviet comrades would respect the opinions of the Vietnamese comrades and adopt the same stand as Viet Nam and China in joint opposition to U.S. aggression.

In the course of the exchange of views between China and the Soviet Union, Comrade Kosygin stressed the need to help the United States "find a way out of Viet Nam". We then pointed out in all seriousness that since the U.S. imperialists were intensifying their



aggression against Viet Nam this was no time to negotiate with the U.S. aggressors but a time to take up
arms to resist them. Our hope was that you would not
find a way out for the United States or make a deal
with it on the Viet Nam question. Comrade Kosygin
expressed agreement with our views at the time and stated
that the new Soviet leadership would "not bargain with
others on this issue".

But immediately after Comrade Kosygin returned to Moscow, you went back on your own promise and behind the backs of Viet Nam and China actively carried on international manoeuvres for "peace negotiations".

Most striking of all was the fact that on February 16, the day after Comrade Kosygin's return to Moscow, the Soviet Government officially put before Viet Nam and China the proposal for the convening of a new international conference on Indo-China, which in fact was advocacy of "unconditional negotiations" on the Viet Nam question. On February 23, disregarding the stand the Vietnamese Government took against this proposal and without waiting for a reply from the Chinese Government, you discussed with the French President, through the Soviet ambassador to France, the question of calling an international conference without prior conditions. Just over a month later, Johnson came 🧀 out with his fraud of "unconditional discussions". Is it not clear whose needs you were catering to in proposing an international conference without prior conditions?



After Johnson's fraudulent "unconditional discussions" proposal was firmly rejected by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, you publicly insinuated that negotiations could be held if only the United States stopped its bombing of North Viet Nam. You engaged in vigorous activities in the international field with a view to putting this idea into effect. Moreover, you officially informed many fraternal Parties that you stood for negotiations with the United States on the condition that it stopped its bombing of North Viet Nam. You also said that ways and means should be sought to settle the Viet Nam question through negotiations. These "conditional negotiations" and your previous "unconditional negotiations" are of a piece. For the very aim of the U.S. bombing of North Viet Nam is to bring about "peace negotiations" so that the United States may gain a breathing spell, continue to suppress the revolution in South Viet Nam and, through negotiations, perpetuate and legalize its occupation of South Viet Nam. To stop bombing and hold negotiations -- this is exactly what U.S. imperialism has been trying very hard but in vain to achieve. Not long after you advanced the idea of stopping the bombing, the Johnson Administration suspended its bombing of North Viet Nam for five days and at the same time demanded that the 30 million Vietnamese people should abandon their patriotic struggle against U.S. aggression. Is it not clear that your idea was closely co-ordinated with the war blackmail of the U.S. aggressors?

At a time when the U.S. imperialists are perpetrating aggression against socialist Viet Nam, instead of waging a tit-for-tat struggle against them you exchange information with the U.S. authorities and coordinate with them. Sometimes you also utter a few words condemning U.S. aggression against Viet Nam, but for all your words your underlying objective is to improve Soviet-U.S. relations and your supreme principle is that nothing should hamper Soviet-U.S. cooperation. Such is the tone of the statements of both February 8 and March 4 issued by the Soviet Government on the Viet Nam question. You are still pursuing the line of Soviet-U.S. collaboration for the domination of the world.

The above facts show that, far from having the determination to frustrate U.S. imperialist aggression, you are doing everything possible to find a way out for the U.S. aggressors. In these circumstances, how can we make a demonstration of unity with you? If we showed unity with you; would that not mean we were following you in seeking friendship and cooperation with the U.S. aggressors? Wouldn't it mean we were following you in subordinating the Viet Nam question to Soviet-U.S. collaboration for the domination of the world? No, we will never do such a thing.

The Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese Government and the Chinese people have been doing everything in our power to give practical and effective aid to the Vietnamese people's patriotic struggle against U.S. aggression, in accordance with the needs of the Vietnamese comrades. By heroically resisting U.S. imperialist

aggression and defending the southeastern outpost of the socialist camp, the Vietnamese people have made enormous sacrifices and thus given tremendous help to all the other socialist countries. It is our bounden proletarian internationalist duty to help the Vietnamese people to the best of our ability. In contrast to you, we hold that such help is nothing to boast about or preen oneself on. Speaking of gratitude, it is we who should be grateful to the Vietnamese people for the help they are giving us.

Now that the Vietnamese people are winning victory after victory in their struggle against U.S. aggression and the U.S. aggressors are beset with difficulties, you have recently given a certain amount of aid to the Vietnamese people. Such aid is necessary. In our opinion, the greater and the more practical it is, the better. But to date, both the quantity and the quality of your aid are far from commensurate with the strength of your country. The criticism we made of you in our letter of April 11 is in complete conformity with the facts. Far from admitting your mistakes, you label us as having "pretensions to play the role of the supreme judge in the mutual relations among the socialist states". Are people forbidden to criticize your mistakes? Are they "supreme judges" if they do? This only goes to show how inveterate is your great-power chauvinism.

Your letter states:

And if any delay occurred in the delivery of the Soviet military equipment to the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, it was not, as you well know, through the fault of the Soviet Union.

According to you, it must be China's fault since it was not the fault of the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, you have long spread the lie throughout the world that China obstructed the transit of Soviet military equipment for Viet Nam. In this way you have insidiously slandered China and attempted to deceive those who are not aware of the truth.

· Lies, however, cannot travel far. The truth is that, in accordance with understandings reached, we make the greatest possible effort and quickly transport to Viet Nam all Soviet military equipment needed by Viet Nam. The Vietnamese comrades know this fact, and you are not unaware of it either. One of the pretexts you used in spreading that lie is that we did not agree to your proposal for the transportation of a small amount of weapons (only 18 anti-aircraft guns, 75 anti-aircraft machine-guns and some ammunition) by 45 AN-12 aeroplanes in a showy long distance flight to Viet Nam across China. We considered that this would violate the principle of absolute secrecy which you yourselves demanded. Besides, the Vietnamese comrades did not ask for shipment by air. Therefore, we made a timely suggestion that the weapons be transported by land. Later you agreed and, in fact, this was how they were transported. That you went so far as to use this event to attack China is too unscrupulous for words.

It should also be pointed out that in assisting Viet Nam, you wanted to send via China a regular army formation of four thousand men to be stationed in Viet Nam, without first obtaining her consent. Under the pretext of defending the territorial air of Viet Nam you wanted to occupy and use one or two airfields in

southwestern China and to station a Soviet armed force of five hundred men there. You also wanted to open an , air corridor in China and obtain for Soviet aeroplanes the privilege of free traffic in her air space. In view of these moves of yours and your collusion with U.S. imperialism, we have every reason to think that you have ulterior motives in offering such assistance.

Frankly speaking, we cannot trust you. We and other fraternal countries learned bitter lessons in the past from Khrushchov's evil practice of control under the cover of aid. The same old tricks you are now playing on the Viet Nam question are even less likely to work. China is not one of your provinces. We cannot accept your control. Nor will we help you to control others. Naturally, we could not but categorically reject your unreasonable demands as enumerated above.

We have carefully observed your activities on the Viet Nam question during the past few months. A series of facts compel us to conclude that on the Viet Nam question you are pursuing a policy of appeasement towards the United States, attempting to strike a political bargain with U.S. imperialism and betray the Vietnamese people's cause of liberation, and that you are practising great-power chauvinism towards fraternal countries, attempting to gain military control over them and hitch them to your chariot of Soviet-U.S. collaboration for the domination of the world. Your April 3 proposal for a summit meeting of Viet Nam, China and the Soviet Union was an important step in the application of your line of appeasement and great-power chauvinism. You intended to dure us into your trap through such a meeting, so

that you could obtain the qualification to speak on behalf of Viet Nam and China in your international manoeuvres, strengthen your position for doing a political deal with U.S. imperialism and build up your capital for deceiving the revolutionary people throughout the world.

In these circumstances, a summit meeting of Viet Nam, China and the Soviet Union would do no good, only harm. Therefore, we did not agree to your proposal.

To obscure the dividing line between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism you parade the idea that differences can be put aside and "united action" taken in common against imperialism. This is sheer demagogy. The fundamental differences between you and ourselves are precisely differences as to whether or not to oppose imperialism headed by the United States, whether or not to make revolution and whether or not to support the revolutionary struggles of the people of all countries. How can differences of so fundamental a nature be put aside?

You talk glibly about united action. Why then do you continue your hostile policy towards fraternal Albania?

You talk glibly about united action. Why then do you carry out subversion and disruption against the Communist Party of Japan in collusion with U.S. imperialism and the Japanése reactionaries?

You talk glibly about united action. Why then do you incessantly distribute anti-Chinese propoganda theses and make anti-Chinese reports everywhere in your country, constantly spread lies against China

among fraternal Parties and in international democratic organizations and ceaselessly carry on secret diplomatic manoeuvres against China in many capitalist countries?

You convened the March Moscow meeting, and in so doing went a step further in openly splitting the international communist movement. Instead of making any efforts to correct your mistakes you are now continuing with your splitting activities. This being so, what is the meaning of your cry for united action?

Clearly enough, by united action you mean that the fraternal Parties should obey the orders of your "father party", that the fraternal Parties and fraternal countries should become your instruments in executing your policy of U.S.-Soviet collaboration for the domination of the world, and that the fraternal Parties should follow your revisionist theory and line. It is absolutely impossible to expect Marxist-Leninists to take such united action with you.

The Viet Nam question is a focal point in the present international struggle. If you are really willing to take united action with the Marxist-Leninists and revolutionary people of the world, you should thoroughly change your erroneous stand on the question.

You should immediately cease your overt and covert complicity with U.S. imperialism and stop your political dealings with the United States for a sell-out of the fundamental interests of the Vietnamese people; you should cease to co-ordinate with U.S. imperialism in plotting the swindle of "peace negotiations" and cease to undermine the revolutionary struggle of the Vietnamese people.

You should give genuine support to the Vietnamese people in their effort to carry the war of resistance through to the end, until every single U.S. aggressor is driven out of Viet Nam. You should send more, and practical and good quality military and civilian supplies to Viet Nam, and not old, out-of-date, impractical and inferior things just to make a show of doing your. duty or for demagogic purposes. You should make a clean break with your bad habit of great-power chauvinism and honestly perform your internationalist obligations, and you must not utilize your so-called aid to achieve your ulterior aims.

You should direct the spearhead of struggle against U.S. imperialism, and not against fraternal Parties and fraternal countries: You should change your hostile policy towards fraternal Albania and put a stop to your disruptive activities against the Japanese Communist Party and other Marxist-Leninist Parties.

You should not oppose socialist China, which firmly supports Viet Nam, by allying yourselves with U.S. imperialism, which is committing aggression against Viet Nam, and with the Indian reactionaries and the Tito clique, who serve U.S. imperialism. You should put an end to your campaign of slander against China on the Viet Nam question, cease concocting lies against China and abandon your shameful attempt to sow dissension among the fraternal countries.



Only when you have done all this will you be able to speak of united action with the Marxist-Leninists and revolutionary people on the Viet Nam question. Otherwise, you will not be trusted no matter how many fine words you speak or how many petty tricks you play.

In the last analysis, the mistakes you have committed on the Viet Nam question are the inevitable result of your obdurate pursuit of the revisionist line as laid down by the 20th and the 22nd Congresses and in the Programme of the CPSU. So long as you hold fast to this erroneous line, you are bound to run your head against a brick wall on all major issues. We hope that you will make a thorough self-criticism, examine yourselves seriously and abandon the revisionist line, the line of Soviet-U.S. collaboration for the domination of the world, and the line of great-power chauvinism and splittism, and return to the correct path of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

With fraternal greetings!

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

The State Council of the People's Republic of China

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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.



Центральному Комитету Коммунистической партии Китая Государственному Совету Китайской Народной Республики

Дорогие товарищи!

Мы получили ваш ответ на письмо ЦК КПСС и Совета Министров СССР от 3 апреля 1965 г., в котором содержалось предлежение о проведении встречи представителей ДРВ, КНР и Советского Союза на самом высоком уровне с целью обсуждения мер для ограждения безопасности Демократической Республики Вьетнам.

В своем письме от II апреля 1965 года вы отказываетесь от такой встречи и считаете, что вам "нет необходимости снова вести разговоры" о координации усилий и осуществлении совместных действий по оказанию помощи героическому вьетнамскому народу. Обстановка, сложившаяся в настоящее время во
Вьетнаме, постоянные провокации американской военщины против
ДРВ и прямая агрессия против этой братской страны вызывают
у народов социалистических стран законные чувства тревоги
и озабоченности. Советский народ уже предпринял необходимые шаги для оказания действенной помощи братскому вьетнамскому народу в отражении агрессии американского империализма. Мы и впредь не пожалеем сил для поддержки справедливой борьбы вьетнамского народа.

Вместе с тем мы считаем, что помощь Вьетнаму явля-ется интернациональным долгом не только Советского Союза,

но и всех социалистических стран. Само собой понятно, что эффективность этой помощи намного увеличится, если социалистические страны будут действовать в тесном единстве, согласовывая и координируя свои усилия.

Сам факт демонстрации единства всех социалистических государств, и особенно Советского Союза и Китая,
открытое совместное заявление о их решимости сорвать
агрессивные замыслы империализма, мог бы явиться серьезной поддержкой Демократической Республики Вьетнам и
охладить пыл американской военщины. В этом прежде всего
кровно заинтересован вьетнамский народ, борющийся за
свою свободу и независимость.

В нынешней обстановке ваш отказ от участия в солидарных действиях по оказанию помощи Вьетнаму, открытая демонстрация перед лицом империализма вашей особой
позиции и стремление еще дальше обострить свои разногласия с КПСС и другими братскими партиями об"ективно
поощряет агрессоров. Эта позиция ЦК КПК и правительства
КНР идет вразрез с жизненными интересами въетнамского
народа, с интересами народов всех социалистических стран.

Отвергая предложение ЦК КПСС и правительства СССР о проведении трехсторонней встречи, вы вместе с тем бросаете необоснованный упрек в адрес советского народа, заявляя, что помощь, оказанная Советским Союзом Вьетнаму, "слишком незначительна". Такое заявление го-

во взаимоотношениях между социалистическими государствами, по своему произволу определять характер этих отношений, определять размеры и формы помощи одного народа другому.

Мы уже не роворим о том, что кому как не вам лучше других известны размеры и формы советской помощи Вьетнаму. Мы не думаем, что вам не были известны заявления руководителей Партии трудящихся Вьетнама и Демократической Республики Вьетнам с оценкой усилий Советского Союза. Можем напомнить вам высказывания товарищей Хо Ши Мина, Ле Зуана и Фам Ван Донга о том, что они "высоко ценят выполнение советским народом своего интернационального долга". Вьетнамские товарищи выражают удовлетворение тем, что практически все их заявки были положительно рассмотрены в Советском Союзе. Выражая ЦК КПСС и Советскому правительству благодарность за инициативу по оказанию широкой помощи ДРВ, вьетнамские товарищи подчеркивали, что эта помощь является достаточной. И если происходила какая-либо задержка с доставкой советской военной техники в ДРВ, то это, как вы хорошо знаете, было не по вине Советского Союза.

В своем письме вы пишете, что "по всем вопросам, касающимся Китая, непременно следует получить согласие китайской стороны". Мы с полным пониманием относимся к этому заявлению. Само собой понятно, что отдаленность

Советского Союза от Вьетнама, необходимость использования территории КНР для быстрейшей доставки помощи
Вьетнаму, требуют согласования многих практических вопросов с китайской стороной. Наше предложение о трехсторонней
встрече представителей ДРВ, КНР и Советского Союза как
раз и исходило из того, что помощь Вьетнаму будет более
эффективной, если три государства будут координировать
свои усилия. Совершенно очевидно, что такого рода координация ни в какой мере не ущемляет суверенитет Китайской
Народной Республики.

В результате советско-вьетнамских переговоров, состоявшихся в апреле этого года в Москве, достигнута договоренность о дальнейшей помощи Советского Союза Вьет- наму в связи с американскими бомбардировками. Достигнуто соглашение о новых поставках оружия и военной техники, а также и по другим вожным вопросам. Мы считаем, что результаты наших переговоров были бы еще более эффективными, если бы в них приняли участие и представители КНР.

В заключение нам хотелось, чтобы китайские товарищи еще раз взвесили всю серьезность обстановки, сложившейся в Юго-Восточной Азии, и встали бы на путь тесного сотрудничества в деле укрепления обороноспособности ДРВ, оказания ей помощи в защите мирных городов и сел от варварских бомбардировок американских империалистов.

Борьба против усилившейся агрессии США требует

от нас практических действий и совместных выступлений в целях обеспечения безопасности границ социалистического лагеря и его форпоста в Юго-Восточной Азии. В этом состоит сегодня священный интернациональный долг коммунистических партий.

С коммунистическим приветом.

Центральный Комитет

. Совет Министров

кпсс

CCCP

Москва 17 апреля 1965 года 苏联共产党中央委員会 苏联部长会議 亲爱的同志們:

中国共产党中央委員会和中华人民共和国国务院收到了幷且研究了苏联共产党中央委員会和苏联部长会議一九六五年四月十七日的信件。

根据兄弟党关系的准則,各国共产党是独立的,平等的。对于一个党的建議,別的党有提出自己不同意見的权利,而沒有非同意不可的义务。中共中央和中国政府在一九六五年四月十一日的复信中,根据种理由,不同意你們四月三日提出的关于举行越、中、苏三国最高級会晤的建議。这在兄弟党关系中本来是一件正常的事情。但是,你們四月十七日的来信,却对我們濫施攻击,橫加辱爲,甚至誣蔑我們"鼓励侵略者"。这那里还有一点兄弟党的独立和平等关系呢。这不是凌駕一切的老子党作风的表現,又是什么呢。

在美帝国主义加紧侵略越南南方, 瘋狂轰炸越南民主共和国的情况下, 社会主义各国理应具有粉碎美帝国主义侵略的决心, 采取坚决支援越南人民反美爱国斗争的立場。中国共产党和中国政府历来抱着这样的决心, 坚持这样的立场。我們热切地希望, 所有社会主义国家, 特別是苏联, 抱有同我們一样的决心, 采取同我們一致的立場。

可是,事实同我們的愿望完全相反。从你們在越南問題上的所作所为来看,你們的立場同馬克思列宁主义政党应当采取的原則立場是完全背道而馳的。

我們注意到,今年一月間,美国当局希望苏联政府使用自己的影响,使越南民主共和国政府接受以下两点要求: (一)停止支援南方,首先停止供应火炮: (二)停止对南方城市的襲击。对于美国当局的这些无理要求,你們不但沒有表示反对,而且正式向越南同志作了轉达。这說明,你們适应美帝国主义的要求,力图阻撓越南人民的反美爱国斗爭。

針对这种情况,当今年二月柯西金同志訪問越南路过北京的时候,我們會經向柯西金同志明确表示,社会主义各国应当尊重越南劳动党和越南民主共和国政府的立場,支持越南人民解放南方、保卫北方、統一祖国的正义斗争,要求美国的一切武装力量从越南撤走。越南問題应当由越南人民自己解决。我們希望苏联同志尊重越

.

行了积极的活动。你們还正式通知許多兄弟党說,你們主張同美国进行談判,条件是美国停止对越南北方的费炸。你們转且表示,要寻找通过談判的道路解决越南問題的途徑和手段。你們的这个"有条件談判",同你們原来那个"无条件談判",完全是一样的货色。因为美国费炸越南北方,本来就是为了炸出一个"和平談判"来,以便美国取得喘息时間,继續鎮压越南南方的革命,并且通过談判,永远地合法地霸占越南南方。停止费炸,进行談判,正是美帝国主义千方百計求之而不可得的。在你們提出"停止费炸"的主張之后不久,約翰逊政府就把对越南北方的费炸暂停了五天,同时要求三千万越南人民放棄反美爱国斗爭。你們的主張,不正是同美国侵略者的战爭訛詐紧密配合的嗎。

当美帝国主义侵略社会主义国家越南的时候,你們不是同美帝 国主义进行針鋒相对的斗爭,而是同美国当局 互通 消息,彼此呼 应。你們有时也說几句譴責美国侵略越南的話,但是,說来說去, 落脚点总是要改善苏美关系,总是以不妨碍苏美合作为最高准則。 苏联政府二月八日和三月四日关于越南問題的两次声明,都是这样 的腔調。你們实行的仍然是苏美合作主宰世界的路綫。

上面这些事实說明,你們不但沒有粉碎美帝国主义侵略的决心,而且千方百計地为美国侵略者找出路。在这种情况下,我們怎么能夠同你們显示出一致呢,如果我們竟然同你們一致起来,那岂

联的过错"。照你們的說法,不是苏联的过錯,那就是中国的过錯了。事实上,你們早就在全世界到处散布中国阻挠苏联援越军事物资过境的謠言,阴險地誹謗中国,企图欺騙那些不明事实真相的人。

但是,謊言毕竟是腿短的。事实的真相是,所有根据越南的需要提供的苏联軍事物資,我們都是按照协議,尽最大的可能,迅速地运到越南去。这个事实,越南同志知道,你們也不是不知道。你們造謠的一个借口,就是我們不同意你們用四十五架安一12飞机,空运为数不多的武器(仅仅有十八門高射炮、七十五挺高射机关枪和一些彈药),浩浩蕩蕩,长途飞行,經过中国領空到越南去。我們认为,这样做違反你們自己要求的絕对保密的原則,而且越南同志也沒有要求空运。因此,我們及时地建議把这批武器改为陆运。你們后来也同意了。事实上也是这样做的。你們竟然利用这样一件事情作为反华的題目,实在太不擇手段了。

还要指出,在援助越南的时候,你們不得到越南同意,就要派遣四千人的整套編制的武裝部队,經过中国,进駐越南。你們借口保护越南領空,要在中国西南地区占用一、两个机場,并且要在这些机場上駐扎苏联武裝部队五百人。你們还要在中国开辟空中走廊,取得苏联飞机在中国領空任意通行的特权。你們这种做法,加上你們还同美帝国主义勾勾搭搭,使我們完全有理由认为,你們的这种援助,是別有用心的。

老实說,我們是信不过你們的。过去,赫魯曉夫借口援助来实 行控制的种种恶劣做法,我們和其他兄弟国家都有过痛苦的教訓。 現在,你們又在越南問題上搞这一套,就更加行不通了。中国不是 你們的一个州。我們不能接受你們的控制。我們也不能帮助你們去 控制別人。对于你們提出的上述无理要求,我們当然只有断然拒絕。

我們細心地观察了你們几个月以来在越南問題上所进行的种种活动。一系列的事实使我們不能不认为,你們在越南問題上,对美国实行綏靖主义,企图在政治上同美帝国主义进行交易,出卖越南人民解放事业的利益,对兄弟国家实行大国沙文主义,企图实行军事上的控制,把我們套在你們的苏美合作主宰世界的馬車上。你們一四月三日提出的举行越、中、苏三国最高級会晤的建議,就是贯彻你們的綏靖主义和大国沙文主义路綫的一个重要步驟。你們就是想通过越、中、苏最高級会談,誘騙我們上你們的圈套,从而取得代表越南和中国在国际上进行活动的資格,提高你們同美帝国主义进行政治交易的地位,增加你們欺騙全世界革命人民的資本。

在这种情况下,举行越、中、苏三国最高级会晤,不仅是无益的,而且是有害的。所以,我們不同意你們的建議。

为了混淆馬克思列宁主义和修正主义的界綫,你們裝腔作势地 說,可以把分歧撤在一边,团結反帝,"联合行动"。你們的这一 套,完全是蠱惑人心的。我們同你們的分歧,最根本的恰恰是要不 要反对以美国为首的帝国主义,要不要革命,要不要支持各国人民革命斗争的分歧。这样根本性质的分歧,怎么能撒在一边呢。

你們口口声声說要联合行动,为什么你們对待兄弟的阿尔巴尼 亚继續采取敌对政策呢?

你們口口声声說要联合行动,为什么你們勾結美帝国主义和日本反动派,对日本共产党进行颠覆和破坏活动呢?

你們口口声声說要联合行动,为什么你們不断地在国內散发反 华宣傳提網,到处做反华报告,不断地在兄弟党和国际民主团体中 散布反华謠言,不断地在許多資本主义国家进行反华的秘密外交活 动呢。

你們召开了莫斯科三月会議,进一步公开分裂国际共产主义运动。現在,你們不但沒有改正錯誤的任何表示,而且继續坚持搞分 裂。在这种情况下,你們还叫褒联合行动,这是什么意思呢,

非常清楚,你們所說的联合行动,就是要兄弟党服从你們的老子党的命令,就是要兄弟党、兄弟国家成为你們推行美苏合作主宰世界政策的工具,就是要兄弟党遵循你們的修正主义理論和路綫。你們指望馬克思列宁主义者同你們搞这样的联合行动,那是絶对办不到的。

越南問題是当前国际斗爭的一个焦点。你們如果真的愿意同全世界馬克思列宁主义者和革命人民采取联合行动,那么,你們就应

当在越南問題上彻底改变自己的錯誤立場。

你們应当馬上停止同美帝国主义的公开的和秘密的勾結,停止 同美国进行出卖越南人民根本利益的政治交易,从此不再同美帝国 主义配合起来玩弄"和平談判"的騙局,不再破坏越南人民的革命 斗爭。

你們应当真心誠意地支持越南人民抗战到底, 直到把美国侵略者一个不剩地从越南赶出去。你們应当把更多的、适用的、合格的 亳用品和民用品送到越南去, 而不应当把一些陈旧的、过时的、不 适用、不合格的东西送去, 敷衍塞貴, 招搖撞騙。你們应当痛改大 国沙文主义的恶习, 老老实实地履行自己的国际主义义务, 不要利 用所謂援助来达到自己不可告人的目的。

你們应当把斗爭的矛头对准美帝国主义,而不应当对着兄弟党和兄弟国家。你們应当改正对兄弟的阿尔巴尼亚的敌对政策,应当停止对日本共产党和其宅馬克思列宁主义政党的破坏活动。你們不应当联合侵略越南的美帝国主义以及为它效劳的印度反动派和鉄托集团,反对坚决支持越南的社会主义中国。你們应当停止在越南問題上誹謗中国的运动,停止制造誣蔑中国的謠言,放棄挑撥兄弟国家关系的可恥企图。

只有做到了这些事情,才談得上你們同馬克思列宁主义者和草 命人民在越南問題上玩合行动。否則,你們无論說多少漂亮話,要 多少小把戏,都是不能取信于人的。

你們在越南問題上所犯的錯誤, 归根到底, 是你們坚持推行苏 共第二十次代表大会、第二十二次代表大会和苏共綱領所規定的修 正主义路綫的必然結果。你們只要坚持这条錯誤路綫, 你們在任何 重大問題上都是要碰壁的。我們希望你們深刻檢討, 痛切反省, 拋 葉修正主义路綫, 拋棄苏美合作主宰世界的路綫, 拋棄大国沙文主 义和分裂主义的路綫, 回到馬克思列宁主义和无产阶级国际主义的 正确道路上来。

致兄弟的敬礼。

中国共产党中央委員会

中华人民共和国国务院

一九六五年七月十四日

TRANSLATION FROM RUSSIAN

To:

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

The State Council of the People's Republic of China

Dear Comrades,

We received your reply to the letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, dated April 3, 1965, which contained a proposal for holding meetings among the representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the People's Republic of China, and the Soviet Union, on the highest level, for the purpose of discussing measures for protecting the security of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

In your letter, dated April 11, 1965, you refused to participate in such a meeting and state the opinion that for you "it is not necessary to again hold talks" about co-ordination of forces carrying out joint activity in rendering aid to the heroic Vietnamese people. The situation currently developing in Vietnam, the constant provocations of the American militarists against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the direct aggression against this fraternal country are causing just feelings of alarm and anxiety among the peoples of the socialist countries. The Soviet people have already taken the necessary steps for giving effective aid to the fraternal Vietnamese people in repelling the aggression of American imperialism. We will continue not to spare our forces in order to support the just struggle of the Vietnamese people.

In addition to this, we believe that aid to Vietnam is an international obligation not only of the Soviet Union, but all the socialist countries. It is self-evident that the effectiveness of this aid will be greatly increased if the socialist countries act in close unity, agreeing upon and coordinating their forces.

The fact of a demonstration of unity among all socialist governments itself, especially between the Soviet Union and China, an open, joint statement about their

file 150-428891

determination to thwart the aggressive designs of imperialism would be a vital support for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and would cool the ardor of the American militarists. The Vietnamese people, struggling for their freedom and independence, are vitally interested in this above all.

In the current situation, your refusal to participate in activities of solidarity for giving aid to Vietnam is an open demonstration to imperialism of your basic position and efforts to sharpen even further your differences with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other fraternal parties. This encourages the aggressors. This position of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the government of the People's Republic of China goes against the vital interests of the Vietnamese people and the interests of the peoples of all the socialist countries.

In rejecting the proposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the government of the USSR to carry out 3-sided meetings, you also hurl an unfounded rebuke against the Soviet people, stating that aid given by the Soviet Union to Vietnam is "too insignificant." Such a statement reveals your pretensions toward playing the role of supreme judge in the mutual relations between socialist countries, toward determining the character of these relations according to your own wishes and determining the size and type of aid from one country to another.

We do not mention the fact that the size and types of Soviet aid to Vietnam are known to you better than to anyone else. We know that the statements of the leaders of the Workers! Party of Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam evaluating the efforts of the Soviet Union were not unknown to you. We can remind you of the statements of comrades Ho Chi Min, Le Zuan (phonetic) and Fam Van Dong (phonetic), that they "value highly the fulfillment of its international obligation by the Soviet nation." The Vietnamese comrades express satisfaction that practically all their requests were considered favorably in the Soviet Union. In expressing their gratefulness to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government for the initiation of extensive aid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Vietnamese comrades emphasized that this aid is sufficient. If there occurred a certain holdup in the delivery of Soviet military equipment to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, then this, as you well know, was not the fault of the Soviet Union.

In your letter you write that "in all questions involving China it is absolutely necessary to obtain the approval of the Chinese side." We view this statement with

complete understanding. It is self-evident that the distance of the Soviet Union from Vietnam and the necessity of using the territory of the People's Republic of China for more rapid delivery of aid to Vietnam require agreement on many practical problems on the part of the Chinese. Our proposal for a 3-sided meeting among the representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union-was based directly on the fact that assistance to Vietnam will be more effective if the three governments coordinate their efforts. It is quite evident that such coordination will not in any measure infringe upon the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China.

As a result of Soviet-Vietnamese talks in April of this year, in Moscow, an agreement concerning future aid by the Soviet Union for Vietnam in connection with American bombings was reached. An agreement was reached concerning new deliveries of arms and military equipment, as well as agreement on other important problems. We believe that the results of our talks would be much more effective if the representatives of the Chinese People's Republic took part in them.

In conclusion we would like the Chinese comrades to once again weigh the seriousness of the situation which has developed in Southeast Asia and to follow the road of close cooperation in the matter of strengthening the defensive capability of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and rendering it aid in defending peaceful cities and villages from the barbarian bombings of the American imperialists.

The struggle against the increasing aggression of the United States demands practical activity and joint declarations in the goal of guaranteeing the security of the borders of the socialist camp and its advanced post in Southeast Asia. This is the sacred international obligation of communist parties today.

With communist greetings

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union

Moscow, April 17, 1965

DATE 01-17-2012



ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

(IS) 100-428091

BY LIAISON .

SC.

Date:

September 1, 1965

Solo

1 - Liaison

1 - Au11 1 - R. Putnam

To:

Director

Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Department of State

From:

John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject:

"WORLD MARXIST REVIEW"

92-6 Led

My letter of August 30, 1965, captioned as above, set forth the plans of the Editorial Board of the "World Marxist Review," official theoretical organ of the world communist movement, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to hold an exchange of views on the 30th anniversary of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in Prague, Czechoslovakia, in October, 1965. A source, which has supplied reliable information in the past, has furnished the following additional information concerning this matter:

An individual prominent in the world communist movement has noted that the above-mentioned exchange of views is but a guise for the holding of an international meeting which will enable communist parties of the world to gather outside the Soviet Union to discuss problems. Through this meeting the various communist parties will be able to discuss problems facing the world communist movement and assume some responsibility regarding these problems. This exchange of views will serve to remove some of the pressure on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to take all of the initiative in the present situation of the world communist movement. 100-428091-5

According to an individual who has been closedy SEP 2 associated with the "World Marxist Review," the current Editor-in-Chief of the publication, Edgene Frantzov, is not well liked by other staff members because of his arrogance which outweighs his ideological ability.

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(SEE NOTE PAGE TWO)

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TOP-SECRET

Director Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Alexander Sobolev, current Executive Editor of the "World Marxist Review," expects to be relieved of his position and reassigned to work with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the Soviet Union following the next meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Because of the sensitive nature of our source, this letter is classified "Top Secret."

1 - Director BY LIAISON Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

r, Plans

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NOTE:

Classified "Top Secret" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. See CGairtel 8/25/65 captioned "Solo, IS - C." Source received this information in private discussion with Norman Freed who has just completed an extended assignment as CP of Canada representative to the "World Marxist Review."

TOP SECRET

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

(IS) 100-428091

BY LIAISON

I N

Date:

August 27, 1965

(50/0)

1 - Cotter

1 - Liaison 1 - R. Putnam

To:

Director

Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Department of State

From:

John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject:

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS -

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

820 bourse

D-READING ROOM

Sources which have furnished reliable information in the past have advised as follows:

Lenders of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), have been advised by a leading member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) that there are stirrings of unrest in the People's Republic of China (PRC). It was reported that there is an underground movement in the PRC which opposes the hard-line interpretation of Harrism-Leninism practiced by the Communist-Party of China (CPC) and the movement is favorably disposed toward the position of the CPSU on international affairs.

Jeaders of the CPUSA have also been advised that officials of a labor union in a western nation have received a letter on the letterhead of the AM-China Federation of Trade Unions, Peking, PRC. This letter voiced criticism of the present leaders of the PRC. It objected to PRC attempts to develop nuclear weapons, the failure of China to sign the nuclear test ban treaty, the slandering of leaders of other socialist countries and the talk of rebuilding the world after half the population is destroyed in a nuclear war. SEP 2 1965

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The letter noted that workers and true trade unionists in the PRC have no voice and are helpless. The current trade-union leaders in the PRC are accused of ignoring the welfare of

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(SEE NOTE PAGE TWO)

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TOP SECRET

Director Bureau of Intelligence and Research

the workers while condemning imperialism, issuing empty slogans and carrying out Party programs. Trade unionism in the PRC is described as a mockery since the workers must obey the orders of the CPC and not attempt to strike for better wages or working conditions because of fear of punishment.

The letter appealed to trade-union leaders and friends of China throughout the world to exert pressure on the leaders of the PRC to have them restore true trade unionism, restore true friendly relations with all socialist countries and to adopt a policy of peaceful relations with countries which have different social systems. The letter also requested support for Chinese workers in their struggle for freedom to improve their conditions and to help the whole world on the path to peace and happiness.

Because of the sensitive nature of our sources this letter has been classified "Top Secret."

1 - Director BY LIAISON Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

1 - Director BY LIAISON National Indications Center

NOTE:

Classified "Top Secret" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of this source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. CG 5824-S* referred to as sources in order to further protect the identity of this valuable informant. CG 5824-S*freceived information concerning underground movement in Communist China from Anton Krchmarek, member of the National Committee, CPUSA, who just returned from abroad. He received his information from a member of the CCCPSU during a briefing. Letter referred to was sent to International Union of Mine, Mill and Smeter Workers in Toronto, Canada. CG 5824-S* received it from William Kashtan,

(NOTE CONTINUED PAGE THREE)

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Director Bureau of Intelligence and Research

NOTE CONTINUED:

General Secretary, CP of Canada. Kashtan and Gus Hall, General Secretary, CPUSA, to whom letter was given, could not assess document's significance. CG 5824-S* believes while letter could be genuine it may be a "mousetrap" by the Chinese to smoke out true feelings of trade unionists in Canada since Chinese have attempted such action in the past. CG 5824-S* cannot vouch for authenticity of document or even furnish a reliable analysis of it at this time.



ROUTE IN ENVILOPE

SAC, New York (100-134637) (Attention: SAC Donald E. Roney)

8/30/65

Director, FBI (100-428091) — 5056

SOLO IS-R RECY 585

Reference is made to your letter of 8/12/65, captioned as above, forwarding 1,500 pages of Xerox reproductions of money in the amount of \$120,000. Reference is also made to Bureau letter 7/1/65 entitled TRACING OF AMERICAN MONEY USED BY SOVIETS IN ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS -- 'REQUEST FOR AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING UNIT SERVICE."

Serial numbers of the money on the 1,500 pages have been recorded in the Automatic Data Processing Unit. The serial numbers will be consolidated with the index at such time as this index has been completely converted to the Automatic Data Processing system.

There are being returned under separate cover the 1,500 pages of Xerox reproductions.

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MAY 1922 EDITION -GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

(ATT: VOUCHER STATISTICAL SECTION)

8/12/65 DATE:

4 30

SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT

ReBulet 7/1/65 entitled TRACING OF AMERICAN MONEY USED BY SOVIETS IN ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS - "REQUEST FOR AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING UNIT SERVICE."

Enclosed for the Bureau are 1,500 pages of Xerox reproductions of money representing \$120,000. These Xerox copies denote "exchange money" for \$120,000 in \$20 bills, which amount was originally received by NY 694-S* from the Soviets on 6/23/65, and is a portion of the total of \$150,000 received on that date. The \$120,000 in \$50 bills was exchanged for the \$120,000 in \$20 bills on 8/10/65.

Records of these bills should contain the reference, NY 65-17696A-It is also requested that the record contain the page number of the Xerox copies, which page number may be found on the lower right hand corner of each sheet and that the record be marked "exchange money." It should also note that the money was exchanged on 8/10/65.

The enclosed material should be returned to the NYO in a communication hearing instant title and marked for the attention of Supervisor

3)- Bureau (Enc: 1.500)(RM)
(1 - Voucher Statistical Section
1 - NY 65-17696 (#343) lest aux productions 17 AUG-13 1965 1 - NY 100-1346 WM: IM (5)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ROUTE IN ENVILOPE

smit the follow	ing in(Type in plaintext or code)
AIRTEL	REGISTERED
	(Priority)
ŤO:	DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
FROM:	SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)
SOLO	O. Sinting Putter
IS - C	CI 32 h
Secretary	On 8/26/65, there was received at the MICHAEL PELHAM lew York City a letter signed B (WILLIAM KASHTAN, General of the Canadian CP) to HERBERT (GUS HALL), the contents are as follows:
	"August 24, 1965
•	"Dear Herbert:
	a little island and advised us that plans are afoot for a Latin American Congress of Solidarity about the middle of November. They were quite anxious that you be informed and of course do what you can to ensure effective representation from the U S A to it. So far we have seen no call and hope it will materialize soon. In connection with the above there is the hope that you would be represented at the 13th Congress in Santiago, Chile taking place from the 11th to 19th October. At that time there will be further thought given to the Latin American affair by all those present.
-	"All the best,
-	"As ever,
	JII B. II
1 - Chica 1 - NY 13	REC- 15 /00-42809/-5057 go (134-46-sub B)(AMR) 4-91-INV (#41) 0-134637 (#41) 10 AUG- 28 1965
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Rev. 5-22-64)	0	S	<u>;</u> †	
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it the following in _ AIRTEL	(Type in plainte REGISTERED	et or code)		
	(F	riority)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428	091)		
FROM :	SAC, NEW YORK (100-134	637 <u>)</u>	- Queter	<u> </u>
SUBJECT:	SOLO IS-C	· · ·		
via radio plain text	On 8/31/65, there was a ciphered and partia of which is as follow	lly-coded mea	n the Soviets, ssage, the	,
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start usin Goldsmith may call u	"I. We agree with you NEEDLEMAN. In connecting Girls. You have two is number one and Wool is to number one any day places for Girls."	tion with the places for (worth is num	ls we should / Hrls. Der two. You	
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not change	"4. Beginning from Se	ptember radio	timetable i	ン) S EEA
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NY 100-134637

In paragraph one above, the reference is to the use of the micro-transceiver, Goldsmith and Woolworth being the two stores on Nassau Street, NYC, in which the micro-transceiver is to be used.

"Sisters" in paragraph two refers to drops.

"Uncles" in paragraph three is a reference to personal rendezvous.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 8/27/65

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ransmit the following in	i I
Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL	
(Priority),	} -
TO : DIRECTÓR, FBI (100-428091)	03
FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)	A MA
IS - C	1 DOLLA
Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are three coeach and for the New York Office one copy each of the ing captioned informant's statements:	
1) "Brief Discussions, August 17, 1965, with William Kashtan, General Secretary, Communist Party of Canada, Toronto, Ontario"	-
2) "Discussions with Gus Hall, Lake Placid, New York, August 19-20, 1965"	·-
The information appearing in the enclosed in statements was furnished 8/22/65 by CG 5824-S*, who had nished reliable information in the past, to SA RICHARD	s fur-
As the Bureau is aware, upon instructions of General Secretary of the CP, USA, CG 5824-5* left Chic 8/16/65 to proceed to Lake Placid, NY, to spend severa with HALL to discuss matters generally relating to inn CP, USA affairs. Since mileage from Chicago to Lake P via the U.S. or Canadian routes was almost identical,	ago on 1 days er lacid source
decided that while en route he would travel via Toront order to attempt to conclude arrangements for NORMAN F to come to the U.S. for formal discussions on the join USA - CP of Canada project, the Marxist training school planned for this fall. WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secre CP of Canada, was to formalize these arrangements. As	REED t CP, tary,
3-Bureau (Enc.) 6) (RM) 3- REC. 15 /00 42809/- 1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 2) (Info) (RM)	505/
1-Chicago RWH: MDW (5)	

Approved: Special Agent in Charge Sent M Per M

CG 134-46 Sub B

result, the source crossed the border at Detroit, Mich., and proceeded to Toronto, arriving there Tuesday a.m., 8/17/65. By prearrangement, he had a brief session of approximately 12 hours with KASHTAN that date and thereafter drove to upstate New York, crossing over at the One Thousand Island Bridge and staying overnight at Alexander Bay, NY.

BRIEF DISCUSSIONS, AUGUST 17, 1965, WITH WILLIAM KASHTAN, GENERAL SECRETARY, COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA, TORONTO, ONTARIO

During the afternoon of August 17, 1965, William Kashtan, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Canada (CPC), mot briefly for approximately one and one-half hours with a representative of the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA) who was then in Toronto. This meeting, a covert one, had been prearranged and was held in a restaurant located on Dufferin (phonetic) Street, Toronto, at a location away from the downtown area. The actual purpose of this meeting was to finalize arrangements with Kashtan tohave Norman Freed come to the United States for a meeting with Eyman Lumer, CP, USA Educational Director, to discuss the joint CP, USA - CPC project, the Marxist training school.

At the time of this meeting, Kashtan advised that Freed still had not returned to Toronto. While Freed was back in Canada and at Montreal, Canada, Kashtan had had no opportunity to talk to him. Kashtan indicated he was rather angry with Freed for "running around the world and ignoring people here." He agreed he would talk to Freed immediately upon that individual's arrival in Toronto and send him down to the United States. At the time, it was arranged that if Freed arrived and could travel before the forthcoming week end, he would proceed to New York and contact Lumer directly. If he could not travel by this time, Kashtan would instruct Freed to proceed to Chicago where Lumer was scheduled to be during the week of August 22, 1965.

The question of a possible meeting between Kashtan and Gus Hall on Lake Champlain was also discussed at this time. In connection with this, Kashtan stated that nothing more had been done by their side to check on this suggested meeting area. He remarked that Sam Walsh, who heads up the Toronto organization, had just gotten back from Cuba and has had no chance to go and look the area over or get details on the place suggested by Hall for this meeting. Kashtan advised that when this had been completed, he would advise the CP, USA representative of their opinions of the meeting place and conclusions on the feasibility of holding the suggested meeting.

Since these two individuals had met less than two weeks previously, Kashtan indicated he had very little new information on the international situation to report, particularly in view of the fact that he had not even talked to Norman Freed who would have the most recent information in this connection.

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He did state that he did feel that it was of significance to note that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had, when the two Party factions in Israel held their conventions, sent greetings only to Mikunis and not to the pro-Arab — nationalist faction of the Party there. Kashtan, in a way, felt that this rectified some of the CPSU's previous errors on this matter and also took some of the pressure off him because he, Kashtan, had originally been active with some other Party delegations in arranging for the two Party factions in Israel to postpone their scheduled conventions.

Kashtan also remarked at this time that the most recent wheat deal concluded by the USSR with Canada hit the Communist Party of Canada without warning. He remarked that this wheat order had caused them problems because "it is giving communism one heck of a reputation."

In discussing briefly the planned CP, USA - CPC joint project, the Marxist-Leninist training school, the CP, USA representative informed Kashtan that Hyman Lumer was more dissatisfied with the letter Tim Euck had sent down pertaining to it than he was with the original outline on the school sent down to him by Kashtan. Kashtan then noted that because of Freed's failure to arrive, the two Parties had better go on the basis that there must be at least a two-week postponement of this school. When they do finally get together for discussions, they could then decide if some additional postponement must be necessary or if it might even be necessary to cancel their plans. Kashtan asked if, in view of Freed's delay in arrival, whether it would be of value to send someone else down for preliminary discussions on this matter. He suggested who will be one of the school's instructors. would be available for such discussions. Kashtan was told, however, that the CP, USA felt that if there were to be talks to settle points of differences, either Kashtan, Freed must participate.

lb 6

Subsequent to the above meeting, it was learned that by prearrangement, the CP, USA representative, during the late p.m. of August 20, 1965, contacted Kashtan by telephone in Toronto. At this time, Kashtan advised that the "friend" still had not arrived in Toronto and, therefore, the New York meeting would be out. However, the "friend" would be instructed to proceed to Chicago and be there no later than August 24 or 25, 1965.

At the same time, the CP, USA representative advised Kashtan that the "fishing trip" which had been discussed should be held in abeyance. By this, it was meant that the planned meeting of Hall and Kashtan on the Lake Champlain international waters was temporarily delayed.

DISCUSSIONS WITH GUS HALL, LAKE PLACID, NEW YORK, AUGUST 19-20, 1965

On August 19 and 20, 1965, discussions were held with Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), at his summer cottage at Lake Placid, New York. In the course of these discussions, the following items relating to inner Party matters involving communications between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the CP, USA came up:

Hall was informed that a message had been received from the CPSU indicating that as of August 10, 1965, Carl Winter was still in Moscow and awaiting information on a possible invitation to Cuba. Upon hearing this, Hall suggested that a message be sent to Winter through the Russians advising Winter to proceed on his vacation and then return home.

At this same time, Hall was advised that the Russians had in response to Hall's request agreed to continue aid to Jessica Smith and the "New World Review." Upon getting this information, Hall remarked that he wanted to pass this on personally to Jessica and would figure out some method of getting the money to her. He wanted the Russians to know that he was appreciative of the fast reply on this matter.

Concerning the recent message received from the Russians dealing with Henry Winston and their desire to have Hall felt that this should not be raised at the moment with Winston. Hall stated there would be sufficient time to raise this with Winston once his honeymoon had ended and then the answer could be sent.

In regard to possible travel of his own family to the USSR this year, Hall noted that he is now positive that they will not go. He also remarked that now since nearly all of the scheduled "tourists" of the Party have traveled to the USSR that were scheduled for this year, the CPSU should be sent a "nice" letter in his name telling how we appreciated all that the CPSU had done for these people. bя

Said To Topon

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1942 EDITION GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27 Tolson UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Belmont Moht. DeLoach . Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE Casper. Conrad. Felt. TO : Mr. Conrad < DATE: August 31, 1965 Sullivan . Tavel. Trotter Tele. Room C. F. Downing Holmes SUBJECT INTERNAL SECURITY - C On 8/31/65, the New York Office furnished the text of a message the informant desired to send and requested that it be enciphered. The cipher text was furnished to New York on the same day. The plain text and cipher text are attached. ACTION: Enclosure *damMr. Belmont 1 - Mr. Conrad 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam) 1 - Mr. Downing 1 - Mr. Newpher 1 - Mr. Paddock REC- 15 100-428097-5060

65 SEP 8 1965

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> 100-428091-5060 ENCLOSURF

ROTTE IN ENVELOPE

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CG 134-46 Sub B

In order to provide additional security to the source, the enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown as having been made at Washington, D. C.



In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C.

August 26, 1965

TOP SECRET

PROBLEMS RELATING TO LEADERSHIP WITHIN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, during late August, 1965, advised as follows:

Norman Freed, Communist Party of Canada (CPC) representative to the "World Marxist Review," the official theoretical organ of the international communist movement located at Prague, Czechoslovakia, recently returned to Canada for reassignment by his Party. During Freed's tenure abroad, which covered a period in excess of three years, he established close contacts with some leading representatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Just prior to his return to Canada, Freed held a number of "off-the-record talks" with CPSU people, including Eugene Frantzov, the Editor-in-Chief of the "World Marxist Review," and a member of the Central Committee, CPSU. Based on such talks, Freed reported the following:

The problem of leadership in the CPSU is still unsettled and Leonid I. Brezhnev, First Secretary, CPSU, is not apparently the leading contender for control of the Party at this time. The general feeling in regard to Brezhnev is that he is neither strong enough nor theoretically capable enough for his present position.

Surprisingly, the most popular contender for the leadership of the CPSU is the youngest man on the Secretariat and the former head of the Secret Police, Alexandr N. Shelepin. At this time, he is the most popular member of the Secretariat and "everyone is praising him to the sky and talking about him."

TOP SECRET N. Korea

Group excluded from automatic downgrazing and

declassification

ENCLOSURE

PROBLEMS RELATING TO LEADERSHIP WITHIN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

TOP SECRET

Now, he has another "feather in his cap," that mission to North Korea where he is ostensibly being given credit for winning over the Korean Party of Labor. At least, this is what those members of the CPSU who are in a position to and should know are saying.

However, it would be foolhardy to hazard a guess at this time and say that Shelepin, though he may now be the most popular person, is insured of the leadership of the Party. Undoubtedly the postponement of the XXIII Congress of the CPSU until early 1966 has some bearing on this leadership question and indicates that it is still unsettled.

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TOP SECRET

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

ROUTE IN ENTROPE

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CONTACT OF NORMAN FREED IN PRAGUE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, BY CHINESE EMBASSY REPRESENTATIVES, AUGUST, 1965

Norman Freed, on August 24, 1965, remarked that during the middle of August, 1965, on the day he was preparing to leave Prague, Czechoslovakia, to return to Canada, after having spent approximately three years on the "World Marxist Review" staff, he had been contacted at his apartment by two representatives of the People's Republic of China Embassy in Prague. Freed noted that these individuals had called him before they had come to see him and had asked to be permitted to say their good-byes. Freed was amazed and surprised by this request and their subsequent visit because since the ideological split between the Russians and the Chinese, the Chinese had ignored him completely. He attempted to find out how the Chinese became aware of the fact that he was returning to Canada and finally came to the conclusion that the Indonesian representative to the "World Marxist Review" in Prague, who lived in an apartment across from his, must have so informed the Chinese. While he had had little contact with this Indonesian in recent months because of his limited association with the "World Marxist Review" and support of the Chinese, he had gone to this Indonesian to say good-bye because he had traveled with that person to Indonesia and during that visit had been treated well by the Indonesian Party.

Freed then went on to note that when the two Chinese representatives did contact him, they brought with them a number of documents. One of these documents was a letter in Russian from the Central Committee, CP of the Soviet Union, to the Central Committee, CP of China; another was the CP of China response to the Central Committee, CP of the Soviet Union; and the others were English translations of the foregoing documents. He stated that in connection with the Chinese reply to the CP of the Soviet Union letter, that he had never seen such a "dirty, filthy document."

Freed also advised that before the Chinese left him, they told him that they knew the CP of Canada had close ties with the CP, USA and they requested that he deliver a copy of their letter to the American Party. Freed agreed

140-4211-5062

to do this for them. Freed, however, noted that he did not dare carry this letter with him on his present trip to Chicago but would immediately upon his return to Toronto send down the Chinese letter to the CP, USA.

Freed also stated that he had learned that there has been a change recently in the tactics of the CP of China. The Chinese are now attempting to reestablish their contacts with all CPs. This apparently was one reason for their desire to say good-bye to him.

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ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 8/25/65	
Transmit the following in(Type in plain text or code)	
Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL (Priority or Method of Mailing)	
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TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)	Sulle
FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B) SOLO IS - C	A Sur
Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the origin and three copies each and for the New York Office one coreach of the following captioned letterhead memoranda:	
1) "Stanley Ryerson, Member, National Executive Committee, Communist Party of Canada"	M
"Alfred Dewhurst, New Communist Party of Canada Representative to the 'World Marxist Review,' Prague, Czechoslovakia"	
State 3) "'World Marxist Review'"	
"Symposium, October 10, 1965, Prague, Czechoslovakia, on the Occasion of the Anniversary of the Founding of the Comintern"	1
The information set forth in the enclosed letter memoranda was furnished on 8/24/65 by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SA RICHARI HANSEN.	5
The information set forth in the enclosed letter memoranda was developed by CG 5824-S* during the course of private discussions held with NORMAN FREED, CP of Canada sentative, during his visit in Chicago, 8/24/65, 9/- 5/3 Result 4 CM. Hund belong BEC 47	f some
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc., 4) (Info) (RM) 6 SEP 6 1965	:
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CG 134-46 Sub B

The enclosed letterhead memoranda have been classified "CONFIDENTIAL," "SECRET," and "TOP-SECRET" since they contain information furnished by CG 5824-S*, a very highly placed source furnishing information on the highest level concerning the international communist movement. Unauthorized disclosure of the information contained therein would, by its nature, tend to identify CG 5824-S* as the source, thereby jeopardizing the security of this source and thus adversely affecting the national interest.

In order to provide additional security to the source, the enclosed letterhead memoranda have been shown as having been made at Washington, D. C.



In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C.

August 25, 1965

COMPTOENTIAL

STANLEY RYERSON, MEMBER, NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, during late August, 1965, advised as follows:

On August 24, 1965, Stanley Ryerson, a member of the National Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Canada (CPC), was scheduled to depart Canada for Vienna, Austria, where he would attend an International Conference of Historians. It was also indicated that Ryerson, after the conclusion of the above-noted Conference, might travel to some of the socialist countries.

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ENCLOSURE 100-428091-5064



"In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C.

August 25, 1965

ALFRED DEWHURST, NEW COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA REPRESENTATIVE TO THE "WORLD MARXIST REVIEW," PRAGUE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, during late August, 1965, advised as follows:

Alfred Dewhurst, current member of the National Executive Committee, Communist Party of Canada (CPC) and their Labor Secretary and Acting Educational Director, is presently the individual who has been selected to replace Norman Freed as CPC representative to the "World Marxist Review," official theoretical organ of the international communist movement, Prague, Czechoslovakia. Freed returned to Canada from Prague during mid-August, 1965, and is not returning to his former position. Freed reportedly will take over ideological and educational work for the CPC.

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ENCLOSURE

~ 100-428091-5064



In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C.

August 25, 1965



"WORLD MARXIST REVIEW"

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, during late August, 1965, advised as follows:

According to an individual who has been closely associated with the "World Marxist Review," official theoretical organ of the international communist movement headquartered in Prague, Czechoslovakia, the current Editor-in-Chief of the journal, Eugene Frantzov, is not well liked by other staff members. He is considered arrogant and his arrogance outweighs his ideological ability.

It was also reported that Alexander Sobolev, current Executive_Editor_of_the_"World_Marxist_Review," will probably be relieved of his position and reassigned to work with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the Soviet Union following the forthcoming meeting of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

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ENOLOSURE 3 100-428091-5064



In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C.

August 25, 1965

Pop secret

SYMPOSIUM, OCTOBER 20, 1965, PRAGUE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, ON THE OCCASION OF THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE COMINTERN

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows during late August, 1965:

On October 10, 1965, an international symposium is scheduled to open in Prague, Czechoslovakia, in celebration of the occasion of the founding of the Comintern. Ostensibly, this symposium is being held under the sponsorship of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the "World Marxist Review," official theoretical organ of the international communist movement.

Reportedly this symposium is but a guise for the holding of an international meeting which will enable world Communist and Workers Parties to gather outside of Moscow to discuss problems. By such a meeting, other Communist Parties will be able to talk things over and assume some responsibility regarding problems dealing with the international communist movement which will partially remove some of the pressures from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to take all of the initiative in this present situation.

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TOP SECRET

Group 1
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ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

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1) "GCCPSU

"We sent this to you knowing it will be of interest to you.

"You will recall that this ISADORE ZIFERSTEIN visited your country and spent some time studying there. Some of your psychiatrists, as well as you, may be interested in what he says, both positive and negative.

"M. CHILDS"

("Medical Tribune" article, dated 1/9-10/65 and 18-page report are enclosed herewith.)

2) "PLEASE NOTE

"As a precaution perhaps it would be best that we do not use NEEDLEMAN for the next period of time. If contact is lost with me and there is need to save valuable time then NEEDLEMAN may be used. However, from now on, please use the drops as described in the following pages:

"J. CHILDS

"NOTE: Drops MATHILDA, CAROL and DORIS will no longer be used."

3) "SISTER MEG:

"White Rose Bar located at 34th Street and 3rd Avenue, N.Y.C., S.W. Corner -- there are two entrances, one on 34th St. and the other on 3rd Ave. (166 East 34th St., N.Y.C.)

"Material will be placed underneath the Men's room washbasin on the left - repeat Left - side.

"SISTER MEG which is the next SISTER will be used only once (1) and then discontinued.

"After SISTER MEG has been used we shall start a new round of SISTERS as follows:

- 1. Sister Ann
- 2. "Beth
- 3. "Catherine
- 4. "Donna
- 5. " Eva
- 6. "Frances
- 7. "Greta

"These SISTERS shall be used also only once (1). Later more SISTERS will be supplied to you.

"See the following descriptions of the SISTERS:"

(There then followed seven photographs of the outside entrances of seven different bars located in Manhattan. The photographs bore the names and addresses of the bars and the times for pick-ups and acknowledgments by public phones.)

4) #cccesu

"GUS HALL asked that following message be conveyed:

"There is a big anti-Soviet campaign in the making on Jewish question with nationwide picketing and demonstrations in October. Since we heard from BILL KASHTAN that there are certain measures on way regarding cultural activities and publications in Soviet, which for time being are not being discussed openly, we would think that if there are firm ideas it would be most advisable to announce them early and publicly in order to take the wind out of the sails of the anti-Soviet campaign on this question.

"M. CHILDS"

5) "CCCPSU

"Communication regarding GUY OWENS received.
Comrade WINSTON and wife are presently out of city and will
be for another few weeks. While we are inclined to agree
with your suggestion we do desire to discuss this matter with
Comrades HALL and WINSTON. We feel however they will also
agree with your suggestion.

"M. CHILDS"

6) "To Central Committee, CPSU

"Dear Comrades

"In behalf of the CPUSA we want to convey to you our heartfelt thanks for the invitation and reception given to the numerous delegations and to the individual comrades who have been guests in your country. We also want to express our deep gratitude and solicitude for those comrades whose health has been looked after and for the medical attention and possibility of rest created for them while in the USSR. Our comrades have been deeply impressed by what they saw in the USSR. They were impressed not only by your advances on the road to Communism but also by the display everywhere on the part of your Party and your people of fraternalism and proletarian internationalism. Some of the comrades who have just returned, talk of a visit to the 'promised land.' We once again want to express our appreciation for making these visits possible. This last tyear, because of the visits on the part of so many comrades, has gone a long way in cementing the unity of the international movement and certainly brought our two Parties closer together.

"With warm fraternal greetings,
"GUS HALL - M. CHILDS"

7) "CCCPSU

"Thank you for the radio of August 24 indicating CARL WINTER's traveling schedule. Let me know of his return from Cuba and when en route toward return to U. S. so that we may watch out for his safe entry.

"GUS HALL - M. CHILDS"

8) "CCCPSU

Most Confidential

"Heard that ALEX TRACHTENBERG is sick and in hospital. If his sickness is serious or tends to become such, my opinion is that perhaps it would be best to offset any burdens on your part or any future adverse putlicity should anything serious happen to him while in Moscow. Therefore advisable he return to recuperate or be treated here. Please do not tell him this since it is a most sensitive matter.

"GUS HALL!"

9) "CCCPSU

"Circumstances at this moment make it impossible for Comrade HALL's family to take the trip to the USSR. However, he reiterates his thanks and is confident that they will be able to make this trip next time.

"M. CHILDS"

10) "CCCPSU

"HALL and other members of the National Executive Committee are now in Chicago participating in a number of national projects concerning the numerous problems confronting the working class and the people of our country. They are also preparing for a conference of Youth September 8 through 9.

"M. CHILDS"

11) "CCCPSU

"Please transmit for me the following to CC, CP Bulgaria and CC, CP Czechoslovakia, respectively. We previously requested of you at the time when HERB APTHEKER was Chairman representing CPUSA at Helsinki. Peace Conference that he travel to the above countries, both for vacation and to lecture on subjects which would be of interest to their CP's and interested institutions.

"Thank you for expediting these requests for me.

"Fraternally yours,

"GUS HALL"

12) "CC, CP Bulgaria

"I most respectfully request that HERB APTHEKER, a member of our National Committee, leading Marxist-Leninist in U. S. and our CP; scholar and author, noted historian on Negro history, in charge of American Marxist Institute in U.S., vacation and rest for a week or so under your auspices. Also you are at liberty to arrange for lectures he will give to any important body or institution during the period that he is there. He will arrive in Sofia from Amsterdam on KIM flight 283 on September 16 at 1725 hours your time. He will stay in Sofia and your country until September 24 when he will leave for Prague to give a series of important lectures to their National Committee.

"Fraternally yours,

"GUS HALL NC, CPUSA"

13) "CC, CP Czechoslovakia

"I most respectfully request that HERB APTHEKER, a member of our National Committee, leading Marxist-Leninist in U. S. and our CP, scholar and author, noted historian on Negro history, in charge of American Marxist Institute in U.S., vacation and rest for a week or so under your auspices. Also you are at liberty to arrange for lectures he will give to any important body or institution during the period that he is there. He will arrive in Prague via Czecholsovakia airlines from Sofia on flight 558 at 1435 hours on September 24 and remain until October 8.

"Thank you on behalf of myself and our National Committee.

"Fraternally yours,

"GUS HALL NC, CPUSA

14) "cccpsu

"We are worried about KNUTI SEITANIEMI, a delegate of our May 1st delegation. We have not heard from him in all these months and do not know of his whereabouts. Can you let me know where he is and to his state of health.

"GUS HALL"

15) "Add to Referee code the following:

"WILLIAM KASHTAN - Crow

"Delete from Referee code:

"LESLIE MORRIS"

16) "The following is a Pro-Chinese letter which is circulating the country---It is a chain letter which each person when receiving and reading it sends it on to another person."

(Xerox copy of letter dated 6/6/65 is enclosed.)

17) "The following may be of interest to you -- this was discussed with the responsible people in Nationalities Committee.

"M. CHILDS"

18) "You may be interested to know that we reprinted over 5000 copies of the "Nation's article on LOVESTONE and mailed them to all important Trade Union and Public Figures in the U. S."

(This refers to article entitled American Labor Abroad - Lovestone Diplomacy" by SIDNEY LENS appearing in the July 5, 1965, issue of "The Nation.")

19) "IMPORTANT

"PLEASE DO NOT USE DROPS OR NEEDLEMAN IN PERIOD OF AUGUST 28th (Saturday) to SEPTEMBER 14th (TUESDAY). USE ONLY RADIO DURING THAT PERIOD AND PERSONAL CONTACTS IF EXTREMELY IMPORTANT.

"J. BROOKS"

All of the above messages were partially coded and message #8 was ciphered as well as partially coded.

OFTIONAL FORM NO., 10 MAY) 1762' EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 5010-104 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memorandum

DATE: August 31, 1965 Felt -Rosen Sullivan _3 Tavel Trotter Tele. Room Holmes . Gandy

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Callahan Contad

'Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

TO

INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

1 - Belmont

1 - DeLoach

1 - Sullivan

1 - Branigan

1 - Baumgardner

1 - Liaison

1 - R: Putnam

In the evening of 8/24/65, CG 5824-S* was in contact with Norman Freed, former Communist Party of Canada representative to the "World Marxist Review," official theoretical organ of the world communist movement published in Prague, Czechoslovakia: Freed had just returned to Canada for reassignment after more than three years abroad in his former position during which time he developed close contact with leading members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Just prior to his return to Canada from Czechoslovakia, Freed held a number of off-the-record talks with his contacts in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Based on these talks, Freed advised our informanton of the following:

OUTE IN

The problem of leadership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is still unsettled and Leonid Brezhnev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, is not apparently, the leading contender for control of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at this time. The general feeling is that Brezhnev is neither strong enough nor theoretically capable for his present position.

The ; most popular contender for the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is Aleksandr N. Shelepin, the youngest member of the Secretariat and former head of the Secret Police. At this time he is the most popular member of the Secretariat and "everyone is praising him to the sky and talking about him." As a result of a mission to North Korea, heais being given credit for developing the Korean Party of Labor's understanding of the Soviet viewpoint in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

However, it would be foolhardy to hazard a guess at this time and say that Shelepin will become the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union because of his present standing. The postponement of the Twenty-third Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union until early 1966 indicates that the leadership question is still unsettled.

100-428091 Enclosures

CONTINUED--OVER

Z-165

RCP:pah

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan Re: SOLO 100-428091

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached summary be sent to Honorable Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to the President; Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Attorney General by routing slips incorporating the information obtained by CG 5824-S*.

S of Wed

O TOP-SECRET

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

I - Belmont 1 - DeLoach

September 1, 1965

Solo

1 - Sullivan 1 - Branigan

LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF THE SOVIET UNION

1 - Baumgardner

1 - Liaison 1 - R. Putnam

A source which has furnished reliable information in the past has advised that an individual prominent in the international communist movement, who has established close contact with some leading members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union over a number of years, recently learned the following during off-the-record talks with some of his contacts:

The problem of leadership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is still unsettled and Leonid Brezhnev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, is not, apparently, the leading contender for control of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at this time. The general feeling is that Brezhnev is neither strong enough nor theoretically capable for his present position.

The most popular contender for the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is Aleksandr N. Shelepin, the youngest member of the Secretariat and former head of the Secret Police. At this time he is the most popular member of the Secretariat and "everyone is praising him to the skyland of talking about him." As a result of a mission to North Korea, he is being given credit for developing the Korean Party of Labor's understanding of the Soviet viewpoint in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

REC-65 100 - 40 8 9 9 8

However, it would be foolhardy to hazard a guess at this time and say that Shelepin will become the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union because of his present standing. The postponement of the Twenty-third Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union until early 1966 indicates that the leadership question is still unsettled.

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DeLoach furnished the above information, this communication	on is
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TOP SECRET

LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

NOTE:

Classified "Tep Secret" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation.

See memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan 8/31/65, captioned "Solo, Internal Security - Communist," prepared by RCP:pah.

Dissemination of this memorandum being made by routing slips to Honorable Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to the President; the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Attorney General. Information extracted from CGairtel 8/26/65, captioned "Solo, IS - C."

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA FPMR (41 CF2) 101-11,6 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

 $Memorandum^{\cdot}$

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE:

9/1/65

FROM

AC, NEW YORK (100-134637A)

SUBJECT:

ReNYlet, 8/4/65.

The records of the NYO reflect the following transactions regarding Solo Funds during the month August, 1965:

Credits

8/1/65 on Hand 8/26/65 Received

\$796,533.78 300,000.00 \$1,096,533.78

Debits

8/2/65 To LENA SCHERER for CP, USA National Office Expenses (\$1,000.00); for Youth Project (\$10.000.00); (\$5,000.00) \$16,000.00

lb6 b7C

8/23/65 To LENA SCHERER for CP, USA National Office Expenses

\$40,000.00

8/25/65 To JESSICA SMITH, "New World Review" (Loan)

\$4,000.00 60,000.00 Balance \$1,036,533.78

1-813 RB

2) - Bureau (RM) 1 - Chicago (134-46-Sub B)(RM) 1 - New York (134-91)(INV)(41) 1 - New York (100-128861-Sub B)(CP, USA, RESERVE FUNDS)(42)

1 - New York (41)

REC- 65 100- 428091- 5068

JDO: rmp (6)

EX-1177

6 SEP 8 1965



 $14\,$ k966.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVEY OPE

TO

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 8/31/65

R Phan (look)

FROM

SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT:

SOLO C

ReNYairtel dated August 27, 1965.

Reairtel sets forth the content of a letter transmitted by WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary, Communist Party of Canada (CPC), to GUS HALL, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), through a mail drop maintained by NY 694-S* in New York City. This letter indicated plans were being made to hold a Latin American Solidarity Conference during mid-November, 1965, and that effective CP, USA participation in this conference was desired. It noted that this conference would take place sometime after the 13th Congress of the CP of Chile scheduled for Santiago, Chile, October 11-19, 1965.

CG 5824-S* on August 31, 1965, advised SA RICHARD W. HANSEN that the question of CP, USA participation with a fraternal delegation to the CP of Chile Congress, October, 1965, had been raised with GUS HALL on August 25, 1965. At this time HALL advised that he had been looking into the matter of expenses and time involved in sending a delegation to this Chilean Congress and stated he had doubts that the CP, USA would send anyone. According to HALL, it would cost the Party more to send someone to Chile to participate in this Congress than it would to send someone to the Soviet Union. His chief concern at this time seemed to be the costs involved and also the fact that there would be no reimbursement of expenses for individuals who would attend.

The above is being furnished for the information of the Bureau and New York.

A 3RB

(2)Bureau (RM)

1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)

1-Chicago

RWH: MDW

(4)

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65 SEP 14 1965

	OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN, REG, NO. 27	O 5010-104	0)	Tolson
	Memora		TE IN ENV	ELOPE	Belmont Mohr DeLoach Casper Callchan Conrad
то :	Mr. Conrad		DATE: Septem	ber 3, 1965	Felt
FROM F	C. F. Downing			Pol	Tele. Room
SUBJECT.	SOLO INTERNAL SE		N	bur Bla	f Dann
	Captinformant NY to him by radio	694-S* who has bee	s the Bureau's highly n receiving commun	y valuable confi ications transm	dential nitted
	On S station at Midl	0/3/65, transmission and at which time a	ons were heard by the message, NR 698 (ne Bureau's rad GR 137, was inf	lio tercepted.
	The	plain text and ciph	er text are attached.	,	
	The	New York Office is	aware of the conte	nts.	
	ACTION:				
	Enclosure W		·		»»
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NR 0698 GR 137

09/03/65

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ENCLOSURE 100-428091- 50 70

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

1emorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

	TO 1
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	FROM
100	Subject

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 9/2/65

SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub F)

5. Robon

ReBulet dated May 4, 1960, and CGlet dated August 3, 1965.

ReBulet instructed Chicago to set forth a monthly accounting of all receipts and disbursements of Solo and CP, USA Reserve Funds in the possession of CG 5824-S*. Set forth below is such an accounting:

Balance of funds in possession of CG 5824-S* as of July 31, 1965

Solo

Maintained in cash in safe deposit box, Mid-America National Bank, Chicago, Illinois......

.......\$32,000.00

Maintained in cash in safe deposit box, Michigan Avenue National Bank, Chicago, Illinois.....

2,762.89

Total

\$34,762.89

CP, USA Reserve Funds

None.

REC-68 100-428091-5071

SEP 9 1965

Additions

Solo

None.

CP, USA Reserve Funds

None.

SEP 7 11 25 M. V.

-New York (RM)

(1 - 100-134637)(SOLO) ER 1 4 1965128861)(CP, USA - Reserve Funds) 1-Chicago RWH: MDW (5)

(2)Bureau (RM)

CG 134-46 Sub F

Disbursements
Solo
On 8/25/65 to GUS HALL, General Secretary, CP, USA, for youth activities\$2,000.00
On 8/25/65 as reimbursement for out-of-pocket payment for following:
On 7/22-23/65 for hotel, transportation, meals, entertainment, and personal items of clothing for ELIZABETH HALL\$45.75
On 8/1-3/65 for entertainment, meals, and similar expenses incurred on behalf of GUS HALL, HELEN WINTER, HENRY WINSTON, etc., New York City
On 8/5/65 for liquor and miscellaneous gifts presented to TIM BUCK, Chairman Emeritus, CP of Canada, at time of departure for abroad as token from CP, USA
On 8/5/65 for liquor, cigarettes, meals, etc., for WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary, CP of Canada
On 8/18/65 as outlay for clothing including sports coat, pants, and miscellaneous wearing apparel items purchased for GUS HALL, Lake Placid, New York
On 8/18/65 for liquor, gifts, and miscellaneous items provided to GUS HALL

b6 b7C

On 8/24/65 paperback books purchased for and provided to NORMAN FREED, CP of Canada representative......

Lake Placid, New York....

and family at summer camp, Lake Placid,

On 8/18-19/65 for dinners, drinks, tips, and other charges for GUS HALL. wife ELIZABETH.

8.00

CG 134-46 Sub F

On 8/24/65 for purchase price of suit for NORMAN FREED.) <u>-</u>
On 8/24/65 for hotel, long distance tele- phone calls, service charges, tips, etc., for NORMAN FREED	 •
On 8/24/65 for meals, drinks, tips, etc., for NORMAN FREED and HYMAN LUMER, CP, USA Educational Director	·
On 8/25/65 for purchase of two cartons of cigarettes given to NORMAN FREED 5.50	- · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
On 8/25/65 as miscellaneous expenses in connection with travel of NORMAN FREED, CP of Canada representative	
On 8/25/65 for meals, drinks, tips, etc for GUS HALL, HYMAN LUMER, CP, USA and MAX WEINSTEIN in Chicago	<u>)</u>
	\$ 481.50
On 8/26/65 for hotel and conference room utilized by GUS HALL, Chicago, plus long distance telephone calls to New York, Los Angeles, etc., tips, service charges and like	54.00
On 8/26-27/65 cost of transportation by personally-owned automobile of GUS HALL to Cleveland, Ohio, rental of two motel rooms, meals, long distance telephone calls and other personal expenses of GUS HALL	128.50
On 8/31/65 for shoes purchased in behalf of GUS HALL	34.92
On 8/31/65 to CLAUDE LIGHTFOOT, leading functionary CP of Illinois, for use in connection with expenses of placing Indiana farm in condition for use in national CP youth meeting	
Total	\$2,898.92

CG 134-46 Sub F

Balance of funds in possession of CG 5824-S* as of August 31, 1965

Solo

Maintained in cash in safe deposit box, Mid-America National Bank, Chicago, Illinois......\$29,101.08

Total \$31,863.97

CP, USA Reserve Funds

None.

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ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

1 - Mr. R. Putnam

September 7, 1965

LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

A source which has furnished reliable information in the past has advised that an individual prominent in the international communist movement, who has established close contact with some leading members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union over a number of years, recently learned the following during off-the-record talks with some of his contacts:

The problem of leadership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is still unsettled and Leonid Brezhnev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, is not, apparently, the leading contender for control of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at this time. The general feeling is that Brezhnev is neither strong enough nor theoretically capable for his present position.

The most popular contender for the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is Aleksandr N. Shelepin, the youngest member of the Secretariat and former head of the Secret Police. At this time he is the most popular member of the Secretariat and "everyone is praising him to the sky and talking about him." As a result of a mission to North Korea, he is being given credit for developing the Korean Party of Labor's understanding of the Soviet viewpoint in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

However, it would be foolhardy to hazard a guess at this time and say that Shelepin will become the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union because of his present standing. The postponement of the Twenty-third Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union until early 1966 indicates that the leadership question is still unsettled.

Belmont Turnished the above information	sensitive nature of rmation, this communication.	the source which ication is classified
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Rosen — RCP: pah Sullivon — (6) Totel — (6) Tele. Room — Holmes — —	GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and	(SEE NOTE PAGE TWO)
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TOP SECRET

LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

NOTE:

Classified "Top Secret" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. See memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan 8/31/65, captioned "Solo, Internal Security - Communist," prepared by RCP:pah. Dissemination of this memorandum has been made to Honorable Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to the President; Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Attorney General. CG 5824-S* received this information from Norman Freed, former Communist Party of Canada representative to the "World Marxist Review," official theoretical organ of the world communist movement. Freed just returned to Canada for reassignment after three years abroad in this position during which time he developed close contact with leading members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Just prior to his return to Canada Freed had a number of off-the-record talks with his contacts in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the information furnished our source was based on these off-the-record talks.

DATE 03-05-2012

CONFIDENTIAL



(IS) 100-428091

BY LIAISON

Date:

September 8, 1965

(5010

1 - Liaison1 - Broyles

To:

Director

Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Department of State

From:

John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: COMMUNIST PARTY OF ISRAEL

4-9-6 worth

Enclosed are copies of two press releases dated August 11, 1965, and August 16, 1965, issued by the Communist Party of Israel. These documents were furnished by a source which has supplied reliable information in the past.

Enclosures (2)

1 - Director BY LIAISON (Enclosures - 2) Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

b6 b7C

NOTE:

Classified "Confidential since the manner in which these documents were received could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could have an adverse effect upon the national defense. Source obtained the documents on a temporary basis from Jack Kling, CP of Illinois functionary, on 8/29/65. Source is unaware from whom Kling obtained the documents. These documents relate to the activities of the nationalist pro-Arab faction, CP of Israel, including some of their officers and National Committee members.

including some of their officers and National Committee members Tolson . REC- 26 Belmont. RECID - SHELIYAN Mohr -HLB:pah Dell.oach Casper, 19 Conrad Felt Gale GROÜP: 1 Sullivan Excluded from automatic Tavel and downgrace TELETYPE UNIT

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 1010-104 MAY 1562 EDITION _ GSA GEN, REG, NO. 27 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DUTE IN E DATE:

September 3, 1965

: Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT

TO

INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

1 -	Belmont
7	13-Y

- DeLoach - Sullivan

1 - Baumgardner

l - Liaison

1 - R. Putnam

Callahar Conrad Felt Gale. Sullivon Tavel Trotter Holmes Gandy

On 8/25/65 CG 5824-S* was in contact with Norman Freed. former Communist Party of Canada representative of the "World Marxist Review," official theoretical organ of the world-communist movement published in Prague, Czechoslovakia: Freed had just returned to Canada for reassignment after more than three years abroad in his former position during which time he developed many contacts among the leaders of communist parties in the various socialist countries: Prior to his departure for home Freed met with individual representatives of various communist parties and, based on the discussions held with these individuals, Freed furnished the following observations to our source:

The majority of individuals with whom thereedige held discussions during his tour expressed the opinion that the Soviet Union-was wrong and foolish in regard to its attitude and lack of aggressiveness in connection with the existing ideological differences in the Sino-Soviet dispute. It appears that some of the communist parties are concerned that the Soviet Union has become the "captive" of the Communist Party of China to such an extent that the Chinese can "call the shots," which, they fear, may involve these countries in wars or fights.

Representatives of Cuba, in particular, were expressing distrust of the Soviets and had the feeling that the Soviets may not carry out commitments to Cuba if something goes wrong. Representatives of Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and others indicated similar concerns It appears that the communist parties of these countries would like to see the Soviets adopt a stronger attitude, first toward the Communist Party of Chinagand then somewhat more toward the United States.

While most of the individuals did not believe the slanders of the Communist Party of China that there is some secret agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, some, including the Vietnamese and the Cubans, are worried that such a possibility may become a reality. 1000-428091-

100-428091

>-SCONTINUED-60VER 10 1965 Enclosures 22

65 SEP 14 1965

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan Re: SOLO 100-428091

It is the unanimous opinion of the communist parties in Europe that they do not want the Soviets to become involved in a two-front war or involved in Vietnam to such an extent that the Soviets cannot carry out commitments to help them. This feeling is particularly strong in the German Democratic Republic and in Czechoslovakia.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached summary be sent to Honorable Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to the President; Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Attorney General by routing slips incorporating the information obtained by CG 5824-S*.

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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE DATE 02-28-2012

TOP SHORET

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ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

1 - Belmont 1 - DeLoach

1 - Sullivan

(0,0)

September 7, 1965

1 - Baumgardner

1 - Liaison1 - R. Putnam

ATTITUDES OF VARIOUS COMMUNIST PARTIES
TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

A source which has furnished reliable information in the past has advised that an individual prominent in the international communist movement who has just returned home from an extended tour abroad recently made the following observations based on personal contact with leaders and representatives of communist parties in various countries.

The majority of individuals with whom discussions were held during the tour expressed the opinion that the Soviet Union was wrong and foolish in regard to its attitude and lack of aggressiveness in connection with the existing ideological differences in the Sino-Soviet dispute. It appears that some of the communist parties are concerned that the Soviet Union has become the "captive" of the Communist Party of China to such an extent that the Chinese can "dall the shots," which, they fear may involve these countries in wars or fights.

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ATTITUDES OF VARIOUS COMMUNIST PARTIES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

It is the unanimous opinion of the communist parties in Europe that they do not want the Soviets to become involved in a two-front war or involved in Vietnam to such an extent that the Soviets cannot carry out commitments to help them. This feeling is particularly strong in the German Democratic Republic and in Czechoślovakia.

Because of the sensitive nature of the source which furnisheds the above information, this communication is classified "Tox Sevet."

NOTE:

Classified "Top Secret" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. See memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan 9/3/65, captioned "Solo, Internal Security - Communist," prepared by RCP:pah. Dissemination of this memorandum being made by routing slips to Honorable Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to the President; Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Attorney General. Information extracted from CGairtel 9/1/65, captioned "Solo, IS - C."

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY-1942 EDITION GSA GEN, REG, NO. 27 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memorandum ROUTE IN EN Contad Felt Gale TO. DATE: September 3, 1965 Mr. W. C. Sullivan Tav ele. Roor J. A. Sizoo FROM Holmes SUBJECT: INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST In accordance with the Director's instruction, I called on Secretary of State Dean Rusk at 9:30 a.m. this morning in connection with the Bureau's memorandum dated 9/1/65 captioned, "Leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," in which we reported information received through our confidential sources that statements had been made by members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) that Leonid Breshnev, First Secretary of the CPSU, is not the leading contender for control of the CPSU, but that Aleksandr Shelepin was the most popular contender for such leadership. Secretary Rusk advised that he received our memorandum yesterday afternoon, but earlier that day had received a confidential report from our Embassy in Moscow concerning possible changes in the hierarchy of the CPSU; that his report was generally consistent with ours, especially as to the assumption regarding possible additional responsibility for Shelepin. He also commented that when Russian Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoliy F. Dobrynin left this country, he commented to Secretary Rusk, "Keep your eyes on Shelepin." Secretary Rusk said that on receiving our report, his interest was aroused and stated that without our naming names it would be helpful to him if additional information concerning the reliability of our source of this material could be made available. I advised Mr. Rusk that the Bureau's source, which had consistently furnished reliable information in the past, had made available the substance of a confidential report of a trusted Western CP functionary who had just returned from three years behind the Iron Curtain where he served as a representative on the "World Marxist Review; the official theoretical organ of the international CP, and had worked and become well acquainted with many members of This Western functionary, in submitting a private and 30 confidential report to top leadership of the CP, USA, advised that prior to his departure he had thad a number of off-the record 3 REG-15 100-428091- 5077 JAS:mls (5) 1-Mr. Belmont 1-Mr. Sullivan 1-Mr. Baumgardner 6 SEP 10, 1965 1-Mr. R. C. Putnam. CONTINUED - OVER 65 SEP 14 1965

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan RE: SOLO IS-C

discussions with CPSU people, including Eugene Frantzov, Editor-in-Chief of the "World Marxist Review" and a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and that his report was based on these discussions. This Western functionary said that the information in this report comes from individuals who are in a position to and should know what they are saying. I advised Mr. Rusk that we were not in a position at this time to add to or elaborate on the substance of the report itself, but we would certainly make available to him any additional information which we received.

Mr. Rusk expressed appreciation for this information and said it would be most helpful to him in evaluating the reliability of the reports which were being received concerning possible changes in the Soviet hierarchy. He further stated that it looks like Shelepin is a man we will have to reckon with in the future. Mr. Rusk asked that his appreciation be expressed to the Director for having someone come over on this matter and that the additional information was exactly what he was looking for.

ACTION:

For information.

ROUTE IN ENVILOPE

		<i>y</i> ₁ <i>y</i> ₁ <i>y y</i>		
Trai	nsmit the following i	in(Type in plain text or code)		
yiếr J	AIRTEL	REGISTERED (Priority or Method of Mailing)		
	TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637) SOLO IS-C	(3)	
	FROM :	SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)	par (le	村)
r a	subject: (IS-C 5-11.	hundren	- } .
-		On 9/3/65, there were received from the Soviets o two ciphered-partially coded messages, the plai which are as follows:	in NOW	
	1. "To Gus H	Hall, Morris Childs:	1000	
,	Youth Fed is negoti	"This is a message from (Bufile 91); question on DuBois Clubs entering Internation deration is considered seriously. I above the seriously above to be of the clubs.)	(). M)b6 b70
	2. "To (Gus Hall:		*********** *************************
	USSR. I	"USSR Central Committee invites additionally this year 20 leading and active CPUSA members to it is desirable to arrange their visit by groups we are able to propose one programme.		
į	experienc successfu CP Delega	"To a group ('To a' probably should read 'the' need with Youth Communist Party Delegation was vertul. Please inform us when we should expect Women gation." REC-15 100-42809/-	ry n	-
,!		Information contained in the above messages will minated to pertinent offices.	11	
,	BURE 1 - CHIC 1 - NY 1	CAU (100-428091) (RM) CAGO (134-46-Sub B) (AM-RMX-113 6 SEP 10 1985		
	1 - NY 10 1 - NY 10	105-14931-Sub C (NIKOLAI M. TALANOV) (341)	⇒ .	
	ACB:rvs , (8) Approved:	Sent M Per		
E		special Agent in Charge	÷	

OPTIONAL FORM NOT 10 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN, REQ, NO. 27 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT lemorandum DATE: September 7, 1965 TO Mr. W. C. Sullivan 1 - Belmont Trotter PŔOM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner Tele, Room 1 - Sullivan -1 - Baumgardner 1 - R. Putnam SUBJECT: INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST Mymemorandum of 8/6/65 set forth in detail receipts and disbursements of funds from the Soviet Union and Red China by the Communist Party, USA, during July, 1965. The following schedule shows the present status of these funds, together with receipts and disbursements during August, 1965. SUMMARY: Total received from the Soviet Union 9/58 to 8/31/65.....\$3,207,463.00 Total received from Red China 2/60 to 8/31/65.....____ Balance of Fund 8/31/65......\$15068,397.75* * \$1,036,533.78 maintained by NY 694-S* in New York City. 31,863.97 maintained by CG 5824-S* in Chicago. DETAILS: Total received from Red China 2/60 to 7/31/65..... 50,000.00 Balance of Fund 7/31/65.....\$ 831,296,67 Receipts during August, 1965..... 300.000.00** ** \$300,000 received by NY 694-S* in New York City on 8/24/65 from Nikolai Talanov, Soviet Mission to the United Nations. DISBURSEMENTS DURING AUGUST, 1965: 8/2/65 - To Lena Scherer for expenses of Party's national office (1.000): for Youth Project (\$10,000); for 16,000:00 b7C (\$5,000).........\$ ONTINUED OVER 6 SEP 13 1965 100-428091. RCP:pah

65 SEP 14 19

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan Re: SOLO 100-428091

8/23/65 - To Lena Scherer for expenses of Party's national office\$	40,000.00
8/25/65 - To Jessicas Smith as loan to publish "New World Review"	4,000.00
8/25/65 - To Gus Hall for Party youth work	2,000.00
8/25/65 - To reimburse CG 5824-S* for expenses in treating Gus Hall and family, gifts to Communist Party of Canada leaders, etc	481.50
8/26, 27, 31/65 - For personal expenses of Gus Hall (including shoes at \$34.92)	217.42
8/31/65 - To Claude Lightfoot to prepare farm for national Party youth meeting	200.00
TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS FOR AUGUST, 1965\$	62,898.92
BALANCE OF FUND - AUGUST,31, 1965\$1	,068,397.75

ACTION:

None. This memorandum is submitted for your information. An up-to-date accounting of Solo funds will be brought to your attention each month. Details of the accounting of these funds are not to be disseminated.

D

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FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)	0	•	0	:
	F	B 1 Date: 9/1/65	ا ا لام رو رو	L.
Transmit the following in	(Type ii REGISTERED	ROUTE I	N EN V	LOPE
FROM: SAC SOLO IS - C copies an mant's st Received Canada Re	Enclosed herewith d for the New York atement captioned, from Norman Freed, presentative Assig	28091) 6 Sub B) 6 Sub B) 7 Office one co 7 Wiscellaneou 7 Former Communication the 'Wo	u are three py of an inf s Informatio ist Party of	on T
informant by CG 582 in the pa /-४13 RR	The information a 's statement was f 4-S*, who has furn st, to SA RICHARD (Enc. 13) (RM) k (100-134637) (Enc.	ppearing in the urnished on 8/ ished reliable W. HANSEN.	27 and 30/65 information	-508.0
ec For South Approved: 65 SEP 14 196	Anghi in Charge	ent	.M Per	1

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM NORMAN FREED. FORMER COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA REPRESENTATIVE ASSIGNED TO THE "WORLD MARXIST REVIEW," PRAGUE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Norman Freed, Communist Party of Canada (CPC) representative who served approximately three years on the staff of the "World Marxist Review," official theoretical organ of the international communist movement, headquartered in Prague, Czechoslovakia, recently returned to Canada. In discussions held on August 24, 1965, Freed provided the following miscellaneous information:

The American issue of the "World Marxist Review," the one scheduled to be devoted to articles prepared by Communist Party, USA (CP, USA) authors, will probably not appear in September, 1965, as scheduled, but rather in October, 1965.

Before leaving the "World Marxist Review" and returning to Canada, Freed, together with Ib. Noerlund of the National Committee of the CP of Denmark, attended as representatives of the "World Marxist Review" an international symposium sponsored by the Gromchi (phonetic) Institute, Rome.

While in Italy, Freed was in contact with Juliano Pajetta, a member of the Central Committee, CP of Italy, and another leading Party person named Mendella (phonetic). Freedcarried on discussions with the foregoing individuals and was the guest of the CP of Italy. The CP of Italy provided him with hotel rooms, food, and all other necessities. He stated that the Italian CP was making a practice of doing this for leading representatives of other CPs and are at this time attempting to set up their own International Department, one patterned after but independent of the Russians.

100-428071-5080

SEP 101965
SEP 101965
COMMEDIA

TELETYPE UNIT

Belmont. Moht ____

DeLoach
Casper __
Callahan
Conrad __
Felt __
Gale __
Rosen __
Sullivan _
Tavel __

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

1 - R. Putnam

September 9, 1965

ATTITUDES OF VARIOUS COMMUNIST PARTIES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION


A source which has furnished reliable information in the past has advised that an individual prominent in the international communist movement who has just returned home from an extended tour abroad recently made the following observations based on personal contact with leaders and representatives of communist parties in various countries.

The majority of individuals with whom discussions were held during the tour expressed the opinion that the Soviet Union was wrong and foolish in regard to its attitude and lack of aggressiveness in connection with the existing ideological differences in the Sino-Soviet dispute. It appears that some of the communist parties are concerned that the Soviet Union has become the "captive" of the Communist Party of China to such an extent that the Chinese can "call the shots," which, they fear, may involve these countries in wars or fights.

Representatives of Cuba, in particular, were expressing distrust of the Soviets and had the feeling that the Soviets may not carry out commitments to Cuba if something goes wrong. Representatives of Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and others indicated similar concern. It appears that the communist parties of these countries would like to see the Soviets adopt a stronger attitude, first toward the Communist Party of China and then somewhat more toward the United States.

While most of the individuals did not believe the slanders of the Communist Party of China that there is some secret agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, some, including the Vietnamese and the Cubars, are worried that such a possibility may become a reality.

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Felt 1 - Foreign Liais	son unit	
Gale		
Rosee II .	•	
Sullivan RCP:pah		
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Holmes	ENCLOSURE	<i>(2)</i> 1
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	100-42	



ATTITUDES OF VARIOUS COMMUNIST PARTIES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

NOTE:

It is the unanimous opinion of the communist parties in Europe that they do not want the Soviets to become involved in a two-front war or involved in Vietnam to such an extent that the Soviets cannot carry out commitments to help them. This feeling is particularly strong in the German Democratic Republic and in Czechoslovakia.

Because of the sensitive nature of the source which furnished the above information, this communication is classified "Top Secret."

Classified "Top Secret" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. See memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan 9/3/65, captioned "Solo, Internal Security - Communist," prepared by RCP:pah. Dissemination of this memorandum has been made to Honorable Marvin

Watson, Special Assistant to the President; Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Attorney General. Information extracted from CGairtel 9/1/65, captioned "Solo, IS - C."

OFTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN. EEG, NO. 27 Belmont UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 1emorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE DeLoach Casper Callahan Contad Mr. Conrad TO DATE: September 8, 1965 Rosen : Trotter Tele. Room C. F. Downing SUBJECT INTERNAL SECURITY - C Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio. On 9/8/65, transmissions were intercepted by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted. ACTION: For information. 1 - Mr. Conrad 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam) 1 - Mr. Downing 100-428091-5082 1 - Mr. Newpher 1 - Mr. Paddock EX-100 SEP 14 1965 3, 4450 7 65 SEP 15 1965

9/14/65

Director, FBI (100-428091)

SAC, Chicago (134-46 Sub B)

1 - R. Putnam

SOLO

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reurairtel 8/30/65 which enclosed a letterhead memorandum captioned "Letter to the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the Council of Ministers, USSR, From the Communist Party of China and the State Council of the People's Republic of China Dated July 14, 1965," and a letter in the Russian language for which a full translation was requested.

Enclosed for CChicago and New York is one copy of a translation of the letter in the Russian language.

Chicago need not submit a letterhead memorandum on the enclosed translation since this information had previously been received at the Bureau.

Enclosure

1 - New York (Enclosure - 1)

RCP:pah

REC-3 100-428091-5083

EX 105

19 SEP 13 1965

	MAILED 19
Tolson Belmont	SEP 13 1965
Mohr DeLooch	COMM-FBI
Casper Callahan	- OB
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TRANSLATION FROM RUSSIAN

To:

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

The State Council of the People's Republic of China

Dear Comrades.

We received your reply to the letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, dated April 3, 1965, which contained a proposal for holding meetings among the representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the People's Republic of China, and the Soviet Union, on the highest level, for the purpose of discussing measures for protecting the security of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

In your letter, dated April 11, 1965, you refused to participate in such a meeting and state the opinion that for you "it is not necessary to again hold talks" about co-ordination of forces carrying out joint activity in rendering aid to the heroic Vietnamese people. The situation currently developing in Vietnam, the constant provocations of the American militarists against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the direct aggression against this fraternal country are causing just feelings of alarm and anxiety among the peoples of the socialist countries. The Soviet people have already taken the necessary steps for giving effective aid to the fraternal Vietnamese people in repelling the aggression of American imperialism. We will continue not to spare our forces in order to support the just struggle of the Vietnamese people.

In addition to this, we believe that aid to Vietnam is an international obligation not only of the Soviet Union, but all the socialist countries. It is self-evident that the effectiveness of this aid will be greatly increased if the socialist countries act in close unity, agreeing upon and co-ordinating their forces.

The fact of a demonstration of unity among all socialist governments itself, especially between the Soviet Union and China, an open, joint statement about their

TRANSLATED BY: OR CRANTHOMAS MCLAUGHLIN, JR.: dek September 8, 1965

ENCLOSURE 100-428091-5083

determination to thwart the aggressive designs of imperialism would be a vital support for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and would cool the ardor of the American militarists. The Vietnamese people, struggling for their freedom and independence, are vitally interested in this above all.

In the current situation, your refusal to participate in activities of solidarity for giving aid to Vietnam is an open demonstration to imperialism of your basic position and efforts to sharpen even further your differences with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other fraternal parties. This encourages the aggressors. This position of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the government of the People's Republic of China goes against the vital interests of the Vietnamese people and the interests of the peoples of all the socialist countries.

In rejecting the proposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the government of the USSR to carry out 3-sided meetings, you also hurl an unfounded rebuke against the Soviet people, stating that aid given by the Soviet Union to Vietnam is "too insignificant." Such a statement reveals your pretensions toward playing the role of supreme judge in the mutual relations between socialist countries, toward determining the character of these relations according to your own wishes and determining the size and type of aid from one country to another.

We do not mention the fact that the size and types of Soviet aid to Vietnam are known to you better than to anyone We know that the statements of the leaders of the Workers' Party of Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam evaluating the efforts of the Soviet Union were not unknown to you. We can remind you of the statements of comrades Ho Chi Min, Le Zuan (phonetic) and Fam Van Dong (phonetic) that they "value highly the fulfillment of its international obligation by the Soviet nation." The Vietnamese comrades express satisfaction that practically all their requests were considered favorably in the Soviet Union. In expressing their gratefulness to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government for the initiation of extensive aid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Vietnamese comrades emphasized that this aid is sufficient. If there occurred a certain holdup in the delivery of Soviet military equipment to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, then this, as you well know, was not the fault of the Soviet Union.

In your letter you write that "in all questions involving China it is absolutely necessary to obtain the approval of the Chinese side." We view this statement with

complete understanding. It is self-evident that the distance of the Soviet Union from Vietnam and the necessity of using the territory of the People's Republic of China for more rapid delivery of aid to Vietnam require agreement on many practical problems on the part of the Chinese. Our proposal for a 3-sided meeting among the representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union was based directly on the fact that assistance to Vietnam will be more effective if the three governments coordinate their efforts. It is quite evident that such coordination will not in any measure infringe upon the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China.

As a result of Soviet-Vietnamese talks in April of this year, in Moscow, an agreement concerning future aid by the Soviet Union for Vietnam in connection with American bombings was reached. An agreement was reached concerning new deliveries of arms and military equipment, as well as agreement on other important problems. We believe that the results of our talks would be much more effective if the representatives of the Chinese People's Republic took part in them.

In conclusion we would like the Chinese comrades to once again weigh the seriousness of the situation which has developed in Southeast Asia and to follow the road of close cooperation in the matter of strengthening the defensive capability of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and rendering it aid in defending peaceful cities and villages from the barbarian bombings of the American imperialists.

The struggle against the increasing aggression of the United States demands practical activity and joint declarations in the goal of guaranteeing the security of the borders of the socialist camp and its advanced post in Southeast Asia. This is the sacred international obligation of communist parties today.

With communist greetings

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union

Moscow, April 17, 1965

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1912 EDITION
03A GEN. HC., NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO

Mr. Conrad

DATE: September 10, 1965

Tavel
Trotter
Tele, Room
Holmes
Gandy

FROM C. F. Downing

SUPPECT:

SOLO

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 9/10/65, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at which time two messages, NR 326 GR 19 and NR 327 GR 115, were intercepted.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

The New York Office is aware of the contents.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure

Area Belmontens

1 - Mr. Conrad

2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)

1 - Mr. Downing

1 - Mr. Newpher

1 - Mr. Paddock

HS: dek

\$ 100-428091-5084

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65 SEP 16 1965

NR 326 GR 19

9/10/65

O 23387 35234 24261 31355 68204 12256 74750 04923 24143 95008 80708 97278 02846 73649 75035 79929 00630 18169 95267

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INCONNECTION ITHYOUR REQUEST TO GIVE OUR PHYSICIANS OP IN

IONO METHODS OF MEDICAL TREATMENT OF DOROTHYHILY HILY WE

INFORMYOU THAT OUR SPECIAL ISTS CONSIDER THAT SHE MUST UNDE

REQUESTION OF OPERATION WITH A TOUR SHE CONSIDERED ONLY AFTER FULL TO REATMENT I ON MUST BE CONSIDERED ONLY AFTER FULL TO REATMENT AS DESCREBED ABOVE!

100-42.8091-5084 ENCLOSURE

ERL ROTTON TAT

			Date:	0/10/65 0/10/65	ENVE	LODA
Transm	nit the following in	·			<u> </u>	~ ~ .
=	AIRTEL	(T	ype in plaintext or co	de)	- I	
Viα ,	MARCIDII.		(Priority)	,	-,-	
-7						771-
	TO: DIRE	CTOR, FBI (10	0-428091)	,-	R D L	Bul
	FROM: SAC,	CHICAGO (134	-46 Sub B)	(/	1 WASA	
جود	SUBJECT: SOLO			5		
	on 9 general conver during the late had to be done contacts and to sending a delethinking of sedelegation and responded to 1 October meeting of Czechoslova and "the bigge (the negotiating response was Chile and the	to re-estable to re-estable hat it might is gation down to ending "WINNIE then said "WIALL's question (the Party skia Symposium or thing which on for funds "Well, maybe were to restable to the party skia symposium or thing which the said symposium or thing which well, maybe were to restable to the party skia symposium or thing which the said symposium or the said symposium or thing which the said symposium or t	US HALL, Gen- 5, the latters ish the Part not be a bad of Chile". He Henry WIN hat about your by reminding sponsored Word, 10/21/65, has to be unby CP, USA we can consider.	eral Secretar remarked to remarked to y's Latin Ar idea "to co ALL stated ISTON) as part going." (and marxist Prague, Czech the CP,	ary, CP, USA that someth- merican onsider me was rt of this CG 5824-S* me schedule Review-CP choslovakia very year" SU). HALL	ing i
•	At t the above and	he time, no d HALL suggeste	efinite déci d "we" think	sion was ma some more :	de regardin about Chile	g
	In or remarked that he had in mind Congress of the American Solid for mid-November 1985 and 1	l a delegation le CP of Chile larity Confere	erence to a which might, 10/11-19/6 nce, which i	delegation attend bot 5, and also	down to Chi h the 13th the Latin	le,
1-वी	Agai HALL to Culver and it was obver 1-8/3RB B- Bureau (RB 1 - New York (1 - Chicago RWH:mkp	/ious that HAL 1)	Lat this ti	ling by car sed the que me was seri 60-4280	ously consider the state of the	ile dering
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CG 134-46 Sub B

sending the delegation he had mentioned previously to Chile. He stated that HALL at this time indicated that he was thinking of utilizing WINSTON because that individual is a good front man and a person capable of drawing great sympathy, but because of his blindness has to be lead around and therefore could not do anything concerning the re-establishment of contacts and relations with Latin American CP's that he desired. He then noted that he was fully aware that CG 5824-S* was acquainted with nearly all of the leading people of the major Latin American CP's and had dealt with these individuals over the years. He therefore indicated that with CG 5824-S* as part of this delegation, if it is desired to send one, it would be easy for CG 5824-S* to restore working relations and contacts between the CP, USA and the various Latin American Parties.

Although HALL brought this matter up again on 9/9/65, there was no final decision made on it. HALL again repeated that it would be discussed further in the near future.

The Chicago Office, in discussing this matter with CG 5824-S*, was told by the source that he had no doubts in his own mind that he could undertake this trip to Chile, as HALL suggested, if he desired and if he simply gave such word to HALL. He noted that he was aware that such a trip would politically enhance his own standing, particularly in the international movement, and that it also could be of some substantial intelligence value to our government. However, he noted he was not fully prepared, either physically or personally, to as yet commit himself to make this trip, his 19th SOLO mission. without giving it further thought. He also added that he is well aware that he will have to make a trip to the Soviet Union by the latest during November in order to cary out the negotiations for funds. However, the trip, as suggested by HALL, could conceivably involve up to three months and is one which would necessarily have to be given great thought and consideration. He noted that in considering this he would also have to keep in mind the affect of such a long trip upon his wife, his own family relations, as well as his own physical well being.

Close liaison is being maintained with CG 5824-S* regarding the above matter.

CG 134-46 Sub B

While there definitely will be a SOLO mission undertaken in the near future, the breadth and scope of such a mission will necessarily depend on the source's personal and physical conditions, but will in final analysis rest on the over-all decision which HALL will make on this matter. The Bureau will be kept advised.

FD-36 (I	Rev. 1	0-29-63)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

		Date: 9/13/65	1
ransmi -	t the following i	n(Type in plain text or code)	-
iα:	AIRTEL	REGISTERED	!
.u	-	(Priority)	
	TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)	%
M	FROM :	SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)	محاسلا (
**	SUBJECT:	SOLO S- Kd	10
	via radio,	On 7/10/65, there were received from the Sov two ciphered-partially coded messages, the hich are as follows:	iets, plain
	Sister Ann	"l. Please exclude Sister Meg from your list is next."	t.
		The above refers to a drop.	and the same of th
	Dorothy He that she m hospital i a full dos	"2. In connection with your request to give clans opinion on methods of medical treatment ealy, we inform you that our specialists consmit undergo the course of complex treatment in order to regulate metabolism process, to the of medicine for blood vessel dilation, and and vitamins. The question of operation must be only after full treatment as described a	of idex in ake in
۲	the inform significant signifi	Since no previous communications regarding to sage above were transmitted to the Soviets the mants apparatus, the NYO was unaware of the name of the above message upon its receipt. (I) (100-428091)(RM) (I) (100-428091)(RM) (I) (134-46-Sub B)(AM-RM) (I) (100-428091)(RM) (I)	rough
	ACB:rvs (8)	(41) (6 FF 16 1985	

65 SEP 17 1965 Pecial Agent in Charge

NY 100-134637

On 9/13/65, when NY 694-S* returned to NYC from Hampton Bays, Long Island, he was interrogated regarding this message, and he explained that DOROTHY HEALY had forwarded to the Soviets a diagnosis of her condition as prepared by her own physicians.

The above message, according to NY 694-S*, is a reply to HEALY's request for information from the Soviets regarding her condition.

	· . Ř.	DOUTE IN ENVILOPE	
		Date: 9/10/65	
Trai	nsmit the following	in	
		(Type in plaintext or code)	
Via	AIRTEL	<u> </u>	
		(Priority)	
	,	4	
(3)	TO:	DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)	
•	FROM:	SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)	
	SUBJECT:	SOLO IS - C	4
		Re New York letter 7/31/63.	
	fund dow CG 5824- suppleme SOLO fun He, acco	On 9/9/65, CG 5824-S* advised that disbursements O funds maintained by him in Chicago have brought this n to a figure approximating \$25,000. As a result, S* stated that it would be necessary to immediately nt his funds by transferring to Chicago monies from ds maintained in New York under the custody of NY 694-S*, rdingly, suggested that the New York Office be requested	
	to contact available through can be actinuated that because	ct NY 694-S* immediately to have this individual make e \$100,000 which can be transmitted to CG 5824-S* the Chicago Office. When this money is received, it dded to the other amounts he now has in his custody deposit boxes in Chicago banks. In addition, he stated ause of the large over-all total of SOLO funds currently intained in New York, approximately \$1,000,000, that	
	in one mo for him presently	onth an additional \$100,000 be transferred to Chicago by the same method. While the source noted that he y would not need the second \$100,000 and did not care additional responsibility of having custody of such	
	severe c the latte	e believed both he and NY 694-S* would be subject to riticism by GUS HALL, General Secretary, CP, USA, if er became aware of the fact that such a large amount	1_
	person. to belie	is now located in one area and in the custody of one He stated that previously HALL has always been led ve that such SOLO monies are divided into smaller and placed with trusted depositories located in scattered	
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		York (100-134637) (RM)	
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CG 134-46 Sub B

The last large transmittal of funds from New York to Chicago, similar to that requested above, was made in 7/63 as set forth in relet. At the time, this money was sent to Chicago Special Delivery, Registered Mail, Return Receipt Requested by the New York Office. It is believed that such a method of transmittal can again be utilized safely in the present situation. Unless the Bureau disagrees with the above method of transmittal, the New York Office is requested that the necessary arrangements be made for the transmittal of the above noted SOLO funds to Chicago.

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1982 EDITION GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Belmont . Mohr -DeLocch. 1emorandum ROUTE IN ENVEL Mr. Conrag TO DATE: September 15, 1965 Tele. Room C. F. Downing Holmes SUBJECT: INTERNAL SECURITY - C Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio. On 9/15/65, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at which time two messages, NR 223 GR 15 and NR 224 GR 184, were intercepted. The plain text and cipher text are attached. The New York Office is aware of the contents. ACTION: For information. Enclosure Mr - Doinonte 1 -- Mr. Conrad - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam) 2'- Mr. Sullivan 1 - Mr. Newpher - Mr. Paddock REC. 66 (00 1 6 SEP 20 1965 EX-113

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NR 223 GR 15

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ENCLOSURE

100-42809/-5088

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
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	ROULE . IN ELOP	E
Transmit	the following in	
/ ² ia	AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL (Priority)	
ارگه		- - 1
	TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)	C/S
	FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)	Jam
	Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the origin and three copies and for the New York Office one copy of letterhead memorandum entitled, "General Observations Concerning Current Attitudes of Various Communist Parties Regarding the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and USS.	a. -
	The information set forth in the enclosed letter head memorandum was furnished by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, on 8/30/65 to SA RICHARD W. HANSEN.	• .
and of	The information set forth in the enclosed lette head memorandum was provided by NORMAN FREED, former CP o Canada representative to the "World Marxist Review," Prag Czechoslovakia, during the course of general discussions held in Chicago on 8/25/65.	£ /
W S.	The enclosed letterhead memorandum is classifie since it contains information furnished by CG 5824-S*, a very highly placed source furnishing information on the highest slevel concerning the international communist movement. Unauthorized disclosure of the infortion contained therein would, by its nature, tend to iden	a- ma-
A STATE OF THE STA	3 Bureau (Enc. 4) (RM) REG 100-428071-5 1-New York (300-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM) 1-Chicago RWH: MDW (5) 3 EP 21 1985	089
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CG 134-46 Sub B

CG 5824-S* as the source, thereby jeopardizing the security of this source and thus adversely affecting the national interest.

In order to provide additional security to the source, the enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown as having been prepared at Washington, D. C.



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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C.

September 1, 1965



GENERAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING CURRENT ATTITUDES OF VARIOUS COMMUNIST PARTIES REGARDING THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND USSR

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, in late August, 1965, advised as follows:

Recently a representative of a Communist Party (CP) in a major western country returned home after a three-year Party assignment abroad. During this individual's period abroad, he established many contacts among CP leaders in the various socialist countries and just prior to his return had met with individual representatives of the CPs in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Cuba, North and South Vietnam, and other countries. Based on such discussions, this individual made the following observations:

Most of the people he had talked to believe that the CP of the Soviet Union was wrong and foolish in regard to its attitude and lack of fight in connection with the existing ideological differences that the CP of the Soviet Union has with the CP of China. What some CPs are now worried about is that the USSR has become "captives" of the Chinese to such an extent that the Chinese can "call the shots" which can get their countries into trouble--wars, fights, etc.

The Cubans, in particular, in their talks were definitely distrustful of the Russians and had a feeling that they may not carry out their commitments to them, the Cubans, if something goes wrong. The Czechoslovaks,

Group 1
excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

ENCLOSURE 100-428091-5089

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING CURRENT ATTITUDES OF VARIOUS CPS REGARDING THE CPSU AND USSR



the East Germans, and others indicated they were similarly worried in this regard. What these CPs would now like to see is the Russians to "get their backs up," first against the Chinese and then somewhat more against the United States.

While most people do not believe the slanders of the CP of China that there is some secret agreement between the USSR and the United States, some people, like the Vietnamese and the Cubans, are worried about such a possibility becoming a reality.

In Europe the unanimous opinion of the CPs there appears to be that they do not want the Russians to get involved in any kind of a two-front war or involved in Vietnam to such an extent that the Russians cannot carry out their commitments to help them. This feeling is particularly strong in the German Democratic Republic and in Czechoslovakia.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.



9/13/65

SAC, NEW YORK (65-17696)

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York Trust Company, \$120,000.00, commisting/2000 \$50.00 notes for \$120,000.00 in \$20,00 notes. This money was part of the \$150,000.00 NV 694-5" received from the Soviets on 6/23/65.

the Bureau by separate communication, deted 8/12/05, captioned, "SOLO: IS-A" (Burlle 100-128091) to be programmed by Automatic Date Processing Unit.

The MYO, for this reason, has not included the serial numbers of this money in the index maintained in captioned case.

of the certal numbers of the "exchange money" with serial numbers in the index because the origin of the "exchange money" is known.

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OFTIONAL FORM NO, 10 MAY 1942 EDITION GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27 Tolson UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Belmont DeLoach Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE Casper Gale DATE: September 17, 1965 TO : Mr. Conrad Sullivon Tavel Trotter F. Downing Holmes SUBJECT: INTERNAL SECURITY - C On 9/17/65, the New York Office furnished the text of a message the informant desired to send and requested that it be enciphered. The cipher text was furnished to New York on the same day. R. Pagnam The plain text and cipher text are attached. ACTION: For information. Enclosure 1 Mr. Belmont 1 - Mr. Conrad 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam) 1 - Mr. Downing 1 - Mr. Newpher 1 Mr. Paddock

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REGISTERED

ΤO

DIRECTOR, FBI (61-8077)

FROM

SAC, NEW YORK (100-84994)

SUBJECT:

GUS HALL

Extreme caution must be exercised with respect to dissemination of the information herein inasmuch as; by its nature, said information tends to identify NY 694-S*, a valuable informant, as the source. Unless this information is obtained from a source other than NY 694-S*, it should not be included--even in paraphrased form--in the investigative section of a report:

On 9/13/65, NY 694-S* advised as follows:

In a conversation with GUS HALL on 9/13/65, the informant gained the impression that GUS HALL is in a state of "panic" with regard to the impending tax Havasion case against him. GUS HALL stated that it seemed inevitable that he would be indicted and he stated for him to be indicted and possibly go to jail at this time would be ruinous to the interest of the US. He stated that he alone in the US can induce the North Vietnamese to negotiate peace with the USA and that he alone can exercise influence on the Chinese necessary to cause the latter to withdraw from their position of advocating all out war against the US. HALL stated that he has been informed by his brother that Government Agents have been questioning the latter and exhibited to the brother documents reflecting that HALL

BUREAU (61-8077) (RM) (1)-100-428091 (SOLO) CHICAGO (134-46-Sub B) (AM-RM)

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NY 100-84994

made numerous flights in 1959.

and to instruct the latter immediately to attempt to contact influential persons in Washington who might be in a position to induce the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to drop their suit against him. He further ordered NY 694-S* to contact CG 582%-S* in Chicago and instruct the latter to immediately make every effort to contact "politicans" whom he might know in order to induce the IRS to drop its case against him.

lb7D

Unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau, the NYO, when advised by with respect to his instructions from HALL through NY 694-S*, will instruct not to make any effort to comply with HALL's instructions.

The above information was telephonically transmitted to the Chicago Office on 9/13/65, for transmittal to CG 5824-S*.

ROUTE IN ENVILOPE

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COMMUNICATION FROM DIAMOND KIMM FORMER AMERICAN NOW IN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF NORTH KOREA, AND RECOMMENDA-Tions of Gus Hall in regard thereto

On September 8, 1965, Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), advised that during his recent visit to the West Coast he had been provided with a communication received from Diamond Kimm, a CP member who had been deported from the United States a number of years ago and who is now residing in North Korea. The text of this letter was as follows:

"Pyong Yang Aug. 1, 1965

"The latest and most reliable report on you comrades as well as organizational achievements have been transmitted to us in person by our mutual friend, John K., ex-P.W. L.A. staff member, whom we unexpectedly and with great pleasure had met in Moscow.

"We salute you with profound admiration on your achievements under the most adverse conditions we know, and wish you greater successes towards the final victory to which we all ourselves so dedicated.

"After 2 months vacationing in Eastern Europe, we have returned home to resume our duties. In concise words. our people's achievements here, since the war, are tremendous. But we see more and greater tasks yet to accomplish, besides rendering all our possible help to the heroic Vietnam people in their anti-imperialist war, now.

"One special request we want to ask you comrades at this time is concerning our Party membership in L.A. We are advised at present that the matriculation process for our participation here would be much facilitated if we had some record of our previous Party status.

"Please send us by any means convinient to you. some document showing necessary data - date and place of joining the Party as well as our status. We submit here Koro pome data as far as we can remember: I, Diamond, joined the Party in L.A. on March 1, 1938. (P. Klein was chairman). Fania also in L.A. in late summer of 1951.

* BERNSTEIN "As for the status, you comrades know very well all our activities - such as the 'Korean Independence' and the Comm. P.F.B. We were deported in January 1962.

-1200 - 428 09/ ENCLOSURE

"We, both, will greatly appreciate if you send this information to us at your earliest convinience, since we are most anxious to receive it.

"With much love as ever, devotedly yours

"/S/ Diamond Kimm
Fania Kimm

"P.S. The document should be addressed to the Party here."

In discussing the above-noted communication, Hall instructed that some type of a document be drawn up and transmitted to the Korean Party of Labor. He stated that

DATE FD-36 (80425-22-64)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

		Date: 9/15/65
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	TO:	DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
	FROM:	SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)
	SUBJECT:	Solo
	SODOHOI.	IS-C
	the follow	Enclosed herewith for the Bureau is one copy each of wing three documents:
	"Hub";	1) A letter to the Central Committee, CPSU, signed
r.	of Comrade	2) A four page document entitled "Notes on Comments Gus Hall at CP National Youth Encampment, September 10,
	Gus Hall (Relations)	3) A document entitled "Notes on Remarks of Comrade on Building a Mass Youth Organization and on the pip of the CP, USA and the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs".
	9/14 and are to be the CPSU a CG 5824-S	The enclosed three documents were composed by CG 5824=S* shed to SAs RICHARD W. HANSEN and WALTER A. BOYLE on 15/65 for transmittal to NY 694-S*. These documents prepared and delivered through the SOLO apparatus to at the next contact in accordance with instructions to from GUS HALL that the essence of his remarks to the USA National Youth Encampment should be communicated CPSU.
1-4	influence their fight 1-813 R	CG 5824-Sk advised that the purpose of HALL's instruction essence of his remarks be forwarded to the CPSU is in oring what pressure to bear as is within his power to the Russians to be more vigorous and outspoken in it against the Chinese and to encourage the Russians [No. 100] 100-12809/15092 (Enast 3) (RM) REC 76 ork (Y00-134637) (RM)
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Ap	provedy (*)	Sent M Per Ment in Charge

CG 134-46 Sub B

to repudiate the notion being promulgated by the Chinese of "no negotiations". According to CG 5824-S*, while GUS HALL and the CP, USA are not at present prepared to openly espouse a policy of negotiation, nonetheless, it is his belief that this forthright stand on his part might "loosen up" or encourage the CPSU and the Parties of the other Socialist countries to mobilize such pressure as is possible to encourage negotiations.

Both CG 5824-S* and GUS HALL consider it a rather ironic position with GUS HALL now doing all within his power to advance the current policy goals of the government of the United States.

Copies of these documents are being hand-delivered to the New York Office on 9/16/65 by SAS RICHARD W. HANSEN and WALTER A. BOYLE who will be in New York City at that time on another matter.

ENCLOSURES TO DIRECTOR, FBI FROM SAC, CHICAGO

RE: SOLO IS - C

Three (3)-- One copy of letter to Central Committee, CPSU signed "Hub";
One copy of four page document entitled "Notes on Comments of Comrade Gus Hall at CP National Youth Encampment, September 10, 1965."
One copy of document entitled "Notes on Remarks on Comrade Gus Hall on Building a Mass Youth Organization and on the Relationship of the CP, USA and the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs".

BUFILE 100-428091 CG 134-465ub B



100-428771-509 Zc.

To the Central Committee, CPSU

Dear Comrades:

Recently our Party held a meeting somewhere in the Midwest attended by the young Communist corps and some members of the landing committee including Comrades Gus Hall, Dan Rubin, I also was there and there are attached some notes on Comrade Hall's remarks at this meeting. These are from my notes which in all essence are exact although it is not a stenogram.

The idea came to Comrade Hall to deliver this address or speech after publication by the New York Times of a full page of excerpts from Marshal Lin Piao's article in which he attacked the entire world movement and particularly the Soviet Union. Also, we cannot approach the American people and ask them to fight for an end to the war in Viet Nam if we endorse the Chinese or, if you please, perhaps the Viet Namese demand for "a complete military victory over U.S. imperialism in Viet Nam" before negotiations. The pro-Chinese element as well as the Trotskyists were making headway among the radical youth with the slogan of "no compromise" and the slogan of "unconditional military defeat of the United States". With these slogans they were weakening the broad peace movement in the U.S. and hindering the struggle for peace in Viet Nam and in the world.

Therefore, these questions had to be clarified. Comrade Hall is also of the opinion that unless there is more clarification on these questions the international movement will suffer irreparable damage. The young people received this speech very well and the overwhelming majority enthusiastically accepted the line as put forward by KK Comrade Hall.

We of the CP, USA are not putting forward the slogan of "negotiations" right now—this is a very difficult thing for us to do since it is our imperialism that is conducting the war of terror in Viet Nam. Yet we cannot utilize the average American's desire to end the war by endorsing the Chinese position. We cannot even expose the hypocritical U.S. imperialist talk about "unconditional negotiations" as "demagogy" or "a sinister plot", etc., etc., with this negative approach. A military victory without politics is inconceivable. We will not accept the Chinese slogan of "continuous war" or "continuous revolution". This is why Comrade Hall hopes that while we are not renewing the open polemics against the CPC leadership, that the ideological debate on general problems and current events will go on in a comradely manner.

With warm fraternal greetings, Comradely yours

lb 6

lb70

Hub

CONFIDENTIAL

Notes on Comments of Comrade Gus Hall at CP National Youth Encampment, September 10, 1965

First of all, I want to express a word of thanks to our Chicago hosts for this meeting. I will point out that you will also be in charge of next year's summer project and therefore I suggest that you set up a committee at this meeting in order to plan for next year.

I will express some thoughts on the vital questions of war and peace in 1965. But, at the outset let me tell you that we have been sent here by the National Board and the Secretariat to express our thanks to you for your work in the various cities and particularly for your work in the ghettos. It is apparent that the summer project has disrupted the very roots of this society. The FBI's Hoover is able to get bigger appropriations from Congress for the FBI because of the "danger" that you are supposed to be. Of course, Hoover is greatly exaggerating. But, you have influenced events in the U.S. through your activity; you have influenced the events in Washington; you also influenced the direction of the convention of the National Students Association in Madison, Wisconsin. You also influenced the course of the World Peace Conference in Helsinki, Finland. You affected the life of the Party everywhere—you gave it new life. You have shown the Party that it "can be done".

On the other hand, what happened to you is most remarkable. You have added to the rebelliousness of youth a "know-how" and a theoretical outlook that turned you into "rebels with a cause". You must remember that the summer project is not over: You must add new results and use new initiatives. Since some of you will go back to school, you must review your work. Some will go back to work and these should consider or look for jobs that will someday make you a trade union leader. Some of you should consider full-time work with the Party that can be a life-time project, not just a one-summer project. We suggest that you review the work of the summer project and the weaknesses you have observed in the CP leadership and put these observations on paper.

Before dealing with the general question of war and peace, I will deal first with the India-Pakistan war. This fight can end only in defeat for both sides. There can be no solution in force of arms. Temporary political solutions must be found. This is not a clear-cut situation and therefore they must find a temporary solution that will lead to peace and stop the spreading of the war that can only benefit imperialism.

Now in regard to Viet Nam--this is a real war, one of the most brutal in history, and is as horrible as the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There are now 110,000 U.S. troops in Viet Nam constituting an army of aggression and occupation. I will not restate all the arguments that I used at the recent legislative conference when I discussed this subject. That report dealt with the results of escalation, its affect on the home front reflected in cuts in social spending, its influence on the political climate in the U.S., and President Johnson's statement that all who oppose the war in Viet Nam are enemies of the U.S. As I said, I will not repeat these arguments.

There are some difficult problems concerning a proper assessment of the forces in this world and the tactics to be employed. The Marxist assessment must be objective and scientific. It cannot be an assessment influenced

100-42-091-509>

by emotions. What is the central point of an assessment of the war in Viet Nam? Is a military victory over the forces of U.S. imperialism possible? If the answer is yes, then we must do everything militarily possible to achieve this. But, I say that a military victory now in that war is not possible. But does this mean that U.S. imperialism will win? The answer is no. We can see that they will suffer a politial-military defeat in the long run if not immediately. Any comparison of the U.S. position to the position of the French in 1954 is not correct. Nor is it correct to say that the U.S. is even weaker today. France was weak, was fighting with few modern weapons and was also fighting a war in Algoria at the same time. Therefore, to compare the U.S. to France is a wrong assessment. The political support from around the world necessary for a political-military victory cannot be won with this kind of assessment.

But, could we win this support if we backed the unconditional surrender of the U.S.? U.S. imperialism uses political slogans to win support for this reason. But, the use of slogans for a "military victory" and for "no negotiations", etc., means that there is no political struggle on this subject in the UN. The Geneva Agreement is not used if you want only a military victory—you cannot avail yourself of the contradictions of inner imperialist antagonisms. Why is it that the new independent nations are not playing a role? It is because they cannot use initiative for only a "military victory". U.S. imperialism is getting away with murder because the assessment is wrong. We and the world movement are not using the political weapons at our disposal.

When we talk of the changing relationship of forces in this world we are not talking only of military force. We include everything. In the liberation of colonialized countries the political factor was most important. The colonial people did not underestimate the military power of imperialism, but they combined all forms of struggle while using political pressures to achieve their goals.

The use of negotiations does not mean surrender, but it does bring the political element into play. To smash U.S. imperialism is not in the cards today; but to force it to retreat—that is possible. We must find the path to force U.S. imperialism to retreat. I am not advocating "negotiations" but I am against closing the path to negotiations and peace.

If "we" say to people in Viet Nam: "Do not negotiate—go on fighting", etc., isn't that a silly position to be in. Of a certainty there will come a time for negotiations and those who preach "military victory" and "no negotiations" will prove to be wrong. Should we assume that U.S. imperialism will continue its present policy until it leads to a world war? Rather, can't we fight to prevent this spreading war by forcing a retreat? Our Party must use two kinds of slogans: Overall slogans, and immediate ones (that is, tactical slogans). We cannot paint ourselves into a corner. The slogan of "no negotiations" would close all the doors. The slogans of Women Strike for Peace are 1) Stop the Bombing; 2) No more U.S. troops in Viet Nam; 3) Negotiations based on the Geneva Agreement. These are good slogans even if such things are not now possible.

In regard to the question of the extension of the Selective Service Act, we did not sufficiently mobilize the masses against this extension. Had we done so this might have led to large-scale opposition. Perhaps it too late now, but we should find out if there is still a basis for

opposition. I don't think that the burning of draft cards is or was the answer. We should also mobilize mass support for the "conscientious objectors and in support of such objectors even in our ranks. But in all cases, we must find mass support. Our relationship to the masses is the key to ± all tactical questions.

With respect to the tactic of civil disobedience, my view is that it is not the "cure-all" for all questions. We can support it in some cases, but it is not practical in all actions. In the case of the Washington action and demonstration, we gave it some support. But, it all depends on the level of struggle. It must be remembered that a coordinating committee does not replace or supplant the peace movement. Of course, we recognize that there are different levels of the struggle for peace and that there are various movements. This is why we support the action of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy scheduled for October in Washington, D. C. We also support the Michigan Conference on Viet Nam. But, we will not allow ourselves to be painted into a corner by sectarian domatist slogans, as revolutionary as they may sound, since we will not separate from the masses. On the contrary, we will try to be at the head of broad movements for peace.

In our private discussions with our Viet Nam Comrades, of both North and South, we wi seem in agreement". But, it is in the area of public declarations that we find ourselves in difficulties. While we do not now raise the slogan of negotiations, nonetheless, we don't accept the idea of purely "military victory". In this respect, we are in disagreement with our Chinese Comrades who glorify war in an infantile manner. We find it difficult to remain silent in the face of the recent declaration by Marshal Lin Piao, Defense Minister of the People's Republic of China. In his article, he quoted from Mao that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Marshal Lin also included the following statement of Comrade Mao: "The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of issues by war is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and all other countries." Marshal Lin stated further that "the peasants constitute the main force of the national-democratic revolution against the imperialists and their lackies," and again stated: "The countryside, and the countryside alone, can provide the revolutionary bases from which the revolutionaries can go forward to final victory. Precisely for this reason, Comrade Mao Tse Tung's theory of establishing revolutionary base areas in the rural districts and encircling the cities from the countryside is attracting more and more attention among the extras people of these regions. Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called the cities of the world, then Asia, Africa, and Latin America constitute 'the rural area of the world'".

We disagree with Marshal Lin and Comrade Mao. Political power does not grow out of the barrel of a gun. Economic and political power and class consciousness are behind the barrel of a gun. The concept that the "countryside" is the basis of the revolution is a complete distortion of Marxism-Leninism. According to the Chinese, everything depends on war-we emphatically disagree.

We must work out our tactics based upon the needs of our people.
Unless we do this, we cannot expece the policies of the Johnson Administration Only in a political mobilization can we also help the victims of U.S. imperialist aggression. We hope that the Comrades in the Socialist States while abandoning open polemics with the CPC will join us in objective ideological discussions to refute erroneous theories and practices that do harm to the international movement—particularly in the struggle for peace. What is wrong with Marxist-Leninist debate to strengthen the movement? Silence will weaken our ideology, Marxism-Leninism. It will also fragmentize the world movement and strengthen those opportunistic elements to want to "go it alone". We are for proletarian internationalism in theory and in practice.

The fact that both China and Viet Nam do not belong to the UN-certainly does create some difficulties, but this situation is not an insurreguntable problem. This is what we mean by a political-military victory: Such a victory would entail the cessation of the bombings; negotiation with the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam along with others joining in the negotiations; and third, the withdrawal of foreign troops and elections in Viet Nam which of course would be swept by the National Liberation Front.

We must realize that the territory of our Viet Namese Comrades lies too close to China to permit them to express an independent position. I believe that these latest Chinese statements are for the purpose of attemptint to prevent other Parties and governments from moving away from the Chinese position. This split within the world Communist movement has affected the initiatives open to many Parties. As a result, the processes of internationalism have been narrowed down. I believe that other Parties in the world Communist movement think like we do and will not object if we express our opinions in this forthright manner. In conclusion, I want to emphasize that the struggle for peace and socialism is the most noble aim of mankind. You, the young cadre, are the hope in this struggle, the hope of our Party.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Following Comrade Hall's comments set forth above, there were about 20 questions asked by the youth in attendance, all of which were answered by Comrade Hall whose answers were received with enthusiastic agreement.

Notes on Remarks of Comrade Gus Hall on Building a Mass Youth Organization and on the Relationship of the CP, USA and the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs

The main object is to turn the DuBois Clubs into a mass organization. It is very possible to build a membership of 50,000 youth if we develop it as an action organization based upon issues. Later, these youth can be developed into Marxists. At the present moment, the DuBois Clubs are composed mainly of cadre and are not a mass organization. Later we can recruit for the Party without difficulties.

The mistake of the CP in the past during the McCarthy period (especially in the trade unions as exemplified by our policy of isolation in respect to the Marshall Plan) was that we cut off heads and expelled people while some others withdrew from the Party because of our mistakes. Our problem now is how to reflect a policy of our Party in such a manner that non-Communists will understand it and accept it.

We believe that the DuBois Clubs were pushed into too narrow positions. We also think that it was a mistake to have called it a "Marxist" organization. There is the danger that the DuBois Clubs would turn into a narrow Communist organization if we pursue the present course. opinion there are too many Communists in the DuBois Clubs and some of them will have to leave and go into other mass organizations. The Du Bois Clubs should be described rather as an organization that generally believes in Socialism and that a person does not have to be a Marxist to join. We don't want to turn the DuBois Clubs into a carbon copy of the Young Communist League. So long as the organization is taking a correct position we will have no worries about recruiting for the Party from the DuBois Clubs. When we get 50,000 members in the DuBois Clubs, and it can be done, then their membership in the CP will follow naturally. That it can be done has been proved by the spread of the Students for a Democratic Society, proving without a doubt that there is a vacuum which must be filled by this type organization such as the DuBois Clubs.

All the Communist Parties of the world are examining their structural makeup and the CP, USA will do so also at our next convention. In order to build the DuBois Clubs to a membership of 50,000, and this is possible, we are convinced, we need to loosen up first so it is not a tight organization, a carbon of the CP.

The proposals of the DuBois Clubs to conduct a series of demonstrations across the country, especially in Washington, D. C., at the time the President delivers the State of the Union Message, is a good one. We only hope it will be a mass initiative. I also think we should endorse the proposal of Students for a Democratic Society who are calling for an International Student Strike for Peace in the near future. Wherever we have connections throughout the world we should remind the Comrades that this International Student Strike for Peace is at the same time a struggle against imperialism. I am confident that the DuBois Clubs understand this.

I want to close with the note that the 50,000 membership is possible and achievable.

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NY 100-134637

1. "To Gus Hall

"Bulgarian and Czechoslovakian comrades invite Herb Aptheker for rest".

Re above see NY airtel, 8/27/65, pages 6 and 7.

2. "To Gus Hall

"Alex Trachtenberg was given a full course of medical treatment in a sanatorium near Moscow. Our physicians consider that his state of health is very unstable and anything may happen any time. He will stay in Moscow for sometime, and then we will start to prepare his neturn to United States according to your suggestion. Trachtenberg also desires to return as soon as possible."

Re above, see NY airtel, 8/27/65, page 5.

3. "Henry Winston's will be in university til December. Situation is not changed. He does not study and avoids any talks on subject of his studies. We would like to get reply on our question soon."

See NY airtel, 8/10/65, concerning WINSTON's

4. "Carl Winter is now in Mongolia. As soon as he is in Moscow we will inform you on date of his return to United States."

Re above see NY airtel, 8/27/65, page 5.

5. "We failed to find out anything about Knut Seitaniemi, who left for Helsinki in June".

Re above, see NY airtel, 8/27/65, page 7. (On 9/14/65, Gus Hall advised NY 694-S* that he had ascertained through the family of SEITANIEMI that the latter is presently in Lapland. What SEITANIEMI is doing there HALL did not know.).

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ROUTE IN ENVILOPE

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	Re New York airtel dated 9/14/65	captioned as a	ov bov
HANSEN as	On 9/15/65, CG 5824-S* advised SA follows:	RICHARD W.	
represent this call as well as that the an answer days ago CP, USA-CI would pre- the forthe make no de agreement inconvenie	At approximately 6:30 PM on 9/15/ ance telephone call from NORMAN FR ative, Toronto, Ontario. FREED no because he had been attempting to s HY LUMER in New York without suc reason for this telephone call was was available on the letter sent dealing with a possible postponeme PC school. FREED stated that the fer a postponement until the new y coming Canadian National election, ecision on this matter until they he also added that if the CP, U ent to postpone the school they wo noted date.	EED, CP of Candeted he had made contact NY 69 cess. FREED as to ascertain to GUS HALL sent of the join CP of Canada rear because of but they would had the CP, US SA found it to buld go ahead were the contact of the c	ada è 4-S dvi if ver t d
	FREED urged that an answer be imm the school and that he be contact as soon as possible.	ediately secur ed by telephon	ed / e
up immedia HALL had l	FREED was informed that no answer this matter in Chicago, but that ately with HALL in New York. FREE account for the city for sometime account for the delay in getting ter.	it would be ta D was also tol- and that this the CP, USA's	d ti nay
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CG 134-46 Sub B

The foregoing information was orally furnished to the New York Office on 9/16/65 for transmittal to NY 694-S*. NY 694-S* was requested to take this matter up with GUS HALL and to advise NORMAN FREED of HALL's response.

FD-36 TRev.	10-29-63)
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ROUTE IN ENVILOPE

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Approved:		Sent	M Per	
35 SEP 28 1965	al Agent in Charge			

NY 100-134637

"original date advise us, or else give us your views on the above alternatives.

"All the best,

"As ever,

 $^{11}B^{11}$

The above letter has reference to a proposed CP leadership school to be operated jointly by the CPUSA and the Canadian CP.

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Shirin Charge

CG 134-46 Sub B

to the CP of Chile through a Comrade of that Party. We fear that the most recent address we have may not be reliable and feel that it may not be desirable to entrust to or transmit by the mail the type of matter involved here.

Hub

Enclosure for Message #2

Commade Louis Corvalan, Secretary General, Communist Party of Chile.

Dear Comrade Corvalan:

Greetings: We want to thank you for inviting a fraternal delegation of our Party to attend the sessions of the 13th Congress of your Party.

As you know, U.S. imperialism continues to place all kinds of obstacles in their attempts to isolate our Party and progressive U.S.A. from any and all contacts with Communist or progressive forces of the world. Amongst other things, this continues to create problem of travel for us. Because of continued indictments pending, it completely bars myself, for example, from getting a passport.

We are very honored to be invited to your Congress and if it is at all possible, we are definitely going to have a delegation there. Because of a number of legal problems, I cannot at this time inform you as to the names of the members of the delegation. I will do so as soon as it is possible.

One of the assignments of our delegation will be to make arrangements for closer and more regular contacts between our Parties. Our Party feels very sharply the lack of such contacts between our Party and the other Parties of the Hemisphere.

Please accept our warmest and comradely good wishes. We remain

Comradely yours,

Gus Hall

CG 134-46 Sub B

The original of the above item, on the letterhead of and bearing the seal of the CP, USA, and signature of GUS HALL, is being enclosed herewith for transmittal by the New York Office to NY 694-S*. In addition, one Xerox copy of this letter is also being enclosed herewith for the Bureau as well as the New York Office.

For the information of New York, CG 5824-S* advised that GUS HALL considered the above noted Message #2 and its enclosure to be extremely urgent and requested immediate action be taken to see that its transmittal be completed.

ENCLOSURE TO DIRECTOR, FBI FROM SAC, CHICAGO

RE: SOLO IS - C

> One copy (Xerox) of letter sent to Comrade Louis Corvalan of the CP of Chile from Gus Hall, General Secretary, CPUSA.

BUFILE 100-428091 Chicago 134-46 Sub B



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ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

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On 9/15/65 CG 5824-S* provided to SAs WALTER	• ٧
A. BOYLE and RICHARD W. HANSEN several messages which	
he desired transmitted as soon as feasible by NY 694-S	*,
to the Russians through the Solo apparatus. These	
messages were prepared at the request of GUS HALL, General Secretary, CP, USA.	•
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Message one relates to an article appearing	
in the 'New York Times" of 9/11/65 which dealt with an	h d
editorial previously appearing in "Pravda" on the sub- ject of a campaign against anti-Semitism in the Soviet	
Union:	
Message two concerns an article captioned,	i de de la constitución de la co
"Computer Teaches Writing" appearing in the "Science News Letter" 2/9/63, a copy of which has previously	Market .
been furnished to the Bureau. The additional document	s
N referred to are in reference to the fact that HELEN	1
WINTER has informed CG 5824-S* that she is in possessio	n 🕴
of a letter from WILLIAM ALBERTSON to GUS, HALL once	*
again protesting his innocence by which letter the article relative to computer writing was furnished to	,
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CG 134-46 Sub B

Copies of the messages referred to herein are being hand delivered to the New York Office on 9/16/65 by SAs BOYLE and HANSEN who will be in New York City on that date on another matter.

ENCLOSURES (2) TO BUREAU FROM CHICAGO

Two messages to be transmitted to Russiansby NY 694-S* thru Solo apparatus

RE: SOLO IS-C

Bufile 100-428091 CGfile 134-46 Sub B

Transmitted via CGairtel to Bureau 9/15/65



100 1:8001 5097

Central Committee CPSU

The attached came to our attention in regard to the William Albertson matter. There are also some new documents which we will transmit to you in the near future.

Hub

Central Committee CPSU

Dear Comrades,

Comrade Birch asked that I convey the following to you. This thought is the result of a discussion among our leading Comrades.

The recent New York Times story quoting the Pravda editorial concerning the struggle against nationalist survivals and anti-Semitism has received wide circulation here. We believe that this will help to weaken the anti-Soviet campaign on the question of anti-Semitism planned in the US during the month of October. We also saw a Tass translation and version seemingly of this same editorial and we regret to say that the Tass story seems to us considerably weaker. We wonder if it refers to the same editorial. Would you please clarify this matter for us.

Hub

FBT

Date: 9/17/65

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ENCLOSURES (2) TO BUREAU FROM CHICAGO

One copy ea of 2 documents prepared for transmission to CPSU

RE: SOLO IS-C

Bufile 100-428091 CGfile 134-46 Sub B

Transmitted via CGairtel to Bureau 9/17/6

ENCLOSURE 160 40 40 71 - 5098.

Central Committee CPSU

Dear Comrades,

We wish to extend our thanks and appreciation for the invitation of an additional 20 Comrades to visit the USSR for rest, excursions, etc. We agree with your suggestion that these Comrades be organized as delegation groups rather than as individuals. At this moment we are not yet prepared to give you the composition of such delegations but we do have in mind a delegation for November 7th. This delegation would include such leading people as Archie Brown, a leading Party trade unionist; Tommy Dennis, a Negro Comrade who heads the Michigan Party and is a member of the national leadership, among others. We are also in the process of preparing a women's delegation.

Hut

17-4-2011-5098

Central Committee CPSU

It has been requested that we ask you if you might ask Mezhdunarodnaja Kniga if they could negotiate with Freedomways Associates, Inc. for Mezh Kniga to publish in Russian in book form 3 special issues of Freedomways. These special issues were the Du Bois Memorial issue, Mississippi issue, and Harlem issue.

The leadership, particularly the Negro Comrades, believe that these 3 special issues of Freedomways constitute a study in depth of the Negro problem. If desired, James Jackson would be willing to write an up-te-date introduction for this book.

In regard to these 3 special issues of Freedomways, Seven Seas Books, Berlin, GDR, has done exactly the above in the German language.

Mezh Kniga could write directly to negotiate on this matter with Esther Jackson, Managing Editor, Freedomways Associates, Inc., 799 Broadway, New York, New York 10003.

Hub

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	•	The plain text an	d cipher text	are attached	d.
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	ACTION:				
		For information.			
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	1 - Mr. Be 1 - Mr. Co 2 - Mr. Su 1 - Mr. Do 1 - Mr. Ne 1 - Mr. Pa	nrad llivan (Attention wning wpher	a: Mr. J. A. S	izoo, Mr. R	. C. Putnam)
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