

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 1352864-000

Total Deleted Page(s) = 40  
Page 3 ~ b1 - per CIA; b3 - per CIA;  
Page 4 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 8 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 11 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 18 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 19 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 20 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 21 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 22 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 23 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 24 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 29 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 30 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 31 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 49 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 50 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 51 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 58 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 73 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 74 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 75 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 76 ~ b1; b3; b7E;  
Page 81 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;  
Page 86 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;  
Page 89 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;  
Page 93 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;  
Page 119 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 120 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 121 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 122 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 123 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 124 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 136 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;  
Page 137 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 178 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;  
Page 183 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA; b7E;  
Page 184 ~ b3; b7D; b7E;  
Page 185 ~ b3; b7D; b7E;  
Page 186 ~ b3; b7D; b7E;  
Page 187 ~ b3; b7D; b7E;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
X Deleted Page(s) X  
X No Duplication Fee X  
X For this Page X  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [ ] ADG

b6  
b7C

TRANSLATION FROM GERMAN

Return:

Dr. HEINRICH SCHÜTZE  
Wien VI (Vienna VI)  
Mariahilferstrasse Nr. 125  
Austria

Postmarks:

Berlin N 31  
5-8-58  
--  
Washington, D. C.  
May 10, 1958

*Handwritten:* D.D. [unclear]  
5-3  
9

Address:

Mr. EDGAR JOHN HOOVER  
Director, FBI  
Washington  
U. S. Department of Justice Building

Address on inside envelope:

Very IMPORTANT AND URGENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

Only into the hands of the  
Director of the FBI  
EDGAR J. HOOVER  
Washington  
U. S. Department of Justice Building!

REC- 83  
MCT - 10

65-65172

23 MAY 16 1958

*Let to CIA) 1. Each - inter-  
1- state report 1. Legal, Bonn, Berlin  
5-14-58 - ESS, [unclear]*

TRANSLATED BY [ ]

[ ]

COPIES DESTROYED  
R241 JAN 17 1962

~~SECRET~~

b1 Per CIA

Prague, May, 1958

To the Director of the FBI  
EDGAR J. HOOVER  
Washington

On April 3, of this year, I sent you a message which is very important to the security of the U. S. A. The message was sent from Zurich, by registered mail, [REDACTED]

b3  
b7E

[REDACTED] From the letter that was sent, it was obvious that it was to be forwarded to you without delay. The report contained accurate and true information about the activities of a communist espionage organization in the U. S. A. In this letter, I also asked you to designate an address for acknowledgment and for further contact with you, where I might write to you in the future. The address was to be made known to me through a coded advertisement in a West German newspaper. Within the desired time limits, I have already read the acknowledgment of my message in the coded advertisement and I am in possession of a cover address in Switzerland.

However, for security's sake, I wish, herewith, to test the fact whether my message really reached you and whether said address was given by you. I have sufficient grounds for using maximal precautions. Even though it is impossible to identify me through my message, I do not have the slightest desire to "make" reports to the Soviet Intelligence Service which are intended for you.

On the basis of the above facts, I respectfully ask you to have the fact confirmed that I am really dealing with you. In the event that you have cognizance of my message and the address in Switzerland was sent by you, please have the same coded advertisement which appeared in a West German newspaper published one more time in "Die Welt" (The World) an independent daily newspaper in Germany, Edition "B"; publisher Dr. HEINRICH SCHULTE. In case you did not receive my message, please insert, also in the newspaper, "Die Welt," the following coded advertisement:

"Kobramann and Co. gegr. 1945 sucht kommerzielle Vertretung in ....." (Kobramann and Co., founded 1945, seeks commercial representation in .....) Then, please give me the address where I may send you a duplicate of the above-mentioned report (espionage activities in the U. S. A.). It is very urgent. I shall watch for the coded advertisement beginning May 10, 1958. I must have it, at the latest, by May 12, 1958, or else I will not have any possibilities for contacting you. My contact man is waiting for this and as soon as everything is cleared, I shall send you by mail, to the address which is now safe, further important information and my suggestions.

Respectfully,

  
HECKENSCHUTZE



ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

MAY 9 1958  
VIA MACKAY RADIO

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	b6
Mr. Nease	b7c
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Trotter	
Mr. Tele. Rm.	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

TRANSLATION FROM GERMAN

*drop*

AW787/FK 1555  
Berlin - Charlottenburg /7 38/37 9 1545

Director EDGAR HOOVER  
FBI, Department of Justice Bldg.  
Washington, D. C.

Registered letter with important business papers  
dispatched via airmail on May 8, (by) order of your repre-  
sentative (in) Berlin 15 Post Office Box 15.

Expect immediate confirmation no later than  
May 12.

Dr. HEINRICH SCHUETZE

Translator's Note: Time-stamp on message, 5/9/58.

*A*

*cc Mr Belmont  
Mr Ferris*

*Let to CIA (encl. copy)  
1- State - Bonn (encl. copy)  
5-16-58  
ESS*

REC-31

*NOT 7/46*

*65-65172-2*

20 MAY 21 1958

COPIES DESTROYED  
R2:51 JAN 17 1962

EX-108

*Called Mr Ferris - m*

*LIASON*

*Mary [Signature]*

1 Liaison  
1 Mr. Sanders

b6  
b7c

REC-31

65-65192-2

Date: May 16, 1958

To: Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

EX-108

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING  
(Nationalities Intelligence)

Reference is made to our letter of  
May 14, 1958, which enclosed a translated copy  
of a letter received from the subject.

Enclosed for your information, and for  
the information of the State Department, is a  
translated copy of a radiogram received on  
May 9, 1958, by this Bureau. Representatives  
of this Bureau have not been in touch with the  
subject and have not, therefore, furnished to him  
any address in Berlin or elsewhere through which  
he can communicate with this Bureau.

As noted in our letter of May 14, 1958,  
it is requested that we be advised of any information  
in your files, and in the files of the State Department,  
which relates to this matter and any information which  
may come to your attention or which you may develop  
in this connection.

Enclosure

1 - Office of Security  
Department of State (Enclosure)

1 - Legat, Bonn (Enclosure)  
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

RECEIVED  
MAY 18 10 51 AM '58  
MAY 19 1958  
COMM - FBI

SEE NOTE - PAGE 2

52 JUN 6 1958

F247

82 MAY 20 10 51 AM '58

Handwritten initials

Handwritten initials

Handwritten initials

Handwritten initials

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT :

[redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

X


[Large redacted area]

13 AUG 14 1967

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1 Per  
b3 CIA



~~(S)~~

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

JAMES ANGLETON



~~(S)~~

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7C

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 5/23/58

FROM : LEGAT, BONN [redacted]

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_ b3  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_ b7E  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
~~MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING~~

Rebuletts to CIA dated 5/14<sup>1</sup> and 5/16<sup>2</sup>/58. The files of this office are negative on the subject.

On 5/21/58, it was determined that the files of the following agencies in Vienna, Austria, revealed no information which could be identified with the subject:

1. [redacted]
2. Security Office [redacted] ~~SECRET~~  
Research Section [redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

Above three offices in American Embassy, Vienna

Dr. JOSEF ROSSMANITH of the [redacted] informed that a check of the Vienna residents' registry records showed that no one by the subject's name is registered as residing at 25 Mariahilferstrasse, Vienna VI.

The only possibly identical reference in the visa files was a card showing that one Dr. HEINRICH KARL SCHUTZ had been issued a visitor's visa to the United States in Vienna in 1955, as a member of the Vienna String Orchestra. The complete visa file is now destroyed.

P.

REC-58

MAY 28 1958

2 - Bureau  
1 - Bonn  
GAV:IM

F247

EX-10

NAT. INT. SEC.

JUN 5 1958

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted]

b6  
b7c

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

282351

*6/27/58*

*1752*

TO: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans *Y.*

SUBJECT: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

1. Reference is made to our memorandum of 22 June 1958,  
number [redacted] by which we transmitted to the Bureau  
a thermorax copy of the letter mailed in Zurich by the  
anonymous writer.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

2. Attached is the original of the above-mentioned  
letter together with the inner and outer envelopes. It  
would be very much appreciated if the letter and envelopes  
could be returned to this Agency after they have served  
the Bureau's purpose.

Attachment (letter and envelopes)

[redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

*to be returned in [redacted] per [redacted]*

~~INDEX~~

ENCLOSURE

REC- 54 65-65192

JUN 30 1958

FORM NO. 826  
MAY 1958

~~SECRET~~

SEVEN

ESP SEC

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6  
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Recorded  
7/3/58 sb

Laboratory Work Sheet

NO LAB FILE

~~SECRET~~

Re: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

File # 65-65192 - 4  
Lab. # D-282381 DL

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, Northwest  
Washington 25, D. C.

[redacted]

X

Examination requested by:

Att: Deputy Director, Plans

Examination requested:

Document

Date received:

6/30/58

Result of Examination:

Examination by:

MILLER <sup>3/10/58</sup>  
2480

Specimens submitted for examination

7610

- Q1 Envelope bearing hp address beginning "AN DEN HERRN....."
- Q2 Envelope bearing hp address beginning "\_IR EDGAR HOOVER....."
- Q3 Accompanying three-page tv letter in German first page beginning "Ich konnte...."
- Q4 Second page beginning "Wie....."
- Q5 Third page beginning "Pkt. 37....."

RETURN EVID.

1 ENCL 7

~~SECRET~~

7-10-58

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY  ADG

b6  
b7c

COPIES SENT TO  
K267 JH



ENCLOSURE





AN DEN HERRN  
USA - AMBASSADEUR  
RESIDENCE DE L'AMBASSADEUR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY   ADG

**R**  
Zürich 23  
Hauptbahnhof  
900

BERN  
TAUBENSTR. 14

65-65192 QJb7C  
b6  
b7C  
FBI

H. SCHÜTZE

WIEN

Maria-Hilferstr  
No 18c

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted]

ADG

b6

b7C



65-65192 Q1 DL



~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY:

SIR EDGAR HOOVER

CHEF ~~OF~~ FBI

NUR PERSÖNLICH

b6

b7C

65-65192 Q2 DL

FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY  ADG

b6  
b7c



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

JUL 1 1958

In reply refer to  
SY:GCM

*JMK*

TO: The Honorable  
J. Edgar Hoover,  
Director,  
Federal Bureau of Investigation,  
Washington 25, D. C.

FROM: Neil H. Ruge *NR*  
For the Director,  
Office of Security.

SUBJECT: SCHUTZE, O. Heinrich

*w/10-1*

*Schutze, Heinrich*

Reference is made to your memorandum dated May 28, 1958,  
regarding the above subject, your file unnumbered.

Appropriate offices within the Department of State advise  
that their files contain no information regarding the subject.

COPY TO: Deputy Director, Plans,  
Central Intelligence Agency,  
1000 "L" Building,  
Washington 25, D. C.

**EX-128**  
**EX-128**  
**JUL 3 1958**  
**EX-128**

*1A*

*on*  
MCT - 46

*65-65192-5*

REC-7 3 JUL 3 1958

**EX-128**

*[Signature]*  
NAT. INT. SEC.  
5-770

*700 40*  
77 JUL 15 1958

~~SECRET~~

1 - Lt. McDermott  
1 - Liaison

65-65192

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [ ] ADG

b6  
b7c

Date: July 22, 1958

To: Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
2400 E Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: DR. WELLSLIGH SCHUTZE  
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

( )

Reference is made to prior correspondence between your Agency and this Bureau concerning information furnished by the subject.

As you have undoubtedly already concluded, in furnishing information regarding Zbigniew Dybalow, the subject intends to refer to the Polish diplomatic courier reportedly in charge of Polish intelligence in the western hemisphere, known to us by the aliases Zbigniew Jaworski and Zbigniew Lewandowski. The subject also referred to Antoni Czajer of the Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C., and one Adam Czarkowski (probably Antoni Czarkowski) of the Polish United Nations Delegation, New York City, as residents working under Dybalow's direction. Czajer and Czarkowski have previously been reported as Polish intelligence personalities. Jaworski has been known to spend considerable time with them between courier runs. Pertinent reports of our investigations of Jaworski, Czajer and Czarkowski have previously been furnished your Agency.

BY COURIER SVC.  
60 JUL 23  
COMM-FBI

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Clayton \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

100-350264 (Po. Intelligence Activities in U.S.)  
JUL 24 1958  
REC-84  
EX-107  
(6)

SEE NOTE PAGE 4

JUL 24 1958  
MAIL ROOM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

Possession by the subject of secret [redacted]

[redacted] is extremely disturbing, especially when coupled with the subject's claim that same were furnished to Polish Intelligence by a highly placed official in the United States Government and were later transmitted to the Soviet Union. As you have indicated, however, the entire incident may constitute a clever provocation by Polish Intelligence. Under this theory, Polish Intelligence may be passing to American Intelligence, through the subject, information (concerning Dybalow, Gzajer and Czarkowski) believed to have been already compromised. If this hypothesis is true, [redacted]

b3  
b7D  
b7E

[redacted]

It is noted that the subject, after figuratively whetting our appetites with some specifics, did not provide sufficient information regarding the NATO documents to permit counterintelligence action. Additional information concerning the source of those documents, however, may be obtained from the subject in the future if your Agency succeeds in maintaining contact with him. It must be borne in mind, however, that those documents could have been obtained from an official or diplomatic establishment of any NATO member country.

b3  
b7E

With regard to the subject's statement that Polish (illegal) agents who work "in the U.S.A. or against the U.S.A. are guided from Canada, Mexico, Brazil, etc., by residents operating under Dybalow's supervision," you are referred to our investigative report captioned "Tadeusz Lolkowski; Internal Security - PG," a copy of which was recently furnished to your Agency. That report sets forth details of a meeting in Mexico City, Mexico, on

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

The subject also furnished the code names "Latrose" and "Ponury" by which Dybalow allegedly is known to the Soviet Security Service as its agent. If the subject is not a provocateur, his knowledge of Dybalow's Soviet Intelligence code names, could mean that he has access to data of Soviet Intelligence, if not connected therewith. Our files contain no information identifiable with *Pbigniew Dybalow*.

An examination of the letter and envelopes from the subject revealed the following:

(1) The hand printing on the envelopes was made with a ball-point pen of undetermined origin;

(2) The letter paper bears the watermark "Sihl Mills For Typewriter" which is listed for W. C. Hamilton, London, England. No watermarks were found on the envelopes;

(3) While the typewriting does not match any of the standards on file in our Laboratory, some similarity in style was noted with a sample prepared on a typewriter equipped with Continental type, pica style, manufactured in Germany.

Enclosed, pursuant to your request, are the originals of the two envelopes and letter from the subject received by United States Ambassador Henry J. Taylor at Bern, Switzerland, on April 3, 1953. It is assumed that you requested the return of this material to permit comparison with specimens received from the subject in the future. You are requested to return this material for the completion of our records when it has served your purposes. Also enclosed is one copy of a translation of this material.

Enclosures - 4

- 3 -

~~SECRET~~



Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

NOTE:

[Redacted]

and forwarded same [Redacted] for appropriate action. [Redacted] the letter

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7E

(1) bore a notation indicating that a copy had also been designated for the Director of CIA, and (2) called for immediate action for the purpose of establishing contact through a mail drop with the subject who volunteered important information concerning Polish Intelligence in his letter. [Redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

letter to the Bureau with advice concerning action he had taken. This matter has been thrashed out [Redacted] which has advised that corrective measures have been taken to avoid a recurrence. CIA is greatly disturbed over subject's letter because (1) subject quoted accurately from secret NATO documents which subject stated were obtained by Polish Intelligence from a highly placed U.S. Government official.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[Redacted]

[Redacted] CIA requested our observations regarding significance of subject's letter and promised to keep us informed of developments. CIA requested that the subject's letter and two envelopes be returned, apparently to permit comparison with correspondence received from the subject in the future. The results of the laboratory analysis were furnished by memo Griffith to Parsons 7-15-59. Instant ~~classified secret~~ since it repeats contents of earlier CIA letters which were so classified.

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

b6  
b7c

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 17, 1958

FROM : Mr. S. B. Donahoe

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Fapich
- 1 - Mr. Donahoe
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Sanders

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Clayton \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Subject wrote letter [redacted]

[Large redacted block]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7E

Subject addressed radiogram on 5-9-58 to Bureau from Germany in which stated registered letter with important business papers dispatched by airmail on 5-8-58 by order "your representative in Berlin" to post office box, place not stated. This information furnished to [redacted] State by letter 5-16-58 and further request made for any information in their possession re this matter.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

CIA made request through liaison for Photostats of communications received by Bureau from subject and Photostats furnished CIA through liaison 6-6-58 [redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[Redacted block]

b3  
b7E

[Redacted block]

in-

ner envelope addressed to "Mr. Edgar Hoover, Chief, Federal Bureau of Investigation."

ESS:dmm  
6/6 AUG 5 1958  
Belmont memo to Boardman  
6-19-58 - ESS

EX-135

REC-94

65-65192-7

65-65192

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

CIA letter states envelope addressed to Director contained carbon copy of letter which subject stated had been sent to CIA Director in Washington, which was not received by CIA. While CIA letter does not so state, it appears obvious that the envelope also contained a note or letter to the Bureau transmitting a copy of the letter allegedly sent to CIA. CIA letter states subject quoted from ~~secret~~ NATO documents to establish his bona fides and that the quotations were found to be accurate.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[REDACTED]

CIA letter advised that the original letter from the subject sent to the Director, and included in a cover envelope addressed to the Ambassador, contained a number of details about Polish Intelligence Staff personnel in the United States.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7E

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

Prior to considering a strong protest we should have benefit of all facts and Liaison Agent S. J. Papich today contacted [redacted] and asked that we be furnished immediately the envelope addressed to the Director and the contents thereof as well as full details as to the handling of the envelope which resulted in its being opened and acted upon without direct transmittal to us.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

ACTION:

This matter is being closely followed and appropriate recommendations will be submitted upon receipt of further data from CIA.

*Handwritten signatures and initials:*  
[Signature] [Signature] [Signature]  
[Signature] [Signature]  
[Signature]

*Letter dated 6/10/68  
see from [redacted]  
[redacted]*

WN 78M AC&R

# American Cable & Radio System

"Via Mackay Radio" "Via All America" "Via Commercial"

To Telephone a Message or  
Call a Messenger  
ADams - 9000  
or  
DEcatur - 4300

58 MAY



An I T & T Associate

8 DU PONT CIRCLE, N. W.  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MARK YOUR REPLY: "VIA MACKAY RADIO" or "VIA ALL AMERICA" or "VIA COMMERCIAL"

AW787/FK1555

BERLINCHARLOTTENBURG/7 38/37 9 1545

DIREKTOR EDGAR HOOVER

FED BUR INV DEPT OF JUST BLDG WASHINGTON

ACHTEN MAI PER LUFTPOST EINSCHREIBEN MIT WICHTIGEN

GESCHAEFTSPAPIEREN ABGESANDT AUFTRAG IHR VERTRETER BERLIN

15 POSTFACH 15 ERWARTE SPAETESTENS BIS ZWOELFTEN MAI DRINGEND

BESTAETIGUNG

DR HEINRICH SCHUETZE

15 15

THIS IS COMMUNICATIONS SECTION COPY  
FOR INFORMATION PURPOSES ONLY  
**DO NOT FILE**  
RETURN TO BE NOTED ON OTHER COPIES  
RETURN BY SPECIAL MESSENGER TO  
ROOM 5644

Only American owned System providing worldwide telegraph service by both Cable and Radio

# American Cable & Radio System

67 BROAD STREET, NEW YORK

Telephone: Bowling Green 9-3800

Teletypewriter Exchanges: NY 1-2651, NY 8-2652, NY 1-112

Other Offices in the United States

## NEW YORK

11 BROADWAY, TEL. WH. 3-7588  
79 WALL STREET, TEL. HA. 2-6620  
99 WALL STREET, TEL. BO. 9-8842  
118 LIBERTY STREET, TEL. BA. 7-3877  
7 BEEKMAN STREET, TEL. BE. 3-3433

10 EAST 16th STREET, TEL. OR. 4-6070  
130 FRANKLIN STREET, TEL. WA. 5-8914  
261 FIFTH AVENUE, TEL. LE. 2-7278  
242 WEST 29th STREET, TEL. CH. 4-3027

60 EAST 42nd STREET, TEL. MU. 2-1183  
9 EAST 44th STREET, TEL. MU. 2-4160  
9 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA, TEL. CI. 6-0565  
30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA, TEL. CI. 6-1515  
926 SEVENTH AVENUE, TEL. CI. 7-2876

## SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

850 MISSION STREET, TEL. GARFIELD 1-1303

470 MARKET STREET, TEL. GARFIELD 1-1303

236 STOCKTON STREET, TEL. GARFIELD 1-1303

## WASHINGTON, D. C.

8 DUPONT CIRCLE, N. W. TEL. ADAMS 9000; DECATUR 4300

Messages also may be filed at any office of Western Union in the United States. To insure their transmission over our lines, such messages must be marked by the sender with the routing indicator: "Via ALL AMERICA", "Via COMMERCIAL" or "Via MACKAY RADIO" for which no charge is made.

### ARGENTINA

Atalaya  
Buenos Aires  
Mendoza  
Rosario  
Villa Mercedes

### ARUBA

Oranjestad

### AZORES

Horta Fayal

### BELGIUM

Antwerp  
Brussels

### BOLIVIA

Corocoro  
La Paz  
Oruro

### BRAZIL

Rio de Janeiro  
Santos  
Sao Paulo

### CHILE

Antofagasta  
Arica  
Iquique  
Los Andes  
Santiago  
Tocopilla  
Valparaiso

### COLOMBIA

Barranquilla  
Bogota  
Buenaventura  
Cali  
Cartagena  
Medellin

### COSTA RICA

Port Limon  
Puntarenas  
San Jose

### CUBA

Havana  
Santiago de Cuba  
U. S. Naval Operating  
Base, Guantanamo Bay

### CURACAO

Willemstad

### DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Ciudad Trujillo  
La Vega  
Puerto Plata  
San Pedro de Macoris  
Santiago R. D.

## OFFICES ABROAD

### ECUADOR

Guayaquil  
Salinas  
Quito

### EIRE

See United Kingdom  
and Eire

### ENGLAND

See United Kingdom

### FRANCE

Paris  
Le Havre

### GUATEMALA

Guatemala City  
San Jose

### HAITI

Port-au-Prince

### HAWAII

Honolulu  
Kitterdam

### NEWFOUNDLAND

St. John's

### NICARAGUA

Managua  
San Juan del Sur

### PANAMA

Balboa  
Colon  
Panama

### PERU

Callao  
Lima  
Tacna

### PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC

Manila

### PUERTO RICO

Mayaguez  
Ponce  
San Juan

### SALVADOR

San Salvador

### SCOTLAND

See United Kingdom

### SPAIN

Madrid

### UNITED KINGDOM AND EIRE

Belfast  
Birmingham  
Bradford  
Bristol  
Cardiff  
Dundee

### Edinburgh

Glasgow  
Liverpool  
London  
Manchester  
Newcastle-on-Tyne  
Southampton  
Waterville  
Weston-Super-Mare

### URUGUAY

Montevideo

### VENEZUELA

Caracas  
La Guayra  
Maracaibo  
Vela de Coro

### VIRGIN ISLANDS

Charlotte Amalie  
(formerly St. John)

### WALES

See United Kingdom

## TELEGRAPH SERVICE BY CABLE AND RADIO TO ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD

### CLASSES OF SERVICE

**ORDINARY SERVICE**—Ordinary messages receive prompt transmission throughout, subject to priority of GOVERNMENT and URGENT PRESS messages. Ordinary messages may be either FULL RATE or CODE (CDE) RATE, both of these categories having equal rank in transmission.

**FULL RATE**—Messages in this category are those which do not qualify as CDE under the CODE (CDE) regulations. They may be written in plain language or cipher (secret) language, or both.

**CODE (CDE) RATE**—Under this category, code words must not contain more than five letters. Figure groups, trade terms and commercial marks composed of figure and letters, may not exceed fifty percent of the total number of words in the text and signature. Minimum charge of five words applies.

**\*DEFERRED (LC) SERVICE**—Deferred messages are subject to deferral in favor of FULL RATE and CODE (CDE) RATE messages of the same date. Such messages must be written wholly in one plain language. Minimum charge of five words applies.

**\*NIGHT LETTER (NLT) SERVICE**—This service is designed especially for business or social messages written wholly in one plain language. Delivery is effected on the day after filing except as otherwise indicated in the Company's Tariff on file with the Federal Communications Commission. Minimum charge of twenty-five words applies.

\*Figure groups, trade terms and commercial marks must not exceed one-third of the total number of words in the text and signature.

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [REDACTED] ADG

b6  
b7c

American Cable & Radio System



INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAM



RECEIVED

"Via All America" or "Via Commercial" or "Via Mackay Radio"

TO EXPEDITE YOUR REPLY USE ONE OF THE ABOVE ROUTINGS.

NO. 787/9/ORD

J EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
5644 DEPT OF JUSTICE BLDG  
9TH AND PENNA AVE NW

PAY NO CHARGE TO MESSENGER UNLESS WRITTEN IN INK ON DELIVERY RECEIPT

65-65192

ENCLOSURE

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *Handwritten initials*


DATE: June 19, 1958

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont *Handwritten initials*

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Papich
- 1 - Mr. Donahoe
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Sander *Handwritten initials*

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Per \_\_\_\_\_
- CIA \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING



The thermofax copy is poor in quality since it is a copy of another thermofax and some difficulty may be encountered in translating the letter which is written in German. b1 Per  
b3 CIA

The thermofax copy of the letter has been forwarded to the Translation Section for immediate translation in order that the contents can be carefully analyzed in the Nationalities Intelligence Section. b1 Per  
b3 CIA



ACTION:

The foregoing is for your information. This matter will be expedited and you will be kept informed of developments.

ESS:dmn  
(7)

65-651921- *Handwritten initials*

JUL 30 1958

65-651921- *Handwritten initials*

122 *Handwritten initials*  
77 AUG 4 1958



~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6  
b7C

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

18 JUN 1958



b7D

TO: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans ~~WAT~~

SUBJECT: Contact with Anonymous Polish Source

1. Reference is made to our memorandum about this subject dated 11 June 1958.


2. Attached for your information is a thermofax reproduction of the thermofax copy of the letter received [redacted]. The letter itself was a carbon copy and therefore this reproduction is of poor legibility. [redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA



Heinrich Schotze

1 Attachment (Letter)



9

ENCLOSURE

REC-94

EX-135

REC-94

65-65192-9

~~SECRET~~

EX-135

65-65192

5-1170

122  
AUG 4 1958

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY  ADG

b6  
b7C

ENCLOSURE

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY  AGC

b6  
b7C


~~SECRET~~

**RETURN ADDRESS: Maria-Hilferstr.**

**No. 18 c**

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6  
b7c

~~SECRET~~

IN DEN  
USA - [unclear]  
EVIDENCE DE [unclear]  
BEAN  
[unclear] 74

SEARCHED  
SERIALIZED  
900

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted]

b6  
b7C

65-65192-10

1 - Mr. Sanders

REC-94

Legal Attache, Bonn [redacted]

June 20, 1958

b3  
b7E

Director, FBI

DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

EX-135

Reurmemo 6-13-58 which requested that Legat, Paris, furnish any information concerning the receipt of a letter from the subject [redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7E

For your information, it has been ascertained that the letter addressed by the subject [redacted] and contained therein was a second envelope addressed to the Director. The envelope addressed to the Director was opened [redacted]

[redacted]

The contents of the envelope allegedly contained, among other things, information relating to Polish intelligence activities in the United States.

You should take no further action in this connection in the absence of further instructions from the Bureau but should furnish to the Bureau any information in this connection which might come to your attention.

1 - Paris

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route thru for Review)

on \_\_\_\_\_  
sls \_\_\_\_\_  
man \_\_\_\_\_  
nt \_\_\_\_\_  
s \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

ESS:dnn  
(6)

LEGAT  
7 JUN 20 1958  
COMM-FBI

MAIL ROOM  
JUN 20 1958

~~SECRET~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 6/13/58

FROM : LEGAT, BONN [redacted]

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_ b3
- Boardman \_\_\_\_\_ b7E
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Remylet 5/23/58. *per 3*

Enclosed for Paris is one copy each of Bulets to CIA dated 5/14/58 and 5/16/58, with their enclosures which are self-explanatory.

For the information of Paris, this office has no record on the subject and no record identifiable with him could be located at the American Embassy in Vienna, Austria. [redacted]

b7D

[redacted] did inform that no one under the subject's name is registered at the return address "Wien VI, Mariahilferstrasse Nr. 125, Austria."

It is requested that Paris advise whether it has any information on the subject and particularly whether it has any information regarding the receipt of a letter from the subject addressed to [redacted]

b3  
b7E

P.

- 2 - Bureau
- 1 - Paris (Enc-2) (Sent direct)
- 1 - Bonn
- (4)
- GAV:IM

*6-30-58-55*

EX-135

REC-94

65-65192-10  
65-65194-10  
7-301  
JUN 18 1958

*Jee*  
*EST. 1958*  
*[Handwritten signatures]*

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted]

b6  
b7c

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman *W* 1 - Mr. Boardman  
 FROM : A. H. Belmont *W* 1 - Mr. Belmont  
 1 - Mr. Branigan  
 1 - Mr. Papich  
 1 - Mr. Sanders  
 1 - Mr. Turner  
 SUBJECT: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE 1 - Mr. McDermott  
 MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

DATE: June 20, 1958

Tolson   
 Boardman   
 Belmont   
 Mohr   
 Nease   
 Parsons   
 Rosen   
 Tamm b1 Per  
 Trotter b3 CIA  
 Clayton  
 Room  
 an

Sullivan

The subject's letter to the Director contains information concerning Zbigniew Dybalow who is described by the subject as being in charge of Polish Intelligence activity in North and South America, working under cover of a Polish diplomatic courier. From the information provided, it is obvious that the subject refers to Zbigniew Jaworski, wa Zbigniew Lewandowski. CIA previously advised us that the Polish courier known by the Jaworski and Lewandowski aliases, whose true identity is unknown to CIA, is in charge of Polish Intelligence in the Western Hemisphere. Subject also advised that Dybalow had been recruited by Soviet Intelligence, with which he was known by code names "Matrose" and "Ponury." Subject also described Antoni Czajer, attache at the Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C. (WDC), and one Adam Czartowski, a secretary at the Polish United Nations (UN) Delegation, as residents working under Dybalow's guidance. Czajer, second secretary Polish Embassy, and Antoni Czarkowski, first secretary Polish UN Delegation, were previously identified to us by CIA as Polish intelligence agents. The subject advised that Polish agents who work in or against the U.S. are guided from Canada, Mexico, Brazil, etc., by residents operating under Dybalow's supervision. That information is corroborated by the recent transfer [redacted] involving [redacted]

JJL:cd:skuy (12)

1 - 100-350264 (Polish Intelligence Activities in the U.S.)

1 - [redacted]  
 1 - [redacted]  
 1 - [redacted]

67 AUG 5/2 1958

EX-135

~~SECRET~~

REC-94

65-65192-11

65-65192 - 5-7m

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

b7D

b3

b7E

b1 Per

b3 CIA

b3

b7E



Memorandum to L. V. Boardman  
RE: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE

ACTION:

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7E

[Redacted]

In addition, CIA will be followed for any additional information obtainable from the subject which would assist in the identification of the unnamed U.S. official who allegedly furnished a NATO document to Polish Intelligence. This matter is being expedited.

MS WAB  
DEAIR  
Jmm  
LHJ  
JG

Letter dated 6/24/58

[Redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

Lesson following  
PP  
6/24/58

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] AEG b6  
b7C

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

*Rev  
6/12/58  
[signature]*

*[handwritten mark]*

*Henrich Schutzen*


*[signature]*

TO: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans *[initials]*

SUBJECT: ~~Contact with~~ Anonymous Polish Source

~~SECRET~~



*31*  
**REC-100**

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7D  
b7E

**JUN 17 1958**

*[handwritten mark]*

*6-15  
Polish material  
[unclear]  
[unclear]*

*memo: [unclear]  
6/19/58  
[unclear]*

65-65192  
(Schutzen)

107-30  
6 JUN 17 1958

~~SECRET~~  
EX-135

FORM NO. 826  
1 NOV 55  
**88 AUG 4 1958**

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

3. Since the above developments a letter and telegram sent directly by the same Source to the Federal Bureau of Investigation have been made available to the Central Intelligence Agency. From these documents it is clear that the letter writer desired to confirm the fact that the United States Government had received his original letter [Redacted]

b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted] There have been no further developments to date.

4. The Source's quotations from the NATO documents have been compared with the original reports and found to be entirely accurate. Since these ~~secret~~ reports were made available to the 15 participating nations and the Source has supplied no further information concerning the alleged Polish agent in the United States "administration," no action has been taken so far in connection with this allegation. [Redacted]

b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

5. The Federal Bureau of Investigation will be informed of any new developments.

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

1 - Boardman  
1 - Mr. Belmont  
1 - Mr. McDermott

b6  
b7c

6-26-58

CODE

URGENT

*JW*  
EX-135  
REC-94  
CABLEGRAM

*104*

TO LEGAL ATTACHE PARIS

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (65-65192)

DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE, MISCELLANEOUS DASH INFORMATION CONCERNING.

REURLET JUNE EIGHTEEN LAST. DO NOT CONTACT AMBASSADOR TAYLOR.

DETAILS FOLLOW.

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (route through for review)

NOTE: Cover memo Belmont to Boardman prepared by JJMcD:skw 6-26-58, same subject, in connection with this mail.

✓  
NR. 625  
ENC. 2230 BY 71  
CK. 2230 BY 71  
APPROVED BY \_\_\_\_\_  
TYPED BY \_\_\_\_\_  
FILED BY \_\_\_\_\_

JJMcD:skw  
(6)

*Sent Via Cable 6/26/58 8:30 PM PJG*

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Clayton \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- By \_\_\_\_\_

Code Room  
MAIL ROOM  
AUG 4 1958

*RECEIVED*  
*RECEIVED*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

*Rec from  
J. Carleton  
6/24/58  
[Signature]*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: <sup>0</sup>  
Dr. Heinrich Schutze

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

~~SECRET~~  
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~  
b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~  
b1 Per  
b3 CIA

*Armed Behavior Research 6-26-58  
JSA-D/SKW  
C. [Signature] Press 6-26-58  
JSA-D/SKW*

EX-135

REC-94

65-65192-104

JUL-30 1958

5-

65-65192

b1 Per  
b3 CIA




~~X~~

4. We are still confronted with the problem of determining the operational significance of this extraordinary message to Mr. Dulles and Mr. Hoover. (The original was never received by Mr. Dulles). We would appreciate the result of your study of this matter. In particular we would welcome your evaluation and interpretation of this information, assuming that investigations are in progress as a result of our previous communications.

BEING HANDLED SEPARATELY

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

5




It is still too early to know whether this is an elaborate fabrication designed to entrap and embarrass the FBI and this Agency.

6. You will be furnished with all details of significant information as it develops.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

*J. Angleton*  
James Angleton



b1 Per  
b3 CIA

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman

*Handwritten initials and numbers*

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Donahoe
- 1 - Mr. McDermott
- 1 - Foreign Liaison Unit


DATE: June 26, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen b1 Per \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm b3 CIA \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Clayton \_\_\_\_\_

*Brubaker*

SUBJECT: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
MISCELLANEOUS-INFORMATION CONCERNING



65-65192

Enclosure *sent* 6-26-58

JJMcD:skw

(8)

*122*

77 AUG 4 1958

EX-135

REC-94

65-65192-15  
5-710

Memorandum to L. V. Boardman  
RE: DR. HEINRICH SCHEITZE  
65-65192

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[Redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[Redacted]

By letter 6-18-58, Legat, Paris, advised that it was contemplating contacting Ambassador Taylor by the end of June, 1958, concerning his knowledge of the subject's letter to the Director. Legat requested to be furnished any information provided by CIA concerning the matter.

OBSERVATIONS:

We do not know under what circumstances the envelope addressed to the Director was opened by Ambassador Taylor when it was received at his residence in an outer envelope addressed to him. It is not believed, however, that we should pursue the matter further with him. It is noted that Ambassador Taylor, for a long time, has been a great admirer of the Director and a good friend of the Bureau.

[Redacted]

ACTION: Attached for approval is a cable to Legat, Paris, instructing that Ambassador Taylor not be contacted concerning this incident.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

11/13/58 DEMS

V

1-5



~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted]

- b3
- b7E
- Boardman
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Parsons
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Trotter
- Nease
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Gandy

# DECODED COPY

Airgram

Cablegram

W. C. Sullivan

DECODE OF CODED CABLE NUMBER 414 DATED JUNE 27, 1958 AT  
PARIS, FRANCE. RECEIVED VIA THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

BRANIGAN

URGENT

DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZ, MISCELLANEOUS-INFORMATION CONCERNING.  
REBUCCABLE JUNE 26, 1958. ON JUNE 25 U. S. [redacted]

b3  
b7E

[redacted] VOLUNTEERED FOLLOWING INFORMATION: ABOUT TWO  
MONTHS AGO HE RECEIVED LETTER CONTAINING SEALED COMMUNICATION  
ADDRESSED TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI. [redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

RELATED THAT AN INQUIRY IS BEING CONDUCTED IN WASHINGTON CONCERN-  
ING THIS MATTER SINCE COMMUNICATION IN QUESTION WAS NOT FORWARDED  
TO FBI. [redacted] DISCLAIMED KNOWLEDGE CONTENTS LETTER ADDRES  
TO DIRECTOR AND APPEARED VERY SORRY HE HAD NOT FORWARDED IT  
DIRECTLY TO BUREAU. [redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7E

NO ACTION BEING TAKEN BY THIS OFFICE.

Unless advised to  
contrary by Bureau

ROLLAND O. L'ALLIER

RECEIVED:

6-27-58

12:44 PM

BLH

cc: Mr. Tolson  
cc: Mr. Belmont

EX-135

65-65192-16

REC-94

JUL 30 1958

122

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably  
paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

87 AUG 4 1958

~~SECRET~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman *lv* 1 - Mr. Boardman  
 1 - Mr. Belmont  
 FROM : A. H. Belmont *ahb* 1 - Mr. Branigan  
 1 - Mr. Donahoe  
 1 - Mr. Papich 1 - Mr. McDermott  
 1 - Foreign Liaison Unit  
 SUBJECT: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
 MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

DATE: June 27, 1958

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease
- Parsons
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Clayton \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman  b1 Per
- Gandy  b3 CIA
- b7E

Reference is made to my memorandum 6-26-58 observing that it was not believed that we should further pursue with

[redacted] of an envelope addressed to the Director from the subject

[redacted]

By cable today, Legat, Paris, advised that on 6-25-58 Ambassador Taylor, having learned that an inquiry was being conducted in Washington, D. C., volunteered that about two months ago, he received a letter containing a sealed communication addressed to the Director.

[redacted] The Legat advised that Ambassador Taylor appeared regretful that he had not forwarded the communication directly to the Bureau.

[redacted] (The letter was written in the German language.)

OBSERVATIONS:

[redacted] There appears nothing further to be gained by additional pursuit of this matter.

[redacted]

ACTION: None. Submitted for information.

65-65192  
 JJMcD:tw zw  
 (8)

122  
 77 AUG 19 1958

REC-94  
 JUL 30 1958  
 EX-135  
 65-65192-17  
 b1 Per  
 b3 CIA  
 SECRET

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. J. Parsons

DATE: July 15, 1958

FROM : W. D. Griffith

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mohr	_____
Nease	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
Clayton	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

SUBJECT: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

The evidence listed below was received from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with a letter dated 6/27/58:

- Q1 Envelope bearing hand printed address beginning "AN DEN DERRN...."
- Q2 Envelope bearing hand printed address beginning "SIR EDGAR HOOVER...."
- Q3 Accompanying three-page typewritten letter in German, first page beginning "Ich konnte...."
- Q4 Second page beginning "Wie...."
- Q5 Third page beginning "Pkt. 37...."

An examination in the FBI Laboratory disclosed that items Q3, Q4 and Q5 contain the watermark "Sihl Mills FOR TYPEWRITER." Paper containing this watermark is listed for W. C. Hamilton, London, England. No watermark was found in the two envelopes, Q1 and Q2.

The hand printing on the envelopes, Q1 and Q2, was done with a ball-point pen. The source was not determined.

The typewriting on Q3, Q4 and Q5 does not match any of the standards on file in the FBI Laboratory. It is pointed out, however, that some similarity in style was noted with a sample prepared on a typewriter equipped with Continental type, pica style, manufactured in Germany.

CIA has not been advised of the results of this examination.

The evidence is attached. Photographs were made.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That this be brought to the attention of the Domestic Intelligence Division.

Enclosures (5)  
 1 - Mr. J. J. McDermott (sent direct)  
 3rd Room 1732  
 FMM:EBK  
 (5)

57 AUG 5 1958

REC-94

JUL 30 1958

65-65192

*D. J. Parsons*

*D*

*see 65-65192-4*

*65-65192-18*

*135*

*[Handwritten signature]*

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6  
b7c

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Recorded  
7/3/58 sb

Laboratory Work Sheet

NO LAB FILE

~~SECRET~~

Re: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

File # 65-65192 -12  
Lab. # D-282381 DL b1 Per  
b3 CIA

Director Ans by memo to Mr. Parsons  
# 3 encl enr.  
Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, Northwest  
Washington 25, D. C.

Examination requested by: Att: Deputy Director, Plans

Examination requested: Document

Date received: 6/30/58  
7/11  
Examination by: Jm  
MILLER

Result of Examination:

1. The type Q3, Q4, & Q5 does not match any of the stds. Some similarity in style with a sample pen on a Continental typewriter (2269) <sup>pic style, info in Germany.</sup>
2. The hp on the envelopes, Q1 + Q2, was done with a ball-point pen. source not det.
3. Q3, Q4, & Q5 contain the word "Sihl Mills FOR TYPEWRITER." Paper contains this word is listed for W.C. Hamilton, London, England. No word was found in the two envelopes, Q1 + Q2.
4. Photos. Evid attached.

Specimens submitted for examination

- Q1 Envelope bearing hp address beginning "AN DEN HERRN....x"
- Q2 Envelope bearing hp address beginning "SIR EDGAR HOOVER....x"
- Q3 Accompanying three-page tw letter in German, first page beginning "Ich konnte...."
- Q4 Second page beginning "Wie....xxx"
- Q5 Third page beginning "Pkt. 37....xx"

RETURN EVID.

cc Mr. J. G. Mc Dermott, R. 1732

7-30-58

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [ ] ADG

b6  
b7C

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Rec  
7/21/58  
[initials]

~~SECRET~~  
[Handwritten signature]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

Zbigniew Lewandowski

SUBJECT: Dr. Heinrich SCHUTZE  
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Zbigniew Dybala Switzer

1. In the letter dated 3 April 1958 mailed by an anonymous writer in Zurich, three individuals are mentioned in the United States who are said to be members of the Polish Intelligence Service. The three individuals named were: Colonel Zbigniew DYBALOW (sic), Antoni CZAJER and Adam CZARTOWSKI (sic). The anonymous writer furnished the following information about these individuals:

8-21-65  
[Handwritten notes]

Poland  
Belgium

Also see  
12/2/58

B. APPROX. 1922

a. Since 1957, Colonel Zbigniew DYBALOW was Deputy Chief of the Polish Intelligence and had the pseudonyms "MATROSE" and "PONUR". DYBALOW traveled in North and South America where he supervised all PIS residents. He was 35 years old, 170 cm tall, strong build, black hair, wide Asiatic face, short red fingers. In 1958, DYBALOW according to the anonymous writer, was hospitalized in the United States with an injured leg. DYBALOW was well known to the British because he was detected in espionage activity in England in 1954 and in Brussels in 1955 when the Belgian Police tried to arrest him while he was attempting to double a Polish agent of the British Service. DYBALOW has been in the internal security service since 1944 having first served in Gdansk and later in Warsaw. He joined the foreign intelligence in 1953 and soon thereafter was appointed Deputy Chief. DYBALOW was to be recalled to Warsaw in early or middle April 1958.

2- Photostats  
NYD  
Re: JAWORSKI  
CZARKOWSKI

2- Photostats  
WFO  
Re: JAWORSKI  
CZAJER

by R/S. 8/8/58  
JgMcDerm

b. Antoni CZAJER, Attache at the Polish Embassy, who lives at 2640-16th Street, is the U.B. resident in Washington.

b3  
b7E

c. Captain Adam CZARTOWSKI (sic), Secretary in the Polish U.N. Delegation, is the U.B. resident in New York. Both CZAJER and CZARTOWSKI are under DYBALOW's direction and both have other U.B. officers under them who run agents directly.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

See 123. 607  
[Handwritten notes]

EX - 102

REC-68

65-65192-19

5-110

52 AUG 14 1958

~~SECRET~~ AUG 11 1958

~~SECRET~~

2. Concerning the above-named individuals, our records reveal the following information:

a. Colonel Zbigniew DYBALOW is probably identical with Zbigniew DYBALA (which appears to be the correct spelling) also known as Zbigniew LEWANDOWSKI and Zbigniew JAWORSKI. We have no information on the pseudonym "MATROSE" and "PONURY" allegedly used by DYBALA as reported by the anonymous writer.

(1) DYBALA's activities in England and Brussels mentioned by the writer were reported to the Bureau by this Agency in our memoranda of 24 May 1958 [redacted] titled under his then known names Zbigniew JAWORSKI aka Zbigniew LEWANDOWSKI. Our memoranda also contained detailed background information on JAWORSKI aka LEWANDOWSKI, his position in the Polish Security Service and his travels.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

(2) In 1954 and 1955, we became especially interested in DYBALA (who was then known only by the name of LEWANDOWSKI) since it was apparent on the basis of his activities that he was an important, and possibly a high-ranking U.B. officer. We also began to suspect at that time that LEWANDOWSKI was a false name. As a result of continual investigation of LEWANDOWSKI and information obtained during this period, we were eventually able to identify him when he traveled to the United States under the name of JAWORSKI. (This information was included in our memorandum to the Bureau.)


(3) Despite the information that we were able to collect on LEWANDOWSKI during the above-mentioned period, we had no information on a U.B. officer named DYBALA. However, in December 1957, we received a report which stated that a "Colonel fnu DYBALA, who has been employed with the U.B. since 1945, is 38 years old, of medium height, has black hair and a round face. Until 1951, he was head of the Counter-espionage Department of the Gdansk Voivodship Branch. He was subsequently appointed head of an unspecified section of the then Department VII. A Party member and an adherent of the Natolin faction, he has a secondary education, is married, and lives at No. 56(?) Piekna Street in Warsaw." (The Bureau will note that this information is almost identical with that reported in [redacted] on JAWORSKI aka LEWANDOWSKI yet the information was furnished by two different sources.) In light of this information, it was becoming more evident that DYBALA was identical with JAWORSKI and LEWANDOWSKI.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

~~SECRET~~

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

~~X~~



b3  
b7E

(6) May we request the Bureau not to disseminate, outside its office, the information that JAWORSKI's true name is Zbigniew DYBALA.

*Indexed on page 1*

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

b. Antoni CZAJER has previously been identified as a U.B. Staff officer. This information plus other details were reported to the Bureau in our memoranda [redacted] dated 20 February 1957, [redacted] dated 31 March 1958, and [redacted] dated 2 July 1958.

c. Adam CZARTOWSKI mentioned by the anonymous writer is probably identical with Antoni CZARKOWSKI, an employee of the Polish U.N. Delegation. Information on Antoni CZARKOWSKI was furnished to the Bureau in our memoranda [redacted] dated 25 October 1957 and [redacted] dated 10 July 1958.

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

3. This Agency will continue to furnish the Bureau with any significant information that may be received on the individuals discussed above.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

*J. Angleton*  
JAMES ANGLETON



b1 Per  
b3 CIA

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7c

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RECEIVED FROM  
SEP 3 1958  
CIA SJP

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: Dr. Heinrich SCHUTZE

*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*

1. Reference is made to your File No. 65-65192.
2. Attached is one copy of [redacted] which has been sent to The Department of State and The Department of the Army.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

*[Signature]*  
for James Angleton

SEP 4 1958  
*[Vertical stamp and handwritten notes]*

Attachment

[redacted]

2. Photostats to ea.  
NYO  
WFC  
RE: JAWORSKI  
CZAJER  
by R/S 9/10/58  
JG med/Dma

REC-12

65-65192-20  
20 SEP 1958

ENCLOSURE

REC-12

60 7/191  
SEP 17 1958  
~~SECRET~~

65-65192  
SEC. 7  
*[Handwritten notes and signatures]*

~~SECRET~~

7 - Mr. McDermott  
7 - Mr. Papich  
7 - Liaison

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6  
b7c

65-65192

VIA LIAISON

Date: November 12, 1958

To: Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, N. W.  
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Mr. James Angleton

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZ  
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING  
ESPIONAGE

Reference is made to our letter of July 22,  
1958, and your letter of September 2, 1958, your reference  
[redacted] concerning the captioned individual.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

You are requested to advise whether you have been  
able to maintain contact with the subject and whether  
additional information has been received from him concerning  
Polish intelligence activity in the United States. *21*

JJMcD:djd  
(6)

EX - 123 REC - 12

NOTE: - In April, 1958, subject, probably using a pseudonym, addressed communications to the Director of the FBI and the Director of CIA volunteering information concerning personalities of Polish intelligence operating in the U. S. Much of the information provided by him is corroborated by data from independent sources. In addition, he quoted verbatim from secret NATO documents, said by him to have been obtained from an official high in the administration of the U. S. Government. Subject furnished instructions regarding the manner by which he might be contacted in the future. It has not yet been determined whether subject attempted to volunteer information to U. S. authorities in good faith or whether the incident constitutes a clever provocation by Polish Intelligence. Classified "Secret" since information previously received from CIA concerning that Agency's attempts to maintain contact with subject was so classified.

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Clayton \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

67 NOV 14 1958

MAIL ROOM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7c

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Dr. Heinrich SCHUTZE  
Miscellaneous - Information Concerning

*[Handwritten signature]*

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 12 November 1958, file no. 65-65192 with above subject, and to our memorandum [redacted] dated 11 June 1958, and [redacted] dated 28 July 1958.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

2. There have been a number of developments in this case since first reported by this Agency on 11 June 1958. These are explained in detail in the following paragraphs. In summary, the following has transpired: a) contact has been maintained by mail with the unidentified letter writer who describes himself as Dr. Heinrich SCHUTZE or Hecksenschuetze, b) a total of seven letters and four telegrams have been received from this unidentified correspondent, c) an operational plan is being carried out to supply this unidentified correspondent with money, and to encourage him to continue his reporting and to arrange if possible a meeting with representatives of this Agency in the West. [redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[redacted]

Nevertheless, we have not been able to identify the anonymous letter writer, nor have we established his bona fides as a source. In view of the information to which he has access, particularly that in the first letter, received from him on 3 April 1958 (transmitted to the Bureau under [redacted] dated 27 June 1958), and that in his most recent letter, received [redacted] on 28 November 1958 (described below in paragraph 3 K), it is clear that this source is on a high level within the Polish or Soviet Security Service. At this point we are not able to determine whether this is

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

EX - 124 REG-25

~~SECRET~~

REC-133

65-65192

52 JAN 7 1959

F-53

5-170

~~SECRET~~

a high-level bona fide source or a high-level provocation.  
We intend to continue this case as if it were bona fide, but bearing in mind the good possibility of provocation, and taking every step possible to determine the identity and reliability of the source.

3. Original documents for all but the most recent communication from Dr. Heinrich SCHUTZE are now in the possession of CIA and will be transmitted to the Bureau when processing is completed. The following is a summary of the contents of these letters and telegrams:

- a. Letter #1. Postmarked 2 April 1958 in Zurich, Switzerland, already examined by the Bureau.
- b. Letter #2. Postmarked 13 May 1958 in West Berlin.

(1) The writer states that he has had no confirmation of his letter and telegram mailed on 8 May. (Note: These were mailed directly to the Bureau.) As a consequence he had to destroy his original report, which he had held up waiting for this confirmation, and his contact man had travelled in vain to Geneva. He states that in April he supplied certain information which described a Communist intelligence organization in the United States. A coded advertisement subsequently appeared in a West German newspaper as confirmation of the receipt of this April information and giving a letter address to be used in the future. But as long as he has not rechecked this address he can't make use of it.

(2) As stated in his first letter he can work on various matters in the so-called Socialist camp. At present he is in the position to throw light on the problems between Prague, Berlin, and Warsaw. These matters are not only important for the FBI but also will interest CIA and G-2. He can expand his possibilities if desired. He can cover the activity of the Soviet Intelligence Service in Poland, the CSR, and the DDR (as a base of operations for their activity in Europe and the US), the activity of the Intelligence Services of these three countries, the political

*Revised to  
late instructions  
1-7-58*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

and economic situation in these countries, and military affairs. He states that he naturally can't report everything but is willing to accept EEIs and needs exact statements of what he should concentrate on. He is enclosing three undeveloped films which contain a political bulletin of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Poland, and an information bulletin of Polish Military Intelligence (0-2). These are both ~~Top Secret~~ documents. He doesn't know whether he was successful in taking these photos. (Note: All three films were completely blank when developed.) He hopes to be able to supply current issues of these publications in the future, as well as past issues. He requests that if his reports are passed to CIA, G-2 or CIC that they be appropriately reprocessed. He says that he has reasons to recommend greatest caution in this respect. In the near future he will send us an exact list of his possibilities.

(3) Please allow him to formulate his requirements. In case there is interest in his cooperation the most necessary conditions for it must be created. He wants to keep the contact in his hands since this is almost completely secure. Besides he has no trust in various contact people of the American Intelligence Service. He makes no personal financial requests, but needs money to acquire the necessary material, for communications, etc. He says he will convince us that he is not a fabricator. To get the business under way he needs money. He is in accord with submitting his information to careful testing, and says that it is also important for him to know that he is not engaged with someone in a game. In the next six months he will have no possibility to accept anything from us in any manner. He hopes that he will be able to send monthly reports. In addition he needs a precise camera, films, secret inks, and radio contact. Under the latter he understands a one-way contact from us to him in cipher.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

117 L 102  
c. Telegram #1. Postmarked 13 May 1958 in West Berlin. "Inform Director ~~HUVER~~ (sic) urgently expect confirmation from him. Dr. Heinrich."

d. Letter #3. Postmarked 6 June 1958 in West Berlin. He confirms the receipt of our message about the validity of his contact with us. [redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[redacted] He states that he is very disappointed to date with the previous course of the work. ~~Matros~~ has returned to his homeland and has been celebrated there as an intelligence hero in America. The intelligence source correctly identified by us in Bonn was very incautiously investigated. (Note: This may refer to the arrest by Danish authorities in Bonn of the Trade Counselor to the Danish Embassy, ~~Rinar~~ BLECKINGBERG, on 4 May 1958 on charges of espionage for Poland.) He has meanwhile clarified the connections and it is clear that we have allowed a small (or big) ABEL somewhere in Europe from the same company as "Matros" to escape. In addition our investigation was known to our biggest rival (Note: Presumably the Soviet Intelligence Service is meant) and caused feverish excitement there, which could obviously have been avoided. He says he can't give any more details in an open letter. He urgently awaits our decision concerning contact as he proposed in his 13 May letter [redacted]

b3  
b7E

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

~~SECRET~~

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

~~SECRET~~


e. Telegram #2. Postmarked 19 July 1958 in Warsaw.  
"On behalf of the ~~Heinrich~~ Company confirm receipt of  
your offer per philatelist company Welt. By 25 July you  
will receive new business proposition concerning stamp  
collection Europe and America. Prepare everything in  
order to decide finally over our import and export plans  
and in order to be able to tell us your decision by  
means of the ~~Welt~~ Company. Philatelist Warsaw Prague."

f. Letter #4.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

(1) Postmarked 22 July 1958 in West Berlin.

~~X~~



~~X~~

6

~~SECRET~~

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

~~SECRET~~

Please warn the US Consul in West Berlin who forwarded to us his earlier letter. He has been indiscreet. If the Consul is not discreet the writer will silence him himself but he will give no more warnings.

(2) The writer lists the following brief pieces of information. "Alfa" - more details about "Matros" and the activities of his company in the US and Berlin are known. "Iraq" - the developments in Iraq (Note: Presumably the recent overthrow of the monarchy is meant) have been known for two months in Soviet Intelligence circles (source Prague). The Soviet Intelligence Service and Nasser were the string pullers. The letter writer had no opportunity to communicate this to us. "Nike" - as known in serious (Note: Presumably "well-informed" is meant) circles the Soviets have invented a new sort of long-distance ray exploding device which is still being tested. Various oil and rocket explosions in the US in recent times can be traced back to the activity of sabotage groups of the Soviet Intelligence which are operating there with this device. It is claimed that atom and hydrogen bomb stocks can also be exploded in this manner. This information has to be thoroughly checked however. "Treaty" - In the months of April and May there were a number of meetings of Intelligence chiefs of Prague, Berlin, Warsaw, and Moscow. Special intelligence and counter-intelligence agreements were reached. According to these the most important intelligence axis against America and Western Europe which had been broken off for one year has again been restored. It lies in the realm of possibilities to learn the true details. "Abel" - the writer says he can get facts, which after investigation can lead to the uncovering of an illegal residentura in the US. He expects our aid. We should also tell him how much money he can spend to buy documents to be photographed in order that he not acquire in vain material which is uninteresting to us.

g. Telegram #3. Postmarked 22 August 1958 in West Berlin. "Your representative Berlin Clayalee 170 Telephone 764315 received by mail today very important documents

7  
~~SECRET~~



for you. Kindly make necessary arrangements have them transferred to you personally."

h. Letter #5.

(1) Postmarked 22 August 1958 in West Berlin. The writer relates that he sent a letter (#4) on 22 July proposing new contact arrangements. He states that he has had no answer to these proposals.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] he assumes that this letter was not received and requests that the matter be investigated. He fears that the telegram he sent from Warsaw before posting this letter (Telegram #2) may have been intercepted by the Swiss counter-intelligence service, and the letter which followed thereby also intercepted. He says that this was just at the time that the Swiss press was conducting a campaign against American Ambassador Taylor who had alleged that Switzerland was a Communist espionage center. For this reason he again uses the indirect route for this letter via the US Consul in West Berlin. In this letter he is giving us an opportunity to prove that Ambassador Taylor was correct in his statement and gives the following information.

71.5.

HENRY J.

[Large Redacted Block]

[Redacted]

b3  
b7E

b3  
b7E

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

b3  
b7E

i. Letter #6. Postmarked 22 September 1958 in West Berlin. This letter concerns only contact arrangements and gives no additional information. The writer states that he has not yet seen any confirmation of his proposals in his letter of 25 July (Note: Presumably he means the letter of 22 July, #4, which made such proposals).

b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

As of 19 September he had not yet seen any confirmation of his last two letters.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[Redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

j. Telegram #4. Postmarked 4 October 1958 in Warsaw.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

k. Letter #7. Postmarked 20 November 1958 in West Berlin.

(1) [redacted] in late September and 4 and 5 November. (Note: He does not mention another letter recently mailed to him in East Berlin.) He again complains about the failure on our part to carry out the communication plan proposed by him. He states that he could have contacted CIA, whose "Department of Covert Activities" (sic, in English) would be interested in his proposal to act as a "defector in place" (sic, in English). He says that he cannot continue, and this letter "could" be the last from him. He allegedly can continue for two or three months longer if supported by us, and he would then be in a position to arrange to meet us in the West in mid-1959. He states that "the time until then is to be considered a test period."

b3  
b7E

(2) The writer says that he has information which he cannot send via the open mail. He repeats his earlier communication demands and states that either communication is arranged as he has requested in the past or contact must be broken off. [redacted]

b3  
b7E

[redacted] He says that if the Berlin situation worsens and communication difficulties arise we would have to provide him with contact possibilities in Poland or Czechoslovakia. If we receive a telegram [redacted]

b3  
b7E

[redacted]

[redacted] he says that he expects our shipment between 15-20 December or 10-15 January. He also asks that we retain the Bern address to which he now writes at least until the end of March so that he can send film if possible.

(3) Three pages of this letter contain information which is summarized as follows:

~~SECRET~~

b3  
b7E

[REDACTED]

(b) During the Prague meetings the Soviet intelligence chief emphasized the urgent need for better work against the BND. (Note: Bundesnachrichtendienst, Federal Intelligence Service.) There have been too few penetrations since an operation in 1953-55 in which about 100 penetration agents were sacrificed by having them resign in order to compromise GEHLEN and have him replaced with a Soviet agent. The Soviets have two agents in the BND leadership, one of whom was to have been the replacement for GEHLEN. After the operation failed, one of the two Soviet agents was recalled.

(c) The UB Major who travelled to Switzerland to meet the BND principal agent (reported in the writer's letter of 22 August 1958 letter #5) travelled as a private citizen going to Zurich for medical treatment. The next meeting is scheduled for the end of March 1959. The UB Major brought back the following:

1. GEHLEN service reports to the German government, including the report for the fourth quarter which contained information on the Chinese talks in Moscow during November 1957; the Chinese military delegation to Moscow during the same month; the 10th Party Conference in Poland; the ZHUKOV case; the situation in China; Sino-Soviet differences; money exchange in the DDR; the situation in Hungary and Czechoslovakia; Soviet economic plans, etc. Also included were the GEHLEN service reports for the period 1 January 1958 to 30 June 1958.

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2. One of the GEHLEN agents run by this principal agent is Wladyslaw or Witold "Schmidt Vel Orlinski," born in Wilno about 1908. ORLINSKI, who lived in Hamburg in 1953, ran a net for GEHLEN in Poland. He was doubled by the UB during an illegal trip to Poland and his net liquidated in the end of 1953 or early 1954. The principal agent of this net was Marian SZYMCZAK. ORLINSKI also has assisted the UB in infiltrating GIC and the BND.

*MROZEK  
see  
Wladyslaw Puzos  
Case*

(d) A young man who repatriated to Switzerland - from Poland about a year ago as Swiss - is actually a UB captain who took the place of the real Swiss who remained in Poland. He obtained his passport through the Swiss Embassy in Warsaw "with the help of a UB agent in the Embassy." He is doing no operational work in Switzerland, but is acclimatizing himself for a later move to the United States.


(e) The American Press Attache in Warsaw, Mr. SZYMONS, whose real name is SZYMANSKI and who is allegedly also a CIA employee, was recruited by the KGB during his period as consul in Poznan (Poland) about 1949-1950. He rendered important service to the Soviets while he was at the American Embassy in Turkey. SZYMONS is now being handled by the KGB out of Prague. The writer emphasizes that this allegation is untested.

4. The information supplied by this anonymous source is being checked where possible. Pertinent evaluations will be forwarded to the Bureau when available.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

*S. H. Horton*  
S. H. Horton

*C.I.A. still in  
inclined to believe that  
since matter - persuasion  
- per JT PPK 4/12*



b1 Per  
b3 CIA

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

111 9-1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Dr. Heinrich SCHUTZE


b3  
b7E

s.t.  
ead  
20

110-5

110-5

Reference is made to this Agency's [redacted] dated 19 March 1959. Subject as above.



b1 Per  
b3 CIA

RECORDED COPY FILED IN

W.H. [unclear]

Photostats to  
by let 12/10/59



ggmc

REC-70

~~SECRET~~

65-6711-23

23 APR 6 1959

65-65142

135-703  
APR 21 1959

5-115


~~SECRET~~



b1 Per  
b3 CIA

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

*J. Angleton*  
James Angleton



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Dr. Heinrich SCHUTZE

*Handwritten signature*

b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[Redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

UNRECORDED COPY FILED

3 APR 6 1959

~~SECRET~~

96  
52 APR 14 1959

15-65192

5-510


ENCLOSURE

Encls to D. Schutze  
File with [redacted]

*Handwritten initials*




~~SECRET~~



b1 Per  
b3 CIA

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

*J. Angleton*  
James Angleton



Attachment

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6  
b7C

Mr. Belmont

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Papich
- 1 - Mr. McDermott

3-23-59

Mr. Branigan

**POLISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE  
UNITED STATES  
INTERNAL SECURITY - POLAND**

By letter 3-19-59 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) furnished information received from "Dr. Heinrich Schutze" (pseudonym) on 3-13-59. "Schutze" is the person who several months ago addressed a letter to the Director in care of the American Embassy, Berne, Switzerland, containing information regarding Polish intelligence activity in the United States, some of which was verifiable. [redacted]

b3  
b7E

[redacted] A copy of the letter was also designated for, but never received by, CIA. At that time, "Schutze" gave directions for future exchange of correspondence [redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

Among other things, "Schutze" in his latest report advised: (A) that Polish Intelligence (UB) agents in the United States will be run from Canada to avoid detection by the FBI; (B) that Major Golembiowski of the Polish Embassy, Canada, is the UB resident in Canada; and (C) that three persons of Polish extraction in the United States have been developed by and have been rendering services for the UB. These were identified as "(1) Anton Ascik, born 1910, Technical Director of a Pittsburgh, USA steel concern, (2) Witold Kocay, engineer active in a chemical firm, residence Stanford (or something similar) - repeat Stanford, Conn., USA, (3) Adam Skompshi, Professor at Vermont University, resident in Burlington, USA." According to "Schutze," they are to be "incorporated into the net" in the future after training and investigation. While the true identity of "Schutze" has not been determined and his reliability is not established, some of his data is known to be accurate. A supplementary analysis is being prepared by CIA.

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Preliminary Analysis: [redacted]

b7D

- Tolson
- Boardman
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Nease
- Parsons
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Trotter
- W.C. Sullivan
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Gandy

JJC:skd (9) 100-350264 (1) (1) -65-65192 (Schutze)

b3  
b7E

NOT RECORDED  
02

Enclosure

Memorandum Mr. Branigan to Mr. Belmont  
RE: POLISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE  
UNITED STATES  
100-350264

ACTION:

<sup>ALBANY</sup>  
Attached/for approval is an airtel to New Haven  
with copies to ~~Buffalo~~, Buffalo, New York and Washington Field  
(1) instituting discreet, intensive investigations of Witold  
Kocay and Adam Skompski, (2) instructing the field to  
determine whether Kocay and Skompski have access to classified  
data and (3) instructing that investigative reports be  
submitted within 30 days together with recommendations  
regarding desirability of interviewing Kocay and Skompski.

*JK*  
*AF*

- 1 - Mr. McDermott
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Brannigan
- 1 - Mr. Papich

b6  
b7C

March 24, 1959

**Airtel**

**To: SAC, New Haven**  
**2 - ~~Albany~~ Albany**

b3  
b7E

**From: Director, FBI**

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

On 3-19-59 information classified "Secret" was furnished by CIA which was received from an unidentified person in Europe using the pseudonym "Dr. Heinrich Schutze." While the reliability of "Schutze" has not been established, some of the information furnished by him in the past is verifiable from independent sources and indicates access to records of Polish Intelligence (UB) on a current basis. In a report dated February, 1959, received by CIA on 3-13-59, "Schutze" advised in part as follows:

"The American citizens named below have been developed for 2 or 3 years by the Polish Intelligence Service Department I. Whether they are already being committed as agents has not yet been determined. In time however they are to be active as agents. Under various covers they are in contact with officers of the Washington and Toronto residencias and have already rendered various services for Department I. It goes without saying that the cases of these people

165-65192-  
NOT RECORDED  
MAR 25 1959

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

YELLOW  
DUPLICATE  
MAR 24 1959

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12

53 APR 1 1959  
- New York  
- Washington Field

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

- ① - 65-65192 (Schutze)
  - 1 - 100-350264 (Polish Intelligence Activities in the U.S.)
- JJMcD:ajd  
(24) (26)

MAIL ROOM

Airtel to New Haven

b3  
b7E

(all of whom are of Polish extraction) require very thorough study and work. They are: (1) Anton ASCIK, born 1910, Technical Director of a Pittsburgh, USA steel concern, (2) Witold KOCAY, engineer active in a chemical firm, residence Stamford (or something similar) - repeat Stamford, Conn., USA, (3) Adam SKOMPSKI, Professor at Vermont University, resident in Burlington, USA. These people are to (or already are) work(ing) in the field of politics technology (sic). Because they are very patriotic Poles they are to be incorporated into the net - MOB (mobilization?) (war net) in the future after training and investigation. (Comments: Source will be questioned on what he means by the term 'war net.') An important field of activity is the Polish emigration in the USA. I ask you however to examine my report carefully in order to avoid getting these people into trouble solely as a result of my information in case they should be unaware of whom they are dealing with, in other words, in case they are not wittingly working against the USA."


Receiving offices are aware that intensive investigation in recent months has all but conclusively established that Anthony Leon Ascik of Niagara Falls, New York, is identical with (FNU) Ascik (MI), who reportedly furnished specifications for the production of high-quality steel to Polish Intelligence.

By letter 4-18-57 captioned

[redacted] New Haven advised that Dabrowska entered the U.S. on 1-11-57 from Poland to visit her brother, Witold R. Kocay, 54 Ledge Lane, Stamford, Connecticut. Inquiry by New Haven at that time disclosed that Kocay was born 9-28-12, Poland, and had been employed as a senior chemist by the American Cyanamid Company, Stamford, since his arrival in the U.S. in 1951. He was naturalized at New Haven, Connecticut, on 12-21-56.

b3  
b7E

**Airtel to New Haven**



b3  
b7E

**Bureau files contain no information identifiable with Adam Skompski.**

**New Haven immediately institute an intensive, discreet investigation of Witold Kocay. Complete background information, including contents of INS files, credit, criminal, security informant and employment record checks, should be submitted in a report to reach the Bureau within thirty days from the date of this communication.**

*These matters are to receive continued and preferred attention.*

**~~Albany~~ Albany immediately institute a discreet investigation to completely identify and develop background information concerning Professor Adam Skompski of Vermont University. Authority is granted to contact established sources at Vermont University. Complete background data, including the results of INS, credit, criminal, security informant and employment checks, should be submitted in a report which is to reach the Bureau within thirty days from the date of this communication.**

**Investigations of Kocay and Skompski should determine whether they have access to classified data. The investigations should be handled by personnel thoroughly conversant with espionage investigations. The investigative report in each case, which is not to be disseminated locally, should be accompanied by recommendations regarding the desirability of interviewing the subjects.**

**These matters are to receive continued and preferred attention. Buffalo's request for authority to interview Anthony Leon Ascik is being handled separately.**

**NOTE: Cover memo Branigan to Belmont prepared 3-23-59 JJMcD/skw captioned "Polish Intelligence Activities in the U.S.; Internal Security - Poland."**

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted]

b1b6  
b7c

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

*3/19/59*  
*psb*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
SUBJECT: Dr. Heinrich SCHUTZE

*McDonnell*

1. Reference is made to our [redacted] of 17 December 1958 Subject as above. Attached is a verbatim translation of a report dated February 1959, received from Subject on 13 March 1959.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

2. Accompanying this report were films of two documents entitled "Monthly Communication" of the Second Administration (O-II, Polish Military Intelligence) of the Ministry of National Defense. These documents appear to be monthly summaries of intelligence collected by O-II from all sources (radio and overt publications as well as agent networks) during the given months. They include Order of Battle information on Western European nations and the United States and a breakdown of the type and amount of military aid given by the United States to certain of the Western allies. Unfortunately, these films are blurred and only about 30% readable. Appropriate dissemination of this information will be made as soon as we have had time to translate the very considerable quantity of material involved.

*copy of it*  
*1/20/59*

[redacted]

UNRECORDED COPY FILED

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

ENCLOSURE

*Please copy to and include in*

[redacted]

REC-92 65-65192-25

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

13 APR 14 1959

57 APR 17 1959

*5-205*


~~SECRET~~



b1 Per  
b3 CIA

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

*J. Angleton*  
James Angleton



Attachment

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

ALFA: As previously reported ~~by~~ "MATROS" has returned to base, unfortunately with a healthy head (e.g., note in one piece). (Translator's Note: "MATROS" is the UB pseudonym for Zbigniew ~~BYBALA~~, former UB resident for the entire Western Hemisphere.) He is deputy to the Director of Department I (Intelligence Service) of the Ministry of the Interior. Department VII no longer exists. "MATROS" among other things has been (for approximately 5 years) in charge of the American operations. The American Intelligence Section II, Department I was thoroughly reorganized upon return of "MATROS." This was done as a result of "MATROS'" practical experiences in the United States and in accordance with advice received from the Soviet Intelligence Group in Warsaw. The Independent Intelligence Section VII, Department I which used to work against Great Britain and Israel was as a result of the reorganization fused with Section II which in consequence now works against America (sic) including U.S.A. and Canada, Great Britain and Israel. Thus Great Britain and Israel are considered as the most important bases for espionage against the United States. The remaining American States are considered exclusively as (bases) surrounding the U.S.A. and are utilized as bases for intelligence work against the U.S.A. on legal positions

14.51

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

65-65192-25

~~SECRET~~

(cover ?) as well as illegal positions. This system is applied (sic) by the Soviet and Czech Intelligence Services.

In accordance with the plan which was devised primarily by "MATROS" important personnel changes have also been effected.

~~Col. MARTIUK~~ who up to now had been Chief of Section II, Department I was transferred to the West Berlin Military

Mission a few months ago. Officially he is the Mission's political attache. His secret mission consists of strengthening and activating the intelligence work against the U.S.A.

from various bases in West Berlin and West Germany. His official cover name is ~~"MARCZAK"~~ and his diplomatic passport

is issued in this name. He is a Ukrainian. 41 years old.

Brown black eyes. Typical Asiatic face. 15 years active

in Polish Intelligence Service. Before that 5 years in

Soviet Military Counter Espionage. While in Polish Intelligence Service simultaneously active as collaborator of the

Soviet Security organs (MGB) ~~Cover name "LUX"~~ (also others but unknown). Has excellent experience in defense against

underground movements and Western espionage. For 7 years

active in Department VII - now Department I. Always in the position of section chief. A close collaborator and friend

of "MATROS." Administratively under the Berlin residentura.

Operationally under "MATROS." "LUX" is an intelligence

officer of considerable stature, intelligent, cunning,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

experienced, knows very well how to dissimulate, very close to the Soviet Intelligence Service, fanatical communist. So far I have not gained any insight into the area of "LUX's" activity, this requires lengthy work. By this I mean an insight with more depth to the point where it could be operationally exploited by you. It is clear that "LUX's" transfer to West Berlin is an important step which requires great caution and counter espionage ingenuity on your part. I have indication that "LUX" is in contact with the Soviet Intelligence Group in Karlshorst in East Berlin. This however requires further examination. It is also certain that 3 or 4 agents from U.S.A., who come to Europe for meetings, will be run personally by "LUX" after his transfer to West Berlin. He lives in East Berlin. As far as I have been able to find out "LUX" works very closely with the resident of the Military Intelligence Service in West Berlin which works against the Federal Republic and the American Army in this area. This resident is directly subordinated to the Chief of the Second Headquarters of the Military Intelligence Service (e.g., note O-2) in Warsaw <sup>offici</sup> General ~~KORCZYNSKI~~. Officially he is Deputy of the Military Attache of the Military Mission of West Berlin Col. FOTEK. In actuality he runs the Military Intelligence Service in West Germany. His name is ~~KUCKOWSKI~~, Henryk. (N.B. Correct spelling is ~~KUCZKOWSKI~~.)

3

HENRYK

~~SECRET~~

B. APPROX

~~SECRET~~

He is a Lt. Col. (possibly Major ?). This is his true name which he also uses in West Berlin. K. is a Pole. Approximately 35 years old. Blond. Well built. Sympathique. A man of brilliant intelligence. Very polite, cultural. With the UB since 1945. 1953 dismissed for political reasons. Reinstated October 1956. For a short while active in military security organization (Military Interior Service Warsaw - District Military Office of the Warsaw District Military Units). Up to his dismissal in 1953 active in former Department I (former MBP) Counter Espionage. A good friend of General KORCZYNSKI from the Partisan days. A great deal of experience in the area of counterespionage and intelligence. He is not an agent of the Soviet I.S. A fanatical GOMULKA follower. According to plans of Department I and O-2, the coordinated collaboration between "LUX" and K. is designed to lead to greater success in the area of espionage against the U.S. direct and through U.S. citizens in West Germany. K. has been in West Berlin for over a year. Further details, if obtainable, will be furnished to you by me on a current basis. I hope, however, that you yourself by means of correct coverage of these two intelligence chiefs will obtain a great deal of valuable information. RU

The successor of "LUX" who has taken over the reorganized Section II, Department I is Lt. Col. ~~MASTRZEMBSKI~~. Prior to

B. APPROX. 1957

4

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

this he was chief of an unknown section in Department I. Has been in Department I for 3 years. Since 1944 active as Section Chief in Department III (formerly MBP) in the area of defensive work against underground movements. Inter alia he also directed the WIN operation against the U.S.A. and also participated in it directly. He is very experienced, intelligent, and has great organizational capabilities. Approximately 40 years old. Further details must still be obtained. It has been decided that in the course of 1959

J. is to replace the present resident in Washington CZAJER who is well known to you. <sup>one</sup> CZAJER will be placed into Headquarters (Department I) and is to take over the leadership of Section II. In answer to your question, I inform you that at the moment nobody is to replace "MATROS." The situation with "MATROS" was in my estimation unique. Whether it will recur is hard to find out or to predict. As previously reported there are two independent residenturas at work - in Washington under CZAJER's leadership and in New York under CZARKOWSKI (approximation). <sup>127</sup> CZARKOWSKI is attache or secretary in the Polish UN Mission in New York. The two residents who even in the U.S.A. run an apparat consisting of 15 to 18 officers of Department I are directly subordinate to "MATROS" through Section II. It is to be assumed (but only for the moment) that after J's transfer to the U.S.A. he will be the most

JASTRZEMSKI →

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten signature]*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

important man in the U.S.A. area of activities.

In mid-1958 "MATROS" dispatched to Canada an experienced intelligence officer within the framework of the general U.S.A. intelligence plan. Officially he is Second Secretary of the Polish Embassy in Canada. He is a Major. His name is GOLEMBIOWSKI and he is also active under this name. Is well known to the French counterespionage in Paris because he was active there for 3 years in the Embassy and as active intelligence chief. He is Jewish. G. is the resident for Canada and from there he is also charged with intelligence operations against U.S.A. Various agents who cannot be met directly in the U.S.A. (due to the FBI) come to Canada and there they are to be run by G. Furthermore, 7 to 10 intelligence officers are assigned to G. in Canada. At the moment he is still in the acclimatization phase and is supposedly not yet active. He is subordinated to Section II of Department I. Since 1945 G. is active in Department VII now Department I. Further details to "ALFA" will be furnished you whenever possible on a current basis.

The American citizens named below have been developed for 2 or 3 years by the Polish Intelligence Service Department I. Whether they are already being committed as agents has not yet been determined. In time however they are to be active as agents. Under various covers they are in contact with officers

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

of the Washington and Toronto residenturas and have already rendered various services for Department I. It goes without saying that the cases of these people (all of whom are of Polish extraction) require very thorough study and work. They are: (1) Anton ASCIK, born 1910, Technical Director of a Pittsburgh, USA steel concern, (2) Witold KOCAY, engineer active in a chemical firm, residence Stanford (or something similar) - repeat Stanford, Conn., USA., (3) Adam SKOMPSKI, Professor at Vermont University, resident in Burlington, USA. These people are to (or already are) work(ing) in the field of politics technology (sic). Because they are very patriotic Poles they are to be incorporated into the net - MOB (mobilization ?) (war net) in the future after training and investigation. (Comment: Source will be questioned on what he means by the term "war net.") An important field of activity is the Polish emigration in the USA. I ask you however to examine my report carefully in order to avoid getting these people into trouble solely as a result of my information in case they should be unaware of whom they are dealing with, in other words, in case they are not wittingly working against the USA. As soon as I am in a position to ascertain additional facets you will receive further information from me pertaining to "ALFA." I trust I have served you with the above "ALFA" excerpt.

~~SECRET~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont *al's*

DATE: May 26, 1959

FROM : W. A. Branigan *W.A.B.*

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Papich
- 1 - Mr. Daunt
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. McDermott

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

DeLoach  
McGuire  
W.C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Dr. Heinrich Schutze is a pseudonym of an unidentified individual who first made contact with U.S. Intelligence in April, 1959. At that time, he addressed letter to the Director in the German language and enclosed it and its envelope in an outer envelope addressed to the

[redacted]

CIA, indicated writer wanted to assist U.S. by furnishing information concerning Polish Intelligence efforts against U.S. He furnished sufficient data (such as verbatim quotes from "Secret" NATO documents) to show that he had high-level access to Polish and possibly Soviet Intelligence. Since then, numerous correspondence has been exchanged between subject and CIA [redacted]. He has avoided personal contact with CIA allegedly for personal safety.

[redacted]

CIA has continued communications with him in hope of ultimately placing him under control while remaining alert for any indication of deception. A copy of subject's latest letter, bearing salutation "Mr. General Director E. Hoover" and enclosed in an envelope addressed to a business firm's post office box [redacted] was received from CIA on 5-22-59. Letter mishandled by postal authorities and ended up in the unclaimed mail section of a Berlin post office where the Army obtained it [redacted].

The subject advised the Soviets are preparing an expose of U.S. intelligence activity as a counterattack to a report on Soviet espionage in U.S. by House Committee on Un-American Activities. He then outlined extensive Soviet-bloc penetrations of U.S., British, French and West German intelligence installations in Europe to illustrate Soviet ability to expose Western intelligence efforts against the Soviet bloc.

OBSERVATIONS:

2 MAY 27 1959

[redacted] the Soviet bloc may be attempted to discourage U.S. from propagandist effort (in further exposing Soviet)

53 JUN 3 1959


65-65192



Memorandum to A. H. Belmont  
RE: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
65-65192

b3  
b7E

intelligence activity) by showing the Soviet bloc is prepared to make a counterexpose.



[redacted] Bureau's role is merely that of an observer. While the subject charged that three alleged U.S. citizens in Europe have been recruited by Soviet Intelligence and a fourth "agent" has relatives in New York, our files contain no information identifiable with them on the basis of available information. One of the alleged U.S. citizens, "John Geyer," was described as an "FBI collaborator" in Geneva. File check reveals no such person is or has been a Bureau employee. It is noted that the FBI is often considered in Europe as being synonymous with U.S. Intelligence. There was nothing else in subject's letter touching on the Bureau's sphere of jurisdiction.

ACTION:

We will follow this matter closely for further developments and for the results of current inquiries in Europe [redacted] b3

[redacted] As results of those inquiries are received, prompt action will b7E be taken on any matter within the Bureau's sphere of responsibility.

WAB  
1/18

over  
A ✓

Dermott

b6  
b7C

SAC, Albany [redacted]

6-11-59

b3  
b7E

Director, FBI [redacted]

[redacted]

ReALlet 5-28-59, no copies furnished New Haven.. In view of observations contained in referenced letter concerning the possibility that Shapski might make an intelligence contact after his arrival in the U.S. but prior to his return to the University of Vermont, the Bureau has no objection to Albany's instructing appropriate offices to institute discreet physical surveillances on Shapski upon notification of his arrival until it is determined that he is traveling to his Vermont residence.

You were previously advised that this case is predicated on information furnished to CIA by an unidentified person in Europe using the pseudonym "Dr. Heinrich Schutze." You were further advised that while the reliability of "Schutze" has not been established, some of the information furnished by him is verifiable. On the basis of information recently received from "Schutze," [redacted]

b3  
b7E

If so, a certain amount of the information furnished would logically be accurate although "expendable" data. On the basis of available information and because of CIA's inability to make personal contact with "Schutze," it is not now possible to further evaluate the data being received from him. [redacted]

b3  
b7E

A copy of this letter is being furnished to New Haven for its file on Witold Kocay, which investigation is also based on information received from "Schutze."

1 - New Haven [redacted]

1 - [redacted] 05-65192 (Schutze)

YELLOW  
DUPLICATE  
JUN 11 1959  
MAILED

65 65174  
NOT RECORDED  
29 JUN 15 1959

- Tolson
- Belmont
- DeLoach
- McGuire
- Mohr
- Parsons
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Trotter
- W.C. Sullivan
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Gandy

b3  
b7E

NOTE: Investigation of the subject was initiated on 3-24-59 upon receipt of information from CIA, originating with "Schutze," to the effect that the subject was one of three named persons

JJMCD:skw (7)  
JUN 17 1959

CONTINUED PAGE TWO

Letter to SAC, Albany



b3  
b7E

NOTE - continued:

in the U.S. who had been recruited by Polish intelligence (UB). The three were said to be in contact with officers of the Polish residencies in Washington, D. C., and Toronto, Canada. Albany was previously advised that the Bureau does not desire physical surveillances to be conducted on the subject except where it is known a specific purpose will be served in a given instance. The subject is presently in West Africa as a consultant for the Ford Foundation. He is scheduled to return to the University of Vermont to resume duties as a professor of physics in the fall of 1959.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [ ] ADG

1 - Mr. McDermott

May 28, 1959

SAC, Washington Field

65-65192  
Director, FBI

UNKNOWN SUBJECT, aka.  
Walter Morach  
IS - PO

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

Since the Spring of 1958, an unidentified individual using the pseudonym Dr. Heinrich Schutze has been furnishing information to CIA [ ] regarding Polish and Soviet intelligence activities. Data furnished by him indicate that he has high-level access to Polish and Soviet intelligence. CIA, however, has been unable to determine whether he is acting in good faith or is a provocateur engaged in a high-level deception operation. He has refused to make personal contact with U.S. intelligence in Europe. By letter dated 12-17-58 classified "Secret," CIA furnished information received from "Schutze" as follows:

"A young man who repatriated to Switzerland - from Poland about a year ago as Swiss - is actually a UB captain who took the place of the real Swiss who remained in Poland. He obtained his passport through the Swiss Embassy in Warsaw 'with the help of a UB agent in the Embassy.' He is doing no operational work in Switzerland, but is acclimatizing himself for a later move to the United States." (65-65192-22, pg. 14)

b3  
b7E

Enclosed for WFO and Paris is a copy of CIA letter 5-15-59 classified "Secret," captioned "Polish Intelligence Activities Against the United States," furnishing information concerning the unidentified individual referred to in the above-quoted paragraph who has assumed the identity of Walter Morach, a Swiss citizen who is known to be in Warsaw. Since available facts constitute a classic example of an illegal agent's plans to enter the United States, the Bureau must proceed on the assumption that the information is accurate until satisfactorily disproven.

WFO should consider itself office of origin and place appropriate steps with INS. Legat, Paris, arrange to be notified of any application of the subject for a visa at the U.S. Embassy, Bern, Switzerland.

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Enclosure  
2 - Paris (Enclosure)

WFO 55 @ AT BW 22

MAILED 20  
MAY 28 1959  
COMM-FBI

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (route thru for review)

JJMcd:skw (7)

MAIL ROOM

67 JUN 3 - 1959

ORIGINAL FILED

~~SECRET~~  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

15 MAY 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Polish Intelligence Activities  
Against the United States

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten notes]*  
5/11/59

1. Reference is made to this Agency's [redacted]  
[redacted] of 17 December 1958, Subject Dr. Heinrich  
SCHUTZE. *65-65192-22 (P. 14, P. 3)*

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[Large redacted block]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[Redacted block]

[Redacted block]

*65-65192*  
NOT RECORDED  
MAY 29 1959  
b1 Per  
b3 CIA

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

MAY 30 1959

*[Handwritten notes]*  
5/11/59

~~SECRET~~



~~S~~

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

*S. W. Horton*  
for James Angleton



~~S~~

~~SECRET~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : R. R. ROACH *RR*

DATE: June 15, 1959

FROM : S. J. PAPICH

Tolson	_____
Belmont	_____
DeLoach	_____
McGuire	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

SUBJECT: DR. HEINRICH SCUTZE  
MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION CONCERNING

*RR*

On June 12, 1959, James Angleton, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) advised the Liaison Agent that CIA is still maintaining contact with the subject. Additional efforts to arrange a meeting with him have been negative. In a recent letter Scutze wrote that the Soviet plan to embarrass the U. S. by publicizing an expose of U. S. intelligence activities in Europe have been temporarily postponed.

Angleton advised that CIA will continue to follow this matter, it being fully understood that Scutze <sup>may be</sup> involved in a Soviet deception operation.

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Espionage Section.

*A*

REC-24

*65-65192 27*

24 JUN 17 1959

- SJE/nmp*  
(5)
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
  - 1 - Mr. McDermott
  - 1 - Liaison
  - 1 - Mr. Papich

*65-65192*

*5-McDermott*

*F179*

60 JUN 22 1959

Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Records BranchALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

7/1, 1959

DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6

 Name Check Unit - Room 6523

b7C

 Service Unit - Room 6524 Forward to File Review Attention mitchell Return to Mc Dermott 226?

Supervisor Room Ext.

## Type of References Requested:

- Regular Request (Analytical Search)  
 All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)  
 Subversive References Only  
 Nonsubversive References Only  
 Main \_\_\_\_\_ References Only

## Type of Search Requested:

- Restricted to Locality of \_\_\_\_\_  
 Exact Name Only (On the Nose)  
 Buildup  Variations  
 Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

breakdown to double initials  
 Subject Wolfgang-Bernard Fleischer  
 Birthdate & Place \_\_\_\_\_  
 Address \_\_\_\_\_

## Localities \_\_\_\_\_

R# \_\_\_\_\_ Date 7/1 Searcher Initials WJS  
 FILE NUMBER SERIAL

39-0-39835  
Wolfgang B  
WK  
Wolfgang  
WK  
W. Bernard  
WK  
W B  
WK  
W.  
67-45434 not in file  
NI 62-96161-1  
Bernard  
NI 100-241165-19  
NI 121-40652-3

~~SEARCHED~~  
~~SERIALIZED~~  
~~INDEXED~~  
~~FILED~~



FD-5  
Revised  
08/05/2008

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

\* This form is consolidated with the old FD-654, based on a Sentinel review.

Date 12/23/13

Document Classification:  Unclass  Confidential  Secret  Top Secret

Document Type:  Letter  Airtel  LHM  Memo  Report  
 Facsimile  Teletype  Misc  EC  Email  
Enclosure \_\_\_\_\_ Attachment \_\_\_\_\_

SCI TYPE: \*requires special handling

SI\*  TK\*  GAMMA\*  COSMIC(NATO)  
 HCS\*  SSRP\*  BYE\*  Other \_\_\_\_\_ (specify)

FD-501 Number: \_\_\_\_\_

Date of Mail 6/30/59

Originating Office or agency \_\_\_\_\_

This serial has been removed and placed in:

Special File Room, FBIHQ  FBIHQ, Room \_\_\_\_\_

Field Office-Room # Container # or Other Location Where Material Is Stored

File 65-410 65-192 - fac 1  
Class. Office of Origin Case No. Last Serial

Pending  Closed

Serial No. Description of Serial Date Charged

29 65-410 65192 - fac 1 \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Employee



RECHARGE#

Date \_\_\_\_\_

To \_\_\_\_\_

From \_\_\_\_\_

Initials of  
Clerk

FD-5  
Revised  
08/05/2008

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

\* This form is consolidated with the old FD-654, based on a Sentinel review.

Date 11/29/13

Document Classification:  Unclass  Confidential  Secret  Top Secret

Document Type:  Letter  Airtel  LHM  Memo  Report  
 Facsimile  Teletype  Misc  EC  Email  
Enclosure \_\_\_\_\_ Attachment \_\_\_\_\_

SCI TYPE: \*requires special handling  
 SI\*  TK\*  GAMMA\*  COSMIC(NATO)  
 HCS\*  SSRP\*  BYE\*  Other \_\_\_\_\_ (specify)

FD-501 Number \_\_\_\_\_

Date of Mail 6/24/59

Originating Office or agency \_\_\_\_\_

This serial has been removed and placed in:

Special File Room, FBIHQ  FBIHQ Room \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Field Office-Room # Container # or Other Location Where Material is Stored

File 65-40-65192 Serial  
Class. Office of Origin Case No. Last Serial

Pending  Closed

Serial No.	Description of Serial	Date Charged
<u>28</u>	<u>65-40-65192- Serial</u>	

Employee

Date \_\_\_\_\_

To \_\_\_\_\_ From \_\_\_\_\_

Initials of  
Clerk

1 - Mr. McDermott

b6  
b7c

8-27-59

**AIRTEL**


**TO: SAC, New York (Enclosures - 2)**  
**3 - WFO (Enclosures - 2)**

b7E

**FROM: Director, FBI**



Enclosed for receiving offices is a copy of CIA letter 8-25-59 with a copy of its enclosure, a document, the original of which was forwarded by an unidentified person using the pseudonym "Dr. Heinrich Schutze." Information concerning and received from "Schutze" was set out in, among other communications, Buairtel to New Haven 3-24-59, copies to Buffalo, New York and WFO, captioned "Witold Kocay, Espionage - PO; Adam Skempaki, Espionage - PO; (PDU) Ascia (Ph), Espionage - PO." CIA has maintained contact with "Schutze" since approximately April, 1958, at which time he contacted American intelligence by mail and offered to be of continuing assistance to American intelligence. Numerous reports have been received from "Schutze" containing much significant and verifiable information according to CIA. Other information from "Schutze," while not confirmed, has not yet been proven deceptive. There can be no doubt that "Schutze" has high-level access to either Polish or Soviet intelligence. In his initial report, he quoted verbatim from "Secret" [redacted] and since then has furnished startlingly accurate, though sometimes dated, information concerning American military establishments and intelligence efforts abroad. There are strong differences of opinion in American intelligence circles regarding whether "Schutze" is a provocateur in a clever Soviet-Polish deception operation or a bona fide volunteer. It has been noted that when furnishing highly significant information (such as in the enclosure referring to the existence of some 43 Soviet illegal residences in the U.S.) he falls short of providing the barest details upon which counter-intelligence action can be taken. He has refused to appear for personal meetings, citing the security factor as the reason.



ORIGINAL FILED IN

b3  
b7D  
b7E

If this is a deception operation, a certain amount of "Schutze's"

- Olson
- Belmont
- Loach
- Guire
- Mohr
- Parsons
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Gandy

① - 65-65192 (Schutze)

① - 100-350264 (Polish Intelligence Activities in the U.S.)

JJMcd:skw  
(11)

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

65-65192-  
RECORDED  
47-AUG 28 1959  
COMM-FBI  
MAILED

b3  
b7E

62 SEP 1 1959

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

Airtel to SAC, New York

RE:

b7D

data would logically be accurate although "expendable" data. Other data might appear possibly true although unverifiable. While the ultimate purpose of deception might be to induce the U.S. Government to take some course of action, or refrain from doing so, to its detriment, a secondary purpose would be served by preoccupying American counterintelligence services with (1) allegations containing a sufficient color of truth to compel investigation or (2) cases, which after evaluation, are considered to have insufficient potential to warrant further attempts at development.

Portions of the enclosure are verifiable. It was previously stated by  (T-1 in report of SA Thomas B. Quinn dated 3-2-59) at New York captioned "Wladyslaw Krawczyk; IS - FO" that he met Krawczyk in Geneva in 1958. Their association in the U.S. was confirmed by Bureau investigation in January and February, 1959. With regard to Zbigniew Dybala ("Matros"), he was previously reported to have been appointed Deputy Director of Department I (Foreign Intelligence) of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW). As you are aware, he was previously assigned, under the name of Zbigniew Jaworski, as "flying resident" supervising UB operations in the Western Hemisphere. Yet "Schutze" refers to "Matros" in the enclosure as if the latter were still in charge of UB residencies in the U.S. It would seem that a person having access to UB and Soviet intelligence on as high a level as "Schutze" would certainly be aware of Dybala's assignment in Warsaw. Perhaps "Schutze" intended to refer to Dybala's control of the UB residencies in the larger sense, that is, in his capacity as Deputy Director of Department I, MSW. While Jan Nanya of the Office of the Commercial Counselor, Polish Embassy, has not been considered a known or suspected intelligence agent, many instances are known where the UB has used commercial cover for its "legal" agents. WFO and New York, from a review of files, attempt to establish whether Nanya traveled to the vicinity of New York City in July, 1959.

b7D

New York immediately determine whereabouts of  and his itinerary for the immediate future. If he has departed from U.S. for Europe or will leave before an interview can be arranged, advise the Bureau of his itinerary immediately so that CIA can attempt to contact him abroad before entering Poland for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Conference on the Uses of Large Radiation Sources in Industry, scheduled to be held in Warsaw between 9/8 and 12/59.

Airtel to SAC, New York

WFO

RE: [redacted]

b7D

If [redacted] is available for interview, such should be arranged promptly. He should be approached on the basis that it has come to our attention that he may be attending the IAEA conference in Warsaw in view of his attendance at the Geneva conference in 1958 and the Columbia University conference in January, 1959. Discreetly develop whether he has had any contact or communication with Soviet-bloc scientists since his last personal meetings with them at the afore-mentioned conferences. Also discreetly develop whether he has had any contact with Soviet-bloc officials assigned to diplomatic establishments in the U.S., taking care not to reveal that we have knowledge of any contacts or communications. He may be advised that our interest in him stems from the fact that his work at the Nuclear Development Corporation of America and his access to technical journals in the nuclear field logically would make him of interest to Soviet-bloc intelligence services. If he confirms that he will travel to the IAEA conference in Warsaw, he should be alerted to the possibility that he may be of special interest to Soviet-bloc intelligence. He should be aware of any special courtesies extended to him and any other indications, however subtle, that more than a casual interest is being taken in him. If [redacted] appears completely cooperative, he should be appropriately instructed not to react in a hostile fashion nor appear overly agreeable to any overt or semiovert recruitment approach or proposal for a private exchange of technical data.

b7D

New York complete full background investigation of [redacted] as early as possible. This matter should receive priority attention. Bufiles contain no derogatory information concerning [redacted]. An extra copy of this airtel is furnished to receiving offices for their respective files on Jan Nany who allegedly will maintain contact with [redacted] in the future.

b7D

APPENDIX:

Open telephone advice this date from supervisor Francis J. Gullent of New York (pursuant to instructions of Bureau telephone call 8-26-57) to the effect that [redacted] is leaving the United States on 9/4/59 for the IAEA conference and that the Air Force is paying his expenses, the Bureau inquired of Air Force concerning its connection with [redacted] and was advised as follows:

[redacted] is being directed in connection with this trip by the Air Technical Intelligence Center (ATIC), Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio. Its primary mission

Airtel to SAC, New York

RE: [redacted]

b7D

is to develop his association with Krawczyk (who invited him to the IAEA conference) for the purpose of obtaining technical data from Krawczyk in the future. Krawczyk may come to the United States in November, 1959. AEC and the Atomic Energy Development Corporation of America (AEDCA) are aware of [redacted] past contacts with foreign scientists and the fact that [redacted] invited Krawczyk to the conference in New York in January, 1959. The Atomic Energy Commission has primary security responsibility for the AEDCA. [redacted] prior to employment at AEDCA, was an "excellent" employee of AEC.

In view of the above, interviewing agents should indicate to [redacted] that the Bureau is aware of his AEC mission, and that aside from information developed by him in the technical field for AEC's benefit, the Bureau desires to be kept advised by him in the future of details concerning his pertinent contacts because of the possibility that he may become a recruitment target of Soviet-bloc intelligence.

b7D

NOTE:

At 5:30 p.m., 8/26/59, Inspector D. E. Moore furnished essential facts to ASAC Schmit of New York with instructions to determine subject's whereabouts and itinerary immediately.

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: 9-3-59

FROM : F. A. FROHBOSE

SUBJECT: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
IS - POLAND  
*Internal Security*

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- McGuire \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Dr. Heinrich Schutze is a pseudonym of an unidentified individual who appears to be connected with a Polish intelligence service, and who first made contact with the U. S. Government in April, 1958. Information received has indicated that he is located in Poland. He has been transmitting in writing to a CIA drop voluminous information, the nature of which is rapidly increasing in importance. Some of his information concerning Polish intelligence activities in this country has led to the opening of cases by us and we have been following the situation very closely.

*Modern*  
*Bridges*

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[redacted] In recent days Schutze has transmitted information concerning Polish knowledge of U. S. intelligence operations abroad which is most shocking. If Schutze is legitimately connected with Polish intelligence, that service has gained knowledge of various sensitive U. S. intelligence activities and has even gained access to documents. In certain instances, according to [redacted] Schutze has quoted certain U. S. reports verbatim. According to [redacted] there is still considerable conjecture as to whether or not this entire matter is part of a clever Polish intelligence hoax. However, information received in the last few days is leading many people, who previously were doubtful, to believe that Schutze is not a phony. [redacted] there is no evidence whatsoever that the U. S. documents allegedly in the possession of the Poles contain any information involving the FBI. There is no indication that the Poles have possession of FBI information or reports and that the Bureau in any way has been compromised.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

Schutze recently furnished information concerning Polish intelligence interest in [redacted] a former Bureau Agent, who has been connected with the Foreign Service of the State Department for the last several years. For the past year or so [redacted] Schutze has stated that [redacted]

b7D

- SJP/nmn  
(6) *nmn*
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
  - 1 - Mr. Branigan
  - 1 - Mr. McDermott
  - 1 - Liaison
  - 1 - Mr. Papich

REC-26

65-65192-31

12 SEP 9 1959

65-65192

*me*  
*5-*  
*100 to [redacted]*  
*9-16-59*

62 SEP 17 1959

PERS. FILES

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont  
RE: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
IS - Poland

[Redacted]

b7D

[Redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[Redacted]

b7D

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[Redacted]

In addition to [Redacted] Schutze has advised that Polish intelligence is also interested in compromising the [Redacted]

b7D



Memorandum for Mr. Belmont  
RE: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
IS - POLAND

b7D

[redacted] who has been separated from his wife.  
This individual allegedly has been frequenting night clubs and  
places of entertainment in [redacted]. Another individual who Schutze  
claims is already compromised is [redacted] stationed  
at [redacted].

[redacted] a detailed report was being prepared  
by his Agency for the Bureau. He asked that no contacts be made  
with other interested agencies for the time being without first  
coordinating with CIA.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

ACTION:

None. For your information. The Liaison Agent will  
continue to be on the alert for additional information of interest  
to us.

*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted]

ADGb3  
b7E

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Polish Intelligence Activities  
Against the United States

*[Handwritten signature]*

1. Forwarded herewith is the translation of an additional portion of the report referred to in [redacted] of 25 August 1959, subject as above. Other portions of this report will be forwarded to the Bureau as they are processed.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

*Section is Section 1  
Subject of 65-65192*

2. The Bureau will recognize Colonel BRYN, who is mentioned in the second paragraph on Page 2 of the attached report, [redacted] It should be added that BRYN did not tell this Agency any information which could lead to identification of an illegal residentura in the United States.

3. The attached report has also been disseminated to Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

*S. H. Horton*  
for James Angleton

EX - 124

Attachment (Report)

[redacted]

REC-99

14 SEP 22 1959

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7E

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

*Please [unclear]*  
[redacted]

*65-65192  
[unclear]*

*10/15/59  
[unclear]*

52 SEP 30 1959

~~SECRET~~

*5-11-2-116*

Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Records Branch

M 9-15, 1959

Name Searching Unit - Room 6527  
 Service Unit - Room 6524  
 Forward to File Review  
 Attention Mitchell  
 Return to McDermott 2268  
Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:

Regular Request (Analytical Search)  
 All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)  
 Subversive References Only  
 Nonsubversive References Only  
 Main \_\_\_\_\_ References Only

b6  
b7C

Type of Search Requested:

Restricted to Locality of \_\_\_\_\_  
 Exact Name Only (On the Nose)  
 Build

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 08-13-2020 BY [ ] ADG

Subject Edward TRAPNELL  
 Birthdate & Place \_\_\_\_\_  
 Address \_\_\_\_\_

Localities \_\_\_\_\_

R# \_\_\_\_\_ Date 9-15 Searcher Initials JO  
 FILE NUMBER SERIAL

*MR*  
Edward R.  
116-4726  
62-82721-419  
62-82721-A (Ward T.H. 7/28/47)  
62-85205-A (Ward Post 1/13/52)  
 [ ]  
121-4723-37

b3  
b7E

Edward R. Colston  
ST  
Ward (var)  
ST  
Ward (var)  
ST  
E. R. Colston  
ST

*NP/*  
*2/11/59*

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG b6  
b7C

AUG 25 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Polish Intelligence Activities  
Against the United States

1. Forwarded herewith as Attachment "A" is a translated but unedited portion of a report received from an unusually sensitive source. Further portions of this same report are being processed and will be forwarded to you shortly.

2. The "isotope conference" referred to in Attachment "A" is the Conference on Uses of Large Radiation Sources in Industry, to be held in Warsaw, Poland from 8 to 12 September 1959. A CIA report giving background information on this conference is forwarded herewith as Attachment "B".

3. It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation determine the present whereabouts and itinerary for the next two weeks of [redacted] who is mentioned in Attachment "A" as a target of Polish and Soviet intelligence. Should [redacted] have already left for Europe, on his way to attend the above mentioned conference in Warsaw, this Agency would be willing to try to contact him in Europe before he goes in to Warsaw.

4. If it can be confirmed that the Polish Government is paying for [redacted] trip to Poland, this would in itself be independent confirmation of strong Polish Intelligence interest in [redacted]. The Polish Government does not have sufficient Western currency funds to pay for such individual trips to Poland by Western scientists unless there is Polish

[Large vertical redaction box]

b3  
b7E

b7D

b7D

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

*gchutze*

65-65192-  
NOT RECORDED  
47 AUG 28 1959

*copy 1/23/59*

62 SEP 22 1959

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Intelligence interest in the scientist concerned. Several instances are known when such trips have been financed by the HR.




b1 Per  
b3 CIA

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

Signed: S. H. Horton

James Angleton



2 Attachments

2

COPY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6  
b7c

**GAMBIT:** One of the most important activities of a counter-espionage service are so-called double agents (Abwehrospiele), which have the aim of penetrating into the activity of the opponent and consequently to reconnoiter intelligence agents and other intelligence interests. The penetration is in my opinion the most important element of the CE system, made light of by you. I have neither the time nor the place to hold unnecessary lectures now thereon; I know that you also have conducted many such operations against the RIS and others. Under **GAMBIT** I plan to transmit to you regularly information, which could eventually help you in such operations. The question is without doubt very complicated and I will frequently come back to it, as well as discuss it with your representative. At your convenience please take a provisional stand on this issue. It is quite certain that at the moment the Soviet Union has in the USA at least 10 residenturas of the "Abel" type, 5 residenturas for mobilization conditions (KSB-Verhaeltnisse), 6-8 military intelligence residenturas, and about 20 diversion and sabotage residenturas which for the most part at the moment conduct no activity. All illegal residenturas. It is indeed of greatest importance to uncover these residenturas. Here, except for lucky accidents, as in the case of Abel, only counter-agents can penetrate into the activity of these residenturas and effectively lead to their discovery, working over, and destruction.

During the Atom Conference in Geneva 1958 a Polish engineer named Wladyslaw KRANCZYK, who is active in the atomic office (Atomamt) in Warsaw, became acquainted with an American scientist, [redacted] Nuclear Development Corporation of America, 5 New St., White Plains, N.Y., Tel. Wh 8-5000. In the atomic and reactor company in the USA [redacted] and is an expert

b7D

in this field of great importance. KRANCZYK, an agent of the RIS, immediately recognized [redacted] possibilities, established a friendly relationship with him, and is trying to come to the USA in order to establish contact with [redacted]. The person of [redacted] evoked the greatest interest in the RIS, in consideration of the problems of the atomic industry which are being developed and worked on by the Nuclear Development Corporation in the USA. At the beginning of this year KRANCZYK succeeded in coming to the USA to a conference and meeting [redacted].

A friendship has been struck up between the two experts on the instructions of the RIS which KRANCZYK has already exploited to elicit intelligence information. It is certain that [redacted] not knowing with whom he is dealing, quite privately has given KRANCZYK various technical information. In order to maintain the friendship, KRANCZYK has a few times sent [redacted] packages from Poland and letters from the West. According to KRANCZYK's reports, [redacted]

65-65192 -

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

C  
O  
P  
Y

is a great expert about [redacted] father was a Hungarian, hence [redacted] the sympathy toward Poland. [redacted] who earns about 1,000 dollars a month and whose wife is a sociological lawyer and is also active in a hospital, live very modestly, because he is only building up his private household. According to KRAWCZYK, they are very frugal people, hungry for money. Now the RIS in Warsaw with MATROS' (Translator's note: This is US pseudonym for Zbigniew DYBALA.) help have evolved a plan to bring [redacted] slowly and carefully into intelligence activity in the technical-scientific field. In July of this year [redacted] was visited by a Polish diplomat from Washington, Jerzy NAWYS (name perhaps not exact), who is a lawyer and economist and in the Polish Embassy occupies the position of an economic counselor. NAWYS, an agent of the PIS since 1946 and now co-worker of the ALFA residentura (Translator's Note: US residentura) in the USA headed by MATROS, had the task to invite [redacted] in the name of KRAWCZYK to Warsaw to the Isotope conference, the travel costs for which would be borne by the Polish Government. Allegedly [redacted] has agreed to go to Poland. J. NAWYS, from the Polish Embassy in Washington, also has the assignment from MATROS tentatively to keep in touch with [redacted] in the future in order to pick up private information for KRAWCZYK and deliver it to KRAWCZYK, i.e., to Soviet intelligence. In Warsaw they will try to establish contact with [redacted] or also under some cover to reach an agreement with [redacted] on a private exchange of information until the time when he is ripe for open agent activity. [redacted] really does not know whom he is dealing with. If, after a thorough reconnaissance of this case you properly prepare [redacted] you will undoubtedly penetrate the intelligence activity in the future. If you prepare the matter properly and win the confidence of the IS for [redacted] he will in time, after being checked, be included in one of the illegal residenturas, since the supervision of such agents out of positions in a legal residentura (embassy) is not possible over a long period of time. The progress of the affair can be controlled by me in part. If [redacted] can keep his tongue or can stick to your instructions, you can talk with him or reconnoiter the matter without any danger for me.

Mr. McDermott

b6  
b7C

SAC, Washington Field

9-11-59

Director, FBI



b3  
b7E

**POLISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
IN THE UNITED STATES  
IS - PO  
(Bufile 100-350264)**

Reference is made to Bureau airtel to New York, copies to WFO, dated 8-27-59 captioned [redacted] wherein information was furnished concerning the unidentified individual using the pseudonym "Dr. Heinrich Schutze" who has been furnishing information abroad to CIA concerning Polish and Soviet intelligence efforts against the United States. For the information of Ottawa, while "Schutze's" reliability has not been established and while his motivation has not been determined, much of the information provided by him [redacted] is known to be accurate.

b7D

By letter 8-31-59, classified "Secret," CIA furnished additional information originating with "Schutze" concerning recent travel to the United States of Tadeusz Jedynak, Deputy Chief of Polish Military Intelligence (O-II). This information is as follows:

"At the beginning of June of this year, Colonel Tadeusz Jedynak, deputy of the Military IS in Warsaw--Second Department (Verwaltung) of the General Staff--traveled to the USA attached to the soccer team "Legia." He spent about four weeks in the USA and 10 days in Canada. In the USA he was in Washington, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore. You probably know it better because you surveilled him. Colonel Jedynak, in consideration of his military and operational qualifications, is in fact the director of the Military IS in Warsaw, and has very good connections, also privately, to the Soviet Military IS. Colonel Jedynak directs the IS work against the USA and Great Britain: 42 years old, medium height, well built, former soccer player, dark (hair?), the nose of a boxer, has extensive military and IS experience. His mission in the USA: to meet an agent in the USA who has connections to the military CE of the USA in order to clarify the case of Bryn; to

ORIGINAL FILED IN

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- McGuire \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

2 - New York  
2 - Ottawa  
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit  
① - 65-65192 (Schutze)  
JJMcD:skw (12)

105-65192-  
NOT RECORDED  
26 SEP 22 1959

SEE NOTE, PAGE THREE

TELETYPE UNIT  
SEP 11 1959  
MAILED

60 SEP 25 1959 TELETYPE UNIT



~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [REDACTED] ADG

b6  
b7C

Letter to SAC, Washington Field

RE: [REDACTED]

POLISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
IN THE UNITED STATES  
100-350264

b3  
b7E

analyze the situation of a momentarily inactive illegal resident in the US for the purpose of eventual reactivation; analysis of illegal work against the US on the basis of the Military Attache in Ottawa, Canada. I'll take pains to learn the details. It is possible that I will learn the name of the illegal resident and report it to you. In spite of your close surveillance Jedynak carried out the meeting with his agent twice--the name of the agent is unknown and at present difficult to learn. Jedynak was able to clarify or uncover nothing in the case of Bryn. Of great importance for you is the Military Attache in Canada. According to Jedynak's plan this Attache is supposed to concentrate above all on the build-up of illegal residents in the USA. The illegal resident in the US, who is momentarily inactive, is supposed to be subordinated to this Attache office. The director of the Attache office, Colonel Roman has been a friend of Jedynak's for years and most recently was taken into the IS and sent to Canada through him. Until then he had been active in the Air Force staff in Warsaw, from where he had been released because of Stalinist inclinations. A good officer, intelligent, cunning. Like Jedynak he likes liquor and women. It is of significance to monitor his trips in Canada, on which, in addition to business matters, he visits loose women."

The Bryn referred to above is Jerzy Bryn, former First Secretary of the Polish Embassy, Tokyo, who defected to the U.S. on 9-1-58. He redefected on approximately 4-2-59. Colonel Roman referred to above is obviously Mieczyslaw Roman, Polish Military, Naval and Air Attache, Ottawa.

Information attributed herein to "Schutze" should not be included in any document prepared for dissemination. The information herein received from CIA should be thoroughly considered by WFO in connection with current investigation concerning activities and contacts of Jedynak during his recent visit to the U.S.

In view of the allegation that Jedynak actually made contact with an intelligence agent during his extensive travel in the U.S., WFO should promptly re-evaluate results of investigation previously submitted by auxiliary offices and submit recommendations where appropriate regarding additional interviews of persons contacted by him. This letter being furnished Ottawa for information only. Contents are not to be furnished to [REDACTED]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7D

~~SECRET~~

Letter to SAC, Washington Field

RE:

POLISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
IN THE UNITED STATES  
100-350264

b3  
b7E

NOTE:

Jedynak arrived in U.S. on 5-27-59 for a one-month visit to the Office of the Military Attache, Polish Embassy, Washington, D.C. During his visit he traveled extensively through the U.S. accompanying the "Polish "Legia" soccer team. (composed of Polish army officers) on tour. They visited Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, Newark, New York, Philadelphia and Washington, D.C. Auxiliary offices were instructed by WFO to cover Jedynak's activities through established sources unless he left the tour. Jedynak met literally hundreds of persons on this tour. Several persons have been interviewed but nothing of intelligence significance was developed.

~~SECRET~~

ARTICLE I have already reported on Aktion twice by telegram FUR.  
to the cable address and once in writing. The development of  
many complicated elements connected with Aktion appeared as follows  
in very abbreviated form. The disclosure in the months of March,  
April, and May of IS activity by Poland in Belgium, Switzerland,  
and France caused great disquiet. The Poles, who anyway from the  
beginning had been against participation in Aktion, felt these blows  
deeply--also in a political sense--and have completely dissociated  
themselves from Aktion. At about the same time there occurred  
compromises of the activity of the Soviet, Czech, Hungarian, and Russian  
IS in the West--Switzerland, Italy, South America, France. Many of  
these were publicized with files, many were kept quiet from the public  
but worked effectively as a counter blow. The known compromises in  
West Germany, according to local calculations, of about 100 agents of  
the NKVD and the Soviet Union, also of Poland, Czechoslovakia and  
Bulgaria, has caused the most severe disquiet, and thus despite the  
pressure of the Soviet CS to carry out Aktion, the most important  
partners have been more occupied with their own affairs and essentially  
the inclination to carry out Aktion has declined. There were various  
ups and downs, but with every day of compromises, NKVD broadcasts,  
statements in Geneva, and publications in the Federal Republic, the  
partners who were supposed to bear the operational burden of Aktion  
have retreated, and even the purpose of Aktion seemed to diminish with  
every day. It wasn't known whether it was mere coincidence, but with  
each week they came to the conclusion that it had to be a prepared or  
approved counter action which had been set in motion by the West with  
and eye to the Geneva Conference. The developments of the counter  
action deepened the differences between the main exponent of Aktion,  
the Soviet Union, and the partners Poland, CS, and NKVD--in addition  
these concerned with Aktion were occupied with their own problems.

65-6-192 - 33

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The constant wait for what would happen tomorrow and what else the West knew and what one now would have to discount caused the main activists to become uncertain and unmoved. Only the Russians insisted stubbornly on Aktion and until the middle of July still prepared for it, constantly threatening that if the partners were too cowardly they would carry out Aktion themselves. These were naturally mere threats because the Soviet GK had above all counted on the operational sacrifices of their partners in Aktion, above all the sacrifice of many GK "genos," and as always wanted to use the hands of others to pull their chestnuts out of the fire. The defection of the Section Chief in charge of CIA operations from the WPS in Berlin and the arrest of about 20 agents exploded in Berlin as well as in Moscow like a high-explosive shell. This blow above all caused complete confusion in the most important partner, the WPS, and almost completely eliminated the WPS from Aktion. Nikita Khrushchev intervened personally with ~~GLERIGT~~ in this matter and fantastic things took place in the WPS. There was even a possibility that the IS director ~~Nischke~~ ~~WOLF~~ would be fired, which to be sure did not happen due to the personal intervention of General ~~KORONKIN~~ in Karlsruhe.

FOR

The high point, however, was still to come. Colonel ~~BYRN~~, who had disappeared in Japan eight months earlier, appeared at the end of April in Warsaw. He had been active for years in the Military IS (2nd Department of the General Staff) in Warsaw and naturally knew a great deal. After he had been released by the Military IS he had worked in the diplomatic realm and most recently had functioned in Tokyo as 1st or 2nd Secretary in the Polish Legation. Suddenly he disappeared without a trace. Eight months later he appeared in Warsaw with a Dominican passport and related that he had been kidnapped by the US-IS in Japan, set in a prison in the Philippines, and had been interrogated and tortured there by your service. The local GK, however, didn't believe him and Colonel ~~BYRN~~ was arrested here and has been sitting up to the present in investigative arrest--the investigative office (Untersuchungsbureau) of the Ministry of the Interior, directed by Colonel ~~WITKOWSKI~~. Shortly after ~~BYRN~~ appeared here, the security organs arrested in France the illegal resident of the Polish Military IS and his wife, which was connected with the affair in Paris of ~~BRAPINSKI~~, who has already been released. Allegedly 4 or 5 agents were arrested or disabled by the French GK. The illegal resident, an Austrian with a French passport, and his wife, a coworker of the Military IS, and also almost all agents of this residentura, which above all worked against NATO and the USA, were known to Colonel ~~BYRN~~, who at one time had directed the IS work

POLAND

P.I.

DOM. RES?

FRANCE

FRANCE

~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**

of Z-II in France. The CS in Warsaw came to the conclusion that Colonel BRIN betrayed this residature to the Americans, that he was not kidnaped but defected of his own accord. Everybody is puzzled, however, why he returned to Warsaw. Various hypotheses have been suggested and the case of BRIN is still under investigation. It was determined that ~~Fra. BRIN~~ is presently in France and is hiding from the Polish Embassy. The case of BRIN with the above-mentioned connections caused the greatest uneasiness here. One doesn't know what BRIN reported to the US organs--he know a great deal. Until now BRIN has been sticking to his remarkable allegations that the Americans gave him recruitment missions in Japan and that he fled from the Americans and returned to Warsaw. The case of BRIN caused just as much disquiet in the General Chief Directorate of the General Staff in Moscow, now directed by BRINOV. In fact Colonel BRIN know a few facts (wasste von paar Anhaltspunkten) about an illegal residature in West Germany and the US, which in 1953-1955 was taken over from the Polish Military IS by the Russians. In addition he knew about an illegal residature run by Poland in the US, which to be sure had been inactive for several years but which was now supposed to be reactivated. If BRIN told the Americans all about this, one would have to assume that the three illegal residatures are in danger, and, even if only partially, could be arrested. Of course these residatures were warned, but that doesn't protect against arrest. In consideration of these facts the enthusiasm for Aktion grew very small in the month of May--to be sure, it was said that the Amis would have to be shown, but this was not convincing. The CDU-NPS case and the case of BRIN served here as powerful brakes on Aktion, not to mention the many little brakes which earlier had shown themselves effective. In the middle of May a conference took place in Moscow of all IS and CS leaders of the Soviet Union. A great deal was discussed there, which, in my opinion, is not of pressing importance. I'll report about it later if of interest. After the general conference--between 22-26 May of this year--a closed meeting was held which was participated in only by the directors of the Chief Directorates (Leiter der Hauptverwaltungen) of the CS and IS of the Soviet Union and the so-called advisors from the satellite countries. At this conference, which ~~WIKITZ/WERESCHAGSKY~~ attended, IS problems were discussed, above all the fields of Aktion was analyzed and cases of Western counter action discussed. I could only learn fragments about this, but it is certain that at this meeting, just as in the best times of Stalin, there was the devil to pay. ~~BRINOVICH~~ raged and cursed with the dirtiest language the directors of the Chief Directorates, as well as the KGB representatives in the Eastern countries. He succinctly called the preparation of "Aktion" by the responsible parties as the biggest shit (fétidité) of the Soviet IS and above all directed accusations against the KGB representatives

POLAND

RUSSIA

POLAND  
RUSSIA

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

in Poland, the USA, and the USSR. Immediately after this case the cessation. During a statement by the present director of the 2nd Chief Directorate of the General Staff, General of the Army ~~SEBOW~~, <sup>RUSSIA</sup> SEBOW said that, according to an exact analysis of all occurrences which are related to "Aktion," it can be asserted that the Americans received timely warning of "Aktion," above all in West Germany, and also initiated (or inspired) a timely counter action in Western Europe. It must be expected that the Americans are also preparing a counter blow in the USA. He, SEBOW, would see to it that the source of the warning was revealed. In the sharpest words he condemned the KGB representatives in the USA, in Poland, and in the USSR, who had gossiped too much about "Aktion" but had not been able to convince in time the appropriate ministers in favor of "Aktion." According to SEBOW, such representatives could direct milk stores but not occupy themselves with counterespionage. Because of this, large and serious damage has been inflicted on the Party and the Soviet State. On the other hand the enemy has acquired political capital--just at the time of the Geneva Conference. The good traditions of the Chain had been compromised. Etc., Etc. A complete confusion of the pertinent organizations and an enormous mistrust has been unleashed. You won't be surprised that I have maintained the greatest caution. A short time after the meeting in Moscow Colonel ~~ORLOV aka PAVLOV~~, in effect the director of the IS organs in Prague and Warsaw, was recalled from Prague. Immediately thereafter, Colonel ~~JAKOWIKIENKO~~, who was in effect the director of the IS organs in Warsaw and Prague, was recalled from Warsaw, which caused the greatest amazement. The indispensable ~~JAKOWIKIENKO~~, the man in Poland who was very well informed, who was in Poland for four years in spite of October 1956, and who had manipulated every possible kind of affair, was recalled and accused of having handled "Aktion" carelessly, of having conducted himself too softly with respect to the Poles, and of having discussed "Aktion" too much and without reason with the Polish CE and IS. At the same time (or a little earlier), Lt. General ~~LEONOW~~, director of the III Chief Department (III. Hauptverwaltung) of the KGB was sent into retirement. They accused LEONOW as director of the military CE of having prepared "Aktion" very unoperationally (unoperativ) and carelessly, and of failing to practice sufficient revolutionary alertness in his office. At this conference it was decided to clarify with all possible means diverse relationships of "Aktion" and the Western counter action. As far as I know, they began operational processing of the case of Colonel ~~MIKI~~, among others. At the beginning of June of this year, Colonel ~~Teduz~~ ~~JENIAK~~, comdr. of the Military IS, in Warsaw--Second Department (Verwaltung) of the General Staff--traveled to the

CZECH  
POLAND  
RUSSIA

POLAND

Poland  
CZECH

NY DC POLAND RUSSIA B...

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

attached to the soccer team "Legia." He spent about four weeks in the USA and 10 days in Canada. In the USA he was in Washington, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore. You probably know it better because you surveilled him. Colonel JEDYNAK has been in the army since 1942, a soldier of the Red Army, later the First Polish Army in the Soviet Union, since then connected with the Soviet Military CE. 1945-1948 at the Academy in Moscow, then Second Department-Military IS, now Deputy Director of the Department along with Colonel JASTRZEBSKI, his Chief is General BOGUTYNSKI, who was already mentioned in the report "ALFA-Berlin." Colonel JEDYNAK, in consideration of his military and operational qualifications, is in fact the director of the Military IS in Warsaw, and has very good connections, also privately, to the Soviet Military IS. His advisor until 1957 is now in Turkey as the Chief Resident of the Soviet IS: Colonel ROMANOW, 176 cm, blond, elegant, about 40 years old, speaks English and French, journalist by profession. Colonel JEDYNAK directs the IS work against the USA and Great Britain: 42 years old, medium height, well built, former soccer player, dark (hair?), the nose of a boxer, has extensive military and IS experience. His mission in the USA: to meet an agent in the USA who has connections to the military CE of the USA in order to clarify the case of BRIN; to analyze the situation of a momentarily inactive illegal resident in the US for the purpose of eventual reactivation; analysis of illegal work against the US on the basis of the Military Attache in Ottawa, Canada. I'll take pains to learn the details. It is possible that I will learn the name of the illegal resident and report it to you. In spite of your close surveillance JEDYNAK carried out the meeting with his agent twice--the name of the agent is unknown and at present difficult to learn. The meeting, however, was without result, and, to the great annoyance of General SIEROW, JEDYNAK was able to clarify or uncover nothing in the case of BRIN. Of great importance for you is the Military Attache in Canada. According to JEDYNAK's plan this Attache is supposed to concentrate above all on the build-up of illegal residents in the USA. The illegal resident in the US, who is momentarily inactive, is supposed to be subordinated to this Attache office. The director of the Attache office, Colonel ROMAN has been a friend of JEDYNAK's for years and most recently was taken into the IS and sent to Canada through him. Until then he had been active in the Air Force staff in Warsaw, from where he had been released because of Stalinist inclinations. A good officer, intelligent, cunning. Like JEDYNAK he likes liquor and women. It is of significance to monitor his trips to Canada, on which, in addition to business matters, he visits loose women. In respect to JEDYNAK and ROMAN I will offer you various plans or discuss them with your representative. Still more interesting is the Attache's deputy, Colonel KILANOWICZ--KILANOWICZ, who is a brother by birth of General BOGUTYNSKI, the present director of Z II in

WARSAW, POLAND

5

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

of Z-II (II Verwaltung) in Warsaw. 1951-1954 he sat in prison like his brother KURCZYNSKI, a well-disguised anti-Soviet. I think it very important to work actively on these two officers, in the future things of great importance for your service could result. The possibility exists to get at JEDYNAK through ROMAN and at General KURCZYNSKI through KILANOWICZ. After JEDYNAK- "BOXER"- returned without success in the case of BRZE, your good acquaintance MAYROS undertook a trip to Peking at the beginning of July until 21 July 1959—this at the instigation of General BOCZAR and under the influence of General SICHAROWSKI of the KGB, First Chief Directorate in Moscow. Mission: to clarify the case of BRZE with the help of the Chinese Secret Service in Japan and above all to learn the extent of the facts which BRZE reported to the US organs. As is already clear the mission of MAYROS has also been without success and neither he nor the Chinese during about a month in spite of great activity have been able to learn anything. Therefore in Warsaw the case of BRZE remains unclarified and sharp investigation continues. As of the middle of June the Soviets still talked about Aktion and hadn't given up the idea. At the KGB meeting in Moscow they decided among other things on a reorganization of the KGB (sic) apparatus, particularly in respect to reducing (Verkleinerung) the apparatus and liquidating various leading positions. The new KGB (Kon. B.G. - sic) director, ~~SKHLEPIN~~, introduced this reorganization. As already learned from various sources the reorganization was in full swing at the end of July, which naturally was associated with inner disquiet in the apparatus. It is hardly imaginable that they are thinking about and preparing Aktion in this atmosphere. Therefore it can be assumed that Aktion has been abandoned for the foreseeable future. If SLESOW's suspicions from the analysis correspond to the facts, I can only congratulate you.

All of this information comes from reliable sources: the Soviet GB and Military IS in Warsaw and Prague, the Polish and Czech GB in Warsaw and Prague. For the most part they have been checked by me against other sources and correspond to the facts. Naturally insignificant inaccuracies are possible. I understand very well that you are more interested in names than numbers in Aktion. I had access and was able to learn facts on the basis of a general plan of action, with various fragmentary amplifications which had been learned, as, for example, DAME, etc. The plan of action contained no names—such a plan with names was not prepared for reasons of security. On the basis of the general plan one was supposed to work out individual operational plans—each section or office for itself—but without preparing a collation of the particulars anywhere. Therefore at present it is impossible to learn the names. Learning the individual—complete plan (Rittlung des Einzel-Gesamtplanes), because of the method used, is an impossible matter. According to your wish, perhaps no longer timely, but included in the general plan (are the following) action points against the English and French IS organizations

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

in the Federal Republic. I warn you about possibly passing these facts to the interested British and French organizations because from there it is definitely possible that they can be passed on to an Eastern IS or CE. These facts above all are interesting anyway.

During Aktion the following are supposed to be worked on:

SIS--Secret Intelligence Service (Trans: sic, in English)--West Berlin, Reichsparkfeld Charlottenburg. This English IS office carries on economic, political, military, scientific, technical IS work against the Soviet Union and the Eastern satellites, including the DDR. The chief SIS office is in Bonn and has branches in Hamburg, Munich, Frankfurt a/M and Dortmund. The activity of the SIS is very well known to the Eastern CE, about 30 agents have penetrated this activity. The 12th Berlin Intelligence Staff (Trans: sic, in English), 12th BIS, is located in the Jerkatirehloek building in the Hans Brennerstrasse. It works mainly against the DDR and the Soviet military in the DDR. 12th BIS is also concerned with influencing good specialists to defect to the West, whereby various CE agents and IS agents have been channeled by the MFS to the West with the help of the 12th BIS. It also carries out counter-espionage.

German Intelligence (Trans: sic, in English), G/INT/I, with the staff of the military northern group (Mil. Nordgruppe Engl. Arme) is directed by the FSS, Field Security Service. Location Munich Gladbach, Rheindalener Wald (sic).

G/INT/I--the English main secret IS and IS organization in West Germany. (das engl. Haupt-GRD-u.MD. Organ). Works mainly against the Soviet Union and the Eastern countries, DDR. Main office of the G/INT/I has the following operational branches: G/INT/A--works against the Soviet Army in the DDR; G/INT/A-2 works against the People's Army, DDR; G/INT/A-1 works against the armies of Eastern states other than the DDR; G/INT/B conducts counterespionage and works in the field of British units in the Federal Republic. A special branch of the G/INT/I conducts operations directly against the Soviet Army; it has allegedly been reorganized and is not known more closely here. The activity of the BIS organs is well known; primarily they conduct many intelligence operations (ND--spies) against Poland, DDR, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

The Directorate for Research in Germany (Direktion des recherches en Allemagne) supports SDESS in Paris and heads the combined IS and CE activity of the French organs in the Federal Republic and West Berlin.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Is also located in Baden-Oos near Baden Baden. The DRA (Trans: see preceding parenthesis) main office conducts the Radio Intelligence Group (Radio-IR-Gruppe) and the Active Operations Group (Gruppe der aktiven Tätigkeit). The Radio Group prepares radio operators for work against the DDR, the Eastern States, and the Soviet Union--unfortunately in many cases Eastern CE agents are being trained and used in double agent operations. Branch offices of the DRA are located in Baden Baden, Mainz, Freiburg, Tübingen, and Koblenz, and are under cover of various military and civilian organs. But all have been uncovered by the Eastern CE. About 15 agents are working against the French IS offices and from there against AIS offices. The main office of the DRA is in West Berlin, with three branches: DRA-ar operates against the DDR and the Soviet Union. Many agents of this branch have been arrested in the DDR. Two leading coworkers of this branch were double by the Soviet CE in Karlhorst. About 30 members of the French IS work in DRA-ar. Address: 25 b Napoleon Kasernen; cover: Mission of the French Economic Administration. The CE branch DRA-tr only works on cases of espionage, their realization (Realization) is carried through by DSF. Works with double agents with great misfortune. Address: Napoleon Kaserne No 8; cover: Liaison Branch. Its activity has been almost completely uncovered.

DRA-marin works on parts of the DDR, Poland, and the Soviet Union. Ten members of the French IS active here. Napoleon Kasernen. The 2nd Bureau--subordinate to the Chief of the French Staff in West Germany--is located in Baden-Oos bei Baden Baden. Works on the military sector of the DDR and the Soviet Army in the DDR. Has the following branches: Baden-Oos, 1st Field Army; Freiburg, 1st Army Corps; Koblenz, 2nd Army Corps and 3rd Infantry Division; Trier, 1st Armored Division; Landau, 5th Armored Division; Konstanz, 7th Mechanized Division; Lera, 1st Tactical Air Liaison; and West Berlin, the Berlin garrison.

The Service Sûreté is subordinate to the Sûreté Nationale in Paris. It has two branches, one administrative and one technical. The technical branch has three sections subordinate to it: DSF, the counterespionage service, since many Germans work there, there are at least ten agents of the NFS in addition to the Soviet CE; the Research Branch (Stützabteilung) works on political attitudes and political parties and organizations in West Berlin; Archives Service--conducts a wanted persons service. Simultaneously there operates in the Federal Republic the military CE of the Sécurité Militaire, whose activity is generally known. The IS and CE organs of the French have been greatly weakened and very many Eastern agents have penetrated the activity of this service, and these are dangerous to the extent that from the French positions they work on the American IS and CE operating against the Soviet Union and the Eastern States. Since, with respect to the facts in this report, the general situation has worsened considerably, I could not in the meantime ascertain closer details with regard to Aktion. I also do not believe that it will be possible in the near future. These are unfortunately problems which for the most part occur only once.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6  
b7c

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Polish Intelligence Activities  
Against the United States

*Mr. J. J. [unclear]*

*Schultz* REC-94

1. Reference is made to [redacted] 25 August 1959,  
Subject Polish Intelligence Activities in the United States.  
Forwarded herewith is another portion of the report recently  
received from this unusually sensitive source which contains  
information on hostile intelligence operations directed against  
the American Embassy in Warsaw, Poland.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7E

2. The attached report has been shown to Messrs. Robert  
Murphy and Loy Henderson, and to the Director and Deputy Director  
of Security, Mr. William Boswell and Mr. Otto Otepka, of the  
Department of State. This report has not been given to the  
Department of State for their retention, but portions of it  
will be given to them for their retention at a later date. This  
Agency has held several discussions with the Department of State  
concerning appropriate measures which could be taken vis-a-vis  
the Warsaw Embassy on the basis of this report, and which would  
not endanger the source.

[redacted]

UNRECORDED COPY FILED

3. This Agency is endeavoring to identify [redacted]  
[redacted] who has reportedly been recruited by  
Polish Intelligence (UB).

b3  
b7E

4. The [redacted] referred to in the attachment is  
identical with [redacted] in  
Easthampton, Massachusetts, American citizen. [redacted] was an  
applicant for employment with this Agency in June 1953. A full  
field investigation was made at this time, and her application  
was rejected because of her relatives in Poland and other

b7D

b3  
b7E

*Classifying*

*Three copies in 100-350264 (P.O. [unclear])*

[redacted]

REC-94  
5 65192  
OCT 2 1959

*3 extra copies  
10-5-59  
3/4 5-100*

57 OCT 7 1959

~~SECRET~~

*1-60 made absend.*

*Handwritten notes and stamps in bottom left corner, including "CLASSIFIED" and "UNRECORDED COPY FILED".*

~~SECRET~~

security factors which tend to give credence to the statements concerning her which are made in the attached report. This file is available for your examination in the CIA Office of Security.



b7D

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

*S. H. Hester*  
for James Angleton



~~(S)~~

Attachment (Report)

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7C

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [ ] ADG

STATION: Under this cryptonym you will get the following information concerning your embassy in Warsaw. The case of Mr. [ ] will also be included here. During the investigation of the [ ] case I have learned other things which in my opinion are very important for you. I gathered from your last letter to me that you doubt Mr. [ ] actually has contact with the KGB office in Prague, as I have reported in the past. I have checked my previous statements again and in my judgment they correspond to the facts. It is, indeed, very interesting that in such a short time you would be able to work on this case so as to draw such fundamental conclusions! I have checked my previous statements again and in my judgment they correspond to the facts. Naturally it is necessary to check my statements very carefully, but sometimes it is necessary to take very great pains in order to get evidence or parallel information.

b7D

In the KGB the [ ] case was, until 1956, carried under the cryptonym [ ]. As already reported, [ ] was worked on actively back in 1948-49 when he was the Consul in Poznan, Poland. He lived in the Hotel Continental, where the Consulate was also located. The owner of this hotel, Count TURNO, was an agent of the UB CE office in Poznan and was one of the agents who actively worked on [ ]. TURNO himself was later sentenced to prison for a couple years on charges of espionage for the US, but that was later, after [ ] had been assigned to Turkey. I have not been able to ascertain the exact period when [ ] began his activity as a KGB agent. I will not rely on assumptions, as you recently charged, so unfortunately I cannot furnish you with more exact data concerning the date of his recruitment. It is, however, certain that [ ] worked actively for the Russians when he was in Turkey, and supplied them with important information. Following [ ] arrival in Warsaw, and after a short period of acclimatization and reconnaissance of the security elements in your embassy in Warsaw, the Russians took up contact with [ ] with great care from their office in Prague. It is known to the Russians that [ ] is engaged in informational and diversionary activity in the political field against Poland. This is, of course, necessary in order to give [ ] the right cover. [ ] has very many contacts among Poles, and it is certain that one of the journalists with whom [ ] is in contact was or is an agent of the KGB CE office in Prague. At the moment nothing further is known concerning the KGB's modus operandi in handling their contact with [ ].

b7D

I can, however, give you fragmentary clues to the information which has been reported by [ ]. On 15 and 16 April 1957 a conference took place in West Berlin with representatives of the MID from

b7D

65 62 192 - 34

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

3 avile copies  
10-5-59

~~SECRET~~

(Western)

Heidelberg. Colonel GILCHRIST took part therein. The progress of these talks, which concerned the status of intelligence work in Poland, is known in detail in Prague. From 15 to 18 February 1958, a conference of military attaches from the Soviet bloc countries took place in West Germany in which Colonel MARLEY and McCaul (Canadian Embassy, Warsaw) participated. The substance of this conference was ascertained by [ ] and transmitted to the KGB office in Prague. According to [ ] embassy secretary JOHNSON engages in intelligence activity in Poland. Among other things, JOHNSON has contact with Sejm deputy LASOTA in Warsaw, whom JOHNSON has visited a few times in his home. A few months ago, a man from Miedzzydroj, Poland, whose initials are D.B., called at the attache office headed by [ ] He asked for contact with the U.S. Ambassador, but this was not granted. Thereupon he addressed a letter to the Ambassador, in which he said that he is an agent in Poland of the GEHLEN intelligence organization. He begged that the appropriate office in the Federal Republic be informed, as he had lost contact with them and wanted to be given new contact instructions via a coded newspaper advertisement. D.B. (full name still unknown) was reported by [ ] to the KGB office in Prague, whereupon the Russians transmitted this information to the UB Department II (CE) in Warsaw. After a thorough working over, D.B. was doubled by the UB. According to [ ] the assistant in the consular section at the Embassy is acquainted with intelligence activity. VLACHOWICZ is being worked on actively by Department II of the UB. In addition, [ ] has supplied important intelligence information. During the negotiations with the Chinese, TOM tape recorded (also from the embassy) reports on this subject, as the Russians feared the Chinese could use this opportunity to set up some kind of secret contacts with the U.S. It is well known to you that behind the wall of unity there reigns a strong mistrust between the Russians and the Chinese, and strong ideological and philosophical differences. The Russians have always checked [ ] information with the Poles, who have an excellent source of their own of another type (as explained later). Of course the Poles inform the Russians about the activity of your embassy, but as is known the Russians don't trust the Poles very much in various matters, and they assume the Poles do not inform them about everything (indeed not without grounds). According to [ ] at the beginning of January 1958 various Western diplomats met with US Ambassador BEAM, among others Austrian Ambassador VEROSTA and the Dutch Ambassador. The "little Marshall Plan" for Poland, to be sponsored by a couple European states, was discussed. The initiator of this discussion was the Austrian Foreign Minister,

b7D

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

who was acting under the influence of an American citizen of German nationality - from the Swiss firm Oerlikon. During World War II the man from Oerlikon was a contact man between German opposition generals and Mr. Allen DULLES in Switzerland, the present head of CIA. This man obtained Mr. DULLES' consent to instigate the matter in order to support Poland economically and thereby slowly make Poland independent from the Soviet Union. The Polish CE got a fragmentary report on this plan through another source, but they did not pass it to the Soviets. The Soviets, however, based on TOM's reports, found out about the plan and torpedoed it through a personal warning from KHRUSHCHEV to GOMULKA.

[ ] reports not only in a general way, but also he has given important operational tips to the Soviet CE office in Prague, and through them, in part, to the WARSAW CE Office of Department II. You will find an interesting example of this in the GAMBIT section of this report. The most important thing, though, in my opinion, is the fact that on instructions from the Soviets [ ] is very actively working on the



But not all of them. Now he feels safe, which in a short time could be his misfortune. [ ] has been working on Mr. [ ] for a long time--his characteristics, hobbies, methods of work, weaknesses, etc. are collected in great detail and analyzed. Above all, the fact, which has become known, that Mr. [ ] would soon be replaced and would apparently go to England within the NATO framework in order to supervise there contacts with the British Intelligence. It is certain that already about a year ago, the Second Main Administration of the KGB in Moscow, headed by Gen. GRIBANOW, made the decision to recruit Mr. [ ] for the KGB at all costs. It is, of course, undoubtedly a difficult undertaking. According to TOM, Mr. [ ] much younger wife likes to indulge in amorous escapades from time to time. But in Warsaw she was careful. Consequently, they exploited the opportunity presented by her recent trip to Moscow to have a Soviet agent establish

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

an amorous contact with her. (It would be interesting to find out who this agent is - unfortunately I am not in a position to do so.) Complete love scenes which took place in a highly compromising manner by Mrs. [redacted] and her partner, the Soviet agent, were filmed and taped. The naive woman permitted herself to reveal her temperament in a Soviet hotel in Moscow! However, the KGB CE believes this represents only a small amount of material for pressure against the woman, and thereby in the future against Mr. [redacted] has also worked on Mr. [redacted] in other ways. If you - a digression - have checked the loyalty of [redacted] with Mr. [redacted] help, which is entirely possible, that would naturally be the joke of the day. For months [redacted] collected samples of [redacted] handwriting, and of his signatures from various months, so that the KGB could analyze [redacted] handwriting. The KGB believes the recruitment of [redacted] can only depend on the method "pressure and gold." Therefore the Soviet graphologists, working with the audio-surveillance reports from [redacted] office and other information, have for months been preparing reports in Mr. [redacted] handwriting. If I am at all oriented in CE methods, the Russians have also already established a bank account somewhere in the name of Mr. [redacted] where deposits are made regularly. The purpose of all this, of course, is to later give the impression that [redacted] has for a long time been working for the KGB, wrote the reports for the KGB in his own hand, and was regularly paid for them by the KGB. The reports, written with the assistance of the tapes, will naturally correspond to the facts, the handwriting will hardly be distinguishable from the original. The bank account signature will be like the real one, and the \$50,000 or \$100,000, which in such cases are not important, will naturally be quite real. Then if personal factors are added thereto, as for example the escapades of the wife or agent activity on the part of the wife, it is really difficult to get out of this provocation trap. Mr. [redacted] has intelligence and I believe also FBI experience, but whether he can find his way about in such a situation one does not know. I must rather doubt whether even you would believe his story. This is then what a fragment of the CE system looks like, which you make light of. Mr. [redacted] makes reports to the Russians in Moscow in his own handwriting, has a bank account--and, most important, knows nothing about it.

b7D

b7D

I submit the following fragments of audio-surveillance reports. On 16 and 17 March of this year in West Germany in the vicinity of Baden-Baden, a conference was to have taken place of U.S., Canadian and other Western power representatives. Subject of this conference: air and water control (of the Eastern areas) through aerial photography. During the talks, according to [redacted] consideration was supposed to have been given to the fact that Poland and other Eastern countries

b7D

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

have received long-distance rockets from the Soviet Union, and that Soviet military units equipped with rockets are stationed on Polish territory. The results of this conference were also learned through audio-surveillance reports, among other things, the tasks of the U.S. and Canadian attaches in Poland. A couple of months ago a man called on Mr. [ ] and reported to him that the local intelligence service had tried to recruit him. The attempted recruitment was supposed to have taken place in the Hotel Polonia in Warsaw. Mr. [ ] reports concerning Radio Free Europe and broadcasts for Poland are known. Among other things, Mr. [ ] complained that the leadership of Radio Free Europe ignores his critical remarks. The latest report of Mr. [ ] on MR. NIXON's stay in Poland is known in detail.

b7D

There is a mass of audio-surveillance reports, because all sorts of things take place in Mr. [ ] room, and the practical leadership of the Embassy is located there. If you make use of this information incautiously, you will shut off one of my excellent sources of information and also possibly put me personally under suspicion. I have no particular confidence in your exploitation of my information to date as far as caution is concerned. After the appropriate preparations you can simply have Mr. [ ] office changed. You can eventually have insulated walls put in, as the Canadians do. But you can in no case discover and destroy the microphones now. I also suggest to you, after you have convinced yourself through technical examination that the microphones are there (which must be done with the greatest care), that you leave them there. I suggest that in the future you thereby carry out a misinformation operation. It would not be bad by means of it to play some kind of espionage organization into the hands of the Polish CE, an organization which would be thought up by us and above all would consist of active representatives of the New Class, so as to hit the best Stalinists behind the ear with a Soviet club. I would be ready to prepare such an operation for you and perhaps also to discuss it with your representative in the future. In any case I emphasize again that cautious handling is necessary. In the event Mr. [ ] is transferred, one can leave the room empty for a time, and then already with the right plan put in a new man, who could put the finger on some Pole who is supposed to be a chief resident agent, but who of course in reality would be a Stalinist you want to get rid of. It would be a pity if you should neglect this opportunity. Please excuse my advice, but I feel myself obliged to advise certain things also from the point of view of exploitation of my information. The [ ] case, according to my information, has to date been badly handled. The KGB in Prague, somehow has information that [ ] is under suspicion. It may be that

b7D

b7D

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

this came about on the basis of the audio-surveillance information or through clumsy handling of the matter by [redacted] Somehow or other they have gotten a signal. An incidental observation - at the time of this signal, beginning of May of this year, suddenly DYBALA, Vice Director of Polish Foreign Intelligence turned up in Prague for a few days and had a couple of conferences with the Military Attache General WITASZEWSKI and the deposed Stalinist big-wig MAZUR, as well as with Colonel MILLER of the Czech CE, and the representative of GRIBANOW, Moscow. It is noteworthy that well-informed persons could learn nothing of the substance of the talks. Devil knows, perhaps something or other has leaked out here? I'll try to clear it up further, but in view of the atmosphere connected with AKTION it will have to be done very slowly and carefully. It is not surprising that in the last two months I have neglected various things and have been cautious. You yourself should put the matter under a magnifying glass in order to discover the reason for the exposure of your interest in [redacted] With help of the facts contained in this section of my report, you will perhaps get there faster.

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

b7D

It is of course certain that the first mistake was keeping [redacted] in Warsaw. [redacted] has been working here since 1955, and before that worked in Turkey. He should have been transferred at the beginning of this year, for which the KGB, Prague, had great hopes. In the meantime [redacted] has prepared a small agent successor, about which more later in this report. For illogical reasons the State Department USA extended [redacted] stay here still further. Even for [redacted] himself it was remarkable. I also wonder why you decided to leave [redacted] here and work on him here. In the West there are better opportunities for this. Here these possibilities are almost zero. One can assume that the Russians have checked the reasons for his remaining in Warsaw and have thereby gotten some cause for suspicion that he has been compromised. Despite everything, he would be less dangerous in Venezuela or Ghana than here. These are naturally just my thoughts out loud, you should know now best how to handle it. It should be handled, however, so that no additional information on the compromise of [redacted] gets into the hands of the KGB. Allow me to ~~HEARD~~ doubt whether you can do it readily in Warsaw. I will try to furnish further data on [redacted] activity in order to give you points for further handling.

b7D

The over-all security situation at the embassy is not exactly gratifying. It also looks approximately the same in Prague. To date, however, I have not been able to find any proper sources for developing information on the situation in Prague, or to set up the proper contacts. It is certain, however, that despite all security measures both in Prague and in Warsaw they are preparing everything in order to be able to get

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

permanent access to the safes of the embassies. They have been preparing these important and very difficult measures for three years. After much effort they have got their hands on various secret documents in Warsaw which speak of the security plan of the Embassy. [redacted]

[redacted] He also is accustomed from time to time to sleep with sweet little girls and that naturally gives the UB all kinds of opportunities. In addition, he is careless. I stress that there is not the slightest suspicion that he has any kind of contacts with the UB. That does not enter the question. Rather he has little weaknesses, which one otherwise in such a service should best leave in Washington. Thus, as stated, various documents are known here. Proof: Document of 20 November 1958, Guard Regulation for Post No. 1. The duty officer should report NIACT or HYPOEF telegrams immediately to the appropriate officials. Instructions on the alarm system and the spare generator. Instructions in the case of political asylum. Key list. Also Guard Regulation for Post No. 2 is known. Main task: "to secure all documents of various classifications. To check security conditions." The guards - Marines - can travel 50 km from Warsaw with the permission of the officer. Explanations that the State Department is a target of espionage and diversion directed against the USA. Employment of persons whose activity does not conflict with security requirements. Etc. Etc. Signed: Wayne E. Eggeber. Certified RM Erbland mjr. USMC. Also [redacted] I have given only examples in order to convince you that such documents are known to the UB. Among other things on the basis of this intelligence they are planning a secret burglary of the Embassy, against which neither the alarm system nor the guards will help. This is possible when the guard in question is an agent of the UB. Recently one of the [redacted] has been recruited. It is difficult to learn the name, but possible in the future.

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

As far as possible I will report to you on the situation in your embassy under the heading STATION. All this information has been checked by me and comes from reliable sources. The utilization of this information requires extreme caution on your part.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

(The following is a continuation of the GAMBUT section of source's report, which was forwarded to you in [redacted])

As mentioned under the heading STATION, the KGB agent [redacted] in Warsaw in the Cultural and Press Attache Office of the US Embassy has spotted and prepared a successor for Polish and Soviet CE. This refers to [redacted] who for a year has been working in the Embassy

b7D

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

in the above mentioned attache office. According to [redacted] has a hot temperament, [redacted] which of course can take place without the knowledge of her superiors in the Embassy. She lives in good circumstances and is not very interested in material things. In political respects also she is very unstable, and according to [redacted] she is a good candidate for an agent, all the more since she has prospects of marrying a US diplomat. [redacted] is [redacted]

b7D

[redacted] in Poland has various family and also private contacts. The information concerning [redacted] comes from reliable sources and has been checked by me; it must be carefully and expertly exploited and eventually worked out in the sense of GAMBIT. In no case can you permit an explanatory talk to be conducted with [redacted] here in Warsaw. For security reason it must unconditionally take place in the West.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

r. Papich  
r. McDermott

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6  
b7C

VIA LIAISON

100-350-264A

**Date:** October 21, 1959  
**To:** Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
**Attention:** Mr. James Angleton  
**From:** John Edgar Hoover, Director  
**Subject:** POLISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
IN THE UNITED STATES  
INTERNAL SECURITY - PO

Reference is made to your [redacted] dated  
October 16, 1959, wherein you inquired concerning [redacted] action  
this Bureau has taken as a result of your earlier [redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

Following a conference attended by representatives of  
your Agency and this Bureau in the office of Lieutenant  
Colonel George Keithley on August 31, 1959, [redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed prior to his departure for Warsaw,  
Poland, by representatives of our New York Office. As you are  
aware, [redacted] associated with the Nuclear Develop-  
ment Corporation of America, Incorporated (NDCA), White Plains,  
New York, had been scheduled to attend an International Atomic  
Energy Agency (IAEA) conference in Warsaw in September, 1959, on  
behalf of the Air Technical Intelligence Center, Wright-Patterson  
Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio. [redacted]

b7D

[redacted] It  
was merely stated to him that in view of his employment and  
scientific background, coupled with his past attendance at  
conferences attended by Soviet-bloc scientists, he logically  
would be of interest to Soviet-bloc intelligence services. He  
was requested to be alert to recognize any special courtesies  
extended to him and any other indications, however subtle, that  
more than casual interest was being taken in him. [redacted]  
advised that in mid-July, 1959, he was visited personally by  
Jan Nanye of the Polish Embassy, Washington, D.C., who delivered  
a written invitation for [redacted] to attend the September, 1959  
IAEA conference in Warsaw. The Polish scientist Wladyslaw  
Krawczyk had previously met [redacted] at the IAEA conference in  
Geneva, Switzerland, in 1958 and, subsequently, in New York City  
in January, 1959.

①-65-65192 (Schutze)

~~SECRET~~

65-65192-  
NOT RECORDED  
SEE NOTE PAGE THREE  
149 OCT 22 1959

JJMcD:skw (7)

b3  
b7E

Isaon \_\_\_\_\_  
Imont \_\_\_\_\_  
Inr \_\_\_\_\_  
Ise \_\_\_\_\_  
Isons \_\_\_\_\_  
Isen \_\_\_\_\_  
Iam \_\_\_\_\_  
Iotter \_\_\_\_\_  
ISullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
IRoom \_\_\_\_\_  
Iloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Ivy \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

Upon his return to the United States, [redacted] was interviewed concerning his experiences in Warsaw. [redacted] related he was met at the airport in Warsaw on September 7, 1959, by Krawczyk, a scientist whose last name is Andrzejewski and another individual whose last name is Herman and who appeared to be in charge of greeting visiting scientists. During his stay in Warsaw, but only after making a point of it with Krawczyk, [redacted] was given a check in the amount of \$508 which constitutes half the amount of his round-trip plane fare from the United States to Warsaw. [redacted] was unable to recall any questions having been posed to him of a personal nature during his stay in Poland.

b7D

b7D

We are, of course, following this matter very closely with [redacted] so that we may be kept advised of all contacts he may have in the future with representatives of the Polish Government.

b7D


Since the source of the original information in this matter concerning [redacted] is the unidentified individual who has been communicating with your Agency under the pseudonym "Dr. Heinrich Schutze," whose motivation for assisting U.S. Intelligence is still undetermined, your attention is invited

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Director  
Central Intelligence Agency



b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7E

NOTE:

Instant classified "~~Secret~~" since it refers to information from CIA which was so classified and since this is a case involving a substantial allegation of espionage or foreign intelligence activity.

- 3 -  
~~SECRET~~

1- McDermott  
1- Wallace

b6  
b7C

SAC, New York [redacted]

December 1, 1959

b3  
b7E

Director, FBI [redacted]

[redacted]

b7D

By letter dated 11/20/59, classified "~~Secret~~"  
CIA forwarded information received from "Doctor Heinrich  
Schutze," information concerning which has previously been  
transmitted to receiving offices. In his latest report  
to CIA, "Schutze" advised that a meeting with [redacted]  
is planned by Manys for December, 1959.

b3  
b7E

- 2- WFO
- 1- [redacted]
- 1- [redacted]

JJMcD:bb  
(9)

- 1- [redacted]
- ① 65-65192 ("Schutze")

b3  
b7E

**NOTE:** [redacted] with the Nuclear  
Development Corporation of America, White Plains, New York,  
who traveled to Warsaw in September, 1959, to attend a conference  
of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Prior to that  
trip, "Schutze" reported that an attempt would be made to  
recruit [redacted] in Warsaw. [redacted] was interviewed before the  
trip and agreed to furnish full details concerning his travel.  
[redacted] advised that [redacted]

b7D

Manys personally extended the invitation to [redacted] in July,  
1959, to attend the afore-mentioned conference and, according  
to "Schutze" will be contacting [redacted] in the future.

ORIGINAL COPY FILE

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- McGuire \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

DEC 4 1959

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

65-65192-  
NOT RECORDED  
150 DEC 2 1959

TELETYPE  
DUPLICATE  
DEC 1 1959  
MAILED



J. McDermott  
Wallace-

b6  
b7C

SAC, Chicago [redacted]

December 1, 1959

Director, FBI [redacted]

[redacted]

b3  
b7D  
b7E

By letter 11/20/59, classified "Secret," CIA forwarded a report received abroad from an unidentified individual using the pseudonym "Dr. Heinrich Schutze" who is believed to have high-level access to Polish and/or Soviet intelligence circles. "Schutze" has refused to meet personally with representatives of U. S. Intelligence, citing the security factor as the reason. While his reliability remains unestablished, he is known to have furnished such accurate information to date. He furnished the following information concerning the subject:

"Polakowski, the Vice-Consul of the Consulate General in Chicago who is already in the U. S., is a captain of Department I of the LSW. He was formerly active in the residentura in Switzerland. Assignment: agent recruitment and handling in the U. S. chiefly in the Chicago area among Polish emigres. Polakowski is very money-conscious and is dishonest in financial dealings with agents. He is not a convinced Communist and is a pronounced opportunist." The foregoing is for your information and is not to be disseminated.

JJ:cd:bb

(6)

65-65192

(1) [redacted] ("Schutze")

b3  
b7E

ORIGINAL COPY FILED

65-65192-

NOT RECORDED  
150 DEC 2 1959

- lson \_\_\_\_\_
- lmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Loach \_\_\_\_\_
- Guire \_\_\_\_\_
- ir \_\_\_\_\_
- sons \_\_\_\_\_
- sen \_\_\_\_\_
- ann \_\_\_\_\_
- lter \_\_\_\_\_
- C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- le. Reed \_\_\_\_\_
- lloman \_\_\_\_\_
- dy \_\_\_\_\_

DEC 10 1959

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

SAC, WFO

11-25-59

Director, FBI [redacted]

b3  
b7E

✓  
[redacted]  
By letter 11-20-59 classified "Secret," CIA forwarded to the Bureau a report received abroad from "Dr. Heinrich Schutze," a pseudonym used by an unidentified individual who has high-level access to Polish and/or Soviet intelligence circles and much of whose information is known to be accurate despite the fact that his reliability is not yet determined. "Schutze" advised in part as follows:

"Unexpectedly the US residentura has been changed with respect to its personnel composition. The present resident Czajka is definitely slated to be Chief of Section II, Department I at US Headquarters in Warsaw after his return. He is to be replaced as resident in Washington not by Lt. Col. Jastrzebski, but by Major Tadeusz Czeslaw Gibor. Gibor's description is as follows: age about 35, dark blond, thin, yellow spots on his face, a Pole, speaks German and English. He has been deputy chief of Section III, Department I (West Germany and Austria) and was formerly active in the Vienna residentura as deputy to the resident. He has been in intelligence for about 14 years and has much experience, but only in the European field. He is supposed to arrive in Washington to take over the residentura from Czajka in November or December. The assignment of Jastrzebski to Washington was changed because it was assumed that Col. Monat knew of it. At the same time Jastrzebski will be transferred to London as representative of the London residentura, and he will conduct IS activity against Canada and the U.S. as well as against Great Britain."

The above information should not be included in any communication prepared for dissemination.

NOT RECORDED  
160 NOV 30 1959

(1) - 65-65192 ("Schutze")

JJMcd:skw  
(5)


ORIGINAL FILED IN

SAC, Chicago

October 20, 1959

Director, FBI

*awk*




b3  
b7E

ReBuairtel 9/30/59 and urlet 10/22/59.

Enclosed is a copy of a letter dated 10/22/59 from CIA, captioned "Polish Intelligence Activities in the United States," concerning subjects. Also enclosed is a copy of the pertinent excerpt from CIA letter dated 10/16/59. The pertinent excerpt from CIA letter dated 9/25/59 was sent to you with reBuairtel.

Because of the extreme sensitivity of the sources involved, no open investigation or physical surveillances should be conducted at this time without Bureau approval. Promptly submit all pertinent data which can be obtained discreetly, including that in relet, in letterhead memorandum form for dissemination to CIA. In cover letter outline recommendations for further investigation.



b3  
b7E

Enclosures - 2

① - 65-65192 ("Schutze")

LHM:sen  
(7)

NOTE: SKOCZEK is Polish immigrant. Both [redacted] and source "Heinrich Schutze" have reported SKOCZEK to be Polish intelligence agent.

b3  
b7D  
b7E

ORIGINAL FILED IN

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- McGuire \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

58 NOV

6 1959

YELLOW  
DUPLICATE  
OCT 24 1959  
MAILED

65-65192-  
NOT RECORDED  
OCT 2 1959

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

SAC, New York [redacted]

November 4, 1959

Director, FBI [redacted]

[redacted]

ReBuairtel 8/27/59. Enclosed is a translated portion of a report furnished by "Schutze," relating to the subject, which was furnished to the Bureau by let dated 10/16/59 classified "Secret."

If not yet done, New York should set out a lead for Chicago to attempt developing additional information through [redacted] which would assist in resolving the question as to whether the subject is identical [redacted]

Enclosure

1 - 65-65192 ("Schutze")

JJMcD:sen  
(5)

NOTE: Enclosure is paragraph number 5 of attachment to CIA letter dated 10/16/59 captioned "Polish Intelligence Activities Against the United States," the original of which is filed in 65-65192 ("Schutze").

ORIGINAL FILED IN

1 65-65192-  
NOT RECORDED  
176 NOV 5 1959

YELLOW  
DATE  
NOV 4 - 1959  
MAILED

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- McGuire \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

62 NOV 12 1959  
MAIL ROOM [ ] TELETYPE UNIT [ ]

b6  
b7C  
b3  
b7E

esa

65-65192-

SAC, Chicago

October 23, 1959

Director, FBI

cc: 31 [redacted]

[redacted]

EX-10

mt

ReBulet 9/28/59. Enclosed for Chicago and New York are copies of Ottawa letter dated 10/9/59. Chicago should submit letterhead memorandum promptly incorporating results of its investigation and the info indicated in Ottawa letter.

Enclosed for each office is copy of CIA letter dated 10/16/59 together with its attached report. The latter part of paragraph 2 of the report sets forth info concerning a certain "Wojtaszek or Wojciaszek" who is apparently identical with subject. CIA's source advises subject directs two or three agents from the U.S. Since George Prominski is the only known suspect who might be identical with one of these agents, Chicago will recognize the importance of its investigation of Prominski and the necessity for being most discreet in conducting the investigations.

[redacted]

Legat should advise [redacted] on a high level, however, that because of reports that the Poles are directing intelligence operations against the U.S. from Canada, the Bureau is most interested in receiving all information which can be obtained concerning subject's activities and his contacts in the U.S.

Enclosures - 3

- 1 - New York (Enclosures - 3)
- 2 - Ottawa [redacted] (Enclosures - 2)
- 1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route thru for review)

LHM:sen  
(8)

See Note Page 2

- Tolson
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Nease
- Parsons
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Trotter
- W.C. Sullivan
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Gandy

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

b3  
b7E

b7D

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7E

SAC Chicago  
RE: [redacted]

b3  
b7E

NOTE: Subject is a clerk at Polish Legation in Ottawa and is a suspected intelligence agent according to [redacted] previously reported contacts between subject and a distant relative, George Prominski, who resides in Chicago. Chicago Office currently conducting investigation of Prominski. CIA letter sets forth info from source "Heinrich Schmitze" that subject is directing two or three agents in U.S. who go to Canada to meet with subject. [redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

b6  
b7C

REGISTERED

Date: October 9, 1959

To: Director, FBI [redacted]

From: Legat, Ottawa

Subject: [redacted]

Heinrich Schutze

ReBulet to Chicago 9-28-59.

Information was received from the [redacted]

b3  
b7E

b7D

5 - Bureau  
{ cc - 1 - Chicago)  
{ cc - 1 - New York)  
1 - Ottawa  
MLI:jhe  
(6)

165-65192-  
NOT RECORDED  
176 NOV 4 1959

Mr. McDermott

SAC, Washington Field [redacted]

10-27-59

b3  
b7D  
b7E

Director, FBI [redacted]

[redacted]

By letter dated 10-16-59 classified "~~Secret~~" CIA furnished the Bureau a copy of a report received abroad from an unidentified individual using the pseudonym "Dr. Heinrich Schutze." As you were previously advised, "Schutze" has been furnishing information to CIA abroad since April, 1958. On the basis of his information, he undoubtedly has extremely high-level access to Soviet and/or Polish intelligence sources. While his reliability has not been established, he has furnished much extremely significant and accurate information. The information received from him should not be incorporated into any communication intended for dissemination. "Schutze" has advised as follows concerning Monat:

"The general situation here has become even worse and more tense since Colonel Monat, the former Military Attache in the U.S. and most recently an inspector in Z-II (O-II), defected in August during the course of a vacation in Vienna. Z-II allegedly knows that he is in your hands, which naturally is no pleasant matter for Z-II."

b3  
b7E

JJMCD:chw  
(5)

1 - 65-65192 ("Schutze")

65-65192  
NOT RECORDED  
136 OCT 28 1959

- \_\_\_\_\_ Tolson
- \_\_\_\_\_ Belmont
- \_\_\_\_\_ Mohr
- \_\_\_\_\_ DeLoach
- \_\_\_\_\_ Casper
- \_\_\_\_\_ Callahan
- \_\_\_\_\_ Conrad
- \_\_\_\_\_ Felt
- \_\_\_\_\_ Gale
- \_\_\_\_\_ Rosen
- \_\_\_\_\_ Sullivan
- \_\_\_\_\_ Tavel
- \_\_\_\_\_ Trotter
- \_\_\_\_\_ Tele. Room
- \_\_\_\_\_ Holloman
- \_\_\_\_\_ Gandy

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

ORIGINAL FILED IN



~~SECRET~~  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

100341

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6  
b7C

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: [redacted]

b3  
b7E

1. Reference is made to this Agency's [redacted]  
of 11 September 1959, subject as above.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[Large redacted area]

HEINRICH SCHULTZE

ORIGINAL FILE IN 100-3-100-6284

755  
52 OCT 26 1959

~~SECRET~~

100-65192-  
NOT RECORDED  
149 OCT 22 1959

Mr. McDermott

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

SAC, Albany [redacted]

10-23-59

b3  
b7E

Director, FBI [redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

Enclosed for receiving offices is a portion of a report [redacted] dated 10-16-59, classified "Secret," which was received abroad from an unidentified individual using the pseudonym "Dr. Heinrich Schutze." For the benefit of offices not previously cognizant concerning this source, "Schutze" began communicating with American intelligence in Europe in approximately April, 1958, stating it was his desire to be of assistance to the United States. He undoubtedly has high-level access within Polish and/or Soviet intelligence services. This has been borne out by his reports which have contained shockingly accurate information concerning penetrations of United States intelligence efforts abroad and Polish intelligence activities in the United States. His motivation remains undetermined. None of his reports have been determined to be attempts at deception and much of the information furnished by him has been confirmed by independent, extremely sensitive sources.

b3  
b7E

With regard to information in the enclosure concerning Tadeusz Ziolkowski, receiving offices, with the exception of Ottawa, were previously aware that he is the principal of [redacted] who has met with Ziolkowski on several occasions in Mexico City. In addition, Ziolkowski has indicated to [redacted] that he has other sources in the United States, specifically an unidentified individual in New York who allegedly is in a position to check somewhat on [redacted]. The enclosure tends to confirm what was previously believed, that is, that Ziolkowski is associated with the Polish Security Service (UB) rather than with Polish Military Intelligence (O-II).

b7D

ORIGINAL FILED IN

It was previously known that Mieczyslaw Golebiowski of the Polish Legation, Ottawa, is the UB resident in Canada. Instructions concerning Wojtaszek (or Wojciaszek) will be forwarded to Ottawa separately.

Information received from "Schutze" should not be included in correspondence prepared for dissemination but may be included in cover pages of reports.

b3  
b7E

- 1 - New York [redacted] (Enclosure)
- 1 - Mexico [redacted] (Enclosure)
- 1 - Ottawa [redacted] (Enclosure)
- 1 - WFO (Enclosure)

NOT RECORDED

168 OCT 27 1959

- 1 - Foreign Liaison Unit
- 65-65192 (Schutze)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

YELLOW  
DUPLICATE  
OCT 23 1959  
MAILED

Letter to SAC, Albany

RE: [redacted]  
[redacted]

b3  
b7E

NOTE:

The enclosure transmitted to receiving offices is paragraph No. 2 [redacted] 10-16-59, classified "~~Secret~~," captioned "Polish Intelligence Activities Against the United States," the original of which is filed in 65-65192 ("Schutze").

McDermott

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [ ] ADG

b6  
b7C

Legat, Ottawa

October 13, 1959

Director, FBI (100-359264)

**POLISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
IN THE UNITED STATES  
INTERNAL SECURITY - PC**

Enclosed for each receiving office is a CIA letter dated 9/22/59 classified "Secret" captioned "The Polish Military Attache's Office in Canada," together with a copy of its enclosure.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[ ] For the information of Ottawa, this individual is [ ] who served as [ ] at the Polish Embassy, Washington, D.C., until his recall in Aug. 1958. He defected to the American Embassy, Vienna, on [ ] and to being interviewed in the Washington, D.C. area by NSD, CIA, and the Army.

b7D

Ottawa letter 9/24/59 recommended that information received from "Schutze" as set forth in Bulet to WFO 9/11/59 regarding plans of Polish Military Intelligence (O-II) to run agents in the United States from the Polish Military Attache's Office, Ottawa, be furnished to the [ ] Since the contents of the enclosure substantiate pertinent portions of the information received from "Schutze" [ ]

b7D

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[ ] Ottawa should discuss the information in the enclosure with the [ ] and stress that the Bureau attaches very great importance to it and desires to be promptly informed of activities of the staff of the Polish Military Attache's Office, Ottawa, which have any possible bearing on Polish intelligence activities in the United States. Since [ ] has not yet been surfaced, his identity should not be revealed to the [ ]

b7D

b3  
b7E

With regard to WFOlet 9/23/59 captioned [ ] [ ] copy of which enclosed for Ottawa, Ottawa should request [ ] to furnish the identities of any individuals who have entered Canada from the United States who are known to have been in contact with the staff of the Polish Military Attache's Office, Ottawa, as well as those who have such contacts in the [ ]

- Enclosures - 3
- 1 - Chicago (Enclosures - 2)
- 1 - New York (Enclosures - 2)
- 1 - WFO (Enclosures - 2)

65-65192  
NOT RECORDED  
OCT 14 1959  
MAILED

ORIGINAL FILE IN

- Olson \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- McGuire \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

1 - [ ]  
D- 65-65192-4 "Schutze" (TO)  
JMcDermott  
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route thru for review)

58 OCT 16 1959  
F165  
TELETYPE UNIT [ ]

FD-5  
Revised  
08/05/2008

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

\* This form is consolidated with the old FD-654, based on a Sentinel review.

Date 11/29/13

Document Classification:  Unclass  Confidential  Secret  Top Secret

Document Type:  Letter  Airtel  LHM  Memo  Report  
 Facsimile  Teletype  Misc  EC  Email  
Enclosure \_\_\_\_\_ Attachment \_\_\_\_\_

SCI TYPE: \*requires special handling

SI\*  TK\*  GAMMA\*  COSMIC(NATO)  
 HCS\*  SSRP\*  BYE\*  Other \_\_\_\_\_ (specify)

FD-501 Number \_\_\_\_\_

Date of Mail 09/29/59

Originating Office or agency \_\_\_\_\_

This serial has been removed and placed in:

Special File Room, FBIHQ  FBIHQ, Room \_\_\_\_\_

Field Office-Room # Container # or Other Location Where Material Is Stored \_\_\_\_\_

File 65-40-65192 Sec 1  
Class. Office of Origin Case No. Last Serial

Pending  Closed

Serial No.	Description of Serial	Date Charged
<u>35</u>	<u>65-40-65192</u>	<u>Sec 1</u>

b6  
b7c

Employee

Date \_\_\_\_\_

To \_\_\_\_\_ From \_\_\_\_\_

Initials of  
Clerk

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6  
b7C

*Handwritten notes and scribbles*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: [redacted]

~~b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7E~~

*Handwritten: Form 1.0 Start*

1. Reference is made to this Agency's [redacted]  
6 October 1959, subject as above.

*Handwritten: original in file 35826*  
1511

[redacted]

~~b1 Per  
b3 CIA~~

[Large redacted block]

[Redacted vertical box]

[Redacted box]

*Handwritten: 65-65170-205-711*

b3  
b7E

62 JAN 12 1960

15-16 DECEMBER 1959

~~SECRET~~

11 NOV 30 1959

*Handwritten: 65-17192 (10/10/59)*

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

b. TRAPNELL was the subject of an investigation conducted [redacted] and which resulted in a very favorable report dated 11 August 1958 (case classification E. O. 10422) which described TRAPNELL as highly regarded in the American community, of moral character, reliability and loyalty to the U.S. Government above reproach. This investigation was conducted in compliance with an official memorandum of 6 May 1958 from the Office of Security, Department of State.

b3  
b7E

c. The Chief of the Division of Investigations of the Department of State should have a copy of TRAPNELL's application for employment on a Department of State form in which TRAPNELL lists travel to Poland and Czechoslovakia among other places from December 1945 to February 1946 as an employee of the International Refugee Agency.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[redacted] X

[redacted] X

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

*J. Angleton*  
JAMES ANGLETON

[redacted] X

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

b6  
b7C

TO : A. H. Belmont

1-Mr. Belmont DATE: 11-20-59

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1-Mr. Branigan  
1-Mr. McDermott  
1-Mr. Fitzgerald  
1-Mr. Papich

SUBJECT: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
INTERNAL SECURITY - POLAND

Tolson	_____
Belmont	_____
DeLoach	_____
McGuire	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	b1 Per
Trotter	b3 CIA
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

As previous memoranda have indicated, information received by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from an unidentified source using captioned pseudonym alleges that the Polish Security Service (UB) and Soviet Intelligence (KGB) plan to attempt recruiting former Bureau Agent [redacted] through compromise.

b7D

memorandum 11-10-59, it was recommended and approved that a representative of the Espionage Section accompany the Bureau's liaison agent to the State Department to confer with William O. Boswell, Director, Office of Security, on this matter.

On 11-19-59, Mr. Fitzgerald of Liaison and Mr. McDermott of Espionage conferred with Boswell and his Deputy Director, Otto Otepka. Boswell stated that the report concerning [redacted] was first received at State with alarm. However, during some ten conferences he has had since with such CIA officials as Richard M. Bissell, James Angleton and Richard Helm, Boswell stated that CIA has repeatedly retreated from taking any position on the source's reliability. (CIA has never actually seen the source who, allegedly as a security measure, refuses to make personal contact.) In the absence of any corroboration and considering CIA's vacillating attitude concerning the source, Boswell is not convinced there is any basis for the report and he is taking a "wait and see" attitude pending receipt of any additional information which would lend credence to the report. Boswell states that [redacted] (against whom the source has made no charges of dereliction) is a "solid" person with an enviable record who should progress to important positions in State. He stated that he could think of few American diplomats behind the Iron Curtain who would be less vulnerable as Soviet-bloc compromise targets than [redacted]. He feels it would be stupid for the Soviets, knowing [redacted] is fully aware of all the tricks of the trade, to regard him as susceptible to recruitment on the basis of fraudulent evidence. Boswell indicated, however, that he intends to confer with [redacted] upon his return to Washington, which is imminent, and advise him of the allegation that he may be a Soviet-Polish recruitment target. He does not intend to inform him

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

b7D

65-65102-1  
JMcD:skw(9)



Memorandum to A. H. Belmont  
RE: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
65-65192

that one of the devices reportedly to be used against him is the alleged evidence of [redacted] Boswell indicated <sup>b7D</sup> that, based upon the bare, unsupported allegations, he intends to take no step which would adversely affect the futures of those involved.

Boswell advised that [redacted] had been routinely transferred from Poland to Australia and, after unsuccessfully attempting to have the transfer cancelled, submitted her resignation. Boswell did not know whether she has yet returned to the United States. [redacted] continues as a United States Information Agency representative in Warsaw, and his tour of duty will not expire until the Spring or Summer of 1960. Boswell stated that American Ambassador to Poland Jacob Beam was fully informed of this matter and is being permitted to take such steps as are necessary to check on the report while Symans is kept away from sensitive information. Boswell stated that he will furnish the Bureau's liaison representative the results of his talk with [redacted] and will have [redacted] (who may be in Washington <sup>b7D</sup> for the next four years) promptly report any indication of inordinate Soviet-bloc interest in him.

OBSERVATIONS:

This has primarily been a State Department internal problem. [redacted] will be briefed by Boswell concerning fact that he allegedly is <sup>b7D</sup> a Soviet-bloc [redacted] and Boswell will keep us informed. [redacted] has resigned from her employment at the American Embassy, Warsaw, and will be returning to the United States. Upon determination of her destination, consideration will be given to interviewing her without, of course, informing her of the report that she had been a [redacted] continues in his position at the American Embassy, Warsaw, and the report concerning him remains a matter strictly for State Department to resolve. While no immediate action by the Bureau is indicated at this time, we should follow CIA to determine what steps are being taken to develop corroboration or disproof concerning the report.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Bureau's liaison representative learn from CIA the extent of that Agency's attempt to resolve the allegations in this matter through independent inquiry [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted]

ADG b6  
b7C

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. F. A. FROHBOSE

SUBJECT: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
INTERNAL SECURITY - POLAND

DATE: November 27, 1959

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Reference is made to memorandum dated November 20, 1959, from Mr. Branigan to you. Liaison was requested to learn through Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) the extent of that Agency's attempt to resolve the allegations in this matter through independent inquiry

[redacted] This matter was discussed with James Angleton, CIA, on November 25, 1959.

Angleton stated that his Agency definitely is conducting operations, the objective of which is to obtain the true identity of Schutze. One of these operations is being conducted in collaboration with another foreign intelligence service which is currently running a double agent against the Polish Intelligence Service. The double agent seems to be of a caliber who might be placed in a position to obtain some information which will assist in identifying the subject.

Angleton advised that CIA is also endeavoring to obtain additional information through existing coverage of Polish intelligence operations. The Agency is also making analyses of past information developed concerning Polish intelligence officials. This is being done in an attempt to at least suggest possible true identities of subject. Angleton further indicated that CIA [redacted] to Schutze but so far the replies have not been of significant assistance in identifying the subject.

Angleton stated that at this point his Agency has no alternative but to continue following this matter on a basis of assuming that Schutze can either be a Soviet or Polish plant or that he can be legitimately cooperating with the U. S.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

- SJP: jlk (6)
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
  - 1 - Mr. McDermott
  - 1 - Liaison Section
  - 1 - Mr. Branigan
  - 1 - Mr. Rappich

25 DEC 8 1959

REC-43 65-65192-40

65-65172

5-110 AM

2 DEC 10 1959

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 1352864-000

Total Deleted Page(s) = 68

Page 11 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;  
Page 12 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;  
Page 13 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;  
Page 42 ~ b7D; b7E;  
Page 43 ~ b7D; b7E;  
Page 44 ~ b7D; b7E;  
Page 45 ~ b7D; b7E;  
Page 46 ~ b7D; b7E;  
Page 47 ~ b7D; b7E;  
Page 48 ~ b7D; b7E;  
Page 49 ~ b7D; b7E;  
Page 50 ~ b7D; b7E;  
Page 51 ~ b7D; b7E;  
Page 53 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA; b7D; b7E;  
Page 54 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA; b7D; b7E;  
Page 55 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA; b7D; b7E;  
Page 56 ~ b7D; b7E;  
Page 57 ~ b7D; b7E;  
Page 58 ~ b7D; b7E;  
Page 59 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA; b7D; b7E;  
Page 60 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA; b7D; b7E;  
Page 61 ~ b7D; b7E;  
Page 62 ~ b7D; b7E;  
Page 63 ~ b7D; b7E;  
Page 64 ~ b1 - per CIA; b3 - per CIA; b6 - per FBI; b7C - per FBI; b7E - per FBI;  
Page 65 ~ b1 - per CIA; b3 - per CIA; b6 - per FBI; b7C - per FBI; b7E - per FBI;  
Page 66 ~ b1 - per CIA; b3 - per CIA; b6 - per FBI; b7C - per FBI; b7E - per FBI;  
Page 67 ~ b1 - per CIA; b3 - per CIA; b6 - per FBI; b7C - per FBI; b7E - per FBI;  
Page 68 ~ b1 - per CIA; b3 - per CIA; b6 - per FBI; b7C - per FBI; b7E - per FBI;  
Page 69 ~ b1 - per CIA; b3 - per CIA; b6 - per FBI; b7C - per FBI; b7E - per FBI;  
Page 70 ~ b1 - per CIA; b3 - per CIA; b6 - per FBI; b7C - per FBI; b7E - per FBI;  
Page 71 ~ b1 - per CIA; b3 - per CIA; b6 - per FBI; b7C - per FBI; b7E - per FBI;  
Page 72 ~ b1 - per CIA; b3 - per CIA; b6 - per FBI; b7C - per FBI; b7E - per FBI;  
Page 74 ~ b1 - per CIA; b3 - per CIA; b6 - per FBI; b7C - per FBI; b7E - per FBI;  
Page 75 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 76 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 77 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 78 ~ b1 - per CIA; b3 - per CIA; b7E - per FBI;  
Page 102 ~ b1 - per CIA; b3 - per CIA; b6 - per FBI; b7C - per FBI; b7E - per FBI;  
Page 103 ~ b1 - per CIA; b3 - per CIA; b7E - per FBI;  
Page 105 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 106 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 107 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 108 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 109 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 110 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 111 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 112 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 113 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 114 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 115 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 116 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 117 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 118 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 119 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 120 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 125 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 137 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;  
Page 140 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 141 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 142 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 143 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 149 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 150 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 151 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 152 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 153 ~ b3; b7E;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
X Deleted Page(s) X  
X No Duplication Fee X  
X For this Page X  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [ ] ADG

64 57

b6  
b7c

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: ~~Polish Intelligence Activities Against~~  
the United States

*Handwritten notes and stamps:*  
REC-6  
Schmitt

1. Reference is made to paragraph 3 of this Agency's  
[ ] of 25 November 1959, subject as above.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

2. The officer mentioned in the reference has been queried and has stated the following about Edward TRAPNELL: "Based on the conversations and contacts which I had with TRAPNELL [ ] I noticed nothing which would suggest that he was other than a loyal American of good character, reliability, and discretion. . . . I found TRAPNELL to be forthcoming and effective; never was he overly curious. . . . Nothing stated in the allegation (about TRAPNELL's political views and differences with the official policies of the United States) in any way relates itself to information I gained about TRAPNELL during my contacts with him. Regarding the allegation that TRAPNELL is being cultivated by Witold LISOWSKI I wouldn't be surprised. . . ."

3. No further action is planned by this Agency with respect to TRAPNELL unless further information is obtained from the source of the original allegation.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

*J. Angleton*  
James Angleton

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[ ]

REC-6 15-1-1960-41

10 JAN 6 1960

62 JAN 12 1960

~~SECRET~~

ESP. REC. 1/10

NUMEROUS REFERENCE

SEARCH SLIP

Subj: Edward Snowden

Supervisor McDonnell 4 Room 2264

R# \_\_\_\_\_ Date 1/8 Searcher Initial cmk

FILE ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED L

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 08-13-2020 BY  ADG b6

b7C

Edward (Vern)  
LT US-65192-32

C  
NR

Journal Currents Rebirth  
13 5 51 mg Collection

Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Records Branch

, 1959

<input type="checkbox"/>	Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
<input type="checkbox"/>	Service Unit - Room 6524
<input type="checkbox"/>	Forward to File Review
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Attention <u>Hearson</u>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Return to <u>Mc Dermott, 2264</u>
	Supervisor Room Ext.

## Type of References Requested:

<input type="checkbox"/>	Regular Request (Analytical Search)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Subversive References Only
<input type="checkbox"/>	Nonsubversive References Only
<input type="checkbox"/>	Main _____ References Only

## Type of Search Requested:

<input type="checkbox"/>	Restricted to Locality of _____
<input type="checkbox"/>	Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Build ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 08-13-2020 BY 

ADG... b6

b7C

Subject Edward Trapnell  
 Birthdate & Place \_\_\_\_\_  
 Address \_\_\_\_\_

Localities \_\_\_\_\_

R# F.C. Date 1/8 Searcher Initials cmk  
1-8 FILE NUMBER SERIAL

65-65192-38-32

100-350264-1511

Edward R

116-4726

100-350264-1511

62-82221-419

62-82221-A Wash Times 7-28-47

62-85205-A Wash Post 1-13-52

b3

121-4723-37 b7E

Edward R. Rugh

138-4295

116 inf S1

39-2151-609155

62-90938-246

Edward R. Rugh, Colston

138 inf S1

62-90938-246

Edward R. Rugh

100-350264-1511

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] Alb6  
b7c

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RECORDED FILED  
NOV 20 1959  
CA SP

~~REC-8~~  
*[Handwritten signature]*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Polish Intelligence Activities Against  
the United States

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

1. Reference is made to this Agency's [redacted] of  
22 October 1959, subject as above.

2. Attached are translated portions of a report recently  
received from the unusually sensitive source who produced the  
report in reference.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[redacted]

4. The above information is from a highly sensitive source  
and should not be further disseminated outside your organization.  
In order to protect the source, it is requested that no action be  
taken on this information without the express approval of this  
Agency.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

*J. Angleton*  
JAMES ANGLETON

[redacted]

Attachment

[redacted]

NOV 20 1959  
REC-8

FILED IN  
SERIALIZED CO.  
UNF b7E

REC-8 65-65192-42  
12 NOV 20 1959

58 JAN 11 1960

ENCLOSURE

65-65192  
(Schutze)



~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7c

ATTACHMENT

1925  
1. Unexpectedly the US residentura has been changed with respect to its personnel composition. The present resident CZAJER is definitely slated to be Chief of Section II, Department I at UB Headquarters in Warsaw after his return. He is to be replaced as resident in Washington not by Lt. Col. JASTRZEBSKI, but by Major Tadeusz Czeslaw CIBOR. CIBOR's description is as follows: age about 35, dark blond, thin, yellow spots on his face, a Pole, speaks German and English. He has been deputy chief of Section III, Department I (West Germany and Austria) and was formerly active in the Vienna residentura as deputy to the resident. He has been in intelligence for about 14 years and has much experience, but only in the European field. He is supposed to arrive in Washington to take over the residentura from CZAJER in November or December. The assignment of JASTRZEBSKI to Washington was changed because it was assumed that Col. MONAT knew of it. At the same time JASTRZEBSKI will be transferred to London as representative of the London residentura, and he will conduct IS activity against Canada and the U.S. as well as against Great Britain.

2. POLAKOWSKI, the Vice-Consul of the Consulate General in Chicago who is already in the U.S., is a captain of Department I of the MSW. He was formerly active in the residentura in Switzerland. Assignment: Agent recruitment and handling in the U.S. chiefly in the Chicago area among Polish emigres. POLAKOWSKI is very money-conscious and is dishonest in financial dealings with agents. He is not a convinced Communist and is a pronounced opportunist.

3. The case of Col. MONAT has created a great stir in Z-II as well as in all of the Eastern intelligence services, particularly because through his wife he is related to Alexander ZAWADZKI and was backed by the latter. If the military CE service (Wojskowa Sluzba Wewnetrzna, WSW, Military Internal Security) had not intervened, MONAT undoubtedly would have been promoted to Deputy Chief of Z-II. Re your query as to what Z-II knows about the activity of the Western IS's against it, this problem is being worked on by a special section of military CE (WSW), which section is directly subordinate to the Chief of WSW, General KOKOSZYN. The Chief of this section is Major Marian ZALUSKA, an old CE officer, active since 1944 in Department II. The WSW and its predecessor organization, the GZI, suspected MONAT of being a U.S. agent. It was known that MONAT had contact in Washington with the former U.S. air attache in Warsaw, Col. CHOINSKI, and used him as a "source of information." The WSW suspected, however, that MONAT himself had been recruited by CHOINSKI for the U.S. intelligence service.

4. In the beginning of October, General SEROV came on an unofficial visit to Warsaw to discuss the MONAT case with the Chief of Z-II, General KORZYNSKI (real name KILANOWICZ). Political complications are much more feared than operational complications, above all the compromise of Alexander ZAWADZKI, who is one of the most important Moscow men in Warsaw. Consequently, it has been decided, under the pressure of SEROV, to try MONAT before a court-martial in absentia and to condemn him to death for treason and desertion to the enemy. The matter was presented to GOMULKA for a decision at the end of October by the higher military prosecutor Col. RYBA. (The case of) MONAT is to be placed before the court in November. SEROV has definitely promised General KORCZYNSKI and General KOKOSZYN that the Soviet IS will carry out the sentence.

~~SECRET~~ 65-65192-42  
ENCLOSURE

5. At the same time Col. BRYN [redacted] (28 August 1959) is also to be placed before the court martial. BRYN has begun to change his testimony and has already confessed that under pressure, injections, torture, and the lie-detector he has confirmed much data and supplied information to your service in Okinawa and other places. The names of persons active in the Polish intelligence service and reported on by BRYN are being carefully checked. The Soviet Chief Directorate II of the General Staff (Military IS) has received information from France which compromises BRYN as being a "voluntary traitor." After the conviction the investigation will continue. It is planned to put BRYN under the pressure of a death sentence.

6. In the beginning of November the agent Jacques James SAUNDER was supposed to travel to the U.S. in order to meet there with Mr. MURPHY. SAUNDER's assignment: collection of political information and examination of the effect of Khrushchev's trip and the German question.

7. A meeting with [redacted] planned by NANYS for December. No change.

b7D

8. In the summer of this year the IS in Warsaw approached [redacted] through her cousin Hilge (a UB agent) and Engineer SZCZYGLIEL, the Department II Captain who had been put in contact with [redacted] visited his apartment and was later invited to the Grand Hotel. An officer of Department II who had already been prepared as an "acquaintance" was not introduced because [redacted] had conducted herself very reservedly. The plan remains the same as before.

~~181~~

MR. A. H. BELMONT

12-29-59

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

F. A. FRODOSE




SJP/mch  
(7)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- Tolson 1 - Mr. Branigan
- Boardman 1 - Mr. McDermott
- Belmont 1 - Mr. Papich
- Mohr 1 - Liaison
- Nease 1 - Mr. Papich
- Parsons 1 - Mr. Papich
- Rosen 1 - yellow - 65-65192 (Dr. Heinrich Schutze)
- Tamm 1 - yellow - 65-65192 (Dr. Heinrich Schutze)
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Clayton \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_ MAIL ROOM

57 JAN 11 1960

65-65192 -  
NOT RECORDED  
149 JAN 4 1960

ORIGINAL FILE IN 65



~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

b6  
b7C

*[Faint stamp]*


~~REC-60~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Polish Intelligence Activities Against  
the United States

*me [signature]*

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7E




*6*  
*43*

1960

b3  
b7E

*65-65192 (Schmitt)*  
*5-MT*



~~SECRET~~

© JAN 13 1964

~~SECRET~~


D.R.'s. H.



b1 Per  
b3 CIA

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

*J. Angleton*  
James Angleton



~~SECRET~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. F. A. FROHOSE

DATE: 11-5-59

FROM : S. J. PAPICH

SUBJECT: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE 65-65192  
IS - POLAND

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- McGuire \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

We previously have received information from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that Polish intelligence allegedly has been planning to compromise [redacted] ranking U.S. Foreign Service Officer at the U.S. Embassy, Warsaw, Poland. We were recently informed that [redacted] has been transferred to Washington, D. C.; the nature and the length of his assignment here are unknown at this time. Furthermore we have received a report that [redacted] and his wife are bringing a Polish maid with them.

WAB b7D

Since [redacted] apparently has been a target of Polish intelligence, and in view of his transfer to Washington, D. C., it is necessary for us to determine what, if any, steps should be taken by the Bureau. The Liaison Agent contacted James Angleton, CIA, on 11-3-59 to determine the nature and extent of exchange of information between CIA and State concerning this matter. Angleton stated that his Agency has given William O. Boswell, Director, Office of Security, State, a complete and thorough briefing concerning developments in the instant case, and have particularly covered all items pertaining to [redacted]. CIA does not know what action is to be taken by State. Angleton has no objection to the Bureau conferring with State and suggests that contact be made with Boswell himself.

With regard to the Polish maid coming to this country with the [redacted] Angleton stated that his Agency does not have any information in addition to what has been disseminated by CIA. He was of the opinion that State might possess some additional information.

Angleton advised on a strictly confidential basis that reports received from Warsaw indicate that [redacted]

[redacted]

**ACTION:** The above information is being directed to the attention of the Espionage Section. 24 JAN 6 1960

- SJP/nmn  
(7)
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
  - 1 - Mr. Martin
  - 1 - Mr. McDermott

- 1 - Mr. Bartlett
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

EX-139  
10/19/60  
5 - McDermott  
Please copy in [redacted]

63 JAN 14 1960

b3  
b7E

b7D

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont


DATE: November 10, 1959

FROM : Mr. W. A. Branigan

- 1 - Belmont
  - 1 - Branigan
  - 1 - Martin
  - 1 - Liaison
- Tolson
  - Belmont
  - DeLoach
  - McGuire
  - Mohr
  - Parsons
  - Rosen
  - Tamm
  - Trotter
  - W.C. Sullivan
  - Tele. Room
  - Holloman
  - Gandy

SUBJECT: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
IS - POLAND

[redacted] a former Bureau agent, is now  
[redacted] United States Embassy, Warsaw, Poland.  
Information has been received from CIA that the Polish Intelligence  
Service (PIS) has been planning an attempt to [redacted]  
and has been collecting material for this purpose, including [redacted]



Attached memorandum from Mr. Papich to Mr. Frohbose dated 11/5/59 advises that CIA has briefed William O. Boswell, Director, Office of Security, State Department, concerning this matter but that CIA does not know what action is to be taken by State. CIA has no objection to our discussing this case with Boswell.

RECOMMENDATION:

Since no investigative action can be taken by the Bureau until all aspects of this case are known, it is recommended that a representative of the Espionage Section be designated to accompany the Bureau's Liaison representative with State Department for the purpose of discussing this case with Mr. Boswell of the State Department, to determine what future assignments are planned for [redacted] whether he has been alerted concerning any of the Schutze allegations, whether there is any reason why he should not be alerted concerning them and any other facts or considerations which may be pertinent.

LHM:bcm

Auto Copy  
1-18-60  
[Handwritten signatures and initials]

REC-146  
EX-139  
11/17/60

65-651-45  
18 JAN 6 1960  
[Handwritten initials and stamps]

UNRECORDED COPY FILED

b3  
b7E



~~SECRET~~  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

b6  
b7C

RECEIVED FROM  
CIA SP

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT : Polish Intelligence Activities Against  
the United States

*Handwritten:* [Signature]  
65-65192-34  
(Schulze)

1. Reference is made to this Agency's memorandum [redacted] of 4 September 1959, subject as above.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

2. The following report which was recently received by this Agency is being forwarded to the Bureau for information:

[redacted] United States  
Counselor in Warsaw, Poland, has returned to the United States where she will await her husband whose tour of duty in Poland will end in November-December 1959. [redacted] brought a Polish maid, Emilia, to the United States. The maid's last name is not known, but she is reputed to be reasonably attractive and intelligent and had been regarded as one of the best cooks in the employ of members of the Western diplomatic colony in Warsaw. Emilia has worked for the [redacted] for two years and had worked for the previous two years for [redacted] Embassy in Warsaw. [redacted] at the Department of State.

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

3. In view of the known UB practice of employing domestics in Warsaw as informants and because Emilia had worked for two high-ranking American diplomats, this Agency felt the above report might be of interest to the Bureau.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

~~24 JAN 6 1960~~

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7E

165-5517  
191 JAN 11 1960

J. Angleton  
James Angleton

*Handwritten:* The woman I had in mind was VB of [redacted]

*Handwritten:* 48 [redacted]  
LHM [redacted]  
11 5-59

[redacted]

[redacted]

62 JAN 12 1960

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RECEIVED FROM  
JAN 11 1960  
CIA A SIP

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Lazarz AJCES aka Lejzor EJCES aka Leon AJCES

1. On 6 January 1960 we transmitted to the Bureau under our memorandum [redacted] a recent report in which Source describes a case known as "CHLOPAK."

2. We wish to call the Bureau's attention to certain similarities in the background of "CHLOPAK" and that of an individual named Lazarz AJCES. The Bureau will recall that there had been some correspondence on AJCES as early as 1949, the first of which was the Bureau's memorandum dated 8 December 1948.

3. In reviewing the AJCES case we note that AJCES arrived in the United States on 6 November 1948. He admitted that he held the rank of Major in the Polish Army. He purportedly came to the United States to receive an inheritance from an aunt. AJCES also admitted that he had written authority from General Wacław KOMAR to come to the United States for a visit. Soon after his visitor's visa expired AJCES asked for political asylum in the United States.

4. Despite the fact that AJCES described himself as an Army officer, we suspected at the time that he had some connection with the O-II. This was further borne out by the Bureau's information dated 8 December 1948 and March 29, 1949 which stated that: (a) "a highly confidential and reliable source reports that AJCES is believed to be a representative of Polish UB or possibly military intelligence (GZI);" and (b) "subsequent information from a highly confidential and delicate source usually reliable reflected that

[redacted]

5. In line with the above thought, we also note with interest that a few months after AJCES asked for asylum he received a letter from one "MIITEK" (per Bureau's report dated 12 October 1949). There is no doubt in our mind that this letter was written by the Polish Intelligence Service (probably the O-II) demanding that AJCES re-establish communication or contact with the Intelligence Service.

*De Heinrich Schurtz*  
*9/19/49*  
*ENSURE DOCUMENT IS CLASSIFIED*  
*AND CIA REVIEW OF 9/19/49*  
*UNCLASSIFIED UN: UNDR*  
*CIA APP - 826*

*100-358667*  
b3  
b7E

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

RECORDED COPY FILED IN

b7D

~~SECRET~~

*Est. 1/18*  
*5-711*  
*65-65192*  
*(Schurtz)*

*51 FEB 17 1960*  
*FOL 5*  
*51*

~~SECRET~~

Since AJCES obviously broke off contact with the Service, it would stand to reason that the Intelligence Service would not have any particular trust in him. These are two points that our source makes in reference to the "CHLOPAK" case.

6. Furthermore, AJCES gave a rather feeble identification of "MIETEK." At first he stated that he did not know who MIETEK was since he met "MIETEK" on the street in Warsaw. Later, (Bureau memorandum of 10 April 1950) AJCES stated that "he felt that 'MIETEK' was an employee of Department II of the Polish Army General Staff."

7. Source of reference stated that "CHLOPAK opened a travel bureau in New York, using \$25,000 of O-II funds, and is currently prospering." In connection with this item, we are wondering whether AJCES' story about his coming to the United States to receive an inheritance from his aunt could possibly have been a cover story to explain his possession of any large sum in the event this had been eventually discovered. AJCES stated (Bureau's report of 26 August 1949) that he was asked by the American Consul "the nature and size of the estate he expects to inherit in the United States" but unfortunately the figure was not given.

8. At one point Source of reference states that the person he describes as "CHLOPAK" made a trip to Poland just before the arrest of General KOMAR. (According to our records, General KOMAR was arrested 7 November 1952.) In the interest of establishing whether AJCES is possibly identical with "CHLOPAK" we believe it would be worthwhile to ascertain whether AJCES ever left the United States at the time in question.

9. Our Source further stated that "CHLOPAK already had good contacts in the U.S." At the present time, we cannot see how this statement applies to AJCES unless this is a reference to his relatives.

10. However, concerning Source's statement that "CHLOPAK" had good contacts "in military circles" and that "O-II . . . are much more interested in his contacts than in him," the following will be of interest to the Bureau as concerns AJCES' contact with the Army.

11. On 29 April 1952, the Department of the Army wrote to the Chairman, Interagency Defector Committee, requesting that AJCES be considered as a candidate for permanent residence in the

~~SECRET~~

United States under provision of Public Law 110. In support of its request, the Army stated, among other things, that:

"AJCES was employed by G2 in a consultive capacity from 29 August 1949 to 1 April 1950. He was recalled to work by G2 in February 1952 on a high-priority project of considerable importance to the Department of the Army, which will last for some months. The Office, A.C. of S., G-2, Intelligence, has had a continuing interest in AJCES arising from the considerable amount of valuable information AJCES has furnished to G2, etc. With respect to this last point, AJCES is acquainted with numerous intelligence personnel in several U.S. intelligence agencies, also he now has a substantial insight into certain U.S. intelligence targets."

We also note that in the Immigration and Naturalization form requesting information on AJCES, dated May 18, 1950, a statement appeared thereon that "at present he is employed by the Government in the Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C."

12. Concerning Source's statement that "CHLOPAK" was "very well known to Colonel ZAGORSKI," this undoubtedly refers to Ludwig ZAGORSKI aka Leon WINTER. In this connection, we noted the following item in the Bureau's report entitled [redacted]

[redacted]

b3  
b7E

"On February 7, 1949 T-14 advised that Czeslaw GRZELAK, Vice President of the Gdynia-America Lines and at the same time under deportation proceedings by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, discussed with WINTER one 'Lazarz' who resided at 346 Hinsdale Street, Brooklyn, New York.

"It is to be noted that Lazarz AJCES was a Major in the Polish Army who defected. His address in the U.S. was given at 346 Hinsdale Street, Brooklyn, New York. According to T-34, Lazarz AJCES was being looked for by the Polish Military Intelligence."

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

13. In order to establish whether AJCES was ever a member of O-II, we feel it worthwhile to show [redacted] AJCES' photograph. If AJCES was an O-II staff officer [redacted] would be the one most

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

likely to know [redacted]  
[redacted] If the Bureau will furnish us with a  
photograph of AJCES we will show it to [redacted]

b7D

14. We would appreciate the Bureau's views on this matter.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

*J. Angleton*  
James Angleton

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

1 - Wallace



SAC, New York

1/22/60

b6  
b7C

Director, FBI

UNKNOWN SUBJECT, wa., Chlopak  
(ILLEGAL RESIDENT POLISH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AGENT)  
IS - FO

b3  
b7E

Enclosed for the New York and Washington  
Field Offices are one copy of paragraph a and b of  
attachment to CIA communication dated 1/6/60 and  
one copy of CIA communication dated 1/12/60 entitled  
"Lazarz Ajces aka Lejzor Ejces aka Leon Ajces."

As you will note from the enclosure, CIA  
believes Lazarz Ajces is possibly identical with the  
individual identified by the cover name "Chlopak."

The Bureau feels that CIA's reasoning should  
be considered, but does not believe that Ajces is the  
only possibility. For instance, Jack Bjoze in certain  
respects appears to be a more likely possibility. Other  
possibilities may come to mind after you consider the  
enclosed material and review your files.


The New York Office is being designated as  
office of origin and reports should be submitted under  
the instant caption until an identification has been  
made. For clarity and ease of administrative handling,  
information contained in reports requested in this case  
pertaining to each suspect should start on a separate  
page headed with the suspect's name. When a suspect  
is eliminated, a statement to that effect, including  
briefly the reasons therefor, should be set forth in  
the administrative pages of said report.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

Dr. Heinrich Schutze

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

YELLOW  
DUPLICATE  
JAN 23  
MAILED



New York will determine whether Ajces has  
been interested financially or otherwise in the operation  
of a travel agency in the United States since his arrival.

Enclosures (2)

- 2 - WFO (Enclosures - 2)
- HHW:pdspgrg (8)
- ① - 65-65192 (Schutze)
- 1 - 100-358661 (Ajces)

(See note page two)

~~SECRET~~

59 FEB 1 1960

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [ ] ADG

b6  
b7C

Letter to SAC, New York  
Re: ~~UNKNOWN SUBJECT~~, wa., Chlopak

[ ] should be contacted as this informant would possibly know of any connection Ajces might have had with any travel agency which also engaged in forwarding parcels to Poland.

[ ]

b7D

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

WFO will review passport and visa records of the State Department for information concerning travel by Ajces outside the United States since his arrival in 1943.

NOTE:

Schutzke, CIA's highly sensitive source, advised cover name "Chlopak" signifies an O-II agent who was a Jew and a Major of O-II. "Chlopak" was set up in the United States by General Komar, allegedly about 1948. Allegedly he had good contacts prior to that date in the United States. He opened a travel bureau in New York using \$25,000 O-II funds, which travel bureau is currently prospering. Before Komar's arrest in November 7, 1952, "Chlopak" was in Warsaw. He was warned of Komar's arrest and departed. Contact with O-II lost. O-II will attempt to reactivate to exploit his contacts. After contacts are eliminated, plan to eliminate "Chlopak" who was well-known to Winter. CIA suggests Lazarz Ajces as suspect for "Chlopak." Ajces has been interviewed by Bureau and has proved cooperative. He has recommended interview of Sandowski, former O-II agent who assisted him in coming from Poland. Stated Sandowski can furnish information of value regarding Polish intelligence. In response to Ajces' request, Schutzke's information should await Sandowski's interview. New York requested to check Ajces' employments. WFO asked to check State Department files. Back Ejoze suggested as possibility for

interview

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [ ] ADG

b6  
b7C

~~REC-14~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7E

SUBJECT: Polish Intelligence Activities Against  
the United States



FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

1 Attachment

J. Angleton  
James Angleton

Schutzge

UNRECORDED COPY FILED

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7E



100 - 92587 (AJCES)

65-65172-417

15 JAN 29 1960

REC-14

EX 100

~~SECRET~~

65-65172  
(100-92587)

*Rice/CIA  
1/7/60  
mud.*

*7/1/94  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 ac/asm  
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR  
C.A. # PP-101  
ENTIRE Doc  
CLASSIFIED BY  
C.A. Review  
of 2/19/94  
(THIS ARE  
ONLY WAS  
REMOVED)*

*Copy to [redacted] NY(3)  
by routing slip for  
 info  action  
date 1-13-60  
by [redacted]  
1-13-60  
62 FEB 4 1960  
1-13-60*

*Please copies in [redacted]*

*1 cc each [redacted]*



~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7c

Attachment to [redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

SUBJECT: Polish Intelligence Activities Against the U.S.

1. Source reported the following as of November 1959:

"a. There is an illegal resident agent of O-II (Polish Military Intelligence) in the U.S. whose O-II cover name is "CHLOPAK," true name unknown. He is a Jew and a Major of O-II. He was set up in the U.S. by the former Director of O-II, General Waclaw KOMAR. "CHLOPAK" was allegedly (not certain) sent there in 1948 to build up a military net. He already had good contacts in the U.S., including in military circles. He opened a travel bureau in New York, using \$25,000 in O-II funds, and is currently prospering. "CHLOPAK" was a personal friend of General KOMAR. As you know, KOMAR fell out of favor and was arrested (CIA note: circa 7 November 1952). One day before KOMAR's arrest, "CHLOPAK" was in Warsaw for an operational contact with KOMAR. He was warned after the arrest of KOMAR and immediately left Warsaw; otherwise he would have been arrested by the Military Counterintelligence Service.

172576  
172576  
P  
VOCAL TALKER  
SPECIAL AGENT

"b. Since then, contact with "CHLOPAK" has been broken off. During his last trip to the U.S., Col. Tadeusz JEDYNAK (CIA note: Deputy Chief of O-II) discussed the further use of "CHLOPAK" with Col. Mieczyslaw ROMAN (CIA note: Military Attache, Polish Legation, Ottawa, Canada. [redacted] dated 31 Aug 59). They will attempt to persuade "CHLOPAK" to do illegal work and will offer him the position of an illegal resident. If he declines, they will blackmail him and threaten him with a denunciation to you, and then employ him not as an illegal resident but as a principal agent, above all to exploit his contacts for the work of O-II. This operational plan was coordinated with SEROV (CIA note: Ivan SEROV, Chief of Soviet Military Intelligence), who promised operational support. They do not have any particular trust in "CHLOPAK", and are much more interested in his contacts than in him. As soon as O-II has approached these contacts, they apparently plan to attempt to eliminate "CHLOPAK" (murderous assault, poison, or something of the sort). In my opinion there is little likelihood that MONAT (CIA note: Pawel MONAT) knows the identity of "CHLOPAK." "CHLOPAK" was, however, very well known to the former O-II Col. ZAGORSKI (a Jew). (CIA note: Leon WINTER aka Ludwig ZAGORSKI, who is well known to the Bureau). In any event I will take pains to learn the identity of "CHLOPAK," or to learn of further steps by O-II.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

France P. [unclear]  
Intell. [unclear]  
Agency [unclear]

"c. JEDYNAK's trip to the U.S. was also connected with the activation of another illegal resident in the U.S., but there are presently difficulties in working on the matter further. At present I lack even clues.

65-65192-47  
ENCLOSURE  
~~SECRET~~

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

"d. As already reported [redacted] dated 31 Aug 59), JEDYNAK, during his U.S. trip, met an agent who is active in naval intelligence (Source actually says "military naval IS"). I have been able to learn the following data: this man is an officer of the AIS (American Intelligence Service), around 50 years of age, of Polish descent. He was recruited by the RIS (Russian Intelligence Service) during the great WIN "game" (fictitious underground organization in Poland) and was at that time well known to Col. SAPIECHA. He is now working in the U.S. He was recruited by the RIS ca. 1950 during a stay in Europe and was later transferred to O-II because of his national feelings against Russians. For security reasons this agent was put on ice for three years. Please accept this information as tentative. I will work on the case further, perhaps with more success, when the present atmosphere becomes relaxed. This agent is run directly by O-II.

"e. Three years ago the RIS had an excellent agent in the Department of State who sat very close to security questions (Section SY) [redacted] [redacted] I don't know what has happened to this agent. His identity is unknown. My information on this case does not come from fantasy, and in time the matter will be clarified.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

"f. Because of the MONAT case, the entire intelligence service activity on the part of the Poles and Czechs has been stopped, with small exceptions. (CIA note: Source apparently means activity in the U.S., not all over the world.) The departure of the new U.S. resident Major Tadeusz GIBOR (CIA note: [redacted] dated 20 Nov 59), was postponed in order to see how the situation in the U.S. develops. It is possible that the interested IS (intelligence service) chiefs of the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia will meet after the New Year to analyze the situation and undertake further steps. The case of MONAT has occasioned great unrest in Department I of the UB (CIA note: Foreign Intelligence Department of the Polish Security Service) but because of the various Jews still occupied there (CIA note: presumably source means in Department I). Department II of the UB (Counterintelligence Department) has been very compartmented. In spite of the critical situation of O-II and Department I in the U.S., the Russians (Col. WLADYKIN, KGB Soviet advisor in Warsaw) have strongly urged that the [redacted] case be developed further, but with great caution.

"g. [redacted] sent Wladyslaw KRAWCZYK important technical information along with the protocols of official meetings. This information was found very interesting by the KGB. So it can be seen that this double agent case is developing in a fruitful manner. It is very important that the case not be spoiled by any careless operating on your part. Because of the critical situation in the U.S., the KGB is taking great pains in arranging a meeting between NANYS (CIA note: Jan NANYS, Economic Counselor, Polish Embassy, Washington) and [redacted] has already been notified of this meeting by KRAWCZYK. The purpose of the meeting is to give [redacted] provisional assignments and not to lose contact with him. It is very important on the occasion of the meeting between NANYS and [redacted] that NANYS not be disquieted by surveillance in order that the case will continue to appear clean. (CIA comment: presumably clean to the

b7D

~~SECRET~~

to the KGB). I consider it very important to develop this case properly so that in time you will achieve success. For that, however, you need perseverance, a plan, caution, and a thorough analysis of steps. (CIA comment: In view of the great emphasis that Source places on the delicate development of the [ ] case, we wish to urge that any surveillance of NANYS undertaken by the Bureau in connection with his projected meeting with [ ] in no way deviate from your normal pattern of attention to NANYS' movements.)

b7D

"h. NANYS reported in November through resident Antoni CZAJER that he has contact with Col. KOBYLINSKI, a former officer of the Polish 2nd Department ("DWOJKA") (CIA note: pre-Communist Polish Intelligence) who is now sitting in some veteran's organization. KOBYLINSKI offered to sell NANYS an "espionage organization" in Silesia, Poland. KOBYLINSKI himself at one time directed IS activity in this area. This contact is interpreted by Department I of the UB (Lt. Col. JASTRZEBSKI) as an approach to NANYS on the part of your service. To be sure, if this were the case, such a scheme is too crude and absolutely would not succeed. Department I, however, does suspect that you are developing NANYS, which naturally could have a negative effect on the [ ] case. The development of NANYS must be carried out very cautiously and intelligently through other sources. Such types as KOBYLINSKI are naturally completely unuseable for a double agent operation. It is possible that the meeting between [ ] and NANYS will not be carried out now because of security reasons, and NANYS will unquestionably inform [ ] of the postponed contact under some pretext. This case is being directed personally by Zbigniew DYBALA in conjunction with the KGB representative in Warsaw, Col. WLADYKIN.

b7D

"i. In regard to [ ] in my opinion you should prepare [ ] a double agent case, but under no circumstances [ ] is stationed at the American Embassy in Poland. (CIA note: Source is apparently not aware that [ ] has left Poland.) In order that the matter is completely clear, [ ] has no idea [ ] been spotted for collaboration with Department II of the UB. According to my investigation, [ ] up to now is absolutely in the clear as far as loyalty to the U.S. is concerned. [ ] further developed by Department II in this respect." (CIA comment: We understand Source to mean here that the PIS has not abandoned its plans to recruit [ ] eventually.)

b7D

2. In addition to the above information the source added the following remarks of a general nature: "I beg you to present this letter to the Director at least in abbreviated form. I also want to know to what extent he is kept informed about my work. If you don't do it, Mr. Case Officer, I'll find ways to complain through other means to your Director... I wish you, Mr. Director E. HOOVER, the best, a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year. I also hope that in the new year our collaboration will unfold even better for the security of the free world and humanity. I take the liberty also on the occasion of the 50th

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

anniversary of your service to send best wishes for much success in the fight against the red inhumanity. I take the liberty to tell you that because of this occasion I have undertaken a special endeavor which I have already finished. I am sorry that for technical reasons I cannot send it to you this year. It concerns a CE analysis of the enormous IS game on the basis of the WIN organization, which at one time was personally directed by STALIN. I hope, although this treatment places the accent principally on the problems of method, that you will find there also many operational problems, such as recruitment and penetration by the Soviet IS of the AIS (American Intelligence Service). I will take pains in the near future to forward this treatment, which is rather bulky. I hope thereby to contribute a little brick for the strengthening of your service."

-4-  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 08-13-2020 BY [ ] ADG b6  
b7C

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7E

SUBJECT: [ ]

[ ]

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

James Angleton

[ ]

65-65142  
**NOT RECORDED**  
199 JAN 25 1960

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. McDermott

SAC, New York

January 22, 1960

Director, FBI

65-65192-

[redacted]

b3  
b7E

Reference is made to CIA letter classified "Secret" dated 1/6/60, copies of which were furnished receiving offices on 1/13/60 captioned "Polish Intelligence Activities Against the United States," which referred on page 3 to a [redacted] who, according to "Dr. Heinrich Schutze," has been in touch with Jan Nanyas of the Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C., on a matter of interest to the UB.

b3  
b7E

By letter dated 1/12/60 classified "Secret," CIA advised as follows:

[Large redacted block]

b3  
b7E  
ORIGINAL COPY FILE

New York initiate inquiry to identify the subject. WFO thoroughly review its investigative file on Jan Nanyas in an attempt to identify the subject. An additional copy of this letter is being furnished each office for [redacted]

b3  
b7E

3 - WFO

① - 65-65192 (Schutze)  
1 - [redacted]

~~NOT RECORDED~~  
YELLOW 199 JAN 25 1960  
DUPLICATE  
JAN 22  
MAILED

b3  
b7E

JJMcD:gmh (10)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

51 FEB 1 1960

36

Letter to SAC, New York

Re: [REDACTED]

b3  
b7E

NOTE: Referenced CIA letter forwarded information originating with "Dr. Heinrich Schutze" to the effect that Nany's had been in touch with [REDACTED] a former officer of the Polish Second Department (presumably O-II) who offered to sell Nany's "an espionage organization" in Silesia, Poland. "Schutze" states that the Poles suspect that [REDACTED] is a plant of American Intelligence.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [ ] ADG

Tolson	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Belmont	_____
Callahan	_____ b6
DeLoach	_____ b7C
Malone	_____
McGuire	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. F. A. Frohbose

DATE: February 1, 1960

FROM : S. J. Papich

1-Brannigan  
1-McDermott  
1-Liaison  
1-Papich

SUBJECT: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
INTERNAL SECURITY - POLAND  
(BUFILE: 65-65192)

*Brannigan*

As you know, over an extended period of time we have been receiving considerable information concerning alleged Polish intelligence activities, from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who in turn has been the recipient of the information from an individual using the pseudonym of Heinrich Schutze. Information furnished by Schutze has necessitated action by the Bureau, CIA and certain other agencies. It has been speculated as to whether or not Schutze is actually a Soviet or Polish intelligence plant, involved in a deception-operation directed against the U.S.

On January 29, 1960, James Angleton, CIA, asked the Liaison Agent if the Bureau would furnish CIA an evaluation of the information received by the Bureau and originating with Schutze. Angleton was specifically referring to that information which has suggested leads in the U.S. In this connection we have initiated some investigation on a selective basis.

ACTION:

The above information and Angleton's request are being directed to the attention of the Espionage Section. The reply to CIA should be transmitted via Liaison channels.

SJP:sal (5)

*sal*

**EX-130**

REC-59 65-65192-48

7 FEB 15 1960

*65-65192*

*R 27*

57 FEB 17 1960

*5- [Signature]*



~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted]

ADG b6  
b7C

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RECEIVED FROM  
FEB 4 1960  
CIA SIP

REC-91

*Handwritten notes and signatures*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Polish Intelligence Activities in  
the United States

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b3  
b7E

2. To enable us to arrive at an evaluation of this Source in the immediate future, it would be appreciated if the Bureau would prepare at least a partial evaluation of the information listed below by 12 February. A complete evaluation of each item of information would also be appreciated as soon as convenient.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

a. [redacted] There has been no direct correspondence on this case between this Agency and the Bureau. It is our understanding that [redacted] information on this subject, which this Agency passed to the Department of the Army, has been made available by the Army to the Bureau. It is also our understanding that the subject is at present resident in the United States and is no longer a Department of the Army employee. Any evaluation which can be made at this time [redacted] serious allegations against the subject would be very helpful in our assessment of this source.

b3  
b7E  
b1 Per  
b3 CIA

REC-91 65-65192-49

b7D

b3  
b7E

FEB 15 1960

64 FEB 19 1960

65-65192 (6-17-60)

5-0710

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

b3  
b7E

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

e. "CHLOPAK." FBI Memorandum dated 22 Jan 60, Subject: Unidentified Subject with alias "CHLOPAK."

~~X~~

f. Witold KOCAY. Our [Redacted] dated 26 Jan 60.

b3  
b7E

g. fru KOBYLINSKI. [Redacted] dated 12 Jan 60.

~~X~~

[Redacted]

~~X~~

i. [Redacted] dated 4 Dec 59. (Note that this memorandum specifically requested that the Bureau take no action on this case, but it may be that information had been developed previously on her.)

~~X~~ b7D

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

4. Various miscellaneous information [Redacted] has been sent to you in addition to information about the above specific cases. The reports listed below included varying amounts of this miscellaneous information. It would be appreciated if the Bureau could also prepare an early evaluation of the information in these reports, especially about unnamed individuals who [Redacted] alleges are Polish agents in the United States, such as the three unnamed American agents of Tadeusz ZIOLKOWSKI of the Polish Embassy in Mexico.

~~X~~

[Redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

*J. Angleton*  
James Angleton

[Redacted]

~~X~~

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6  
b7C

RECEIVED FROM  
FEB 9 1960  
CIA SIP

*McGinnis*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Polish Intelligence Activities Against  
the United States

1. Reference is made to this Agency's [redacted] of  
6 January 1960, subject as above.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

2. Attached herewith are translated portions of a report  
recently received from the Source of referenced report. [redacted]

3. The Consul MICHEJDA mentioned [redacted] is undoubtedly  
identical with Andrzej MICHEJDA, born 9 February 1918, Vice Consul,  
Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C., who is well known to you. A

5. We should appreciate receiving an evaluation of the  
attached information at your earliest convenience.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

EX 109

REC-10

65-65112 50 b3  
b7E

FEB 17 1960

James Angleton

CONSOLIDATION:

1 Attachment

Place copies in:

[redacted]

(S)  
[redacted]

ENCLOSURE

52 FEB 23 1960

UNRECORDED  
FILED IN

~~SECRET~~

Attachment to  X

SUBJECT: Polish Intelligence Activities Against the U.S.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

Source reports the following as of December 1959:

"1. Your special operation against the wife of Resident CZAJER caused great excitement in Department I of MSW (Foreign Intelligence Department of the Polish Ministry of Interior). It may be that this is a fragment of a more complex plan. If, however, the entire plan consists of this operation, I must tell you that I am not exactly impressed. What you expected from a dim-witted woman is not clear to me. Perhaps you hoped that she, like the wife of the defector PIETROW was also a member of the IS? You could have learned that without further ado from me. You could also have learned who "ANDRZEJ" is. The cover name of NANYS (CIA note: Jan NANYS, Economic Counselor, Polish Embassy, Washington) is "ANDRZEJ." Consul MICHEJDA, about whom your officers asked, is a collaborator of O-II (CIA note: Polish Military Intelligence Service). Mrs. CZAJER really didn't have the faintest idea about any intelligence people in Berlin.

"2. Because of this episode, a somewhat unfavorable political tone has entered the Polish scene, and above all in the PIS (CIA note: Polish Intelligence Service). This is in contrast to the climate in recent years, in which the Poles felt friendly to Americans; the PIS looked upon them as opponents, certainly, but without exaggerated ideas of their imperialism. This state of mind naturally annoyed the KGB very much. Today our KGB brothers are naturally laughing with malicious joy and are making propaganda material out of the CZAJER case. CZAJER has, of course, many friends in Departments I and II of the MSW who are sorry for him and his wife and who are preparing a war of revenge against you. They know, to be sure, that for political and economic reasons the Central Committee of the Communist Party will not accept any measures against U.S. diplomats, but they plan within the framework of various double agent operations against AIS (CIA note: American Intelligence Service) offices to pay you back properly and sufficiently for this operation.

"3. The director of Section 1, Department II, MSW, 1st Lt. (CIA note: we believe Lt. Col. is meant here instead of 1st Lt.) WYPARLO, has already worked out a plan to blow up one of the AIS offices in West Germany in the near future. This Section has been working for a long time with an agent who is known as an AIS double agent. It is planned through this agent to simulate a "contact man" and with his help to smuggle radio sets to the West. An explosive charge is supposed to be built into the second radio set. They figure that these shipments will be opened for inspection by the AIS, and thus on the second occasion the pertinent office will fly in the air. They are just checking whether it really is a U.S. office, so that they don't make a mistake. It is not clear whether it isn't the English Intelligence Service. The AIS office allegedly is in Hamburg and the "game" is being carried on through an agent who is a seaman.

"4. The chief of the AIS office in Berlin (uncertain) at Manteuffelstr. 31 or 41 is supposed to be kidnapped. An agent of Section 1, Department I, MSW, named WACHOWSKI (WACHOWICZ or something similar) works in this office. This man is supposed to help in this operation. Allegedly this agent has a sister

~~SECRET~~  
ENCLOSURE

65-65192-50

~~SECRET~~

or relative in Posen who works for the AIS, but in reality is a double agent of Department II, MSW.

"5. Please protect Col. MONAT, especially at a possible press conference. As far as is known, the KGB plans to liquidate MONAT during a press conference through a photo reporter with the aid of a pneumatic poison pistol, which is supposed to be camouflaged in a camera. Iced drops of poison are shot from such a pistol. The target notices nothing except a little prick. No traces remain either. Death follows after 2-3 days. This is naturally one of many variations which have been thought out by the KGB. Until now they haven't made any firm decision, above all because they don't have exact information about the location of Col. MONAT. This information should be evaluated with great caution. It is strange that DYBALA (CIA note: Zbigniew DYBALA, Deputy Chief, Department I, MSW) is already informed that various Jews in the U.S. know about the planned trial in absentia planned against MONAT. It could naturally have become known through other channels besides your service, because this affair has become rather well known in recent weeks. For the sake of order, however, I am alerting you. I hope that members of your service do not make topics for private conversation out of my information. I also hope that you will keep your promise to keep to a minimum the circle of persons in your service who know about my activity."

~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7C

A. H. Belmont

3/4/60

W. A. Branigan

- 1 - A. H. Belmont
- 1 - W. A. Branigan
- 1 - F. H. Fields
- 1 - J. J. McDermott

b7D  
b3  
b7E

[redacted]

[redacted]

is

reportedly of interest to both Polish and Soviet intelligence services. Because of his past association with Air Technical Intelligence Center (ATIC) of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base which sponsored his travel to Poland in September, 1959, it is necessary to learn from the Office of Special Investigations, Air Force, (OSI) his past and present relationship with ATIC.

Investigation initiated in August, 1959, on information received from "Dr. Heinrich Schütze" (pseudonym for unidentified and unevaluated source with high-level access to Polish and/or Soviet intelligence services who has furnished startlingly accurate information to CIA abroad) to the effect that [redacted] who was scheduled to attend an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conference in Warsaw in September, 1959, was a recruitment target of Polish and Soviet intelligence services. It was learned that [redacted] travel to the conference was being sponsored by ATIC which desired [redacted] to obtain positive intelligence in Warsaw. As a result, a meeting at OSI attended by CIA and F. H. Fields and J. J. McDermott of Liaison and Espionage Sections was held on 8/31/59, at which time the sensitive information concerning [redacted] was discussed and OSI was informed that the Bureau was interested in exploring [redacted]

b7D  
ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN  
b7D

[redacted] was interviewed before and after his travel to Poland where he was propositioned to act as a "paid consultant" for the Poles on atomic energy. Subsequent reports from "Schütze" on later developments, including contact by Jan Janus of the Polish Embassy, were confirmed by [redacted]. Also, [redacted] has furnished data concerning Polish interest in an unnamed U. S. scientist who attended the IAEA conference who is undoubtedly identical with [redacted]

[redacted] admittedly is reluctant to "become involved" with the Poles for fear of adverse effect on his professional future. While he has promised New York to promptly report all contacts and developments, New York has had to prod him. He did not promptly report a 2/15/60 contact by Hanys nor did he volunteer details concerning a letter and unclassified scientific material he mailed to Poland of which we learned from "Schütze." [redacted] attitude may be caused by some sense of obligation to the Air Force.

b3  
b7E

NOT RECORDED  
167 APR 21 1960  
MAR - 8 1960

Enc. [redacted]

1 - 65-65192 ("Schütze")

JLH:dprg  
(6) APR 25 1960

Memo Branigan to Belmont

Re: [REDACTED]

Bufile [REDACTED]

b3  
b7E

ACTION:

Attached for approval is a letter to OSI calculated to determine [REDACTED] current relationship with the Air Force and to what extent he has been used operationally by the Air Force and details of such operation. It also requests OSI to notify the Bureau in advance of any planned use of [REDACTED] by Air Force. When OSI response is received, we will be in a better position to "talk turkey" with [REDACTED]. Appropriate instructions will then be forwarded to New York.

b7D

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6  
b7C

FBI

Date: 2/26/60

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plain text or code)

b3  
b7D  
b7E

Via AIRTEL \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]  
FROM : SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]  
SUBJECT: [redacted]  
(OO:NEW YORK)

ReNYlet to Bureau dated 2/3/60; WFO airtel to Bureau dated 2/17/60, entitled "JAN NANYS; IS - PO", and NY airtel to Bureau dated 2/19/60.

Due to [redacted] association with the Poles, from information provided by him and as [redacted] [redacted] the NYO has changed the classification of instant case from [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

- 3 - Bureau [redacted] (RM)
- 1 - Chicago [redacted] (Info) (RM)
- 2 - Washington Field (RM)
- (1 - [redacted])
- (1 - [redacted])
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]

TBQ:llr  
(12)

65-65172 -  
**NOT RECORDED**  
167 APR 21 1960

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

b3  
b7D  
b7E

60 APR 25 1960



OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : MR. F. A. FROHOSE *7*

DATE: 2-20-60

FROM : S. J. PAPICH *SJP*

1-Branigan  
1-McDemott  
1-Liaison  
1-Papich

SUBJECT: [redacted]

Tolson	_____
Walters	_____
Parsons	_____
Belmont	_____
Callahan	_____
DeLoach	_____
Malone	_____
McGuire	_____
Rosen	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7E

*C*

*SJP*

[Large redacted area]

(5)

SJP/nmp  
(5)

*1-65-65192-*

NOT RECORDED  
16 MAR 8 1960

18 MAR 2 1960

*Handwritten signatures and notes*

~~SECRET~~

Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

NOTE: continued:

CIA is attempting to arrive at an evaluation of this source in the immediate future and, therefore, requested the Bureau to prepare an evaluation of certain of the information previously furnished to the Bureau and on which we have taken investigative action. Instant classified "~~Secret~~" since it discusses the contents of referenced communications which were so classified.

- 8 -


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

7. The above information is from a highly sensitive source and should not be further disseminated outside your organization. In order to protect the Source, it is requested that no action be taken on this information without the express approval of this Agency.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

*J. Angleton*  
James Angleton



~~X~~

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted]

ADG b6  
b7c

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

RECEIVED 10:00  
10/1/60  
GA SP

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: [redacted] Definition of Recruitment

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

*[Handwritten signature]*

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 12 February 1960,  
Subject: [redacted] In this memorandum  
you raised the question of exactly what [redacted] means by recruit-  
ment.

2. An official Polish definition of recruitment is as follows:

"By the term 'recruitment' is understood a process by  
which a specified person is drawn into clandestine collabora-  
tion with the Public Security Authorities (UB), a process  
which is executed and documented in a prescribed manner by  
an operational worker."

In a detailed discussion of the process of recruitment, an official  
UB document states: "On receiving from a candidate his agreement to  
collaborate, the operational worker should as a rule obtain from him  
a written undertaking. The undertaking is a document in which the  
recruited person promises to collaborate honestly with the Security  
Authorities, to carry out conscientiously instructions given him and  
to keep secret the fact of his contact with the Authorities." A  
pseudonym is also assigned to the agent at the time of recruitment,  
and the newly recruited agent signs the undertaking in true name and  
in pseudonym. Exceptions are permitted in the requirement of an  
undertaking when, in the operational officer's opinion, the loyalty  
of the agent is unquestioned, or when the fact of requesting such a  
statement might have a detrimental psychological effect on the agent.

3. The above is presumably the official Polish definition of  
"recruitment." However, the actual working definition is harder to  
pin down, as we have discovered that different individuals view the  
matter differently. In some cases, the UB appears to consider that  
a recruitment has been consummated when the production of intelli-  
gence has started, whether or not the agent is witting of his agent

HEINRICH SCHUTZE

REC-97

65-65192 (S. 1720)  
65-65192-54

20 MAR 23 1960

EX-101  
~~SECRET~~

59 MAR 28 1960

5-100

~~SECRET~~

role. We cannot further elucidate on what [redacted] may mean by the term, since he himself may mean different things quite inadvertently. If he receives his information from UB staff officers, he is accepting these sources' separate definitions of "recruitment," so one is faced with the problem of what "recruitment" means to each Polish Intelligence Service officer from whom [redacted] receives information.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

4. The above information is from a highly sensitive source and should not be further disseminated outside your organization. In order to protect the Source, it is requested that no action be taken on this information without the express approval of this Agency.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

*J. Angleton*

James Angleton

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG b6  
b7C

SEARCHED  
SERIALIZED  
INDEXED  
GA SP

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

~~REC-47~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: [redacted] X

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7E

*File immediately*

1. Reference is made to our [redacted] subject:  
[redacted]

2. There follows another portion of the [redacted] report  
quoted in reference which may be of interest to you:

" "BETA". For more than 10 years a residentura in East Berlin, directed by Michael ALBERMANN, who is well-known to the police in West Berlin, has been working against the West and above all against the US. He has meanwhile used the name Michael WISCHNIENSKI. Most recently he is called Michael BERLACH. He has a company which deals with trade representation (Handelsvertretungen) for the DDR. In reality this is a cover for IS and CE work. "BETA" is run by the SSD and in addition by an IS Section of the Soviets - Karlshorst. His direct superior is the CE Colonel FRUCK - SSD Berlin. His business partner and representative is a French Jew, SIMON (or SIMONS). At one time "BETA" was actively engaged in kidnapping from West Berlin and West Germany for the Soviet service (SU-Ast). He runs agents, takes care of the illegal financing of illegal residents in the West, spots agents for the SSD and the RIS, for cover does various business. His "office" is in Berlin Weisensee - Parkstarasse (translator's note: Parkstrasse ?) 37 - 2nd floor (I Stock) - 54 59. "BETA" has enormous contacts and connections in the West. His work is carried out almost exclusively by means of Jews (auf Basis der Juden). He has trade representatives in Vienna, Switzerland, Brussels, Holland, London, Paris ?, Madrid, USA, South America. One of his representatives in London is a steel businessman, STACH, a Czech Jew who built his company with the support of "BETA", i.e., the SSD. Through his "representative" in Geneva - a certain MORRIS, could also have another name, who allegedly is an illegal worker of the RIS office in Moscow - he actively developed

*(ins. of personal hearing, new)*  
*Fluents in.*

①

65-65192-53

MAR 23 1960

65-65192 (S-1200)

*HEINRIH, BUTLE*

*504*  
MAR 23 1960

~~SECRET~~

5-770

~~SECRET~~

12/1

B-2

a year ago the following US citizens in Switzerland: Robert LINDSEY, active in the UN office in Geneva; John GEYER, allegedly FBI collaborator in Geneva and Gerald GROSS, Director of the Telecommunications Union in Geneva, brother of a US admiral (translator's note: Could also read "John GEYER...FBI collaborator in Geneva and Chief Director of the Telecommunications Union.") These people among others were being developed by the Soviet CE agent from Warsaw, Janusz ZABLOTZKI, who two years ago was officially active in CERN (sic) and had good contact with these Americans. "BETA," however, needs to have more exact investigation. It is important that "BETA" has recruited for the RIS a former CIC Colonel. Jack SANDERS, currently residing in Paris, B-2 1/17 steel businessman, ca. 40 years old, medium size, dark, Jewish. Until 1949 he was allegedly a secretary to Robert MURPHY in West Berlin. He was a CIC Colonel during the war and landed with the Americans in Africa. Lived previously in the US. This man was developed for 12 years by the RIS, and recruited for the RIS with the help of "BETA," with whom SANDERS was friendly. Perhaps SANDERS formerly had another name, as is customary with Jews. He is supposed to have supplied very important and interesting political and intelligence information. The work is continuing, the Soviet main office (Hauptleitstelle) in Karlshorst values this man very highly. He is said to have very good (reich) contacts among Americans. SANDERS is a rich man and he gets a lot of business (grosse Geschaefte) in indirect ways from the Soviet Union and the DDR, which enables him to earn much money. This is indeed one of the methods employed with Soviet contacts who are rich. If I should have the possibility I will be able to investigate "BETA" further through my contacts (sic)."

3. This Agency is investigating the allegations [redacted] and will advise the Bureau as pertinent information is developed. To date, although we have ascertained that the individuals have business and social contact with bloc persons by nature of their mutual participation in international telecommunications organizations, we have not established that there have been as yet any actual RIS recruitment overtures toward the U.S. citizens. We have not yet identified LIBERMANN's "representative" in Geneva, fnu MORRIS. We have a record of a Janusz ZABLOCKI, [redacted] Warsaw, who traveled as a Polish official to Switzerland in 1957 and who had previous record of official travel to Geneva and to Paris. We have no information on his alleged contacts with Americans, however.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

b6  
b7c

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



5. The above information is from a highly sensitive source and should not be further disseminated outside your organization. In order to protect the Source, it is requested that no action be taken on this information without the express approval of this Agency.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

*J. Angleton*

James Angleton



~~SECRET~~



- Mr. McDermott

b6  
b7C

SAC, Memphis [redacted]

March 16, 1960

Director, FBI [redacted]

b3  
b7E

MATTHEW LEON ASCIK  
ESPIONAGE - FO

Rerep Special Agent Francis W. Morwood 2-29-60  
at Memphis.

Under lead for Chicago it was stated that "Heinrich Schutze" is believed to be the original source of information to the effect that subject was selected as a target for development by the Poles. This is erroneous.

Instant investigation was initiated upon receipt of information from CIA on 7-9-58 originating with an unnamed source in Europe described by CIA as highly reliable and sensitive. Information concerning "Anselm" was furnished by CIA on 8-27-58 and originated with the source later designated as [redacted]. It was not until 3-19-59 that CIA furnished information received from "Schutze" on 3-13-59 to the effect that (EIU) Ascik, "born 1910, technical director of a Pittsburgh, USA steel concern," was of intelligence interest to the Poles.

b7D

Bulet to Buffalo 12-18-59 with copies to Chicago, Memphis, and WFO instructed Chicago to interview [redacted] exhibiting photographs of Ascik, in an attempt to confirm that Ascik is identical with "Anselm." While the Bureau realizes that Chicago may have difficulty scheduling access to this informant, and that there are numerous leads outstanding to interview the informant on a wide variety of topics, the Bureau desires this matter to be handled at the earliest opportunity.

b7D

The lead for Chicago as stated in rerep should be disregarded inasmuch as Chicago is in no position to obtain information from "Heinrich Schutze."

- 2 - Chicago [redacted]
- 1 - Albany [redacted]
- 1 - Buffalo [redacted]
- 1 - Louisville [redacted]

b3  
b7E

① - 65-65192 (Schutze)

JJMcd:sah  
(10)

65-65192 -  
NOT RECORDED  
128 MAR 17 1960

51 MAR 17 1960

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [ ] AUC

1-Mr. Vizas  
1-Mr. Papich  
1-Mr. McDermott

b6  
b7C

65-65192

55

VIA LIAISON

REC-14

Date: March 24, 1960  
To: Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Attention: Mr. James Angleton  
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Subject: [ ]  
[ ]

*Handwritten notes and signatures*

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

Reference is made to your [ ] dated March 15, 1960.

b3  
b7E

Pursuant to your inquiry concerning the impact which the defections of Pawel Monat and Frantisek Tisler have had on Polish and Czech intelligence activity in the United States, the following has been noted:

[ ]

Polish Military Intelligence (O-II) is not known to have attempted agent-running operations in the United States directed by legal residenturas in recent years. This has been confirmed by Monat. His defection has not, therefore, resulted in any change in this sphere of activity. Overt intelligence collection practices by O-II staff officers attached to the Office of the Polish Military, Naval and Air Attache, Washington, D.C., continue to be substantial and have not noticeably decreased following Monat's defection. The plans of Tadeusz Jedynak, Deputy Chief of O-II, to reinstitute illegal agent activity in the United States may have been affected by Monat's defection since no implementation of such plans has come to our attention.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

MAILED 30  
MAR 24 1960  
COMM-FBI

Agent-running activity in the United States by identified staff officers of the Polish Security Service (UB) under legal cover is believed to have been carried

- 1 - Chicago (Enc. 2) See note page 4.
- 1 - New York (Enc. 2) See note page 4.
- 1 - WFO (Enc. 2) See note page 4.

JJMcD:skw (9)

~~SECRET~~

SEE NOTE PAGE 4.

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Malone \_\_\_\_\_
- McGuire \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Ingram \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

APR 1 1960

~~SECRET~~

Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7E

out only on a very selective basis for some time even prior to Monat's defection. [redacted]

[redacted] statement that, "with a few minor exceptions," Polish intelligence activity in the United States has been suspended until further notice appears somewhat inconsistent with his own prior report of contacts by Jan Nanys with [redacted] on behalf of the UB and the Soviet KGB. Certainly, the [redacted] operation is not considered "minor" by the Poles and the Soviets if [redacted] earlier reports are to be given credence.

b7D

Czech agent operations in the United States were noticeably influenced by the defection of Tisler. All Czech operational activity abruptly halted with his defection. The Czech military service agent operations continue to be dormant as far as contacts by staff officers with legal cover are concerned. However, approximately two months after Tisler's defection, some Czech civilian intelligence service representatives renewed contacts with sources on a selective basis. Some such sources were assured that Tisler did not know of their existence. These contacts have been less frequent than prior to Tisler's defection, and more rigid security safeguards are being observed.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

With regard to [redacted] statement to the effect that the meeting between Nanys and [redacted] did not take place because of "heavy surveillance" activity, it should be noted that the two did meet on February 15, 1960. Since the date of [redacted] report is unknown to us, we are unable to determine whether this apparent inconsistency holds any significance on the question of his reliability. It has been our experience, however, that Polish and other

b7D

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

Soviet-bloc officials in the United States frequently mention that they have been subjected to physical surveillances where none have been maintained. It is conceivable that these imagined surveillances are used by individual Soviet-bloc officials as a "crutch" to explain inability to perform intelligence missions in a timely manner. Our surveillance coverage of Nany's has been mainly confined to occasional, brief periods of observation. He has not been the object of sustained coverage.

It is interesting to observe that, after prompting [redacted] on February 15, 1960, to deliver some scientific material to him at the Polish booth of the International Trade Fair in New York City on either March 13 or 14, 1960, Nany's arranged to travel to Poland on March 3, 1960, and is not expected to return until May 5, 1960.

b7D

Concerning [redacted] assertion that Lieutenant Colonel Jastrzebski, Chief of Section 2, Department I (Foreign Intelligence) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, corresponds with a brother in Cleveland, Ohio, who recently married a Polish girl named [redacted] the following has been noted:

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[redacted] Lodz, Poland, arrived in the United States on October 22, 1958, to visit [redacted] Mrs. Henrietta Markowski, 3620 East 113th Street, Cleveland, Ohio. She contemplated returning to Poland in April, 1959. In applying to the American Embassy, Warsaw, Poland, for a visa, she indicated her occupation as bookkeeper; furnished her residence as [redacted]

b3  
b7E

[redacted] as  
Alicja Wacławska of Lodz.

In September, 1959, the Immigration and Naturalization Service at Cleveland submitted a request for information concerning [redacted] in connection with a petition for an adjustment of her status (presumably to that of permanent resident alien). She was then identified as [redacted] who was said to have been born in Siberia on [redacted]. We plan to inquire into the background of [redacted].

- 3 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

NOTE FOR SAC's, CHICAGO, NEW YORK AND WFO:

Enclosed is a copy of referenced CIA letter with a copy of its enclosure. Contents should not be included in documents intended for dissemination but, where appropriate, should be placed in cover pages of reports on individual subjects. [REDACTED]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

NOTE:

In his latest report to CIA, "Schutze" stated, among other things, that Polish and Czech intelligence services, with minor exceptions, suspended U.S. operations following defections of Monat and Tisler. Classified "~~Secret~~" since it repeats contents of referenced CIA letter which was so classified.

- 4 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

RECEIVED FROM  
[redacted]  
CIA SIP

REC-14

12 1969

*Handwritten signature*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

SUBJECT: [redacted]

Reliability not established *MD*

1. Attached herewith is a translation of portions of a report recently received from Subject.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[redacted]

3. You will note that Source mentions for a second time virtually complete cessation of Polish and Czech intelligence activity in the U.S. (see paragraph 5 of attached). We should appreciate whatever evidence you have which would either confirm or refute this assertion.

b3  
b7E

4. The above information is from a highly sensitive source and should not be further disseminated outside your organization. In order to protect the Source, it is requested that no action be taken on this information without the express approval of this Agency.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

*J. Angleton*  
James Angleton

1 Attachment

[redacted]

REC-14

65-65192-55

Place copies in: 100-350264 (Pa. Intell. Activities in U.S.)

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[redacted]

4 MAR 25 1969

UNRECORDED  
b3  
b7E

ORIG: 65-65192(5-1217)

~~SECRET~~

5- *Handwritten signature*

*Let Cost  
1-06 NY440F03 Enc-2  
CAC file 4 for the case  
3-24-69  
W. H. [redacted]*

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY   ADG

b6  
b7c

1. "The general security situation has become steadily more acute. Because of the defection of the Czech attache (TISLER); the head of the Czech Military Intelligence Service, General V. PACZEK, is being replaced. Moreover, special security measures are being introduced within the secret service apparatus."

2. "In early January 1960, a trial of MONAT was carried out in the District Military Court in Warsaw as a result of which MONAT was condemned to death for desertion and high treason. In the immediate future, his relative, who a short time ago was the Polish Consul in Prague (CIA NOTE: Ludwig WINIARSKI, relative of MONAT's wife) and who had served as a witness before the military court, will be arrested himself and brought before the military court. Because of great pressure from ZAMBROWSKI (CIA NOTE: Roman ZAMBROWSKI, member of the Polish Politburo), who remarkably enough, was supported on the quiet by Alexander ZAWADSKI, the announcement of the trial of MONAT has not yet taken place. They wanted to avoid an anti-semitic wave. The KGB unexpectedly approved this with the assertion that it would be even better if the matter were publicized after the execution of the sentence. The KGB has fully taken over the task of liquidating MONAT and has set various methods in motion."

3. "The case against Jerzy BRYN is being prepared zealously. They have almost completely broken BRYN by showing him that the places where he was allegedly in your imprisonment were invented and that his descriptions do not fit the actual places. They undertook through the KGB, through special officers of O-II, and through the Chinese intelligence service, an exact check on BRYN's statements, which has proved even more the falsity of these statements."

4. "In connection with the cases of MONAT, BRYN and the Czech attache, preparations are being made in Czechoslovakia and in Poland to remove all Jews from the intelligence services. Thus, in the immediate future about thirty Jews from Department I (Foreign Intelligence) of the MSW (Polish Ministry of Interior) will be dismissed under various excuses. In O-II the 'purging' action has been almost completed. There are still, however, two Jews left. In the Polish military CE (WSW) the purge is in full swing. In these security actions in the military field, a leading role is being played by Col. AMASOV, representative of Soviet Military Intelligence and liaison officer to O-II. The great activity by the KGB is increasing in Prague as well as in Warsaw under the direction of the new KGB CE (CIA NOTE: counterespionage) representative, General SZWYRKOV (or SCHWYRKOW). The pressure for a total tightening up of the secret service and the general atmosphere of mistrust have increased up to the level of the BERIA times."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5. "The entire intelligence activity by Poland and Czechoslovakia in the U.S., with a few minor exceptions, has been suspended until further notice because of the two defections of military attaches. In order to save face, under pressure from the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw, the recall of resident CZAJER was postponed until April or May. The new resident ~~WLIBOR~~ is still being prepared in Section 2 of Department I for his work in the U.S. <sup>WLIBOR</sup>

6. "Because of heavy surveillance by you, the meeting between NANYS and [redacted] did not take place. ~~WLIBOR~~ has written to [redacted] two or three times in order to maintain the contact and to keep him calm, but lately has had no answer, which has made Department I and the KGB very uneasy. In this situation it is out of the question that the contact to [redacted] will be taken up by any other person such as NANYS. Up to the present time this affair is still suitable for a double agent play, and in my opinion it is very important to build up the course of events in this way."

b7D

7. "Not all the proposals of the UB for reprisals against the AIS (American Intelligence Service) were accepted by the Politburo. Two or three actions are under preparation, but I have no concrete information about them."

8. "The Lt. Col. ~~WLIBOR~~ who is planned for England (up to now the chief of Section 2 of Department I, MSW) has a brother in the U.S. who lives in Cleveland, Ohio and who emigrated there a short time ago from Canada and recently married a Polish girl with the maiden name [redacted]. The brother maintains private letter correspondence with [redacted] (the brother's name is also [redacted]). This proved to be the reason why [redacted] was not transferred to the U.S."

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~



Tolson	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____ b6
Belmont	_____ b7C
Callahan	_____
DeLoach	_____
Malone	_____
McGuire	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : MR. F. A. FROHBOSE

FROM : S. J. PAPICH

SUBJECT: DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
IS - POLAND  
BUFILE 65-65192

DATE: 2-16-60

1-Mr. Brangian  
1-Liaison  
1-Mr. Papich

The captioned name is being used by an individual claiming to be connected with the Polish Intelligence Service, who has been transmitting considerable information to CIA concerning Polish intelligence activities abroad and also in the U.S. So far Schutze has been an enigma in that sufficient information has not been acquired in order to determine if he is involved in a deception operation or if he is honestly cooperating with the U.S. Government. Recently the Espionage Section transmitted to CIA a summary of developments in the U.S. which had a bearing on CIA interests. You may be interested in the following comments which were volunteered to the Liaison Agent on 2-15-60 by James Angleton, CIA.

Angleton stated that the recent Bureau letter was "a first-rate analysis of developments in the case and very clearly showed that considerable thought had been employed." Angleton confided that the communication was a type which boosted the prestige of the Bureau because it showed "that the Bureau knew what it was doing in this field."

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Espionage Section. The communication referred to was prepared by Supervisor J. J. McDermott.

SJP/nmn  
(4)

EX-135

REC-31

65-65192-56

50 MAR 31 1960

30 APR 1 1960

*Handled*  
*5/29/60*

*2015*

~~SECRET~~

- Mr. McDermott  
- Liaison

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6  
b7C

**Date:** March 29, 1960  
**To:** Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence  
Department of the Army  
**Attention:** Chief, Security Division  
**From:** John Edgar Hoover, Director  
**Subject:** [redacted]

b3  
b7E

Reference is made to the memorandum of Colonel Robert C. Hall dated June 26, 1959, to the Central Intelligence Agency captioned "HECKENSCHUETZE," a copy of which was furnished to this Bureau. (65-65192-30)

According to the unevaluated source in this matter, [redacted] former Army Intelligence agent handler in Europe, allegedly was compromised by and agreed to cooperate with the Soviets.

[redacted] reportedly was residing in [redacted] in 1957.

Referenced memorandum noted that the Army operations discussed by the source had all been closed or dropped at least two years previously as a result of compromise, but further indicated that the Army planned investigation to determine the validity of the charges against [redacted]. You advised our liaison representative on October 13, 1959, that while the Army has no reason to believe the source's charges against [redacted] investigation was continuing and the results would be furnished to this Bureau. Our liaison representative was further informed on February 11, 1960, that this Bureau would receive the results of the Army's inquiry upon completion.

b6  
b7C  
b7E  
b3

ORIGINAL COPY

YELLOW  
DUPLICATE  
MAR 29 1960  
MAILED

① - 65-65192 ("Schutze")

JJMCD:gds  
(6)

65-65192  
NOT RECORDED  
167 MAR 29 1960  
(SEE NOTE PAGE TWO)

~~SECRET~~

APR 11 1960

~~SECRET~~

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence  
Department of the Army

Since the source's report concerning [redacted] is punctuated with frequent references to other individuals and operations of which the Army is cognizant but concerning which we are uninformed, we would appreciate a crystallization of the source's allegations concerning [redacted] in addition to advice concerning the status of your inquiries abroad.

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

We are holding in abeyance any further action in this matter pending your response to this request.

NOTE: Original source in this matter is the unidentified individual using the pseudonym "Dr. Heinrich Schutze." Mr. J. J. Daunt of Liaison received the information referred to herein from Mr. Merrill Kelley of the Army on the dates indicated. Instant classified "~~Secret~~" since it repeats in part the contents of referenced Army communication which was so classified.

~~SECRET~~

1-Mr. McDermott

SAC, Cleveland

3-24-60

Director, FBI

[redacted]

By letter dated 3-15-60 classified "Secret," CIA forwarded information recently received from an unidentified individual using the pseudonym "Dr. Heinrich Schutze." "Schutze" is described on pages 28 and 29, Part VII, of the study entitled "Poland - Polish Intelligence Services and Summary of Polish Intelligence Activities in the United States," a copy of which was recently furnished to your office. Since neither the reliability nor motivation of "Schutze" has been established, the Bureau has proceeded cautiously in investigations predicated upon information received from him. "Schutze" has recently reported as follows:

b3  
b7E

"The Lt. Col. Jastrzebski who is planned for England (up to now the chief of Section 2 of Department I, MSW) has a brother in the U.S. who lives in Cleveland, Ohio and who emigrated there a short time ago from Canada and recently married a Polish girl with the maiden name [redacted]. The brother maintains private letter correspondence with [redacted] (the brother's name is also [redacted]). This proved to be the reason why [redacted] was not transferred to the U.S."

You are referred to your [redacted] captioned [redacted] Bufiles indicate that [redacted] Lodz, Poland, arrived in the United States on 10-22-53 to visit [redacted] Mrs. Henrietta Markowski, who you determined resided at 3026 East 113th Street, Cleveland, Ohio. A pretext call by your office to the residence of Mrs. Markowski revealed that [redacted] contemplated returning to Poland in April, 1959. In applying to the American Embassy, Warsaw, for a visa, [redacted] indicated her occupation as bookkeeper;

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN b3 b7E

(1) - 65-65192 ("Schutze")  
JJMcD:skw  
(5)

NOT RECORDED  
150 MAR 28 1960

YELLOW  
DUPLICATE  
MAR 24 1960  
MAILED

9 MAR 30 1960

Letter to SAC, Cleveland

RE: [redacted]

b3  
b7E

Further, her residence as [redacted] and  
id [redacted] as Alicja Wacławska of Lodz.  
In [redacted]ber, 1959, a request for information concerning  
[redacted] was received from INS, Cleveland, by the Bureau  
in connection with a petition for an adjustment of her  
status, presumably to that of permanent resident alien.  
She was then identified as [redacted]  
[redacted] who was said to have been born  
in Siberia on [redacted]

You are instructed to initiate a discreet back-  
ground investigation of the subject. Care should be  
exercised that the subject not become aware of the  
Bureau's investigative interest in him. Upon completion  
of background investigation, including a review of local  
INS files concerning the subject and his wife and contacts  
with reliable established sources, all pertinent information  
should be incorporated in an investigative report. Attempts  
should be made to develop information concerning the identity  
and whereabouts of all subject's relatives. The information  
quoted above from "Schutze" should be included in the cover  
pages only of such report. You should consider submitting  
a request for a mail cover on the subject's residence for  
the purpose of confirming that he maintains correspondence  
with a relative in Poland who is possibly a UB official.

For your guidance, while there is no allegation  
that the subject is engaged in any hostile intelligence  
activity, the Bureau is primarily interested in determining  
whether the subject is related to the UB official mentioned  
by "Schutze" and, if so, the nature of any correspondence  
exchanged between them if this can be discreetly determined.

~~SECRET~~



- Parsons
- Belmont
- 1 - F. A. Frohbose
- 1 - S. J. Papich
- W. A. Branigan
- L. Whitson

Legat, Paris

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-15-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6  
b7C

Director, FBI

1 - J. J. McDermott

Mr. J. J. McDermott  
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

4799-1

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

On April, 1960, an unidentified individual using the pseudonym "Dr. Heinrich Schutze" communicated with [redacted] intelligence [redacted] offered to be of assistance by way of furnishing information concerning Soviet and Polish intelligence efforts against the U. S. and furnished instructions regarding manner in which he could be contacted through "drops." CIA has received from "Schutze" a large volume of information since that time, some described as startlingly accurate, concerning Soviet- bloc penetrations of U. S. intelligence operations in Europe and some verifiable information concerning Polish intelligence agents in the U. S. "Schutze" has refused to appear for personal meetings, citing the necessity for complete security. There can be no doubt that "Schutze" has high-level access to Polish and/or Soviet intelligence circles but his identity, motivation and reliability remain undetermined. It is strongly suspected that this may constitute a Soviet deception or disruption operation and CIA, as well as the Bureau, has been most cautious in taking any positive action based on "Schutze's" information.

b7E

UNRECORDED COPY FILED

On 3-30-60, CIA advised the Bureau that it had recently received from "Schutze" a Polish-language version of a NATO Special Committee working paper classified "confidential" dated 10-6-56 dealing with proposed solutions to security problems posed by visits of Soviet-bloc vessels and aircraft to NATO countries. The U. S. representative's (PRL) views were referred to therein. Nothing of a sensitive nature was contained in the document. "Schutze" reported that the original document had been obtained from [redacted]

MAILED 10  
APR - 4 1960  
COMM-FBI

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Malone \_\_\_\_\_
- McGuire \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Ingram \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

[redacted]  
J.J. McDermott  
1 - [redacted]

REC 35  
APR 5 1960

65-62790-57  
p3  
b7E

1 - 62-98719  
J.J. McDermott:bjc (17)

See cover memo Parsons from Belmont prepared by J.J. McDermott:ces, 3/31/60, same subject.

~~SECRET~~

55 APR 15 1960  
MAIL ROOM [ ] TELETYPE UNIT [ ]

~~SECRET~~

Letter to Legat, Paris  
Re: [REDACTED]

an unnamed agent within the East German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (DFV) who furnished it to an unnamed illegal agent of the East German Security Service (MAD) which, in turn, passed it on to Departments I (Foreign Intelligence) and II (Counterintelligence) of the Polish Security Service (UB). It is observed, however, that this document could have been obtained from any MAD country which has an internal security service represented in the MAD Special Committee.

You are, therefore, being alerted to this Soviet-bloc penetration and are again being cautioned to be most circumspect in dealing with your contacts. No action should be taken on the information contained herein and you should engage in no discussions concerning this matter with persons outside the Bureau.

~~SECRET~~

Tolson	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Belmont	_____ b6
Callahan	_____ b7C
DeLoach	_____
Malone	_____
McGuire	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *AB*

FROM : F. A. FROHBOSE *TF*

SUBJECT: "DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE"  
INTERNAL SECURITY - POLAND

DATE: 4-7-60

1-Parsons  
1-Belmont  
1-Branigan  
1-Whitson  
1-McDermott  
1-Liaison  
1-Papich

*Branigan*

Reference is made to memorandum dated 3-31-60 from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Parsons. As you know, "Schutze," in a recent communication to CIA, made available to CIA the contents of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Special Committee working paper classified ~~confidential~~ dated 10-6-58, dealing with proposed solutions to security problems posed by visits of Soviet bloc vessels and aircraft to NATO countries. The communication quite clearly indicated that the Soviets and the Poles undoubtedly have a source in one of the NATO countries. It was recommended and approved that Liaison discuss this matter with CIA in order to determine what steps were being taken by the Agency to identify the "leak."

This matter was discussed with James Hunt, CIA, on 4-5-60. Hunt stated that his Agency has been studying this matter, but actually no positive steps have been taken to identify the apparent leak. As pointed out in the referenced memorandum, it was suggested to Hunt that consideration possibly could be given to varying the language or the form of future copies of Committee documents distributed to the member country representatives. By so doing, it would be possible to identify the country involved if Schutze again makes the contents of a Committee document available. Hunt stated that this definitely had merit and he plans to hold discussions with other CIA officials. It is his understanding that the staff handling the preparation of the documents is relatively small [redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[redacted]

[redacted]

REC-55

65-65192-528

ACTION:

Liaison will follow in order to determine what action is to be taken by CIA.

APR 13 1960

SJP/nmn

(8)

APR 13 1960

65-65192



~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 08-13-2020 BY [ ] ADG

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_ b6  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_ b7C  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
 McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : MR. F. A. FROHBOSE *Jm*

DATE: 4-13-60

FROM : S. J. PAPICH *[Signature]*

1-Branigan  
 1-McDermott  
 1-Liaison  
 1-Papich

SUBJECT: "DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE"  
 IS - POLAND

Reference is made to memorandum from you to Mr. Belmont dated 4-7-60. You will recall that Liaison had conferred with CIA concerning steps which might be taken to identify the source of the apparent leak of information from the NATO Special Committee to a Polish or Soviet intelligence service. I reported that CIA was favorably inclined toward our suggestion that documents issued by the Committee could be varied in form or language in each individual dissemination to member countries.

b1 Per  
 b3 CIA



ACTION:

This information is being directed to the attention of the Espionage Section.

SJP/nmn  
 (5) *[Handwritten initials]*

REC-19

*65-65192-59*

APR 15 1960

*[Handwritten signature]*

*5- 65-65192*

*1 auto  
 4-15-60  
 #69*

~~SECRET~~

59 APR 19 1960




b3 FILE  
 b7E

UNRECORDED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY  ADG

b6  
b7C



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

*J*  
*Am...*

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_ b6
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_ b7C
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Malone \_\_\_\_\_
- McGuire \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Ingram \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : D. J. Parsons

DATE: March 31, 1960

FROM : A. H. Belmont

- 1 - D. J. Parsons
- 1 - A. H. Belmont
- 1 - F. A. Frohbose
- 1 - S. J. Papich
- 1 - W. A. Branigan
- 1 - L. Whitson
- 1 - J. J. McDermott

SUBJECT: "DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE"  
INTERNAL SECURITY - POLAND

*6/24/91*

*Page 1*

On 3/30/60 CIA advised that it recently received from "Dr. Heinrich Schutze" a Polish-language copy of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Special Committee working paper classified "~~Confidential~~" dated 10/6/58 dealing with proposed solutions to security problems posed by visits of Soviet-bloc vessels and aircraft to NATO countries. "Schutze" is the pseudonym of the unidentified individual who has been furnishing information to CIA abroad since April, 1958. He has refused to make personal contact, as a "security measure," but has furnished some highly accurate information regarding Soviet and Polish knowledge of U.S. intelligence operations abroad and occasionally verifiable information concerning Polish intelligence operations against the U.S.

b3  
b7E

[redacted] Whatever his motivation, however, there can be no doubt that "Schutze" has high-level access to Soviet and/or Polish intelligence services.

The document furnished by "Schutze" refers to U.S. and Belgian contributions to the NATO Special Committee on port security problems. The Bureau, of course, represents the U.S. on this Committee. From the beginning we have approached our relationship with the NATO Special Committee with the thought uppermost in mind that anything we contribute might eventually find its way to the Soviet bloc because of inadequate security standards of some member countries. Material submitted by us has never been classified higher than "~~Confidential~~," has always been couched in very general terms, and has never included anything which could compromise Bureau operations. Nothing sensitive is contained in the NATO Special Committee document forwarded by "Schutze".

REC-10 105-65192-1011



Enclosure  
J.J. McDermott 6/15/1  
6-14-1987 (NATO Special Committee)  
COPY SENT TO MR. TOLSON

11 APR 14 1960

*5-MTU*

Memorandum to Mr. Parsons  
Re: "Dr. Heinrich Schutze"

OBSERVATIONS:

[Empty box for observations]

b3  
b7E

RECOMMENDATIONS:

[Empty box for recommendations]

2. That Liaison discuss this matter with CIA and determine what steps it is taking in this matter to identify the "leak" of the NATO Special Committee document.

WAB  
JJMcd:ces:sky  
OKK  
[Handwritten initials and signatures]

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

b6  
b7C

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
[redacted]  
SUBJECT: [redacted] ~~X~~  
INTERNAL SECURITY - PO

*the Department*

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

1. Reference is made to your memorandum to this Agency dated 24 March 1960, subject as above.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7D  
b7E

2. We note in paragraph 6 of reference that MANYIS and [redacted] did meet in February. [redacted] We should appreciate receiving your account of this meeting and of any relevant subsequent developments.

*done  
4-14-6  
9ms*

[redacted]

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

*S. N. Horton*  
for JAMES ANGLETON

[redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

UNCL

b3  
b7E

CONSOLIDATIONS

[redacted]

[redacted]

65-45192-62

4 APR 14 1960

[redacted]

FSP

65-65192 (class)

~~SECRET~~

62 APR 22 1960

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted]

ADG66  
b7C

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

[Handwritten box with illegible text]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

SUBJECT: [redacted]

*Dr. [illegible]*

[Redacted line]

[Large redacted block]

b3  
b7E

UNRECORDED COPY FILE

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

REC-46 65-65192-63

*S. H. Horton*  
20 APR 15 1960  
for James Angleton

[Redacted box]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

*4/16*

*5.7.65*

b3  
b7E

*Please copy to:*  
1 auto  
4-15-60  
#69

[Redacted box]

~~SECRET~~

65-65192

88 APR 21 1960

~~SECRET~~

- Papich  
1 - McDermott

65-65192

BY LIAISON

Date: June 3, 1960  
To: Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Attention: Mr. S. H. Horton  
Acting Chief, Counterintelligence Staff  
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

S. H. Horton  
6/3/60  
[initials]

Subject: [redacted] (S)

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7E

Reference is made to your letters of May 2 and 27, 1960, your references [redacted]

b3  
b7E

With regard to the reportedly continuing interest of the Polish Security Service (UB) in [redacted] we have recently informed the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) that it is not this Bureau's intention to interfere with the utilization of [redacted] services by the Aerospace Technical Intelligence Center (ATIC), Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio. After reviewing ATIC's file on [redacted] which was made available by OSI, it appears that what began as essentially an ATIC inspired and directed liaison between [redacted] and Polish nuclear scientists looking toward the acquisition of positive intelligence continues to be just that. The role of Jan Nanyo of the Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C., thus far appears to be little more than that of messenger according to ATIC, has been a prolific source of intelligence concerning Soviet-bloc efforts and personalities in the field of nuclear energy. We have, therefore, suspended direction of [redacted] activities in favor of exclusive ATIC control until such time as more concrete evidence of Polish intentions to accomplish an operational recruitment of [redacted] appears.

b7D

MAILED 5  
JUN 3 1960  
COMM-FBI

EX-102

REC-19 65-65192-64

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Malone \_\_\_\_\_
- McGuire \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Ingram \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

1 - WFO (Enc. 2 - copies of relets)  
1 - New York (Enc. 2 - copies of relets)

[redacted]

JJMcDiprgr (11)

See note page 3.

52 JUN 9 1960

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

~~SECRET~~

FILED IN  
b3  
b7E  
UNRECORDED C

717 per

JD

[Handwritten initials]

[Handwritten initials]

2713

~~SECRET~~

Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

In view of the above, you may wish to consider the advisability of briefing ATIC or OSI more fully in this matter. Since captioned source is being handled by your Agency, we, of course, have not gone beyond the briefing afforded to Lieutenant Colonel George Keithley of Air Force Intelligence on August 31, 1959, by representatives of your Agency and this Bureau.

You have advised that you possess no information concerning Dr. Eduard Fischel described [redacted] as a German rocket specialist of interest to the Soviets. This person is probably identical with Eduard Martin Fischel, born July 6, 1902, Bacharach, Germany, who arrived in the United States on December 6, 1945, under the sponsorship of the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency. As of May 5, 1952, Fischel was a supervisory aerodynamic development engineer (measuring system) at the Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama, and resided at 123 East Rhett Avenue, Huntsville. In view of the prohibition against further dissemination of data received [redacted] imposed by your Agency, we are taking no further action concerning Fischel. You may wish to consider informing the competent agency of [redacted] report concerning Fischel.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

With regard to [redacted] presently and formerly, respectively, of the American Embassy, Warsaw, Poland, you are referred to our letter under instant caption dated February 12, 1960, requesting a copy of a detailed study concerning [redacted] which was being prepared by your Agency, according to your [redacted] dated September 4, 1959. Since [redacted] reportedly has returned to the United States, we desire complete information before proceeding in that matter and we are, therefore, awaiting a response to that request.

b7D

We agree with your suggested identification of "Richard" as Wladyslaw Skrzypczak, a Polish employee of the American Embassy, Warsaw. As you are aware from investigative reports furnished you, while several fellow employees were reportedly suspicious of Skrzypczak, no information has yet been developed confirming that he came to the United States on an intelligence assignment.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

The individual "Kokenzie" referred to [redacted] as having been "spotted" by "Richard" may be identical with Henry F. Kokenzie, 340 Abercorn Street, Savannah, Georgia. You are referred to report of Special Agent William P. Friday dated October 22, 1958, at Savannah, captioned "Edward Kmiecik; Internal Security - PO," a copy of which was forwarded to your Agency on November 4, 1958. It was reported therein that Kokenzie, executive secretary of the Count Pulaski Club of Georgia, along with others, met Kmiecik, First Secretary of the Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C., at the Savannah airport on October 10, 1958, in connection with the latter's arrival for Pulaski Day observances. Kmiecik and his wife later were to have dined at the Kokenzie residence. [redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

b7E

We plan to inquire further into Kokenzie's background and eventually may interview him to determine whether he was contacted by Skrzypczak in the Fall of 1959.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

b6  
b7C

1 - Mr. Brantigan

MR. A. H. BELMONT

April 13, 1960

1 - Mr. McDermott  
1 - Liaison  
1 - Mr. Fitzgerald

F. A. FROBOSE

DOCTOR HEINRICH SCHUTZE  
INTERNAL SECURITY - PO

b3  
b7E

It will be recalled that in the fall of 1959 information was received from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the effect that captioned individual, a CIA source abroad, had stated [redacted]

b7D

[Large redacted block]

On 4-11-60 Mr. William Boswell, Director of State Security, advised that he talked with [redacted] soon after the latter's return to this country and alerted him to the fact that he was reported to be a recruitment target of the Soviet Bloc Intelligence. Boswell said he told [redacted] that part of the recruitment effort reportedly would be the establishment of a bank account in [redacted] name, as well as the use of a tape recording allegedly made of conversations in [redacted] office in the Embassy in Warsaw. Boswell said [redacted] was very dubious that such a tape recording was made in his office, and Boswell remarked that four State Security searches of [redacted] office had failed to disclose any microphones installation. Boswell said that he had made no reference to [redacted] concerning the portion of the alleged recruitment effort dealing with compromising [redacted] with the use of material allegedly secured by the Soviet Bloc Intelligence while [redacted] was visiting in Moscow. Boswell said that he cautioned [redacted] to report promptly to him for referral to the FBI any apparent approach by any Soviet Bloc people, which he said [redacted] assured him he would do. Boswell said that State has no new information from CIA concerning the allegations of Schutze. Boswell said that he never felt the possibility of [redacted] being recruited was very strong, particularly in view of his Bureau training, and he also felt [redacted] would be a most unlikely target for recruitment. He added, he feels the possibility of [redacted] ever being approached has now diminished considerably in view of his transfer out of Poland.

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

b7D

- Tolson
- Mohr
- Parsons
- Belmont
- Callahan
- DeLoach
- Malone
- McGuire
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Trotter
- W.C. Sullivan
- Tele. Room
- Ingram
- Gandy

**ACTION:**

302  
APR 18 1960  
for information.

65-65192  
NOT RECORDED  
145 APR 15 1960

JMF:bas

[redacted]

65-65192 MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [ ] Ab6  
b7c

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: [ ]

REC-81  
[Handwritten signature]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

1. Following are extracts of a recent report from Subject.

[ ] Throughout the following paragraphs, "Department I" should be taken to mean Department I (Foreign Intelligence) of the UB and "Department II", Department II (Counterintelligence) of the UB.

2. "Mrs. CZAJER has arrived in Warsaw, was thoroughly interrogated, and confirmed everything which I have already reported to you. On the basis of these statements (which are accepted by Department I and the Central Committee as facts), the counteraction which is already known to you is planned. (Note: see previous report from Subject, [ ] dated 8 Feb 60.) For reasons of good relations to the U.S. (for political counterbalance vis a vis the Soviet Union), RAPACKI (Adam RAPACKI, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs) and JAROSZEWICZ (Piotr JAROSZEWICZ, Deputy Premier of Poland) opposed these plans and convinced GOMULKA that a counteraction in Poland at present would be nonsense. Therefore Department II has a free hand for the counter-action abroad, but all preparations in this regard in Warsaw were stopped."

b1 Per  
b3 CIA  
b7E

3. "The execution of the sentence against MONAT was not voluntarily determined by the Polish government, but was extorted by the Soviet Union and the KGB. Measures in this regard are at present being carried out by the KGB and the RU in the U.S. Further details are not known."

4. "In consideration of the new position of General Kazimierz WITASZEWSKI (Director of the Administrative Section of the Central Committee, in control of the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense and the Courts), it can be anticipated that the situation will deteriorate in Poland. Work against U.S. and other Western installations in Warsaw will be considerably intensified in the near future."

\* Reliability of source not established  
dissemination - See pgs 6.

REC-81

65-65192-65

64 JUN 10 1960

18 JUN 6 1960

~~SECRET~~

65-65192

6-7-60  
6-11-60

5-11-60

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

~~SECRET~~

5. "Liquidation steps against TISLER are self-evident and are being carried out exclusively by the KGB directed from Moscow. The KGB is afraid that U.S. officials will publish the documents which TISLER turned over to them, thereby causing a political scandal and, above all, upsetting the relations between Poland and the CSR. The security organs of the CSR are preparing as a portion of a counter-action the arrest of a member of the Prague Station (American Embassy is probably meant here), who works actively and in a leading position for American intelligence, and of his information sources. Details are not known."

6. "The new Department I resident (GIBOR) in the U.S. has already finished his preparations and at present is being broken in at the Foreign Ministry. He is supposed to travel to the U.S. in the next two months."

7. "The [redacted] case is, in my opinion, proceeding according to plan. The meeting (NANYS, [redacted]) took place in mid-February and was evaluated positively by NANYS and Resident CZAJER. NANYS gave [redacted] books and a letter from KRAWCZYK. [redacted] promised to fulfill in part the assignments, even though this was difficult. It is extraordinarily important to inspire [redacted] work with genuine material (but not dangerous for the U.S.) in order that [redacted] position in the testing phase is built up correctly and full of trust. The next meeting between [redacted] and NANYS was arranged between 1-11 (sic) during the New York fair. A meeting of KRAWCZYK with [redacted] in Europe at the initiative of KRAWCZYK is possible. A Department I officer (the name begins with an S) carried out a counter-surveillance behind NANYS and noticed no surveillance by you. On the next day after the meeting, however, NANYS noticed an active surveillance which was disturbed because of the absence of NANYS the day before. Also, an American woman who is active there (presume Polish Embassy is meant here) and who is suspected as your source was strikingly forthright in attempting to learn the reasons for NANYS' absence from work the day before. These symptoms were carefully analyzed by the KGB representative in Warsaw, Col. WLADYKIN, and were found to be signs that [redacted] is apparently "clean." If this was a trick carried out by you to allay suspicions, such an undertaking is only to be praised. In double agent operations, such diversionary maneuvers are more than necessary. The surveillance team behind NANYS on 27 January 1960 was fully compromised in spite of their efforts. Because CZAJER is fully compromised, he now briefs his officers in the code room."

b7D

8. "For a long time the KGB has pushed without great success a campaign for the return from the U.S. to the German Federal Republic of various German specialists, with the purpose of making relations more tense and to realize its intelligence plans. It is known that

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

such a plan has been practically realized through unofficial channels in connection with the person of Professor Dr. Eduard FISCHER, who is a rocket specialist and has worked in the U.S. for a long time. Professor FISCHER works with Werner von BRAUN and is a leading expert in the field of rockets. He allegedly adopted U.S. citizenship a long time ago."

9. "The KGB has not changed its recruitment plans against [redacted] It has turned out that [redacted] even earlier in Prague and Moscow during his activities in these posts was actively cultivated as an agent recruit by the KGB, and his wife as a supplementary source. It is good that he was transferred to the U.S. (State Department) because that gives you better possibilities of following and controlling the matter thoroughly. It is important to identify the man who at one time filmed love scenes with [redacted] in Moscow, because this is an important KGB agent."

b7D

10. [redacted] <sup>William L.</sup> Mr. MAGISTRETTI, is well known to the KGB. He was actively investigated by the KGB in Japan. According to KGB information which was turned over to Department II, MAGISTRETTI is a member of the American intelligence service. In Tokyo, according to the KGB, among other things, he worked against the Soviet Mission. The KGB runs an important agent in Warsaw in the Japanese Legation who is also active for the Japanese intelligence service. A plan exists on the part of the KGB to use this agent in the investigation of MAGISTRETTI. Strangely enough, Department II has also observed tendencies to romantic adventures on the part of Mrs. MAGISTRETTI and is trying to exploit these through agent means (up to now, however, without any great success)."

b7D

11. [redacted] who has already been recalled, is Miss ZWYNAR or CWINAR (Note: identified as Dorothy M. CWINAR), who is suspected by Department II, Section 8 (Western diplomatic installations in Poland), as an agent of American intelligence. An exact control and investigation of Miss CWINAR is presently underway."

b7D

12. (CIA Note: In August 1959 [redacted] reported that one of the marine guard personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw had been recruited by the UB. No further details were given at that time.

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

[redacted] now reports as follows on the case.) "I can give you the following provisional facts on the case of the guard. The director of the garage of the U.S. Embassy, the Pole Andrzej ZIELINSKI, a famous auto racer who formerly worked for the Canadian Mission, is an agent of Department II. His cover names are "Johann" and "George". He has been investigating the Canadian and American missions since 1955. The guard, according to my untested information, was spotted by "Johann" and observed and investigated by him. The further development of the guard was carried out naturally through other channels, among others through a woman agent who established intimate contact with the guard

Counterintelligence Dept

3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

on orders of Department II. In addition, the guard was inclined to drink heavily as soon as he got out of the control of the U.S. Embassy. He has been transferred from Warsaw. He negotiated twice with UB officers about aiding a secret burglary of the U.S. Embassy and pocketed about \$2-3,000, but otherwise did nothing, delivered no information of any significance, and later avoided meetings with the UB under various pretexts. The whole "collaboration" lasted about eight months. Department II therefore naturally does not trust the guard and no contact was agreed on. This was also due to the fact that the guard left Warsaw rather unexpectedly. To what extent further plans exist is at present not known. Please consider this information as provisional."

13. "In the fall of 1959, an employee of the U.S. Consulate in Warsaw (name unknown) travelled to the U.S., Miami and Florida. He is about 33, studies at the Faculty of English Philology and has been an agent of Department II actively working against the U.S. Consulate since 1955. His cover name is allegedly "Richard." Richard travelled to the U.S. to visit an acquaintance named WRONOWSKI (or something similar) who has a small travel office in Miami. In reality, his trip to Miami was inspired by Z-II (Polish Military Intelligence) through Department II to carry out an investigation in the Miami area. The main point of interest: the U.S. air base in the vicinity of Miami, the Air Training Center, as well as the experimental facilities of the Air Force. "Richard" carried out his mission brilliantly."

14. "He also spotted various contacts, among them a U.S. citizen of Polish descent, KOKENZIE (or something similar) who aroused Z-II interest. KOKENZIE is a former captain in the Air Force and has very good connections to the air base (or is working there). He was released from the Air Force for health reasons. He runs a Pulawski Club and has various contacts of interest to Z-II. The plan exists to win KOKENZIE for Z-II work with the help of "Richard" and to build up the contact between "Richard" and KOKENZIE. First the correspondence will be reactivated."

15. "From various clues which hang together with Jerzy BRYN and Pawel MONAT, it can be deduced that the KGB currently has put the contact with [redacted] on ice. The KGB suspects that [redacted] work has been compromised. The real reasons for this as far as the KGB is concerned are not completely known. One clue, however, is as follows: A former Department Chief (or Section Chief) of Department II (until 1956) was Major Adam WEIN, a Jew. WEIN worked for years in Department II. The KGB suspects that he knew or suspected about the work (for the KGB) of [redacted]. In 1958 a secretary of the Israeli Legation in Warsaw attempted to recruit WEIN with the help of the latter's brother, who is in Israel. WEIN reported this to Department II, and the pertinent collaborator of the Israeli Legation left Poland persona non grata. After the cases of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

BRYN and MONAT, the KGB representatives examined this case again and came to the conclusion that WEIN perhaps does have contact with the Israeli intelligence service. Therefore, they thoroughly analyzed the information which WEIN could possibly have passed, which included the SYMANS matter."

16. "A new fact which confirms that [ ] has had contact with the KGB is as follows. In June 1955 during the Poznan International Fair [ ] went to Poznan in a car. He drove with the U.S. Minister, therefore he had no surveillance. However, [ ] was picked up by a special group of the surveillance service in Poznan and observed for a long time. The surveillance established one fact which clearly indicated IS activity by [ ] in Poland. [ ] went to an antique store in Poznan. During his visit to the antique store he passed the director of the store an envelope and took from the salesman some kind of paper. Everything gave the impression of a secret contact and this is how the surveillance service interpreted and reported the matter. After this alleged contact, [ ] visited other stores, until the next day very suddenly he came face to face with a surveillance man whom he knew from Warsaw. [ ] was furious because he could see that he had gone around in Poznan under observation. He cursed the surveillance people and even attempted to hit them. The matter was reported to the UB district direction in Poznan, Lt. Col. DWOJAK, who ordered all identified contacts of [ ] (above all, the director of the store, who earlier had been registered as suspicious) to be investigated under suspicion of espionage. The former KGB advisor in Poznan, Col. ALEXANDROW interfered in this affair. He first belittled [ ] contact and attempted to explain that the surveillance service had reported "fairy stories." But because of a firm stand in this matter by DWOJAK, he took the entire case file "under study" and sent it to Warsaw to the KGB leadership. The investigation was broken off "because of analysis." These files were not returned to Department II (by mistake) until 1957. The leadership of Department II is very unhappy because it had to put up with intelligence activity (at least in the recent past) for the benefit of the KGB."

b7D

8. APPROX. 1920 Pulawski

17. "The Deputy Chief of Section 1 (illegals) of Department I is Major Kazimierz ZYBURA. This section is headed by Lt. Col. SZMIDT. ZYBURA is about 40, about 165 cms. tall, well built, has a boxer's walk, brunet, looks French, has black eyes, has been active for 15 years in Department I. He is unquestionably the best intelligence officer, or one of the best, in Department I. He has great experience, speaks perfect French, very good English. He is Polish, the son of a French re-smigrant miner who is a member of the French communist party. ZYBURA is brilliant, able to adjust well, has great courage, cocky, good social form, a man who can endure a great deal. He has been active as Deputy Chief of Section 1, Department I, since 1956. He directs the setting up of illegal residenturas in the U.S., Canada, and in part also in Europe. Two or three times each year he goes

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

illegally to the West for the inspection of illegal residenturas or groups, or for contacts with the most important agents. He always has two false Western passports. He works according to the classic art of the illegals with all reserves, precautions, signals, warning signs, reserve deaddrops, etc. A specialist in the detection of counter-surveillance. He uses the following passports: Belgian, French, English, Canadian (preferred) or American. He likes to play the role of a citizen of these countries while pointing to his French origin. He travels to the West by train to Vienna or Berlin and from there further, or directly by air from Warsaw to Vienna, Zurich, Brussels, Copenhagen or The Hague. His return along the same routes is always a combination; i.e., he always returns through different cities from those through which he left. He "studied" (not for long) in New York in 1949 or 1950. He used the cover name ZYGIELSKI or ZYBIELSKI."

18. "Your service ran an agent into him with whom he had a few contacts. During a meeting in a restaurant he observed that he was being surveilled, and therefore he destroyed while still in the restaurant a cigarette containing microfilm which had been passed to him by this agent (double agent). After this incident he was allegedly recalled from the U.S. He is setting up illegal residenturas in the U.S. parallel to Section 5, Department I. (Note: presumably Source means here that the illegal residenturas will work against emigration targets, which would parallel the work of the legal residenturas in the U.S. working on Section 5 (emigre) targets.) His next trip will possibly take place in May or June." (Source goes on to suggest surveillance of ZYBURA and his arrest, if he comes to the West, and discusses possible psychological appeals to him. Source will attempt to notify us of the dates of ZYBURA's travel.)

19. The above information is from a highly sensitive source and should not be further disseminated outside your organization. In order to protect the Source, it is requested that no action be taken on this information without the express approval of this Agency.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):



*S. H. Horton*  
for JAMES ANGLETON

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADG b6  
b7c

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RECEIVED FROM  
[redacted]  
CA SIP

27 SEP 68

~~REC-68~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

SUBJECT: [redacted] ~~SECRET~~

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

*[Handwritten signature]*

[Large redacted area]

*[Handwritten notes]*  
6-23-68 3.3  
100-44-10000

~~SECRET~~

EX 904


65-65192

5-11-770


~~SECRET~~

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

~~SECRET~~



FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):



~~SECRET~~

*James R. Hunt*  
James Angleton

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

~~SECRET~~

1 - McDermott

b6  
b7C

SAC, Miami [redacted]

6/3/60

b3  
b7E

Director, FBI [redacted]

[redacted]

For the information of Savannah, subject is a Polish national employed by the American Embassy, Warsaw, who visited the U. S. from 10/14/59 until 12/9/59. Investigation was initiated by the Miami and Washington Field Offices upon receipt of information by WFO from a former official of the American Embassy, Warsaw, to the effect that the subject was the object of suspicion and mistrust by older Polish employees of the Embassy. Savannah is referred to Miami airtel to the Bureau, Savannah, New York, and WFO dated 11/13/59 concerning the subject, which advised, in part, that the subject intended to visit an unidentified friend at Savannah after his departure from Miami. The Bureau is not aware of any information developed by Savannah in this matter since no copies of Savannah letter to Miami 12/22/59 were furnished the Bureau.

b3  
b7E

For the information of both Savannah and Miami, since April, 1958, an unidentified individual using the pseudonym "Dr. Heinrich Schutze" has been exchanging correspondence with CIA abroad concerning Polish and Soviet intelligence efforts against the U. S. This individual has refused to appear for personal contact and his identity, motivation, and reliability remain unestablished. From time to time he has provided CIA with extremely significant information concerning Soviet-bloc knowledge of U. S. intelligence operations abroad and also information concerning specific individuals dispatched by the Soviets and the Poles against the U. S. There can be no doubt, on the basis of his past production, that this individual enjoys high-level access to Polish and/or Soviet intelligence circles. Both CIA and the Bureau have been most circumspect in conducting investigations based upon his information [redacted]

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Enc.

2 - Savannah (Enc.)

2 - WFO [redacted] (Enc.)

*Encl. filed with orig.*

① - 65-65192 ("Schutze")

JJMcd:prg  
(9)

YELLOW  
DUPLICATE  
JUN - 2 1960  
MAILED

b3  
b7E

-65-65192-  
NOT RECORDED  
198 JUN 6 1960

717J  
62 JUN 8 1960

Letter to SAC, Miami

Re: [redacted]

Subject: [redacted]

b3  
b7E

Enclosed for receiving offices is a portion of the report received from "Schutze," which was contained in CIA letter to the Bureau, classified "Secret," dated 5/2/60. The Bureau and CIA agree that "Richard" in the enclosure probably refers to the subject of instant case. The Bureau further believes it probable that the "Kokenzie" in the enclosure refers to Henry F. Kokenzie, 340 Abercorn Street, Savannah, who has furnished information to the Savannah Office in the past and who is referred to in report of SA William P. Friday dated 10/22/58 at Savannah, captioned "Edward Kniecik; IS - PC." It is noted that Kokenzie was executive secretary of the Count Pulaski Club of Georgia in 1958.

The records of the Identification Division indicate that one Henry Fayette Kokenzie, born 7/13/18, Gray's Landing, Pennsylvania, enlisted in the U. S. Army at Fort Monroe, Virginia, on 4/17/39. He was then assigned as a private with Battery A of the Second Coast Artillery, enlisted serial number 6892254. He was described as: 5 feet 10 1/2 inches tall; 160 pounds; medium build; gray eyes; brown hair; and ruddy complexion. Based upon available information, it cannot be determined whether this individual is identical with the Henry F. Kokenzie of Savannah.

Since CIA has requested that the information in the enclosure not be further disseminated, in any future report, the information should be included in cover pages only.

Miami should forward pertinent serials in instant case to Savannah. Upon receipt of same, and upon completion of background check of Henry F. Kokenzie, in the absence of derogatory information, Savannah should proceed to interview Kokenzie to determine whether he is acquainted with the subject; whether the subject visited him in the Fall of 1959; and, if so, complete details concerning their meeting should be obtained. If Kokenzie has traveled to Poland in the past, it is possible that he met the subject at the American Embassy, Warsaw. Savannah should incorporate the results of its interview with Kokenzie in an investigative report. During the interview, Kokenzie should

Letter to SAC, Miami

Re: [redacted]

Bufile [redacted]

b3  
b7E

be given no reason to suspect that he may be the object of Polish intelligence interest. If he appears fully cooperative, he should be requested to maintain the interview in complete confidence and not to advise anyone that he has been contacted by the FBI. He should further be requested to immediately advise the Savannah Office of any future contacts he may have with the subject or other Soviet-bloc nationals.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [REDACTED] ADG

b6  
b7C

ENCLOSURE

15-61172

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted]

b1b6  
b7c

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

RECEIVED FROM  
JUL 11 1960  
CIA SIP

11 JUL 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: [redacted]

*Waltman*

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

1. Reference is made to your Memorandum dated 3 June 1960,  
Subject: [redacted]

2. In regard to Eduard Martin FISCHER, we authorize you to  
advise the competent agency [redacted] report concerning FISCHER,  
and to pursue the matter as appropriate.

*no loc.*

3. In order to protect our Source, we request that you conceal  
the origin of the [redacted] information when passing it to the third  
Agency.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PIANS):

*S. H. Horton*  
S. H. HORTON

[redacted]

b1 Per  
b3 CIA

*1 copy, req to  
American...  
7/26/60 Paul Fisher  
adv OSI records request  
EGY in 1955 Kearsott  
secret clearance.  
for to Mark. 18-60*

7-112

REC-45

65-65192-67

65-65192

JUL 26 1960

53 AUG 9 1960

SECRET

*[Handwritten initials]*