

centers for propaganda and their literature. Flynn stated the Chinese had expressed sharp differences with the "commonly accepted" thesis that "war is not fatally inevitable" and disagreed with the "possibility" of achieving general disarmament and peaceful coexistence of different social systems. Flynn charged that the Chinese criticism was aimed at Nikita Khrushchev's expressed policies "which are the official policies of the USSR" endorsed by other socialist countries, some neutral countries, and by many peace loving people everywhere.

Flynn reported the Chinese countered with the claim that Khrushchev and his supporters exaggerated the dangers of nuclear warfare and that the world peace movement, as presently constituted, was based on fear and was disarming the people. The Chinese argued that the peace movement must be anti-imperialist and must be willing to fight for freedom of the colonial people and for socialism.

Flynn said that it was charged by the various fraternal parties that the views of the Chinese were at complete variance with the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and the line of the 20th and 21st Congresses of the CPSU, to which the Chinese had agreed. Now they were using literature, introducing resolutions and publicly defending a contrary position, without previous consultation with brother Parties.

Flynn stated that on the second day of the Bucharest meeting, the Chinese announced that the CCCCP had instructed that

the communique be signed, but with reservations that would be stated later by their Central Committee.

She reported that at the Rumanian meeting the Albanian delegation was the only one which disassociated itself from criticism of the Chinese publications and their distribution and the actions of the Chinese in the mass organization meetings.

Flynn reported that as she subsequently visited other countries, it was evident that attempts to contain the controversy were being made in the hope of resolving the conflict at the 81-Party meeting.

She reported that the 81-Party meeting had been preceded by a meeting in October, 1960, with representatives of 25 Communist Parties who were members of Central Committees and Secretaries of various Parties but not of the well-known top leaders of the Parties.

This meeting was presented with a draft statement of the CPSU, and M. A. Suslov and B. N. Ponomarev, prominent theoreticians of the CPSU, presided at this preliminary meeting. The 81-Party document was discussed paragraph by paragraph. The chief spokesman of the CPC was Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary, CPC. Peng Chen, Mayor of Peking and a member of the CCCPC, was also present. Speeches of the key delegates representing the CPC indicated there were still basic disagreements on the question of "war and peace," the cult of the individual, and the possibility in some countries of peaceful transition to socialism as well as on a variety of Party "tactics." However, according to Flynn,

the CPC concentrated all its fire, after restating its position on foreign policy, on several paragraphs which the Secretariat finally referred to the larger body to meet later. These questions related to war and peace and to the construction of socialism. The Chinese strongly objected to strong formulations on the cult of the individual, insisting that they referred not only to Stalin, but more specifically to their leader, Mao.

Flynn said at the preliminary conference many small Parties from countries close to China were disturbed by the debate and appeared not to want to disagree with either the USSR or China.

At the 81-Party meeting, the Chinese delegation was led by Liu Shao-chi, Chairman of the PRC.

At the 81-Party Congress it became evident that the Chinese wanted to "fix the responsibility for policy, foreign and domestic, of the socialist camp, on the Soviet Union" - There was a growing suspicion at the conference of a possible power struggle in the future when the Chinese would attempt to thoroughly discredit the Soviet Union and at the same time the Chinese could assume the position of the "head" in world leadership of international communism in opposition to the Soviet Union.

In the course of debate, Khrushchey outlined the basis of the dispute between the Soviet Union and the Chinese. He spoke of the removal of Soviet experts from China because their professional advice was flouted. He spoke of insults by the Chinese and recalled one incident which occurred at a banquet following the

completion of a project. The Chinese engineers were given a "red flag," symbolic of courage, while on the other hand the Russian engineers were given a "white flag," signifying cowardice. Delegates from other Parties including Antonin Novotny of Czechoslovakia, recounted similar incidents which occurred to their experts in China.

Flynn reported that Khrushchey also charged the Chinese with failure to cooperate with the Soviet Union, in refusing to permit the Soviets to build a radar station for the mutual benefit of China and the Soviet Union in defense protection.

Flynn's document recounted the Chinese charge of "East wind - West wind," which had reference to the change of the revolutionary spirit of communism from West to East. She stated that despite the conciliatory attitude of the Russians and the socialist camp in general at the 81-Party meeting, it was a shock for the delegates attending to hear the bitter and uncomradely language spoken by the Chinese toward their "big brother." She recounted that the Albanians similarly viciously attacked the Soviet Union and gave full and unqualified support to the CPC. She reported that at the conference itself, the Chinese and Albanians maintained that they alone remained true to the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and that all the others had changed and compromised with imperialism. They disputed the possibility of a peaceful road to socialism, and there was an "all or nothing" viewpoint in their positions which refused to take into account

the stages of possible political and economic development over a period of time, eventually leading to socialism.

Flynn reported that the Chinese did not attempt to reply at length to various criticisms mentioned in the document, such as "East wind" thesis except to say that they were poetic and not political expressions. The Chinese denounced the "cult of the individual" and condemned the factional struggle within the international communist movement.

She reported that the Chinese threatened at the conference, as at the Secretariat meetings preceding, that if their objections were not met, they would leave the meeting.

Continuing, Flynn reported that after the adjournment of the 81-Party meeting, the international debate gradually emerged into the open but in a peculiarly camouflaged way. The Russians attacked Albania, and the Chinese attacked Yugoslavia. This idea has, as of now, 1963, been abandoned, and the debate is now in the open.

Flynn next raised the question as to why the Chinese comrades evinced such personal animosity toward Nikita Khrushchev. She stated that some at the conference felt that on the death of Stalin, the Chinese assumed that Mao Tse-tung would be considered the leading Marxist spokesman in the world and that this would be accepted by both Parties. With the struggle for power in the Soviet Union around the "anti-Party group" in Moscow, these expectations were undoubtedly strengthened. Some of the anti-Party group, notably Molotov, were close to the Chinese views.

Apparently the Chinese did not anticipate the emergence of Khrushchev as the accepted leader of the CPSU, nor did they welcome it. Stalin's previous aloof, remote and unsocial characteristics were more to the liking of the Chinese. The Chinese have called Khrushchev uncouth and vulgar. Whenever Khrushchev spoke at the meetings, the cold dignity of the Chinese expressed their scorn.

Flynn reported that on the final day of the Sl-Party Conference the Chinese formally accepted the statement. However, Liu Shao-chi, next to Mao in leadership, only spoke once during the entire meeting. He made no statement of affirmation on the statement which came out of the conference. No one at the conference had any illusions but that once again the Chinese were accepting the statement with reservations.

Toward the end of the conference the Chinese, however, seemed to take a more modified position, that is, they did not put it in exact words, but the inference was as follows: "We agree with the desirability of common disarmament, coexistence, the end to war, etc. They are good for propaganda slogans. But we doubt if they are possible to achieve under capitalism. However, we are not opposed to you comrades struggling to attain them, if you believe it is possible, and we will not place obstacles in your way."

Speaking of the failure of Mao to attend this conference, Flynn expressed the opinion that it appeared to be an attitude of

contempt on the part of the Chinese Party not to send their counterparts to the other high leaders present to carry on discussions in such vital matters.

Continuing, Flynn reported on the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in September, 1961, noting that the Chinese delegation was led by Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council of China; however, he remained only a few days. His greeting to the Congress contained a rebuke for not inviting Albania and for discussing "inner Party differences in public." Before his departure, Chou placed wreaths on the tombs of Lenin and Stalin, which bore the following respective inscriptions: "Great leader and teacher of the proletarian revolution" and "Great Marxist-Leninist."

Flynn reported that Peng Chen, Mayor of Peking, was left in charge of the delegation. She reported that the Congress itself opened on October 17, 1961, with 87 Parties represented. The conference was a progress report on the building of communism. Also, unfinished business of the 21st Congress on the "cult of the individual" and the anti-Party group which developed after the Congress, the relations with other socialist countries, namely Albania and Yugoslavia, and foreign policy in relation to peace were the subjects of this agenda.

She reported that the Congress upheld the decisions of the 21st Congress and unanimously condemned all attempts to defeat them and to revive the Stalinist methods. Most of the anti-Party group retired into private life, except Molotov, who was made Ambassador to Mongolia. Molotov was later removed

because it was felt he was too close to the Chinese and he was transferred elsewhere.

Flynn reported that the 22nd Congress presented in their program several new major theoretical conclusions which they had arrived at but with which the Chinese Party did not agree. They are as follows:

1. The disappearance of the dictatorship of the proletariat in their now classless society. There is no longer a class to be abolished (the exploiters). It fulfilled its historic function and is no longer necessary.

2. The socialist state is becoming a democracy of the whole people. The dictatorship of the proletariat will cease to exist long before the state "withers away."

3. Transformation of functions of state organs into political organizations of public self-government, such as trade unions, cooperatives, cultural clubs, Young Communist League, is now under way. The program emphasized the need of perfecting the forms of popular representation and to promote democratic principles in the Soviet electoral system.

#### C. Gilbert Green Views Regarding Sino-Soviet Rift

Gilbert Green, one of the top leaders of the CPUSA who was among the original CPUSA leadership indicted and prosecuted for violation of the Smith Act of 1940, returned to active CP leadership after a long period of CPUSA underground activities, confinement and probation, in August, 1963.



On October 6, 1963, Green made his first public appearance in New York at a large meeting. During the course of his speech Green, in speaking of the CPC, said, "The Chinese are our comrades." The Chinese are "Marxists."

Ben Davis, a member of the CPUSA National Executive Committee and Board, who followed Green on the rostrum, took the occasion to refute Green's remarks publicly. Davis noted that the Chinese were trying to use the race question, and he refuted the validity of Robert Williams' (Negro who fled the United States and is now in China) theory on the Negro question as it regarded the matter of violence.

Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, National Chairman of the CPUSA, subsequently in delivering reactions of the CPUSA leadership's views to Green's remarks, stated that the speech shocked everyone and that people (Party members and leaders) were asking "Is this a new factional fight?" She stated that Green spoke so strongly for the Chinese that Ben Davis answered him equally strongly, and further, that at a subsequent meeting of the CPUSA National Board, the Board members "took him apart." Flynn's evaluation of Green's remarks was that "He is a very stubborn--not willing to listen and quite opinionated on all topics." Green himself subsequently indicated that his remarks had been misinterpreted and that he supported the over-all Soviet position but was critical of the Party for failure to allow free and full discussion of the Chinese position in connection with this rift. Nevertheless, some questions

were raised by the national Party leadership as to Green's potential for future leadership because of his stated pro-Chinese views.

A personal letter from Green dated November 10, 1963, addressed to Henry Winston, CPUSA National Vice Chairman, now in Moscow, has been obtained, of the existence of which the CPSU is also cognizant.

Green in this letter to Winston expressed a wish that Winston was in the United States so that they could "kick around" questions relating to both policy and perspective.

He then stated that there was one question he would like to mention to get Winston's thinking on it. This question had to do with the international controversy with the "Chinese comrades." He stated that he was quite disturbed by some aspects of this controversy--not that it is a controversy because he thought that differences were inevitable, "even exceedingly sharp differences."

He noted that the world was extremely complicated and that conditions in different parts of the world were completely different. Furthermore, he noted that there are contradictions also within the socialist system and in the relations between the socialist states ~~are~~ "not antagonisms--but contradictions." He stated that all of these matters have to be faced openly, analyzed objectively, or else they could become transformed into antagonisms. Green stated that "I, for one do not believe that Cuba's non-signing of the test ban treaty is necessarily a mistake, given, of course,

her correct evaluation of the significance of the test ban agreement as a whole." In this connection he noted that Washington had refused to consider a nuclear free zone in the Caribbean, that Cuba had been denied nuclear weapons, and he raised the question, "Why should Cuba unilaterally give up its right to these weapons until such a free zone is agreed to?" He said that he mentioned the Cuban situation because he had met comrades greatly disturbed because Cuba had refused to sign the test ban agreement, but yet "I cannot feel that way. I do not believe that unity of the socialist camp precludes differences in tactical approach arising out of difference in national interest and position."

Continuing on the major issue of the dispute, that is, the Sino-Soviet rift, Green stated that he believed the Chinese comrades were basically wrong. Further, he believed that the Chinese view every step to reduce world tension as some kind of an act of betrayal and that this position is "simply out of this world." He stated that in his view the criticism by the CPC of the western parties is dogmatic and wrong and that their attacks on the Soviet comrades is completely irresponsible. He expressed the hope, however, that no irrevocable break will take place. He stated further that he believes that ~~before~~ a world conference of Parties to act against the Chinese is called, there should be preparatory work "with the Chinese" or else no conference should be held at the present time. He indicated that he had no view as

to whether the differences can be reconciled in the near future, but reiterated that certainly nothing should be done to bring on a break. He noted that the Chinese position does carry considerable Trotskyism in it. However, he called Winston's attention to the fact there is one difference which "we cannot forget: it is the position of a Party leading a state with one-fourth of the world mankind."

Green then told Winston that the question that disturbs him the most is how the differences were permitted to reach the stage of vitriolic name calling, particularly on the side of the Chinese, at least as far as public statements are concerned. He expressed the belief that the main reason it has reached this stage is because the conflict was permitted to fester so long behind closed doors until differences of shading and emphasis became differences in fundamental outlook. "In other words," Green stated "I believe the main fault is not to be found in the fact that the dispute came into the open but that it came into the open only when it could no longer be kept quiet, only when it had reached a point of explosion."

Continuing, Green stated that he had read voluminous material published recently and that based upon this it is clear that the differences date back to the 20th Congress--and possibly even before then. He raised the question as to why there was not an airing of these differences in public. He stated that in his opinion a public, comradely discussion could have checked certain tendencies before they became hard and fast lines. He said he

had no fear as to how the Party and non-Party masses would have reacted and had confidence that they would have responded to the corrections made in the Soviet Party and certainly would have responded in support of the policy of peaceful coexistence.

Green then stated that "I think it was a mistake to just brand the Molotovs, etc., as an anti-Party group without ever presenting their views openly for discussion and rejection--for I am sure they would have been rejected. And let us recall that the Chinese comrades have done the same--they have branded those in their leadership who disagreed with their policies as anti-Party but without permitting their views to be presented to the Party."

Continuing, Green said "What I am saying is this: Was there not a deformation during the Stalin period in the entire approach to inner Party democracy? Is it not necessary to permit differences of opinion in the Party, even though we demand that the Party act as one when a decision is made? In the days of Lenin there were real inner Party discussions and debates, but since the defeat of the Trotskyites and the Bucharinites, there have really been no such discussions. I think it is this failure to establish a real normal inner Party democracy and real meaningful Party congresses where differences are thrashed out and resolved which makes inevitable periodic explosions, for what happens is that contradictions that can be resolved and overcome become smothered until at some point an explosion occurs. With all the

progress that the Soviet Party has made in democratization, in getting away from the distortions of the Stalin period, it has still, in my opinion, not openly faced up to this need for real inner Party democracy based on democratic centralism."

Green then cited examples of the speeches at the 22nd Congress which referred to a letter from Molotov, the contents of which were only known to members of the Central Committee or the Congress and which were never divulged to the masses. He said that he thought the details of these letters should be brought to the attention of Party members so that they might wrestle with ideas and think them through so that they could ascertain the facts of the situation and "especially both sides of a basic dispute." He added that only when people think through questions do they have confidence to act on their own; to make independent judgments and not wait for orders from above. He spoke out against "spoon-feeding of the masses" from above and stated that in such an atmosphere it is hard to fight tendencies toward bureaucracy even when there is the best will in the world to do so.

Continuing, Green stated that he thought this same tendency had reflected itself in the world movement and to one degree or another in various Parties. He stated that the Italian Party was especially conscious of this danger and had developed a real inner democratic life and an atmosphere of real discussion over basic questions. In connection with the Sino-Soviet rift, he stated that the Italian Party is most objective in the way it

debates with the Chinese comrades, "never calling them names, always indicating respect for them and their Party and people, and yet giving not an inch on fundamental questions." He added, "I, for one, am for more of this kind of inner life in the communist movement."

XIII. ECHOES OF SINO-SOVIET RIFT  
IN CANADIAN CP, APRIL, 1963

Leslie Morris, General Secretary, and William Kashtan, Organization Secretary, CP of Canada, arranged talks in China with the CPC during April, 1963, to express views on problems confronting the international communist movement.

Peng Chen, Mayor of Peking and a Member of the Secretariat of the CPC; Chao I-min, former CPC representative to the publication "Problems of Peace and Socialism;" and Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary of the CPC, were among the individuals with whom discussions were held.

En route to Peking the Canadian delegation met with members of the CCCPSU who reiterated that the differences between the CCCPSU and the CPC are also differences which the Chinese have with other Parties and they concern basic propositions of Marxism-Leninism. The CPSU representatives stated that the Albanian Party of Labor had rejected all overtures for the resumption of talks with the Soviet Union with the demand that the CPSU and Khrushchev must admit their mistakes and apologize to the Albanians before talks could be resumed.

Upon the arrival of the Canadian delegation in Peking, the CPC leadership at the very outset of this discussion indicated an air of hostility to the Canadians. Teng Hsiao-ping launched into a bitter attack against the Canadian Party and said that the Canadian communists were no good, that they never ceased in their attacks on the CPC, and that they had engaged in open polemics.

The Canadian representatives stressed the need to resolve questions through a conference of the international movement. Peng Chen agreed to the need for such a conference but attached three significant conditions to the conference agenda:

1. It must deal with the strategy and tactics of the proletarian revolution;

2. It must deal with the relations of Communist Parties to each other; and

3. Such a conference would have to allow a majority to decide on the correctness of the issues. Peng said that the CPC could not trust the leadership of Khrushchev because he had openly and unilaterally violated a resolution regarding Yugoslavia at the 81-Party Congress.

In view of the suggested agenda, the Canadians raised the question with the Chinese as to whether one party can be the judge or repository of all that is correct. They asked what were the roots of these disputes which were disturbing the entire world communist movement including elements in the Canadian Party. As



these questions were raised, the Chinese answered only the questions they cared to answer and then only in an atmosphere of hostility.

Peng engaged in a lengthy dissertation on imperialism and attacked the United States as being the main enemy. He said that the Moscow Declaration of 1957 said that peace is the paramount question, but, in fact, peace is only one point among others. He discussed the thesis of armed struggle as against the thesis of peaceful transition. In this connection he attacked the Popular Socialist Party of Cuba because it did not prepare for armed struggle and became isolated from the Cuban people. He described Castro as "one of the greatest Marxist-Leninist leaders, who saved Cuba, engaged in armed struggle, and won."

As these discussions developed, the CPC leaders kept emphasizing the necessity of civil war and used one-sided arguments to disprove the thesis of peaceful transition.

On the question of a "united front" they developed a similar line. They said they were for a "united front" even with the national bourgeoisie, but the approach should be "to hang our so-called allies, the Social Democrats." This, it is noted, is in contradiction to the Moscow Declaration since this Declaration emphasized the need for a "united front" with Social Democrats.

The Chinese throughout the discussions placed the national liberation question first as against the class struggle. They stressed that the colonial countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America will lead the revolution.

Continuing on the question of war and peace, the Chinese said, "How can we defend peace? First build socialism, then defend peace. We must first depend on the national independence movement in the colonies, then on the peace movement."

Summing up the results of these discussions, it could be concluded that the Chinese in April, 1963, were encouraging any and all Parties to join in the fight for their position even if it meant splitting the international communist movement. The CPC was dogmatically interpreting the Lenin theory of ousting the opportunists at the time of the struggle with the Mensheviks in the early 1900s and wanted to repeat this in the form of a split in every Party, even though the situation in the world today is quite different than at the time of Lenin's struggle with the Mensheviks.

The Canadian delegation reported back to their Executive Committee that while they were in discussion with the Chinese leaders they felt like prisoners in the dock who were being abused, berated, and could not appeal to any logic as far as the Chinese reaction was concerned. They left the conference with the belief that there were many difficulties lying ahead before an international conference of Parties could convene. The Chinese left the impression that they were actively organizing factions in many Parties and that there were pro-Chinese elements in the Canadian Communist Party.

XIV. CPSU VIEWS AIMS OF CPC AS DIRECTED  
TOWARD BUILDING UNITED WORLD ANTI-  
IMPERIALIST FRONT BASED ON  
NATIONALISM AND RACISM - SHIFT  
OF "CENTER" FROM MOSCOW TO PEKING

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In May, 1963, CPSU leaders including Boris N. Ponomarev, Member of the Secretariat, CCCPSU in charge of the International Department, and V. G. Korianov, his chief deputy in the International Department, CCCPSU, in intimate discussions with leaders of other Parties, engaged in open attacks on the CPC.

They stated that the CPC had lost its perspective and faith in socialism. It no longer thinks in terms of socialist revolution but rather it thinks in terms of national liberation movements. Thus, they are concentrating on the three "A's," referring to Asia, Africa and Latin America. They desire to form a united world anti-imperialist front based on "nationalism and racism." This is part of the CPC philosophy and what it wishes to do is to split or separate themselves from the present world communist revolutionary movement. The Chinese are planning the formation of a new Communist International and are known to have made overtures to the Australian CP to join this new International. This offer was refused by the Australian Party, but the Chinese indicated they were further continuing their plans for a new Communist International with Peking as the "center." When the leadership of the Australian CP refused their offer, the Chinese organized a split-off pro-Chinese group of their own in Australia, headed by an expelled member of the Australian CP.

The Russians stated that the CPC in violation of the 81-Party Conference has continued to engage in splitting tactics in from 20 to 30 Parties, including Brazil, Canada, France, Italy, Belgium and the United States.

They are also engaging in splitting tactics in organizing six new international organizations of women, youth, students, peace, sports and an international trade union organization.

The CPSU representatives stated that the CPC has also organized centers for women in Brazil, Uruguay, Panama and Mexico. The CPC has influence in Brazil through a group of expelled CP members. It is supplying this group with arms and is training this group for guerilla warfare. The CPC bought out the CP of New Zealand "lock, stock and barrel." For the past two months the CPC has been attempting to promote its line and policy in Africa, Asia and Latin American countries.

During these discussions with members of the CPSU leadership, it was learned that the CPC and CPSU had agreed to meet on current differences on July 5, 1963. Yet three days after they had reached this agreement, Liu Shao-chi, Chairman of the PRC, said in a speech, "The foreign policy of socialist countries must not be reduced into the single aspect of peaceful coexistence." This statement itself, according to the CPSU leaders, is in violation of agreements made at the 81-Party Conference.

V. G. Korianov said that insofar as the CPC is concerned, it is simply a racist problem, that is, yellow and black

against white. He reported that in a private conversation with CPSU leaders, Chou En-lai reportedly said "East is East. We are one people. We have nothing to do with you. China can change the world."

Korianov stated that the CPSU disagrees with the race issue and as communists could never accept this thinking. He stated the class struggle is the basic tenet of Marxism-Leninism.

Continuing, he said that now the Chinese are trying to shift the center of the revolution from Moscow to Peking. The signing of the 81-Party Statement in 1960 by the Chinese did not indicate that they had retreated from this position. Rather the signing meant nothing. They have moved further away from that agreement.

Another CPSU leader speaking at the same time stated that the question of achieving unity with the Chinese is not simple. The CPSU will be most circumspect in accepting CPC proposals and will not compromise on principles. The CPSU may compromise on a government level to effect better relations, but such compromise would be in effect a "face saving device."

Continuing, the CPSU leaders stated that with regard to the July 5, 1963, meeting agreed to by the Chinese, the CPSU had already received information from a friendly party that the CPC would go to the Moscow meeting only to restate its position and would do nothing more. The CPSU leader said that in view of this development the CPSU intends to do the same - merely restate its position.

A. CASTRO AND THE SINO-SOVIET  
RIFT, AUGUST, 1963

In 1963 Fidel Castro visited the USSR and had personal conversations with Premier Khrushchev. The invitation was extended in order to win Castro into closer cooperation with the USSR.

According to CPSU leaders, Khrushchev made efforts to convince Castro that he wanted Cuba utilized as an example for other Latin American countries, and to accomplish this there were several things that Castro must do. He must build a solid economy and work hard so that the glow of the Cuban revolution will continue to be reflected on the other Latin American countries.

V. Korianov, Deputy to the Head of the International Department, CCCPSU, indicated in August, 1963, that the Russians did not consider Castro completely in rein but that he, Castro, no longer speaks like the Chinese. Further, that since Castro's visit to the USSR, the Chinese had not mentioned him in their press or other public media.

The Russians, however, are still concerned that Castro might still come under the influence of Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Deputy Premier and Minister of Industry of Cuba, and others around him and felt it necessary from time to time to have other Latin American comrades visit Cuba and influence him to do the things which the USSR cannot directly tell him to do.

Insofar as Guevara is concerned, the CPSU said that he was a communist in good standing when he left Argentina but was among those who advocated armed uprisings and adventurism. Guevara left Argentina when the CP of Argentina told him his views were anarchistic, and as a result Guevara went into voluntary exile, looking for greener pastures.

XV. CPC-CPSU CONFERENCE, MOSCOW,  
USSR, JULY 5-20, 1963

A confidential meeting between leading representatives of the CPSU and the CPC was held in Moscow, USSR, from July 5 to 20, 1963, for the purpose of discussing differences between the Parties. The CPC delegation was headed by Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary of the CPC, with the Russian delegation being headed by Mikhail A. Suslov, a Member of the Presidium and a Secretary of the CCCPSU.

While both Parties indicated that this conference was to lay the groundwork for a subsequent conference, it was obvious from the beginning that both sides were not interested in settling differences and were more concerned with a reiteration and presentation of their respective positions before the Parties of the international communist movement.

Teng Hsiao-ping made speeches on July 8 and 12, 1963, initially emphasizing that the CPC came to the meeting in an effort to achieve unity in the world communist movement.

He said, however, that the resolution of differences can only be achieved on the basis of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary principles contained in the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and the Moscow Statement of 1960.

Teng referred to a letter of the CPC of June 14, 1963, which he claimed explained the causes of the differences and then said that frankly the causes of the many differences stem from the 20th Congress, CPSU, which presented propositions running



counter to Marxism-Leninism on the question of war and peace, peaceful coexistence and the peaceful transition to socialism. He charged that the CPC had disagreed with the attacks on Stalin since 1956 and that Mao-Tse-tung as well as Chou En-lai and others had so told the Russians. He stated that the "cult of the personality" thesis led and paved the way to a revision of Marxism-Leninism.

Teng charged that the CPSU had adopted a position of "great power chauvinism" in Poland. It had encouraged revisionism and anti-Party factional groups in many fraternal parties. The CPSU itself began to take an opportunistic trend.

Elaborating on CPC charges of "big power chauvinism" by the CPSU, Teng related the fact that on April 7, 1958, Russia had proposed establishing a long-range radar station on Chinese soil and the establishment of a joint Chinese-Soviet fleet, thus trying to bring China under the military control of the USSR. Following refusal by the Chinese, the CPSU launched an anti-Chinese campaign including attacks on the communes.

Continuing, Teng charged that in June, 1959, the USSR unilaterally annulled its agreement to assist China in establishing an atomic industry and in manufacturing atomic bombs.

According to Teng, in September, 1959, a Tass news article presented a biased picture on the China-India border dispute and then in November, 1959, Khrushchev made a statement that the Chinese were behaving stupidly in the China-India border dispute.

Teng charged that at the Camp David meeting in September, 1959, Khrushchev spoke of a world without arms or armies and without wars, that he extolled United States imperialism in every way, that he considered peaceful coexistence as the "thing of things," and that Khrushchev also spoke of the idea that the United States-Soviet friendship would determine the destiny of mankind.

Teng said that on September 30, 1959, at a dinner in Peking on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the CPC, Khrushchev said one must not use force to test the stability of the capitalist system.

Teng said that on October 5, 1959, at Vladivostok, USSR, Khrushchev attacked the CPC, saying that "We (the Chinese) are striving for war as cocks strive for a fight,"

In his speech of July 12, 1963, Teng said that the CPSU charges against the CPC are a deliberate distortion of the basic position of the CPC, that the CPSU misinterprets and distorts the Moscow Declaration of 1957, that it holds to its special position and line and imposes the line of one Party on the world communist movement.

Teng said that the CPSU was exerting economic and military pressures on fraternal parties and was using the pretext of the **personality cult** as a basis for interfering in the internal affairs of fraternal parties. He said the CPSU exploits its congresses and the congresses of other Parties and uses all

conceivable means of propaganda to make open and direct attacks on other fraternal parties. It also encourages other Parties to attack some fraternal parties.

Teng charged the CPSU with turning the International Aid Fund into an instrument of the CPSU to conduct factional activities.

Summing this up, Teng said that all of these matters add up to great power chauvinism, dissension, and sectarianism and create a serious threat of a split in the socialist camp and in the world communist movement.

Teng said the CPC rejects the charge that the CPC is seeking to impose an adventurous policy on the whole world. It rejects the charge that the CPC has departed from Marxism-Leninism, as well as the charges of narrow nationalism, left opportunism and sectarianism.

Teng charged the CPSU with renouncing the struggle against imperialism and by so doing renouncing revolution and acting against revolution. This he claimed is undermining the unity of the socialist camp. He charged that the USSR has departed from the principles of proletarian internationalism and has embarked on a revisionist and opportunist line.

Teng charged that United States imperialism is trying to drive a wedge between the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic. He called for unity to deliver a blow against imperialism.

Mikhail Suslov replied to some of these charges in a speech on July 10, 1963. He traced the Chinese campaign against the CPSU and other Parties to the lessening of the tensions of the cold war which began in 1954. He saw a connection between the campaign against the CPSU and the difficulties which China was experiencing in the economic field as a result of its "leap forward" and the communes. He charged the Chinese with laying the blame for its difficulties at someone else's door.

Suslov defended the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the implementation of the decisions of this Congress with regard to the cult of the personality. He reiterated the soundness of the CPSU position on the character of the present epoch and charged that the Chinese thesis that the main contradictions of the present epoch are between imperialism and the national liberation movement is a departure from Marxism-Leninism. He stated that this is the case since the CPC ignores the working class as the leader of the revolutionary struggle. He charged the CPC with making the national liberation movement the central factor of the world revolutionary movement.

Suslov charged that the CPC had rejected the conclusions of the 20th Congress on the question of war and peace and peaceful coexistence as running counter to Marxism-Leninism. He said that the CPC did not recognize the possibility of preventing war and further that it underestimates the power of the world socialist

system and the peace forces, and overestimates the strength of imperialism.

A. CPSU Reaction to Failure of  
July 5-20, 1963, Meeting with CPC

Vitaly Korianov commented on the status of the rift following the July, 1963, meeting. He described the situation as in a state of change with the majority of Parties fighting the existing opportunistic nationalistic trend. He said the CPSU will again try to meet with the CPC because it feels it must show the world Marxist movement that it is trying to effect a reconciliation.

Due to the failure of the July 5-20, 1963, meeting of Central Committee representatives of the interested Parties to come to any agreement whatsoever, the CCCPSU directed that a letter be sent to the fraternal parties, setting out the CPSU version of what transpired at the meeting and to further develop the direction of CPSU policy. A secret "news letter" approved by the CPSU Presidium dated August 19, 1963, was prepared for dissemination to the leadership of the fraternal parties.

The letter, in essence, said that the Soviet Union entered into the meeting in a businesslike way and in a cooperative spirit to discuss:

1. Burning problems relating to the international situation;
2. Soviet-Chinese relations and the communist movement; and

3. To further prepare for an international conference of Communist Parties.

The letter charged that the CPC was not interested in eliminating differences but used the meeting for an assault on the decisions of the 20th and 22nd Congress of the CPSU and on the policies of the working class movement. The letter referred to a CPC letter of June 14, 1963, which it charged gave notice that the purpose of the CPC was to build tension, exacerbate the differences and extend the front of polemics.

It stated that the June, 1963, CPSU plenum denounced the slanderous attacks of the CPC made in the CPC letter of June 14, 1963.

The CPSU letter of August 19, 1963, detailed the "obvious" errors of the Chinese comrades and their distortions of basic principles of the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and the Moscow Statement of 1960.

The CPSU letter set forth a summary of the CPSU position as presented by M. A. Suslov and stated that he had proposed the following basic propositions for discussion:

1. To struggle for the further development of the might and cohesion of the world socialist system and to make it the decisive factor in the development of human society.

2. To struggle for peace and peaceful coexistence.

3. To struggle against the policy of aggression and war pursued by the imperialist camp headed by the United States.

4. To discuss questions relating to the national liberation movement and ways and means whereby the socialist countries can support the liberation struggle of oppressed nations.

5. To discuss questions of strengthening the unity and cohesion of the world communist movement.

6. To discuss other questions of interest to both Parties dealing with Sino-Soviet relations. Albania and Yugoslavia were also suggested.

The CPSU letter states that the CPSU dealt with each question in detail and set out the viewpoint of the CPSU.

It was shown in the secret "news letter" that the CPC leadership's thoughts on key questions departed from the common line of the communist movement, particularly in the following areas:

1. The main contradictions of the contemporary epoch.
2. War and peace.
3. Appraisal of the role of the socialist system.
4. The national liberation movement in the revolutionary process.
5. So-called intermediate zones.
6. The relation of peaceful coexistence policy to the revolutionary struggle.
7. The role of the revolutionary movement in developed capitalistic countries,

8. The attitude toward the ideology and practices of the personality cult.

9. Relations between the socialist countries.

The CPSU letter of August 19, 1963, claimed that an examination of the CPC letter of June 14, 1963, extended the differences further by raising the question of a new general line. It struck out the existing general line of the working class movement contained in the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement.

Continuing, the CPSU letter stated that the CPC in rebuttal made countless attacks against the program of the CPSU on the struggle of the personality cult, the development of the dictatorship of the proletariat, etc. It charges that Teng, speaking for the CPC, evaded the problems of principle submitted for joint discussion. It charged that his speech was an assortment of distorted views, falsification of facts and insulting threats against the Soviet Union and the Marxist-Leninist Parties.

The CPSU letter stated that the CPC charged the USSR with adventurism and defeatism for the Soviet position on Cuba. It stated that the CPC had demonstrated that they refused to reckon with the distinctive features of modern times that shape the revolutionary movement. The CPC strives for the position of permanent revolution - the export of revolution.

The CPSU letter recounts that the CPSU has demonstrated that it is impossible in "our times" to advance the cause of the



socialist revolution without an active struggle for the prevention of thermonuclear war, and without rallying the masses to the banner of peace, democracy and national independence in an anti-imperialistic front.

The CPSU letter stated that the CPC delegates at the July 5-20, 1963, meeting ignored all facts and repeatedly failed to discuss concrete problems and made no positive proposals. Finally at the end of the session of July 19, the Chinese delegation proposed to adjourn the meeting. There was a motion to adjourn the meeting and to issue a communique. It was suggested that open polemics relative to this matter be ended but the Chinese opposed this portion of the motion.

The CPSU letter then outlined the basic problems and questions existing between the CPSU and the CPC from the Soviet point of view. These were essentially the same points as existed at the opening of the meeting.

The CPSU secret letter of August 19, 1963, lists the following conclusions of the CPSU as a result of its meeting of July 5-20, 1963:

1. There was a clash of lines of the two delegations-- the line of the world communist movement (that of the CPSU) defined by the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and the Moscow Statement of 1960, and the CPC line that wants to openly revise these policies in a left sectarian spirit and replace them by an adventurist, nationalist, disruptive policy. The CPC is bent on defaming the world fraternal parties.

2. The CPC delegation came to camouflage and maneuver, hypocritically showing a willingness to hold discussions but in reality pushing their line against the CPSU and other Parties. A comparison with their 1960 statements shows that they have pushed further and in a more undisguised form.

3. Numerous facts show that the CPC leadership is striving for hegemony in an overt form to achieve leadership of the world Communist Parties but differing from the line of the world communist movement.

4. The CPC refusal to stop open polemics shows they are bent on a disruptive stepped-up campaign. They will use the time between the first and second round of talks for further attacks on the CPSU and other Parties. They will back splinter groups and will continue to sow ideological confusion and chaos in the ranks of the world communist movement.

5. The CPC leadership is out to split the communist movement despite their 1960 pledge and will try to divert the communist movement on an adventurist and sectarian path.

6. This will cause serious damage to the common struggle for peace, against the imperialist policy of aggression and war, to the entire international working class movement, and to the communist and national liberation movement. All forms of renegades will take up with them.

7. The left phrases used by the CPC were merely a smoke screen behind which they conceal their special aims and designs.

Their desire is to keep up world tensions and sabotage the fight to prevent nuclear war or achieve disarmament. This is shown by their position on India and the Caribbean. They are also fanning racial and national discord. Their false theory of the "intermediate zone" includes everyone but the United States. Their advocacy of great power adventurism is nationalistic in aim.

8. The result of this policy will be that the CPC will link up with Trotskyism.

9. "We draw the conclusion since they do not back down from their present policy that we must intensify our struggle against left sectarianism, against factionalism, and continue to defend our internationalist Marxist-Leninist line. Defending all fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties, we identify ourselves with all Parties attacked."

10. "We will show self-restraint in order to exhaust all opportunities to prevent a split in the world communist movement. Lenin's bequest places the world revolutionary movement above everything else and that is why we have agreed to continue talks with the CPC."

This document is signed by the CCCPSU.

In August, 1963, Boris N. Ponomarev and Vitaly Korianov discussed the July, 1963, meeting. Ponomarev charged that the CPC is striving for hegemony in the world communist movement. He said that the CPSU is now preparing for a conference of fraternal parties to be held in about six months. He did not believe that the CPC could be kept from this conference. He considered the Chinese as "mad men."

Ponomarev and Korianov noted that it was clear that the Chinese are steering a resolute course for a split. It is a fact within the international communist movement that the policies of the CPC indicate a new opportunistic trend within the movement, not yet clearly defined. It might be called "left communism" or perhaps "nationalistic communism." What are the signs of this trend? They said that the first sign is nationalism and particularly that the inspirer of this new nationalism is a party in power in a big country. The trend is based on: 1) nationalism and 2) on a loss of confidence in the forces of socialism in China and in the international arena. One of the basic reasons for this loss of confidence by China is its inability to solve its economic problems. This has undermined its faith in socialist construction and leads China to move closer to the Western camp economically. All of these facts show that the Chinese have strayed from the camp of socialism.

The third feature, according to Ponomarev and Korianov, is the transformation of dogmatism and sectarianism. China has now gone beyond mere dogmatism and sectarianism, and this current is now on a splitting course which it is pursuing in each Party in the entire communist movement. They reiterated that reports are coming back to the effect that China is doing preparatory work to the formation of a new communist international. The Chinese approached Japanese communist leaders and suggested that it was necessary for each Party to establish as opposition a revolutionary grouping. These groups, according to Ponomarev

and Korianov, cannot be underestimated or ignored in many countries. They exist in the United States and in many other countries.

Continuing, Korianov and Ponomarev said that there is a factual linking up of the Chinese with Trotskyism. The CPC is attracting the Trotskyites for the establishment of a new international.

Another feature of the present situation might be called anti-Sovietism, and this concerns not only Party problems but is transferred also to state relations.

Concluding, Ponomarev and Korianov said that the Chinese, as the CPSU sees it, have launched a cold war against the Soviet Union and other Parties. They are spreading their literature and using all sorts of dirty methods and tactics in their fight. Chinese anti-Sovietism has now come out into the open. Their splitting tactics are not only confined to Communist Parties but are also undermining and splitting all democratic mass organizations. They have not been paying dues to those organizations but come to their congresses and try to break them up or to split them.

According to Ponomarev and Korianov, the Chinese are trying to split these people's organizations in Asia, Africa and Latin America from the world organizations. They are making attempts to form new world-wide organizations based chiefly in Asia, in the trade unions, among writers, women and peace organizations.

## XVI. BORDER INCIDENTS BETWEEN USSR AND CHINA

Representatives of the CCCPSU International Department remarked in August, 1963, that during the past several years there had been 156 border incidents of one type or another. The most serious of these incidents occurred on the border between the USSR and China which was heavily populated by Chinese Moslems and involved 60,000 persons who crossed the border into the USSR. They were practically starving and came across the border for food. The Government of China demanded that the USSR drive the peasants back to China with the use of machine guns if necessary.

In the view of these CPSU representatives, none of these border incidents were of great significance. The main concern of the CPSU with regard to these incidents is the fear that perhaps in the future substantially larger numbers of Chinese could cross the border into the Soviet Union. It was noted that these people are Asian and not European and that future incursions by millions of Chinese would concern the Soviet Union, bearing in mind the historical references to invasion by millions of Asians under Genghis Khan. The Chinese are fighting for hegemony of the world.

## XVII. ALIGNMENT OF FORCES IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, SEPTEMBER, 1963

Based upon comments and opinions rendered by a number of individuals holding leadership positions in the CPSU as of September, 1963, it appeared that the overwhelming majority of Communist and Workers Parties throughout the world are now

supporting the ideological position of the CPSU in the current Sino-Soviet rift.

In Europe, for example, the Albanian Party of Labor is the only Party echoing the CPC viewpoint. Most European Parties have some individuals or small factions who support the Chinese, but none of these Parties reported a threat to existing Party leadership.

All the Parties in Africa are organizationally at this stage anti-Chinese and endorse the CPSU although the Chinese have made both economic and political inroads in these areas. They are particularly interested in Africa and are utilizing the "racial and nationalistic" approach.

In Latin America all the Parties support the CPSU though some CPC influence is noted in these Parties. The CP of Venezuela is a possible exception in that there is a group in the Party leadership that favors armed rebellion although there is a split in the leadership on this question.

The CP of Brazil fully supports the CPSU but within the ranks there are dissidents. A pro-Chinese group is now publishing a weekly newspaper in Brazil.

In Asia and the Far East the CPC has the support of the Malaya and Burma Parties and has "bought out" the CP of New Zealand. The proximity of Malaya and Burma to China, and the fact that these Parties maintain headquarters in Peking make support of the CPC almost mandatory.

The Korean Party of Labor and the Workers Party of Vietnam are lined up against the CPSU.

The CP of Japan is now inclined toward the Chinese, and according to leaders of the world communist movement, this Party too has been bought up by the CPC. There is a minority in the CP of Japan leadership which favors the CPSU.

The vast majority of Communist and Workers Parties desire the CPSU and the CPC to continue to meet, but few believe that the differences can be resolved. The majority of Parties favor international gatherings but ask that there be no compromise on principles.

XVIII. SOVIET GOVERNMENT ATTACKS  
PRC, SEPTEMBER, 1963

On September 21, 1963, the Soviet Government published an official statement in Izvestia, organ of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which was widely reprinted in the press and in pamphlet form and distributed throughout the world.

This statement emphasized again the deepening of the conflict and was provoked by a statement of the Government of China of September 1, 1963, on the subject of the treaty banning nuclear testing which was negotiated by the USSR, Britain and the United States.

The Soviet statement makes the charge that the Chinese are using a Government statement to "slander the CPSU" on a wide range of questions in which the CPC and CPSU had differences. It



states that the Chinese statement of September 1, 1963, can no longer be considered as a comradely discussion between communists but as "actions of people who have set themselves the aim of discrediting at any cost the CPSU and the Soviet Union, of splitting the communist movement and undermining the unity of the anti-imperialist forces."

The Soviet Government statement charges the Chinese with "trying to degrade the discussion on principled questions of our times to the level of a vociferous exchange of angry words and angry accusations." It states that the Soviet Government will not trade abuse for abuse but finds it necessary to again restate its position.

The Soviet statement referred to a previous USSR statement of August 21, 1963, which it said "exposed the actual motives that guided the Chinese leaders in their opposition to the nuclear test ban Treaty--it showed their desire to acquire their own bomb at any cost."

The statement examines the motives which prompted the Peking "giants" to rush into battle against the nuclear test ban treaty. It concludes that it is the Chinese desire to make their country a nuclear power. It charges the Chinese with being "provocative" in posing the question of "monopoly" on nuclear weapons and in placing a socialist state on the same footing as the "imperialists."

The statement then criticizes the "Chinese commune" program, noting that the CPSU saw the dangers of this road as

abusing every Marxist-Leninist principle of material incentive. It states that today the Chinese seek to blame the USSR for failure of the PRC economy because of a violation of economic agreements and because of the recall of specialists. It lays the failure of the Chinese economic outlook on the violation of Marxist-Leninist principles and grave mistakes made by the PRC Government.

The document rejects the Chinese claim of the USSR settling for "two Chinas"---and reiterates that the PRC Government itself had advanced the idea of "peaceful reunification" of China.

On the question of border disputes, the statement notes the Soviet Government has, a number of times, called for consultations, but that the Chinese evade such consultations while continuing to violate the border and at the same time the Chinese propaganda machine makes hints of unjust demarcation of some of the sections of the Chinese-Soviet borders. It notes that the artificial creation of territorial problems would be tantamount to a very dangerous path where states begin to make territorial claims. Such propaganda instigates "national passion."

The Soviet statement accuses the Chinese leaders of pursuing their own "great power aims" and of using Cuba, for example, to exploit the crisis for their own factional ends.

The statement continues and emphasizes that the CPSU is interested in strengthening unity between the CPSU and the CPC, but that all practical steps in this direction have been for

nought. Rather, while these efforts were being made, the CPC leaders "are going farther and farther along the road of a split."

The Soviet statement notes that disagreements between the Parties "are being extended by them (the Chinese) more and more to inter-state relations. The Chinese Government has resorted to openly hostile acts against the Soviet Union. Its foreign policy steps contradict more and more the peaceloving policy of the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community."

Continuing, the Soviet Government alleges that more recent statements by the Chinese leaders gave rise to apprehensions in another area. The Chinese have not only outdone themselves in the number of abuses but have breached secrecy of internal affairs of the international communist movement. They divulged confidential correspondence between the Governments and Parties of socialist countries, international talks and meetings of fraternal parties. It states that the CPC has slandered the CCCPSU, its leadership and leaders of the other Communist and Workers Parties and "especially Comrade N. S. Khrushchev."

It charges the Chinese have "transcended the boundaries of comradely Party discussion and are now waging an open political struggle against the CPSU and the other Marxist-Leninist Parties, for their special goals."

Continuing, it states "The Soviet people reject wrathfully and indignantly this unseemly campaign against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, against the world communist

movement." It states that "it is highly impermissible to transfer differences in ideological questions, disagreements arising among Parties, to relations between socialist states--to use them as a pretext to fan nationalism and chauvinism, mistrust and disunity among the peoples of these states."

The statement then calls for ceasing of open polemics because "only people who pay lip service to unity, while actually pursuing a splitting policy, can refuse to end the polemics." It expresses a willingness to discuss the differences in the interest of unity of socialist countries. It continues by warning that if the factional activity continues, the Chinese "will meet with the most resolute rebuff from the CPSU and the Soviet people."

Concluding, the statement indicates that the Soviet Union will not retreat from the principles of Marxism-Leninism and will not be budged by any "adventuristic attacks" on its policy.

One can only conclude that since this statement appeared in the name of the Soviet Government, the chief concern of the CPSU as of September, 1963, was that the Chinese had brought the differences among the Parties into affairs of government, and the CPSU felt the need for expressing itself in the strongest of language so that its position and that of the Chinese would be apparent to the eyes of the world. Thus, the CPSU hoped that in the event of a severance of international ties, the governments of the world would be on notice as to the views of the Soviets on "peace and peaceful coexistence."

A. Soviets Explore Possibility of an  
Opposition to Present CPC Leadership  
in the PRC - Late 1963

Timur Timofeev, Deputy Director, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, an affiliate of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, in confidential discussions in November, 1963, stated that the CPSU is presently engaged in carrying out a program of interviewing all Soviet experts and technicians who had worked in the PRC. It is debriefing such individuals in order to secure every bit of information possible with the purpose in mind of attempting to determine if there might be a possibility of the establishment today in China of an opposition to the present CPC leadership.

In this regard Timofeev noted that he had learned that the debriefing of the Soviet experts and technicians who had been among the last to leave China seemed to point out that there was no possibility of reconciliation with the present leadership of the CPC and the PRC insofar as the Soviets were concerned. In view of this, according to Timofeev, the CPSU officials emphasized that there must be no illusion or false hopes held for such a reconciliation. The CPSU will therefore pursue the tactical line of letting the Chinese "yell themselves hoarse" and be labelled as splitters.

B. Status of Sino-Soviet  
Relations, Mid November, 1963

In mid-November, 1963, Boris N. Ponomarev, Member of the Secretariat and Head of the International Department, CCCPSU, gave a confidential briefing to selected members of the other Communist Parties wherein he reported on the current status of the Sino-Soviet differences. The essence of Ponomarev's remarks at that time are as follows:

"Have no illusions that the CPC and the CPSU will agree. However, there may be some effort to improve relations with the Chinese.

"We know many Parties have been hurt by the Chinese. For this reason we are trying to use the technique of trying to help other Parties by muzzling these things; that is, the vocal expression by the CPC and their attacks on other Parties. However, the CPC has just published another book, 'Two Lines of War and Peace,' which is in our opinion diametrically opposed to our concept of international developments as related to peaceful coexistence and disarmament."

Continuing, Ponomarev stated that the CPSU had hoped that during the summer of 1963 it would have obtained some positive results from the July meeting with the CPC. He stated that Khrushchev had tried to do everything possible to avoid a split, and in fact since the 81-Party Conference in 1960 the CPSU has attempted to minimize the differences between the Parties in order to avoid such a split.

Ponomarev, continuing, outlined a number of efforts by the CPSU to bring about comradely discussions with the Chinese including an approach by Khrushchev to the Chinese Ambassador Liu Hsiao when he left for China in the fall of 1962. These efforts were interpreted by the CPC as a "sign of weakness."

Ponomarev stated that the CPC takes the position that all Parties of the world are opportunists and that therefore the Chinese are going ahead with their efforts to split all the Parties if they can.

He indicated that the most disgraceful action of the CPC is the ideological attack on the Soviet Union because by so doing they are calling for a split in the socialist camp. He stated that the CPC claims that they are only against the leadership of the CPSU, but the CPSU knows they are against the CPSU and the Soviet Union.

At this point Ponomarev discussed the prospects of a new international meeting of Communist and Workers Parties. He stated the CPSU had given this matter a lot of thought, and at the moment, if an international meeting were called, it would mean an open split. This he said "would mean a split not only of the Communist and Workers Parties but a split of the socialist camp as well. They, the CPC, in the event of such a conference and/or split, would have only 10 or 12 Parties with them. This does not seem like much but nevertheless it would mean a separation."

Continuing, with regard to the possibility of a new conference of Communist Parties, Ponomarev stated that to call an early world meeting would not do. The CPSU needs a lot of time and feels it must try to have a meeting with the CPC prior to such a world meeting. The purpose of such a preliminary meeting would be to see if the contending Parties could not work out some manner of get-together if such a conference was called. He re-emphasized that the CPSU would not agree to a meeting of world Parties if sacrificing any Marxist-Leninist principles would be required. Secondly, he stated that in case the CPC continues to struggle against the very line of the world movement and the CPSU is ready to call a conference, it would need time to prepare for the drafting of documents and in this connection would have to consult other Parties on this matter. Therefore, the CPSU, as of now, sees no possibility of a world conference of Parties in the near future and the CPSU position on such a conference is as follows:

First the CPSU is against a split in the communist movement, yet at the same time a fear of a split will not cause the CPSU to give in on any principled matter. The CPSU will continue to fight for its line and for the line of the world communist movement.

Ponomarev stated that the CPC has its strategic plan to split all the Communist Parties and to establish Communist Parties under its own leadership. They are going about perfecting



this plan in many countries and are seeking to split off a number of people from Parties. This has already occurred in Brazil, Chile, Belgium, Switzerland and other countries. Once these groups are established, they assume the title of a Party, and the CPC will argue that if a conference is held these Parties as Marxist-Leninist Parties should also be invited to any world conference.

Ponomarev recognized that there are some Parties that now agree with the Chinese. He said the CPSU does not object to the various Parties bringing their influence to bear in contact with individual Parties including the Chinese, but that the individual Communist Parties will have to work out the basis of persuasion. However, contact with other Parties, to be of use, should not be limited to leadership but must be established with broad sections of the membership.

Concerning the reaction of the CPC to the latest moves of the CPSU for the discontinuance of open polemics, Ponomarev stated that the Chinese had not responded. He stated that the CPC is acting in a way that it seems to the CPSU it may have to intensify its own polemics. Despite these actions of the CPC, the CPSU was proposing to stop polemics.

Ponomarev concluded his remarks by relating a story the source of which he said was from China and is therefore not always completely reliable. However, he stated, "I will vouch for the following.

"We know that recently in Peking a very important Party meeting was held. At the moment I cannot tell you if it was a

Politburo meeting or a plenum, but at this meeting Liu Shao-chi, Chairman of the PRC and Assistant Chairman of the CCCPC, spoke and said the following, 'One of the results of the line pursued by the CPC is the fact that we have shaken the idols, altars and gods of the church. Let us destroy all of these idols, altars and gods completely and we, ourselves, will be the gods.'

C. One More Effort by CPSU  
to Effect Conciliation

In December, 1963, a confidential letter dated November 29, 1963, from N. S. Khrushchev, First Secretary, CCCPSU, directed to "The CCCPC - Comrade Mao Tse-tung" was obtained. The letter in essence states:

Khrushchev notes that a number of documents had recently been published which publicly outlined the positions of the Marxist-Leninist Parties on the principal problems of the international communist movement raised in the current discussions. He states that "These documents have demonstrated the existence of serious differences within the international communist movement (and a) different understanding and interpretation of the declarations and statements of the Moscow Conferences."

Khrushchev notes that the CPSU and other fraternal parties, "irrespective of their attitudes, are seriously concerned with the fact that the differences are growing deeper and deeper, the scale of the debate is widening, with sharp and frank polemics assuming forms inadmissible in relations among Marxist-Leninists."

He expresses "concern" that ideological differences are transplanted to the "inter-state relations and influence in the sphere of concrete policies, thus weakening friendship and unity of the socialist community," and such a situation within the communist movement cannot but cause grievance on "our part."

Khrushchev called attention to repeated statements of the CPSU to the effect that abnormal relations between the CPSU and the CPC disrupt the strength and forces of the communist movement and benefit "only our enemies" who use existing differences for anti-communist purposes. He expressed concern as to the effect these differences are having on fraternal parties despite a reply of the CPC to the Soviet Ambassador to China, Chervonenko, to the effect that "The skies will not fall down, grass and trees will go on growing, women will bear children and fish will swim in the water."

Khrushchev pointed out that comrades in all countries want "unity" of action because without unity the struggle against the class enemy will be more difficult.

He states that in the present situation an "important and urgent" task of Marxist-Leninists is to turn from the "dangerous precipice" to normalization and consolidation "of all fraternal parties, all socialist countries."

He asserts that now as never before has the validity of Lenin's words regarding duties of Parties to give priority to the cardinal interests of the communist movement been more apparent.

Khrushchev pledged the CPSU to do everything possible for strengthening the unity of the communist movement.

He next outlined the thoughts of the CPSU as to what both Parties could do to achieve the aim of unity of communist movement.

He enumerated these thoughts as follows:

1. Despite serious differences there is a real basis for improving relations in the common struggle for socialism and communism, in supporting revolutionary labor and national liberation movements, and in the struggle for peace against aggressive intrigues of imperialism.

2. Both Parties hold objectively identical positions on the class struggle, the struggle against imperialism, and for the victory of the workers and all working people for the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Though the Parties do not always interpret these questions in the same way, it was felt by Khrushchev that a discussion in a calm and unprejudiced way could result in broad possibilities, not only for the maintenance but also for the development and strengthening of cooperation along numerous lines.

He suggested that now that both sides as well as the other fraternal parties have expressed their opinions on the

controversial questions, that it would be appropriate not to stress the "problems" on which the Parties differ but to wait for the tension to ease and "let time do its work."

Khrushchev then suggested that at the same time the Parties and countries could develop cooperation in the fields where cooperation is possible. In this area, he specifically suggested the development of cooperation in strengthening friendship between the Soviet Union and China and all socialist countries and with all fraternal parties through coordination of activities in various international organizations in order to achieve a common aim of securing peace and promoting a struggle against imperialism.

He suggested further the possibilities for cooperation in the economic field, scientific, technical and cultural fields. This, Khrushchev felt, was possible in view of recent public statements by Chou En-lai who spoke to the press of China's intentions to develop contacts with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and of China's adherence to the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

Khrushchev then suggested as an immediate objective that the two countries start working for trade exchange between the PRC and the USSR and proposed that the Soviet Union in the next few years could substantially increase its exports to China as well as its imports from China.

He recalled that an agreement was signed on May 13, 1962, by the respective governments calling for a reopening of negotiations on the delivery of "complete sets of equipment," the production of which was delayed for two years at the request of the Chinese.

He also indicated the amenability of the Soviet Union for the expansion of technical assistance in construction of industries if the Chinese show such an interest, and he particularly offered technical assistance in the oil industry, in the building of mining enterprises and in other fields "on conditions favorable for both our countries."

Khrushchev next proposed that in view of the fact that both countries are engaged in drawing up new five year plans, that discussions be held on the development of commercial and other ties for approval and incorporation in the national economic plans of both countries.

He next stated, "Of course, it is never too late to begin a welcome process of strengthening cooperation between the USSR and PRC, but it is better to come to it right now."

He pointed out that both countries would gain from broadening the scientific and technical cooperation and from developing all cultural ties. He solicited the views of the CPC toward cooperation in the economic, scientific and cultural fields but only "if you consider that this corresponds to the interests of China." He stressed the value of economic cooperation for

both countries as well as for the socialist countries as being important for the building of socialism and communism.

He stressed that agreements on economic cooperation will also build valuable conditions for normalizing relations in other fields and will facilitate the settlement of other problems which influence relations between the countries.

He stated that he recognizes that recent developments on the China-USSR border "cannot be regarded as normal." In this regard he called attention to Soviet proposals to hold friendly consultations on "demarcation of some parts of the border line, considering that this will eliminate causes for existing misunderstanding." He acknowledged that China likewise had expressed itself favorably in intentions to solve this problem by mutual agreement.

Khrushchev next reminded the CPC of recent statements in the PRC concerning the "aggressive policy of the Tzarist Government" and unfair agreements imposed on China. He said the Soviet Union would not defend the Russian Tzars on setting up the borders, and on the other hand the Soviet Union is certain that China is not going to defend the Chinese Emperors who had taken territories by force of arms. He said that denouncing the exploiter clique will not help the situation and "we cannot but face the reality of the existence of historically established frontiers between the states." Any attempt, said Khrushchev, to ignore this reality can become a source of misunderstanding and conflict that will not resolve the problem.

Khrushchev called for both Parties to create favorable conditions and to avoid everything that might aggravate differences within the communist movement.

He asked Mao to go forward, step by step, and not to permit any actions that might undermine unity.

Khrushchev next asked for agreement not to let open polemics come out of control and reminded the CPC that the CPSU appealed to this course of action in August and as recently as November 7, 1963. Further, that the CPSU stopped publishing articles of a polemic character. He called again on the CCCPC to stop open polemics and other actions detrimental to the unity of the international communist.

Khrushchev was clear in stating that the CPSU was not proposing an all-out exchange on basic problems of world development. He said the CCCPSU in making these proposals proceeds from the position that such proposals would contribute towards strengthening the confidence of the Parties and would create more favorable conditions for the preparation of an international meeting of Communist and Workers Parties.

Khrushchev then again emphasized that if such a meeting occurred, it must be fruitful. It must be fruitful in order not to split the world communist movement, and it must bring about unity of all Parties and forces of peace and socialism.



The letter concludes by reiterating that the CPSU is motivated exclusively by its concern for strengthening unity. Some differences may exist in ideological problems but time will correct "those who are mistaken." The letter is signed by N. S. Khrushchev, First Secretary, Central Committee, CPSU, and dated November 29, 1963.

XX. FURTHER DEFECTIONS FROM  
CPSU VIEWS NOTED IN ASIA

In conversations with a leading member of the Editorial Board of the "World Marxist Review" in Prague during November, 1963, it was learned that the CP of Indonesia is now aligned with the CPC and is threatening to withdraw its members from the "World Marxist Review" staff. Also, the North Korean Party of Labor has now officially withdrawn its staff from the "World Marxist Review." This leading official stated that these actions have been the result of the widening ideological differences which now exist between the CPSU and the CPC.

## XXI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The information developed in this paper has clearly established that a deep rift exists in Sino-Soviet relations today at both the ideological and state levels and that it continues to grow sharper.

In the foreseeable future, it does not appear that this breach will be healed despite constant efforts by the Russians to effect a reconciliation. It would require a change in the international picture of major proportions to force either of these great Communist Parties into reuniting in behalf of its own national interests, but such an eventuality cannot be ignored.

Each of these Parties wants to place the onus for the split on the other. There is an additional complicated problem at present for the CPSU because at the present time it is virtually impossible for the CPSU to call an international conference of Communist Parties. The reason for this is that the Chinese have set up parties of their own, some of which are small in number, in countries where Communist Parties exist, and would insist that not only the official Communist Parties but also representatives of the split-off parties be represented. This is a dilemma which the CPSU, as of late November, 1963, had been unable to resolve.

The rift is also complicated by differences of national interests which basically involve spheres of influence in the world. It has important racial connotations as definitely stressed by the

Chinese leadership, involving potential alignments of the black and yellow races against the peoples of the white race. It involves a question of a schism in the world communist movement with possible communist "centers" in Peking and Moscow.

Potentially, the ramifications of this rift could involve all nations and continents of the world. Asia, Africa and Latin America are very much in the fore in connection with the struggle for spheres of influence. The Chinese have sloganized this into the three "A's," Asia, Africa and Latin America. The free world has an important stake in the outcome of this rift. It is difficult to conceive of the consequences to the free world, if a reconciliation of these communist powers comes about, which could result in combining their efforts to communize Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Yet, the CPSU considers the Chinese as a potential enemy and is fearful that the Chinese will effect a formal ideological break with the CPSU and the CPSU would move heaven and earth to prevent such a break. This is evidenced by the recent letter of Premier Khrushchev to Mao Tse-tung and the CCCPC of November 29, 1963.

The leadership of the CPC headed by Mao Tse-tung has made efforts to separate the leadership of the CPSU, with N. S. Khrushchev as its head, from the Soviet people. The CPC hopes that a new leadership will rise in the CPSU which would be more friendly to the Chinese position. The Chinese Party disagrees with the

present CPSU leadership on such issues as peaceful coexistence with imperialist states, particularly the United States. Similar sentiments against the leadership of Mao exist in the CPSU.

It is speculative as to whether or not a change of leadership in either of these Parties at this time could result in a renewal of party and state relations since this rift at the present time definitely goes far beyond the question of Party leadership.

The differences now appear to hinge on the question of whether the "center" of the international communist movement will be in Moscow or Peking; that is, who will influence the other Parties of the world and who will guide them in the development of Marxist-Leninist principles, in the struggle against capitalist imperialism and as to tactical means and methods.

The CPSU recognizes that there is support and appeal for the Chinese theoretical approach in many Parties of the world and is concerned with keeping these Parties within its sphere of influence and in avoiding further defections to a new "center" of communism in Peking.

In this struggle for support of socialist nations and Communist Parties, both the CPC and CPSU are constantly currying the favor of Party and socialist state leaders through "red carpet" treatment of leadership at Party conferences and through material support.

While the CPC and CPSU have ideological differences, they are still bound together to an extent by a general outlook-Marxism-Leninism. There are deep differences between them where their respective national interests are involved. As between ideology and national interests on crucial matters of state policy of these countries, at this time, national interests would appear to take precedence over ideology.

Why do the Russians try to reach out for a reconciliation with the Chinese?

1. They fear the effects of a split from the point of view of their national interests and they are concerned with their ability to continue to influence other socialist countries.

2. They are concerned with a possible loss of their power and influence in the world.

3. They are worried because the free world will take advantage of this struggle.

4. They consider the Chinese and their potential allies of the yellow and black races as potential enemies.

These overtures being made by the Russians to the Chinese are not being made by them because ideology is "the apple of their eye;" rather, these overtures are being made because the national interests of the USSR are involved and the power and influence of the socialist camp are weakened by the split.

The issues therefore are:

1. Which of these two powerful countries is potentially the more dangerous to our national interests, and how should the free world deal with each of them now and in the future, keeping in mind that the communist ideology does not think in terms of months or years but in terms of generations and centuries in the attainment of world socialism?

2. How can the free world take advantage of the opportunities offered by the split in the socialist camp by keeping both of these great communist powers off balance while at the same time always keeping in mind our national interests and pursuing tactics that would prevent a reuniting of these powers, which would also mean uniting the entire international communist movement, when they feel their own national interests are threatened?

A correct and positive position by the United States and its democratic allies to take advantage of this rift could result in curbing and defeating the advance of communism.

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