Fears of Russian Domination Of Europe Subsiding Here

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North Africa Political Dispute Token of What May Greet United States if It Tries to Settle All Rows

By Constantine Brown.

Some responsible Washington quarters are much less concerned now than in the past over the possibility Russia may establish its hegemony over Europe at the end of the war.

The bitter dispute over political jurisdiction in North Africa was only a minor indication of what may be in store for us if after the conflict is over we attempt to straighten out the many political, racial and social problems which are certain to beset the countries obtaining their freedom as a result of an Allied victory.

For the present, while victory is not yet ours, there is an apparent cohesion among the United Nations. Political matters, balance of power and many economic and social questions are shunted into the background. This is natural. Until the enemy has been defeated, it would be demoralizing for the armies in the field and for the men and women on the home front to be told of the many differences among the Allies as to who will be who and what will be what in the post-war period.

Our association with the enemies of Hitler and Mussolini dates back before the time we were attacked by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor. We were on record as backing with all our means short of war, any nation which opposed the Axis. We are spending hundreds of billions of dollars and the blood of hundreds of thousands of Americans will be shed before the tragedy is ended.

American Selflessness.

But we do not expect or desire any material gain. The people of this country do not seek any territorial aggrandizement or any specific "zones of influence" which so frequently hide designs on lands which belong to somebody else. Neither are we seeking economic privileges. The American people have been told from the very beginning that the billions advanced to our associates will not be repaid and the bitterness caused by the defaulting of our Allies in the last war will thus not exist.

We have already written off colossal sums. The only repayment we are entitled to expect is peace and freedom throughout the world with equal opportunities for all and no restrictions of any kind to our traders and trade carriers.

This, in short, is the position adopted by the legislative and executive branches of the American Government. There are a few optimists who believe that this is a war to end all wars. This Utopian thought might eventually become a reality provided there is no idea in the minds of all our associates to seek the same type of strategic and economic security which made the last war the cause of the present one.

For the time being, while the armies are fighting, there is only little talk about what any of the United Nations' members would want after the war is over. The Atlantic Charter is the document which might regulate the desires of the individual nations. But the Atlantic Charter in many ways is a nebulous charter which needs many explanations and amplifications. President Wilson's 14-point program also had offered the world an ideal solution for its ills. By the end of the Versailles conference it was torn in so many shreds that the former war President himself could hardly recognize it. There were no territorial conquests, but there were "mandates"; there was no war indemnity, but there were "reparations" which far exceeded—nominally, at least—any lump sums the Allies may have asked of their former enemies as indemnity.

Britain's Perilous Position.

The situation, from the few hints and indications we have received so far, is not much different from that of a quarter of a century ago.

Great Britain had undergone a difficult and dangerous period since 1940. The empire was at stake. The Mediterranean, her principal artery to her vast colonial empire, was closed to her men o' war and merchantmen. She has indicated to us, not officially, of course, that she would not like to see a repetition of the old days. Since France has proved herself unable to defend her colonies—the surrender of Indo-China made possible the Japanese blitz in the Pacific and Indian Oceans—she would like to control at least some of the key naval and air bases in North Africa and also in Asia, if the Japanese are defeated. It is difficult to say how Britain's strategic needs, and they are irrefutable, can be dovetailed with the American people's ideals that we are fighting for the reconstruction of all countries whose freedom has been destroyed by the Axis. We know that the French, once liberated from the Nazi yoke, would fight to the last man to preserve at least their African empire. Should they be unable to regain sovereignty over Madagascar and the other overseas possessions there will be much bad blood in France against her associates who have deprived her of what the Frenchman considers his own. As a result the much-needed harmony in Europe may not be achieved easily and those who make a career of fishing in troubled waters may bring up these matters as another excuse for war. Another "league of nations" is being advocated by our idealists.

The Moscow government so far has given the world as few indications of its aims after Hitler is defeated as the Russian high command has given military information about its operations and supplies. But there have been hints from Foreign Minister Molotov and other high-ranking Russians that Russia intends to settle once and for all the question of her frontiers. The ideology of a "common boundary for all nations" was regarded as the chief utopian ideal of communism. Whether it will remain after the war is over is difficult to say. But in any event this was intended mostly for foreign consumption.

The Moscow government has always sought to bring the old Russian territories under the wing of Moscow. In 1920 it took over the independent Cau-

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casian republic of Georgia. It fought Finland to regain some strategic portions of that republic. It took over the Baltic states which are now under Nazi domination and it intends to take them back as soon as Hitler's troops are chased to the old border of the Reich.

But it would not be surprising if the Moscow government wished to straighten out its borders in Central and Southern Europe to include parts of Poland, Bessarabia and Moravia to the Carpathian Mountains and Dobruja on the Black Sea. Bulgaria herself will ask for the privilege of being incorporated into the U. S. S. R. should the Russians, after the collapse of Nazi power, succeed in establishing a common boundary by the annexation of the former Turkish province of Dobruja, which has been in Rumanian hands for less than 50 years.

Nobody here would be surprised if Moscow insisted on extending its influence through Iran to the Persian Gulf in order to gain access to the Indian Ocean. Nor is it certain that the people of Yugoslavia will not be induced to ask for a union with the great Slav power—Russia—thus giving that empire an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea.

We are told these are matters which should not be discussed publicly but are possibilities in view of conditions in Europe today. The people of the Balkans have undergone unbelievable hardships under the Nazi domination. The prestige of the Russians has deservedly gone up by leaps and bounds ever since the Reds began to roll back Hitler's powerful and hitherto invincible armies. We are a kind nation as far as these countries are concerned because we can supply them with food and clothing, but there is mighty little in common between the people of the United States—even though some of our citizens come from those portions of Europe—and the people of the countries which may wish or be forced to join the U. S. S. R. Hence, the Russians may tell us in all sincerity that while a Europe chopped up in many weak independent states will continue to remain extremely explosive, a Europe in which Russian influence and power are predominant is the only guarantee that there will be no repitition of 1914 and 1939.

There was a time until quite recently when the bulk of the people in this country and many of our leaders were scared at the prospect of a Soviet-dominated Europe. This idea still worries a number of political men in Washington, but there are others even in the ranks of our most conservative circles who are now of the opinion that after all this may be the best solution if we wish to avoid being drawn into a European turmoil every quarter of a century.

The state of European political intrigues which we have had since we entered North Africa has been enough to cure some of the inveterate interventionists in European affairs. Our Army and diplomatic officers who enjoyed the full confidence of the people of this country and of their Commander in Chief have been criticized.

If the Russians feel that they could bring peace to a continent which has been at war periodically for centuries, so much the better for all concerned.

Recent developments have shown that we can deal with the Russians in a friendly manner even more successfully than with other of our close friends and associates. One thing appears certain: We shall have no major disputes with Moscow over economic zones of influence or the air routes of the world.

File

"Letters from Our Readers"

The Name Is V. I. Lenin

New York, N. Y.

Editor, Daily Worker:

On Jan. 21, the day Lenin's name and deeds were honored in the Daily Worker, you printed a U.P. dispatch reporting the gist of a speech by A. Scherbakov, Secretary of the Moscow Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, made on the occasion of the lifting of the 16-month siege of heroic Leningrad. The name Nikolai Lenin was used in that dispatch. I would suggest that the Daily Worker, in referring to Lenin, do not use the name "Nikolai" and for the reason stated below:

Early in his revolutionary literary career, Lenin, born Vladimir Ulianov, adopted pen names for his published writings. Depending on the occasion or the publications in which his writings would appear, he would use a different nom de plume. The names Ilyn, Karpov, Petrov, and others can be found signed to Lenin's letters and articles, but the name which he used most, and which became known beyond the confines of Russia long before the October Revolution, was the pseudonym Lenin. His associates and friends called him Vladimir Ilyitch (his father's name was Ilya) as is the custom in Russia in addressing each other by the given name and patronymic.

In signing his articles for the Bolshevik press or preparing his pamphlets for publication, Lenin prefixed his name with the initial N. Thus, most of his published writings appeared with the signature N. Lenin. As far as the writer knows, the N. did not represent the initial of any given name, but was used by Lenin rather to make the signature appear complete.

As is well known, Lenin was arrested on several occasions during his early political career. The tsarist police was continually on the lookout for the author of the powerful articles and pamphlets who signed his name N. Lenin. As is wont with police officials, reports about their activities must be submitted to their superiors in writing. A dossier, or as the Russians called it, a "dyelo" (case) must be assembled about each prospective victim, and in Lenin's case, the "dyelo" about his political activities and peregrinations since his student days in Kazan University, was growing bulkier from year to year.

The single most important feature of a dossier is the name of the person involved. Every man, even a Bolshevik, the tsarist police must have mused, has a first name. In the case of the culprit Lenin, however, the police could produce for the dossier only the initial N and a period. The police, therefore, had the problem of completing for the record Lenin's first name. This was not a difficult task even for the half literate police bureaucrats who "knew" that the letter N stood for Nikolai — probably the most common name in Russia after Ivan.

Thus was Lenin christened Nikolai by the tsarist police and that was the name picked up by the press, also always anxious to report a man's name in full, even finding its way into the ranks of the labor movement.

When the Soviet Government was founded and Lenin became its head, he signed his name to official documents Vladimir Ilyitch (Lenin). Since that time and after his death, all published writings of Lenin carry the signature V. I. Lenin, the initials of his true name and patronymic in addition to the name known and revered wherever a heart beats for freedom ad a mind seeks the liberating truth of his teachings.

Alexander Trachtenberg.

This is a clipping from page 6 of the Daily Worker for 1-30-43

Clipped at the Seat of Government

FILE

1 MAR 20 1945

INDEXED

We Must Work With Russia

Russia is a force to be reckoned with, says Mr. Willkie. 'Such a power, such a people, cannot be ignored nor disposed of with a high hat.'

By Wendell L. Willkie

THERE is a river in Eastern Siberia called Chita, and on it is a town of the same name. Peter the Great, hat lusty, half-savage monarch, who had in urge to transform Russia into a modrn State, sent a royal commission to nvestigate and map his Siberian possesions. The commission apparently became ost, and after it had been gone several ears, Peter sent another.

A year or two later both commissions eturned and they fell into dispute in 'eter's presence as to the exact location f a small native settlement, each putting at a different spot on their incomplete aps. Finally Peter, impatient at the rgument, put his finger on the map and id "that one." Thus a city and a river ere named, for Chita in that part of ussia means in effect "that one."

I landed at "that one" one cold raw day st October. At the airport, which was modern one with concrete runways and cellent buildings and mechanical equipent, I was met by the Governor of the ea. He was a short, erect, husky man some 35 years of age. He greeted me the formal speech-making manner of ssian officialdom—very serious, very rnest. As we drove from the airport the city he told me of the potential hes of his district.

I asked casually, "How far is it from re to Moscow?" And on his reply that was nearly 4,000 miles by rail, my exclamation of surprise at such a distance in one country between the capital and a local seat of government drew from him the remark: "Well, that's the kind of country we are, Mr. Willkie. I thought you were that kind of country, too."

That expression of him pretty well sums up one's impression in flying over European and Asiatic Russia: that's the kind of country it is. I flew endless hours over thousands of miles of wheat and grain fields. And more hours over forests that seemed unending. I crossed mountain ranges, great plateaus and literally myriad little villages. Everything in Russia is extensive and vast. And when you talk to Russians, particularly to government officials, every plan for the future is extensive and vast. I remember so well when I was in Kuibyshev how they told me of their plans to dam a great bend in the Volga River for the production of electric power.

I spent a day on a modern river boat going over the part of the Volga concerned in the proposed development. Later I saw the engineers' plans in Moscow. I am not one to be easily surprised by vast governmental power developments, but when it became clear that this one development, if completed, would produce twice as much power as all the TVA, the Grand Coulee and the Bonneville developments combined, I began to realize that the Russians dream and plan on a scale to fit their vast forests and plains. It was carefully explained to me that the project has been put aside for the duration of the war.

Likewise, when on my request a group of Russian government officials took a trip with me on those smooth-riding Moscow subways, with their attractive underground stations, I was told again how the few miles of that subway, of which the Russians are inordinately proud, were about to be extended to literally hundreds of miles when the war intervened.

IN Southern Russia, in Northern Siberia, blueprints for vast irrigation and industrial developments were enthusiastically shown to me. Always with the same intensity and always with the explanation: the war interrupted our plans. And there was always the same question: Have you anything that big in America?

I visited several factories and later talked with Mr. Stalin about the particular factories I had visited. He plied me

This is a clipping fro
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nd pinned me down with questions as to ow his factories in their efficiency, their nethods of operation compared with sim- ar factories in America. He would not et me escape with generalities. He anted to know, and with exactitude, how losely he was measuring up to the Amer- can standard of production. The N. A. M. f America has no greater admiration for merican productive methods than has Mr. Stalin.

At the Lenin Library the librarian in- isted to me that his library was, with its illions of books, next to the Congression- l Library in Washington the largest li- rary in the world. In school rooms which visited, and the hospitals and the battle- ields at Rzhev, every one wanted to im- ress me with the size of things, the big- ess of things. And always the inevitable uestion, whether from Mr. Stalin, from overnment officials, army officers, fac- ory superintendents, common soldiers or orkmen: How does it compare with merica?

Back home, wherever I go, I find eople wondering about Russia. It is ob- ious to all now that Germany is not oing to conquer Russia. It is likewise lear that when the war is over Russia is oing to be in a position to claim a large hare of credit for the winning. It is pparent that she is so geographically ocated that if she became rapacious in er demands for territorial aggrandize- ent, she could (Continued on Page 25)

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well upset the peace which we are trying to bring about.

I find some of my American friends almost haunted when they conjure up in their minds the picture of this vast relatively unknown, powerful country seeking to impose its communistic ideology on large areas of the world. Some of them have even got themselves into a state of mind where they think we are merely destroying Hitler to create a new world menace in Russia.

Now what is Russia going to do? Is she going to be the new disturber of the peace? Is she going to demand conditions at the end of the war that will make it impossible to re-establish Europe on a decent peaceful road? Is she going to attempt to infiltrate other countries with her economic and social philosophy?

Frankly, I don't think any one knows the answers to these questions; I doubt if even Mr. Stalin knows all the answers. Although it must be remembered that Stalin was among the first leaders in the world to condemn the Versailles Treaty, with its economic barriers, its geographic maladjustments and its unpayable indemnities, as the creator of the cancer which would cause another World War. It was some time later that, one by one, other public leaders of the world took the same position. Any one who talks with Mr. Stalin comes away with the feeling that he understands what causes the world to tick economically and politically. One also comes away with the realization that Mr. Stalin is a complete realist, almost fanatically devoted to his plans for Russia's internal development.

OBVIOUSLY it would be ridiculous for me to attempt to say what Russia is going to do. This much, however, I do know to be true: That there are 200,000,000 subjects of the U. S. S. R.; that they control the largest single land mass in the world under one government; that they have almost inexhaustible supplies of timber, iron, coal, oil, which is, practically speaking, unexploited; that through elaborate systems of hospitalization and public health organizations the Russian people are one of the healthiest peoples in the world, living in a vigorous, stimulating climate; that in the last twenty-five years, through a widespread, drastic educational system, a large percentage have become literate and tens of thousands technically trained; and that from the topmost official to the most insignificant farm or factory worker the Russians are fanatically devoted to Russia and supercharged with the dream of its future development.

I don't know the answers to the questions about Russia, but there's one other thing I know: that such a force, such a power, such a people cannot be ignored nor disposed of with a high hat or a lifting of the skirt. They will be reckoned with. That is the reason why I am constantly telling my fellow Americans: Work in ever-closer cooperation with them while we are joined together in the common purpose of defeating a common enemy. Learn all we can about them and let them learn about us.

I REMEMBER not long ago at a dinner party, a lady said to me: "Do you think the Russians really want to understand us?" I said: "I think so." She replied, "Well, how many of them are learning to speak English?" And the answer was easy: "Certainly more than are learning Russian in this country."

There's still another thing I know. That geographically, from a trade standpoint, from a similarity of approach to many problems, the Russians and the Americans should get along together. The industrialization of Russia will require a limitless amount of American products, and Russia has unlimited natural resources that we need. The Russians, like us, are a hardy, a direct people and have great admiration for everything in America, except the capitalistic system. And frankly, there are many things in Russia that we can admire—its vigor, its vast dreams, its energy, its tenacity of purpose. No one could be more opposed to the communist doctrine than I am, for I am completely opposed to any system that leads to absolutism. But I have never understood why should be assumed possible contact

munism and democracy, democracy should go down.

I believe it is possible for Russia and America, perhaps the most powerful countries in the world, to work together for the economic freedom and the peace of the world. At least, knowing that there can be no enduring peace, no economic stability, unless the two work together, there is nothing I ever wanted more to believe. And so deep is my faith in the fundamental rightness of our free economic and political institutions that I am convinced they will survive any such working together.

This is a clipping from page _____ of the New York Times for _____

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Reds Shed Mental Garment of Communism After Attack

Editor's Note: Following is the fourth of a series of six dispatches by former President Herbert Hoover appraising the situation on the Axis and United Nations' home fronts as they appear today, as they loom in the future, and as they affect global strategy.

By HERBERT HOOVER

NEW YORK, Jan. 14—When Russia was invaded she dropped the mental garments of Communist Internationalism and took on the fighting armor of nationalism. The Russian people rose as of old to defend the soil of Holy Russia. She still holds fast, after the loss of probably 5,000,000 soldiers, 70,000,000 of her population, with a considerable part of her industries and food sources.

It is a magnificent defense by a people of unlimited courage. And now she bids fair not only to hold her segment of the ring but even to strike telling blows. From her untapped manpower and her vast hinterland, she will still be formidable in 1943.

Russia will suffer greatly on the home front. But with the spirit of nationalism reawakened, with the furious hates against an enemy on her own soil cruelly butchering her people, she will keep fighting. But she will need help in food, clothing and arms.

CHINA'S HOME FRONT

I have lived in China in years gone by. It is only in the last 25 years that she has developed a national spirit of independence. That spirit has been fiercely inflamed by the invasion of her soil and barbaric treatment of her people.

The living standard of the great mass of Chinese are always at bare subsistence level. Famine is the experience of every Chinese village. At present she cannot be reached with much-needed supplies of food or arms. Yet she holds half of her hinterland from the Japanese.

When we try to assess China's spirit, we must remember that Asiatic peoples are less sensitive to death and more stoic in misery than the western people.

BRITISH HOME FRONT

For three years the British have made magnificent defensive war. They have lost many battles on the military front. Yet, with a nucleus of 65,000,000 white population, they have held their empire of a half a billion people intact except for Burma, Malaya and the Chinese cities.

The people on the home front in Britain are the great heroes of this war. Despite air destruction they have reached the highest point in their industrial production.

In a military way the British Isles are now apparently safe from invasion by land. German tanks will never see Trafalgar Square. Her industries are turning out proportionately more materials than ours.

AMERICAN HOME FRONT

On our home front we are in a more favored position than our Allies in one great particular. The airplane has rendered the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans wider instead of narrower. No effective sea attack against the Western Hemisphere is now possible against adequate land-based planes and our Navy.

Our task on the home front is different from that of any other nation in the war. We must not only raise large military forces, equip them and transport them overseas but we have an enormous further burden. We must furnish finance, food and munitions to the other United Nations. We must do this in the face of the Axis submarine blockade and the Jap conquests, which reduce our normal supplies of many commodities from overseas. And we must support our civil population in such a fashion that their physical strength and spirit are not exhausted.

If we are to perform these tasks so as to get this war over without delay, we have no margins for the waste of blunders or mismanagement on our home front.

Our job is production, production and more production. And it is production of planes, ships and arms, and food right now, if the United Nations are to aggressively tighten the rings around the European and Asiatic Axis, and if we are to compel their continuing internal degeneration by effective attrition.

We could wish for better conduct and organization of our civilian front.

Our fighting forces have availed themselves of every experience and every lesson from World War I in building their organization. But these experiences and these lessons have been largely ignored and even repudiated on our civilian front.

All nations in that war, Britain, France, the United States, and even Germany—had to pioneer the way to total civilian organization. In the end, they all arrived at certain common principles of organization. Our initial and continuing mistake in this war was ignoring the experience and these principles. Only in the past few months has their validity been recognized and only yet partially adopted.

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Soviet Critic Enters Controversy Over Steinbeck's 'Moon Is Down'

By Janet Weaver

MOSCOW. — Symptomatic of the tremendous interest of the Soviet reading public in American authors and their works is the discussion that has developed around the review of Steinbeck's "The Moon Is Down," published recently in Pravda.

Steinbeck is one of the most popular American authors among Soviet Russians. His "Grapes of Wrath," which like most Russian translations was published first in the Russian edition of International Literature, and then in book form, is particularly popular.

"The Moon Is Down" is reviewed by N. Sergeyeva who gives excerpts from the book and cites the lively discussion it evoked in the American papers.

"The character of the critical remarks made by American writers with regard to this book reflects the exacting demands of American readers on works dedicated to the struggle against Hitlerism," she writes.

She points out that some critics reproached Steinbeck for depicting a group of occupation officers in too indifferent a manner, but adds that despite their outward "politeness" the Hitlerites are still portrayed as the brutes they are. In this connection too she emphasizes that Steinbeck writes not as an eyewitness of the German occupation. . . .

Thinks Controversy Hurt Hitler

"The discussion that has arisen around Steinbeck's book has reflected the political sentiment of the American intelligentsia and the healthy feeling of hatred for the enemy," she concludes. "In a book about the war against Hitlerism the American reader wants the Hitlerites to be depicted as hateful characters; the same implacable and undivided and boundless hatred as one which so skillfully and with such dramatic effect has been depicted by Steinbeck in describing the struggle of the people against the invaders."

Although the war has hampered the exchange of goods between the Soviet Union and the

John Steinbeck

Anglo-American countries the Soviet people are managing to keep abreast of all the major literary events there. Today the Soviet reading public is interested chiefly in books that reflect the life of their allies in wartime and their struggle against the common enemy.

"Margin for Error" Shown in Moscow

"Enemy Sighted" by the American writer Alec Hudson attracted considerable attention here after being published in International Literature. It is scheduled to appear in book form. Clare Boothe's anti-fascist play "Margin for Error" has been adapted for the stage by Leonid Lench and produced by the Lenin Soviet Theatre in Moscow. Extremely well received here was Robert Greenwood's "Mr. Bunting in Peace and War," which ran serially in International Literature and is also being published in book form.

Eyewitness accounts by Americans of how the Hitlerites have turned Germany into a land of medieval barbarism are of tremendous interest and "Through Embassy Eyes" by Martha Dodd and "Ambassador Dodd's Diary" created quite a sensation here. William Shirer's "Berlin Diary" is now being translated.

It would be a mistake to think that the war has decreased interest in the English and American classics. On the contrary, the state literary publishing house published a number of them for the press in new translations, among them "Romeo and Juliet" and the Canterbury Tales.

A volume of English songs and ballads translated by the well known Soviet poet Samuel Marshak is already out and even contains "This is the House that Jack Built," which sounds wonderful in Russian. Corneus Chukovsky has finished a translation of his ninth edition of Walt Whitman containing prose, poetry and popular verse on the death of Lincoln for the first time in Russian translation.

Of the collections and anthologies scheduled for publication mention should be made of the Anthology of the 20th Century American Short Stories, a collection of Anglo-American humor including Mark Twain, O. Henry, Jerome K. Jerome and others.

Interested in American Songs

I would not be surprised if any day now we hear the Red Army men in Moscow singing "Wings Over the Navy" or some of Irving Berlin's songs from "This Is the Army" or some other new American songs—translated into Russian of course. "Literatural Iskusstvo" (Literature and Art), the newspaper of the literary and art workers, has just carried a review of some of the latest American war songs from the army song book just received here. "A good song is a necessary weapon in the arsenal of every army fighting for a just cause," the reviewer states, "and in not a single country in the world is the 'production of songs' conducted on such a mass scale as in the United States.

"Of special interest is the Soldiers' Songbook. In these songs we got a good picture of a jolly, young fellow proud of his America and ready to fight and die for it."

(By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

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Communist Party of Russia

Fair Enough

By Westbrook Pegler

NEW YORK, Feb. 1—The deadly fault of the American propaganda by which the political leaders of our Government try to win the confidence of the world, including the Axis, is that it is only a lure which is certain to be repudiated by Americans because it commits them to idealistic sacrifices which they never authorized. If it succeeds in helping to conquer the enemy, it will have been useful to us.

But when the time comes to make good, Americans will refuse, because, as the first operation in the establishment of the four freedoms movement everywhere in the world, we would have to depose our gallant ally, Joseph Stalin, and liberate the Russians and all the other continental European peoples who, in the fulfillment of victory by the Allies over the Germans, would fall under his rule or the rule of his successor.

* * *

THE Americans will refuse to assume that task, not only because of the probability of military defeat abroad and consequent dissolution at home, but because we have no mission to impose our form of government on the rest of the world. That would be the rule of a small minority over a great majority, even if it could be accomplished, as, of course, it can't. As a military enterprise it would be insane. As a political project, hopeless.

It is useless to try to refute the fact that Russian Communism is no less oppressive, dictatorial, brutal and treacherous than Hitlerism. Some publicists, who a few years ago were describing Hitlerism as brown Bolshevism, have more recently had less to say about the practical identity of the two brutalitarian systems. This is polite and expedient with Russia fighting savagely on our side, but the Russian form of government has not changed and it must be noticed that Stalin has neither expressed any intention to adopt the four freedoms in his own country nor to institute free government in any lands which he would occupy, seize or police as his victorious soldiers moved onward behind the crumbling legions of the Fuehrer.

* * *

IF IT is to be argued that the four freedoms can exist under some other system than ours, then nobody has yet named that system. For that matter, all four of them cannot exist at all, and they are, in plain truth, just sky-writing thought up for propaganda purposes by two strong, determined political leaders with a gift for phrase-making and an alert sense of expediency. Freedom from want and fear everywhere in the world is an order which cannot be fulfilled in the time of any person now living, and probably never can be in the world, and when the present military enemies are beaten the surviving fighters abroad will want to come home and resume life and their families will demand that they be brought home. Any program of deliberate permanent impoverishment here for the benefit of the rest of the world will be beaten at the polls.

* * *

THE United States did not enter this war to raise the living standards of the rest of the world but to protect this country and those living standards which Americans alone enjoyed. And the American contribution so far has been colossal and in the end will be just as important in the victory as the contributions of Britain, which stood alone while Stalin co-operated with Hitler, and of the Russians, who fought only when invaded and for honest reasons which they have had the decency not to misrepresent with sanctimonious slogans. They are fighting for the same reason that aroused the United States, namely, love of homeland, and Stalin has been honest enough, confident enough in his strength, not to go in for hypocritical preaching.

If our propagandists could kid the rest of the world and deal us out at home, our people might be practical and cynical enough to understand and let the four freedoms pass without challenge. But when it all seems to commit us in dead earnest to a national career of pestiferous do-gooding all over the world, and to sharing forever our butter and beef, our clothing, automobiles and all else that constitutes the materials standard of American life, it suggests that the country which the fighters will come back to would be just another land of want.

And who ever gave anyone permission to promise all this in the name of the people of the United States?

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Communist Truth Vs Democratic Liberty

Stalin's Speech on the War and the Soviet's International Relations

By The Associated Press.

MOSCOW, Nov. 6—The complete text of Joseph Stalin's address to the Moscow Soviet today follows:

Comrades, we celebrate today the twenty-fifth anniversary of the October Revolution in our country.

Twenty-five years have passed since Soviet order was established in our country. We stand now on the threshold of the twenty-sixth year of existence, of Soviet existence, of Soviet order. It is the custom of meetings held in honor of the anniversary of the October Revolution to sum up the results of the path traversed by the State and party organizations.

Permit me to present to you a report of results for the past year, from last November to this November.

Activity of our State and party organization has, in the main, followed two channels—on one hand, in the direction of peaceful construction and organization of a strong rear for our fronts and, on the other hand, in the direction of constructing defensive and offensive operations by our Red Army.

The peaceful contsructive work of our leading organizations during this period was expressed in the development of our industries, both war and civilian, in the eastern district of our country, in the evacuation of workers and equipment and setting them up in new areas; the extension of the sown area and of the Winter crop, obtaining radical improvements in the work of our enterprises working for the front, and in strengthening labor and discipline in the rear.

It must be said that this was a most difficult and complicated piece of organizational work on big scale for our economic and administrative organizations, including our railway transport.

However, it was possible to surmount the difficulties and our factories, collective and State farms, despite wartime difficulties, indoubtedly are working satisfactorily.

Our war factories and enterprises are honestly and effectively supplying the Red Army with guns, mortars, planes, tanks, machine guns and other arms. Our collective farms and State farms equally are fully supplying the Red Army with food and our industry with raw materials, and it can be said that never before has our country's home front been so firmly and strongly organized.

As a result of this glorious organizational and constructional work the people of our country have learned to act differently and to become more disciplined, and have learned to work in military fashion. They have realized their duty and responsibility toward their motherland and their defenders at the front, the Red Army.

Idlers and loafers devoid of any sense of civic duty have become fewer and fewer in our country. Organized and disciplined people fully imbued with a sense of civic duty have become more and more numerous.

The past year has been a year not only of peaceful construction but at the same time a year of patriotic war against the German invaders who treacherously attacked our country.

Military operations on the Soviet-German front during the past year can be divided into two periods:

The first was chiefly the Winter period when the Red Army, having beaten off German attacks against Moscow, took the initiative into its hands and went over to the offensive, driving off the German troops and, in the space of four months, covering in some places more than 240 miles.

The second period was the Summer period when the German Fascist troops, taking advantage of the absence of a second front in Europe and hurling in their last reserves, pierced the front in a southwestern direction and took the initiative into their hands, during five months covering in some places as much as 350 miles.

Hails Red Army Work.

I should like to say that military operations during the first period were especially successful. Operations of the Red Army in the areas of Rostov, Tula, Kaluga, before Mozdok and before Tikkvin and Leningrad revealed a number of significant facts.

They showed, in the first place, that the Red Army and its fighting cadres had grown into a serious force capable not only of withstanding the pressure of the German Fascist troops but also of routing them in open battle and driving them back.

In the second place, they demonstrated also that the German Fascist troops, despite all their perseverance, are possessed of serious organic defects which, given certain favorable conditions for the Red Army, would lead to their defeat.

It cannot be regarded as accidental that the German troops who made a triumphant march through the whole of Europe and who in one blow defeated French troops considered to be a first-class army, could only meet with serious military resistance in our country. Not only they met resistance, but also they found themselves compelled under the blows of the Red Army to retreat more than 400 kilometers from positions they had occupied, abandoning on their road of retreat an immense quantity of guns, machines and ammunition.

This fact cannot be explained by Winter conditions of warfare alone.

The second period of hostilities on the Soviet-German front was marked by terms in favor of the Germans, by the passing of the initiative into the hands of the Germans, by the piercing of our front in the southwestern direction, by the advance of the German troops and their reaching the areas of Voronezh, Stalingrad, Novorossiisk, Pyatigorsk and Mozdok.

Taking advantage of the absence of a second front in Europe, the Germans and their allies hurled all available reserves to the front and, massing them in one direction—the southwestern

This is a clipping from page 6 of the New York Times for Nov. 7, 1942

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

direction, created a large superiority of forces and achieved substantial tactical success.

Apparently the Germans are already not strong enough to conduct an offensive simultaneously in all three directions, in the south, north and center, as was the case in the early months of the German offensive in the Summer of last year, but they are still strong enough to organize a serious offensive in some one direction.

What was the principal objective pursued by German Fascist strategists when they started their Summer offensive on our front?

To judge by the comment of the foreign press, including the Germans, one might think the principal objective of the offensive was to capture the oil districts of Grozny and Baku, but the facts decidedly refute this assumption.

The facts show that the German advance toward the oil districts of the U.S.S.R. is not their principal objective, but an auxiliary one.

What, then, was the principal objective of the German offensive?

It was to outflank Moscow from the east, to cut it off from the Volga and our rear in the Urals, and then to strike at Moscow.

The advance of the Germans southward toward the oil districts had an auxiliary purpose which was not only and not so much to capture the oil district as to divert our main reserves to the south and weaken the Moscow front so as to make it easier to achieve success when striking at Moscow.

That, in fact, explains why the main group of German troops is now to be found not in the south but in the Orel and Stalingrad areas.

Recently a German officer of the German General Staff fell into the hands of our men.

A map was found on this officer showing the plans and schedule of the German advance.

From this document it develops that the Germans intended to be in Borisoglybsk on July 10, 1942, in Stalingrad July 25, 1942, in Saratov Aug. 10, 1942, in Kuibyshev Aug. 15, 1942, in Arzamas Sept. 10, 1942, and in Baku Sept. 25, 1942.

This document completely confirms our information to the effect that the principal aims of the Germans' Summer offensive was to outflank Moscow from the east and to strike at Moscow, while the purpose of the advance to the south was, apart from everything else, to divert our reserves as far as possible from Moscow and to weaken the Moscow front so as to make it easier to strike at Moscow.

In short, the principal objective of the Germans' Summer offensive was to surround Moscow and end the war this year.

In November last year the Germans reckoned on capturing Moscow by striking a frontal blow and compelling the Red Army to capitulate, thus achieving the termination of the war in the East. They fed their soldiers with these illusions.

But this calculation, as we know, miscarried.

Says Fingers There Burned

Having burned their fingers last year attempting a frontal blow at Moscow the Germans conceived the intention of capturing Moscow this year—this time by an outflanking movement, and thus ending the war in the East.

It is with these illusions that they now are feeding their duped soldiers.

As we know, these calculations of the Germans also miscarried.

As the result of hunting after two hares—after oil and after encirclement of Moscow—German strategists landed in a difficult situation.

Thus, the tactical objectives of the German Summer offensive were not consummated, owing to the obvious impossibility of their strategical plans.

How are we to explain the fact that the Germans this year were still able to take the initiative of operations into their hands and achieve substantial tactical successes on our front?

It is to be explained by the fact that the Germans and their allies succeeded in mustering all their available reserves, hurling them onto the Eastern Front and creating a large superiority of forces in one direction. There can be no doubt that but for these measures the Germans could not have achieved any success on our front.

But why were they able to muster all their reserves and hurl them onto the Eastern Front?

Because the absence of a second front in Europe enabled them to carry on this operation without any risk to themselves.

Hence, the chief reason for the tactical successes of the Germans on our fronts this year is that the absence of a second front enabled them to hurl onto our fronts all their available reserves and create a large superiority of forces in the southwestern direction.

Let us assume that a second front existed in Europe as it existed in the first World War and that a second front diverted—let us say—sixty German divisions and twenty divisions of Germany's allies. What would have been the position of German troops on our front then? It is not difficult to guess that their position would be deplorable.

More than that, it would have been the end of German Fascist troops for, in that case, the Red Army would not be where it is now but somewhere near Pskov, Minsk, Zhitomir and Odessa.

This means that already in the Summer of this year the German Fascist army would have been on the verge of disaster and, if that has not occurred, it is because the Germans were saved by the absence of a second front in Europe.

Second Front in World War I

Let us examine the question of a second front in Europe in its historical aspect. In the first World War Germany had to fight on two fronts: in the West, chiefly against Great Britain and France, and in the East against Russian troops.

Thus, in the first World War, there existed a second front against Germany.

Of 220 divisions which Germany had then, not more than eighty-five German divisions were stationed on the Russian front. If to this we add the troops of Germany's allies then facing the Russian front—namely thirty-seven Austro-Hungarian divisions, two Bulgarian divisions and three Turkish divisions—we get a total of 127 divisions facing the Russians.

The rest of the divisions of Germany and her allies were mainly held on the front against the Anglo-French troops while part of them performed garrison service in occupied territories of Europe.

Such was the position in the first World War.

What is the position now in the second World War? In September of this year, let us say? According to authenticated information which is beyond all doubt, of the 256 divisions which Germany now has not less than 179 German divisions are on our front.

If to this we add twenty-two Rumanian divisions, fourteen Finnish divisions, ten Italian divisions, thirteen Hungarian divisions, one Slovak and one Spanish, we get a total of 240 divisions which are now fighting on our fronts.

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The remaining divisions of Germany and her allies are performing garrison service in the occupied countries, while part of them are fighting in Libya or Egypt against Great Britain. The Libyan front is diverting, in all, four German divisions and eleven Italian divisions.

Hence, instead of the 127 divisions in the first World War, we are now facing on our front no less than 240 divisions, and instead of eighty-five German divisions we now have 179 German divisions fighting the Red Army. There you have the chief reason and the foundation for the tactical success of the German Fascist troops on our front in the Summer of this year.

The Germans' invasion of our country is often compared to Napoleon's invasion of Russia. But this comparison will not bear criticism. Of 600,000 troops which began the campaign against Russia, Napoleon carefully brought 130,000 to 140,000 troops as far as Borodino. That was all he had at his disposal at Moscow.

Well, we now have over 3,000,000 troops facing the front of the Red Army and armed with all the implements of modern warfare.

What comparison can there be here?

The German invasion of our country is also sometimes compared with the Germans' invasion of Russia of the First World War. But neither will this comparison bear criticism.

First, in the First World War there was a second front in Europe which rendered the German positions very difficult, whereas in this war there is no second front in Europe.

Second, in this war twice as many troops are facing our front as in the First World War. Obviously, a comparison is not appropriate. You can now conceive how serious and extraordinary are the difficulties confronting the Red Army and how great is the heroism displayed by the Red Army in its war of liberation against the German Fascist troops.

I think that no other country and no other army could have withstood such an onslaught of bestial bands of German Fascist brigands and their allies. Only our Soviet country and only our Red Army are capable of withstanding such an onslaught, and not only withstanding it but overpowering it.

It is often asked, "But will there be a second front in Europe after all?" Yes, there will be, sooner or later. There will be one. And it will be not only because we need it but, above all, because our Allies need it no less than we do.

Our allies cannot fail to realize that since France has been put out of action the absence of a second front against Fascist Germany may end badly for all freedom-loving countries, including the Allies themselves.

Programs Are Contrasted

It may now be considered indisputable that in the course of the war imposed upon the nations by Hitlerite Germany, a radical demarcation of forces and formation of two opposite camps have taken place—the camp of the Italo-German coalition and the camp of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. It is equally indisputable that these two opposing coalitions are guided by two different and opposite programs of action. The program of action of the Italo-German coalition may be described by the following points:

Racial hatred, domination of chosen nations, subjugation of other nations and seizure of their territories, economic enslavement of subjugated nations and spoliation of their national wealth, destruction of democratic liberties, the institution of the Hitlerite regime everywhere.

The program of action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition is:

Abolition of racial exclusiveness, equality of nations and integrity of their territories, liberation of enslaved nations and restoration of their sovereign rights, the right of every nation to arrange its affairs as it wishes, economic aid to nations that have suffered and assistance to them in attaining their material welfare, restoration of democratic liberties, the destruction of the Hitlerite regime.

The effect of the program of the Italo-German coalition has been that all the occupied countries of Europe—Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece and the occupied regions of the U.S.S.R.—are burning with hatred of the Italo-German tyrants, are causing all the damage they can to the Germans and their allies and are waiting for a favorable opportunity to take revenge on their conquerors for the humiliation and violence they are suffering.

Axis Isolation Is Noted

In this connection one of the characteristic features of the present moment is the progressively growing isolation of the Italo-German coalition and the depletion of its moral and political reserves in Europe, its growing weakness and disintegration.

The effect of the program of action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition has been that all the occupied countries in Europe are in full sympathy with the members of this coalition and are prepared to render them all the help of which they are capable.

In this connection another characteristic feature of the present moment is that the moral and political reserves of this coalition are growing from day to day in Europe, and that this coalition is progressively winning millions of sympathizers ready to join it in fighting against Hitlerite tyranny.

If the relative strength of these two coalitions is examined from the standpoint of human and material resources, one cannot help reaching the conclusion that the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition has the indisputable advantage.

The question is: Is this advantage alone sufficient for victory? There are occasions, as we know, when resources are abundant, but they are expended so unprofitably that the advantage is nullified.

Obviously, what is needed in addition to resources is the capacity to mobilize these resources and the ability to expend them properly.

Is there any reason for doubting the existence of such ability, of such capacity on the part of the men of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition? There are people who doubt this. But what grounds have they for their doubts? There was a time when the men of this coalition displayed their ability and capacity to mobilize the resources of their countries and expend them properly for the purposes of economic, cultural and political developments.

Article 123 of Soviet Constitution gives Lithuania "sovereignty of land or national self-government."

One asks: What grounds are there for doubting that the men who have displayed capacity and ability in mobilizing and distributing resources for economic, cultural and political purposes will prove incapable of doing the same things for the purposes of war?

I think there are no such grounds.

It is said that the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition has every chance of winning and will certainly win if it did not have one organic defect which is capable of weakening and disintegrating it.

This defect, in the opinion of these people, is that this coalition consists of heterogeneous elements with different ideologies and that this circumstance will prevent their organizing joint action against the common enemy.

I think this assertion is wrong. It would be ridiculous to deny the difference in ideologies and social systems of the countries composing the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. But does this preclude the possibility and expediency of joint action on the part of members of this coalition against the common enemy who holds out the threat of enslavement for them? It certainly does not.

More that that, the existence of this threat imperatively imposes the necessity of joint action upon the members of the coalition in order to save mankind from a reversion to savagery and medieval brutality.

Is not the program of action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition a sufficient basis for the organization of the joint struggle against the Hitlerite tyranny and for the achievement of victory over it? I think that it is quite sufficient.

The assumption of these people is also wrong because of the fact that it is completely refuted by the events of the past year and, indeed, if these people were right we should be observing a progressive mutual alienation of members of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition.

Yet far from observing this we have facts and events pointing to a progressive rapprochement between the members of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition and their uniting into a single fighting alliance. The events of the past year supply direct proof of this.

In July, 1941, several weeks after Germany attacked the U.S.S.R., Great Britain concluded with us an agreeemnt "on joint action in the war against Germany." Up to that time we had not yet had an agreement with the United States of America on this subject.

Ten months later, May 26, 1942, during Comrade Molotoff's visit to Great Britain, the latter concluded with us a treaty of alliance in the war against Hitlerite Germany and her associates in Europe and of collaboration and mutual assistance thereafter.

This treaty was concluded for a period of twenty years. It marked a historic turning point in relations between our country and Great Britain.

In June, 1942, during Comrade Molotoff's visit to the United States, the United States of America concluded with us an agreement on principle applying to mutual aid in prosecution of the war against aggression, the agreement representing a substantial advance in relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

Lastly, one should mention so important a fact as the visit to Moscow of the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Churchill, which established complete mutual understanding between the leaders of the two countries.

There can be no doubt that all these facts point to progressive rapprochement between the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the United States of America, who today are uniting in a fighting alliance against the Italo-German coalition.

It follows that the logic of things is stronger than any other logic. There can be only one conclusion, namely, that the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition has every chance of vanquishing the Italo-German coalition, and certainly will vanquish it.

Thus our tasks—the war has torn off all veils and laid bare all relationships. The situation has become so clear that nothing is easier than to define our tasks in this war. In an interview with a Turkish general published in the Turkish newspaper Cumhuriyet, that cannibal, Hitler, said:

"We shall destroy Russia so that she will never be able to rise again." That would appear clear although rather silly.

Aim to Destroy Hitlerites

It is not our aim to destroy Germany, for it is impossible to destory Germany, just as it is impossible to destroy Russia, but the Hitlerite State can and should be destroyed, and our first task, in fact, is to destroy the Hitlerite State and its inspirers.

In the same interview with the same general that cannibal, Hitler, went on to say "we shall continue the war until Russia ceases to have an organized military force."

That would appear clear, although illiterate. It is not our aim to destroy all military force in Germany, for every literate person will understand that this is not only impossible in regard to Germany, as it is in regard to Russia, but it is also inadvisable from the point of view of the future. But Hitler's army can and should be destroyed.

Our second task is, in fact, to destroy Hitler's army and its leaders. The Hitlerite blackguards have made it a rule to torture Soviet war prisoners, to flay them by the hundreds and to condemn thousands of them to death by starvation.

They outrage and slaughter the civilian population of occupied territories of our country, men and women, children and old folk, our brothers and sisters. They have made it their aim to enslave or exterminate the population of the Ukraine, White Russia, the Baltic States, Moldavia, the Crimea and the Caucasus.

Only villians and blackguards, bereft of all honor and fallen to the level of beasts, can permit themselves such outrages toward innocent, unarmed people.

But that is not all. They have covered Europe with gallows and concentration camps; they have introduced a vile system of hostages; they shoot and hang absolutely innocent citizens taken as hostages because some German beast was prevented from violating women or robbing citizens. They have turned Europe into a prison of nations, and this they call the "new order in Europe."

We know who are the men guilty of these outrages, the builders of the "new order in Europe," all those newly baked governor generals or just ordinary governors, commandants and sub-commandants. Their names are known to tens of thousands of tormented peoples. Let these butchers know that they will not escape responsibility for their crimes or elude the avenging hand of tormented nations.

Our third task is to destroy the hated new order in Europe and to punish its builders.

Such are our tasks, comrades.

We are waging a great war of liberation. We are not waging it alone, but in conjunction with our allies. It will end in our victory over the vile foes of mankind, over the German Fascist imperialists.

On our standard is inscribed: "Hail the victory of the Anglo-Soviet-American fighting alliance! Hail the liberation of the nations of Europe from Hitler's tyranny! Hail the liberty and independence of our glorious Soviet motherland! Execration and death to the German Fascist invaders, their State, their army, their new order in Europe! Glory to our Red Army, glory to our Navy, glory to the men and women guerrillas!"

Stalin's Order of the Day

By The Associated Press.

MOSCOW, Saturday, Nov. 7—The text o fthe order of the day issued by Premier Stalin today follows:

Comrades, Red Army men and commanders, political workers, men and women guerrillas, working people of the Soviet Union:

On behalf of the Soviet Government and our Bolshevist party, I greet you and congratulate you on this twenty-fifth anniversary of the victory of the great October Socialist revolution.

The peoples of the Soviet Union have traversed a glorious past during this period. In the course of twenty-five years our motherland has become a mighty socialist, industrial and collective farming power.

A quarter of a century ago workers and peasants under the leadership of the party of Bolsheviki and of the great Lenin established in our country the power of the Soviets.

The people of the Soviet States, having won freedom and independence for themselves, are united in the indissoluble friendship of brotherhood. Soviet people were freed from all forms of oppression and by their stubborn labors insured for themselves a prosperous and cultured life.

The peoples of our country are meeting the twenty-fifth anniversary of the great October Socialist revolution in the heat of a fierce struggle against the German Fascist invaders and their accomplices in Europe.

Recalls Red Army Gains

At the beginning of this year, in the Winter period, the Red Army inflicted substantial blows on the German fascist troops. Having beaten off the attack of the Germans on Moscow, it took the initiative into its hands and launched an offensive and drove to the west the German troops, liberating several regions of our country from German fascist slavery. The Red Army thus showed that, given certain favorable conditions, it would overcome the German fascist troops.

In the Summer, however, the situation on the front changed for the worse. Utilizing the absence of a second front, the Germans and their allies swept together all their reserves, threw them on the Ukrainian front and broke through it.

At the cost of enormous losses, the German fascist troops succeeded in advancing in the South and constituting a threat to Stalingrad, the Black Sea coast, Grozny, the approaches to the trans-Caucasus.

The true steadfastness ~~and cour~~age of the Red Army frustrated the plans of the Germans concerning the approach to Moscow from the east and a blow from the rear against the capital of our country. The enemy was halted before Stalingrad. But, having left tens of thousands of his soldiers and officers there, the enemy is throwing new divisions into the battle and straining his last efforts.

Fighting on the German fascist front is becoming more and more tense. On the outcome of this struggle depends the fate of the Soviet State and the freedom and independance of our motherland.

Our Soviet people have come through with honor from the trials that have fallen to their lot and are filled with unshakable faith in victory.

Soviet's Stability Shown

The war has been a stern test of strength and stability of the Soviet system. The calculations of German imperialists that the Soviet State would disintegrate have been completely overthrown. In its socialist industry, collective farming system, friendship of peoples of our country, the Soviet State has shown its stability and invincibility.

Workers and peasants, all the intellectuals, all those in the rear are honestly and self-sacrificingly working to satisfy the requirements of our front.

The Red Army is carrying the full weight of the war against Hitlerite Germany and its accomplices. By its self-sacrificing struggle against the fascist army it has won the love and respect of all freedom-loving peoples of the world.

Men and commanders of the Red Army who had not previously had enough military experience learned to smite the enemy for sure, to destroy his manpower and equipment, to discover enemy plans and to defend steadfastly our towns and villages from the foreign enslavers.

The heroic defenders of Moscow, Tula, Odessa, Sevastopol, Leningrad and Stalingrad have displayed examples of supreme courage, iron discipline and steadfastness and the ability to vanquish. The whole of our Red Army follows in the footsteps of these heroes.

The enemy has already felt on his skin the ability of the Red Army to resist. He will know still more the force of the devastating blows of the Red Army.

There can be no doubt that the German invaders will again hurl themselves into new adventures. But the forces of the enemy have already been blunted and have been stretched to the limit.

During the course of the war the Red Army has put out of action over 8,000,000 enemy officers and men. Now the Hitlerite army, watered down with Rumanians, Hungarians, Italians and Finns, has become considerably weaker than it was in the Summer and Autumn of 1941.

Comrades, Red Army men and commanders, political workers, men and women guerrillas: On your stubbornness and steadfastness, on your fighting ability and readiness to perform your duty to the motherland depends the defeat of the German fascist army and the clearing of the Hitlerite invaders out of Soviet soil.

Essential for Soviet Fighters

We can and must clear the Hitlerite filth from our Soviet soil. To do this it is essential:

1. Steadfastly and stubbornly to defend the line of our front, not to allow the enemy to advance further, to strain all efforts to wear down the enemy, to exterminate his manpower and to destroy his equipment.
2. To strengthen to the maximum the iron discipline, strict order and singleness of command in our army, to perfect the military training of troops, stubbornly and persistently to prepare devastating blows against the enemy.
3. To fan the flames of the popular guerrilla movement in the rear of the enemy, to devastate the enemy rear and to exterminate the German Fascist scoundrel.

Comrades, the enemy has already once experienced the force of blows of the Red Army before Rostov, before Moscow, before Tikhvin. The day is not far off when the enemy will feel the force of new blows of the Red Army.

There will be a holiday in our streets.

Long live the twenty-fifth anniversary of the great Socialist October Revolution!

Long live our Red Army!

Long live our Navy!

Long live our gallant men and women guerrillas!

Death to German Fascist invaders!

The Peoples Commissar for De-Defense,

J. STALIN.

This is a clipping from page _____ of the New York Times for _____

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

reak With Tradition Urged

itish Leader Sees No Hope for the Four Freedoms Otherwise

THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

I am very much obliged to you for e opportunity to comment on the edi-ial of Aug. 9, in which you attack y article "Epitaph of a System" in e New Statesman of July 11.

May I begin by saying that all at-npts to understand the crisis of orld civilization in terms of an anal-y from the innocent householder tacked by a burglar seem to me ut-ly beside the point? No one who ares my outlook has any doubt that e fullest cooperation between the ft and the Right is necessary in the mocracies if we are to survive the eat of Hitlerism.

The questions we have to face are:

) The terms of the cooperation. This eans getting the maximum good out the maximum use of our resources.

). The purpose of the cooperation. is I take to be more than the over-ow of Hitlerism. It is the creation a world in which the conditions no nger make possible the emergence of ces like Hitlerism.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, like Mr. urchill, wants the cooperation to be the terms approved by the Right. r argument is that, this is a short-hted view. It may ultimately lead to litary victory in the field. It will ve unsolved all the problems which de it necessary to wage a war. And oner or later this will mean a new r.

Counter-Revolution On

The United Nations are fighting the nter-revolution. Counter-revolution urs when a traditional system of ted interests, having lost its power economic expansion, cannot safe-ard itself within the historic frame-rk. It then sets out to use revolu-nary techniques in order to destroy se elements in the society which eaten its privileges. It has a super-al resemblance, its élan, its use of v men, its appeal to the masses. But neath its appearance of novelty, its pose is reactionary.

o destroy the counter-revolution, its onents need a revolutionary idea. the business of war is to break the l of your enemy, and your endur-e depends on your power to arouse e and exhilaration in the masses. These are not likely to be aroused if, like Mr. Churchill, you offer the masses the maintenance of the traditional system as the reward for their effort and sacrifice. Still less are they likely to be aroused if you call the traditional system "freedom and democracy" when millions of your citizens have not experienced it as either.

In the war against counter-revolution the deed is the word. That has, I suggest, been amply shown in Burma, Malaya and India. It was recognized by President Roosevelt when he defined the Four Freedoms as our purpose in this war, and by Vice President Wallace when he called upon us to build the "century of the common people."

Great Ideal Needed

A great ideal will evoke the resolution that victory requires. But the great ideal must be more than rhetoric for the future if it is to be creative; it must take the form at least of a token payment. All the promises made in this war were made in the last; when it was over, they were, for the most part, conveniently forgotten. This was the primary cause of the massive disillusion of the inter-war years. It will be repeated if we do not use, while it is possible, that common sense of danger which makes men ready for great innovations.

There is too little evidence that the Churchill Government is prepared for risks of this character. So far, there is not any aspect of social organization in which it has attempted great experiments. If the war ended tomorrow, "traditional" Britain, to use Mr. Churchill's phrase, would still be in power; and the adaptations which war has required, especially in the concentration of economic power which has taken place, would leave it stronger than in 1939 and not weaker.

People of the Left in Britain are well aware that, even at this price, Hitlerism must be destroyed. But we say that, if this price is paid, the purpose of the victory will be thrown away. The deep cleavages of the pre-war era will be more intense, and their outcome will be more tragic.

Justice Holmes Quoted

I said, in a phrase that you describe as "nonsense," that the reverse in Libya was the epitaph on a system. I said so for the reasons implied in the famous remark of Montesquieu of which Justice Holmes was so fond: "When I hear that a nation has been defeated because of the loss of a single battle, I do not believe it; I look to the general causes which led it to lose that battle."

There went into the Libyan defeat a body of general causes the operation of which can be seen in all the capitalist democracies before Sept. 3, 1939. Our task is to prevent their prolongation into the years of peace. If our rulers really mean the Four Freedoms, they must create the conditions in which they have the chance of effectiveness. If they do not do so when grave external danger makes us aware of how much we have in common, I do not think, on all historic precedent, that they are likely to do so when, with that danger overcome, we resume the consideration of the differences by which we are divided.

Those who will the end of the Four Freedoms have the obligation to use the means which give them reality. If you find the name of socialism an obstacle, another word will do. What you have to recognize, while there is time, is that the Four Freedoms did not exist for millions under capitalist democracy.

The defeat of Hitlerism makes their achievement possible. But it does no more than that. And the possibility will not be fulfilled if we do not begin the fulfillment while the opportunity is here.

HAROLD J. LASKI.

Little Bardfield, England, Sept. 17, 1942.

N. Y. Times
Sept. 30, 1942.
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THE TWO FACES OF RUSSIA

The fourth week of the Stalingrad battle has brought into the open a disagreement between Moscow on the one hand, London and Washington on the other, as to the early establishment of a second front in Europe. The dissension is more profound than its ostensible cause. It is the result of twenty-five years of tragic history: Allied intervention in Russia at the close of the First World War; Communist-supported agitation in the democratic countries; the arbitrary and sometimes brutal nature of the Soviet regime, with its repressions and purges; the inevitable clash between an oriental Marxism and an occidental capitalism; the existence of groups in democratic countries who worked for a truce with Hitler because they hated Stalin more; the inability, in more ways than one, of the West to speak the language of Eastern Europe; the record of appeasement in which neither Russia nor the democratic nations appear with clean hands.

These deep sources of estrangement might not have been overcome in this generation if it had not been for Adolf Hitler. He has proved to Britain and the United States that communism in Russia is not civilization's worst enemy. He has proved to Stalin that the national security of Russia depends on the destruction of Hitler, and that the destruction of Hitler depends on cooperation with the democratic Powers. The very demand for a second front establishes this point. Cooperation in war is useless without cooperation after the war. The historical moment that Hitler has produced makes an adjustment of differences imperative. The system of free enterprise and the system of communistic enterprise must learn to get along together, or both will perish, leaving only the Nazi slave system.

This achievement will not be completed in a day. We in the West must recognize one face of Russia that is turned away from us, seeing things we do not see, not hoping our hopes, not dreaming our dreams. The course of Russian influence, once her European frontiers are safe, is eastward. We may as well face the truth that it overshadows China and India, just as some of Russia's temperament has been determined in the past by oriental currents.

But the other face of Russia looks westward. It is turned toward our enemies, who are also Russia's bitter foes. The whole course of the Russian war has taught us to respect that keen and fearless westward gaze and the men and women whom it typifies. Some of those men and women are now fighting in the streets of Stalingrad, a part of the greatest battle in all human history. The defenders have been reinforced not only by troops drawn in from Eastern Siberia but by civilian factory workers. The Germans themselves were producing excuses yesterday: that the city was "colossally fortified," that it was raining, that "every bit of a street must be mopped up," that whether or not they had the city they already controlled the river. The Russians had crossed the Volga to take back a lost town. They were counterattacking in force in the Voronezh area, in the Moscow area and elsewhere.

No admiration for this spectacular heroism can justify a second front if we have not the men and weapons ready for it. We cannot help Russia by being defeated in the West. But the Russians may be assured that their endurance now speeds the day. When the time comes for us to strike Russia's enemies the memory of Stalingrad will put passion and certainty into our blows. We will know that we have comrades worthy of the name.

N.Y. TIMES SEPT. 19, 1942

oviet Bitter Over Allied Course; ees Hesitation in Churchill Speech

By The United Press.

OSCOW, Sept. 9—British Prime ister Winston Churchill's state- it in Parliament indicating disagreement between himself Premier Joseph Stalin during ir-conversations here was pub- ed in Moscow newspapers with- comment today, but it strength- d the Russian belief—correctly ncorrectly—that there was little spect of an early second front. Consequently there appeared to an intensified bitterness among se Russian leaders who believe Soviet Union is not being treat- as a full-fledged ally in the nd strategy of the British and ericans.

This feeling was strengthened by fact that the Russians presum- y were not invited, or at any e did not attend, the Allied conferences in London at which Britain and the United States "reached complete agreement on all fields of military operations." The belief is strong that the Allies are not taking Russia's necessities into proper consideration.

The published summary of Mr. Churchill's address omitted some portions of the Prime Minister's speech but included those in which Mr. Churchill noted differences of opinion between the British and the Russians. The summary omitted Mr. Churchill's disclosure that he found difficulty in getting the Russians to understand the nature of the war at sea. It also omitted Mr. Churchill's personal appreciation of Mr. Stalin's character.

The Soviet Government had never previously gone beyond the formal communiqués to tell the public what happened at the Churchill-Stalin meetings. However, informed persons here were well aware that a sharp divergence of views over the war arose in the course of the discussions. Aside from this small group of persons, the Russian populace a a whole assumed that the results of the conference were far from satisfactory but still hoped vaguely that the much-desired second front would be opened.

Mr. Churchill's announcement that Britain and the United States reached a complete agreement in all fields of military operation in London in July was the first inkling to Russians outside of the government that such an accord had been achieved. Tehere was also a feeling here that Britain and the United States were making their war plans without taking the necessities of Russia's situation into consideration and there was a suspicion here that Russian resistance only played a part in the Allied grand strtegy.

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Diplomtic quarters here discounted reports abroad that the Soviet Government had rejected Japanese demands reported to have been presented by Ambassador Naotaka Sato and that Russo-Japanese hostilities, therefore, were imminent. It was pointed out that Mr. Sato was last in Moscow June 18 to attend a session of the Supreme Soviet. After a few days he returned to Kuibyshev, where he has remained ever since.

Washington Is Reticent

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Sept. 9—Diplomatic circles were left in the dark, so far as could be learned here today, over the disclosure that a disagreement over the conduct of the war arose between Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Premier Joseph Stalin during their conversations in Moscow last month.

Presumably the White House has some report on details of the discussions, but it maintained silence, and officials outside the White House pleaded ignorance of the facts beyond those announced by the British Prime Minister to the House of Commons.

It was recalled that when Mr.

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Churchill left Moscow no great achievement was announced in the formal communiqués. Only now, through what the Russian press has been permitted to publish of the Prime Minister's statement to the House of Commons, it was pointed out, have the Russian people been informed of any significant features of the conversations. It was considered an interesting circumstance that not only is the information at least being given to the Russian people, but that press dispatches were permitted to come through the censorship from Moscow today telling of bitterness arising out of a popular belief that there is no prospect of early military aid by the United Nations for the relief of the Russian military situation.

This, it was realized, might be another form of pressure for the opening of a second front this year, but there was no indication here as to whether Russian apprehensions on this soscore would be dissipated by military action in the next few weeks. Such plans necessarily would be kept secret. The latest authoritative discussion of the subject was given by President Roosevelt in his fireside chat on Labor Day.

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EW LEADERS SEEN RISING IN RUSSIA

›ung Production Engineers Emerging to Dominance, Observer Asserts

MANAGERIAL REVOLT

›mmunists Are No Longer the Workers' Party, Says Dr. S. M. Schwarz

A new social class is emerging d rising to dominance in Soviet ıssia, composed not of prole-rians nor the old, loyal Bolshe-ti, but of the young production gineers in whose hands economic ntrol and administration has en unified, Dr. Solomon M. hwarz declares in a report on leads of Russian Factories" made blic yesterday.

In the study, which was pre-red in connection with a war search project on social and eco-mic controls in Germany and ıssia under the auspices of the aduate Faculty of Political and cial Science of the New School Social Research, Dr. Schwarz serts that the Communist party Russia is no longer a workers' rty, but "to an increasing extent has become the party of the of-ers of the various branches of onomy and administration."

According to Dr. Schwarz's find-gs, which will be published in the thcoming issue of Social Re-ırch, scientific quarterly of the aduate Faculty, Russia has gone ough a type of managerial revo-ion, with the trained executives coming a new privileged class. ven the most glorified Stak-nov workers were somewhat out place" at the Communist party ngress in 1939 after the great rge of 1936-38, he says, and not of them was elected to the ıtral committee.

Proletarian Is Subordinate

As the new type of leader is promoted, the proletarian worker is subordinated, and by a 1940 decree the worker is denied the privileges of free higher education for his children. Moreover, the children of workers are obliged to take vocational training, but those of engineers, attending higher schools at which tuition fees are charged, are exempted. The promotion of workers within the industry has been abandoned, exceptional work being rewarded by bonuses and other wage premiums.

"It is characteristic of recent developments that the young engineers are being increasingly promoted, not only in industrial plants but everywhere, especially in the Communist party offices and the general administration," Dr. Schwarz writes. "Engineers in the Soviet Union constitute today almost a third of the government, a phenomenon not to be observed anywhere else."

This vast social change was still in process when Germany attacked Russia and the ensuing conflict may affect the trend, but it was a process that has its roots back in the difficulties Russia has experienced with the problems of administration, he says.

In 1919, following the end of the civil war, Russian factories were placed under the dual control of directors, who were Communist party members, and technical assistants inherited from the earlier regime. A conflict of authority and interests developed and in 1928 there began far-reaching changes in the personnel of factory administration, accomplished by purge, terrorization and political trials.

A plan was instituted for providing specific training for industrial management and under it young Communists, mainly of proletarian origin, were given accelerated specialist courses by the thousands. In 1932, Dr. Schwarz finds, it was openly acknowledged that the scheme had failed as a result of lowering the levels of technical training and the plan was revised to provide more thorough training. The influx of manual workers was thus limited and the emphasis on proletarian background was neglected.

In the great purge of 1936-38 the old party wheel horses who had risen to directorial posts were ousted and the new type of leader was placed in charge of industrial plants.

"These new leaders were younger, often scarcely out of school, and they had a better and more systematic education than the 'Red specialists' who had preceded them," he says. "They were more interested in their professions, less interested in political problems."

The new leaders are conscious from their school days that they form a separate social stratum. Most of them leaned toward authoritative thinking and are completely devoted to Stalin as the embodiment of the economic rise and the international strengthening of the country.

"They accepted as natural the fact that this rise was dearly paid for, that the bulk of the toiling masses remained in dire want," Dr. Schwarz declares. "Their interest was not in social problems, but in the strong State that built up the national economy."

As a result, he concludes, the friction between the party apparatus and the general administration has died out.

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JAN 15 1943

The Text of Molotoff's Statement to Supreme Soviet on Allied Accords

Following, as furnished by the official Soviet Tass news agency is the text of the report made on June 18 by Vyacheslaff M. Molotoff, Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to the Supreme Soviet of U.S.S.R. on the treaty between the Soviet Union and Great Britain, signed May 26. It also covers the lease-lend agreement reached with the United States on June 11:

Comrade Deputies, the government has deemed it necessary to submit to the Supreme Soviet for examination and ratification the Anglo-Soviet treaty concluded May 26 in London. It does so in view of the great political importance of this treaty.

The treaty consolidates the friendly relations which have arisen between the Soviet Union and Great Britain and their mutual military assistance in the struggle against Hitlerite Germany and transforms these relations into a stable alliance. The treaty likewise defines the common line of our joint action with Great Britain in the post-war period.

The entire contents of this treaty bears out its great political importance not only as regards the future development of the entire complex of international relations in Europe.

Both the Anglo-Soviet treaty and the results of the negotiations which I conducted on the instructions of the Soviet Government in London and Washington testify to the substantial consolidation of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain and the United States of America. This will be of the greater significance to the peoples of the Soviet Union, who are bearing the main brunt of the struggle against Hitlerite Germany, the more it will help to expedite our victory over the German invaders.

Double Effect of Treaty

The treaty, like other results of negotiations in London and Washington, should hasten the defeat of Hitlerite Germany and her associates in aggression in Europe and at the same time provide a reliable base for further development of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain, as well as between these countries and the United States of America.

This was likewise the understanding reached both between the Soviet Union and England and between the Soviet Union and the United States of America on a number of the most important questions in relation to the present war and on collaboration after the war, implies the consolidation of fellowship in arms of all freedom-loving nations which are headed today by the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States.

Let me recall the events which preceded the conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet treaty of May 26 and which constituted the main stages of the development of new and friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

As we know, on the very day Germany attacked the Soviet Union, June 22 last year, Mr. Churchill, the British Prime Minister, publicly and firmly declared that Great Britain would assist the Soviet Union in the war against the German invaders, as the British people considered it the common task of theirs and of the peoples of the Soviet Union to defeat Hitlerite Germany. Subsequent negotiations with Sir Stafford Cripps, British Ambassador in Moscow, in which Comrade Stalin took the most active part, led to the conclusion of the well-known Anglo-Soviet agreement of July 12, 1941.

In this agreement the governments of the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain reciprocally undertook to accord one another assistance and support of all kinds in the present war against Hitlerite Germany and likewise not to conduct negotiations or conclude an armistice or peace except by mutual consent.

Frustrated Hitler's Plans

This agreement frustrated Hitler's plans of dividing his adversaries and Hitler's hopes of combating each one of them separately. July 12 of last year marked the turning point in the development of Anglo-Soviet relations. On that day the foundation of friendship and fighting collaboration was laid between our countries in the struggle against their common sworn enemy and in the interests of the great future of our nations.

The next stage in the development of the Anglo-Soviet and at the same time of the Soviet-American relations was the well-known Moscow three-power conference attended by Lord Beaverbrook, representing Great Britain, and Mr. Harriman, representing the United States of America, which completed its labors on Oct. 1 last year.

At this conference a plan was worked out for the delivery of munitions to the Soviet Union from Great Britain and the United States. As a result, tanks, aircraft and other armaments as well as deficient materials such as aluminum, nickel, rubber, etc., began to arrive in the Soviet Union in accordance with the big program of deliveries drawn up at the Moscow conference.

We must, of course, remember that the delivery of armaments and materials to the Soviet Union involved and still involves no inconsiderable difficulties. German warships, German submarines and aircraft engaged in banditry and piracy in the Atlantic constantly attack vessels transporting these armaments to the Soviet Union. In spite of the naval forces of our Allies escorting them, a number of vessels carrying cargoes for the U.S.S.R. perished on their way to Murmansk and Archangelsk.

Nevertheless, far from having diminished, deliveries of armaments and materials from the United States and Great Britain have increased in the past few months. These deliveries constitute an essential and important addition to the armaments and supplies which the Red Army receives in overwhelming proportion from our internal resources.

We considered, and still consider, it necessary to take measures for the increase and the improvement of these deliveries, both at present and in the future. It must likewise be recognized that these deliveries have played, and will play in the future, an important role in strengthening friendly relations between the

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U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the United States.

Eden's Visit to Moscow

A new important factor in the development of the Anglo-Soviet relations was the visit to Moscow last December of Mr. Eden, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the fruitful negotiations which Comrade Stalin conducted with him and in which I participated. These negotiations were subsequently developed, and after while it became clear that they promised to lead to definite and positive results.

Next, in April, there came the invitation from the British Government to the Soviet Government to send me to London to complete these negotiations and discuss a corresponding draft treaty. Simultaneously the President of the United States of America invited Comrade Stalin to send me to Washington for negotiations on important military and political questions of urgent character.

As you know, this visit of mine and of a group of close assistants took place and I had long and friendly conversations both in London with Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden and other members of the British Government, and in Washington with Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Hull and other leading representatives of the United States of America. The Soviet Ambassador, Comrade Litvinov, took part in these negotiations in London, and the Soviet Ambassador, Comrade Litvinoff, in Washington.

Furthermore, a close part in the discussion of military, strategical problems, was taken by chiefs of the military staffs of Great Britain and the United States, as well as the appropriate Soviet military representatives. As a result of successful negotiations there was signed in London on May 26 the "Treaty of Alliance in the War against Hitlerite Germany and her Associates in Europe, and of Collaboration and Mutual Assistance Thereafter, Concluded Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom of Great Britain."

The treaty consists of two parts: the first part contains two articles concerning relations between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain during the war against Hitlerite Germany, while the second part contains articles defining relations between the two countries after the war.

As regards the first part of the treaty, it may be said that in the main it repeats the contents of the well-known Anglo-Soviet agreement of July 12 of last year, transforming this agreement into a formal treaty. Lending greater precision to last year's agreement, the first part of the treaty provides mutual military and other assistance and support, not only against Germany but also against those States which are associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe."

Significance of Part II

The second part of the treaty is comparatively new. The significance of this part of the treaty lies firstly in the fact that it lays down for the first time the basic principles for friendly collaboration between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain after the war. It also provides for the collaboration of both countries with other United Nations in the peace settlement and in the post-war period, this collaboration being conceived on the lines of the basic principles of the well-known Atlantic Charter, to which the U.S.S.R. in its time adhered. There can be no doubt that an agreement of this kind will be of great significance to the entire future development of Europe.

Both countries agreed to work together after the re-establishment of peace "for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe." The treaty states that both countries "will take into account the interests of the United Nations in this object and will act in accordance with two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandizement for themselves and of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states."

These principles of the treaty are in full accord with the well-known pronouncement made by the head of the Government of the U.S.S.R., Comrade Stalin, on Nov. 6 last year, when he said: "We have not and cannot have any such war aims as the seizure of foreign territories and the subjugation of foreign peoples, whether it be peoples and territories of Europe or peoples and territories of Asia, including Iran."

Stressing the absence of any desire for territorial aggrandizement for themselves and noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, the Soviet Union and Great Britain proclaim the friendly principles of their policy toward all freedom-loving nations, and at the same time point to the fundamental difference between their policy and the aggressive policy of Hitlerite Germany, which is fighting for seizure of territory of other nations and for their enslavement.

In this connection, it is necessary to recall what Comrade Stalin said about the aims of our patriotic war of liberation against the Fascist invaders when he addressed the peoples of the Soviet Union as far back as July 3 last year:

Stalin's Words Recalled

"Our war for the freedom of our country will merge with the struggle of the peoples of Europe and America for their independence and for democratic liberties. It will be a united front of the peoples standing for freedom and against enslavement and threats of enslavement by Hitler's Fascist armies."

In accordance with the aforementioned objects and principles of the treaty, it declares that both governments desire "to unite with the other like-minded states in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the post-war period." And likewise after the termination of the war, "to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of the peace by Germany or any of the states associated with her in the acts of aggression in Europe."

Both countries also agreed that should one of them, during the post-war period, be again attacked by Germany or any other aggressor state, the other party "will at once give to the contracting party so involved in hostilities all the military and other support and assistance in its power."

The clear and categorical nature of this mutual undertaking is of high importance to our countries, which are striving to insure a stable peace after the victorious termination of this war. Further, every one realizes the importance of the fact that both governments agreed that all the above-mentioned obligations relating to the post-war period shall remain in force for a prolonged period, twenty years being the term envisaged, with the possibility of its prolongation.

No Secret Agreements

It is also asked whether, in addition to the published treaty, any secret agreements between the U. S. S. R. and Great Britain were concluded. I must declare with a full sense of responsibility that these assumptions are absolutely unfounded, and that no secret Anglo-Soviet agreements exist, as likewise there exist no secret Soviet-American agreements.

After all that has been said, one cannot help associating oneself with words uttered by Mr. Eden in his speech on the signing of the treaty when he said:

"Never before in the history of our two countries has our association been so close or our mutual pledge for the future so complete. This is surely a happy augury."

The treaty met with sympathetic response both in the U.S.S.R. and in Great Britain. Among the broad masses of people of both countries, the consolidation of friendship and collaboration in the struggle against German Fascist invaders, tyrants and oppressors met with warm approval and support.

The United States of America, which was kept duly informed of the progress of the negotiations and the conclusion of the treaty, as well as other freedom-loving countries which have experienced oppression and bloody tyranny of the Hitlerite hordes or are in danger of experiencing them, greeted our treaty with Great Britain with approval.

In the camp of our enemies, in the camp of the German Fascists and their associates, on the other hand, the treaty has caused dismay and malignant hissing. The camp of our enemies was caught unawares. All the more effectively will the treaty serve our just and righteous cause of liberation.

Other Questions Discussed

Important as are the questions which are dealt with in the treaty and to which great attention was devoted in the London negotiations, these negotiations, as you know, were not confined to the aforementioned questions alone. Both in London and in Washington other important questions were also discussed. I am referring chiefly to the questions intimately bearing on the vital problems of our war against Hitlerite Germany.

Serious attention was naturally paid in our negotiations both in London and in Washington to the problems of a second front in Europe. The results of these negotiations are dealt with in similar words both in the Anglo-Soviet and the Soviet-American communiqués. Both communiqués declare that in the negotiations "complete understanding was reached with regard to the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942."

This statement is of great im-

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portance to the peoples of the Soviet Union, since the creation of a second front in Europe will create insuperable difficulties for Hitler's armies on our front. Let us hope that our common enemy will soon experience to his cost the results of ever-growing military collaboration of the three great powers.

Furthermore, questions were discussed of further improving and increasing munitions deliveries to the Soviet Union from the United States and Great Britain. Here, too, positive results may be recorded. In the second half of the current year deliveries of munitions and supplies to the U.S.S.R. by the Allies will be increased and accelerated. This is confirmed above all by the increasing dimensions of deliveries from the United States.

As we know, last November the United States of America decided to accord the Soviet Union a loan of one thousand million dollars for payment of munitions deliveries to the Soviet Union. In the new program of deliveries the United States fixes their total value at three thousand million dollars. Thus we have a further substantial increase in the military and economic assistance rendered to the Soviet Union by the United States of America, as well as the consent of Great Britain to further improve munitions deliveries.

Agreement With United States

In this connection we must recognize the supreme importance of the "Agreement Between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, on Principles Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War Against Aggression," signed in Washington June 11, and which follows the lines of a similar agreement between the United States of America and Great Britain. This agreement is of a preliminary nature and lays down only principles of a future agreement between the two governments on this question.

The significance of this Soviet-American agreement lies in that it not only proceeds from the recognition of the fact of the fighting collaboration established between the Soviet Union and the United States of America in the present war against Hitlerite Germany, but also provides for coordinated action between the two countries in the post-war period.

The agreement implies the understanding between the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A. as regards the improvement of international relationships after the war in the interests of the stability of peace. Consequently the Washington agreement is of great significance to the United States and to the Soviet Union, as well as to other nations.

Lastly, in Washington, as in London, were discussed all the basic problems of collaboration between the Soviet Union and the United States in insuring peace and security for freedom-loving nations after the war. In this as in other fundamental questions of our relations, the parties noted with satisfaction a mutual understanding and identity of views.

I must declare that, as the representative of the U. S. S. R., I was shown cordiality and exceptional hospitality both in London and in Washington. I must particularly note the personal attention given to, and the most active part taken in, conversations, by the President of the United States, Mr. Roosevelt, and the British Premier, Mr. Churchill, to whom I take this opportunity of expressing my sincere gratitude.

In all this we observe the consolidation of the international position of the Soviet Union. Fact after fact confirms what Comrade Stalin said in his May 1 Order of the Day:

"As regards international ties of our country, they have grown stronger and become more extensive of late than ever before. All freedom-loving peoples have united against German imperialism. Their eyes are fixed on the Soviet Union. The heroic fight which the peoples of our country are waging for their freedom, honor and independence evokes the admiration of all progressive humanity.

"Peoples of all freedom-loving countries look upon the Soviet Union as the force that is capable of delivering the world from the Hitlerite plague. First among these freedom-loving countries stand Britain and the United States of America, to which we are linked by bonds of friendship and alliance, and which are affording our country ever-increasing military assistance against the German fascist invaders."

Ties Growing Ever Stronger

The treaty and the results of the negotiations in London and Washington in general testify that the ties of friendship and alliance between the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States of America are growing ever stronger and closer. This is a sign of the growing international recognition of the strength, and of the successes achieved by the Red Army in the struggle against the sworn enemy of all freedom-loving nations, in the struggle against Hitler and his bloody underlings.

In this we observe also confirmation of the correctness of the foreign policy of our government, which is unswervingly concerned to strengthen the friendly relations with Great Britain and the United States of America, as well as with all other freedom-loving nations, for the purpose of expediting the defeat of the Hitler hordes and their expulsion from our country, and for the sake of the triumph of the cause of all freedom-loving nations united in the struggle for their existence and happy future.

The treaty with Great Britain, as well as the results of the negotiations in London and in Washington, strengthen our confidence, the confidence of the Red Army and of the entire Soviet people, that the united forces of the adversaries of Hitler's army are growing ever stronger and more consolidated. They strengthen our confidence that the defeat of the German invaders is growing near, that now our victory over the predatory German imperialism will be considerably accelerated.

The growing strength of the Red Army, the invincible Soviet rear, and the increasing military assistance of our allies will defeat all and every plan of the German fascist invaders. Our strength is growing and our confidence in the victory is greater than ever.

On behalf of the government, I request the Supreme Soviet to ratify the treaty before it, as one which fully corresponds with the interests of the Soviet people.

Under the great banner of Lenin and Stalin, we are waging our heroic struggle of liberation against German fascism. Under the great banner of Lenin and Stalin we shall carry this struggle to a victorious conclusion and to the triumph of the cause of our country and all freedom-loving nations.

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ATLANTIC CHARTER SAVED IN ITS FIRST GREAT CRISIS

Unwavering Stand by President and Hull Prevented Any Surrender by Our Allies of Guarantee to Small Nations

BUT RUSSIA GAINS GREAT DEAL

By ARTHUR KROCK

WASHINGTON, June 13—The Atlantic Charter has survived its first great crisis, and the totalitarian government of Soviet Russia has placed its trust in the democratic governments of the United States and Great Britain in so far as aid during the war and security afterward are concerned. These are the outstanding implications of the treaty just signed between London and Moscow and the coeval understandings between the governments of the United States and Russia.

The three great anti-Axis nations are now closer allies, with respect to military operations in Europe, than ever before.

The statement that Moscow has placed its trust in the democracies refers, of course, to their promise to form a second front in 1942, if that can be managed with any hope of success, and to Great Britain's pledge of twenty years of assistance and cooperation, military and otherwise, on the basis of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. It may be that, as a result of the conversations in London and Washington between Mr. Molotoff and the highest officials of the democracies, the trust will be extended to complete partnership in the field. Thus far the Russians have declined to permit British and American military observers to have a real look at their war and production machines. But if the spirit of the other understandings represents the final conviction of Russia that the United Nations can be trusted in every way, come fair weather or foul, it may well be that this restraint will be lifted also.

Soviet Persuaded

The crisis confronting the Atlantic Charter was weathered when the Soviet Government was persuaded to abandon a demand for British guarantees at this time that Russia's frontiers, prior to Hitler's attack, will be restored if the United Nations win the war, plus slices of Rumania and Finland. This would have been a flagrant violation of the Roosevelt-Churchill pledge to small nations, forcibly deprived of their importance, that their sovereignty will be returned to them.

When the American Government, some months ago, learned of this Russian demand for security, it learned also that the British were reluctantly disposed to accede to it. The war was very close to them; from a Russian viewpoint the demand was natural and based on bitter experience; and to assure that the Soviets would stay in the war was more important than to live up to the high principles of the Charter, if so grievous a choice had to be made.

The British at the time concluded that the choice was this, and that they must sign the guarantees. They advised Washington of the dismal prospect, and Foreign Secretary Eden began to prepare a political and diplomatic position strong enough to withstand the assault of criticism that was anticipated in Great Britain and the Empire. He felt confident this could be done, but he knew there would be a battleground of disillusioned public opinion in the United States on which the allied war program might be seriously damaged.

Weeks of Communications

Through the British Embassy in Washington, the American Embassy in London (Mr. Winant made a special trip home to go over the prospect), the State Department, the Foreign Office, Downing Street and the White House the disturbed communications flowed for weeks. But from Washington there came only one message, unwavering from the moment the Russian demand was first made known to the President and Secretary Hull. The message was that some other way must be found to pledge full war cooperation and post-war security to Russia, and it must be planted on the Atlantic Charter.

This pressure produced the mutual security pact for twenty years between Great Britain and the Soviet Union, the Anglo-American pledge to attempt to form a second front in Europe in 1942, promises of increased aid from the democracies that materialized in the new lease-lend pact between Washington and Moscow, and the President's verbal opinion that the question of Russian boundaries would be settled in a way to insure Russia's safety if the matter were deferred until the war was over.

When Mr. Eden presented this alternative formula to Mr. Molotoff, it is said that he was not sure of its reception. But he was able to say that the United States endorsed it wholly, would stand behind it physically where that was indicated and morally where it was not, and was unalterably opposed to foreclosure at this time of the independence of the Baltic States and large areas of Poland and Finland. He was able to say

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also that the United States would immediately declare war on Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, something the Soviet Union had long desired (because this removes them from the boundary and other protections of the Charter by the American Government), and that if Mr. Molotoff accepted the President's invitation to visit Washington he would have all the assurances confirmed.

Stalin Accepts

Somewhat to the surprise of the British Government, well aware of the Russian distrust of the democracies, Mr. Stalin directed prompt acceptance of the alternative. Mr. Molotoff even signed the treaty with the British before coming to Washington, where he found that all the London representations were in order. The fact that his arrival and the news of the Administration order deporting Harry Bridges were curiously close together was generally interpreted as Presidential notice to Mr. Molotoff that the United States frowns on the importation of Communism anywhere.

The sea-born Atlantic Charter had weathered a hard blow, and the President and Mr. Hull had won a battle of realistic, hard-hitting and high-minded diplomacy after a most anxious period. Doubtless Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden breathed deep sighs of relief also, for the position in which they had found themselves for a rather long time was a very uncomfortable one for the European champions of self-determination.

But probably no man was more relieved than Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador to the United States. A man of unflinching integrity and deep moral sense, he was unhappy at the prospect of any sacrifice of national autonomy, however pressing the necessity. As the representative here of a government which consented to such a sacrifice, his personal and political situation would have been disagreeable and the target of the Anglo-American "liberal" group which sought to prevent his appointment.

Happy Ending

The happy ending can be attributed to the pressure of Washington from afar and to the skill with which Mr. Eden handled the delicate case from the time of his first visit to Moscow. But the Russians gained more than they relinquished. Post-war Baltic plebiscites, conducted by the peace machinery which will be set up by the United Nations, may conceivably produce some political extensions of their system. A second front has been pledged to them, and the whole power of Britain—morally supported, at least, by the United Nations unless there is a political reaction here—has been put behind them for twenty years.

Maybe Mr. Stalin anticipated he would get a better horse out of the trade if he asked for the one he did. But the horse's papers include the Atlantic Charter, and that was worth the exchange.

This is a clipping from page _____ of the New York Times for _____

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Speech by Molotoff

The text of the speech made by M. Molotoff, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs:

Mr. Churchill, gentlemen:

The treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Great Britain of alliance in the war against Hitlerite Germany and her accomplices in Europe, and of cooperation and mutual assistance after the war, which I have just had the honor of signing in the name of the Government of the U.S.S.R., represents an important political landmark in the development of relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

The treaty between us is essential not only to the peoples of the U. S. S. R. and Great Britain but also to the peoples who have experienced the aggression of the German-Fascist imperialists or whose freedom and honor have been threatened and may still be threatened by the Hitlerite band of robbers, oppressors and ravishers—all of these will express their satisfaction at the conclusion of this historic treaty.

Our Allies all over the world will share with us the warmest feelings of satisfaction. Our treaty is indispenable in order the more quickly to insure the destruction of Hitlerite Germany and to attain our desired aim—victory.

The present treaty also determines the common line of action of the Soviet Union and Great Britain after the war. The fact that this treaty operates for a period of twenty years and is based on mutual military and economic assistance against possible further aggression on the part of Germany, and is intended to insure the security and economic well-being of the peoples of Europe, speaks for itself.

Hitler and his accomplices in their blood-stained robbery of Europe will now feel more than ever that the united forces of their adversaries have been rallied and strengthened. So much the better for us, for our peoples and for our common cause.

This treaty signifies and contains much more than the Anglo-Soviet agreement of last year.

The treaty of May 26, 19[illegible] marks a new and important stage in the development of Anglo-Soviet relations on the basis of alliance and mutual military assistance against our common and irreconcilable foe, both of today and of the future, in Europe. It provides a desired basis for joint action after the war, thus greatly adding to its importance.

It is still further necessary that what relates to the present day in this treaty is already successfully being realized and carried into effect.

Such a treaty will be welcomed with great satisfaction by the masses of the Soviet Union, where, under the direction of their great leader and supreme commander, J. V. Stalin, the Red Army is carrying on a heroic struggle against the German invaders, confident in the belief that the time is not far distant when our just cause will achieve full victory.

Please accept, Mr. Prime Minister Churchill and Mr. Secretary Eden, to whom the present treaty owes so much, my sincere gratitude for the active part you have taken at all stages.

I express my sincere personal gratitude to His Majesty's Government for the hospitality shown to me, the representative of the Government of the U.S.S.R.

In conclusion I wish to express my firm conviction that the treaty which has been signed today well serves the cause of our victory, the cause of the great future of our two peoples.

This is a clipping from page 3 of the New York Times for June 12, 1942
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NO SECRET IN PACT, BRITISH ASSURED

Commons Cheers the News of Open Treaty—Agreement Is Hailed as Peace Safeguard

By ROBERT P. POST

Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES

LONDON, June 11—The loudest cheers—or rather a loud but gentlemanly "Hear, hear!"—greeted Secretary Anthony Eden's announcement in the House of Commons today that there were no secrets in the British-Russian treaty and no commitments not made public. The cheers were an indication of the Members' relief on learning that Britain was not going to be drawn into any possible Continental demands on the part of Russia.

The second loudest response came when Mr. Eden announced that there had been complete agreement on a second European front in 1942.

The immediate Parliamentary reaction came from Arthur Greenwood, official leader of the Labor Party outside the Government, who said the House had received the statement with the most profound satisfaction "that we are working together as comrades in the war, and would be working together in times of peace."

Then came a little surprise as David Lloyd George rose amid another Parliamentary chorus.

"As one who has labored over twenty years to establish good understanding between Soviet Russia and this country," he said, "I

Continued on Page Two

felicitate the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Government upon the accomplishment of this treaty. Had it been a fact some years ago, many grave blunders in foreign policy would have been avoided; not only that, but this war would never have occurred."

There was a similar reaction in the House of Lords. Whatever private worries some reactionaries and Tories may have over the treaty with Russia, they appeared to be drowned by the overwhelming tide of pleasure that a hard and fast treaty with a nation that has proved so powerful and fought so well had been signed.

Though some time must elapse before Parliament can completely make up its mind, it appeared tonight that the treaty, which probably will be discussed on the floor next week, met the general approval of Parliament, as it seems to have done throughout the country. Indeed it will probably prove so popular that it will be a brave politician who dares to raise his voice against it.

Press Reaction Favorable

The reactions of the London press tonight was overwhelmingly favorable.

"Soviet Russia, the United States and Britain are marked out by the extent of their resources to be the three main artificers of victory," The Times of London will say tomorrow. "Their steadfast resolve to maintain the closest cooperation with one another, as well as with all who have actively sustained them in the great common effort is the most effective guarantee that victory will be merely the first stage of the task of construction and reconstruction that lies ahead."

The Times sees "no reason to deplore" the lack of political stipulations "regarding the future map of Europe." A durable peace, The Times says, depends much elss on the delineation of frontiers or political pacts than on a solid foundation of military security for the establishment of proper social and economic conditions.

"If a catastrophe of famine and disease is not to aggravate the terrible havoc of the war, the closest cooperation of both Britain and Russia with the United States and the other great oversea democracies will be needed for the immediate work of relief and reconstruction, and it can be assumed that these questions were discussed," the editorial asserts.

"It means," The Daily Mail will say, "that both Britain and Russia will exercise their proper influence in an atmosphere that should have been cleared by their common sacrifices in the war. Let us hope that the suspicions which marred relations in the past will be permanently removed."

War Prevention Acclaimed

The radical Dily Mirror, once threatened with suspension, says: "Our peoples will rejoice at the news that friendship with Russia, which might have prevented the war, will now be confirmed in determination to prevent another."

The Daily Herald, Labor's official organ, says that the first condition of a successful world after the war is unity of purpose and effort between Britain and Russia.

"We have made an Anglo-Russian partnership not for the selfish purposes of either the Soviet Union or the British Commonwealth, but to serve the common interests of the United Nations and the well-being of all humanity," The Herald writes.

This is Adolf Hitler's second worst moment of the war, the first having been his failure to take Moscow, says Lord Beaverbrook's Express.

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Times for June 12, 1942

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

White House Statement

By The Associated Press.

WASHINGTON, June 11—The text of the official White House statement on the Roosevelt-Molotoff conversations follows:

The People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. V. M. Molotoff, following the invitation of the President of the United States of America, arrived in Washington May 29 and was for some time the President's guest.

This visit to Washington afforded an opportunity for a friendly exchange of views between the President and his advisers on the one hand and Mr. V. Molotoff and his party on the other. Among those who participated in the conversations were the Soviet Ambassador in the United States, Mr. Maxim Litvinoff, Mr. Harry Hopkins, Chief of Staff General Marshall and Commander in Chief of the United States Navy, Admiral Ernest J. King, Mr. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, joined in subsequent conversations on non-military matters.

In the course of the conversations, full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942. In addition, the measures for increasing and speeding up the supplies of planes, tanks, and other kinds of war materials from the United States to the Soviet Union were discussed.

Further were discussed the fundamental problems of cooperation of the Soviet Union and the United States in safeguarding peace and security to the freedom-loving peoples after the war.

Both sides state with satisfaction the unity of their views on all these questions.

At the conclusion of the visit the President asked Mr. Molotoff to inform Mr. Stalin on his behalf that he feels these conversations have been most useful in establishing a basis for fruitful and closer relationship between the two governments in the pursuit of the common objectives of the United Nations.

This is a clipping from page 6 of the New York Times for June 12, 1942
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U. S., RUSSIA AGREE

Accord on War Action and Help Reached, President Reveals

URGENT TASKS SET

Reaction of Congress to Agreements Favorable —2d Front Backed

Text of White House statement will be found on Page 6.

By W. H. LAWRENCE
Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, June 11—A full understanding has been reached by President Roosevelt and Vyacheslaff M. Molotoff, Soviet Russia's Foreign Commissar, "with regard to the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942," it was announced by the White House today.

The disclosure of the accord between the President and Mr. Molotoff, reached during a secret visit of the Russian Commissar to this country from May 29 through June 4, came shortly after an announcement in London that the British Government also had agreed with the Russians on the second front question and, in addition, had signed with the Soviet Government a twenty-year mutual assistance treaty against Hitlerite Germany.

Neither Washington nor London indicated just how soon an American-British expeditionary force could be expected to make a landing on the Nazi-held continent of Europe to recapture lost territory from the Germans and provide a "diversion front" to which German troops, now pressing against usRsia ,would have to be sent.

Agree To Increase Aid to Russia

The White House also said that the President and Mr. Molotoff had agreed on measures "for increasing and speeding up the supplies of planes, tanks and other kinds of war materials from the United States to Soviet Russia." It was learned on good authority that Mr. Molotoff carried back to Moscow a new schedule of American lease-lend shipments, replacing the Moscow protocol, which expires June 30.

It was understood that the new aid schedule placed greater emphasis on finished military materiel, especially tanks and bombers, than the agreement negotiated in October by the Harriman-Beaverbrook mission, which provided primarily for supplies of raw materials.

Looking oward victory over the Axis, the President and Mr. Molotoff also found unity on "the fundamental problems of cooperation of the Soviet Union and the United States in safeguarding peace and security to the freedom-loving peoples after the war."

There was no indication in the White House statement nor in the London announcement by Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, that the question of Russian cooperation with the United States and Great Britain in the war against Japan had been discussed, but if such discussions took place, it is probable that they would not be revealed in any event because Russia still remains at peace with Japan.

Nye Cool to Second Front

Congressional reaction to the agreement between the United States Government and Russia generally was good, although the pre-war leaders in opposition to the President's foreign policy urged caution in opening a second front in Europe, and one of them, Senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota, chided "others of our allies" for not opening "a second front before this time." Senator Nye added that "we've got a front of two of our own that we are needing to devote ourselves to most energetically."

Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana, another opponent of the President, said he hoped that "we don't attempt an invasion until we're prepared," but he was in favor of doing "everything we can to get war tools and tanks to Russia now that she's our ally in this war."

Senator Tom Connally of Texas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who was among the few officials invited to meet with Mr. Molotoff while he was here, spoke approvingly of the agreement, declaring that the United States must give Russia "every possible aid and assistance in defeating the enemy." He said that Mr. Molotoff's visit here "was very helpful in creating unity between our countries in the prosecution of the war. He said the closest contact and understanding in regard to military operations, "including the ultimate establishment of a western front," was of vast importance to both countries.

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Other comment included:

Senator Millard E. Tydings of Maryland: "If the military people deem it wise, it certainly looks sensible to me."

Senator William H. Smathers of New Jersey: "I think a second front ought to be opened immediately—the quicker the better. I don't see any sense in having our troops and the British sitting on the British Isles. I'm in favor of opening a second front as soon as the military experts think it advisable."

Representative Carl Vinson of Georgia, chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee: "This is good news; it is to be earnestly hoped that the United Nations can at the earliest possible date open a second front in Europe. I have been of the opinion for some time that the combined resources of England and the United States should be hurled against the Axis by opening up a second front. It is imperative that this be done immediately, for I am of the opinion it will insure victory to the Allied nations."

Senator Lister Hill of Alabama: "The most momentous and critical place in the whole world battle line is the war on the Russian front. The Molotoff agreement is extremely gratifying."

Senator Carl A. Hatch of New Mexico: "I am in hearty agreement with supplying all the equipment we can to our Allies. I want a second front opened just as quickly as possible, consonant with military preparedness."

Wheeler Asks About Peace

Senator Wheeler: "I feel we do everything we can to get war tools and tanks to Russia now that she's our ally in this war. I am glad to note that the President and Mr. Molotoff have come to an understanding in helping to maintain peace after the war. What the people would be interested to know is what steps, if any, have been taken to bring about peace. I hope the President and Mr. Molotoff come to an agreement similar to the one that Russia and England entered into, that Russia was not asking territorial aggrandizement, and would not in the future interfere with the internal affairs of other nations, as Eden says. I hope that the United States will not attempt an unsound invasion of Europe. I hope we don't attempt an invasion until we're fully prepared. The people of the United States want no Dunkerques."

Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia: "A second front is going to have to come to win the war. We should open it as soon as it is possible from a military point of view—without the possibility of a second Dunkerque."

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By The Associated Press.

LONDON, June 11—The following White Paper, "Russia Number One (1942)," was issued by the British Government today immediately after the announcement of the British-Russian treaty in the House of Commons:

Russian-British Agreement

The text of the twenty-year Russian-British Mutual Assistance Agreement:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and British Dominions Beyond Seas, Emperor of India, and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Desiring to confirm the stipulations of the agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for joint action in the war against Germany signed at Moscow, July 12, 1941, and to replace them by formal treaty;

Desiring to contribute after the war to the maintenance of peace and to the prevention of further aggression by Germany or the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe;

Desiring, moreover, to give expression to their intention to collaborate closely with one another as well as with the other United Nations at the peace settlement and during the ensuing period of reconstruction on a basis of the principles enunciated in the declaration made Aug. 14, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, to which the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has adhered;

Desiring finally to provide for mutual assistance in the event of attack upon either high contracting party by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe;

Have decided to conclude a treaty for that purpose and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions Beyond Seas, Emperor of India, for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M. P., His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

M. Vyacheslaff Mikhailovich Molotoff, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs,

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

PART ONE

Article I.

In virtue of the alliance established between the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the high contracting parties mutually undertake to afford one another military and other assistance and support of all kinds in war against Germany and all those States which are associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Article II

The high contracting parties undertake not to enter into any negotiations with the Hitlerite Government or any other government in Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggression intentions, and not to negotiate or conclude, except by mutual consent, any armistice or peace treaty with Germany or any other State associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

PART TWO

Article III

1. The high contracting parties declare their desire to unite with other like-minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the post-war period.

2. Pending adoption of such proposals, they will after termination of hostilities take all measures in their power to render impossible the repetition of aggression and violation of peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Article IV

Should either of the high contracting parties during the post-war period become involved in hostilities with Germany or any of the States mentioned in Article III, Section 2, in consequence of the attack by that State against that party, the other high contracting party will at once give to the contracting party so involved in hostilities all military

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and other support and assistance in his power.

This article shall remain in force until the high contracting parties, by mutual agreement, shall recognize that it is superseded by adoption of proposals contemplated in Article III, Section 1. In default of adoption of such proposals, it shall remain in force for a period of twenty years and thereafter until terminated by either high contracting party as provided in Article VIII.

Article V

The high contracting parties, having regard to the interests of security of each of them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after re-establishment of peace for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe.

They will take into account the interests of the United Nations in these objects and they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandizement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

Article VI

The high contracting parties agree to render one another all possible economic assistance after the war.

Article VII

Each high contracting party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other high contracting party.

Article VIII

The present treaty is subject to ratification in the shortest possible time and instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Moscow as soon as possible.

It comes into force immediately on the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall thereupon replace the agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom signed at Moscow July 12, 1941.

Part One of the present treaty shall remain in force until the re-establishment of peace between the high contracting parties and Germany and the powers associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Part Two of the present treaty shall remain in force for a period of twenty years. Thereafter, unless twelve months' notice has been given by either party to terminate the treaty at the end of the said period of twenty years, it shall continue in force until twelve months after either high contracting party shall have given notice to the other in writing of his intention to terminate it.

In witness whereof the abovenamed plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate in London on the twenty-sixth day of May, 1942, in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

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King's Message to Kalinin

The text of a message from His Majesty the King to M. Kalinin, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council U.S.S.R.:

I cannot let this occasion pass without expressing to you, Mr. President, my gratification at the signature which has taken place this day of our treaty of alliance.

This treaty consecrates the efforts of our two countries in the hard and bitter struggle they are waging and pledges them to whole-hearted cooperation and mutual support in the years that will follow our victory.

I like to believe that you, Mr. President, welcome it as sincerely as I do myself and that you share my confidence that its effect will be to the benefit not only of our two countries but of all the world.

Kalinin's Reply to King

The text of the message in reply from M. Kalinin to His Majesty the King:

I fully share the satisfaction expressed by Your Majesty at the signing of the treaty of alliance between our countries.

I am sure that the treaty now signed will consolidate yet further the fighting alliance of our countries in their stern and incompromising struggles against the common enemy and will insure cordial cooperation and mutual assistance in the years following victory.

I welcome the treaty as sincerely as does Your Majesty and express the conviction that this treaty will be a benefit not only to our two countries but to all the world.

Speech by Eden

The text of the speech by Mr. Eden on the occasion of the signature of the treaty:

On behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom I welcome you, M. Molotoff, as Foreign Secretary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

We are met in a world at war when our two countries are together at grips with a common enemy. Under the impact of war we have found that understanding which escaped us in the uneasy years of peace. The treaty which we have just signed engages us to continue the struggle together until the victory be won. On behalf of my colleagues, I give you a pledge that there will be no wavering in this endeavor on the part of the government or the people of these islands.

Such then is the first chapter of our task, the overthrow of Hitler and the destruction of all that his regime stands for. But there is a second chapter also to our treaty. One day the war will end. One day the common enemy will be defeated and there will be peace again. We must see to it that this time the peace endures. In the treaty which we have signed we pledge ourselves to work together for this purpose.

Never before in the history of our two countries has our association been so close or our mutual pledge for the future so complete. This is surely a happy augury. There is nothing exclusive in our agreement. We are seeking peace and security, not only for our two countries but for all the United Nations. But understanding between us is one of the foundations of peace, not for us alone but for the world. We have signed our treaty and part of the work is behind us.

I would like to say now, M. Molotoff, how much we have valued the statesmanship and insight which you have shown in our negotiations. I would like, too, to thank M. Maisky, your Ambassador, who has done so much in his years here to build the bridge between our two countries.

Part of the work is behind us. But the greater part yet lies ahead. There is the war to win.

You yourself, M. Molotoff, are leaving our shores for the United States. Upon the cooperation of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the British Commonwealth the future of mankind will largely depend.

We thank you for your work with us here and we wish you well upon your journey.

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Foreign Secretary Eden's Address

By The Associated Press.

LONDON, June 11—The text of Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's statement in the House of Commons today follows:

I am glad to be able to inform the House that His Majesty's Government have concluded a treaty with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which confirms our alliance with that country during the war against Germany and her associates in Europe.

The treaty provides that after the war our two countries will render each other mutual assistance against any further attack by Germany or her associates.

It further provides that we will collaborate with one another and with the other United Nations and in the peace settlement and during the ensuing period of reconstruction on the basis of the principles set out in the Atlantic Charter.

The House will remember that Germany invaded Russia on June 22 last year and on the same evening the Prime Minister affirmed that the Russian danger was our danger and that we should give whatever help we could to Russia and make common cause with the Russian people. Practical effect was given to the Prime Minister's declarations by the signing on July 12 of the agreement for joint action in the war against Germany.

How Negotiations Began

In September Lord Beaverbrook, with Mr. Averell Harriman, visited Moscow and negotiated an arrangement for supplying the Soviet Government with war materials they urgently needed for prosecution of the war.

This visit was followed in the political field by my visit to Moscow in December last year. The purpose of the visit, in the words of a joint communique issued on my return, was the exchange of views on questions relating to the conduct of the war and to the post-war organization of peace and security in Europe.

Since then the conversations begun in Moscow have been continuing. The British Dominions, the United States and other countries most closely concerned have been kept fully informed of the whole course of our negotiations.

When I was in Moscow I gave Mr. Molotov a cordial invitation to visit us in this country and when our discussions here had made sufficient progress the Government suggested that Mr. Molotov should come to London to embody our agreement in a formal treaty.

Mr. Molotov, meanwhile, had been invited by President Roosevelt to visit him in Washington. It was arranged accordingly that Mr. Molotov should come here and then go on to the United States. He arrived in London on May 21 and the treaty was signed May 26.

The next day Mr. Molotov left for the United States in accordance with his program. I am glad to be able to tell the House that Mr. Molotov had a safe journey to the United States and back and he had most useful and satisfactory talks with the President in Washington. Mr. Molotov has now gone back to Moscow.

When I sat down a White Paper will be available to the members at the vote office. The White Paper will contain, in addition to the treaty and the exchange of messages between the King and Mr. Kalinin, speeches made by Mr. Molotov and myself at the signature of the treaty, but I think it would be for the convenience of the House if I give them now a brief outline of what the treaty says.

The United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. reaffirm their determination to afford one another all possible assistance in the war and not to enter into any negotiations with the Hitlerite government or any other government in Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions and not to negotiate or conclude except by mutual consent any armistice or peace treaty with Germany or any other state associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

The two countries also agree that they will when peace is re-established work together for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe. In doing so they will take into account the interests of the United Nations and they undertake to be guided by the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandizement for themselves and of not interfering in the internal affairs of other States.

The two governments go on to declare their desire to unite with other like-minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the post-war period. Meanwhile, when the war is ended they will take—I quote the

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treaty—all measures in their power to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of the peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Interval After Victory

There is, of course, bound to be some interval after victory has been gained before an effective international system can be built up for preserving peace and for the prevention of further aggression. The two governments accordingly have agreed that should one of our countries during the post-war period become involved in hostilities with Germany or any of her European associates in consequence of an attack by one of them the two governments will at once give each other all military and other support and assistance in their power.

As for the duration of this undertaking—I will quote from the relevant article of the treaty—this article shall remain in force until the high contracting parties by mutual agreement shall recognize that it is superseded by the adoption of proposals contemplated in Article III—that is, a long-term system of international security which the treaty contemplates as our goal and which I already have mentioned.

The article then goes on as follows:

"In default of adoption of such proposals it shall remain in force for a period of twenty years and thereafter until terminated by either high contracting party."

The treaty contains a ratification clause. Both governments are anxious that the treaty shall come into force as soon as possible. The treaty accordingly will be laid forthwith on the table of the House.

Second Front Discussed

Our conversations with Mr. Molotoff were not, of course, confined to treaty matters, important as they were. The war in all its aspects was reviewed and I will now give the House a quotation from the communiqué which is being issued this afternoon:

"A full understanding was reached between the two parties with regard to the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942. Discussions also took place on the question of further improving the supplies of airplanes, tanks and other war material to be sent from Great Britain to the Soviet Union."

Both sides were gratified to note the identity of their views on all the above questions. I am sure the House will join with me in welcoming the signature of this treaty and the prospects which it opens up of active and fruitful cooperation in war and peace. From our long and friendly exchange of views with Mr. Molotoff we are sure the treaty expresses exactly the common desire of the two governments.

We have been able to arrive at this happy result through establishing by our contact with Mr. Stalin and Mr. Molotoff complete mutual confidence. This is the time to mention their valuable contribution to Anglo-Russian understanding over a long period of years.

Basis for Reconstruction

The signature of this treaty not only formulates and emphasizes the closeness of the collaboration between our two countries during the war; it affords also an indispensable basis for European reconstruction. This does not mean our two countries alone will be responsible for the peace of Europe when the war is won. That is a burden which will be shared by all the United Nations.

It means that without the closest understanding between Great Britain and the Soviet Union there can be no security and stability in Europe, either for ourselves or any of our Allies.

The problems of peace, of course, are not for Europe alone and I hope with sure confidence that the good work our two countries have accomplished will be welcomed by the President and people of the United States and will enable our three countries to work together in the years of peace as now in the hard times of war.

[Arthur Greenwood, Labor leader and a former Minister Without Portfolio, said he felt sure the House received the statement with feelings of most profound satisfaction.

[He asked whether Mr. Eden could assure the House and "any suspicious persons outside" whether in these negotiations any secret understanding had been made.

[Mr. Eden replied: "The whole of the terms of the agreement arrived at are published in the White Paper. There are no secret engagements or commitments of any kind whatsoever."]

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The German workers and the German nation can be reassured: That the defeat of Hitler, the dethronement of the shameless Fascistic tyranny by the hands of the own German nation, is the salvation of Germany. The workers of all countries, nations that are completely determined to conquer, and finally establish a peace of duration, only want the destruction of German Fascism. Workers of all nations wait for it and expect it, that Germany should join the ranks of the league of all nations, embracing the whole world, who see their own salvation and the salvation of the German nation not in war and destruction, but in peace and creative work.

In this manner, the first of May of the year 1942, reminds the German workers of the wonderful days of past battles, calls the German working class to a decisive battle against the war of Hitler and Hitler's slavery. In history there are moments that leave traces in the memory of the whole of humanity; moments which not only mean a step, but a jump ahead, which, like lightenings, show the contours of the future. Such a moment was the battle at Walma (Valma) of which Goethe said on the very battlefield: "On this place and from this moment a new epoch of world history is starting!" Such a moment was the great battle for Moscow. With unknown intensity all of humanity was following the genial leader of the regiment, Stalin, leading the Red Army into this decisive battle against the Fascistic monster. The Red Army won the battle. She smashed back the "unconquerable" German regiments, turned the falsely proclaimed victory of Hitler into a terrible defeat. The first of May must become the day of mobilization of the forces of the working class of all nations for the creation of the holy liberating war of nations against the slavery of Hitler.

The first of May has been for a whole generation a day when the working man started to grow in his own eyes, when he started to feel that he was one whole unit together with millions of brothers of his class, when it started dawning on him that he belonged to the mighty fighting collective unit. The first of May 1942 is even much more great in its meaning. This day is the day of the firmness of all nations, this is the day that unites all lovers of liberty, of all honest people, in the battle for their individual worthy existence for the holy liberating war against Fascism for the whole human race. On this day of the realization of one's human worth, the manliness and determination of every fighter must put aside all cowardly cautions. The greatness of this duty must force all local and selfish desires on the last plan. Unity of all progressive, liberty-loving powers must result into determined action. Unity of the working class, unity of the nations, uniting the battles of the people with the unique battle of the Soviet nation and her Red Army—this is the cry and sign of the first of May, 1942.

There is no time to wait any longer, one has to start for action. Forward, into battle against the blood-thirsty, inhuman Fascism! Forward, towards the defeat of the weakened front of the Fascist tyranny. The war can be finished with the victory of liberty-loving nations still in this year of 1942. Also Hitler can be destroyed already in this year of 1942. This is the chief slogan of the first of May. The clue of the victory of the nations lies in this slogan.

(This article is styled "The First of May, 1942." It is "The Address of the All-Slav Congress" by Perodovaya.)

A 20-YEAR TREATY

Mutual Aid Agreement Bars Separate Peace and Annexations

JAPAN NOT COVERED

Pact Based on Atlantic Charter Is Hailed by King and Kalinin

Text of White Paper, treaty and Eden's speech, Page 3.

By RAYMOND DANIELL
Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, June 11 — A treaty has been signed binding Russia and Great Britain in close alliance in the war against Nazi Germany and the countries "associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe" and pledging cooperation and mutual assistance for twenty years.

This momentous announcement was made by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in the House of Commons late this afternoon. He introduced the White Paper containing the text of the treaty and the speeches made by him and by Soviet Foreign Commissar Vyacheslaff Molotoff when they affixed their signatures to the historic document May 26 at the Foreign Office.

The White Paper also included the texts of the messages exchanged between King George VI and President Mikhail I. Kalinin, which the alliance between democratic nation and the world's first Communist State was hailed as the foundation on which the post-war world would be built.

Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in a message to Premier Joseph V. Stalin, said he thought the treaty would go fa rtoward "overcoming barriers" between the two countries and expressed "the conviction that victory will be ours."

Mr. Stalin in reply said he hoped the treaty would strengthen relations not only between the Soviet Union and Britain, but also with the United States, whose close collaboration is sought "after the victorious conclusion of the war."

Accord on Second Front

A Foreign Office communiqué issued at the same time as the White Paper was presented said that during the visit of Mr. Molotoff, which was kept a closely guarded secret until he had returned safely to Moscow after visiting President Roosevelt in Washington, "a full understanding was reached between the two parties with regard to the urgent task of creating a second front in Europe in 1942. Mr. Molotoff, Soviet Ambassador Ivan M. Maisky, Major Gen. Issayeff, Rear Admiral Kharlamoff, Mr. Churchill, Deputy Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee, Mr. Eden and the British chiefs of staff all took part in the discussions of this subject, the communiqué disclosed, although naturally it did not reveal what decisions were taken. Obviously it is just as possible to agree not to do things as to do them.

By inserting the words "in Europe," Russia limited her commitment so that she is not bound to lift a finger against the other enemy of Britain and the United States, Japan, except in the unlikely event that her armies or navy should enter this war-torn Continent. This limitation is cheerfully accepted here, for it is felt that the Russians have their hands full already.

There was considerable relief in parliamentary and diplomatic circles that the treaty contained no reference to post-war bundaries. One section of the treaty that Mr. Eden read to the Commons pledged both countries not to seek "territorial aggrandizement" and a promise not to interfere in "the internal affairs of other States."

In reply, Deputy Leader Arthur Greenwood of the Labor Party, Mr. Eden assured the Commons that the whole terms of the agreement were published in the White Paper he had submitted. There were no "secret engagements or commitments of any kind whatsoever," he declared.

Russia has contended since 1939 that her security required domination of the Baltic States and parts of Rumania and Finland, and that at the peace conference ending the war she could claim them without violation of treaty obligation not to seek territorial aggrandizement, inasmuch as this territory, including a large part of Poland, was within the Russian frontiers when Adolf Hitler attacked on June 22, 1940. She could hardly be accused of seeking territorial aggrandizement at the peace conference if she should demand that her prewar frontiers be re-establishd, although it was the refusal of the British in 1939 to recognize Russia's need of the Baltic States that broke off negotiations for an alliance then and drove the Soviet regime into a marriage of convenience with the Nazi Reich.

The new treaty, which the British hope will go far toward allaying any lingering Russian suspicions of British sincerity and determination to destroy Hitlerism, supersedes the agreement of July 12, 1940, in which Britain and Russia promised to make common cause against Germany and pledged themselves to make no separate peace. The new treaty of alliance goes much farther. It is divided into two parts, the first military and the second, far more important, political and economic.

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Times for June 12, 1942
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

The military section consists of
o articles. In the first the sig-
tories undertake to give each
her military and other support
all kinds in the war against
ermany and "any other State
hich is associated with her in
ts of aggression in Europe." The
cond article binds the two na-
ons not to enter into negotiations
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y other government of Germany
at does not clearly renounce all
gressive intentions," nor to en-
r into an armistice or peace with
y State associated with Nazi-
rmany "except by mutual con-
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In the first article of the politi-
l and economic section the par-
s declared their desire to "unite
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mmon action to preserve peace
d resist aggression in the post-
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ntly to prevent Germany and
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the peace, again with the lim-
ng phrase "in Europe."

The treaty provides that if the
viet Union or Britain should be-
me involved in hostilities with
rmany or any of the States as-
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o countries will give each other
l military and other support
d assistance" in their power.
less the treaty is abrogated by
tual agreement, it is to run
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Both countries are pledged under
treaty to collaborate after
ce is restored for "the security
l economic prosperity of Eu-
e, taking into account the in-
es's of the other United Na-
ns. Each is bound for the life of
the treaty to form no alliance and to join no coalition directed against the other.

It is expected that King George will ratify the compact after the three-week period provided by law and custom. No serious oppositon is expected in Parliament, which, while it cannot reject the treaty, could, by adopting a resolution it, bring the downfall of the government that negotiated it.

A Triumph For Eden

This Anglo-Russian treaty represents a diplomatic triumph for Mr. Eden. In chieving it he was greatly helped by United States Ambassador John J. Wynant.

When Mr. Molotoff and his staff arrived here they came to seek a treaty in which the British would recognize the Soviet Government's de jure claim to the de facto boundaries that existed when Reichsfuehrer Hitler attacked. This was a serious matter, for Mr. Eden recognized that such a treaty would be unfavorably received by a large part of the British population and would be definitely distasteful to the United States.

Yet it was recognized that some tangible evidence of Britain's good faith must be given if Russia's suspicion was to be allayed. It was here that Mr. Winant was able to help.

Before Mr. Molotoff's secret arrival here Mr. Winant flew to the United States to discuss the whole problem with President Roosevelt. General Wladyslaw Sikorsky, Premier of the Polish Government in exile, also visited Washington to obtain assurances from Mr. Roosevelt that Poland's claim to reconstruction after the war would be treated sympathetically at the Peace Conference.

The negotiations that resulted in the signing of the treaty really began last December, when Mr. Eden visited Moscow. Premier Stalin, Mr. Molotoff, Mr. Eden and Sir Stafford Cripps, then Ambassador to Russia, engaged in a frank exchange of views regarding the war and post-war organization of peace and security. It was in these discussions that the foundation was laid for a treaty that, with the Atlantic Charter, will be a cornerstone of the new European order.

After his Moscow talks, Mr. Eden returned here to take up the question with Britain's War Cabinet. For four months he and Mr. Maisky continued their efforts until they had completed a draft agreement. This was sent to Moscow with a renewal of the invitation the British Foreign Secretary had extended to Mr. Molotoff while there.

Russian's Visit Delayed

Weather conditions at that time were bad. It was therefore some time before the Soviet plenipotentiaries were able to complete their dangerous journey here.

While Mr. Eden was in Moscow, there was some discussion of the question of Russia's western frontiers. When Mr. Molotoff arrived here, however, he was quick to realize that it would be wise to leave this matter in abeyance and to concentrate on the alliance. There is no doubt, however, that on frontier questions, including the future of the Baltic states, there were exchanges of views that will facilitate a settlement at the appropriate time, which all now agree is at the peace conference.

The new alliance marks a fundamental change in Britain's foreign policy. Britain and Russia were allies in World War I, but between 1918 and 1940 there have often been misunderstanding and distrust. In a sense Russia now becomes to Britain what France was before the Nazi conquest, a strong continental military power bound by close alliance.

Throughout the negotiations Mr. Eden kept the United States, China and other allied governments, as well as the British Dominions, fully informed of the progress of the talks and of their trend.

Great as was the surprise to the British public in Mr. Eden's announcement, the facts that Mr. Molotoff was here and that a treaty had been signed have been open secrets in diplomatic circles for some time. The only surprise it caused among diplomats was that the pact was much broader and more sweeping in its terms and implications than had been expected when Mr. Molotoff first decided to come here.

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New York Times for
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Russian Jews Mark Autonomous Reign

Soviet Officials Address Farmers of Ukrainia at Celebration.

Moscow, July 5 (Jewish Telegraphic Agency).—More than 10,000 Jewish and non-Jewish peasants left their work in the fields today and walked miles to witness the ceremonies in the old Jewish colony of Islutschisia, officially opening the third Jewish autonomous region in Ukrainia.

Red flags waved from every roof and from a huge dais in the center of the colony.

The speakers included officials of the Ukrainian and central Soviet governments. The new autonomous Jewish region embraces nine Jewish and two Ukrainian villages with a population of 9,000 Jews and 4,000 Ukrainians. It is situated in the Krivorog district and consists of old prewar Jewish colonies and new agro-joint colonies.

Communist Party - Russia

Div. I

The Evening Star, Washington, D.C.

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TRANSLATION FROM THE RUSSIAN

Taken from "Communistic International" March-April 1942, pages 7, 8, 9.

A special word this year belongs to the German working class. May the voice of their class-brothers, on this first day of May, reach the German workers, may an urgent warning and burning question reach them, which echoes from all parts of the world: "Where in the German working class, where are the German workers? Once you marched in the first ranks with the great ideas of Marx and Engels reflected on your foreheads. Among your leaders were Bebel and Liebknecht. In your strong handshake we felt strength and solidity of the proletarians. But today? With your hands Hitler is leading today war against the socialistic state of workers and peasants. With your own hand you produce weapons for the most bloody murder of the workers. Is it possible that you, German workers, count it a part of your honor, with your conscience, with your own vital concern, to tolerate any longer the system of the Gestapo, concentration camps, dragging the working-class down to the level of the dumb cattle, strolling after the criminal Fuehrer, after the greedy, dirty adventurers!"

That millions of German workers deny the fascistic regime, that they curse the war of Hitler against the Socialistic state of workers and peasants, — is an undeniable fact. But today, it is not a question of moods, but of historical decisions. Hitler has torn millions of workers from their jobs into the army. He is chasing them to war against the Soviet Union. They must bleed to death in the terrible adventures of Hitler. And not only these workers, but in front of the whole German nation a gulf has opened, into which Hitler is sweeping the last sons of German mothers in order to prolong his own mean life a little longer. The preparations which Hitler is making for his last and most terrible crime, will have to raise the German working class on its feet, and so the German proletariat will have to give up the passiveness of its ranks, and take into their hands the salvation of the German nation.

It is necessary and possible that the German workers, consisting of the largest masses of the German nation, start the most definite battle against the war of Hitler and the regime of Hitler. It is necessary and possible that the German workers should refuse to worry their soul and body out in drudgery, that they work from day to day more slowly, that they sabotage the production. It is necessary and possible, that they, taking advantage of the shortage of raw materials, the depreciation of equipment, call forth scores and thousands of demurrages and delays in the work, in order to take up the fighting activities.

The Terror is not an unremovable hindrance. Nobody will dare to state that the terror of the fascists is holding away with less force in Norway or France than it is in Germany itself. In spite of this, Norwegian and French workers find enough strength through different ways and means to lead a war against the Fascist executioners. If the German workers will realize, at last, to what a destruction, with delirious rapidity, Hitler is dragging the German nation, they will have to wake up and they <u>will</u> wake up; they will show the German nation the way and salvation toward ending the war, and toward a new and free Germany.

The German workers and the German nation can be reassured: That the defeat of Hitler, the dethronement of the shameless Fascistic tyranny by the hands of the own German nation, is the salvation of Germany. The workers of all countries, nations that are completely determined to conquer, and finally establish a peace of duration, only want the destruction of German Fascism. Workers of all nations wait for it and expect it, that Germany should join the ranks of the league of all nations, embracing the whole world, who see their own salvation and the salvation of the German nation not in war and destruction, but in peace and creative work.

In this manner, the first of May of the year 1942, reminds the German workers of the wonderful days of past battles, calls the German working class to a decisive battle against the war of Hitler and Hitler's slavery. In history there are moments that leave traces in the memory of the whole of humanity; moments which not only mean a step, but a jump ahead, which, like lightenings, show the contours of the future. Such a moment was the battle at Walma (Valma) of which Goethe said on the very battlefield: "On this place and from this moment a new epoch of world history is starting!" Such a moment was the great battle for Moscow. With unknown intensity all of humanity was following the genial leader of the regiment, Stalin, leading the Red Army into this decisive battle against the Fascistic monster. The Red Army won the battle. She smashed back the "unconquerable" German regiments, turned the falsely proclaimed victory of Hitler into a terrible defeat. The first of May must become the day of mobilization of the forces of the working class of all nations for the creation of the holy liberating war of nations against the slavery of Hitler.

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Post - War Forum No. 5

How About Russia and the Peace?

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PM today publishes its fifth forum on concrete problems of the peace that must be studied before it is too late.

The immediate picture of our relations with the Soviet Union is blurred. Stalin was not at Casablanca. He was cordially invited, as the Casablanca communique announced, but was unable to be present because of pressing military duties.

Contributors to the forum represent as many shades of opinion as it was possible for PM to get. The list of participants was selected without regard to whether or not we on PM happen to agree with them.

Today's forum centers on two points:

What should our relations with Russia be?

Where should Russia's Western boundary be?

These forums will be published weekly. PM welcomes opinions from its readers.

By Wendell Willkie:

We Must Work Together With Russia NOW To Insure Cooperation in Post-War World

We are still hopeful that we are beginning to move into the later phases of this war. All those who believe, as I do, that international co-operation after the war is over is indispensable, not only for the maintenance of world peace but equally so for economic security and the preservation of liberty, are naturally concerned about the methods by which we can bring about such co-operation.

Much as I would like to believe that by some miracle we can impose upon the world some formalized plan of parliaments or councils, my sense of realism makes me know that if we wait until after the fighting is over such proposals will be but the dreams of active minds. If our experience in the last war and knowledge of history teaches us anything, it is that people win in a peace only what they win when they fight.

This is a clipping from page 2 of the PM for FEB 1, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Take, for instance, the case of Russia. What force on earth is going to be able to tell Russia that she shall join some international conference or send representatives to an international parliament? If, however, we are able to draw Russia into boards of strategy or councils while the war is on, we have a chance at least to learn how to work with her. Then, from such methods of working together, we can develop the instrumentalities with which we can work together after the war.

The rulers of Russia and its military strategists think they know something about the art of war. I believe they have some right to think so. Instead of keeping them at arm's length, I would recommend that while the war is on, we draw them into every conference and council we can. Along that route I see a hope of world co-operation, particularly with Russia.

By John Gunther:

Communist Bogey Is Just Nonsense

Stalin in his speech of November 6 said he did not want Germany destroyed, that he did not even want the German army destroyed. I think he almost certainly assumes that some sort of Communism will come in Germany after the war. Perhaps, Communism all over Europe after the war, of some sort.

What's happening in Yugoslavia is of great interest. The Russians are very busy there organizing guerilla resistance against the Axis. This brings up a very serious question for us. Are we going to be so frightened by the Communist bogey that we are going to refuse to co-operate with that part of Europe under Russian influence? Are we going to be stampeded into conflict with Russia after the war? I should think not, because luckily most of the people who are extremely anti-Communist are also extremely Isolationist.

I think it would be a great disaster if we got into conflict with the Russians after the war. I am also convinced that the path for co-operation with the Russians after the war will be very difficult and thorny.

Russia is not a very mysterious country. I think the Russians have two basic policies. Ever since the Revolution there have been two chords—a bass and a treble, so to speak. One theme was to make Russia strong, a strong national state, on the theory that nothing could survive of their ideas unless they themselves survived. That, by and large, has been the Stalin line. The other theme or chord, the chord of world revolution, was the Trotzky line, as everybody knows. This may be over-simplifying it a bit, but these two chords were always on the piano, one very loud and one very soft, depending on the circumstances.

If the Russians win the war in Europe on land, which is not impossible, and if the Soviet Union becomes the strongest land power in the world, we can certainly expect a recrudescence of policies designed to spread Marxist doctrines throughout Europe. That will raise a real problem for our statesmanship.

The possibility of future political conflict between the United States and Russia should be guarded against very strictly. Of course, the Russians represent a different world from ours and we are a different world from theirs, but if any of us have any hope of world peace and world order, we have got to co-operate as best we can, whether we like it or not.

It would be a catastrophe, a calamity to use American troops to intervene in Europe against Russia. That would be a disaster. You can write me down for that.

This is a clipping from page_____ of the PM for

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

defining our attitude toward the question of co-operation between a capitalist country and a socialist country.

At the present time this issue is being side-stepped in the public thinking and in the leading circles in this country. The general formula used is that we can collaborate with the Soviet Union because it is really not a socialist country, but is actually in the process of returning to capitalism. Of course good relations cannot be based on such illusions, because the Soviet Union is clearly not going back to capitalism, just as the United States is not going to adopt socialism in the immediate post-war period.

If this country is not able to face and answer this question soberly and without prejudice, there is little prospect of establishing that long term co-operation between the two countries, which is so vital and necessary and at the same time so completely possible. The Soviet Union long ago answered this question in principle in favor of collaboration, especially with the United States, irrespective of the nature of the internal regimes.

Nothing would be gained by trying to ignore the ideological difficulties involved. These difficulties are augmented by the fact that there are reactionary sections of industry and public men who immediately interpret any acknowledgment of the irrevocable facts as representing a danger of socialism in this country, from which they conclude that association with the Soviet Union is a dangerous thing to their privileges here. The necessity of this collaboration, however, is so obvious that we can hope it will over-ride even such deep-seated prejudices.

There is a large part of Europe which, in a free world, will naturally collaborate most closely with the Soviet Union, especially for the purpose of insuring a just and durable peace. As to other parts of Europe, it is not so clear what the orientation will be. Some will probably orientate toward the capitalist world, particularly the United States and Great Britain. But this should be worked out on the principle of self-determination within the framework of a system of collective security, without trying to impose from the outside upon any part of Europe a preconceived regime.

Anyone who has studied Europe knows that there are parts of that continent which [illegible] overwhelmingly socialist in tendency. Given freedom to determine their own form, these would probably establish socialist regimes or some form of people's republic.

By Bruce Bliven:

Decent Peace Will Avoid Problems

Q: Should Russia be forced to yield the Baltic states and return to Poland the area it took during the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact?

A: The question seems to me irrelevant, if we have any kind of sensible peace settlement. I'm perfectly sure that Russia want into the Baltic States, for instance, only for reasons of military security. If she gets her security in other ways, she will no longer be interested in holding the territory against the will of the inhabitants.

I am convinced that Russia is one of the least aggressive countries in the world today. I'm sure her foreign policy for 25 years has been defensive in character. The kind of settlement which will keep peace in Western Europe will also keep peace between Russia and Western Europe, or indeed throughout the rest of the world.

Q: Do you think a kind of tug-of-war will spring up between the Soviet Union and the western democracies for control of central and Eastern Europe?

A: If we have the kind of peace I hope for, based on economic freedom, there should be no conflict. Russia wants to export nothing today except ideas, and even as to ideas, she's far less enthusiastic about their export than she used to be.

I think a position of equilibrium is not at all impossible between Russian state socialism and western democratic capitalism. The western world has already moved a long way toward Russia and Russia has moved a little distance toward us.

I rather think that most of Europe will go some distance toward Socialism, but I don't think this tendency will necessarily increase as you go eastward. Agrarian countries are not good countries for a Socialist regime. Lenin took over Russia not because it was the best country for his purposes, but because it was the only one he could get.

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By Earl Browder:

Gives Views Of Communists

Our relations with the Soviet Union are based upon the natural friendship of the peoples of both countries strengthened by our common national interests in the war to destroy Hitlerism and in the organization of the post-war peace. The further development of these relations clearly depend upon

This is a clipping from page _____ of the PM for _____

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

TODAY and TOMORROW

By WALTER LIPPMANN

Germany and the Russian Power

IN VIEW of what was said in Berlin on Saturday we may remind ourselves that for fifty years Germany has had two policies toward Russia: to marry Russia or to kill Russia. Bismarck, who was the last great statesman of the German empire, tried marriage. William II tried war. The Weimar republic tried marriage. Hitler has tried both. He began by shouting that Russia was the great enemy. Then he made the pact of 1939 and declared that all would be well forever. Then he made war on Russia. Now we may well expect to see the not too distant day when the immediate successors of Hitler will again seek to marry Russia.

The pendulum has swung back and forth whether Germany was Hohenzollern, Republican, or Nazi, whether Russia was Czarist or communist. Why does the pendulum swing? Because Germany, in order to become the dominant world power, must either conquer Russia or absorb Russia; because Russia, in order to develop her vast undeveloped domain, must find security on her western borderland either by thwarting the German military power or by placating it.

Thus Russo-German relations are crucial. They produced the first world war. They determined the alignment of power at the beginning of the second world war. They are pivotal in the strategic shape of this, the decisive phase of that war, and they will exercise the controlling influence upon events to come.

* * *

The Germans, as always, have two alternative policies in mind in this culminating phase of the conflict. They are the same old alternatives—to marry Russia or to kill her. For the moment they are presenting the second of the two alternatives. By means of intensified submarine war they hope to convince Britain, America, and also occupied Europe, that the western democracies are incapable of playing a deciding role in the European theater, and that therefore, it will be Russia, Communist Russia, which would in the event of German defeat dictate the peace.

But they are also considering the other alternative in case they are unable to persuade the westerners to abandon their support of Russia, and to negotiate a peace which promises to support a quasi-Nazi regime, minus only Hitler and a few of his more notorious accomplices. The second alternative would be to set a communist facade in front of German military imperialism, and as a German soviet state to seek an alliance with the Russian soviets. This second alternative, marriage with Russia in a new form, would have a double attraction to the pan-German imperialists. It would terrify Britain, America, and France, and it would open up the prospect to the Germans that they could eventually infiltrate and conquer Russia from within.

* * *

It is said on reasonable good authority that Stalin is aware of the possibility of this maneuver, and that he has said that the last thing he wants is a German communist state. For being above all a realistic Russian nationalist, Stalin knows quite well that German communism would be more German than communist.

* * *

There are a number of compelling reasons why neither of these plans for avoiding the destruction of pan-German imperialism is likely to succeed. For one thing the manner in which the Nazis have conducted their war in Russia has been too bitter an experience for the Russians to be dealt with by masquerades and maneuvers. This has been no 18th Century war among professional soldiers; this is a total and elemental war of nations which would not lend itself to cunning arrangements.

For another, Great Britain and America are, like Russia, not European powers, and their actions will be determined primarily by their interest in their own vital security throughout the world. They will bear it in mind that a strong Russia checks the two powers which threaten their security—namely Germany and Japan—and that a strong Russia in the land mass of the Eurasian continent is for the calculable future no threat to the security on the sea and in the air of the English-speaking nations and their natural allies.

* * *

Thus the only place where Germany can hope to exploit with some effect the fear of a Russian victory is in continental Europe. It would be a mistake to deny this. But having recognized it, let us be as lucid as we can be about the nature of the communist danger in central and western Europe.

It exists because a large part of continental Europe has been unable in the past twenty years to govern itself successfully by democratic means. Internal problems have been unmanageable, and defense against external aggression has been a failure. There are three choices for many, though not all, of the European states. One is to try Fascism. A second is to try communism. A third is to try to regenerate their democratic systems.

There can be no doubt that the mass of the people of western Europe are deeply imbued with the European tradition which seeks freedom under law. They would, therefore, greatly prefer the democratic way. But if for some reason that way is closed to them, then it is certain that a terrible civil struggle will ensue between quasi-Fascist regimes supported by the privileged classes and quasi-communist movements in the masses of the people.

* * *

If that civil struggle is precipitated,—and if at the same time Britain and America have been made antagonistic to Russia's demands for the security of her western borders,—if, further, Britain and America are maneuvered into the support of a quasi-Fascist regime in Germany, France, Italy, Hungary and elsewhere—then we may be sure that Russia will exert all her power and prestige on the side of the mass revolt. That will be for Russia the defense of her national security but for the rest of us it will be the road to chaos. The peace will be lost for this generation, and an ordered future will be denied to us.

That is why the prestige of the western democracies must not be destroyed by commitments to support, except as the most temporary military expedients, quasi-Fascist regimes in Europe. That is the reason why the explanations and the moral climate produced by the inspired comment about North African politics have been infinitely more important and more disturbing than the mere expedients and the personalities and the little details. If what had to be done, or even what men on the spot honestly thought had to be done, had been left at the level of a military operation, and had not been adopted in the eyes of the world as a triumph of American diplomacy, we should not be threatened, as we are threatened, with the loss of our political prestige in western Europe and in the whole free world. And if we were not faced with the impairment of the prestige of the democracies, the awful danger of civil war in Europe between quasi-Fascist regimes and communist mass movements would be much less serious than in fact it now is.

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N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE

By Raymond Gram Swing:

Stalin-FDR Meeting Is Urgent Need

It seems to me that the Russian boundaries will fall into place easily, if we set up the right kind of relationship between Russia and the rest of the world. The boundaries are comparatively unimportant.

What I want more than anything at this time is a meeting between President Roosevelt and Stalin, so that they can ask each other frankly what it is that each one wants for his country. (This was written before the Casablanca meeting to which Stalin was invited, but replied he was unable to attend.)

The whole attitude of Russia today is nationalist. But old habits in the Allied countries plant suspicion in the minds of the Russians, and may drive Stalin to seek his security in his own subversive ways, while these subversive ways only strengthen the old habits of the Allies.

As I said in a broadcast last December, if the major Allies don't work and function together in winning the war, they will not work and function together in making the peace. And if there is not to be real peace, this United Nations war will have been the sorriest of all human follies.

The paramount question is whether the United States and Britain can work together with the Soviet Union FOR something. To be explicit, they should be able to work together to establish in Europe and in the world at large, first of all a stable peace, then a peace which offers a restoration of the former standards of living and then a continual improvement of the standards, which leaves local peoples in freedom to manage their local affairs and enjoy the culture which is in their marrow.

This, certainly, is the peace held out in prospect by Vice President Wallace. But will the Soviet Union agree to such a peace? It raises the bogey that Stalin, who turned nationalist before this war so as to fight it more effectively, will turn into a super-Trotzky and flood the world with revolution when it is over. But it would be a counsel of despair to take that for granted. Apart from ideology, it is reasonable to believe that the Soviet Government will not want anything so much as a quarter of a century of peace and prosperity for its people. And if Stalin is a realist, he would want to make sure that his allies want that and no more. He would need to be sure of their cooperation, of their friendliness, and until he is sure of it, he will be on his guard.

By Count Sforza:

Fix Boundaries By Plebiscites

The answer to the question "Where should Russia's western boundary be?" is very simple—a plebiscite.

By Premier Sikorski:

Poland Wants Friendly Collaboration With USSR

Poland wishes to live on a footing of friendly and loyal collaboration with Russia, with which she possesses many mutually complementary economic needs.

I feel convinced that this collaboration is possible and wish to base the same on mutual respect for the different political ideas held by the two nations.

At the root of friendship must thrive the firm conviction that international laws will be obeyed in conformity with the Atlantic Charter of which both countries are signatories.

After my conversation with Premier Stalin, in which he declared for a "great and strong Poland," I cannot doubt that Russia, quite as much as Poland, will strictly adhere to existing international obligations.

This is also the confident expectation of the Polish people who have offered themselves wholly in supreme sacrifice for the sake of freedom and integral independence.

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By Senator Nye:

Isn't Scared of Communist Bogey

As respects those lesser countries along the Baltic and Finland I should certainly not want to see them lose their identities, except as they themselves might wish to be assimilated and become part of another nation.

Here is where we run into a strange criticism of ourselves. While we proclaim the kind of a world that we want to see when the war is over, some of us think that we can weigh our wishes on all the world, when in truth, with the line-up being what it is, no one would have a larger right to dictate terms of peace than would Russia, in the light of the extreme sacrifices which the Russians have made in this war.

What might be Russia's demands and interests at the peace table is just one of the uncertainties with which we deal when we go too far in trying to plan the peace that shall be written. You ask me what should be our relations with Russia. All things being equal, we should maintain the relationship that has existed between our two countries. It would depend upon the kind of co-operation that was prevalent at the peace table. It should be on a perfectly normal basis, as it is with other countries irrespective of the differences in ideologies. I don't have any fear of a Russian Communistic bogey as long as we maintain our own sovereignty. This should not be a problem of worry at all.

There are some who insist that the views

I express smack of what they call "narrow isolation." Of course, I have never been a "narrow isolationist." To be such would imply that we should take no interest whatever in the affairs of our neighbors, to abandon all trade and all social intercourse. That has never been my philosophy. I do not think, however, that our destiny is either to reform or to police the world. Such we can accomplish only at the loss of most of what we ourselves possess. And on that score I am adamant. Americans must have first consideration by the American government, never left-overs. To pursue any other course is not noble in purpose, but on the contrary short-sighted reasoning.

By Freda Kirchwey:

Need Democratic Peace Program

The United States and Russia will have to co-operate closely at the peace table, and this co-operation can be achieved only if we approach the conference with a really democratic program. If the United States and Britain propose to support reactionary governments, if we do not honestly go about solving problems created by colonialism and the exploitation of native peoples, we will encourage Russia in her suspicions of the western democracies—the same suspicions which have given rise to so many difficulties in the past. Such a situation would inevitably lead to a growth of Communism all over the continent, particularly in Eastern Europe, and the certainty of revolutionary uprisings against reactionary governments wherever they are set up.

Q. Do you think that Russia might try to exploit chaotic Europe to her own advantage at the peace table?

A. Yes, such danger exists. But I think that the power to check it lies in the hands of the western nations. Russia is not out for conquest; and I think—and this is fairly obvious—that Russia will have enough to do to reconstruct its own smashed economy without indulging in the luxury of aggression.

What I've said here about the Soviet Union does not mean that I think Russia has done everything it could do to ease over the difficulties which still exist between it and its capitalist allies. Russia's long-standing suspicion of the democracies has made it unwilling to go as far as I believe an Ally should go in exchanging military information, etc. But we haven't gone as far as we should, either, in consulting Russia in matters of mutual concern.

And I think that the nearer the western powers come to solving problems like unemployment in their own countries, and the more they show themselves ready to make a really equitable distribution of the world's resources after the war, the less chance will there be of a clash between Russia's economy and our own.

Millions Now Dead

Maurice Hindus Says Russians Pay Heavily for Heroism

This is the first of several articles by Maurice Hindus, Russian-American author of "Humanity Uprooted," who has just returned from a seven-month tour of Russia.

by Maurice Hindus

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"Tell America," said a Russian colonel whom I was bidding farewell, "not to pat us so much on the back."

"But," I said, "America appreciates the heroism of the Red army."

"Yes," he said, "but think of the price we are paying. I had two brothers. One is dead. From the other I haven't heard in three months—a bad sign. My wife and child saved themselves and are now in Novosibirsk. But my poor father and mother remained in occupied territory. In all likelihood they are dead because of me, a son who is a colonel in the Red army."

Hardly a Russian I went to see before leaving Moscow but spoke in a similar vein. Happy as Russians are over their present victories, they are acutely aware that the fighting is on Russian soil, that it is Russian towns, villages and cities which are being devastated. Not for a single moment do they forget the stupendous price they are paying. Too many, too constant, too poignant are the personal reminders, especially when they come home from work. They cannot escape the photographs on the walls of a father, a son, a husband, a brother who will never return.

Few Russians wear mourning. There is no law against it. When there is so much bereavement in the country, there is no use showing it in public. That also is why there are seldom public funerals. I did not see one in Moscow in all

See HINDUS, Page 4, Col. 2.

the time I was there. But if people did wear mourning in the capital or in Leningrad, the streets and public squares would be black.

"Rzhev," I heard an officer say, "is a slaughterhouse. We are killing plenty of Germans, but they are killing lots of our men—the flower of our youth."

It is not only in Rzhev that the flower of Russia's youth is perishing, and Russians know it only too well. Russia is a land of young widows; there are millions of them. There are even more millions of orphans.

It is safe to assert that no less than four million Russians have already lost their lives in the fighting. But this is the smaller part of the casualties the Russians have suffered. By far the greater number of deaths has occurred in the German-held territories.

In a village which the Germans controlled for 10 months, there is an old peasant barn built of timber, with a low-hanging thatch roof which tells a shattering story. In the dead of winter, the Germans drove into this barn several hundred Russian war prisoners. Despite the bitter cold, there was no heat in the barn, not a single wood stove. Nor did the Russians have warm clothes. The Germans stripped them of the felts, woolens and sheepskins they wore when they were captured. Exposed to cold and wretchedly fed—one bowl of grainless soup and one slice of bread a day—they died by the score from pneumonia and other diseases.

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One night two Russians attempted to escape. They were captured and hanged in front of the barn. For three weeks, in wind and snow, the frozen bodies swung from the gallows. I was in the village, and eyewitnesses who told me this story said they had never seen anything more gruesome.

Millions Have Died

There were hundreds of such barns in the German-held lands. War prisoners and others lived, hungered, died in crowds. No one knows how many millions of Russians have died prematurely in conquered territory. The estimates run from 10 million to 15 million. But even if we lower it to 6 million, Russia has already lost at least 10 million lives.

The population of America is about three-fourths that of Russia in 1939. The reader can imagine what the condition of American homes and the mood of the American people would be had we suffered a proportionate loss of life—that is, between seven and eight million.

With so many millions already sacrificed in the war, not merely against fascism but against Germans, junkers as well as peasants and workers, Russians feel their losses too deeply to derive consolation from the plaudits of the outside world. It is significant that the Russian press gives little space to these plaudits.

Enduring Sacrifice

Wherever one turns in Russia, one becomes acutely aware of the tremendous sacrifices the people are making. The fact that they are enduring these sacrifices with fortitude does not mitigate their severity.

Compared with what they used to be, the shops are practically empty. The only things which Moscow stores seem to carry in abundance are children's toys and men's ties. But neither of these commodities is of recent manufacture. Since about half of Moscow's children have been evacuated and more than half the men are at war, the pre-war supply of toys and ties remains unexhausted.

Candles are very useful in a country at war. I had neglected to bring any with me, so on my arrival in Moscow I went shopping for candles. After visiting a dozen stores I gave up the search. There were no candles for sale; at least I could not find any. Only church people are permitted to buy candles freely, not for home use but for religious purposes. I was astonished at the hundreds of lighted candles I saw at the services in the Moscow Cathedral.

Thrift Is Fortunate

New shoes and new clothes are impossible to buy. Fortunately Russians are a thrifty people and know how to conserve and preserve clothes. When winter came Muscovites were comfortably clad—but in old clothes. If a Russian wants to fix a pair of shoes, he usually uses the leather from a shoe that is no longer wearable.

Food is more than rigidly rationed. In Russia, unlike this country, it is not a question of a limited amount of sugar and a more or less unlimited supply of maple syrup, candy, oranges, jam, milk, honey, dates, figs and other forms of sweets. In Russia it is "either—or;" sometimes it is neither. The allowance is skipped or postponed to some future month. The Russians do not command such a vast variety of sweets as America.

I observed last summer that peasants were planting in their gardens more pumpkin than usual.

"Why do you do it?" I asked the old woman of the home in which I was stopping in a village on the Volga.

Gift of Onions

"We have five children in the house," she said, "and we don't expect much sugar or candy next winter. Perhaps we won't get any at all. So we'll bake and steam pumpkin and give it to the children instead of sugar."

One evening, as I was sending a cable to America from the Moscow postoffice, I felt someone's heavy hand on my back. Turning, I saw Russian captain whom I recog-ized as a physician I had known d prewar Kiev. We talked for a ew minutes, then he said:

"I've just come from central Asia and I have a gift for you—omething you won't find in Mos-ow."

He pulled out of his knapsack wo small Spanish onions. I grabbed hem and, on my return to the otel, shared them with the Aus-ralian correspondent and his wife, ho were as hungry for a taste of nion as I.

egetables Sales

Considering the food situation in ussia, foreign correspondents are ell taken care of. American cor-spondents arriving from London id they were getting more eggs, utter and meat in Moscow than in e British capital. But fresh egetables are so rare that a Spanish onion is a luxury.

Only the army has no shortag At the front I was served tea and cocoa with all the sugar I wanted. The best meals correspondents get are at the front. The best of everything in Russia—food, clothes, books, entertainment—goes to the army. The soldier gets 2 pounds of bread daily, more if he wants it; 40 grams of sugar, an occasional handful of sweet biscuits, about one-third of a pound of meat, in addition to the fat in his palatable soup and porridge, and, of course, 100 grams of vodka. He is one of the most comfortably-clad and abundantly-fed soldiers in the world.

But civilians must be content with the rigidly controled food rations.

Tomorrow Mr. Hindus tells of life behind the front in Russia.

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STALIN'S WAR SEEN IN LONG-RANGE AIM

Russian Objectives in Europe, After Smashing of Germans, Held Limited to Baltic

GOALS IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Soviet, Looking to Manchuria and Korea, Will Join Fight on Japan, Duranty Thinks

Russia's post-war program is discussed in the following article by a noted foreign correspondent. Mr. Duranty has lived for many years in Russia and is recognized as an outstanding authority on the Soviet Union.

By WALTER DURANTY

North American Newspaper Alliance.

Joseph Stalin is fighting his own war, Russia's war, the war which he foresaw—perhaps before anyone else—and for which he prepared his country.

On two occasions I have talked with Mr. Stalin, for more than an hour each time. In addition I have read his writings and studied his character closely. His outstanding quality is perseverance and tenacity of purpose. A man of ruthless will and cold judgment, who never forgets a friend nor forgives a foe. A hard man trained by the life he has led to be suspicious and to show no mercy, who is playing his own hand—Russia's hand—in his own way.

Like Czar Alexander I, in whose Kremlin Palace he now sits, Mr. Stalin shocked the conscience of the world by making a deal with the enemy. I refer to the Soviet-Nazi pact of August, 1939, and to the treaty between Alexander I and Napoleon.

This is the best and most remarkable of all historical parallels, because in both cases a Russian ruler made a deal with a man whom he knew to be his destined assailant, for the same two reasons: First, to gain time for his own preparation of defense; second, because he had no confidence in his allies or potential allies. Mr. Stalin gained twenty-two months by his pact with Hitler, and used it to the best advantage, building Soviet strength for the coming struggle.

The first time I talked with Mr. Stalin I wrote that he was "the inheritor of Lenin's mantle." He did not like the phrase, and changed it to: "Lenin's most faithful disciple and the prolonger of his work." Is that the key, perhaps, to Mr. Stalin's mysterious character? If it is a key, it is a key because Lenin, don't forget, was a revolutionary. Is Mr. Stalin a revolutionary? Does he want to "bolshevise" Europe, or are his eyes fixed upon Asia?

Stalin's View Is East and West

Bolshevism, it has been said, is a new religion, fanatical and iconoclastic. Such a view would present Mr. Stalin as Khaled, the successor of Mohammed, the Prophet of God. Personally I doubt this. I see Mr. Stalin as the clear-minded statesman who looks at East and West. He has not and cannot yet have the vast industrial strength of the United States. He has not the naval power and experience in statecraft which the English possess. But he sits between East and West, to look both ways at once.

Will Russia drive into Germany and raise the Red Flag in Europe? She may. She may, because the atrocities committed by the Nazis in the Ukraine and other parts of occupied Russia have been so horrid and frightful that blood must be paid by blood. I mean that it all will depend upon now and where, rather than when, the war ends.

If Germany breaks before the American and British armies have got deep into Europe, the Russians may be unable to resist the temptation of rushing on to Berlin—which they once took in 1760, as once also they went to Paris after Napoleon's downfall—with the possible temptation to Stalin, disciple of Lenin, of making all Europe red under one Soviet flag. Or he might want no part in Germany, indeed I am told he has said that he wants no part in Germany, because he is afraid that the methodical German tail might wag the huge Russian dog.

If, on the other hand, the war ends with our armies fairly deep in Europe, there won't be any difficulty. We shall have to feed Europe and provide it with fuel and medicine, but that, of course, can be done. In that case the Russians will probably halt somewhere east of Berlin, just as they made the agreement with England and Iran last year to regard Teheran as the boundary, that the Russians took the north and the British took the south.

Unless I am mistaken, what Russia really wants is not concerned with Europe. I suppose that the Russians will hold the Baltic States. Russia will want Petsamo. Russia will also want full access to, but not ownership of, Istanbul and the Persian Gulf. That is as it may be, but there is something else.

Manchuria's Place in Program

What Russia will want, what Mr. Stalin wants, is an independent Soviet Republic of Manchuria, affiliated with the U.S.S.R.; a similar republic of Korea, and even perhaps the Northwestern Chinese Soviet Republic of Sinkiang, Ningshia and Shensi, whether Chiang Kai-shek likes that or not.

As THE NEW YORK TIMES said recently in an admirable editorial, Mr. Stalin does not share the esteem for Chiang Kai-shek that the Americans and British have. Last but not least, Russia wants the Liaotang Peninsula, her lost fortress of Port Arthur and the great port of Dairen, which in Russian is known as Dalny, meaning "far off."

That is what the Russians want, the control of the West Pacific; that is, of the China coast. Let the British take back Singapore and let them recover Hong Kong, but if the Russians hold Dalny, that will be right with them. Because they are going to build in the cold and frozen north, up there in the Burry Basin north of Blagoveshchensk, a new and bigger Pittsburgh. When they have built their steel town up there in the frozen north, and hold Port Arthur as well as Dalny, the town they lost, then they will rule Northeast Asia.

That, I think, is the Soviet program, but it does not mean that Mr. Stalin will be unwilling to cooperate with us. There is one thing you must understand: that the Russians do not love Japan. And therefore I say that as soon as German pressure upon the Soviet Union has been reduced below the danger point to the Soviet Union, and as soon as the United States is able and ready to put a really powerful force of airplanes—not 200, but 1,000 or more first-line planes, with all which that implies in ground crews and high-octane gas and equipment of various kinds—into the Pacific Maritime Provinces of the U. S. S. R.—that is, Vladivostok—then I am sure that the Russians will cooperate in our death stroke against Japan.

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Eat Lard and Love It

Victories Repay Russians For Sacrifices, Hindus Says

This is the second of several articles by Maurice Hindus, special New York Herald Tribune correspondent, who has just returned from a seven-month tour of Russia.

By Maurice Hindus

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Russia is winning victories because she is willing to pay the price in life, in comfort, in convenience.

"What did you eat for supper tonight?" I asked the wife of a Russian physician.

"Soup, bread, porridge," was her answer, "which is precisely what I had last night and the night before."

She told me American lard was one of the greatest luxuries in Moscow. People spread it on bread, eat it like butter and love it. "If only we had more of it."

If only they had more of everything!

Russians are among the heaviest bread eaters in the world. Fortunately, the bread rations are, on the whole, satisfactory; in the case of peasants away from the periphery of the large cities and of workers in the factories, the ration is more than ample.

Russian Bread Excellent

Fortunately also it is excellent bread made of the whole grain of rye or with a mixture of whole wheat flour. But for this highly nutritious bread, Russian cities would have been famine-stricken. With bread, soup, porridge, now and then a little meat, a little butter, a little lard and potatoes, the Russians manage to get along. There is undernourishment in certain parts of the country, but no starvation. The Russians one sees in the street walk fast, look well and energetic.

The continuous overfulfillment of production plans in the factories and the high-grade work on the collective farms testify to a physical well-being which would have been impossible on a starvation diet. Food conditions are bad, but not desperate, and in many plants which have their own vegetable and dairy farms the meals are more than satisfactory.

Eight-Hour Day Forgotten

Prices in the open market are high; and it is here that the Herald Tribune's anonymous informant, quoted on January 28, found potatoes at $5 a pound. But it must be kept in mind that no more than 8 per cent of the nation's food is supplied by the open market. In government stores, prices are fixed and comparatively low. But Russians are praying for the day when they can again enjoy the hearty and abundant meals they knew in the prewar days.

And how they work! The eight-hour labor day is all but forgotten. Eleven and 12 hours is the rule in Russian factories. Again and again

See HINDUS, Page 4, Column 1.

foremen and engineers remain on their jobs 20 and 30 hours without rest. An engineer in the huge Gorki automobile plant told me that at the time the Germans were making their drive on Moscow he and his men never left the factory for five weeks. They worked day and night.

"I don't know how we stood it," he said, "but we did."

Woe to the worker who is late 10 minutes or even less! The first time he commits the offense he is privately reprimanded by the superintendent or the director of the factory. The second time he is publicly reprimanded and his name appears in the list of offenders on the bulletin board. If he is late a third time in the same month, he is tried by a people's court.

If he is ever late more than 20 minutes without the most valid of reasons, even if it is a first offense, he must also stand trial. He is seldom acquitted. The penalty is three to four months of "redeeming labor;" he remains at his regular job, but from 15 to 25 per cent of his salary during the period of the sentence is deducted as a fine which is paid not to the factory but to the government.

Quitters Are Punished

No worker is ever permitted to change his place of work unless it is in the interests of national defense. If he leaves of his own accord, he is tried as a deserter.

"It makes no difference," a trade union leader explained, "whether the worker is a man or woman; he or she is tried anyway and severely punished."

But these severe disciplinary measures are seldom applied. There is no need for it. The hours are long, the food inferior, the means of transportation an agony; but the fighting spirit of the men and women in the factories is high. Never in all Russia's history have workers applied themselves to their jobs with such zeal and diligence. They compete with each other in schedules of production. They create their own speed-up systems or quickly adopt those a fellow worker invents. Always conscious of the war, constantly propagandized by radio, press, orators, entertainers, motion pictures inside as well as outside the factory, they seldom fail to fulfill their own daily plan of production and overwhelming is the number of those who surpass it.

Nor is this all. In factory after factory men and women work overtime without pay to make a special contribution of tanks, guns, shells, boots and other products for the "front." The Russian press devotes a great deal of space to these special contributions for the army.

Nobody Takes a Vacation

Nobody takes a vacation in Russia. No one is exempt from labor excepting invalids and women with too many small children. There are no janitors and no charwomen in Russian schools. Pupils and teachers themselves scrub, wipe, clean and heat the classrooms.

Last summer Moscow faced the problem of laying in fuel for the winter. Coal from the Ukraine was cut off. Oil from the Caucasus was needed for war purposes. For the first time in years Moscow had to be largely heated with wood. Who would cut wood? Factory workers could not be spared for that purpose; so housemaids, office workers, housewives—about 50,000 of them—were sent to the forests for three or four months to cut wood.

Last summer we saw few children in the cities. They were out in the country, not on vacations but at work, cultivating crops and gathering harvests. Provided their health was good, boys and girls between 12 and 16 were obliged to do enough work during the summer to earn 60 "labor days." There were no exceptions.

Nor did the children complain. I saw crowds of them on collective farms and they looked neither overworked nor unhappy. In good weather they ate and slept outdoors, and it is because of the help they furnished that for the first time since collectivization was introduced the crops were harvested with scarcely any waste. With knives and rakes children followed the reapers and picked up every stray or fallen stalk of grain. If Russia has more bread this winter than foreign observers expected it is because of the inestimable help which millions of children gave the collective farms.

The Russian people wholeheartedly support the defense of the country not only with life and labor,

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but also with their earnings and savings.

"'What taxes are you paying?" I asked a former izvoschik of 61, now driving a team for a Moscow warehouse.

"My wages," he said "are 375 rubles a month; after taxes and other levies are deducted I have 260 rubles left."

All taxes are deducted by the state-owned banks.

There was always a stiff income tax in Russia for people in the higher income groups, including writers, artists, musicians, engineers and factory managers. Since the start of the war, income taxes have been substantially increased for other income groups. Anyone earning from 300 to 500 rubles a month pays twice as high a tax as formerly.

A man exempted from military service because of health or some special work he is doing must pay an additional income tax of 50 to 200 per cent.

The Russians have even introduced a tax on childless couples and on men and women of marriageable age who are single. The tax comes to about 5 per cent of the income. Unmarried women begin to pay this tax at 18, and unmarried men at 20. The revenue derived from this source is used to maintain millions of war orphans. Indirectly this tax seeks to encourage childless couples and unmarried people to adopt orphans. With the renewed, intense emphasis on family life, the Soviets prefer to place orphans with families rather than in children's homes. Once a single person or a childless couple has adopted a child they no longer pay this special tax. Thus every Soviet citizen supports children directly or indirectly.

Levy Taken on Wages

One or two days' wages go every month to the defense fund as a levy. Then there are lotteries and special collections for gifts to men at the front or in hospitals, and these, too, have to be met.

Just before I left Moscow there appeared on the front page of leading newspapers a telegram to Stalin from the secretary of the party in Tambov Province, informing him that 40 million rubles had been gathered on collective farms for the building of a special tank column for the army. Every province in Russia has been making similar collections for planes, shells, tanks, field guns and other armaments.

At the outbreak of the war people threw their government bonds into the defense fund. Writers and artists, among the highest paid people in Russia, started the campaign, and others followed suit. At least one-half of the internal debt had already been canceled through these voluntary donations.

The special contributions are drawing on the personal savings which Soviet citizens and collective farms have been accumulating during the past decades.

"Everything for victory!" is the slogan of Russia, and the people are making this slogan a living, fighting thing.

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(Tomorrow Mr. Hindus tells of the Russians' rage against the Germans.)

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Nazis Most Hated Foe of Russians

Soviet Soldiers Driven to Savagery By Their Fury, Hindus Reports

(This is the third of several articles by Maurice Hindus, special New York Herald Tribune correspondent, who has just returned from a seven-month tour of Russia.)

By Maurice Hindus

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"As a child," Sergeant Trentyev wrote to a well-known Russian author, "I used to go to the woods with my grandmother to pick raspberries. Often my hands got red with raspberry juice. Now I want my hands to be red with Germans' blood."

In this letter, the use of the word German is as significant as the violence of the emotion.

At the outbreak of the war, the Russians drew a clear-cut, emphatic distinction between Fascist and German. They not only believed there was a gulf between the two; they tried with every means of propaganda to deepen it. Soon enough they discovered it was a futile, hopeless task.

Red Star, official Red army organ, no longer carries on its masthead the slogan, "Proletarians of the world, unite!" Instead it prints in bold letters the slogan: "Death to the German invaders!" So does the Red Fleet, official organ of the Soviet navy.

Hardly an issue of the Komsomolskaya Pravada, official daily of the youth organization, but flames with hatred for Germans. Izvestia, official organ of the Soviet government; and Pravda, mouthpiece of the party, both use the words German and Fascist interchangeably.

Stories of Savagery

Never in all Russian history have Russians hated an enemy with such passion and fury as they now hate Germans. Again and again I read stories in the Soviet press of a Russian soldier in hand to hand combat with an enemy, pinning the German to the ground, biting his throat with his teeth and letting him bleed to death.

Not that the Russians—people or government—seek the extermination of the German people. Nor do they seek to derogate or ruin Germany's great contribution to the world's civilization. On my last day in Moscow I passed a leading book store and through the window saw a display of new editions of Goethe's "Werther" and "Wilhelm Meister." The German language is assiduously studied in the schools and colleges, and I am certain that Schiller, Beethoven and other leading German artists enjoy greater esteem in Russia than in Germany.

But the Russians insist that the Germans of today have nothing in common with the great Germans of yesterday. Russians have had abundant experience not only with the Gestapo but with the German Reichswehr to justify this belief.

Russians, and particularly the peasants, have been profoundly shocked by the personal manners of the Germans.

At Tolstoy's Estate

Last summer I visited Tolstoy's estate in Yasnaya Polyana. Much has already been written of the depredations the Germans committed there during their six weeks' occupation; but the following incident needs to be recorded: Tolstoy's granddaughter took me through the house in which the great novelist lived. During the German occupation Reichswehr officers stayed there. We walked through Tolstoy's study and came out on the balcony from which, Sophia Andeyevna said, "My grandfather loved to look out on the two things closest to his heart, nature and people."

The German officers had used this balcony as a latrine!

There was not the slightest excuse for this barbarism. The open, unprotected balcony was not only exposed to cold winds but made an excellent target for guerilla sharpshooters. There is only one explanation for the behavior of the Reichswehr officers—they wanted to show open contempt for anything and everything Russian, no matter how sacred and precious it might be to the Russian people.

The Tolstoy estate was not the only place where they committed incredible offenses. Peasants in villages which had been occupied by the Germans for ten months told me it was a common practice of the Germans to use vestibules and courtyards as latrines.

"Our dog," said one old peasant woman, "could teach them good manners."

Artists' Homes Destroyed

The former homes of Tchaikowsky, Rimsky-Korsakov, Chekov, Gogol, Shevtchenko, Korolenko, which have been converted into Russian and Ukrainian museums, are no more. Germans have desecrated and destroyed them. Not a monument of historical and cultural importance in any of the territories which they held or are holding but has been destroyed. Not even in Poland have the Germans tried so systematically to obliterate "the inferior culture" of "an inferior race."

One of the most amazing things about Reichswehr behavior in Russia is the utter lack of military correctness, of which this army has always been proud. Peasants frankly told me they had never known "such unclean people" as the Germans.

The peasants were equally shocked by the moral practices of Reichswehr officers and soldiers. One of the greatest diversions is pornography. They introduced and fostered it in the villages at the Rzhev front in which I traveled,

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particularly among young girls. Russian peasants are home-loving; they have deep-rooted family traditions. Whatever their sins, they have never known pornography. It is as alien to their mode of thought and their daily life as professional prostitution. But the Germans deluged them with all kinds of printed pornography.

"They didn't corrupt many of our girls," said the chairman of a village Soviet.

Food Is Confiscated

Clear cut and systematic is the policy the Reichswehr pursues in the communities it occupies. The very first thing the German soldiers do is to lay their hands on chickens, geese, ducks. Revolver in hand, they chase after them in the street, in the courtyard, in the barns, shoot them and eat them. Then they gather all the grain and potatoes they can find, also all the livestock. Ordered to live off the country, confiscation of food is one of the Reichswehr's first acts whenever it moves into a community. Peasants told me heart-breaking stories of the manner in which food seizures were carried out.

At the same time, the Germans search for Russian books and destroy them. They raid schools, offices, libraries, homes and haul away any books they find in the Russian language, often using them for fuel. Fiction, whether Russian or foreign, whether Tolstoy or Balzac, Turgenyev or Mark Twain, is as much taboo as nonfiction. In only one of the villages I visited were any books left after the Germans were driven out, and that was by acident; the librarian had hidden in the garret a number of library books and the Germans had neglected to search this spot.

I asked peasants if any of the Germans who stayed in their villages came to them secretly and said they were workers or liberals, and were out of sympathy with the action of the Reichswehr, but were powerless to stop it. Only once in a village removed from the main highways was I told of a German aviator who had come for grain. He requested the pea an o collect a certain amount voluntarily because he did not feel like forcing them to do it. Only once!

"The German workers are robbers like the rest of them," was the universal comment.

Burn All in Retreat

Endless are the plunderings and degradations to which the Reichswehr subjects an occupied community. If they have time during a forced retreat, they invariably burn every home and everything else in the village. I have seen scores of villages which are now overgrown with weeds, with only battered chimney stacks marking their former location. Hitler boasted last year that in territory Germans would be forced to evacuate the Russians would find only burned ruins. His Reichswehr has made good the boast.

The Germans do more when they retreat; they drive the civilian population ahead of them. They cannot feed them. They have no clothes and often no shelter for them. They do not need them —especially the children and the old people But if they have time and the population has failed to hide, they drive the people into German-held land, often to certain death.

These depredations and degradations ,visited on Russians only because they are Russians, members of an "inferior race," have stirred Russian wrath and Russian hate against Germans as against no other enemy Russia has ever known.

In one of his recent contributions to the Red Star, Ilya Erenburg, the most widely read writer in the army, cited the Biblical tale of Sodom and Gomorrah, which the Lord was willing to spare if only ten righteous men were found within their gates; but it was impossible to find even ten righteous men and so the iniquitous cities were destroyed. It is the same with the Germans, Erenburg said. People speak of good Germans and bad Germans. "Where are the good Germans?" the writer asks. "The only good Germans are buried deep underground."

Red Star would never have published this article if the army did not share this judgment of wrath.

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(Tomorrow Mr. Hindus tells of Russian demands for vengeance.)

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Pravda Answers Capital Paper

MOSCOW, Feb. 9 (UP). — The Communist Party organ Pravda cited Premier Joseph Stalin's May 1 statement today that the Soviet government has no territorial designs on Europe or Asia or any wish to interfere in the domestic affairs of a liberated Europe.

The article, written by David Zaslavsky, Pravda's political observer, was in answer to speculation appearing in a Washington newspaper.

The passage quoted from Stalin's speech was as follows:

"We haven't, we can't have such a purpose in this war as the conquest of foreign territories or foreign peoples in Europe or Asia, including Iran.

"Our primary aims are to free our territory and our people from the German fascist yoke. We have not we cannot have, such a purpose as to impose our will and a

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slavonic regime on the other enslaved people of Europe who expect help from us.

"Our purpose is to free these peoples to fight against Hitler tyranny, to give them a chance to organize their own affairs according to their wills—not interference in internal affairs of other peoples."

In an order of the day to the Soviet people last May 1, Joseph Stalin declared that Russia had no aim of seizing foreign territory or conquering foreign peoples. The nation's only aim, he said, was to liberate Russia "from the German fascist beasts" and to free "our brother Ukrainians, Moldavians, White Russians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians and Karelians from the insults to which they have been subjected."

The sole way to accomplish this aim, he said, was to destroy the German fascist army to the last man in so far as they do not lay down their arms.

Stalin also spoke of Russia's foreign policy in a speech to the Moscow Soviet last Nov. 6 and set up as a program for the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition:

"Abolition of racial exclusiveness, equality of nations and integrity of their territories, liberation of enslaved nations and restoration of their sovereign rights, the right of every nation to arrange its affairs as it wishes, economic aid to nations that have suffered and assistance to them in attaining their material welfare, restoration of democratic liberties and the destruction of the Hitlerite regime."

well since the necessity for protecting the retreat from the Caucasus had ended.)

DESTROY NAZI BATTALION

The midday Soviet communique said that in the area of Kursk a Red Army detachment destroyed a German infantry battalion of about 1,000 men.

Another battalion was smashed in the area of Fatezh, 32 miles northwest of Kursk. Several German defense points near captured

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Russians Demand Full Vengeance

(This is the fourth of several articles by Maurice Hindus, special New York Herald Tribune correspondent, who has just returned from a seven-month tour of Russia.)

By Maurice Hindus

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Because of their enormous sacrifices, there is nothing the Russian people would welcome more than a termination of the war—*but not without victory.* The word "defeat" is as alien to their thinking as to their vocabulary. No less alien is the thought of peace with an unconquered Germany.

August, September and October were as dark a time as Russia has ever known. Fighting the continental German army all alone with an inferior industrial output, with nowhere nearly enough equipment from England and America to make up the difference, especially in tanks and planes, the people were wondering how far the Germans would advance.

"I dread turning on the radio in the morning," said the wife of a commissar, "and listening to news of retreats. If only these retreats would end!"

Few Russians I knew felt that Stalingrad and Grozny would remain in Russian hands. Baku, too, seemed doomed. With the loss of these cities the Caucasus could hardly be held. And it was believed in high circles and by the man in the street that Turkey and Japan were likely to attack. Fear of such an attack was very great indeed.

No Talk of Defeat

Yet even in those crucial days I heard no words of defeat or capitulation, not from a single person I knew. Russians were angry and desperate. The British Prime Minister came and went. His visit blasted all hope of an immediate Allied fight somewhere which would compel Hitler to withdraw from one-fourth to one-third of his army in Russia. More than ever did the Russian people (and here I am speaking specifically of the people) see themselves abandoned by their Allies and obliged to fight Germany's land armies all alone.

Their mood and vocabulary gathered fresh emotion and fresh fire. But never for an instant did they waver in their faith of ultimate victory.

"We'll lose 20 million lives, but we'll win," I heard a naval commander exclaim at a meeting. Tempestuous applause greeted these words.

"We shall slaughter the Germans some day, somewhere," I heard a factory director cry out at a mass meeting of workers, and the very walls shook with determination to fight on to victory.

"Everything for victory," is the slogan and passion of the Russian people. By victory they mean not only expulsion of the Germans from Russian territory, but the destruction of naziism, the imposition of conditions making it impossible for Germany ever again to gain enough military strength to start another war.

Reckoning With Home Folk

They mean, more: The punishment of Nazi leaders from the highest to the lowest, as well as the instigators and perpetrators of atrocities in occupied territory. No less do they want a reckoning with the home folk in Germany who demanded or felt grateful for parcels from Russia—food, felts, woolens, toys and other things looted by the Reichswehr from the civilian population of Russia, especially from the peasantry.

One has only to visit a liberated village to appreciate the magnitude of the thefts and cruelties of the German invaders, privates and officers alike. To Russian leaders and to the Russian people, the peasant whose grain, potatoes, felts and woolens are seized and who dies of starvation or pneumonia is no less a victim of deliberate murder than if he were shot dead or bashed in the head with an ax.

Official utterances in the press and comments by the people in their homes, offices and shops make it clear that the Russians do not mean to leave unpunished a single one of those directly or indirectly responsible for murders of this kind.

While longing for complete victory and for the complete destruction of Germany's fighting machine, the Russians have no illusions of an impending collapse of Germany. They know only too well Germany's military and industrial power. That Czecho-Slovakia has been converted into one of Hitler's largest arsenals is no news to them.

Germany's steel capacity is at least three times as high as their own, a fact which stares them only too stubbornly in the face. They do not underestimate Germany's ability to reorganize the Reichswehr and unleash it once more against the Red armies.

See No Breakdown

Nor do the Russians cherish any hope of a German breakdown from within. Petty and helpless has been Germany's underground movement. Russians have seen the Germans in action. Even factory workers in the Reichswehr's ranks usually fight to the bitter end. Among their prisoners of war, the Russians have interviewed too many German bricklayers, blacksmith, mechanics and coal miners and have read too many of their letters and diaries to deceive themselves into the belief that they will rise up against Hitler and overthrow him at some near date.

Of course, if their persent offensive sets off an explosion inside Germany and the Nazi regime collapses, the Russians will rejoice. But they do not count on it.

The Russians are wondering what their allies will do. They wonder about it now more than ever. They are elated by the British offensive in Libya and Tunisia and the American action in North Africa, but they do not regard these campaigns as a second front, if only because the number of German troops involved is small. In Africa, there are six to eight divisions of the Reichswehr :in Russia the Red Army has been facing 240 divisions.

I arrived in Kuybyshev last summer in time to attend a vast outdoor mass meeting celebrating the expected opening of a second front.

This was immediately after

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Molotov's return from London and Washington, and the publication of the communique about a second front in 1942.

This is not the place to discuss the wording or the varied interpretations subsequently given to this unfortunate document. But to the Russian people it meant that during the summer of 1942 they would receive the kind of help which they had been expecting and demanding from the Allies.

Russians think of the second front not in geographic, but in military terms. Whether the place of the Allied onslaught against Germany is Norway, France or Africa is a question for the Allied high command to decide. What the Russians want is a scale of combat which will compel Hitler to withdraw from 60 to 80 divisions, or one-fourth to one-third of his troops in Russia.

Had this been done last summer, Russians feel, the war might have ended. They may be mistaken, but that is what they really believe.

But 1942 is past. Tightening their belts to the utmost, working harder than ever in their lives and in their history, paying heavier taxes than ever, contributing their government bonds and personal savings, living in unheated and dimly lit rooms so that factories can have all the possible fuel and electric power for making ammunition—making all these sacrifices for victory, the Russian people have enabled the Red army to strengthen itself and to inflict mighty blows on the Reichswehr.

And the Russians are convinced that if the Allies were now in position to engage from 60 to 80 German divisions anywhere in the world, the war would soon be over.

Right now the Russians are still asking: When will a real second front (as they understand the phrase) be opened?

The Russians are winning victories, but they are suffering enormous losses. They are losing the flower of their youth on the battlefield; millions of their civilians in German-held lands are being starved, frozen and tortured to death. Will there be a second front soon somewhere?

On the answer to this question, more than on any other issue, depends, in this writer's judgment, the outcome of the war and, even more, the outcome of the peace.

(Tomorrow: Mr. Hindus tells of growing popularity of Red system.)

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Maurice Hindus Says War Fails To Shake Stability of Russia

Reports Speedy and Effective Reconstruction Work in Ravaged Areas Is Making Soviet Goverment More Popular Than Ever

This is the fifth of several articles by Maurice Hindus, special New York Herald Tribune correspondent, who has just returned from a seven-month tour of Russia.

By Maurice Hindus

Endless are the questions the world is asking about Russia. It is not the aim of this article or this series to answer all or most of them.

But for the guidance of New York Herald Tribune readers I'd like to set down certain basic facts I have observed about the people, government and civilization of the country. Without a knowledge of these facts it is hopeless to attempt an evaluation of Russia's position in the world either today or tomorrow.

First and foremost, the Soviet government is more powerful now than it has ever been since its rise to power. The prophecies of diplomats, military observers, students of Russia, like the anticipations of Hitler and many of his closest advisers, that the war would bring rebellion and the overthrow of the existing government, have fallen on barren soil. The wish for such an eventuality has again and again insulated foreign observers, Nazis and others against a judicial appraisal of the Soviets, the economic plans, the people and everything else pertaining to national stability and national strength.

Since the outbreak of the war, the civilian population has been armed to the teeth. There is not a Russian who cannot lay his hands on a gun or a hand grenade. Factories, schools, collective farms bristle with arms. Nor are there many Russians who do not know how to handle them. These arms the people have used not against their government but against the German invaders. The fiercest enemy of the Soviets cannot afford to overlook this fact.

Impressed by Stability

Never have I been so impressed with the stability and strength of the Soviet government as last summer when I made a study of a rural district that had been liberated after nearly a year of German occupation. Never had I observed more closely its capacity to reconstruct life and the means whereby Russians live. This capacity is the chief source of the Soviet government's stability and power, and will further solidify its hold on the people.

Before leaving on my trip for this district a Foreign Office official said to me:

"You'd better take along all the food you'll need. You won't find any there. You know what happens to a village which the Germans occupy."

So I took along the food I thought I would need. But on arriving at my destination I discovered I did not need it. There was food in the village I visited. There was even meat and candy, though no sugar and sweet biscuits. Only limited rations of these were sold to the people. There were also a few centrally located government restaurants which served simple but satisfying meals at low prices.

I was amazed at the speed with which relief had come to a district where the Germans had seized every chicken, every egg, every pig, every sack of grain, every potato and where the people had been living, as they put it, "on grass." A British journalist and I had brought food with us; we had to take it back to Moscow.

Nothing is privately controlled in Russia, not even charity. Incidentally, that word is no longer used; Russians speak of "government help." Unless transport conditions interfere, such help comes quickly in the wake of victory. Evidently there are special reserves of food and other things for this purpose.

Fit Up New Hospital

The district I visited was stricken with typhus. The old hospital had been wrecked by the Germans. So nurses and doctors fitted up a hospital in several available buildings and at once started a campaign against the epidemic. They isolated all known cases and inoculated the people with the necessary serum.

"We have it well in hand now," said the woman doctor whom I interviewed.

Not only do food and medicine appear in the wake of German retreat, but Soviet and party administrations bob up as if out of the earth.

It is an unwritten law that leaders of a town or village which falls into the hands of the enemy must go underground and organize or join guerrilla bands. Unless ordered elsewhere for duty, they remain in their own district and operate there or as near there as safety permits.

Because these leaders know the people, the country, its geography, its resources, they are best equipped to command guerrilla warfare. When the community is liberated they likewise are best equipped to resume their old functions. If they are killed their assistants replace them or some one else familiar with local conditions takes over their post.

Russian methods of bringing back civil administration to liberated villages are illuminating, and have stirred in the village communities more good will than the Soviets ever knew in pre-war days.

The administration proceeds immediately with the task of rehabilitation. Usually, if they have time, the retreating Germans drive the civilian population ahead of them. But groups of civilians take to the woods and underground shelters and as soon as the Germans depart they return home.

Administration Helps

Often enough there is no home. There is only a heap of ashes. There is neither barn nor shed—everything has been burned. The Soviet administration, which is set up after the village is liberated, helps them find shelter somewhere—if only in a dugout shared with another family, usually relatives.

Sad, weary, angry, the people, especially older folk, weep a great deal over their ruined homes and their devastated village. The administration seeks to discourage tears and lamentations. They do it with food, especially bread and hot soup, with plans and schemes of restoration and with work.

They bring in livestock. The amount may be small, but the cows provide some milk for the children. Oxen or horses make possible immediate tillage of the land. Implements appear simultaneously with the livestock; so does seed. As much as possible of the land is plowed according to plan.

When people go to work, they are encouraged. They weep less or not at all. They feel they have a future.

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With books destroyed, with the school usually burned, the resumption of education in a liberated village is not an easy task. The problem of feeding pupils in winter only adds to the difficulties of opening schools. In the district I visited, the young people between fourteen and eighteen have been sent away to the Urals to be educated there in factory schools.

Food Rations Rigid

Schools have been opened for younger children, but not everywhere. Too many schoolhouses have been burned, and no other buildings are available for school purposes. Distance and weather permitting, the children from these villages attend schools elsewhere.

Slowly cultural activities are being reorganized in the villages. Evenings there may be a collective reading of a Moscow newspaper, a lecture, a concert by a company on the way to or from the front. There may be an amateur theatrical performance by local talent. More often, a portable film is shown in a public building.

Usually the returning population is greatly in need of warm clothing. The administration sends word to some district Soviet in the province which has not been under German occupation, or to some factory, requesting an immediate collection of all kinds of warm clothing which the people can spare. The local Soviet or trade union in the factory does the collecting and sends the clothes on to the Soviet in the destitute village or farm.

Life, of course, is hard. Food rations are rigid. There are few things to buy. There is some soap but not much. There is not enough in the country to provide ample rations for any one but the army, the hospitals and the nurseries. There is a shortage of tobacco. There is no fruit and very few fresh vegetables.

Russians have been propagandized so heavily about vitamins that they are almost as vitamin conscious as Americans, even in the villages. Mothers are continually going to doctors and demanding vitamins for their children and themselves. With so much of the drug industry lost, especially in the Ukraine and the North Caucasus, there are seldom enough vitamin preparations anywhere to meet the demand.

Some Grumbling

Naturally there is grumbling. But the peasants can not help asking themselves what would have happened to them had there been no Soviets to help them get re-established. Where would they get a horse or an ox to work their land? Where would they get a plow, or seed or other indispensable articles? In fact, they have been conditioned to look in time of emergency only to the government for aid; and in these dark times more than ever, do they place hope of recovery in government agencies.

Already the Soviets are promising to provide them in time, especially when the war is over, with building materials for new houses, new barns, new schools, new hospitals, new clubhouses.

Listening to Soviet officials in these reconquered villages, one gets the feeling that life is beginning all over for a people that has been wantonly and completely ruined and degraded by the German invaders.

The work of reconstruction, as much as the successful operation of Russian industry and Russian agriculture, and the fighting capacity of the Russian armies make the Soviets more powerful and popular than they have ever been.

To underestimate or disregard this fact is to underestimate or disregard one of the basic realities of our times.

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Soviet Applied U. S. Ideas to Marxist Principal

By Maurice Hindus

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(This is the last article by Maurice Hindus, special New York Herald Tribune correspondent, who has just returned from a seven-month tour of Russia.)

Basically, Sovietism means collectivized control of all economic resources and activities in the land. From this idea and this policy Russia has not deviated since the start of the first Five-Year Plan in 1928.

It has no individual enterprise, neither in the city nor in the village. The few remaining individual landholdings and the open markets do not invalidate the fundamental fact that private business as an institution is gone, and that all the powers of the party and the government are arrayed against its return.

On this issue America and Russia present their sharpest contrast. Under a system of private enterprise America has achieved her most expansive economic development, the greatest the world has ever known. Were it not for this spectacular achievement of private enterprise in our country the very idea of a Russian Five-Year Plan never would have been born. American industrial achievement, American engineers, American blueprints have been the inspiration of all the plans. Technologically the plans have meant the Americanization of Russia. But this Americanization—or, as the Russians say, mechanization—of the country has been achieved not under a system of individual but of collectivized enterprise.

Ready to Fight for System

Whatever we may feel about it, however the Russian system may be repugnant to us and contrary to our experience, tradition, habit of thought or individual ambition, in Russia it has come to stay, unless the government is overthrown and a new government is forced on the nation.

There is not a chance in the world of the Russians abandoning or modifying the foundations of their economic system. The young generation knows no other. Any attempt to exert pressure, direct or indirect, from the outside to achieve a change is certain to meet with mighty defiance on the part of the Russian people, and will be resisted with every drop of Russian energy and Russian blood.

It must be emphasized that in Russia this mode of economic control is no longer regarded even by former private bankers or manufacturers as an experiment. The system has survived the strain of the cruelest and most desperate war Russia has ever fought, above all a mechanized war. Despite Germany's much older and more seasoned industrial machine, despite her superior industrial output, Russia, with the increasing aid of American and British equipment, has been able to stage a swift and vigorous counteroffensive. We must reconcile ourselves to the thought that collectivized control of property is as basic to Russian life today as national consciousness, and will be as violently defended and upheld.

Learned to Build Factories

The new Russia which the war has revealed also has demonstrated something else equally momentous. It has learned to build factories, the largest and most complicated, with its own hands and its own resources. In the very midst of war the Russians have erected and equipped hundreds of new factories, among them the largest blast furnace in Europe. This is not the place to discuss how they do it but to emphasize the fact that they can do it and have done it.

After the war, with all the ruin they will be compelled to face, the abundant work on their hands for years and years and to come. Yet should circumstances arise which will make it politically or economically feasible for them to help a backward nation become industrialized, they will not shrink from the task and they are equipped to do it.

Agriculture is Collectivized

Collectivized enterprise has swept not only industry but agriculture. The farms have been reorganized into large-scale mechanized collectives. Despite psychological and technical difficulties, these have been especially successful in growing grain and breeding livestock (all but horses). They still have much to learn about horticulture. The new orchards I saw early last summer in the North Caucasus are a poor advertisement for collectivized farming. The main reason for this is lack of attention. The orchards were for the most part in a state of obvious, sorrowful neglect.

Yet the new system of farming remains. When villages are liberated from German occupation they go back automatically to collectivized farming, even in places where the Germans have sought to carve up the lands into individual holdings.

On the political side, it cannot be emphasized too vigorously that Russia has been going Russian more and more all the time. Every military leader in Russian history, whether czar, prince or count, has been lifted to a pedestral of national glory. Not only Peter the Great, but Ivan the Terrible (now called only Ivan the Fourth) has become a national hero. Sergei Eisenstein, Russia's noted motion picture director, has been at work more than a year on a film dealing with the life and reign of Ivan IV, whom the Russians now regard as one of the greatest statesmen in their history. Never under the Romanovs was this czar so lauded and glorified. The Soviets naturally laud him today not for his errors and misdeeds, but for his contribution to Russian statehood and Russian national unity.

Nevsky and Marx as Heroes

"Alexander Nevsky," said a British observer in Moscow, "is a greater hero in Russia than Karl Marx."

This does not mean that Russians have abandoned Marx. They have not. It does mean that Prince Alexander Nevsky, mighty conqueror of Germans in the thirteenth century, rouses deeper and more natural emotions than the founder of so-called scientific socialism.

As time goes on, Russia, I am convinced, will become more and more Russian. This does not mean she will withdraw more and more into her own national shell and pay

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no heed whatever to the outside world.

People in America often ask what Russians will want to do at the end of the war. No one can possibly answer this question now, for much depends on how, when and under what circumstances the war will end. After spending seven months in Russia and traveling more or less extensively to the limit of the permission granted me, I have the feeling that the Russians want nothing so much as to bind and heal their wounds and start to live again in some degree of comfort. The last thing they want is more fighting anywhere.

But I must repeat, much depends on the shape of things to come and on the international relationships that are built up or spring up in the Allied world.

Of one thing we can be certain. Bled profusely as Russia may be at the end of the war, exhausted as her people may feel, they will not only resent, they will oppose and, if necessary, fight any effort to build a coalition against them.

The very word "coalition" rouses deep emotion in Russia. To the Russians it means an attempt not only to build a wall around them but to mass together a military force against them. Any one with the least knowledge of Russia and Russians—Stalin, the Soviets, the youth or the people in general—must know that under whatever idea, name or guise a coalition may pass, the Russians are certain to recognize it and to battle against it with all the physical and spiritual power at their command.

It should also be kept in mind that Russia is the most powerful nation in Asia. Not even Japan can now match the heavy and machine-building industry which Russia possesses in the Urals, Siberia and central Asia.

It is especially important to remember this fact in any attempt to visualize post-war policies and possibilities.

This is a clipping from
page _____ of the
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Pravda: Soviet Wants Only Baltic States, Bessarabia

(4150)

By M. S. HANDLER
United Press Correspondent

MOSCOW, Feb. 12.—David Zazlavsky, political observer for the Communist Party organ *Pravda*, cited Premier Stalin's May 1 speech on Soviet territorial aims in his newspaper two days ago to refute rumors circulated abroad attributing annexationist ambitions to the Soviet Government in Europe and Asia, it was learned today.

Zazlavsky insisted strenuously that the Red Army is fighting to keep the "Soviet State intact"—of which Bessarabia and the Baltic states are organic parts.

Zazlavsky's restatement of Soviet policy was inspired by speculative assertions by Constantine Brown in the Washington *Star* Jan. 31. The *Pravda* observer asserted that Brown had been victimized by German propaganda which is employing the victories of the Red Army to frighten the world with the spectre of Bolshevist domination.

Russia's Aims

In his dispatch, Zazlavsky quoted passages from Stalin's speech, saying:

"We haven't, we can't have such a purpose in this war as the conquest of foreign territories or foreign peoples in Europe or Asia, including Iran.

"Our primary aims are to free our territory and our people from the German Fascist yoke. We have not, we cannot have, such a purpose as to impose our will and a Slavonic regime on the other enslaved people of Europe who expect help from us. Our purpose is to free these peoples, to fight against Hitler tyranny, to give them a chance to organize their own affairs according to their wills—not interference in internal affairs of other peoples."

Zazlavsky said the "Hitlerites are making desperate efforts to frighten other peoples with the Red Army's victories," and are "stealthily trying to attribute a plan to dominate Europe to the Soviet Union.

An Old Nazi Trick

"This is not a new German trick. It has not been successful before and obviously is doomed to fail now when the Red Army and the armies of our Allies are bringing freedom from the Hitlerite yoke.

"Like card-sharpers, the Hitlerite propagandists are pulling marked cards from the greasy pack."

Alleging that Brown had been taken in by a Nazi trick, Zazlavsky said that Brown was "very generous." Zazlavsky wrote:

"He presents us almost all of Europe on a silver platter in a generous gesture. He gave Czhechia to the Soviet Union. He doesn't mind. He did not even spare Asia. He says: 'Nobody in Washington would be surprised if Moscow insisted upon widening its sphere of influence across Iran to the Persian Gulf.'

Baltic Is Soviet

"Why shouldn't he give California or Alaska to the U. S. A.? There still are some strange people ready to present the Soviet Union with parts of its own territory—the Baltic Republics, for example. They pretend not to know that, according to the Soviet Constitution, they are part of the Soviet Union, and the Red Army is fighting to keep the Soviet state intact."

Whether or not the Red Army will proceed west of its frontiers which include Bessarabia and the Baltic Republics is essentially a military problem, it was said by observers, who recalled that Soviet leaders before the war frequently stated that, if attacked, the Red Army would crush the enemy in his own territory.

It is to be presumed now, these observers said, that whether or not the Red Army continues beyond the borders depends primarily on whether or not it is able to crush the *Wehrmacht* in Russia or must pursue the enemy into his own territory.

This is a clipping from page 13 of the PM for FEB. 12, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

04556

TERRITORY CLAIMS LISTED BY RUSSIAN

Pravda Editor Says Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bessarabia Are Part of Soviet Union

By BERTRAM D. HULEN

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 12—The latest and most emphatic assertion of the claim of the Soviet Union to Bessarabia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on the ground; that they are legally a part of Russia is contained in an editorial in Pravda, which was circulated in English translation today by the Soviet Embassy in its information bulletin.

It aroused deep interest in diplomatic circles because the claim has heretofore been asserted only by implication.

The editorial was written by David Zaslavksy, one of the editors of the newspaper, and appeared on

Continued on Page Six

Continued From Page One

Feb. 8. Pravda is the organ of the Central Committee of the All-Union Russian Communist party.

The occasion for setting forth Moscow's attitude was found in suggestions of Constantine Brown, a columnist for The Evening Star of Washington, on Jan. 21 that Russia was seeking wide territorial gains, including Bessarabia and the Baltic republics, and intimating that the subject was open to discussion among the powers.

Obviously other writers who have been presenting similar views in a growing discussion of the question were also in the mind of the Pravda editor. Moreover, German propagandists have been using the discussions for their own purposes.

The discussion has been prompted in recent weeks by the prospect that the German Army in its retreat from Russia might have to flee from Bessarabia and the Baltic republics, from which Russian troops were driven in 1941.

"Constantine Brown," the editorial says, "kindly presents us with Bessarabia on behalf of unknown Americans. Why should he not make a generous present of California or Alaska to the United States? Do there not exist curious persons who are ready to present to the Soviet Union parts of the latter's own territory as, for instance, the Baltic republics? These persons pretend not to know that the basic law of our country—the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.—has fixed the ties between these republics and the other union republics, and that the Red Army heroically fights for the honor, independence and integrity of our State.

There was no official comment on the editorial by the State Department.

Bessarabia and the Baltic republics were taken over by Russia in 1940. When the Baltic States were absorbed the State Department declared that this government did not recognize the status and since then there has been no official change from the positions, so that the question appears to be an open one for the United States.

The Baltic republics never established governments in exile, nor have they joined the United Nations, but they maintain legations here and the State Department continues to recognize their Ministers.

Britain discussed the status of these territories with Russia last year but, according to information here, never concluded an understanding.

From the broader standpoint the issue poses the question of Russia collaboration in the peace, which is causing much thinking here as the Soviet Armies continue their progress against the Germans.

The editorial then sets forth Russian aims in the words of Premier Joseph Stalin in his speech on Nov. 6, 1941, in observance of the Soviet Union's national holiday.

"Hitlerite liars," it says, "have very short legs. Whoever marches in step with them will fall together with them. The world has heard and remembers the clear and simple words of Stalin:

"'We have not and cannot have any such war aims as the seizure of foreign territories or the subjugation of foreign peoples—whether it be the peoples and territories of Europe or the peoples and territories of Asia, including Iran.

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Times for Feb. 13, 1944

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Pravda Demolishes 'Stupidities' on Soviet Territorial 'Aims' Printed Here

How does the Soviet Union feel about the so-called "problem of the Baltic Republics"? What are its aims with regard to Europe's future? Yesterday's afternoon papers carried brief United Press excerpts from David Zaslavsky's article in *Pravda*. The *Daily Worker* carried those in Wednesday's issue. Today we have the full story, direct from Moscow, on what Zaslavsky said.

(By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

MOSCOW, Feb. 12.—A blistering refutation of all stories about the "Sovietization of Europe" came in David Zaslavsky's article in **Pravda**, in reply to allegations by Constantine Brown, foreign expert of the Washington Star.

EXCLUSIVE

Brown had charged in the Washington Star for Jan. 31st that the USSR intended to "annex Bulgaria," reach the Persian Gulf, "dominate Europe" as though echoing Hitlerite propaganda on the "danger of Bolshevism."

Zaslavsky's article entitled "Swindlers and Buffoons" follows:

"The Red Army victories "frightened the German fascist masters of lies and slander. The Hitlerites are making a desperate effort to frighten other peoples with the victories of the Red Army. Inventing a terrible Soviet 'bogey,' they are displaying it to Europe and America.

A HITLER TRICK

"In a thievish manner they want to throw at the doorstep of the Soviet Union Hitler's shattered plan for the domination of Europe. This is not a new German trick.

"It never won success in the past and is clearly doomed to failure now that the people enslaved by the German invaders see that the Red Army and the armies of our Allies are bringing them liberation from the Hitler yoke.

"Like market swindlers the Hitler propagandists are dejectedly shuffling the old pack of soiled, marked cards. They realize that a sensible, honest man will not fall for the bait of the exposed and beaten swindlers. So they are fishing for simpletons or people who have no objection to being deceived. And they recently caught one.

"On January 31st, the 'Washington Star' published an article by its correspondent Constantine Brown, a very generous, magnanimous journalist.

"BENEVOLENT" STUPIDITIES

"In a grand manner he presents us with almost the whole of Europe on a platter. This for example, is what he writes: 'Bulgaria herself will seek the privilege of incorporation into the U. S. S. R. if the Russians, after the Nazi collapse succeed in establishing a common frontier by the annexation of Dobrudja. . . .

"'Possibly the people of Yugoslavia may be induced to ask union with the great Slav power, Russia, thereby giving Russia an outlet to the Mediterranean.'

"Constantine Brown ungrudgingly presents the Soviet Union with Czechoslovakia. Even Asia was not spared. 'Nobody in Washington would be surprised,' he says magnanimously, 'if Moscow insisted on extending its influence through Iran to the Persian Gulf'. . . .

"One cannot enumerate all the benevolent stupidities uttered by this garrulous American journalist. We can see one thing—a game is in progress on the market. The German swindlers handed out a marked card and Constantine Brown accepted it.

"The Hitler press eagerly seized at 'Brown's Plan.' At a press conference in Berlin the notorious Doctor Schmidt 'comments' in a very grave manner. The swindlers and clowns have found work. It is a crude job. Constantine Brown with a touching expression on his face presents us in the name of unnamed Americans. . . with Bessarabia.

"Perhaps in a fit of generosity he would present the Soviet Union with the United States or with California or Alaska?

"Why there are even such remarkable people who are ready to present the Soviet Union with part of its own territory, as for example, the Baltic Republics.

STALIN'S WORDS

"These people feign ignorance of the fact that the union of these republics with the other republics of the Soviet Union is recorded in the basic law of our State Constitution of the U. S. S. R., and that the Red Army is fighting for the honor, independence and integrity of our State.

"What can one expect of a Constantine Brown? But it is hardly befitting for the 'Washington Star' to fall for the bait of the Berlin fishermen and share their unenviable laurels of buffoonery. Hitler's lies have feeble feet. He who keeps in step with the fascist propaganda falls together with it.

"The whole world heard and remembers the simple and clear words uttered by Stalin: 'We have not and cannot have any such war aims as the seizure of foreign territories and the subjugation of foreign peoples—whether it be peoples and territories of Europe or peoples and territories of Asia, including Iran. Our first aim is to liberate our territories and our peoples from the German fascist yoke.

ONE AIM: LIBERATION

"'We have not and cannot have any such war aims as that of imposing our will and our regime upon the Slavonic or other enslaved nations of Europe who are expecting our help.

"Our aim is to help these nations in the struggle of liberation they are waging against Hitler's tyranny, and then leave it to them quite freely to organize their life on their lands as they think fit. There must be no interference whatever in the internal affairs of other nations."

"Here are words which resound through the world like a bell made of a clear, noble metal.

"How insignificant compared with this truth are the petty intrigues of the stupid Hitler politicians! Let them talk. They have no alternative in their position of beaten swindlers.

"But should someone unwittingly, or through unwise calculation, play into the hands of the shady company of fascist swindlers and use their marked cards, he will have no one but himself to blame for landing in the bad company of arrant swindlers and clowns."

This is a clipping from page 2 of the Daily Worker for FEB. 13, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

DAVIES ASKS CURB ON BANDIT NATIONS

Calls for a Peace Organized by China, Russia, Britain and United States

PRAISES SOVIET'S RECORD

It Has Lived Up to Its Pledged Word He Says on Victory Program of the Opera

Joseph E. Davies, former ambassador to Soviet Russia, appealed yesterday for organization of the peace "so that it cannot soon again be smashed by aggressor bandit nations, who run amok, who would rule or ruin their neighbors and destroy the peace of the community of this shrunken world."

Speaking from Washington at the Metropolitan Opera's weekly Victory Rally, which was a "Salute to Russia," Mr. Davies said that if the peace is to be assured, it "must be done by an agreement—a contract or treaty—by the four great nations, China, Russia, the British Commonwealth and ourselves, who bear the brunt of the fighting."

Different ideologies, religions and political systems must not stand in the way, Mr. Davies maintained, for "these are exclusively the business of each, and not the business of the others." The controlling question, Mr. Davies said, was whether the contracting parties would keep their pledges.

Says Soviet Keeps Promises

"The simple truth is," declared Mr. Davies, "that so far as the Soviet Union is concerned, their record as a government will disclose that in business and diplomacy, they live up strictly to their promises and to their pledged word. That record is as fine, so far as treaty and business obligations are concerned, as any nation of the earth."

The Soviet people have given their bond by formal treaties with England and the United Nations as to their attitude, and Premier Stalin "publicly gave the lie to the suggestion that the Soviets seek to dominate Europe and to project communism there and here," Mr. Davies asserted. The Russians "have sealed that bond and contract with the blood, sacrifices and sorrows of the millions of their men, women and children."

Mr. Davis pointed out that our enemies have filled the air with "all manner of lies reflecting upon the reliability and the purposes of the Soviet Union." When the Nazis suffered "their greatest catastrophe at the hands of the Red Army at immortal Stalingrad," Mr. Davies observed, Dr. Joseph Goebbels filled the Nazi press and the airways of the world with "his frenzied cries against the Communist bugaboo."

Nazi Lies Not Believed, He Says

"But he didn't get away with it," Mr. Davies emphasized. "The Czechs don't believe it. The Poles don't beliebe it. The Norwegians don't belive it. Evn the Finns an' the Hungarians and the Rumanians don't believe it."

Mr. Davies expressed the opinion that "among all of the United Nations, not one will be found more stanch or true in an effort to project, maintain and protect that great and noble enterprise of establishing a peaceful, decent and free world aftr the war than will the great people of th Soviet Union." It is vital, he said, "that the Soviet people should understand and trust us, as it is that we should trust them."

Bruno Walter, conductor of the Metropolitan Opera, acted as chairman of yesterday's rally during an intermission of "Boris Godunoff." Othere who spoke were Allen Wardwell, member of the executive committee of Russian War Relief, and Mrs. Joseph Truesdale, president of the Metropolitan Opera Guild. M. M. Gousez, chairman of the board and president of Amtorg Trading Corporation, was a guest of honor.

This is a clipping from page 50 of the New York Times for FEB. 14, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

RED ARMY VICTORY BUILT ON SOLDIERS' COURAGE

Continued Soviet Gains Also Depend Upon Staying Power of Men in Ranks

By RALPH PARKER

Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, Feb. 13—So immense are the Red Army's achievements in its Winter campaign that one tends to lose sight of the part played by the individual Russian soldier in its accomplishment. Yet it is on his stanchness and matchless courage that the victory is being built and upon him depends how far the Red Army can continue its advance as Winter relinquishes its grasp in South Russia.

About a week ago I was sitting on the floor of a small ambulance driving toward Stalingrad across the battlefield where Field Marshal Friedrich von Paulus's German Sixth Army perished. The temperature was between 35 and 40 below and we made slow progress because the water in the lower part of the radiator kept freezing and then the water in the top part would boil.

Emergency Measures

The driver would then light a fire under the radiator and melt some snow and pour the cold water into the top and go on. Incidentally, the big American trucks the Red Army is using stand up well to this rough-and-ready treatment.

But at midnight we came to a long standstill. The road, or rather the wide track of beaten, rutted snow we were traveling, was jammed with the impedimenta of a Russian army at grips with the elements. By the light of flickering fires around which tall, hooded figures crouched, we caught a glimpse of one of the problems of the present campaign.

Line upon line of trucks stood in the snow while drivers with numbed hands struggled to get engines to run. Horses heaved at guns and from behind groups of men with hoarse, rhythmical cries pushed with their shoulders.

For hours the Red Army men fought this midnight battle with Winter. Then we heard a shrill whistle and watched the whole column tear itself from the ice and roll forward, leaving us alone under the unwinking stars, with Stalingrad ahead.

That was far in the rear of the front, but similar spectacles could be seen in the Ukraine, in the Kursk forests, in Central Russia.

Lieut. Gen. Mikhail Malinin, chief of staff of the Don Army group, told the Allied correspondents who visited Stalingrad how the dauntless constancy of men had overcome problems created by an inadequate communications system to enable the fighting troops to annihilate the Nazis' Sixth Army.

There is such an upsurge of confidence in the Red Army that speculation about the possible effect of the Spring thaw on its offensive is likely to be disproved by events.

Six weeks ago foreign "military experts" in Moscow were talking as if the Germans had left Marshal von Paulus and his twenty-two divisions before Stalingrad as part of an elaborate plan. A fortnight later they advanced the view that the abysmal frosts of mid-January would bring the Russian mechanized forces to a halt.

Now it is being suggested that the "bitter frosts" of mid-February may prove a handicap. And after that the thaw——

But still the Red Army advances—and advances faster than the Germans did.

Nothing is more suggestive of its strength than its ability to dispense with operative pauses; and that in the long run is due to the confidence the commanders have in their men's power to overcome fatigue, natural trials and supply shortages.

Weather Has Had Effect

All the same, changing weather conditions have their effect on the fighting. There was a period of about two months last year when the Ukrainian black earth was too soft to enable mechanized forces to sweep fast across open country.

One feature of the Russian advance is that it is enabling the Red Army to build up a hinterland well supplied with communications both local and directly connected with Russia's main trunk lines. This Winter's offensive was made from the narrowest possible springboard. At Stalingrad Lieut. Gen. Vassily I. Chuikoff held a few hundred yards of land along the Volga's right bank. Col. Gen. Philip I. Golikoff operated from a mere foothold. In the Caucasus the springs that were uncoiled lay cramped around two bases. A river, a sea, a trackless steppe and great mountains lay immediately behind these starting points. A miracle of supply was performed.

But even if an early Spring does bring a pause in operations, the Red Army will at its close be in a highly favorable position for a further advance. This time last year the main Russian forces were stemmed at the German Winter line behind which Gen. Field Marshal Fedor von Bock prepared his Summer offensive. That line has been breached now and is in danger of tottering everywhere in the lower half of the Russian front.

"Bolshevist Bogy"

So far-reaching are the implications of the Red Army's successes at the opening of this year, in which we were promised activity on other fronts in Europe against the Axis, that factors other than military need to be considered. Echoes of Germany's "Bolshevist bogy" propaganda have reached us here via the American press, in which, as David Zaslavsky wrote in Pravada this week, one publicist picked a marked card from the pack Goebbels handed him. Russia is not amused when a Washington journalist, in the name of America, offers the Soviet Union Bessarabia. Bessarabia, it is pointed out, is as much a part constitutionally of the U.S.S.R. as Alaska or California is of the U. S. A. So are the Baltic republics.

Goebbels is trying to spread the idea that the Russians are fighting to impose their rule on the whole Slav world and to extend their frontiers to the Mediterranean, the Sudetens and the Persian Gulf. One American commentator goes one better and, if he has been correctly reported here, only with condescension would he allow Russia to rule her own territory.

The Red Army, it is clear to anybody who has spent any time with its commanders and men, has no intention of supporting a world revolutionary policy and will never

is a clipping from E-3 of the York Times for FEB 14, 1943

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be asked to do so. Its Commander in Chief has pronounced himself more often and more positively against such a policy than on any other subject. But the Red Army is very definitely fighting for honor, independence and unity of its land. It is not often that an American journalist is singled out for reference in Izvestia. That paper's satire usually is reserved for Hitler, Goebbels, Laval and Axis quislings. But the rare distinction is expensive in the currency of good-will between Allies.

I have been looking out for the Bolshevist bogy this week. Stalingrad seemed a likely place, for the men who fought so toughly in sewers and rubble are probably the fiercest soldiers Russia has. Here, if anywhere, would be the "hordes of inner Asia" Hitler spoke about.

Russia Men's Concern

The other Allied correspondents and I supped in Stalingrad with Major Gen. Alexander Rodimtseff of the tough Thirteenth Guards Division.

That young, fair-haired general answered our questions shyly—questions that seemed to scare him more than the Germans did. At intervals some of his men sang nostalgic songs about girls and Summer evenings at home and recited lyric poems about Russia's land.

I have looked for the "Bolshevik bogy" in Marxian schools and the Lenin Institute in Moscow. Here the studious-looking professor in charge talked to me about Lenin's respect for the rights of other countries to the forms of government they preferred.

When, on a road near Stalingrad, we watched a Russian Army unit march westward through the night, a Ukrainian doctor approached us out of the ranks and chatted about Tolstoy. And when we sheltered in a dugout that night the soldiers made us listen to Russian folk music on a gramaphone they had recaptured from the Germans.

That bogy, it seems, is a chimera.

Europe, it has occurred to me, used to have anxieties 150 years ago about America after her Revolution and War of Independence, but as America grew up the bogy evaporated and Europe grew proud to be associated with America.

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This is a clipping from page _____ of the New York Times for _____

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Less Communistic Russia Seen Emerging From Strain of War

Mark Sullivan Cites Propaganda Emphasis Upon Nationalism and Army's Release From Political Rule as Signs of New Trend

By Mark Sullivan

WASHINGTON, Feb. 20.—Russian successes against Hitler have led to consideration of what might happen at the end of the war and at the peace conference if Russia should emerge as the principal conqueror of the Nazis—as the unquestionably dominant power in Europe. The question is asked, would Russia then proceed to impose Communism on all Europe? In Germany this is not put as a question, it is put as an assertion. German propaganda uses it to cause suspicion and fear among the United Nations, especially in the United States.

The question cannot be answered, except by time. But there may be light on it in a condition apparently arising within Russia. It is necessary to say "apparently," because it is difficult for outsiders to know what goes on within Russian military or government circles. It is startling to say—and it is said here only with the utmost tentativeness—but there are signs which suggest that, as a consequence of the war, Russia may be becoming less Communistic. One sign is something very remarkable that has happened to the Russian Army.

Army Beaten While Intact

Consider, first, the Russian Army as of June, 1941, when Hitler made his first onrush. At that time, the Russian Army was intact; it had suffered no losses. The country behind it was intact. The country's whole industrial structure for supplying arms was intact. And the Russian Army had at that time the protection of the strongly fortified Stalin line. Yet at that time the Russian Army was beaten, again and again, disastrously.

Consider now the Russian Army as of today. Today it has fewer men—it has lost millions in killed and prisoners. It has less equipment. It has lost to Germany most of the industrial area which supplied its equipment, and the man power that made the equipment. It has lost to Germany most of the farm area that supplied it with food. Yet today the Russian Army wins, again and again, magnificently.

Why the difference? Why did an intact Russian Army with complete equipment lose in the summer of 1941? Why does a diminished Russian Army with less equipment and resources win in 1943?

The answer includes many factors, of course, and it is not intended here to overemphasize one. It is this:

In Russia, from the beginning of the Communist regime in 1917, the Communist political leaders were suspicious of the army, especially of army officers. For this there was, in the beginning, a reason. At that time most of the army officers held over from the regime of the Czars. That they might retain a sentimental loyalty to the old regime was a natural suspicion of the Communist revolution's leaders.

After that early reason for suspicion ceased with time the Communist political leaders had another—a permanent and a fundamental suspicion. They suspected

Propaganda of Gloom

success has been far from complete.

At any rate German propaganda has gone through three phases since the beginning of the Russian offensive. The first was the period of "Strength Through Fear." The second, which only a Mephistopheles-like character such as Goebbels could organize, might be termed "Strength Through Grief." This was the coordinated "mourning campaign" over the loss of the 6th Army at Stalingrad. The Nazis seem now to be embarking on a propaganda period which could be called "Strength Through Confidence"—confidence despite everything. Adolf Hitler's own newspaper, "Voelkische Beobachter," heralded this new phase the other day when it wrote: "The Reich's gigantic army stands strong and unshakable as the most closely knit and strongest military instrument in world history."

Easier Said Than Done

And a leading provincial journal laid down the new propaganda line: "The dream of Ch...

Divided Leadership a Handicap

It was a Russian Army thus divided in leadership that, in 1939, made a poor showing against little Finland's army, one-twentieth the size. It was a Russian Army thus handicapped that was beaten again and again by the Germans in 1941. Thereafter, under stress of disaster, the Communist political leaders at Moscow ended or greatly modified the system of political commissars with the army. By that change the military leaders in the field got self-confidence, authority, morale. From that resulted the successful Russian Army of today.

Along with this has gone another development. Communism in Russia, as everywhere, was opposed to the spirit of nationalism, of patriotism. Communism stresses loyalty not to the nation but to the common people of all nations, of the world. It is expressed in the slogan long put forward in Russia as official dogma: "Proletariat of the world, unite!"

Since the war with Germany began that slogan has been dropped from the mastheads of the official Communist press and from the other instruments of propaganda. This is not merely a gesture of deference to Russia's non-Communist allies in the war. It is a recognition of human nature, in Russia and elsewhere—a recognition that men will fight instinctively and heroically for their country, for their soil. Russia's propaganda to her own people stresses now not the ideology of Communism, but the love of country.

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This is a clipping from page 2-II of the New York Herald Tribune for Feb. 21, 1943
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25th Year Finds Red Army With Fresh Strength

2/21

Many Changes, New Power Won in War Emphasize Its Anniversary Tuesday

By Walter Kerr 3

By Telephone to the Herald Tribune

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MOSCOW, Feb. 20 (via London).—On Tuesday the Red Army will observe the twenty-fifth anniversary of its baptism of fire that took place in a battle against the Germans near Pskov and Narva, on Feb. 23, 1918.

It's a big day on the Soviet calender, and this year men who look back to see how the Red Army has developed will find it is a far different army than the one that took the field on the day of the second German invasion, June 22, 1941.

In twenty months of war the Red Army has changed a great deal. It has learned a lot. Young officers have won their way to important positions.

Supreme general headquarters have been organized, with Premier Joseph Stalin as supreme commander in chief. Two officers have earned the rank of marshal of the Soviet Union, Gregory Konstantinovitch Zhukov and Alexander Mikhailovitch Vasilievsky. Vasilievsky started the war as a major general and was successively promoted to lieutenant general, colonel general, army general and marshal.

Voronov Also a Marshal

Another young leader is forty-three-year-old Nikolai Voronov, chief of artillery, who received the rank of marshal of artillery.

There is also a group of young generals who in the early part of the war commanded one army each. Now, as front commanders, they lead groups of armies. Among them are Konstantin Rokossovsky, Filip I. Golikov, Leonid A. Govorov, Nikolai Vatutin and Rodion Malinovsky, all with the rank of colonel general.

Undivided command has been established with the abolition of the commissar system, though political leaders still handle political affairs within the army.

The army has put on the epaulets that were discarded during the revolution.

But more important, the army itself has better equipment than it had, more planes, more sub-machine guns, a better organized rear, with fore smoothly functioning supply lines. It is catching up to the Germans in regard to number of tanks.

Planes Equal to Foe's

Russian pilots say their planes are as good as the German machines and that their attack plane, the Stormovik, is better than the similar German types. Soldiers have more sub-machine guns because factories turned them out by the thousands and got the barrels in a hurry by cutting in half the old rifle barrels and so providing barrels for two sub-machine guns. Everywhere can be seen evidence of improved transport. Last winter it took about six days for a civilian to go by train from Moscow to Kuybyshev. Now he makes the trip in less than two days.

The soldiers themselves are better fighters than they were in the early days. They have learned to fight by fighting and they have more fire-power than they had before.

A Russian division today has far more anti-tank power than it had. Today officers' infantry, with its usual complement of artillery, grenades, anti-tank guns and anti-tank rifles, can repel tank attacks.

Tanks Best Defense

Still, the Russians know there is only one way to repel a mass tank attack, and that is with tanks. They have the tanks, not organized as before, but in formations as large as a corps. The Russian, however, will deny that the use of large tank forces was learned from the Germans.

He will recall when large tank forces were used for the first time. This was when Zhukov planned the operation near Bain Tzagan, in Outer Mongolia, against the Japanese 23d Division, commanded by General Katzubara. He also used tanks when he destroyed the Japanese 6th Army near Khol Khin Gol, in Outer Mongolia, in August, 1939.

Zhukov does not seem to have much trouble with armies bearing the number six. He destroyed the Japanese 6th Army in Outer Mongolia and recently helped to carry out operations that ultimately led to the destruction of the German 6th Army near Stalingrad.

This is a clipping from page 3 of the New York Herald Tribune for FEB. 21, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Red Army Day Dates From 1918 Victory Over the Germans

(04551)

The President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics writes about Lenin's work in forging the Red Army—"the first, and so far the only army in the world which not only held out, but is now striking blow after blow at the combined hordes of the Italo-German coalition."

By MIKHAIL KALININ

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

MOSCOW (By Wireless)

FOLLOWING the establishment of Soviet power, Lenin had been constantly preparing the Soviet people for the defense of their country, and his first concern was the formation of the armed forces of the Soviet State. A new army, the Red Army, was formed by decree of the Council of Peoples Commissars on January 28, 1918.

At the initial stage of its formation the new army was already faced with a cruel and ruthless enemy. German troops were closing in on Pskov and Narva in an attempt to capture Petrograd. Lenin then set as the main task of the people to learn to fight, to "create an army capable not of flight but of withstanding the severest trials." Otherwise, Lenin warned, you will have to live under the German jackboot. And the young workers and peasants of the Red Army justified Lenin's confidence.

On February 23, 1918 it checked the advance of the German troops near Pskov and Narva. This day has become known as the Red Army's birthday.

LENIN looked upon the Red Army as the best armed section of the people In the days when the Soviet State was menaced, Lenin particularly warned the people that the Soviet Republic was besieged by the enemy. It must become a united armed camp, not in words but in deeds. To conduct the war in real fashion, said Lenin, a strong organized rear is needed.

The very best army, men most devoted to the cause of the Revolution, would be immediately exterminated by the enemy unless they were adequately armed, supplied with food and trained. And Lenin demanded that the slogan "All for the front" be put as the basis of all work; that all the country's manpower reserves be placed at the service of the front; he demanded the full mobilization of the population.

Lenin attached exceptional importance to the institution and strengthening of the new socialist discipline. He demanded not only a ruthless struggle against direct traitors and saboteurs, but the most rigid measures with regard to cowards and self-seekers, as well as those who tolerate or hide them.

Lenin considered strict military discipline the most important prerequisite of success, the basis of all defense work. Lenin urged the strictest military discipline and greatest vigilance. To miss or lose presence of mind, he said, is to lose everything.

WE ARE at present engaged in a war of liberation. The brutal face of German imperialism is well known to us from the last war. Its predatory aims, its desire aims, its desire to enslave our people have remained the same as in 1918-1919. In his appeal, "The Socialist Fatherland is in danger," Lenin said that it had happened more than once that the peasants and workers in the Ukraine had opposed the removal or destruction of property, hoping to preserve it for themselves. They were severely punished. The invaders seized everything—grain, cattle, coal, metals, machines, and shipped it to their country.

The example of the Ukraine must serve as a terrible example to all of Russia. This shows that the Germans are past masters at burglary. Nevertheless, to a considerable section of the Soviet people the brutality and exceptional greed of the German soldiers came as a surprise.

MANY people could not comprehend the fact that the devastation caused in any territory through which the German army passed is like that caused by locusts. And indeed the Soviet citizen found it hard to imagine that a German soldier could strip a Soviet child, shot by him, of his blood stained shirt to send to his Frau in the Vaterland.

According to the Soviet laws such a monster must be shot. But in the fascist army, plunder, violence and murder are encouraged by the command and looked upon as the matter of fact thing to do in occupied territory.

However great German violence may be, however brutal their oppression of the conquered people, whatever their efforts, the position of Hitler Germany in its fourth year of war, despite its territorial seizures, greatly resembles the position of Kaiser Germany in 1918. At that time Lenin estimated the war situation of German imperialism as follows:

"The more Germany is victorious the clearer it becomes to all, even to many representatives of the big bourgeoisie in Germany that the war is hopeless. They are beginning to realize that even if the Germans are able to maintain their resistance on the Western Front, it will not bring the end of the war a bit nearer, but will create another enslaved country which will have to be occupied by German troops and make it necessary to continue the war. And this will lead to the disintegration of the German army, which is being transformed from an army into gangs of losters violating alien people, unarmed people; and extracting from the country the last remnants of food supplies and raw materials in the face of the tremendous resistance of the population."

THIS Leninist estimate of the German successes at that time may be fully applied to Hitler Germany. Initial military successes and territorial seizures have by no means brought fascist Germany closer to a victorious conclusion of the war; but on the contrary have removed further

This is a clipping from page 2 of the Hag. Soc. Worker for

FEB. 21, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

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from it. And just as in the First World War, the present war is again becoming hopeless for Germany, and the outlines of the inevitable debacle of Hitlerism loom clearer and clearer ahead.

We are celebrating the 25th anniversary of the Red Army. This is a big people's holiday. The Red Army is the child of the Soviet people. The people are sparing no means for its organization and for strengthening it. From its very foundation Stalin constantly helped strengthen its fighting capacity, directed its development, carefully reared its officers' staff.

AND now the moment has arrived when the Red Army's fighting capacity is being tested on the fields of battle in a clash with the world's strongest army. Germany's military caste is haughty and inflated. The German generals deem themselves unsurpassed experts in warfare, and their victories in Europe completely turned their heads.

Hitler terror and unbridled propaganda placed into the hands of the German generals a slavishly obedient army, which even loots and perpetrates crimes in connivance and upon the orders of the command. The humiliation by the fascist chieftains of the international treaties concluded by themselves, their treachery with regard to neighboring countries, have given the German generals big trumps in their war game.

This was fully utilized with regard to the Soviet Union. The Red Army was faced with a tremendous force, with a numerically superior enemy armed to the teeth with modern equipment, an enemy brazen, stubborn, intoxicated by easy victories.

The Red Army was the first, and so far the only army, in the world which not only held out, but is now striking blow after blow at the combined hordes of the Italo-German coalition.

(By Intercontinent —FS.)

This is a clipping from page_____of the Daily Worker for

_____

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

C4534

RED ARMY LIKENED TO CONTINENTALS

Senator Thomas Says Russian Forces Crushed Tyranny as Washington Did Here

DEFEAT OF BLITZ PRAISED

Davies Declares That Halting Nazis Saved World—Labor Leader Lauds Our Allies

Russia's Red Army was compared by speakers at the Hotel Commodore last night with George Washington's forces in the American Revolution; hailed as crushing tyranny to preserve freedom.

The occasion was a dinner celebrating the Red Army's twenty-fifth anniversayr, which falls on Washington's Birthday. The speakers included representatives of American labor, the United States Army and the Senate.

"The tyrannies which Washington struck against were those which hindered the growth and development of individual man," said Senator Elbert D. Thomas of Utah. "The tyrannies of old Russia kept the people submerged.

"Freed by the people's army, Russia today knows what she is fighting for. Men, women and even children have tasted freedom. They call it good. And for it today they willingly sacrifice.

"In the sacrifices of the Russian people's army and the accomplishment of its great victories, the world now sees the strength of men and women united in a fight for liberty. We revere the dead, we honor the living of this great army because we know as Lincoln knew at Gettysburg that the dead have not died in vain, that the nation they represent shall have a new birth of freedom and that these republics of many peoples shall not perish from the earth."

Saved World, Davies Says

Joseph E. Davies, former Ambassador to Russia, told the guests, brought together by the magazine Soviet Russia Today and other sponsors, that the Red Army's solution of the Nazi blitzkrieg had saved the world.

"It was the Soviet High Command, and the Red Army, that conceived a system of defense and military technique to meet and solve this threat," Mr. Davies said, "relieving men everywhere of the fear that our civilization, based upon ideals of good-will, altruism, and brotherhood, faced destruction. That, as we see it now, is the proud accolade which history will accord to the Soviet Union."

Mr. Davies spoke in high praise of the British stand against the Nazis, of China's grim fight, of America's transformation into the arsenal of democracy and of its armed forces abroad.

"We may hope, that standing together, for collective security we will project and maintain a durable, just and secure peace," he said. "The Soviet Union has created this possibility for us. Only through closest cooperation with her can we achieve it. And we are proud to confirm our pledges in this task in the defense of freedom, on this double anniversary of freedom—the anniversary of the founder of our national liberties and the anniversary of the Red Army that is now preserving these liberties not only for the Soviet people, but for all humanity."

War Seen Shortened

Major Gen. T. A. Terry, representing the War Department, pointed out that both Washington's army and the Red Army were born in revolution; said the Russian forces' offensives "will shorten considerably the time required for the Allied forces to win complete victory."

He warned against Axis peace propaganda with its threat of "half-way victory," and said that to win the war we must fight with full strength on the home and on the oversea battlefronts.

"Any Allied success should be an inspiration to all," the general told the guests. "In recent months the Red Army has furnished its full share of inspiration. It is my great privilege, as the representative of the War Department, to salute the overwhelming courage of the Russian people in withstanding and hurling back the invaders. I am particularly honored to salute the genius with which the Red Army has been directed and led by its military commanders."

A. F. Whitney, president of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, saluted he Red Army on behalf of American labor.

"The Red Army not only exploded the myth of Nazi invincibility," he said, "but also tore down the wall of misrepresentation that prevented us from working cooperatively with the Soviet people. We cannot erase the mistakes of the past, but we can learn not to repeat them."

Senator James E. Murray, unable to attend because of illness, sent a message of greeting to the Red Army in which he said: "Now, when civilization is threatened with extinction, once more the Russian people have risen in all their strength to defend the cause of mankind."

Captain Sergei N. Kournakoff, a Russian writer, discussed at length the Red Army strategy that stopped the German blitzkrieg and hurled the Nazi armies into headlong retreat.

Vilhjalmur Stefansson presided at the dinner. The guests of honor were Rear Admiral Mikhail I. Akulin, vice chairman of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission; Major Pavel I. Barayev, attaché for mechanized forces of the Red Army, and Captain Pavel N. Asseyev, of the Red Air Force.

Fifteen hundred guests heard the talks. The halls and tables were decorated with American and Soviet emblems.

This is a clipping from page 22 of the New York Times for Feb. 23, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Stalin's Order of Day Extolling Red Army

By The Associated Press.

LONDON, Feb. 22 (AP)—The text of Premier Stalin's order of the day as broadcast by Moscow and recorded by the Soviet monitor:

Comrades, Red Army men, Red Navy men, commanders and political workers and men and women guerrillas, today we are celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the existence of the Red Army.

A quarter of a century has passed since the Red Army was created. It was created for a struggle against foreign invaders striving to enslave our country.

Feb. 23, 1918, when detachments of the Red Army thoroughly defeated troops of German invaders before Poskov and Narva, was established as the birthday of the Red Army.

In 1918 to 1921, in a stubborn struggle against foreign invaders, the Red Army defended the honor, freedom and independence of our Soviet motherland and defended the right of the peoples of our country to build their lives as our great Lenin taught.

For two decades the Red Army guarded the peaceful and constructive labor of the Soviet people. The people of our country have never forgotten the encroachment on our land and have constantly cared for the strengthening of the might of the Red Army and have provided it with first-class military and technical equipment and lovingly reared cadres of Soviet fighters.

The Red Army is an army defending the peace and friendship between the peoples of all countries.

"Not Created for Conquest"

It was not created for the purpose of conquest of foreign countries, but to defend the frontiers of Soviet land. The Red Army has always respected the rights and independence of all peoples.

But in June, 1941, Hitlerite Germany perfidiously attacked our country, rudely and foully violating the non-aggression agreement, and the Red Army found itself compelled to launch a campaign to defend its native land against the German invaders and to drive him from the borders of our country.

Since that time the Red Army has become an army of deadly struggle against the Hitlerite troops, an army of avengers of the violation and debasement perpetrated by the German Fascist scoundrels against our brothers and sisters in the occupied districts of our native land.

The Red Army is meeting the twenty-fifth anniversary of its existence at a decisive moment in the patriotic war against Hitlerite Germany and its accomplices, Italians, Hungarians, Rumanians and Finns.

Twenty months have passed since the Red Army began to wage its heroic struggle, unexampled in history, against the invasion of the German Fascist hordes.

Laid Foundation for Victory

In view of the absence of a second front in Europe the Red Army alone is bearing the whole weight of the war.

Nevertheless the Red Army has not only stood firm against the onslaught of the German Fascist hordes but has also in the course of the war become a menace to the Fascist army.

During the hard battles in the Summer and Autumn of 1942 the Red Army barred the way to Fascist hopes. Our people will remember for all time the heroic defense of Sevastopol and Odessa, the stubborn battles before Moscow and in the foothills of the Caucasus, in the Rzhev area and before Leningrad and the most magnificent warriors in history who fought at the walls of Stalingrad.

In these great battles our valiant Red Army men, commanders and political workers covered the military banners of the [illegible] trumpeted by our [illegible] to persuade the disintegrating people of Germany and Italy and their captives that America is disunited—that America will be guilty of faithlessness in this war and will thus enable the Axis powers to control the earth.

It is perhaps fitting that on this day I should read a few more words spoken many years ago—words which helped to shape the character and the career of George Washington.

The Inspiration of Washington

"Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.

"Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted.

"Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth.

"Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they shall be filled.

"Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy.

"Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.

"Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God.

"Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness' sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.

"Blessed are ye, when men shall revile you, and persecute you, and shall say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake.

"Rejoice, and be exceedingly glad: for great is your reward in heaven: for so persecuted they the prophets which were before you."

Those are the truths which are the eternal heritage of our civilization. I repeat them to give heart and comfort to all men and women.

The relations of forces on the Soviet-German front has changed. The fact is Fascist Germany is becoming ever more and more exhausted and weaker while the Soviet Union is more and more developing its reserves and becoming ever stronger. Time is working against Fascist Germany.

Hitlerite Germany, which forces the war industry of Europe to work for it, until recently had superiority against the Soviet Union in technical equipment and first and foremost in tanks and planes. It was here that she had the advantage. But during the twenty months of war the situation has changed.

Lists Enormous Enemy Losses

Thanks for the self-sacrificing labor of the working men and women engineers and technical experts in the war industry of the U.S.S.R., the production of tanks and guns has increased during the period of the war.

During this time the enemy has suffered enormous losses on the Soviet-German front in war material, particularly in tanks, planes and guns.

In three months of the offensive of the Red Army in the Winter of 1942-43 alone the Germans lost over 7,000 tanks, 4,000 planes, 17,000 guns and large quantities of other war material.

Of course the Germans are endeavoring to cover these losses, but this will not be so easy to do as no little time would be required for the enemy to be in a position to make up for these enormous losses in war material. Meanwhile time will not wait.

Hitlerite Germany began the war against the U.S.S.R. having a numerical superiority of troops mobilized and ready for battle as compared with the Red Army. It was heer that she had the advantage.

In twenty months, however, the situation has changed in this respect also. In defensive and offensive battle, the Red Army since the beginning of the war has put out of commission about 9,000,000 German fascist officers and men, of which no less than 4,000,000 were killed on the field of battle.

112 Divisions Routed

The Rumanian, Italian and Hungarian armies which Hitler had thrown on the Soviet-German frontier have been completely defeated.

In the last three months alone 112 enemy divisions have been routed by the Red Army, 700,000 men have been killed and over 300,000 have been taken prisoner.

Of course the German command will adopt all measures to cover this colossal loss. But firstly the weak spot in the German Army is the shortage of manpower reserve, in view of which it is unknown from what sources this loss will be made up.

Secondly, even supposing the Germans scraped together by hook and by crook the necessary number of men, it would require no short period of time to get them together and train them. And time will not wait.

The Hitlerite army entered the war against the Soviet Union having almost two years' experience in conducting large-scale military operations in Europe, utilizing for the purpose the most modern means of war. The Red Army, in the first period of the war, naturally had not yet had nor could have had such military experience. It was here that the German Fascist army had the advantage.

In twenty months the situation, however, has changed in this sphere as well. In the course of the war the Red Army has become a seasoned army. It has learned to smite the enemy for certain, taking into accounts its weak and strong sides as is demanded by modern military science. Hundreds of thousands and millions of Red Army men have become masters of their weapons, rifles, sabers, machine guns, artillery, mortars, tanks, sapper work and aircraft.

Tens of thousands of commanders of the Red Army have become masters in leading troops. They have learned to combine personal valor and courage with an ability to lead their troops on the field of battle, revoking stupid linear tactics and adopting firm tactics of manoeuvring.

Sign of Military Maturity

It should not be considered an accident that the command of the Red Army is not only liberating from the enemy Soviet soil but is also not allowing the enemy to leave our soil alive by carrying out operations to surround and wipe out the enemy which can well serve as an example of military skill.

This is a clipping from page 3 of the New York Times for FEB. 23, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

This undoubtedly is a sign or maturity of our commanders. There is not the slighest doubt that only the correct strategy of the command of the Red Army and the flexible tactics of our commanders who executed it could lead to such outstanding action as the surrounding and wiping out of the enormous Sixth Army of the Germans making up the 330,000 men of Stalingrad.

In this respect everytihng is not well with the Germans. Their stategy is defective, since as a general rule it underestimates the strength and possibilities of the enemy and overestimates its own strength.

They apply their tactics in accordance with textbooks, endeavoring to fit events at the front into paragraphs of their regulations. The Germans are accurate and exact in their operations when the situation allows the requirements of their regulations to be carried out. This is where their strength lies. The Germans become helpless when the situation gets complicated and does not "correspond" with this or that paragraph in their regulations but requires adoption of an independent decision not provided for in the regulations.

Warns Against Overconfidence

It is here that their main weakness lies. These are the causes which determined the defeat of the German troops and the successes of the Red Army in the last three months.

It does not follow from this, however, that the Hitlerite army is finished and the Red Army has now only to pursue it to the western frontiers of our country. To think thus would mean to fall into unwise and harmful self dedeception. To think thus would mean to over-estimate our own strength, underestimate the strength of the enemy and to fall into adventurism¼

The enemy has suffered defeat but he is not yet conquered. The German Fascist Army is experiencing a crisis because of the blows it has received from the Red Army but this does not yet mean that it cannot recover.

The struggle against the German invaders is not yet ended—it is only developing and flaring up as yet. It would be stupid to suppose the Germans will give up even one kilometer of our land without a struggle.

The Red Army has befort it a severe struggle against the cunning, cruel and as yet strong enemy. This struggle will require time and sacrifices, exertion on the part of our forces and mobilization of all our possibilities.

We have begun the liberation of the Soviet Ukraine from German possession, but millions of Ukrainians still are languishing under the yoke of German enslavers. In Byelo-Russia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, in Moldavia, in Crimea, in Koarelia, German invaders and their accomplices still hold sway. Enemy armies have received powerful blows, but the enemy is not yet conquered. The German invaders are furiously resisting, are launching counter-attacks, are striving to cling to their defense lines and may enter into fresh adventures.

For Continued Effort

That is why there can be no place in our ranks for complacency, carefree attitude, or swank.

The Soviet people are joyful concerning the victories of the Red Armies.

But men, commanders and political workers should firmly remember the behest of our teacher, Lenin, that "the first thing is not to be carried away by victory or to swagger, the second thing is to consolidate victories, the third thing is to defeat the enemy completely."

For the sake of liberation of our country from the hated enemy, for the sake of finer victory over the German Fascist invaders I order:

1. Continually to perfect military training and strengthen discipline, order and organization throughout the Red Army and Navy.

Two, strengthen the blows on the enemy troops constantly and stubbornly and give him no chance to consolidate a defense line, to give him no rest by day or by night, to cut enemy communications, to surround enemy troops and annihilate them if they refuse to lay down their arms.

Three, to fan more extensively the flames of guerrilla warfare in the rear of the enemy, to destroy enemy communications, to blow up railway bridges, to hamper the transport of enemy troops, the transport of arms and ammunition, to blow up and set fire to army stores, to raid enemy garrisons, to prevent the retreating enemy from burning down our villages and towns, to help the advancing Red Army in all ways and by all means.

In this lies the guarantee of our victory, comrades, Red Army men and Red Navy men, commanders and political workers, men and women guerrillas.

On behalf of the Soviet Government and our Bolshevik party I greet you and congratulate you on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Red Army.

Long live our great motherland! Long live our glorious Red Army, our valiant Red Navy, our intrepid men and women guerrillas!

Long live the party of the Bolsheviki, inspirer and organizer of the Red armies' victories!

Death to the German invaders!

J. STALIN,
Supreme Commander in-Chief.

This is a clipping from page _____ of the New York Times for _____

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Pride in Victory and Fighting Allied Unity Highlight Red Army Anniversary Slogans

(By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

MOSCOW, Feb. 22.—A spirit of pride in the Red Army's victories and in its mission of liberation to the Nazi-oppressed peoples of Europe throbs through the slogans issued for tomorrow by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in honor of the Red Army's 25th anniversary.

Some of the slogans follow:

"Long live the Red Army heroically fighting for the honor, freedom and independence of the Soviet Fatherland against the German fascist invaders! Mark the 25th anniversary of the Red Army with new victories over the enemy!

"Long live the great Soviet people and their heroic Red Army and Navy, which have laid a firm foundation for victory over the German fascist invaders! Forward into battle for the complete destruction of the German occupationists!

"Comrades, men of the Red Army and Red Navy, commanders and political instructors, men and women guerrillas! A great liberation mission has fallen to your lot. Be worthy of that mission—ruthlessly destroy the German fascist scoundrels!

"The sons of all the peoples of the Soviet Union are fighting for the Soviet Fatherland. Long live the Red Army—the army of fraternity and friendship of the peoples of the USSR!

"Valiant men of the Red Army! The Fatherland is proud of your magnificent victories. Strike out with greater hammer blows at the German fascist robbers! Clear out native soil of the Hitlerite scum! Long live the Red Army which brings liberation to the enslaved people and which inspires them to struggle against Hitlerite tyranny.

"Long live the victory of the Anglo-Soviet-American fighting alliance over the foul enemies of mankind—the German fascist enslavers! Damnation and death to the German fascists, to their state, their army and their 'New Order in Europe.'

FORWARD TO THE WEST

The slogans then call upon the Red Army commanders to perfect their military skill and improve the military training of the army units; and upon the men of the Red Army to learn to use their weapons skillfully against the German fascist invaders until their complete annihilation.

"Men of the Red Army," reads another slogan, "millions of Soviet people are suffering under the German fascist yoke and looking towards you as their liberators. Forward to the west, to the liberation of Soviet Soil!

"Avenge our towns and villages plundered and ruined by the German fascist scoundrels. Avenge the Soviet people who have been murdered or driven to slave labor in Germany. Avenge the violation of women and children. Blood for blood! Death for death!

"Infantrymen of the Red Army! Drive the Germans and their hirelings off Soviet soil! Pursue and exterminate the enemy troops! Encircle and take prisoner the German invaders, and if they refuse to surrender, wipe them out!"

Further slogans greet the airmen, tankmen, artillerymen and mortar crews, motorized units, cavalrymen, Red Army and Navy men, tommy gunners, scouts, signalmen, engineering and sapper units, doctors, nurses and stretcher bearers.

The Guardsmen are called upon to be an example of valor and courage, discipline and staunchness, an example of how to launch a swift onslaught in the offensive.

Other slogans read:

"Glory to the heroic defenders of Leningrad, Odessa, Sevastopol and Stalingrad, who have set an example of boundless courage, iron discipline, staunchness and ability to conquer the foe!

"Honor and glory to the valiant men of the Red Army who successfully encircled and liquidated the enemy troops at Stalingrad!"

Another slogan greets the Leningrad inhabitants and Red Army troops who broke the Leningrad blockade.

The slogans addressed to the Russians, Ukrainians, Byelo-Russians, Moldavians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Esthonians and Karelians who have temporarily fallen under the yoke of the German fascist scoundrels, state:

"The hour of your liberation is drawing near. Ruthlessly exterminate the fascist invaders, fan the flames of popular guerrilla warfare!

"Men and women guerrilla fighters! Raid the enemy's rear, destroy his headquarters, demolish his railway lines and bridges, set fire to and blow up his supply depots and barracks, exterminate the enemy's manpower! Daily increase your assistance to the advancing Red Army!

"Soviet men and women patriots! Study military matters and learn to defend your native land! 'All our efforts to support our heroic Red Army and our glorious Red Navy! All the efforts of the people to destroy the enemy!' (Stalin).

"Working people of the Soviet Union! Care for the families of Red Army men is part of our care for the Red Army.

"Working men and women, engineers and technicians! Work tirelessly to support the front! Supply the advancing Red Army with more tanks, planes, guns, mortars, shells, mines, machine guns, tommy guns and rifles!

"Collective farmers, men and women, working men and women employed in machine tractor stations and state farms! Supply the front with more provisions!

"Railway and transport workers! Fight for the uninterrupted and efficient work of the railways! Assure the success of the offensive of the Soviet troops!

LONG LIVE STALIN

"Soviet intelligentsia! Devote all your energy and knowledge to the struggle against the German fascist enslavers!

"Ardent greetings to the Soviet men and women patriots who have contributed their savings for the construction of tanks, planes and guns for the Red Army!

"Soviet women, learn the men's jobs, replace the men who have gone to the front! Train for anti-aircraft and chemical defense; train for signalling; learn nursing. All out for the struggle against the German invaders.

"Soviet youth. Work self-sacrificingly to help the front; master the technique of production; set examples of labor discipline; patiently study military art!

"Working people of the towns and villages liberated from the German occupationists! Spare no efforts to help the advancing Red Army! Speedily restore industry and agriculture!

"Communists and YCLers! Be in the front ranks of the fighters against the German fascist invaders!

"Long live the freedom and independence of our glorious Soviet Fatherland! Long live the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Party of Lenin, the Party of Stalin, the organizer of the struggle for victory over the German fascist invaders!"

This is a clipping from page 2 of the Daily Worker for FEB. 23, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

C9548

Comintern Aids Red Army

Gives Funds to Help "Liberation of Peoples of Europe"

MOSCOW, Feb. 22 (UP).—The executive committee of the Comintern (Communist International) has contributed 430,000 rubles (about $86,000) to the popular subscription for the construction of defense units for the Red Army, it was learned today.

In a letter to Premier Josef V. Stalin published in the newspaper "Pravda," George Dimitrov, general secretary of the Comintern, and three other officials requested that the fund be used toward the creation of an aircraft unit to be named "Moscow."

"Conscious of our duty to the Red Army which is bringing liberation to the peoples of Europe, we promise to exert even greater effort so that at the moment of the decisive battles we may successfully aid in the creation of a universal anti-Hitler war in the rear of the German Fascists," the letter said.

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This is a clipping from page 2 of the New York Herald Tribune for FEB 23, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

04524

Roosevelt Calls Africa Start of Second Front

Advises Reporters Not to Try to Interpret Stalin on Aims of Red Army

By Bert Andrews

WASHINGTON, Feb. 23.—President Roosevelt took issue today with a newspaper man who suggested that Premier Josef V. Stalin had intimated, in his order of the day made public yesterday in Moscow, that the Red Army's war effore would be ended once the Germans were driven out of Russian territory.

The newspaper man began the discussion, during which it developed that the President regards the American invasion of North Africa as the beginning of a second front, by asking Mr. Roosevelt if he had read Stalin's order of the day.

President Roosevelt said he had not.

"He made several statements," the newspaper man said, "which would indicate that after he has pushed the Germans out of Russia he was through."

Advised Not to Interpret

President Roosevelt said somewhat sharply that no, Stalin didn't say that, and advised his questioner to stick to the language used by Stalin and not to interpret it. Then he quickly added that he honestly had not read the Stalin statement.

The newspaper man was willing to enlighten him, and said: "Stalin said that Russia was bearing the whole weight of the war because no second front had been set up." The President acknowledged that he had read that headline, but repeated that he had not read the article.

Another questioner told the President that the leading article in the current issue of "The Saturday Evening Post" said that he and Prime Minister Churchill had promised Stalin a second front in 1942.

President Roosevelt seemed somewhat irritated as he said that he wondered where the magazine got that story, adding that he didn't think it had read any secret files of the Casablanca conference or had decoded any messages.

Another questioner observing that the magazine's article was not in reference to promises made at the Casablanca conference, but at the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting of Jan. 1, 1942.

President Roosevelt said, a little testily, that that was going into a perfect futile argument. He and Churchill did agree to start a second front, he said. When the time came, it seemed best to start it in Algiers or Casablanca as the most feasible point. There is always the problem of what is meant by a second front, he said. Then, closing the subject, he said that no two people in the room with him would agree on an answer.

Welles Praises Russians

As other developments in Russian-American relations, words of praise for Russia were forthcoming from Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State; Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, and Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War.

Mr. Welles said the people of the United States unanimously share the greatest amount of admiration for the achievements of the Russian armed forces. He did not comment on the second front or other military aspects of Stalin's statement.

Mr. Knox noted the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Red Army by sending a message to Stalin congratulating the Soviet Army for the "decisive defeat of the invading Nazi horde," and adding: "I salute the day when the Red Army and its comrades of the Soviet Navy shall have driven the enemy beyond the frontiers of the U. S. S. R."

At a press conference Mr. Knox declined to comment on Stalin's declaration that the Soviet armed forces alone were bearing the burden in defeating Germany in Europe.

Mr. Stimson sent the following message to Stalin: "It is a happy coincidence that the twenty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of the Red Army should come at a moment of such great achievement for Soviet arms. The winter campaign of the Red Army of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has aroused the admiration of the world. Its story will be told as long as courage and heroism are honored among men.

"I extend my cordial greetings and congratulations to you, to whose genius is so largely due both the development of the Soviet Army of today and its success against the common enemy. To all the valiant officers and men of the Red Army I extend the salutations of their American comrades in arms on this anniversary."

This is a clipping from page 4 of the New York Herald Tribune for [illegible]

Clipped at the State of Government.

Many Generals Occupy Party Posts in Russia

Typical Front Commander Found To Be a Veteran of Political Wars, Too

By Walter Kerr

By Wireless to the Herald Tribune

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MOSCOW, Feb. 23.—A typical general in the Red Army, which is celebrating today its twenty-fifth anniversary, is about forty-five years old, stands five feet seven and a half inches tall and weighs 175 pounds. He has a hard, round face, is smooth shaven and has thick brown hair, unless he has shaved it off.

He is a member of the Communist party and has been for many years. He was born in a provincial town of a peasant or worker family. After serving as a private in the Czarist army in the first world war, or working on a farm or in a factory, he joined the Red Army soon after its formation in 1918, when he was about twenty years old.

After the civil war he entered military school, being graduated as an officer. He then served with the troops before entering the Frunze Military Academy for training as a high commanding officer.

Many Served in Far East

This is only my own idea of the average general in the Red Army, but I have found that most of the generals I have met come pretty close to fitting the description. Most of them, I have learned, in addition to their military experience in the first world war and the civil war, served in the Finnish War, and an astonishing proportion of them served in the Far East.

It is probably not generally understood outside the Soviet Union how many generals are members of the Communist party. Every one I have met has been a member, and many others have reached high positions in the party organization.

An important body within the party is the Politburo, or political bureau, of the central executive committee. One of its fourteen members is Marshal Klementi E. Voroshilov, a military man. Within the last six months, three others of the group have been given the military rank of lieutenant general. They are Alexander Scherbakov, since October an Assistant Commissar of Defense and now chief of the political department of the army; Nikita Khrushchev, head of the Ukrainian party committee and now member of the military council of the southern front, and Andrei A. Zhdanov, head of the Leningrad party city committee and member of the military council of the Leningrad front.

Still a fifth member of the Politburo is Lazar M. Kaganovich, a member of the military council of the Trans-Caucasus front, but the newspapers have not said that he has received a military rank.

Stalin Holds No Rank

Another of the fourteen, of course, is Premier Josepf V. Stalin, who is commander in chief of the Red Army; but he does not hold a regular military rank.

The central executive committee itself has seventy-one members, including the fourteen members of the Politburo. Four are military men, all marshals. They are Semyon M. Budenny, Semyon Timoshenko, Gregory Kulik and Voroshilov.

Besides Scherbakov, Zhdanov and Khrushchev, another member of the central committee serving with the rank of lieutenant general is Lev Mekhlis, a member of the military council of the Volkhov front.

Every front and army has a military council whose membership includes the front or army commander, his chief of staff and a third member whose title is simply member of the military council. He is a political leader.

There are also seventy-six candidate members of the central executive committee. Eleven are soldiers.

One is Gregory K. Zhukov, Marshal of the Soviet Union and First Vice-Commissar of Defense. Another is Army General Josef R. Apanasenko, commander of the Far Eastern front. A third is Colonel General E. A. Shchadenko, of the army's political department.

Four Command Fronts

Four others are now commanding fronts. They are Army General Kirkill A. Meretskov, of the Volkhov front; Army General Ivan E. Tulenev, of the Trans-Caucasus front; Colonel General I. S. Koniev, of the central front, and Colonel General Ivan Massienikov, of the north Caucasus front.

The other four are Marshal Boris M. Shaposhnikov, chief of the general staff; Colonel General Yakov Cherevichenko, Colonel General Mikhail P. Kirponos and Lieutenant General George Savchenko.

The other front commanders who are party members are Marshal Timoshenko and Colonel General Rodion Malinovsky, of the southern front.

The Communist party also has a high organization known as the central revision commission. One of its members is Colonel General Filip I. Golikov, commanding on the Voronezh front.

This is a clipping from page 4 of the New York Herald Tribune for

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C4536

The Red Army

There is some food for sober thought in Stalin's order of the day to the Red Army on its twenty-fifth anniversary. It was inevitable, under the circumstances, that he should recall the creation of that army "for a struggle against foreign invaders"; it is unfortunate that the "foreign invaders" a quarter of a century ago included not only the Germans (whom Stalin mentions by name) but the British, the Americans and the White Russian armies supported by them. No doubt the remark that the Red Army "alone is bearing the whole weight of the war" was also inevitable. It was not strictly accurate. If the Royal Air Force and the British and American Navies, to say nothing of lend-lease, or the diversion in Africa, were subtracted from the scene the Russians would quickly realize that they are not carrying the "whole" burden of the struggle; but they are carrying so fearful a proportion of it that the remark is understandable. And it is of the utmost importance that we should appreciate the attitude which lies behind it.

It should be quite clear from Stalin's order that the Russians have not forgotten the past any more than have our own Communist baiters. They are at least as suspicious of the American and British democracies as the democracies are suspicious of them. They feel that they have done the major work; and as they add to their victories—the only really definitive victories which any one has yet achieved over the Axis—they are certainly going to feel that they are entitled to a major voice in the outcome. It is worth noting that Stalin, in cataloguing the Russian territories yet to be freed from the barbarian, includes Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the same breath with White Russia and the Crimea. But it is also worth noting that he reiterates that the Red Army does not exist "for the purpose of conquest of foreign countries but to defend the frontiers of Soviet land."

The Red Army will certainly emerge from this struggle as one of the greatest concentrations of power in the world. Since its leadership is as yet unconvinced as to either the purposes or the determination of the democracies, it intends to take what it regards as already its own. There are strong reasons for believing, however, that it is not a power devoted to imperial conquest. Russian armies rarely have been; unyielding in defense of Russia, they have seldom fought effectively beyond their borders. Here is, beyond question, the first and biggest phenomenon with which any thinker about the post-war world must deal. But the effort of the democracies should plainly lie in one direction. If the United States and Britain prove themselves resolute in their devotion to their own democratic principles; if they show themselves powerful in battle and capable of assuming the obligations for world order which victory will impose, they can have good hopes of finding in Russia a permanent and helpful ally. If they fail, they will find Russia rebuilding her own world in her own way.

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C4527

C4527

On The Record

By Dorothy Thompson

Stalin's "Order of the Day"

Stalin's Order of the Day is of great importance, both for what it reveals politically and militarily.

The allies are mentioned only once, and that in a not too friendly manner. Stalin says that in the absence of a second front in Europe the Red Army is bearing the whole weight of the war. By this he affirms the superiority of the Red Army, but immediately stresses that the Red Army is "not an army for conquest."

"It was not created for conquest of foreign countries, but to defend the frontiers of Soviet land. The Red Army has always respected the rights and independence of all peoples."

This is repeated several times, in various phraseology, and does not parallel the Casablanca demand for "unconditional surrender."

Stalin then defines the Soviet Union. It is less than that Russia which was divided by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, dictated by the Germans after the last war.

A Definite Program

Still to be "liberated," are: the rest of the Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bessarabia, the Crimea, Karelia, and "White Russia."

Only the last two concepts are not clear. We do not know exactly the limits of Karelia, the eastern-most part of Finland, or White Russia, which in 1920 was divided between Poland and Russia.

That these are the limits of Russian claims is underlined by the fact that, at the same time, he guarantees the integrity of pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia, including sub-Carpathian Russia, which is wholly populated by a branch of the Ukrainian population.

Russia Vs. Pan-Slavism

This, then, is no pan-Slavic concept. It is a Russian, and a security concept. Stalin gives notice that the Baltic states, Karelia, and Bessarabia, are never again going to be jumping off points for a crusade against the Soviet Union.

The guarantee for Czecho-Slovakia is a denial that the Russians want to expand into Central Europe. It is Stalin's answer to the Goebbel's campaign rousing fears of the Bolshevization of Europe.

Actually what Stalin claims is exactly what Hitler conceded him at the time of the Russo-German pact. It is a consistent Russian plan. It is what the Russians tried to recover of their historic territory after the German defeat in the last war—and were prevented from getting by western intervention. It is what they again tried to recover in negotiations with both the British and the Germans in 1939.

* * *

Three Military Claims

This statement of political aims occurs in an account of the military situation. Stalin, as always, is cautious. He makes, however, three claims:

First, that the Russians will drive the Germans out of Russia alone, and regardless of any action taken by the allies.

Second, that the Russian and German armies have reached equality—both as to numbers of trained men, and material, and that the training and strategy of the Russians are superior.

Third, that the Germans will not be allowed to build a new defense line.

Stalin does not say it will be easy. He says the enemy has suffered defeat, but is not yet conquered. "They can recover if we allow them time to recover." But he repeats that the Russians will not give the Germans time to build new manpower and replace material.

* * *

Now, what is the meaning of this Order of the Day to us?

Stalin defines what Russian victory means. He says, "The Red Army is an army of avengers." But the vengeance outlined is on Russian soil—killing German invaders, chopping up their armies, putting them behind the 1941 frontiers—and nothing more. He does not say that he will make a separate peace on the basis of these Russian aims. Neither does he say that he will reject one.

Russia Not Isolationist

Russia does not want to make an isolationist policy. That can be categorically stated. Russia wants a friendly Europe in a friendly world, with a system of collective security. But as this column has often said, "Great nations (especially victorious ones) always have alternatives."

The frontiers demanded by Russia have never been accepted by the United States—and indeed cannot be, under our constitutional system, unless the President makes a secret treaty, which he positively will not do.

Signs of Hostility

There are signs both in Europe and America of such an hostility to Russia, that it gives Russian leadership some reason for suspicion. As things look at present it is by no means certain that the defeat of Germany will assure a non-Fascist Europe, or one prepared to adopt a good neighbor policy towards Russia.

What is whispered about negotiations with Finland and Italy is heard as through a loud-speaker in the Kremlin, and probably distorted.

But if Russia does not step beyond her frontiers to fight the Germans, there is a difference between a Russia that is still in the war, and a Russia that might get out of it, if her aims are accomplished alone.

Our own crisis in North Africa makes it the more important that the western powers should act somewhere else. If we have all our eggs in one basket, the result may be dismaying.

Britain appears to see the situation clearly. The great celebration in London of the Red Army's victories is driving the German propaganda machine quite crazy.

This is a clipping from page 27 of the New York Post for FEB. 24, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

C4528

NEW YORK, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1943.

A Treaty With Russia

27

Why should we have to guess at what Stalin intends, from an anxious reading of such statements as his order of the day commemorating the Red Army Anniversary?

If you read that document carefully, you will find no mention of any war aim except to throw the Germans out of Russia; you will find no mention of English and American aid to Russia, though 6000 tanks and 6000 planes have been forced through a bloody blockade; you will find, in fact, no mention of England and America except of our failure to open a second front.

Is our relationship with Russia as distant, remote and arm's-length as all this would seem to indicate?

Stalin's order of the day will stir more discussion of questions which are already lively and hot in the west. What does Russia intend to do? How far does she plan to go? We think that guessing-game is profoundly harmful.

It arises, clearly, because the west and especially America, has no straight policy toward Russia. The truth is that we have not yet fully accepted the fact that we shall have to live in the same world with Russia after the war.

Only one leading western statesman, so far as we can see, has made up his mind. He is Anthony Eden, foreign minister of Great Britain, who last year negotiated Britain's 20-year-treaty of mutual assistance with Russia. That treaty also calls for mutual planning of the peace. It seems as if Eden is basing English policy and his own future on the hope of working with Russia.

We Americans have no such treaty, merely an indefinite executive agreement. Shouldn't we, now, during war, enlarge the British-Soviet 20-year treaty into a British-American-Chinese-Soviet 20-year treaty?

Can't we end the guessing-game that continually clouds relationships between Russia and the west?

This is a clipping from page 27 of the New York Post for FEB. 24, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

C4539

STALIN TO HIS SOLDIERS

In an order of the day on the occasion of its twenty-fifth anniversary, Premier Stalin paid a just tribute to the unexampled heroism of the Red Army, which, he again emphasized, is waging a patriotic war to oust the German invaders from the borders of its native land. In the same order he likewise expressed his thanks for the self-sacrificing labor of the working men and women, engineers and technical experts, in the Russian war industries, who, indeed, have sacrificed to an extent unknown anywhere else. And these tributes to the Red Army and the Russian people were echoed by the leading statesmen of all the United Nations, including President Roosevelt, Foreign Minister Eden and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

But there are also certain other notes in Stalin's order which require special attention because of their implications for both the political and military strategy of the United Nations. With that bluntness on which the Bolshevist leaders pride themselves, Stalin declared that "in view of the absence of a second front in Europe the Red Army alone is bearing the whole weight of the war." He further emphasized that, while the Germans are still strong and there is no ground for complacency, nevertheless the relation between the forces on the Russo-German front has changed and Russia is becoming stronger while Germany is growing weaker. Finally, he served notice that the native land for which the Red Army is fighting includes the lands acquired in days of Russo-German collaboration, but that for the rest the Red Army has been created to defend the Soviet frontiers and—presumably—no more.

The reference to the absence of a second front in "Europe" was Stalin's only reference to Russia's allies, and there was no reference at all to any common aims. But Stalin spoke primarily to the Russian Army and the Russian people, who have little if any knowledge of their allies or the latter's aid to them that played so substantial a role in saving Russia from defeat. The Russian spokesman to the outside world was Ivan Maisky, Soviet Ambassador to London, who, echoing Stalin regarding the continued menace of the German armies, stressed the aim of a "common victory," but also emphasized that Russia "expects an early realization of the military decisions taken at Casablanca." These decisions, he implied, include "Anglo-American blows against Nazi Germany in Europe," and German-controlled reports, obviously fishing for information, already speak of "enormous preparations at certain English ports for an English attempt of unsuspected audacity."

That the Casablanca decisions included an invasion of Europe was freely stated at the time, and Mr. Maisky is right that the sooner it is made, the sooner will come our common victory. But the execution of such a vast enterprise is still a military matter, and the time and place for it must be left to those responsible for it. As a matter of fact, unless all signs deceive, both sides are already engaged in a race for the initiative, which is half the battle, and Stalin's statement has helped to clear the ground for it. For in this statement Stalin has made plain, first, that Russia is fighting its own war for its own aims, and second, that so far as present needs are concerned, Russia can now take care of itself. The way is clear, and the time has come, for us to concentrate on our own part in the war against Germany, and against Japan.

This is a clipping from page 20 of the New York Times for Feb. 24, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

04550

Roosevelt Denies Stalin Said Russians Will Halt at Border

President Takes Sharp Issue With Those Who So Interpret Red Army Order—Suggests Heeding the Exact Language

By BERTRAM D. HULEN

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 23—President Roosevelt took sharp issue at his press conference today with those who have interpreted Premier Joseph Stalin's order of the day to the Red Army as implying that Russia will not continue the war after the Germans have been driven from Soviet territory.

The Premier did not say that, Mr. Roosevelt declared. The President suggested that it would be wise to stick to the language and not try to interpret the order.

The questioners had in mind not only Mr. Stalin's complaint about the absence of a second front in Europe but assertions in his order of the day that the Red Army was "not created for the purpose of conquest of foreign countries, but to defend the frontiers of Soviet Land" and that the Russian campaign was designed to drive the German invader "from the borders of our country."

President Roosevelt did not go into details in expounding his interpretation of the order. In fact, he insisted that he was not in a position to comment on it because, he said repeatedly, he had not read it. Then he said he had read the headlines in newspapers. But a little later he remarked that headlines were sometimes inaccurate.

In the face of these assertions and explanations, his hearers could only assume that he had received a report on the order of the day by the State, War or some other department.

President Roosevelt was then asked about an article in The Saturday Evening Post, which, he was told by his questioners, represented that he and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, during their conference here in January, 1942, had promised Maxim M. Litvinoff, the Soviet Ambassador, that a second front would be opened in Europe against Germany in 1942.

Continued on Page Four

An agreement was reached, the President replied, on a second front of some sort and as details were worked out it seemed the most feasible to start it as Casablanca and Algiers.

Asks for Definition

He wondered where the magazine had obtained the story, and he described as a futile argument the question of what was a second front.

Mr. Roosevelt then asked what was meant by a second front. In reply to his own question he said no two persons in his office at the time would agree on what constituted a second front. But, he added in reference to North Africa, at least action was taken.

The press conference exchange, it was agreed among those present, served to bring more into the open the existence of reports that have been circulating in the capital for several weeks that, after the Russian armies had reached some point in their drive against the Germans, Mr. Stalin would either agree to peace terms with Germany or stand on that line—wherever it might be—and announce that Russia was through with the war and would not fight further unless Germany should renew her efforts at invasion.

These reports, which were described in a statement last week by Senator Burton K. Wheeler, Democrat of Montana, and have been a subject of conjecture in private conversations here of various American and foreign officials, received impetus by Premier Stalin's order of the day and by the alleged complaints he and other Soviet officials had been making against the failure to open a second front in Europe thus far.

One report that has circulated widely the past few days in the capital is that Ambassador Litvinoff is to be recalled to Russia, either for an indefinite period or permanently, as a gesture of displeasure over the absence of a second front in Europe and the extent of lend-lease aid to date. The Ambassador has concentrated on these two problems during his mission.

The report of his recall lacked official confirmation either at the State Department or the Soviet Embassy.

The existence of the various reports was overlooked in official expressions today on the occasion of Red Army Day.

Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox sent a message of fecilitations to Mr. Stalin as supreme commander in chief of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union.

"From its comrades-in-arms of the United States Navy," Secretary Knox said, "I transmit to your victorious Red Army not only congratulations for its twenty-fifth anniversary but for the decisive defeat of the invading Nazi horde. I salute the day when the Red Army and its comrades of the Soviet Nazy shall have driven the enemy beyond the frontiers of the U. S. S. R."

Sumner Welles, Under-Secretary of State, also praised Russia, in response to a question at his press conference inviting comment on the order of the day. His comment was in line with a formal statement given out by Secretary of State Cordell Hull yesterday.

The people of the United States, Mr. Welles said, unanimously share the utmost measure of admiration for the magnificent efforts and successful achievements of the Russian armies. He personally shared that feeling with the utmost measure of sincerity, he added.

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Times for Feb. 24, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Maisky Asserts Russia Expects Allies to Strike

He Calls for Speedy Action; Beaverbrook Stirs Lords by Demanding Invasion

By Geoffrey Parsons Jr.

From the Herald Tribune Bureau

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LONDON, Feb. 23.—The Russian government expects "an early realization of the military decisions taken at Casablanca," Ivan M. Maisky, Soviet Ambassador at London, declared otday. At almost the same time Lord Beaverbrook, speaking in the House of Lords, emphatically urged the immediate opening of a second front in northwestern Europe and caused an uproar among the members, some of whom sharply critized the former member of the War Cabinet for publicly "prodding" the government at this stage.

The Soviet Ambassador spoke at the opening of a London exhibition entitled, "The Twenty-five Years of the U. S. S. R. and the Red Army." He warned against "optimistic illusions" that might be created by Soviet successes against the Nazis.

Wants No 'Fool's Paradise'

In some quarters, said Maisky, "people begin to think that the Germans are already on the run, that victory is just around the corner and that, in consequence, we can relax a bit and go back to our habits, feelings and interests of peace time.

"Nothing is more dangerous than this mood. We cannot afford to live in a fool's paradise."

The perils inherent in over-optimism inspired by the Russian victories were stressed also by Beaverbrook, who declared that it was urgent that a second front be opened against the Germans in time to help Russia and to forestall a new Nazi offensive.

Britain, said the former Production Minister, appeared to be quite satisfied that the war was going admirably. Optimism, he declared, abounded everywhere.

"In fact," he continued, "so far as I can see, the public is of the opinion that the war is won but that the fighting is not yet finished.

Says War Isn't Won Yet

"For my part, I take a very different view. I believe that the war is not won. Whatever may be the plans of the Germans, we should strike and strike now, before the Germans can regroup their divisions. We should strike before the Germans can recover from the Russian offensive."

Although Lord Beaverbrook's sentiments doubtless find ready echo generally in Britain and among the majority of the members of the House of Lords, there was, nevertheless, sharp criticism of his tactics.

The Earl of Listowel, speaking for the Labor party as junior whip, accused Beaverbrook of doing "a positive disservice to the country" by raising the issue publicly. This provoked an inter-party reaction from Lord Strabolgi who, speaking as he asserted for many in the Labor party, said he thought second-front talk would be dangerous only to Germans.

Viscount Simon, the Lord Chancellor, rebuked Beaverbrook for "prodding" the government on the second-front issue and said he had started an "absolutely dangerous" discussion. Beaverbrook turned on the Lord Chancellor and called him a "master of distortion." The Lord Chancellor called the "second front" a catchpenny phrase.

Cites Need for Secrecy

Viscount Trenchard, a marshal of the Royal Air Force, said that no government could defend itself against the type of attack made by Beaverbrook except by explaining the difficulties involved in a second front, which would give away information valuable to the enemy.

"Neither in secret nor in public can this subject be debated, and it is time everybody knew it," Lord Trenchard said.

Lord Simon said: "On behalf of the government, I have to say that I do not intend to say one single word on that subject (the second front) at all. I think myself, and I would urge all serious-minded people to consider, that the use of the words 'second front'—a catchpenny phrase—is seriously misleading.'

Beaverbrook, with great warmth, turned on the Lord Chancellor and charged that he "holds me up to ridicule or contempt, which he has no right to do."

Ambassador Maisky, admitting that the Russian successes are encouraging, noted soberly:

"These successes were won and are being won at a high price, at the price of thousands and hundreds of thousands of human lives, of tremendous destruction in town and country, of great hardships for millions of the civil population, of unparalleled sftrain borne by the whole Soviet people.

Tells of Cost to Russia

"The burden is so heavy that I doubt whether any other people would have been able to bear it. This fact is very often overlooked in hearing of victory bulletins, but it is an all-important fact and it should always be kept in mind.

"It is natural, therefore, that the U. S. S. R. expects an early realization of the military decisions taken at Casablanca.

"The sooner the Anglo-American forces begin to deliver hard blows against Nazi Germany in Europe, the sooner will Nazi Germany be placed between two powerful hammers, knocking at her from the east and from the west, and the sooner will come our common victory and the smaller will be the sacrifices needed for it.

"Do not give respite to the enemy. He is now confused because of the reverses in the east. Let us make the year 1943 a year of decisive defeat for Nazi Germany and her satellites."

This is a clipping from page 12 of the New York Herald Tribune for

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Abroad

The Red Army in the Future of Europe

By ANNE O'HARE McCORMICK

The Red Army has justified the policy of Joseph Stalin. Hitler's invasion of Russia under cover of the Nazi-Soviet agreement, made by the Soviet leader for the purpose of preventing such an assault, would have stamped that policy as the costliest of failures if the army and the people behind the army had not proved strong and ready enough, when the pact was broken, to stop the invader and put him on the run.

Stalin has every reason to congratulate himself and Russia on the heroic performance of this twenty-five-year-old army. It is the new instrument of a new power, forged in the first place, ironically enough, by Leon Trotsky and used originally for the defense of the Revolution. Like nearly every other institution in the Soviet Union, it has gone through many metamorphoses in its evolution from the army of the proletariat, its officers untitled, distrusted and without authority, to the strictly disciplined and well-trained national army of today. It has suffered a drastic purge at the top, which most observers thought would seriously weaken it as a fighting force. Perhaps Stalin thought so himself when he tried to turn the war westward. Perhaps he is as much surprised as anybody by its achievements.

In any case the Red Army was untried. So was the industrial armory the Soviet state had sacrificed everything to build. Any leader might have hesitated to test these forces against the most formidable military machine in the world. Stalin did hesitate; yet when Hitler called the turn, with a sublime ignorance of Russian strength and patriotism, he found in the first Winter that the Wehrmacht had at last met its match.

Sure of Russian Strength

The Soviet troops have not only proved themselves a great modern army, brilliantly led and excellently equipped; they have made the Soviet Union a far weightier power in the world than Imperial Russia ever was. They have not only vindicated Stalin's policy and increased his prestige inside and outside Russia; they give him a mighty instrument for carrying out his further aims.

It was implicit in the anniversary order of the day. Mr. Stalin spoke as the head of the Red Army. He spoke as a successful military commander able to criticize the strategy and point out the weaknesses of his opponent. If he was blunter than usual in asserting that "the Red Army is bearing alone the whole weight of the war," if he disdained to mention Africa as a second front and ignored the British and American equipment delivered to the Russian line, it was because he was very sure of the force behind him. Ambassador Maisky in London, when he called for "an early realization of military decisions taken at Casablanca," suggested that Moscow knows something more is afoot. But Stalin did not refer to Casablanca. He was telling the Red Army that it was defeating the Nazis alone. He was telling the rest of us to draw the logical inference from that premise.

One such inference is spelled out in the passage in which Stalin speaks of the liberation of the invaded territories. He puts Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Karelia, Moldavia (in which the Russians include Bessarabia) in the same category of Soviet lands to be recovered as the Crimea and White Russia. Thus he gives official notice that he does not merely "claim" these territories; he considers as indisputably belonging to Russia all the ground lost in World War I, or at least all that was occupied by the Russians after the pact with Germany. The Red Army drew the frontier then that it expects to reconquer now.

Design for the Future

The report that the Nazis are evacuating Estonia and parts of Latvia implies than the German generals understand this. So, no doubt, do the Finns.

There are other highly relevant reports. The Soviet Government is said to have guaranteed to Dr. Benes that it will recognize the pre-Munich boundaries of Czechoslovakia. But apparently Moscow is unwilling today to restore as much of Eastern Poland to the Poles as was tentatively agreed upon last Summer.

All this helps to trace the outline of what Russia wants in Europe after the war. It suggests also what she does not want, for if Stalin is willing to let Czechoslovakia retain the Carpatho-Ukraine, inhabited mostly by Ukrainians, it means that he recognizes the Carpathians as the eastern wall of Europe.

This outline, of course, is of today. It remains to be seen how it will be modified by further Russian victories, by an invasion of Europe from the west, by assurances that Russia can believe that the United States will be a powerful partner in a collective system that will insure the independence of small and the safety of great nations. Stalin reminds us in no uncertain terms that the Soviet Union is now a great military power, determined to play its full part in shaping the future. Thereby he points up the question of American "claims," and what the United States is going to do to push its demand for the kind of world envisaged in the Atlantic Charter.

This is a clipping from page 20 of the New York Times for Feb. 24, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

A Question to Consider Now

Ever since the Russians began to demonstrate definite military superiority over the Germans, a disturbing question has been lurking in the background of United Nations councils. It is this: When Germany is finally beaten and the time for postwar settlements arrives, what will Russia demand in the way of territory and other concessions as due rewards for her great contributions to the Axis defeat?

An earnest and perhaps mistaken effort has been made to defer consideration of this question on the grounds that it is a bridge to be crossed when we get to it and that any present attempt to reach an answer might create misunderstandings to the injury of war cooperation. Several factors, however, combine to keep forcing it to the front. Since all of these are of Russian origin, there seems to be no doubt that Moscow is at least indirectly encouraging discussion of the matter now.

Most important of these is a recent editorial in Pravda, semiofficial mouthpiece of the Soviet government, setting forth that, after the war, Russia will "retain control" of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Bessarabia and presumably that part of former Poland which fell to her in the partition following Hitler's conquest of that country. The quoted words are slightly euphemistic in that Russia does not now control any of them, but obviously expects to do so again after the Nazis have been driven back into their own country.

A second factor lies in the rapid westward progress being made by the Russian armies, particularly in the area fronting the onetime Baltic states. As a sequel to the fall of Velikie Luki, Red troops are already reported within striking distance of the Latvian border. If they can do so, the Soviets undoubtedly will occupy all the Pravda-specified territory as a war measure. If so, they will presumably have occupied and held it a long time before actual peace comes. Possession is always a strong point.

A third includes the reference in Premier Stalin's Red Army anniversary speech yesterday to the absence of the long-promised Allied second front in Europe, his statement that Russia alone is now bearing the whole weight of the war and, by implication, that Allied matériel aid to her has been too negligible to mention. In view of our services in keeping Japan off Russia's back, the R.A.F.'s wholesale destruction of German munitions factories, transportation and so on, the African front which has diverted much Axis air and ground strength from Russia and the immense quantity of war material which Britain and the United States have sent to the U.S.S.R., these statements seem hardly fair. [illegible] nt. consid[illegible] a's outgiv[illegible] ain that, [illegible] ssia will ha[illegible] ctating the peace and the territorial reallocations that go with it.

Such a stand, if maintained, is well calculated to lead to difficulties. By the terms of the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration of Washington, the United States and Britain—and, at least by implication, Russia, too—are committed to support small nations in their own self-determination after the war. Further, in the Eden-Molotov treaty between Britain and Russia, signed in London last May, the signatories pledged themselves to seek no "territorial aggrandizements" and to noninterference with the affairs of other states, at least for the next 20 years. According to articles now running in the Saturday Evening Post by Forrest Davis and purporting to give the inside of Anglo-American-Russian war relations, the Russian Foreign Commissar was reluctant to sign this treaty and finally did so, after a three-day delay, on instructions from Moscow.

Superficially it would appear that a postwar gobbling of the Baltic states and Bessarabia by Russia would be in violation of this treaty and of the other Allied interagreements to which Moscow has subscribed in principle. Actually Moscow has a case for what Pravda neatly refers to as "retaining" control. It rests on three grounds: First, that Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Bessarabia and Eastern Poland were Russian territory for more than a century before the first World War; second, that Russia reacquired them prior to the break with Germany in June, 1941; third, that the populations of all of them except Poland at that time voted themselves into the Soviet Union by plebiscite.

The last-named action presumably will be cited by Moscow as having already fulfilled the United Nations undertaking that small peoples shall have the right to decide for themselves between protected independence and adherence to some larger power. As a matter of fact, the plebiscites in question hardly represented a free expression of opinion. Bessarabia, taken from Rumania under pressure from Germany in order to satisfy Russia, was Soviet-occupied at the time of the vote. All three of the Baltic states, with a Russian army on their borders, had yielded military bases for Soviet use, which amounted almost to occupation. No one of the four populations is predominantly Slav.

Here is a question which clearly calls for early clarification and settlement before occupation, military or other, of these countries takes place. No one wishes to deny to Russia anything legitimately her due. Neither can the broad principles for which we are fighting be disregarded. There should be a way to meet both considerations.

Note!

LOS ANGELES TIMES
FEB. 24, 1943, PAGE 4

What Russia Wants

By Barnet Nover

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Stalin's Order Of The Day

IN HIS REMARKABLE order of the day issued on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Red army, Josef Stalin made a number of statements which have produced a violent fluttering in Allied dovecotes.

In the first place, he pointedly revived the second front issue which has been dormant since November 7, when American and British forces landed in Morocco and Algeria. "In view of the absence of a second front in Europe," he said, "the Red army alone is bearing the whole weight of the war."

Secondly, he hinted strongly that Russia will not go back to its 1920 frontiers in Europe but will insist, in greater or lesser measure, on a restoration of the status quo as of June 22, 1941, when Russia was in possession of the Baltic republics, a slice of post-Versailles Finland, a large chunk of Poland and the former Rumanian territories of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina.

"We have begun the liberation of the Soviet Ukraine from German possession," he said, "but millions of Ukrainians are still languishing under the yoke of the German enslavers. In Byelorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia, in Moldavia, in Crimea, in Karelia, German invaders and their accomplices still hold sway."

Thirdly, Stalin played variations on the theme that the Red army's objective is to drive the Germans out of Russian territory and said nothing about pursuing the enemy any further.

THE SURPRISING thing about Stalin's order of the day is not what it contained, however, but that its remarks should have occasioned any surprise. For with slight exceptions it is all of a piece with what he has said on other occasions in the past.

It is true that after November 7 second front agitation in Russia and by Russia subsided. It is impossible to estimate the effect of that Allied diversionary move on the military balance of power in the Russian theater. That it had some effect and that this effect was unfavorable to Germany and favorable to Russia cannot, however, be doubted.

On the other hand, the Anglo-American venture in North Africa has obviously not been followed, as Stalin may have expected, by the speedy elimination of the last Axis stronghold south of the Mediterranean and the opening of an Allied second front in Europe.

Stalin's order of the day must, therefore, be regarded as an expression both of his disappointment over North African military developments and of his alarms that the Allied failure in Tunisia may give Germany time to establish a strong defensive position.

However, there is nothing in the revived second front controversy which a second front cannot cure.

IN THE MATTER of Russia's postwar boundaries the issue is far more complicated and far less likely to be straightened out by the inexorable march of events.

What is involved in this issue is nothing less than the future organization of the world. On this issue Stalin is taking no chances on being caught short. Many who have spoken to him during the past year and a half have come away convinced that he is prepared to lead Russia into a cooperative peace system. That alone could give Russia that period of recuperation she will desperately need after the bloodletting and destruction of this war. But there is no assurance that such a system will actually come into being. So, as an alternative, Russia is preparing to defend her frontiers through the acquisition—or reacquisition—of buffer areas.

This is actually no new aim. On July 3, 1941, less than two weeks after the German assault on Russia, Stalin cited among "the free people of the Soviet Union," which Hitler was seeking to enslave, not only Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanians, Uzbeks and Tartars but also Lithuanians, Letts, Esthonians and Moldavians.

And on May 1, 1942, he declared: "Our aim is clear and noble. We want to liberate our Soviet land from the German fascist scoundrels. We want to liberate our brothers, the Ukrainians, Moldavians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Letts, Esthonians and Karelians . . ."

In all past pronouncements, as in Tuesday's order of the day, Stalin also insisted that Russia's war aims did not include the conquest of foreign peoples.

THE ORDER of the day was vague on the subject of what Russia proposed to do once Russian territory has been freed of the invader. A similar vagueness has characterized most other statements on war aims which have emanated from the Kremlin. On one occasion, however, Stalin did go further. On November 6, 1941, he declared:

"Unlike Hitlerite Germany, the Soviet Union and its Allies are waging a war for liberation—a just war for the liberation of the enslaved peoples of Europe and the U. S. S. R. from Hitler's tyranny . . .

"We have not nor can we have such war aims as the imposition of our will and our regime on the Slavic and other enslaved peoples of Europe who are waiting for our help. Our aim is to help these peoples in their struggle for liberation from Hitler's tyranny . . .

"Russia's first aim is to free her own territory and the second aim is to free the enslaved peoples of Europe and then allow them to decide their own fate without any outside interference in their internal affairs."

With this statement Stalin put himself categorically on record against transforming what has been a war of liberation into a war of aggression.

The fate of Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania falls into the twilight zone between the two. That twilight zone is the area of maneuver which Russia is allowing herself pending the settlement of the question of the kind of world we are going to have after the war. And the answer to that question will depend as much on what we do as what the Russians do.

WASH. POST
FEB. 25, 1943

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Defeat in Russia Cuts Off 'Promised' Food Supply for Germany

By Pieter V. Anen

Written for The Christian Science Monitor

The German defeat in Russia means more than the loss of several hundred thousand men, great quantities of equipment, and of several hundred thousand square miles of costly conquered territory. It means that the Ukrainian bread basket about which the Nazis made so much fuss is getting beyond reach and that all the carefully laid plans for sending 3,000,000 Dutch colonists to the East have been shattered.

The German plan was that the Baltic States were to become the vegetable garden of Europe, and White Russia, the Ukraine and the Kuban Basin its corn chamber.

That would make Europe self-sufficient in foodstuffs. Besides, it would put the screw on the two wavering Axis vassals, Hungary and Rumania, and make them more willing to co-operate.

The manual labor in the eastern garden and farm belt was to be done by the native population of which, allegedly, there was plenty. One third of the Dutch population was to be shifted to these territories.

The Dutch were to act not only as agricultural supervisors, but also to set up industries and develop the Baltic ports through which most of the products were to be shipped. Beyond their merely economic function the "pioneer settlers," as the Nazis called them, were intended to form a solid buffer between the Third Reich proper and the Slav countries.

Planned in 1942

This plan dated back to the spring of 1942. It was then that the Nazis started canvassing for volunteer emigrants in the Netherlands. Originally, when they invaded Russia, the Germans had a different intention. They hoped to carry out the campaign in a "blitz" manner, to have the whole war finished by the end of 1941, and to settle several millions of demobilized German soldiers in the Russian border provinces. However, the unexpected Russian resistance not only delayed the demobilization date indefinitely, but aggravated the food supply problem.

The Nazis could neither afford to wait with the cultivation of conquered Russian soil until the war was over, nor could they spare any German farmers for the urgent task of colonization. The idea to use the Dutch for this purpose recommended itself for various reasons.

The Netherlanders were excellent farmers. Their home country was, according to Nazi standards, overpopulated. The removal of 3,000,000 Dutch would enable the Germans to tighten their grip on the country.

The Eastern project, which was pictured in glowing colors would make the Dutch people forget the loss of the Netherlands East Indies, for it was clear by then that not even a victorious Germany would be in a position to take these colonies away from Japan.

Company Founded

The plans for the resettlement were drawn up under the leadership of Alfred Rosenberg, Reich Minister for the Eastern Provinces, in collaboration with Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, head of the Netherlands Bank, and F. Gips, economic adviser to the occupation authorities.

In June of last year, the Netherlands East Company was founded with a capital of $1,350,000 and given a monopoly for the settling of Dutch citizens in White Russia. Two decrees provided for the granting of the necessary funds, either directly to the East Company or via the Netherlands Bank. Another newly founded institute, the East Shipping Company, was commissioned to take care first of the transportation of the settlers and later on of the import traffic.

The Dutch learned what was in store for them through an address by Mynher Rost van Tonningen who asserted that his fellow-countrymen "warmly" welcomed the opportunity of transferring the Netherlands' large surplus population to the East of Europe.

First, the scheme was to be carried out on a voluntary basis. As was to be expected, there were not any volunteers to be found. Of those who were "inclined to go East" a good portion changed their mind when the first reports about conditions in the Eastern provinces came in.

"The living standard in Lithuania," wrote the Riga correspondent of the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, last August, "is so much lower than in Holland that it is inconceivable that Dutch truck gardeners could make a good living there. Other regions mentioned for settlement are poor and neglected districts where much destruction has been effected."

Little Left

Another visitor to White Russia wrote in the organ of the Dutch Nazi Party that the scorched-earth policy of the Russians had greatly impaired the settlement scheme. He revealed that the Russians had successfully evacuated almost the entire able-bodied native population and the larger part of the cattle stock.

Rost van Tonningen, after returning from a tour through Eastern Europe, vigorously denied these statements and warned the Netherlanders that they would face deportation if they did not respond to the call for voluntary settlers. He announced that "entire communities, including private individuals, traders, large and small firms, peasants, teachers and pastors" would be removed to furnish labor for the Germans and settlers for the East European program. In an article in the Nationale Dagblad and in an interview the Kölnische Zeitung, the head of the Netherlands Bank waxed enthusiastic about his own brain-child. He stated that the opportunities opened to Dutch settlers were so enormous that "not even we who were prepared can put our impressions in words." Every Dutchman, he promised, would receive terri-

Nazis Conscript Dutch Labor Openly

LONDON, Feb. 25 (AP)—Labor conscription was introduced openly in Occupied Holland Feb. 22 with a decree issued by Reichscommissar Arthur Seyss-Inquart and radiocast by the German-controlled Dutch Hilversum Radio, the Netherlands News Agency Aneta reported.

Coupled with the reading of the decree was a warning to all Dutch people that refusal to co-operate with the German war effort would be considered sabotage — punishable by capital punishment, the Aneta dis patch added.

Dutch economic circles here pointed out that the decree imposes "total concentration of all available forces" in the Netherlands in the same way Hitler has imposed the same concentration in Germany itself, Aneta reported.

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CHRISTIAN SCI. MON. FEB. 25, 1943 P. 1

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tory in the East as large as he owned in the homeland.

Another Dutch Nazi, E. J. Roskam, leader of the Agricultural Front, turned poet and asserted in a radiocast that the "black earth of Eastern Europe" was "calling" all Dutchmen.

Deportation Loomed

In spite of all the high-pressure sales talks few voluntary settlers were forthcoming, and the danger of large-scale deportation grew more and more imminent between last October and December. Fortunately, the Germans needed every bit of their rolling stock for the military operations in the East Otherwise, the resettling would have begun in earnest. As it was, the plan did not develop beyond a preparatory stage.

However, the propaganda did not stop. As late as last Dec. 18, a Dutch Nazi paper published an article, the author of which recommended the Kuban territory to his friends. He wrote that this region which had been laid open for the Dutch by the German armies was preferable even to the Ukraine and, owing to its mild climate, might enable the farmers to grow wheat side by side with rice, tobacco and even tea.

At the time when this description of a farmer's paradise was published, the Russian armies had gone a long way toward closing the Kuban Basin to any immigrants—military or agricultural. And the Dutch people hope that further progress of the Red Army will thwart the Nazi plans concerning the Ukraine and White Russia.

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Stalin's Europe

By William Philip Simms

IT IS now fairly certain that Premier Joseph Stalin has already redrawn the map of eastern Europe as he wants it after the war. The only thing likely to cause him materially to change his mind would be an Anglo-American invasion of western Europe stopping only at Berlin or points beyond.

Poland is likely to emerge in an entirely new shape. She will probably have a slice taken from her in the east and a slice added by way of compensation in the west, giving her better access to the sea than ever. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Karelia, Bessarabia, Moldavia and part of Finland are once more officially proclaimed as integral parts of the Soviet Union. What happens elsewhere in Europe depends on British and American arms.

While Premier Stalin has not yet gone into detail with regard to Poland, there seems reason to believe that he will insist on approximately the frontier which Moscow and Berlin drew at the time of the 1939 partition. This line ran from southern Lithuania via Bialystok, Brest-Litovsk, Vladimir, Valinsk and Lvov to the Carpathians near the junction of the Romanian-Polish frontiers.

* * *

BY WAY of compensation, it is believed, Russia would give Poland East Prussia, Pomerania as far west as Stettin, and perhaps a part of Silesia. This would include Danzig and other excellent ports on the Baltic as well as the old Polish Corridor and the strictly Polish harbor of Gdynia.

Just what Poland, herself, might think of all this is not a matter of record. Parts of it, certainly, would not be altogether to her liking. Such an arrangement, for example, would cost her Vilna, birthplace of Marshal Pilsudski, modern Poland's George Washington. But since Russia considers Vilna as belonging to Lithuania, and Lithuania as belonging to the Soviet Union, there would seem to be little that Poland—or Britain, or America—could do if Stalin should insist.

And those who know Stalin best believe he will do exactly that. Despite the surprises he sometimes causes abroad, he is known as one of the most consistent statesmen in the world. He is always for Russia. Even if, like a clever player carrying a football, he dodges this way and that, his final goal is to score for the Soviet Union. What happened in September, 1939, therefore, provides an excellent clue in the case of Poland.

On Sept. 1, 1939, Nazi troops crossed the Polish frontier, marching eastward. About the middle of September, Russian troops crossed the Polish frontier, marching westward. Shortly thereafter, the two armies met about midway, along the line sketched above. Some 10 days later, Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop went to Moscow. On Sept. 29, at 6:40 a. m., the Moscow radio broadcast the official announcement of a pact fixing the new Russo-German frontier and revealing that no new Polish state would be formed.

* * *

ON Oct. 31, in an 85-minute speech before the Supreme Soviet, Molotov repeated that "there can be no question of restoring Poland."

But much water has gone over the dam since then. Hitler was insane enough to attack Russia. And Russia, after bending dangerously, has astounded the world by snapping back so hard that today the Nazi legions are on the run with every prospect of being beaten back beyond the frontier set in 1939.

Moreover, Poland has become Russia's gallant ally. Without wavering for a moment, Poland forgot the hurt done her by the Soviets and held out her hand in friendship. Russia, therefore, is expected to reconsider—but probably not altogether. That is to say, Russia may hold on to eastern Poland into which White Russia blends, and try to make Germany, the enemy of both, compensate Poland for her loss.

WASH DAILY NEWS FRI. Feb. 1943

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Abroad

British and American Aid to the Russian Army

By ANNE O'HARE McCORMICK

Red Army Day was celebrated in Great Britain last Sunday, two days before the publication of Stalin's Order of the Day, so the speeches delivered on the occasion by Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, Minister of Production, Mr. Oliver Stanley, Colonial Secretary, and Mr. William Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, could not have been intended as replies to the statement that Russia is bearing "the whole weight of the war." Nevertheless they might have been answers to Mr. Stalin, for while other Cabinet members addressed mass meetings held to pay tribute to the Russians, these three stressed particularly the satisfaction they felt in the material aid Britain and the United States were able to render the Soviet troops in their great offensive.

Some of the figures they quoted are new. Mr. Lyttelton, speaking at Newcastle, said that the British and Americans together have sent Russia enough tanks to provide the initial equipment for thirty-two armored divisions and enough aircraft for 400 squadrons. The United States alone, he added, has sent 85,000 trucks and the United Kingdom alone 70,000,000 rounds of small ammunition and more than 50,000 tons from her precious rubber stocks.

Mr. Stanley, in a speech at Manchester, made the point that although Great Britain has received more lend-lease goods and services than any other country, British exports to Russia of key military equipment are vastly more than Britain has obtained from the United States.

Mr. Alexander told an audience at Bristol that from the beginning of October, 1941, to the end of December, 1942, 8,600 tanks and 6,174 planes were delivered to the Soviet Union. Of these 5,546 tanks, 2,126 planes and 54,969 trucks were delivered in November and December, the months when Allied shipping and production were strained to supply the North African expedition. This increase, maintained in the first two months of this year, is a striking proof of the cumulative productive power of the Western democracies and of the dogged and successful effort they are making to solve a shipping problem of almost unimaginable magnitude. It is proof, too, of Anglo-American determination, strong because essentially self-interested, to step up to the limit the supply of equipment for the Russian Winter campaign.

Apparently Stalin does not think this equipment has much to do with the success of the Red Army, which he ascribes wholly to its own courage and leadership and to the engineers and technical experts in the war industry of the U.S.S.R., and apparently the British Ministers believe that the November and December deliveries contributed to the Russian victories.

The inference to be drawn from all the Red Army Day speeches before Mr. Stalin's was that the moves being carried out and those to come—there were strong hints of great Spring "surprises"—followed a plan and timetable known to and approved in Moscow. Ambassador Maisky's demand for the early realization of the "military decisions taken at Casablanca" confirmed them.

The Soviet leader emphasized a different theme. He dismissed the aid retailed by the previous speakers as "short of war," and implied that the Red Army is now capable under its own power of driving the enemy beyond the frontiers Russia has set for herself. The reaction of the border states was immediate. The Polish government-in-exile protested that in signing a treaty with the Soviets in July, 1941, it renounced no territory or sovereignty and expects Poland's eastern frontier restored to the line of 1939. The American Lithuanian Council passed a set of resolutions reaffirming faith in the promises of the Atlantic Charter and appealing for a British-American army of occupation for the Baltic states on the conclusion of hostilities in order to give the people free opportunity to determine their own future. Dr. Benes, head of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, in a broadcast to his own people asserted that the Germans have told the Finns, the Hungarians and Rumanians, evidently with the idea of warning them that they must protect themselves against the Russians, that the Reichswehr plans to retire as far west as the Dniester.

Evidently Russia's neighbors have no doubt that the Red Army can achieve Stalin's objectives. But this is not the most important point he has raised. What the Soviet leader brought into the foreground—perhaps on purpose, perhaps as a test of the reality of our war aims—is the question on which every political decision hinges. Are we fighting for national security, which means that each of the great belligerents is fighting for itself, or for the security of all nations in an international system?

Until this fundamental question is clearly and positively answered, and first of all by the United States, because British and Russian and Chinese policy depends on ours, we have to expect that these powers will manoeuvre to secure strategic positions for their own defense. Stalin makes the dilemma very plain. If Russia wants a collective security system which this country will join she will not press her claims for strategic frontiers at the expense of the existence of small nations, and if we want Russia to join a collective security system we shall have to give firmer guarantees than we have given yet that we mean to support such a system with all our power.

This is a clipping from page 12 of the New York Times for Feb. 17, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Russia's Secret Is Out

By Henry Sowerby

THE GREAT SECRET OF RUSSIA, which for 25 years had kept the world wondering, is out. It has been discovered by Herr Hitler—one of the really useful achievements of that great experimentalist. Hitler sent his Prussian war machine—the most efficient engine of destruction ever fashioned on this earth—into what he had every reason to assume was the world's most inefficient welter of humanity.

But things did not happen "according to plan." The Prussian legions, goose-stepping around the Pripet marshes, hardly recognized the old Russia. It was as if someone from Grimm's' fairy tales had waved a wand over the steppes and suddenly changed a nation of shiftless muzhiks into a super-race of technical proficients, who could out-Prussian the Prussians at their own game. Long-forgotten defeats at Jena and Auerstadt in 1805 are sadly coming back to a nation that thought it was a Herrenvolk on the verge of conquering the world.

What is this change that has come over Russia? Hitler was not the only one to be surprised. Had not the Finns only two years before exposed Russia's disorganization and inefficiency? Was not Lindbergh said to have gone to Moscow and to have reported to British appeasers that the Soviet air fleet was "weak and disorganized"? Was not Russia known to have been riddled with sabotage and enfeebled with purges? And was not Russia so friendless that Stalin tried every device to keep out of the war—even to the extent of signing accords with Hitler—while Chamberlain and Daladier at Munich did not consider Russia of sufficient consequence to be brought into the discussion?

* * *

How had Hitler and the world so profoundly miscalculated? That question can now be answered. Humanity offers many stories of the defeated, depressed individual who transforms himself mentally and physically under the influence of a new faith. History tells of like changes in peoples. But surely never before has a nation of 180,000,000 so completely transformed its outlook and its whole way of life as Russia has done in the incredibly brief period of ten short years.

For these ten years—1928 to 1938—Russia literally went into a chrysalis stage. It sealed itself up. No one really knew what was afoot. Returning foreigners brought back dismal tales of fear, failure, liquidations. There were rumors of a sizable army and air force, but no one knew much about that. The silent, gray, cheerless land began to be held up to the democracies as a world menace, which only an enterprising Hitler could dispose of.

Hitler's invasion tore open the ten-year chrysalis. And behold, a fresh, young, buoyant and supremely confident Russia burst forth upon the embattled world, sending a fresh breeze of new confidence to Britain, America, and to all the enslaved nations.

Efficiency demands strict conformity to plan, and this is precisely what the people of old Russia disliked from the deepest tap-roots of their nature. Nevertheless, Stalin had the plan. He was determined to force the nation to conform. "The history of old Russia," he said to a conference of factory managers in Moscow, Feb. 4, 1941, "is the history of defeat due to backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol Khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish barons. She was beaten by the Japanese barons . . . because she was backward. We are 50 to 100 years behind advanced countries. We must cover this distance in ten years or they will crush us. . . ."

Stalin had made up his mind that Russia's vocation was not, as Lenin taught, to reform the world, but to reform itself—to transform itself from a traditional failure into the controller of its own destiny. He had to start from scratch. Eighty per cent of the people were illiterate peasants, without interest in, or aptitude for, modern mechanical industrialism. Only 43 per cent of Russia's wealth was produced by industries—all inefficiently run and grouped around the Baltics and the Ukraine, within easy reach of an invader and his airmen. The country had some of the world's greatest mineral deposits. But they were away beyond the Urals in prairie and desert practically untouched and unconnected by railroad. Yet Stalin dreamed of producing in ten years an army of seven to ten millions as efficient and as well equipped as that of any possible invader.

What America had done to transform itself to a war basis since its Pearl Harbor, Stalin determined to do to his own country in the ten years before Russia's Pearl Harbor—which, with a clarity of vision for which he has never received due credit, he then saw coming. But while America had its Fords, Kaisers, and Martins and its hundreds of great plants ready for quick adaptation to the war effort, Stalin had to jump his people from a backward and in some parts nomadic cattle-raising age into an age of Detroits and Pittsburghs in two short Five-Year Plans, with himself as super-Carnegie-Schwab-Kaiser rolled into one.

* * *

Americans have achieved gigantic triumphs in taming a new country, but surely no American ever dreamed of such a ten-year project as this. It meant converting 35,000,000 ignorant peasants into efficient industrial workers. It meant putting American-type farm machinery on every farm so that the loss of the 35,000,000 could be made up by greater efficiency. It meant developing the huge trans-Ural mineral resources around Magnitogorsk and the Kuznetz basin to equip the great modern mechanized armies. It entailed converting steppes and desert into thriving industrial cities. It meant transplanting something like 60,000,000 people, building 82 major towns of more than 100,000 inhabitants each, in the greatest colonizing project of the age.

The project meant pushing through a high-pressure education system to build up slipshod peasants into efficient technical workers. It meant getting the people to understand that this was the way out of despondency and defeat; that every amenity of life must be sacrificed while the two Five-Year Plans pulled them into shape for the coming great ordeal. It meant getting the people to realize that they were already in the war.

* * *

This was the great act of faith that Stalin held up to the Russian people. He knew, as everyone engaged in a great act of faith knows, that to parade his intentions to the world at large would be fatal to his high purpose. Beyond calling in a few hundred American and other technical experts to start the process in action, therefore, he placed the seal of secrecy upon the whole project, not even getting loans from foreign banks. Russia must retire into a ten-year chrysalis stage, in which the mistakes, the distresses, and the agony of this stupendous transformation must be borne in seclusion. By 1934, the foreigners were given to understand that their presence was not desired, and most of them came away incensed and violently critical of everything in Russia.

The initial stages were agony indeed. The well-to-do farmers, Kulaks, refused to accept American machinery or step up their yield. Stalin ruthlessly liquidated them as a class, leaving a residue of discontent, sabotage, and terrible famine.

The steel, iron, copper and aluminum works of Magnitogorsk and the coal mines of Kuznetz were started up under

(Continued on page 14)

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Government.

(Continued from Page 2)

unbelievably discouraging conditions—workers living in tents at 30 below zero, because there were no houses, little but black bread and some cereal grain to live on, no proper clothing, little heat, no proper scaffolding for the great blast furnaces, so that frozen riggers would pitch to the ground, single railway lines ballasted with sand, which kept giving way. An American engineer at Magnitogorsk—John Scott—tells in his "Behind the Urals" how there were no light bulbs for working in dark places, and how through lack of the necessary knowledge $25,000,000 worth of chemicals went up in smoke and millions of dollars' worth of machinery were ruined. Executives untrained at everything except making a fine show of their achievements on paper raised the initial cost of the project to fabulous heights. On top of all this came the 1934 purge that practically cleaned out all the original executives and brought a state of fear into every plant in the nation.

A good deal of this terrible state of affairs had already been made known and the world in general has assumed that ruthless "Stalinism" was something far more terrible than Hitlerism. What was not known, and has only just been discovered, is the quality of the new Russia that was springing up amidst the destruction of the old. We did not know that, through all the bad working conditions at Magnitogorsk, there was little grumbling, that young workers would leave a day's work in the bitter cold, swallow some thin soup and then eagerly attend night school, seeing their breath go up in clouds, in order to qualify for skilled work and high pay, because they felt the nation was driving for a new goal.

We did not know that millions of quick, alert, well-dressed technicians began to emerge from this early chaos, that in places like Perm, Sverdlovsk, and Chelyabinsk the railroad passed through miles and miles of new plants, that railroads began to be double-tracked and properly ballasted, that food and clothing gradually became adequate and working conditions exemplary. One did not see those tens of thousands of fine young aviators behind the barbed-wire enclosures of the new airfields. We did not realize that Magnitogorsk, which turned out 50,000 tons of ore in 1913, would today be turning out that much in two days.

The full story of the great achievement has yet to be written. It is only known today in the first superficial glimpses. Stalin, by some insight that we cannot attempt to explain, realized that the only way for Russia to survive the coming war was through a course of merciless self-discipline. That he should have understood this and resolutely acted upon it, now appears to have been the salvation not only of Russia but of the whole society of free nations.

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SOVIET SEEN FIRM FOR GAIN SINCE '39

Washington Authorities Assert It Wants Parts of Poland and Other Countries

FINNISH AREAS ARE LISTED

Baltic States and Moldavia Are Also Among Claims—Stand Is Stressed by Embassy

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By HAROLD CALLENDER

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 26 — The reassertion by the Polish Government in London yesterday of Poland's claims to her pre-war frontiers is believed here to have been provoked by numerous articles in the Russian and foreign press urging that Russia should receive wide control over disputed regions in Eastern Europe.

The Polish statement is regarded as having been made chiefly "for the record," yet as drawing attention to the present extent of Russian claims affecting not only Poland but Finland and other countries on the borders of the Soviet Republics.

The Soviet Embassy today answered the Polish claim in effect in an article contained in its Information Bulletin. This article, written by Alexander Korneichuck, member of he Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, demanded in firm language that two areas of pre-war Poland, the region around Lwow and the region neighboring White Russia be part of the Soviet Union after the war.

The article was originally published in Pravda, Moscow newspaper, and reported in a dispatch to THE NEW YORK TIMES last Sunday. Its publication here under auspices of the embassy is deemed to indicate its views are those of the Soviet Government.

It was declared authoritatively here today that Russia insisted upon retaining the parts of former Polish territory that she occupied in September, 1939, which include the White Russian region and the former Polish Ukraine, and that in Finland and elsewhere she claimed the territories she acquired in 1940 and 1941.

This is the interpretation placed upon Josef Stalin's allusion in his order of the day last Monday to the yet-to-be-liberated regions of White Russia, the Baltic States, Moldavia, embracing Bessarabia and Bukowina, and Karelia, all disputed regions.

Supported by Pravda Article

This interpretation is regarded as fully confirmed by the article published in the newspaper Pravda on Feb. 8 and circulated here by the Russian Embassy on Feb. 12. Referring to the Baltic States as a case in point, the article said that the Constitution of the Soviet Union "has fixed he ties between these republics and the other republics of the Soviet Union," for whose honor and integrity the Red armies were fighting. These regions are considered constituent parts of the Soviet Union, whose Constitution was amended to include them.

Since the same modification of the Constieution was made to include the parts of Poland occupied in September, 1939, the parts of Finland acquired by the peace treaty of March, 1940, and Moldavia, occupied in 1940, it is assumed that, in the Russian view, the argument applied by Pravda specifically to the Baltic States applied to all other territory acquired and incorporated subsequently.

Informed observers here believe the legal position taken by the Soviet Government is clear regarding the territorial acquisitions from the Black Sea to the Baltic in the years 1939 to 1941, though most of that territory has since been occupied by Germans or Finns. This legal view is taken to represent also the Russian diplomatic attitude and to reveal the minimum claims of Russia at the moment, though not necessarily the maximum, which may depend upon circumstances.

Stalin's Supposed Claims

When Mr. Stalin speaks of "liberating our territories" from the German invader he includes these recently annexed territories, it is believed.

Restoration of the frontier of June, 1941, when Germany attacked Russia, would remove from Poland the White Russian and the Ukrainian minorities, Russians point out. Restoration of the Finnish-Russian frontier of 1940-41 would give Russia what she gained in her war against Finland in 1939-40, though some military men think that if she made peace with Finland Russia might insist upon occupying the Petsamo region in the north of Finland for the duration of the war to protect herself against German attacks from that region upon convoys and by air upon Murmansk.

The Polish-Russian treaty of July, 1941, declared void the territorial changes of the German-Russian agreement of 1939, made after Poland was invaded, but it is pointed out that it did not provide for changes in the Russian constitution to relinquish the Polish territory that Russia had acquired, and it is interpreted as leaving the frontier questoin open for settlement after the war.

Some believe Russia is less interested in any fixed boundary in Northern Poland than in keeping the White Russians who were put under Polish rule after World War I.

This is a clipping from page 4 of the New York Times for Feb. 27, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

GERMANY BELIEVED SHIFTING ARMIES

By HAROLD CALLENDER

WASHINGTON, Feb. 27—Premier Joseph Stalin aroused new doubts about Russia's intentions and the whole future strategy of the war this week by saying that Russia was fighting not for conquest but to rid her territory of the German invaders. At the same time, in his order of the day to the Red Army, Mr. Stalin again reminded his Western Allies of the absence of a second front in Europe, which, he said, caused the Russians to bear the "whole weight of the war."

Mr. Stalin's words were perhaps directed at the Russian public chiefly, yet from them some here inferred that he was interested only in liberating Russian territory and, this accomplished, might suspend active hostilities or even make a truce with Germany. Others believed he was trying once more to prod the Western powers into hastening their invasion of the Continent.

Military men pointed out that even if the outcome was simply that the Germans withdrew to a shorter and more easily defensible line, this might release fifty or more Nazi divisions for use elsewhere—say in Spain or North Africa or to be held on the western or southern coast of Europe to repel a British-American landing.

This is believed to be Germany's intention. Such a German move would achieve, from the Russian point of view, precisely the same purpose as the second front which

Revised War Plans Would Give Relief To the Russians

Mr. Stalin has so long demanded: It would relieve the strain on Russia by diverting German forces to the West.

Should Germany succeed in cutting her losses in this way, or otherwise find her liabilities limited on the Eastern Front, she would be materially strengthened to resist an Allied invasion of the continent and perhaps to make the offensive thrusts that now seem desperately needed from the point of view of German morale.

Factor of Geography

Such are some of the possibilities inherent in the strategic situation created by the fact that while Russia can and does throw her whole weight directly against Germany, the two great Western Allies are so far prevented by their geographical positions from striking an equivalent blow. Russia is a continental power that has been compelled to come to grips with the mass of German might, while Britain and the United States are non-European powers that must press in upon Germany slowly from the seas and from an adjoining continent. Mr. Stalin's complaint is really against this geographical fact.

The Nazis have recently made a particularly intense effort to exploit the mutual suspicions between Russia and the Western powers by telling the British that they and all Europe, as well as Germany, are menaced by bolshevism. And it may be noted that while some in this country profess to fear that Russia will stop fighting at her frontiers, others fear the Soviet forces will try to occupy Berlin ahead of their Western powers in order to insure Russian domination of the continent.

Thus the Nazis' political exploitation of Western suspicions of Russia is to some extent an easy task. Their military exploitation seems certain to prove far more difficult, thanks to the damage Russia has done to the German Army and—a point Mr. Stalin overlooked—the damage the R. A. F. has done to German war industries and shipyards and to German morale.

What, then, is Germany's striking power today, so far as it can be measured, and where will it be used next to stave off defeat, to delay the projected Allied invasion of Europe and to regain some of the prestige that German militarism has lately lost?

Russian Claims

Mr. Stalin says the Russians have inflicted 9,000,000 casualties on the German Army, leaving 4,000,000 Germans dead. The first figure about equals the total personnel of the German Army, as estimated here, while the second figure is roughly equivalent to the whole of the German forces thrown into Russia, where it is believed not more than half the Nazi army has ever been engaged.

This is a clipping from page 5 of the New York Times for Feb. 28, 1943
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An authoritative estimate here is that since the beginning of the war Germany has lost about 2,500,000 men who were either killed or incapacitated for further military service. Total casualties, including minor wounds that put men out of action temporarily, are believed to number some 4,000,000.

According to the best estimates available here, Germany has under arms somewhat more than 300 divisions, 135 to 160 of which have been in Russia at any one time. In North Africa the Axis is believed to have some 200,000 men, about half of them Germans. It is estimated that forty to fifty divisions are held in France, Belgium and Holland, twenty-five in Norway and Finland, eight in the Balkans, three in Italy and forty in Germany.

Planes and U-Boats

Germany today is believed to have something like 12,000 "operational" planes—those ready or nearly ready for combat. She keeps about 1,000 in the Mediterranean. New production is estimated at 2,000 to 3,000 a month. Germany has some twenty-six armored divisions, including three in Africa, it is estimated. She operates 400 to 500 submarines and builds about twenty-five a month, more than twice her average losses. Her navy includes five to seven battleships, with two others building, two new aircraft carriers, eight to ten cruisers and numerous destroyers.

Germany's striking power is thus formidable in spite of her tremendous losses of men and material in Russia, of which Mr. Stalin justly boasts, even though exaggerating them.

As to where Germany might strike next, there are several possibilities. She might concentrate upon holding Tunisia and threatening the Allied supply lines along the North African coast and at sea, thus delaying an Allied offensive on the Continent.

She undoubtedly planned at one time a blow at Suez through Turkey or by storming the Dardanelles with use of air power as in Crete or by taking Cyprus and landing in Syria. The latter is regarded as an operation that would strain her resources; and with the German withdrawal in Russia the Turks appear to feel increasingly confident their country will be spared a German invasion.

A Blow Through Spain

A third possibility apparently contemplated by the Nazis is a march through Spain to strike the Allied North African armies in their rear and to close the Mediterranean gateway at Gibraltar by occupying Spanish Morocco.

Tangier, the Spanish Moroccan capital, is reported to be full of Germans, fifth columnists and reservists, and there are rumors of Germans in the Spanish Army there. On the other hand, in French Morocco, keeping an eye on the Spanish Moroccan frontier, is the Fifth United States Army.

The Spanish Army, unmechanized, would be no match for a German force like Rommel's, though its resistance would imperil an invader's supply line. There is much doubt what Spain would do if the Germans crossed the frontier at Irun, where they have kept troops on the French side. The Spanish people are believed to be overwhelmingly opposed to the Axis while the government, though having leaned throughout the war toward the Axis side, wants to avoid war or at least to be aligned with the victors.

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Clipped at the Seat of Government.

RUSSIA'S AMBITIONS ARE SECRETS OF THE KREMLIN

By C. L. SULZBERGER

Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, Feb. 27—In all the confusion and lack of specific post-war planning now evident both in Washington and in London, a great fog has arisen concerning the all-important peace objectives of the Soviet Union, especially as regards the territorial claims. Within this fog Propaganda Minister Goebbels has carefully managed to create the outlines of the old Bolshevik bogyman, who, it would appear, alternates with the traditional imperialist Russian Bear as the threat to the Western World.

This brace of menacing bogies is projected to unite the squirming puppet allies of the Axis in one grand eleventh-hour effort to stave off defeat and preserve that Western civilization which at present goes under the name of "the New Order in Europe."

The effect of this skillful and deliberate propaganda campaign of the Nazi conjurors has been not only to frighten the nervous satellite nations but also to unite various British and American elements which have always either feared or suspected the Soviet Union. Many of them now paradoxically agree with Stalin that the second front should immediately be speeded up, not in order to assist the Red Army but rather to occupy Europe before the "Bolshies" get there.

Bungling Seen

To add to this unhealthy atmosphere which, it cannot be concealed, now prevails among the United Nations—and, as Napoleon insisted, such suspicions always exist among Allies—the nervous refugee governments of Eastern Europe by frequent diplomatic bungling are playing into Berlin's hands.

As the Red Armies march westward, the question which is becoming paramount is what peace plans are now being fomented within the secret recesses of the Kremlin? Aside from the general objectives enunciated in Premier Stalin's infrequent speeches, which are equivalent to the equally general objectives put forth by Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt,

Territorial Adjustments and Friendly Neighbors Are the Known Demands

no specific program of an authoritative nature has so far been given out.

Rumors Flourish

This lack of definite commitments furnishes plenty of vacuum in which rumormongers can function. Their views range from the certainty that Russia intends to take over the entire world from the Channel coast to the Japan Sea and the Arabian Gulf, as a vast imperialist power to more specific contentions that Moscow will insist on control of Europe as far as the Adriatic, possession of the Dardanelles, control of all of Scandinavia, [illegible] Iran, and possibly Afghanistan.

The argument of one foreign observer goes thus:

"The Soviet Union intends to remain completely at peace with Japan. When the European war is over, the Red Army will have defeated the greatest military force ever assembled and will have unlimited prestige with the liberated peoples of the Continent.

"Then what do you expect Stalin to do? Obviously he will say to his Allies: 'Well, you've still got a war [illegible] It will be [illegible] to do out against Japan. We are perfectly willing to assist and bomb Tokyo to hell, if you give us a free hand in Europe. And if you don't—well, I'll run Europe anyway, but I'll let Japan run the Far East. If I make an alliance with Japan, do you think you fellows can beat us?'"

A Conference Vision

Another prominent statesman told the writer: "When F. D. R., Winston and Uncle Joe sit down to the peace table Uncle Joe is going to pose this question: 'And how many dead have you, my Allies?' and Winston will be able to say, 'Well, we've got about 750,000, but, you know, we are a naval empire and sea losses are never large.' And F. D. R. will say 'About 200,000.' Then Stalin will say: 'Yes, and we have 6,000,000—6,000,000 dead.'" And, continues this statesman, "Don't you think that will affect the balance of peace?"

Between such theories and the general public hangs a great curtain of double-talk woven by the foreign offices and career diplomats of the United Nations. When Foreign Minister Anthony Eden says Britain has agreed with Russia on "the principles which will underlie our collaboration in peace" it doesn't particularly serve to clarify the issues so far as the man in the street is concerned.

Thus when one sits down and tries to figure out exactly what are the aims of the Soviet Union, one has to work on the basis of clues which, when put together, may give some outline of the complete appearance of the [illegible] puzzle. Obviously the chief desire of Moscow is the same as that of Washington and of London and probably of most of the people in the world—to win the war and establish a lasting peace. What are the exact methods of bringing about the latter objective?

In the first place, one thing is self-evident and clear: Moscow will insist on the restoration of Russia's pre-war frontiers which means inclusion in the U.S.S.R. of portions of pre-Munich Finland, Poland and Rumania as well as the three Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These are considered by the Kremlin to be integral parts of the Soviet Union.

Those claims affect only one United Nations country—Poland. Despite Polish protestations, there is scant likelihood that Moscow would be willing to give up the eastern portion of that country which it considers its own domain or that any of the other United Nations, no matter how sympathetic, would be willing to fight to back up Warsaw's desires. The reason the recent Polish-Czech federation talks broke down was that President Benes of Czechoslovakia was unwilling to be involved in any Warsaw-Moscow fracas. Premier Sikorski of Poland told the writer that Stalin had informed him that he wants to see a strong Poland after the war.

Outlook for Finland

Regarding Finland, Russia officially considers the Karelian population as a portion of the Karelian Soviet Republic based on Petrozavodsk. In addition, it would not be unreasonable to predict that the Soviets will insist on possession of the port of Petsamo on the Arctic Ocean with its nickel-bearing hinterland, and Hango and other key points controlling the Eastern Baltic.

From pre-Munich Rumania, Russia will certainly want North Bukovina and Bessarabia to be given back to a restored Moldavian S.S.R. The Kremlin considers the populations of those areas as Moldavian Soviet citizens, just as the Kremlin considers the Ukrainian Poles and White Russians as coming within the jurisdiction of the Soviet republics of those peoples.

This is a clipping from page [illegible] of the New York Times for [illegible]

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Further one cannot speak with any semblance of authority. Whether the Soviet Union will want the Danube delta and a portion of the Bulgarian coastline for strategic reasons it is impossible to predict.

In the Middle East Iran appears to be the only area which could come under discussion, although there is some possibility that the Turko-Russian parleys now taking place may involve Soviet demands on former Russian regions surrounding Kars and Ardahan. The Soviet is pretty well installed in Northern Iran and the southern coast of the Caspian and might well be reluctant to move out.

For Friendly Neighbors

Beyond the actual post-war frontiers which the Soviet may desire it is logical to expect Moscow to insist on the establishment of a belt of bordering States—whether federated or not—which are friendly to the U.S.S.R.

And now for the biggest bogy man of all. What are the Kremlin's post-war ideas on the world-wide social system? Does Stalin hope to encourage those revolutionary tendencies which are bound to rise in Hitler's wake? Does his support of the continental partisans—especially in Yugoslavia and Poland—hint at a wish for militant anarchy or for territorial aggrandizement toward the Adriatic?

If the fed-up citizens of Eastern Europe establish their own Soviet republics and ask Moscow's support, will it be given? Would Stalin encourage a Communist revolt in Germany or oppose it for fear it might turn Trotskyist and build up another menace to Russia under able Teuton guidance? If revolution starts, as it is almost bound to do, could Stalin avoid entanglement?

A Possible Course

The best guess—and it must be emphasized that a guess is all it can be called—is that Russia will want to establish strategically safe new borders and surround herself with sympathetic States. Sympathy must necessarily be expressed by internal as well as external policy, and it is certain Moscow will not want any feudal institutions to remain around her dooryard.

Just how the Kremlin will coordinate its left arm, the Comintern with its right arm, the Narkomindel (Commissariat for Foreign Affairs) and in fact how much power either will be able to exert over the populations of a brutalized Continent is something for a fortune teller to discuss, not a newspaper correspondent. Anyway, the Kremlin always has had more than a little in common with the sphinx.

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I'd Rather Be Right

By Samuel Grafton

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What Russia wants from us is a second front. So long as we do not deliver a second front, we are not going to have much closer relations with Russia. Those relations depend only incidentally on what Ambassador Standley says in Moscow. If we deliver a second front, Ambassador Standley can be a growly bear in Moscow, and it will not greatly matter.

If we do not deliver a second front, Standley can coo like a dove, he can wear a picture of Stalin in his locket, and our relations with Russia will not be substantially improved.

I doubt whether Russia is nearly as interested as we are in the question of whether we recall Standley or do not recall him. I doubt if she cares greatly whether we send a more amiable ambassador to Moscow, or a less amiable one. She wants us to send troops into Europe.

How to Curb the Standleys

In the great debate over whether Standley shoulda said it or shouldna said it, it is alleged that his blast at Russia for (supposedly) not telling her own people about the extent of lend-lease aid will create disunity and encourage the axis.

But it is the absence of coalition warfare which really encourages the axis. If we establish a second front, the axis cannot possibly be encouraged by anything any ambassador can possibly say in Moscow. Nor will the axis be greatly discouraged, or Russia greatly encouraged, even if we find the most polite of verbal forms for covering over the absence of coalition warfare, even if we send the nicest American there is to Moscow.

Standley is not the problem. Policy is the problem. And therefore sending someone to replace Standley will not solve the problem. The problem is to establish true coalition warfare, an offensive in the west to match Russia's offensive in the east. Just as the Standley incident could not possibly have occurred were such an offensive taking place, so similar incidents can perhaps not be avoided so long as that offensive does not take place.

An Admiral in a Vacuum

Those who are protesting against Standley, per se, fool themselves if they think that any change in verbal forms or improvement in manners can take the place of policy.

It will not matter in the slightest degree to Russia how politely we say "No!" to her, if "No!" is all we have to say.

So long as we say "No!" on the question of the speedy opening of the second front, all those forces which are not too friendly to Russia are encouraged, and given a space of time in which to operate.

The lack of an offensive in Europe creates a vacuum, which a Standley promptly fills by raising the irrelevant issue of whether the Russians are giving us enough publicity.

Better Words Won't Help

The lack of an offensive creates a coolness between ourselves and Russia. A section of the isolationist press promptly builds on that coolness, arguing that since Russia does not trust us, we should not trust her. The isolationists tried, winkingly, to hint that Standley's remarks had the full backing of our government, and were greatly dashed when this turned out to be not so.

You start by suggesting (as Admiral Standley came near doing) that lend-lease is a sufficient contribution by us to the war. In the quarrel thus engendered, enemies of lend-lease are encouraged, and lend-lease itself is endangered, and so the gap widens.

The specter is created not only of no invasion, just lend-lease; but of no invasion and less lend-lease.

The thing feeds on itself. Only the invasion of Europe can stop it. Our relations with Russia cannot be improved adjectively, by better words and better manners. They can only be improved substantively, by joint fighting of the war.

This is a clipping from page 22 of the New York Post for March 12, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

This Changing World

New Stalin Demand for Western Europe Front Is Expected Soon by Washington and London

By CONSTANTINE BROWN.

A demand by Moscow that the Allies speed up plans for an offensive on the western front in accordance with the pledges of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill is expected soon in Washington and London.

Constantine Brown.

Allied military quarters are puzzled by recent German strategy. Latest reports indicate that new and powerful Nazi forces now are being rushed to the Southern Russian front.

This unexpected move lends itself to many interpretations. In some quarters it is believed that the Germans are over-confident on their fixed defenses in Western Europe and after having been concerned over the possibility of an Allied all-out attack on France or Norway are now minimizing the danger.

Other observers believe that although Hitler has relinquished the effective command over Germany's armed forces, some of his generals still are wedded to the idea that a last effort should be made this spring to cut off oil supplies from Russia by a renewed offensive toward the Volga River and the Caucasus.

Divisions Identified.

Only two weeks ago the Allies identified a number of divisions which had been reported recently in the Balkans and France.

Many military and political observers believed that after the heavy knocks the Nazis had received in the last four months in Russia they would retire to a short line—probably along the Dnieper River—and remain on the defensive. They thought the main German effort would be directed toward the defense of Western Europe and possibly a last strong offensive through the Balkans either against Turkey or toward Syria and Palestine.

Latest reports, however, appear to deny this assumption. It is true that while tremendously successful against the German forces the Russians have lost many men and a large amount of war material. On the other hand the Nazis are believed to have suffered relatively small losses.

The main blow to their armed forces and to their prestige was the capitulation of the army commanded by Marshal Paulus at Stalingrad.

Beyond statements in official communiques from Moscow we know little about actual losses in Russia.

The opinion of military observers who draw their conclusions mainly from available official reports is that the Red Army may have lost heavily in the new brilliant offensive and may now be out of breath. It is also true that the rapid advance of the Soviet forces has made the transportation of war materials and food from their supply bases more complicated.

All these considerations put together lead observers not to discount the possibility that while the Nazi forces will fight a defensive campaign in the North they may be preparing another spectacular coup in the South.

The Russians have been fighting without interruption for 2½ years. Whenever the Germans slowed down their offensive in the winter the Russian high command began counterattacking. When the Russian offensive ended the Nazis resumed.

Satellites Sacrificed.

Consequently, in spite of the brilliant spirit of the Red Armies, the Germans may feel they still have a chance to get in a hard blow this spring or summer. It is pointed out that the Nazis have not been sacrificing their own men exclusively. Rumanian, Hungarian, Italian and some Slovak divisions have been mercilessly sacrificed for the greater glory of Herr Hitler.

Military observers agree that there still is enough manpower and sufficient modern weapons in the Reich to enable Germany to resume the offensive.

The Russian high command maintains that the Nazi forces in Tunisia have reached the saturation point and regardless of how soon Gen. Dwight Eisenhower may order an all-out offensive it could not detract any more men from the Russian front.

The Russian high command is said to believe that the only way to reduce the pressure on the Eastern front is for Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill to keep their pledges and carry out the offensive against Western Europe.

This time it will be difficult to answer that we are not prepared for an attack. The President, who also is Commander-in-Chief of the American forces, and the British Prime Minister must have canvassed the situation carefully at Casablanca and they could not have given their pledges lightly. They must have known that we would be ready soon. They signed a "note" which will fall due very shortly.

WASH. STAR MARCH 12, 1943 p.11

WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW

Moscow has been quick to answer Admiral Standley's complaints. Not only did the Soviet news agencies immediately broadcast the latest reports of lend-lease aid to Russia; they even published accounts of the criticism itself. The latter procedure is so unusual that it should dispel misgivings over the effect of the Ambassador's indiscretion on the Soviet Government. Evidently it was taken in better part in the Kremlin than in many nervous circles in this country. The American envoy was at once received by Foreign Commissar Molotoff, and whether or not the conversation resulted in the exchange of military information for which the Admiral has been pressing, at least it brought reassurance that instead of being offended the Russian leaders are responsive to the kind of plain speaking it is their own habit to employ in addressing their allies.

Perhaps, indeed, they welcome it. There is no reason to believe that the Soviet Government does not fully share the desire of our Government to maintain and strengthen good relations between the two countries. Nor, despite the dark threats contained in Vice President Wallace's address in Ohio, is there any reason to believe that Russia and the United States are not equally anxious to avoid creating misunderstandings that will make World War 3 "inevitable." After the incalculable strain on her manpower, her economy and her endurance, Russia will need peace and friends and help in reconstruction as much as if not more than any other belligerent. She will need to count on our collaboration in a new security system as much as we shall want to count on hers. Words, however unwisely spoken, are not likely to affect these basic realities, but if words could deepen suspicion between the Soviet Union and the United States, Mr. Wallace's extraordinary suggestion that we might "double-cross" Russia would do far more harm than the remarks of Admiral Standley.

The very fact that motives of self-interest dictate cooperation between Russia and her allies, cooperation in peace as well as in war, also implies the utmost frankness in their dealings with one another. In moments as critical as this, the discussions should take place directly between governments. The press-conference method is as questionable a use of frankness as the public speech. It is obvious, however, that differences arising from different systems, different methods, different relations between government and people, cannot be dissolved by ignoring them. They must be honestly faced. Mutual confidence cannot be based on fictions, illusions or hopes, but only on understanding. Stalin does not hesitate to make his position, his claims and his complaints plain to us, and the best way to win his confidence and respect is to be equally forthright in making clear our position, our claims, and, above all, our firm adherence to the principle of post-war cooperation.

This is a clipping from page 16 of the New York Times for MARCH 12, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

SOVIET RENEWS CRY FOR SECOND FRONT

Pravda and Izvestia Reiterate That Russia Bears 'Alone' Full Weight of Nazi Army

STANDLEY REACTION CITED

Comments of U. S. Officials and Others on Ambassador's Assertions Printed

MOSCOW, March 11 (U.P.)—Russian newspapers, despite space restrictions of the war that confine them to four pages, gave lengthy treatment today to developments that have followed the complaint by United States Ambassador William H. Standley, that Russia had not properly acknowledged American aid.

All papers published dispatches from the United States reporting the comments of Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles, Senator Tom Connally, Democrat, of Texas, and Representative Sol Bloom, Democrat, of New York; Wendell L. Willkie and some radio commentators.

Although Russians are not unduly pessimistic over their reverses in the Ukraine and Donets Basin, increasing German pressure and reports that Adolph Hitler is shifting more forces from the west without apparent signs of immediate Allied relief in Europe, there are indications of growing anxiety that Russia may be compelled to bear the brunt of land fighting again this Summer.

Russian Fatigue Natural

Clamor for a second front has not reached and probably will not reach last Summer's proportions. But the Russians are naturally fatigued after almost four months of an uninterrupted offensive carried on at tremendous cost in men and materials.

Premier Joseph Stalin's warning Feb. 23 that the enemy is far from defeated, followed by the German successes in the south, has produced sober realism and realization that the second front is no less vital this year than it was in 1942.

There is no official campaign for a second front. But taking their cue from Premier Stalin's Red Army Day statement that the Russians are facing alone the full weight of the German armed forces, recent editorials in Izvestia and Pravda, organs of the government and the Russian Communist party, respectively, have emphasized the difficulties of the Soviet Union in the absence of hostilities in Western Europe.

Using practically identical language, the editorials said:

"The Red Army alone, owing to the lack of a second front in Europe, is bearing the whole weight of the struggle against the hordes of Hitler and his vassals, for whom the entire continent's war industry is working. No other country, no other army in the world, could have withstood such trials."

No Press Views on Standley

The Soviet newspapers refrained from direct comment on Admiral Standley's statement, but they replied to his charges by their publication of dispatches sent by the official news agency, Tass, on American and British reaction. The dispatches were grouped together under the headline, "Declaration of the American Ambassador to Moscow and American reactions to it."

They led off with the quotation of Admiral Standley's complaint. Then came the text of Mr. Welles's statement and those of Senator Connally, Mr. Bloom and Mr. Willkie. The newspapers quoted United Press Washington dispatches to the effect that Mr. Welles had been displeased by Admiral Standley's statement. Tass from New York said that the New York papers published Mr. Welles's statement under headings indicating that Mr. Welles disavowed responsibility for Admiral Standley's statement.

The papers also published a Washington dispatch of the British agency Reuter, saying that diplomatic quarters had interpreted Mr. Welles's statement as a reaffirmation of American desire to co-operate with Russia not only now but after the war.

Admiral Standley declined to comment on the situation.

Standley as Correctly Quoted

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, March 11—Ambassador William H. Standley, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, has assumed personal responsibility for his utterances at his Moscow press conference, in which he complained of the alleged failure of the Soviet Government to present the full facts of American war aid to the Russian people.

In a report announced today by Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State, the Ambassador said he had spoken in his personal capacity and not for the government. His report, according to Mr. Welles, did not differ in any essential details from press reports of the Moscow conference.

The State Department had requested a report from Admiral Standley. When asked whether it could be assumed that no consideration was being given to recall of the Ambassador or any other disciplinary action, Mr. Welles replied that he had nothing further to say at this time.

This is a clipping from page 4 of the New York Times for MARCH 12, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Litvinov Says Soviets 'Deeply Appreciate' Aid

Calls Them 'Fully Aware' of Extent; Standley Asserts He Didn't Speak for U.S.

From the Herald Tribune Bureau

WASHINGTON, March 11.—Russia's people are "fully aware" of the extent of lend-lease aid supplied by America and such aid is "deeply appreciated," Maxim M. Litvinov, the Soviet Ambassador, said today in an address apparently meant as a reply to the charge by Admiral William H. Standley, American Ambassador to Russia, that the Russian people were being kept in ignorance of this help.

Ambassador Litvinov's statement, supplemented by remarks from Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State, seemed to indicate that the tempest caused by Admiral Standley's talk to newspaper men in Moscow had about blown over.

Mr. Welles said at a press conference that Admiral Standley, in a report to the State Department, had assumed personal responsibility for his remarks. The admiral reported that he realized he was speaking in his personal capacity and not for the American government. Mr. Welles added that the exact text of the Ambassador's statement, received by cable, did not differ in any essential detail from the versions which appeared in the American press.

Mr. Welles was asked whether it could be assumed that no consideration was being given to Admiral Standley's recall or to any disciplinary action. He replied that there was nothing further he wished to say at this time.

Marks Two Years of Lend-Lease

Ambassador Litvinov, speaking at the Hotel Statler at a luncheon marking the second anniversary of the lend-lease program, told of the vast amount of armaments and supplies used by the Red Army in fighting for twenty months along a front of 2,000 miles. He said the largest part of these supplies had to be provided by Russia itself, but added:

"Supplies received through lend-lease have been an enormous help, and as such deeply appreciated by the people of the Soviet Union, who are fully aware of its extent.

"Unfortunately I have no statistics which would enable me to quote the exact proportion of American supplies used in any particular battle, and such statistics are hardly likely to be obtainable. I can, however, say that war material received from the United State has been used during both the defensive and the offensive operations of the Red Army, and that American fighters, notably Airacobras, have given a specially good account of themselves.

Quotes Example of Aid

"I can quote you a few examples know nto me of the independent part played by American armaments:

"There is a regiment in the air force of the Red Army, using nothing but Airacobras, which has been given the title of a Guards regiment for its distinguished services. During the last three months this regiment, at first on the Voronezh front and then on the northwest in the Demyansk area, brought down during air fights forty-three enemy planes, itself losing only three.

"One of our aviation units, using American B-25 bombers (Mitchells, achieved, in difficult meteorological conditions, 380 combat fights during January last without losing a single plane. One of the results of these raids was the destruction of a railway junction of the utmost importance to the enemy for the transfer of troops to the south, where the Red Army was then launching an offensive. Five trains of war material, two troop trains and a number of locomotives were destroyed at the junction."

Ambassador Litvinov spoke also of the shipments of American trucks and jeeps, and of the welcome arrival of foodstuffs and medicines.

"I hope the originators of lend-lease and those contributing to its realization," he said, "will find satisfaction in the conviction that they could hardly have found an investment yielding better dividends than the share of lend-lease in the results of the Red Army's operations."

Russians Told of Controversy

MOSCOW, March 11 (AP).—The Russian people were informed last night and today that American Ambassador Standley had expressed the opinion they were not getting the full story of American aid to the Soviet Union in its war against Germany.

Tass, the official news agency, in a dispatch from New York dated March 9, the day after the admiral's press-conference statement, told the story in this way: "According to the Moscow correspondent of The Associated Press, the United States Ambassador to Moscow, Mr. Standley, made a statement to American correspondents announcing that, as he presumes, the information is not given to the Russian people on American aid to Russia."

The dispatch also quoted the announcement of Under Secretary Welles that the State Department had not been consulted by the ambassador prior to his statement, and said, "Washington regards the Welles statement as a condemnation of Standley's position."

Admiral Standley also refused comment, saying: "I have made my statement. I have nothing more to say at present." But he was matching the course of the controversy closely, listening to all the English-language broadcasts he could receive.

This is a clipping from page 3 of the New York Herald Tribune for March 12, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Russian People Are Informed Of Statement by Standley

By the Associated Press

Moscow, March 11.—The Russian people were informed last night and today that Admiral William H. Standley, the American Ambassador, had expressed the opinion they were not getting the full story of United States aid to the Soviet Union in its war against Germany.

Tass, official news agency, in a dispatch from New York dated March 9, the day after the admiral's press conference statement, told the story in this way:

"According to the Moscow correspondent of the Associated Press, the United States Ambassador to Moscow, Mr. Standley, made a statement to American correspondents announcing that, as he presumes, the information is not given to the Russian people on American aid to Russia."

Welles Statement Quoted

The dispatch also quoted the announcement of Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles that the State Department had not been consulted by the Ambassador prior to his statement and said, "Washington regards the Welles statement as a condemnation of Standley's position."

The dispatch was broadcast on the Russian home radio in evening and morning schedules and was then carried in all papers on the back page with their other foreign news.

There was no editorial comment, however, and the Kremlin remained silent.

Admiral Standley also refused comment, saying, "I have made my statement, I have nothing more to say at present."

But he was closely watching the course of the controversy, listening to all the English-language broadcasts he could receive.

Reaction Here Reported

The Tass dispatch quoted Standley's strongest remark, "I carefully looked for information that Russians get material support from America in the Russian press but could not find real recognition of this fact."

It then reported much of the reaction in the United States, including statements from Wendell Willkie, Senator Tom Connally and Representative Sol Bloom, respectively chairmen of the Senate and House Foreign Relations Committees; Maurice Hindus, writer, and quoted excerpts from a story written in New York by Henry C. Cassidy, vacationing chief of the Moscow bureau of the Associated Press, who said the Russian people had considerable knowledge of American aid.

Tass also quoted Welles as saying he believed "mutual understanding and confidence" exists among the United Nations.

The agency then quoted a Reuters dispatch from London as saying "diplomatic circles in Washington regard the quick explanation of the position of the American Government by Welles as proof showing the desire of America to cooperate entirely with the U. S. S. R., not only at present but after the war as well."

WASH. POST
MARCH 12, 1943, PAGE 2

Clearing The Air

By Ernest Lindley

Appreciation Is Not The Point

THE EXTENT of our aid to Russia during the war should not, and will not, depend on whether the Russian people appreciate it or the Soviet government thanks us for it. It will continue to depend on the capacity to transport equipment and materials to Russia and the ability of the Russians to use them effectively in fighting the Germans.

LINDLEY

Geography, size of population, and fighting qualities combine to make the Russian army the pivot of Allied strategy. The first aim of British-American strategy in 1942 was to help the Russian army, by shipments of equipment and supplies, by the creation of diversions, in the air and on the ground, to prevent the European Axis from exerting its full force on the Russian front, and by trying to draw Japan away from an attack on Siberia.

British-American strategy for 1943, likewise, has been devised with primary regard for the Russian army. If Russia had been defeated in 1942, the destruction of the European Axis might have required 5 to 10 years. The length of the war still depends largely upon the ability and determination of the Russians to keep on fighting with all their strength until the German army has been crushed. So shipments to Russia have had top priority under lend-lease, and the volume of aid will continue to mount as rapidly as shipping and other means of transportation can be expanded.

IF OR WHEN the Germans are driven from Russian soil, or retire from it, they may be expected to make a final hullabaloo over the "Communist peril" to Europe. Unless Germany were already at the point of collapse, it would be most inconvenient for the Western Allies if the Russians should decide to stop at their own borders, permitting most of Germany's strength to be massed against American and British forces. The fitting conclusion to the war would be the arrival of Russian troops in Berlin simultaneously with the forces of the United States, Britain, France and the other fighting Allies.

If the Russians keep on fighting, we can get along without the thanks—even though our aid has been and still is vital to them, as well as to us. But the situation touched upon by Admiral Standley is important because of what it may signify for the longer future.

Stalin and his advisers may feel that the best way to get more aid is to pretend that what they have received is insignificant. They may genuinely believe that the American-British combination could have opened a second front on the ground in Europe last year, and that generally it is bringing its force to bear in a too leisurely way. The Russians have had little experience in ocean transport and may therefore be unable to comprehend the magnitude of the effort being exerted by Britain and the United States.

BUT IF these are contributory reasons, they seem inadequate to explain the failure of the Russian government to display appreciation of the British and American contributions to the saving of Russia and toward the ultimate victory. Russian soldiers and many people behind the lines know that the Red army is using American planes, trucks, and tanks, and that many other items are coming to them from Britain and the United States. According to Admiral Standley, they had not been told that in addition to lend-lease they were receiving through the Red Cross Russian War Relief supplies bought with money voluntarily contributed by individual American citizens. According to American correspondents, in Moscow, the Russian press has published the statements of American and British officials about the extent of lend-lease aid. But the studied policy of the Kremlin appears to be to lead the Russian people to feel that they are carrying the whole burden of the war.

The Russians lived in pretty thorough isolation from the rest of the world before the war. Contacts between Russians and foreigners were discouraged; and the Russian people had few means of knowing how people in the rest of the world lived and thought. On the part of the Soviet government, this policy of insulation probably stemmed chiefly from fear. Such a policy does not prohibit collaboration with other nations. Governments can still [illegible] formal agreements and var[illegible] working arrangements, even tho[illegible] their respective peoples know [illegible] about each other.

But the tendency to disparage the contribution of Allies does not promote the spirit of collaboration. If the Russians want to collaborate with Britian and the United States after the war, their present policy doesn't make sense.

WASH. POST
MAR. 12. 1943 - PAGE 11

LET'S BE FRANK

By order of the British censorship, the British press is to confine its mention of Poland's dispute with Russia over post-war boundaries to official utterances. The ban extends to stories cabled abroad. The reason assigned for suppressing the news is that the controversy is productive of nothing but acrimony and cannot fail to injure relations among the allies fighting Germany.

This policy of sweeping the dirt under the carpet and pretending it doesn't exist is strangely at variance with the satisfaction recently expressed in British official circles and among American internationalists when Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles announced that the American government was prepared to open discussions at once with other allied nations on plans for the post-war world. Mr. Welles' statement was made at Toronto and the selection of a Canadian rostrum was interpreted as a means of assuring Britain that it need not be concerned about counting on our coöperation after the war.

The subject of post-war planning is one dear to the hearts of all who delight in styling themselves liberals. They hardly waited for the battleships to come to rest on the bottom at Pearl Harbor before starting a clamor that we should begin to plan for post-war world organization right away. The favorite statement always was, "We can win the war but lose the peace." Anybody who had the temerity to suggest that bridges were better crossed when reached was denounced as a reactionary and an enemy of the four freedoms, the Atlantic Charter, and the hope for a better world.

Offhand we can't think of anything that would be more pertinent to discussion of the post-war world than the boundaries that are to be fixed for that world, but, curiously enough, as we now see, this is not considered a fit subject to be brought into the open. Mr. Roosevelt, the coauthor of the Atlantic Charter, which is to govern this post-war world, has also shown a strange reluctance to approach the Russo-Polish dispute for a close examination, altho one article of his composition supposedly guarantees that all peoples are to live under governments of their own choosing. When asked how he reconciled Russia's obdurate insistence upon possessing part of prewar Poland the President took refuge in the assertion that he had only read the headlines about the matter.

We should think that our post-war planners, if they wished to be at all consistent, would at once come to grips with this problem of boundaries, but they are found tiptoeing in the opposite direction. We grant that this is a ticklish and stubborn problem, not susceptible of easy solution, but it is going to be no less difficult after the war, when the Red army may be occupying the territory in dispute.

This is a clipping from page 13 of the Chicago Tribune for [illegible]
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Realism Is Needed

By Barnet Nover

10

Russia As An American Problem

THE SENSATION produced by Admiral Standley's off-the-cuff remarks at a press conference in Moscow last Monday has now, fortunately, subsided. Only our enemies can derive any advantage from prolonged washing of allegedly dirty linen.

Less than 24 hours after he accused the Soviet authorities of holding back from the Russian people the facts regarding our aid to their country, the Russian radio broadcast in full the statement of Lend-Lease Administrator Edward R. Stettinius in which the latter made public the details of the shipments we have sent to the U. S. S. R.

So if the Ambassador's undiplomatic plain-speaking gave the Axis propagandists a field day and some of our unconverted isolationists a chance to vent anew their spleen against an Allied power, it also produced the intended results.

YET THE VICTORY which Ambassador Standley won is trifling and unimportant. From a realistic point of view it makes no particular difference whether the Russian authorities observe the amenities, make public acknowledgment and express the proper degree of gratitude for the planes, tanks, trucks, jeeps and food we have sent to the Soviet Union. What counts is the use to which the Russians put those supplies. And on that score we certainly have no cause for complaint.

Actually, as was soon pointed out by critics of the Ambassador, Admiral Standley was not altogether on firm ground when he gave the impression, perhaps unintended, that the Soviet press has completely ignored lend-lease aid.

The fact is that even before the Russian radio broadcast of Mr. Stettinius' statement the Russian people were by no means kept in complete ignorance of what we and the British have been sending them.

But the Ambassador was on very slippery ground, indeed, when, in the course of his remarks, he declared that while the American Congress is "big hearted and generous" the story might be different "if you give it the impression that its help means nothing."

For nothing is further from the truth; nothing is more unrealistic, nothing is more dangerous, than the thesis that the aid we are sending to Russia or, for that matter, to any other of our partners in the war, is simply an act of generosity.

No progress in the direction of building a better world order can be made so long as such a distorted view of our role as "arsenal of democracy" remains widely prevalent in the United States.

The phrase, it will be remembered, was given currency by President Roosevelt in the days when this country was only beginning to shake off the lethargy and unrealism which had dominated its thinking on world affairs so long. The concept and the reality arose out of the grim awareness that what we needed most was what, despite our vast resources, we had least of—time.

We needed time to build up an Army, time to expand our Navy, time to gear our industrial plant to the exigencies of total war. And the only way to win time was to help those nations that were then fighting the Axis to win it for us and for themselves. The wisdom and statesmanship of the Lend-Lease Act have been made so manifestly clear in the months since the measure was approved that its renewal, by a practically unanimous vote, appears certain.

It would be folly to assume that our relations with Russia in the period since we became allies has been untroubled. Difference and disagreements between us have arisen from time to time. There has been a good deal less than a meeting of minds on certain questions of procedure. The mutual suspicions of a quarter of a century have not altogether dissolved, even in the fires of a war which finds Russia and the United States fighting a common enemy.

But it would be folly of the worst kind to allow minor bickerings, pride of place and punctilio, the amenities of international intercourse or their absence, to stand in the way of basic agreement between us. A world order without Russia is bound to be a world order without stability. The same holds true of a world order from which the United States absents itself.

OUR RELATIONS with Russia as our relations with Great Britain, China and our other Allies must be based on the bedrock fact that in peace as in war we stand or fall together.

This does not mean that a complete and thoroughgoing working arrangement between us on all matters involving the peace will be easy of accomplishment. Some of the problems we shall have to solve will prove extremely difficult of solution. The necessity of dealing with these problems collectively is nonetheless inescapable unless another period of international anarchy is to be ushered in. Which brings home the point made by Vice President Wallace the other day when he declared that: "Unless the Western democracies and Russia come to a satisfactory understanding before the war ends, I very much fear that World War No. 3 will be inevitable." Truer words were never spoken.

WASH. POST
MAR. 11, 1943 - P. 10

U. S., RUSSIA SEEN AS KEY TO PEACE

Each Must Give Concessions After War, Commission of Education Holds

3

If there is to be a just and lasting peace after the war, America and Russia must find a way to cooperate and each must make concessions, according to a report made public yesterday by the Commission on Education and the Post-War World of the American Federation of Teachers.

The report is being issued in book form by the John Day Company, Inc., under the title, "America, Russia, and the Communist Party in the Post-War World." It was written by Dr. John L. Childs, chairman, and Dr. George S. Counts, both of Teachers College, Columbia University, for the commission. The study was authorized at the last annual convention of the Federation, which is affiliated with the American Federation of Labor.

According to the report, the United States and the other capitalistic democracies must accept Soviet Russia into full and cordial partnership in fighting the war and setting up a new world order. The old idea of encirclement of the Soviet Union, it added, must be repudiated.

What Is Facing Russia

For her part, the report continues, Russia must give up all idea of "Communist imperialism" by repudiating and withdrawing all moral and financial support from the Communist Internationale and especially from the American Communist party.

The interests of both Russia and America will be served by the dissolution of the American Communist party, the report says, because its secret "machinations" in support of the "Party Line dictated from Moscow" have poisoned Soviet-American relations. It characterizes the party and the party line as a "curious hangover" from the period when the Comintern was an important factor in Soviet policy.

Only through the United Nations, with America and Russia working together, the report declares, can real peace be established and maintained. It emphasizes that Americans must realize that the vast area, resources and population of the Soviet Union, not to speak of her tremendous military establishment and strength as shown in the war, make her a world power of the first rank.

Moral Drawn From History

There is no reason why there should not be good relaeions between the two countries, simply because they have different ideologies and social systems, the report adds, because history shows these can exist side by side. Neither is there any reason for trouble in economic conflicts, since both have ample natural resources. Nor can ambition for expansion be blamed, as both nations have a big stake in world peace and have disavowed any aggressive intentions.

What really stands between the two countries, it continues, is the last quarter-century of mutual suspicion, fear and active hostility, which must be removed by concessions by both sides if the problem of world peace is to be solved.

This is a clipping from page 3 of the New York Times for MAR. 11, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

STANDLEY EXPLAINS VIEWS TO MOLOTOFF

U.S. Ambassador Confers With Soviet Premier as Izvestia Prints Stettinius Report

LEND-LEASE ITEMS LISTED

Washington Inclined to Let the Tempest Blow Away—Welles Refuses Any Comment

3

MOSCOW, March 10 (UP)—Admiral William H. Standley, United States Ambassador, conferred with Foreign Commissar Vyacheslaff Molotoff this afternoon at the Kremlin, two days after his complaint at a press conference that American aid to Russia had not been sufficiently acknowledged.

There was no immediate indication whether Admiral Standley had sought to explain his complaint, made at a press conference at the embassy. Newly arrived from a visit to Kuibyshev, Admiral Standley had awaited a conference with Mr. Molotoff and, it was understood, with Premier Joseph Stalin even before his press conference statement.

Admiral Standley seemed to feel that his complaint about lack of acknowledgement of Russian aid had been misunderstood. His view apparently was, first, that Russian newspaper dispatches on American aid were carried under foreign datelines, and were not issued officially as thank-you statements by the Russian Government, and, secondly, that the Russian people had no way of knowing what part of the aid was coming from private donations, such as the Red Cross and the Russian War Relief, as differentiated from official lend-lease aid.

Russian newspapers have reported fully lend-lease reports on aid to Russia and statements by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. Admiral Standley's remarks, it now appears, were intended to apply solely to the alleged failure of the Russian papers to acknowledge Red Cross and Russian War Relief materials.

Izvestia Prints Statement

MOSCOW, March 10 (AP)—Two days after the statement by Admiral William H. Standley, United States Ambassador, that the Russian people were not being properly informed of American Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union, Izvestia Soviet Government newspaper, printed on its back page today an artticle supplied by Tass from New York and based on an aricle by Edward R. Stettinius Jr., American Lend-Lease Administrator, in the American Magazine.

The statement was carried under the headline, "Stettinius Statement on American Food Supplies," and represented by far the most inclusive light thrown here thus far on aid to the Soviet Union. Izvestia has a circulation of about 3,000,000.

The article was not carried in Pravda, organ of the Communist party, or in Red Star, organ of the Red Army.

Ambassador Standley's statement has not been published, nor has a recent Stettinius statement concerning trucks, jeeps, motorcycles, military tractors, rails and telephones. In the article printed in Izvestia Mr. Stettinius was quoted as writing that the great majority of food supplies shipped in 1942 consisted of pork, dairy products, fats and eggs.

Statement Published March 5

The only recent statement by Mr. Stettinius to appear in Soviet newspapers was published March 5, under a New York date line of March 2. It said:

"In connection with the discussion taking place in Congress about the prolongation of Lend-Lease aid * * * Stettinius made a statement. In the statement he reviewed aid given by the United States tot Allied counries according to the principle of Lend-Lease.

"Touching on aid to the Soviet Union, Stettinius said the larger part of thhe armament which was used by the Red Army to hold back and then rebuff the Hitlerites was produced in Soviet Russia.

"Simultaneous with these events, the United States and England began sending materials and armament which played their part, although not a large one, in inflicting blows upon the enemy.

"'Up until,' said Stettininus, 'sufficient aid has not been shipped to the Soviet people. We must do literally everything in our power to increase the supplies.'

"The price of materials sent by theh United States to the Soviet Union, according to Stettinius, amounted to $1,300,000,000 as of Jan. 1, 1943."

"United States supplies to countries in thhe Middle East," the Tass story continued, "consisted of $1,650,000,000. This includes supplies of armament and materials to Australia, New Zealand, the British troops in Egypt and the Middle East and to China and India.

"Pertaining to supplies to England Stettinius stated that up to Jan. 1, this year, the United States had sent to England under the Lend-Lease law various materials worth of $2,440,000,000.

"Into North Africa for use of the civilian population, Stettinius said 93,000 tons of materials had been sent. This does not include teh armament of French troops in North Africa."

Today's story said:

"During 1942 America exported 1,112,000,000 pounds of pork—in other words, 10 per cent of the whole American production in the same year; 815,000,000 pounds of dairy products have been exported, which formed 3.4 per cent of the

This is a clipping from page 3 of the New York Times for MAR. 11, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

whole American dairy production. All this amount of dairy products was shipped to the Soviet Union.

"Besides these totals, Stettinius wrote that 723,000,000 pounds of fat and vegetable oil, or 13.2 per cent of American production, were exported, and 450,000,000 dozens of eggs, or 10 per cent of American egg production, were exported to England and the Soviet Union.

"The United States also shipped 156,000,000 pounds of fish, 415,000,000 pounds of corn, 393,000,000 pounds of wheat, 11,000,000 cans of vegetables, 89,000,000 pounds of canned fruits and fruit juices. In general the whole of the food supplies shipped by the United States was 6 per cent of its production."

FUROR IN CAPITAL ENDS

Washington Inclined to Let Row Over Standley Blow Away

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, March 10—Indications today were that the government was disposed to let the furor subside over the Moscow press conference of Admiral William H. Standley, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, after an explanation had been received from the Ambassador.

His report was said to have made his alleged complaint concerning the lack of knowledge by the Russian people of America's war aid merely an incidental observation in the course of his press conference, which was designed to express his personal disappointment over what he considered the lack of knowledge of the Russian people concerning the extent of American contributions to Russia through the American Red Cross and Russian War Relief funds.

He realized that Moscow had publicized the extent of American aid, but felt it had been done in such a way that the people did not know whether it came under lend-lease or was a gift through the Red Cross or relief funds. He did not intend to imply that the Russian people were unaware of America's contribution to the Soviet war effort.

The report did not contain the exact text of his remarks. It was dispatched before the Ambassador received the inquiry from Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State, concerning what he had said.

There was no official disclosure or comment on the explanation today, but unless there are further developments that would change the attitude here, the disposition appeared to be to consider the incident closed. Mr. Welles canceled his press conference with the explanation that he had no further comment to make for the time being on the matter. President Roosevelt maintained silence on the incident.

It was pointed out in diplomatic circles in support of Admiral Standley's explanation that he had previously reported that Pravda, the official Soviet newspaper, on Jan. 23 published a statement by Edward R. Stettinius Jr., Lend-Lease Administrator, summarizing American and British aid to Russia. Consequently, it was accepted as beyond dispute that Admiral Standley was aware that Moscow had publicized lend-lease aid to the people.

Confidence was expressed by diplomats that good relations would continue between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, there were still rumblings on Capitol Hill.

Representative George H. Bender, Republican of Ohio, told the House that Ambassador Standley should be recalled because of his "irresponsible" statements, and called for a Congressional investigation of the State Department.

This is a clipping from page ____ of the New York Times for

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

To Begin With:

Russia Faces Europe

The Standley incident has served to point up how sensitive our relations with Russia continue to be. The whole mood is an uneasy one. I am certain that even with the new proof the Nazis have given during the past week that they are by no means beaten in Russia, the question is still being raised whether the Russians will stop at their borders and leave the rest of the fighting to us.

Those who feel this way base their view chiefly on two items. One is a book, recently published in an English translation, by a Soviet professor, Eugene Tarle. It is called *Napoleon's Invasion of Russia,* 1812. One of the points Tarle makes is that Czar Alexander was wrong in continuing to fight Napoleon after the Russian armies had driven him from their borders, and that this merely played into English hands.

The trouble with stressing the Tarle thesis as being Stalin's present view is that the book appeared in Russia before the outbreak of the war and that much has happened since, both to Stalin and the Russian people. The crucial thing then is to examine Stalin's own recent statements and the Russian actions.

After the North African landings, Stalin issued a congratulatory statement. But when our armies seemed to have bogged down in North Africa, and our political policy as well, demands for a second front again began to crop up in the Russian papers. And then came the historic Order of the Day on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Red Army.

Two sentences out of a 2500-word statement by Stalin were seized upon here as most important. One was that the Red Army would "defend its native land against the German invader and drive him from the borders of our country." The second said that "in view of the absence of a second front in Europe, the Red Army alone is bearing the whole weight of the war."

The Stalin statement as a whole is an impressive document, well worth study. In it the note of exultation is mixed with a sober appraisal of the relative strength of Russian and enemy forces. There are three recurring themes:

¶ That "time is working against Fascist Germany," and that the Nazis are getting weaker while the Russians are growing stronger.

¶ That "while the enemy has suffered defeat," he is "not yet conquered."

¶ That "meanwhile, time will not wait," and the Russians must seize the occasion to destroy the enemy completely.

All this does not seem to describe a man who will be content merely to drive the German armies from the Russian borders. There are certain facts about Stalin's thinking that we must start with if we are to be realistic about him:

¶ He believes that the Nazi armies must be crushed before Russia can be secure: Hitler has shown him that.

¶ He knows Hitler's treachery in the past, and is unlikely to trust his promises in the future.

¶ He still fears the possibility of an ultimate alliance of German and Anglo-American strength against him after the negotiation of a compromise peace on our part. That possibility is doubtless what Vice President Wallace referred to when he warned against the groups in America who want to double-cross Russia.

Nothing is certain in an uncertain world. But it would seem fairly logical that if the Russians stop at their borders, it would play hash with all three of the facts above. If Stalin did not want the Nazi armies destroyed, why would he be asking for a second front all along? As long as Nazi power remains intact, how can Stalin feel safe about the fear of an anti-Soviet front that haunts him?

If this is true, how explain Stalin's emphasis on the lack of a second front and on the expulsion of the Nazis from Russian soil?

The answer must lie in Stalin's shrewd understanding of nationalist feeling. He not only appeals to the national pride and the liberating fury of the Russian people. He also, by emphasizing that his army is fighting for Russian soil, undermines the will to fight on the part of the enemy. And to the other nations of Europe, before whom he has been pictured as a great menace, he says in effect that he is not Hitler, that the Russians are not aggressive, and that Europe has nothing to fear from Russia.

What it all amounts to is that, in default of a line of action on our part to help build a genuine structure of European security on progressive principles, Stalin intends to seek Russian security in Europe itself. Russia naturally faces Europe. We have it in our power, by changing our State Department attitude toward the reactionary European governments, to persuade the Russians that we can build a structure of security together. But an America which appeases the Fascists, which is under the spell of reaction, which is swinging to a new isolationism, is not an America that will allay the suspicions that the Russian ruling groups all along have had of us.

Three courses of action are open to Stalin. One is to strike a new pact with the Germans after expelling them from Russia. I have tried to show why this is extremely improbable. The second is to act in co-operation with us. In that, so long as we pursue our Peyrouton-Franco policy, we are not giving him much encouragement. The third is to turn to Europe and build Russian security there.

The last is what he probably will do—unless we can convince him that he does not have to.—MAX LERNER

Note

This is a clipping from page 2 of the PM for March 11, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

BRITISH PRESS HAILS SPEECH BY WALLACE

U. S., Britain and Russia Called Keys to World Peace

LONDON, March 10 (AP)—Vice President Henry A. Wallace's proposal that a satisfactory understanding be reached by the Western democracies and Russia before the war ends received strong endorsement today from most of the influential sections of the press in Britain, which already has a twenty-year treaty of collaboration with Russia.

Nearly all the newspapers gave prominent display to Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles's statement that Ambassador William H. Standley's assertion that the Russian people are not being told the full story of American aid had been made without consultation with Washington.

Declining comment on Admiral Standley's assertion, Brendan Bracken, Minister of Information, told the House of Commons that "we have had the fullest possible cooperation from the Russian Government" and that the sales of a British weekly published in Russia to tell the Soviet people of Britain's war effort were increasing daily.

Note

In a historical analysis of British policy in Europe for the past three centuries, a correspondent in The Times of London asserted that "experience proves most emphatically that no Western power, however great, can safely act on the eastern flank of Germany except in genuine and close understanding with Russia." If lasting peace is to come to Europe, The Times correspondent concluded, there must bze, contrary to the experience of 1919 to 1939, a "truly close collaboration" among Russia, Britain and the United States.

In a one-and-a-half-column editorial endorsing this conclusion, The Times said: "* * * Security in Eastern Europe is unattainable unless it is buttressed by the military power of Russia. * * * The realization of security will depend on the joint and continuous vigilance of Britain and Russia."

The Times also declared that Russia after the war must enjoy the same right as her Allies to judge for herself "the conditions which she deems necessary for the security of her frontiers," including the presence of friendly governments in the "lands between her frontiers and those of Germany."

This is a clipping from page 3 of the New York Times for MAR. 11, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

British Press For Wallace's View on Russia

Influential Sections Back Appeal for Allied-Soviet Pact Before End of War

LONDON, March 10 (AP).—Vice-President Henry A. Wallace's proposal that satisfactory understanding be reached by the western democracies and Russia before the war ends received strong indorsement today from most of the influential sections of the press in Britain, which already has a twenty-year treaty of collaboration with the Soviet Union.

"The Times" devoted nearly three columns in its war-time edition of only ten pages to an exhaustive argument for "truly close collaboration" among Britain, Russia and the United States.

In an analysis of the British policy in Europe for the last three centuries, a correspondent in "The Times" asserted that "experience proves most emphatically that no western power, however great, can safely act on the eastern flank of Germany except in genuine and close understanding with Russia."

If lasting peace is to come to Europe, the unidentified correspondent concluded, there must be, contrary to the experience ofc 1919 to 1939, a "truly close collaboration" among Russia, Britain and the United States.

In a column-and-a-half editorial indorsing this conclusion, "The Times" said: . . . "Security in eastern Europe is unattainable unless it is buttressed by the military power of Russia. . . . Realization of security will depend on the joint and continuous vigilance of Britain and Russia."

British diplomacy, then, has two tasks, "The Times" continued. The first is "to develop a spirit of growing confidence in relations between Britain and Russia" and the second is "to interpret to the United States the common interest of Britain and Russia in European security and the means of attaining it."

In an oblique reference to Russia's insistence upon territorial adpustments in Poland and the Baltic states, "The Times" declared that Russia after the war must enjoy the same right as her allies to judge for herself "the conditions which she deems necessary for the security of her frontiers," including the presence of friendly governments in the "lands between her frontiers and those of Germany."

This is a clipping from page 2 of the New York Herald Tribune for March 11, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Standley Sees Molotov, Thinks Statement Was Misunderstood

Indicates He Meant That Soviet Papers Failed to Acknowledge Relief Materials Sent by Red Cross and Russian War Relief

By The United Press

MOSCOW, March 10—Admiral William H. Standley, Ambassador to Russia, conferred with Foreign Commissar Viacheslav M. Molotov this afternoon at the Kremlin, two days after his statement that American aid to Russia had not been sufficiently acknowledged. There was no immediate indication whether Admiral Standley sought to explain his complaint made at a press conference at the embassy. Having recently returned from a visit to Kuybyshev, he had awaited a conference with Molotov and, it was understood, with Premier Josef V. Stalin, even before his statement.

Admiral Standley seemed to feel that his remarks had been misunderstood. His view apparently was, first, that Russian newspaper dispatches on American aid were carried under foreign datelines and were not issued officially as statements by the Russian government and, second, that the Russian people had no way of knowing what part of the aid was coming from private donations, such as the Red Cross and the Russian War Relief, as differentiated from official lend-lease aid.

Admiral Standley's remarks, it now appeared, were intended to apply solely to the alleged failure of the Russian papers to acknowledge Red Cross and Russian War Relief materials.

"Izvestia" Quotes Stettinius

MOSCOW, March 10 (AP).—Two days after Admiral Standley's statement that the Russian people were not being properly informed of American lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union, "Izvestia," the government newspaper, printed today

(Continued on page 2, column 3)

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Herald Tribune for March 11, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

(Continued from page one)

an article supplied by the Russian official news agency, Tass, from New York and based on an article by Edward R. Stettinius jr., American Lend-Lease Administrator, in "The American Magazine."

The statement was carried under the headline: "Stettinius Statement on American Food Supplies," and represented by far the most inclusive light thrown here thus far on aid to the Soviet Union. "Izvestia" has a circulation of about 3,000,000. The article was not carried in "Pravda," organ of the Communist party, or in "Red Star," organ of the Red Army.

Ambassador Standley's statement has not been published, nor has a recent Stettinius statement concerning lend-lease trucks, jeeps, motorcycles, military tractors, rails and telephones sent to Russia.

Statement on Food Supplies

In the article printed in "Izvestia" Stettinius was quoted as writing that the great majority of food supplies shipped in 1942 consisted of pork, dairy products, fats and eggs.

[The Moscow radio broadcast Tuesday night a later statement made by Stettinus on Saturday listing planes, tanks, trucks and many other articles sent to Russia. The broadcast was recorded by Reuters and the Soviet Monitor at London. The statement was read slowly, the usual sign that provincial papers were expected to copy it.]

In the first half of 1942 the greater part of lend-lease supplies was shipped to England, the "Izvestia" dispatch said, but by last December the majority of such shipments were to Russia.

The last previous statement by Stettinius to appear in Soviet newspapers was published on March 5, under a New York date line of March 2. It said: "In connection with the discussion taking place in Congress about the prolongation of lend-lease aid. . . . Stettinius made a statement. . . .

"Touching on aid to the Soviet Union, Stettinius said the larger part of the armament which was used by the Red Army to hold back and then rebuff the Hitlerites was produced in Soviet Russia.

"Simultaneous with these events the United States and England began sending materials and armament which played their part, although not a large one, in inflicting blows upon the enemy.

More Aid Urged

"'Up until now,' said Stettinius, 'sufficient aid has not been shipped to the Soviet people. We must do literally everything in our power in order to increase the supplies.'"

Today's story, credited to "The American Magazine," after pointing out that the majority of lend-lease supplies were being sent to the Soviet Union by December, said "this policy will be continued during a period of time."

"During 1942," the story continued, "America exported 1,112,000,000 pounds of pork, in other words, 10 per cent of the whole American production in the same year; 815,000,000 pounds of dairy products have been exported, which formed 3.4 per cent of the whole American dairy production. All this amount of dairy products was shipped to the Soviet Union.

"Besides these totals, Stettinius wrote that 723,000,000 pounds of fats and vegetable oil, or 13.2 per cent of American production, were exported, and 450,000,000 dozens of eggs, or 10 per cent of American egg production, were exported to England and the Soviet Union.

"The United States also shipped 156,000,000 pounds of fish, 415,000,000 pounds of corn, 393,000,000 pounds of wheat, 51,000,000 cans of vegetables, 89,000,000 pounds of canned fruits and fruit juices. In general, the whole of the food supplies shipped by the United States was 6 per cent of its production."

British Reaction

LONDON, March 10 (AP).—Many British newspapers gave prominent display today to Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles's statement that Ambassador Standley's assertion in Moscow was made without consultation with Washington.

Declining comment on Ambassador Standley's assertion, Brendan Bracken, British Minister of Information, told the House of omCmons that "we have had the fullest possible co-operation from the Russian government" and that sales of a British weekly published in Russia to tell the Soviet people of Great Britain's war effort are increasing daily.

a clipping from
of the New York
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ht.

This Changing World

Capital Observers Predict Standley Outburst Will Make Him Most Popular Envoy in Moscow

By CONSTANTINE BROWN.

Washington political and diplomatic circles are speculating on whether Admiral William H. Standley will be recalled from his post as Ambassador to Russia as a result of his statement to the American reporters in Moscow charging the Soviet government failed to inform the Russian people on the extent of help given by the United States.

Constantine Brown.

While Ambassador Standley has been disavowed mildly by Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles, the general feeling is that he will remain at his post.

Old-school diplomats with well-cut clothes and custom-made shoes who speak softly and write lengthy reports in faultless English are not popular in Russia. They represent a past from which Russia has broken away.

Premier Stalin has little use, moreover, for "enthusiastic" ambassadors who fall over themselves in adulation for the government to which they are accredited, and he has been known, on occasion, to show a certain note of ill-disguised contempt for them.

Frank and plain talking, particularly to Russian high officials including Stalin himself, is appreciated provided that the business of calling a spade a spade is based on facts and not because the ambassador's own feelings have been ruffled.

Demonstrated in Past.

This has been demonstrated in the past.

Among other persons, President Roosevelt sent two special envoys to talk with Stalin—Wendell Willkie and Maj. Gen. Patrick Hurley.

Mr. Willkie was bubbling over with what he had seen in Russia in a few days. Stalin was pleasant to Willkie and was delighted when the former Republican presidential candidate criticized his own Government and some Army leaders for lack of initiative in opening up a second front.

Mr. Willkie, however, received nothing positive from Russia. His desire to see the Russian forces in action was complied with by his being sent to what may be called an "inactive front." Those who know the situation well say that Red Army inner circles call that front "distinguished visitors' front." It bordered the most inactive positions of the Nazis.

Gen. Hurley, on the other hand, is said to have spoken to Stalin as plainly as Stalin spoke to him and each time the Russian leader "threw a ball at him," Gen. Hurley caught it and threw it right back.

Occasionally, in the four-hour talk between the two, the "ball" hit Stalin hard. But, good humoredly, he took such a liking to Gen. Hurley that he broke all precedent by offering to let Gen. Hurley see the Russian armies in action.

As far as is known here, the former Secretary of War in the Hoover administration is the only foreigner who has ever lived for several weeks with the Russian armies which at that time were rolling the enemy back.

These facts are being recalled in Washington, not in a spirit of criticism for Mr. Willkie or exaggerated praise for Gen. Hurley, but merely as an example of diplomatic methods. These cannot be taught in any school of foreign service, but depend entirely on the temperament of the individual whom President Roosevelt sends as his representative.

Admiral Standley belongs to the school of blunt-talking men. During his stay in Washington a few months ago he praised the Red Army, but expressed regret that American officers who had been sent to Russia had never been given the opportunity to see the fighting at close quarters.

He also complained that the Embassy at Kuibyshev learned all about the situation on the battle fronts from official communiques which were seldom implemented by explanations from the general staff.

But he agreed that while the Russian armies had to retreat, it was understandable that they would not wish to have foreigners along on such retreats.

Admiral Standley, moreover, was among those who obstinately believed—chiefly by intuition—that the Nazis would never defeat the Russians and that the territory of the U. S. S. R. would be the tomb ofr Hitler's ambitions.

Since this was his deep conviction he gave his views not only to his own Government, but also to all those with whom he came in contact. His Monday outburst, which had an immediate effect on the Soviet government and resulted in a broadcast of news of American help, is likely to stand him in good stead and many observers predict that he will soon be the most popular envoy in Russia.

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geant Krivorot, Ukrainians. Each does his duty to his country selflessly; each has to his credit no small number of Hitlerites and no small quantity of enemy war materiel destroyed.

The best warship in the Soviet Baltic Fleet, a vessel that has made over 100 voyages and been awarded the Challenge Banner for its achievements, has among its crew Lazarenko, a Ukrainian; Romenko, a Byelorussian; Pavlov, a Chuvash; Fadeev, a Marii; Blacher, a Jew; Osiants, an Armenian. When the Georgian sailor, Javashvili, died a hero's death, the whole crew bowed their heads in sorrow over the glorious grave of their comrade and brother.

Istrafuil Mamedov, an Azerbaijanian awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, destroyed in battle 70 Hitlerite soldiers and officers, in the defense of the ancient Russian city of Novgorod. Tommy-gunner Siubayev, a Kirghiz fighter, killed over 20 Hitlerites in battle; having no more cartridges he flung himself upon the enemy and killed a German soldier with his own helmet in a hand-to-hand fight.

The Uzbek Rakhmanov damaged six German tanks with his anti-tank gun. The Armenian Red Army man Eranosian, sent on a mission behind the enemy lines, was attacked by five Hitlerites. He killed them all. When seven more came up, he flung a grenade, killing three, while the rest fled.

Now, when the Red Army is driving the enemy further westward, all the Soviet peoples will participate as one friendly, closely knit family in a great holiday of nations. They are all striving toward one goal: to destroy the enemy, to sweep him from the face of the Soviet earth, and to return to peaceful construction, to that great labor of building which in a quarter of a century has turned the multinational Soviet country into one family, all members of which have equal rights.

RED ARMY'S STRENGTH IS IN THE UNITY OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE

By Jacob Rykachev

The USSR is a multi-national State which includes 16 Union Republics and about 60 national groups. The opinion persists, and not without historic foundation, that these multi-nationalisms are a source of weakness in peacetime, and particularly so in wartime.

When the Hitlerites attacked the USSR, they counted on the disintegration of the unity of the peoples. But these plans and calculations met the fate of all the German calculations: they were refuted by reality. The new social-political principles upon which the Soviet State was built proved their firmness and strength during the difficulties and trials of the great war of liberation against the enemies of mankind and culture. Far from weakening in the face of mortal danger, the union of Soviet peoples grew stronger.

The Hitlerites, with characteristic nearsightedness and vulgarity in analogy, expected to foment national enmity among the Soviet peoples and to set them against one another as they set the Croats against the Serbs, the Slovaks against the Czechs, and the Flemish people against the Walloons in Europe.

But for a quarter of a century the Soviet Government's farsighted and upright policy has been founded upon the principles of equal rights and self-determination for all nations peopling the Soviet country. The 1917 Revolution did away with the historic injustice under which all non-Russian peoples suffered in the old Tsarist Empire. A hundred million Russians, first among equals, possessing a high national culture, stretched out the hand of brotherly aid to the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Armenians, Central Asians and the small nationalities of the North. In the course of a quarter of a century these nationalities and peoples have attained, on the basis of a new, progressive social order and under the aegis of the great Russian people, a high standard of cultured prosperity, have created a very highly developed industry and a mechanized agriculture, and built many schools and educational institutions.

Never in their entire history, which in many cases goes back a thousand years, have the Soviet peoples attained so high a level of national culture and general welfare. For example, in the Tadjik Republic industry showed a 26-fold increase during the first two Five-Year Plans; in the Georgian Soviet Republic, 12½-fold. Thousands of tractors and combines are working in the fields of the national republics, among nationalities who 25 years ago were almost entirely illiterate. High school education is now general under the compulsory education system, considerable numbers have university educations, and there are many scholars, scientists, writers, teachers, doctors and agronomists in their ranks.

Soviet citizens do not know the feeling of national hostility. From the earliest years, in family, school and public life, they are conscious of the equality of all nationalities, so that even the suggestion of national discrimination, or the concept of a higher and lower race, is alien to them. This in no way hinders the peoples of the USSR in acknowledging the leading cultural and historic role of the Russians.

One of the most striking proofs of the equality of the Soviet peoples is the fact that there is a special article in the Constitution of the USSR affirming that the equality of rights of all citizens, irrespective of nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, state, cultural and political life, is an indefeasible law.

That is why, when war broke out, when the Hitlerites, disregarding international treaties, attacked the frontiers of the Soviet country, all the Soviet peoples arose as one man in the defense of their mother country. Turkman, Uzbek, Georgian and Ukrainian felt no less pain and indignation over the enemy menace to Moscow or Leningrad than if the enemy had threatened their own homes. Russians, Byelorussians, Tatars, Bashkirs, Mordvinians and Jews fought for the Caucasus. Every patch of Soviet soil, no matter how distant from the Red Army men's birthplace, was infinitely dear: there was no sacrifice they were not ready to make to destroy and drive the enemy from the bounds of their native land.

The multi-national Red Army reflects on a smaller scale the multi-national Soviet country. Representatives of all these nations are fighting shoulder to shoulder against the despicable Hitlerite invaders. Among Red Army men and commanders who have received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union there are representatives of over 20 nationalities: Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Jews, Georgians, Armenians, Tatars, Turkmen, Azerbaijanians, Latvians, Estonians, Finns, Uzbeks, and others. Men of more than 60 nationalities have been awarded medals and orders for bravery.

The unit of Hero of the Soviet Union Shishly, a tankist, is comprised of the following nationalities: the commander, Captain Kazpov, is a Russian; Lieutenant Abultalinov, a Tatar; Lieutenant Malyshev, a Mordvinian; Junior Sergeant Storozhev and Ser-

MARCH 16, 1943

Intimate Message: Washington 9

Behind Ambassador Standley's Little Furore.....By R. D.

Why has Ambassador William H. Standley's careful indiscretion created such a stir? His Stalinesque bluntness in suggesting that Moscow would do well to let the Russian people know a little more about the aid they are getting from the United States is not going to do any harm. The Kremlin is not exercised other than to broadcast Mr. Stettinius' latest lend-lease report, and most members of Congress appear to be more annoyed at the United States Ambassador than at the Russian Premier.

But it is apparent that the headlines which Admiral Standley evoked do not exaggerate the public interest which has been aroused. The reason, as viewed in Washington at least, is that the Ambassador's honest impatience is not significant as an incident but as a barometer—a barometer of the importance of American-Soviet relations.

Thus, when Ambassador Standley raises only a minor aspect of American-Soviet co-operation, it produces a strong reaction because the United States—and the British—Governments genuinely recognize the urgency of preserving the basis for continuing and cordial relations between Moscow and themselves.

This is a healthy reaction. It evidences both a popular and an official awareness of what may prove to be a central problem of the future peace. It was this problem which Vice-President Wallace had in mind when he said earlier this week that "the future well-being of the world depends upon the extent to which Marxianism, as it is being progressively modified in Russia, and democracy, as we are adapting it to 20th Century conditions, can live together in peace."

Other Relations With Russia

There are, frankly, two major concerns which do bother Washington and London even if they don't appear to bother Moscow as yet. They are: (1) How secure is American-British-Soviet military collaboration; will it be shaken by either bold and subtle appeasement overtures from Hitler, will it continue to the unconditional surrender of the enemy? and (2) what are the prospects and what are the difficulties of postwar American-British-Soviet political collaboration; can Marxianism and democracy work together for the common peace and is there a genuine will that they should?

These are the real questions which American military and diplomatic officials are weighing and Ambassador Standley's amiable tempest in a headline reflects not any real worry over whether Lend-Lease gets more publicity in the Russian press but a deep concern over the wider range of Soviet co-operation.

The answer to the first concern—whether Britain and the United States and the U. S. S. R. will fight the war together to the end—is definite and altogether heartening. Despite the background of prewar suspicion between the three countries and despite the continued refusal of the Soviet Union to permit Allied observers first-hand insight into the actual fighting, the highest military and political authorities in Washington, who are in the best position to know the facts and to judge the prospects, are confident that the Red Army is in the war to the finish.

They have no doubt that Joseph Stalin will fully honor the British-Soviet treaty and the Declaration of Washington in which the three countries guarantee to make no separate peace with the enemy. They feel that Mr. Stalin will never consider an "appeased" Germany as a safe neighbor. They believe that the Russian people would never accept anything but the complete defeat of the invading Nazis. Their judgment is that there is no weak link on either side in the chain of American-British-Soviet military collaboration.

Unresolved Problems

There are, however, unresolved problems in the field of American-British-Soviet collaboration. And it is about time that they should come a little more clearly into the open. They are not only unresolved problems; they are thus far almost unapproached problems, at least there has been nothing like a frank exchange between Washington, London and Moscow.

A basic difficulty is that the Soviet Union shows every sign of being intent upon maintaining historic interest in the affairs of the Baltic States and holding to territorial claims affecting Poland and Bessarabia. It will certainly be a hard job for the United Nations to interpret the Atlantic Charter principle of no territorial aggrandizement in two different ways at once. Russia will ask: if the United States needs new defenses on its Pacific frontier doesn't the Soviet Union need new defenses along its western frontier?

The immediate shortcoming is that these problems are not being confronted and they are not growing smaller by being allowed to lie dormant. They thrive on inattention and that is what they have been getting, largely, it should be said, because Moscow has not yet moved to co-ordinate its postwar policies with those of the other United Nations. It takes two to make an agreement as well as to make a quarrel and, while there has been little quarreling, there has been no agreement.

The reasons Britain, the United States, and Russia are in this war together are the same reasons why they will need to be in the peace together if, as Vice-President Wallace said, the world is to avert World War III. At a time when the Soviet Union seems so coy about postwar intentions and when the United States is obviously uncertain, it is well that a first step at least is soon to be taken toward opening United Nations political discussions in Washington.

This is a clipping from page 9 of the Christian Science Monitor for March 11, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Russia's Problem

Vice President Wallace will have done a service if he encourages people to think through the issues which must be solved as the condition precedent of a just and durable peace. But his Monday effort to put the problem of Russia in plain terms left something to be desired. The trouble lay in Mr. Wallace's terminology.

Stalin's Russia was made to appear as the embodiment of Marxism, or anticapitalism. In point of fact, there is very little left of Marxism beyond lip service in Soviet practice. The dictatorship of the proletariat has been transformed into the dictatorship of one man, Josef Stalin. His word is law throughout the whole of the vast Russian domain. So permeated are the Russian people with Stalin that virtually every Russian—certainly every Russian in contact with foreigners—is an extension of the Stalin personality. That is to say, the Russians not only mold their conduct on Stalin; they actually adopt his words as the subject matter of their everyday conversation. Marxism is not even used as a guide in economic Russia. In place of being rewarded on the basis of need, Russians are paid on the basis of skill, piecework being the rule in modern Russia. Wendell L. Willkie on his return from Russia spoke of men working side by side at a bench who received such unequal wages that one man might earn twice as much as his neighbor. The disparity between the white-collar class and the workers is even more marked than the disparities within the worker class. An engineer could earn ten times as much as the most highly skilled workman. In no country, in other words, are the capitalist virtues of skill, enterprise, and incentive rewarded more than in Russia. So that while we agree that an understanding with Russia is fundamental to a just and durable peace, the bases of agreement have little to do with our accommodation of the nonexistent Marxism of Stalin's Russia.

What we do have to accommodate in the peace are the new nationalist aspirations of the Kremlin which are now expressed in Pan-Slavism. Nowhere in the Wallace speech is there any recognition of this difficulty. Yet if the American people were polled, we have no doubt that they would see the problem in these terms.

On the one hand, they are told—and, if Governor Stassen is any guide, are convinced—that we can win the peace only by setting up a world organization. On the other, they see evidence in the Kremlin of a sharpened and expanded nationalism. It is expressed in claims which already have been put out informally for territories in the Baltic and the Balkans. Is this evidence of a new imperialism to take the place of the old? Is the demand limited only to the territories having predominantly Slav populations? Is it only an effort to surround Russia with such a safety belt that never again will there be any danger of an invasion of Russia? These are the questions that arise from the peace aims which already seem to have been staked out in the mind of the man in the Kremlin. They have nothing to do with economic terminology.

It would be foolish to suppose that the problem is insoluble. For the problem has its roots in Russia's lack of faith in other nations. There can be no doubt that, as Mr. Wallace said, many of the "Marxian" activities of the last 10 years have been inspired by fear of Germany, though he might have added of the other great powers as well.

What Stalin thus requires is and always has been security. It was a quest for security that made him the most ardent advocate at Genova of collective security. Mr. Litvinoff in his behalf pleaded time after time for recognition of the concept that peace is one and indivisible. If it were broken anywhere, the problem was the concern of all nations. This was the theory of the League of Nations. But Russia saw in one case after another that the theory was more honored in the breach than the observance. Then came the pact with the Nazi aggressor at Munich. When that event occurred—accompanied as it was by the undisguised hope in many high quarters that Germany would liquidate its war spirit at the expense of Russia—the Kremlin had reason to feel double-crossed. Stalin had to revise his foreign policy overnight. Since collective security was dead, he had to make sure of his own security, and nothing else accounts for the march to the Baltic. War with Finland was part of his "proventive encirclement strategy." Russia was making use of what we in America in those days called "a safety belt" against the aggressors. We sought to keep the belligerents outside a new 300-mile limit off our shoreline; Russia did precisely the same thing.

Mr. Wallace did not mention this history. But in the light of it, his warning against a "double cross" of Russia is equipped with a background, though probably he had in mind our repudiation of the League of Nations. Our problem is so to act that Russia can feel security within the framework of a new world organization. Otherwise she will collect her own security. After all, self-collection of security is precisely the course commended to this country by many Americans—that we should collect our own security in the form of bases in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. The suggestion as to the Pacific bases is offered repeatedly, for example, by Secretary Knox. Never is the suggestion tied up to any mandate by some world organization. Let us think how these ideas sound when they are heard in Moscow, and then Pan-Slavism won't seem so surprising.

It is obvious that if this war ends with nothing but a scramble for territory to shore up national security, World War III is inevitable. Security can never be insured by such means. If we grab one base, we shall have to grab another base in order to insure the security of the first, and so on. Thus Pan-Americanism and Pan-Slavism would follow Pan-Germanism in insuring only a new world cataclysm. Either the United States or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics must set such an example of a belief in collective security as will be a convincing demonstration to the other. That is the problem stated in much plainer terms than the Vice President used.

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PAGE 10, 1943.

Standley's Provocation

AMBASSADOR STANDLEY'S statements in Moscow came as a shock to the peoples of America and all the United Nations. They are shocked that a high American official charged with the most responsible diplomatic post abroad should make such irresponsible and disruptive assertions against the Soviet Government, people and their matchless Red Army, which single-handed are smashing Hitler's hordes and paving the way for victory over our common enemy—Nazism-fascism. All patriotic Americans will be ashamed at the disgusting lack of modesty shown by Standley in berating our Soviet ally for not appreciating to his satisfaction our Lend-Lease aid when we have yet to begin to do our share in fighting in the decisive theatre of the war in Europe against Hitler Germany.

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According to Sumner Welles, Ambassador Standley talked without prior consultation with the American government. The declaration of the Under-Secretary of State, obviously speaking for the administration, in which he underscored the need for strengthening mutual understanding among the Allies, is a welcome clarification. For Standley's provocative utterances, dangerous as they are in themselves, would take on a different and more ominous meaning if he had represented the position of our government. The Welles statement makes it clear that Standley is not a spokesman of administration policy, just as it implicitly rejects the false and slanderous allegations made by Standley to the effect that the Soviet leaders have withheld information from the Soviet people regarding the extent of American Lend-Lease aid.

Irrespective of Standley's motivations, it is clear that he has voiced the anti-Soviet and defeatist views of un-American groups in this country who aim to subvert our nation's policy of coalition and friendship with the Soviet Union; who aim to obstruct the opening of the second front which is the key to victory over Hitler's Axis.

ADDITIONAL INDEXING

The Ambassador's remarks are also extremely disquieting because they provide one more illustration of the ambiguity of American foreign policy. The ambiguity of our policy, under which an important Ambassador feels free to make disruptive statements in the capital of our great ally, does harm not only to the Soviet people and all the United Nations but, above all, to the American people. It endangers victory and our participation in jointly fighting for victory over Hitler and the Axis and thus imperils our national security.

At the core of Standley's remarks is a complete misrepresentation of the nature of coalition warfare, and concretely of our coalition with the Soviet Union and Britain and of the role of our Lend-Lease aid. According to him, it would appear that our function is to supply war material to the Soviet Union, while it is the duty of the Russians to continue to do the fighting and dying.

By his remarks, the Ambassador infers that the United States is not committed to actual fighting on the main theatre of war in Europe. He dismisses the policy of common fighting action of the United Nations through the opening of a second front in Europe, to which our nation is committed.

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This is a clipping from page 8 of the Daily Worker for 3-10-43

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

55 MAY 24 1943

and for which we are preparing, even though too slowly.

He casts doubt upon our national policy when he states that he is not sure what the Russians would consider a second front.

No one can plead ignorance on this question and get away with it. Stalin gave a very clear definition in his speech of last November when he said a second front which is really a second front would draw from the Soviet front at least 60 German and 20 satellite divisions, or one-third of the enemy strength directed against the Soviet Union. To the present moment, British and American troops are engaging no more than 2 per cent of the Axis forces in the whole European-Mediterranean area.

Obviously the admiral likewise is not sure what his countrymen would consider a second front. He rejects or opposes the decisions of the Casablanca conference to speed an Anglo-American invasion of Europe. He ignores the demand of American labor to attack Hitler in Western Europe now, in unison with the epic Soviet offensive.

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THE Ambassador directed his remarks quite pointedly to the American Congress, which is now considering the extension of Lend-Lease. At the very moment when Hamilton Fish was raising the question of stopping aid to Britain, Standley, in effect, appealed to Congress to discontinue Soviet aid.

No matter what the purpose of his remarks, there can be no question but that they encourage all the appeasement, anti-war and anti-administration forces. Standley has rendered aid and comfort to those who seek to break up the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition and to delay or prevent entirely the fulfillment of the Casablanca plans for the invasion of Europe.

Clearly, Ambassador Standley does not represent the views of the American people and the policies of our government.

Standley's conduct emphasizes the urgent need for the people, especially labor, to be fully on guard and constantly on the alert. They must more completely unify their effort and sharpen the struggle against all forces which seek to disrupt American-Soviet friendship, which try to break up the anti-Hitler coalition and which attempt to prevent our country from bearing its full share of the war against our common enemy.

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American patriots! Working men and women! All enemies of fascism!

Now is the time to speak out, now is the time to act.

It is time to call a halt to all anti-Soviet incitements and intrigues. It is necessary to strengthen the fighting alliance of the United States and our Soviet ally. It is necessary to strengthen the anti-fascist unity of our nation and of all the United Nations.

It is urgent to make the will of the people felt in Washington and to let Congress know that the American people demand the immediate renewal and extension of Lend-Lease.

Above all it is imperative to secure the opening of the second front in Europe now! For this is the way to utilize the new opportunities created by the mighty offensive of the Red Army for real coalition warfare which can destroy Hitler and the Hitlerites in 1943!

Allied 'Misinterpretation'

By RALPH PARKER

Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, March 9—William H. Standley's strictures on Russian domestic policy concerning the press reveal a tendency to misinterpret the Soviet attitude toward the Allies—the persistence of which is likely to lead to future misunderstandings. A clue to the misinterpretation may be found in the American Admiral's belief that the United States Congress is "big hearted and generous." Be that as it may, that is not the Soviet attitude about the motives actuating Allied aid to Russia, whether governmental or individual, and it is too much to expect the Soviet Government to express gratitude for Allied acts which, it is firmly believed here, are in Allied interests.

The Russians take the cold, logical view that the war has a plan and that capitalist Britain and America have reached a fundamental viewpoint that Socialist Russia's victory is essential to an Axis defeat and their cause's triumph.

In its twenty-five years of history the Soviet Union has shown how tenaciously its leaders stick to their plans, whether it has been industrialization, a gradual raising of the living standard, the building of an army or avoidance of being jockeyed into a position in which the country would be faced by a military coalition of capitalist powers. The average Russian holds in mind an outline of the plan, in fulfillment of which he is frequently told what his job is. One of the reasons that the Soviet people have accepted hardship, sacrifice, heavy loss and bad news so calmly is because they have seen a blueprint of the war's future in fairly precise outlines.

From time to time the leaders enable them to fill in a little more to make the outlines sharper and thus make plainer the people's role.

The most important development of the war plan last year was the growing confidence between the Allies, to which Premier Joseph Stalin referred in November, and his valuation of the North African operations as an important step forward toward the Axis defeat. It is not unnatural that the Russians believe the Allies were also conducting their part in the war according to a plan more or less clearly envisaged by all their citizens and that provision of maximum supplies to the major fighting front, which is in Russia, was seen as primarily a strategic matter.

Self-Interest Is Alleged

Sentiment, generosity and big-heartedness, according to the Soviet view, plays no part in the drawing up and fulfillment of the plans to earmark and ship supplies to the Red Army. The losses sustained by convoys and the bravery of crews are part of the day-to-day risks and conduct of the war. Even personal contributions to the Red Cross fund is seen as essentially motivated by a feeling that, in aiding Russia, the Allies are aiding themselves.

The broad Russian masses have a shrewd idea as to the part played in supply problems by the Allied sources of materials, though this they have gained by personal observation rather than in reading the Soviet press or listening to the radio. They know that Allied supplies are reaching the Soviet Union with difficulty and are part of the mutual planning done by Foreign Commissar Vyacheslaff Molotoff in London and Washington, as referred to in the Commissar's speech last June, and it is important to remember that major pronouncements by Soviet leaders are remembered for long.

But the people also know that the great bulk of war materials supplied to the Red Army is work of their own hands, built out of their own resources. If the Soviet government were now to give wider publicity to Allied supplies they would be likely to run into danger of creating a mood in the country that the food, planes, tanks, boots and other supplies sent here were being substituted for active and speedy intervention on the European continent, and the Soviet government should receive credit for not creating such a mood.

Any one who moves in Russian circles could categorically state that Admiral Standley's criticism that the Soviet Government is seeking to mislead its own people on the question of Allied supplies is ill-founded. American food is sold in American wrappers so strikingly different in design from the Russian that everything delivered here from the United States is spotted at once.

To this writer's knowledge there has been no attempt to conceal the American origin of any drugs, X-ray units or other medical supplies used in hospitals.

Fundamentally the situation is this. The Russians believe that the Allies, willingly and for their own interests, committed themselves to two courses of action—distribution of supplies to fronts where those supplies are most effective and the use of trained manpower against the enemy at the moment of most effective impact.

This is a clipping from page 5 of the New York Times, for MAR. 10, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

SOVIET BROADCASTS REPORT ON U. S. AID

Puts Stettinius Statement on Air for Domestic Press—'Misinterpretation' Seen

By The Associated Press.

LONDON, March 9—An official American account of aid to Russia was broadcast by the Soviet domestic radio tonight—just a full day after United States Ambassador William H. Standley had complained in Moscow that the Russian people were not being told the full story of help provided by lend-lease.

The Russian broadcast of the most recent statement from Washington by Lend-Lease Administrator Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. was reported by both the Soviet monitor here and the British news agency, Reuter. The broadcast recited Mr. Stettinius's statement of last Saturday in which he listed the planes, tanks and trucks sent to Russia and Britain under lend-lease, and enumerating the amounts of many other articles as well.

Thus the Kremlin apparently

Continued on Page Five

SOVIET BROADCASTS REPORT ON U. S. AID

Continued From Page One

acted swiftly to meet the admiral's complaint. The broadcast was made not only directly to the Russian people, but was likewise given at dictation speed—a usual indication that it was to be printed in the provincial press.

The Stettinius statement said the United States had sent more than 3,200 tanks and nearly 2,600 airplanes to Russia as of Jan. 1, and huge amounts of other supplies, including 81,000 trucks, jeeps and other military vehicles. He also detailed the amounts of such articles as boots, field telephones and other equipment for war.

No Mention in Soviet Press

MOSCOW, March 9 (UP)—Russian newspapers made no mention today of the complaint by Admiral William H. Standley, American Ambassador, that Russia had not sufficiently acknowledged United States aid. It is their custom not to comment on such statements made at foreign ambassadorial press conferences.

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Times for MAR. 10, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Willkie Assails 'Ill-Considered' Views on Russia

Replying to Standley and Wallace, He Says No One in U.S. Fears Double-Cross

In reply to statements made on Monday by Vice-President Henry A. Wallace and by Admiral William H. Standley, American Ambassador to Russia, Wendell L. Willkie asserted yesterday that he did not believe that "any one in America wants to double-cross Russia now or in the future" and that he thinks the Russians are well aware of war aid being sent to them by the United States.

Although he did not mention Mr. Wallace or Admiral Standley by name, his reference to their remarks was unmistakable; he labeled both statements as not wise and not correct, adding: "Drastic and ill-considered statements are not the basis for the sort of discussion we need, for such statements can only do harm."

Admiral Standley, at a press conference in Moscow on Monday, said that news of American war aid was being kept from the Russian people to give an impression that Russia was fighting entirely alone.

And Mr. Wallace, speaking at Delaware, Ohio, said that unless Russia and the Western democracies reach a "satisfactory understanding," seeds of an inevitable World War No. 3 would be planted. As a possible cause of another war he listed an American "double-cross" of Russia.

The portion of Mr. Willkie's statement which dealt with Admiral Standley's remarks was concurred in yesterday by Edward C. Carter, president of Russian War Relief, Inc., of 11 East Thirty-fifth Street, which has sent thousands of packages of goods to Russia.

Mr. Carter said that many of the agency's gifts to Russia have been acknowledged by notes written by Russian soldiers and people, that the Soviet Embassy in Washington has consistently facilitated and encouraged the exchange of letters between American donors and Russian beneficiaries, and that many Soviet officials have thanked Russian War Relief for its contributions.

As further proof of his belief that Russians are apprised of the source of war aid, at least so far as aid from Russian War Relief is concerned, Mr. Carter exhibited a small cardboard tag which is affixed on every one of he packets sent to Russia.

In both Russian and English, the card carries the message, "To the brave people of the Soviet Union' from the people of the United States."

Text of Willkie Statement

The complete text of Mr. Willkie's statement follows:

"One government representative implies we may double-cross the Russians after the war is over. Another indicates that the Russian government is today playing us two ways. Neither statement in my judgment is wise or correct.

"Both the Russian government and its people feel that they are bearing the brunt of the war—and in number of casualties that is and has been true for a long time. We are sending supplies in increasing quantities as our present way of helping and perhaps we are entitled to more credit than we are receiving, but naturally the Russians, like any people, look upon the loss of lives of their own young men as more important than materials and supplies.

"The Russians have long thought that we owed the duty to relieve them from pressure by presently opening a second European front. They have likewise thought it the best military strategy for the United Nations to do so. Our military authorities have thought otherwise. Only history will decide which is correct.

"Certainly no final verdict can be arrived at with censored information and propaganda, through which each government seeks to convince its people of the wisdom of its course. But in the mean time, tolerance in understanding Russia's viewpoint and rational statements about America's attitude toward the Russians after the war will help. Drastic and ill-considered statements are not the basis for the sort of discussion we need, for such statements can only do harm.

"I know no one in America who wants to double-cross Russia now or in the future. I likewise know no Russian who is ignorant of the fact that we are helpin. her with materials and by our fighting on other fronts."

Soviet Urgings Recalled

Behind the strain which the Wallace and Standley statements put on the White House and the State Department lie many months of what seems to the public to be possibly less than ideal relations between America and Britain and their powerful Nazi-killing ally—Russia.

Three times in the last six months Premier Josef V. Stalin has indicated publicly that he thought Britain and America should get busy and open a second front in Europe.

On Oct. 4, in a letter to The Associated Press, Stalin said a second front held a high place in Soviet estimates of the war set-up, and that Allied aid to Russia had so far been little effective compared with the help Russia was giving the Allies.

Then, on Nov. 6, in an address to the Moscow Soviet, Stalin asserted the absence of a second front enabled the Germans to hurl their powerful 1942 summer offensive at the Red Army.

He said that sooner or later there would be a second front, and he implied that the sooner the better.

On Feb. 23, evidently feeling the North African offensive did not meet the need, Stalin said in an order of the day that "in view of the absence of a second front in Europe, the Red Army alone is bearing the whole weight of the war."

This is a clipping from page 2 of the New York Times for March 10, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

A. P. Correspondent Says Russia Reports Allied Aid in Own Way

By Henry C. Cassidy

Chief of Associated Press Bureau in Moscow, now in United States on leave.

The Soviet government has its own way of letting its people know about Allied aid—not through anything it says itself, but through what other Allied leaders say.

Admiral William H. Standley, American Ambassador, who was quoted from Moscow yesterday as telling a press conference he "failed to find any real acknowledgment" of American assistance in the Soviet press, evidently referred to lack of statements of appreciation by Rusisan leaders.

None has been made publicly by any prominent Soviet statesman. But the press has published frequent references from abroad to Allied supplies—references made available to millions of Russian readers.

Factors in Reticence

Russian reluctance to comment on the flow of Allied material dates back to the original supply conference in Moscow in September, 1941. An American delegate told me he was surprised by the casual way in which the Soviet authorities accepted offers of American and British aid.

This attitude is attributed by Moscow observers to three factors:

1. The Soviet Union does not wish its allies to take a big-brotherly air in sending supplies to Russia.

2. The main desire of the Soviet Union is to see the United States and Great Britain open a second land front in Europe.

3. Actual Allied deliveries to the Soviet Union apparently have not reached original estimates, because of losses en route and other factors.

I have heard responsible Russians comment that our assistance, in supplies alone, was roughly equal only to that given by Hungary to Germany, and that the Allied material on hand corresponded only to the output of Saratov, a single Soviet industrial city on the Volga.

But figures given by Edward R. Stettinius jr., lend-lease administrator, in Washington last Jan. 20, estimating that the United States and Great Britain had consigned 5,800 tanks and 4,600 planes to Russia, were published Jan. 23 in "Pravda," Communist party organ and most important Soviet newspaper.

Statements Printed

From Moscow newspapers in my possession I find that a speech made in New York Nov. 19 by W. Averell Harriman appeared in the Soviet press Nov. 24, saying: "Food has been taken from the slim British diet to send to the Russian people. . . . More is on the way."

President Roosevelt's Columbus Day Speech Oct. 12 was given top display in the foreign news pages of the same newspapers Oct. 14, with his mention of men of the merchant marine bringing war material and provisions to the defenders of Stalingrad and other United Nations forces.

Other speeches by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, with references to Allied aid to the Soviet Union, have appeared periodically in the newspapers of Moscow and other Soviet cities.

The Soviet authorities have taken another way of acknowledging Allied assistance. They have escorted foreign correspondents on trips to see American and British tanks and planes. On other visits to the front they have pointed out American trucks and jeeps, and even such less conspicuous equipment as field telephones.

The stories of these trips were written for foreign newspapers, and did not appear in the Soviet press, but the men who drove the tanks, filey the planes and talked over the telephones told the correspondents freely that they liked the equipment and wanted more.

As for the food which is being sent, the Moscow bureau of The Associated Press received a message, at the time when American lard was first put on sale publicly in exchange for meat ration tickets. It was from an eighty-year-old woman who said: "An old Russian hopes you will thank your Americans for the nice lard they are sending us."

The Soviet government has not been talking much about Allied aid, but the Russian people, to all appearances, know about it and appreciate it.

This is a clipping from page 3 of the New York Herald Tribune for March 10, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Stettinius Story Of U. S. Aid Put On Soviet Radio

Report Is Broadcast in Full for Domestic Use; Reply to Standley Charge Seen

LONDON, March 9 (AP).—The Russian radio broadcast in full tonight the most recent statement by lend-lease Administrator Edward R. Stettinius jr., on aid to both Russia and Britain, a Reuters report said.

The reading on the domestic Russian radio followed only twenty-four hours the objection voiced by Admiral William H. Standley, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, that the Russian people were not being told the full extent of lend-lease aid to Russia.

The broadcast recited Mr. Stettinius's statement of last Saturday in which he listed the planes, tanks and trucks sent to Russia and Britain under lend-lease, and enumerating the amounts of many other articles as well.

Thus the Kremlin apparently acted swiftly to meet the admiral's complaint. The broadcast was made not directly to the Russian people, but was likewise given at dictation speed—a usual indication that it was to be printed in the provincial press.

Mr. Stettinius in his statement last Saturday said the United States had sent more than 3,200 tanks and almost 2,600 airplanes to Russia as of Jan. 1, and huge amounts of other supplies including 81,000 trucks, jeeps and other military vehicles. He also detailed the amounts of such articles as boots ,field telephones and other equipment for war.

Admiral Standley declared at a press conference in Moscow yesterday that "I have carefully looked for an admission in the Russian press that they receive material aid from America, yet I have failed to find any real acknowledgment of it . . .

"I find no political motive to this. It is only an effort to create the impression with their own people that they are pulling themselves through by their own bootstraps," the American ambassador said.

But he declared this situation was unfair to the "plain American people who are digging down in their own pockets" for the funds to make and send lend-lease supplies.

He also warned that a new lend-lease bill now is pending before the American Congress, a Congress that "is big-hearted and generous. But if you give it the impression that its help means nothing there might be a different story."

This is a clipping from page 3 of the New York Herald Tribune for March 10, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Soviet-Jap Fishing Treaty Held Test of Stalin's Attitude

By the Associated Press.

CHICAGO, March 10.—Josef Stalin's friendship with the United States will be tested within the next 30 days when the Kamchatka fishing treaty between Russia and Japan must be decided, in the opinion of the Rev. Bernard R. Hubbard, the "Glacier Priest."

In an address before the Geographic Society of Chicago last night Father Hubbard, author and explorer and for many years head of the geology department of the University of Santa Clara (Calif.), asserted that although each year the treaty expires on December 31, "they haggle over it until March and early in April it usually is signed.

"The Japs heretofore have needed the $10,000,000 in fish they get off Kamchatka Peninsula, but this year they have all the food they need in conquered territory. But they can use the weather stations there to watch over the Aleutian Islands.

"If Stalin signs that treaty again it is a sure sign that he wants a strong Japan and a weak United States and China in the Pacific."

Praising Ambassador William H. Standley's statement in Moscow that the Russian people were not completely informed of American lease-lend aid, Father Hubbard declared:

"Now while our manpower is mobilized and our production is at its peak is the time to clarify our relations with Russia and find out definitely whether Stalin is a friend or foe.

"It makes you want a clarification of relations when you know that Russian submarine officers, while fraternizing with our naval officers, enthusiastically respond to every toast for victory on the Russian front, but refuse to drink to the defeat of Japan."

He asserted that Stalin could save "thousands of brave lives by giving us safer bases in Siberia. If Stalin insists on a second front he can open one in Siberia."

Father Hubbard, now on leave of absence from Santa Clara, for many years led explorations into Alaska for scientific studies.

WASH. STAR MARCH 10, 1943 p. 4

RUSSIA AND HER ALLIES

The difficulties of waging a coalition war have again been brought into sharp relief by the statements of Vice President Wallace and Ambassador Standley throwing the spotlight of publicity on one of the fundamental problems facing the United Nations—namely, the relations between Russia and her allies. For some reason Mr. Wallace thought it advisable to warn against "double-crossing" Russia at a time when American and British aid is being sent to Russia on an unprecedented scale. Admiral Standley's objection was that the Russian people are not being adequately informed of this extensive aid and are thus left under the impression that they are fighting—and winning—the war alone. His declaration was obviously a reply to the equally blunt statement of Marshal Stalin on Red Army Day that "in view of the absence of a second front in Europe the Red Army alone is bearing the whole weight of the war." But Russia has now broadcast Mr. Stettinius's lend-lease report giving details of American supplies shipped to Russia and Britain. This may clarify the situation.

It must be said, however, that if such controversies were to continue they might speedily create a dangerous situation which could only play into the hands of Hitler. It is inevitable that a world-wide combination such as the United Nations should represent many specific interests and points of view, and it is likewise inevitable that there should arise differences of opinion among them. But all such differences can be for the moment of only secondary importance, because the United Nations are being held together by one inseparable bond: they are engaged in a common life and death struggle against a common and still dangerous enemy bent on their annihilation. To forget this would be suicide.

Nobody knows that better than the Nazis themselves. They are doing their best and worst to split the United Nations in order to finish them off as in the past—one by one. It is, therefore, imperative that, whether it is acknowledged or not, our war materials and lend-lease aid should continue to be distributed as in the past, not according to political, but only according to the military requirements of a global strategy designed to hit the enemy where he is most vulnerable at the moment.

But once this common bond is recognized and heeded, there is no reason why the differences still existing between the United Nations should not be aired in mutual trust and confidence, so that a settlement might be reached before these differences are crystallized into fixed state policies from which retreat is difficult. The best way to do this is by a direct exchange of views among the governments concerned, rather than by the present method of long-distance debate.

This is a clipping from page 18 of the New York Times for Mar. 10, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

SOVIET ALOOFNESS TO WEST EXAMINED

Russia Is Seen as Determined Not to Abandon Her 'Self-Imposed Isolationism'

CLARIFICATION HELD NEED

Eden and Benes Suggested as Best-Fitted Emissaries to Achieve Rapprochement

By PERTINAX

North American Newspaper Alliance.

Russia's inclination to keep aloof from the rest of the United Nations has for many months been a patent fact. Conte di Cavour, the great Italian statesman of the nineteenth century, used to exclaim when the French Emperor Napoleon III showed some reluctance to comply with his requests: "Italia fara da sè [Italy will act on her own]." Not very different is today the motto of the Kremlin. From day to day, a good deal of evidence accumulates in support of that interpretation of Soviet policy, part of it still concealed from the public.

In diplomatic circles there is a belief that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill did not remain passve n Casablanca when confronted wth Premier Stalin's refusal to join them in Khartoum. An effort was made to arrange for a conference to take place in March. But the suggestion does not appear to have made any impression on Mr. Stalin.

Another incident points to the sovereign determination of the Russian régime not to break away from its self-imposed isolationism. Last Summer convoys on their way to Murmansk from the west, had to pay a very high price to the German air force. The lack of an efficient air patrol was singled out by the experts in London as the main cause of the havoc. Thereupon, the British came forward with a proposal to station aircraft of their own on Russian soil. A short time ago, after all preparations had been completed, objections were raised in Moscow against the permanent presence of British pilots and ground crews. The project was given up. It must be added that the above information is not confirmed on the Russian side, but elsewhere its authenticity s not doubted.

Contrasts in Attitudes

The Russian attitude of detachment is commonly accounted for by the long-standing grievance concerning the "second front." Yet last December satisfaction was officially expressed from Moscow about the incipient success of the American-British campaign in North Africa, and even the Darlan episode did not seem to have caused any resentment or bitterness in the Soviet capital.

To understand Russian feelings at the present time one should perhaps refer to the Anglo-Russian negotiations of May, 1942. Then Foreign Commissar Vyacheslaff M. Molotoff engaged in lengthy discussions with Prime Minister Churchill in England. He earned for his country an advantage of considerable import: the treaty signed on May 26 to embody a twenty-year alliance. Russia received the promise of a large share of influence, by the side of Great Britain, in the reconstruction of Europe after the war.

Moreover, according to another article in the convention, she was not to be forced into a system of collective security (involving the cancellation of the alliance) until she had been in a position to judge for herself that the new patten of international organization proved effective. In short, the Russian Government got what had been denied to France in 1919 by David Lloyd George.

What, then, may be the cause of Russian discontent?

A territorial agreement was to be linked with the treaty as to the Baltic States and it had to be shelved or suspended to meet criticisms directed from the outside against the separate procedure that had been used in the occasion. But we must also remember that Mr. Stalin and his friends parted with Britain and France in the late Spring of 1939 because those two powers had not seen their way to fall in with Russian views on the same subject.

Atlantic Charter Plays Role

Obviously, some apprehension is felt at the Kremlin lest the United Nations should some day interpret the Atlantic Charter in opposition to Russian claims. Russia cannot be expected, on the basis of her heroic resistance to the Germans, to put up with her narrow frontiers of 1918-1939.

The two statesmen best qualified to straighten out political relations between the western world and Russia and to attune them to the military cooperation that cannot be dispensed with by any one aligned against Germany are Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and President Eduard Benes of Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Eden stayed in Moscow in 1935 and at the end of 1941, and his Russian hosts are supposed to think well of him. It has already been announced that Mr. Benes intends to visit in turn Washington and Moscow, or vice versa. He has always excelled in the part of a diplomatic go-between. He is very representative of the devotion of the Czechs to the great Slav empire. More than anybody else, he may be relied upon to find the key to an all-around understanding.

This is a clipping from page 4 of the New York Times for MAR. 10, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

WILLKIE CRITICIZES WALLACE, STANDLEY

He Says Their Statements on Our Relations With Russia 'Can Do Only Harm'

URGES RATIONAL ATTITUDE

Republican Deplores Talk of Doublecross by U. S. or Soviet's Playing Us 2 Ways

Statements on United States relations with Russia such as those recently made by Vice President Henry A. Wallace and Admiral William H. Standley, our Ambassador to Moscow, "can do only harm," Wendell L. Willkie said yesterday in asking for an appreciation of Russia's viewpoint and rational statements of American post-war attitudes toward the Soviet Government.

Referring specifically to Mr. Wallace's suggestion in a speech at Ohio Wesleyan University that there may be American attempt to "double cross" Russia at the end of this conflict and to Admiral Standley's statement in Moscow that the Russian people were not allowed to know of American help reaching them, Mr. Willkie said, without mentioning either by name:

"One government representative implies that we may double-cross the Russians after the war is over. Another indicates that the Russian Government is today playing us two ways. Neither statement in my judgment is wise or correct.

Bothe the Russian Government and its people feel that they are bearing the brunt of the war—and in number of casualties that is and has been true for a long time. We are sending supplies in increasing quantities as our present way of helping and perhaps we are entitled to more credit than we are receiving. But naturally the Russians, like any people, look upon the loss of lives of their own young men as more important than materials and supplies.

"The Russians have long thought that we owed the duty to relieve them from pressure by presently opening a second European front. They have likewise thought it the best military strategy for the United Nations to do so. Our military authorities have thought otherwise. Only history will decide which is correct.

"Certainly no final verdict can be arrived at with censored information and propaganda, through which each government seeks to convince its people of the wisdom of its course. But in the meantime, tolerance in understanding Russia's viewpoint and rational statements about America's attitude toward the Russians after the war will help. Drastic and ill-considered statements are not the basis for the sort of discussion we need, for such statements can only do harm.

"I know no one in America who wants to double-cross Russia now or in the future. I likewise know no Russian who is ignorant of the fact that we are helping her with materials and by our fighting on other fronts."

This is a clipping from page 5 of the New York Times for MAR. 10, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Standley's Position

Ambassador's Prodding of Russia, Some Think, May Have Good Effect

By ARTHUR KROCK

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES. 5

WASHINGTON, March 9—Among persons experienced in the ways of statecraft and politics it is taken for granted that the Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, consulted the White House before announcing today that Admiral William H. Standley, the United States Ambassador to Soviet Russia, spoke yesterday without previous conference with or reference to this government.

This being the extreme probability, the Admiral's criticism of certain Russian Government policies toward the United States must stand for the time being as merely his personal decision to say what he thought should be said and take the consequences.

These consequences may be beneficial to Russian-American relations; at least some officials here today said they thought so, and accordingly they do not believe the Ambassador will be recalled.

This opinion is founded on the premise that straight, realistic talk is appreciated by the Soviets and particularly by Mr. Stalin, who has a strong penchant for it himself, and that he would not find persona non grata an Ambassador who said bluntly that he thought the Russian people should be told more about United States assistance to them in their hour of need and that United States representatives should be told more about Russian military operations.

If Mr. Stalin should respond to the admiral's interview in this way and especially if the criticisms made should be satisfied by the Russian press and the Red Army, Mr. Welles's comment would doubtless end the incident in so far as disciplinary measures are concerned. But if our relations with our ally are shown to have been adversely affected because of Congressional resentment here or untoward developments in Moscow, informed opinion in Washington is that Admiral Standley will have to come home. This outcome is prophesied even if, after getting the Ambassador's official head as a sacrifice, Mr. Stalin should proceed to remedy the conditions of which Admiral Standley publicly complained.

No one was surprised at Admiral Standley's strong implication that the Russians were as reticent as ever in exchanging military information with the representatives of this country. When he was here recently he expressed dissatisfaction on that score several times and it was obvious he did not think the Russians had substantially relaxed their rule of military secrecy in the case of Wendell L. Willkie.

But there was some surprise at his statement that the Russian people were by official design kept unaware of the magnitude of the aid they and their armies were getting from the United States. Dispatches have carried detailed accounts of lend-lease reports in the controlled Soviet press. And it has been accepted here that the Russian Army must know, and through it the people generally, the national source of such items as 2,600 planes, 3,200 tanks, 72,500 trucks, and 3,000,000 pairs of boots—all plainly stamped as made in the United States. Mr. Stalin's Order of the Day on Feb. 23, including the statement that "in the absence of a second front in Europe the Red Army is bearing the whole weight of the war," was not generally interpreted here as part of a policy to suppress the fact of United States aid with food and materiel.

Admiral Standley is on the ground, however, and he should know whether such a deliberate policy exists and whether it has been successful. If he was in error, his recall on this ground alone would be expected.

Of one result of the interview there is little question. Coming on the same day, though fortuitously, that Vice President Wallace offered for discussion the possibility that we may "double-cross Russia," the implicit suggestion in the Admiral's remarks that Russia is double-crossing us angered Congress and certainly did not sweeten our present relations with the Soviet or the prospect of future dealings between the two allies.

But this may prove to have been the mischief done by his statement. And in the sum it may not be mischief at all. The same hope, to judge from what was being said on Capitol Hill today, may not yet be expressed about the speech made by Mr. Wallace.

This is a clipping from page 5 of the New York Times for Mar. 10, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Abroad

Long-Distance Line Between Washington and Moscow

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By ANNE O'HARE McCORMICK

Admiral Standley was not speaking according to the diplomatic book when he charged that the Russian people are kept in ignorance of American aid. He was not speaking quite accurately, for the Stettinius report on lend-lease was summarized in the Pravda of Jan. 23. If his pointed reference to the extension of the act carried a threat that Congress might discontinue help if Russia feels able to carry on "alone," it will have no effect on the pending legislation. The vote for the measure is expected to be unanimous, and this unquestioning support is the best possible proof that increased aid to Russia is highly popular. The legislators and the country are well aware that it is sent primarily in our own interests—not to win Russian appreciation but to win the war for all of us.

It hardly needed Under-Secretary Welles's sharp disclaimer to convince those who have followed Administration policy that the Ambassador spoke without the authority of the President or the State Department. Evidently he decided on his own, for reasons more apparent on the ground than they can be at this distance, to adopt Stalin's bluff technique and reply to "Soviet frankness" with a sample of American frankness. Yet he spoke to some effect, in language better understood in Moscow than Washington, for the Soviet Government immediately broadcast the full text of the latest Stettinius report of goods sent to Russia.

One can guess that his purpose was somewhat similar to Mr. Wallace's when the latter warned that we invite another war if we "double-cross" Russia. In this strange hint of unknown intrigues the Vice President was apparently seeking to dissipate a distrust of Russia actually little felt by the American people. The Ambassador may be disturbed by a more real feeling among the Russian people, officially fostered or not, that they are abandoned by their allies.

For Good Relations

The Soviet reaction is encouraging as a proof that Stalin is as concerned about good relations between Russia and the United States as we are. There can be no question that one of the prime aims of the President's war policy is to win and inspire confidence in the Soviet Government, or, more specifically, in the mind of Joseph Stalin, which is the headquarters of the Soviet Government. This is why Washington was sincerely perturbed by Admiral Standley's outburst.

Mr. Roosevelt was more urgent than any one in pushing for the second front; he stepped up the schedule for the North African expedition in order that we might get into action in the West before the end of 1942. In spite of last year's heavy losses in transit, he insisted on increasing the flow of lend-lease material to Russia until it became a substantial and constant factor, as it is today, in reinforcing the Red Army and supplying the civilian population.

Unlikely as it is that Stalin will ever leave the Soviet Union for a war council, the President did his best to induce the Soviet leader to go to Casablanca, or any other point designated by Stalin. Mr. Roosevelt has an unquenchable faith in the efficacy of face-to-face talks to iron out differences and resolve suspicions, and his desire for a personal conference with the Soviet chief was—and is—so strong that if another meeting place cannot be agreed upon it would not be surprising if the President should some day turn up at the Kremlin.

Certainly it is not the fault of the Administration that closer understandings are not reached between Washington and Moscow. Any realistic view of the world situation, as it is now, and as it promises to be when the war ends, underlines the capital importance of Russian-American agreement. Two great unanswered questions shadow the fact of victory: Is Russia willing to cooperate with the other winning powers in making and maintaining peace? Is the United States willing to cooperate? This country can bring up the Atlantic Charter when Stalin flies claims to the border states. And Stalin can retort: What assurances have I that you are going to stand by the Atlantic Charter?

Where Interest Lies

The response to Admiral Standley's complaint is one sign that Russia is not fixed in the idea that she is fighting her own war, for such gains and ends as she can win and maintain by her own power. For Stalin the rest of the world is blotted out by the sheer magnitude of the Russian struggle on one hand and by an ingrained habit of secrecy and suspicion on the other. It will take a lot of persuasion and plain speaking to convince him that we mean to work with Russia or that it is to Russia's advantage to work with us.

Material help and invasion of Europe will help because they will change the balance of forces at grips with Germany. But unless military moves are combined with positive guarantees of our purpose to cooperate in the post-war world, it will not convince the Soviet government that its interest in joining a general security system is greater than its interest in looking out for itself.

This is a clipping from page 18 of the New York Times for Mar. 10, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

STANDLEY COMMENT EXPLAINED BY HINDUS

Author Says It Was Result of 'Just Irritation'

Terming Admiral William H. Standley's Russian statement the result of a "just irritation," Maurice Hindus, author and correspondent, declared yesterday that the incident was "the fruit of a basic clash between the British and Americans and the Russians over the second front question."

Mr. Hindus, who spoke at the Books and Authors luncheon at the Hotel Astor under the auspices of The New York Herald Tribune and the American Booksellers Association, added that Admiral Standley probably was influenced by Stalin's failure in a recent speech to mention American aid to Russia.

"Stalin's emotional irritation over our failure to open a second front was probably responsible there," said Mr. Hindus. "Millions of Russian lives have been lost in the present campaign against Germany, and such a reaction is understandable, given the promise of a promised second front."

Speaking from recent experience in Russia, Mr. Hindus said that military men who used American machines or arms, and soldiers and civilians who ate American food, knew their point of origin. He emphasized, however, that unless a more direct method of informing the whole Russian public were used in the future, only a fraction of the Russian people would know about American aid.

Louis Bromfield, author of "Mrs. Parkington," and John Hersey, author of "Into the Valley," were other speakers. Mrs. Irita Van Doren, chairman of the luncheon, announced that Mr. Hersey's book, an account of the Marines on Guadalcanal, has been the second book chosen by the Council of Books in Wartime as "imperative" reading for the general public.

This is a clipping from page 17 of the New York Times for Mar. 10, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Standley May Quit, Repudiated by State Dept.

Envoy's Slur on Russia Brings Protests In Congress

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By I. F. Stone
PM's Bureau

WASHINGTON, Mar. 10. — Informed circles here today expect William H. Standley to resign as Ambassador to the Soviet Union or else be recalled within the next few days.

Ambassador Standley's charge at Moscow that the Russian government was keeping the facts of Lend-Lease from its people was disowned by Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles yesterday and disproved by Congressional leaders.

No ambassador in many years, if ever, has been so severely criticized and so flatly repudiated by his own government. The effect was to turn the Ambassador's sour comments on an ally into the occasion for a demonstration of U. S. friendship for the Soviet Union by conservatives as well as progressives of both parties in Congress.

Permits Quotation

Undersecretary Welles did not wait to be asked about Standley's statement at the State Dept.'s regular noon press conference yesterday. He opened the conference by making it clear that the Ambassador had spoken without the approval or prior knowledge of his own Government and Welles later took the usual step of permitting correspondents to quote his words directly.

This is what Welles said:

"I have cabled Ambassador Standley asking him to let us have the text of what remarks he may have made. I have not yet received a reply and for that reason, until I have received a reply from the Ambassador, I am not going to comment in any detail on what was said or alleged to have been said.

"I think I should make it clear, however, that whatever was said was without prior consultation with or reference to this Government. The understanding which exists between the United Nations in this great enterprise in which they are joined for the purpose of defeating utterly the Axis tyrannies, and for the purpose of insuring the security and liberties of the peoples of the United Nations, would not be worth very much if it were not based upon complete trust and understanding among all of them.

Believes Trust Exists

"I believe that the understanding and trust exists and I am perfectly confident that anything that Ambassador Standley may have said could not have been intended to and did not cast any doubt on that trust and understanding. For the time being I am going to limit myself to that brief statement."

Earlier in the day, at the White House, Presidential Secretary Stephen T. Early made it clear that the Ambassador had spoken without prior consultation with the President.

In Congress, the chairmen of both Senate and House Foreign Affairs Committees took the floor to criticize Ambassador Standley and to express their regret over his outburst. Sen. Tom Connally and Rep. Sol Bloom rose to declare that Standley was wrong on his facts when he said that the Russian people were not being told about our aid to them.

Even Ham Fish rose to declare that the Standley statement would not affect Lend-Lease, because "we want to supply them as long as they'll keep on fighting." Fish said, however, that he was not surprised by the Standley statement, because he "never thought for a moment that the Communists had changed their principles or views."

Minority Leader Charles McNary of the Senate also was one of those who expressed the opinion that the Standley statement would not be allowed to interfere with Lend-Lease.

The one ugly note was struck by Sen. Burton K. Wheeler, one of the earliest to comment. Wheeler, when reached by Cissie Patterson's *Times-Herald*, said he was not surprised "that it is being kept from the Russian people that we are giving them tremendous help. That is the policy of the ruling class in Russia, as it always has been the policy of the Communist leaders to point out to the Russian people everything that is bad about the United States and to keep from them everything that is good about us."

Standley's Moscow interview was regarded here as an attempt to encourage the appeasement-isolationist bloc in Congress to oppose or restrict further aid to the Soviets. It was observed in Congressional circles that it had just the opposite effect.

This is a clipping from page 4 of the PM for March 10, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

This Changing World

Standley's Charges on Aid to Russia Believed To Be Answer in Kind to Stalin's Plain Talk

By CONSTANTINE BROWN.

Admiral William Standley's declaration to the press Monday to the effect that the Soviet government has never offically recognized the tremendous support given by the United States need not be interpreted, according to well-informed Washington quarters, as an indication that this is the beginning of a serious rift among members of the United Nations.

Constantine Brown.

The American Ambassador to Russia has spoken frankly, on his own initiative, in the same manner Premier Joseph Stalin has spoken on many other occasions. The Soviet leader has never minced his words and has expressed dissatisfaction with the attitude of the American and British governments whenever he thought the situation justified criticism.

Stalin has stated his views publicly in speeches or statements. On some occasions he has used the press by making statements to representatives of American agencies in Russia and he also has been even more brutally frank in private conversations with British and American high officials who have visited him at the Kremlin.

Hence, since a characteristic of democracies is frank talk and open diplomacy, the American Ambassador has thought it advisable to speak plainly to the American people and tell them that the Russian people would be really our lifelong friends if they only knew of our great effort to help them and were told of the tremendous cost of this help in lives and materials.

A realization by the Russians of the extreme effort made by this country unquestionably would create a greater friendship and a closer collaboration in the postwar period. Such a collaboration might prove even more important after the war is over than now.

So long as their government leads the Russian people to believe that they alone have had to bear the brunt of the war without anything more than warm applause and cheering words from their associates, their feeling toward the United States is bound to be lukewarm or even resentful.

Whether the Russian people, whose news is restricted by a stringent censorship, will ever learn what the American Ambassador has said publicly is, however, another matter. It all depends on whether the Soviet government will permit Admiral Standley's declaration to become known to the masses.

For the sake of our future friendship with Russia it is essential that we shall speak as bluntly to the Moscow government as Moscow is talking to us.

For the time being, while we are fighting the same enemy in Europe, there is little interchange of information between the United Nations in the west and their ally in the east. With the exception of Maj. Gen. Patrick Hurley, who went to Russia as President Roosevelt's personal representative and who managed by talking bluntly to Premier Stalin to obtain permission to visit the Russian battle front, no other American or British officer ever has been granted such a privilege.

Soviet representatives in this country on occasion have been unjustifiably careful in the reception of lease-lend goods.

For instance, there was the case of large quantities of butter being sent to Russia by way of the Pacific. A quantity packed in cartons was turned down by the Russian expediter because some of the cartons had been crushed in transit. The American Government had to repack the damaged packages at a cost of $16,000 to the American taxpayer although there was nothing wrong with the butter and any American dealer would have been glad to accept it for sale to his customers.

There have been similar incidents which have never been mentioned because of a desire not to create any ideas in this country that the Russians are treating us roughly.

There was some resentment in Washington and London because Stalin in his message on the 25th anniversary of the Red Army did not mention that there are American and British forces in the west which have already relieved the pressure on the Russian armies by invading Africa and preparing an offensive in Western Europe.

But nothing was said because there was no desire to increase the difficulties between the Kremlin and Washington governments.

WASH. STAR MARCH 19, 1943 p. 9

To Begin With:

The Standley Blunder

The diplomatic story of this war continues to present a mixture of the tragic and the farcical. Another American ambassador made a speech the other day—this time not Hayes at Barcelona, but Standley at Moscow.

And what a contrast between the twol Accredited to a Fascist "neutral" government, which never has concealed its hostility to us, Ambassador Hayes had only sickening words of praise. Accredited to an allied government which has borne the brunt of the task of killing Nazis and has bled profusely in the process, Ambassador Standley had only ungenerous words. We honey up the enemy and we insult an ally. Try to make some sense out of it.

The problem of American-Russian relations is complex enough without the sort of contribution that Standley has made to it. His speech—with its implication that the Russian government is ungrateful for American aid, that for reasons of its own it has kept the news of that aid from its people, and that Congress might punish this ingratitude by withdrawing further aid—is one of the crassest blunders that any American diplomat has publicly committed.

Blunders of diplomats can be as costly as blunders of generals. Sumner Wells, as Acting Secretary of State, did the only thing possible and did it handsomely and soundly when he repudiated Standley's statement. But in American-Russian relations there is a residue of harm that already has been done.

For not only was Standley's an ungenerous statement. It also was factually inaccurate. PM's dispatches from Washington today leave no doubt of that. (*For the latest dispatches, see Page 4.*):

¶ The fact is that Russian papers *have* carried the story of American Lend-Lease aid.

¶ The fact is that Russia has carried the major part of the war against the Nazis; and that, as Lend-Lease Administrator Stettinius several times publicly has stated, the overwhelming proportion of Russian war material has come from Russian and not American factories.

¶ The fact is that what we have sent Russia has been but a small fraction of our total war production.

¶ The fact is that while what we have sent has been substantial, our aid started late; that much of it was sunk in transit and never reached the Russians; and that much of it also did not match the quality of our best output.

It is fruitless to guess where Ambassador Standley got his facts and views: whether he thought them up out of his own head, or whether they express the attitude of a group of American officials with whom he had talked things over when he last was in Washington. The Welles statement now makes it clear that Standley was not expressing the State Dept. view. But Standley's words must have come out of a climate of opinion that is not restricted to the air that only he breathes.

What that climate is can be illustrated best by two editorials commenting on Stalin's recent Order of the Day to the Red Army. One, from the Chicago *Tribune*, said that we must for the present support Russia "just as an army of grizzly bears or cobras should be supported if they could do the same work." The other, from the New York *Times*, has more dignity, but goes even farther in making its point. "Stalin has made plain," the *Times* wrote, "first, that Russia is fighting its own war for its own aims, and, second, that so far as present needs are concerned, Russia now can take care of itself."

One might ask some whimsical questions. If the Russians are cobras, why exact gratitude from them? If we are not going to send the Russians any further aid, on the ground that they can take care of themselves, then again why exact gratitude from them?

But if the Standley statement was meant, either by the Ambassador or others, to exploit the fear and distrust of Russia which are latent in American opinion, it probably will prove a boomerang.

It has been good to note from the reactions of our Congressional leaders (*See I. F. Stone's story on Page 4*) that our Congressmen have some real acumen on foreign affairs, and can detect a whopping blunder when someone else makes it. It also has been heartening to have Sumner Welles disown Standley's statement with a clarity and directness that does something to retrieve the reputation of the State Dept.

But a rebuke is not enough. Incalculable harm already has been done and more must be prevented. It does not require a prophet to see that Standley's usefulness in his post is at an end. We cannot afford to keep in Moscow someone who is either deliberately anti-Soviet or who—at the best calculation—is an irresponsible dupe for more mischievous people.

Ambassador Standley must be recalled.

—MAX LERNER

This is the third of a series of editorials on American-Russian relations, now and in the post war world. The fourth will appear tomorrow.

This is a clipping from page 2 of the PM for March 10, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Standley Spoke on His Own, Says Welles, Avoiding Stand

By BERTRAM D. HULEN

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, March 9—The complaint of Admiral William H. Standley, American Ambassador to Russia, against the alleged concealment from the Russian people of United States war aid to the Soviet Union, was said by Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State, at his press conference today, to have been "without prior consultation or reference to this government."

This assertion did not go so far as a repudiation of what the Admiral had said, for Mr. Welles announced that he had cabled the Ambassador for the text of his remarks and before saying anything further he would await the reply from the envoy.

Mr. Welles, however, took occasion to bespeak complete trust and understanding among the United Nations and expressed confidence that Admiral Standley did not intend to cast any doubt on that trust and understanding.

Connally, Bloom Comment

The admiral's charges, however, raised a furore on Capitol Hill, where Senator Tom Connally, Democrat of Texas, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and Representative Sol Bloom, Democrat, of New York, chairman of the companion committee in the House, took the floor to deplore the Ambassador's reported utterances as unfortunate and to take issue with them.

No comment was available from President Roosevelt, who did not hold his regular Tuesday afternoon press conference. In the House, where the renewal of lend-lease legislation is under debate, it did not appear this early that the

Continued on Page Five

Continued From Page One

course of that bill through Congress would be affected.

Whether the charges may affect the future diplomatic career of Admiral Standley was a question that could not be answered by officials before his official report has been received.

Although it would be exceptional for the press conference, words of Admiral Standley to be cut off by the Russian censor, the fact that they were permitted to be cabled here was taken by some diplomats as possibly indicating that the Soviet Government intended to do something about the matter, whatever that might be.

Pravda Summary Cited

In the meantime, the State Department and members of Congress pointed out that Pravda, the official Soviet newspaper, on Jan. 23, published a statement by E. R. Stettinius Jr., Lend-Lease Administrator, summarizing American and British aid to Russia.

When Mr. Welles entered the press conference room this noon he smiled and remarked that he knew what the correspondents desired to ask him. Without more ado, he made a statement, as follows:

"I have cabled Ambassador Standley asking him to let me have the text of what remarks he may have made. I have not yet received a reply, and for that reason, until I have received a reply from the Ambassador, I am not going to comment in any detail on what was said, or alleged to have been said.

"I think I should make it clear, however, that whatever was said in this reported press conference was said without prior consultation with or reference to this government.

"The understanding which exists between the United Nations in this great enterprise in which they are joined for the purpose of defeating utterly the Axis tyrannies and for the purpose of insuring the security and the liberties of the peoples of the United Nations would not be worth very much if it was not based upon complete trust and understanding between all of them.

"I believe that that understanding and trust exists, and I am perfectly confident that anything that Ambassador Standley may have said could not have been intended to and did not cast any doubt on that trust and understanding.

"For the time being, I am going to limit myself to that brief statement."

Mr. Welles declined to comment on the speech of Vice President Wallace in Delaware, Ohio, urging a "satisfactory understanding" between Russia and the Western democracies and expressing the hope that we would not "double cross" Russia.

Bloom Issues a Statement

Senator Connally and Representative Bloom spoke along the same lines in the Senate and House. Mr. Bloom said he spoke on the basis of information received from the State Department. Mr. Bloom said in a prepared statement:

"The Russian press has told the people of Russia something about the lend-lease aid supplies to Russia by the United Kingdom and the United States. Thus, for example, THE NEW YORK TIMES, on Jan. 24, 1943, reported that Pravda, one of the leading newspapers of the Soviet Union, contained a news item about the planes, tanks, motor vehicles, etc., supplied to the Soviet by the British and ourselves.

"The people of Russia, seeing and using a great multitude of United States and British lend-lease supplies, must of necessity know of the lend-lease aid which has been supplied to Russia. The Russian papers generally print in full the speeches of the President and of Prime Minister Churchill. Many of these speeches refer to the lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union.

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Times for MAR. 10, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

"There can be little doubt that in many different ways the soldiers and people of the Soviet Union know a good deal about the lend-lease supplies which have been made available to them."

"Unfortunate," Connally Says

Senator Connally considered "it most unfortunate that there should be any incident to provoke friction between United Nations." He expressed the hope that no unfavorable reaction would result from any remarks, however ill-advised they might be, on the part of the Ambassador.

"It does not lie within me," he said, "to criticize the ineptness of our Ambassador to Russia. I cannot understand why he should make such a statement as he did without having had some information about the matter. But the information which has come to me—not in a great volume—convinces me that the Russian people and the Russian Government do know of the aid which the United States is undertaking to get to Russia.

"I trust that no unfavorable reactions may result from the incident provoked by the remarks of Admiral Standley in Moscow. I know that they came as a shock and a surprise to those who are in authority here in the United States.

"Whatever Admiral Standley may have said, and even though the Russians may not have given to our aid the publicity which we might feel was due it—that is a matter for the internal administration of the Russian people and their government."

Other Members Comment

Other comment by members of Congress, both on and off the floor, follows:

Senator Burton K. Wheeler, Democrat, of Montana: "I don't know the purpose but I don't doubt that what he said was correct and true. Stalin is a realist. He is for Russia first, last and all the time, and for Russia alone. He is not for the four freedoms. We should be honest with the American people. A lot of foolish statements are being put out that we are going to reform the world."

Senator Alexander Wiley, Republican, of Wisconsin: "All this fuss and feathers is just a tempest in a teapot. Stalin appreciates what the United States has done for Russia. Stalin knows that we have split the German Air Force. We must recognize now that there is not going to be any selling short by any one. We must paddle together or the boat will go down."

Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Republican, of Michigan: "The record provides no indication of any doublecross on our part against any one. I am amazed at Admiral Standley's remarks. It is equally amazing for the Vice President to suggest that America is even capable of doublecrossing Russia or any one else for that matter."

Representative James W. Wadsworth, Reupblican, of New York: "I don't think I'll add any fuel to the flame."

Representative Hamilton Fish, Republican, of New York: "Stalin is surrounded by the same group that went into power with him and their goal is the spreading of communism. They don't propose to give us any credit for anything. They have made no post-war commitments. Standley's statement won't affect extension of lend-lease. We'll vote for it because we want to supply them as long as they'll keep on fighting."

Representative Luther A. Johnson, Democrat, of Texas: "I think the Admiral probably got his facts mixed up a bit. I think it is unwise when we are engaged in war to make faces at our allies."

Representative Charles A. Eaton, Democrat, of New Jersey: "Admiral Standley considered it his duty for reasons which must have been strong in his mind to make this statement. If he is right, it is a rather serious situation.

More Convoys Reach Russia

Secretary of Navy Frank Knox at his press conference said more convoys had been getting through to Russia lately "and with less loss." This, however, may be "only temporary," he said, emphasizing the "ups and downs" of submarine warfare.

The Atlantic situation remains somewhat improved, he said, with the rate of United Nations losses still continuing somewhat lower than it was at the peak of the U-boat campaign. Germany, although she is believed to have a number of new submarines in reserve, does not appear to have thrown them into the Battle of the Atlantic as yet, he indicated.

Aims to Increase Aid

WASHINGTON, March 9 (UP)—Most of the Congressional talking today on Ambassador William H. Standley's charges was done on the Senate floor, where Chairman Tom Connally of the Foreign Relations Committee said:

"We shall not hesitate to go ahead with renewal of the lend-lease program. We shall not hesitate to supply arms, munitions and food to our Russian ally. I pray to God we may be able to increase the volume of arms, munitions and foods that we can send to her while she holds our common enemy until such a time as we can occupy the enemy's other flank."

This is a clipping from page _____ of the New York Times for

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Welles Disowns Standley Rebuke to Reds

U. S. Envoy Is Assailed by Willkie, Connally and Bloom for Moscow Talk

But Some Believe It Was All Planned

Think Standley-Wallace Utterances Aim to Get New Deal From Russia

By Bert Andrews

WASHINGTON, March 9.—Admiral William H. Standley's criticism of what he termed Russia's failure to tell its people the full story of American lend-lease aid was formally disowned today by the State Department and was forcefully denounced in the Senate and House of Representatives.

The remarks made yesterday by the American Ambassador to Russia at a press conference in Moscow drew castigation from Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State; Senator Tom Connally, Democrat, of Texas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Representative Sol Bloom, Democrat, of New York, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Willkie Joins in Protest

Wendell L. Willkie also assailed Admiral Standley in a statement in which he similarly attacked Vice-President Henry A. Wallace for a speech yesterday in which Mr. Wallace emphasized the need for "a close and trusting understanding" between the United States and Russia if the danger of a third world war is to be averted.

"One government representative implies we may double-cross the Russians after the war is over," Mr. Willkie said. "Another indicates that the Russian government is today playing us two ways. Neither statement in my judgment is wise or correct."

The statement by Mr. Welles drew top attention because of his position in the State Department. He said he wanted to make one thing clear—"that whatever was said in this reported press conference (by Admiral Standley) was said without prior consultation with, or reference to, this government." Mr. Welles said he was going to limit himself to the brief statement, pending arrival of a report from Admiral Standley, who has been asked to send the text of his remarks to the State Department.

Linked to Wallace Speech

Despite all the official disavowals, there were indications beneath the surface that the American Ambassador's frank statements marked the beginning of a drive by the United States to get from Russia a definitive working agreement for the present and post-war periods.

This interpretation was strongly bolstered by the fact that Admiral Standley's assertions seemed timed to break with the address by Mr. Wallace. Most observers in the capital believed it extremely unlikely that both Admiral Standley and Mr. Wallace would have used

(Continued on page 2, column 5)

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the language they did without White House approval, and for that reason were inclined to take with a grain of salt the official disavowals made of Admiral Standley's statements.

The disposition in some informed quarters was to scoff at the suggestion that the Standley-Wallace comments would cause any rift in Soviet-American relations, and to contend, instead, that their publication now was designed to end a rift that has existed all along—a rift created by Russia's insistence on playing a lone hand in the war.

Natural Trend Indicated

Some correspondents, who have closely watched the changing attitudes manifested toward Russia by men high in military and civil positions, regarded the Standley-Wallace statements as natural results of the following chronological developments:

1. As long as lend-lease aid to Russia was just a trickle, Russia was held to be within her rights in refusing to take American or British military men into her confidence. 2. When American-British aid increased to huge proportions, Russia retained the same secrecy. 3. Some American military men have become increasingly critical of Russia's "refusal to tell us anything," while at the same time harping on her demands for a second front. 4. Some military and civil men now belive that American-British aid has reached a point where it makes "the differ-

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Herald Tribune for March 10, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

ence to Russit. 5. These men, aparently including Mr. Wallace and Admiral Standley, believe that now is the time to point out to Russia that the interests of the United Nations can best be served by an immediate and complete understanding on present and post-war problems.

Washington Reactions

This was the background against which Admiral Standley's Moscow comments were read by men who popped up with the following reactions:

Senator Connally: "I trust that no unfortunate reaction shall result from any remarks, however, ill-advised they may be, on the part of our ambassador. We shall not hesitate to go ahead with renewal of the lend-lease program. We shall not hesitate to supply arms, munitions and food to our Russian allies."

Representative Bloom: "The people of Russia, seeing and using a great multitude of United States and British lend-lease supplies, must of necessity know of the lend-lease aid which has been supplied to Russia."

At his press conference, Mr. Welles said he was confident Admiral Standley's remarks were not intended to and did not cast any doubt on the understanding and trust existing between all the United Nations.

Connally Assails Remarks

Senator Connally, speaking in the Senate, said he thought the Standley statement "a most unfortunate one." He noted that "Pravda" had carried news about lend-lease aid, and added:

"I think it is of interest to note that a recent story by Mr. Henry Cassidy, head of The Associated Press bureau in Moscow, clearly indicates that the people of Soviet Russia not only know of but appreciate the supplies which have been sent to them under lend-lease.

"I wish Senators to observe that up to March 1, 1943, the United States had sent 3,250,000 tons of lend-lease supplies to Russia. We have extended, in terms of dollars, $1,532,230,000 for arms, munitions and supplies. . . . .

"It is most unfortunate that any incident might be provoked at this time which would in any wise cause any friction or unpleasant reaction as between Russia and the United States. . . . I trust that no unfavorable reactions may result from the remarks of Admiral Standley. I know they came as a shock and a surprise to those who are in authority here in the United States."

Mr. Welles later lent emphasis to his remarks on Russia by releasing them textually. They follow:

"I have cabled Ambassador Standley asking him to let us have the text of what remarks he may have made. I have not yet received a reply and for that reason, until I have received a reply from the ambassador, I am not going to comment in any detail on what was said or alleged to have been said.

"I think I should make it clear, however, that whatever was said in this reported press conference was said without prior consultation with, or reference to, this government.

"The understanding which exists between the United Nations in this great enterprise in which they are joined for the purpose of defeating utterly the Axis tyrannies and for the purpose of insuring the security and liberties of the peoples of the United Nations would not be worth very much if it were not based upon complete trust and understanding between all of them.

"I believe that that understanding and trust exists, and I am perfectly confident that anything AAmbassador Standley may have said could not have been intended to, and did not, cast any doubt on that trust and understanding. For the time being I am going to limit myself to that brief statement."

Moscow Issued Report

In reply to other inquiries, the State Department confirmed that a public statement by Edward R. Stettinius jr., lend-lease administrator, summarizing American and British material aid to Russia had been printed by "Pravda" on Jan. 23. This publication was reported to the State Department by the with Ambassador Standley's embassy in Moscow, presumably with Ambassador Standley's knowledge.

In the wake of Admiral Standley's assertion that the Russian people were not being told the full story of American aid, reports were current in London that negotiations already were under way for talks among the United States, Britain and Russia for an understanding on post-war problems.

These quarters, according to The Associated Press, said they saw no major obstacles in the way of such an understanding, and pointed out that Britain already has a twenty-year treaty with the Soviet Union and is pledged to a program of post-war co-operation.

Concurrently, recent statements from American and British leaders on the extent to which help had been given ussia were recalled.

Captain Oliver Lyttleton, British Production Minister, told a meeting at Newcastle Feb. 21, celebrating Russia's Red Army anniversary, that the United States and Britain together had sent Russia nearly 6,200 tanks and 5,600 aircraft between October, 1941, and December, 1942. He said the United States had sent 3,200 tanks and about 2,600 planes, as well as most of a shipment of 85,000 trucks.

Other Supplies in Quantity

In addition, he declared, the British-American contribution to the Russian war front included 50,000 tons of rubber, 831,000 deadweight tons of machine tools, metals, ammunition and small arms, and 70,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. The tanks and planes, he said, were sufficient to equip thirty-two armored divisions and 400 aerial squadrons.

In Washington Sunday, Mr. Stettinius revealed that, in addition to planes and tanks, this country has sent Russia 3,000,000 pairs of heavy boots, 18,000 tons of sole leather, 17,500 jeeps and armored cars, 1,300 military tractors, 75,000 tons of rails and 17,000 tons of other railroad equipment, 140,000 field telephones, hundreds of thousands of miles of field telephone wire, 268,000 tons of petroleum products, 580,000 tons of steel, 135,000 tons of toluol and other chemicals and 161,000 tons of aluminum, copper, zinc and other metals.

from New York

of

Out of Hibernation

This war, so largely produced by isolationism, is destroying isolationism —particularly in the two greatest hermit countries, Russia and the United States. When Governor Stassen says American isolationism is on the way out he may overlook an expected peacetime reaction, but any reading of the headlines in the last few days must leave the distinct impression that Americans and Russians are gaining an awareness of their interdependence that will not soon be lost. Witness the regret with which Americans hear that Kharkov is threatened by a Nazi counterattack, and Moscow's prompt publication of lend-lease figures following Ambassador Standley's acid remarks.

The State Department's sharp repudiation of the blunt Admiral's statement does not remove the possibility that it was a calculated indiscretion, designed to let Moscow see how Russian claims to be carrying the whole burden of the war might look to somebody else. The Ambassador was not strictly accurate in saying that the Russians were being kept in ignorance of American help. Summaries of lend-lease aid have appeared in Pravda, but now Moscow is broadcasting the full story of the more than $1,000,000,000 worth of supplies from America and it will probably appear in the provincial press.

This is all to the good. It will be even better if Americans get a clearer understanding that those lend-lease materials are of more value to America when used by the Russians than if they had been kept at home. Lend-lease is not a sign of American big-heartedness or soft-headedness as much as of hard-headed recognition that the defense of Russia greatly aids the defense of America. Before Pearl Harbor that might have been hard to see, but today one need not be a statesman to see that Japanese forces tied up on the Russian border are not likely to invade Alaska and that Nazi divisions destroyed before Stalingrad cannot hit American troops in Tunisia.

In some respects Russia has been more isolationist than America. It is far larger and set somewhat out of the currents of world trade and culture. Communism has not made it a comfortable neighbor, while the Russians still remember that they were attacked only about twenty years ago by British, French and American forces—the latter acting in co-operation with the Japanese in Siberia.

Russians, like Americans, are conscious of their strength, and proud. In both cases this pride is strangely combined with a self-depreciating fear that they are not shrewd enough to deal with the world. Of course the fear and ignorance that make isolationism will be wiped out as surely as new methods of transport and communication spread trade and education.

Both Russia and America will benefit from greater efforts to appreciate the good in others, and that is particularly true about recognizing the value of the services contributed by each to the war's common cause. Especially in America is there need for understanding how much better the peace will be if Russia can be weaned from an isolationism which grows out of fear, makes for reliance on military power and creates fear in neighbors.

This is a clipping from page 14 of the Christian Science Monitor for March 10, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Standley Statement Delights Germans

Axis Propagandists Busy; Berlin Urges U. S.-Soviet Break

3. By Dillard Stokes
Post Staff Writer

The statements on Russia by Ambassador Standley, Vice President Wallace and Undersecretary of State Welles gave the Axis a propaganda field day all over Europe.

All day yesterday the enemy radio—in a dozen languages—made the most of the situations, with subtle distortions and malicious comments, which grew more bold as new statements came out.

By 4:30 p. m. Berlin was suggesting that the United States break off diplomatic relations with the Soviet.

The recordings of widely scattered listening posts and Morse code dispatches intercepted in South America showed that the enemy's handling of the Standley-Wallace-Welles declarations was a text book case of capitalization upon an apparent misunderstanding on the other side.

The Rome radio, in Italian, at 3 a. m., quoted Vice President Wallace as saying the United States should hold out its hand to help India and called this "equivalent to an open criticism of present conditions."

Wallace, the Berlin radio said in Dutch at 10 a. m., was at one and the same time proposing another Versailles treaty and promoting a third world war.

Berlin told North and South America at 9:15 that Ambassador Standley's statement "had caused astonishment in Washington." American observers were declared to see the interview as an attempt to force Washington to clarify its relations with the Soviet.

Three hours later, Rome said in French that there was a great stir in Washington, where the Standley statement was considered evidence of pressure. And half an hour later the Nazi-controlled Mondail station in Paris followed up with the comment that the Wallace speech proved "that nothing good, durable or positive can come out of this marriage of the carp and the rabbit—the Anglo-American and Soviet alliance."

About the same time, Rome said in French that Lisbon reported the Manchester Guardian had declared that "at the present time the anti-Russian feeling is a hundred times stronger in the United States than in England, and that is why Mr. Wallace made his speech."

Meanwhile, a Berlin all-Europe broadcast in German followed up the theme that Standley's remarks had caused a stir in the United States. Senator Nye (Republican), of North Dakota, was quoted as saying: "This news is extremely disturbing and distressing." Also quoted as unhappy over the situation discussed by Ambassador Standley were Senators Tydings and Connally.

The Rome radio picked up this line at 1:30 in a broadcast aimed at North America, which quoted Standley as having threatened the Russians with a shutting down of lend-lease aid. This propaganda suggested that "the misunderstandings between the Allies have suddenly become greater than ever have very nearly reached the breaking point."

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Wallace Speaks Out

By Ernest Lindley

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Russia And The Western Allies

OTHERS, including Wendell Willkie, had said previously what Vice President Wallace said Monday about future relations between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies. They must collaborate or another world war will become only too probable. Until now, the tendency in some official quarters has been to discourage open and frank discussion of this central problem, lest the result be to inspire greater mistrust and fear, and so weaken the grand alliance. The Axis radio exploits to the utmost every sign or admission that Russia and the Western Allies do not entirely trust each other. It probably will twist the Vice President's speech into a prediction of war between the United States and Russia within 10 years. For internal political reasons, also, some officials have hesitated to talk candidly about our relations with Russia, now and in the future.

LINDLEY

The Vice President has taken off the lid. He was not quite as blunt as Stalin sometimes is, but he did not pretend that our present understandings, and relationships with Russia form a solid base for confidence as to fruitful collaboration in the future.

We are fighting the war with Britain on a basis of mutual confidence. Our affairs have become interlocked at many points with those of Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and other parts of the British Empire. With Britain and the empire we not only have a solid structure of common understanding but it already contains a great deal of machinery for day-by-day collaboration. The machinery could be dismantled and the structure weakened after the war by short-sighted policies in London, Washington and the Dominions. But both the structure and the machinery inside it will already exist, and with sound management on all sides it should be possible to keep them in repair and expand them as conditions warrant.

OUR RELATIONS with Russia are still those between fortuitous Allies, of dissimilar languages, institutions and traditions. Russia's relations with all her Allies are handicapped further by the suspicions and fears which grew out of the Communist revolution, and the reaction of most of the rest of the world to it, and by the possibility of a revival of Russian imperialism of the traditional sort.

Mr. Wallace has underlined the first essentials of enduring collaboration between Russia and the principal Western Allies. Russia must not revert to its efforts to foment world revolution. The Western powers must not foment or encourage anti-Russian activities in Germany and other nations. This means, of course, that Russia must not arouse the fears of her neighbors and of more distant powers by imperialistic practices.

AS THE Vice President also rightly emphasizes, the principal western democracies need have no fear of old-line communism or any other revolutionary doctrine, including fascism, if they provide full employment and a rising standard of living.

If these first principles of policy are accepted by Britain, Russia and the United States, there is no reason why a foundation of mutual trust cannot be laid and the machinery for enduring collaboration contrived. Many problems will have to be worked out. Some may be difficult, but no more so than some of the collisions of interest between Britain and the United States which will be amicably adjusted unless, after the war, men completely lacking in common sense come into power in London or Washington. But there are no fundamental conflicts in interest between Russia as a nation and the United States, unless one or the other embarks on a policy of world-wide imperialism or domination menacing to the security of the other. As things stand now, the Russians have no territory or spheres of influence which we want, and we have none which, so far as we know, they want. The geographical claims made by the Russians raise difficult questions—and incidentally have created more mistrust of them than Nazi propaganda has been able to arouse since the war began—but so far they are limited and specific claims, which are not without historical and other justification.

Insofar as these justifications are military, their weight will depend upon the other military and political arrangements made by the victorious Allies, especially the Big Three who will have most of the military power in the years immediately following the defeat of Germany and Japan.

The Vice President has posed the alternatives and given his own answer—the only answer which holds the hope of achieving an enduring peace.

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Tempest In A Teapot

Ambassador Standley's charge that the Soviet authorities are withholding from the Russian people the full facts about the volume and character of American aid should help clear the Russian-American air. On the high level of major policies, no basic grievances mar the even tenor of our relations with the Soviet Union. There has certainly been no complaint on our part regarding the contributions made by the Red army and the Russian people to the common effort. These have been magnificent, and we have said so time and time again. Clearly the Russian leaders have been disappointed by the immediate effects of the North African occupation by our and British troops, yet they recognize that this military action did ease German pressure on the Red army and will, in due course, lead to the establishment of a second land front in Europe.

By no means the same harmony has prevailed on the lower level of day-to-day relations. Our military leaders have complained of Russia's failure to permit them to keep observers on the fighting fronts. Recently, it is true, Brig. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley was given permission to make such a survey in the Stalingrad area and the Caucasus. But this was a departure from the rule, rather than a change of policy. Then, there is no doubt that Premier Stalin's statement in his recent order of the day to the effect that the Red army was alone bearing the whole weight of the war was irritating to Washington and London. Both capitals have long felt that greater Russian recognition should be given to the aid we have sent into the Soviet Union, sometimes in the face of fierce odds.

However, it is not entirely true to say that even before the Moscow broadcasts of the Stettinius report on lend-lease last night, the Russian people had been kept in complete ignorance of our lend-lease aid. Millions of Russians have seen our planes and tanks and jeeps with their own eyes. Then the Soviet newspapers, in printing the speeches of Premier Churchill and President Roosevelt, have also printed their remarks about our aid to Russia. *Pravda*, moreover, on January 23 published complete figures of war supplies received from Russia's allies, "giving the public for the first time," according to cabled accounts published here at the time, "the details of their great bulk." And we have the testimony of Henry Cassidy, head of the Associated Press Bureau in Moscow, and now in this country, that the people of Soviet Russia not only know of but also appreciate the supplies which have been sent to them under lend-lease.

The whole episode would seem to fall into the category of a tempest in a teapot. After all, it is not the amount of publicity which is given to lend-lease aid in the Russian press, nor even whether the Russians are duly grateful for the aid they have received from us, that counts. The greatest possible mistake we could make is to assume that our shipments to Russia or to any other ally are an act of charity on our part. Those shipments are a manifestation of cold-blooded self-interest which yield dividends even if they don't always yield official amenities. To the extent that our aid to Russia enables that country to do greater damage to our common foe, we are helping ourselves. If we don't remember that, and get superheated by way of backing up Admiral Standley's irritation, then we should be completely lacking in a sense of proportion.

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Bloom Asserts Russian Press Gave Full Reports of U. S. Aid

Describes Adm. Standley's Charges of Concealment as 'Unfortunate'

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PM's Bureau

WASHINGTON, Mar. 10.—After consultation with the State Dept., Chairman Sol Bloom of the House Foreign Affairs Committee told the House of Representatives yesterday afternoon that "Russian newspapers have carried very full reports of American military assistance to Moscow." Bloom declared the Standley statement "unfortunate."

This finds confirmation in recent dispatches by U. S. correspondents in the Soviet Union. In yesterday's New York *Times*, Ralph Parker reported from Moscow, "there can be no doubt that the masses of the Soviet Union are fully aware of the extent of American aid. American-built trucks rumble through many towns and villages. American-built tanks—not the latest types—are used on many fronts."

Full Figures Published

In last Saturday's Washington *Post*, Henry C. Cassidy, Associated Press correspondent on leave from his post in Moscow, wrote, "Since my return to New York, I have heard some comment that the Russians do not seem to realize or appreciate the extent of our effort to aid them. They do realize it, for every statement President Roosevelt or Prime Minister Churchill has made on this subject, complete with figures, has been reproduced in the Soviet press, and the Russians are avid newspaper readers. Those with whom I have come into contact also have made clear that they appreciate it."

On Jan. 24, the New York *Times* reported from Moscow: "*Pravda* publishes figures of the United States and British war supplies sent to Russia." This referred to Lend-Lease Administrator Stettinius' report on Jan. 24, first detailed statement giving actual figures on shipments to the Soviet Union.

But this was not the first mention in the Soviet press of aid from the U. S. A. and Great Britain. On the contrary, as Chairman Bloom discovered, files of the Soviet press here disclose that leading Russian papers have given prominence to every statement made by U. S. and British statesmen on aid to the Soviets.

RUSSIANS TOLD OF OUR AID

Pravda Gives Public the First Details Showing Great Bulk

Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, Jan. 23.—Pravda publishes figures of the United States and British war supplies sent to Russia, giving the public for the first time details of their great bulk.

Pravda editorially calls attention to the big increases in home production last year. In 1942 several times more tanks were produced than in 1941. In 1942, airplane production was 75 per cent higher than in 1941, and in 1942 two million more hectares of soil were sown than in 1941, Pravda stated.

As the New York *Times* clipping shows, *Pravda* published the first figures released on Lend-Lease aid to Russia almost immediately after they were made public.

Papers Quoted Welles

Here are a few samples: *Izvestia*, Nov. 24, 1942, carried a long report on the speech made by W. Averell Harriman at the Hotel Commodore in New York City on Nov. 19. *Izvestia* quoted Harriman's statement that "food has been taken from the slim British diet to send to the Russian people. . . ."

Izvestia, *Pravda*, and *Red Star* carried long reports on the speech made by Sumner Welles at the National Foreign Trades Convention in Boston last Oct. 9, quoting Welles' statement, "The United States and its associates among the United Nations must render the utmost measure of assistance to the Soviet Union."

Pravda, Oct. 14, published the full text of the address of last Oct. 12 in which President Roosevelt praised the men of the Merchant Marine for "risking their lives every hour so that guns and tanks and planes and ammunition and food may be carried to the heroic defenders of Stalingrad and to all the United Nations all over the world." The text also was carried in *Izvestia*, *Red Star*, and smaller papers all over the USSR.

This is a clipping from page 4 of the PM for March 10, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Candid Blast By Standley May Clear Air

Stalin Himself Has Been Blunt On Second Front

By DAVID LAWRENCE.

The real question raised by Admiral Standley's comments in Moscow given to the press is not whether the American Ambassador spoke out of turn or whether what he said was possibly not intended for publication, but whether what he did say is the fact.

David Lawrence.

Is the Russian government withholding from the Russian people the story of how extensive American lease-lend aid is to Russia? It is noted that in certain Russian newspapers, copies of which have reached New York, there are published references to American aid under the lease-lend program. But it still may be true the the essential facts are being withheld, because in Russia newspapers are not circulated beyond certain areas, and it may well be that the radio, for example, has not been permitted in Russia to convey the facts about our lease-lend aid to the Russian people.

Certainly Admiral Standely had some reason for making the statements attributed to him. The State Department here says it was not consulted in advance, which may or may not mean that what the admiral said is repudiated. Actually, the department takes the customary discreet and diplomatic attitude that the admiral could not surely have intended to imply that there was any lack of trust between the Russian and American governments.

Practiced by Stalin.

The incident is just as puzzling in some respects as the occasional bits of seeming indiscretion which Premier Stalin permits himself to practice. Thus, every now and then he makes a statement or a speech apparently minimizing the second front in North Africa and giving the impression that Russia is bearing the brunt of the war. If the head of the Russian government can speak so frankly about Russian-American relations and cannot be accused of attempting to foster disunity, then it seems plausible that an American Ambassador might speak his mind, too.

As a matter of fact, bluntness and outspoken comments are believed to be relished by the Russian Premier, so it might well be that Admiral Standley has done a bit of that famous "prodding" which Wendell Willkie indulged a few months back when he gave an interview from Moscow urging a second front. Many American observers were flabbergasted, but apparently Stalin liked the prodding and apparently Admiral Standley has begun a little prodding of his own.

The American Ambassador was once chief of naval operations here and is not the kind to go off half-cocked in a delicate situation such as envelops American-Russian diplomacy. He evidently is after something—possibly to impress on the Russians that they must not minimize American aid or what we are doing in North Africa and also to persuade them to develop a closer collaboration with us on military and naval matters.

Talked With President.

Admiral Stanley was back here for a visit recently and talked with President Roosevelt and high officials. He presumably knows what we want Russia to do for us as an ally. It is, of course, possible that his patience is somewhat tried and that he wants to come home anyway, but that isn't probable.

The inference which appears most plausible is that high officials here want some sort of showdown with Russia on postwar plans as well as Allied collaboration, particularly in respect to the use of Siberian bases to help in the war against Japan. And it may be that Admiral Standley chose his own way of bringing about the desired intimacy between Russia and America, especially while the lease-lend bill is pending. It would be a risky piece of pressure, but it is not unknown in diplomacy, especially in the devious history of Russian maneuvers in world affairs.

Lives Lost in Convoys.

What is more important than lease-lend aid to Russia, however, are the American and British lives lost in convoying goods to Russia. The stories of those convoy losses have never been told to the American people.

If the tanks and guns and planes landed at Murmansk are appreciated by the Russian government, then the Russian people ought to be told about it, too. That's not a charge of bad faith but a criticism at the censorship policy inside Russia, and surely an American has a right to complain about lack of contact between our people and the Russian people.

This is not a private war, but a people's war, and Admiral Standley's effort to establish some form of communication between the peoples of this country and of Russia on the major points of the war effort to date is something for which he should be commended instead of condemned.

It is too soon to know what the background of the episode was, but it is clear that the long-range objective was that attainment of a basis of candor and frankness rather than the continuance of a status of secrecy and suppression.

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This is a clipping from page 9 of the WASH. STAR ~~Christian Science Monitor~~ for MARCH 10, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

U. S. and Britain to Begin Postwar Discussions Soon

By a Staff Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON, March 10—The United States and British Governments will begin postwar political discussions in the near future, it was reliably learned today.

These discussions, though undertaken at the initiative of Washington and London, will be broadened to include the other principal United Nations before binding decisions are taken.

They also will provide the opportunity for the State Department to explore with the interested countries the plan, recently advanced by Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, for United States acquisition of defensive bases in the Pacific, although this will be only an incidental by-product of the conference.

The primary purpose of the forthcoming Anglo - American gathering is to prepare the way for the general conference of the United Nations and to sift views on such subjects as the best way to deal with postwar Germany and how to strengthen present and future collaboration with the Soviet Union.

An identity of views between the United States and Great Britain is very much sought at this time.

Casablanca Groundwork

First plans for these talks, it is understood, were laid at the Casablanca conference, and it will be remembered that Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, told the House of Commons that steps soon would be taken to develop a more formal, functioning organization of the United Nations.

Whatever part of these discussions takes place in Washington, high United Nations diplomats will be available to participate. T. V. Soong, Chinese Foreign Minister and brother of Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, recently returned to the Capital after an extended visit to Chungking. Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Foreign Minister, will be arriving here soon, and it is not without purpose that Maxim Litvinoff, Soviet Ambassador, continues to hold the post of Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

There is no doubt that a considerable part of the coming discussions will be devoted to relations with the Soviet Union, and one view which is expressed here now is that the United States might profit by placing its relations with Russia on a treaty basis similar to the 20-year agreement already in effect between Moscow and London. While there are thorny territorial issues in Eastern Europe on which Britain and the United States do not know Moscow's final intentions, some feel that the problem of boundaries would be much more readily resolved if Russia could receive strong assurance of co-operation from the United States and Britain in case of any threat to Soviet security.

No Coercion

As to the United States' claim to the acquisition of new bases in the Pacific, Representative Warren G. Magnuson (D) of Washington, Chairman of a House Naval Affairs Subcommittee studying this question, emphasized that there was nothing in the Committee's plan designed to "force or coerce" friendly powers into giving up Pacific possessions. He expressed the belief that arrangements would be possible on a sensible, equitable basis. He said that informal assurance already had been obtained from China, Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands that they are willing to collaborate with the United Nations in policing the Pacific after the defeat of Japan and to make bases available for this purpose.

The American purpose is not to control the Pacific for its own interests alone, but to guarantee the peace of the Pacific in the interests of all countries. Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State, himself has taken pains to emphasize this objective and at his press conference yesterday, he said that the unconditional surrender and complete disarmament of Japan should serve to make the Pacific Ocean safe for all nations.

Mr. Welles explained that the United States has no other aim than to achieve complete security after the war, and he stressed the fact that Washington certainly would not claim the Pacific as an "American Lake," but rather that it would seek to make it a peaceful lake secure for all powers in-be to determine just what the Navy needs in the way of bases, what it has now as a result of development during this war, and what must be done to insure American rights for their postwar use.

To Take Japanese Bases

"We know some of those we need, and we aren't going to have to worry about how we are going to get them—we'll just take them," he said, referring to the well-developed Japanese air and naval bases in the mandated Gilbert and Marshall Islands.

"In the cases of others, however, it will be up to this Committee to correlate the Navy's needs with the work of the State Department in opening up discussion to see that they are met."

Mr. Magnuson said he could see nothing to convince him that it won't be up to the United States to maintain peace in the Pacific after the war.

'Spadework Now'

"And what's the use of going to the peace table with indefinite plans about what we will need to do it?" he asked. "That's why the Committee has been created. We're going to do the spadework now."

Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox lately has advocated acquiring more Pacific bases to at least three committees of Congress:

"We must disarm Japan, particularly on the sea, when this war is over," he told the Foreign Affairs Committee. "It will be perfectly futile to disarm her if we do not have the power to keep her disarmed for a long time to come.

"That means one of the things which must be undertaken in any peace arrangements will be a provision for air bases and naval bases through the Pacific theater. We have now a very fine set of steppingstone bases through the Pacific theater. We must always have those.

"We do not want to take sovereignty of anything. But it would be wise to insist upon complete control and possession of a sufficient number of bases in the Pacific to insure that both our naval and air strength will be effective as against any future aggression in that quarter of the world."

This is a clipping from page 3 of the Christian Science Monitor for March 10, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

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Soviet Communists Hail Women's Day

MOSCOW, March 8 (ICN).—"This year Soviet women meet International Woman's Day at a decisive moment of the patriotic war against Hitler Germany," declared the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in a statement today.

"The mass expulsion of the enemy from our Soviet country has begun.

"In the patriotic war the Soviet women are in the ranks of the active fighters against the German fascist monsters. Never before in history have women participated as selflessly in the defense of their native country as today, in the great liberation war of our people.

"Soviet women have something worth defending! Soviet power brought to working women full and real equality in all fields of life. It drew women into the administration of the state, and created all conditions for free, creative labor and happy motherhood.

WOMEN ENSLAVED

"Hundreds of thousands of Soviet women have been shipped to Germany by the fascist enslavers for hard, chain-gang labor.

"Together with the whole people, the working women rose to the defenses of the freedom and independence of their country from the base enemy. In the rear and on the front Soviet women patriots are showing examples of heroism and supreme devotion to their country, to the Bolshevik Party and to Stalin.

"Woman's role in production has increased immeasurably during the patriotic war. By dint of selfless labor, the millions of women who are working in the plants and factories, on the collective and state farms, are ensuring an uninterrupted supply of armaments, ammunition and food to the front.

"The role of woman has especially grown in agriculture. Women collective farmers are now shouldering the brunt of the responsibility for collective farm production. Tens of thousands of women are managing farms, working as brigade and group leaders, administrators of stock breeding farms, agronomists.

"The Soviet women and girls in the ranks of the valiant Red Army and guerrilla detachments are selflessly fighting against the German invaders.

GREATER EFFORTS

"The present decisive moment of the patriotic war demands a still greater strain of every effort on the part of the Soviet people and Soviet women to bring about the rout of the enemy. All the reserves of women labor must be fully mobilized. The industrial training of women must be extended and more women workers and collective farmers promoted to leading positions.

"Social organizations must display the utmost concern for the living conditions of women in production."

The decision concludes with the following greetings:

"The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union greets the women workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, doctors, nurses, nurses aides, communications workers, guerrillas, all the working women of the Soviet Union on the occasion of International Woman's Day, and expresses the firm confidence that at this decisive moment of the patriotic war the Soviet women will give all their strength to the cause of the complete rout of the German invaders.

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This is a clipping from page 2 of the Daily Worker for 3-9-43
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Breach Has Been Long in Making

Only Roosevelt Can Soften 'Ingrate' Rebuke to Stalin

By LYLE C. WILSON
United Press Staff Correspondent

Admiral Standley

Barring repudiation by President Roosevelt, Ambassador William H. Standley's sensational complaint against Russian concealment of American war aid apparently must be accepted as a direct Washington rebuke to Stalin.

The former Chief of Naval Operations charged at a Moscow press conference last night that Americans were being mislead into giving millions to Russia while the Russian people were not even aware they were being helped. He hinted of Russian refusal to exchange military data with her Allies — a policy generally acknowledged and regretted by military men here. Standley went further to warn that under the circumstances Congress might balk at further Lend-Lease aid.

Congressional reaction was mixed but on the whole confident Lend-Lease would continue. The White House and State Dpartment refused comment.

Earlier in the day Vice President Wallace had told a Delaware, O., audience that Russia and Germany some day might make common cause against us if the United States and the Soviet Union fail to establish a basis of mutual trust.

REPLY to 'LONE WOLF'

First judgment here was that the Admiral was replying to Stalin's blunt statement Feb. 23 that "In view of the absence of a second front in Europe the Red Army alone is bearing the whole weight of the war." That jarred Washington, and so did another assertion that the Red Army was "not created for the purpose of conquest of foreign countries but to defend the frontiers of Soviet land."

A questioner at Mr. Roosevelt's press conference that day suggested such language implied that the Red Army would not continue the war after driving Germany from Russian territory. No, no, no, Mr. Roosevelt sharply replied: Stalin had not said that. But Mr. Roosevelt also said he had not read the Red Army order, and the impression on his conferees was that the President might have been expressing a hope rather than a certainty.

Standley's sharp language looks like evidence that this Government, and perhaps the British, are irked by Soviet refusal to acknowledge the value of aid rendered or of the Anglo-American thrust into North Africa. There is speculation also whether Mr. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill ever got a satisfactory acknowledgment from Stalin after the Casablanca conference.

This is a year's ship sailings with lend-lease supplies, as revealed by Admiral Emory Land, maritime commission chief, who added that not every vessel that sailed reached its destination. China hopes that by October, 1943, more shipments of lend-lease aid will be headed her way.

WASH. NEWS MARCH 3, 1943 p.4

THE PLANE THEFT

During Wendell Willkie's visit to Moscow, Stalin at a great public dinner denounced the British Government for "stealing" 183 fighter planes en route from the United States to the Soviet Union. It developed that the planes were diverted to North Africa by order of Lieut. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, commander of the U. S. Army Air Forces, but Stalin thought the British stole them and said so in the presence of the British ambassador. Willkie averted a more serious incident by immediately going into a speech.

On Feb. 4 Mr. Roosevelt sent Stalin congratulations on the liberation of Stalingrad. No reply from Stalin ever was made public here, but London relayed a Moscow broadcast quoting Stalin that "the joint military operations of the armed forces of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union in the near future will bring about victory over our common enemy."

On Feb. 23, the day Stalin said the Red Army was bearing the war's whole weight, Mr. Roosevelt sent a glowing tribute to the Red Army on its 25th anniversary, expressing "our profound admiration for its magnificent achievements, unsurpassed in all history."

WHEELER PEACE SUGGESTION

The press conference query about Russia's possible stoppage of her armies at her own borders may have been predicated in part on an interview given Feb. 19 by Sen. Wheeler (D., Mont.) who suggested there might be something phony about Germany's retreat and added:

"There is a persistent fear in some high quarters that Germany and Russia will conclude a separate peace, but Stalin has repeatedly stated that he only wanted the return of Russian territory; that his armies will fight until they have driven the last German from Russian soil. In other words, Stalin has been and is for Russia first."

Stalin's Army Day order recalled his blunt demand last autumn that the United States and Great Britain make good "fully and on time" on European second front promises for 1942. But after the African invasion Stalin said landing "fulfilled the prerequisites."

Going to Bat With His Charges

Standley Awaits Talk With Russian Premier

By M. S. HANDLER
United Press Staff Correspondent

MOSCOW, March 9—U. S. Ambassador William H. Standley prepared today to confer with high Soviet officials after bluntly accusing the Soviet government of deliberately withholding from its people information concerning American aid to Russia. It was presumed he would take up his charge, made at a press conference yesterday, with the government.

(The CBS correspondent at Moscow said Standley was awaiting a conference with Stalin.)

Standley told American and British newsmen that it was not "fair to mislead Americans into giving millions of dollars from their pockets, thinking they are aiding the Russian people, and the Russian people not to know it."

OUT OF FRIENDLY FEELING

"Ever since I have been here," he said, "I have been carefully looking for recognition by the Russian press of the fact that they are getting material help from America, not only thru Lend-Lease but also thru the Red Cross and Russian-American Relief—and I have so far failed to find any acknowledgment. . . .

"The American people are doing it out of a friendly feeling for the Russians, but the Russian people don't know about it."

Standley said the Soviet government "seems to be trying to create the impression at home, as well as abroad, that they are fighting the war alone.

"It appears to be a desire on the part of the Russians to show that they are fighting the war with their own resources rather than acknowledge help from any one."

When Standley's attention was drawn to the fact that the Russian Red Cross' acknowledgment of aid from the Allies was published in the Anglo-American press but not in Russian newspapers, Standley said:

"Well, there is no question the people in America know the facts and here the people don't."

A LONG WAY FROM LAW

Standley warned that the American Congress was a sensitive group.

"They are generous and big-hearted so long as they feel that they are helping someone," he said, "but give them the idea that they are not helping and it might be a different story."

He pointed out that the Lend-Lease bill has been approved only by the House Foreign Relations Committee, adding:

"As those who are familiar with legislative procedure know, it's a long way from the Foreign Affairs Committee to enactment."

Standley said the Russian government had not changed its policy of keeping its allies largely in the dark about its military plans.

The Ambassador arrived here several days ago from Kuibyshev.

Aid to Soviet Totals One and Third Billion

By United Press

Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union up to Jan. 1 totaled $1,360,000,000, Lend-Lease Administrator Stettinius reported recently to congressional committees. Some of the specific figures:

2600 planes.
3200 tanks.
72,500 trucks.
7700 motorcycles.
1300 military tractors.
130,000 sub-machine guns.
3,000,000 pairs of boots and 18,000 tons of sole leather.
75,000 tons of railroad rails and other railroad equipment.
140,000 field telephones and "hundreds of thousands of miles" of phone wire.
268,000 tons of petroleum products.
580,000 tons of steel.
46,000 tons of aluminum and duralumin.
21,500 tons of zinc.
94,000 tons of copper and brass.
50,000 tons of tuloul and TNT.
75,000 tons of other chemicals.
Tremendous quantities of food.

Standley Doubts Russian People Are Told Truth About U. S. Aid

By The Associated Press

MOSCOW, March 8. — Admiral William H. Standley, American Ambassador to Russia, told a press conference today he did not think the Russian people were being told the complete story of American aid to Russia.

"I find no political motive to this," he said. "It is only an effort to create the impression with their own people that they are pulling themselves through by their own bootstraps."

Pointing out that a new lend-lease bill is now before Congress, Admiral Standley added: "The American Congress is big-hearted and generous, but if you give it the impression that their help means nothing, there mighe be a different story."

"I have carefully looked for an admission in the Russian press that they receive material aid from America," said Admiral Standley. "Yet I have failed to find any real acknowledgement of it."

He declared the Russians were getting numerous things from the United States. "You can say planes by the thousands," he declared.

It was pointed out to Admiral Standley that recently several Russian generals told foreign correspondents they were getting no American help at the front except trucks.

"They are getting plenty of other kind of war material," he replied. "If it's not at the front, I don't know what they are doing with it."

He said there had been no obvious change in the exchange of information between the United States and the Soviet Union since the Washington agreemnt last year.

"There's no question about the Soviets trying to create the impression abroad, as well as home, that they are fighting the war alone," he declared.

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Herald Tribune for March 9, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

GETTING ON WITH RUSSIA

One of the privileges of an American Vice President derives from his constitutional lack of executive power. He can say what he likes, for the simple reason that he cannot do what he likes. Hence Henry A. Wallace can be the prophet of the Roosevelt Administration without in any way committing that Administration to a course of action. Yesterday, in his speech at Ohio Wesleyan University, Mr. Wallace took advantage of this situation in one paragraph which can profitably be quoted:

> We shall decide some time in 1943 or 1944 whether to plant the seeds for World War No. 3. That war will be certain if we allow Prussia to rearm either materially or psychologically. *That war will be probable if we double-cross Russia.* That war will be probable if we fail to demonstrate that we can furnish full employment after this war comes to an end, and Fascist interests motivated largely by anti-Russian bias get control of our Government. Unless the Western democracies and Russia come to a satisfactory understanding before the war ends I very much fear that World War No. 3 will be inevitable. Without a close and trusting understanding between Russia and the United States there is grave possibility of Russia and Germany later making common cause.

Boiled down, this passage appears to mean that we may turn Fascist and attack Russia, or that Russia may first secure the mastery of Europe and then attack us. These fears are far-fetched. The convulsions of history are unpredictable, but it is difficult to imagine the citizens of this country submitting to home-grown Fascists after beating the foreign variety. Nor does it seem that Russia would have anything to gain by provoking a war with the United States.

Nevertheless, Mr. Wallace is timely in his insistence that the foundations of post-war friendship between Russia and the United States must be laid during the war. What is meant by "double-crossing Russia" we do not know. We are surely not double-crossing our ally when, as Lend-Lease Administrator Stettinius disclosed on Sunday, we sent her in fifteen months $1,250,000,000 worth of supplies, and when we plan, as we do plan, to increase the rate of assistance. Possibly Mr. Wallace had reference to the danger of a compromise peace, in which Nazi Germany would be let off easily in order to become a buffer against a further Russian advance. This danger does not seem imminent.

The actual danger is not one of armed conflict between the United States and Russia but of a failure to cooperate; not necessarily of a third World War following the second one, but of a world-wide anarchy in which no nation would be secure or prosperous. This war will leave the earth impoverished, but with great hopes for quick recovery if the constructive machinery and skills possessed by mankind can be set confidently to work. Russia must have its full share in that work. We may say frankly that she will be double-crossing the other United Nations if she does not assume her part of the responsibility.

We believe that the Russian people will wish to assume such responsibility, and we hope that Mr. Stalin is in accord with them. There will be difficulties in laying out the future boundary lines of Eastern Europe and adjusting the systems of communism and free enterprise to work together. These difficulties will diminish if they are faced frankly, realistically and in time. The plans must be laid now. Mr. Wallace is right about that.

This is a clipping from page 22 of the New York Times for March 9, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

CURB ON OUR AID TO SOVIET IS SEEN

Some Congressmen Say Lend-Lease Bill Will Feel Effect of Standley Statement

ISSUE MAY DELAY ACTION

Debate for a Day or Two Held Likely—Officials Silent on the Issue

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Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, March 8—The disclosure in Moscow by Admiral William H. Standley, United States Ambassador, that news of United States's help was being withheld from the Russian people, met with varying interpretations in Washington as to what may be its effect on domestic, as well as foreign issues.

Officials were reluctant to discuss the matter, one high in Congressional circles saying that it was a "ticklish" subject and called for deliberation before "spouting off" in public.

Senator Tom Connally of Texas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, declined any comment.

Others in Congress said privately that they feared the news would make far more possible the adoption of restrictive amendments to the pending bill in the House for a one-year extension of the Lend-Lease Act. Extension of the act as far as countries other than Russia were concerned would not be jeopardized, informed quarters held.

The House was expected to be ready for a vote on this bill tomorrow, but efforts to "control" aid to Russia through amendments may possibly delay passage for a day or two while members debate the issue. It was agreed that Congress as a whole was sensitive to any idea that it, as representative of the American people, was not being given credit in a nation that was receiving all the aid possible to be transported—aid that was costing the taxpayers heavily and particularly at the approach of a heavy tax payment March 15.

As to the foreign implications, the news had any number of interpretations.

It was held in some quarters that the Order of the Day broadcast to the Russian people two weeks ago by Premier Stalin was entirely for political effect in Russia and was not meant for the world at large.

Others contended that the Order of the Day was as much designed to influence foreign opinion as that in Russia. In that speech, Premier Stalin made it plain that Russia would insist upon a restoration of its boundaries as of 1940, which would mean a part of Finland, about half of Poland, and parts of other countries overrun by Germany.

While the Order of the Day speech might be considered to have no relation to Admiral Standley's disclosure today, persons in several quarters could not disassociate them. They felt that Mr. Stalin had in effect told the Russian people they were fighting the war alone, and were entitled to dictate their own peace terms.

This is a clipping from page 5 of the New York Times for March 9, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Aid to Reds Is Enormous

Some idea of the amount of material help sent to Russia by the United States, which American Ambassador William H. Standley yesterday said was being concealed from the Russian people, is given in reports submitted by Lend-Lease Administrator Edwin R. Stettinius, jr., to congressional committees recently.

Some of the figures were:

2600 planes.

3200 tanks.

72,500 trucks.

7700 motorcycles.

1300 military tractors.

130,000 submachine guns.

Three million pairs of heavy boots.

18,000 tons of sole leather.

75,000 tons of rails and 17,000 tons of other railroad equipment.

140 thousand field telephones and "hundreds of thousands of miles" of field telephone wire.

268 thousand tons of petroleum products.

880 thousand tons of steel.

46 thousand tons of aluminum and duraluminum.

21,500 tons of zinc.

94 thousand tons of copper and brass.

50 thousand tons of tuluol and TNT.

75 thousand tons of other chemicals.

And tremendous quantities of food.

WASH. Post March 1, 1943 p. 1

Text of Vice President Wallace's Address

Warning of Next War

By The United Press.

DELAWARE, Ohio, March 8 — The text of Vice President Wallace's speech to the Conference on Christian Bases of World Order was as follows:

There are three great philosophies in the world today.

The first, based on the supremacy of might over right, says that war between nations is inevitable until such time as a single master race dominates the entire world and every one is assigned his daily task by an arrogant, self-appointed fuehrer.

The second, the Marxian philosophy, says that class warfare is inevitable until such time as the proletariat comes out on top, everywhere in the world, and can start building a society without classes.

The third, which we in this country know as the democratic Christian philosophy, denies that man was made for war, whether it be war between nations or war between classes, and asserts boldly that ultimate peace is inevitable, that all men are brothers, and that God is their father.

This democratic philosophy pervades not only the hearts and minds of those who live by the Christian religion, both Protestant and Catholic, but of those who draw their inspiration from Mohammedanism, Judaism, Hinduism, Confucianism and other faiths.

When we look beneath the outer forms we find that all these faiths, in one way or another, preach the doctrine of the dignity of each individual human soul, the doctrine that God intended man to be a good neighbor to his fellow man, and the doctrine of the essential unity of the entire world.

Those who think most about individualism preach freedom. Those who think most about unity, whether it be the unity of a nation or of the entire world, preach the sacred obligation of duty. There is a seeming conflict between freedom and duty, and it takes the spirit of democracy to resolve it.

Only through religion and education can the freedom-loving individual realize that his greatest private pleasure comes from serving the highest unity, the general welfare of all. This truth, the essence of democracy, must capture the hearts of men over the entire world if human civilization is not to be torn to pieces in a series of wars and revolutions far more terrible than anything that has yet been endured. Democracy is the hope of civilization.

Prussia's Total State and War

To understand the significance of these three philosophies dominant in the world today, let us look at each one in turn. During the last eighty years the outstanding exponent of the sacredness and inevitability of war has been Prussia. By nature the common people of Prussia are simple and hard-working, and make excellent citizens except where they have become infected by the Prussian doctrine that might makes right.

The Prussian philosophy causes its adherents to practice many of the highest virtues, but these virtues are all ultimately placed at the disposal of supreme evil. Hitler, seizing the Prussian militaristic tradition as a powerful instrument in his hand and putting it to use with his own religious frenzy, has become the Anti-Christ of this generation, perhaps the most complete Anti-Christ who has ever lived.

It is not enough to bring about the downfall of Hitler. We must understand the origin and growth of the Prussian spirit, and do something to counteract that spirit, if we wish to bring permanent peace.

The Prussian attitude toward war and supremacy has strong roots. Whether it reaches back to the days of Caesar or whether it first took form under the guidance of the Teutonic knights in the Middle Ages, we are certain of this: by the time of Frederick the Great the Prussians consciously adopted the doctrine of total war and the total State as the chief end of man. Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II modernized and made completely deceitful and ruthless that which Frederick the Great had founded.

Shortly after Kaiser Wilhelm II rose to power, a general before the first World War, one of the more tender-hearted of the German generals, said, in addressing his troops:

"Our civilization must build its temple on mountains of corpses, an ocean of tears, and the groans of innumerable dying men."

We know now, to our sorrow, that those were not just idle words. But God grant they will not be true much longer!

Glorifying of Ruthlessness

Bernhardi and Treitschke, through the printed page and through the classroom, preached the glory of war and the necessity of Germany picking a quarrel with England or France. Frederick the Great, Moltke and Bismarck were proclaimed as being superior to Goethe, Schiller, Bach and Beethoven.

Hegel laid broad and deep the philosophy of the totalitarian State. Other philosophers, and especially Nietzsche, seized on the Darwinian doctrines of natural selection and survival of the fittest to erect a seemingly scientific but false materialism to justify their ruthless acts.

In saying all of this, I do not mean to indicate that Prussia was the only wicked State in the world. England, France, Russia, Spain, and the United States, were not always perfect. But Prussia and Japan were the only countries which systematically devoted the highest virtues of their citizenry, generation after generation, to the glorification of the State and to the ruthlessness of war.

The ancestors of many of the people of German origin in the United States were members of the minority in Germany who dissented from the extremist tendencies toward militarism. Thousands of these dissenters migrated to this country in the twenty or thirty years after the failure of the revolution of 1848. Their children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren today are among our finest American citizens. They are patriotically doing their part in the present war for freedom, and we honor them for the spirit they have shown.

It is in the years since 1848 that the liberal culture of the old Germany has been so completely submerged by the worship of strength and power. In this period of less than a century, under Bismarck, Kaiser Wilhelm II, and Hitler, Germany has launched five aggressive wars.

The result has been that over the last thirty years the spirit of Prussianism has cost the lives of at least twenty million men, has crippled at least ten million others, and has caused the nations of the world to squander hundreds of billions of dollars on death, destruction and hate. How different things would have been if this money had been spent instead on peace, prosperity and understanding!

Teaching of Fuehrer Worship

Germans by blood are neither better nor worse than Englishmen, Americans, Swedes, Poles or Russians. But the Prussian tradition of the last century, and especially the Nazi education of the last ten years, have created a psychic entity so monstrous and so dangerous to the entire world that it is absolutely vital to exercise some control over German education when the war comes to an end.

This is a clipping from page 4 of the New York Times for MARCH 9, 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Prussian schoolmasters have been of greater importance to the German Army than Prussian captains, and Prussian textbooks have had greater value than ammunition. It is the disciplined will to power and the worship of war as the method of power that have made the German Army such a terrible instrument of force.

Just as Hitler took the Prussian military tradition and organized it into gangsterism, so he took the Prussian education system and streamlined it to marshal the millions of German boys and girls behind his evil conspiracy of world conquest. Hitler's children have been trained to believe implicitly that the state is more important than the individual, and that the individual must be willing and ready to sacrifice himself for the German nation and for the Fuehrer.

Starting with the young mothers and fathers, married or unmarried, and taking the children through the day nurseries and a series of schools for different ages, Hitler has indoctrinated the German children with what he calls his "leadership principle," that among men as in nature there is an eternal struggle between the weak and the strong, and that the "decadent" democracies are destined to crumble before the superior might of the Nazi élite.

German boys have been systematically trained in brutality. German girls have been systematically trained to believe that their supreme duty is to be mothers, married or unmarried, of children dedicated to the service of the fatherland and the Fuehrer. Through the use of mystic ceremonies—pagan dances, bonfires, sun festivals on mountain tops and many other types of ritual—both boys and girls have been trained to look upon Hitler as divine and they pray to him as God.

Re-education of Germany

The evil influence of this systematic degradation of millions of German boys and girls cannot be counteracted in a short time. Even Hitler's death will not end it, because many of Hitler's children, conditioned as they are, will believe that he is still their leader, in the spirit if not in the flesh. Hitler dead may be almost as dangerous as Hitler alive.

This, then, is the vastly difficult problem with which the United Nations will have to cope, if the victory which now is coming closer is to bring more than just a short breathing spell before another Prussian attack is launched upon the world.

It is not up to the United Nations to say just what the German schools of the future should teach, and we do not want to be guilty of a Hitler-like orgy of book burning. But it is vital to the peace of the world to make sure that neither Prussianism, Hitlerism nor any modification of them is taught.

There are many cultured German scholars with an excellent attitude toward the world who should be put to work on the job of rewriting the German textbooks in their own way. I believe these men would glorify peace and international honesty, re-establishment of the German culture of Beethoven, Schubert, Schiller and Goethe, and the gradual preparation of the German spirit for an appreciation of the fact that a bill of rights for the individual is as vital as a bill of duties toward the state.

Doubtless thousands of German boys will come home from the war bitterly disillusioned of Prussianism and Hitlerism. Thousands of both young and old will feel the same way. They will honestly want to help build up a new democratic Germany, and we, without yielding at all to the old warlike spirit of Prussia, should encourage them to try.

We shall need the help of all Germans who give convincing evidence that they do not subscribe to the "master race" myth and are genuinely opposed to the doctrine that might makes right. The re-education we insist upon should not crush out any sincere desire to practice democracy and live at peace among the world family of nations.

It will not be necessary for Americans to teach in the German schools. The all-important thing is to see that the cult of war and international deceit is no longer preached as a virtue in the schools. We cannot countenance the soft, lazy forgetfulness which characterized England and France in their treatment of Germany in the Thirties. The cost of such short-sighted appeasement is too great in men and money. We must not go down that mistaken, tragic road again.

Rise of Religion in Russia

All of my discussion thus far has been concerned with Prussianism. Now I want to talk about Marxianism. This philosophy in some whys is the child of Prussianism, because Marx, its high priest, was molded in his thinking by Hegel, the great philosopher of the Prussian State.

Marxianism has used the Cheka, just as Prussianism has used the Gestapo, but it has never preached international war as an instrument of national policy. It does not believe one race is superior to another. Many of the Marxian activities of the last ten years which people of the West have most condemned have been inspired by fear of Germany.

The Russian people, who are the chief believers in Marxianism, are fundamentally more religious than the Prussians. The great mass of the Russian people is still hungry for spiritual food. The Russians have a better opportunity to find that spiritual food than have the Prussians under their regime, which glorifies the violence of the old Teutonic gods.

This question of religious freedom in Russia has been getting attention from the Church of England and from the Roman Catholic Church in this country. In a recent issue of the magazine Commonweal, which surely cannot be said to have Marxian leanings, the managing editor discussed two books by exiled Russians on the status of religion in Russia.

Quoting from both books, one written under the auspices of the Church of England and the other by a professor at Fordham University, the editor came to the conclusion that the position of the Christian church in Russia has definitely improved.

The future well-being of the world depends upon the extent to which Marxianism, as it is being progressively modified in Russia, and democracy, as we are adapting it to twentieth century conditions, can live together in peace.

Old-line Marxianism has held that democracy is more words, that it serves the cause of the common man with platitudes rather than with jobs, and that belief in it results in a weak governmental organization. And we who believe in democracy must admit that modern science, invention and technology have provided us with new bottles into many of which we have not yet poured the wine of the democratic spirit.

For More Efficient Democracy

In some respects both the Prussians and the Russians have perceived the signs of the times better than we, and I hope that reactionary politicians will not quote this sentence out of its context in an effort to prove that I have come out for dictatorship.

The fact is that the Prussians have done an effective job of making their bureaucrats efficient in coordinating the social forces in the service of the State. The Russians have put great emphasis on serving and gaining the

This is a clipping from page _____ of the New York Times for _____

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

enthusiastic adherence of the common man.

It is my belief that democracy is the only true expression of Christianity, but if it is not to let Christianity down democracy must be tremendously more efficient than it has been in the service of the common man and in resistance to selfish pressure groups.

After this war is over the democratic capitalistic nations will need to prove that they are supremely interested in full employment and full utilization of natural resources. They will need to demonstrate that the consuming power of their people can be made to equal their productive power. The right to work at a regular job and for a decent wage is essential to the true dignity of man.

If the Western democracies furnish full employment and an expanding production, they need have no fear of a revival of old-line communistic propaganda from within.

If they do not furnish full employment, communistic propaganda of this kind is inevitable and there is nothing which the Russian Government or our government or any other government can do to stop it. In the event of long-continued unemployment, the only question will be as to whether the Prussian or Marxian doctrine will take us over first.

I believe in the democratic doctrine, the religion based on the social message of the prophets, the heart insight of Christ, and the wisdom of the men who drew up the Constitution of the United States and adopted the Bill of Rights.

By tradition and by structure we believe that it is possible to reconcile the freedom and rights of the individual with the duties required of us by the general welfare. We believe in religious tolerance and the separation of Church and State, but we need to fight again the old spirit to meet the challenge of new facts.

Seeds of a Third World War

We shall decide some time in 1943 or 1944 whether to plant the seeds for World War No. 3. That war will be certain if we allow Prussia to rearm either materially or psychologically. That war will be probable in case we double-cross Russia. That war will be probable if we fail to demonstrate that we can furnish full employment after this war comes to an end and Fascist interests, motivated largely by anti-Russian bias, get control of our government.

Unless the Western democracies and Russia come to a satisfactory understanding before the war ends, I very much fear that World War No. 3 will be inevitable. Without a close and trusting understanding between Russia and the United States there is grave probability of Russia and Germany sooner or later making common cause.

Of course, the ground for World War No. 3 can be laid by actions of the other powers, even though we in the United States follow the most constructive course. For example, such a war would be inevitable if Russia should again embrace the Trotskyist idea of fomenting world-wide revolution; or if British interests should again be sympathetic to anti-Russian activity in Germany and other countries.

Another possible cause of World War No. 3 might rise out of our own willingness to repeat the mistakes we made after World War No. 1. When a creditor nation raises its tariffs and asks foreign nations to pay up and at the same time refuse to let them pay in goods, the result is irritation of a sort that sooner or later leads first to trade war and then to bloodshed.

Good Neighbor Christianity

The gospel of Christ was to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, comfort the sick and visit those who were in hard luck. He said that treating your neighbor decently was the way to show that you loved God.

The neighborhood in Christ's day was a few miles in diameter. Today the airplane has made the whole world a neighborhood. The good neighbor policy, whether at home or abroad, is a Christian policy. Those who preach isolationism and hate of other nations are preaching a modified form of Prussian nazism, and the only outcome of such preaching will be war.

If we want peace we must treat other nations in the spirit of democratic Christianity. We must make our religion practical. In our relations with China, for example, we must act in such a way as to enhance the material as well as the spiritual well-being of her people. So doing will not only be of spiritual advantage to ourselves, will not only do much to prevent war, but will give us more material prosperity than we can otherwise enjoy. And in saying this I do not preach the missionary spirit as a forerunner of a new imperialism.

Nearly half the people of the world live in Eastern Asia. Seven-eighths of them do not know how to read and write, but many of them listen to the radio and they know that the world is on the move and they are determined to move with it. We can at their request help them to move in knowledge toward a higher standard of living rather than in ignorance toward confusion and anarchy.

Throughout history every big nation has been given an opportunity to help itself by helping the world. If such an opportunity is seized with a broad and generous spirit, an infinitude of practical possibilities opens up.

Thousands of business men in the United States have seen this kind of thing happen on a smaller scale in their own businesses, as their broad and enlightened policies have increased their prosperity and given jobs to their neighbors.

Manifesting Faith to World

Christianity is not star-gazing or foolish idealism. Applied on a world-wide scale, it is intensely practical. Bread cast upon the waters does return. National friendships are remembered. Help to starving people is not soon forgotten.

We of the United States who now have the greatest opportunity that ever came to any people do not wish to impose on any other race, or to thrust our money or technical experts or ways of thought on those who do not desire them.

But we do believe that if we measure up to the responsibility which Providence has placed on our shoulders we shall be called on for help by many peoples who admire us. When we respond to this cry for help we shall be manifesting not only a Christian spirit but also obeying a fundamental law of life.

We of the Western democracies must demonstrate the practicality of our religion. We must extend a helping hand to China and India; we must be firm and just with Prussia; we must deal honestly and fairly with Russia and be tolerant and even helpful as she works out her economic problems in her own way; we must prove that we ourselves can give an example, in our American democratic way, of full employment and full production for the benefit of the common man.

By collaborating with the rest of the world to put productive resources fully to work, we shall raise our own standard of living and help to raise the standard of living of others. It is not that we shall be taking the bread out of the mouths of our own children to feed the children of others but that we shall cooperate with every one to call forth the energies of every one, to put God's earth more completely at the service of all mankind.

Mr. Wallace's Fears

Vice President Wallace's assertion that a third world war will be probable if the United States should "double-cross" Russia is indicative of a rather curious line of thinking on his part. And it is a state of mind which takes on added importance in the light of Ambassador Standley's observation that the Russian people are not being told by their own government of the extent of American aid to the Soviets.

Presumably, Mr. Wallace would not have discussed the consequences of double-crossing Russia unless he believed there was some danger in this respect. Unfortunately, however, he did not make clear the basis for his apprehension.

To most Americans the suggestion that the United States may double-cross Russia will be rather repugnant. It is not in keeping with our national character, and it does not seem to be in line with the known facts of our relations with the Soviet government. The overwhelming majority of the American people understand the great contribution that Russia has made to the common war effort, are grateful for it, and are determined to give the Russians every possible assistance. They also appreciate, as well as Mr. Wallace, the importance of coming to an understanding with Russia on the questions that will arise after the war, and there has been no slightest indication that the American people lean toward a postwar policy that would be prejudicial to any legitimate Soviet aspiration.

By and large, the people of this country subscribe to the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Certainly they seek no postwar advantage at Russia's expense. No doubt there are some who experience a certain sense of misgiving as Russia marks out her claims on Poland, on the Baltic states and on Bessarabia. Others are not quite reconciled to the Russian government's attitude of indifference to the military aid which we have been giving the Red Army. It is true that the measure of this aid is small as compared to the effort that Russia herself has made, but the American people know that it has not been inconsequential and they also know that the struggle to get this war material across the Atlantic has been hard and bitter. Perhaps there are still others who are not quite as ready as Mr. Wallace to believe that the Russians have permanently abandoned what the Vice President called "the Trotskyist idea of fomenting world-wide revolution," but it is difficult to believe that even the hardiest of these skeptics contemplates taking the initiative in any course that would be inimical to Russia. Certainly the Vice President, in discussing the consequences of an American double-cross, cited no evidence to support such an assumption, and if he has any tangible reasons to believe that such a betrayal of our ally is in prospect he ought to set them forth in the plainest language.

WASH. STAR MARCH 7, 1943 P. 10

SOVIET PEACE TIE URGED BY WALLACE

Vice President Asks Mutual Trust With Russia, Disarmed Germany to Avert New War

By The United Press.

DELAWARE, Ohio, March 8—Vice President Wallace, asserting that a decision would be made this year or next "whether to plant the seeds for World War No. 3," declared today that unless the Western democracies and Russia come to a "satisfactory understanding" he feared such a conflict would be inevitable.

In an address at Ohio Wesleyan University before the Conference on Christian Bases of World Order, he warned that if the United States and Russia failed to establish a basis of mutual trust Russia and Germany might later make for another world war:

If we permit Germany to rearm common cause against us.

He gave these possible factors

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either physically or psychologically.

If we double-cross Russia.

If we fail to demonstrate that we can furnish full employment after the present war and if we let Fascist interests, motivated by anti-Russian bias, get control of our government.

If Russia again embraces the Trotskyist idea of fomenting world-wide revolution or if British interests again become sympathetic to anti-Russian activity in Germany and other countries.

Mr. Wallace drew a sharp distinction between communism as now practiced in Russia under Premier Joseph Stalin and as once practiced in accord with the principles of the late Leon Trotsky, the world revolutionist.

"The future well-being of the world depends on the extent to which Marxianism, as it is being progressively modified in Russia, and democracy, as we are adapting it to twentieth century conditions, can live together in peace," he said.

Asserting that the Western democracies need have no fear of old-line communism if they furnish full employment and expanding production and thus take out the spawning grounds of this philosophy, he continued:

"If they do not furnish full employment, communistic propaganda of this kind is inevitable and there is nothing which the Russian Government or our government or any other government can do to stop it.

"In the event of long-continued unemployment, the only question will be as to whether the Prussian or Marxist doctrine will take up over first."

As for Germany, he said that it was not enough to bring about Adolf Hitler's downfall and that permanent peace would be impossible unless the Prussian tradition of glorifying the state and ruthless war as an instrument of power were thoroughly crushed.

Ending of Prussian Tradition

"The Prussian tradition of the last century, and especially the Nazi education of the last ten years, have created a psychic entity so monstrous and so dangerous to the entire world that it is absolutely vital to exercise some control over German education when the war comes to an end," he went on.

"It is not up to the United Nations to say just what the German schools of the future should teach, and we do not want to be guilty of a Hitler-like orgy of book burning," he said. "But it is vital to the peace of the world to make sure that neither Prussianism, Hitlerism nor any modification of them is taught.

"There are many cultured German scholars with an excellent attitude toward the world, who should be put to work on the job

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of rewriting the German textbooks in their own way."

Such men, he added, would glorify peace and international honesty, re-establish the true German culture and gradually prepare the German spirit for an understanding that a "bill of rights for the individual is as vital as a bill of duties toward the state."

He mentioned Japan only once, saying that Japan and Germany were alone in systematically devoting the highest virtues of their citizenry to exalting the state and war as the twin objectives of life. He did not suggest controlling Japanese education and made no comment concerning the post-war internal structure of Italy.

Mr. Wallace pointed out that unlike Prussianism, Marxism had never preached international war as an instrument of national policy and did not hold one race superior to another. Likewise, he said, the Russians were fundamentally more religious than the Germans and in the main were "still hungry for spiritual food."

He said that in some ways both the Prussians and the Russians had taken better note of the signs of the times than the United States.

"I hope that reactionary politicians will not quote this sentence out of its context, in an effort to prove tha I have come out for dictatorship," he said.

"The fact is that the Prussians have done an effective job of making their beaureacrats efficient in coordinating the social forces of the Sttac. The Russians have put great emphasis on serving and gaining the enthusiastic adherence of the common man.

"It is my belief that democracy is the only true expression of Christianity, but if it is not to let Christianity down, democracy must be tremendously more efficient than it has been in the service of the comman man, and in resistance to selfish pressure groups."

WALLACE WARNS FARMERS

Tells Ohioans to Guard Triple A Against 'Fair-Weather Friends'

COLUMBUS, Ohio—March 8 (AP) —Vice President Wallace cautioned farmers today to be "on guard so as not to let fair-weather friends destroy the Triple A machinery or public sympathy for the farmer's cause."

He spoke here on the tenth anniversary of the Administration's farm program which Mr. Wallace began as Secretary of Agriculture.

Foreseeing a possible period of good business and full employment after the war ends, he added that it might prove to be temporary because it would be based on short-lived war-caused factors.

"Unless we take definite steps to insure that sufficient buying power will be kept up, there will be a decline in both foreign and domestic demand for farm products within a few years after the war ends," he said.

"If that should happen, farmers will desperately need the kind of help that only the Triple A machinery can give. That is one reason why it is so important for the farmers to be on guard so as not to let their fair-weather friends destroy the Triple A or public sympathy for the farmer's cause.

"If such a period of business decline should set in, not only will farmers desperately need a farm program, but business men and laboring men will desperately need a program to restore industrial employment and production."

Mr. Wallace cautioned against any post-war national program embodying an "excessive nationalist policy." He said that the country was now "being flooded with propaganda for new, subtle and therefore dangerous forms of isolationism which, if adopted, would lead straight to World War No. 3."

This is a clipping from page_____ of the New York Times for

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To Begin With:

Our Fears Can't Reshape Europe

Much of the thinking with which we are being regaled these days on the Russian question isn't so much thinking as it is response to fear. And nothing interferes with thinking as much as fear.

You would suppose that, after praying all these months that Russia would beat back the Nazi hordes, we would now feel grateful and admiring toward our Russian allies for doing exactly that. But not at all. One of the dominant themes in Congressional thinking is still the danger of "Communism," and one of the dominant questions is the faked-up issue of whether we will cling to our American way of life or exchange it for the Russian.

I took a longish trip recently through the Middle West and Canada, and I can testify that when I discussed the Russian question it was regarded by my audiences as somehow a special mark of courage or temerity on my part. On a radio program at which every week high-school students discuss some issue of the day, eight high schools had to be canvassed before one could be found which was willing to let its students talk about Russia. It wasn't the mike that would bite them: it was the question.

The curious thing about this fear is that it is a dual one. On the one hand there is the fear that, after having driven the Nazis out of their territory, the Russians will stop fighting and will negotiate a peace with Germany. On the other hand there is the fear that the Russians will go on driving the Nazis until they have driven to Berlin or beyond, and that they will occupy Germany and control the European continent.

The fear-drenched thinkers can't seem to make up their minds whether they want the Russians to go on fighting or not. They suffer from compartment thinking. In one compartment of their minds they fear that the Russians will stop fighting, in another they fear that they won't. And never the twain shall meet. They do not see the contradiction because fears are irrational, and are not erased by logic.

One could argue that the fears are self-contradictory, that they are unbased, that they are unworthy of us in the face of the Russian war record, that they are dangerous to the United Nations understanding, that they are demoralizing to our own war mood and peace intentions.

One could argue these things, but it wouldn't do any good:

¶ For the soil in which these fears grow is the soil of the historical memories that Americans still have from the days when the Russian Revolution shook the world.

¶ And the roots of the fear are the deep roots of class-interest thinking. The possessors of the earth fear Russia as the embodiment of the socialist idea. And the humble folk tend, in their thinking, to identify themselves with the ruling groups. The stronger Russia shows itself, the more deeply do these roots of fear dig into the soil.

¶ And the green bay tree of these fears is cherished and tended anxiously by the Nazi propagandists, who hope with them to make the house of the United Nations a house divided against itself.

I don't mean to dump all fear and distrust of Russia into these categories. There are many liberals who distrust Russia for moral and political reasons. Theirs is the disillusionment of a lost dream. They remember the hopes with which the liberal world watched the development of a socialist state. They place side by side with those hopes the single-party state, the secret police, the deaths by famine, the purges, the Pact, the dictatorship. As a result they feel that there is a vast moral gulf that separates their world from the Russian.

But though they hold off from Russia, the driving forces that are today trying to whip up the fears of Russia into a world political movement are not theirs. These forces are to be found not among the liberals, but among the primitives and reactionaries of our world.

As against these forces there are powerful emerging facts that must be reckoned with:

¶ One is the new respect that ordinary people all over the world feel for what Russia has built up and for its war record.

¶ A second is the habits of common action that are emerging out of the terrible crucible of a coalition war.

¶ A third is the sheer fact that, despite McCormick and Patterson and Dies and the rest, America must live in a real world, and not in the nightmare world of the double fear.

Europe after the war will not be shaped by American fears. It will be shaped by its own sense of interest. It will be a Europe in which, whether we like it or not, Russia will have an important place. It will be a Europe that has lived through a ten-year ordeal of violence and suffering—an ordeal that either cleanses men or brutalizes them, but that in any case frees them from the phantoms that still preside over American thinking.

—Max Lerner

This is the second of a series of editorials on American-Russian relations, now and in the postwar world. The third, Russia Faces Europe, *will appear tomorrow.*

This is a clipping from page R of the PM for March 7, 1943
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Frankness, Not Fear

If some wise diplomat were to write a textbook for the United Nations on the subject, "How to be friends though allies," a principal chapter would have to be headed, "Russia and America." Few keys to the postwar world need more attention. Its difficulties—and its hopeful possibilities—have just been illustrated in the sharply contrasting statements of two notable Americans.

Ambassador Standley, breaking out with some heat in Moscow, insisted that the Russian people be told about the help they are getting from the United States. This is not what might be called "diplomatic language" but bluntness is sometimes the best diplomacy. It would be unfortunate if the bluff Admiral's words aroused any popular animosity toward Russia or led Congress to stop lend-lease aid to Moscow. But frankness could clear away fears and suspicions.

Vice-President Wallace, advocating friendship and co-operation with Russia as essential to the building of a sound peace, was also making a useful approach to the question. But to us his intimation that unless Americans are more friendly toward Russia she will make common cause with Germany and bring on World War Three, seems to promote untimely fears. A more positive and helpful emphasis would be on adequate appreciation of what Russia has done to win this war.

Mr. Wallace's speech on the whole was positive and helpful, particularly in upholding the Christian democracy, its doctrine of service, its reliance on reason, its insistence on the dignity and freedom of the individual, and its basic confidence in peace among men who are brothers because they have one Father. In such spiritual concepts lies the fundamental answer to the claims of war—the fascist belief that nations must fight and the communist insistence on class war.

Application of the Wallace thesis to the Russian question need not lead into any blurring of the differences between democracy and communism or any hiding of the spots where Russian-American understanding is weak. It is better to face these things frankly and bring them into the open for correction and adjustment. The war has proved that Russia and America have one large political interest in common—the restraining of aggression. Geographical considerations are likely to make Russia always a very great counterpoise to both Japan and Germany, which for various reasons have been and are cast as enemies of the United States.

The present co-operation can continue even though there be still a great ideological chasm between democracy and communism. But that co-operation can be greater and more useful if some of the misunderstandings which have nothing to do with ideology are removed. Mutual appreciation and more willingness to recognize that humanity is greater than ideologies would help.

Appreciation of the Russian people has been growing in the United States. Admiral Standley's urging that Russians be permitted to know what aid they are getting from America may help Russian appreciation of America. If America goes on to overcome its fears of international co-operation and to prove a lasting interest in maintaining a peaceful world the Russian people are more likely to overcome their own isolationist fears and suspicions.

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Allies State Case on Aid to Stalin;

By a Staff Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON, March 9—While Ambassador William H. Standley was speaking on his own when he told a Moscow press conference that Stalin wasn't informing the Russian people about American aid to the U. S. S. R., the basic Washington reaction to his statement is that a little plain speaking on the part of the United States at this time won't do any harm—and may do some eventual good.

Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles declared today that Admiral Standley's remarks were made "without prior consultation with or reference to" the American Government, adding that he had cabled the Ambassador for the full text of his statement.

Secretary Welles stressed to his press conference, however, that he was confident that anything Ambassador Standley might have said "could not have been intended to, and did not, cast any doubt on the understanding and trust" which exists between the United States and other members of the United Nations.

Hint Against Secretiveness

Stalin has been outspoken in his demands for a second front in Europe. The United States knows exactly where he stands on that subject. Now an American spokesman, it is observed, has given more than a hint that the United States would prefer a little less secretiveness on the Kremlin's part.

This goes both for home-consumption publicity about American aid to Russia and for more vital subjects. Washington would like better arrangements for exchange of military information with the Soviet; it would like to know more about Russia's military needs, its wartime and postwar objectives. This American displeasure, diplomatically expressed, has now reached Stalin's ears.

But informed Government quarters do not believe Admiral Standley's forthright words will result in any strain in diplomatic relations with Moscow, will produce any crisis in Russian relations with the rest of the United Nations, or will result in any diminution of lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union.

The Russian Embassy, as if in partial reply, today released a Soviet information bulletin containing the text of a message to British and American women from the Soviet Women's Anti-Fascist Committee in which it was stressed that American and British meas-

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What Standley Said On Russian Silence

By the Associated Press

Moscow, March 9

Admiral William H. Standley, U. S. Ambassador to Russia, told a press conference yesterday that he did not think the Russian people were being told the complete story of United States aid to Russia.

"I find no political motive to this," Admiral Standley said. "It is only an effort to create the impression with their own people that they are pulling themselves through by their own boot straps."

Pointing out that a new lend-lease bill is now before Congress in Washington, Admiral Standley added that "the American Congress is big-hearted and generous, but if you give it the impression that their help means nothing there might be a different story."

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tensive celebrations of all sorts, mass meetings, speeches, parades, and newspaper and magazine articles, all celebrating whole-heartedly the magnificent achievements of Soviet Russia in the war.

But Admiral Standley's frank statement, combined with the common sense in Mr. Wallace's plain implications that it is up to the Russians as well as to the democracies to show they can co-operate, have crystallized a sentiment that has been growing steadily here in past weeks.

It is that no lasting unity nor even useful co-operation between the English-speaking democracies on the one hand and Russia on the other, can be possible without a give-and-take attitude on both sides.

Need for Mutuality

Although great restraint is still exercised in the press to avoid any criticism of the Russian allies, it is undoubtedly the case that the better-informed section of the public is, like Admiral Standley, beginning to be seriously concerned at the need for more "mutuality" in Anglo-Soviet relations.

There is a growing feeling in particular that not enough is being done either in Russia, or for that matter in Britain itself, to state the democracies' case.

There is increasing recognition of the importance of the Soviet Government showing a willingness to let the Soviet people know the facts about Allied aid, both direct and indirect, to the Soviet Union. Otherwise there is a definite danger of a false situation arising when victory has been won, if not before.

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Restatement of Case

Thus there is a new demand for a restatement of the case against Stalin's contention that the Red Army has been bearing alone the whole burden of the war. Britain and the United States have in fact got a very good case.

To begin with many persons here are now beginning to wonder whether they have been altogether wise in never calling to Moscow's attention the fact that for a whole year after the collapse of France, Britain stood out alone against Nazi might, and that at that time the British never alluded to the possibility of Russia opening a second front in the east.

Even ignoring this, however, and overlooking the part which the Soviets played in encouraging Germany to go to war by making an agreement with them in August, 1939, Britain and the other Allies, including the United States have an excellent case in proving they have borne their full share in this war against the Axis.

Comparison of Rates

In fact in two of three theaters of war—air, sea, land—Britain especially, and the United States more lately has actually played a far greater role than the Soviets.

At sea it is the British and American navies which have kept German ports and the German fleet blockaded, and which have waged unceasing war against the U-boats.

It is the British and American fleets and also the Allied merchant navies which have kept open the convoy lifelines in this global war.

Had it not been for this naval blockade of the continent, Hitler's armies would undoubtedly have had even greater strength and would possess reserves of rubber, petrol, and war material of many kinds, the shortage of which is now giving them a great deal of trouble.

Achievements of RAF

In the air, the decisive task of wresting from the Luftwaffe the air superiority upon which its conquest of Western Europe was based has been accomplished mainly by the RAF.

In 1942 alone British fighter pilots destroyed at least 738 German planes, while antiaircraft artillery and other defenses accounted for another 177.

It is estimated that since the war began the RAF fighter command pilots alone have shot down some 9,000 aircraft, while another 800 have been brought down at night.

These are conservative figures which take no account of German planes destroyed by bomber and coastal commands, and furthermore which do not include the vast number of German planes destroyed in North Africa.

Heavy Toll on Germans

The figures are sufficient, however, to show that a heavy toll has been taken of the German air force in the west. Furthermore it is now reliably established that Britain's bombing raids and fighter sweeps, combined with the North African operations, keep more than half of the total in the Luftwaffe pinned down so Hitler is unable to use it in Russia.

Moreover, the bombing of Germany by the RAF and more recently by the United States Air Force has undoubtedly been a major factor in the war.

More than 100,000 tons of bombs have been dropped on Germany, Italy and occupied territories by the RAF Bomber Command alone since the start of the war.

More than half of this total was dropped during the past 12 months. However much the estimates of the effectiveness of the air raids may vary, those who went through the German air blitz on Britain won't be inclined to ignore this aspect of the Allied offensive against Hitler.

Help in War Supplies

Besides this indirect aid to the Red Army at sea and in the air, both Britain and the United States have given much direct aid to Russia in the form of planes, tanks, guns, ammunition, and other war supplies.

The figures on this aid, given in another column in this issue, constitute concrete proof of the sincerity of Prime Minister Churchill's statement in his House of Commons speech after the Casablanca conference, when he said, "Our duty to aid to the utmost in our power the magnificent and tremendous effort of Russia, and to try to draw the enemy and the enemy air force from the Russian front, was accepted as the first of our objectives, once the problem of the U-boat has been settled in such a way as to enable us to act aggressively."

Today it is impossible to question the willingness even to eagerness of the British and American armies and Governments to get at the German enemy, to open a second, third, even a fourth front, on the continent of Europe.

One of the main reasons why they have been unable to do this sooner is the fact that they have devoted such a large proportion a their merchant shipping with naval escorts to the costly task of carrying tremendous quantities of war supplies to Russia.

Whatever may have delayed a second front in the past, however, there is no doubt that it is now being prepared for the future.

In fact if it were not, popular opinion in this country would undoubtedly force the Government to take action of some sort.

One of the most striking phe-

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nomena of the war has been the tidal wave of enthusiasm for Russia which has swept Britain. And it is not a question merely of the "working classes."

Support and active sympathy for Russia with a genuine desire to reach an Anglo-Soviet understanding extends throughout all but a few diehard elements here.

It is significant of this feeling that Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in a recent speech took great pains to demolish the new version of the "Red bogey" which German propaganda has been working overtime lately to inflate as a means of disrupting the accord of the United Nations.

It is safe to say that the British Government and people are today ready to go more than halfway not only to aid the Russians during the war but to co-operate with them after victory.

Because of this, it is all the more important to face frankly the fact that so far there has been disappointingly little evidence of equal good will on the Soviet side.

No one here minimizes the greatness and gallantry of the Soviet resistance to Nazi invasion. On the contrary the Red Army's achievement is more in danger of being exaggerated rather than understated.

Need for Reciprocity

But it is now beginning to be realized here that the Soviets so far have done very little to reciprocate all that has been undertaken here in the way of informing the public sympathetically about Russia.

It is not at all a question of Britain or the United States wanting appreciation or thanks for its own sake. It is that there is beginning to be a sharp realization that failure on the part of Russian leaders to explain the big British and American part in the war fully to the Russian people may cause complications after final victory has been achieved.

In short, the situation might almost be summed up by saying that Britain and America today would be justified in paraphrasing Stalin's complaint and saying that "owing to the absence of adequate appreciation on the part of Russia of the part of its Allies in the war, the western democracies are now bearing alone the whole burden of winning the peace."

U. S.-British Aid to Russia

Just how much aid have Britain and the United States sent to Soviet Russia?

Actual figures are, for the most part, military secrets, but a fairly accurate picture can be obtained from recent statements made in Washington and London.

Capt. Oliver Lyttelton, British Production Minister, told a meeting at Newcastle on Feb. 21 that the United States and Britain together had sent Russia nearly 6,200 tanks and 5,600 aircraft between October, 1941, and December, 1942.

John Anderson, Lord President of the Council, in a statement made about the same time, said that Britain alone had by the middle of November sent equipment for 20 armored divisions to Russia. By Dec. 31, he said, the British had shipped 2,974 tanks, 2,480 aircraft, and an extra 600 aircraft under the terms of the British-Russian agreement.

Captain Lyttelton declared that in addition to planes and tanks the British-American contribution to the Russian war front included 50,000 tons of rubber, 831,000 deadweight tons of machine tools, metals, ammunition and small arms, and 70,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. The tanks and planes, he said, were sufficient to equip 32 armored divisions and 400 aerial squadrons.

Reports submitted to congressional committees by Edward R. Stettinius, Lend-Lease Administrator, show that American war supplies to Russia have included 2,600 planes, 3,200 tanks, 72,500 trucks, 7,700 motorcycles, 1,300 military tractors, 130,000 submachine guns, 580,000 tons of steel, 75,000 tons of rails, 17,000 tons of other railroad equipment, 140,000 field telephones, thousands of tons of zinc, duraluminum, copper and brass, "tremendous quantities" of food, and 3,000,000 pairs of heavy boots.

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Plain Speaking Due to Clear the Air

By Mallory Browne

The Christian Science Monitor

LONDON, March 9 — Several factors point to the possibility of a saner stage being inaugurated soon in the relations between Russia and other United Nations, particularly Britain and the United States.

The issue has been brought to the fore by the prominence given here to Vice-President Wallace's speech in which he emphasized the importance of a "close and trusting understanding" with Russia if World War III is to be avoided, as well as by United States Ambassador Admiral William H. Standley's statement at Moscow that there was no appreciation on the part of the Russian people for the aid they have been receiving from the Allies.

Admiral Standley expressed serious concern at the absence of any recognition in the Russian press of the magnificent material help sent from the United States, and added: "There has been no question about the Soviets' trying to create the impression abroad as well as at home that they are fighting the war alone."

Stalin's Speech Recalled

This, of course, echoes Stalin's own statement in his order of the day on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Russian Army last month that "the Red Army has been bearing alone the whole burden of the war."

At the time this assertion passed almost unchallenged in Britain, due mainly to the fact that the whole country was in the midst of ex-

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ures of assistance "are keenly felt in our country and are a source of inspiration to us in our grim struggle."

A general confidence is felt here that despite Kremlin secretiveness, Allied relations with the nation which is doing the maor damage to Hitler right now are firm enough not to be upset over what is termed a bit of constructive criticism. British and American diplomatic officials are confident that Russia will make no separate peace with German in the near or distant future.

Nor is there any prospect that American aid to Russia will be diminished, despite the fact that Admiral Standley gave vent to American displeasure just as the matter of extension of the Lend-Lease Act was nearing final vote in the House of Representatives. New isolationist attempts to add restrictive amendments may delay the final vote, but Russia is too valuable a war partner to permit any change in American military plans and pledges to the U. S. S. R.

Representative Hamilton Fish (R) of New York, congressional arch-isolationist, said today that the American Ambassador's statement would not affect extension of lend-lease, declaring that while he had never supposed Russia's Communists had altered their desire to spread Communism in other lands, "we'll vote for lend-lease because we want to supply them as long as they'll keep on fighting."

As a matter of record, the extent of material help sent to Russia by the United States has been vast, at least when viewed from an American perspective. Reports submitted to congressional committees by Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease Administrator, show what war supplies have been sent to Russia.

[An accompanying box lists these items.]

The great majority of Russians manifestly know nothing of these supplies, although soldiers on some fronts are using American tanks and planes and some housewives doubtless have recognized that the flour, sugar, lard and canned meats they have used recently have been of American origin, and hundreds of thousands of persons in reconquered areas must understand that their new boots came from overseas.

Russian Morale Helped

Admiral Standley, a champion of maximum aid to Russia, stressed that he found no political motive behind Stalin's concealment of the extent of American aid. Informed quarters here concur with his view that a prime purpose behind the secrecy is the maintaining of Russian morale at high pitch, accomplished by giving the populace the impression that they are pulling themselves through a desperate crisis "by their own bootstraps."

American officials realize that Russia is fighting a terrific battle, enduring hardships which have as yet hardly touched the United States. In the atmosphere of such a struggle for defense of the homeland, American supplies, particularly after the submarines have taken their toll en route, may sometimes appear to be a "trickle," whereas in fact they have materially helped to bolster several Soviet fronts.

Washington agencies concerned with the postwar peace conference, however, realize that a second objective may also motivate Stalin in soft-pedaling Allied assistance. If he can tell the Russian people that they are fighting the war relatively unaided, he can also persuade them that they are entitled to dictate their own peace terms. Thus he can be assured of a united nation behind him when and if Russia lays claim, at the peace, to the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, and Bessarabia.

It was remarked that Admiral Standley spoke on the same day that Vice-President Wallace, in a major address, warned the western democracies that unless they found bases for firm collaboration with Russia today, the seeds of World War III would soon be planted. In discovering these bases, it was stressed, plain-speaking by American as well as Russian officials will let both parties know where they stand. The more pessimistic opinion, however, is that Stalin will be impressed, and made a firm ally, by one event only: the opening of a second front in Europe.

This is a clipping from
page 1 of the
Christian Science Monitor
for [illegible]
Clipped at the Seat of
Government.

Envoy Warns at Moscow Of Lend-Lease Effect Here

By The United Press.

MOSCOW, March 8—Admiral William H. Standley, United States Ambassador, said today that news of important American aid was being kept from the Russian people and he suggested that Russian authorities sought to give the impression that Russia was fighting the war entirely alone.

Admiral Standley said also by implication that Russia was reluctant to exchange information on conduct of the war and that unless Congress felt that it was helping Russia, it might be inclined to hesitate before it passed the pending lend-lease extension bill.

"It is not fair to mislead Americans into giving millions from their pockets, thinking that they are aiding the Russian people, without the Russian people knowing about it," Admiral Standley said at a press conference.

[Premier Joseph Stalin said in his order of the day to the Russian Army on Feb. 23, The United Press recalled, that "in view of the absence of a second front in Europe the Red Army alone is bearing the whole weight of the war." Throughout his message, Mr. Stalin emphasized that Russia was depending on her own resources.]

Admiral Standley, the blunt Navy man sent here on a key diplomatic assignment after a disinguished career of nearly forty years that took him to the high post of Chief of Naval Operations, mad his statement when he was asked about the fact that British and American, but not Russian,

Continued on Page Five

Continued From Page One

newspapers had published an acknowledgement by the Russian Red Cross of American aid.

"Well, there is no question that people in America know the facts and that here the people don't," Admiral Standley said.

"Ever since I have been here, I have been carefully looking for recognition by the Russian press of the fact that they are getting material help through America, not only through lend-lease but through the Red Cross and the Russian-American Relief. And I have yet failed to find any acknowledgment of that.

"The American people are giving aid out of a friendly feeling for the Russians, but the Russian people do not know about it."

He Sees Little Progress

Asked whether there had been any progress in the exchange of information between the Russian and United States governments, Admiral Standley said there had been no obvious change in Russia's attitude concerning exchange of information dealing with the conduct of the war.

When asked why he thought the Russian authorities were not informing their people regarding the aid received, Admiral Standley said:

"They seem to be trying to create the impression at home as wel as abroad that they are fighting the war alone.

"There appears to be a desire on the part of the Russians to create the impression that thew are fighting the war with their own resources rather than acknowledge help from any one."

In a discussion of extension of the Lend-Lease Act, Admiral Standley said that the bill to that effect had passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

"But as those familiar with legislative procedure know," he continued, "it is a long way from the Foreign Affairs Committee to enactment. The American Congress is rather sensitive. It is generous and big-hearted as long as it feels that it is helping some one. But give it the idea it is not helping, and it might be a different story."

Finds "No Political Motive"

MOSCOW, March 8 (AP)—Admiral Standley in the course of his press conference statement today to the effect that he did not think the Russian people were being told the complete story of United States aid to Russia, said:

"I find no political motive to this. It is only an effort to create the impression with their own people that they are pulling themselves through by their own boot straps."

"The Russian people have no opportunity to know they are being helped by the American people," he added. "I mean the plain American people who are digging down in their own pockets."

The Ambassador said the Russians were getting numerous things from the United States.

"You can say planes by the thousands," he declared.

It was pointed out to Admiral Standley that recently several Russian generals told foreign correspondents they were getting no American help at the front except trucks.

"They are getting plenty of other kind of war material," said Admiral Standley. "If it's not at the front, I don't know what they are doing with it."

The Ambassador said he planned to see Premier Stalin soon.

Asked about the second front question, Admiral Standley said he was not sure what the Russians would consider a second front."

People Have Some Knowledge

By RALPH PARKER

Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, March 8—The United

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Times for March 9, 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

States Ambassador, Admiral William Standley, in a conference with American and British press representatives today, expressed concern that the lack of publicity in the Soviet Union to war supplies of American origin might affect opinion in Congress during the present negotiations on the Lend-Lease Act.

Admiral Standley has always been a champion of maximum United States aid to Russia and his remarks, made with characteristic frankness, clearly indicated his desire to remove any obstacles to fulfillment of President Roosevelt's policy of giving the Red Army every possible aid in the gigantic struggle with the main forces of the enemy.

The admiral expressed regret that the Soviet people had not been told more of the supplies reaching their front and factories from the United States. Wider publicity would, in his opinion, ease the task of the Washington administration in maintaining lend-lease aid at maximum quantity. He said shipping problems had caused American supplies to fall behind schedule.

In considering the Russian information on American aid it would be an error to imagine that the people are unaware of the origin of the weapons, trucks and food shipped from the United States. In their present mood it would be too much to expect people who are exerting almost superhuman efforts in the war—scarcely one family is not mourning the loss of a relative—to show any great enthusiasm for material supplies.

Nevertheless many housewives realize that their flour, sugar, lard and canned meats are of American origin. Few persons in the liberated regions who have received boots are not aware that they were shipped across the Atlantic.

Concerns Internal Affairs

Official recognition of American aid in the Soviet press is a matter concerning internal Russian affairs, which Admiral Standley would be the first to recognize would be outside the competence of an Ambassador's comment. But anyone who knows the Russian people in their day-to-day lives would subscribe to the view that official mention is not the only way in which knowledge can reach the people.

There can be no doubt that the masses of the Soviet Union are fully aware of the extent of American aid. American-built trucks rumble through many towns and villages; American-built tanks—not the latest types—are used on many fronts.

A colonel of the Red Army Air Force told the writer that every American plane delivered was welcome and used.

It must be left to the supreme command of the Red Army to decide just when and where the bulk of the American supplies, which after all are only a small fraction of the total matériel consumed in the immense struggle on this front, can best be used. And it is a matter for the Soviet Government to decide whether it is in the general interest to give wide official publicity to share the Allied-built material used at present.

That is a matter intimately bound up with the complex problem of maintaining the morale of the people, enduring hardships that Americans can hardly imagine, at the highest pitch.

Though undoubtedly made with the best of intentions, Ambassador Standley's criticisms of the manner in which the Soviet Government is handling internal propaganda is likely to undermine the painstakingly built up confidence between the Allies. It cannot be too often emphasized that until the Russians' allies are actively engaging the enemy on European soil they cannot expect much credit for supplying food, arms, trucks and raw materials.

The government's reticence is calculated to allay ill feeling. To Russian soldiers, fighting in the snow, to Russian workers enduring great hardships in remote Ural townships 200,000 trucks do not tip the balance against 200,000 Russian lives.

Stalin Book Clew to Reds War Aims

(Last of a series.)

By Henry C. Cassidy
Associated Press Staff Writer

New York, March 8.—A guide to the Soviet Union at war, and an outline of the postwar Soviet state, are given by a small, paper-covered book, issued by the Foreign Language Publishing House in Moscow.

It is "J. Stalin on the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union," a collection of the leader's wartime pronouncements.

When Stalin speaks, it is not an idle address to suit some passing occasion. It is a document, giving a definite directive to his people, repeated to them over and over again, and kept before them, not as a thing of the past, but as a current order.

Before the war, Stalin's speeches, articles and letters were collected periodically in volumes entitled "Problems of Leninism."

Constant Reiteration

During the war, his utterances have been published textually in every Soviet periodical, and then taken, phrase by phrase, as the subject for editorials until a new statement is made. They are repeated constantly on the radio, posted in public places.

Translated into German, Italian, Hungarian, Rumanian and the other languages of the Axis countries, they are dropped in enemy territory in leaflets, pamphlest and newspapers.

Finally, they are assembled, in the original Russian, and in English, French and other Allied languages, in book form.

The latest edition comprises his first broadcast July 3, 1941, his speeches November 6 and 7, 1941, on the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, his orders of the day February 23 and May 1, 1942, on Red Army Day and May Day, his speech of November 6, 1942, order of the day November 7 and his two letters to the Associated Press October 3 and November 13, 1942. His latest order of the day, on February 23, will be included in the next volume.

Key to Red Action

These statements, because of their constant repetition, provide, perhaps more than those of any national leader, a key to the thoughts and actions of the country. Reference to them makes clear much about the Soviet Union that sometimes seems abroad to be a mystery.

The dominating note is one of firm confidence in victory. Even in his first broadcast, the "scorched earth" speech, calling on the Russians to leave nothing to the invader, while the Germans were stampeding into the country, Stalin closed with the slogan, "Forward to Victory." That thought, in one form or another, has been, ever since, his conclusion.

Prophetically, he said in the same speech, "In this great war, we shall have true allies in the peoples of Europe and America." Despite differences which have arisen since then, particularly over the second front, that has remained his story.

As the war proceeds, his orders become more specific: increase production of tanks and antitank weapons; learn to handle these weapons perfectly; stiffen discipline and stimulate guerilla warfare; exterminate every invader; and finally, destroy the Nazi state, and Nazi army and the Nazi "new order" in Europe.

Clews to Future

In these pronouncements, there are clews to the future domestic status planned for the Soviet Union: a continued Soviet system, controlled by Soviet government and Communist Party organs, with socialized industry and collectivized farms.

There are indications of the Soviet claims at the peace conference: the Baltic states, Belo-Russia, Karelia and Moldavia, all belonging to the Soviet Union, but no aspirations to territory which was outside the Soviet fold before the war, including specifically Iran and Slavonic nations like Yugoslavia.

There are suggestions of the Soviet attitude toward postwar Germany: Destruction of the Nazi regime with its army and new order, but maintenance of a unified German people and nation, with some sort of organized military force of its own.

There are signs of the future foreign policy of the Soviet Union: Noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations, collaboration with Great Britain and the United States, racial and national equality, territorial integrity and political sovereignty for occupied nations and economic assistance in reconstruction of devastated countries.

Given Stalin as a victor, that is his outline of the Soviet Union of the future.

FIGURES ON ARMS SENT TO RUSSIA REVEALED BY U.S.

Stettinius Itemizes Aid by Lend-Lease.

[Chicago Tribune Press Service.]

Washington, D. C., March 7.—Actual "facts and figures" on the lend-lease materials going to Russia in addition to the "many thousand planes, tanks, and guns" and tons of food, were made public today by lend-lease administrator E. R. Stettinius Jr. A measure calling for extension of the lend-lease act comes up for consideration on the house floor tomorrow.

Stettinius revealed that lend-lease aid provided the soviet union by the United States has included:

1. Considerable quantities of raw materials for Russia's munitions industry, and

2. Important transportation and communications equipment for use along and behind the long Russian front.

Many Plants Shipped.

These materials were provided in addition also to the modern million dollar industrial plants bought in this country and "knocked down" for shipment abroad to be set up in Russian war production centers, as described by Stettinius to congressional investigating committees last week.

His "facts and figures" on munitions, transportation, and communication lend-lease aid to Russia, follows:

"Up to Feb. 1, 1943, we had shipped to the U. S. S. R. more than 580,000 tons of steel, 46,000 tons of aluminum and duraluminum, 21,500 tons of zinc, 94,000 tons of copper and brass and other industrial materials such as nickel and molybdenum for soviet factories making planes tanks, and other war equipment.

"We have shipped 50,000 tons of tuluol and TNT, and 75,000 tons of other chemicals for Soviet production of bombs, high explosive shells, and other munitions," Stettinius said.

140,000 Field Telephones.

"For soviet railroads we have sent 75,000 tons of rails and 17,000 tons of other railroad equipment. We have sent 140,000 field telephones, in addition to hundreds of thousands of miles of field telephone wire. We have shipped 268,000 tons of petroleum products for the operation of soviet planes and trucks.

"Of the 99,000 military motor vehicles other than tanks shipped to soviet union from the United States tens of thousands of trucks are employed in maintaining supply lines behind the Russian front. We have shipped 72,500 trucks, 17,500 jeeps and armored cars, 7,700 motorcycles, and 1,300 military tractors.

"We have shipped nearly 3 million pairs of army boots for soviet soldiers who battle in snow and ice and mud, in addition to 18,000 tons of sole leather for Red army shoes made in soviet factories," the lend-lease administrator reported.

This is a clipping from page 11 of the Chicago Tribune for March 8, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Bryce Oliver

Says USSR, Pope Seek Balkan Bloc

Bryce Oliver (WEVD) said over the weekend that an Allied invasion of Europe through the Balkans will face a clash of interests between Soviet Russia and the Vatican. Oliver said:

"Stalin is ambitious to knit together a Slavic confederation under the guidance of 'Mother Russia.' This involves the Slavs of the Balkans. A Slav conference already has its headquarters in Moscow and the political direction clashes directly with known ambitions of the Vatican to weld a Catholic Slav Federation."

Oliver said both sides of the controversy are "getting set to obtain support for themselves from London and Washington."

He also said that the "sharp divergence between the Soviet and the exiled Polish government" may be due to the fact that the old Polish regime was and is strongly Catholic. He went on:

"A Poland under the old regime would have special consideration from the Vatican, especially against Russia. It is therefore not unreasonable to suspect that the conversations at the Vatican, in which New York's Archbishop Spellman took part, are concerned at least in part with the future of Poland."

This is a clipping from page 13 of the PM for March 8, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Red War Reports True

Rules Of Censorship Liberal

(One of a series.)

By Henry C. Cassidy

Associated Press Staff Writer

New York, March 7.—The news you read from the Soviet Union is as accurate as any that can be given from a great country at war.

I have been asked repeatedly, since my return to New York: Can we believe the Moscow stories?

For the Associated Press bureau, and, I think, for the rest of the press corps in Moscow, I can say that the correspondents are satisfield that their reports are subsiantially reliable.

They do not always tell the whole story, and the figures may sometimes be out of line, but in general, what they say is true.

The sources of information are exceptionally trustworthy. They are the Soviet press, official communiques and eye-witness observation.

The greatest single source is the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda, or Red Star, official organ of the commissariat of defense. It is not circulated generally, but is destined for Red army officers and men.

Invariably Accurate

Red Star carries brief dispatches from its own correspondents on current action, and long, instructive articles by high officers on military problems. These writers are not trying to fool their own men. Their reports are invariably accurate.

Pravda, organ of the central committee of the Communist Party, and Izvestia, organ of the Supreme Soviet, are the other principal newspapers. They have official backing for what they say.

They publish more general, descriptive articles for their millions of readers. Each prints four pages daily, the first devoted to an editorial and communiques, the last to foreign news and the two inside pages to dispatches from their correspondents.

The communiques are issued each noon and night. Copies are handed to foreign correspondents in the ground-floor press room of the foreign commissariat at about the same time they are delivered to Soviet news offices and broadcast by Moscow radio.

This winter, the communiques have consisted of a page, listing points recaptured by the Red army, and several pages of details on individual operations. There is no case known to Moscow correspondents of a false Soviet claim to capture of any point.

When German counter-attacks have resulted in recapture of points, the Soviet authorities do not make misleading statements about such action, but usually lapse into silence on that operation. Such silences are understood by the Russian people.

During the battle of Moscow, I had an opportunity to check on figures given by the communiqué, which estimated 750 German vehicles were destroyed along the road of Volokolamsk. Driving down that road, I counted more than 1000 wrecked tanks, trucks and cars.

Hitler Habit Cited

I asked a Red army officer why the figure had been underestimated, and he replied: "Hitler overestimates, and look what happened to him."

Figures on enemy casualties, however, sometimes seem to correspondents to be overestimated. This was particularly so early in the war, when German losses were estimated at one million a month, at a time when the Red army was retreating. Now that the Russians are advancing, and they have more opportunity to confirm their estimates, correspondents consider the figures more reliable.

The correspondents have made eight group visits to the front. The first was to the Yelnia sector, west of Moscow, in September, 1941. There were three to the Moscow front in the winter of 1941-42, one to the Rzhev front last August, and three so far this winter to the Stalingrad front, the City of Stalingrad and the Ukraine.

After Victory

They are permitted on the front only after the Red army has won a victory and consolidated its new positions. They do not see actual combat. But they are able to inspect the scenes of battle, and talk with officers and men who participated in the action.

In addition to these main sources of news, the correspondents sometimes have interviews with Soviet authorities, arranged through the foreign commissariat or the Soviet Information Bureau, and make infrequent trips to cities or training centers in the rear.

Solomon Lozovsky, vice-commissar of foreign affairs and assistant chief of the Sovinformburo, under Alexander Shcherbakov, no longer holds the press conferences he began early in the war. He is staying in Kuibyshev, dealing with Far Eastern affairs, while the correspondents' headquarters are in Moscow. Nikolai Palgunov, former Tass correspondent in Paris, heads the press section of the foreign commissariat.

Censored by Two Men

Two young men censor all the dispatches sent from Moscow. They are Pietr Anurov, former press attache at Tokio, and Viktor Kozhemiako, former secretary of embassy at Chungking. Theirs is a 12-hour day, seven-day week job, going through the telegrams of a score of correspondents.

The censorship, which was the strictest of any before the war, sometimes limiting dispatches entirely to what appeared in the Soviet press, is now among the most liberal. The censors watch for information which might aid or give comfort to the enemy, and also for any that might be misleading or incorrect in their opinion.

But any article which seems to them a reasonable interpretation of the facts given by the Soviet press or communique, or witnessed at the front, is permitted to pass.

The correspondents now have comparatively few quarrels with the censors. Their quarrel is in trying to get more news from the source.

(Tomorrow: Stalin.)

WASH. POST
MARCH 8, 1943
PAGE 9

Russia: Guesswork And Fact

The guessing has started again. I mean, of course, the guessing as to what Russia will do, both in the war and the post-war period. There is scarcely a newspaper editor, columnist, or radio commentator in the country who has not, during the past week or two, taken a fling at "interpreting" Stalin's message to the Red Army on its twenty-fifth anniversary, and who has not peered into the crystal ball of the future.

Russia is once more, whether we like it or not, dominating our thinking. There are many over whose minds it looms as a massive shadow. There are others for whom it is the lodestar, the one fixed point in a shifting and bewildering world. And each group lets its thinking be shaped by its fears and wishes.

In this series of editorials I want to see the relations between Russia and America steadily and whole. I want to see them without benefit of fear or wishfulness.

My basic premise is a conviction that America and Russia are the great peoples, the two creative and powerful nations of the future. Britain will still have strength, but its day as the ranking power of the world is past. China will have strength, but it will be the strength of rebirth in an ancient tradition, rather than the strength of a young people. Latin America will have strength, but it will be the strength of a people not yet unified and not yet out of its satellite stage. America and Russia will have the strength of youth and confidence.

There are, to be sure, a fear and a wish that I start with. It is the fear that the two nations will pull against each other, will grapple with each other for dominance, with disaster for the world as the only consequence. It is the wish for common action between the two peoples as the leaders of a United Nations world. Whether it will be the fear or the wish that is fulfilled depends on how clearly we think about the main lines of our relations with Russia.

The Russian 'Mystery'

At the very beginning we had better dispel the idea of a special "mystery" surrounding Russia. The Russians are no more of a mystery than we are. Actually it is anyone's guess whether we are going to put the fascist collaborationists into power permanently in North Africa, France, Spain, Italy, or whether that is just a temporary policy which will yield to the setting-up of democracies. It is also anyone's guess whether we are going to use our post-war economic strength to play the imperialist game on a large scale or whether we will use it to help lift other nation's living standards closer to our own. It is finally

This is a clipping from page 18 of the PM for March 8, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

anyone's guess whether we are going to go back to isolationism or whether we have learned how inept and futile it is.

But instead of searching their own hearts, Americans prefer to puzzle over what the mysterious Russians will do. It is a subject that fascinates us. For years before the war we debated whether Russia had any strength. When she was attacked we debated whether she could hold out. When she fought and fought well, we sought to solve the "mystery" of what gave her the strength she had. Now again we are debating whether she will stop fighting, whether she will grab territory, whether she will go on to Berlin, whether she will Bolshevize Europe and the world.

I do not say that Russian policy is crystal clear. Russia is a one-man government, and Russian policy is what Stalin decides. That removes the obscurities that exist in our foreign policy, which is a tug-of-war between our democratic credo and State Department action. But it has obscurities of its own, since Stalin doesn't have to carry on his diplomatic education in public, since no one has a pipe-line to his intentions, and since he is the sort of person who plays his cards close to his chest.

Nevertheless Stalin is not fool enough to invent a world in his own mind. What he does will be the outcome partly of Russian foreign policy in the past, and partly the needs of Russian national and international interest in the future. To these we must turn.

Some Bedrock Facts

There are a few propositions that can be stated in the nature of bedrock fact about Russia, instead of guesswork:

¶ That Russia, like every other nation, is not a simple unity; that it contains within itself conflicting forces—nationalism and internationalism, socialism and dictatorship, interventionism and isolationism, the United Nations idea and power politics.

¶ That it has all along, under Stalin's regime, followed a fairly consistent foreign policy, not of trying to destroy the world or win the world or save the world, but of trying to build its own strength and make itself secure for future growth.

¶ That in doing so it has taken the lead in acting through international machinery and collective agreements; and that only when its lead was not followed did it (as in the attack on Finland and the pact with the Nazis) try to use shortcuts to security.

¶ That it has been astutely led, by men who have no illusions about the western powers and their economic and diplomatic ruling groups. These men, and Stalin in particular, have trusted the deed rather than the word.

¶ That it is an efficient and strong state, with an iron control over internal [illegible], with vast resources and the capacity to organize them, and with a social system that gives full scope to the machine, to technical innovation, and to planning.

¶ That it is a military power to be reckoned with, and that its military strength and prestige will grow rather than diminish.

¶ That it can count on the allegiance of its people.

¶ That the Russians are a creative people, on a mounting arc of growth, with an unquenchable vitality, with the power of an idea behind their course, and with a strong grip on the future.

We can draw what conclusions we wish from these facts, depending on the premises and the kit of values we want to use. My own conclusions will follow in the articles to come. But if we try to ignore the facts themselves, we are doing no good to America, Russia, or the world.—MAX LERNER.

(This is the first of a series of editorials under the general heading of Russia and America, *dealing with various phases of American-Russian relations, now and in the postwar world. The second,* The Double Fear, *will appear tomorrow.*

This is a clipping from
page_____ of the
PM for

Clipped at the Seat of
Government.

SOVIET WAR AIMS.

[Wall Street Journal.] 16 5

Russia has made known, in a semi-official but unquestionably authoritative manner, that one of her war aims is the annexation of part of the Polish republic and the smaller Baltic countries which, after the first World war, were created out of territory included in czarist Russia.

This newspaper regrets that one of the united nations has such a purpose and it wishes that all of them would give substance to the Atlantic charter by abiding by its provision which rejected territorial aggrandizement. Nevertheless we believe that the declaration of Mr. Stalin's government is not without its value at this time and that the soviet government is at least to be commended for its candor in publishing its intentions. When the time for peace making comes we will have no occasion to plead that the aims of one of our war associates were unclear to us. . . .

This is not the first candid statement of the head of the soviet government. He has registered his disinclination for pursuit of the war beyond the boundaries of Russia once the enemy is cleared from Russian soil. He also has made pretty clear that Russia does not intend to attack nations which do not first attack Russia. In brief Mr. Stalin's first aim is to make Russia strong and secure. There is no reason to believe that Mr. Stalin will be easily deterred.

There may be a great many who will deplore an attitude which they consider shortsighted and selfish—altho a goodly portion of our best "deplorers" seem loath to exercise their "deploring" talents so far as Russia is concerned. Nevertheless the Russian statement may not be wholly lacking in possibilities for a more sane outlook on post-war settlements.

It surely ought to deflate, in the first place, the outgivings of those of our publicists and radio orators who seem to class any suggestions of "nationalism" along with smallpox and typhus. . . .

And neither need Mr. Stalin's decision be regarded as a deterrent to sensible international agreement. An association for collective international action can be no stronger than its component parts, a truism which Mr. Stalin—apparently capable of direct thinking as well as direct action—may have in mind. At any rate he intends to keep Russia strong.

This is a clipping from page 16 of the Chicago Tribune for March 7, 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

U. S. Women Leaders Greet Sisters Of Other Lands on Women's Day

Women leaders of national prominence in the trade unions, civic, professional and defense groups join in sending their International Women's Day greetings to the anti-fascist women of all lands through the columns of The Worker.

The greetings follow:

Rose Schneiderman, National President of the Women's Trade Union League:

In behalf of the Women's Trade Union League, we send our fraternal greetings to the working women of the United Nations. Women right now in all the United Nations—especially working women—are the most important factor in the prosecution of the war. They have shown that they can take gallantly and heroically hard work, long hours, all the privations which come with the war. It is our hope and prayer that when the war is won, the working women will share in the writing of the peace.

Genevieve Tabouis, distinguished Free French journalist, editor of "Pour La Victoire":

To the women of the United Nations who gallantly resist fascism I am sending the tribute of my most earnest admiration, though I feel these words inadequate to express my very deep gratitude for their courage, stubbornness and heroism. I can only say to the women of France, my compatriots, that they are for us all the living example of the self-sacrifice which we owe to our country and to our ideal of liberty and justice. We are proud of them, and long to be at their side, to carry on the struggle against the enemies of all free men.

Mabel K. Staupers, President of the National Association of Colored Graduate Nurses:

Negro nurses of America are happy to send greetings to women throughout the world who are fighting fascism on this International Woman's Day. We are working on the home front and the fighting front with the belief that when victory comes women of all nations will have the opportunity to build a better world.

Dr. Alice Y. Keliher, distinguished educator, head of Child and Youth Services, Greater New York CDVO:

Perhaps the greatest courage is the courage of one's convictions, and this courage is being shown by women everywhere who live by the conviction that a democratic world is possible and on the way. I had the opportunity this week to see Madame Chiang Kai-shek. Her dignity, gallantry and intelligence swept over all who hear her. To me she symbolizes the spirit of the new democratic women to be found in China, Russia, Latin America, Britain and our own United States. I am delighted to send greetings to the women—especially those concerned with care of the children—of these nations.

Josephine Thams, Secretary-Treasurer, American Communications Association, CIO:

The women of all nations are faced with a new task of making their contribution on the farms, in the factories, in the homes and in the armed forces in a common effort to defeat a common enemy—Hitler fascism. As an American woman I wish to register my admiration for the special job being done by my sisters across the sea in Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China.

Mrs. T. Arnold Hill, Negro member National Board, American Women's Voluntary Services:

I am most happy to send my greetings to the brave women of China, Great Britain, Soviet Russia, Africa, India—to women everywhere who are fighting fascism. This is women's opportunity to regain civilization and make democracy mean something. We've got to do the job without regard to social levels, economic levels or racial levels. We've got to keep the flame of democracy burning!

Magistrate Anna Kross:

I consider it a great privilege to send greetings and comfort, sympathy and fraternity to women of the Allied nations. American women are appalled at the ravages of Nazi-fascism, the ruthless and brutal destruction of men, women and children, the abysmal throwback into the barbarism of the middle ages. We join forces with the women of the Allied nations to make the supreme effort to bring a speedy Allied victory, a fundamental, lasting and just peace, to the benefit of humankind. To American women, anti-Semitism is not merely an attack against the Jews, but against the fundamental concept of democracy which stands for liberty, justice and religious freedom for all. We recognize that our country's democratic tradition is at stake in this war. We will bring our influence to bear, that the peace to come after glorious victory will be a peace of freedom for all peoples and religions for all time.

Maude Malone, veteran leader in American women's fight for the vote:

I walked in the 1st Women's Day parade, in the spring of 1908, fighting for votes and for the rights of working women. Now Women's Day has taken on significance for women of the whole world, in the fight for freedom and equality for all people. I send my greetings to women of the Soviet Union, Britain and China. We're all

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bound up together in this war to end fascism—what one gains, all gain—what one loses, all lose. I want to send special greetings to the women of the Soviet Union, because they have suffered the most—and given the most.

Alice Neville, Negro leader in the Women's Auxiliary of the National Maritime Union:

The struggle of the entire world is the struggle of all women. The women of China, the Soviet Union, Britain have shown their tremendous courage. We here, inflamed by their noble example, should be determined to carry on and sacrifice everything we've got till this war against the hated fascists is won. Especially as a Negro woman, I feel there is nothing too great to sacrifice, since I believe America will be a better place after the war is won.

Mary Testa, editor of L'Unita del Populo:

Fraternal greetings to the women of the world from Italian-American women. This year, International Women's Day finds the mothers, wives and sisters of four million Italian-Americans in the United States armed forces working and sacrificing with all American womanhood to bring speedy victory to the United Nations and peace and freedom to all peoples. We greet the heroism of the women of the Soviet Union, who have given to the world a glorious example of courage and self sacrifice, and join in expressing our solidarity for victory to our Chinese and British sisters. The women of Italy weep for their dead and revolt against the useless sacrifice for an inglorious cause. They look to the women of the United Nations to help them in their struggle to end fascism's war and fascism's rule in Italy.

Additional Women's Day statements including several from prominent men unionists will appear in the Monday, March 8, issue of the Daily Worker.

Control of Minerals by Allies Now Enough to Outlaw War

LONDON, March 2, Delayed. (AP) —War can be—probably will be—outlawed by joint control of the distribution of the world's mineral wealth by the United States, the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the U. S. S. R.

That is the considered opinion of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, now engaged in checking the implications of the fourth clause of the Atlantic Charter: "They (United States and Britain) will endeavor, with due respect for all their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access on equal terms to the grade and raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity."

The Association, acting in an advisory capacity to the United Nations, in collaboration with Allied natural scientists, is on a regular schedule of committee and conference work, reporting regularly to the British Government.

German propaganda has consistently claimed the Axis nations were forced to go to war because they were unable to gain access to the world's raw materials. Allied natural scientists are furnishing plenty of statistical arguments to the contrary.

Proof by Statistics

As regards the extent of the United Nations' holdings of raw materials, here are some figures which can be appreciated by the man in the street.

Their steel-making capacity is twice that of the three Axis nations together with all the countries they have occupied. The United States alone is producing at the rate of about twice that of continental Europe and 10 times that of Japan.

In hardening metals the United Nations are practically out on their own. Together with the countries accessible only to them they produce:

All the world output of vanadium, 97 per cent of nickel, 96 per cent of molybdenum, 82 per cent of chrome, 82 per cent of cobalt, 77 per cent of manganese, 77 per cent of tungsten, and about 90 per cent of the world's copper.

Aluminum, now in the higher brackets of war materials, used to be more plentiful for the Axis nations. Between them in 1938 they produced about 55 per cent of the world's total. Since then it has been a race between the Allies and Axis, and 1942's figures show the ratio has switched to 60-40 in favor of the Allied nations.

Aluminum and Coal

In the four years, 1937 to 1941, the world output of virgin aluminum approximately doubled, reaching just under a million tons.

In coal [the United Nations produce about 70 per cent of the world's supplies] the Axis powers together have sufficient current resources, although mounting Allied air offensive against their mines and transport facilities is slowing down production and distribution.

Against this, the Axis hold nearly three quarters of the world's tin supply mainly through the Japanese conquest of Malaya and the Netherlands Indies.

The United States uses over 40 per cent of the world's production, but in the whole of that country and of Canada there is not a single tin mine.

Ninety per cent of the world's production of manganese ore is consumed in the iron and steel industry, but four fifths of the world's steel output occurs in countries producing about 2 per cent of the required manganese.

Russia Third in Steel

Russia is the only example of a large producer of the ore being a large steel producer. It is now third on the list of steel-making countries.

Canada produces 90 per cent of the world's nickel, and ~~natural~~ scientists have already indicated the responsibility that ~~would~~ will share in arranging its fair distribution and yet to prevent its accumulation for war purposes.

The supply of platinum, rare enough but wanted for various war industries including the manufacture of nitrous explosives, is under the control of the Allied nations, Canada producing one half, Russia a fifth, America and South Africa between them another fifth, with smaller quantities from Colombia, the Belgian Congo and Abyssinia.

Soviet Russia's potential mineral supplies are estimated to exceed those of any other country.

Omitting incalculable quantities of low-grade iron ores in the Kursk district, Soviet reserves of iron ore have recently been estimated at 10,000 million tons, surpassing those of the United States.

Resources of Gold

As long ago as 1936, Russia's manganese resources were computed at over 700 million tons, sufficient for about 200 years' output at present levels.

Russia is also in the front rank of platinum producers. Statistics for gold production are secret, but the union has "adequate resources."

The position in Soviet Russia with regard to nonmetallic minerals is stronger than that of any other country. In recent years it has been the world's largest producer of crude magnesite, reserves of which are computed at 250,000,000 tons. The prospected phosphate rock deposits of the country now exceed 60 per cent of the world's resources. No details of mica production have been issued since 1935, but then the U. S. S. R. ranked second in the world. The Russian output of asbestos has been exceeded only by Canada.

Russian deposits of potassium, magnesium, and rock salts have yet to be properly assayed. Reserves alone of these salts, consisting of scores of thousands of millions of tons, equal about 80 per cent of the world's present resources.

This is a clipping from page 9 of the Christian Science Monitor for MARCH 6, 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Stalin Has 2 Fighting Sons And an Attractive Daughter

[Henry Cassidy, chief of The Associated Press Bureau in Moscow, who has returned to the United States, tells some little-known facts about the personal life of Premier Stalin's family.]

By Henry Cassidy

NEW YORK, March 6 (AP)—Joseph Stalin's family life, long concealed behind the Kremlin walls, has been made an open book by his country's war with Germany.

The same great struggle which has laid bare the power of the Soviet Union has disclosed that its leader, Stalin, is the father of two fighting sons.

The elder, Jacob Josefovich Djugashvili, bears his father's family name. He served as an artillery officer on the front early in the war. The Germans claimed his capture. Although this has never been confirmed by Soviet authorities, he has been cited for staying with his battery "to the last round of ammunition."

Younger Son Decorated

The younger, Vassily Josefovich Stalin, has the honor of bearing his father's adopted name. He is a colonel of aviation with a front-line air force. He has been decorated for exemplary fulfillment of his duties in action.

Stalin also has a pretty daughter, Svetlana, who is living in Moscow. She went to Kuibyshev at the time of the 1941 evacuation of the capital to live with her brother Vassily, who was then working on the Moscow-Kuibyshev military airline, while their father remained in the Kremlin. Since then, she has returned to the capital, and has been seen from time to time, quietly attending the ballet or opera with friends.

Vassily, a dark, lively youth, is popularly supposed in Moscow to be his father's favorite. As a boy, he was the ringleader of a group of sons of Soviet leaders. As with many American boys, they were zealous followers of flying. One of their number, Mikhail Frunze, son of the late commissar of war, perished in air combat.

Vassily has keen interest in other hobbies, including jazz. With a number of friends, he once invited the leader of a prominent Soviet jazz band to his Kuibyshev apartment to play, and then discussed music avidly with him.

No Favors or Publicity

Stalin's children neither ask nor receive any special favors. They receive no publicity. When Jacob was cited, and Vassily was decorated, their names appeared only in alphabetical order, among many others. Svetlana's name, to the best of my knowledge, has never appeared in the Soviet press.

I once asked to see Vassily, and was told there was nothing more he could say to a foreign correspondent than any other Soviet youth. But while I am home on leave, so many persons have asked me about Stalin's children that I feel no harm can come from writing what is common knowledge to the correspondents in Moscow.

Stalin himself is a widower. His second wife, Nadya Alliluieva, passed on in 1932.

Since then, gossip abroad has sometimes connected his name with others, including Marina Raskov, the handsome, black-haired aviatrix who crashed fatally this winter while flying at an air base. She was buried in the Kremlin wall. Stalin did not attend the funeral.

No word is breathed in Moscow of any new romance involving Stalin. His great aim seems to be to rid his country of the Germans.

This is a clipping from page 9 of the Christian Science Monitor for March 6, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Reds Get U. S. Supplies

Nazis Unable to Stop Flow

(One of a Series.)

By Henry C. Cassidy

Associated Press Staff Writer

New York, March 5.—The United States, despite all Adolf Hitler can do to stop it, is definitely delivering the goods to the Soviet Union.

After riding in American tanks, trucks and jeeps, seeing American bombers and fighters, eating American sugar and lard, in remote corners of Russia, one cannot doubt that a large part of the supplies we promised the Red Army is reaching its destination.

I cannot cite figures. The only ones made known in Moscow are those announced from Washington or London. But I can tell you the impression of one who has been in Russia throughout the war.

It is that the answer to the questions—are American goods reaching the Soviet Union? Are the Russians satisfied with our supplies?—is, in each case, yes.

Hitler, early in the war, boasted that the United Nations' only supply lines to the Soviet Union were across the Arctic or along the Equator. Since then, he has certainly been surprised by the way those very lines have been made effective.

U. S. Vehicles Are Common

Our most conspicuous contribution to the Soviet war effort is in vehicles. On the main streets of Moscow, on the roads of provincial town, on the dirt tracks of the countryside, American trucks are a common sight. Jeeps scuttle everywhere, from the paved highways of the rear to the rough fields of the front.

A year ago they were rare sights, which caused onlookers to stop and admire them. Now they are no longer a novelty.

The trucks are used for road transport, on which the Red army depends largely for its supplies. The jeeps are used as staff cars, to carry officers on their missions. Both have been employed extensively in the Russian winter offensive.

It would be idle to deny that there has been any trouble with the vehicles. Some trucks have broken axles on trackless terrain, boiled over in summer, frozen up in winter; some jeep motors have become clogged with mud. But generally, men who drive the machines have told me, their performance has been splendid.

The Russians, moreover, whatever their reputation may be abroad, are good, resourceful mechanics. Machines come in for rough treatment in that rigorous climate. But with a minimum of tools and spare parts, the drivers keep them running.

Car Runs at 40 Below

For example, Pavel Ivanovich Diakov, an average Russian chauffeur, who drives a light American sedan for the Associated Press, had to park his car out of doors in Kuibyshev all last winter, in 42-below-zero temperatures, and several feet of snow. But each morning, when the telegrams were ready to go, so was the car.

American tanks are less noticeable to the Russian people, since they are assembled deep in the rear and sent directly to the front. I have visited an assembly point, however, and seen hundreds of medium and light tanks, ready to go into action.

The first M-3 models, with a riveted frame and fixed cannon, proved less effective than the welded types and mobile turret, but since then, more modern machines have been delivered.

The Russians still prefer their heavy KV, medium T-34 and light T-60 tanks for major combat. They used these principally in their southern offensives this winter, but American tanks, as well as the British Mathildas and Valentines, are doing service on other fronts.

American fighters, the Tomahawk, Kittyhawk and Airacobra, are defending some of the most important points of the Soviet Union, including Moscow, Leningrad and Murmansk. Crack pilots, many of them wearers of the highest decoration, Hero of the Soviet Union, are flying them. Unanimously, they like them.

Moscow Not Raided

All these, too, I have seen at airports outside Moscow. They have had little to do there recently, for the Germans have not raided the capital since last April 5. That, in itself, is a strong recommendation of their efficiency.

American attack bombers have not been on public display, but they are reliably reported to have been used effectively during the defense of Stalingrad and the Red Army counteroffensive.

It may be a prod to American pride to note that the Russians believe they have fighters, as well as tanks, superior to anything we have delivered to the Soviet Union. A foreign pilot, who has flown American, British and Soviet planes and who is now fighting on the Russian front, told me he agreed the Red air force Yak was better than anything else he had handled.

In addition to the principal equipment, I have come across numerous other items of American supplies: Field telephones with a Cossack unit, woolen blankets in a military hospital, granulated sugar in a Red army mess, lard on the shelves of a Moscow store, all of it being given good use.

People Are Grateful

Since my return to New York, I have heard some comment that the Russians do not seem to realize or appreciate the extent of our effort to aid them.

They do realize it, for every statement President Roosevelt or Prime Minister Churchill has made on this subject, complete with figures, has been reproduced in the Soviet press, and the Russians are avid newspaper readers. Those with whom I have come into contact have also made clear that they appreciate it.

The man behind American supplies to the Soviet Union is Brig. Gen. Philip R. Faymonville, former military attaché and present lend-lease representative in Moscow. He speaks Russian fluently and is on friendly terms with the Soviet authorities, from Foreign Trade Commissar Anastas Mikoyan, with whom he deals, on down.

If he has one main problem, it is to give the Russians more of the same.

(Tomorrow: Foreign relations.)

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Red Civilian Also Fights

Suffers Cold, Hunger

(One of a series.)

By Henry C. Cassidy

Associated Press Staff Writer

New York, March 5.—Life for the people of the Soviet Union in this war is a battle as hard as the one the Red Army is putting up on the front.

It involves work and hardships, sometimes, suffering and danger.

It is as important as the fight at the front; and as far as can be seen, it is another battle that is being won.

As a Moscow housekeeper myself, for the 20 months of war, I can tell you something about it.

The big problems are heat, light and food.

This has been a comparatively mild winter there, but the temperature has been down to 19 below zero, Fahrenheit, cold enough to freeze to death, and there has been no coal for civilians. The output from mines not wrecked or occupied goes to war industries.

Last autumn, the Moscow Soviet decided that only part of the apartment houses could be heated, and persons living in others should move in with their neighbors. Moving was actually started, when the situation was saved by as heroic an undertaking as any of this war, although little publicized.

Women Chopped Wood

About 50,000 women were mobilized, those not in warwork and who had no children 8 years old or younger. They went into the forests around Moscow, chopped and hauled wood, and provided enough fuel to give the entire capital limited, but sufficient heat.

My three-room house on Ulitsa Shchukina has been out of wood twice. But, by shutting off two rooms, living entirely in the bedroom, and luckily receiving a new delivery of birch every time the cold started to set in, I was able to keep comfortable.

The heating situation has been most acute in Leningrad, where a gap has been broken in the German ring around the city, but the enemy still camps in the southern and western suburbs. There, I heard, not a single wooden house is left standing—all have been torn down for fuel.

Lighting Rationed

Electric lighting is severely rationed. Only a single bulb is permitted for each room, limited to 25 watts for an average living room or kitchen, and 16 watts for halls and wash rooms. The penalty for violation of this rule may be a fine of 1000 rubles (officially, $200) or loss of electricity for the duration of the war.

In addition, a total limit is fixed for consumption in each house, and as this is approached, the house committee may cut off all current periodically, to reduce its use. This often means sitting in the darkness, or by the light of a rare candle, in the early hours of the evening.

Basic food rations provide daily a pound of bread, and monthly four pounds of meat, or fish, four pounds of rice, one pound of sugar and one pound of butter. Meat tickets usually bring sausage or herring. Chocolate candies are sometimes issued instead of sugar, vegetable oil instead of butter, and potatoes instead of rice.

In addition, milk, vegetables and meat may be bought on the markets where collective farmers are permitted to sell their surplus products at competitive prices.

Without Public Debate

The ration system was instituted quickly and competently at the start of the war, without public debate. It was designed to stretch the supply as far as possible, without seasonal ups-and-downs, and although there are some who go hungry, few starve.

I have been solemnly invited to drop in for tea, and upon doing so, been handed a glass of pure hot water and a piece of candy through which to sip it. If you use your imagination, it is a very tasty drink.

The clothes you wear in Moscow are the ones you always had, or that someone left you. The clothing industry works entirely for the Red army. The shops are bare But styles do not matter. The thing is to keep warm.

Transportation is less of a problem. For persons engaged in essential work, 25 gallons of gasoline a month are provided. For others there are buses, streetcars and the subway. These have been less crowded during the war than before, since the population of Moscow has dwindled from four million to 2,800,000.

Toughest Task

Perhaps the toughest task of all is having the washing done. My Moscow ration is two cakes of soap a month, and on that basis, you think twice before changing your shirt.

Work is on a 12-hour day, seven-day week basis. All social reforms, including the five-day, 35-hour

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week and paid vacations, have been abandoned for the duration.

Those who left Moscow with evacuated factories, stores and commissariats are staying in the east, on their jobs. Passes to return to the capital are rare. Those who remained in Moscow are working at their old posts, or new ones, almost all devoted to national defense. Small plants which once made consumers' goods are now turning out arms.

The additional work has brought increased compensation. The average pay of a Russian worker, before the war, was estimated at about 300 rubles (officially $60) a month. This has been swelled by pay for overtime work and lost vacations. But there is not much to buy.

Still, there is some brightness in Moscow life. The theaters are showing regularly the best of their repertoire, the ballets "Swan Lake" and "Don Quixote," the operas "Eugene Onegin" and "The Queen of Spades," and plays like the old favorite, "The Cherry Orchard," and a new hit, "Front," a satire on an old-fashioned Red army general.

The controlling factor in everyone's life is the curfew from midnight to 5 a. m. Theaters open at 6:30 p. m., close about 10 p. m., so the audience can get home on time. There are no nightclubs. The subway stops running at 10 p. m., street cars at 11 p. m.

At midnight, the streets are silent and dark, and the city sleeps, resting for another day's work.

(Tomorrow: Supplying the Army.)

Red Soldier's New Epaulettes Boost His Already High Morale

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By Henry C. Cassidy
Associated Press Staff Writer

New York, March 3.—The Red army man is stepping out these days, as proud and smart as any soldier, with epaulettes on his shoulders and the assurance of success in his heart.

Adolf Hitler, in a moment of exasperation, once called the Russians "swamp animals." From questions I have been asked since my return from Moscow, I gather many Americans think of them as big, rough, bear-like creatures.

Actually, the Soviet soldier very often resembles an average American boy, and now, he looks brighter than ever.

The winter victories of the Red army have added to his self-confidence, and new regulations have spruced up his appearance.

The placing of epaulettes on the Red uniform constituted a startling change. These were once the ornaments of the Czarist soldiers, and therefore, to the Soviet people, the insignia of enemies. Their restitution was taken by Moscow observers to indicate a return of the Soviet Union to traditions of old Russia.

Hark Back to Past

Another sign of this rooting of modern Russia in its past was seen in the creation of numerous decorations and orders, including those named after the Czarist Marshals Suvorov and Kutuzov.

The epaulettes, stiff, oblong boards covering the shoulder, and bearing the colors of the various branches of the Red army, insignia of rank and number of regiment were not the only touching-up given to the uniform.

As they were being distributed progressively to the units and being donned last month, other regulations went out to the troops:

Keep uniforms pressed, hair combed, faces shaven.

Carry no bundles, except a small parcel under the left arm.

Carry no babies in public, except at railroad stations.

Do not hang onto the steps of a crowded streetcar.

Do not appear in public markets.

Do not sit in a public conveyance if a superior is standing.

These did not mean the Red army man had been unkempt, unshaven, burdened with bundles and babies, and sloughing in a streetcar while generals stood around him. They were meant, rather, to correct minor, isolated cases and to provide a uniform code of behavior.

Another Change Coming

There were rumors in Moscow, just as I left, that another change was coming; that the word "tovarish," or "comrade," used for a quarter-century since the revolution, would be dropped from the Red army vocabulary, in addressing superiors, and that "gospodin," the prerevolutionary word for "mister," would be substituted.

This change would be no more surprising to the Russians than the restoration of epaulettes, but so far, it has not been effected.

As it is, the Red army man follows a regular formula in speaking to his officers. He salutes briskly, announces his rank and name, and says: "I am listening to you, Comrade Commander." As the officer speaks, instead of "Yes, sir," he says again, "I listen to you."

If addressed in a group, the Soviet soldier acknowledges orders by saying in unison, "We serve the Soviet Union."

As in the United States Army, however, formalities are dropped in the heat of battle, or when the men are at ease.

Just now, the Red army man is still wearing the winter uniform of felt boots, sheepskin jacket and fleece-lined hat which he donned last November. Soon, however, he will change it for the black boots, khaki tunic and peaked cap of spring.

At each change, the front-line soldier receives an entirely new uniform, while the old one goes back to men in training or reserve. The suit, so long as he keeps it, is his personal property.

Upon entering the Red army, he either contributes his civilian clothes to the defense fund, or sends them back to his family. Upon being discharged, his last uniform remains his own.

Plenty of Equipment

During the years it was building the Red army and heavy industry, the Soviet Union cut down on consumers' goods, but there is no shortage of clothes or equipment for the armed forces.

The Red army man also receives free his food, lodging and tobacco. The mainstays of his diet are cabbage soup and kasha, a porridge like oatmeal. He lives in a farmhouse, school or wherever shelter is to be found. He usually smokes "makhorka," a nicotine-bearing plant grown in the Soviet Union.

The base pay for a private is 10 rubles a month, about $2 at the official exchange rate. This is doubled if he serves in a guards unit, so designated for particularly effective service. The pay rises rapidly with the rank.

Women are common at the Russian front. They wear side-arms, and march in their own formations, but do not go into action as such. Some serve in combat as specialists, such as snipers or machine gunners, but most of them are nurses, clerks or waitresses.

They live in special barracks, or in tents for medical units.

On the battlefield, the Red army man can be just as tough as they come.

If ordered to attack, he hunches his way through snow, slush, dirt or dust, crawling on the ground, then rising to charge, until his objective is captured or he is killed. If ordered to resist, he stands his ground stubbornly.

Penalty Is Death

This does not mean he is superhuman. There have been cases in the Red army, as in any army, of men in the ranks wavering under fire. The penalty, in such a case, is immediate death. Several instances have been made known of men who faltered or fled, and were promptly shot by their superior officers.

This iron discipline is one of the outstanding characteristics of the Red army man. Another which has impressed observers is his endurance. He can fight his way forward, through terrible climatic conditions, for day after day, and still summon physical strength for a further effort. He stays in the front line, without relief, for several months at a stretch.

His favorite method of combat is infighting with the bayonet. He carries the long, triangular-bladed "shtik" constantly on his rifle, which is balanced for accurate fire with the steel in place.

His weakest point, compared to some other troops, is probably in his handling of modern automatic weapons. Army orders stress periodically that he must study, learn how to handle his weapon perfectly.

While in reserve, he goes through training and maneuvers which closely resemble in action, hardship and all but danger itself the conditions of actual battle.

(Tomorrow: Wartime Life in Russia.)

This is a clipping from page 9 of the New York Herald Tribune for March 4, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Soviet Claims Land Ruled by Czars

By Joseph C. Harsch,
Staff Writer of
The Christian Science Monitor

The first serious territorial dispute among members of the United Nations shows no signs of moving toward a quick settlement as the continued improvement of Allied military fortunes makes the shape of the world to come an increasingly imperative subject for discussions.

Russia's claim for a slice of what —between 1921 and 1939—was Polish territory has been based since the beginning on the contention that it is inhabited by Ukranians and White Russians. Poland, on the other hand, has shown no evidence of retreating from its position that this eastern section of its between-war territory is a part of Poland.

The issue now has reached an acute stage with both sides issuing official statements of their views and the bases for their claims. Poland is, in effect, attempting to gain British and American support for its contentions while Russia takes the position that there can be no outside interference in the reunion of all integral elements of Russia when they have been purged of the German invader.

So far as the official public is concerned, Russia maintains that the Ukranian and White Russian inhabited parts of Poland; the former Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia which were all organized as Soviet governments during the period of Russian occupation from September, 1939, until spring of 1941, and Bessarabia, which at the same time was merged into the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic, are integral parts of the Soviet Union.

Finland Recognized

Although fighting a war with Finland, Moscow has not modified the official view of its March, 1940, peace with Finland when it recognized the independence of that country.

The Russian atttitude towards the areas claimed — Bessarabia, Eastern Poland and the Baltic States, was best indicated in the recent Pravda article which held that these areas were just as much a part of Soviet Russia as Alaska or California is a part of the United States.

An official Tass agency statement just made public takes specific issue with the Polish Government-in-Exile in London over the Ukranian and White-Russian inhabited portions of former Poland, asserting that Polish claims to such territory is viewed in Soviet circles as "evidence of the existence of imperialistic tendencies in the Polish Government."

The Russian statement says that the Atlantic Charter's recognition of the rights of peoples includes the rights of the Ukranians and White Russians to be united, and certainly cannot be cited as supporting any Polish right to such territory.

Lord Curzon's Statement

"Even the former British Prime Minister Lord Curzon, despite his unfriendly attitude toward the Soviet Union, understood that Poland could not make any claims on Ukranian and White-Russian territory, and Polish ruling circles up to now show no desire to understand this question," it continued.

[The Soviet statement's reference to Lord Curzon as British Prime Minister obviously was a slip of the official pen. Lord Curzon never was Prime Minister of Britain. He became Foreign Secretary in 1919 and a year later presided at the conference which established the so-called "Curzon Line" separating Poland from Russia.]

Lord Curzon attempted to draw a Polish-Russian frontier on ethnographical lines after the last war which very closely approximated the frontier Russia achieved after the collapse of Polish armed resistance in 1939. In July, 1941, Russia entered into an agreement with the Polish Government-in-Exile whereby it abandoned the "Molotoff-Ribbentrop Line" of 1939 and agreed to submit the frontier to negotiation.

However, this abandonment of the specific 1939 line never was regarded as an abandonment of the Russian contention that parts of former Poland inhabited by Ukranian and White Russian populations belonged inherently to Russia.

Poland now claims that was, in effect, the Polish State of the seventeenth century before the subsequent partitions of Poland wiped out its existence. Russia is willing to negotiate details of the frontier, but it has made it extremely plain that the basis of such negotiation should be something like the Curzon Line, which did not put Ukranians and White Russians under Polish sovereignty.

Russian Demands Clear

It is cogent to the discussion to note that in this claim, as in the Baltic States and Bessarabian claim, Russia is staking out nothing which was not part of Russia previous to 1914. In effect, the Soviet Government is laying claim to the areas which had been incorporated in the Russian state by the Czars.

On the basis of that view, Alexander F. Gorkin, Secretary of the Supreme Soviet of Russia, declares that Russia "cannot have any such war aims as the seizure of foreign territories and the subjugation of foreign peoples."

"There must be no interference whatsoever in the internal affairs of other nations," he added in an official statement made public this week.

According to the Soviet view, there is no inconsistency or contradiction between such renunciation of territorial ambitions and the insistence of areas which Poland considers Polish. The Soviet Government has, in fact, made its territorial intentions quite clear. It wants certain specified areas which once belonged to Russia and it regards them as Russian. It goes on record as wanting nothing "foreign."

The whole thing comes down to a definition of what is "foreign." Russia has made its definitions, at least for the time being. Poland challenges them.

This is a clipping from page 5 of the Christian Science Monitor for March 3, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Secret Reorganization of Red Army Spelled Russian Battle Success

By Henry C. Cassidy
Associated Press Staff Writer

(One of a Series)

New York, March 2.—What is behind the scenes of the Red army?

I have been asked that question repeatedly by persons who have been successively surprised, first by the Soviet Union's resistance to Germany, then by last winter's counteroffensive from Moscow and now by the Red army's reconquest in the Ukraine.

The answer, early in the war, was that the power of the Soviet Union, its 193 million people, Red army, navy and air force and heavy industry had been underestimated, but now it is more than that.

It is a story of reorganization that has made the Red army as efficient a fighting force as any in the world, capable of capturing this winter more than the Germans could last spring, summer and fall.

This reorganization, cutting the Red army down from a few sprawling fronts into many compact units, is credited largely by the best-informed military observers in the Soviet Union for the current Russian victories.

Formerly 3 Fronts

During the first year of the war in Russia, the Red army was divided into three fronts, the north-western, western and southwestern, commanded by Marshals Klementy Voroshilov, Semeon Timoshenko and Semeon Budenny. Each was a large, unwieldy organization, difficult to control and lacking elasticity.

Take, for the sake of an example, the German estimate that the Red army numbered 330 divisions. That meant that each marshal was commanding 110 divisions, about one and a half million men—a stupendous task under the highly mobile conditions of modern warfare.

There were some changes in the setup, some shifts in command, but for a year the organization generally remained the same.

The reorganization started last summer, after the Germans broke through the Red army's Southwestern Front, raced south to the Caucasus, east to the Volga and shattered the Russian lines.

The first indication of alterations in the Red army dispositions was given by dispatches to the military newspaper, Red Star. These had been date-lined from the fronts to which the correspondents were accredited. Suddenly, instead of "Southwestern Front," for example, the dispatches started, "Acting Army," with no designation of a specific front. Secretly, changes were affected.

Formed Into 12 Fronts

After the Battle of Stalingrad was won, the secret came out—the Red army had been reorganized into 12 fronts, each smaller, more manageable than the original three.

The fronts, running from north to south, were the Karelian, Leningrad, Volkhov, Northwestern, Kalinin, Central Briansk, Voronezh, Southwestern, Don, Stalingrad and Caucasian.

Each was commanded by a skillful professional soldier. Outstanding were Generals Filip Golikov of Voronezh; Nikolai Vatutin of the Southwest; Konstantin Rokossovsky of the Don, and Andrei Yeremenko of Stalingrad, who won the battle of Stalingrad; Leonid Govorov of Leningrad, and Kirill Meretskov of Volkhov, who broke the Leningrad blockade.

Above them served newly designated representatives of the general headquarters of the supreme command, who coordinated the actions of the fronts. Representatives of the Stawka, the general staff of the Red army, were Marshals Voroshilov, Gregory Zhukov, Nikolai Voronov and Gen. Alexander Vasilevsky.

Many military observers in Moscow believed this new organization, providing closely knit forces under strong general direction, made much of the difference in the new striking power of the Red army.

This fluid organization is constantly changing, now that the Red army is moving into new fields. The Stalingrad Front, for example, has become the Southern Front. Others will take new designations as they enter new territory, divide or combine as their lines lengthen or shorten. The principal of smaller fronts, or army groups, remains.

There is, of course, more to the story than that.

Another major factor has been the production of the war industries, evacuated to or established in the Soviet East, which have sent a constant stream of materiel to the front.

Two items have been of particular importance:

Tanks—the KV, a 46-ton monster, born at the Putilov works of Leningrad and named after Klementy Voroshilov, has gone into mass action. This machine was used largely in breaking the German lines.

Guns—Katiusha, the Soviet secret weapon, invented by Army Engineer Andrei Kostikov and nicknamed for the heroine of a popular love song, has grown a large family. This gun, about which little is known except that it works on the mortar principle, formed the backbone of the defense of Stalingrad.

Both of these instruments existed at the start of the war, but have been developed extensively, both in quantity and quality.

(Tomorrow: The Russian Soldier as a Fighter.)

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Old Political Cronies, New Soldiers Help Stalin Carry Out War Plans

Communist Party Men Still Hold Influence at Top

(Following is the second in a series of articles by the chief of the Associated Press Bureau in Moscow, now in this country on leave.)

By Henry C. Cassidy
Associated Press Staff Writer

New York, March 1.—Josef Stalin's old companions in politics, as well as his new soldiers in arms, are working by his side to fashion the victories of the Red army.

The men close to Stalin in wartime form a cross-section of two institutions, the Politburo, or political bureau of the central committee of the Communist Party, which guided the Soviet Union in peacetime, and the Stavka, or general staff of the Red army.

Together, they make an elite team.

Although the system of political commissars has been abolished, and the commissars themselves have become military officers, the Communist Party men still hold their influence at the top.

Three members of the Politburo are in the field. They are:

Andrei Zhdanov, chubby, cheerful secretary of the Leningrad district committee of the Communist Party, of whom Stalin is particularly fond. He is in Leningrad, on the military council of the formerly besieged city.

Lazarus Kaganovich, tall, dark, solemn commissar of railways, who is one of Stalin's oldest aides. He is in the Caucasus, on the military council there.

Three of the Soviet Union's politico-military leaders who are close to Premier Stalin. Left to right—Lazar Kaganovich, a member of the Politburo, the political bureau of the Communist Party; Marshal Klementi Y. Voroshilov, whose forces recently recaptured the fortress of Schluesselburg, also a member of the Politburo; Andrei Zhdanov, another member of the Politburo

Other Russian leaders who are close to Stalin. Left to right—Anastas I. Mikoyan, a member of the Politburo; Gen. Gregori K. Zhukov, who was commanding general in charge of the defense of Stalingrad, and L. Z. Mekhlis, chief of the political department of the Red Army

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Viktor Kruschev, blond, burly sceretary of the Comhunist Party for the Ukraine, another veteran of the Politburo. He has served on the military council of the southwestern front since the start of the war, and remains with the armies of that region.

Two other politburo men are doing war work in Moscow:

Anastas Mikoyan, lean, dark commissar of foreign trade, has taken over Kaganovich's work on the railways, as well as the general direction of transportation and supplies for the Red army.

Alexander Scherbakov, roly-poly, bespectacled secretary of the Moscow Party committee, has become a lieutenant general, head of the political department of the Red army and chief of the Soviet information bureau in charge of war propaganda.

Vyacheslav Molotov, who is probably closest of them all to Stalin, remains as foreign commissar, while the other members of the politburo go on with their customary administrative duties.

Voroshilov Still in Action

Of the five original marshals of the Soviet Union, named since the civil war, only one, Klementy Voroshilov, holds a top place in prosecution of the current war. He is on both the politburo and Stavka, and coordinated the action this winter which broke a path from Leningrad's back door through the German ring.

The others have become comparatively obscure. Semeon Timoshenko's star has been outshone by younger men, although he is still in command of the northwestern front. Semeon Budenny has been staying in Moscow. Boris Shaposhnikov has been ill. No post has been announced for Gregory Kulik.

Shaposhnikov served as chief of the general staff for the first year of the war, but this former Czarist colonel fell ill last autumn and retired, at least temporarily, at the age of 60.

The name of his successor has not been made public, but Gen. Alexander Vasilevsky, an experienced staff officer who was a coordinator in the battle of Stalingrad, is known to be performing many of Shaposhnikov's former duties.

The most active member of the Stavka is Marshal Gregory Zhukov, who has been the chief delegate sent to coordinate the actions of armies. He handled the great operations at Stalingrad, involving joint attacks on four fronts, and at Leningrad, involving two fronts.

No. 1 Red Soldier

As first vice commissar of defense, directly under Stalin, he has undoubtedly become the Soviet Union's No. 1 soldier.

Another rising member of the Stavka is Marshal Nikolai Voronov, an artillery expert, who served with Zhukov and Vasilevsky as a coordinator to Stalingrad and remained there to batter the encircled Germans to destruction with his big guns.

Two generals of aviation, A. A. Novikov and F. J. Falaleyev, also serve on the Stavka.

Stalin's emphasis, in selecting his generals for first-rank assignments, has been on young, proficient, progressive officers. But among them he has placed seasoned veterans. Lev Mekhlis, for example, who once headed the political department of the Red army, has turned up as a lieutenant general on the Volkhov front.

The hierarchy of the Soviet Union, the order in which all these men stand closest to Stalin, is known to the Russian people through the order in which they are named in public documents or on the honorary praesidia of state meetings.

The younger generals, Zhukov, Voronov, Vasilevsky and others, have won the credit and have been given the glory for the great victories on the front.

But the hierarchy still starts: Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov and then runs through the membership of the politburo.

Stalin's oldest friends, the cream of the Communist Party, are still without doubt those closest to him.

(Tomorow: Secret of Russia's military success.)

Russia Lists— Her War Aims

PM's Bureau

WASHINGTON, Mar. 2.—Russia's war aims have been listed by Alexander F. Gorkin, secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR as:

¶ Liberation of the nations enslaved by the Germans.

¶ Restoration of the democratic rights of the people.

¶ Economic assistance to nations which have experienced all the terrors of the Fascist yoke.

¶ Annihilation of the Hitler regime and its army.

The statement, released by the Soviet Embassy here, disavows any intention of seizing foreign territory or interfering in the internal affairs of other nations.

"Our first aim is to liberate our territories and our peoples from the German-Fascist yoke," the statement said. "We have not and cannot have any such war aims as that of imposing our will and our regime upon the Slavic or other enslaved nations of Europe who are expecting our help.

"Our aim is to help these nations in their struggle for liberation from Hitler's tyranny, and then to leave them to organize their lives on their own lands as they think fit."

(*Russia, having formally incorporated the Baltic states, Bessarabia, parts of the Karelian isthmus and of the Polish Ukraine into the Soviet Union, has made it clear that she expects to get these territories back after the war.*)

It ascribes Russia's successes to the Red Army's understanding of these aims, to the people's unity and to increasing production. It points out that one unit defending Leningrad was composed of 11 nationalities. It reports Russia's output of tanks was several times greater in 1942 than in 1941 and that plane production increased 75 per cent.

This is a clipping from page 12 of the PM for March 2, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Soviet Cities Honor Red Army

MOSCOW, March 1 (ICN).—The official Red Army anniversary meeting took place here in the Hall of Columns of the House of Trade Unions, with the main report presented by Emelyan Yaroslavsky, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

"Under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party and of Stalin personally," Yaroslavsky said, "there was formed in the Soviet country a politically mature, courageous and strong army, capable of defending the gains of the Soviet people. In the course of 20 months this army has been withstanding the onslaught of the German war machine single-handed.

"The Red Army has already annihilated millions of enemy soldiers and officers, destroyed enormous quantities of German equipment and frustrated the plans of the German command."

Yaroslavsky spoke of the rout of the Germans at Stalingrad as the "turning point in the patriotic war."

Among the members of the Presidium were the secretary of the Moscow committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Scherbakov; Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Budenny; and Peoples Commissar of the Red Navy, Admiral Kuznetsov. The honorary presidium elected by the members of the Political Bureau was headed by Stalin.

Red Army anniversary meetings were held in all the factories and institutions of Moscow. The capital's streets were decorated with red flags.

Leningrad too was festively adorned with many panels depicting front line episodes and with portraits of Soviet leaders.

Voronezh held an anniversary meeting in one of the halls of a medical institute that had escaped destruction. Representatives of the city's districts reported on the work to restore it. Voronezh bakeries and public baths have already started operating; stores have been opened, and preparations are underway at a number of enterprises to resume production.

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Fighter, Statesman

Stalin Runs Red Army, Cassidy Says

(Editor's note: Here is the first of a series of stories which will give you a clearer picture as you read the war news from Russia, written by an ace foreign correspondent who has been with the Russians throughout their 20 months of battle. Henry C. Cassidy is chief of the Associated Press in Moscow and has just returned, on leave, to his native America.)

By Henry C. Cassidy

New York, Feb. 28 (AP).—Joseph Stalin, who started his career as a soldier at Tsaritsyn and has won his finest victory at the same city, now called Stalingrad, is going on from there.

I can say with confidence that he is already planning personally the future campaign which he is sure will lead, come what may, to the complete defeat of Germany.

This does not mean that I am a confidante of Stalin, knowing his secret plans, hopes and aspirations. Very few persons are that, and they are his marshals, or members of his Politburo.

But, after living with the Russian people throughout the 20 months of their war, I can say what they well know, that Stalin is their leader, in military as well as state matters, in fact as well as in name.

This is one of the first questions people have asked me since my return to the United States on leave—is Stalin really running the Red army?

The answer is, emphatically, yes.

It is only since the victory at Stalingrad that Stalin has assumed

See CASSIDY, Page 2, Column 2.

CASSIDY, from Page 1.

to his generals in the field and overseeing their victories.

He is not an armchair strategist.

He went to Tsaritsyn in June, 1918, as a civilian, commissar of food for southern Russia, during the civil war. He found a military situation bordering on the catastrophic, and plunged into his first military venture, becoming chief of the revolutionary military council there. He won the battle of Tsaritsyn.

In the years before the present war, he remained a keen student of military affairs. He amazed visitors by his knowledge of technical subjects.

Corrected Beaverbrook

Once, while talking with Lord Beaverbrook, he casually corrected the British former Minister of Aircraft Production in specifications of British planes which they were discussing.

When the war came to Russia, he took over promptly the commissariat of defense, and became, once more, a soldier.

As a sort of symbol of that action, he made one minute change in his customary unadorned costume of khaki tunic, breeches and black boots. Just above the visor of his cap, he affixed the tiny red enamel star, surmounted with the gold hammer and sickle, of the Red army man.

During the first great battle, before Moscow, he kept in close touch with the front. I know of at least two cases in which he telephoned an army commander, said curtly, "Report your situation," and then gave equally curt orders to cope with the situation.

In the period preceding the Battle of Stalingrad, he made in advance several necessarily discreet, but nevertheless clear, mentions to visitors of plans for a great counter-offensive. These plans he made himself, with the help of his general staff.

Composite Picture

How he works can only be assumed, since no outsider has ever been in on such deliberations, but on the basis of scattered indications, it is not difficult to make a composite picture:

He sits at the head of his conference table. At the sides are the members of his "stavka," or general staff. Its members, whose names have been made known, are Marshals K. Y. Voroshilov, G. K. Zhukov and N. N. Voronov, and Generals A. M. Vasilevsky, A. A. Novikov and F. J. Falaleyev. A number of other officers also attend the deliberations.

They hear full, up-to-the-minute reports on the military situation, brought in by a modern teletype system directly from the commanders on the fronts. Members of the supreme command make their proposals for the operation under discussion.

Stalin listens to them, one after the other. Then, as he did with his politburo in peacetime, he selects the line to be followed and assigns a member of the staff to direct the plan.

It was thus that the classic plan for encirclement and destruction of the Germans before Stalingrad was made and executed.

Twice, in the legends that are growing up around the current war, it has been suggested that Stalin himself was at the front.

The first time was during the battle of Moscow. An oil painting, hung in the celebrated Tretiakov gallery, shows him conferring with his generals by the light of a kerosene lamp in a cottage at Khimki, 5 miles north of Moscow, the nearest point to the capital reached by the Germans.

Again, during the battle of Stalingrad, a rumor spread through Moscow, during the dark November days just before the Red army's counteroffensive, that Stalin was at the front. Strangely, I learned later that the same story circulated at the same time among the troops on the front, although no one soldier could say he himself had seen the leader.

My own impression was that these stories were more symbolic of Stalin's being with his men in thought, rather than representing

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his physical presence among them. In fact, no foreigner knows for a fact that Stalin has once left the Kremlin throughout the war.

The only time I have seen Stalin during the war was in the Kremlin, during the Supreme Soviet ratification last June of the 20-year treaty of mutual assistance with Great Britain. I know that, when I wrote to him last fall about the second front, and this winter about the Allied landing in North Africa, he received my letters the same day, and answered them the next day. Allied statesmen and soldiers who have seen him were received invariably in the Kremlin.

These facts indicate that Stalin stays constantly within his red-walled fortress, nerve center of the Soviet war effort.

There, he dispatches quickly and efficiently a tremendous amount of work nightly. Farther down the scale of the Soviet regime, as in any great country at war, there is bureaucracy and delay. But not at the top.

Not only military matters, but high affairs of state, international diplomacy and domestic policy come to him for decision. One of the matters to which he has given much attention this winter has been a campaign for donations to the Red army defense fund. It has brought more than four billion rubles out of hiding or circulation, into the account for building of tanks and planes.

Hundreds of messages have come from collective farms, factories, Communist Party centers and Red army headquarters, contributing funds. Each has been answered by Stalin, not in a form letter, but in a distinctive, personal telegram, dictated by himself.

Works All Night

He starts on his enormous volume of work late in the day. The earliest hour at which he receives visitors is 6 p. m. It is morning before he has finished. I know of one case, during a difficult negotiation, when he stayed with the conferees until 7 a. m., still fresh and alert, despite his 63 years.

His thick black hair now shows an over-all fringe of gray, his dark face has paled somewhat, but his short, stubby figure is still erect, and his physical powers show no sign of diminishing.

His is an ascetic life. He has been known, on the occasion of state dinners, to drink as many as 80 toasts "do adna," or "bottoms up," and still keep a steady head. But work is his complete preoccupation.

All who have seen or talked to Stalin during the war have been impressed most of all by his calmness. Good news and bad news alike, he receives with the same unruffled air, which means not placidity, but firm control and concentration.

They have been struck also by his complete grasp of the situation, down to small details, and by his far-sighted view of the future.

These are the qualities he is putting into preparations for coming phases of the campaign.

Now that the spring thaw is converting the Eastern Front into a muddy morass, the winter campaign must soon end. As I left Moscow, there were many who believed the Germans could still put on another offensive this summer, although limited to a single sector.

But Stalin is not worried. He is certainly planning more offensives of his own—and he is sure his will win.

(Tomorrow: The men around Stalin.)

History Has Thrown Baltic Buffer Scheme in Ash Can

By Joseph Starobin

Believe it or not, but one little fact is being forgotten in all the talk about the Soiet Union desiring to "hold on" to the Baltic States after the war.

That little fact is that the historic policy of the United States, after the first World /ar, looked forward to uniting these states with the rest of the Russian people.

Some of the high nabobs in our State Department are today encouraging various ithuanian, Latvian and Estonian uislings to look forward to the ay when these states can be reitablished as buffers against the SSR.

But if they would only go back the files of the State Departent itself, when Robert Lansing as Secretary of State in Wilson's dministration, and then Bainridge Colby after him—and they ould find that the United States as the last power to recognize the ndependence" of these Baltic tates, and did so very reluctantly.

In other words, we Americans are ie last people to talk about the oviet Union's policy in the Baltics. or it was American policy, four ears after the October Revolution, work for unity of the Baltic and ussian nations, a policy which was t last realized—under different onditions of course, in the summer f 1940.

BUFFERS OF REACTION

The Soviet case on the Baltics is lear, without the point I am mak ng. These states were established s buffers. The most reactionary egime was instituted in them, rowning in blood the desire of the eettish, Estonian and Lithuanian eoples themselves.

Everybody understands today that ad the Red Army not moved into ese countries in 1940, Leningrad nd Moscow might not have withood the Nazi assault, with all that ould mean to the United Nations.

Likewise, the case of peoples in nese countries themselves is also lear. When they voted 91-99 per ent for affiliation with the USSR July, 1940 they were expressing long-felt desire. For the big cities these countries were historically mong the most advanced in the old ussian empire. They were great ommercial outlets. The railway nes that ran to Tallinn, Libau and iga brought most of the commerce om inside Russia to the outer orld.

When these states were torn economic life disrupted: they became appendages to a far-off British market, which did not need their dairy produce.

ECONOMY WRECKED

In fact, these Baltic states had to compete in the British market with the goods of much-nearer Denmark, Holland and Belgium. Their economic relations with Soviet Russia were forcibly destroyed.

And of course, with the rise of Hitler, they became prey to the Nazi imperialism. When Hitler moved into Memel, in Lithuania one morning in April, 1939, it was clear that the Nazis were planning to use all of the Baltic coast for their already-outlined anti-Soviet adventure.

PART OF RUSSIA

But the point I want to make is my original point. A fuller discussion on the Baltic peoples will appear in next Sunday's Worker. And that point is that there is no basis, either in the present and future relations of the United States with the Soviet Union, or in the historic policy of the past, for any American to question the unity of the Baltic nations and the USSR.

For example, in Wilson's famous fourteen points, Jan. 8, 1918, he made no mention of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in so far as their self-determination was concerned.

Woodrow Wilson assumed they were part of Russia. Incidentally, in Wilson's mention of Poland, he emphasized her right to nationhood, restricted "to territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations." Attention, Gen'l Sikorski.

When Robert Lansing, Wilson's second Secretary of State, was preparing a memorandum to the President at the Versailles conference, he specifically declared: "The Baltic provinces of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia shall be autonomous states of a Russian confederation. . . ."

In 1920, when the United States was thinking about a de facto recognition of the Baltic states, as they were being torn away from the struggling Soviet republic, our commissioner, Evan Young declared:

"The leading men here (in the Baltic States) are under no illusions as to the future relations of these states to Russia and realize full well that with an orderly, well-established government in Russia, the Baltic provinces will again become part of what will probably be a federated Russia."

AIDED BY GERMANY

In fact, as Frederick L. Schuman describes in his book "American Policy Toward Russia since 1917" when the reactionary regimes established in these countries with German help appealed to the United States for recognition in 1919 and 1920, Secretary Robert Lansing replied:

"It has been thought unwise and unfair to prejudice in advance of the establishment of an orderly, constitutional government in Russia, the principle of Russian unity as a whole."

And when the Allies—France, England and Italy—decided on Jan Jan. 27, 1921 to recognize the reactionary Baltic regimes. "This decision" writes Schuman, "was received with keen regret in Washington. . . .

It was not until July, 1920, after all the other great powers had done so, that the United States recognized de facto the existence of Lithuania an the other Baltic states.

So much for history. Of course, the United States expected that an "orderly, well-established government in Russia" would come about on a capitalist basis.

But let's ask ourselves: has an "orderly" government been functioning in the USSR? The question itself is an insult today.

Is this government well-established? The question is also an insult.

So there is no basis for reviving the concept that the Baltic nations need any greater self-determination than they already have as free and equal members of the Soviet family of nations. Their people feel this way and are fighting valiantly in the Red Army and as guerrillas.

As the lawyers say: "the case against the USSR on this issue ought to be thrown out of court." History has already thrown it in the ash-can.

This is a clipping from page 2 of the Daily Worker for

MARCH 1, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

I'd Rather Be Right

By Samuel Grafton

Some men have worried that Russia might not stop at her own borders. Some have worried that she might stop there, giving us back the war. It has remained for Senator Wheeler to worry about both possibilities simultaneously.

He called a reporter in, the other day, and said there was a possibility that Russia might go right on toward Berlin. That would give her control of Europe. The Senator did not appear to be in favor of that.

But he went on to say there was also a possibility Russia might stop fighting when she came to her own borders. The Senator seemed to find that equally distasteful. It is quite clear now that whether Russia goes on or whether she stops, the Senator from Montana is not going to like it.

When Not Any Prospect Pleases

When the big Russian push rolled past Kharkov, we heard a good deal of whispering to the effect that the Soviet drive had so much momentum it could not halt itself until it pulled up before the cafes of Paris, its brakes screeching.

Mr. Stalin's order of the day, of last week, with its sole stated aim of ousting the invader from Russian territory, should, therefore, have been profoundly reassuring. It proclaimed no intention on the part of the Soviet armies to travel and see the world.

But on the contrary, the whisper immediately went up: "See! Those Russians do not really intend to cross their own borders. They are going to pull out on us when they hit the last county line."

If It Does, or Does Not

Soviet policy is therefore damned if it does and also damned if it doesn't.

If the Soviet armies cross their own borders, that will be described by some as a bid to control Europe. If they pull up short it will be described by some, the same some, as desertion of the allied cause. Their policy for Russia would be to have her cross the border, but remain on her own side; and while in that interesting posture to defeat Hitler without defeating him; then, having finished this hard job, to roll over and die for the convenience of the confused.

That is a good, round plan, it is complete, it covers all eventualities, but it is not likely to be adopted. We cannot ask a great power to do a contortionist turn; to appear and disappear conveniently; to materialize and dematerialize itself, according to these intricate specifications.

Neither First Nor Last

It might be supposed, then, that those who are most in fear of Russia would be most in favor of a second front. If nothing Russia can do can please us, we ought to want to do it ourselves.

But one searches the pleadings of most isolationists in vain for a plea for a second front. They are afraid, and they say so, that Russia may reach Berlin before we do. They do not say that we ought to jump in and get there first.

They want Russia to get there last without our getting there first.

Or, to put it another way, they want Russia to get there without being there, and they want us to be there without getting there.

Even more distractedly, they sometimes seem to want Europe if Russia wants it, and not to want it if Russia doesn't.

In other words, their policy is not centered about Hitler, but about Russia. Or else they have no policy; to hope Russia will drop dead is not a policy. And Hitler has known every one of these paradoxes, and has used them against us, for twenty years.

This is a clipping from page 24 of the New York Post for March 1, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

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WHAT RUSSIA DEMANDS.

The government controled Russian press has stated unequivocally that Russia has no intention of restoring some of the extinct buffer states and the boundaries that prevailed before Sept. 1, 1939. There is going to be a lot of weeping and wailing about that, and the dialecticians who devote their time to the more recondite aspects of the Atlantic Charter and the four freedoms are going to be cruelly disabused. But none of this will alter the facts or stop the stars.

The Russians have said as clearly as they could on many occasions that those who wanted to enunciate idealistic codes of ethics were privileged to do so, but that certain realities had to be observed. The foremost of these from the Russian viewpoint is the security of Russia. Stalin believed long before Germany attacked him that he needed different frontiers to protect his country. He was willing to throw in with Britain and France if they'd sacrifice some of the smaller nations, but they weren't willing to pay his price. Germany was, and that accounts for the uneasy pact of August, 1939, that prepared the way for war.

What Stalin professed to want at that time was rather less than he subsequently managed to grab. His original intentions seemed to concern the acquisition of the Baltic states. But when he made his deal with Hitler, which enabled the Fuehrer to fight a one front war, Stalin's price was eastern Poland. Hitler, with a future reckoning in mind, let the partition go thru. While the Nazis were occupied with Britain and France in the west, Stalin made the best of his opportunities.

First he went to war with Finland to straighten out that boundary and obtain a little more elbow room for Leningrad. Then he swallowed the Baltic states and forced Rumania to hand over Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, putting Russia back on the Danube once more. It was obvious that some of these grabs were not by prearrangement with the Nazis, but were dictated by considerations of defense against expected German attack. The Nazis, however, still had enough other things on their hands to compel them to give a semblance of approval to Red expansion, but Russia remained Hitler's first hate and the Reds were on his agenda.

As it turned out, Russia didn't have enough time to develop the defensive possibilities of its new border territory adequately before the attack came. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Russian Poland were quickly overrun, but the Karelian territory acquired from Finland helped to shield Leningrad and enable the city to withs-

Great as have been the changes in Russia's social and political organization from Nicholas II. to Stalin, it is impossible to lose sight of the fact that Russian nationalism has changed not at all. Stalin has been busy restoring the czarist frontiers, and if he happens to have lost them again for the present, there isn't any doubt that in the end he intends to have them back.

He may even be thinking of moving farther afield, for with the acquisition of Lwow the soviet union would again possess a jumping off place for adventures in southeastern Europe. Bulgaria and Jugo-Slavia would be drawn into the Pan-Slavic orbit once more and the Balkans would revert to their historic status as the powder keg of Europe. Thus the conditions of war as of 1939 having been removed, the conditions of 1914 are once again restored. It is Europe's old cycle.

The more credulous charter members of the post-war New Atlantis, however, refuse to accept Russian statements concerning expansion at face value. Their usual recourse is to cite Stalin's declaration of Nov. 6, 1941, "We have no war aims of imposing our régime, Slav or otherwise, on the enslaved peoples of the world who are waiting for our help," as fulfillment of their wishes that Europe be reconstituted as it was before Munich. They seem to think that, having whipped the Nazis, Stalin will be content to go quietly home and take his reward in virtuous thoughts.

What these daydreamers fail to note is that Russia in all her utterances thinks of her borders as they existed in 1914, not as they happened to exist between 1919 and 1939. These border lands, as the soviet press puts it, are "as incontrovertibly a part of the soviet union as Alaska or Texas is of the United States." That is explicit enough even for a Henry Wallace or a President who only reads headlines. They can apply the Atlantic Charter as they please to the Land of Cockaigne, but Stalin and the Red army will attend to Russia's western frontier without assistance.

This is a clipping from page 14 of the Chicago Tribune for March 1, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Democracies' Bargain With Soviet Hinted

Moscow Would Curb Comintern for U. S.-British Pledges

By HELEN KIRKPATRICK
Special Radio to The Post

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London, Mar. 31– Fear in the democracies that the desired Russian participation in the post-war world may lead to the extension of Communism is believed to be baseless, provided the democracies are willing to make certain concessions themselves.

The desire of various groups in both the United States and Britain to obtain assurance from Russia that the actitivies of the Comintern (Communist International) will be curtailed in the post-war

EXCLUSIVE

world may be fulfilled, if both countries are willing to give suitable guarantees in return.

Limit on Missionaries

It is believed that Russia will agree to limit Comintern activities if the U. S. and Britain agree to limit the activities of missionaries and proselytes and do not continue to press the Soviet Government for greater religious freedom within Russia.

Since neither of the two Allied governments is believed yet to have asked formally for the Russian attitude on the Comintern after the war, it is not likely that Russia has indicated a basis for agreement. But the best informed quarters here are convinced that these are the lines along which the Russians will be willing to negotiate.

This is a clipping from page 22 of the New York Post for March 31, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Second-Front Appeal Made by Troyanovsky

Former Russian Envoy to U. S. Asks Allies to Strike 'Crushing Blow in West'

MOSCOW, March 30 (AP).—The long-debated question of a second front in Europe is discussed anew in "Why the United States Fights Against Hitlerite Germany," a 112-page pamphlet by Alexander Troyanovsky, former Soviet Ambassador to the United States.

"The United States and Great Britain," he says, "have every possibility of fulfilling their obligations by inflicting a crushing blow from the west upon the Hitlerite robber hordes. It is necessary only to launch decisive operations to let loose the enormous military forces commanded by Great Britain and the United States."

The pamphlet was quickly sold out when it appeared last week on Moscow bookstalls. It describes for the Russian people the Monroe Doctrine and the policy of the freedom of the seas, and discusses the principles of American foreign policies.

In a chapter discussing the "penetration of Hitler agents into America," the former ambassador declares:

"Isolationism . . . found support among groups which failed to understand the international position of the United States and believed that international conflicts would not touch United States interests.

Accuses Isolationists

"The United States also has isolationists who consciously take up the role of defenders and helpers of Fascist aggression. These reactionary elements consider that even the foreign brand of Fascism means curbing the rights of the working masses in the United States.

"Hitler Germany to a much greater extent than Imperial Germany strived to . . . subjugate renowned personages and representatives of American industry under their influence and power."

Recalling the German spy trials in the United States and the closing of German and Italian consulates, he refers to the large number of German-Born Americans and to the numerous German organizations as sources of Fascist influence.

Concluding the chapter, Troyanovsky says: "However, Fascist elements exist among native Americans. Such Fascist organizations as the Klu-Klux Klan, the Silver Shirts and the Black Legion for a long time developed their subversive activity. At present these organizations are forbidden."

In a chapter titled "The United States' struggle against Fascism before the second world war," Troyanovsky says:

"An effective move against aggression was the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

"Formally, this was only an act to normalize the relations between the two great powers, but under the conditions in which the re-establishment was carried out, it was not only a tribute to the power and international influence of the Soviet Union but also signified the establishment of further grounds of co-operation between the two greatest peace-loving countries against aggression."

The ex-Ambassador says President Roosevelt "saw the danger (of Fascist aggression) and repeatedly turned the attention of the citizens toward it," and recalls "the numerous trips persons close to Roosevelt took over (to Europe), to receive information" about the war "and the trips undertaken in order to influence the policies of certain countries."

Sees Plan Aimed at U. S.

Discussing briefly the war in the Pacific, Troyanovsky mentions the anti-Comintern pact and the Axis treaty, and adds that since Russia and Japan signed a neutrality pact, it must be plain that "the German--Japanese cimbination is directed primarily against the United States and Great Britain."

Hitler for a long time, he goes on, tried to draw Japan into the war, offering numerous promises which he was unable to fulfill. "Finally, the Japanese military circles gave way and agreed to enter the war against the United States andGreat Britain."

He quotes "The New York Times" on Hitler promising the Japanese government to end the war in Russia and invade England, completing hostilities before the winter of 1941.

"Japanese militarists," he says, "decided Hitler really was able to take Moscow and liberate the necessary forces in order to move against Britain and the United States. . . . The Japanese militarists calculated on a simultaneous offensive in the Pacific ocean at a time when Germany would begin military operations against England and then the United States."

This is a clipping from page 5 of the New York Herald Tribune for March 31, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

FDR Discloses He Hopes to Meet Stalin Soon Discussions on Post-War Allied Problems

President, Discussing Recent Parleys With Eden, Says United Nations Are '95 Per Cent' in Agreement

PM's Bureau

WASHINGTON, Mar. 31.—Joint U. S.-Soviet discussions on postwar problems — probably with President Roosevelt and Premier Stalin among the conferees—apparently are near.

FDR made that disclosure yesterday during a press conference discussion of his recent conversations with British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden.

The conversations, FDR said, had been a great help in looking into postwar planning by all the United Nations, not merely that of the U. S. A. and the United Kingdom.

The President noted that Eden had been to Russia and had talked with Stalin and Foreign Commissar Molotov, and he said that he hoped, and expected, that talks of the same general nature soon could be held by the U. S. A. and Russia.

United Nations Agreed

In the conferences already held, FDR went on, the U. S. A. has been largely in agreement with other United Nations members. He declared:

"If you want to be didactic, and put it in terms of figures, I would say that so far, in all the conferences we have held with other members of the United Nations, we are about 95 per cent together. Well, that is an amazing statement. And it happens to be true."

That 95 per cent figure, FDR added, included Russia and China. Every time another conference would take place, he continued, the remaining 5 per cent would be reduced.

Hope Springs Eternal

Some people, he said, should put that fact in their pipes and smoke it. Written agreements, he held, were not necessary, since a lot could be accomplished through gentlemen's agreements.

The President declined to be specific about the forthcoming meeting with Stalin, but he said that hope springs eternal so far as a meeting between him and Stalin is concerned.

Several allied conferences definitely are in prospect, FDR disclosed. They include a food conference, a relief conference and others on finances and possibly minerals, metals and oil, he said.

He stressed that his talks with Eden had been exploratory, that no final decisions had been made, because that was impractical at this stage of the war.

The procedure, FDR said, was to take time by the forelock and determine and agree on general objectives.

World War I Cited

Pointing out that when World War I had ended most of the peace conferees had been caught unprepared, he said he thought the current type of conference would be a great help in the future.

The President said that he and Eden had decided against issuing a formal statement about their meetings, and that Eden had requested that an informal explanation of the meeting be given.

He added that he and Eden were entirely in agreement, and had discussed about everything that might be put down as current military and political affairs, as well as other questions growing out of the war and relating to the present and future.

This is a clipping from page 3 of the PM for March 31, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

U. S., Russia To Talk Soon On War Aims

Roosevelt Calls Results With Eden Good; Plans for Parleys With Others

Sees United Nations '95% Together' Now

Says That Is 'Amazing'; Allied Conference on Food Set for April 27

By Bert Andrews

WASHINGTON, March 30.—Exploratory conferences on post-war problems will be held soon between the United States and Russia, President Roosevelt revealed today at a press conference at which he summed up the results—and found them good—of the discussions on similar matters that he has been having with Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary.

Soon after Mr. Eden departed for Ottawa by train, Mr. Roosevelt held his semi-weekly meeting with newspaper men and informed them that he and Mr. Eden had agreed that the President would informally comment on their talks of the last two weeks, rather than give out any formal joint statement.

Mr. Roosevelt, who emphasized that his sessions with Mr. Eden were merely a small part of a long series of conferences in which all the United Nations have figured and will figure, authorized the following direct quotation:

"If you want to be didactic and put it in terms of figures, I would say that so far, in all of the conferences we have held with the other members of the United Nations—this is not just the British; it applies to the others also—we are about 95 per cent together. Well, that is an amazing statement and it happens to be true."

Food Parleys Next Month

Mr. Roosevelt, disclosing that United Nations conferences are to cover many topics, reiterated that the first one—dealing with food—will be held some time next month. Later, the State Department revealed that it had informed all United Nations governments that the food conference will be held in the United States on April 27. The place has not yet been selected.

The conferences, in addition to food, will discuss other essential agricultural products. Each government was asked to send to the conference a small number of appropriate technical and expert representatives.

Subsequently, at dates still to be fixed, Mr. Roosevelt disclosed, there will be separate meetings on relief, on finances and on minerals, including metals and oil.

President Roosevelt, by way of emphasizing that the interests of all the United Nations will receive

(Continued on page 19, column 5)

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Herald Tribune for March 31, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

attention in future conferences, observed that he and Mr. Eden had talked with representatives of China and one or two South American countries and that Mr. Eden himself had been to Russia and had conferred with Premier Stalin and Foreign Minister Molotov.

Hopes for Talks With Russia

At this point Mr. Roosevelt said he hoped we would be continuing discussions with Russia in the very near future. Newspaper men perked up their ears at that, and as soon as a chance was available they pressed for more information.

"Is there anything specific you can tell us?" one asked. Mr. Roosevelt said there wasn't. "Will we be surprised by some one arriving for a visit?" asked another. Mr. Roosevelt laughed and said—you never can tell. "Does hope still spring eternal?" asked another, mindful of a previous press conference at which Mr. Roosevelt, when asked if he hoped to meet Stalin, replied that hope springs eternal. This time Mr. Roosevelt laughed and nodded, but the general impression of his listeners was that nothing spectacular is imminent.

Eden Talks Comprehensive

President Roosevelt began his talk about the Eden talks by saying that they covered all current military and political affairs arising out of this war as they relate both to the present and the future. A similarity of outlook between the two governments prevailed, he said, and there was a very fruitful meeting of minds on all matters.

He said he wanted to make it clear and thought that his listeners should do so, too, that the conferences were exploratory and were not designed to reach final decisions that are impossible at this stage.

President Roosevelt said that he and Mr. Eden discussed the practical problems that will arise on the surrender of the enemy; problems which will face the United States, the United Kingdom, China and Russia, and all the other United Nations in their drive to safeguard the world from future aggression.

If one of the enemy blows up first, Mr. Roosevelt said, the United Nations would begin immediately on the post-war problems arising from the fellow who had blown up, but would concentrate their military and naval power on the other one that didn't blow up.

When he said that he and Mr. Eden were in general agreement and that the conferences were going along extremely well, Mr. Roosevelt said that some people ought to take note of that. Later, when he said that "we are about 95 per cent together," he said that some people ought to put that in their pipe and smoke it.

"How about the 5 per cent?" asked a newspaper man. Mr. Roosevelt replied that every additional conference eliminates parts of the missing percentage. "Does that apply to Russia? and to China?" he was asked. He said it did.

Stresses Gentlemen's Agreements

President Roosevelt recalled that when the first World War ended very little had been done on post-war problems. Between 1918 and 1919, he said, every one was rushing around so frantically that it reminded him of the lady who was told at noon that she must pack by 3 p. m. to accompany her husband on a month's trip. That was the situation, he said, with everybody grabbing in closets and throwing stuff into suitcases, some of it not needed at all. It was also true, he said, that every one with a happy thought or who thought that he was an expert got a free ride to the peace conference.

The type of conference now under way or in contemplation will go a long way toward avoiding such confusion after this war, he said.

President Roosevelt scorned the idea of reducing the present conversations to written agreements, explaining that a lot could be done by gentlemen's agreements. There are thirty-one gentlemen in this show, he added, expressing his belief that the term pact was a headline word without meaning.

This is a clipping from page _____ of the New York Herald Tribune for

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Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Nobly Save or Meanly Lose

In every revolutionary era there is someing new and big struggling to be born the world. The means and petty men of r own time work mightily against it—and ey may for a time have their way. The faint-hearted in our own ranks always seem amazed when they discover that nothing new and great can come into being without pain and struggle and an iterated succession of defeats.

Josef Stalin

The great idea of our age is the idea of a United Nations that includes peoles of diverse traditions, social systems, adership. That idea took a substantial step rward yesterday when President Roosesit announced plans are in prospect for lks between U. S. and the Russian leaders presumably Stalin or Molotov or both.

To get a full sense of the potential imortance of this, one must sum up what ms far have been the steps our Governent has taken toward building a postwar orld. They have been of three sorts:

¶ First, the technical steps taken or being ken toward meeting the problems of food nd physical reconstruction in the ravaged reas. This is important, but does nothing answer the basic political problems.

¶ Second, the State Department maneuerings with respect to North Africa, France, pain, Italy, and other countries. The genral strategy here has been, if anything, ither to isolate Russia or ignore her in the icture of postwar Europe.

¶ Third, talks between American and ritish leaders, and manifestos—like the Atntic Charter—issued primarily by the two ountries. Here one can say only that an nglo-American agreement is an Angloamerican agreement. That does not mean is unimportant. But it does mean that it an inadequate basis for world peace.

It is because this has been the sum of merican policy thus far that the Presilent's statement yesterday is important. The Casablanca conference trembled on the argin of an understanding with Russia. The Eden talks must have been intended to rive beyond that margin.

Since the President's statement was timed o Eden's departure from Washington, the Eden talks must have left some residue in he President's own thinking and in that nost impermeable of impermeable subtances—the State Department mind.

We don't know, of course, what Eden said or didn't say. But here are a few things that he might have said, if he had been blunt and direct.

He might have said that the American official attempts either to ignore Russia in our post-war thinking or to build a bloc of hostile nations around her were dangerous in the extreme. He might have added that if we persisted in this we might find ourselves facing two alternatives: A post-war Europe organized by Britain and Russia without America; or a Europe in which anti- and pro-Russian blocs would be locked in a struggle leading only to World War III.

And he might have added that if American leaders persist in being dogmatic about Russian boundaries before the event, they will succeed only in creating an issue between ourselves and Russia at the very threshold of an understanding—an issue which would balk agreement with Russia on the larger stakes of world peace.

Whatever Eden may or may not have said, the President's announcement must be studied in this context. And when so studied it may well prove one of the turning points in our postwar policy. For the first time our Government is talking clearly of taking the crucial step that liberal opinion has been asking.

Now it is up to the Russian leaders to meet the President half way. But it is also up to our leaders—and British—to stop a policy that can end only in alienating the Russians, making them suspect our good faith.

Eden touched on one aspect of this when he hit at the fears that some Americans feel that the Russians will occupy Berlin ahead of us. He gave the only possible answer—that it would be good to see *some* Allied army or other in Berlin soon.

But he hit a snag when he talked about the American and English policy toward France and Spain. Why do we so persistently snub the Fighting French movement when it alone contains that cross-section of French opinion, from Left to Right, on which any plan to rebuild Europe with Russia's help would have to be based?

And, even more crucially, how can Eden support so warmly the policy that the Anglo-American twins, Hayes and Hoare, have been following in Spain toward the Franco government, and at the same time plead for an understanding with Russia? Does he not see, and does not the President see, that the whole burden of Franco's speeches has been that Russia and Bolshevism are the great enemies of Europe?

One only can conclude that Eden is either confused or attempting an impossible straddle. If he tries to reach an accord first with State Dept. policy and then with Russia, it is like trying to span an abyss in two leaps. If he thinks that America and Britain can cultivate good relations with Russia, and at the same time placate Russia's Fascist and clerical enemies in Spain, France and Italy, he is thinking monstrous nonsense.

Somehow, both in America and England, this contradiction will have to be resolved. You canont walk in firm bonds of friendship with the Russians, and at the same time keep your hands off Franco and the hands off politer but just as ruthless Fascists preparing to take over elsewhere in Europe.

If we really mean to work with Russia in the postwar, we must clear our minds of cant and our policy of impossible encumbrances.

The world's future rests with these two countries. If they learn to work together, there will be peace. If they do not, we are headed for an ice age.

Upon what we do in this area depends the fate of generations to come. "We shall nobly save or meanly lose the last best hope of earth." The words are Lincoln's, from his 1862 message to Congress, and he was thinking of America only. But they can be applied today as well.

Unless America and Russia can learn to work together and walk side by side into the future, the United Nations idea—born of so much blood and suffering—will prove to be only hollow rhetoric.

—MAX LERNER

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This is a clipping from page 3 of the PM for March 31, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Cowles Urges Public to Understand Soviet

A worthwhile peace is possible only if Americans try to understand the Soviet and its "place in in the schemes of things to follow the war," Gardner Cowles, jr., of the Office of War Information said last night, adding:

"We don't have to turn Communist to play ball with Russia in the field of international politics. It isn't the American 'pinks' whom the Russians admire. They admire the businessmen and technicians who have made America industrially strong."

Cowles, a member of the Des Moines publishing family, went to Russia last October with Wendell Willkie. Now serving as director of OWI's domestic division, he spoke at the fourth of a United Nations lecture series at Constitution Hall.

"Too many Americans rather secretly regret that we must fight side-by-side with Russia as Allies in this war," he said. "They'd rather not think about our relations.

"If Americans don't make an effort to understand Russia and the Russian place in the scheme of things to follow this war, I fail to see how we can possibly hope to build a worthwhile peace.

"Prejudice and distrust of Russia by Americans run high, it seems to me, for three reasons—Russia is thought still to be stamping out religion, still to want to impose Communism on the rest of the world, still to be killing the idea of private property.

"So long as the church remains clearly out of politics in Russia, I think the violent persecutions are a thing of the past. Stalin feels the survival and development of the Soviet Union no longer depend upon world revolution. On the question of private property, Americans are much confused about Russia. Workers may acquire any amount of consumer goods; one or more houses, any amount of furniture, an auto, etc., for their own use. The distinction from our economy is that in Russia an individual may not own income-producing property.

"Russia wants to be treated by us for what she is—a very strong, first-rate power, perhaps even the dominant power of the coming century so far as keeping the peace of the world is concerned.

"After visiting Russia at war much of the problem seems to me to be here at home, not over there. We have learned the United States cannot isolate herself and have military safety. We have yet to learn that we cannot isolate ourselves economically and politically and have prosperity and freedom."

The panel included Maurice G. Hindus, author and lecturer on the Soviet Union; Edward C. Carter, secretary-general of the Institute of Pacific Relations and president of Russian War Relief, Inc.; Ernest C. Ropes, who is in charge of the Russian desk in the United States Department of Commerce's Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, and Sir Bernard Pares of England, world-famous authority on Russian history.

This is a clipping from page 7 of the Washington Post for MAR. 30, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

DISTRUST OF RUSSIA DECRIED BY COWLES

Head of OWI Domestic Division Says It Is Based on False Ideas About Soviet

CALLS FOR COLLABORATION

This Is Vital to Our Post-War Welfare, He Holds, Urging Committal Now

WASHINGTON, March 29 (U.P.)—Gardiner Cowles Jr., publisher and director of the OWI's domestic division, tonight criticized American distrust of the Soviet Union and called on the United States to make an "unequivocal commitment" on post-war collaboration with Russia and other members of the United Nations.

"We in the United States tend to become indignant because the Soviets do not let down their hair completely and rely for their whole future upon the assumption of our collaboration," he said. "We don't realize that the Russians could get just as indignant at us for the same reason.

"It is the United States and not Soviet Russia which today presents the world's greatest enigma."

Mr. Cowles, who accompanied Wendell L. Willkie on his trip to Moscow, spoke at Constitution Hall during the fourth of a series of lectures entitled "United Nations Today and Tomorrow."

Likening those who "secretly regret we must fight side-by-side with Russia as Allies" to the "hillbilly who went to the hardware store to buy a silencer for his shotgun so his daughter would have a quiet wedding," he said he could see no possible means of building "a worthwhile peace" unless Americans make an effort to understand Russia and Russia's place in the post-war world.

"Much of the problem seems to me to be here at home, not over there," he said. "We have learned the United States cannot isolate itself and have military safety. We have yet to learn that we cannot isolate ourselves economically and politically and have prosperity and freedom.

"Russia and China understand the modern world. They still wonder whether the people of the United States do. If we do, we ought to say so promptly, before it is too late."

Mr. Cowles said that his trip with Mr. Willkie convinced him the Russian people were "completely resolved to fight this war through to victory, no matter what the cost in men or time or suffering."

He said Russia's total troop casualties run at least 5,000,000 dead, wounded and missing and perhaps reach 6,000,000 or 7,000,000, but the losses have been "even more staggering" among civilians.

Premier Joseph Stalen, he said, "told us 50,000,000 Russian civilians living in territory overrun by Germany are now German captives, or more than 25 per cent of the entire Russian population."

"It would be as if, in this country, Germany had captured all the people of New England, plus the people of New York State, plus the people of Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia," he continued.

Amercian "prejudice and distrust" of Russia, he said, apparently is based on the supposition that the Soviet still stamps out religion, seeks to impose communism on te rest of the world and "kills" the idea of private property. None of these hold true any longer under Stalin's regime and the Russians "want just what the United States wants—security and peace."

"Russia," he continued, "wants to be treated by us for what she is—a very strong, first-rate power, perhaps even the dominant power of the coming century so far as keeping the peace of the world is concerned.

"We Americans need to realize we don't have to turn Communist to play ball with Russia in the field of international politics. It isn't the American 'pink' whom the Russians admire. They admire the business men and technicians who have made America industrially strong.

"And we need to get over the strange notion which too many Americans have that we would have to fight Russia in another twenty or twenty-five years. On the contrary, I think the argument can be logically made that there is less reason for us or Great Britain to fight Russia in the future than for us to fight any of the other powers.

"And lastly, why do so many Americans assume that democracy will lose in any ideological combat with communism? If democracy is still the most vital force in the world—and I think it is—democracy should not wither and die from mere association."

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Times for MAR. 30, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Cowles Rebukes U. S. for Doubts Of Soviet Aims

Stettinius Says Reds Got Half of Lend-Lease Food in January and February

By Frank Kelley 3

WASHINGTON, March 29. — Gardner Cowles jr., director of the Office of War Information's domestic division, who accompanied Wendell L. Willkie around the world last fall, sharply criticized American distrust of Soviet Russia tonight and declared that a "worthwhile peace" cannot be built unless Americans "make an effort to understand Russia and the Russian place in the scheme of things to follow this war."

Mr. Cowles asserted that in crossing Russian with Mr. Willkie "I saw no single bit of propaganda for world revolution," contrary to American "prejudice and distrust" on that score, and he suggested that Russia may be "even the dominant power of the coming century so far as keeping the peace of the world is concerned."

Mr. Cowles, participating in a panel discussion in the "United Nations Today and Tomorrow" series at Constitution Hall here, contended that "too many Americans don't want to learn about Russia" and "rather secretly regret that we must fight side by side with Russia as allies in this war."

He said prejudice and distrust of Russia by Americans "runs high" for these reasons: Russia is still thought to be stamping out religion; Russia is still thought to want to impose Communism on the rest of world, and Russia is still thought to be killing the idea of private property.

Religion, he admitted, "has been most brutally attacked in Russia," but he added that "so long as the church remains clearly out of politics in Russia I think the violent persecutions are a thing of the past."

Josef Stalin, Mr. Cowles said, feels that the survival and development of the Soviet Union no longer depend upon world revolution and is building only an intense nationalism, with the theme of such present-day Russian slogans as "Save the Fatherland."

Americans are much confused about the question of private property in Russia, Mr. Cowles said, pointing out that the Russian worker may acquire any amount of consumer goods for his own use but may not own an income-producing property or capital goods calling for the meployment of others.

Meanwhile, on another aspect of Russian relations about which some Americans are suspicious, Edward R. Stettinius jr., lend-lease administrator, reported that lend-lease food shipments in January and February went to Russia and Great Britain in about equal proportions. He expressed the hope that the food-supply situation in the United States would permit larger shipments to Allied Nations later this year.

In terms of the United States population, Mr. Stettinius disclosed, this country shipped to Russia and Britain in the first two months of 1943 less than one-quarter of an ounce of beef a person a week, three ounces of pork, ham and bacon, three-fifths of an ounce of lamb and mutton, one-quarter of an ounce of butter, and about one egg.

In an address prepared for tonight's discussion, Mr. Cowles said in part:

"Russia especially wants just what the United States wants—security and peace. Russia wants to be treated by us for what she is—a very strong, first-rate power, perhaps even the dominant power of the coming century so far as keeping the peace of the world is concerned. The Russian leaders feel there is an intimacy between the United States and Great Britain which Russia does not share. This leaves them suspicious.

"We in the United States tend to become indignant because the Soviets do not let down their hair completely and rely for their whole future upon the assumption of our post-war collaboration. We don't realize that the Russians could get just as indignant at us for the same reason.

"We Americans need to realize we don't have to turn Communist to play ball with Russia in the field of international politics. It isn't the American 'pinks' whom the Russians admire. They admire the business men and technicians who have made America industrially strong.

"And we need to get over the strange notion which too many Americans have that we'll have to fight Russia in another twenty or twenty-five years. On the contrary, I think the argument can be logically made that there is less reason for us or Great Britain to fight Russia in the future than for us to fight any of the other powers."

This is a clipping from page 3 of the New York Herald Tribune for March 30, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Moscow and Tokyo Avoid Rift on Fisheries

By Randall Gould
Former Chief Far Eastern Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

The Russian-Japanese annual fisheries agreement records Moscow the winner after the usual three months' diplomatic tug-of-war.

The margin of victory this year, however, is not as great as in March of 1942 when the Russians exacted a 20 per cent increase in price and a Japanese agreement not to bid on five out of the 12 fishing grounds in the Okhotsk Sea. The rate this year will be between 4 and 5 per cent higher than last year, and presumably restriction on fishing grounds still stands.

Negotiations started early last January. These usually drag on until the end of March when the fishing season begins and Japanese fishermen are eager to start their work. During this time each country indulges, through its controlled press, in a variety of threatening gestures—the Russians implying that they may not let the Japanese fish in their territory, and the Japanese suggesting in turn that if necessary they will do their fishing under the guns of warship.

Neither last year nor this was there much inclination to carry on this bluff, although the negotiations dragged as usual.

The new arrangement seems to have been completed with a record low in the matter of provocative propaganda. Neither party has been in the market for more trouble than was being generously provided from other quarters. Nevertheless Moscow evidently was willing to protract the negotiations enough to win fresh concession of a financial sort. Quite likely the mechanics of the matter centered about the exchange rate of the Japanese yen as against the Soviet ruble, although the Moscow radio somewhat puzzlingly spoke of payment "in gold."

Compromise on Exchange

In 1930 the Russians closed the Korean Bank in Vladivostok—the only foreign bank which exchanged rubles in Soviet territory, and which was able to buy rubles on the "black market" at a great saving to Japan. The unofficial rate was only 27½ Japanese sen to the ruble as contrasted with an official rate of 40 sen. Moscow understood the operation very well and wanted to squeeze Tokyo somewhat. However, at the outset a compromise rate of 32½ sen was fixed and this was supposed to prevail until 1944 with reference to fisheries payments.

When Japan became involved in war with America and Britain, Russia was quick to capitalize the situation. By last year's agreement, expiring last Dec. 31, the full official rate of 40 sen was charged.

Japan's currency is now quite largely off the world market and the Moscow argument clearly would be that it is no longer worth what it was last year, due to war strains and inflation. Tokyo could easily enough put the shoe on the other foot, arguing that the ruble, too, had been hit by the war. It is all in a realm of fantasy from the standpoint of economics and international exchange.

It is obvious that the whole affair was only a caricature of ordinary diplomatic or economic dealing. Neither had any sort of diplomatic sanctions to invoke, neither could offer the other trade so long as the war goes on. The significance lies, first, in showing that neither was willing under present conditions to press toward any actual clash. In other days occasional tests of military strength were frequent and routine. In the second place Russia apparently felt in rather the better position—else the fisheries price might well enough have been lowered rather than increased.

Anxious to Buy Time

However, nothing in Japanese history gives ground for drawing too sweeping conclusions this year any more than last year. What Japans wants now, just as she wanted then, was a chance to keep its food supply at something approximating normal levels while at the same time postponing what has long been regarded as the probably inevitable full-dress war with Russia.

Quite likely the Japanese are even more anxious to buy time from Russia now than they were last spring when their southern expansion had been unexpectedly rapid and easy. Now what is wanted is a chance to cash in on the occupied territories, to build up stockpiles of oil, and rubber, and manufactured munitions, while at the same time pressing the "Asia for the Asiatics" propaganda throughout areas where the native peoples may be beginning to doubt the wisdom of long resistance to the conqueror.

To stave off trouble with Russia, even a Russia weakened by protracted war with Germany, it is a small price to pay if Japan merely increases the number of printing-press yen required to buy the requisite number of printing-press rubles. Neither Tokyo nor Moscow is taken in by what has become a completely artificial arrangement. But at least Moscow has the satisfaction of having won the most "face"—though Japan gets Russian fish, which are important too.

This is a clipping from page 4 of the Christian Science Monitor for _____
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Spokesman Explains Need For Closer U. S.-Soviet Tie

OWI official, in White House-approved address, declares Communism is fading, Church tolerance increasing and clears up seven points which Americans must understand to co-operate fully for victory.

By Roscoe Drummond

Staff Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON, March 30—Through the spokesman of a non-New Deal public official highly regarded throughout the country, the Government has today put forward its strongest case for close and continuing collaboration with the Soviet Union—collaboration to win the war, to preserve the peace, and to further a mutual prosperity.

The spokesman is Gardner Cowles, Jr., nationally known newspaper publisher, co-owner of the Des Moines Register and Tribune, the Minneapolis Star Journal, and Look Magazine. He is Deputy Director of the Office of War Information in charge of its Domestic Division. He speaks from the advantage of intimate first-hand contacts with Russian conditions and Russian leaders made during his trip with Wendell L. Willkie, and his judgments are obviously untinged with any sympathy or support for the system of Communism.

Mr. Cowles, speaking with the approval of the Administration, dealt forthrightly with all the controversial issues which appear to surround American relations with the Soviet Union, and he asked the American people to examine the merits of these seven major propositions:

Things to Consider Frankly

That if Americans fail to make an effort to understand Russia and the Russian place in the scheme of things to follow this war, the United Nations cannot hope to build a worthwhile peace.

That the Soviet Union intends to fight Germany to the finish.

That Moscow is greatly moderating its restrictions on freedom of religious worship.

That Stalin is abandoning the idea of trying to impose Communism on the rest of the world.

That Russia and the United States are countries least likely ever to fall into war with each other.

That Russia, as well as the whole Eastern World from Egypt to Alaska, is "simply aching for positive evidence that we here in the United States are committed to what the United Nations coalition and the Atlantic Charter imply."

That assurance now that the United States intends to play a full role in a system of collective security will contribute most to bringing that system into being.

White House in Accord

This exposition of the need for Russo - American co-operation, known to correspond to the views held both at the White House and at the State Department, was made as part of an address at Constitution Hall here last night in a fourth of a United Nations lecture series.

Mr. Cowles dealt with the whole broad range of questions and prejudices and apprehensions which some Americans have toward Russia, and he gave his observations with complete frankness, without any indirection on such vital matters as these:

Question—Is Russia still stamping out religion?

Answer—"It is true that religion has been most brutally attacked in Russia. But we should remember that before the 1917 revolution the Church and the State in Russia were tightly intertwined. The attacks on the Church were regarded by the revolutionist as part of the necessary attack on the Czarist State. As in most revolutions, the attacks went to violent and inexcusable excesses.

"The Church is still frowned upon, but a more moderate attitude clearly prevails today. In Tashkent, Tamberlane's old headquarters in South-Central Russia, for example, we saw Roman Catholic, Baptist, Greek, Mohammedan, Buddhist, and Zionist churches open and holding services. So long as the Church remains clearly out of politics in Russia, I think the violent persecutions are a thing of the past."

Communism Less Expensive

Question—Does Russia want to posing Communism on the world. the world?

Answer—"The question of iming Communism on the world. There seem to me to be many evidences that this urge held so strongly by Lenin and the other early leaders is not held strongly by Stalin today. Stalin is building an intense nationalism in Russia and pride in her history going back centuries before the 1917 revolution. The theme of present-day Russian slogan is, "Save the Fatherland." In crossing Russia I saw no single bit of propaganda for world revolution. Stalin feels the survival and development of the Soviet Union no longer depend upon world revolution."

Question—Is Russia killing the idea of private property?

Answer—"On the question of private property, Americans are much confused about Russia. In the first place, Russia has moved a long way from pure Communism. The classic definition; 'From every man according to his ability, to every man according to his ned' has been replaced by the Socialist

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Clipped at the Seat of Government.

slogan 'From every man according to his ability, to every man according to his work.' It seems to me even Calvin Coolidge would applaud that formula.

One Sharp Difference

"Workers may acquire any amount of consumer goods; one or more houses, any amount of furniture, an auto, etc., for their own use. The distinction from our economy is that in Russia an individual may not own income-producing property. He may not hold capital goods calling for the employment of others. Within this limitation, there is no longer any studied plan that I could see to kill the basic idea of the ownership of property by individuals. In fact, many signs point in the other direction."

Question—are Russia and America headed for war anyway?

Answer—"We need to get over the strange notion which too many Americans have that we'll have to fight Russia in another 20 or 25 years. On the contrary, I think the argument can be logically made that there is less reason for us or Great Britain to fight Russia in the future than for us to fight any of the other powers.

"Russia has no 'super race' complex. Her nearly 200,000,000 people have all the living room they need, with space for expansion in the Vast area (loaded with natural resources) stretching nearly 6,000 miles from Moscow to Vladivostok, equal to the distance from New York to Hawaii, or from New York to Patagonia in Argentina.

"I believe Americans would more nearly accord Russia her just position in the scheme of things to come if they would realize her sheer size. Russia is bigger than the entire continent of South

Continued on Page 5, Column 7

Continued from Page 1

America and has twice the population.

"And lastly, why do so many Americans assume that democracy will lose in any ideological combat with Communism? If democracy is still the most vital force in the world, and I think it is, democracy should not wither and die from mere association with Communistic Russia."

Question—What should be America's relationship with Russia and all the non-Anglo-Saxon peoples?

Answer—"First of all, the leaders of the Arab World, of China, of Russia (and I particularly include Mr. Stalin himself) realize the advance of science has killed the old political-economic order built exclusively on national lines. They realize in the future no nation will be safely free unless the whole world is at peace. Russia especially wants just what the United States wants—security and peace.

"Russia wants to be treated by us for what she is—a very strong, first-rate power, perhaps even the dominant power of the coming century so far as keeping the peace of the world is concerned. The Russian leaders feel there is an intimacy between the United States and Great Britain which Russia does not share. This leaves them suspicious. As one leading world statesman aptly put it, the Russians think relations between the United States and Great Britain are actually what those relations should be but aren't.

"Traveling around the world from Egypt through Russia and China to Alaska and talking with the leaders both great and small, I was impressed above all else with the fact that a good share of the world is simply aching for positive evidence that we here in the United States are committed to what the United Nations coalition and the Atlantic Charter imply.

Hope Mingles With Suspicion

"These other peoples are enormously encouraged by most of the signs. But they know from harsh experience that the signs could change. They remember our course after the first World War. They would like to hear an unequivocal commitment as to our purposes from both major political parties.

"We in the United States tend to become indignant because the Soviets do not let down their hair completely and rely for their whole future upon the assumption of our postwar collaboration. We don't realize that the Russians could get just as indignant at us for the same reason.

"We Americans need to realize we don't have to turn Communist to play ball with Russia in the field of international politics. It isn't the American 'pinks' whom the Russians admire. They admire the businessmen and technicians who have made America industrially strong.

"After visiting Russia at war, much of the problem seems to me to be here at home, not over there. We have learned the United States cannot isolate itself and have military safety. We have yet to learn that we cannot isolate ourselves economically and politically and have prosperity and freedom.

"Russia and China understand the modern world. They still wonder whether the people of the United States do. If we do, we ought to say so promptly, before it is too late."

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ALLIED PATRIOTS ABROAD PROTEST OWI PROPAGANDA

Broadcasts Extolling Reds Disillusion Nazi Foes.

BY WALTER TROHAN.
[Chicago Tribune Press Service.]

Washington, D. C., March 28.—Word has been received here from the underground of patriots operating in various occupied countries in Europe that injudicious American radio propaganda, extrolling the soviets, is doing more harm than good to the allied cause.

The New Deal propagandizers, in their enthusiastic acclaim of the soviet war effort, are reported to be playing directly into the hands of Nazi propagandists with the result that the inhabitants of the conquered nations, who dread communism, are becoming disillusioned.

German broadcasts to occupied countries are harping on the theme that Britain has betrayed the small nations into the hands of the bolsheviks and that the deal has been made with the consent of the United States.

Praise All Things Russian.

Citizens of occupied countries, who are compelled to listen to German broadcasts, would ordinarily dismiss such information as propaganda calculated to deceive them, but they find American broadcasts, to which they listen secretly, apparently confirming the Nazis by praising all things Russian.

For years the citizens of such occupied countries as Poland, Lithuania, Czecho-Slovakia, Holland, Belgium, Norway, and Denmark have been bred to a horror of communism. When they get the notion thru Nazis and American broadcasts they are being sold out to the Reds, they choose to throw their lots with the Nazis, according to information received here.

It is reported that the OWI broadcasts are increasing the efficiency of the slave labor in German industry. In deciding to throw their lot with the Nazis as against the Reds, many captive workers no longer attempt to delay production thru various subterfuges, such as sneezing.

7 Million in Industry.

According to official German announcements some 7 million men from occupied countries are at work in German industry. The bulk of these are from eastern Europe, the Poles alone numbering 2 million. There are about 1½ million Frenchmen, the largest block of enforced laborers.

A sneeze multiplied 7 million times, according to the underground can put a sizeable crimp in German production. There are similar forms of delay employed by captive workers to the exasperation of Nazi production bosses.

According to information received here from the underground these practices have fallen off considerably with the result that Nazi production has become more efficient as a result of the Nazi propaganda line being unwittingly supported by the OWI broadcasts.

There also are reports of a drop in underground enrollment with an inevitable lessening of sabotage by patriots, particularly on the vital German supply lines on the eastern front.

This is not the first time that OWI propaganda has been questioned. The OWI propaganda set up was recently reorganized as a result of complaints from Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, commander in chief of the allied forces in North Africa.

Eisenhower Protests.

Eisenhower protested that he could take care of the Nazis in front of his army, but could not protect his back from OWI broadcasts. He complained the broadcasts were doing more injury to the American expeditionary force than to enemy morale.

At the time when Eisenhower was dealing with Adm. Jean Darlan and his successor, Gen. Henri Giraud, OWI was blasting Vichyites over the air waves directed at Africa. Eisenhower charged that the OWI propaganda was inept and silly.

The general executed a skillful coup which saved many American lives and much time by having Darlan call off French resistance to the invasion of the French African colonies. Thruout the delicate negotiations and in the critical days of the French-American rapprochement, OWI flooded the airwaves with propaganda calculated to destroy French confidence in Eisenhower, the general complained. The propaganda line continued even after the negotiations conducted by Eisenhower were blessed by the state department and the White House.

This is a clipping from page 11 of the Chicago Tribune for

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Russia's Uncertainty Top Issue in Senate's Postwar Planning

Foreign Relations Unit To Begin Study of Proposals Tuesday

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By the Associated Press.

The possibility that Russia may refuse to join in any attempt at this time to frame post-war policies for the United Nations developed yesterday as a major issue in Senate consideration of collective security proposals.

With a Foreign Relations Subcommittee scheduled to begin preliminary study Tuesday of a half-dozen resolutions, Senators who have counseled against undertaking any international commitments now predicted the Soviet Government would refuse to participate in such moves until after the war is won.

Chairman Reynolds of the Military Affairs Committee and a Foreign Relations committeeman said he doubts that Premier Stalin desires at this time to lay out the course Russia would follow after the war.

"I think Mr. Stalin is too busy looking after the interests of Russia and winning the war to hold any conferences now about such matters," Senator Reynolds told reporters. "When he gets all he wants for Russia, all the territory he thinks she is entitled to, I assume that he will be willing to advise with the other United Nations about keeping the peace."

Hatch Urges "First Move."

Senator Reynolds said he believed any pledges other United Nations might make would be of little value if Russia did not join in—a view that was not disputed in its fundamental sense by Senators who have urged that the United States take the lead in organizing the United Nations for co-operation in solving immediate problems and for collaboration in establishing and maintaining peace.

One of these, Senator Hatch, Democrat of New Mexico, said it is possible that Russia may not want to join now in shaping postwar policies.

"But that doesn't mean that we should do nothing," he added. "How are we going to find out how Russia feels about it unless we make the first move?"

There is no better time, he argued, to bring the Russian attitude into the open, indicating his belief that action by the United States might help to solve the enigma which has surrounded many Soviet diplomatic moves.

The impossibility thus far of forecasting Russia's moves after the war has been cited frequently by Senator Wheeler, Democrat, of Montana and others who have voiced objections to what they characterize as attempts to blue-print the peace before the conflict is over.

Members said there was no doubt this issue would receive serious discussion within the Foreign Relations Subcommittee, charged primarily with finding an acceptable compromise for the collective security resolutions before it, and in the Senate itself when such a proposal is brought out on the floor.

Senator Guffey, Democrat, of Pennsylvania, in which he called an "undiplomatic" broadcast, said yesterday that no matter how completely the Axis is crushed, "unless we win the peace, within another 20 years there will again be a flood of new aggression."

"We owe it to ourselves and to our Allies to let them know now where we stand on postwar plans and postwar responsibilities for world peace," Senator Guffey declared.

The Pennsylvanian said disputes which broke out in North Africa after United States troops landed were "made inevitable by the plain, brutal fact that our other Allies Among the United Nations did not know and could not know what our foreign policy would be after 1944

Burton Favors 'World Police.'

"How, for example, could the British government take a chance on a regime in French North Africa—the region which assures air-control of the vital Straits of Gibraltar—if America was going to walk out on her Allies again, get back into bed, pull the blanket over her face and leave England holding the bag the way we left France holding the bag after the last war?"

In a New York address, Senator Burton, Republican, of Ohio, one of four Senators who have introduced a resolution for postwar action now, advocated an approach to these issues "with the same indomitable determination and fixed faith" that "inspires us in fighting the war."

Senator Burton's speech before the Pan-European Conference said a military force to police against future aggression is a keystone of any broad program for constructive peace.

This is a clipping from page 5 of the Washington Star for MAR. 4 28, 1943
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What Russia Will Demand In Asia After the War

y EDWARD HUNTER
. Y. Post Far East Expert

What is Russia's territorial policy for postwar Asia? What are Britain's ılans for that part of the world—and America's? Spaces are so wide in Asia hat areas as large as continents are situated snugly in its distant recesses;

ıly now being penetrated by the pressure of war needs. A ɔmad civilization still inhabits enormous tracts. Along ith World War II, the eternal struggle between soil and ısert continues.

Under such circumstances, it is evitable that there should be eculation during wartime over e ultimate national borders on at conti ent.

Such speculation has been ought to the surface by official atements, off-the-record reports ıd significant news items. It ıs inevitable, too, that there ould be an Asiatic repercussion the border discussions now tak- g place in Europe regarding ɔst-war boundaries.

ıranty's Appraisal

The frankest appraisal so far ıs that of Walter Duranty re- ntly:

"What Mr. Stalin wants is an dependent Soviet Republic of anchuria, affiliated with the S.S.R.; a similar republic of ɔrea, and even perhaps the ɔrthwestern Chinese Soviet Re- ıblic of Sinkiang, Ningsia and ıensi. Mr. Stalin does not share e esteem for Chiang Kai-shek at the Americans and British ıve. Last, but not least, Russia ants the Liaotang Peninsula, ɔr lost fortress of Port Arthur ıd the great port of Dairen, ıich in Russian is known as ıiny, meaning 'far off.'"

I know that territory and I wit- ɔssed the international banditry which Japanese troops liter- ly massacred entire villages to ınvince the Chinese that they ɔre not Chinese, and that Man- ıuria was Manchukuo. One can- ıt fail to recognize its strategic ıportance to Russia.

ps Said They'd Invade Russia

The Japs everywhere in that st area, and in Inner Mongolia, o, hastened to the Russian fron- ɔrs to build fortifications and ilitary depots that were prima- y designed to support an attack g army. These troops boasted at they were going to invade ıssia.

"Russian battalions" were or- ɔnized with fanfare for the even- tual attack on Russia. For these battalions impoverished Russian refugees were enlisted. Although it is likely that in a showdown the bulk of these men would use their rifles against the Japanese them- selves, they constitute one of the many psychological factors in Sta- lin's coldly nationalistic outlook.

There is today, in that vast in- terior recess, a semi-autonomous Japanese army whose purpose is just this aggression of Russian soil. This Kwantung army has been preserved intact, separate from the other Japanese armies.

This much, therefore, should be evident: that if Stalin feels that the American State Dept. or the British Foreign Office might per- mit the Japanese to retain a hold in that part of the world, he would insist on the same security ar- rangements that Russia is asking in Europe — security arrange- ments of a territorial nature.

Withdrawal Provided For

That is where Manchuria, Ko- rea, Inner and Outer Magnolia come in. Moscow still actually recognizes Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia. As Edgar Snow points out in "The Battle for Asia," the Soviet-China treaty of 1924 even "provided for the eventual withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Outer Mongolia," but before these negotiations were completed the Chinese broke off relations with Moscow. By the time they were resumed, China was too deeply in trouble with Ja- pan to have time to do more than reiterate its nominal claim.

Korea is a natural jumping off place for Vladivostok and Siberia. We can be sure Russia has no- ticed recent suggestions in the U. S. by former appeasers that maybe the Japs should be al- lowed to keep their fingers in the Korean pie. Moscow has surely noticed, too, with what a curious antagonism our State Dept. re- ceives suggestions that Korean independence be recognized.

If Japan were to be allowed to retain a hold in Korea, then Du- ranty's prognostication probably would prove accurate — the Rus- sians would see to it that this military base be taken out of Jap hands.

Russia's Policy Consistent

Russia's policy has been con- sistent; the inconsistency has been that of foreign observers. Outside of other considerations, the Russians are not convinced that the central Chinese govern- ment is able to create a bulwark against the Japs. Russian influ- ence has been most intensive and longest standing in North Man- churia. Harbin was the first white city to be captured by the Japanese, its inhabitants were Russian—a large proportion were Soviet citizens. I was there when the Japanese took it.

Only a few years previously, when the Chinese seized control of the Chinese Eastern Railway that runs across North Manchu- ria, Russian troops and airplanes forcibly returned it to the Soviets.

Moscow consistently dealt with the local government in Manchu- ria on Manchurian affairs and dis- puted the claim of Chiang that it should deal through the central government. This continued even after the same Kuomintang flag flew in Manchuria as flew in Chi- na proper.

Between Outer and Inner Mon- golia, a demarcation line was drawn that was as strict as any quarantine could be.

The ancient caravan routes were marked by empty caravan- serai. Then the Japanese struck, spreading to many strategic points in Inner Mongolia. Russia, men- aced along with China, sent sup- plies to China until she was her- self attacked in Europe. An an- cient road was revived and en- larged through Inner Mongolia.

A map of this road is provid- ed by Violet Creasy-Marcks, in a recent book, "Journey into China." She is one of the few non-Russians to have traversed this route and tells of close- lipped Russians, who drove lor- ries in a steady stream from the U. S. S. R. to China. At Pin Fan, she saw that "all writing—direc- tions and instructions—was post ed up in Russian. Twenty-five Russian chauffeurs were staying here."

Russian Influence Spreads

Russian influence has under- standably spread along this route, and into Sinkiang Province. Again quoting Snow's book pub- lished in 1940, "The economic life of Sinkiang is now much more closely related to Soviet Russia than to China."

He warned that if a serious controversy broke out between Chiang and Moscow, "a new red- colored state might then emerge across the whole Northwest [of China] with a profound signifi- cance for the colonial and semi- colonial countries."

Thus, the complete, uncondi- tional surrender of Japan, and the strengthening of the Chinese central government within a dem- ocratic framework, become essen- tial for the peace of Asia. Only that way can China's great neigh- bor — Russia — be provided the sense of security that must ac- company the Atlantic Charter if we are to succeed in persuading Moscow to help put it into effect in Asia.

This means that our State Dept. must shed its appeasement skin —with all that this signifies for Asia's future.

NY Post

A RUSSO-JAP ALLIANCE.

The Russian government has renewed the treaty by which the Japanese enjoy fishing rights in the Pacific waters of the soviets. The treaty gives the Japanese continuing access to an important supply of food, but that is not the chief significance of the renewal. Much more important is the fact that the Japanese will continue to enjoy the very great advantage of possessing weather stations to the west of Alaska. As Father Hubbard, the Glacier priest, has shown, the Japanese operations against Alaska will be planned with full knowledge of weather conditions to come while we must continue to conduct our operations without the benefit of adequate forecasts, and to do so in an area in which the success or failure of the fighting depends almost entirely upon the weather.

The Russian-Japanese treaty can be regarded, for practical purposes, as an alliance against the United States and the fact that it is not in form an alliance is scarcely worthy of note.

The situation is almost unbelievable. The United States is denying adequate armament to our own soldiers in the Pacific in order to send vast quantities of material to Russia. American boys are being sacrificed and America's future is being jeopardized in order that we may help Russia. In return what do we get? Russia cries for a second front in Europe, but refuses to give us a second front in Asia. Russia's hour of greatest danger is past, thanks in no small measure to the help we gave her. Now China's darkest hour has arrived, but Russia, far from helping us relieve China and fight Japan, is actually giving assistance to our enemy.

Japan is getting very considerable benefits from Russia, for otherwise Japan would not be doing favors for Russia, such as sending her rubber and allowing shipments from America for Russia to enter Vladivostok and other Siberian ports. There is no secret about all this. The German government has protested to Japan against these shipments from America and Father Hubbard has said, without qualification, that he knows that there has been a steady movement of supplies into Siberia under the guns of the Japanese fleet. The Japanese do not perform such favors for nothing. They got something in return, and it must have been something of great value in waging war upon the United States, like steel to shoot at our soldiers.

Nothing in the history of international double dealing has been more monstrous than this Russian-Japanese coöperation. People on our west coast are running short of food because of the shipments being sent to the soviets. American soldiers are dying for lack of airplanes and other weapons that we gave to the Russians. We have been Russia's benefactor and yet the Communists are found dealing on terms of friendship with our most menacing enemy. The facts could not be believed if there were not ample evidence to bear them out.

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Clipped at the Seat of Government.

This Changing World

Soviets Indicate They Are Most Anxious For Allies to Act at Earliest Moment

11

By CONSTANTINE BROWN.

On the basis of definite pledges from London and Washington that the Allies will open a road to Berlin this year by an invasion of Western Europe, the Soviet government is now indicating that it is most anxious to see definite action at the earliest possible moment.

Constantine Brown.

The promises of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill contained no "ifs" or "whens." But their application from the technical point of view is necessarily subordinated to two factors: Defeat of the Axis forces in Tunisia and obliteration of the Axis menace in the Atlantic. Of the two, the successful handling of the submarine peril appears to military experts as the more important.

The Allied offensive in Tunisia was taken as soon as weather conditions made it possible for the armies of Gen. Bernard Montgomery and Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, jr., to move. The high command realizes that the Allied forces are fighting an enemy who has firmly decided to resist to the last man and the last cartridge.

The German generals who are now in full control of all military operations seem to believe the Allies will not dare start a large offensive in Europe until they have cleaned enemy forces out of North Africa. Hence, orders have been sent to Marshal Erwin Rommel to keep his opponents fighting as long as he has a single complete unit.

Rommel Missing No Bets.

Rommel is missing no bet. He still has plenty of supplies and, thanks to his highly mobile forces and the relatively short distances to both attacking forces, he can shift quickly his troops from one sector to another.

Knowing the ability of their opponent, the Allied commanders are moving cautiously to prevent the German fox from taking advantage of the slightest opportunity. Whether the Nazi high command can spare him enough planes to make up for the Allied air superiority is a matter of conjecture.

But it appears certain that neither Gen. Montgomery nor Gen. Patton will rush things to a point where they may give Rommel the advantage he is looking for.

Although the British 8th Army and Patton's divisions are superior in number to Rommel's forces, he still has the advantage of being able to move behind natural or previously constructed fortifications against both forces. The battle in Southern Tunisia which began last week end with a strong initial advantage for the Allies, has shown in the last 48 hours that Rommel still has a powerful resistance which cannot be underestimated.

Russia Wants Allied Invasion.

The Allied high command, while confident that the series of battles will end in victory, does not expect the campaign to be concluded in a few weeks. While no one is willing to predict when the Nazis might become exhausted, conservative military observers believe a good part of the summer will be required to drive the Nazis from Tunisia.

The submarine campaign, however, is even more difficult to cope with. Some military observers maintain that it might be possible for the British and American forces to start an offensive against Europe even if the Axis was still fighting in Tunisia. But they all agree that so long as the Nazi U-boats have the upper hand in the Atlantic a major operation against the European mainland would be a most hazardous operation.

Plans to combat the submarine menace have been completed by the naval and air experts, and their execution depends on the number of escort surface ships and carriers we will have at our disposal in the near future.

From all indications the Nazi high command, which at one time was gravely concerned over the possibility of an Allied attack against Western Europe and as a result had weakened its forces in Russia, considers this danger less immediate. Therefore Nazi divisions have been moved back to the eastern front.

The Russians feel strongly that all their sacrifices in the last five months might have been in vain if the Germans are permitted to throw once more the bulk of their forces against the Red Armies which have borne the brunt of the war against Germany since the summer of 1941.

They want to see the Allied invasion pledges put into effect soon regardless of the risks their Allies may have to take.

This is a clipping from page 11 of the Washington Star for March 28, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

U. S., Russia Should Deal Directly

Britain Is Not In Good Graces Of Soviets

By DAVID LAWRENCE.

For some time now there has been developing in London the belief that Britain might set as an intermediary between Russia and the United States with respect to questions arising both during and after the war.

David Lawrence.

Just why the United States and Russia cannot come to a harmonious understanding on all pending questions or just why it is assumed that America and Russia are far apart is not explained. It certainly runs counter to the general impression which has prevailed in Washington for some time that if any mediator is needed it is probably to bring Russia and Britain closer together.

For many months the comment frequently has been heard hereabouts that one of the reasons that the Russians do not permit military observers from the United States is that they would also have to admit British observers and that the feeling between the British and Russians is not all that it should be.

It will be recalled that before Stalin decided in the summer of 1939 to make a non-aggression pact with Germany, there had been months of negotiations between London and Moscow. The complete story of why the British failed to win the trust of the Russians in that fateful period has never been told, but it would be surprising if the British had so improved their position with Moscow as to be permitted to mediate alleged disputes as between the United States and Russia.

Differences Exist.

There are points of difference between the United States and Russia, and there is little use blinking that fact. A substantial part of the American citizenry feel that the Russian government did not live up to its pledge to refrain from communistic propaganda in the United States—a pledge solemnly given when formal recognition was given to the Moscow government by the American Government. A substantial part of the American people also have not forgotten the way the Russian government destroyed the freedom to worship and for a time permitted the despoiling of Christian churches.

No amount of mediation which any foreign government may undertake will ever do for Russia what the Moscow government can do for itself—namely, to accept wholeheartedly the four freedoms.

This is so much the heart and soul of the crusade which the American people have undertaken in the present war that it cannot but cause an estrangement if ignored. Mediators can never compromise the principles involved in the four freedoms. Our Allies either accept them in the letter as well as the spirit or they frankly discard them. But they are our main war aims and our main peace aims.

But even such differences cannot obscure the fact that Russia and America are fighting common enemies. Lease-lend aid is being sent in ever increasing quantities to Russia because of a deep-seated confidence that America and Russia will be better friends than any two other nations in the world after the war with the possible exception of that growing out of our blood relationship to the British people.

Airplanes Will Bring Us Closer.

There are many more reasons for a close friendship with Russia than for coldness. For one thing, Russian territory is directly adjacent to ours in Alaska. The airplane will bring us closer in the North Pacific. Likewise, Russia's great undeveloped resources will sooner or later be the basis for the reciprocal exchange of raw materials and facilities—we shall become business partners in developing those resources.

Furthermore, it may be assumed that the Russian people after their heroic sacrifices in this war will tend more and more toward democracy and less and less toward totalitarianism. The notion that Russia will become so powerful in a military way as to become an aggressor state has its source more in Axis propaganda than in any known circumstances that would warrant any such inference.

The Russians may want certain territory in Europe on the Baltic so as to maintain naval bases. They may want certain bases in Southern Europe. But there is always the opportunity, if there is a clash of nationalities and conflicting claims, for a solution to be worked out whereby strategic points will be internationalized. Certainly if an international police force is to be set up there will be no need for disputes about military or naval defenses. The airplane, moreover, is bound to become of increasing radius, thus making less valuable the so-called strategic points of prewar psychology.

Russia and America can be friends, but they will forge that friendship more rapidly and more effectively if they deal directly with each other on a basis of frankness, mutual respect and mutual trust.

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This is a clipping from page 11 of the Washington Star for MARCH 26, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Japan and Russia Renew Pact On Far East Fishing Privileges

LONDON, March 26 (AP)—Japan and Russia, not at war against each other but fighting on opposite sides in the world struggle, have signed an agreement extending Japanese fishing privileges in Soviet Far Eastern waters, it was announced today.

A Moscow radiocast recorded by the Soviet monitor said, however, that Japanese fishing companies must pay between 4 and 5 per cent more than during last year. The payments are to be in gold as before.

Under the 1942 agreement, which ended Dec. 31, 1942, the Russians had exacted a 20 per cent increase in rentals over the price paid by the Japanese the previous year.

Signed at Kuibyshev

S. A. Lozovsky, Vice-Commissar for Soviet Foreign Affairs, and Naotake Sato, Japanese Ambassador to Russia, signed the 1943 protocol at Kuibyshev yesterday, the Moscow radiocast said.

Renewal of the Japanese-Soviet agreement generally is regarded as a gauge of relations between the two countries which have a neutrality agreement despite the fact that Japan is allied with Germany and Russia is a member of the United Nations group.

Last year's agreement was signed after Germany had attacked Russia and Japan had attacked the United States. At the time, British and United States officials termed the renewal a purely routine matter, and did not attach any international significance to it. A failure to renew, however, would have been regarded as indicating Soviet-Japanese tension.

Lateness Not Significant

The lateness of the signing this year is not significant, since the same tardiness occurred last year. In 1942, the terms restricted the Japanese to bidding for concessions in only 7 of the 12 fishing grounds, most of them off the Kamchatka Peninsula.

A Soviet refusal to grant fishing rights would be a severe blow to Japan, whose food supply depends to a large extent on its catch in Russian waters.

Japan received the basic right in the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905 ending the Russo-Japanese War. Later a long-term convention was agreed upon, but it expired in 1936. Since then the negotiations have been on a yearly basis.

This is a clipping from page 1 of the Christian Science Monitor for
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Topics of The Times

25 Years After

Vice President Wallace's remark about people who might be tempted to double-cross Soviet Russia was called unfortunate because it was so untimely. But we must remember one thing about words which people call untimely. The inference is that on the proper occasion it would be quite all right to say such things. We may go further. An untimely statement is assumed to be a true statement out of place. But when in our past relations with Soviet Russia have the people or government of the United States, or for that matter of the Allies, double-crossed the U.S.S.R. or tried to do so?

There is a frequently quoted epigram about how badly the Allies of 1914-18 treated the Soviet Union after the war. First they tried to crush her. Then they snubbed her. Then they tried to forget her. This belief underlies much that is now being said about the Soviet Union's role after the present war. The old mistakes must not be repeated. Russia cannot be ostracized.

Always the assumption is that Russia's isolation after 1918 was of anybody's making but her own. The legend goes back, in large measure, to the story of Allied intervention in Russia twenty-five years ago.

Not Sheer Malice

The elementary facts about the presence of American troops in Russia in 1918-19 might well form part of that wider study of American history which we have come to feel so sadly lacking in our schools. It has been almost the invariable custom to speak of Allied intervention in Russia twenty-five years ago as a piece of gratuitous wickedness and folly. Apparently the governments of the United States, Britain and France, having no other business on hand in 1918, and bored with themselves for lack of something to do, and looking for some one on whom to vent their ill will, suddenly bethought themselves of the new Soviet regime in Russia.

Thereupon the Allies without loss of time set forth to destroy a system which on general principles they hated and feared. With the object of overthrowing the Soviet government British and French forces landed at Archangel and Murmansk and were later joined by American troops. The beginning was in June, 1918. The occupation lasted until the early Fall of 1919 when the discomfited Allies withdrew.

Allies Face Disaster

This classic version of Allied intervention in Russia manages to forget that in June, 1918, when the first landings were made in Arctic Russia, the Allies were engaged in a life-and-death struggle with Germany. The task was made harder for the Western Allies by the defection of Russia. To all intents and purposes, Russia was taken out of the war as early as the Summer of 1917, when Bolshevist agitation against the Provisional Government—this was several months before the Bolshevists seized power—brought the Russian war effort to a stop. Formally, the Soviet Government did not sign peace with Germany until February, 1918, at Brest Litovsk, but the Germans did not wait for that treaty to shift many German divisions from the Eastern Front to France. This was the end of the second front against the Kaiser which the Russian people had maintained for three years between 1914 and 1917, with unflinching devotion and at the cost of immense sacrifices.

Second Front Collapses

The reinforced Germans in the West began on March 21, 1918, a series of terrific blows for a knockout, which on one occasion at least came within a shadow of reaching its mark. Those hammer blows were still falling on the Allied lines in June, 1918, when, in a desperate move to reopen an eastern front against Germany, the Allies sent troops to Archangel and Murmansk. A second object was to prevent large stocks of war materials in those ports from falling into German hands. But very soon after, in July, 1918, the tide of war in the West turned in favor of the Allies. Final victory came in November, and the United States and Britain lost all interest in the Russian business.

Well-Justified Fears

Perhaps the Allies were suffering from shell shock when they sent troops into Russia in 1918, but then a great many heavy Ludendorff shells had been falling on the Allies since the Soviet leaders took Russia out of the war. The Allies in those critical months were afraid of Germany's conscripting Russian manpower and Russian resources for victory in the West. Are we prepared today to say that the Allied leaders were seeing ghosts? In any event, there were military stores in Russian ports which Germany might seize and which the Allied troops in France could use. Before this, for a matter of two years, British blood had run in torrents at Gallipoli in an effort to supply Russia through the Straits. It was Winston Churchill's idea.

Nothing can be more grotesque than the common notion that in 1918 the Allies intervened in Russia in a wanton attempt to strangle the infant U.S.S.R. At that time the Allies had all they could do to keep German hands from their own throats.

This is a clipping from page 20 of the New York Times for Mar. 25, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Soviet Booklet Tells Why U. S. Fights Hitler

By Eddy Gilmore
Associated Press Staff Writer

Moscow, March 3.—Fifteen thousand copies of "Why the United States Fights Against Hitlerite Germany," by Alexander Troyanovsky, former Soviet Ambassador to Washington, have been placed on sale in the Soviet Union.

The 112-page pamphlet begins chapter one with a history of the Monroe Doctrine and the policy of freedom of the seas, discussing the principles of United States foreign policies.

Chapters 2, 3, and 4 deal with American relations with Germany and the Kaiser before and during World War I. Chapter 5 describes United States relations with Germany after the war.

Chapter 6 is titled: "First Friction Between the United States and Hitlerite Germany; Kellogg Pact Useless."

Axis Benetration

Chapter 7 tells of the penetration of Hitler's agents into America and deals with isolationists. It also relates the entrance of Hitler agents into South America.

Chapter 11 discusses the reestablishment of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and tells of the neutrality law. Chapter 12, "Defense of the United States," declares certain American circles doubted the possibilites of aggressive powers utilizing Latin-American countries for war against the United States.

In chapters 13, 14 and 15, the former Ambassador deals with Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union, the Moscow conference among United States, British and Russian authorities and the American activities under lease-lend.

Chapter 16, dealing with war in the Pacific Ocean, says:

"This time the Japanese militarists decided Hitler would be able to take Moscow and would liberate necessary military forces in order to move them against Great Britain and the United States.

"Japanese military circles calculated Germany, simultaneously with the offensive in the Pacific Ocean, would begin decisive military operations against the British Isles, then against the United States."

Chapter 17 says: "The Japanese were tricked by Hitler into war with the United States and England."

The final chapter tells of Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov's visit to Washington and the visits of Prime Minister Churchill and W. Averell Harriman's visit to Moscow. It mentions the trip of Wendell Willkie, saying it increased friendship between the United States and Russia.

This is a clipping from page 13 of the Washington Post for March 2, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

CHURCHILL'S SPEECH INTERESTS RUSSIANS

Long Summary Is Prominently Published in Moscow

Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, March 23—An extensive summary of Prime Minister Churchill's Sunday broadcast was published prominently today in the Moscow press. His warning to Britain not to let planning for peace divert the nation's energy from the task of defeating the enemy and his underlining of the principle that international planning after Reichsfuehrer Hitler's fall must be the joint task of Britain, the United States and Russia was appreciated here.

Mr. Churchill's reticence on the military situation is unlikely to cause surprise, for the Soviet public believes that great things are being prepared in the west and does not expect to hear about them until they happen.

Intense interest was roused by the news that the Eighth Army had resumed the offensive, though until events unfold it is likely to be restrained in its expression. A recent editorial in the English-language newspaper Moscow News expressed a rather widely held view of Herr Hitler's design when it stated that the fascist aim was to preserve as long as possible the present military situation, enduring British bombings and exposing the western defenses while seeking to stabilize the eastern front. The possibility of a "peace offensive" through neutral capitals is also envisaged.

This is a clipping from page 4 of the New York Times for Mar. 24, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

MY VIEW OF SOVIET WAR AIMS

Corliss Lamont surveys the principles on which the USSR has conducted its foreign relations. History solves a so-called mystery. The Baltic states and Poland.

THE most alarming threat to speedy victory and an enduring peace is the new wave of anti-Soviet propaganda in the United States. The furor over Soviet territorial aims in Eastern Europe, the fatuous debate over whether the Red Army will march to Berlin or not march to Berlin, the implication in Vice-President Wallace's recent speech that someone may be planning to "double-cross Russia," Ambassador Standley's untrue charge that knowledge of American aid is being withheld from the Soviet people, the scandalous whispering campaign to the effect that America will have to fight Russia after Hitler is beaten—all these things, and others I do not have the space to mention, add up to a very serious situation indeed.

Undoubtedly the immediate stimulus for the renewed campaign against Soviet Russia has been the magnificent successes of the Red Army against the Nazi invaders since November 1942. It is a tragic commentary on the hoped-for unity of the United Nations that just as the great Russian offensive begins to make possible the final smashing of Hitler, reactionary elements in England and the United States could utilize these very Russian victories as a means to split the Western democracies away from the Soviet Union. The ghost of Neville Chamberlain has not yet been laid. And the basic reason for the current anti-Soviet drive, whipping up wild and fantastic fears of present Russian strength and postwar strategy, is the revival of the old Munich idea both by the Nazi propaganda machine and by the unreconstructed appeasers, defeatists, anti-war and anti-Soviet diehards among the United Nations.

In America these groups constitute only a tiny minority, but it is a minority that wields considerable power in the halls of Congress and in our organs of public opinion. We cannot neglect its dangerous potentialities for misleading the American people and exploiting a certain complacency in regard to our war effort and dislike of making essential sacrifices. There was a time last fall when it seemed to some optimists that good American-Soviet relations were thenceforth going to proceed automatically. The wishful character of their thinking now becomes obvious. The honeymoon is over. No matter how rosy the prospects look at any particular moment, those who know the supreme importance of close cooperation and understanding between the United States and the USSR for winning the war and the peace can never afford to relax their efforts.

A great deal of today's anti-Soviet talk centers around Soviet Russia's alleged goals, territorial and otherwise, in the postwar world. Therefore I am assuming the task in this article of restating what in my opinion is the nature of Soviet aims in the realm of international relations. These aims are simple, understandable, and permanent. They are not policies of the moment; they are of long standing and have been applied consistently by the Soviet Union to the relevant situations during the entire twenty-five years of its existence and in relation to its foreign affairs in both Europe and Asia. They are policies that have been actualized in deeds as well as expressed in words.

FIRST and foremost, let it be said categorically that in the sphere of international affairs the Soviet Union desires world peace above all else. Since its founding in 1917 the Soviet Republic has twice gone through the terrible ordeal of foreign aggression: once, at the very start of its career as a socialist commonwealth and, again, as the paramount object of Hitler's hatred during the second world war. At the end of this war the USSR will want lasting peace more than ever, so that it can devote itself to the prodigious internal tasks of reconstruction that will be necessary, especially in the immense devastated areas of western Russia. It will want to continue with the great Five-Year Plans and the building of socialism, unhampered by the constant threat of military attack

NEW MASSES

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and the need of putting into defense industries and armaments a major portion of its economic energies and resources.

The Soviet view is that international war is ultimately ruinous to economic security and stability, no matter what sort of social-economic system is involved. America and Great Britain have surely learned by this time that world wars under twentieth century conditions do not exactly strengthen the capitalist system. The Soviet government has for years taken the position that both war and peace are indivisible and that aggression against one nation, capitalist or otherwise, constitutes an eventual menace to every nation. How sound this position is both Russia and the United States have discovered anew through the rapid spread of the second world war.

Though the Soviets consider wars of national liberation justified—such wars usually being caused by prior imperialist aggression—the wars in general that have been inflicted upon humanity in the twentieth century have been counter-revolutionary in the sense of holding back the peaceful and democratic progress of the people. Today the fascists represent the most reactionary elements in society and have resorted to internal violence and then to external violence precisely to prevent mankind from evolving naturally toward a more cooperative economic system and possibly toward socialism itself.

The international ideals of the Soviet Republic, repeatedly given voice since Lenin's time, stress the urgent need of permanent peace among the various countries of the earth. They call attention to the fact that it is the masses of the people, the workers and peasants (or farmers) in every land who suffer most from war. Thus the self-interest of the Soviet Union as a state, the interest of the Soviet people in economic and social progress throughout the world, and the Marxist ideals dominant within the USRR, all point to the seriousness and sincerity of Soviet Russia's wish for international peace.

SECOND, Soviet Russia remains firm in its insistence that peace can be achieved only through the principle of collective security—that is, the banding together of the peace-loving peoples of the world for the unflinching purpose of imposing economic and, if necessary, military sanctions against a potential or actual aggressor state. The USSR supported this principle unequivocally during the entire period of prewar fascist aggression, starting with the Japa-

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nese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Among all the statesmen of the world it was Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Foreign Minister and now happily ambassador to the United States, who fought hardest and most uncompromisingly on behalf of collective security, thus carrying on the task initiated by America's President Woodrow Wilson following the first world war.

It was the failure of the Western democracies adequately to implement this invention of collective security, written into their own League of Nations Covenant, that prevented the building of a genuine peace front with Russia in 1938 and 1939 and that gave Hitler his great opportunity for a one-front war in Europe. Few Americans realize that from the viewpoint of the League Covenant itself the Soviet Union was right all the way through. For Article XVI of the Covenant states in part: "The members of the League agree . . . that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are cooperating to protect the covenants of the League." Now it was precisely the refusal of the Baltic states and Poland to permit passage of Soviet troops in case of a Nazi attack, a refusal backed by Prime Minister Chamberlain, that led to the breakdown in British-Soviet negotiations prior to the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.

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Since the Nazi assault on the USSR in summer of 1941, the Soviet government has made perfectly clear that it regards the principle of collective security as a foundation stone in any system of enduring peace. For example, in the Polish-Soviet Agreement of December 1941, it is stated that "a durable and just peace . . . can be achieved only through a new organization of international relations on the basis of unification of the democratic countries in a durable alliance. Respect for international law, backed by the collective armed force of all the Allied states, must form the decisive factor in the creation of such an organization." The same thought is to be found in the Twenty-Year British-Soviet Pact guaranteeing the peace of Europe through the collective might of Britain and Russia. The statement in question reads: "The high contracting parties declare their desire to unite with other like-minded states in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the postwar period."

THIRD, the Soviet Union stands for the self-determination of peoples and in fact has always supported this principle. The Soviet government, therefore, having subscribed to the Atlantic Charter along with the other United Nations, completely endorses the Charter's pledge that its signatories "seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other. . . . They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of govern-

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ıent under which they live." Premier oseph Stalin considers this matter so imortant that on several occasions since his ountry became involved in the war he has xplicitly reaffirmed Soviet policy in this egard.

On Nov. 6, 1941, Mr. Stalin stated that We have not nor can we have such war ims as the seizure of foreign territories or ıe conquest of other peoples, irrespective f whether European peoples and territories r Asiatic peoples and territories, including ran, are concerned. Our first aim is to berate our territories and our people from ıe German Nazi yoke. We have not nor ın we have such war aims as the impotion of our will and regime on the Slavic ıd other enslaved peoples of Europe who e waiting for our help. Our aim is to elp these peoples in their struggle for eration from Hitler's tyranny, and then accord them the possibility of arranging ıeir own lives on their own land as they e fit, with absolute freedom. No interrence of any kind with the domestic afirs of other nations!"

A year later, on Nov. 6, 1942, Premier alin said that the peace settlement must clude "abolition of racial exclusiveness; quality of nations and integrity of their rritories; liberation of enslaved nations and the restoration of their sovereign rights; the right of every nation to arrange its affairs as it wishes; economic aid to nations that have suffered and assistance to them in attaining their material welfare; restoration of democratic liberties; destruction of the Hitlerite regime."

Considering the record of the Soviet Union over the past twenty-five years and its own success in establishing full racial and international democracy in relation to the more than 150 minority peoples of the USSR, I think we can say that no member of the United Nations supports more firmly and sincerely the right of self-determination than does Soviet Russia. The Russians want to see this principle extended to the whole world, including the colonial areas. Looking at the matter historically, our conclusion must be that violation of the principle of self-determination through foreign intervention has in general been a tool of reaction and imperialism. This holds true as far back as the period of Metternich subsequent to the Napoleonic wars. And of course all the military intervention that was initiated in foreign countries between the first world war and the second was on behalf of old-time imperialist or outright fascist interests.

Unfortunately there are a number of

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Americans who approve the principle of self-determination only so long as it is not applied in a way that can be regarded as fair or favorable to the Soviet Union. Such Americans approved the intervention by the armies of fourteen different nations against the USSR from 1918 to 1922. Today they and their more recent recruits are trying to puff up into a big anti-Soviet issue the right of the peoples of the Baltic states and what was formerly eastern Poland to carry out the principle of self-determination and be part of the USSR. But if this principle means anything, it means not only recognition on the part of Soviet Russia of other peoples' right to live under capitalist or non-socialist systems. It means also a reciprocal recognition on the part of the rest of the world, particularly by the United States and Great Britain, of the right of such peoples as may so desire to follow a socialistic way of life.

THE Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were, with the aid of the Kaiser's armies, separated from the Soviet Union in 1918 for the express purpose of weakening it and serving as outposts of aggression against it. These three countries voted, in the summer of 1940, to become Soviet Republics and to become incorporated in the USSR. Their inclusion in the Soviet commonwealth of nations greatly strengthened Russia's western defenses and later functioned as a most necessary buffer against Hitler's surprise onslaught. The Soviet Union has a legitimate concern for postwar boundaries that will give it relative security against aggression. But apart from that, there can be no doubt that faithful adherence to the principle of self-determination must recognize that an overwhelming majority of the Baltic peoples desire to retain their natural economic and political ties with the Soviet Union, and that no good reason exists for upsetting the parliamentary decisions of 1940.

As for the 12,000,000 or more Ukrainians and White Russians who lived in the eastern part of Poland, they, too, have a right to the privilege of self-determination. It is to be remembered that these regions, which voted in 1939 to become parts of the White Russian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics and thus part of the USSR itself, were annexed by the Polish imperialists in 1920 after their unprovoked war of aggression against the Soviet Union. The new frontier of 1939, along most of its 400-odd miles, followed the line proposed as a just one before the Polish-Soviet war by Lord Curzon, an anti-Soviet, British conservative. It included within it about 1,000,000 Poles inextricably mixed with the rest of the population. In any case, the Soviet government, which stands for a strong and independent Poland, has made clear that the precise postwar boundary is an open question that can be satisfactorily adjusted after the final defeat of the Nazis.

Bessarabia, as is well known, was stolen from Russia in 1918 by Rumania. Its annexation was never recognized by the Soviet government nor even by the United States. There would seem to be no sound ground why Rumania, Hitler's satellite in aggression, should receive back Bessarabia and the small portion of Bukowina, predominantly Ukrainian in population, that the USSR incorporated at the same time. Again, viewing objectively Finland's role as a full-fledged ally of the Nazis, there would appear to be no particular point in redrawing the boundaries agreed upon in the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty of 1940 and in reestablishing, for example, the Finnish frontier less than twenty miles from the city of Leningrad. Apart from any other arguments, strategic considerations of transcendent importance justify the Soviet attitude here.

As for the nightmare frequently conjured up, that the Soviet Union will march its armies all over Europe placing in power Communist regimes at the close of the war —this fanciful notion comes straight from the maliciously purposeful brains of Goebbels and Hitler, doing their best to disrupt the United Nations coalition. Not only is such action contrary to all Soviet policy and principle. As a practical matter it is hardly conceivable that Soviet Russia, with its army and civilian casualties probably as high as 12,000,000, and with almost the entire western part of the country laid waste, would wish to embark on doubtful military adventures throughout the continent of Europe. Above all, the Soviet Union will not desire to clash with England and the United States, from whom it will greatly need postwar collaboration, especially in the economic sphere. And in the Far East the USSR will still have to deal with the tough problem of Japan.

The Soviet people continue to believe firmly that a planned socialist system is superior to capitalism and that the rest of the world would do well to adopt it, but this does not mean that the Soviet people or their government are in favor of spreading socialism through military aggression. The USSR, which is almost three times as big as the United States and which possesses within its extensive borders abundant natural resources of almost every variety, has neither an economic nor strategic need for additional territories. Of course new governments will arise in Europe when Hitler and Mussolini are smashed. They may be republics; they may be monarchies. They may be radical; they may be conservative. If some of them turn out to be genuinely socialist, certainly the Soviet people will be glad, just as most Americans will be glad if they turn out to be capitalist.

THE fourth main peace aim of the Soviet Union is the reestablishment of

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normal international trade. Following the war the USSR will itself be in tremendous need of goods from other countries, especially from the United States and Great Britain. Naturally Soviet Russia was never in favor of the economic and financial boycott imposed upon it by the capitalist powers after the first world war. When the present conflict is over no nation will be more insistent than the Soviet Union on the complete, worldwide extension of the economic provisions of the Atlantic Charter. And our own America will have much to gain economically from maintaining good trade relations with Soviet Russia, since orders from that nation may well soften the shock of readjustment of a peace economy here.

Fifth and finally, Soviet Russia supports the principle of universal disarmament. And though that goal looks exceedingly distant and downright utopian at the moment, I am convinced that the Russians will return to their former proposals on behalf of total disarmament as soon as postwar security is established on a reliable foundation. The Soviet Union favors disarmament both in order to eliminate international fears and frictions and in order that the billions which go into armaments can be used, both in Russia and elsewhere, to raise the living standards of the people in general.

I hope that this review of Soviet aims in the postwar world makes clear the fundamental, deep-reaching issues upon which the Soviet Union, America, and the other United Nations can collaborate in the field of international relations. Such collaboration can be supported wholeheartedly by any American, regardless of his position on domestic issues in either the United States or Soviet Russia. Internal problems of economics, politics, philosophy, and whatnot are either secondary or irrelevant to cooperation with the Soviet Union on the great ends of world peace, collective security, the self-determination of peoples, normal international trade and disarmament.

Misunderstanding now of Soviet postwar aims is creating a lack of harmony that imperils both victory in this conflict and success in averting that third world war which looms ahead as a frightful possibility. Particularly in regard to the most pressing and critical present, all anti-fascist Americans of every political persuasion must realize that *the war against the Axis is not yet won,* on either the Russian or any other front. The United Nations cannot afford the luxury of disunity. The United States cannot afford the distraction of an anti-Soviet debauch.

CORLISS LAMONT.

Mr. Lamont, the author of "You Might Like Socialism" and "The Illusion of Immortality," is chairman of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship.

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Russia Denies Charge By Japs That U. S. Sub Sank Soviet Vessel

Star

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Pravda Says Ship Was Searched by Nipponese Two Days Earlier

By the Associated Press.

MOSCOW, March 22.—The newspaper Pravda, official organ of the Communist party, asserted today that Japanese newspapers had falsely represented four Soviet sailors as saying their ship, the Kola, had been sunk by an American submarine in the East China Sea and said the vessel had been held up and searched by the Japanese two days before the sinking.

Pravda displayed the story prominently under a Vladivostok dateline. The dispatch was credited to Tass, the official Russian news agency.

(The Tokio radio reported March 14 that the 6,000-ton Soviet freighter Kola had been "torpedoed and sunk the night of February 17 in the East China Sea by an American submarine" and that four exhausted Russian seamen had been rescued by a Japanese warship. The broadcast was not confirmed by any United Nations agency.)

The dispatch in Pravda said:

"According to information received from the Far Eastern Ship Line, Japanese papers published recently the announcement of the torpedoing and sinking February 17 in the East China Sea of the Kola, Soviet ship sailing from Vladivostok for Kamchatka.

"According to the Japanese papers, of the crew of 73 only four were saved, picked up by a Japanese warship. Two days prior to the sinking, the ship, sailing without cargo, was held up and searched by Japanese authorities at the Tsushima Straits (between the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea).

"The Japanese papers Asakhi and Nippon Times published an interview supposedly given by the four survivors of the crew of the sunken Kola. In the interview the Soviet sailors were falsely credited with stating that the Kola was sunk supposedly by an American submarine. Headquarters of the Far Eastern Ship Line point out that, as seen from the known facts about the sinking of the ship Kola, the announcements of the Japanese press on the statements supposedly made by Soviet sailors does not deserve any credibility."

This is a clipping from page 1 of the Washington Star for March 22, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

DREAMS OF 'NEW WORLD' BELIEVED SPIKED BY EDEN

Hint F. D. R. Plan Shelved to Pacify Stalin.

BY ARTHUR SEARS HENNING.
[Chicago Tribune Press Service.]

Washington, D. C., March 21.—Altho the conversations are not ended, the understanding in official circles is that British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden has accomplished the principal object of his visit to Washington.

When he returns to London it will be with satisfactory assurance that President Roosevelt will not attempt under existing conditions to commit the allied nations to post-war collective security plans involving territorial and political dispositions. That is, he will not seek to thwart Soviet Dictator Josef Stalin's plans to annex Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, a large slice, if not all, of Finland, and the eastern half of Poland and a goodly portion of Rumania, including Bessarabia.

British Opposed to F. D. R. Plan.

Eden took a plane for Washington immediately after the President disclosed an intention to call a meeting of the allies on post-war plans in order to get an early start on a collective security project and other featurs of the "brave new world" the utopians visualize.

The British government was firmly opposed to a conference on post-war collective security at this time, for it would necessarily put not only Stalin but Prime Minister Churchill on the spot with respect to the renunciation of territorial aggrandizement they subscribed to in the Atlantic Charter, the declaration of Jan. 2, 1942, and the 20 year Anglo-Russian treaty of 1942.

Want No Arguments Now.

The British may or may not oppose Stalin's annexation plans at the close of the war but they believe that it would create nothing but harm to raise the question now when it is vitally important to maintain harmony among the allies and aid in every manner the magnificent resistance Russia is offering the Nazis on the eastern front.

That Mr. Roosevelt has been influenced by the British view is inferred from his statement of Friday that the forthcoming meetings of representatives of the allied governments will be confined to post-war plans relating to the distribution of food and to relief. Post-war collective security



plans have been dropped from the immediate agenda.

U. S. Needs Territory, Too.

Incidentally, there is much speculation on the bearing of the renunciation of territorial aggrandizement on United States' security. Many members of congress and many persons high in the administration hold that there will be nothing more essential to our security in the Pacific than possession of the Marshall, Caroline, Ladrone, and other groups of Japanese islands from which the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor was launched. How, it is asked, would we square this without renunciation of territorial aggrandizement?

The resolution introduced in the senate by Senators Joseph H. Ball [R., Minn.], Carl A. Hatch [D., N. M.], Harold H. Burton [R., O.], and Lister Hill [D., Ala.], proposing that the United States initiate an international organization to police the world, was indorsed today by 26 of the 42 new Repupblican members of the house. Few midwestern members were among the signers of the letter in which they said:

"There are some people who contend that these things should not be discussed or agreed upon until the war is won. We disagree. The American people are looking to their leaders in congress of whatever party to exercise real statesmanship so that there may be no repetition of the present tragedy.

Can't Police World Alone.

"Our nation alone cannot police the world. Our nation alone cannot prevent wars. The world can progress toward permanent stability and peace only thru the collaboration of its component peoples. To deny this is playing false with the thousands who are risking or losing their lives, not alone to defend the nation but to save future generations from the same fate.

"A complete blueprint for post-war organization in the international field is not yet a necessity. Agreement on simple formulae is. The Atlantic charter and the declaration of the united nations are not enough. More specific formulae should be agreed to now so that friend and foe alike may know what victory will bring."

The signers were: S. W. [Wat] Arnold [Mo.], James C. Auchincloss [N. J.], Ranulf Compton [Conn.], Daniel Ellison [Md.], Harris Ellsworth [Ore.], Robert Hale [Me.], Christian A. Herter [Mass.], Hal Holmes [Wash.], Walter F. Horan [Wash.], Harry P. Jeffrey [O.], Leroy Johnson [Cal.], Walter H. Judd [Minn.], Charles M. La Follette [Ind.], Clare Boothe Luce [Conn.], John D. McWilliams [Conn.], A. L. Miller [Neb.], Alvin E. O'Konski [Wis.], John Phillips [Cal.], Norris Poulson [Cal.], C. Frederick Pracht [Pa.], Edward G. Rohbrough [W. Va.], Ed Rowe [O.], Winifred C. Stanley [N. Y.], Lowell Stockman [Ore.], Harry L. Towe [N. J.], and William I. Troutman [Pa.].

Explained on Radio.

The four senators explained and defended their resolution tonight on Theodore Granik's American Forum of the Air, broadcast by W-G-N and the Mutual Broadcasting system.

Looking ahead to the tremendous international problems which must be faced when the fighting ends, Sen. Ball declared:

"We will need a strong functioning organization to meet them. Just as a military commander tries to give his troops as much training as possible before they actually meet the enemy, we believe the united nations should get as much training in the procedures and techniques of working together on specific tasks as they possibly can before they tackle the all-important job of maintaining permanent peace and stability in our world."

This is a clipping from page 6 of the Chicago Tribune for March 22, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Russia Expects Farms to Better Their '42 Mark

Agricultural Plan for 1943 Issued; 15 Million More Acres Will Be Planted

By Walter Kerr

By Wireless to the Herald Tribune

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MOSCOW, March 19.—The Soviet Union tackled one of the most pressing problems it faces this year with the publication today of the state agricultural plan for 1943.

It is a two-edged problem, and the plan is a two-edged solution.

The Soviet Union has lost by German occupation some of its most fertile areas, the Ukraine, Crimea and part of the Kuban Valley. They produced, in peace time, grain, sugar beets and fruits that fed a large part of the population.

To make up as much as possible for their loss, the Council of People's Commissars (cabinet) and the Central Committee of the Communist party have decreed in the agricultural plan for 1943 that the seeding area in the non-occupied regions of the country be increased 6,400,000 hectares (15,814,400 acres) over last year. Of the total new areas, 3,900,000 hectares (9,636,900 acres) will be devoted to the production of grain. In 1942 there were 2,000,000 more hectares (4,942,000 acres) under cultivation in these regions than in 1941.

Labor Shortage Is Factor

The second phase of the agricultural problem stems from the mobilization of man power, tractors, horses and other transport for the Red Army and other defense purposes. This is a harder nut to crack, and most of the text of the plan for 1943 is devoted to this difficulty.

The regulations and recommendations are detailed. The director of any state farm has the right to mobilize for farm work all adults and all persons of fourteen years of age and up. All farmers are freed from compulsory work off the farm for a month before the start of the spring seeding campaign.

All farm horses are to get three weeks' rest and full fodder for three weeks before the campaign. Cows that provide little milk can be used for field and transport work, but in cases where an individual farmer owns a cow, that farmer should work with his own animal. An individual farmer's cow gets the same fodder as a collective animal as long as it is working.

A norm, or minimum amount of work, is fixed for every worker, every animal, every tractor and other piece of farm machinery. The norm is fixed according to conditions on each farm. The norm for a horse equals the norm for a pair of oxen. During the spring period a horse's norm varies from five hectars (12.355 acres) in regions like the Caucasus, to ten hectares (24.710 acres) in fertile areas along the Volga, such as the Kuybyshev, Saratov and Stalingrad regions.

The norm for a cow is one-third of the norm for a horse or a pair of oxen, but a worker handling a cow gets double working time to equalize his income.

Much attention is paid to the care of farm machinery. Tractors must be in readiness, and trade agreements must be worked out in advance between machine and tractor stations and collective farms. No tractor may be used for agricultural work after April 5, except to bring in fuel or transport bread from remote depots. Because of difficulties in repairing already old tractors, the amount of time allowed for repairs is increased 20 per cent.

Plan Mobile Repair Shops

Mobile repair shops are to be organized to keep the tractors working as much as possible. The tractor that works thirty hectares (74.130 acres) in fifteen days gets credit for thirty-five days' work, and credit for an additional day's work for every hectare over thirty.

All seed must be ready by April 5.

So the country is getting ready for a spring that has come early to the Soviet Union this year. The snow is going rapidly, and in the fields there now is a lot of brown earth visible, and in some areas there are only scattered patches of snow.

Last year, according to the preface to the plan for the 1943 agricultural problem, was met successfully. The seeding area was increased by 2,000,000 hectares, and in the eastern districts large quantities of sugar beets were planted.

The report singled out for special mention these regions: Gorky, Sverdlovsk, Molotovsk, Moscow, Ivanov, Yaroslavl, Kalinin, Ryazan and Vologda. Also cited were two autonomous republics, Chuvash and Udmurtsk, and five Soviet republics, Uzbek, Kirghiz, Tadjik, Georgia and Armenia.

Unsatisfactory work was reported in eight regions: Penza Saratov, Kuybyshev, Chkalov, Cheliabinsk, Omsk, Kustanai and northern Kazakstan, and in two autonomous republics, Tartar and Bashkir.

But for 1943 the plan is calling for an increase of 6,400,000 hectares instead of an increase of only the 2,000,000 fixed for 1942.

This is a clipping from page 30 of the New York Herald Tribune for March 21, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Russia's Post-War Role Called Dominant Topic in Eden Talks

Visson Cites Swing of Britain's Foreign Policy Toward Anglo-Soviet Collaboration in Europe, Sees Effort to Convince U. S. of Path

By Andre Visson M21 4-II

Of all the angles in the talks Anthony Eden is having in Washington the Russian angle is perhaps among the most important.

A highly significant editorial "The Times" of London published on the eve of Mr. Eden's departure for Washington described British diplomacy as facing two essential tasks.

The first is to "develop a spirit of growing confidence in Anglo-Russian relations." The second is "to interpret to the United States the common interest of Britain and Russia in European security and the means of attaining it."

Should the line proposed by "The London Times" become the official line of the British government we would witness the beginnings of a completely new diplomatic situation. Until now we have been thinking in terms of an "Anglo-American (or American-British) concert of power" which would endeavor to establish a lasting collaboration with Russia in the East and with China in the Far East.

Now the British are considering an "Anglo-Russian" concert of power which would assure security in Europe—and they would ask that the United States join this concert of power to assure security in the rest of the world.

New Balance Required

"The Times" editorial, which completed a special 3½-column article analyzing British policy in Europe, throws many interesting lights on the new road which Britain may have decided to follow in her desire to prevent a third world war.

Great Britain has come to the conclusion that the nineteenth-century balance of power within Europe has been destroyed irrevocably by the unrelenting march of military and economic developments. Britain believes, on the other hand, that Russia cannot continue—any more than Britain herself—in a policy of isolation from European troubles. If either Britain or Russia remains aloof or reverts to policies of isolationism, the domination of Europe by Germany once more becomes inevitable.

"There can be no security in western Europe unless there is also security in eastern Europe, and security in eastern Europe is unobtainable unless it is buttressed by the military power in Russia."

This same idea of the vital importance of Russia's collaboration for the security of the world has been expressed in the United States by Vice-President Henry A. Wallace and Joseph E. Davies, former Ambassador to Russia.

"The Times" editorial marks, however, the realization of the historic evolution of British policy toward Russia since the World War.

Russia and Britain, allies in that war, nevertheless entered it with memories of their centuries-old rivalries in Asia, which had been only freshly liquidated by the Russian-British agreement of 1907 for the partition of Persia into two zones of influence.

When in 1919 British statesmen tried to achieve security in eastern Europe on the basis of a combination of minor states between Russian and Germany, they were anxious not only to build up a "cordon sanitaire" to prevent the spread of Communism, but also to contribute to the weakening, if not the dismemberment, of their competitor in Asia.

Question of Defenses

Today the British realize that the "Continental nations, hopelessly divided, are no match for Germany." Consequently they want a strong Russia. They believe that Russia's neighbors "have good cause to look to Russia for security against any repetition of Nazi domination." Thinking of all those controversies recently stirred up around Russia's future western boundaries, "The Times" writes: "The one condition on which Russia must and will insist is that her outer defenses are in sure hands," and adds: "Everything shows that Russia will be in a position after the war to shape the settlement on lines consistent with this conception of what her security demands."

"The Times" goes even as far as to say that "the Franco-British undertaking to Poland in 1939 led to the German-Russian agreement of August, 1939." This statement may contain the clew for a proper understanding of the new British foreign policy as advocated by "The Times."

The British fear that Russian apprehensions that "Britain and America will seek to rob Russia of the fruits of victory" (this is now more than ever the line of German propaganda to Russia) might prepare the ground for an understanding between victorious Russia and defeated Germany after the disappearance of Adolf Hitler and his regime.

The British feel that it is necessary to destroy the seeds of all Russian suspicions. "The Times" deplores the "official hesitations both in Britain and in America to recognize that Russia will, at the moment of a victory so largely due to her outstanding effort, enjoy the same right as her allies to judge for herself of the conditions which she deems necessary for the security of her frontiers." According to "The Times," it would be "suicidal" if British and American statesmen failed to read the lesson conveyed by the last years of European history—and it would be "sheer madness to suppose that Britain and the United States with the aid of some of the lesser European powers could maintain permanent security in Europe through a policy which alienated Russia."

"Cordon" Idea Condemned

Consequently the British sharply condemn all those political circles which play with the Vatican-sponsored idea of a "cordon sanitaire" to be established under the

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guise of a Catholic agrarian federation in eastern Europe. That such ideas still are current in certain circles has been revealed once more no later than last Monday, when Dr. Ignatius Smith, dean of the school of philosophy at Catholic University in Washington, addressed a warning to high-ranking government officials who came with Archduke Otto to attend mass on the fifth anniversary of the Anschluss. Dr. Smith appealed to the democracies to "guarantee Austria's security from the imperialistic threat which stalks her borders under the guise of atheistic and Bolshevistic Communism." He appealed to the democracies not to permit Austria "to pass into a new and more fatal assassination by the marauding monitors of the mummy of Moscow."

The British oppose all projects of a Catholic "cordon sanitaire" by a collective security in which Russia would play a part as outstanding as her present effort in the war.

Champion of collective security, Mr. Eden came to Washington as advocate of the closest and most cordial co-operation with Russia.

Paradox of History

It appears as a great paradox of current history that the Tory government of Britain is becoming an intermediary between the Soviet Union and the New Deal regime in the United States. It also seems paradoxical that Britain, which for generations considered Russia her rival in Asia, became more aware of Russia's importance for world security than this country, which practically never has had any conflict with Russia, and which needs Russia for the curbing of Japanese imperialism.

Administration circles explain this paradoxical situation by two facts. The American Constitution does not allow this country to enter into such treaties as the British-Russian twenty-year alliance. On the other hand, the 25,000,000 American citizens who still have certain sentimental ties with the countries of their origin in central and eastern Europe oblige the Administration to be cautious in the elaboration of the fairest possible solutions for international issues.

The "Four Senators" proposal may become the first step on the long road leading to the evolution of American foreign policy.

As to Mr. Eden's visit, it may become a significant curtain-raiser for the rehearsal of the peace conference which Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, would like to prepare to assure the winning of the peace.

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Why Russia Is 'Too Big' for Hitler

4B

(James E. Brown, International News Service Moscow bureau chief who is in America on leave, tells some of the behind-the-battlefront reasons why the Nazis have found Russia "too big to conquer.)

By James E. Brown

BEHIND the scenes of Soviet Russia's spectacular military accomplishments this winter, the effective flow of war supplies to the various fronts has played an important role.

These supplies have come partially from giant Soviet factories adjacent to and far behind the Ural Mountains separating European from Asiatic Russia; and partially from the lend-lease shipments of key war materials sent by America and Britain.

Long before the war, Soviet industrial planners decided to build up a network of industrial centers behind the Urals. One prime incentive was the vast supply of coal, iron, and other strategic raw materials in the region.

Another was the realization that if Germany, her European industrial centers like Kiev, Kharkov, and Stalingrad, would be vulnerable to devastating attacks by an invading army and air force.

This foresight has paid rich dividends in contributing to Russia's tenacious survival.

BUT Russia's far-flung industrial empire around and behind the Urals has not been able to carry the entire burden of supplying the colossal amount of war materials necessary to stem the Nazi armies.

For one thing, transportation facilities have been limited. Some of the industries were just getting on their feet when the war with Germany began; others that were transplanted after the Germans nearly reached Moscow have had a long struggle to resume production schedules.

And so the Soviet regime has been supplementing its own production with lend-lease aid from Britain and America.

Lend-lease shipments have gone along the northern Atlantic route via Murmansk and Archangel, which are linked by rail to Leningrad and Moscow; along the southern route around Africa to Iran for transshipment by rail into Russia; and along the northern Pacific sea lanes, in more limited quantities, to Siberia.

Russia's own arsenals of production are working at top speed to produce more weapons with which to turn the Nazi tide.

Actual figures of production are as closely guarded from the outside world as the factory centers themselves. A recent Soviet announcement did reveal, however, that women now comprise over 70 per cent of the workers in Soviet industry.

While her heavier industries are for the most part now securely entrenched behind the Urals, there is still plenty of industrial activity of an important nature going full blast in European Russia.

Even some of the factories in Moscow and Leningrad are still functioning. And east of Moscow, there is an important cluster of aircraft plants at Gorki, Molotov, Ufa, and Kuibyshev.

Directly behind the Urals, there is a tremendous industrial development embracing Magnitogorsk, Chelyabrinsk, Sverdlovsk and Tagil. Here are giant steel works, tank factories, machinery plants and heavy war industries.

Farther to the east, there is another cluster of important heavy industries

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March 21, 1943

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in the vicinity of Kuznesk ~~where some~~ of the greatest coal reserves are located.

IN the Pacific Coast area of Asiatic Russia, Vladivostock, Kharbarovsk, Svobodnyi, and Komsomolsk form another industrial network—set up to supply Russia's far eastern war machine, ever on the alert against any surprise Japanese attack.

The entire region of Asiatic Russia is a vase reservoir of almost unlimited natural resources.

The famous Kuznetsk Basin is so rich in coal its reserves are estimated around 445 billion tons. Great steel works havve been built at Kuznetsk itself.

The Urals are rich in iron ore and deposits in the Magnitogorsk region alone are estimated at 470 million tons. Manganese is found in ample quantities around Irkutsk and throughout Siberia there are vast mineral resources which are being tapped for war purposes.

It is from this giant storehouse—supplemented by lend-lease aid—that Russia is drawing the weapons with which to defeat Hitler. Most of these plants have been developed since 1938 and previously were largely in the blueprint stage.

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Anglo-Russian Relationship

By Andre Visson 6B

On The United Nations Inside Front

OF all the angles in the talks which Mr. Anthony Eden is now having in Washington, the Russian angle is perhaps among the most important one.

The highly significant editorial which the London Times published on the eve of Mr. Eden's departure for Washington describes British diplomacy as facing two essential tasks at the present time.

The first is to "develop a spirit of growing confidence in Anglo-Russian relations." The second is "to interpret to the United States the common interest of Britain and Russia in European security and the means of attaining it.

New Diplomacy Looms.

Should the line proposed by the London Times become the official line of the British government, we would witness the beginnings of a completely new diplomatic situation. Until now we have been thinking in terms of an Anglo-American (or American-British) concert of power which would endeavor to establish a lasting collaboration with Russia in the East and with China in the Far East.

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The Times editorial, which completed a special 3½-column article analyzing British policy in Europe, throws many interesting sidelights on the new road which Britain may have decided to follow in her desire to prevent a third world war.

Old Balance Gone.

Britain has come to the conclusion that the nineteenth century balance of power within Europe has been irrevocably destroyed by the unrelenting march of military and economic developments. Britain believes, on the other hand, that Russia cannot continue—any more than Britain herself—in a policy of isolation from European troubles. If either Great Britain or Russia remains aloof or reverts to policies of isolationism, the domination of Europe by Germany once more becomes inevitable.

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Russia and Britain, Allies in that war, nevertheless entered it with memories of their centuries-old rivalries in Asia, which had been only freshly liquidated by the Russian-British agreement of 1907 for the partition of Persia into two zones of influence.

When in 1919 British statesmen tried to achieve security in Eastern Europe on the basis of a combination of minor states between Russia and Germany, they were anxious not only to build up a "cordon sanitaire" to prevent the spread of Communism, but also to contribute to the weakening, if not the dismemberment, of their redoutable competitor in Asia.

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Why America Sagged

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POSTWAR PLANS PREPARED IN SECRET STUDIES

Russian-Born Economist Directs State Department's Research

By Richard G. Massock,
Associated Press Writer.

B-3

While talk of postwar planning grows apace, a full-grown Government plannery is fabricating a peace program for the world; as the United States Government would like it.

It consists of the divisions of political and economic studies in the State Department, its site is in a department annex and its chief is the precarious, rotund, Russian-born economist, Dr. Leo Pasvolsky, as little known to the world as the policies that he is forming for it.

The plans are taking shape in a secrecy as profound as the win-the-war strategy of the generals and the admirals. They are confided only to those members of Congress who ask about them, to President Roosevelt and to the highest State Department officials. None of the planners will talk of his work to an outsider.

Yet the all-important basis for the United States Government's negotiations with the statesmen of the United Nations is being laid there in carefully studied and documented files. The planning machinery was set up three months ago. Forearmed with the reports and recommendations of hand-picked collaborators, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles already has begun to urge a joint discussion of postwar policies among the nations.

Welles Deplores Delay.

"Failing to begin such organized study and discussion now," Welles said in a recent speech, "there is danger that divergent views and policies may become crystallized, to the detriment of the common war effort, and to the detriment of efforts to bring about a peace that will be more than a brief and uneasy interlude before another even more horrible and more destructive war."

DR. LEO PASVOLSKY.

In other words, an anonymous official explained, unless the nations, big and small, now united in the fight against Hitlerism, agree on the main points of the postwar settlement, from boundaries to air bases, national rivalries may predominate after the victory and spoil the peace.

For that reason, the United States is preparing to go into all kinds of questions, geographic, ethnic, economic and social, with a fistful of arguments for its side. Preparing the data and the arguments are a staff of more than 60 drafting officers of the State Department. But few of them are diplomats. Most of them are former college instructors, recognized as authorities in some field of history, geography, political, economic or social science.

No hard and fast program, like the 14 points of Woodrow Wilson, is the aim.

The planners recognize that Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain, Premier Joseph Stalin of Soviet Russia, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of China and the many smaller governments in exile will have their own ideas.

Seek Full Understanding.

For instance, the higher-ups in Washington may consider that Germany's industrial and political power should be decentralized under Allied control for a considerable period after the war. But should Germany be partitioned into a lot of small states, as Lord Robert Vansittart has proposed in Great Britain?

Welles, or perhaps some one else, orders the planners to study the problem from all angles, weigh the advantages, the disadvantages, the difficulties, the probable repercussions, in the light of historic precedents and experience. On the basis of this study, the American statesmen may form a tentative decision, and be ready, if necessary, to answer a counterproposal with the statement, "We think it would be inadvisable for this reason," and lay all the data on the table.

Already proposals have been made to disarm potential aggressors, set up an international police force and re-educate the Germans, the Italians ~~and the~~ Japanese.

This is a clipping from page B-3 of the Washington Star for March 21, 1943
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How have such experiments operated in the past? How are they most likely to succeed in the prospective aftermath of World War II? Those are questions on which the professors in the State Department are working.

Their chief, Pasvolsky, 49-year-old special assistant to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, may have a particular interest in his work because his native city, Pavlograd, is in the Kharkov sector long occupied by the Germans.

Pasvolsky Is Naturalized.

Brought from Russia by his parents in 1905, at the age of 12, he was naturalized six years later. At the age of 16 he was editor of a Russian language newspaper in New York, taking over the job at the death of his father.

Graduated from the City College in New York, in 1916, he took graduate work at Columbia and the University of Geneva, became a writer on international and financial relations and eventually was a research economist for the Brookings Institution in Washington, where he received his Ph. D. degree in 1936.

Peace conferences attracted him from his youth. He managed to attend the Paris conference of 1919 and the arms limitation conference at Washington in 1921 as a journalist. He was an observer for Brookings at the world economic conferences in Geneva in 1927 and 1930 and in London in 1933. Shortly after that he went to the United States Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce as an economist and transferred to the State Department, in the same capacity, in 1935.

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Some Key Officials in Military, Diplomatic Services Long Have Been Unfriendly to the Soviet Union

Power They Have Exercised Helps Explain Widening Breach Between Two Allies

By I. F. STONE
PM's Bureau

PM Exclusive

WASHINGTON, Mar. 20. — Officials unfriendly to the Soviet Union hold key positions in our diplomatic and military services.

They occupy posts which command the ow of information from the Soviet Union) the U. S. A. and from the FCC, War nd State Depts. to the American people.

Officials hostile to the USSR are in charge f the conduct of Soviet-American relations t the State Dept.

The power exercised by officials of this ind in key positions helps to explain the larm expressed last week by two great onservative newspapers over the dangerous rift in American policy away from the oviet Union.

Sheer Madness

The *Times* of London in an editorial eferring to American policy toward the oviets declared it "sheer madness" to suppose "that Britain and the United States vith the aid of some of the lesser European owers could maintain permanent security ı Europe through a policy which alienated ussia and induced her to disinterest herelf in continental affairs . . ."

"Are there really influences within our oreign policy," the New York *Herald-'ribune* asked, "attempting to pursue the isastrous aim of 'building a bulwark against olshevism' in the spirit of Goebbels? Are 'e really at a point where the British must ıetfully warn us that unless we endeavor) establish our relations with Russia on ıat basis to which her strength, her posion and her sacrifices entitle her, the Brith may find the 'Anglo-Russian interest' ıore powerful than the Anglo-American!"

Thi[illegible]ory is an attempt at a first tentavr [illegible]er to those questions. It does not [illegible] do more than scratch the surıce. No Washington correspondent can ope to pierce very far behind the "confuions, windy generalities and supercilious ecrecy" which, as the *Herald-Tribune* comlains, mark the conduct of our foreign olicy.

Some Observations

But here are a few general observations which may be useful and here are a few of the officials whose conduct and records help to explain Soviet suspicion, British uneasiness and the darkness which often seems to be considered the better part of our diplomacy.

What first strikes the eye in any survey of the men dealing with the Soviet Union is the fact that this is one case where Big Business tends to see eye to eye with the New Dealers rather than with the professional diplomats and leading members of the Army-Navy bureaucracy.

Outstanding big business men like Lend-Lease Administrator Edward N. Stettinius, Jr., of U. S. Steel; WPB Chairman Donald M. Nelson of Sears, Roebuck; and WPB Vice Chairman William L. Batt of SKF Industries, have been robustly realistic and genuinely friendly, though dealing with a Communistic ally.

Practical men of affairs, whatever their political ideas, have shown more comprehension than the professional diplomat of the necessities of the war and of reaching a workable understanding for the future. Examples are two of Washington's foremost corporation lawyers, former Ambassador Joseph E. Davies and former Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley. Both have represented the biggest of American big business interests at the capital yet both have been conspicuously friendly to the Soviets and have won the confidence of Moscow.

Edward Stettinius

By contrast, those friendly to the Soviet Union in the diplomatic military and naval services are the exception. Here one finds many key positions occupied by men identified with hostility to the USSR.

Here is a cross section of some of the men who have a finger, one way or another, in our relations with Russia:

Col. F. V. Fitzgerald

Col. Fitzgerald, of the War Department's Bureau of Public Relations, is the man who provides the "off the record" background information for Washington correspondents and columnists. He was the source of the original widely publicized estimate that the Red Army would collapse within six weeks under the impact of the Nazi attack. Some of the stuff one reads in anti-Soviet columnists like Constantine Brown of the Washington *Star* reflects information given out by Col. Fitzgerald.

This is a clipping from page 4 of the PM for March 21, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

A Reserve officer who entered the service ı the last war, Col. Fitzgerald is a graduate f the Army War College, The Army Industrial College and the Quartermaster Corps School and holds degrees of Bachelor f Science and Master of Science from Georgetown University. How much of his information reflects his own opinion, how much the views generally held in the War Department, can hardly be determined. Gen. Marshall himself at first thought the Soviets would crumble within a short time.

Col. Ivan D. Yeaton

The principal source of Army information on the Soviet Union comes from the Russian section of G-2 and from our military attache in Moscow. The head of the Russian division of G-2 is Col. Ivan D. Yeaton. Col. Yeaton graduated from the California College of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons in 1916. He entered the Army as a private in 1917, and was commissioned second lieutenant of infantry in 1918. Before becoming head of the Russian division of G-2, he was military attache in Moscow. Col. Yeaton went there in July, 1939, when the war broke out and returned shortly after Pearl Harbor. As the Army's principal observer in the Soviet Union during the period, he was the chief source of the opinion that the Red Army would be unable to resist the Nazi attack late last fall, after the President had several times intervened.

When one enters the field of diplomacy, one enters an area in which the anti-Soviet attitude is dominant. The leading figure here is William C. Bullitt, former ambassador to the USSR and later to France.

William C. Bullitt

Bullitt is no longer in the State Department but he still exercises considerable influence on the conduct of our foreign policy. His official job is that of special assistant to Secretary of the Navy Knox and his duties are described, vaguely, as that of liaison man between the Navy Department on the one hand and the State Department and the White House on the other. Actually he has been assigned various public and private chores in recent years in the field of foreign policy.

William C. Bullitt

The prevalent view in Washington which I can only report but for which I cannot vouch for is that the Administration, after a series of wrong guesses by Bullitt, thought it better to keep him out of the limelight. As one of Bullitt's most powerful opponents in his home state of Pennsylvania expressed it to me at a cocktail party recently, "Bullitt has a perfect batting average. He was wrong on Russia, wrong on France, wrong on Spain and wrong on Pennsylvania." That is the salty comment of a prejudiced man, but a politician whose opinions carry weight at the White House.

One of Bullitt's recent unpublicized chores was an unsuccessful attempt to convince Gen. de Gaulle to join forces with Darlan before the latter's assassination. He is said also to have been playing some obscure part in the behind-scenes wrangling over Polish borders that have done so much to muddy the waters of Soviet-American relations.

Several of those who were with Bullitt when he was Ambassador to Moscow from 1933 to 1936 are now in the European division of the State Department. The most important of these men is Loy W. Henderson, who was charge d'affaires and first secretary under Bullitt and is now in charge of Soviet affairs in the Department. Another is Ellbridge Durbrow, who was third secretary under Bullitt, and handles Soviet-Polish questions for Henderson.

Pro-Soviet sources regarded the Embassy under Bullitt as a center of anti-Soviet and pro-Fascist gossip and intrigue. This may require some discount in the light of the Soviet tendency to be suspicious of foreigners and intolerant of dissent. A recent spy case in London, however, showed one instance Soviet suspicion was justified. This involved a young foreign service employe named Tyler Kent who served as confidential clerk and translator under Bullitt and was later transferred to the American Embassy in London.

In November, 1940, Kent was sentenced by a British court to nine years in jail for passing confidential documents to a White Russian woman who passed them on in turn to a British Fascist working for the Nazis in Berlin. The woman, a daughter of a former admiral in the Imperial Russian Navy, was declared to have an "anti Jewish obsession" by the judge who passed sentence on her and Tyler. Newspaper reports

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from London said "love and a strongly marked anti-Semitism, rather than money, were believed to have motivated Kent."

Anti-Semitism is far from unusual in our foreign service, as in the social circles which set its tone.

Little documentary evidence is available on the men who handle Soviet affairs within the State Department. Surmise, gossip, reputation, general social outlook and the policies of the department account for the Washington opinion that puts them in the anti-Soviet camp. In Bullitt's case, however, we have extensive testimony in the diary of the late William E. Dodd, whose outspoken democratic views as Ambassador to Berlin offended the Nazis and annoyed the State Department.

If Dodd's diary is correct in its reporting, Bullitt thought that the Russians had "no business trying to hold the peninsula which projects into the Japanese sea at Vladivostok" and predicted "that it's all going to be taken soon by Japan." Dodd asked him:

"You agree if the Germans have their way Russia with 60,000,000 people shall be denied access to the Pacific, and be excluded from the Baltic?"

Bullitt's answer, according to Dodd, was, "Oh, that makes no difference."

Dodd pointed out that "this treatment of Russia over the last two hundred years has caused many wars" and was "amazed at this kind of talk from a responsible diplomat who had done much to get Russia recognized in 1933."

The question now under discussion between representatives of the United States and Britain in Washington is much the same question which agitated the Western Powers in the years before the war: Should they attempt to establish a system of security based on co-operation with the USSR or on the idea of protecting themselves against the Soviets?

An entry in Dodd's diary under date of Feb. 12, 1936, just before the end of Bullitt's term as Ambassador in Moscow, shows how the latter felt about it then. There is little reason to believe that Bullitt's ideas have undergone fundamental change. Bullitt came to see Dodd in Berlin on his way back to Moscow. Dodd notes that Bullitt "condemned sharply the co-operation between England, France and the Balkan states in the hope of bringing Russia into a moderate policy and keeping the peace of Europe."

William E. Dodd

The alternative to co-operation with the USSR, as Dodd noted, was domination of the Continent by Germany. Bullitt seemed to be doing all he could to defeat such co-operation. The Dodd diary says:

"Learning that France was about to loan her old Russian ally of 1914 one billion francs it is reported that Bullitt went to a strategic person in the French government and convinced him that Russia would never repay the loan. Thus he had defeated the Russian negotiations. I was not sure myself whether the Russians would pay, but it seemed unusual for an American Ambassador to Russia to defeat Russo-French negotiations."

Dodd records the fact that at a luncheon in Berlin with the French Ambassador to Germany, Bullitt "repeated his hostile attitude [toward the Soviets] and argued at length with the French for the defeat of the Franco-Soviet peace pact then being negotiated."

Dodd says that "when the new Italian Ambassador came here directly from Moscow, we were told that Bullitt had become attracted to Fascism before leaving Moscow." Dodd said he could understand "how disappointed he [Bullitt] must have been at the failure of the Russians to keep their promises made in Washington in 1934" but Dodd "did not see how an intelligent American could become a Fascist. Perhaps he was not."

Dodd declares that he finds it hard to believe a report published by Drew-Pearson in Washington that Bullitt "is in full sympathy with Nazi ideas," but records a significant incident:

"However, yesterday Monsieur Marcel Knecht, editor and owner of *Le Matin* in Paris, came to see me, reporting that Bullitt, working for an alliance between France and Germany, had requested him to see me and ask me to advise the President to lend a hand in this. Knecht convinced me that he is an able but very conservative man, perhaps a Fascist in France.

"A little while after Knecht left, a telegram from Bullitt urged me to see and talk with Knecht. Does this mean that the United States is intermeddling, or that Bullitt is moving, as in 1935, without official instructions?"

Louis Fischer, in his *Men and Politics*, supports Dodd's opinion of Bullitt.

"Lothian and I," Fischer says, "also wrangled about Spain. Lothian said, 'In April 1936, Bullitt came to us from Moscow and told us that the Bolsheviks were preparing a revolution in Spain.'" Fischer adds that by "us," Lothian meant the Cliveden set. Fischer says Bullitt favored an agree-

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ment between France and Nazi Germany rather than between France and the Soviet Union and says, "This was also the guiding thought of Bonnet and all other appeasers."

Dodd's view was that "real co-operation between the United States, England, France and Russia is the only way to maintain world peace." This great democratic historian and thinker saw only one alternative.

"One thing seems to me certain," he wrote, "there will come a complete totalitarian domination of Europe and Asia if democratic countries continue their popular isolation policies."

James C. Dunn

But this view is almost as much a minority view at the State Department now as it was then. Those who deal with Russian affairs at the Department are not men who think in terms of co-operation with the Soviets.

James Clement Dunn, the Department's political adviser for Europe; Ray Atherton, the acting chief of the European division; and Loy W. Henderson, their subordinate in charge of Soviet affairs, all belong to the old school of upper class diplomacy, with its undemocratic tendencies and anti-Soviet bias.

James C. Dunn

"Wealthy in his own right and privately educated abroad," Robert Bendiner wrote in his *The Riddle of the State Department*, Dunn married into the Armour meat packing family, and he and his wife entertain on a more lavish scale than anyone else in the Department. They are particularly attentive to the nobility of the diplomatic corps (Dunn's daughter married a Belgian count) and before the war mingled freely with the aristocrats of the Italian and French embassies. Rich, snobbish, and flawlessly groomed, cultivated in the social graces and backward in social thought, Dunn is the pattern of the career man who has long dominated the Foreign Service."

Ray Atherton

Bendiner's work also provides an excellent thumb - nail sketch of Ray Atherton, Dunn's subordinate as acting chief of the European division: " . . . the standard Boston Harvard career man Anti-New Deal, he used to complain to journalists that the country had gone flabby because of its 'ten years on the dole'."

Ray Atherton

Loy W. Henderson

Although Loy Henderson, who serves under Atherton in charge of the Soviet "desk," hails originally from Rogers, Ark., he has been assimilated to the dominant State Department type. In 1919 and 1920, Henderson was with the American Red Cross Mission to Western Russia and the Baltic States, a mission that was attacked as unfriendly to the Soviets. From 1927 until 1930, he was third secretary and later second secretary of the American legation at Riga, center for anti-Soviet propaganda and intrigue. He became second secretary at Moscow in February of 1934 and remained there until 1938. He virtually ran the Embassy under Bullitt.

Loy W. Henderson

Dunn, Atherton and Henderson are all pro-Franco, the first most strongly of all, and those who are pro-Franco in the State Department are also anti-Soviet. Most of them favor a *cordon sanitaire* in Central and Eastern Europe, if possible under Hapsburg aegis. The European division of the State Department, the division that handles Russian relations, is the most reactionary, as the Latin American is the most progressive, of the Department's geographical divisions.

Sumner Welles

No picture of the Department's Russian policies would be complete without some sketch of the strange conflict between Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles and Assistant Secretary of State A. A. Berle, Jr.

Welles, the wealthy aristocrat and conservative, has tried hard in recent years to adapt himself to the New Deal and to win the confidence of the liberals. Berle, who began as a liberal, has devoted himself to winning the confidence of the Right and in the process has antagonized most of his old friends.

Welles sought to woo the Soviets during

MORE

Government.

the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact while Berle seems to have held the view that it was useless to try for better relations with Moscow. June 22, in a sense, was a triumph for Welles.

Sumner Welles

Today Berle is one of the principal sponsors within the department of the *cordon sanitaire* idea. He and the European division long sought to delay the pending visit of Eduard Benes, former president of Czechoslovakia, to this country. Benes, as a spokesman for understanding with the Soviets, is unpopular with Berle and the European division. Hodza, the right wing Slovak leader who is the principal rival of Benes, and the Hungarian reactionary, Tibor Eckhardt, have both enjoyed Berle's favor.

A. A. Berle, Jr.

"They are both charming gentlemen," Blair Bolles, diplomatic correspondent of the Washington *Star* writes in the current issue of *The Nation*, "but it was not their manners that won them the Berle smile. They carried with them little plans for a European federation of a sort that would shield the Western World from the Soviets. The isolation of Russia, it is recognized, depends upon the destruction of Czechoslovakia. And the destruction of Czechoslovakia depends upon the erasure of Benes, the firmest proponent of a restored Czechoslovak state."

A. A. Berle

Secretary of State Hull's attitude toward the Soviet Union is little known. He has never shown himself particularly friendly to the Soviets. He depends largely on Loy Henderson for advice on Russian affairs. A close associate is Leo Pasvolsky, Russian-born former Kerenskyist editor, who went from the ultra-conservative Brookings Institution to the post of economic analyst for Hull. Pasvolsky is one of the principal expounders of Hull's free trade ideas.

This brief survey, wholly and necessarily inadequate as it is, because of the secrecy which veils the conduct of our foreign policy, does nevertheless show why the Russians are suspicious and the British uneasy. Too many of the men in key positions on Russian relations are neither progressives nor realistic business men but either embittered ex-liberals or conventional upper class diplomats. A number have provided evidence of definite and consistent anti-Soviet bias.

Among them are many who actively sponsor what the *Times* of London calls "sheer madness," the view that Britain and the United States with the aid of some of the lesser European powers could maintain permanent security in Europe through a policy which alienated Russia."

American-Soviet Relations

AN EDITORIAL

There is no question of the fact that the highly important editorial in the London Times of March 10th on the pivotal question of Anglo-Soviet-American relations, reflects the decisive public opinion of the British Commonwealth and its support for cooperation with the USSR. The 20-year Anglo-Soviet treaty is a symbol of the relationship among these two great powers and the basis for approaching all future questions. Undoubtedly this treaty is fully taken into account by Anthony Eden in his conversations with our government.

Unfortunately, the policy of our own country, whose security is equally bound up with that of the USSR, has not been as clearly defined. This is not true of our people—they have long realized that a decisive victory over the Axis, and a stable future for ourselves depends on close, firm, unbreakable friendship with the Soviet Union.

Yet, not only are the defeatist elements openly hostile to our fighting ally, but even within circles that would like to win the war, fatal illusions, misconceptions, divisions continue to exist. The New York Times for example continues to broach all sorts of illusory issues, calculated to delay immediate military action, to isolate the USSR within the coalition, to cancel out, if it can, the respect and warm friendship which all Americans must feel for the heroism of the Red Army, the wisdom, skill, patience, principledness of its leadership.

It is these circles, in the present debate on American foreign policy, that might take some advice from the London Times. For what it did its editorial tells us?

It said that "it would be sheer madness," "inexcusable," "suicide," to suppose that "Britain and the United States, with the aid of some lesser European powers could maintain permanent security in Europe through a policy which alienated Russia. . . ."

There are two crucial matters here. One is that for our own permanent security we must have friendship with the USSR. The other is that the possibility of alienation of Russia—what Henry Wallace called a "double-cross"—does not come from the Soviet side.

On the contrary, the London Times believes it comes from "official hesitations of both Britain and America to recognize that Russia will, at the moment of victory so largely due to her outstanding effort, enjoy the same rights as her allies to judge for herself the conditions which she deems necessary for the security of her frontiers."

Now, what is important here is not the reference to frontiers. That issue, magnified by the New York Times, is a false one. It is false because it denies the right of self-determination to all nations, denies the integrity of the union of Soviet nations. But it is also false because the real concept which the London Times upholds is the conception of the USSR as an equal of the other great nations of the great coalition.

Failure to recognize this equality haunts us from the bitter past; refusal to recognize Soviet equality is the heart of the current anti-Soviet incitement; there must be no "official hesitation," as the London Times says, to recognize this today and in the future.

Americans will naturally be pleased that the British offer to help "interpret" international realities for us. But the fact is that the American people has it fully within its power to clarify the ambiguities of our foreign policy, and strengthen all-around relations of the coalition. In this we have much to learn from Britain: exchange on cultural and political matters, mutual deputations from factories, release of films that tell the whole truth, and of vital importance—direct relations between the Soviet and American labor movements.

But the single greatest immediate need is the implementation of the President's policy of the military offensive against the citadel of the Axis. This is the single most urgent measure to clarify and strengthen the entire coalition.

The debate on Soviet relations must not be allowed to divert us from the crucial military task of the hour. The people of this country must press for invasion of the European continent now. Joint fighting in a two front war, joint victory over the Axis carried on in a real spirit of coalition warfare is today the most important means of assuring Anglo-Soviet-American collaboration after the war.

This is a clipping from page 8 of the Daily Worker for March 20, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

By Drew Pearson

Don't Want Boundaries Fixed Now

IT IS violating no diplomatic secret to report that the most important phase of the Anthony Eden conversations is Russia and how she will fit into peace plans after the war. To put it more bluntly—how much European territory will Russia want after the war?

It is also a fact that Foreign Minister Eden's visit is just one year late as far as the Russians are concerned.

Just a year ago, February, 1942, Eden went to Moscow and listened to Russian ideas about the future boundaries of Europe.

What Russia wanted was virtually the old Czarist boundary of 1914, giving her Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia; a southern slice of Finland (The Czar had all of Finland); the Russian half of Poland, and a good slice out of Rumania, including Bessarabia.

In this the Russians were consistent. Their proposal was similar to that handed Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in 1939, before war started, when Britain was flirting with a Russian alliance against Hitler and before the Cliveden set finally decided to urge Hitler to attack Russia.

Molotoff Wanted Treaty

EDEN DUCKED any commitment in his Moscow conversations last February, so Foreign Minister Molotoff came to London. He and Eden got along well, agreed on general ideas. But Molotoff was told the United States had now become an important partner in the war and no treaty could be negotiated behind Washington's back.

Molotoff saw this was reasonable, came to Washington.

In his conversations here, President Roosevelt emphasized senatorial difficulties in negotiating treaties, suggested that it would harm the united drive for victory to have the Senate debating future boundaries now. He urged that the whole thing be left until after the war.

Molotoff understood, was satisfied to leave Washington after giving a general outline of Russia's postwar aims.

Since then Russia has reversed herself. Whereas she was once pressing for a postwar pact, today she doesn't want one. And whereas we were then opposed to any postwar pact, today we and the British are taking the initiative.

Stalin last November came out for the self-determination of peoples. Apparently he figures that the Bulgars and groups among the Poles and Yugoslavs will lean toward Russia after the war, and that Russia is strong enough to get what it wants for boundaries. That's why Stalin has no one sitting in on the Eden conversations. Obviously he takes the view that the Americans and British, who didn't want to talk boundaries last year, can now go ahead and do the talking—to themselves.

That is why the Eden conversations have to be handled so skillfully. They must not offend Russia. Yet they must work out a general peace security pattern into which Russian ideas will fit after the war.

NOTE: FDR is reported to have a treaty in his desk, four pages long, written by himself in three afternoons. It is couched in general terms.

This is a clipping from page 7 of the Washington Post for March 20, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.



I'd Rather Be Right

By Samuel Grafton

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THE PLUNGE: England has taken the plunge. She obviously ntends to live in the same world with Russia after the war. We mericans have not quite decided about that. Some of us think naybe some other world would be preferable. But we are having lifficulties finding that other world.

It isn't easy to locate. Where is it, that other world, the one vithout Russia? We have tried to cook up such a world for ears. You know the recipe. You throw in a little Mussolini, a ash of Otto, a touch of Franco, a bit of Darlan. But every time he resulting mess is a tasteless slumgullion. And it doesn't keep. That is the worst of it.

A World With the Shivers

Even when (before the war) we added Hitler himself and Hirohito, too, to the recipe, the world we made that way wasn't ny better. Not solid, somehow. It was a world that shivered, ke a thousand-island pudding, and overflowed at the edges, and ecame liquid on any warm day.

So, it is more than likely that Eden has come here to sell us n the idea of living in the same world with Russia.

He has based his political career at home on his twenty-year act with Russia. Just before he left England, the London Times rinted its famous three-column editorial on Russia. That was n amazing editorial for one reason only. It treated Russia like ny other country. The number of editorials printed in the west hich have treated Russia just like any other country can be ounted on the fingers of one finger. It was a hard, tough, sour nd yet curiously hopeful editorial. It postulated a Europe kept t peace by a strong England at one end and a strong Russia at e other. It took the plunge.

(And then a certain amount of shush-shush over the editorial rose in England, a certain embarrassed backing away, with sidelances toward America. It was as if some Englishmen feared lest e London Times piece would upset our painful American concentation on the search for a world without Russia in it, our grave ame of building a substitute planet with jackstraws and wishones.)

These Countries Have Names

So, Mr. Eden arrives, to find us coyly discussing, with a vague and disingenuous air, the question of whether we ought to co-operate with "other United Nations" after the war. No names are mentioned. It is as if we were discussing the future over the 'phone and were afraid someone might be listening in.

What is this tittering nonsense? The countries with which we must co-operate are Britain, Russia, China. These countries have names. Why not use them? But we are not yet ready for the plunge. We fear that nameless and horrid things will happen to us, if we say the names, and, especially, the Russian name.

(Odd. Because the nameless and horrid things happen when you do not say it. When you do not say it, then the diplomats become mad professors in the political laboratory, cooking frantically, but never with gas; cooking up a world with a bit of Ciano and a dash of appeasement, a touch of Petain and a sprinkle of Peyrouton. It is then that we lose our forthright American character, and begin to wink and to smirk, to deal and to conspire. Has Eden become less Eden for taking the plunge, or Britain less British? Strangely, both seem to have become stronger; and more, not less, like themselves.)

Out of the Shyster Decade

What folly, to say that we shall become less American if we choose to depend, now and forever, on the goodness of our people and the strength of our own institutions, rather than on fraternization with the gutter rats of the world, and perhaps even the passing of money and a hair from the head of Hitler!

We have seen nations lose their national character, through their fear of Russia, but never because they took the plunge of admitting that she is here to stay, and always because they thought they had found some alternative to taking it.

So, Eden is here. His message is that Britain has decided to live with Russia, and to base her policy on British strength, and not on nameless British fear, leading to nameless British weakness. It is an invitation to us to come out of the shyster decade at last, to stand up for our own way of life, and yet live strongly and gladly in the world as it really is.

This is a clipping from
page 20 of the
New York Post for
March 20, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of
Government.

Steel Filings

New Isolationist Bogey Is an Anglo-Soviet Bloc

By Johannes Steel

Some of the members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs are said, in the course of a luncheon on Thursday, to have expressed to the British Foreign Secretary their anxiety over the Mar. 10 editorial of the London Times, in which that conservative paper made the point that the pre-eminent responsibility for post-war European security rests upon the military and diplomatic collaboration between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.

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I wonder who put them up to it! For this happened after the isolationist old guard and the reactionary press (who have their own purposes, of course) had raised the spectre of an Anglo-Soviet bloc which—so they insisted gravely—would leave the United States out in the cold. That they did so almost simultaneously with the kicking around they gave the Ball resolution is only an additional commentary upon their short-sighted bigotry and downright stupidity.

These people object to a British position which in the last analysis was taken because of the fear that an isolationist Senate would eventually take precisely the same attitude toward the principle of post-war collective security, based on the unity and collective military strength of the United Nations, as the present Senate took toward the Ball resolution.

The members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs could do worse than study the editorial of the Times of London. It is a very realistic appraisal of post-war possibilities. For instance the Times says: "No Western Power, however great, can safely act on the Eastern flank of Germany except in genuine and close understanding with Russia. . . . The security of that region cannot be asked for any nation by any grouping of minor countries or by support given to any such grouping from the West." In other words, the Times of London believes that the policy of creating another cordon sanitaire of small semi-Fascist and anti-Soviet states, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, would ultimately lead to disaster.

Not Our Neighbors

It is all very well for an Administration which is in the process of being terrorized by a group of isolationist Senators and Congressmen to encourage the Fascist government of Finland, the political aspirations of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian dictators in exile, reactionary anti-Soviet Poles who are busy sabotaging the Sikorski administration, and the hungry Hapsburgs in their anti-Soviet intrigues, with the idea that all these occult forces might lend themselves to the creation of another cordon sanitaire in Eastern Europe.

For, in the last analysis, America will not have to live with such a diplomatic abortion.

What could be sounder than learning from past mistakes? To invoke the Atlantic Charter on behalf of the Baltic states and at the same time assail the Ball resolution as Sen. Wheeler has done, is not only the acme of insincerity but sheer idiocy. Why is it that the isolationists only find it possible to speak on behalf of the fascist states which not only refuse to get along with Russia, but which also have no raison d'etre in the new international setup based on ethnic democracy and not on behalf of a democracy like Czechoslovakia which looks to Russia for security against Germany?

No! These gentlemen are worried about the Mannerheims of Finland, the Smetonas of Lithuania, the Matuczewskis of Poland, the Eckhardts of Hungary and the Hapsburgs. The attempt which has been made to put difficulties in the way of Mr. Eden's effort to help bring about a better understanding between the United States and Russia is motivated by the fear of the reactionaries in this country that their kindred spirits in Europe will be put out of business once and for all. Not only would it leave them lonely, but they also fear it as a significant omen.

This is a clipping from page 21 of the New York Post for March 20, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

This Is Our Munich

Here is a shocking possibility: That American foreign olicy is deliberately aimed at establishing a bloc of conervative, or anti-democratic, or semi-fascist, or fascist naions in Europe, as a bulwark against Russia.

There used to be something like the feel of a clean, fresh reeze associated with the mention of the name of America 1 the foreign affairs of the world.

Today the Manchester Guardian, England's great liberal ewspaper, scolds America for having "a hundred times" ıore anti-Russian sentiment than England; than conservaive, old-school-tie England.

Today our Ambassador in Moscow sounds off against ussia, while England's does not.

Today we praise Franco, and specifically subscribe to ıe permanence of his fascist regime in Spain, while Engınd does not.

* * *

What does it mean that de Gaulle works with Russia, nd England works with de Gaulle, but that we work with iraud, until finally the point is reached at which England, o, has to accept Giraud? Are we, in a sense, using our reat weight in world affairs to force a kind of appeasement f America on England, for fear of us?

What does it mean that we have deliberately cut off the ands that were extended to us by the underground in rance, and by the democratic movement in Spain?

hey Do Business With Roosevelt

What does it mean that American isolationists (who ave really become the American anti-Russian party) find ıcreasingly that they can do business with the administraon; anti-Willkie business, anti-de Gaulle business, anti-Hillatch-Burton-Ball business, and pro-Franco business?

What does it mean that in each case, Vichy, North Afca, Spain, the Otto of Austria business, we are compelled we are blandly told) to make certain decisions because of necessity"—and yet all the decisions point in the same diection, toward the proposed reconstruction of a reactionry Europe? If these necessities are necessities, and not mething else, why are they not controlling upon England?

What does it mean when we permit Giraud, under the gis of our own fine, clean troops, to disenfranchise a ndred thousand Algerian Jews, whose citizenship stems om a French law adopted before Giraud was born? Are e so intent on seeing that French state power goes into nservative hands that we will swallow a dose of antiemitism itself to make the arrangement?

Is our country chasing the will-o'-the-wisp that so many lemocratic" statesmen pursued during the thirties, the pe that out of pins and tissue paper and a touch of reaction Europe could be put together that could refuse to work ith Russia and even defy her?

Another Agony in the Making

Are we preparing another agony of disappointment for the brutalized people of the continent of Europe?

And if we are trying this, at the twelfth hour, what can the effect be except to drive the people of Europe into the arms of Russia?

What alternative does our incredible policy leave to them? We have, a hundred times, shown our disdain for the truly revolutionary, truly democratic forces on the Continent. We have thrown away our moral leadership over those forces. We have shown them that we are more easily moved by pressure from reaction and isolation and proto-fascism at home, than by faith in the European masses. We have all but convinced them that, except for one or two outstanding scoundrels, there is no creature in the world so low that we will not deal with him.

We believe Anthony Eden has come here to plead with us to deal with Russia as England deals with her. We shall believe that, in spite of all denials which may come forth, for our power to obtain such statements is great.

We believe that an appalling danger of world catastrophe has been resurrected by us, and by us alone, out of a decade in which it seemed safely buried.

We believe that the future of the world depends on whether Mr. Roosevelt will now at last take sides in the war against fascism, as well as merely in the war against Hitler.

This is a clipping from
page 21 of the
New York Post for
March 20, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of
Government.

Better U. S. Ties With Russia Held Blocked by Prejudice

By Edmund Stevens

Staff Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Personal contact between higher-ups which has done so much to improve United States relations with Britain and British relations with Russia might do as much for Soviet-American relations whose improvement is so essential to the world's future welfare. Already some beginnings have been made in this direction on the United States Government's initiative.

During the past year numerous highly important Americans in and out of uniform have made the round trip from Washington to Moscow with entourage. In addition to their diplomatic passports and credentials each of them carried in his innermost pocket a far more precious document: a long white envelope unembellished save for the legend "White House" neatly embossed in the left-hand corner and the typed address: To His Excellency, Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Joseph Stalin.

Frankness Appreciated

In expansive moments the bearer might reach for his envelope and proudly exhibit it without letting it out of his hands, but never would he think of revealing the contents which therefore remain a mystery.

While all of these presidential letter carriers were assured of a hospitable reception, some were better treated than others.

For two of them—Wendell Willkie and Brig. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley—the Russians really rolled out the carpet. Perhaps it was because the Russians recognized their genuinely democratic American spirit and liked their rough-and-ready manners and frankness, so refreshingy unlike the demeanor of polished diplomats.

For both Mr. Willkie and General Hurley the Soviet leaders arranged extensive trips to the front and the Red Army Generals unbuttoned their lips and the customary suspicion and reserve toward foreigners was almost completely relaxed.

Without drawing any too sweeping conclusions, I merely wish to suggest through the above that the choice of individuals and personalities can exert a decisive influence on relations between the United States and the U. S. S. R. just as between any two sets of countries.

Alas, not all Americans bound for the Soviet Union fared as well as Mr. Willkie and General Hurley.

There was, for example, one

Continued on Page 2, Column 5

This is a clipping from page 1 of the Christian Science Monitor for March 20, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Continued from Page 1.

American who flew to Moscow in his own plane also with a letter from President Roosevelt to Mr. Stalin on an extra-confidential errand who cooled his heels many months in Moscow and finally departed without being asked to the Kremlin.

Whether he handed his letter over through someone else or took it back to Washington undelivered I cannot say.

His visit had one useful result, however, for while he was waiting, his B-24 plane made several mercy trips from Moscow to Teheran where it loaded its bombracks with food for the needy American Embassy staff.

Not all the messengers bound for Moscow ever got there. The strangest case is that of the United States military mission to the Soviet Union, 20-odd Army men headed by a ranking officer which left Washington in January, 1942.

Blanket Visas Refused

It got as far as Teheran to discover that the Soviet visas were not in order. Eventually the Russians agreed to admit the mission chief and five others but refused to issue blanket visas for the entire group.

The head of the mission refused to split them, so for the next six months the entire mission waited vainly at Teheran for matters to be straightened out.

Eventually as the mission's chances of ever getting to Russia faded, its name was changed to the "U. S. Army Mission to the Iranian Army." The officer returned to Washington, but the mission under its altered designation survived and is now functioning in Teheran.

One of the original group of medical officers, Col. Abraham Neuwirth, is an adviser to the Iranian Ministry of Health.

The remaining members of the original group went their separate ways to new assignments.

Two Divergent Methods

The most puzzling feature of this curious story is that presumably Washington would not have sent a large military mission to Moscow without first obtaining an agreement with the Government.

If one assumes this, the only explanation of the subsequent visa snag is either that the Kremlin reversed its decision or took exception to the mission's personal composition.

It is essential to remember that Russians attach more importance to the personnel of such official bodies than Americans do. When an American is appointed to some post it is not always because he is the most eminently qualified candidate.

Soviet Coolly Realistic

As regards Ambassador William H. Standley's press conference declaration regarding the lack of publicity given to American aid inside Russia, there is undoubtedly some basis for this assertion, and it is unlikely that Admiral Standley's remarks caused any grave resentment. They may indeed have had a salutary effect.

But the fact remains that while the Standley approach was somewhat sentimental in citing American aid as evidence of generosity and big-heartedness, the Soviet attitude is coolly realistic. They consider the United States helps them solely because it is to the United States' own interest; and that considering the scale of the Soviet war effort this aid is fairly small, which is undeniable.

The Soviets are suspicious of the United States, unduly so perhaps, but fairness requires the admission that they have some grounds for suspicion. Thus when Vice-President Wallace warns against "double-crossing" Russia he implies that there is danger of such double-crossing.

At the same time when the former Ambassador to Moscow, William C. Bullitt, tells the American people to use both a "club and a carrot" in dealing with the Russians the latter are certain to resent it, for whatever Russia's leaders are they certainly aren't donkeys.

Treated as an Outlaw

After the Russian revolution America for many years treated the Soviet Government as an outlaw.

Seldom has America evinced a desire for a sympathetic understanding of Russia's struggles and Herculean efforts to lift itself up by its own bootstraps. Until relatively recently any book defaming the Soviet Union was assured a ready sale.

Even now, when the Soviet Union is fighting on the Allied side and when Red Army successes have saved the bacon, many Americans persist in a "holier than thou" attitude towards Russia in treating with that country, like a paroled criminal on probation.

A fairly articulate section of the press and public opinion still operates on the theory that Russia can do no right.

Thus when Russia retreated before the German onslaughts they opposed aid to Russia on the grounds that Russia would shortly collapse. When the Red Army recaptured the initiative one school immediately proclaimed that Stalin would make peace as soon as he regained Russian frontiers, thereby double-crossing the Allies.

The other school declared that instead of stopping at the frontiers the Red Army would overrun and Bolshevize all Europe.

Yet the majority of American observers of all categories who have visited Russia at war have emerged with deep sympathy and admiration for the Russian people and the conviction that they are interested solely in defending their country, driving out the enemy, repairing the terrible damage and losses, and guaranteeing their country's future peace against the possibility of repetition of such attack. They are convinced that all the Americans and Russians need in order to get along and like each other is to get to know each other better.

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World-In-The-Making

It has become pretty plain to Americans that many Britons are anxious to win American good will toward the war aims of the Soviet Union. Those war aims, of course, are pivoted upon the Russification in one way or another of a strip of territory all the way from the Baltic to the Aegean. A recent editorial in the London *Times* was regarded as evidence that such an anxiety was Britain's official mission till a disclaimer came from Mr. Eden. That newspaper wrote about the need "to interpret to the United States the common interest of Britain and Russia in European security and the means of attaining it." The newspaper article appeared on the eve of Mr. Eden's departure for Washington. It was thus taken for granted in many quarters that the submission of Russia's case occupies the outstanding place in Mr. Eden's agenda.

It is no news, of course, that influential British opinion wishes to see Britain become Russia's second in seeking America's recognition of Russia's security program. That was the role Britain was said to be ready to adopt almost a year ago when she signed a 20-year alliance with Soviet Russia with the concurrence of the United States. Even at that time, it is said, the British were discussing how to incorporate Russia's territorial aims in the alliance. They were deterred from pursuing the quest by American diplomacy. Aside from the effect of any such incorporation upon the Atlantic Charter, it would have been somewhat hard for American public opinion to swallow a clause allowing Russia a long and immense glacis from the Baltic to the Aegean. Accordingly the Russians saved the request for further submission. Now they seem to be pushing it again.

We can no longer balk at a discussion of the new world polity in the insurance terms of security which all nations at bottom seek. There are those who may think any such discussion premature. That is not statesmanlike counsel. We have the President's word, if that were needed, that the conduct of the war and postwar planning are part of the same complex. They are. When the Israelites of old, returning from Babylonian captivity, rebuilt the walls of Jerusalem they wrought with one hand and held a weapon in the other. The President may have been referring to social planning. But, since first things come first, the house of our next world polity must be built before we can make our new furniture. And the house cannot be built by reconciling economic theories in the Wallace manner, but by reconciling political facts.

There can be little doubt that the blueprint in the minds of our British and our Russian friends will not make much appeal to the American people. We may assume that Americans are no longer isolationist. We may assume that they are world-minded. But he would make a great mistake who imagined that we would have a part in a return to the old alliance or quasi-alliance system for maintaining world peace. That is not the American way. What most Americans want, we fancy, is the development of collective security through the establishment of a "higher level of government" which would profit by the mistakes of the League of Nations.

In the Old World they will say that any such desire is too nebulous to satisfy those of our great allies who are seeking now to insure their security when the present shooting is over. They are right. What we need in this ountry is a foreign policy agreed upon by Congress and Executive that will express concretely the American alternative to an interlocking series of alliances which would entangle this country in balance-of-power politics. Senator Ball of Minnesota in the resolution submitted to the Senate on Wednesday sought to prepare the way for it. The resolution has been buried in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and one doubts whether there will be any exhumation, though the President's explicit backing of the objective of the Ball resolution may bring action. Our Government in its own interests, cannot go on negating other people's policies and shelving those of domestic origin. The deadlines of the peace will be as inexorable as the deadlines of the war. We must meet those deadlines, and Mr. Eden's visit is a reminder that the main deadline is in the offing. In short, we must offer Mr. Eden and the Russians a definitive plan of our own for the insurance of collective security as a talking point in place of their own tentative plans.

This is a clipping from page 8 of the Washington Post for March 20, 1943.
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Maxim Maximovitch Litvinoff

By LAURENCE GREENE

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The three important foreign diplomats in Washington today represent Britain, China and Russia. And the one from Russia, a fat man with thick glasses, who looks like a butcher dressed up for a convention, is by no means the least important.

On the contrary, Maxim Maximovich Litvinoff (he made the name up himself) is perhaps the shrewdest of the lot, diplomatically speaking. Unquestionably, he is the most devastating—for the last couple of decades he has been hurling monkey wrenches into the engine of state and overturning diplomacy's apple cart with unfailing regularity and immense glee.

They used to say of Litvinoff that he was the most snubbed diplomat on earth.

His Propaganda For Peace in 1927

Times have changed, for Litvinoff. He is ambassador to the most powerful supporting ally the embattled Russians have. He has a great embassy in Washington, at which to entertain in the grand manner. He is frequently on the White House caller's list, more frequently on that of Secretary of State Hull, or Undersecretary Welles. And at 66 he is still the man who confounded the 1927 Geneva arms conference by suggesting vehemently that every instrument of war be destroyed.

The assembled disarmament experts listened to him in astonishment. His was no half-way cure for war; it was the utter purge, the abolition of armies and navies, poison gas and airplanes. "This," cried the diplomats in anguish, "is propaganda."

"Exactly," said the urbane Litvinoff. "Propaganda for peace. Where better to spread it than at a disarmament conference?"

He Goes Home—But Not Beaten

Nobody could answer that, but neither could anybody bring himself to full world disarmament... so Litvinoff, whose life has been a symphony whose theme is frustration, went back to Moscow. Not beaten. Not Litvinoff.

If anything characterizes Litvinoff it is his directness and his wit. Long years in London gave him an English easily understandable, albeit with a Cockney accent, and hung together with due consideration for grammar. His time in America has added our slang to the East End's accent; not long ago, for instance, he told a press conference that the Red Army was "far from being washed up" and would "settle Hitler's hash" soon or late.

The years have dealt kindly with the culture of the poor boy who was born to a petty bank clerk in Bialystok, in what later became Poland, in 1876. When he was 18 he entered the Czarist army, some say as a volunteer, others as a conscriptee. Whichever it was, the treatment to which a Jewish private was subjected started him on the road toward socialism, and by the time he was mustered out he was ready to throw in with Lenin and the other Marxist revolutionaries.

Jailed for a Year—Then to Switzerland

His writings and other activities caused his arrest in 1901, and he was jailed for nearly a year. Somehow he gained a distinction from this misadventure—he was not sent to Siberia, as virtually all of his fellows were. He broke jail in 1902 and he fled to Switzerland.

England knew him next, as a 10-year resident. His health was not good, due largely to an experience he had while running guns into Russia. He was a very reliable gun-runner, so much so that Lenin said of him: "While we have Maxim we have transport. Let him take energetic measures to find a successor in case anything should happen to him."

On one of his trips, carrying 250 small automatic pistols in the lining of his fur coat, he was warned that the Imperial Secret Police were waiting for him at the frontier. He leaped off the train into deep snow and plodded 20 miles to the farmhouse of Bolshevist sympathizers. His heart suffered from the strain; today he is an abstemious eater and almost no drinker at all.

Litvinoff's real name is Meer Moisivich Vallakh—In the revolutionist's necessary fashion he has used Finkelstein, Harrison, Felike, Mordecai, Luvinye and Graf. Lenin called him Papasha (Dear Father), and so did Stalin in 1936, when he awarded him the Order of Lenin.

Between his exile in England and the beginnings of his true diplomatic career, there were a few more classes in his university of hard knocks. After the ill-starred Kerensky regime had fallen, he was named Soviet representative to the British government. England was embarrassed; what she needed least, at that time, was a Bolshevist envoy.

The situation resolved itself when, in 1918, the Soviet government arrested Bruce Lockhart, the British agent, on charges of subversion. The British promptly threw Litvinoff into Brixton Prison and he, with typical dry humor, hung a sign over his cell door reading, "Military Guest of His Majesty." The erstwhile unwanted envoy ate off Brixton's tin plates for a time and then was released in an exchange for Lockhart. Years later he ate from British metal again, this time the gold service of Buckingham Palace.

Married Ivy Low, Niece of Lord Mayor

During his stay in London, Litvinoff married Ivy Low, radical writer and niece of a former Lord Mayor of London. They had two children, a son and a daughter. When Litvinoff became Commissar for Foreign Affairs in 1930, Mme. Litvinoff became one of Moscow's most successful hostesses.

Litvinoff is a man of medium height, 5 feet 8 inches, and too much weight, 200 pounds. His head is overlarge and his greenish eyes peer at the world through powerful spectacles. His face is lined and blemished with moles, and the skin hangs in folds from his jaws. He wears the proper clothing for an ambassador but his garments look as though they had never felt the weight of an iron.

He loves music, Bach and Beethoven mostly, and is a great reader, with a particular liking for Thackeray, Henry James, Jane Austen and Trollope.

His greatest attribute is his "audacious simplicity"—the capacity to say much in a few blunt words.

Back in 1933, immediately after U. S. recognition, he gained the respect of reporters with one quick phrase. They asked him if he had promised President Roosevelt that Russia would guarantee religious freedom to all. He smiled and said:

"We can't talk business today—it's Sunday."

N.Y. Post MAR. 14 20, 1943 p. 75

COOPERATING WITH RUSSIA

Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden has made it clear that the views expressed in a leading article of The Times of London on "Security in Europe" do not represent the ideas of the British Government on the vital question of the future relations of Russia, Great Britain and the United States. The editorial in question, which was reprinted in full in this newspaper yesterday, has aroused considerable interest because of a happily unfounded report that its transmission was forbidden by the British censors on the ground that Americans might resent the inference that peace on the European continent was primarily the affair of Britain and the Soviet Union.

Mr. Eden's disclaimer is hardly needed to assure informed American opinion that this is not his conception of the organization of peace. He has been one of the most consistent advocates of a system of collective security as the only sure safeguard of world order. So, for that matter, have the spokesmen for Russia. It is the general belief of Americans that the Soviet Government would prefer to base its security on an international organization, backed by force, and that Mr. Stalin's frankly expressed concern to carve out western frontiers to protect Russia against future aggression constitutes a hedge against the possibility either that such an organization will not be created or that it will not be backed by all the victorious Powers.

It can hardly be supposed, moreover, that the United States has failed to learn the lesson that "peace is indivisible." Unless this country is ready to put its force behind a general security system, the only alternatives are a system of alliances or a return to the old anarchic system in which great Powers look out for their own safety by whatever means they deem necessary. It is all too clear that the choice depends as much on this country as on any other.

Where The Times of London is wrong, we believe, is in assuming that the desire for Russian cooperation is not as strong in this country as in Britain. The assertion that the two essential tasks of British diplomacy are first, to develop confidence between Britain and Russia, and second, to interpret to the United States the common interest of Britain and Russia in European security, proceeds from two false premises. One is that the United States is not equally anxious to win and inspire Russian confidence; the other that we do not recognize the "common interest in European security" as an interest not only of Britain and Russia but so vital to us that we are throwing all our resources into the common effort to defend it.

The question is not whether we are willing to cooperate with Russia. The American Government and the American people are fully convinced that there can be no stable and satisfactory reorganization of Europe, or of Asia, either, when it comes to that, without the participation of the Soviet Union. No far-sighted and realistic policy-maker would dream of "alienating" this preponderant Power or would expect or wish her to be disinterested in Continental affairs. The disequilibrium of the world after the last war was largely due to the fact that neither Russia nor the United States threw its weight into the balance, and it would be fatal for either country and for the world if the same mistake were repeated after this war.

Is Russia ready to cooperate with us? That is the real question underlying the present uneasiness. Is the Soviet Government willing, if we are, to accept the principles on which our conception of collective security rests? The answer to that will inevitably affect our own decisions. It is obvious that Russia must "enjoy the same right as her allies to judge for herself of the conditions which she deems necessary for the security of her frontiers," as The Times of London declares. But unless her allies, including ourselves, unless all the major Powers waging this war against domination by any one Power recognize and act on the theory that only an over-all system can enforce peace, there is not much hope of lasting security on any frontier, however strongly guarded. This is the crucial issue, and it can never be solved unless all the United Nations agree on the same basis of settlement.

This is a clipping from page 18 of the New York Times for Mar. 19, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Wallace's Warning

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By Milton Howard

VICE-PRESIDENT WALLACE has been associated, perhaps more than any other Government spokesman, with the effort of the ruling circles in the United States to work out a new, cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union.

From October 1917 to December 1942, American policy toward the Soviet Union was dominated by the fixed obsession (even during the brief friendly interlude after America's official recognition in 1933) that the Soviet Government was weak, incompetent, tyrannical, and without any firm hold upon the loyalty of its people. The corollary of this was the illusion that the Soviet system of socialist production was inefficient, backward, and not to be compared with the industrial capacity of the other states.

Wallace is trying to dissipate in some measure the almost unbelievable ignorance about the Soviet one-sixth of the globe which prevailed in America for twenty-five years thanks to the unceasing and profitable racket of the "hate Russia" journalists typified by Max Eastman, Eugene Lyons, William Henry Chamberlain and others.

This is so because Wallace speaks for that group within the Government which has decided to substitute political realties for maniacal prejudices. Prejudices are an unreliable guide in the calculation of national interests, and the anti-Soviet prejudice has been proved by history to be the most foolish and costly of all.

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PRIOR to his latest speech on the Soviet Union delivered the other day in Ohio, Wallace made two notable remarks on the subject of American-Soviet relations.

First, in his famous "Century of the Comman Man" speech, delivered May 1942 he laid down this theoretical approach to American Soviet relations:

"The march of freedom of the past 150 years has been a long-drawn out peoples revolution. In this Great Revolution of the people, there were the American Revolution of 1775, the French Revolution of 1792, the Latin-American revolutions of the Bolivarian period, the German Revolution of 1848, and the Russian Revolution of 1918. Each spoke for the common man in terms of the blood on the battlefield."

~~Thus, in~~ his very first pronouncement on the subject, Wallace gave the conservative-minded but honest people of the country a new approach in which the Russian Revolution was depicted not as some barbarous, fiendish development, but as a historically progressive fact linked to the more generally accepted ideas of evolving capitalist democracy.

Wallace saw, if not altogether accurately, at least sympathetically that the Russian Revolution and the resulting socialist society were not a "hideous break" with the advances of the past but a historic continuation of those democratic advances with which American nations had been so intimately linked throughout her history.

Secondly, several months later, November 1942, Wallace returned to this theme with the more developed idea that:

"Russia and the United States have had a profound effect on each other. . . . In order that the United Nations may effectively serve the world, it is vital that the United States and Russia be in accord as to the fundamentals of an enduring peace based on the aspirations of the common man."

Thus, the "peoples revolution" theme was supplemented with the practical political insistence that America's future was linked with American-Soviet collaboration.

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IN HIS most recent speech, Wallace returns with renewed vigor to his basic theme of American-Soviet collaboration, emphasizing the urgency of "a satisfactory understanding" with the Soviet Union which still engages ninety per cent of Hitler's armies alone, in the absence of a second front.

In making this emphasis, Wallace continues, on the one hand, to combat the anti-Soviet fanaticism of the Hoover - Hearst - Lavalmen of America, while on the other hand, he is no doubt seeking to influence the forces of his own camp.

But in his latest speech, Wallace introduces some new notes which deserve detailed consideration.

He adds to the fight for American-Soviet collaboration the warning (valuable to the people) that there will be the danger of another, but reactionary war, **"If we fail to demonstrate that we can furnish full employment after this war comes to an end, and Fascist interests, motivated largely by anti-Russian bias, get control of our Government."**

Coming from so highly-placed and well-informed an official, this is a revelation that Wallace and the Roosevelt forces very well know that the danger of American Fascism is very real. Wallace is indicating that this fascism, whose leaders we know, is awaiting what it considers the "inevitable" economic chaos of the post-war, and that it hopes to be able (by 1944 Presidential elections let us say) to reverse the entire course of the war in favor of a deal with Nazi Germany. He warned against an American "double-cross" of the Soviet Union.

Wallace is indicating, therefore, the understanding of the Administration forces that anti-Soviet obsessions constitute a persistent peril even now to the outcome of the war, and to the future of world peace.

But in addition to this reiterated fight for American-Soviet collaboration, Wallace makes some serious concessions to the anti-Soviet propaganda of his political enemies which mark a retreat from the position outlined in his earlier "peoples revolution" speeches.

And it is this which we must note and try to correct if we can by further discussion.

For example, in his speech on March 8 last week, Wallace drops the idea that the Russian Revolution was a historic outgrowth of the struggle for democracy, and substitutes for it the idea that:

"Marxianism is in some ways the child of Prussianism, because Marx, its high priest, was molded in his thinking by Hegel, the great philosopher of the Prussian state. Marxianism used the Cheka just as Prussianism has used the Gestapo."

As if this were not sufficiently historically unjust and inaccurate, Wallace "balances" his timely and justified warning against the brewing Fascist intrigues of the Hoover-Hearst forces with another "warning" that war with the Soviet Union will be inevitable "if Russia should again embrace the idea of fomenting world revolution."

Both of these ideas are an echo of the misconceptions which have befogged America's clear view of the Soviet state and its world relations. Coming at this particular moment, they are bound to have the harmful effect of weakening the position of Wallace's own camp in the political struggle with the fascist forces. That is why we shall analyze and refute them in another column appearing Monday.

DAILY WORKER
MARCH 19, 1943
P. 11

Intimate Message: Washington

Eden's Visit Concerns More Than Russia ..... *By Joseph C. Harsch*

Just how we are going to fit British and American interests in with Russian after this war is over is so much the big news of the moment that it has taken most of the headlines and most of the news column space about Anthony Eden's visit to Washington. There are some other smaller and less exciting bits about that visit that are really worth noticing.

Russia was by no means the only reason for his visit. There is the question of British and American relations, which don't always run quite so smoothly as would appear on the surface. The fact is that while the President and Mr. Churchill have been extremely close together since before the war started, not many of the men in the other brackets have had a chance to visit with each other.

This is actually the first time that Mr. Eden and Cordell Hull have ever met while they were bearing the responsibility for the foreign policies of their respective countries. When Mr. Hull was at the London Economic Conference at the beginning of the Roosevelt Administration, Mr. Eden was not at the head of the Foreign Ministry. Mr. Eden came over here in 1938, but again as just a traveling individual.

The wartime atmosphere of Washington is all new to Mr. Eden, who has been steeped in the strains of Europe from the day the first shot was fired in 1939. And Mr. Hull has been dealing with Mr. Eden over the cables and through the mouths of subordinate officials. Thus there were bound to be some barriers of understanding between the two men.

Points to Be Cleared

For one thing, Mr. Eden has learned since he reached here that official Washington still felt that Whitehall let it down rather badly over the Darlan affair and failed to show sufficient appreciation of the military reasons for what was done.

For another thing, Mr. Eden has had a welcome opportunity to get far enough away from Europe to again think deeply about the other parts of the world. He has told friends that when German bombs were coming down on your head you tended to think about the war mostly in terms of Germans. Here in Washington there is just about equal awareness of Japan, which is a new atmosphere and a new point of view for Mr. Eden.

It is extremely important for these differences of perspective to be merged down the ladder of authority as well as at the top. Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill can't possibly handle all the details of Anglo-American relations themselves. The men farther down the line need a Casablanca just as much as they do. The Eden visit is the answer. He is talking daily about all sorts of little points with dozens of different men concerned here in Washington. It isn't by any means all talk about Russia or all an argument about whether Britain or America is the logical "honest broker" between Uncle Joe Stalin and the western world.

Just how healthy these exchanges of views have proven was shown the other day when Mr. Churchill delivered a verbal pat on the back to General Giraud. That was a product of discussions here. As a result General De Gaulle is planning another trip to Algiers to talk things over with General Giraud and hopes for a final marging of the two French groups are better than ever before.

Policy Toward Russia Involved

Incidentally, the now famous Russian-policy editorial of March 10 in The Times, of London, caused more disturbance in Washington because it took the line that America and Russia were incapable of understanding each other and that Britain should act as the interpreter between the two than because it called for scrapping any idea of saving the independence of the small prewar states bordering on Russia. And, also incidentally, the delayed impact of that editorial was not because of censorship in London. There wasn't any. Some American news agency correspondents were asltep at the switch and missed it. The fact that it didn't bounce over the cables in a big way at once was so surprising to the State Department that it inquired whether there had been censorship stopping it.

Washington is pretty skeptical now about the Finns really wanting to end their war with Russia. According to the best information available here the Finns have not yet made any real peace overtures, nor are they in any mood to do so now. The presence of seven German divisions in their midst is the excuse given, but almost in the same breath the stout Finns boast that they could get rid of them if they wanted to.

The heat is still on for more attention to the Pacific battle fronts. But the men who make the decisions are now inclined to the view that the Japanese preparations in the islands north of Australia are much more defensive than offensive. They may make a few minor concessions, but the betting is heavily on the side that they won't be budged seriously from the basic decision to finish off Hitler before we really turn against the Japanese. In fact there is a disposition to get a little annoyed with the repeated appeals from "down under."

This is a clipping from page 9 of the Christian Science Monitor for March 19, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Washington Memo

By Charles Van Devander and William O. Player, Jr.

Washington, Mar. 17.

Perhaps the most significant hint regarding the problems involved in current United Nations talks was given by President Roosevelt himself just a few hours before the arrival of British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden.

It has been no secret that the U. S. has been concerned about the apparent intention of Russia to retain, in the post-war settlement, the Baltic States and Eastern Poland. So, when Mr. Roosevelt pointedly called attention to a 2-weeks-old pledge by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, that China did not want any territory from Thailand, and said that pledge was in accord with United Nations' policy, the inference seemed obvious.

The fact is that lack of agreement with Russia on post-war territorial claims is seriously handicapping the British-American propaganda campaign. Until that basic question is settled our appeal to neutrals and the enemy cannot be placed on the firm basis of Wilson's 14 Points, which helped to undermine enemy resistance in the last war.

Russia's insistence on the acquisition of territory along her western boundary is based on a determination to protect her own safety in an unsettled, balance-of-power set-up in post-war Europe. Best prospect of getting concessions from Russia, it is believed here, is to provide concrete assurance that this country and Britain will be willing to guarantee the peace of the world once peace is achieved.

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This is a clipping from page 32 of the New York Post for March 18, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

EDEN DISCLAIMS ANGLO-SOVIET BLOC

Idea of an Exclusive Sphere Said Not to Be His—He Sees Roosevelt and Litvinoff

By HAROLD CALLENDER

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, March 17—After lunching at the Russian Embassy with Maxim M. Litvinoff, the Soviet Ambassador, Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, visited the White House at 4:30 o'clock this afternoon, accompanied by Secretary of State Cordell Hull. While there was no official indication of the subject discussed with the President, this sequence of appointments seemed to emphasize the conspicuous place that the future relations of Great Britain, Russia and the United States are understood to be taking in Mr. Eden's consultations here.

In authorized British circles it was said today on behalf of Mr. Eden that the editorial in The Times of London of March 10, which argued that only the military and economic power of Russia and Britain acting together could keep the peace in Europe, did not express the British Foreign Secretary's conception of the policy Britain should follow.

Eden Speeches Recalled

The British spokesmen pointed to Mr. Eden's speeches, notably that made in the House of Commons on Dec. 2, last, to show that what Mr. Eden had in mind was not an exclusively British-Russian responsibility for peace on the Continent of Europe, but rather an association of the four great powers —Britain, the United States, Russia and China—which would have at the end of the war "a virtual monopoly of armed strength" and would use it, not for a "big-power dictatorship over everybody else" but in the name of the United Nations, to prevent a repetition of aggression.

Mr. Eden did say "particularly ourselves, the United States and Russia" in speaking of the powers that would be responsible for world peace, but he did not describe Europe as the special sphere of Britain and Russia, as The Times's editorial did.

It is expected that Mr. Eden may be questioned on this point when, with Viscount Halifax, the British Ambassador, and members of the Foreign Secretary's party, he takes lunch tomorrow with the members of the two committees of Congress having to do with foreign affairs, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. After the lunch there is to be a round-table conference for discussion of peace problems. The Foreign Secretary was invited by the chairmen of the two committees, Senator Tom Connally of Texas and Representative Sol Bloom of New York.

Article Dismays Some

The London Times article caused some dismay in official circles here where it was thought that it might be interpreted as an officially inspired deviation from the conception of collective security outlined in the Atlantic Charter and in speeches by President Roosevelt, Mr. Hull and Sumner Welles, Under-Secretary of State, because of the delimited regional responsibilities it suggested.

The British Ministry of Information issued here a denial that the British censors had interfered in any way with transmission of The Times article to the United States, correcting an impression to that effect here. One reason for this impression was that the article appeared just before Mr. Eden's departure from London and hence might be taken as a semi-official indication of the British Government's views, which The London Times has long been regarded as reflecting or anticipating.

British circles here commented that The London Times was now less authoritative than it once had been as a barometer of official opinion, and they cited its disagreement with the government on the Sir William Beveridge report on social security.

The Times's view appeared to represent more nearly that of the Russian Government, according to authoritative sources here, who believed Russia would welcome the idea of Britain's coming around now to the view of collective security so long espoused before this war by Mr. Litvinoff. Russia, it was thought, would be especially pleased by the conclusion of The Times that the policy it urged would involve Russia being the judge of her security—this is, the strategic frontiers she required.

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Times for March 18 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

MARCH 18, 1943.

In The Nation

The Useful Conversations of Mr. Eden

By ARTHUR KROCK

WASHINGTON, March 17—In whatever report may be made to the people of the United Nations of the results of the visit to Washington of the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, no announcement of important agreements should be expected. That is not the purpose of the conversations. It may be that certain relatively minor matters will be disposed of which will make specific news, but that would be incidental. Mr. Eden's visit is, in the highest and most useful sense, an errand for the exchange of information which should have great value in helping the Allies get on with the war with a minimum of policy disputes and misunderstandings.

Admirably Qualified

For such a mission the British Foreign Secretary is admirably qualified. He is profoundly informed on Continental questions, both those current with the war and those which are certain to arise afterward. It is no reflection on American statecraft and diplomacy to point out that Mr. Eden's greater familiarity with these is the result of having lived with them officially for years and at close range. The world has grown small and, as events have amply proved, what disturbs and threatens Europe threatens the United States in the next moment. But Great Britain's immediate interests and perils are in the European realm geographically, and, despite the clipper plane, ours are somewhat removed.

The British have been invaded in this war, though it is true the invasion came from the air and still never from the sea. The Russians have known invasion by air, land and sea. The United States thus far has been spared the experience which makes a bond between the British and the Russians closer than the British have felt for any great European power save France for many years. The historic resistance of the Russian armies has saved Britain from attempted invasion by sea, and this has naturally tightened the bond and brought the British people and government to sentiments of sympathy with Russia's ideas of her required protections against another assault from Germany.

His Role That of a Reporter

In his discussions with American officials of Russian policies Mr. Eden has doubtless made all this clear. It is not conceivable that he would even imply that this administration, committed by the President's signature and chief authorship of the Atlantic Charter, should express or indicate approval of Russian territorial goals which to many here will seem well beyond the barricades of principles set up in the Charter. But the British Foreign Secretary, notably because his whole career has been spent in championship of those very principles, has been accepted in Washington as one who can report the Russian position with more sympathetic understanding and approval of the viewpoint of the United States than any other European statesman.

He knows at first hand that what in Congress may seem plain "aggression" is something very different to Russians fighting for their survival. He knows at first hand the enthusiastic emotions which the Soviet stand has aroused among his own people. He is in a position to explain how a British group, recently given voice by The Times of London, has come to feel that (1) Great Britain must look primarily to Russia for help to keep the peace in Europe that is made; and (2) that, if Russia should be impelled on the theory of self-interest to make Germany or Japan, or both, its partner, the United States would not or could not restore the European balance in favor of any large survival of the democratic system.

Valuable Information

However much this may fall short of high aspirations, including those repeatedly uttered by Mr. Eden himself, it is the view of many in Europe, who must remain there after the Americans have gone home. That is a useful reminder. It does not follow that the United States should on this account desert the principles it has stated or fail to apply them forcefully in its own immediate spheres of interest. But to understand conflicting situations elsewhere, and the accurate details of these situations, is of the greatest possible value to all governments. And no better-equipped reporter of them has appeared in Washington than Mr. Eden, who once resigned high office to stand by the very international principle to which this government is committed.

The world he would make is the world of collective security and self-determination which have always been the American goals. But probably the ideal will draw nearer of attainment by recognizing the problems of other peoples who are bearing the brunt of the war against the Axis, and certainly it will not the other way round.

Part of Mr. Eden's fine equipment for his errand is to be found in the associations he made here in 1938. Then he met many of the men of his own generation who, like himself, will be highly responsible for world affairs in years after the elder statesmen have passed from the scene. Their appreciation of one another should be most serviceable in the coming crises of war and peace.

This is a clipping from page 18 of the New York Times for Mar. 18, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

REPORT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA PLAN TO RULE EUROPE

Believe Pact Will Bar Any Meddling by U. S.

[Chicago Tribune Press Service.]

Washington, D. C., March 17.—A picture of post-war Europe dominated by Britain and Russia was being unfolded in the national capital as Anthony Eden, British foreign minister, continued his official conversations here today.

The dashing diplomat lunched with Maxim M. Litvinov, soviet ambassador, at the Russian embassy, and conferred at length in the late afternoon with President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull in the White House.

As the conferences were under way word was received at the state department that Britain had definitely aligned herself with Russia in European affairs. Whether Eden has presented to Mr. Roosevelt the views of his government on the new working alliance, could not be determined.

Questioning Prohibited.

At the White House reporters were asked not to question the conferees, being told that if they made any attempt to do so the White House usher would be instructed to take the guests out thru a secret entrance.

Reports at the state department were that Britain intended to live up to the terms of her 20 year pact with Russia, which Eden negotiated, even to supporting Russia's territorial claims against Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and the portion of Poland she took over in the Stalin-Hitler partition of that country in 1939.

In return, it was understood, Russia would agree to Britain's dominance of western Europe except for France, which the soviets expect will coöperate with Russia. France was reported to be 40 per cent communistic before the war.

See U. S. Eased Out of Picture.

At the outset of the Eden mission, the London Times devoted a leading editorial to the "joint responsibility of Britain and Russia for post-war security in Europe."

Observers here regard the editorial as most significant because the London Times is regarded as the official organ of the British foreign office. If Britain and Russia are to dominate post-war Europe, the United States would be eased out of the European post-war picture.

Pre-Pearl Harbor isolationists had charged that United States meddling in European affairs, allegedly fostered by the administration, would lead to war. Now, with the country in war, a program of British-Russian coöperation would in effect serve notice that meddling by this country will not be tolerated in the Anglo-Russian post-war Europe.

With European security a Russo-British problem, it was intimated unofficially that the United States would be given a greater voice in Western Pacific affairs. The United States would exercise a greater influence in the trans-Pacific in collaboration with China, Russia, and of course, Great Britain.

Want North Africa Control.

Observers long have felt that Britain will go in for intensified development of Malayasia after the war. In order to do this, the British must maintain a supply line thru the Mediterranean and the Red sea to the Pacific. For this reason, it has been predicted in informed quarters, Britain probably will ask for greater control of North Africa at the peace table.

In many capital quarters it is believed that the primary purpose of Eden's visit here is to explain the new British European policy of coöperation with Russia to American officials and to secure approval of it here.

As Eden arrived, Stalin was said to have expressed approval of the visit in Moscow dispatches. It was considered strange that he did not offer to participate in the discussions either himself or by a delegate. If the purpose of the Eden mission is to acquaint this country with an Anglo-Russian program of coöperation and enlist the coöperation of American officials, Stalin would not need to participate in the conference, it was said.

Policy Not Publicized.

The Eden conversations were being followed in the capital with high interest in view of the reports of the new pattern of coöperation. It was considered possible that Eden may be informing officials of this country that unless the United States sanctions the new European order, Anglo-Russian coöperation may become more important than Anglo-American coöperation now is.

Observers here recognize that the question of American policy toward Russia is one of the most important matters of the moment. New Deal secrecy is at present keeping this policy from the people, it is charged.

This is a clipping from page 6 of the Chicago Tribune for MARCH 18, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

This looks very much like a slap at America for refusing to acquiesce in the demands of Russia for the Baltics, at the time the Anglo-Russian Pact was entered into. The London Times seems to venture the thought that the U.S. does not understand European problems, and must receive a tongue-lashing. America must be led in interpreting European matters by Great Britain.

LONDON TIMES THES SECURITY TO SOVIET

Editorial Says It Can Be Won in Europe Only by Common Effort of Strongest Powers

BACKS RUSSIAN CLAIMS

Paper Calls on U. S. Leadership to Promote 'Appreciation' of Recent Lessons of War

Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, March 17—The March 0 editorial of The Times of Lon-on on post-war Anglo-Soviet rela-ions, which has attracted atten-ion in the United States, read as ollows:

SECURITY IN EUROPE

Two lessons are to be drawn from the historical analysis of British policy in Europe which appears on this page this morning. The first is the familiar one that "splendid isolation" has ceased to be a safe, practicable policy for Great Britain now that the Nineteenth Century balance of power within the continent itself has been destroyed—and to all seeming, irrevocably destroyed—by the inexorable march of military and economic development toward larger and more complex forms of organization.

The second and less familiar lesson relates specifically to Russia and is two sided. In the first place, Russia's attempts to isolate herself from the troubles of the European Continent — the last made as recently as 1919—have proved as futile and as disastrous as similar attempts by Britain. Secondly, Britain has the same interest as Russia herself in active and effective Russian participation in continental affairs: for there can be no security in Western Europe unless there also is security in Eastern Europe and security in Eastern Europe is unattainable unless it is buttressed by military power of Russia.

Continuous Vigilance Stressed

The security of Europe cannot be achieved by any single stroke, however overwhelming. The proposition that it is impossible to exterminate the German people or destroy the German State has behind it the authority of Stalin himself. The realization of security will depend on the joint and continuous vigilance of Britain and Russia. If either one of them remains aloof or reverts to policies of isolation the domination of Europe by Germany becomes once more inevitable.

A case so clear and cogent for close cooperation between Britain and Russia after the war cannot fail to carry conviction to any open and impartial mind. Yet its impact has undoubtedly been retarded and weakened on both sides by the prejudices left by recent history.

To ignore them or to pretend that they do not exist is to render a poor service to Anglo-Russian friendship. There is a small minority of people in this country who, undeterred by the thought of playing into Hitler's hands, are still impressed by the Bolshevist bogy, just as there probably is a small minority of Russians who still believe that British capitalism is a standing menace to Soviet Russia.

The chances of making mischief have been swollen by the official hesitations of both Britain and America to recognize that Russia will, at the moment of victory so largely due to her outstanding effort, enjoy the same right as her allies to judge for herself of the conditions which she deems necessary for the security of her frontiers.

Russian Apprehensions

A study of historical background serves to illuminate the character of Russian apprehension and to make these apprehensions comprehensible to her allies. Russia as well as Germany was excluded from the last peace settlement, and the corollary was an attempt to build up security to the east of Germany on a basis of combinations of minor States under the aegis of Western powers. Excuses can be found for those who committed this cardinal blunder in 1919. There would be no excuse for advocating its repetition today.

The sequel irrefutably proved that the security of that region cannot be assured for any nation by any grouping of minor countries or by support given to any such grouping from the West.

In the words of our correspondent: "No Western power, however great, can safely act on the eastern flank of Germany except in genuine and close understanding with Russia."

The mere threat of intervention there by the Western powers produced the Rapallo treaty of 1922, just as the France-British undertaking to Poland, given independently of Russia in April, 1939, led to the German-Russian agreement in August of that fatal year.

It would be inexcusable—and in the long run suicidal—if British and American statesmen failed to read the lesson which these facts convey.

To suppose that Britain and the United States, with the aid of some lesser European powers, could maintain permanent security in Europe through a policy which alienated Russia and induced her to disinterest herself in continental affairs would be sheer madness.

Essential British Tasks

These considerations point to two essential tasks which must engage British diplomacy presently. The first is to develop the spirit of growing confidence in the relations between Britain and Russia. The success of this task will no doubt depend as much on military achievement as on diplomatic skill. But it will in no circumstances be complete or lasting unless ungrudging and unqualified agreements are attained between the two countries on future conditions of security in Europe.

Four great powers, as Mr. Eden said in his speech last December, will have "a virtual monopoly of armed strength" when the war ends: and this armed strength "must be used in the name of the United Nations to prevent a repetition of aggression." Of these four powers only two are situated on the confines of Europe; and on these two rests the preeminent responsibility for European security. This is the sense and significance of the Eden-Molotoff treaty of May last. If Britain's frontier is on the Rhine it might just as pertinently be said—though it has not in fact been said—that Russia's frontier is on the Oder, and in the same sense.

This does not mean that Russia, any more than Britain, desires to assail the independence of other countries or to control their domestic affairs. On the contrary, it must stand to reason that Russian security will be best served by an understanding with peoples who have themselves good cause to look to Russia for security against any repetition of the grim experience of Nazi domination and whose relations with the Soviet Union are founded upon a solid basis of contentment and good-will.

Sole Interest of Soviet

The sole interest of Russia is to assure herself that her outer defenses are in sure hands; and this interest will be best served if the lands between her frontiers and those of Germany are held by governments and peoples friendly to herself. That is one condition on which Russia must and will insist. Everything goes to show that she will be in a position after the war to shape a settlement on lines consistent with this conception of what her security demands. But it will make all the difference to the future of Anglo-Russian friendship whether these lines have been freely approved and welcomed by Britain in advance or whether they are grudgingly accepted as a fait accompli after victory is won.

The other task of British foreign policy is to interpret to the United States the common interest of Britain and Russia in European security and in the means of attaining it. Mr. Herbert Morrison [Minister of Home Security] said in his speech that "we may be able to play a part in developing and cementing relations of friendship between our two great Allies—the Russians and the Americans," but this part cannot be passive.

Differences, where they exist, will not be resolved or mitigated by pusillanimity which refuses to make up its mind one way or the other. Vice President Wallace said bluntly on Monday that another world war is inevitable "unless the Western democracies and Russia come to a satisfactory understanding before the war ends."

Only Basis for Security

Both Britain and America have paid dearly for past indulgence in ignorant and wishful thinking about Europe: and if Britain has paid for it even more dearly than America in cash and in the humiliations of the pre-war years and in the disasters of the war—this priority gives her both the duty and the right to speak out freely against the repetition of these errors.

The issue of security in Europe will not be settled by the enunciation of general principles; it will not be settled by the acceptance of hypothetical obligations or by the establishment of loose machinery of consultation or cooperation: it will not be settled by any organization based on the conception of national independence which entails the partition of Europe among twenty separate and jarring military and economic sovereignties.

It will be settled only if those who possess military and economic power on the largest scale and are prepared to exercise it within the confines of Europe organize that power in common for the fulfillment of common purposes for the benefit of all.

Russia's military achievement in the war have shown conclusively that such an organization cannot exist for a moment without her, and those concerned for future security in Europe, both great and small, have an imperative need of her. This is the message of the events of the past eighteen months in Europe. It must be a decisive factor in shaping future British policy on the Continent, and one main concern is that British statesmanship must be reinforced by the efforts of American leaders to promote American understanding and appreciation of it.

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Eden Pushes Allied Ties With Russia

Eden and Litvinoff in conference—Support is rising for approval of peace resolution.

By Roscoe Drummond
Staff Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON, March 17—nthony Eden, British Foreign ecretary, today began the most rgent, though the most delicate, art of his mission, to Washing-n—to promote a closer and fuller nderstanding between Great ritain, the United States and the oviet Union on war and postwar roblems.

Following five days of explora-ry discussions on a wide range ! immediate and future political sues with President Roosevelt, ordell Hull, Sumner Welles, and her American leaders, Mr. Eden oadened his negotiations to take a luncheon conference this noon ith Maxim Litvinoff, the Russian mbassador, as the first significant fort to reach the basis of a three-ower United Nations agreement the essentials of the peace.

Since it is authoritatively known at there is no dispute on any ajor point with China, a more ecise undertaking with the So-et Union is regarded both here d in London as the sine qua non a satisfactory Allied peace pro-am.

Since his arrival in the Capital r. Eden has described the 20-ar British-Soviet alliance as a urning point" in the relations be-een the two countries—relations hich have been marred by re-rring mutual suspicion and hos-ity until the Nazi invasion in the mmer of 1941—and Vice-Presi-nt Wallace was obviously speak-g with the highest approval when recently declared that unless e United States, Britain, and ussia show that they can live d work together another war ll not be avertable.

Collaboration Necessary

It is this sense of the indispensability of effective American-British-Soviet collaboration which Mr. Eden took to his conference with Ambassador Litvinoff today and it is the hope of Washington that agreement on even Eastern European territorial claims can ultimately be reached.

Meanwhile, the proponents of the Senate resolution designed to assure the United Nations that the Congress and the Chief Executive are at one in intending that the United States co-operate fully in securing the peace indicated that they expect an aroused and articulate public opinion to crystalize behind their proposal. They are counting on the American people to show the Senate that they are prepared to support American par-

Continued on Page 4, Column 4

Continued from Page 1

ticipation in a system of collective security.

The immediate snag which the Ball-Burton-Hill-Hatch resolution has hit is that even some of its supporters, who are united in backing its central provisions, are divided over the wisdom of attempting to bring it to full debate and decision at this moment.

Its sponsors are convinced that delay will not increase agreement within the country and that to withhold this assurance of Congressional-Executive unity will make it all the more difficult for the United States to reach the necessary understandings with the other United Nations.

A Question of Timing

President Roosevelt, who has assured the four Senators that he supports the "broad objectives" of their resolution, publicly took a noncommital attitude at his press conference yesterday afternoon toward the specific resolution. This is not an inexplicable viewpoint because, while he hopes for Senate action, he does not want to be tied to a particular proposal at this time.

Mr. Roosevelt did, however, take pains to emphasize the need of planning for the peace, both internationally and domestically, during the war, and indicate that the Administration intended to continue such preparation at every practicable point.

Senator Tom Connally (D) of Texas, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who has openly identified himself with the two main parts of the resolution—the remainder of which, if necessary, its authors would probably be willing to eliminate—is likewise counseling delay in considering it.

At the moment the resolution is in the hands of the Foreign Relations Committee and immediate debate is not a prospect. It is quite possible that a middle-road resolution will be reported out at Senator Connally's own initiative and if he embodies in it the features he has publicly accepted, it will be agreeable to the four Senators.

Indorsed by Willkie

Wendell L. Willkie gave the resolution his forthright support.

"Congratulations on the rsolution which you have jointly introduced": he wired Senators Ball, Burton, Hill and Hatch. "Let me know if there is anything I can do to help."

The resolution was also backed almost unanimously by the most widely circulated and widely read Washington columnists.

Raymond Clapper remarked that "the change in the times is clearly marked by the initiative that the Senate is taking with regard to the United States.

"This is not a bloc move of any kind. It is a Senate move. It is contemplated as an impressive act in which the full dignity and power

This is a clipping from page 1 of the Christian Science Monitor for March 17, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

of the Senate is thrown into the development of our foreign policy, to make clear to the world which fork of the road the United States intends to travel.

"Above all, the spirit in which this is being done is what counts. Not a single Senator attempted to obstruct the continuation of lend-lease last week, not even to capitalize through any gallery grandstand play by delaying the vote, as any single Senator could have done. Now the Senate is making a straightforward move to make its attitude on the United Nations clear to the world. In these ways the Senate is bound to inspire public confidence and help to provide the national leadership that the United States is entitled to exercise in world affairs from here on out."

Other Press Comments

Ernest Lindley writes today:

"A suitable resolution passed overwhelmingly by the Senate would be of immense value in strengthening the hand of the United States Government in its conferences with its Allies. But to be effective it would have to be passed by a majority of the Senators of both parties without protracted debate.

"The resolution drafted by Senators Hatch, Ball, Burton, and Hill probably is a little too specific to have a chance of easy passage. Possibly no resolution strong enough to serve the purpose can be passed now without a damaging debate. This is distinctly the type of action to which at least two thirds, preferably more, of the Senators should subscribe before it is brought forward for formal debate.

"If such an agreement could be reached it would go down in history as one of the most constructive actions ever taken by the United States Senate.

Timely and Useful

Mark Sullivan views the resolution as timely and useful.

"There is now something definite which Senators and everybody else can get their teeth into," he says. "People were longing for some such thing. This is shown by the quick publicity and discussion which the action excited, the instant importance it attained. Its chief distinction is its concreteness, its comprehensiveness. Also its nonpartisan quality—two of the Senators are Democratic, two Republican.

"The postwar plan that will emerge ultimately may differ greatly from this resolution. The very important and timely service these four Senators have done is to give the country something tangible, upon which all the talk about postwar can concentrate, for indorsement or modification, for addition or for subtraction.

"It is a fair judgment that had Wilson laid the League of Nations before the Senate preceding the end of the war, had the Senate and Wilson co-operated in formulating the League, it would have been adopted and much subsequent history would have been different.

"What is now taking place is a forehanded effort to avoid what happened after the Great War."

Amendment Offered

Senator Raymond E. Willis of Indiana today introduced an amendment to the Ball resolution as follows:

"Any agreement concluded in accordance with the provisions of this resolution on behalf of the Government of the United States with any other nation or any association of nations, shall not be binding upon the Government of the United States until a proposal of such agreement shall have been submitted to the United States Senate and concurred in by two-thirds of the Senators present."

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The Wide Horizon

The Russian Way

By Eleanor Bisbee 18

Two trifling personal incidents in Russia just before there was a war stand out in my mind as small samples of something in the Russian character, which is looming very large in Stalin's attitude towards postwar settlements.

In Baku, in the summer of 1939, the local Intourist chief tore four days' worth of sight-seeing coupons from my Intourist book. I protested, I cajoled, I argued. My trip had just begun and I refused to be cheated out of anything. The chief listened most courteously, and, at every opportunity, quietly said, "You will still have enough coupons." I pointed out the American energy which would permit the full quota of sight-seeing and then some, instead of the original quota minus some. "You will have enough," he repeated.

I counted out the days of the trip on the fingers of both hands, and he helpfully tallied up with me all the days and weeks of my stay, and, in triumph, I said, "You see, I can use them," and he replied, "You will have enough." He kept the coupons and I did have enough and to spare. He knew that he knew the situation better than I did. If I was unwilling to see it, he would not argue, and, even if theoretical evidence was against him and even if he helped to build up that theoretical evidence, he would only repeat, "You will have enough."

* * *

In Tblissi (Tiflis) in Georgia, when I was ready to see the city, I was told, "You will go up the funicular railway." "No," said I, "I will not go up the funicular railway." I had been up enough of them here and there so that the very thought bored me. This time it was the Intourist chief who argued and cajoled. I agreed with the soundness of all his arguments and then I answered firmly: "I will not go up the funicular railway."

I did not want to see the Park of Culture and Rest at the top. I had seen my fill of Parks of Culture and Rest. I could see the unparalleled, unprecedented view quite well enough from the motor road just below the summit. Listening courteously to all this he finally beguilingly concluded the discussion, "Now you will take a rest, and then you will go up the funicular railway."

Then we all laughed, for his staff had joined in the effort to deal with me. I did rest, and when I came again, his secretary bustled forward to greet me with, "Now you will go up the . . ." "No," I interrupted. "Now I'll go to the cinema." At the end of another half hour, they paid my way to the cinema which I chose and let me go. They are sure that I have not "seen" Tblissi yet, and I was not forgiven, nor can I ever forget my "mistake."

The point that I derived from these little tempests in very small samovars, often repeated on the trip, was that an idea once established in the Russian mind is not dislodged by argument, nor, in the end, is it defended by argument. The Russian once convinced that he is in the right falls back on reiteration, such firm and persistent reiteration that an opponent must either co-operate or be prepared to have the idea haunt him forevermore.

* * *

It seems quite consistent to hear now vitally important reiterations coming from Russia. There is the din of reminders that the second front is due now. Also Stalin keeps saying that Russia expects re-establishment of former Russian boundaries after the war. That takes in, among other areas, the Baltic States. We have heard all about this before. It was repeated doggedly in 1938 and 1939 when the English and French missions to Moscow failed to secure a pact with Russia to head off the war. The fate of the Baltics was the immediate stumbling block on that occasion.

Since then, the Baltics have fallen into Russian hands, and then into German hands, and now Russia is again on the verge of recapturing them. We of the West have never been able to defend them. We have just been able to talk about them. No matter how much we talk, the echo always brings back the Russian reiteration that they are hers by rights. By what rights? Past possession and future defense needs are the answer. It has been the same answer for four years.

We cannot argue with the Russians when a thing is as clearly fixed in their minds as this. We must either meet the demand, or prepare ourselves for a difference of opinion at the peace conference, about which we cannot pretend surprise and which we shall not be able to laugh off with anything like nonchalance.

This is a clipping from page 18 of the Christian Science Monitor for March 17, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Postwar Role of Russia In Europe Pondered

British concerned over persistence of 'Red bogey' in public opinion—Question raised in Parliament of need of strong declaration that smaller powers are to be free to choose own regimes.

By Mallory Browne

Staff Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

LONDON, March 17—The problem of Soviet Russia's position in postwar Europe is fast becoming a dominant factor, not only in the diplomatic councils of the Allied Governments here, but even to a certain extent in Anglo-American relations as well.

A number of new developments emphasize the importance of this question of relations with Russia:

1. Prime Minister Churchill was asked in Parliament today: "Whether in view of the present trend in German propaganda, namely, that a German defeat meant a Bolshevized Europe, the Government would issue a White Paper, preferably in association with the U. S. S. R. and other powers of the United Nations, emphasizing their pledges that, as set out in the Atlantic Charter and elsewhere, complete liberty to settle their own form of government without external influence was to be afforded to all countries, occupied, unoccupied, satellite and even enemy, when purged."

This elaborately and carefully worded query is in fact a reflection of the fact that, to put it plainly, the "Red bogey" is beginning to worry many persons here. The Prime Minister replied that he didn't think it was necessary at the present time to add to declarations made by the British and United States Governments and by Premier Stalin on behalf of the U. S. S. R.

2. Reports from Washington published here today emphasized the importance of the meeting of Mr. Anthony Eden with the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Maxim Litvinoff, and declared that conviction is increasing in the United States that one of the chief missions of the British Foreign Secretary is to make clear to America the basis and scope of Britain's relations with Soviet Russia.

3. Count Raczynski, Polish Ambassador to Britain and acting foreign Minister, has issued a strong statement opposing what he sees as a dangerous tendency on the part of the Big Four—Britain, Russia, the United States and China—to impose a postwar settlement on the smaller countries.

Security for Continent

In part, Count Raczynski denounced the treatment of the postwar problem of Europe as set forth in the leader in The Times, of London, of March 10.

This editorial warned against any attempt to ignore the fact that Russia must play a leading part in any postwar system on the continent.

On Britain and Russia, The Times declared, "rests a pre-eminent responsibility for European security. This is the sense and significance of the Eden-Molotoff treaty of May last. If Britain's frontier is on the Rhine it might just as pertinently be said—though it hasn't, in fact, been said—that Russian's frontier is on the Oder and in the same sense."

It was the implication behind this last sentence that European Governments here, and particularly the Poles, have protested against. They see in it rightly or wrongly the same sort of policy which led to Munich.

And they maintain this view despite the next sentence in The Times' editorial which continues: "This doesn't mean that Russia any more than Britain desires to assail the independence of other countries or to control their domestic affairs. On the contrary, it must stand to reason that Russian security can best be served by an understanding with peoples who have themselves a good cause to look to Russia for security against any repetition of the grim experience of Nazi domination, and whose relations with Soviet Russia are founded upon the solid basis of contentment and good will.

"The sole interest of Russia is to assure herself that her outer defenses are in sure hands; and this interest will be best served if the lands between her frontiers and those of Germany are held by Governments and peoples friendly to herself. That is one condition upon which Russia must and will insist."

Closer Co-operation Sought

Even with these qualifying remarks, the implications of The Times' editorial are regarded by Count Raczynski and some others here as, at least, an indication that the British Government intends to base its postwar policy primarily on co-operation with Russia combined with closer co-operation overseas with the United States and the Dominions.

This is probably an incomplete view of British policy. It is true that recent statements by Mr. Eden, Mr. Herbert Morrison, Mr. Churchill, and other British leaders point to an intention to base postwar foreign policy on practical co-operation with the other three big powers, Russia, America, and China.

It is also true that Britain definitely intends to adhere fully to both the letter and the spirit of the Anglo-Soviet 20-year treaty of alliance.

But it is also a fact that the British Government is equally clear on two other fundamental points.

The first is that the fullest and closest peace co-operation with the United States is a matter of equal importance with Anglo-Soviet co-operation.

For this reason British opinion here is following with the greatest interest efforts to obtain agreement of the American Congress, especially the Senate, now to a certain minimum of international co-operation after the war.

The second point is that British emphasis on co-operation with Russia doesn't mean that the Foreign Office here intends to ignore the importance of building up France, Poland, and other smaller continental countries.

The British view may be said to be that during the interim period bound to ensue after any armistice it is the four big powers who must take a strong lead: but that once order is established, the smaller countries should have full representation in any political organization of Europe or the world.

This is a clipping from page 1 of the Christian Science Monitor for March 17, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Moscow Pupils 'All Out' for War

Military Training Stressed in Red Schoolhouses

By DAVID M. NICHOL

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Moscow

The Russians call their struggle a "popular war." There are few more convincing proofs than a visit to a Soviet school.

One expects soldiers to fight and workers to turn their efforts to war production. It is surprising, however, to find the same singleness of purpose and depth of feeling among youngsters.

I spent several hours in a red brick schoolhouse in the center of Moscow—a building not unlike hundreds in America—where 500 children, from 8 to 18, study. No phase of its activity is unaffected by the war.

Bombing Closed School

During the Nazi air raids last winter a half-ton bomb landed in the backyard, smashing glass and making junk of the physics and chemistry laboratories. The school was closed and the children evacuated. Six months later it was decided to reopen the building.

Neighborhood youngsters, parents and teachers pitched in. They helped clean the building; they organized wood-cutting brigades to assure an adequate supply of fuel.

Over the entrance stairway a huge banner exhorts: "More study and discipline will aid the front."

The first four grades stress gymnastics and military games, which Pravda cautions must not be considered "childhood play but a serious governmental measure." The next three years, ending the period of compulsory schooling, are devoted to "elementary preparation."

'Pre-Mobilization Course'

For the last three years, corresponding to American high schools, the boys and girls get a "pre-mobilization course." While the boys learn rifle and mortar rudiments and artillery and infantry tactics, the girls are trained as nurses' assistants and radio and telephone technicians.

The school day for the 25 teachers lasts from 9 a. m. to 7 p. m.

Groups of older boys, who will join the Red Army in three or four years, snapped through their drill during my visit with an enthusiasm that could not be staged.

The whole school was preparing, for the third time in this war, to send presents to the front. Where the youngsters find the precious gifts no one knows, but one brings a bar of chocolate, another a tiny bottle of liquid soap, a third a warm woolen scarf. Each gift is usually packed in a homemade cloth tobacco pouch embroidered with bold childish stitches, so much their own product that some even show the charming misspelling of youth.

"Soldiers" on Home Front

The Pioneers Organization, for children from 10 to 14, was busy with an edition of their wall newspaper. The youngsters had the intensity of crusaders. Rote, memory or a tongue-in-the-cheek attitude was absent.

We interrupted a history class studying the ancient Byzantine empire and immediately encountered the question uppermost in the minds of Soviet citizens: "When will there be a second front?"

For the next 15 minutes 14-year-olds gravely pointed out on a huge wall map the advantages and disadvantages of various routes through France, Italy and the Balkans and asked surprisingly penetrating questions.

This is a clipping from page 25 of the New York Post for December 17, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Relations With Russia

On the eve of Mr. Eden's arrival in the United States, "The Times" of London—that influential and anything but radical voice of British opinion—devoted a leading editorial to the "joint responsibility of Britain and Russia for post-war security in Europe" and to the "task of British foreign policy in interpreting this common Anglo-Russian interest in European security to the United States." To suppose, the editorial observed, "that Britain and the United States with the aid of some of the lesser European powers could maintain permanent security in Europe through a policy which alienated Russia and induced her to disinterest herself in continental affairs would be sheer madness." It is a view which to most American students of the subject is coming to seem axiomatic. Yet evidently "The Times" felt that American policy was not wholly untouched by this "madness"; and so, it is dispiriting to realize, did the British censors. Apparently feeling that this might be too strong an expression for some American susceptibilities, they forbade its transmission by American correspondents.

The suppression was ridiculous; the situation behind it has in it elements of the tragic. Are there really influences within our foreign policy attempting to pursue the disastrous aim of "building a bulwark against Bolshevism" in the spirit of Goebbels? Are we really at a point where the British must tactfully warn us that unless we endeavor to establish our relations with Russia on that basis of confidence to which her strength, her position and her sacrifices entitle her, the British may find the "Anglo-Russian interest" more powerful than the Anglo-American? We do not know. The conduct of our foreign policy, veiled in confusions, windy generalities and the supercilious secrecy of the State Department, is far too much a mystery. On what is certainly the one most vital practical issue in American foreign relations, which is our policy in respect to Russia, the American public is almost totally in the dark.

But the importance of the subject is obvious and overwhelming. It is, indeed, "madness" to suppose that any kind of rational or satisfactory peace can be established without a sound and cordial understanding with Russia; and the fact that some one thought it necessary to suppress "The Times's" statement of this rather simple fact is not exactly reassuring.

This is a clipping from page 20 of the New York Herald Tribune for March 17, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

We Can Work With Russia

I met my friend Andy Trotter yesterday. He is a devoted PM reader, and he did me the honor of saying that he had read my series of editorials on Russia and America—"All six," as he put it a shade too grimly.

Andy is a former auto mechanic who is now working, along with his wife, in a New York war plant. There isn't much he misses, and I have learned from experience to have a healthy respect for his opinions.

"You've made your points," he told me when we were settled down over a beer, "and on the whole I'm with you. I agree there's no sense in talking about Stalin as if he had a forked red tail, and no sense in expecting him any moment to sprout wings. The Russians are a great people. They've put up a cracking good fight, and we need them pulling with us in the peace.

"I'm against anyone," Andy went on, "whether he's this fellow Berle in the State Department or Joe Patterson on the *News*, who thinks you can pull a fast one on the Russians in the peace and get away with it. And I'm for anyone, whether it's Roosevelt or Wallace or Willkie, whether its Phil Murray of my own outfit, or Tom Lamont of the House of Morgan, who thinks we should work with Russia. But the question is, can we? ~~Will they~~ play the game, even if we want to? Or do they have their own cards and their own rules?"

Can Work With Russia

This was a long speech for Andy, who isn't a speechifying man. And we sat long and late over two or three beers more, thrashing it all out. I haven't the space to put down what we said: This new set-up on page 2 clips my wings. Whenever I get poised for a long flight I bump smack into Frank Sullivan or Louis Kronenberger at my right. But I want to put down the gist of what I said to Andy's question. What I should like to say if I had a chance to all the Andys in America.

We can work with Russia. It won't be on just our own terms, for the Russians are canny and unsentimental fellows who talk business and mean business—but then, so is Andy Trotter. There will be hurdles—second front and lend-lease, boundary disputes, the Communist International, the American Congress and the American press, the war against Japan, post-war trade, the suppression of political opposition in Russia and the hounding of all progressives in America, the question of who will rule Germany and what the other governments will be like in Europe at the end of the war.

Can Clear Obstacles

Yet, despite all this, we can work with Russia—if the will to do it is there. If the will is there even the big obstacles can be cleared. If there is no will, then every molehill of difficulty becomes a mountain. I was pretty clear about this in my own mind. But my conviction was confirmed by a little book that was published the other day, a remarkable little book with a long title, *America, Russia, and the Communist Party in the Post-War World.*

The two men who wrote the report, John L. Childs and George S. Counts, are not naturally Soviet-lovers. They have had some bitter experiences in struggles with the American Communist party, and a residue of that bitterness has found its way into a passionately written chapter denouncing the party. But the rest of the book is matter of fact, squeezed dry of emotion as the rat-tat-tat of machine-gun fire, clean as a scaffolding—all bones and no padding.

What they say is that there can be no peace in the post-war world unless the two countries cooperate; that both have high stakes in working together; that each has sinned against the other in the past; that to each of them the war experience has done something that should make it possible to forgive and forget past grievances and animosities; that each will have to yield something in order to gain more; but that the great fact that makes action possible is that the common ground between the two countries is vastly larger than their differences.

I like that way of putting it. And in the light of it I should like to suggest some plans for a program of common action.

¶ Continue, of course, and extend the amount and pace of lend-lease aid. Russia needs it now as much as ever. And give Russia, along with China, representation on our lend lease commission.

¶ Make it unmistakably clear that the three great United Nations concerned with Europe intend to set up in Europe, under United Nations trusteeship, governments that have no truck with quislings or former collaborationists or reactionaries, but are progressive democratic regimes. This must be a clear manifesto to be used as a touchstone for everything we do later.

¶ Set up means for settlement of boundary disputes by arbitration through a British-Russian-American commission.

¶ Set up immediately machinery for post-war economic cooperation, including the provision of funds for relief and reconstruction work in Russia's devastated areas, and provisions for trade agreements.

¶ Bring America into the Anglo-Russian 20-year alliance and mutual security pact.

If we do this we can laugh at all the powers and principalities of darkness. And each country will have the chance, that only an enduring peace can bring, to go on with the unfinished business of internal social construction in its own way.—MAX LERNER

This is a clipping from page 3 of the PM for March 16, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

WAR CONFERENCE SLOWED BY DOUBT ON RUSSIAN AIMS

Uncertainty Forces Eden and F. D. R. to Grope.

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BY ARTHUR SEARS HENNING.

[Chicago Tribune Press Service.]

Washington, D. C., March 15.—Soviet Dictator Josef Stalin's Russia-first policy is the great problem of the discussions taking place between President Roosevelt and Anthony Eden, British foreign secretary.

In fact, it was chiefly the development of a critical state of relations between the soviet union and the Anglo-American alliance that caused Eden to take a plane to Washington last week for consultation with Mr. Roosevelt.

The President and the British foreign secretary are considering many questions of the greatest importance relating to the prosecution of the war and to plans for the peace to follow an allied victory over the axis.

Stalin an Unknown Quantity.

In regard to many of these matters, however, they find themselves groping because of the unknown quantity represented by Stalin and his attitude toward his partners in the war. They don't know how much he can be counted on to go along with the Anglo-American conception of the war and the peace outlined in the Atlantic charter despite soviet acceptance of the pronouncement in the allied nations' declaration of Jan. 2, 1942.

After an hour's talk with Eden today, Secretary of State Cordell Hull significantly remarked at a press conference that complete understanding among the allied governments is essential to every stage of the war and the post-war period.

With Eden and British Ambassador Halifax in attendance, Hull said he already is beginning to feel better as a result of the initial talk.

Parley Extension Suggested.

He thought that his discussions with the British official might well be extended to Russia, China, and other allies. The American government, he said, will profit by full and elaborate exchanges of information and even of opinions, within proper limits.

It is the lack of a complete understanding between Russia and the English speaking nations that produced the current crisis. For a long time Stalin was at loggerheads with Winston Churchill, British prime minister, and Mr. Roosevelt over his demand for a second front in Europe to lessen the nazi pressure on the Russian front.

Finally, Stalin, referring to the Roosevelt-Churchill pledge to do something about a second front in 1942, bluntly demanded that the allies "fulfill their obligations fully and on time."

Stalin Renews Demand.

The occupation of Africa was offered Stalin as satisfaction of the promise and the friction was allayed until recently. With the Russians retreating before the Germans at Kharkov, Stalin has renewed his demand for a second front in Europe and the incessant aerial bombardment of the continent by the allies has given rise to the surmise that an allied invasion may be at hand.

While appealing for a second front to help Russia, Stalin turned a deaf ear to the proposition of a second front in Siberia against Japan to help the United States. A few Siberian air bases might enable America to bomb Japan into submission, but Stalin would do nothing that might involve Russia in war with Japan.

Stalin declined the Anglo-American invitation to the Casablanca conference at which Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill vowed war till the axis surrenders unconditionally. He has accepted vast lend-lease aid, but has not allowed British and American military attachés to view the operations and the use of American equipment.

Post-War Plans Indicated.

At the same time, soviet inspired statements have been made that Russia proposes to annex the Baltic republics, Bessarabia, a large slice, if not all, of Finland, and about half of Poland—all of this in contravention of the Atlantic charter. Stalin also has proclaimed against disarming Germany, for which the Atlantic charter declares, thus inspiring speculation that he contemplates the communization of Germany with a Red army for protection.

On top of all that came Stalin's assertion that the soviet's objective is to free Russian soil of Nazi troops, which was widely construed as a delicate hint that Stalin does not subscribe to Mr. Roosevelt's pronunciamentos that allied troops are going to march to Berlin.

As a consequence of these developments, apprehensions that Stalin will make a separate peace with Hitler once the Nazis are driven from Russia, if not before, began to permeate London and Washington.

Wallace Gives Hint.

Vice President Henry A. Wallace hinted at the situation when he warned that another world war will be precipitated if America double-crosses Russia or Russia attempts to spread world revolution. He said that "without a close and trusting understanding between Russia and the United States there is grave probability of Russia and Germany sooner or later making common cause."

Fuel to the flames was added by Ambassador William H. Standley's charge that the soviet government has suppressed public information of the lend-lease aid received from America.

This is a clipping from page ; of the Chicago Tribune for March 16, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Eden and Hull in First Parley; Senate Studies Post-War Plan

Briton 'Already Feels Better' as War Talks Start; Connally Pledges Careful Consideration of League Idea, but Hard Sledding Is Seen

By Jack Beall

WASHINGTON, March 15.—A highly satisfactory beginning to the talks between Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, and Cordell Hull, United States Secretary of State, on war and post-war diplomacy was reported by Secretary Hull this morning after their first conference. Later Mr. Eden appeared at Secretary Hull's press conference, along with Viscount Halifax, British Ambassador, and declared that he "already felt better" after the first exchanges and looked forward to the results of later conferences.

Mr. Hull, seemingly rested after a two-week absence in Florida, sidestepped a question about the five-point plan for a United Nations organization on the lines of the League of Nations which was taken up with President Roosevelt yesterday by six Senators. The Secretary said he had not read the proposal yet.

On Capitol Hill signs multiplied that the plan would have some hard going in its present form. Vice-President Henry A. Wallace said he indorsed the broad objectives of the plan for a United Nations organization, but when asked if he thought it could be brought up in the Senate now "without blowing the roof off," he took exception to the question as framed.

When it was reframed to ask if he thought it could be taken up "without very bitter debate that would jeopardize relations with certain of our allies," the Vice-President smiled and said: "I would hope that it could be."

Senator Tom Connally, Democrat, of Texas, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, promised his committee would give "prompt and careful attention" to the resolution when it is

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introduced. But he reserved several caveats to its present form, in which it speaks of the United States acting as a relief agency to feed populations abroad during the post-war reconstruction. He approved, however, the main thesis of the resolution, which was to put the Senate on record as favoring some form of post-war set-up which could use armed force to prevent aggression and conquest.

"I would not oppose," he said, "a general declaration that at the end of the war the United States would co-operate with other United Nations in all matters growing out of the war. The chief value is to give assurance that the United States won't abondon them when the war is over."

One of the authors of the measure, Senator Carl A. Hatch, Democrat, of New Mexico, indicated that while the resolution would be introduced tomorrow in unchanged form, no effort would be made to press for its consideration.

"I want everybody to give it the fullest consideration," he said. "We are not pressing for immediate action on it, but we want it to be thoroughly aired in public."

At his press conference today, Secretary Hull stated that he was in agreement with Mr. Eden's warning of last Saturday that the American and British public must not reach hasty conclusions about the duration of the war. It will be, according to all reasonable and practical calculations, more long drawn out than we might decide through hasty judgment, Mr. Hull added.

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Herald Tribune for March 16, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Russia Expert Called In

Though no hint of the topics which occupied Mr. Hull, Mr. Eden and Lord Halifax was given, it is known that one of the experts of the State Department on Soviet Russia was called in on the hour-long preliminary meeting.

The satisfactory development in French North Africa, relating to the apparent reapprochment between the Giraud and De Gaulle factions, was believed also to have been one of the things uppermost in the minds of Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden. Mr. Hull later in the day issued a statement praising the Sunday speech of General Henri Honore Giraud and said it should "insure the proper place for a victorious France in the restoration of liberty everywhere."

After saying a few general words about the value of full and even elaborate exchanges between the governments of the Allied Nations during every stage of the war, Mr. Hull invited his "opposite number" to say a few words. Mr. Eden, who had been observing attentively how the American Secretary conducted a press conference, nodding occasionally in agreement with he sentiments expressed, said: "I really came for a little information. I have learned quite a bit this morning. I can only say that we have begun our work. We shall have many more such talkes as we have had this morning. I look forward fully to the results of later exchanges."

This morning the British Foreign Secretary conferred with Vice-President Wallace, who is leaving soon on a trip to South America, and lunched with Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, and with high naval officers. It was his second meeting in two days with Secretary Knox.

Later in the day, Mr. Eden conferred with Sir Arthur Salter, head of the British shipping mission here.

Last night, President Roosevelt had Mr. Eden to dinner with the top civil and military figures of this and the British governments.

This is a clipping from page _____ of the New York Times for _____

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

What Will Russia Do?

Russia is the specter at every discussion in which American foreign policy is formed. Its shadow looms over our policy toward Giraud and De Gaulle and the Richelieu sailors, toward Franco and the House of Savoy, Mikhailovitch and the Partisans, Otto of Hapsburg and Tibor Eckhardt, Finland and Czechoslovakia.

Because of their fears that Russia will Bolshevize Russia and the world, our statesmen are engaged—as they see it—in a mortal struggle for the mind and heart of Europe.

Their method, as Edgar Ansel Mowrer pointed out in his article in PM last week, is to throw an iron ring around Russia—a ring of governments dominated by political clericalism, that will keep Russian power from being extended. While one branch of our government, the OWI, warns the European people against being taken in by the new Nazi propaganda line which is drumming up the Bolshevist bogey, others in our government don't have to be taken in by it; they already believe it.

I don't pretend to know what can be done with these men who are drunk with their sense of the dangers of world Bolshevism. If there were some Keeley cure they could go through, the world's future would be healthier. I doubt, however, that it would do much good to explain to them some elementary propositions:

¶ That the present Russian regime prefers "national" security and power to world revolution.

¶ That the doctrine of world revolution has given way in Russian thinking, both formally and actually, to the doctrine of "Socialism in one country."

¶ That while the Communist International still is maintained, the principal function is to bolster Russia's position in world power politics rather than to foment revolutions.

¶ That the surest way to get civil wars and revolutions in Europe is to allow the specter of Bolshevism to dominate our peacemaking.

The last point is worth some elaboration. A Europe built on political clericalism rather than on genuine religious feeling, on big feudal landowners rather than on small farmers and peasants, on Fascist generals rather than on the ordinary soldier, on reactionary industrialists rather than on workers, on political adventurers rather than on thinkers and writers—such a Europe is not one that will survive.

For the people of Europe are sick to death of regimes exactly like these, that they have had in the past. Any attempt to impose such governments on them can be backed up only by our maintaining standing armies in Europe. Even then Europe would be swept by civil wars, of which the present struggle in Yugoslavia is only an ominous curtain-raiser. And out of such civil wars anything could emerge—Bolshevism or, what is much more likely, a new and more chaotic form of Fascism.

In thinking about Russia's future power in Europe, we must distinguish between three forms of power.

¶ One is the creation of Communistic governments on the Continent, especially in Central Europe. Unless we blunder fearfully, there is little chance that Russia wants to or can attain this.

¶ The second is the prestige of Russian arms and the influence of Russian planning ideas. There is no human way by which this can be suppressed. Nor should it. I believe that America at its best—an America, let us say, under the new NRPB jobs-and-security plan—has something better to offer the European people than a Socialist dictatorship. But if we have, we must offer it in the open competition of ideas.

¶ The third is economic relations between Russia and governments not hostile to her. I believe the Russians are more interested in this than in the others.

Russia will be especially anxious to have a new German government in Europe that will not be hostile to her. For the German economic machine, even stripped of the Nazis, is still one of the most powerful and efficient in the world. It will be, in addition to the Russian, the only other big economic machine on the Continent. It will not be to Russia's advantage to have it destroyed. For Russia has needed in the past, and will continue to need, machines and machine tools to supplment her own. If German technology is either destroyed or put in the hands of anti-Russian groups, Russia again will feel herself encircled.

Thus the shape that a new German government assumes will be the key to United Nations relations in Europe. If we hang Hitler and let the German generals remain, if we make a deal with reactionary Junkers like Rauschning or phony "capitalists" like Hjalmar Schacht, Russia will have to look out for itself. And then the only possible course for her to pursue is to use the technique of civil war and world revolution.

I have talked in this series only of Russia in Europe. But I believe the logic of what I have said applies to Russia in Asia as well. Whether Russia helps us eventually in the war against Japan or not depends on what line we take toward her.

We shall not, in any event, avoid a measure of power politics in the post-war world. But power politics within a co-operative United Nations framework is tolerable. Power politics without it means a jungle world—and a third World War.

—MAX LERNER.

(This is the sixth editorial in the series on Russia and America. The final one will appear tomorrow.)

PM March 15, 1943 p 2

Institute Urges A Balkan Union

Spokesmen See United States of Eastern Europe as Peace Guaranty

Spokesmen of Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Greece have suggested a United States of Central and Eastern European nations as a solution to their problems in the postwar period.

Speaking before the "Institute on Reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe" held at Antioch College at Yellow Springs, O., representatives were in agreement about the need for a regional federation if the pact is to last.

The federation, which would incorporate Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, calls for a collective cultural and economic union of states organized on the pattern of the United States.

Coordination

Stefan de Ropp, Polish Information Director, suggested a system of 11 economic institutions through which the regional federation might be co-ordinated.

The program included among other proposals, a Board of Tariffs to work for free trade, a Central Bank of monetary issue, a common Board of Trade, an Educational Commission, a Labor Organization Board and a Foreign Policy Board.

Carter Goodrich, Chairman of the International Labor Office, suggested that the regional emphasis should be balanced by an international point of view. He said:

"We must be no more anxious to encourage central and eastern European isolationism than Pan American isolationism."

Vision Needed

Recognizing that the success of the reconstruction program would depend on the people who carry it out, Sava N. Kosanovitch, Yugoslav Minister of State declared:

"Postwar reconstruction is a job for men with vision and revolutionary courage, rather than for diplomats."

This is a clipping from page 7 of the PM for March 15, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Intimate Message: Washington

Four Barriers to the Peace ..... By Roscoe Drummond

The visit of Anthony Eden to Washington is not going to solve the most pressing issues of securing the future peace. Rather, it dramatizes the fact that they are not within the reach of American and British diplomacy alone. His presence here is welcome and valuable and timely and while it will not by itself resolve the major difficulties which stand in the way of a United Nations postwar agreement, it will usefully focus attention upon them.

The outlook is hopeful because an earnest and an honest beginning is at hand, and because our understanding of the need for a just and durable peace should by now be greater than the human resistance to it. The outlook is also uncertain, even dubious, because there are barriers in the way of a United Nations agreement which have got to be dissolved before any substantial headway can be made, before any solid and significant end can be foreseen. There are four such barriers and they need to be candidly brought out into the open. The recognition that they must be surmounted is the first step toward surmounting them. They are:

The Russian Barrier—It is clearly the conviction of the most responsible officials in the Government that an American-Soviet agreement on peace aims and a willingness on the part of both countries to join in protecting the peace is indispensable. It is recognized that an American-Soviet agreement on what the peace terms shall be must precede the establishment of collective security to preserve that peace and that unless Russia and the United States are both to be participants in such a security system, there will be neither system nor security. As yet there have been no signs of such an agreement; there has been no beginning of discussions to produce such an agreement; there has been no mutual preparation for beginning them. That is how far off an American-Soviet agreement is, and on the assumption that an American-Soviet understanding is essential to the creation of a United Nations security system, that is how far off its creation still is.

The Time Barrier—Time may well be on the side of the Allies in winning the war, but it is not on the side of the Allies in winning the peace. Delay is not wearing down the enemy of agreement; it is increasing the difficulty of agreement. It is certainly the judgment of some, who have title to judgment because of their first-hand knowledge of the problems, that if the principal United Nations cannot reach a broad and reasonably precise agreement on the organization of the future peace within the next five months, it will be too late; that agreement after that will be unattainable.

There is a time when delicate and controversial issues have to be faced, and they believe that now is the time. The issues do not grow less complicated; they grow more complicated as national views become more deep-seated and national prejudices become more solidified. The time for a meeting of the minds of governments, as well as men, is when those minds are malleable; when, perhaps, they will be more responsive to the highest common good. Those who have reason to know most measure that period as the next five months.

The Congressional Barrier—If 90 per cent of the strength went out of the arm of Bob Feller he could hardly throw a dime across the street. Today 90 per cent of the power and initaitive and influence of American diplomacy in the field of building the future peace is dormant because it simply cannot negotiate the essential and urgent agreements affecting the peace until the United States Senate emphatically shows that it, also, wants the same thing. Today, as far as peace negotiations are concerned, American diplomacy can't toss an aide-mémoire across the conference table. Today American diplomacy has no peace credentials. The Senate took them away in 1920 and no foreign government is going to commit itself to agreements with the United States until they can be assured they are negotiating with all of the American Government, not with just part of it—and a repudiable part of it at that.

Concretely, we know that Russia is sorely tempted to fortify its own security behind a barricade of acquired territory in Eastern Europe and to retire into what it hopes will be an isolationist peace. American diplomacy cannot responsibly begin negotiations with the Soviet Union until it—as well as the United Nations—is assured that the United States Senate is ready to see America co-operate to secure the common peace. Many would like to see Russia exchange its territorial ambitions for full partnership in a system of collective security, but American diplomacy cannot speak until Congress speaks first. The new Ball-Burton-Hill-Hatch resolution promises these credentials, but they can't be picked up until the Senate approves and they cannot be used effectively unless the Senate approves decisively.

The Diplomatic Barrier—It is more than a Washington correspondent's casual opinion to say that any early and promising opening of discussions between the United States and the U. S. S. R. in order to promote the kind of agreement essential to any durable United Nations peace agreement will have to await a two-way change of Ambassadors—in Washington as well as Moscow. Quite unrelated to the recent lend-lease incident, Washington has for some time been concerned and dissatisfied because Ambassador Standley was unable to establish anything approaching close confidential relations with Premier Stalin. Such relations are obviously a necessary basis for the diplomatic negotiations which lie ahead ~~and which~~ cannot be safely deferred for long. At the same time the opinion will not down that Ambassador Maxim Litvinoff, though an able, farseeing and popular statesman, may not have quite such full personal confidence of Premier Stalin as would guarantee the quickest results from American-Soviet negotiations. The most able and brilliant men will be unsuccessful Ambassadors unless they possess the complete confidence of their principals.

These barriers to reaching a sound and substantial United Nations security system—the Russian barrier, the time barrier, the congressional barrier, and the diplomatic barrier—are not at all insuperable, but as long as they stand unsurmounted, a durable peace is still beyond our reach.

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9 of the
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Standley's Comment Clarifies Russia's Relations With Allies

Present Association Held to Be Only Temporary Coalition Rather Than Full Partnership In United Nations

By Felix Morley.

B1

Whether or not a calculated indiscretion, the outspoken observations made by Admiral Standley in Moscow have served one desirable end. They have brought home to most of us the hard fact that a temporary coalition is not welded into a permanent combination of "United Nations" merely by repetition of that pleasant phrase.

In simple fact the United Nations are a heterogeneous group of governments which are at war, or have severed relations with, one or more of the Axis powers. Many of these governments are in exile and may or may not have postwar standing with their people. The coalition has no central organization, no unified command and no common policy beyond mutual antagonism to the aggression from which its members suffer.

There is a hope, but it is at present no more than a hope, that these governments may work out some plan of permanent collaboration, thus creating the nucleus of an eventual and, this time, effective international organization. That hope, however, is retarded rather than advanced by assumptions that it will automatically become a reality. As the Undersecretary of State indicated in his recent Toronto speech, the difficult spadework in this direction is still to be accomplished.

Until the United Nations become united in something more than dependence on lease-lend, it will continue to be dangerously misleading to talk as though an enduring program has already been achieved. Picturesque displays of entwined flags, which could in a few minutes be arranged in wholly different but equally colorful combinations, are very far from providing a basis of unity worthy of the name.

Stalin's Viewpoint.

That unswerving realist, Premier Stalin of Russia, has from the outset demonstrated that he regards his country as a member of a temporary coalition rather than as an integral part of the United Nations' line-up.

Soviet opportunism was emphasized when Russia, having defeated and dismembered Finland, associated herself in a temporary marriage of convenience with Nazi Germany. It has been further evinced by Russia's careful relationships with Japan, continued after Hitler's notorious intuition led him to break with the Communist dictatorship. And all of Stalin's recent speeches have further emphasized that he regards Russia not as one of the United Nations, as we use the phrase, but as a power provisionally associated, with Great Britain and the United States alone, for the single purpose of destroying the Nazi regime in Germany.

So shrewd is Stalin's diplomacy that he has been able to establish a logically untenable position. Russia is never publicly urged to open a second front against Japan, even though that would seem the most effective way to bring aid to China and to prevent the Japanese from consolidating the huge empire they have conquered. But Stalin's refusal to let Russia gamble on a second front does not restrain him from openly criticizing Great Britain and the United States for failing to attempt prematurely what Russia could undertake with far less risk of possible disaster.

Admiral Standley, who after all only complained that the Russian government does not advertise the extent of American aid to that country, must be a little surprised by the tempest which his remarks have aroused. What would have been the reaction if he had emulated Stalin's frankness by asserting that the second-front argument is applicable for Russia also?

Effect Is Disturbing.

The remarks of the American Ambassador to Russia were certainly far less blunt and forthright than many which Premier Stalin has made himself. Yet their effect is more disturbing. The explanation of this paradox is found in the theory that it is desirable for us to regard Russia as one of the United Nations even though Russia herself continuously makes clear that she disclaims that definition.

It is now nearly six months since Stalin, in a statement prepared for the Associated Press correspondent in Moscow, demanded "that the Allies fulfill their obligations fully and on time." With the Germans then in partial occupation of Stalingrad a certain curtness of expression was wholly natural. But the language used in this statement was that of an associated power, thinking in terms of ad hoc agreement and not of permanent unity.

A month later, in his speech of November 6, the Russian Premier announced that: "It is not our aim to destroy all military force in Germany." He further asserted that such compulsory disarmament, in the event of Nazi defeat, would not only be "impossible," but also "inadvisable from the point of view of the victor."

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Whether or not that argument is reasonable is at the moment an academic question. The point is that it runs counter to one of the tenets of the Atlantic Charter and to one of the principles on which the majority of the United Nations are agreed. For Great Britain and the United States, at any rate, the compulsory disarmament of Germany is announced as a basic war aim.

At Casablanca, where Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt decided on the policy of "unconditional surrender," there was, by Stalin's decision, no Russian representation. And more recently, in his Order of the Day for February 22, the Russian Premier twice took occasion to say that the Red Army objective is to drive the German invaders "from the borders of our country."

This was immediately after President Roosevelt, in his address on Lincoln's birthday, had envisaged "the day when United Nations forces march in triumph through the streets of Berlin, Rome and Tokio." It was as though Stalin had said: "Include us out."

In all this there is no necessary inconsistency, provided that Russia is regarded as an associated power, as was the United States in the last war, and not as a full-fledged and deeply-com-

(Continued on Page B-3, Column 6.)

(Continued From Page B-1.)

mitted member of the United Nations grouping. It is to avoid the possibility of eventual disillusionment that the distinction should be kept in mind. And the risk of this is now openly voiced, in somewhat exaggerated and sensational terms, by no less an authority than Vice President Wallace, who, in his speech of March 8, said:

"Unless the Western democracies and Russia come to a satisfactory understanding before the war ends, I very much fear that World War No. 3 will be inevitable. Without a close and trusting understanding between Russia and the United States there is grave probability of Russia and Germany sooner or later making common cause."

The first step in that essential understanding would seem to be realization that the Russian postwar political outlook is very different from that which Great Britain and the United States may be said to have in common.

The Anglo-Saxon democracies, as indicated by our fondness for the phrase "United Nations," are thinking in terms of interstate organization, of a revived and revised League of Nations, perhaps "with teeth," but based essentially on the fragmented national structure established in Europe by the treaty of Versailles.

Russia's approach to the problem of world order is wholly different. It looks much more toward the establishment of governments with a kindred philosophy, than toward any mechanical linkage of governments with diverse social and political backgrounds. Trotsky's oversimplified concept of world revolution is out, but not so his central idea of unification through a common outlook rather than through common processes.

All of which should remind us, in good time, that a mere parroting of the phrase "United Nations" gets us nowhere. There are forces abroad in the world today which transcend national lines. They must be understood before they can be controlled. That they are not yet well understood by Americans is something which Stalin has done his best to tell us.

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Allied Parley

On War and Peace

Russia was the center last week for major events in the global war. A new turn of military fortunes on the Russian front coincided with signs of a new turn in Allied diplomacy concerning the Soviet Union. While Germans for the first time in months were striking hard blows at the Red Army, attention in Allied capitals was focused on the vital problem of relations between Russia and the United States.

Highlighting the diplomatic side of affairs was the arrival in Washington Friday of Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary. As he stepped from the four-engined Liberator which had taken Prime Minister Churchill to Casablanca he first called for a luxury rare in Britain, a glass of orange juice, then turned to the purpose of his visit. It was to confer on war and post-war problems with President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull, Wendell Willkie and other leaders. At a press conference yesterday he indicated that the talks would deal with momentous post-war problems of economics and food supply, as well as means of international cooperation to insure peace.

Mr. Eden's Role

Observers remembered the leading part Mr. Eden had played in cementing relations between Russia and Great Britain. His trip to Moscow in December, 1941, to talk with Joseph Stalin had been followed by a twenty-year mutual assistance pact between the two nations. Among those who accompanied him to Washington was William Strang, British Foreign Office official and an expert on Russian affairs. At his press conference the visitor, in response to a question on Russia, recalled his earlier statement to Parliament that cooperation among all the United Nations is indispensable for a stable peace.

The Foreign Secretary's arrival followed an outbreak of discussion on Russian-American relations. The lack of a complete mutual understanding between the countries had long been apparent. Its roots lay in the history of pre-war Soviet relations with Western Powers. Its effects had been countered somewhat by the joint struggle against a common foe. But Soviet disappointment over lack of a second front, voiced anew last week, and American misgivings about Russian reticence had again pointed up the need for better understanding.

Upon solution of the problem hinged far-reaching consequences. It could affect not only the future course of the war but the kind of peace that will be made after victory is won.

The Standley Statement

A blunt-spoken sailor, Admiral William H. Standley, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, set off the discussion. In a statement issued in Moscow he charged that the Soviet Government and press were not properly informing the Russian people of the extent of America lend-lease aid. He declared that Russians were being given the impression that "they were fighting the war alone."

His words brought prompt reaction from Washington and Moscow. The Soviet domestic radio broadcast a recent statement by Lend-Lease Administrator Edward R. Stettinius Jr. summarizing American equipment and supplies sent to Russia. In Washington Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles declared that the admiral had spoken "without prior consultation or reference to this government." His declaration appeared to be a rebuke to the Ambassador.

Wallace's Views

Meanwhile the delicate subject of mutual trust between the countries had been broached by Vice President Wallace in an address at Ohio Wesleyan University. In the course of a plea for a more effective democracy in this country he said:

> "Unless the Western democracies and Russia come to a satisfactory understanding before this war ends, I very much fear that World War No. 3 will be inevitable. Without a close and trusting understanding between Russia and the United States there is grave probability of Russia and Germany sooner or later making common cause."

The implications of the problem were admittedly grave. The two peoples are the mightiest foes of nazism. It appeared likely their nations would emerge from the war as the two strongest powers on earth. Their future relations might well determine whether the post-war world is to be warlike or peaceful. The choice they now make might shape the future for generations to come.

The differences lay deeper than the usual problems of liaison between allies who fight a coalition war against a common enemy. They stemmed from a fundamental difference of viewpoint. Some leaders of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1918 subscribed to the theory that world revolution was necessary to the success of communism in Russia. The idea appeared to have been abandoned when Stalin ousted its chief proponent, Leon Trotsky. But the fear of it lingered in the minds of many Americans. In turn Moscow had viewed "capitalistic imperialism" with dread. Its policies seemed inspired by the conviction that one day Soviet Russia must fight for life against "capitalist" invaders.

A Goal Unattained

For a quarter of a century these suspicions had alternately risen and ebbed. When Hitler's legions drove into Russia the way was opened for better relations. With America in the war the two nations became allies. The groundwork seemed laid for a realistic understanding based on mutual self-interest. But it was evident that the goal had not been reached. Joseph Stalin's recent statement that Russia was bearing the whole brunt of the war because of the lack of a second front, the Soviet view that the Baltic States, Bessarabia and the eastern half of pre-war Poland were part of Russia—these and other developments were considered by many Americans as indicating that the Soviet Union intended to make its own plans.

Washington's endeavor to dispel the apparent misunderstandings was backed last week by a Congressional resolution extending lend-lease for another year. The measure passed the Senate unanimously, the House by a vote of 407 to 6. Much of the new help would go to Russia. In response the Soviet Ambassador, Maxim Litvinoff, at a lend-lease anniversary luncheon, declared that supplies received through

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lend-lease have been an enormous help, and as such deeply appreciated by the people of the Soviet Union, who are fully aware of its extent."

Simultaneously, Lend-Lease Administrator Stettinius reported to Congress on goods transferred from March, 1941, through February, 1943. The total sent to Russia included $1,028,000,000 worth of airplanes, tanks, motor vehicles and munitions, $379,000,000 of industrial products, $128,000,000 of agricultural products, $290,000,000 worth of other services.

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To Begin With:

Russia As a World Power

Anthony Eden's mission to Washington is, one may surmise, only partially aimed at ironing out the wrinkles of Anglo-American relations. Its aim is also to find common ground for post-war action between the two English-speaking countries and Russia.

Eden can well serve as an intermediary, for the British have a closer understanding with both Russia and America than either of them has with the other. The British, being part of Europe, know they will have to live with Russia in Europe. America, being far away, still seems to think it can invent a Europe which excludes Russia as a powerful force.

The Washington conferences will get over their preliminary hurdle if everyone recognizes that Russia will be a post-war world power. But how much power will she have, and within what sort of world framework?

To begin with, the world of the next generation will continue to be a world of Great Powers, whatever the larger world structure. If there is a lot of fearful thinking on the other side of the fence, there is a lot of wishful thinking on the side of the angels. The fact of nationalism will not be wiped out by the war.

Nor does it have to be. There is a difference between an aggressive nationalism and a healthy nationalism. Aggressive nationalisms feed on world insecurity. And even a healthy nationalism can be turned into an aggressive one if it does not see a path to national security without hurting its neighbors.

Let us face the fact that the Russians, like the British and Chinese and Americans, are thinking first of all of national security. They can get it in a new way of hanging together in a system of collective security. Or they can seek it in the old way by rounding out their boundaries, making non-aggression and mutual security pacts, strengthening their economic ties with countries that have the materials they lack for war, and grabbing strategic bases.

Thus far the Russians have shown that they are willing to use either method, move in either direction. The decision has not been made nor the curtain drawn. Anything is still possible.

London sources say that Stalin has given his blessing to the Washington talks. But, as was true of Casablanca, there are no doubt conditions that attach to the blessing. If "informed circles"—those nebulous screens against newspapermen's guesses—are right, Stalin was willing to come to Casablanca only if America would join Britain in recognizing Russian sovereignty over the Baltic countries and Bessarabia. In this case what the "informed circles" say has an internal logic that makes it plausible, and that matches the logic of recent Russian statements.

The recent Russian diplomatic moves seem to jibe with this. The official Soviet papers announce acridly that there can be no more dispute about the Russian claim to the Baltic countries than about the American claim to California. Russian-Polish relations over the boundary question grow more vexed daily, and it is hard to say whether the weaker position of Premier Sikorski (who is relatively friendly to the Soviets) within the Polish cabinet is cause or result of these difficulties.

The question of Bessarabia is an even greater stumbling-block for American officials, despite the fact that Rumania is on the enemy side. The Russian-Czechoslovakian border is likely to create less headaches—unless we are foolish enough to throw our weight against Benes and toward someone less able to get along with Russia. Russian relations with Turkey are in abeyance pending further light on Turkey's stand in the war and on the outcome of the Churchill-Ionoru talks.

There is little sense in our getting righteous about all this. The whole of American history, in its earlier stages at least, has been an expression toward "natural boundaries." And some Americans are still talking of getting British and Japanese bases and controlling strategic airways after the war. A State Department, especially, which accepted the Munich settlement as a contribution to world peace will find it hard logically to balk at Russian claims to national security. It would be straining at a gnat after swallowing a camel.

Neither, however, is there any sense in accepting the Russian claim uncritically. Reclaiming what Russia had before Hitler's attack is one thing. Pushing the boundaries farther than that is land-grabbing, no matter who indulges in it. And land-grabbing as a method, aside from the moral question, will not lead to a durable peace.

In judging Russian policy, everything depends whether—along with the boundary claims—the Russians intend genuinely to form part of the United Nations, in peace as in war. And in judging the official American attitude toward these claims, everything depends on whether we only pay lip-homage to the United Nations as a going concern or *mean* it. And the test of that will lie not in formal declarations but in the facts of Lend-Lease and a second front and a working Supreme Council that includes Russia as soon as she is willing to come in.

—MAX LERNER

This is the fifth of the series on Russia and America. *The sixth will appear tomorrow.*

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RUSSIAN-AMERICAN ISSUES BROUGHT INTO OPEN

By HAROLD CALLENDER

WASHINGTON, March 13—The ıccusation that the Russian Gov-ernment was keeping its people in gnorance of the aid sent them by his country, made in Moscow by \merican Ambassador Admiral Villiam H. Standley, coincided this veek with Vice President Wal-ace's prediction that "in case we louble-cross Russia," we shall nake another world war problem.

The admiral's remarks seem to ave been considerably exagger-ted, as was Premier Joseph Stalin's recent statement that Rus-ia was bearing the whole burden f the war. Mr. Wallace's predic-ion was regarded by some as un-uly exaggerating the potential ynicism of our foreign policy. All hree utterances disturbed certain ersons here and abroad—for dif-erent reasons.

The irritation, not unrelated to ne troubled relations and the more nan occasional lack of confidence n both sides since the Russian evolution, existed already; and nere are many here who, without ndorsing his phraseology, share Mr. Wallace's view that the possi-ility of a more than transitory eace for the world may turn upon ne relation of Russia's policies to nose of the United States. Doubt-ss it was with such an idea in lind that President Roosevelt, in ranging for the conference fi-ally held at Casablanca, offered go much farther east if Mr. talin would attend.

utlook for Soviets

Russia's system of government not ours, and few would pretend at the Soviet regime is a democ-cy as we understand it. Yet Rus-a, under that system, has sur-ised friend and foe alike by her ilitary and industrial power and the morale shown under extreme ress by her people, who appar-tly believe in that system. Con-quently, Russia seems destined r years to come to be the great-t, if not the only great, power the Continent of Europe, in ad-tion to being the greatest Asiatic wer. The role she will play may pend somewhat upon this coun-y as well as upon the impulses tuating future Russian govern-ents.

We should not forget—for the Russians do not—that in 1918 and 1919 American troops, with those of our "associates" in the war, stood upon Russian soil for rea-sons that may have grown obscure today, or that for fifteen years after the Russian revolution the United States did not recognize the government thus set up in Moscow.

In 1939 American sympathies were with the Poles and the Finns against Russia, whose ruler seemed to be cynically and disastrously taking the side of Herr Hitler against the democracies, great and small, after the earlier British-Russian negotiations had failed to achieve a common front against German aggression.

Today, as a result of a strategic mistake by Herr Hitler, Russia is the only powerful continental ally of the democracies and has con-tributed far more than any other country to the defeat of the Ger-man armies, while the United States, as a result of a strategic mistake by Japan, fights in the European zone on Russia's side and ships arms and supplies to Russia, having with Russia a pact in which both agree not to make a separate peace.

In the Pacific Ocean Russia re-mains neutral, not desiring two fronts at once, and this fact may have been in Mr. Stalin's mind when he contemplated conferring with the American and British leaders who, unlike him, are fight-ing on both sides of the globe. Moreover, Russia does not seem quite so keen as our statesmen are to create a powerful China.

But in the west events have thrown Russia and the United States together, against their wills perhaps, but inevitably. Any one who may question Russia's value as an ally has only to consider the aspect that the war would assume if Russia was out of it. The front we should then be planning would not be a second but a first and only land front against Herr Hit-ler.

Early Russian Aid to U. S.

This is not the first time that Russia has happened to play a helpful role from the point of view of the strategic interests of this country. She contributed much to the defeat of Napoleon, who, had he retained mastery of Europe, might have dreamed of a new world to conquer or penetrate, as his nephew, Napoleon III, later sought to do in Mexico.

When Russia, then not on good terms with Britain, sent warships to New York and San Francisco in 1863, Americans regarded their presence as serving to deter a declaration of war on the United States by Great Britain. By in-vading East Prussia in 1914 the Russians helped to save Paris and to turn the tide against the Ger-mans in that war, just as in this war their weight has diverted Nazi pressure from our ally, Great Britain.

It need not be argued that on any of these occasions Russia acted from other motives than self-inter-est, but that self-interest happened to coincide with ours, as it does to-day. Nor at any of these periods of history did Russia have a gov-ernment that resembled ours or that inspired universal admiration on the part of Americans.

Shocked by Ruthlessness

Many Americans were shocked by the ruthlessness of the revolu-tion, by the Communists' attitude toward religion, by the destruction of the middle and kulak classes, by the Communist efforts to fo-ment revolution in Europe, Asia and even the United States. There was sympathy here with the doc-trine, now appropriated by the Nazis, that Europe must be saved from communism—that is, from Russia. That doctrine, still offi-cially supreme in Spain, quickly spread to Spanish America where the Nazis have made good use of it against us. This doctrine was the basis of the "cordon sanitaire" policy which some, including ap-parently Mr. Wallace, fear may be revived.

Today some of those who are most critical of Moscow argue, first, that by our own principles of self-determination Russia is en-titled to the regime of her choice; second, that common interests may exist even with widely differing re-gimes, especially if, as many here believe, Russia at the end of this war will need tranquillity for re-construction and materials that only we shall be able to supply.

As for foreign policy, Russia—to judge by official hints and semi-

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official definitions—insists for the present upon the frontiers she held when Germany attacked her in June, 1941.

Some believe these claims conflict with the first two points of the Atlantic Charter, which disavow territorial aggrandizement and territorial changes that do not accord with the expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. To this Russia has the answer that, in some cases at least, she is only getting back territory originally hers while, in regard to the White-Russians who were under Poland, the people want her sovereignty.

But her real reasons—reasons that carry weight in diplomatic circles here—are strategic. She invaded Poland and Finland in preparation for the expected attack by Herr Hitler, with whom she was more or less cooperating at that time. She demands a frontier farther from Leningrad, control of the Eastern Baltic coast and possession of Bessarabia as extra bulwarks against some future German attack.

Problem of Security

Until we can assure Russia that there will be no new attacks from Germany, can we reasonably expect her to abandon what some consider her cynically realistic policy, which she thinks her defensive interests compel?

This is the crux of the problem of the future relations ~~of this country~~ with Russia, as also of British-Russian relations. If there is to be a new world in which peace will be collectively guaranteed and strategy will no longer matter, then we may logically ask Russia to pay more attention to the will of the people along her borders and less to purely military considerations. Otherwise we can hardly blame her for looking out for herself at some cost to lesser States.

The President and his Secretary of State have proclaimed the intention of the United States to take part, necessarily a leading part, in creating such a peace. But the Senate, which has the last word on our treaty engagements, has not so expressed itself. Meanwhile, Europeans accept our policy with reservations. Probably Russia has plenty of them. Nor would it be surprising if, in the outspoken manner of Mr. Stalin and Admiral Standley, she should express them publicly.

On the other hand, there is no assurance—and there are doubts in many minds—that Russia would drop her territorial claims, notably to the Baltic States and parts of what was Finland, even if full collective guarantees were forthcoming.

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Roosevelt-Eden Talks Begin; Briton Warns of a Long War

Visitor Asserts Nothing Will Be Excluded in Meetings Here to Solve Problems of Allies—'On With the Job' Is Motto

By BERTRAM D. HULEN

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, March 13—Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, began his official conversations on problems of the war and the peace at an informal meeting with President Roosevelt in the White House this evening.

The Foreign Secretary was the guest of the President at dinner, together with John G. Winant, United States Ambassador to Britain, who has been here for several weeks engaged in consultations.

The interest the entire subject is occasioning here was heightened by the announcement of a group of Senators late today that they would confer with President Roosevelt and later with Secretary of

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State Cordell Hull tomorrow to gain support for a proposal they are sponsoring for the calling of a conference of the United Nations to work out wartime and post-war problems.

Mr. Eden's conversations here will be with many officials, cover a wide scope and extend over a considerable period and, according to indications given today, will be directed to a unification of the war effort, particularly in the political and economic fields.

Explains Plans to Press

Mr. Eden described their purport in general during a press conference at the British Embassy this afternoon when he emphasized the wording of the White House announcement last night which said he would "undertake a general exchange of views with the United States Government on all aspects of the war situation."

Mr. Eden stressed this part of the communiqué rather than its second part, which went on to say that he would also "discuss the most effective method of preparing for meetings between the governments of all United Nations to consider questions arising out of the war."

But he pointed out that solutions of problems of the war would prepare bases for peace. At the same time he indicated that the conversations would be comparative by saying nothing is excluded.

The Foreign Secretary stressed the usefulness of cooperation among Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, China and others of the United Nations. He also expressed the hope that conferences similar to his will become more frequent as the Allied war effort progresses.

For Utmost Allied Collaboration

In giving first place to the problems of the war, he declared that the United Nations must collaborate to the utmost and assume that it will take a long time to achieve victory.

"The only possible assumption," he repeated, "is that we have a long way to go."

To assume an early conclusion of the war, he warned, would be "only to get ourselves into trouble."

"We must all understand," he continued, "that hard work lies ahead. Setbacks and disappointments are absolutely certain before we can hope to win the war and the peace. Our motto should be 'On with the job.'

"It's going to be pretty tough, but no job is better worth doing."

The Foreign Secretary was in

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excellent form when he received 150 newspaper correspondents in the ballroom of the British Embassy. He stated in general terms the purpose of his visit by pointing to last night's communiqué, and answered questions, but in so doing kept within the framework of his official utterances of recent months.

Wearing the formal morning clothes of a British civil servant, he was introduced to the correspondents by Viscount Halifax, the British Ambassador, who radiated good humor. The Ambassador wore a gray sack suit. It was a great relief and pleasure for him to be present under the circumstances, Lord Halifax said, because it would be a press conference at which he would have no responsibility. But Mr. Eden showed no concern. He was thoroughly at ease and equally good humored.

Both officials seated themselves at a table while the correspondents faced them in rows of seats placed in a semicircle across the room.

In speaking of war aims, Mr. Eden said "the important thing is to take precautions this time" so that Germany and Japan would never be able "to start this thing again."

"That is fundamental," he continued. "We should not adopt the same attitude as the last time. I don't think it is wise just to set up a new government in Germany and trust to luck. We have got to take precautions in both Germany and Japan."

Doubts Long Italian Menace

When asked about Italy, he replied:

"Italy is different. I don't think the Italian menace will be a long enduring menace."

In touching upon post-war problems he again emphasized collaboration among the members of the United Nations, mentioning particularly Britain, America and Russia.

"That kind of collaboration," he went on, "is pretty well indispensable if we are going to have a stable peace after the war. I don't mean any exclusive collaboration. It, of course, would bring in China and would be the foundation for the kind of collaboration we would like to see among all members of the United Nations."

Asked about post-war air problems, he said:

"Generally, I feel we would hope this question would be approached in a spirit of making air commerce serve to bring all nations more closely together after the war rather than be a matter of rivalry. I don't see why statesmenship shouldn't be able to find a solution of it."

In response to other questions, Mr. Eden expressed the hope for the emergence of a strong France after the war and had encouraging words concerning North Africa.

"The thing to do," he said, "is to bring all Frenchmen together to fight against the enemy."

It was incorrect to think, he declared, that the British prefer General Charles de Gaulle to General Henri Honoré Giraud as leader of the French war effort.

"What Britain wants to see," he said, "is both Generals and all others together."

But he warned that this "may take a bit of time." Yet he was confident "it will work out." We should remember, he added, that France has been through something which, "thank God, neither your country nor mine has been through."

"We have got to be patient," he asserted. "What we want to see after the war is a strong and united France. The first step is to get all the elements together. That's our policy."

Mr. Eden extended the congratulations of the British people on the American victories in the South Pacific, mentioning particularly the recent destruction of the large Japanese convoy.

"The British people," he said, "have watched with intense admiration the fighting prowess of American forces and their Australian comrades in arms in the Pacific theatre. The British people would want me to extend to you their warmest congratulations on the signal victory in which American forces destroyed the Japanese convoy recently."

Praises General Eisenhower

He went on to remark upon the "gallant victories" of the British Eighth Army in Africa and "the loyal comradeship of your forces and ours" in Tunisia, and to praise "the trusted leadership" of General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

In speaking of the good news from North Africa and from the Russian theatre of operations, he said:

"We are beginning to feel our strength and make the enemy feel it, too."

Mr. Eden brought a favorable report from Prime Minister Churchill, with whom he spent Wednesday evening. The Prime Minister, he reported, was in very good health, in excellent spirits, and "at the very top of his form."

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JAPAN LETS RUSSIA GET OUR SUPPLIES

Map in Lend-Lease Report to Congress Reveals Shipments Made by Route to Siberia

THESE ARE UNMOLESTED

Cargoes Moving in Russian Vessels Are Mostly of Food So Far, Capital Hears

WASHINGTON, March 12 (U.P.) —Japan is permitting lend-lease shipments from the United States for use against her Axis partner, Germany, to move in Russian ships unmolested across the Pacific and past her back door into Siberia, it was disclosed today.

The revelation came in a map accompanying the quarterly report to Congress on lend-lease operations for the period ended March 11, 1943. The map showed curved lines indicating the relative quantities of lend-lease goods shipped and the country of destination.

One of the lines curved across the Pacific, from a starting point which appeared to be in the region of San Francisco, to a port on the Siberian coast of Russia.

A footnote said the lines "do not show the exact shipping routes nor the location of ports," but lend-lease officials confirmed that war shipments had long been moving across the Pacific to Russia.

The cargoes are moved in Russian ships and, one authority said, thus far had been limited largely to food. The size of the shipments, it was stated, was restricted only by the number of Russian ships available.

Russian-Japanese Pact Cited

Officials confirmed that the shipments were moving across the Pacific with the full knowledge of Japan. This, it was emphasized, was due to Japan's desire to do nothing that would infringe on her treaty of non-aggression with Russia.

Foreign experts said lend-lease shipments would probably continue to move unmolested across Japan's back door, despite protests from Germany which they considered probably had been made already.

Lend-lease officials declined to disclose the size of the shipments or to asy what they contained. It was understood that some airplanes had been in the cargoes.

The report to Congress did not go into this phase of the Russian aid program. It said the volume of aid to Russia was increasing and that in February shipments were 30 per cent higher than during the month before.

Lend-lease shipments to the Soviet Union go by three routes—over the North Atlantic to Murmansk on the Arctic Ocean; over the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean to Iraq and thence by land and the Caspian Sea to South Russia; over the Pacific to Siberia.

Map Notes Shipment Quantity

The lend-lease map footnote says the lines indicate "the relative quantity" of gods shipped. The lines to Murmansk and around Africa to the South of Russia are about equal. But the line to Siberia is only slightly smaller, indicating that nearly one-third of all lend-lease goods shipped to the Soviet Union has been going over the Pacific-Far East route.

In addition to sending to the Soviet more lend-lease planes, tanks and trucks than to any other area, the report said, the United States had shipped more than 130,000 sub-machine guns, more than 98,000,000 pounds of TNT and more than 188,000,000 pounds of copper and brass.

The report said that two-thirds of all supplies sent to Russia had been transported in American ships and that the great majority of the supplies to the Soviet Union were arriving safely.

This is a clipping from page 4 of the New York Times for March 13, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Russia Should Not Try to Grab Territory, Roosevelt Hints

By Edward Angly

Washington Bureau of Chicago Sun

Some remarks by President Roosevelt at his press conference yesterday struck a goodly portion of his audience as being perhaps an oblique hint to Joseph Stalin that his partners among the United Nations, and some of Russia's neighbors, would appreciate assurance that the U. S. S. R. isn't going to grab anybody else's territory.

Russia has already absorbed the Baltic states, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. At the war's beginning the Soviets invaded eastern Poland, later conquered part of Finland, and cut a slice from Rumania.

Yesterday the President began his press conference by describing as a good outline of United Nations policy a recent statement by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to the people of Japanese-occupied Thailand, assuring them that China and her Allies have no territorial ambitions there. Mr. Roosevelt said he thought this expressed the general point of view of the United Nations in regard to the grabbing of territory.

General Chiang's statement said China and Thailand had been at peace for more than 1000 years. The United Nations were dedicated, he said, to liberating countries under the Japanese and German yokes.

Later the President was noncommittal when asked if he intended to meet Stalin. He declined to be drawn out on the subject of Soviet-American relations.

Having in mind the international storm which blew up out of remarks by the American Ambassador to Russia, Admiral William D. Standley, a reporter asked the President if he cared to "comment on the element of frankness in the character of our admirals."

Like everybody else, Mr. Roosevelt remarked light-heartedly, some admirals are sometimes too frank and others not frank enough; sometimes they talk too much, sometimes too little.

Point was added to the President's reference to Chiang Kai-shek's disavowal of territorial ambitions an hour later when Mme. Chiang's brother, T. V. Soong, Chinese Foreign Minister, called upon the President and, on leaving, said China had no desire to acquire further territory anywhere. China, he said, hoped to see Korea, as well as Thailand, become "an entirely independent country" after the war.

At the State Department Acting Secretary Sumner Welles declined to comment on the speech Thursday night in Philadelphia by William C. Bullitt, former Ambassador to Russia, then to France, who said if the United States did not quickly shape its peace plans, its bargaining power might be lost, and Russia would hold the whip hand after the war.

This is a clipping from page 3 of the Washington Post for MAR. 13, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Russia's Problem

I cannot refrain from expressing my admiration for the strong editorial on Russia's problem in this morning's Post. The analysis of the situation and its perspective on the international problem of collective security for assured peace is powerfully stated. You hit the nail exactly on the head. I am sure it will receive grateful recognition from forward-looking people who are deeply concerned that at least we shall get a secure peace for a time out of this world calamity. As you so ably put it, without Russia or without the United States in it, there can be no stable peace.

JOSEPH E. DAVIES.

Washington, March 11.

This is a clipping from page 6 of the Washington Post for MAR. 13, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Stalin May Wear Diamond Star In New Role as a Red Marshal

His Acceptance of Highest Military Rank Places Emphasis on the Vital Part He Is Playing as Russia's Supreme Commander in Chief

By Walter Kerr

By Wireless to the Herald Tribune

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MOSCOW, March 7.—Premier Josef V. Stalin, who has avoided military rank for many years and medals and decorations as much as possible, became a marshal of the Soviet Union yesterday by order of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (Parliament) of the U. S. S. R.

On Jan. 25 he used for the first time the title of supreme commander in chief in charge of the supreme general headquarters.

As a marshal of the Soviet Union Stalin is entitled to wear the uniform of that rank with the marshal's star at the throat of a uniform coat. The insignia is a gold and platinum five-pointed star encrusted with diamonds. The star is provided for by a decree issued Sept. 3, 1940.

It consists of a platinum star superimposed on a gold star. In the center of the platinum star there is one 2.69-carat diamond surrounded by twenty-five small diamonds with a total weight of 1.25 carats. Outside the platinum star and between the rays of the gold star are five other diamonds with a total weight of 3.06 carats.

The diameter of the gold star is 44.5 mm. (about two inches) and that of the platinum star 23 mm. The entire medal is 8 mm. thick, weighs 36.8 grams (about an ounce) and is suspended from a red moire ribbon 35 mm. wide.

Until now Stalin has always worn a semi-military tunic, even after Jan. 25, when he became supreme commander in chief of the armed forces. On the tunic he has worn on rare occasions the medal of Hero of Socialist Labor, which he received on his sixtieth birthday, three years ago last December. Possibly he will now continue to wear the semi-military tunic except on special occasions.

Stalin's acceptance of the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union emphasizes the part he is playing in military affairs, as does also his position as supreme commander in chief.

This is a clipping from page 6 of the New York Herald Tribune for March 13, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

U.S. and Britain May Hold Talks On War Issues

London Thinks Parleys Are Imminent; Russia and Aviation Are on Agenda

From the Herald Tribune Bureau

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LONDON, March 11.—The agenda of items that must be settled between the United States and Great Britain is long and mounting almost daily, and the necessity for a get-together between British and American officials is growing.

The loose and occasionally sensible talk on both sides of the Atlantic about post-war aviation and the very serious problem of working out a two-way agreement with Soviet Russia are among the big jobs that face British and American diplomats. The indications are that the British Foreign Office and the American State Department will act soon to iron out some of these questions.

Thus far there is only an admission that serious questions are facing discussion. Even without this admission, the recent trend of diplomatic news among the United Nations would underline the need for conferences between high British and American officials on many mutual problems.

An example of the obvious topics for Anglo-American discussion is the means of organizing a United Nations post-war conference while the war is still in progress. There have been, admittedly, a number of frictions among certain of the United Nations.

One of the chief issues facing the United Nations is the problem of Russian-American relations. Vice-President Henry A. Wallace in his speech this week only emphasized what the British have long realized—that the Americans, like the British, must work out a two-way street with the Russians for the post-war world.

Both in America and in Britain there has been great worry over who will control post-war commercial aviation. A solution of this problem, it is felt in London, would offer a formula for solving many other knotty problems. The post-war air question involves nearly all problems that may be expected to come up among nations.

This is a clipping from page 11 of the New York Herald Tribune for March 13, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Donkey Diplomacy

To the curious cacaphony of chatter that has arisen concerning American relations with Russia Mr. William C. Bullitt has added his own contribution. Presumably there was nothing official about Mr. Bullitt's remarks but they bear an unpleasantly close resemblance to at least one aspect of Washington's inconsistent attitude toward foreign affairs and they will, doubtless, appeal to those who pride themselves upon a "realistic" approach to world problems.

Mr. Bullitt proposes, with respect to Russia specifically, the use of what might be termed donkey diplomacy. "When a foreign government will not move in the direction we want it to move," said Mr. Bullitt, "there is only one way to make it move." That, he explains, is the "old way of getting a donkey to move by holding a carrot in front of his nose and a club behind his tail." Mr. Bullitt believes that we have a real carrot and a real club to influence Russia now, but that when Hitler is vanquished and we begin serious work on Japan, Russia will be at peace and we shall want Soviet support. "The real carrot and the real club will be in Stalin's hands," concludes Mr. Bullitt.

It is the naïvete of this statement, reflecting the naïvete of so much of American diplomacy, which makes it alarming. If we, using our club and our carrot now, divert Russian policy into certain channels (as yet uncharted by any authoritative American spokesman) what is to prevent Stalin from using his club and his carrot when his opportunity arises, to reverse the process? And, after all, who has the biggest club and the biggest carrot at this very moment? The United States with its long and tenuous lines of communication, its Army in process of growth? Or Stalin with an army very much in being, hammering America's European enemy?

As we have said Mr. Bullitt did not speak officially. But there is, unfortunately, reason to believe that at least a portion of those who are seeking to mould a foreign policy for the United States are less concerned with the possibilities of creating a broad framework for the peace, within which nations may explore the possibilities of international co-operation with some degree of mutual confidence, than with donkey diplomacy. Certainly they are an element in the confusion which has America's associates in the war wondering whether this country is about to embark on a career as free-spending friend of all the world or relapse into the worst tradition of eighteenth-century power politics. Americans who have watched the New Deal in action on the home front are uncomfortably aware of the Administration's willingness to attempt to reconcile such irreconcilables.

It might be just as well, at this time, to return to some of the first principles for which this war is being fought; to recognize that while the peace that is to come with a victory of the United Nations will, since it will be constructed by finite humans, fall short of the New Jerusalem, it will still be vastly preferable to the sort of world which Hitler and Tojo would have made. That is a common mainspring of action, shared by all who combat the aggressors. Beyond this primary motive the nations have a mutual interest in preventing the outbreak of a new cycle of aggressions. But security will be built upon this mutual interest, and not by any competition in donkey diplomacy. Meanwhile, there is still a war to be fought and won by united effort.

This is a clipping from page 14 of the New York Herald Tribune for March 13, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Comintern Decision Marks New Period of Working class Activity

By James S. Allen

(Fifth and Concluding Article)

The creative forces of the working class, the backbone of national unity within the United Nations and of the national liberation struggle within the subjugated countries, are devoted to one central imperative: the defeat of the Axis, the destruction of the fascist "New Order," and the establishment of collective peace in the world after the war is won.

The over-all perspective for the joint victory and the peace arises from the developing collaboration between the United Nations, especially between the leaders of the anti-Hitler Coalition — Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. The cooperation which has developed and is expanding between these powers, is expressed in the degree of common fighting action attained, in the Anglo-Soviet 20-Year Alliance and in the understanding between these two and the United States. This is a perspective of long-range cooperation between the Socialist state and the two biggest capitalist powers, extending beyond the war and into the period of reconstruction and peace.

Understanding for victory and peace is not an automatic achievement arising merely from objective conditions, nor is its further development automatically assured. It has to be continually fought for and reinforced, through common military action and also through the constant endeavours of the governments and the peoples.

Each new step forward in the war against Axis tyranny must be made not only against the stubborn resistance of the fascist armies. The allies must overcome and defeat ever more desperate maneuvers and political onslaughts of Hitler and his Fifth Columns, directed towards destroying cooperation among the United Nations and undermining national unity.

The dissolution of the Comintern is, therefore, a well-aimed blow at the very base of fascist propaganda, at Hitler, his Fifth Columns and their agents within the United Nations.

It is also a heavy blow at those who have been unable to overcome their prejudices against Communism, based mostly on the hard struggles of the past quarter century, and have themselves played into the hands of the nation's enemies by continuing their work against unity within the labor movement.

For these reasons the self-dissolution of the Comintern will help remove the obstacles to greater unity among the anti-Axis nations and to working class and national unity.

* * *

The objective of victory still has to be reached. In the process of achieving that victory and of destroying the fascist tyranny, that relationship of forces will be formed which will determine not only how thoroughly this objective will be carried out but also the content of the peace to be established.

In mobilizing the peoples for the final military blows against Hitler and his Axis allies, the immediate objectives of the working class depend first of all upon the relation of their nation to the war.

As part of the national victory front in the countries of the United Nations, the main task of the working class, especially its vanguard of advanced and progressive workers, is to strengthen the war effort of their governments for a speedy victory in firm collaboration with all other freedom-loving nations.

Within the countries of the Axis bloc, the workers and honest opponents of the regimes and the war, have the duty to undermine the fascist war effort and to assist in overthrowing their governments.

In the countries and regions subjugated by Hitler and the Axis, the workers and the people have the objective of developing the armed struggle of resistance into the national war liberation for the fascist tyranny.

* * *

The sweep of historical development cuts new channels and opens up broad perspectives. The working class and the peoples must seek to change old forms and create new forms of organization to encompass the mass upsurge and give direction to the popular endeavour, in accordance with the widely divergent situations and problems prevailing in different groups of nations.

An indication of the kind of regroupings and new formations which are already beginning to emerge is given by developments within the labor movements and liberation struggles in a number of countries.

One type of development within the countries of the United Nations is best illustrated by the great vitality of the movement for the affiliation of the Communist Party to the Labor Party in Britain.

This is not a new departure in the policy of the British Communists, who over a long period have fought against the anti-unity position of

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the majority of the Labor Party executive. In other countries also, especially with the rise of the fascist menace, the Communists have fought for the creation of a single working class party, for the organic unity of the Socialist and Communist parties (in France of the People's Front, in Chile and elsewhere; and successfully in Catalonia during the Spanish war, in the Philippines, and in Cuba.)

But now, under the impetus of the war effort and the need to help guarantee a progressive solution of post-war problems, large and important sectors of the British labor movement favor affiliation, for it will revive and stimulate the Labor Party and enable the workers to influence British national policy more directly and effectively.

In Britain, therefore, the situation is favorable for the emergence of a single party of the working class, which will strengthen the war effort and reinforce the labor backbone of national unity.

* * *

Within the European countries at present subjugated by Hitlerism, the previous political parties, trade unions and people's organizations have been smashed or driven underground, where they operate under entirely new forms and with new objectives.

In these countries the liberation struggle is producing new political formations.

Differences of the past and recriminations arising from previous struggles are giving way to unity of widely divergent forces. Under the impetus of the resistance movement and the growing liberation struggle new forms of common action and unity are being sought and are taking shape.

The results and the possibilities vary with the conditions in the separate countries and with the level of the national struggle.

Yugoslavia exemplifies a country in which the resistance movement has developed into a full-scale war of liberation against the armies of the Axis and their puppets. Within the liberated areas, the Vece or liberation councils already form the embryo of a new state form, encompassing all strata of the people participating in the freedom war. It is to be expected that political parties are also taking on new forms in accordance with this condition and the tasks of the freedom front.

France exemplifies still another stage of development. Its higher level of economy has produced a more homogeneous and more powerful working class, which plays a decisive role in the present struggle. Still as a whole a movement of resistance, although already turning to various forms of armed struggle, the liberation upsurge has already produced a high degree of unity not only within the working class but between it and all other anti-Hitler and anti-Vichy sectors.

This united action has just found organizational expression in the United French Council of Resistance representing all the patriotic political organizations and trends within France.

It would be pedantic and sterile not to understand that these important political developments within the French liberation movement will have a great deal to do with overthrowing the fascist regime and shaping the new democratic state which will arise in France after victory.

Undoubtedly, even now before the second front is opened, the higher level of patriotic unity in France arises from the greater unity reached at the base of the nation, within the working class. This is a fact which is bound to lead to new political formations and combinations in accordance with the conditions and aims of the whole nation.

* * *

Germany has been under the Nazi regime for one decade, and Italian fascism has lasted for two. In these countries all the former political parties associated with the old pre-fascist state have been thoroughly smashed, except in so far as the old groups have been able to continue their work under completely new and illegal forms and for entirely new objectives.

It would, indeed, be naive to believe that either the old political states or the types of parties associated with them will automatically reappear upon the scene after the victory of the Anti-Hitler Coalition.

At present, the unity of action achieved by the various resistance and sabotage groups within these countries strives for but one aim: the destruction of the fascist régimes. In that process new types of organizations and new combinations arise, and will emerge to play a more important role as the disintegration of the fascist order under the blows of the war proceeds and as the collapse of the regime approaches.

New political parties and combinations in embryo are even now beginning to take shape. This does not mean to say that the influence of the old parties, especially to the degree that they now function as the focus of opposition, will not play an important role.

* * *

The varied developments in different groups of countries, including also the political shifts within the colonial world, already indicate a new and more intensive phase of popular political activity. The forces unleashed by the war against Hitler and the Axis do not stop to accommodate themselves to previously established norms and methods, if they are no longer suitable. Old forms must change and expand to meet the new needs. New forms of combination and effective organization arise.

Just as the labor movement and the working class must respond to this need on a national scale, they will also seek to find the best medium and manner to advance solidarity of the working classes and peoples on an international scale.

One of the chief needs of the moment is the further development of world labor solidarity for victory and collective peace, through the trade unions—such as the extension of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee to include the U. S. unions and the Latin American Confederation of Workers. New developments within the various countries, of a general political character as well as within the working class,

will determine both the opportunity and the form of international working class organization of a political type.

* * *

The approaching joint military action by the anti-Hitler Coalition will accelerate the upsurge of the peoples and hasten shifts and changes within and between all political parties and groups.

The defeat and destruction of Hitlerism and the Axis cannot help but affect all political relationships, within nations and among them. Old attitudes and programs which are brittle, institutionalized parties which remain rigid, stubborn and unflexible policies incapable of meeting new realities will have to go by the board.

The decision of the Comintern to dissolve itself is a recognition of this reality.

The wisdom of political leaders of the working class now has to be measured by how well they guard and retain all the valuable achievements of the labor movement, including those organizational forms and parties which embody these achievements, while discarding everything that has become an obstacle to further progress. It has to be measured further by the creative approach to the solution of present problems of working class unity and of national unity.

The working class and the people enter upon a new period of great creative endeavour.

In his statement on the Comintern proposal, Earl Browder stated concisely what the objectives of the American Communists are:

"The Communist Party of the United States will continue to fight with all its strength, as it has in the past period, for the complete unity of the United Nations, for international labor unity, and for national unity within our country, to win the unconditional surrender of the Hitler regime and its allies, Japan and Italy, and an ordered and peaceful world when victory is achieved."

FILE

Stalin Says Comintern Decision Buries One of Hitler's Big Lies

MOSCOW, May 29 (UP).—Premier Joseph Stalin, in a letter to a British correspondent, said today that dissolution of the Communist Third International facilitated the task of uniting all freedom-loving nations for the struggle against Hitlerism.

JOSEPH STALIN

"Dissolution of the Communist International is proper and timely because it facilitates the organization of the common onslaught of all freedom-loving nations against the common enemy—Hitlerism," Stalin said in reply to a request for comment by Harold King, Reuters' correspondent in Moscow.

The text of Premier Stalin's letter follows:

Dissolution of the Communist International is proper because:

(a) It exposes the lie of the Hitlerites to the effect that "Moscow" allegedly intends to intervene in the life of other nations and to "Bolshevize" them. An end is now being put to this lie.

(b) It exposes the calumny of adversaries of Communism within the labor movement to the effect that Communist Parties in various countries are allegedly acting not in the interest of their people but on orders from the outside. An end is now being put to this calumny, too.

(c) It facilitates the work of patriots in freedom-loving countries for uniting progressive forces of their respective countries regardless of party or religious faith into a single camp of national liberation—for the unfolding struggle against fascism.

(d) It facilitates the work of patriots in all countries for uniting all freedom-loving peoples into a single international camp for the fight against the menace of world domination by Hitlerism, thus clearing the way for future organization and companionship of the nations based on their equality.

I think that all of these circumstances taken together will result in further strengthening of the united front of the Allies and other United Nations in the fighting for victory over Hitlerite tyranny.

I feel that dissolution of the Communist International is perfectly timely because it is exactly now when the fascist beast is exerting its last strength that it is necessary to organize the common onslaught of freedom-loving countries to finish off this beast and deliver the peoples from fascist oppression.

JOSEPH STALIN

This is a clipping from page 1 Sec. 1 of THE WORKER
Date May 30 1943
Clipped at the seat of Government

JUN 23 1943

FILE

Comintern Decision Stuns Foe--Gil Green

Speaking before 600 Communist Party functionaries at Tom Mooney Hall, 13 Astor Pl., Wednesday evening, Gilbert Green, New York State Secretary of the Communist Party, characterized the proposal for the dissolution of the Communist International as "a devastating blow aimed against the Axis and its leader, Hitler."

"It created consernation in the camp of the enemy," Green said. "It caught our native fascist, Mr. Dies in a position where he was unable to give an intelligent explanation of this event."

WILL AID VICTORY

Answering the "twisted logic" of those who argue that the dissolution of the Communist International should be followed by the dissolution of the Communist Party, Green declared "that if it were true that the dissolution of the Communist Party of this country would in the slightest degree serve the cause of victory, we would not hesitate for a single moment in making that sacrifice in the interests of victory over fascism. While the Communist International had outlived its usefulness as it had already fulfilled its historic mission, it is our firm belief that the existence and the further development of the Communist Party is of tremendous importance in bringing about the victory of our nation and the United Nations."

Speaking of Earl Browder's **Victory—and After**, Green showed how America and the war effort need the Marxst clarity embodied in that book. "Today," he said, "and especially in the last days, as a result of the proposal of the Presiding Committee of the Communist International, the millions of people of this country are discussing the Communist Party of this country, want to know what it stands for, what its real program is, and whether it serves the interests of the nation at war. We must, therefore, seize this opportunity, this moment when the millions of workers and people want an answer to the question of what our Party stands for, by reaching them as never before with the 10c edition of Comrade Browder's book, which between the pages of one book, gives to the masses of workers the program, the role, the tasks of the Party and the working class in the struggle for the winning of the war and for the building of a new world after the war."

Green characterized the proposal for the dissolution of the Communist International as "an event of world historic importance."

Drawing the conclusions from the CI action, Green pointed out that "the working class in each country has a new role in respect to the nation. The working class in this country, for example, is today in the midst of this war the backbone of the nation . . . and the working class, especially the organized labor section of it, to a greater extent understand that upon its shoulders rests the responsibility for the fate of the nation itself."

Green told the audience that "with these new perspectives of the vanguard of the working class marching together with the main sections of that class in one common direction, it becomes necessary to remove every artificial obstacle or barrier that continues to separate our Party from the mass of workers."

At the conclusion of the meeting, a resolution was unanimously adopted expressing enthusiastic endorsement of the position on the dissolution of the CI expressed by Earl Browder and printed in The Worker of May 23.

The meeting was held at Tom Mooney Hall, 13 Astor Pl. In addition to Gil Green, Alexander Trachtenberg, president of International Publishers, spoke on the new 10c edition of Victory—and After and gave many valuable suggestions for the effective sale of the new popular edition.

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Heritage of the Comintern Remains for the Workingclass

By James S. Allen

(Fourth Article of a Series)

Each Communist Party is the product of the workingclass of its own country and is conditioned by the traditions of the labor movement and the people of which it is a part, by the general social and political conditions within which it lives and works, and by the nature of the specific problems which arise within each country.

Communists throughout the world share in the fundamental political approach of Marxism-Leninism—the policies of scientific socialism first worked out and applied by Marx and Engels under the conditions of their epoch, later rescued from the vulgar distortions of the opportunists of the Second International by Lenin and applied creatively under the conditions of modern capitalism and imperialism.

The foundation of the Soviet Union as the first Socialist State by Lenin, and the further development of the socialist society under the leadership of Stalin constitute the greatest triumph of scientific socialism, a triumph conclusively demonstrated by the glorious successes of the Soviet State and peoples in the present war.

For the Communists of all countries the science of Marxism-Leninism, considered as a living and developing body of working class political thought and action, is first of all an instrument to be applied to the solution of the problems of their own country. It is a rich mine of political thought, social and economic analysis and living mass experience, open to all those who wish to avail themselves of the great contributions of the international working class.

The Comintern, like the First and Second Internationals before it, was in the contemporary period the medium through which the national workers' parties contributed to the stream of common historical and current experience, and derived from it what they could beneficially use in their own country.

One of the great and lasting contributions of the Comintern is that as the medium of proletarian internationalism it preserved the basic essence of Marxism-Leninism, enriched and expanded it, and helped the initially weak and undeveloped national workers' parties understand and apply it.

* * *

As the Comintern document on the proposal to dissolve points out, the international organization was able to stimulate the rebirth of the labor movement after the collapse of the Second International and helped to unite the vanguard of the most advanced workers into genuine workers' parties in a number of countries.

The parties of the Comintern, even in the period of their initial growth made important international contributions by their part in helping to defend the young and struggling Soviet Republic from reaction and counter-revolution, in which the anti-Soviet Social-Democrats participated.

Among other important contributions of the Comintern, is the role it played in advancing in the labor movements of the highly developed countries understanding of and solidarity with the national liberation movements of the colonial peoples, such as China, India, and Latin America.

These are among the most important contributions of the Comintern, which are lasting, which are part of the life and consciousness of the working class and peoples in all lands.

These remain as the permanent property of the working class and the peoples. The proposal to dissolve the center, "releasing the sections of the Communist International from obligations ensuing from the constitution and decisions of the Congresses of the Communist International" does not deprive the national parties of the great heritage of workingclass internationalism and of Marxism-Leninism.

* * *

Given the united world view of the Communists, the vitality and strength of their parties in many countries, and the fact that the Comintern was able to function as a center through a period of the severest stress and strain of war and sudden zig-zags in world development, why is it that the Communist International now considers that it can no longer function effectively?

The Comintern document recalls that already at the Seventh Congress in 1935 it was seen that the changes in the world situation and the labor movement were demanding greater flexibility and independence of the Communist Parties to solve the new and complex problems facing them.

The great emphasis placed at that Congress upon the need to develop united workingclass action and anti-fascist people's fronts within each country already foreshadowed the policy of the national front and national unity which now prevails in the anti-Axis war.

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The developments set into motion by the world economic crisis beginning in 1929 and the coming of Hitler to power in Germany, a country with the most powerful industrial base in Europe, released and encouraged throughout the world all the forces of fascism and fascist aggression.

After the defeat of the German working class in 1933 as a result of its failure to achieve unity against Hitler, the whole international working class movement began to assess the lessons of Germany. As fascism became entrenched in Germany, encouraging fascist movements and tendencies in other countries, a whole series of new problems presented themselves which could be met only by developing new policies and tactics to achieve unity of the working class and people.

These had to be based more and more upon the specific conditions and relations of forces within each separate country, for the problem of destroying fascism became the problem of the whole nation, of unity within the nation and among the peace-loving nations. The struggle for collective security and a world anti-aggression front had to be fought out within each country, no longer on the basis of class against class but of a people's, later national, front against the appeasers and pro-fascists.

* * *

The turn in world development, necessarily bringing with it a turn in the policies of the working class and all political sectors within the nation, necessarily complicated the problem of attempting to guide the labor movement from a single political center.

Problems became even more complex and more varied, from country to country and from region to region, to such an extent, as the Comintern now says, that "insuperable obstacles" were created to international guidance.

The position of whole sectors within nations and relations among nations continually shifted and fluctuated with respect to the new world menace of fascism embodied in the rising Axis bloc. Because of this the sharp differences and variations which existed between the historical development, social systems and level of the working class movements played more and more of a role in determining the attitude and approach of the working class and progressive forces within each country.

The difference in the problems facing the peoples of the Soviet Union, already a great world power, and the workers and peoples in [illegible] became wider, in direct proportion as further rapid progress in the building of socialism more and more differentiated the system prevailing in the Soviet Union from the social order in all other countries.

To mention one problem: the question of the people's front and, later, national unity was and is totally different in the Soviet Union, a country without classes, than in any other. The USSR was ready quite early, politically, and in a military sense, to defend itself against any aggressor and to participate in a world anti-aggression front; while in the democratic capitalist countries, as events have shown, a major political struggle had first to take place to prepare the country to defend itself.

Similarly, the very marked differences in the level of economic and social development in the imperialist powers and in the colonial and semi-dependent countries, and between the smaller capitalist countries and the big powers, as well as the differences among the big powers themselves, played an increasingly greater role as the Axis bloc began its series of aggression.

* * *

During the pre-war period, despite all the differences and complexities enumerated, the Comintern was able to play an important guiding role in signalizing the new world menace and mobilizing the workers and peoples against it, as shown in the Seventh World Congress and, among other things, in development of the popular fronts in France and Spain.

But as the war unfolded, the differences in the conditions of various countries and whole regions of the globe became even more marked. The problems and tasks of the workers and peoples now vary widely as between the countries in the Hitler bloc, the countries in the anti-Hitler coalition and the overrun and subjugated countries, as explained in the Comintern document.

These complexities, taken together with the growth of the labor movement which is now better able to solve the problems of each country, render the Comintern as a form of international organization obsolete.

When a form becomes obsolete and it persists in the face of new problems with which it can no longer cope it becomes an obstacle. It becomes an obstacle in relation to the solution of the new problems now facing the workers and the peoples, in relation to the new forces which seek organizational expression, and in relation to the new possibilities of working class political action in the various countries.

To some of these new conditions and problems we will turn in the next article.

(The final and concluding article will appear on Monday)

File

VATICAN IS HOPEFUL OF RUSSIAN ACCORD

No Confirmation Is Given to Rumors of Early Pact, but Talks Are Reported

RELIGIOUS TRAINING ASKED

Holy See Said to Want Radical Change in Moscow Attitude on Subject of Education

By Telephone to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

BERNE, Switzerland, May 27—Semi-official Vatican sources today did not confirm insistent rumors of the past two days that Moscow and the Vatican might be on the eve of concluding a concordat, negotiations for which, according to some usually reliable sources, have been under way for the past month in Ankara, Turkey, under the guidance of British and American representations there.

A fillip was given to this rumor early today when an unconfirmed report from Ankara announced the precipitant departure of a special envoy from Moscow to his government to report after lengthy consultations with the Americans and British, who had previously had long talks with a special Vatican envoy.

For the moment official Vatican circles confine their statements to assurances of their satisfaction "should events take a course where the Holy See might participate in the resumption of religious liberty to Russia." They point, however, to the Kremlin's steadfast refusal to give in on several points—notably concerning communications in regard to prisoners of war repeatedly requested through Ankara—as an indication that the Kremlin "still pursues a negative policy regarding Catholicism."

A well-informed Vatican informant added to this, however, that, "if the official decision by the Kremlin to renounce internationalism as an instrument of policy for the Communist party was accompanied by a radical change on the par tof Soviet authorities toward religious education, it would be an ~~extremely~~ simple matter to realize an accord between the Catholic Church and the Moscow government."

In connection with thes erumors of impending concordats, official Vatican sources denied any knowledge of an impending visit by Archbishop Francis J. Spellman to Moscow. They qualified as "premature" an assertion that the New York Archbishop might be the bearer of a special message from the Pope to Premier Joseph Stalin.

According to inquiries made by Religious News Service in New York, the consensus in religious circles is that the position of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia will continue to improve, but that no evidence exists to justify any expectation that the status of the Protestant or Roman Catholic faiths will be substantially altered, in the near future at least, as an outcome of the recent dissolution of the Third International.

Well-informed Russian circles in Stockholm declare that rumors of further concessions point only to the Orthodox Church. They assert that there were always concessions to the orthodox religion in the Soviet, although the government did not encourage religion, and in some periods fought it. Since Russia's entry into the war Premier Joseph Stalin has shown an appreciation of the cooperation and effort of the Orthodox Church and its religious organizations in support of the Russian cause.

It is emphasized that the spirit of religion is growing stronger in Russia, with large numbers of the population attending church services regularly and Russian youth beginning to understand and appreciate the importance and power of religion. Nevertheless, it is pointed out, anti-religious sentiment persists among large masses of the people.

Well-informed Roman Catholic circles in this country expect an expansion of religious concessions in Russia, but are not hopeful of any early change in the attitude of the Soviet Government toward the Catholic Church In some quarters, the opinion is that the present is an opportune time to press for some form of agreement between the Vatican and the Soviet State for wider religious freedom.

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Religion only
churches

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31 JUN 26 1943

FILE

The Comintern Decision

Communist Parties Have Met All Tests

By James S. Allen

Second Article of a Series

When the presiding body of the Comintern publicly states that it has become obsolete in the new situation and accordingly proposes its own dissolution this is an act of basic strength and great historic responsibility.

The proposal arises from an undimmed and confident analysis of an extremely complex world situation.

It demonstrates great historic responsibility on the part of the Comintern leaders because the proposal frankly recognizes that an outmoded organizational form if persisted in and turned into a fetish cannot help but hinder the working class and the peoples in achieving even greater international collaboration to win the war and the peace.

It is an act of positive leadership, despite the negative shape which it appears to assume, because the very act of self-effacement of the Comintern center at this time becomes a contribution and a stimulus to the mobilization of labor and the national fronts for the destruction of fascist barbarism.

There is no similarity between the conditions which lead to the present Comintern proposal and the conditions which led to the end of the First International.

Under the leadership of Karl Marx, the International Workingmen's Association (First International) took the initial step towards disbanding itself at the Hague Congress in 1872 when it decided to move its center to New York. By the time a few remaining American affiliates met in 1876 to officially proclaim the end of the First International, this already amounted to the recognition of an existing fact.

Even before 1872, it was already clear to Marx and his associates in the General Council that their organization had become outmoded by events and could no longer fulfill its international role. The European reaction which followed upon the Paris Commune, the disintegration which set in among some of its most important sections as a result of the splitting actions of Bakunin and the anarchists and new developments in the trade unions in Britain were among the factors which accounted for the inner disintegration of the First International.

As the Comintern document says, the First International had fulfilled its historic tasks in laying the basis for workers' parties, and the new task of building the mass parties of the working class within the various countries and no longer be effectively aided by the General Council.

Marx and Engels noted at the time that to continue the organization would turn it into an obstacle to the further maturing of the workers' parties, because the International would become the instrument of the anarchists and the adventurist advocates of armed uprisings who had become stronger in the General Council and its weakened sections.

Clearly, none of these conditions of organizational and political disintegration prevail in the Communist parties today, and therefore play no role whatsoever as a reason for dissolution.

The Presidium statement cites the example of Marx and the First International only in order to make the point that Marx, the great creative founder of scientific socialism, did not hesitate to disband the form of international organization then prevailing when it be-

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FILE

The 7th World Congress of the Comintern

Scene at the 1935 7th World Congress of the Communist International in Moscow showing the huge portraits of the founders of Marxism-Leninism and its greatest teachers, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. On the great stage of the hall is a delegation of Moscow Pioneers greeting the Congress.

came apparent that it no longer corresponded to the new needs and tasks of the workers and the peoples.

* * *

No parallel can be drawn between the proposed dissolution of the Comintern center and the collapse of the Second (Socialist) International.

The latter collapsed in a heap, without even a moment in which to announce let alone discuss the event, when the 110 Socialist deputies voted the war credits in the Reichstag on August 4, 1914, the Black Day of German Social-Democracy.

The process of political disintegration marked by the growth of opportunism and chauvinism within the major parties of the West resulted in the automatic collapse of the international center when the outbreak of the war led to the victory of these tendencies within the largest socialist parties.

(The Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party [Bolsheviks], as well as a number of smaller European parties, defeated the opportunist and chauvinist wings within their own parties, and important groups within the parties of the western belligerent countries continued to fight the policies of the dominant leaders.)

The Second International collapsed because the majority of its leaders betrayed the working class and the peoples. Despite declarations by several Socialist Parties and official anti-imperialist war pronouncements by International Congresses in the years before 1914 (as late as the Berne Congress in 1912), when the World War did break out the majority of the Second International leaders supported their own imperialist bourgeoisies. This was the act of treachery and betrayal which tore the Second International asunder.

Plainly, only the enemies of working class unity, among them those who participated in the betrayal of 1914, would attempt to draw a parallel between the collapse of the Second International and the present proposal to dissolve the Comintern.

* * *

The act of dissolution is proposed in furtherance of the very same policies which have been pursued consistently since the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International in 1935, the last Comintern Congress to be held.

It was at this Congress, that the delegates of all the Communist parties in the world adopted a policy and a program of action directed towards mobilizing the working class and the peoples against the Nazi-fascist warmakers.

The Congress warned the world that Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Military-Fascist Japan were carrying through feverish preparations for world conquest.

It called for united working class and peoples' fronts throughout the world to combat the menace of fascism from within and to defend each nation from aggression. It adopted the policy of a world front of peace-loving nations and of active support for the policy of collective security against fascist aggression.

The Communist delegations left the Congress fully armed, as a result of the discussion and decisions, to face more effectively the most exacting tests yet faced by the peoples and nations of the world.

No matter what shortcomings and mistakes various Communist parties may have committed since 1935, who can honestly deny that the international Communist movement had placed squarely before all the workers and the peoples the only policy which could save the nations from slavery and destruction?

The obstacles to the carrying through of the united struggle against fascism were to be found not in the Comintern or in its affiliated parties.

They were to be found in those forces which prepared, carried through and supported the policy of non-intervention during the Spanish War, of supplying fascist-militarist Japan, of the Munich Pact, etc.

These obstacles were to be found in the international labor movement, in the activities of those "unreconstructed" Social-Democrats who beat down the proposals of the Soviet trade unions for world trade union unity and blocked every effort, although in France unsuccessfully, to establish labor unity within each country.

* * *

The line of the Communist parties remained consistent throughout the period leading to the war as well as during the three and one-half years which the war has already lasted.

Despite the complexity of problems, and the sharp differentiation which developed further in the conditions of various countries (as pointed out in the C. I. declaration) the Communist parties maintained a basic and united world view.

Whether under the worst conditions of Nazi tyranny, as in Germany, or under military fascist rule in subjugated Europe or the conquered sections of Asia, or under the duress of a sharp political struggle in the neutral countries, or under the brutal repressions of a fascist regime as in Spain, or under the obligation of strengthening national unity among the peoples of the United Nations, there is not a single Communist Party which does not devote all its energies for the single world task of destroying Hitlerism and the Axis.

A number of parties, as in Germany and Japan, have been smashed and battered and driven into a hard and bitter illegality, with most of their leaders either killed, imprisoned or exiled.

But you cannot name a single Communist Party which has betrayed the cause of the international working class and of world humanity.

That is the greatest test which any international working class organization has ever had to meet. The parties associated with the Comintern have met it successfully. In the process they have grown stronger and become more matured politically.

That, as the Comintern statement says, is one of the most important considerations to be kept in mind with respect to the proposal to dissolve the Communist International.

FILE

Soviets Hail Year of Anglo-USSR Pact

MOSCOW, May 26 (UP).—Official Soviet newspapers, in editorials today on the first anniversary of the Soviet-British mutual aid treaty, pledged the Soviet Union to fight until Germany surrendered unconditionally and emphasized that the USSR and Britain did not seek to assume dictatorial powers over Europe.

They repeated the pledge that neither the USSR nor Britain sought territorial gains as the result of the war or intended to interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries.

Pravda, official organ of the Soviet Communist Party; Izvestia, official organ of the Government, and Red Star, official organ of the Army, were among the newspapers which commented.

"Unconditional surrender or destruction of the Hitlerite Armies and the Hitler state is the preliminary condition for discussion or settlement of post-war European problems," Pravda said.

"No negotiated or compromise peace!" said Izvestia. "The Anglo-Soviet pact and the Soviet-Amer-

(Continued on Page 4)

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(Continued from Page 1)

ican agreement have helped to strengthen the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition, born during the struggle. This coalition is determined to carry out the job to the end—the complete smashing of Hitlerite Germany and its accomplices in Europe. This is the only road to real and solid peace. The firm unity of the coalition has frustrated peace fellers by Hitler's agents."

"The Soviet Union and Britain do not intend to assume the roles of dictators of Europe after the victory," Red Star said. "They do not seek any territorial gains nor do they intend to interfere with the domestic affairs of other countries."

Red Star emphasized the falsity of Axis propaganda which sought to stir up fear of the "Bolshevik danger" and alleged aggressive aims by both Britain and the Soviet Union.

In honor of the anniversary, the Soviet Government gave a luncheon for Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador, members of his staff and members of British military missions. The diplomatic corps of other countries were guests.

(In London Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden gave a luncheon. Soviet Ambassador Ivan Maisky, members of his staff, nearly all members of the War Cabinet and many chiefs of staffs attended, a United Press London dispatch said.)

Pravda in its long editorial said:

"The freedom loving nations face the task not only of winning the war but of winning the peace. For the second time in a generation German imperialism has thrown the world masses into bloody, devastating war. The peoples are determined not only to carry on the war to complete victory over the common enemy, but to ensure such a post-war organization as shall exclude the possibility of bloody aggression.

"The Anglo-Soviet agreement has determined the line of our conduct after the war as well as during it alongside Britain. The agreement undoubtedly will plan an exceptional role not only in British-Russian relations but in the further development of the international relations of Europe.

"The Anglo-Soviet agreement was concluded for the war and 20 years after the war. It is one of the most important instruments to ensure fair post-war organization of the world, but the task of providing a fair post-war organization of Europe can not be decided, it can not even be placed on the program, before the Hitlerite tyranny has been smashed and Hitler's criminal imperialism has been destroyed.

"Successful decisions on post-war problems, decisions in the interest of all progressive humanity, decisions intended to ensure a firm and fair peace—will be possible only after the complete destruction of the Hitlerite armies and the unconditional capitulation of the German-Italian coalition."

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ALLIED PEACE AIMS HAILED BY MOSCOW

British Treaty's Anniversary Marked by Press Emphasis on Post-War Security

U. S. VIEWED AS PARTNER

Our Arms Deliveries Cited—Role of European Dictator Disavowed in Comment

By RALPH PARKER

Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, May 26—The first anniversary of the Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance was hailed in Moscow today not only as an instrument whose proved worth would facilitate the achievement of complete victory, but as the cornerstone of the righteous peace to succeed it.

For the first time since they were involved in the war, the Soviet people's vision was directed by the official press through the strenuous and exacting days of war ahead to the tasks of the post-war period. It was in a forward-looking mood that Russian opinion celebrated the day.

Before freedom-loving people, Pravda wrote, lies the task not only of winning the war, but of winning the peace. The broad masses were aroused to awareness of their legitimate interests.

Twice in a generation German imperialists have thrown the world into bloody and devastating war, Pravda said. The people are fully resolved not only to see the war through to complete victory, the newspaper added, but to assure a post-war arrangement that will exclude the possibility of a repetition of such aggression.

Dictator's Role Rejected

History has shown that only the united efforts of great democracies interested in peace can prevent war, the army newspaper Red Star commented. But in their aim of bringing peace and prosperity to Europe the Allies do not wish to become Europe's dictator, and they are bound by the treaty to act in the United Nations' interests. The editorial pointed out that the treaty binds its parties to renounce territorial aggrandizement and refrain from interference in the internal affairs of other nations.

No occasion was missed to link the United States with the Anglo-Soviet alliance and it was as much a celebration of the entire coalition as of the formal treaty. Foreign Commissar Vyackesloff M. Molotoff entertained both the British and American Ambassadors and their staffs and the presence of Joseph E. Davies in the capital provided an opportunity for the re-establishment of personal contacts between him and many Soviet leaders whose respect he gained during his ambassadorship.

Press comment described the alliance's first year as a year of enemy failure in Russia, Africa and the Atlantic and, most significantly, in the diplomatic field. Just as the Wehrmacht's resistance collapsed at Stalingrad and in Tunisia, so German propaganda has failed to split the Allied coalition, which is determined to see the war through to the end as the only means of securing a real and enduring peace.

In an important passage, Red Star mentioned President Roosevelt's recent message to Premier Joseph Stalin and, probably for the first time in Soviet editorial columns, referred to American arms deliveries to Russia—deliveries that the conquest of the Mediterranean passage will permit to be increased. However, no illusions are held about the hard days ahead.

DAVIES SEES STALIN AGAIN

Roosevelt's Envoy Is Expected to Start Back to U. S. Soon

LONDON, Thursday, May 27 (Reuter)—Premier Joseph Stalin yesterday again saw Joseph E. Davies, President Roosevelt's special envoy, according to a Moscow broadcast early this morning. Foreign Commissar Vyacheslaff M. Molotoff was present at the interview.

Early Return Indicated

MOSCOW, May 26 (AP)—Joseph E. Davies is rapidly winding up his affairs here in preparation for his return to Washington, he indicated today, but did not set a definite date for his departure.

"There is nothing now to prevent my leaving," he said.

Mr. Davies did not say whether he had received a written reply from Premier Stalin to President Roosevelt's secret letter, nor did he say whether one was expected. He has seen Mr. Stalin at least once since he delivered the letter. Mr. Davies was the luncheon guest today of Foreign Commissar Molotoff.

The plane that brought Mr. Davies here was flown by a crack American Transport Command crew led by Waldon (Swede) Golien of Washington, former T. W. A. chief pilot, and Ben Prescott of Fort Worth, Texas. Mr. Prescott, a former Flying Tiger, has six Japanese planes to his credit. The plane is equipped with a double crew so it can fly continuously if necessary.

The Russians have given the crew a big welcome.

This is a clipping from page 4 of the New York Times for May 27, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

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Allen Talks on Comintern Tonite

The international repercussions of the proposed dissolution of the Communist International will be stressed in a discussion to be led tonight by James Allen, foreign editor of the Daily Worker, at the Workers' School Auditorium. How this move will affect the relations between the Soviet Union and other countries of the United Nations; what results it will have for the appeaser forces, such as Martin Dies; its probable influence upon the course of the war—these and other subjects will be taken up by Mr. Allen in his meeting under the auspices of the Workers' School in its auditorium at 35 East 12th St.

Mr. Allen will discuss also the services which the Comintern in the 24 years of its existence rendered to progress and especially to the fight against fascism, the danger of which it perceived even before Hitler's rise to power. He will explain the changing world conditions which made dissolution of the organization a necessary step.

Classes are called off for tonight, except for those classes which meet at 6:15, the school announced.

Admission to the meeting is 25 cents.

ADDITIONAL INDEXING

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4:50 pm - 5/28/43
ASAC Dougan requested to have someone attend meeting

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The Comintern Decision: Historic Step Long Maturing Among Signers of Statement

ANDRE MARTY
France

OTTO KUUSINEN
Finland



ANDREI ZHDANOV
Soviet Union

M. ERCOLI
Italy

By James S. Allen

(First Article of a Series.)

All the important implications and consequences of the proposed dissolution of the Comintern center are not yet fully apparent, nor can they be immediately visible. But it can be readily appreciated that the act of dissolving the Comintern, which for the past two decades exerted a powerful influence in shaping world history, will have far-reaching significance in the present war of national liberation and for the future.

For all consistent anti-fascists as well as for Communists, the need to subordinate and relate all questions to the central task of joint victory over Hitler and his allies is not new. It is in relation to the supreme need for joint victory and a collective peace that the proposal of the leading body of the Communist International to its affiliated parties should be viewed.

As has already been widely noted, among the most important immediate consequences to be expected is its effect in facilitating the unity of all labor and anti-fascist forces

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FIVE

within each country and in easing the process of collaboration between the nations of the anti-Hitler coalition.

Many in the anti-Axis camp already have drawn this conclusion and on the basis of it are urging an American-Soviet alliance on a level with the Anglo-Soviet Pact. This is to be welcomed, even though many such people display much misinformation, confusion and prejudice with respect to the role of the Comintern, the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties.

The Comintern never was an obstacle to U. S.-Soviet friendship. It was transformed into an obstacle only to the extent that Nazi-fascist propaganda was able to make it appear such in the minds of some, including key, sectors of the American people. To the same extent that this has occurred, the dissolving of the C. I. center will remove the main butt of the Goebbels' line and the supposed objective of the anti-Comintern Pact. It will help to destroy the deception, systematically propagated by the Fifth Column, that the Communists are an "enemy alien" force directing their activities against the governments of their own country on orders from Moscow.

As important as this aspect may be, it is only an important by-product of an act which, while taking it into account, has much broader and greater objectives.

Only those who wish to distort and misuse the C. I. proposal will attempt to pass it off as a hoax, a maneuver or even a diplomatic démarche, taken on the spur of the moment to meet an urgent but passing situation. Even a hasty reading of the full Presidium proposal reveals immediately that it is a profound historic document, taking into account the basic factors ranging back over the past decade and affecting the war and the peace.

* * *

Before attempting to come to definitive conclusions, let everyone study and think over deeply everything in the document, at the same time being careful to avoid reading into it what is not there.

Although necessarily based on the conditions leading to the war and arising from it, the proposal to dissolve the Comintern is not made only because the world is in a state of war. A hasty reading of the document has led some commentators to make this over-simplified explanation.

The Presidium's declaration merely points out that, owing to the conditions of world war, it is impossible to convene a Congress to consider its proposal and that therefore it must out of necessity submit the proposal to each affiliated party separately. The condition of world war is not advanced in itself as a reason for the proposal to dissolve; it is given as the reason for not submitting the proposal for general and collective discussion at a World Congress.

This is an important distinction, as can easily be seen in viewing the experiences of the past.

The International Workingmen's Association (First International), for example, continued to function during two major European wars, the Prussian-Austrian War (1866) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870), the last of which produced the Paris Commune of 1871 which represented the culmination of the program and acts of the First International.

The Second International, which was organized in 1889, collapsed as soon as the First World War began because of the triumph of opportunism and chauvinism within most of its leading national parties, and not because an international was no longer necessary. In fact, during the progress of the war the various forces from within the old Social-Democracy which were to form the Third International, were already gathering strength and were drawing closer together.

The Third International continued through the Wars of Intervention against the Soviet Union (1918-1921), the Manchurian War (1932), the Ethiopian War (1935), the Spanish War (1936-39), and the first three and one-half years of the present world war.

The proposal to dissolve the Comintern center is based upon conditions and factors which began to evolve long before the war and are now emerging in their full force at the height of the war. The statement of the Comintern Presidium proposes, in view of the developments of the last decade, to dis-

solve the Comintern because it has become outmoded and has outgrown its role as "the guiding center of the international labor movement."

The conditions which have made the Comintern as a guiding center both impossible and unnecessary will be discussed in a later article. What I want to emphasize at this point is that the Presidium does not propose to dissolve the Comintern center because the need to unite the workers on a world scale has disappeared. It proposes to do so because that particular organizational form for international proletarian unity, which was established at the First Congress of the Comintern in 1919

"and which corresponded to the needs of the initial period of the rebirth of the labor movement, more and more outlived itself in proportion to the growth of this movement and to the increasing complexity of problems in each country; and that this form even became a hindrance to the further strengthening of the national workers' parties."

That the leading body of an international workingclass organization frankly recognizes that it has outlived its useful function and has even become a hindrance to the growth of workers' parties in various lands must not be mistaken as a sign of weakness or of helpless collapse.

On the contrary, it is a token of the present strength, vitality and basic Marxist-Leninist approach of all those forces throughout the world which for a quarter century maintained and sought to extend workers' unity through the medium of the Comintern.

(Second Article in Tomorrow's Daily Worker.)

FILE

Hearst, Social-Democrats Echo Berlin on Comintern

(Daily Worker Foreign Department)

Goebbels was caught completely off base last Saturday when the presiding committee of the Communist International announced the proposal for its own dissolution.

Swiss sources and American government listening posts agree that the Nazi radio was completely bewildered. It recovered only after several hours to hammer away at the Nazi's chief line, namely, that the dissolution of the International is a "hoax" and a "bluff."

The Nazis were soon quoting their own newspapers and the press of satellite and allied countries, all of which agreed on the continued "Bolshevik danger," and the International's "bluff."

Associated with this line are a number of variations: (1) that in reality the "threat of Bolshevism" is even greater in Europe than ever before; (2) that Stalin is only posing as a "nationalist" but cannot be trusted; (3) that in reality, the whole thing was engineered by President Roosevelt, perhaps through the trip of former Ambassador Joseph E. Davies, and (4) that all this is preparatory to a meeting of Stalin and Roosevelt.

HEARST ECHOES GOEBBELS

But in addition to the cry of "bluff," the Berlin radio also points up prominently the idea that even if the CI dissolves itself, its national sections, in the form of Communist Parties in the major countries, remain. Berlin therefore calls for the dissolution of the Communist Parties everywhere. Since in Europe such parties are illegal anyway Berlin is obviously raising the demand for dissolution of the American Communist Party first of all.

Echoes of the Berlin line are already apparent in the United States. The Hearst press also shouts "bluff," warns against the Communist Party of the United States and calls for its suppression.

Martin Dies, head of his infamous committee, attempted feverishly yesterday to cover up his power of the day before. On Sunday, Dies was quoted by the United Press as saying that his committee would wind up its affairs and dissolve, its work accomplished.

Thus Dies gave away in a flash the fact that he is really not interested in investigating Nazi or Japanese fascist activities at all.

Yesterday, however, the far-off Texan at last made contact with the Berlin radio. He claimed the United Press had had a bad phone connection and changed his mind entirely.

Through his secretary, Robert Stripling, Dies said that it was now "more than ever necessary to watch the activities of the Communists in the United States." He called the CI's action "face-lifting," predicted a "streamlining" of the "Earl Browder type of Communism in the United States" by Stalin personally and warned of a "Pan-American Communism" growing up under the guidance of the American Communists.

Echoes of this same line run through the New York Times editorial, which likewise is skeptical and urges dissolution of the American Communists presumably to be accomplished only on Stalin's orders.

But the Berlin line is even better reflected by the Social-Democrats who, like Berlin, were initially confused and chagrined, but recovered their poise in time to claim skepticism, and warn against the Communist menace.

Norman Thomas, "socialist" anti-war leader, was reported by the N. Y. Herald Tribune as saying that Stalin was acting as a Russian rather than a Communist, almost word for word the Berlin radio's formulation. Thomas, likewise made the main theme of his remarks an attack on the American Communist Party.

David Dubinsky's whole thought was even more clearly in line with Berlin's. The head of the ILGWU was cited as being "frankly sus-

61-16-A
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FILE

picious of the move by the International. . . . He argued that the action might even 'strengthen the position of the Communist Party of the United States' in removing the foreign agent 'stigma.' . . ."

Luigi Antonini, Dubinsky's man Friday in the Italian-American field, made his characteristic adaptation to the Axis line, and with characteristic bombast.

PM quoted him as shouting: "I challenge the truth of the announcement by Pravda."

Just a coincidence, of course, that Goebbels has nothing left but the very same idea. Since Goebbels could not have been listening to Antonini—you can draw your own conclusion.

ILE

PM's 'Labor Reaction' to Dissolution Is a Phony

(Daily Worker Foreign Department)

PM did an exceptionally shabby job in its Sunday edition on the alleged reactions of CIO and AFL leaders to the dissolution of the Communist International. Perhaps it was to be expected coming from Harold Lavine, PM's new national editor.

The headline of the article said: "Action Leaves CIO, AFL Leaders Unmoved." The first paragraph said "the news from Moscow created little interest and less excitement among ALF and CIO leaders in New York and Washington. . . . It was an old story, they insisted. Only the dialogue had changed."

But the story did not bear out the headline and did not bear out the first paragraph.

When Lavine actually gets down to cases, he finds that William Green wouldn't talk, and only a "close associate"—un-named—had anything to say.

"High CIO leaders in Washington wouldn't comment for the record either," says Lavine. Only unnamed officials would.

MAKES UP STORY

And "no comment was immediately available from New York unionists identified with the left wing."

In other words, Lavine didn't have a story. And so he made it up.

Of course, a couple of Social-Democrats were interviewed, Dubinsky, Rose, Antonini, Counts. But no one in his right mind would headline what they said: "Action Leaves CIO, AFL Leaders Unmoved."

PM did the same shabby trick with the Alter-Ehrlich case.

And, incidentally, PM was the only New York paper which played down the text of the CI's proposal. It carried three paragraphs by United Press, whereas United Press had practically the entire text.

The editors of PM sure were in a hurry to get the labor movement's reaction, so much so that they manufactured that reaction personally. Likewise, they hurried with their own editorial opinion.

But why not give PM's own readers, especially for the Sunday edition, a chance to read in full and think over for themselves, what the CI's action meant?

61-16-14

This is a clipping from page 2 of the DAILY WORKER

Date May 25, 1943

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FIVE

FILE

Reactions to Comintern Decision

(Daily Worker Foreign Department)

First reactions of important public figures, Congressmen, newspaper commentators and governmental spokesmen in other lands to the proposed dissolution of the Communist International were overwhelmingly favorable.

Irrespective of the misconceptions and reasoning of many of those who made statements they view the decision of the Communist International as a mighty spur to the forward development of the war, and a further strengthening of the unity of the United Nations.

While some of the press slanderously spoke of the CI's action as coming from the Soviet government rather than the Communist International itself, the State Department declined to comment.

But the Washington diplomatic correspondent of the N. Y. Times said that in the Capital "the dissolution will be hailed as an attempt to improve unity among the United Nations and clear up misunderstandings among the Allies."

WILLKIE SPEAKS

Wendell Willkie, Republican wartime leader, declared the dissolution "a very wise move. It will do much to dissipate misunderstandings among the United Nations, particularly in their relations with Soviet Russia."

Senator Tom Connally of Texas, head of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations committee, called the dissolution of the CI "of tremendous importance to the United Nations." Connally said "it is a plea for solidarity among the nations fighting Hitler."

Rep. Jerry Voorhis, California Democrat, and member of the Dies Committee saw it "as a step which would greatly improve relations between the Soviet Union and other countries, including the United States."

Eric Johnston, president of the United States Chamber of Commerce, said "Why if that's the news, it is the most important and heartening news since Stalingrad."

REPORT HITLER LIES

David Dubinsky, head of the ILGWU, and sponsor of John L. Lewis' move to join the AFL, together with Norman Thomas, generally followed the line of the Berlin radio, which interpreted the Comintern's dissolution as a "bluff."

Dubinsky was worried more than anything else by what he said would be the strengthening of the Communist Party in the United States by removing the "stigma" arising from the charge that the American Communists were "foreign agents."

Norman Thomas echoing Goebbel's line called the CI's action a "concession" by Stalin, attacked the American Communists, said their withdrawal from the International in November, 1940 was "purely formal," and called Earl Browder's statement yesterday a "deception."

Martin Dies gave away the whole meaning of his un-American committee to investigate un-American activities when he said the dissolution of the Communist International "will enable us to wind up our work at an early date."

Dies forgot completely that he has been pretending to investigate Nazi and Japanese activities in this country; and said "it makes it unnecessary to enact legislation which we have recommended outlawing the (American) Communist Party."

The Berlin radio was cited by the OWI and FCC ~~observers~~ as having been completely surprised by the news. Berlin declared that the move was a "bluff," tried to make it appear that President Roosevelt through Joseph E. Davies had engineered the move, and that it was, as Norman Thomas said a "concession from Stalin."

Commentators in Stockholm, noting the confusion in Berlin, pointed out that the Comintern's action was taken on May 15th, several days before Davies arrived in Russia.

NEWS GETS PROMINENCE

London dispatches to the New York Herald-Tribune said the Comintern's dissolution "was hailed at London as a shattering blow to Nazi 'Red bogey' propaganda and as a valuable contribution to the harmony among the United Nations."

London was reported believing that Adolf Hitler has been robbed of the "propaganda value" of the "anti-Comintern alliance." Most of Sunday's newspapers gave the news great prominence, generally hailing Stalin.

British sources considered the development as a great boon specifically for American-Soviet relations. But many observers predicted a favorable effect on the proposals for affiliation of the British Communist Party to the Labor Party, to be decided on June 14.

Eric Hawkins, N. Y. Herald-Tribune London correspondent, said that "the strongest argument put forward by opponents of affiliation was that the Communist Party in this country was neither self-governing nor self-supporting."

"As this argument apparently will now fall," says Hawkins, "it was thought tonight that the Communists chances of admission [to the Labor Party] would be considerably brighter."

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Date May 24, 1943
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FVS

Neither the British CP, nor the Labor Party, issued any statement as of Sunday, but the British Party's executive was to meet on Monday and the Labor Party executive in the near future.

Prof. Harold Laski, member of the British Labor Party Executive said the development "opens perspectives for the unification of working class interests in Europe and Asia which offer the most real prospects so far opened for gathering the fruits of victory."

FROM CANADA TO CHILE

In other countries:

The Canadian Department of Justice was reported as "viewing with interest" the latest development, since the Canadian Communists are still under ban.

Tim Buck, head of the Dominion Communist-Labor Total War Committee, declared that he and his colleagues endorse the CI's action.

Brazil's Foreign Minister, Oswaldo Aranha, was reported saying that Brazil viewed the development "with the greatest satisfaction."

In Argentina, the N. Y. Times correspondent observed that the basis for the illegalization of the Argentine Communists, and the arrest of their leaders, has been that the Argentine Communists were allegedly an "organization obeying orders from abroad."

The Times correspondent speculated that the abolition of the Comintern would form a basis for demand to reconsider of the position of the Argentine Communists, although he doubted the success of such a demand.

The CI's decision was reported to have been applauded by leaders of Argentine General Confederation of Labor, but the Socialists are "making little effort to conceal their chagrin," while Right and government circles were reported "skeptical."

In Chile and Uruguay, says this same correspondent, the dissolution of the CI was considered to have no practical effect since the parties in these countries exist as independent political entities.

FILE

The Historic Act Of the Comintern

An Editorial

THE American people recognize in the proposal of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International to dissolve the International organization an act of great historical significance. Despite certain confusion and misconception regarding the proposal, most patriots and anti-fascists understand that one of the immediate effects of the proposed action will be to advance further the unity of action of all anti-Hitlerites, to strengthen the collaboration of the United Nations and peoples.

* * *

In estimating the significance of the latest decision of the Presidum of the Communist International it is important to grasp the fact that the Communist International has always fought for the unity of the working class within each country and on a world scale on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles. In each phase of world development since the first World War and the Russian Revolution, as a medium of the exchange of international working class experience and opinion it has made great contributions in the interests of labor and the freedom-loving peoples. The special target of reaction and fascism, always arousing the wrath and persecution of the most reactionary forces of modern society, it was the first internationally organized force to fight fascism from its very inception and to expose to the whole world the real aims of Hitler's Axis and its so-called Anti-Comintern Pact.

* * *

AMONG other things, every anti-fascist, no matter in what country or region of the world, knows what labor and the people owe to the Seventh World Congress which met in 1935 to signalize the world menace of German Nazism, Italian Fascism and Japanese military fascism. They know the tremendous contribution of that Congress, and particularly of George Dimitrov, the Hero of the Leipzig Trial, towards the development of the united working class and people's fronts against fascism, already at the time emerging in France, and towards mobilizing the working class, the peoples and the peace-loving nations for a world front and policy of collective security against fascist aggression and war.

In the present war of national liberation, the Communist Parties throughout the world, fully conscious of their national and global responsibilities, and basing their actions upon the best national interests of their own countries, have been and are in the front ranks of their peoples as undeviating fighters for the unconditional surrender of the Axis, and the destruction of the fascist "New Order."

The Presidium's proposal is based upon the complicated and varied problems which face the working class and peoples in each country and the great differentiation which now exists among the various countries under the new conditions. Like its predecessor, the First International organized by Karl Marx, the Presidium finds that the Communist International as an organized form of international collaboration no longer meets the present needs and conditions.

The proposal to dissolve the Comintern is therefore made in the interest of furthering the development of the unity of labor and all other anti-fascists within each country, of promoting the fighting alliance of the anti-Hitler coalition and peoples for the common task of defeating Nazism-fascism, the common enemy of all humanity.

As is noted by the Communist International Presidium, one of the important factors which was taken into account in making its recommendation to its affiliates, is the maturity of the national parties, some of which have themselves requested the disbanding of the Comintern. The role played by the Communist Parties in strengthening national unity in the anti-Axis countries and mobilizing the peoples for the overthrow of the fascist tyranny in the Axis and subjugated countries, as well as the conditions of the present war, render it not only impossible but also no longer necessary to maintain a single international guiding center.

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(23)

52 JUN 23 1943

The Communist Party of the United States, which in November 1940 took a decision to disaffiliate from the Communist International had for the most of its existence maintained a fraternal relationship with that body. This fact has been used by the enemies of labor unity and the forces of reaction and fascism to fight the Party throughout its whole history as a "foreign agent."

These attacks were however based on deception. The aim of the anti-Communist campaign, was always in essence anti-labor, anti-Soviet and now is also anti-United Nations.

The Communist Party of the U. S. developed and grew as a result of conditions in our own country. It was organized in 1919 from forces in the American Socialist and labor movements. Its roots are firmly planted in a long and glorious American heritage which includes the great traditions of W. Sylvis, Eugene V. Debs, "Big Bill" Heywood as well as the earlier role played by the Marxist groups in the war for the abolition of slavery. And it was in the line of this tradition, which always was internationalist, that the Communist Party shortly after its organization sought fraternal relations with the working-class international. In doing so, it brought the experience and influence of the advanced sector of the American working class to the world political movement of labor, and in turn derived benefits for our own labor movement and people in acquiring knowledge and solidarity from the working class of other lands.

Who can honestly deny, especially in view of the present role which international collaboration of labor, peoples and nations must play in saving humanity, that this association with the movements of other lands did not help the American working class and people meet their present responsibilities? Only hypocrites and outright defeatists now dare to minimize and distort the role which the Communist Party played in arousing labor and the people against the invasion of Manchuria and the rape of Ethiopia, against the Italo-German overrunning of Spain, against the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and the treachery of the Munich Pact. Only the enemies of our country can slander the Communist Party for urging incessantly throughout the land that America pursue a policy of friendship with the Soviet Union and of collective security together with all freedom-loving peoples against fascist aggression. The Communist Party, as events should now prove even to the most sceptical, was urging a course of action which if accepted in time would have saved our country and the world much suffering and grief.

What the war policy of the Communist Party has been, is and will continue to be, was stated succinctly by Earl Browder, its General Secretary, in his declaration on the C.I. proposal:

"The Communist Party of the United States will continue to fight with all its strength, as it has in the past period, for the complete unity of the United Nations, for international labor unity, and for national unity within our country, to win the unconditional surrender of the Hitler regime and its allies, Japan and Italy; and an ordered and peaceful world when victory is achieved."

* * *

Many political commentators have remarked upon the significance of the C.I. proposal in furthering the unity of the United Nations, especially between the United States and the Soviet Union. In this connection, it should be clear that the fraternal relations of the Communist Party of the U.S.A., as well as the affiliation of the Communist Parties of other countries, to the Comintern never was an obstacle to American-Soviet relations.

The obstacle to firmer American friendship with the Soviet Union was and remains today the poisonous propaganda of Hitler and the pro-fascist fomenters of disunity such as the Martin Dies, the Hearsts, the anti-Soviet Social Democrats and the whole defeatist cabal.

The basis for firm U. S.-Soviet friendship has always existed, in the common interests of both nations. It especially exists today in the common task to bring about as completely and rapidly as possible the unconditional surrender of Hitler and his allies and the complete destruction of fascist tyranny. It exists in the common need of both nations to assure a durable collective peace after this war has been won. There could be no firmer basis for national friendship and alliance.

* * *

The New York Herald Tribune called attention to a basic historic truth in its editorial yesterday when it said:

"It must be recognized that revolutionary socialism on an international basis will not die. It represents an idea that will always find adherents when the world is troubled by wars or economic disaster—a movement that will wax or wane, spontaneously."

It was the objective, underlying conditions of the modern world which gave rise to those forces and ideas that led to the formation of the First, Second and Third Internationals. It is the very condition of the contemporary world, now in a new and great turmoil, which nurtures and makes even more persistent the principle of international working class solidarity.

This is shown in the recent advances of international labor unity, such as the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee and the formation of the Latin American Confederation of Workers (CTAL), in the very process of strengthening national and world unity against the Axis.

The requirements of a victorious conclusion of the war and of post-war collective peace, necessitate the further extension of international labor unity which is indispensable to the strengthening of the Grand Alliance against Hitler and his allies. The precise forms which trade union and workingclass political unity on a world scale will take cannot now be clearly foreseen. These will arise as an expression of the actual historical conditions, in accordance with the relations and needs not only of labor but of all the freedom-loving peoples and nations.

Within our own country, all sectors of labor, including the Communists, are confronted with the immediate task of achieving the unity of action of the whole working class as the backbone of national unity around our Commander-in-Chief.

Congress Welcomes News of Russia's Dissolution of Comintern

'Plea for Solidarity,' Says Connally

By the Associated Press

Members of Congress today welcomed the news that Russia had abandoned sponsorship of international communism.

Chairman Connally (Democrat) of Texas, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called the announcement "of tremendous importance to the United Nations."

"It is an assurance that Russian communism will not intermeddle in the affairs of other Nations," he said. "It is a plea for solidarity among the nations fighting Hitler.

"Russians for years have been changing their economy and approaching the abandonment of communism and the whole western world will be gratified at the happy climax of their efforts."

Senator Revercomb (Republican) West Va., called the news "splendid" and said he hoped it meant the end of communism in America.

"It will remove from the feelings of the American people a doubt they have always had about Russia's attitude toward our own country," he said.

Representative Jonkman (Republican) Michigan, minority member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, said: "It shows progress in the right direction. It is a move toward democracy on the part of Russia."

Representative Voorhis (Democrat), California, former member of the House Investigating Un-American Activities, saw it as a step which would "greatly improve relations between the Soviet Union and other countries, including the United States."

Comment was withheld at the State Department, with the explanation that the Soviet government was not involved. But private diplomatic sources, which must remain anonymous, said the action should divorce United States relations with Russia from the American attitude toward communism.

British Ambassador Lord Halifax visited Secretary of State Hull during the day, but whether they discussed the Moscow announcement was not ascertained.

Wise Move Says Willkie

New York, May 22 (AP).—Wendell L. Willkie, 1940 Republican Presidential nominee, said today that dissolution of the Communist International was "a very wise move."

"It will do much to dissipate misunderstanding among the United Nations, particularly in their relations with Soviet Russia," Willkie said.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Acers
Mr. Carson
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Starke
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Gandy

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THE WASHINGTON POST
MORNING EDITION

Date MAY 2[illegible] 1943

Soviet Move Hailed In London as Boon to Allied Relationships

Magnitude of Action Is Acknowledged By Germans

By the Associated Press.

LONDON, May 22.—The decision of the Communist International in Moscow to dissolve itself and relinquish central direction of the policies of its offshoots throughout the world was acclaimed in sympathetic London quarters tonight as strengthening British, American and Russian war and postwar relationships.

The magnitude of the action in abolishing one of the principal barriers to Soviet friendship with other nations was acknowledged by the Germans as well as by the Allies.

While a DNB broadcast from Berlin declared the dissolution was the "greatest propaganda action ever started by Stalin," a foreign diplomatic source described it as "the most intelligent and adroit diplomatic move of the war."

Observers were inclined to set considerable store to the action at a time when President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill have been meeting in Washington and seeking closer personal contacts with Premier Stalin.

Hope for Meeting.

Only last Wednesday Prime Minister Churchill, in his address before Congress in Washington, asserted he and President Roosevelt had hopes of meeting Stalin and perhaps Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in the near future.

Yesterday Joseph E. Davies, former American Ambassador to Russia, delivered a letter, the contents of which have not yet been disclosed, from President Roosevelt to Premier Stalin.

The action coincided, also, with developments in the North Pacific where American forces were in the final stages of crushing resistance on Attu Island in the Aleutians.

Political quarters awaited with particular interest the impact on neutrals and half-hearted belligerents of Europe, many of whom had quarrels with Communism and all of whom Hitler has been attempting to win under the anti-Communist banner.

While Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was expected to express Britain's approval in the House of Commons soon, British newspapers already were taking an optimistic view.

Paper Praises Action.

The Star said the "step will be of real benefit in sweetening future Soviet-United States relations (and) should remove in every Allied country the chief stumbling block to happy Soviet-Allied relations."

One of the principal disputes between Russia and the United States in the past was the charge that Moscow financed and directed subversive Communist activities in the United States, although the Russian government contended it had no official obligation toward the Comintern.

British critics never have forgotten how Communist leaders began eating their words when there was an abrupt change in the "party line" in 1939 as a result of the German-Russian non-aggression pact. The party's dependence on Moscow has been a chief argument against the British Communist party's application for affiliation with the British Labor party, now pending.

Setting free the Communist parties in all countries may permit them to work out programs suitable to their local conditions.

Effect Not Yet Known.

The effect of the dissolution on the Labor party's decision regarding the Communists remains to be seen. Tome O'Brien, member of the council of the Trades Union Congress, the principal affiliate of the Labor party, said, however, that dissolution of the British Communist party itself would be a logical corollary.

Some London observers interpreted the development as additional evidence of Russia's swing to nationalism and away from promotion of world revolution.

This trend has been developing ever since Stalin expelled Leon Trotzky in 1927, it was pointed out, and turned his attention principally to domestic affairs, reconstruction and defense.

It was accentuated, they said, by the unity of the Russian people in a patriotic war and the return of old ideas of army organization and discipline, and may be further emphasized after the war by Russia's need to rebuild and reconstruct rather than try to convert others to her political ideas.

In some quarters, however, an opposite view prevailed and suspicion of Russia's intentions abroad were not entirely allayed.

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Coffey	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Acers	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Mumford	b6
Mr. Starke	b7C
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Mr. Nease	

THE SUNDAY STAR
Washington, D.C.
May 23, 1943

File

Beginning Wednesday
A series of articles on the proposal to dissolve

THE
COMMUNIST
INTERNATIONAL

by
JAMES S. ALLEN

Allen's previously announced series on his recent trip to Mexico is being postponed; his first article on Mexico will appear in next week's *Worker* magazine section.

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"FIVE"

54 JUL 1 - 1943

Comintern Dissolved as Aid to Unity

Lenin-Inspired Workers' Group Terms Its Own Methods 'Outmoded'

Not Us, Says Browder

The American Communist Party takes the stand that it is not affected by the Comintern dissolution, since the American group removed itself from the international organization in 1940. (Page 4.)

Called It a Drag

By Eddy Gilmore
Associated Press Staff Writer

Moscow, May 22.—The Comintern, the organization which Lenin and his advanced revolutionary followers created in 1919 to mobilize working class parties throughout the world, announced its own dissolution today in order to advance the cause against fascism.

The action, the most far-reaching yet taken in the swing toward full war cooperation between Soviet Russia and her major western Allies, was adopted by the Comintern's executive committee which explained that, because of inability to convene a congress under present war conditions, it was asking the various national sections to ratify the step.

Great Lesson of War

A resolution adopted by the committee said the Communist International had been outmoded and had proved to be a drag, in some countries, on the "further strengthening of the national working class parties."

The great lesson of the war, it added, was that "the general national uprising and mobilization of people for the speediest victory over the enemy can be best of all and most fruitfully carried out by the vanguard of the working class movement of each separate country working within the framework of its own country."

The text of the announcement seemed to indicate that dissolution of the Comintern was no temporary war time expediency but a final act of abolition.

(The German radio, broadcasting prompt German reaction to the sensational development, at once connected the measure with Allied preparations for an invasion of the continent.

Acclaimed in London

(The broadcast said it was intended to aid the "kindling of a political revolution in Europe" in support of an American-British invasion, and explained that fear of Russian Communism had interfered with the marshaling of strength for an uprising.

(The German vehemence in denouncing the act as a "gigantic bluff" and the "biggest Bolshevik propaganda scheme ever started by

See REDS, Page 6, Column 4.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
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Mr. Carson
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Starke
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

RECORDED

THE WASHINGTON POST
MORNING EDITION

Date

Russians Dissolve Famed Comintern Body as Gesture Toward Greater Unity

REDS, from Page 1.

Stalin" only served to reinforce the view of London observers, however, that a major blow for Allied unity had been struck.)

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Latins Favor Move

Buenos Aires, May 22 (AP).—Announcement of the decision to abandon the Comintern found a generally favorable echo in many parts of South America today.

Workers' representatives in Buenos Aires and elsewhere tended to agree that it would contribute to consolidation of Leftist elements which have been divided in the past over the Communists' resumed subservience to Moscow.

In Brazil, Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha told newspapermen that "we received the news with the greatest satisfaction. The intervention of one government into the life of another government and the restriction of liberty of individuals are against the way of life of the peoples of America."

Argentine officials expressed interest, but said the decision would be relatively unimportant in Argentina, since the Communist Party is outlawed here.

THE WASHINGTON POST
MORNING EDITION

Date MAY 23 1943

Communist Resolution

Although it is unlikely that the resolution announcing the impending dissolution of the Communist International will have any appreciable effect on Communist activity within the United States, it seems reasonable to regard it as a conciliatory gesture on the part of the Soviet government toward its Allies. Whether it will be more than a gesture remains to be seen.

There is nothing in the language of the resolution to support the interpretation that dissolution of the Comintern will mean abandonment of the effort to "sell" the philosophy of communism. On the contrary, it is stated that the dissolution is attributable to the obstacles facing the Communist movement in each separate country, and to the further fact that the Communist International, having outlived its usefulness as a form of organization, has "become a drag on the further strengthening of the national working class parties." In the United States, as Communist Leader Earl Browder points out, the dissolution can have no direct effect, since the American Communist party withdrew from the Comintern three years ago to avoid trouble under congressional legislation designed to discourage the affiliation of domestic political groups with foreign agencies.

Thus, the net result seems to be that the Communist parties outside Russia, having achieved what the resolution calls "political maturity," will be left to carry on without the guidance or financial support of the parent organization. If this is the case, a major stumbling block in American-Soviet diplomatic relations will have been removed, since the presumed financing and direction from Moscow of subversive activity in the United States has been productive of considerable bad feeling.

What the future of the isolated Communist groups will be, once they are cut off from the guidance and support of the mother party, is uncertain. Experience in the United States indicates, however, that the Communists have not been and will not be an important political factor. Their strength has lain in the penetration of certain labor unions and similar groups, where they have been able to exert an influence out of proportion to their numerical strength, and dissolution of the Comintern is not apt to affect this condition, either for better ~~or worse~~.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Acers
Mr. Carson
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Starke
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

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Washington, D.C.
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Mr. Tolson
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Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

Moscow Stand Won't Affect Party in U. S., Browder Believes

American Communists Agree With 'Motivation' Of Order, Says Leader

By the Associated Press.

NEW YORK, May 22.—American Communists took the view today that their organization in the United States was in no way affected by the Soviet decision to disband the Communist International, although it was conceded that party policy would be touched.

General Secretary Earl Browder pointed out that actually the international characteristics of the American party had been cancelled three years ago when a national convention of the organization resolved to free itself of all groups of any kind outside the boundaries of the United States.

Agree With 'Motivation.'

Mr. Browder expressed the opinion that the American Communist party would agree with the Moscow proposal "and its motivation," since experience in this country "already pointed in the same direction."

(The Moscow resolution said that the forms, methods and regulations of the omintern had become obsolete and in some cases actually hindered workers in their battle against fascism.)

When news of the Comintern action first reached Mr. Browder at his Yonkers, N. Y., home he declared that the party as a body was unaffected and added that "it only affects our policy." Later in a statement issued from party headquarters in Manhattan, he said:

"The Communist party of the United States will continue to fight with all its strength, as it has in the past period, for the complete unity of the United Nations, for international labor unity, and for national unity within our country to win the unconditional surrender of the Hitler regime and its allies, Japan and Italy, and an ordered and peaceful world when victory is achieved."

No Elaboration on Policy.

There was no elaboration otherwise on how the Comintern proposal would affect the party's policy in the United States. The objectives listed in the formal statement appeared largely to be those advocated by American Communists ever since Russia entered the war.

Actually, the American branch removed itself from the international organization in 1940 specifically because of passage of the Voorhis Act which required "foreign controlled" organizations to register with the Justice Department.

At that time the party's resolution branded the Voorhis Act as an instrument which would tend to destroy the party's position "as a legal and open political party of the American working class."

Mr. Browder himself declared then that its design was to "coerce the people into submission to the entry of the United States into the imperialistic war" and labeled it as a "part of the sweep of fascization over the capitalistic world."

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May 23, 1943

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Move Regarded As Step to Unify United Nations

Comintern Setup Will Never Be Revived, One Source Says

(Text of Resolution on Page A-9.)

By the Associated Press.

MOSCOW, May 22.—In the midst of the daily increasing cooperation between Soviet Russia and her Allies, the Executive Committee of the Communist International has asked its centers in all parts of the world to approve its own dissolution.

The resolution said the forms, methods and regulations of the Comintern have become obsolete and in some cases have actually hindered workers of the world in their battle against Germany and her satellites.

The action was considered here an open admission that the Comintern, which had stood for solidification of the workers of the world under the Communist banner, should dissolve and that the workers in each country should get down to the job of beating Adolf Hitler.

Many foreign observers in Moscow saw in the decision one of the most significant gestures yet toward complete cooperation among the nations whose primary objective is the defeat of Nazism.

Explaining the action, the committee's resolution declared there was no time now for a formal convention of the branches throughout the world in war time, and recommended that they cease their duties under prevailing regulations.

Complete Abolition Seen.

Dissolution of the Comintern's branches throughout the world was interpreted in London as meaning its complete abolition, although the text of the resolution, as broadcast from Moscow, said the temporary difficulty of holding international meetings in war time was the cause of the action.

One Communist authority in London declared the Comintern never would be resurrected.

The German radio, broadcasting the "reaction of Berlin quarters," promptly declared "the whole affair is a gigantic bluff of Allied wire-pullers" and connected it with plans for an invasion of the continent.

"Berlin quarters point out that Germany in recent days time and again had drawn attention to the fundamental issue of actual relations between Moscow on the one hand and Washington and London on the other * * *" the broadcast said. "This issue was that Churchill's and Roosevelt's intention of kindling a 'political revolution' in Europe for the support of an Anglo-American invasion was suspected not only by European people but also by all European emigrant governments in London.

"This suspicion was due to the consideration of the emigrant governments that no one in Europe would lift a hand for such revolution after Stalin's intransigeance and his attitude toward the Polish and Serb emigrants had proved beyond doubt that after the British and Americans had invaded Europe the Soviets would come and would come to stay.

"This suspicion, it is declared in Berlin, is to be allayed by the announcement of the dissolution of the Comintern."

Difficulty of Meeting.

The resolution proposed that inasmuch as a meeting of the international could not be convened because of the war various national sections should vote individually to disband the International and henceforth operate without regard to its rules.

Both the Soviet Monitor, who recorded the resolution in London, and London Communist party quarters indorsed this interpretation of the resolution.

One British Communist authority added that the dissolution of the international would clear the way for unifying all Communist and Socialist parties throughout the world on a new voluntary basis.

After a long preamble the presidium's resolution concluded with these proposals:

"Working in the spirit of the founders of Marxism and Leninism, the Communists have never supported the retention of organizational forms that have outlived themselves.

"Taking the above into account and having in view the fact that the presidium of the Executive Committee of Communist International cannot under war conditions call a congress of the Communist International it adopts the following proposal for ratification by sections of the Communist International:

"The Communist International, as the directing center of the international working class movement, should be dissolved, thus freeing its sections from their obligations arising from statutes and resolutions of congresses of the Communist International.

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Concentration of Energies.

"The presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International calls on all supporters of the Communist International to concentrate their energies on the whole-hearted support of active participation in the war of liberation of peoples and states of the anti-Hitlerite coalition for the speediest defeat of the deadly enemy of the working class—German Fascism and its associates and vassals."

The Central Committee of the British Communist party will convene in special session Monday to consider the Moscow recommendations. It is expected to ratify the dissolution proposal promptly.

London observers made these points about the resolutions:

1. It is a direct and positive answer to the German propaganda charge that Communists in every country are directly manipulated from Moscow.

2. It is designed to allay suspicion among Russia's Allies.

One of the principal disputes which has always clouded United States and Soviet relations was the charge that Moscow was financing and directing subversive Communist activities in the United States.

The agreement by which President Roosevelt recognized the Soviet government in 1933 was directed partly against such Russian participation in American affairs.

Some quarters in the United States always contended the existence of the International belied observance of this agreement.

Party Affiliation Sought.

At this moment the Communist party of Britain is campaigning for affiliation with the Labor party, which so far has rejected the application on the ground the Communists are dependent on Moscow and hence would be unwilling to submit themselves to majority decisions of the Labor party.

The application is scheduled for consideration at the Labor party's annual conference in June.

The resolution was published at a moment when Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt were reported seeking closer personal contacts with Premier Stalin. Special Envoy Joseph E. Davies is in Moscow after delivering a note from President Roosevelt.

It also comes as Italy and Germany are celebrating their anti-Comintern alliance, near the first anniversary of the Anglo-Soviet 20-year alliance of May 26, 1942, and when joint military action by the Allies seems closer than at any time during the war.

Published in Pravda.

The Moscow announcement, as heard in London by the Soviet Monitor, said the decree had been published in Pravda, official organ of the Communist party.

The resolution was signed by the following members:

Clemens Gottwald, Czech.
Georgi Dimitrov, Bulgarian.
Andrei Zhdanov, Russian and member of the politburo.
Koplenig, German (first name not available).
Otto Kuusinen, Finnish.
Dmitri Z. Manuilsky, Russian.
Andrei Marty, French.
Pick, German (first name not available).
Torese, French (first name not available).
M. Ercoli, Italian.

The following representatives of various national sections also signed:

Bialco, Italian (first name not available).
Dolores Ibarruri, Spanish.
Lechtinen, Finnish (first name not available).
Matrias Rakosi, Hungarian.

The Comintern, founded in 1919 by Lenin and Trotsky, aimed at world revolution in its early days, but after the rise of Hitler and Mussolini began concentrating its energies against them.

The Berlin-Rome-Tokio Axis, originally set up as an anti-Comintern front, later developed into a military alliance.

File

Text of Communist Resolution

Executive Committee of International Moves to Dissolve Centers in World

By the Associated Press.

LONDON, May 22.—The text of the resolution of the presidium of the Executive Committee of Communist International, as broadcast by Moscow and recorded here by the Soviet radio monitor:

The historic role of the Communist International, which was founded in 1919 as a result of a political union of the great majority of the old pre-war working class parties, consisted in upholding the principles of the working class movement, in helping to promote consolidation in a number of countries of the vanguard of the foremost workers in the real working class parties and in helping them mobilize workers for the defense of their economic and political interests, and for the struggle against Fascism and the war which the latter was preparing, and for the support of the Soviet Union as the chief bulwark against Fascism.

The Communist International from the first exposed the real meaning of the anti-Comintern pact as a weapon for the preparation of war by the Hitlerites. Long before the war it ceaselessly and tirelessly exposed the vicious, subversive work of the Hitlerites who masked it by their screams about so-called interference of the Communist International in the internal affairs of these States.

Insuperable Obstacles.

But long before the war it became more and more clear that with increasing complications in internal and international relations of various countries, any sort of international center would encounter insuperable obstacles in solving the problems facing the movement in each separate country. Deep differences of the historic paths of development of various countries, differences in their character and even contradictions in their social orders, differences in the level and the tempo of their economic and political development, differences finally in the degree of consciousness and organization of workers conditioned different problems affecting the working class of the various countries.

The whole development of events in the last quarter of century and the experience accumulated by the Communist International convincingly showed that the organizational form of uniting workers chosen by the first Congress of the Communist International answered conditions of the first stages of the working class movement, but it has been outgrown by the growth of this movement and by the complications of its problems in separate countries and has even become a drag on the further strengthening of the national working class parties.

The world war that the Hitlerites have let loose has still further sharpened the differences in the situation of the separate countries and has placed a deep dividing line between those countries which fell under the Hitlerite tyranny and those freedom loving peoples who have united in a powerful anti-Hitlerite coalition.

"Countries" Own Problems.

In countries of the Hitlerite bloc the fundamental task of the working class, toilers and all honest people consists in giving all help for the defeat of this bloc by sabotage of the Hitlerite military machine from within and by helping to overthrow the governments guilty of war. In countries of the anti-Hitlerite coalition the sacred duty of the widest masses of the people and in the first place of foremost workers consists in aiding by every means the military efforts of the governments of these countries aimed at the speediest defeat of the Hitlerite bloc and the assurance of the friendship of nations based on their equality.

At the same time the fact must not be lost sight of that the separate countries which are members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition have their own particular problems. For example, in countries occupied by the Hitlerites which have lost their state of independence the basic task of the foremost workers and of the wide masses of people consists in promoting the armed struggle developing into a national war of liberation against Hitlerite Germany.

At the same time the war of liberation of freedom loving peoples against the Hitlerite tyranny which has brought into movement the masses of people uniting them without difference of party or religion in the ranks of the powerful anti-Hitlerite coalition has demonstrated with still greater clearness that the general national uprising and mobilization of people for the speediest victory over the enemy can be best of all and most fruitfully carried out by the vanguard of the working class movement of each separate country working within framework of its own country.

Changes in Conditions.

Already the seventh congres of the Communist International meeting in 1935, taking into account the change that had taken place both in the international situation and in working class movements that demand great flexibility and independence of

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its sections in deciding the problems confronting them, emphasized the necessity for the Executive Committee of the Communist International in deciding all questions of the working class movement arising from concrete conditions and peculiarities of each country, to make a rule of avoiding interference in the internal organizational affairs of the Communist parties. These same considerations guided the Communist International in considering the resolution of the Communist Party of the U. S. A. of November, 1940, on its withdrawal from the ranks of the Communist International.

Guided by the judgment of the founders of Marxism, Leninism Communists have never been supporters of the conservation of organizational forms that have outlived themselves. They have always subordinated forms of organization of the working class movement and methods of working of such organization to the fundamental political interest of the working class movement as whole, to peculiarities of the concrete historical situation and to problems immediately resulting from this situation.

They remember the example of the great Marx, who united foremost workers in the ranks of the Workingmen's International Association, and when the First International had fulfilled its historical task of laying the foundations for the development of working class parties in the countries of Europe and America, and, as result of the matured situation creating mass national working class parties, dissolved first the International inasmuch as this form of organization already no longer corresponded to the demands confronting it.

International to Be Dissolved

In consideration of the above and taking into account the growth and the political maturity of Communist parties and their leading cadres in separate countries and also having in view the fact that during the present war some sections have raised the question of the dissolution of the Communist International as the directing center of the international working class movement, the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, in the circumstances of the World War not being able to convene a Congress of the Communist International, puts forward the following proposal for ratification by the sections of the Communist International:

The Communist International, as the directing center of the international working class movement, is to be dissolved, thus freeing the sections of the Communist International from their obligations arising from the statutes and resolutions of the congresses of the Communist International.

The presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International calls on all supporters of the Communist International to concentrate their energies on the whole-hearted support of and active participation in the war of liberation of the peoples and the states of the anti-Hitlerite coalition for the speediest defeat of the deadly enemy of the working class and toilers—German Fascism and its associates and vassals.

File

Browder Says Order From Moscow Won't Affect U. S. Party

Sees Only Policy Changes; Points Out American Body Cut Russian Ties in 1940

By the Associated Press.

NEW YORK, May 22.—Earl Browder, general secretary of the Communist party in the United States, said today that the Moscow resolution dissolving the Communist International would not affect the American party, "because since 1940 the Communist party of the United States has maintained no affiliation outside the borders of our country."

A statement signed by Mr. Browder and issued at Communist party headquarters said:

"The proposal of dissolution of the Communist International, made by the presiding committee of that organization, does not affect organizationally the status of the Communist party of the United States, because since 1940 the Communist party of the United States of America has maintained no affiliation outside the borders of our country.

"It is my opinion, however, that the Communist party of the United States will express its agreement with the proposal and its motivation, since its own experience has already pointed in the same direction.

"The Communist party of the United States will continue to fight with all its strength, as it has in the past period, for the complete unity of the United Nations, for international labor unity and for national unity within our country to win the unconditional surrender of the Hitler regime and its allies, Japan and Italy, and an ordered and peaceful world when victory is achieved."

When interviewed at his Yonkers (N. Y.) home by telephone earlier today, Mr. Browder said that "we have been disaffiliated from any international organization for three years—since 1940. That announcement from Moscow does not affect us as a body; it only affects our policy."

This referred to a resolution adopted by a special national convention of the Communist party in New York in November, 1940, which directed the party to "cancel and dissolve organization affiliation to the Communist International and all other bodies of any kind outside the boundaries of the United States."

The purpose of the action, as outlined by the resolution, was to remove the party "from the terms of the so-called Voorhis Act" which required registration with the Justice Department of all "foreign controlled" organizations which it defined as those receiving material support from a foreign or international political party, or whose policies were determined by or at the suggestion, or in collaboration with, a foreign government or political party.

The 1940 resolution stated that the Voorhis Act would "tend to destroy the position of the Communist Party as a legal and open political party of the American working class" and at the time Mr. Browder himself termed it "harmful and destructive of the democratic rights of the people" and asserted that it was "designed to coerce the people into submission to the entry of the United States into the imperialistic war and as a part of the sweep of fascization over the capitalistic world."

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MOSCOW DISSOLVES RED INTERNATIONAL

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WASHINGTON TIMES-HERALD
EDITION NUMBER 8
5/22/43

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World's Party Ties Severed

Unite Against Hitler, Followers Told

By M. S. HANDLER

MOSCOW, May 22 (U.P.). The Communist Internationale, which had as one of its basic principles the fomenting of world revolution, was dissolved today by the action of its own leaders who directed followers to join hands in the common fight against Hitlerism.

The action was embodied in a resolution adopted by the Comintern executive committee which stated simply:

"In countries against the Hitlerite coalition, the sacred duty of all the masses and primarily that of the vanguard of workers consists in all-out support of their governments' war efforts in order to rout the Hitlerites as quickly as possible and secure friendly co-operation of nations on a basis of equality."

Move for Solidarity

The dissolution was announced by the official Communist party newspaper, Pravda.

[Allied sources in London greeted the Russian announcement as a major Soviet gesture toward United Nations solidarity and one which paved the way for clearing up misunderstandings that have developed in the United States and other countries regarding Russia's postwar aims.

[These sources pointed out that it might pave the way for a conference of President Roosevelt, Premier Josef Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill under the friendliest conditions. It was not known at once whether there was any connection between the President's personal letter to Stalin and today's action.

Parties Cut From Moscow

[It was pointed out that dissolution of the Comintern did not break up Communist party organization outside Russia but cut toward winning the war against them loose from [illegible]idance and direction of Moscow. But following the news from Moscow, a special meeting of the central committee of the British Communist party was called for Monday to recommend disbandment of the group.]

The action of the executive committee of Communist Internationale, which had directed the international workers movement in many lands, released its several sections to devote their energies the Axis.

The Communist presidium's resolution was submitted to foreign members for ratification but this was expected to be a mere formality. The resolution said the action had been taken at the request of foreign sections since the war started.

Labor Problems Different

"Long before the war it became more than clear that, as international and domestic situations in each country became more and more complicated, the solution of labor problems in each separate country would be met by insurmountable difficulties," the resolution declared.

The resolution also asserted that one of the reasons for the decision to disband was the inability to convoke a Congress in wartime.

Members of the presidium who signed it were Gotwald, Czechoslovakia; Grigoridimitrov and Koralov, Bulgaria; Manouilski and Zhdanov, Russia; Kooplening, Austria; Pick and Florin, Germany; Kusinnen, Finland; Erkoli, Italy; Andre Marty and Maurice Thorez, France. It was counter-signed by Bianco, Italy; Dolores Ibarruri, Spain; Lekhtinen, Finland; Pauker, Romania, and R. K. Kosch, Hungary.

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WASHINGTON TIMES-HERALD
EDITION NUMBER 8

5/22/43

DAVIES IN MOSCOW WITH STALIN NOTE

Roosevelt's Envoy, Reticent on Mission, Says He Is Serving Only as 'Messenger Boy'

IMPRESSED BY STALINGRAD

Americans Visiting Battlefield Angered by Work of Nazis—Honor Soviet Dead

By RALPH PARKER

Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, May 19 — Describing himself as "only a messenger boy," former Ambassador Joseph E. Davies arrived at the Moscow airport this afternoon and was met in a swirl of Soviet and United States flags by Soviet Foreign Office officials and William H. Standley, the United States Ambassador, and members of his staff.

Mr. Davies later said that he was being "deliberately evasive" in replying to any questions concerning his visit's purpose beyond affirming that he carried a personal letter from President Roosevelt to Premier Joseph Stalin.

Mr. Davies expects to be received by Vyacheslaff M. Molotoff tomorrow after he has rested from his journey. Admiral Standley will present him to the Soviet Foreign Commissar. It is understood that Mr. Davies's visit is not expected to be a long one. Tomorrow night Admiral Standley will be host at a reception to which the British Ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, has been invited, among other diplomatic guests.

Party Flies to Stalingrad

Mr. Davies is accompanied by Dr. Arthur F. Chace, president of the New York Academy of Medicine, acting as his personal physician; Bartley Gordon, assigned to the trip by the State Department; his personal secretary, Navy Lieutenant J. V. Stamm, and Army Corporal George Richards, acting as valet. Commander Victor Blakesley, the new assistant naval attaché in Moscow, joined the party en route. The Soviet Government has placed the State Guest House at Mr. Davies's disposal.

Yesterday, at his own suggestion, Mr. Davies flew from Kuibyshev, where he had stopped over night, to Stalingrad, and this evening he spoke of the tremendous impression the ruined city had made on him and his party. For some time their plane flew low over the city and along the Volga's course, criss-crossing over the battlefield.

"I was interested in the reaction of the American crew to the scene," he said. "They seemed struck dumb by it. Then one of them said, "the so-and-so—I could tear the Germans apart with my hands!' That, I believe, was how all fifteen of us Americans in the plane felt."

Speaks at Soviet Shrine

Before he left Kuibyshev a bunch of Spring flowers was presented to Mr. Davies. He had it made up into a modest bouquet during the trip. This he laid, in President Roosevelt's name, on the unknown Soviet soldier's tomb in Stalingrad's battle-scarred Square of Heroes. Mr. Davies described the ceremony as follows:

"It was in the center of the square, not forty yards from the building where Field Marshal General Friedrich von Paulus surrendered and perhaps not a quarter of a mile from the river he never crossed. I am used to participating in ceremonies of laying wreaths on tombs. It is usually a silk-hatted protocol ceremony. You make a little speech, then lay the wreath, then salute and then about three minutes' silence usually follows before you bow and take your leave of the dead.

"This time I had no silk hat and the wreath was a very simple, modest one. The words I spoke were not prepared. But we were so overwhelmed that the silence was far longer than usual, and, when I took off my hat to Stalingrad's dead all the simple, humble people around us did the same and bowed with that tremendously moving deep Russian bow.

According to notes taken down by Lieutenant Stamm, Mr. Davies said before the tomb:

"Here in immortal Stalingrad we stand humbly, in the midst of the still charred remains of the brave new city which has been devastated by the Hun.

"Acting for the President of the United States and for the free liberty of the sons of God everywhere on this earth, as a token of our homage and deathless respect, I lay this simple wreath of Russian Spring flowers on the grave of the Unknown Soviet Soldier.

"Even in death he is gloriously typifying the supreme heroism and devotion to freedom of our inconquerable ally, the Soviet Union, its great leaders, its glorious Red Army and its heroically undaunted Soviet people."

Mr. Davies described Stalingrad's destruction as "the most terrible, damnable blot on civilization ever perpetrated by some one called a man in all history." Its defense, he said, was "typical of all that we are fighting for—to show that there is more than the beast in man. Stalingrad's defenders fought for an ideal."

This is a clipping from page 7 of the New York Times for May 20, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Abroad

Prelude to the Second Mission to Moscow

By ANNE O'HARE McCORMICK

Stalin might have used a red pencil to sign his now famous letter to Ralph Parker of THE TIMES. He is supposed to like red. Some anxious souls fear to offend the Russians by calling them "Reds," but actually the word, like the color, means to them something fine and splendid. They apply it to whatever they are proud of—the army, the great square beside the Kremlin, the most impressive factories, the star that symbolizes the Soviet Union—and they are pleased when foreigners adopt the designation.

Or he might have used a blue pencil. It would not be inappropriate for a writer whose powers of deletion are as large as Stalin's. But the crayon he chose was bright green. A good deal has been read into his letter, it has been seized on in the highest governmental circles as another sign, even more definite than the May Day speech, of a change of attitude toward his allies. No doubt the green pencil will also mean something to those who look for signs in everything. They may see in it an additional indication that Stalin, having turned on the red light in the break with Poland, has now switched on the green.

At any rate, the omens for the success of Joseph Davies' second mission to Moscow are far more propitious than if he had started a fortnight ago. It is not yet clear why the Soviet Government broke with the Poles one week and came out the next with a statement apparently opening the door to reconciliation, and then, two days later, added fuel to the feud by publicly accusing members of the Polish Embassy in Moscow of "espionage activities," a charge not mentioned in the note severing relations.

This is the kind of question that has to be asked and answered before we arrive at that understanding with Russia which Mr. Davies is sent to accelerate. He is the choice of a government intensely anxious to establish closer contacts with Moscow because it is assumed that he will have easy access to the Kremlin. In his book, in speeches delivered all over the country, he has been busy "explaining" Russia and advocating whole-hearted Russian-American collaboration. So he is selected as the best emissary to convey to Stalin a message expressing the President's desire for a personal conference and the reasons of high policy that make such a meeting more and more urgent.

It is urgent. The assignment given to Mr. Davies is of the utmost importance. The knock-out blows being delivered in Africa are like a pounding on the doors of Europe. This government must know very soon how far the aims and ideas of the Soviet Government run along with ours in facing the problems of the future.

Therefore it is unfortunate, to put it mildly, that Mr. Davies should set out on his errand just as the film version of his first mission is presented to millions of Americans. For if anything is calculated to cause misunderstanding between the two countries, it is the false picture of America, the false picture of Russia and the false picture of history that are combined in the distorted composite to which the former Ambassador unluckily gives his authorization in an introductory speech.

The film does not even stick to the facts in his book. Here transferred to the screen is a period we have all lived through, and the dates are so mixed up and rearranged that even the sequence of events is unreal. It isn't merely that for everything that has occurred—the first war with Finland, for instance—there is no hint of any story but Moscow's. The Nazi-Soviet pact is explained as a means to gain time, but there is no explanation why in this interval of preparation everywhere the "party line" was to oppose the Allied war against Hitler. And it isn't only that in the film Mr. Davies is convinced that justice was done in the Moscow trials to a band of conspirators and Fifth Columnists. The trouble is not the completely one-sided and uncritical interpretation of facts. It is that the facts themselves are wrong.

The picture presents nothing but the Russian case and fails utterly to do justice to Russia. Except for officials, the lay figures in the trials, a few shots of factories and a military show in the Red Square, there is nothing to suggest the Russian people, their vitality, the power and spirit that make them fight as they do.

Worse, the film grossly misrepresents the United States. Stalin may see it, and it will give him a good deal of sardonic amusement, but it is most unlikely that it will be exhibited to Russian audiences, if only because the purges are not considered dramatic material in Moscow. But if it is, they will see a Congress that puts money and safety before any other consideration. Whether the film sells Russia to the United States, it would certainly never sell the United States to Russia.

It would not sell international cooperation to anybody. The policies of all the pre-war governments, except Stalin's and Roosevelt's, were stupid or cynical. All the diplomats portrayed, except Davies, learned nothing and foresaw nothing. The delegates to the League of Nations deserted the assembly in a body when Litvinoff warned them of the disasters to come. We can only hope that the second "Mission to Moscow" is based on surer premises than the dramatization of the first. If Russia and the United States are to work together, they first have to know the truth about each other.

This is a clipping from page 14 of the New York Times for Tues. Feb 19 '47
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Stalin's Letter to Times Man Was on Plain White Notepaper

By RALPH PARKER

Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, May 6—Premier Joseph Stalin's letter to me was typed on a single sheet of plain white paper of foolscap shape without heading or watermark. Also it bore no address to denote where it was written.

The words "Cospodin Parker!" with which it begins, i sthe usual form of address employed by a Soviet Russian in correspondence with a foreigner.

My own letter to Premier Stalin was the second I have taken the liberty of addressing to the Soviet Premier during the eighteen months I have worked here as a correspondent. It was typed on notepaper with The Times of London and THE NEW YORK TIMES heading and was addressed to Premier Stalin as supreme commander in chief and hero of socialist toil. This letter too closed with the the words "with respect."

The letter was sent to Premier Stalin through the organization to which the foreign correspondents are accredited—the Press Department of the Foreign Commissariat, and was handed to the department chief Nikolai Palgounoff, who also handled the correspondence of Henry Cassidys of The Associated Press with Premier Stalin.

At 2:20 o'clock yesterday morning Mr. Palgounoff's vivacious Cossack secretary, Mariana Vassilyevna Belko, telephoned to ask me to get dressed and come to the Foreign Commissary immediately.

As every foreign newspaper man in Moscow hopes that one day that is the way he will be invited to go to the Kremlin, I walked through Moscow's curfewed streets with mixed feelings.

No patrols stopped to ask me for my night pass during the ten-minute walk up broad Theatre Street to the press department.

A few minutes before 3 o'clock Mr. Palgounoff received me and handed me Premier Stalin's letter with an English translation thirty-six hours after my original letter had been sent.

I read them both through, garbled some unintelligible words and after making arrangements for transmission the following day, I walked back the way I had come, though with very different feelings.

During the next day the press department telephoned to ask whether I raised any objections to the letter being published in the Russian press. I did not and today I have been kept busy answering the telephone calls of Russian friends and generous colleagues.

This is a clipping from page ___ of the New York Times for ___

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

REASSURANCE SEEN FOR SMALL STATES

Stalin's Letter Is Viewed in Washington as Helping Yugoslavia, for One

DAVIES TRIP IS WATCHED

His Visit to Moscow as an Emissary of Roosevelt Is Expected to Help Amity

By HAROLD CALLENDER

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, May 6—Premier Joseph Stalin's desire for a "strong and independent" Poland, expressed in his letter yesterday to THE NEW YORK TIMES correspondent in Moscow, should smooth the way toward more friendly relations with Yugoslavia and generally reassure those States in Russia's broad orbit where Moscow's breach with the Polish Government had caused alarm, in the opinion of diplomatic circles here that are in close touch with Europe.

It is understood that Russian channels abroad quickly informed Moscow of the reports here and in London of a project to set up in Russia a new provisional government for Poland and of the unwillingness of both London and Washington to recognize such a regime if there were any idea of establishing it. Premier Stalin's subsequent letter is taken as a repudiation of this reported intention.

The implications of this are believed to extend beyond the case of Poland and to apply likewise to other border States like Yugoslavia, where Russian influence is potent and where some have believed a Russian-sponsored regime might appear. In that case London and Washington would have withheld recognition and the policies of the United Nations there would have been still more ~~sharply~~ divided.

Rift in Country Started

In Yugoslavia the situation differs from htat of Poland in the absence of a frontier dispute such as forms the basic Russian-Polish contention. But in Yugosolavia, especially in Serbia, a strong affinity to Russia has long existed in spite of recent idealogical differences, and Russian support of the Communist-led Partisan guerilla force, together with Russian propaganda against the official leader, General Droja Mikhailovich, who has been aided by the British, recently created a division both within Yugoclavia and between the two great powers allied against Germany.

This Russian activity in Yugoslavia was attributed to Moscow's desire for all possible aid against Germany in the absence of a second front. Whether or not it is because of an access of Russian confidence in a second front, reports reaching Washington are that the situation in Yugoslavia has greatly improved lately and that the Russians, while unwilling to make any offcial pronouncement, have shown a new friendliness toward the Yugoslav Government in London. Meanwhile anti-Mikhailovich propaganda has eased off.

Davies Enters Situation

It is believed in diplomatic circles that when Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, was here ecently, he agreed to a unified Anglo-American policy in North Africa and at the same time indicated a British desire that Washington should reciprocate by improving American relations with Moscow. The journey to Moscow by Joseph E. Davies, as special emissary of President Roosecelt, is expected ti prove a step in that direction.

The task will be facilitated, it is generally believed, by such indications as Moscow has given or may give of an intention to adopt toward lesser States on her borders a European version of our Good Neighbor policy—an intention that may have been implied by Mr. Stalin's use in his letter of the term "good-neighborliness" to designate his conception of the future footing of Russia and Poland.

This is a clipping from page 4 of the New York Times for May 7, 1944
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

MR. STALIN TO THE TIMES

In answering promptly and frankly the questions put to him by Ralph Parker, the correspondent of THE NEW YORK TIMES in Moscow, Premier Joseph Stalin has addressed his first letter to an American newspaper and made the first statement since the rupture of diplomatic relations of Russia's policy toward post-war Poland. In so doing he has answered a question that has been troubling the democratic world, and the answer is highly reassuring on two counts: first, as evidence that the Soviet leader is concerned about public opinion in the United States, and, second, as proof that the "friendly neighbor" on which the Moscow press has been insisting since the Russian-Polish break is not envisioned as a weak state, subservient to the Soviet Union, but as a strong and independent Poland.

Mr. Stalin's reply on that point is as unequivocal as Mr. Churchill's. He does not, to be sure, refer to the boundaries within which Polish sovereignty will be exercised and thus does not touch the crux of the differences between the Soviet and the Polish Governments. But raising this issue at a time when it could stir up fear and friction but could not be settled was an error of statesmanship in the first place, and it is to be hoped that Mr. Stalin has decided to adopt the American and British principle of leaving all frontier disputes to be discussed as part of a general settlement in which these questions may assume less importance in a new pattern of world security.

Even now the border lines are secondary to the main question. What worries the Poles and other small neighbors as the result of Russia's recent claims is not so much where their frontiers run as their future status within the frontiers. Are they to be able to treat with the Great Power on the east as independent nations, free within the bounds of "good neighborliness" to conduct their internal affairs and follow their own way of life? This basic question Mr. Stalin seems to answer in the affirmative when he declares that the Soviet Union desires a strong Poland and especially when he makes a future alliance for mutual assistance contingent on the wishes of the Polish people.

Such an assurance, by going back to the agreement made with General Sikorski, offers an opening for healing the disastrous breach in the United Nations' front. The Polish Premier widens the way to a new understanding in his address on the Polish National Day. While firmly reasserting Poland's rights and giving a picture of the Polish part in the war which impressively refutes the fantastic charge of passivity, much less sympathy, toward the Germans, he declared that "the securing of friendly relations with Soviet Russia has been and continues to be one of the main guiding principles of the whole Polish Government and the whole Polish nation."

Mr. Stalin's statement, like General Sikorski's, corresponds to the realities in the relations not only between Russia and Poland but between Russia and all her western neighbors, and by extension to all the nations banded together to make a securer world. We are entering a new epoch and a new dimension in international relations. The problems of yesterday must be weighed in the scale and solved in the terms of tomorrow. It is not too much to say that the two Powers making the most difficult transition toward cooperation with others are the Soviet Union and the United States. The chief significance of the Soviet leader's terse message to America is as a sign that Russia, like ourselves, perhaps even more unwillingly, is moving with the inexorable tides of history.

This is a clipping from page 14 of the New York Times for [illegible]
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Soviet Premier Offers Tie With Poland After War

Says in Note to New York Times Correspondent That He Wants a Mutual Assistance Pact With Poles Against Germans

By RALPH PARKER

Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

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MOSCOW, May 5—Premier Joseph Stalin in a personal letter to your correspondent, received early this morning, has emphatically stated his government's desire to see established after the war a strong and independent Poland.

Premier Stalin said post-war relations between the Union of Soviet oScial Republics and Poland would be based on mutual respect and solid good neighborliness and if the Polish people desired on a mutual assistance alliance directed against their common enemy, the Germans.

Mr. Stalin's letter was in reply to two questions on Polish-Soviet relations submitted to the Premlin on the previous day.

TEXT OF THE LETTER

The officially authorized English translation follows:

Dear Mr. Parker:

On May 3 I received your two questions concerning Polish-Soviet relations.

Here are my answers:

1. Question: "Does the Government of the U. S. S. R. desire to see a strong and independent Poland after the defeat of Hitler's Germany?"

Answer: Unquestionably, it does.

2. Question: "On what fundaments is it your opinion that the relations between Poland and the U. S. S. R. should be based after the war?"

Answer: Upon the fundament of solid good neighborly relations

Joseph Stalin
The New York Times

Continued on Page Four

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Times for May 6, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Continued From Page One

and mutual respect or, should the Polish people so desire, upon the fundament of an alliance providing for mutual assistance against the Germans as the chief enemies of the Soviet Union and Poland.

With respect,

J. STALIN.

May 4, 1943.

The original Russian text, on a single sheet of chalk-white paper, bore Premier Stalin's signature in bright green crayon.

Substantial Gain Seen

In this important statement about the principles of post-war European settlement, Premier Stalin would seem to have made a substantial advance toward improvement of Polish-Soviet relations. The terse and categoric reply to the first question constitues a statement that the pledge of the Soviet Government's desire to see a strong and independent Poland made in December, 1941, by Premier Stalin to Premier Fladyslaw Sikorski of the Polish Government in London is still the cornerstone of Soviet-Polish relations.

On that assurance it should be possible to rebuild the bridge between the Soviet and Polish Premiers. "Strong and independent" are words about the meaning of which there can be little or no ambiguity.

The alliance for mutual assistance against the Germans which Premier Stalin's reply suggests would be a natural development from good-neighborly relations established between the two countries after their common enemy's defeat but which, he emphasizes, could only be achieved should it meet a Polish popular desire, would meet understandable Russian determination to organize its western zone of security against the possibility of recurrence of the German menace.

But such a self-defense organization between independent sovereign States is, in Premier Stalin's view, perfectly reconcilable with good-neighborliness and mutual respect between partners.

For Early Agreements

The Soviet Union's attitude toward the Allies's post-war plans for Europe, it is safe to assume, will in the main depend on how much agreement can be reached before hostilities close between all the interested parties about that Eastern European zone that lies between Russia and Germany, the people and the State of which, in Premier Stalin's words, will "live on." For the last thing the Soviet Union is likely to desire is a state of confusion and enfeeblement in those vital areas during years when the U.S.S.R. will be engaged on the arduous task of reconstructing its own liberated regions of the west.

As has been pointed out before, Russian eyes gazing from the frontiers see land, not an ocean, in the direction where the traditional enemy lives. That land for a considerable distance on each side of that frontier is devastated or enfeebled by war and alien occupation. It is as much to Russia's interest to see order, discipline and mutual respect between the various peoples dwelling in those lands as it would be to Britain's to keep the sea around her own coasts safe for all woh use them, were there danger after the war of activities in them of rival submarine fleets, of deadly mines broken from moorings and of pirate vessels.

In its westward advance the Red Army, cooperating closely with the local civil population, has established order out of chaos and destruction. Soon that advance will be resumed, and with it will spread the tide of order. When it reaches the Soviet frontiers it will be in Russia's interest that the post-war future of Poland and its relations with the Soviet Union should be free from doubt and that the outlines of a strong and independent Poland should be a visible rebirth of a State conscious of where its true enemy and real friends are to be found.

This is a clipping from page ____ of the New York Times for

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STALIN HELD TRYING TO ALTER REACTION

His Replies on Poland Viewed in Washington as Showing Concern Over Rift Opinion

ALLIANCE AIM QUESTIONED

Some Observers Wonder Whether Soviet Premier Seeks Bases in Post-War Poland

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, May 5—The replies of Premier Joseph Stalin to the questions propounded to him by Ralph Parker, Moscow correspondent of THE NEW YORK TIMES, were generally interpreted here today as indicative of Russian concern over an adverse reaction in the world, and particularly among small European States, to the Russian-Polish controversy.

It was also surmised that Premier Stalin might have been disposed to answer the questions at this time in view of the conversations he will hold soon with Joseph E. Davies as the special representative of President Roosevelt.

The replies were regarded as in line with Premier Stalin's May 1 Order of the Day to the Red Army, in which he stressed the desirability of collaboration with the United Nations.

Important, Say Poles

Polish circles regarded Mr. Stalin's answers as highly important and pointed out that they came just after the Polish Premier, General Wladislaw Sikorski, in his speech in London yesterday on Poland's National Day, had said that one of the guiding principals of Polish policy would continued to be friendly relations with Russia.

Neither the Russian Ambassador, Maxim Litvinoff, who is to leave for Moscow this week to report, nor the Polish Ambassador, Jan Ciechanowski, would add further comment to what Premier Stalin had said.

The White House and the State Department also would make no comment. Congressional reaction was mixed, ranging from encouragement to reserve or even skepticism.

The questions and answers were given out as Mr. Davies was making final preparations for his departure. He conferred during the day with Sumner Welles Under-Secretary of State. Now, if Mr. Davies raises the Russian-Polish question, it was suggested by diplomatic observers, Premier Stalin can say his attitude was expressed in his statement to Mr. Parker.

"The question naturally arises," it was remarked in these circles, "Is Mr. Stalin pulling a rug from under Mr. Davies?"

Our Pacts Recalled

The suggestion of a mutual assistance with Poland is not new in principle. Russia in the past has declared for such arrangements with the Baltic States and with Finland. Here again, just what that may mean, it was pointed out, would also have to await definition by events. For example, it was asked by some whether mutual assistance woud contemplate the establishement of military bases in Poland in order to help her to protect herself.

There was keen interest here in the fact that Premier Stalin through his reply had tacitly admitted that the reaction abroad to his Polish policy had been adverse. This has been particularly acute in the smaller States of Europe, and in Turkey, according to reports received here. Countries are wondering, these reports say, whether they are to be absorbed or penetrated in Russia emerges as the victor in the war.

Yugoslavia has been mentioned as a State, which is concerned on this score. Constantin Fotitch, the Yugoslav Ambassador, conferred today with President Roosevelt, but it was not disclosed whether this subject was broached.

The Ambassador recently returned from a visit to his government in London, and he gave the President messages from King Peter and the heads of the Yugoslav Government. The messages, he said, reflected confidence in victory, adding:

"Our confidence has never been so great as it is today, particularly since the good news from Tunisia."

This is a clipping from page 4 of the New York Times for May 6, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

STALIN SEEN BINDING ALLIES IN CLOSE TIE

New Tone in May Day Order Linked to Neighbors' Alarm Over Clash With Poles

By HAROLD CALLENDER

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, May 3—The novel praise of the Western Allies in the Soviet press yesterday, supplementing the fuller recognition of their cooperation given in Premier Joseph Stalin's May Day order of the day, was regarded here today as indicating a new military solidarity with the West in a common struggle against Adolf Hitler.

But these reassuring official utterances were interpreted as having no immediate political implications and as leaving frontier issues and related questions still to be solved.

It was noted here that Moscow had supplied that official acknowledgement of the Western Allies' contribution to victory that Admiral William H. Standley, the American Ambassador to Russia, had complained was lacking. Mr. Stalin's May Day tribute to "the victorious troops of our Allies" in Africa was contrasted with his statement on Feb. 22 that the Red Army alone bore "the whole weight of the war."

This more generous tone from the Russian leader was thought by some observers here to be not unrelated to the alarm caused among Russia's neighbors in Asia as well as in Europe by Moscow's brusque treatment of the Polish Government, with which it suspended relations a week ago. To those lesser States the Russian attitude toward Poland did not seem a good augury for the good-neighbor policy by Moscow for which they and Russia's Allies had hoped.

Took New Front for Granted

It was pointed out that Mr. Stalin, in speaking of Allied air attacks on the Axis as presaging a second front, took such a front for granted. While commending the Allied effort in Africa, he made it clear that he expected much more and did not abandon his claim on the Western Allies for this type of assistance, which Russians believe is overdue.

When that front is opened, it is agreed here, the greatest Russian military complaint against the Western powers will disappear and the full solidarity in the war that has hitherto been wanting will be nearer, especially since Mr. Stalin, although he did not accept the invitation to join the conference that finally met at Casablanca, has now endorsed the decision taken there to demand unconditional surrender of the Axis.

This is taken as disposing of the rumors, current here and elsewhere after Mr. Stalin's statement of Feb. 22, of a possible separate peace by Russia when she had liberated her own territories.

Mr. Stalin's absence from the Roosevelt-Churchill-General Staff meeting in Africa has been explained by saying he could not leave Moscow for more than a day or so and hence was unable to make a rendezvous at Cairo or in Alaska, as suggested. There is still hope that a Roosevelt-Stalin meeting might carry the new solidarity beyond the military sphere, but it is pointed out that the President would be unable to make to the Russian leader commitments such as the British have made in their twenty-year alliance.

In spite of reports from London that the United States had assured the Poles it would not recognize Russia's territorial claims during this war, it is said authoritatively here that this government has made and will make no commitments one way or the other regarding Russia's frontiers.

It is one of the Russian grievances that Washington still recognizes the Ministers of the three Baltic States incorporated in the Russian realm in 1940. Washington has pressed Finland not to aid Germany in an offensive against Russia but has been unable to get Finland out of the war by an agreement with Russia on frontiers.

While Washington has not been disposed to emphasize these frontier differences between Russia and her neighbors, Moscow has thrust them into the foreground by proclaiming Russia's intention to retain her annexations of 1939 and 1940. Nobody here sees any sign of recession from this position at present. This is the conclusion resulting from the peace feelers for Finland and from the Russian break with the Polish Government.

Meanwhile satisfaction is found in the new solidarity in the military field.

Russians More Confident

Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, May 3—The Soviet press is still concerning itself principally with Premier Stalin's May Day order of the day, which had a perceptibly steadying and encouraging effect on public opinion.

A growth of what might be called the "strategy minded" attitude, noticeable through last Winter, is revealing itself in an increased interest in maps and in accounts of operations beyond the Russo-German front. Both confidence and expectation are raised.

It is undeniable that in the minds of some there have been suspicions that Britain and the United States deliberately withheld full-scale intervention in the war because it seemed desirable to the dominant interests in those lands that their armies and domestic economies should be strong enough at the end of hostilities to impose a settlement in which overstrained Russia, intent on problems of reconstruction at home, might be forced to see her interests ignored or deliberately opposed.

It is difficult to remove this suspicion, for to many it would seem to have been supported by the evidence of twenty-five years' European history. The idea that there are powerful influences in London and Washington working for acceptance of the view that the closest possible cooperation between the Allies is the cornerstone of post-war policy has not gained much ground while the suspicions remained.

In this atmosphere the Russians were acutely sensitive to anti-Soviet currents of opinion, which it appeared to them still counted for something in Allied lands.

The canvassing of certain plans for post-war Europe by European personalities, who despite their association with past catastrophe still seemed to have political and social influence in Washington and London, is given an importance in Moscow that is not easily appreciated elsewhere.

Premier Stalin has now given supreme authority to the view that had been gradually spreading through the masses, that Britain and America are in line with Russia on the battlefield. One can now look forward confidently to the final disappearance of suspicion from quarters where it could have harmed Allied interests.

This is a clipping from page ____ of the New York Times for ____

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FILE

Pravda Warns Soviet People Of New Attack

(By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

MOSCOW, May 2.—Preparation for forthcoming decisive battles is the main theme of Pravda's comment on the May Day slogans issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

"For a second time the Land of Soviets is meeting May Day in conditions of the great patriotic war," says Pravda, "amidst tense, severe struggle against the German fascist invader for the liberation of Soviet soil from the Hitler brigands.

"The hearts of all freedom-loving peoples united for struggle and victory over mankind's mortal enemy, are burning with hatred for the German fascist enslavers.

"The struggle of progressive mankind against Hitler tyranny is conducted by the Anglo-Soviet-American fighting alliance. As a result of the heroic resistance of the Soviet people, as a result of the major defeats inflicted by the Red Army on the German fascist hordes, our Allies had time for mobilizing their reserves, and were able to accumulate strength and prepare their troops for striking crushing blows at the enemy.

"On the African war theatre, Anglo-American troops have dealt serious defeats to the Italo-German troops, have ousted them from Libya and are now knocking them out of Tunisia.

TURN OF THE WAR

"The Red Army's winter offensive has caused a turn in the whole course of the war. The enemy suffered a heavy defeat, but he is not yet routed. He is still strong and is feverishly mobilizing the the remnants of his reserves exerting every effort to compel his vassals to dispatch the maximum number of cannon fodder to the Soviet-German front.

"Gripped by mad fury, dreading the approaching hour of grim reckoning, the enemy is preparing for a desperate struggle, preparing new adventures.

"During the war the Soviet people and their Red Army gained good knowledge of the enemy who doesn't hesitate before the most monstrous crime, the most unprecedented atrocities for the sake of his predatory aim of conquest. That is why the Red Army is preparing for the forthcoming battles with special thoroughness and the utmost strain of effort.

"But the struggle against the hated enemy is in progress not only on the front but behind the lines as well, where daring Soviet men and women guerrillas are operating in the enemy rear.

"The Soviet people firmly remember that they must repay the enemy for all the unparalleled crimes, for burned cities and villages, for the blood of the Soviet people, for their brothers and sisters abducted into German slavery.

"The Soviet people and the Red Army will never forget all those who are still suffering in captivity under the yoke of the German invaders.

"May First is the day of militant review of all forces of the working people, the day of review of the front and the rear. Just like the front, the hinterland is also preparing for the forthcoming decisive battles. Both town and countryside are fighting for victory.

This is a clipping from page 2 of the DAILY WORKER

Date May 3, 1943

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Abroad

Stalin Recognizes His Western Allies

16

By ANNE O'HARE McCORMICK

There is a striking contrast between Josef Stalin's May Day broadcast and his Order of the Day to the Red Army last February. In the earlier pronouncement he did not mention his allies. He bluntly asserted that the Soviet Union was fighting alone. Although he spoke after Casablanca, he made no reference to the war council of Churchill and Roosevelt or to their efforts to induce him to be present. He intimated very plainly that he did not consider the African campaign a second front. The declaration seemed intended to give notice that Russia was fighting her own war, and everything that has come out of Moscow since, up to and including the break with Poland, was calculated to underline that message.

Now, less than ten weeks later, Stalin not only recognizes that he has allies but pays high tribute to the part they are playing in the war. In the May Day order he spoke of the "victorious troops of our allies" defeating the Italo-German forces in Africa. He declared that the battle of Tunisia and the devastating blows delivered by "the gallant Anglo-American air force" on war industry centers in Germany and Italy are "presaging the creation of a second front in Europe."

The new note is immediately taken up by the Soviet press. "Pravda" published yesterday a front-page editorial echoing Stalin's words and speaking with unwonted enthusiasm of the "comradeship-in-arms of the freedom-loving peoples, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States of America."

Straight Talk From London

This change of tone, immediately following the diplomatic rupture with Poland which caused such disturbance in London and Washington, is not so puzzling as it seems at first sight. There has been some straight talk between London and Moscow in recent days on the subject of preserving unity among the Allies at all costs, and Stalin responds to straight talk. It has been made pretty clear to the Kremlin that a rival Polish government set up in Moscow will not be recognized.

Winston Churchill, in a message read at a celebration of the Polish National Day in London, took occasion to remind the Poles that Poland's liberation has been brought nearer by the joint efforts of the United Nations during the past year, while assuring them that the heavy sacrifices they have made to the common cause "will be crowned by the restoration, to which we all look forward, of a great and independent Poland." This statement does not foreclose the frontier question or preclude a shake-up in the Polish Cabinet. At an opportune moment, however, it definitely re-emphasizes Britain's deep interest in the future of Poland.

It may be that Stalin acclaimed his allies at this time because he realizes that his breach with Poland has been effectively capitalized by the Nazis as proof that the Grand Alliance is only a false front. But that is not the only reason. There are much larger implications to be drawn from the May Day declaration.

In the first place, it confirms the impression that Hitler would not have exploited the Polish issue if he had not been sure there was no possibility of a separate peace with Russia. Stalin said as much when he declared that "the Fascists are beginning to talk frequently of peace." They would like, he added, to make a separate peace with Britain and the United States at the expense of Russia, or with Russia at the expense of the United States and Britain. But what kind of a peace could this be? he asks, and answers by adopting for the first time as his own the aim President Roosevelt expressed at Casablanca and repeated in his recent broadcast from Monterrey. "Is it not clear," Stalin repeated, "that only the complete rout of the Hitlerite armies and the unconditional surrender of Hitlerite Germans can bring Europe to peace?"

Outlook to Victory

The cheers for the Allies ..... that Stalin is at last convinced that the Western powers are preparing to attack Germany in force. This interpretation is borne out by other signs. Since Admiral Standley's complaint that the Russian people were kept in ignorance of American aid, the Soviet policy has changed, not only in that respect but in the disclosure of military and naval information. Major General James H. Burns, executive of the British and American joint munitions board, since his arrival ten days ago to study the lend-lease situation, has received more cooperation from Soviet authorities than any envoy so far sent to Russia. Joseph W. Davies, who is soon to follow, should be persona grata in Moscow.

Stalin's use of the term "unconditional surrender" is more significant than his cheers. It means that he is now confident that the Germans will be beaten. This is highly important on the eve of a campaign that will decide the issue and duration of the war. Already we see the forces putting out feelers all along the Eastern Front. Military observers here believe that the big push will be made in the south, but the Russians expect the Germans to strike in the north and center, for Leningrad and Moscow. Wherever the blow falls, it is evident that Stalin no longer thinks he will fight alone. His May Day speech gave a testimony not so much to a change in his attitude as to the change in the whole war outlook.

This is a clipping from page 16 of the New York Times for May 3, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

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FILE

Two Front War Frightens Nazis

By K. Hofman
(Soviet Political Analyst)

MOSCOW, May 2 (ICN).—The fourth war Spring differs for Germany from the preceding ones in that it is a Spring following heavy defeats inflicted by the Red Army on the Hitlerite troops. The defeats of the German and Italian troops in North Africa are now being added to the unfavorable results of the winter campaign on the Soviet - German Front for the Axis powers.

The preparations of the German fascists for new military adventures are characterized by an increased mobilization of reserves of manpower, raw materials and provisions in the vassal and occupied countries. The frequent meetings betwen the separate Hitlerite vassals and their meetings with Hitler indicate that there are a number of unsettled problems.

Hitler's vassals are aware that Germany is more dependent on their help than was the case last year. They are trying to raise their price and get Hitler to make more compensations for their supplies of soldiers, labor power and raw materials.

BIG LOSSES

This particularly refers to those countries which despite the big losses they suffered on the Soviet-German Front nevertheless succeeded in preserving part of their armies and reserves for reinforcements. This refers above all to Italy, Hungary and, to a lesser degree, Rumania. Bulgaria occupies a specific place.

The maneuvers of some of the vassals and their bargaining in cannon fodder are to a certain extent indicative of the difficulties Germany is experiencing. They also speak of Hitler's decreasing prestige inside the bloc.

Actually, however, the changes between Germany and her accomplices in Europe are not such as would make it impossible for Hitler to reckon on his vassals for carrying out most of his demands. Only the strong, combined blows of the united powers as a whole at the Hitlerite bloc, and, above all, at Germany herself, can lead to the collapse of the fascist coalition.

In the course of its winter campaign the Red Army laid the foundation for the destruction of the Hitlerite Germans. The Soviet troops inflicted serious blows on the Hitlerite army by routing and destroying not only dozens of German divisions but practically all the forces thrown on the Soviet-German Front by Hitler's allies.

CHANGE IN AFRICA

Of course Hitler is compelled to take into account the fact that the changed situation in North Africa and the loss of Tunis in the near future give rise to the danger of military operations being transferred to the territories of south and southeast Europe.

But the Hitlerites continue to look upon the Soviet-German Front as the main and decisive front. Indicative of the Hitlerite preparations for new adventures on this front is the fact that the German command is leaving only covering units in Western Europe and in the Balkans.

The situation in Europe, and above all the Soviet-German front, holds Hitler's main attention. Hitler would undoubtedly have rendered more substantial help to the German and Italian forces in Africa had not the German troops been tied down by the Red Army.

But this is out of the question for him at present. A year ago the situation was different. Then the Axis powers were still in a position to draw up and discuss the adventurist perspectives of conquering the "continents." Today all of their thoughts are concerned with how to hold the European continent and to avoid utter defeat.

BITTER FIGHT AHEAD

The German fascists know that further defeats will inevitably strengthen the liberation struggle of the European peoples against Hitler's feudal "New Order." The Red Army knows the strong and weak sides of the enemy. It knows that Hitler will still be able to reinforce his army at the expense of his European rear, and that a bitter fight is ahead with an enemy who is still strong and who will desperately resist.

But the Red Army is strong enough and can support itself on the moral and political unity of the Soviet people. Moreover, as distinct from the German army, it has powerful allies.

The Germans and their accomplices sense that the opening of the Second Front in Europe is inevitable. To reassure their rear, the Hitlerites are sowing the illusion that the "Atlantic rampart" allegedly will protect Germany against the blows of the Anglo-American troops, while the main forces of the German army are operating on the Soviet-Nazi Front.

Hitler is in every conceivable way trying to strengthen his bloc. He is feverishly preparing new adventures on the Soviet-German Front in order to avoid war on two fronts in Europe. **But it is obvious that the concentration of Germany's main forces on the Soviet-German Front will make it easier for the Allied forces to shift their military operations to the European continent.**

ADDITIONAL INDEXING

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FILE

Stalin's Order

IN STALIN'S "Order of the Day," the note of high confidence in what the United Nations have already achieved is mingled with sober emphasis on the tremendous tasks that lie ahead. In estimating the results of the recent campaigns, Stalin lays great emphasis on the beginning of coalition warfare by the USSR and its allies and underscores their results in these words:

> "Thus the blows on the enemy from the east by the Red Army have, for the first time since the beginning of the war, merged with the blow from the west by our Allies into one single, common blow.
>
> "All these circumstances taken together have shaken the Hitlerites' war machine to its foundations, have changed the course of the war and created the preliminary conditions necessary for victory over Hitlerite Germany."

Summarizing the great achievements of the Red Army's winter offensive, Stalin then cites the simultaneous rout of the Axis in Africa, plus the "devastating blows" to Hitler's war industry which our own, and the Royal Air Force have delivered. These latter developments, Stalin says, presage the creation of a second front.

Nevertheless, all this taken together establishes only the preliminary conditions for victory. Victory will not come automatically, or as he says, "as part of the present course of events." We have to follow up what has already been done. To make the enemy's catastrophe a fact, he says, "two or three powerful blows" are necessary both from the west and from the east on Hitler's Germany.

The Soviet press last week emphasized the **imminence of large-scale developments on the eastern front. Obviously, only equally large-scale developments in western Europe, and timed to coincide with the battles on the Eastern Front is the only way to really capitalize on what has been done so far.**

Premier Stalin also points out that in the severe crisis rocking the Axis, our enemies are beginning to talk frequently of peace. "They would like to conclude peace with Britain and the United States under conditions of their separation from the Soviet Union, and vice versa"—separate the Soviet Union from its allies.

And here Stalin reaffirms that peace is possible **"only with the complete rout of the Hitlerite armies and the unconditional surrender of Hitlerite Germany."** In dwelling on this theme at some length, Stalin points up, not only the crisis within the Axis, but the manifold dangers to the United Nations.

For many months now, a big anti-Soviet campaign has been whipped up in our own country: a campaign of insinuation against the USSR over alleged boundary issues; of direct slanders, as in the Alter-Ehrlich affair: of outright complicity with pro-fascists as in the continued cooperation of defeatist elements with the Polish Embassy in Washington.

Stalin's characterization and exposure of the enemy's peace maneuvers is a blow against all intrigues designed to divide the United Nations. It discloses the ultimate source of all efforts to divide the United Nations in Berlin. It makes it obligatory for our own nation, and especially the labor movement to take up the offensive against all negotiated peace forces, against all anti-

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Soviet provocations as inimical to our own stake in the United Nations.

Likewise, we must expose those defeatists who campaign for a revision of the Casablanca conference strategy. What Hitler fears is that the Casablanca strategy will actually be carried into effect, and very soon. We must do what the enemy fears, and avoid everything that the enemy wants.

All the conditions for smashing Hitler exist. Everything necessary must be done to assure the defeat of Hitler in 1943.

RUSSO-GERMAN QUARREL INVOLVES OTHER ALLIES

War Strategy and Peace Settlements Are the Background of the Break

By RAYMOND DANIELL
Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, May 1—The full extent of the diplomatic victory won by Joseph Goebbels, German Propaganda Minister, when Vyacheslaff Molotoff, Soviet Foreign Commissar, tendered Tadeusz Romer, Polish Ambassador, his passport cannot be gauged as yet. If the severance of diplomatic relations between the Russians and the Polish Government in exile is the end of it, it remains a notable achievement for the Nazis and a serious blow to the cause of the United Nations. But if it goes further and is allowed to arouse hostility between Britain and the United States, for instance, or between Moscow and the other great powers allied with Russia, it will be a catastrophe.

Thus far the weight of opinion here, and apparently in the United States as well, has tended to blame the Poles for political stupidity in asking the International Red Cross to investigate Herr Goebbels's charge that the Red Army massacred thousands of Polish officers in the Katyn forest near Smolensk, which has been in German hands for two years. Nobody here, however, finds it any easier to credit the Russian charge that the Poles have been conniving with the Nazis than to swallow Herr Goebbels's story that a mass grave of slain Polish officers was suddenly discovered after all this time.

Possibility of Harm

In adopting a drastic arbitrary measure against the Poles, Moscow is obviously relying heavily upon the sympathy of the British people and the keen appreciation of their government as well as the people themselves of Russia's importance to them in their own war of survival. It is by no means as certain that there is as lively appreciation in the United States of Russia's part in this war, and if in the United States the onus of responsibility for disrupting harmony among the United Nations should shift to the Soviet, it might lead to a public clamor for curtailment of aid to Russia that might have grave consequences not alone upon the fortunes of the Soviets but for the whole United Nations' cause as well. That is one of the stakes Herr Goebbels is believed to be seeking. The fact is that the breach between the Soviets and Poles is not a simple issue of right and wrong.

The appeal to the International Red Cross for an investigation was an excuse rather than an underlying cause for the Russian action.

The causes of the friction and mutual suspicion between the two countries antedate this war and have been aggravated time after time since Adolf Hitler marched into Poland and the Red Army went into the eastern half under cover of Nazi aggression.

Russian Suspicions

On the Russian side there has been suspicion of the Polish landowner reactionaries who still exercise considerable influence in Polish councils. Thus it was that when Poland and Czechoslovakia undertook negotiations for a post-war federation and planned to extend it to other States in Central Europe, Russia adopted the attitude that it was an attempt to establish a new cordon sanitaire and induce the Czechs to break off the negotiations that had begun with the blessing of the British Foreign Office.

Then there is the problem of upward of 300,000 Polish refugees in Russia—a problem that is closely related to the question of Poland's post-war frontiers. These people, many of whom fled to Russia to escape Nazi aggression, have been declared Soviet citizens. Russia is relying on the plebiscite taken in 1939, in which it was announced 98 per cent of the voters favored incorporation of what is known as the Polish Ukraine. The Soviet has long laid claim to Poland's eastern territory.

It is the assumption that, having gone to war with Germany rather than cede Danzig to Herr Hitler, Poland is now faced with the loss of half her territory to Russia. That underlies the anti-Russian sentiment forever cropping up in the Polish press to the intense anger of Moscow.

Lack of Candor

Part of the trouble undoubtedly has arisen from lack of candor in dealing with the Poles. Premier Wladyslaw Sikorski himself is keenly aware that Poland cannot survive as a nation unless the United Nations win the war, but some of his followers do not seem to appreciate that one of the conditions of the resurrection of Poland is friendly relationship with Russia.

The view here is that after the war is won the influence of the Soviet is bound to be the chief factor in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, some Poles appear to rely on the United States or Britain to guarantee their frontiers or maintain their security if trouble arises between them and their eastern neighbor.

That is freely said and openly discussed in London by every one with every one except the Poles. The Times of London was speaking realistically in its editorial be-

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fore Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's visit to Washington when it suggested a kind of Russo-British codominion over Europe, and The Statesman and Nation declared today that it was "a pity" that Mr. Eden should have given an interview in the United States calculated to encourage the Poles to believe that the British Government did not accept the viewpoint of The Times.

Russia's Interests

There is no sense in blinking the fact that however altruistic the war and peace aims of Britain and the United States may be, Russia is fighting her own war for her own purposes. Chief among them are the struggle for self-preservation against an immediate peril and insurance against any future attack. The security of the Soviet demands a strategic frontier including part of Finland and the Baltic States and parts of Rumania, and Premier Joseph Stalin means to have it.

The simple truth is that at no time since Russia was attacked by Germany has there been complete confidence and trust on her part in her Western Allies. First there was the unfounded suspicion that forces of appeasement were still strong enough in this country to engineer a negotiated peace, then there was the suspicion that Britain was not pulling her weight against the Nazis and later the darker suspicion that the second front was deliberately delayed until Russia was so weakened and Britain and the United States so strong in armament and organized manpower that they could dominate the Peace Conference.

Even the Anglo-Russian treaty signed a year ago did not completely allay these suspicions, although it did pave the way for an improvement in relations, so far as this country was concerned, and there is no doubt that Moscow has a warmer feeling today toward London than toward the city of Washington.

There has been no corresponding growth of affection toward the United States, but up to the time of the Polish break there was a noticeable spirit of greater trust and confidence between Moscow and London. There has not even been a protest to the British Government regarding the freedom with which Polish newspapers published here have abused the Russians, although it is notoriously difficult for them to appreciate the value of a free press or the British Government's policy of treating governments in exile as sovereign States. How far the British can continue their policy of non-interference in the foreign policy of exiled governments remains to be seen, however.

It is noteworthy that of all the exiled governments, the Russians' relations with the Czechs and Fighting French are the most cordial. They have warmed to President Eduard Benes ever since he yielded to their demand to terminate plans for confederation with the Poles, and they have gone out of their way to confer high decorations on Czech soldiers fighting beside the Red Army. Friendship for General Charles de Gaulle has increased materially since Ferdinand Grenier, French Communist leader, joined forces with him.

Feeling Against Yugoslavs

To the Russians, the behavior of the Poles falls into the same pattern as the encouragement of General Draja Mikhailovitch and of Otto of Habsburg in the United States and the Allied recognition of Admiral Jean François Darlan.

Both Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt are keenly aware not only of the necessity for close cooperation with Russia but for healing the breaches in the United Nations that have occurred and preventing any further schisms in the grand alliance. It will not be an easy task to overcome old suspicions and fears, and it is doubtful if the problem will be completely solved until the Allied armies have opened a second front on the Continent of Europe. One bridgehead on the Continent captured and permanently held, even if it is represented by a front only a few miles long, would do more to end Russia's suspicions of her allies than a dozen treaties and a score of conferences of Allied leaders.

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FILE

NKO Communist Party Situation

Determination Key Of Soviet Slogans

(By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

MOSCOW, April 30.—Praise for the "valiant Anglo-American troops" in North Africa and for the "Anglo-Soviet-American fighting alliance over the enemies of mankind" are well up in front in the long list of slogans issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) for May Day in the Soviet Union.

The leading general slogans were as follows:

Long live May Day—day of review of the fighting forces of the working people! Workers of all lands, unite for the struggle against the German fascist invaders.

Down with the Hitlerite imperialists—the robbers who have violated peace among the peoples, who have hurled hundreds of millions of working people into the abyss of war.

We salute the peoples of Europe fighting against Hitlerite imperialism! Patriots of the European countries! Rise up in struggle for your liberation from the fascist yoke! Overthrow the Hitlerite tyranny.

Oppressed brother Slavs! Fan the flames of the sacred peoples' war against the Hitlerite imperialists—the mortal enemies of Slavdom! Long live the fighting unity of the Slav people.

Long live the victory of the Anglo-Soviet-American fighting alliance over the enemies of mankind—the German fascist enslavers.

Long live the valiant Anglo-American troops routing the German and Italian fascists in North Africa.

Long live the glorious Red Army heroically fighting for the honor, freedom and independence of our native land against the German fascist invaders.

Men of the Red Army! Millions of Soviet people suffering under the German fascist yoke are awaiting you as their liberators. Forward to the west for the liberation of Soviet soil.

Death to the German occupationists.

Red Army men! Tirelessly perfect your military training, strengthen the discipline, order and organization in our army! Fight the Hitlerite scoundrels until they are utterly exterminated.

* * *

Other slogans addressed to Red Army men call on them to strengthen and follow up the successes of the winter battles and not to yield an inch of recaptured soil to the enemy. **"Prepare for decisive battles against the German enslavers!"** they are told.

Separate slogans are addressed to the infantrymen, airmen, tankmen, artillerymen, mortar crews, men of the Navy, tommy gunners, scouts, signalmen, medical personnel of the Red Army, and to the commissary workers.

* * *

The peoples in the temporarily occupied regions—Russians, Ukrainians, Byelo-Russians, Moldavians, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians—are called upon to fan the flame of the popular guerrilla movement to exterminate the German scum.

Men and women guerrillas! Strengthen your blows in the enemy rear; demolish the railways, mines, bridges and means of communications; wipe out the enemy's manpower! Do not allow the Germans to burn our villages and towns! Save the Soviet people from being driven into German slavery and from extermination by the Hitlerite executioners! Vengeance! Death to the German scoundrels!

The universal military training of the men and women citizens of the USSR strengthens our defense. Soviet patriots! Study military art! Be skilful defenders of our native land.

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FIVE

"All forces in support of our heroic Red Army and our glorious Navy! All forces of the people for the rout of the enemy!" (Stalin).

Working people of the Soviet Union! Care for the families of Red Armymen is part of all of our care for the Red Army.

Working men and working women, engineers and technicians producing arms and munitions for the front are called upon to increase the output of rifles, tommy guns, machine guns, mortars, guns, shells. The workers of tank and aircraft plants are called upon to supply the Red Army with more excellent fighting machines. "The more tanks, the closer the hour of victory over the enemy."

The slogans call upon workers and engineers in different industries to increase the output of coal and metal for tanks, planes, guns, machine guns, shells and textiles for Red Army uniforms and for the population; and for foodstuffs for the front and for the civilian population.

The railway workers are called upon to carry out government transport assignments on time; the workers of the marine and river transports to deliver the cargoes to the front and rear at a heightened tempo.

Slogans are addressed to the men and women collective farmers, to the men and women workers of the machine and tractor stations and of state farms; and to agronomists and tractor drivers to fight for a high harvest of all agricultural crops and for an increase in the number of heads of cattle and products.

The Soviet intelligentsia is called upon to devote all their energy and knowledge to fighting the German fascist enslavers.

Soviet women and youth are called upon to fully master their industrial jobs and to tirelessly increase the productivity of labor.

The working people of the towns and villages liberated from the German invaders are called upon rapidly to restore their ruined industry and agriculture.

The last slogans read: Communists and YCLers! Be in the vanguard of th fighters against the German fascist invader.

Long live the freedom and independence of our glorious Soviet land.

Long live the inviolable friendship of the peoples of our country.

Long live the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the party of Lenin and Stalin—the organizer of our struggle for victory over the German fascist invaders.

Under the banner of Lenin, under the leadership of Stalin—forward to the rout of the German occupationists! Expel them from the confines of our country!

May Day Sees Soviets Preparing For Vital Battles, Says Yaroslavsky

By Emelian Yaroslavsky
(Published in "Red Star")
(By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

MOSCOW, April 30.—We are meeting May First, 1943, knowing that difficult decisive battles lie ahead. The enemy has lost his military advantages. During the winter he lost over 6,000 planes on the Soviet-German front alone. His tank columns are not yet sapped of their strength, but opposing his tank columns today there are already no less strong anti-tank formations and guns. Last winter alone the enemy lost over 9,000 tanks on the Soviet-German front and more than 20,000 guns.

Is the enemy able to make good these losses? Of course, if he is given time. And time, as Stalin said, doesn't wait. The enemy is pursuing "total mobilization." He is not yet smashed.

If his hands are not tied in the West, as was the case heretofore, he may still embark upon new major military adventures and begin an offensive on one or another sector.

But if he succeeds in launching this offensive, he will be obliged to throw into action an army substantially different in many respects from the Army which conducted the offensives in 1941 and 1942.

Advancing at that time was an army confident of its victory — crack German troops. Today the Germans lack this confidence in victory despite all of Goebbels' hysteria and threats of severest repressions at the disposal of the Hitler bandits against the "incredulous."

During this time the Red Army has accumulated vast military experience, it has learned to hate the enemy with a burning hatred which nothing less than the death of the enemy can appease. We know that we have the means with which to pay back for unprecedented mockery and humiliation.

WAR FACTORIES

Day and night our factories are forging weapons for delivering decisive blows to the enemy. These weapons are being steadily perfected. We know that, let us say, if the Germans are today perfecting a tank and tomorrow a plane we can find the means to destroy these perfected tanks and planes. We know that in our powerful plants and shops with millions of men and women workers, engineers and technicians are working selflessly, loyally; in our scientific research laboratories, where scientists directed by the Academy of Sciences are energetically pursuing their endeavors—Soviet people work with indomitable energy day and night to produce the weapons designed to destroy the monstrous cannibal system of Hitler Germany.

The enemy will soon have occasion to learn how our manpower reserves have become strong and seasoned. Marching to the decisive battle are brave warriors tempered in battles, burning with one desire: to clear our land of the fascist scum as soon as possible. This task demands the utmost strain of efforts.

In this great patriotic war our people have shown that they possess unprecedented energy. They are making supreme sacrifices. We today are both observers of and party to the powerful patriotic enthusiasm which has swept the Soviet people. Never before in history has the countryside evinced such exceptional concern for strengthening the defense of the country.

On the initiative of the Tambov collective farmers, the entire nation —collective farms and collective farmers personally, workers, army units, Soviet institutions, religious organizations and clergymen — joined this great historically important movement and in a short time contributed to the State over 7,000,000,000 rubles, plus grain and other agricultural produce for armaments and aid to the Red Army.

A SINGLE IDEA

Pre-May Day socialist emulation has shown how much can be accomplished by a people inspired by a single idea, pursuing one noble liberation aim and impelled by united will for victory. Many enterprises have not only fulfilled state production plans ahead of schedule but have produced, above the plan, armaments sufficient to equip scores of regiments.

In the countryside there is a growing mass movement for planting hundreds of thousands of acres above the plan, the harvest of which is to go to the Red Army fund.

To us, this May Day more than ever before is the day of the review of the militant forces of the working people. We are not alone in this struggle. The working people of all countries who cherish the freedom, independence and honor of their nation, who won't want to become slaves of fascists, are taking up arms for the struggle against the Hitlerite invaders.

We see how despite all obstacles the anti-fascist front of struggle is growing in scope and strength. We greet the decisive struggle of the fighters of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, France and the other occupied countries.

And on this May First, we call the working people of all countries to greater unity in the struggle. We greet the peoples of Europe fighting against Hitler imperialism. We are proud that fighting in the ranks of the Red Army are Czechoslovak soldiers who have covered themselves with unfading glory and with their blood have sealed the unity of the Czechoslovak people with the Russian, Ukrainian and Byelo-Russian brothers, with all the peoples of the Soviet Union.

ALLIES' SUCCESS

We are rejoicing at every success of our allies and are trying by all means to secure the victory of the Anglo-Soviet-American fighting alliance over the enemies of mankind, the German fascist enslavers.

All the greater is our contempt for the attempts of the Polish chauvinists—the Sikorski Government to back up the slanderous, smearing campaign of the Hitlerites against Soviet power. Our people and the popular masses in all democratic countries fully approve the decision of the Soviet government to suspend diplomatic relations with the Polish government which established contact with Hitler.

We love the Red Army, believe in its strength, in its victory. The Red Armymen and their glorious commanders know that the eyes of the world, of all progressive mankind are turned on them.

Decisive battles are approaching. And the Red Army and Navy will throw on the scales of history the full strength of their blows, their hatred for the nemy, their love for our people, their devotion to our Socialist country, their loyalty to the banner of Lenin and Stalin.

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Stalin Applauds Allies' Aid; Sees 2d Front and Victory

By The United Press.

LONDON, Saturday, May 1—Marshal Joseph Stalin, Premier of Russia, said in a May Day order of the day that Russia and her United Nations allies for the first time had merged hammer blows against Germany from East and West and that together they would "break the backbone of the fascist beast." Russia had given Germany a beating during the Winter, Marshal Stalin said, and now the Allies were running the Germans out of Africa while the "gallant" British and American Air Forces were striking devastating blows on German and Italian war industry, "presaging the opening of a second front in Europe."

The text of the May Day order by Stalin is on Page 8.

Adolf Hitler's war machine had been shaken to its foundations by the combined blows of Russia and her allies, Marshal Stalin said, and would like to make peace with Russia or with Britain and America by alienating them.

"But what sort of peace can be in question with the imperialist Fascists who have flooded Europe with blood and covered her with gallows?" he asked. "Is it not clear that only the complete rout of the Hitlerite armies and the unconditional surrender of Hitlerite Germans can bring Europe to peace?"

He warned that the Russian and allied armies and peoples must

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STALIN APPLAUDS HELP FROM ALLIES

Continued From Page One

gird themselves for an unflinching finish fight. He called on Russian fighting men, guerrillas and workers to give everything they had and warned that slacking would be punished under military law.

He called on the fighting forces to consolidate and develop their Winter successes, to surrender no single inch of Russian soil, to prepare for decisive battles, to be stubborn in defense and bold in offensive and to crown victory by encircling and annihilating the enemy.

He warned that Germany was not beaten yet and that victory would come only by the combined merciless blows of the United Nations. But his entire statement was confident in tone, with the theme that all that was necessary now was to fight.

At the start of his order of the day on the great Russian holiday, Marshal Stalin reviewed the Soviet's Winter victories.

"Simultaneous with this," he went on, "the victorious troops of our allies defeated the Italo-German forces in Libya and Tripolitania, cleared these areas of the enemy and now continue to rout them in the region of Tunisia, while the gallant Anglo-American air forces inflict devastating blows on war industrial centers of Germany and Italy, presaging the creation of a second front in Europe against the Italo-German fascists.

"Thus the blow on the enemy from the east by the Red Army has for the first time since the beginning of the war merged with a blow from the west by our allies into one common single blow.

"All these circumstances taken together have shaken the Hitlerites' war machine to its foundations, have changed the course of the war and have created the preliminary conditions necessary for victory over Hitlerite Germany."

There was a sign of crisis in the frequent Fascist talk about peace, he said.

"If we are to judge by reports in the foreign press one may draw the conclusion that the Germans would like to conclude peace with Great Britain and the United States of America under the condition of their separation from the Soviet Union, or vice versa they would like to make peace with the Soviet Union under the condition of its separation from Britain and the United States.

"The German Imperialists have the impudence to measure the Allies by their own yardstick, presuming that one of them would fall into the trap."

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Times for May 1, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Text of Stalin's May 1 Order of Day

LONDON, Saturday, May 1 (U.P.)—The text of a May Day order of the day by Marshal Joseph Stalin, Premier of Russia, recorded from the Moscow radio:

Comrades, Red Army men, sailors of the Red Fleet, commanders, political workers, guerrillas, guerrilla women, workmen and workwomen, peasant men and women, intelligenstia workers, brothers and sisters temporarily fallen under the yoke of the German oppressors, in the name of the Soviet Government and of our Bolshevist party I greet you and congratulate you on this day of the First of May.

The peoples of our country meet on the day of May 1 under the severe conditions of war. They entrusted their fate to the Red Army and were not mistaken in their hope. The Soviet soldiers rose to a man to the defense of their country. And now, for almost two years, they have defended the honor and independence of the Soviet Union.

During the period of the Winter campaign of the years 1942-1943, the Red Army inflicted a severe defeat on the Hitlerite troops, destroyed a large quantity of the manpower of the enemy, encircled two enemy armies at Stalingrad, captured more than 300,000 enemy officers and men and liberated from the German yoke hundreds of Soviet towns and thousands of villages.

The Winter campaign has shown that the offensive power of the Red Army has grown. Our troops not only dislodged the Germans from territory captured by them last Summer but also occupied a number of towns and districts that were in the enemy's occupation for almost a year and a half.

Forced to Shift Troops

The Germans found it beyond their power to prevent the offensive of the Red Army. Even for a counter-offensive on a narrow front sector in the area of Kharkov the German command was compelled to throw in more than thirty divisions from Western Europe.

The Germans intended to encircle the Soviet troops in the area of Kharkov and stage a German Stalingrad for our troops. However, the attempt of the Hitlerite command to avenge themselves for Stalingrad failed.

Simultaneous with this, the victorious troops of our allies defeated the Italo-German forces in Libya and Tripolitania, cleared these areas of the enemy and now continue to rout them in Tunisia, while the gallant Anglo-American air force inflicts devastating blows on the war industry centers of Germany and Italy, presaging the creation of a second front in Europe against the Italo-German fascists.

Thus the blows on the enemy from the east by the Red Army have, for the first time since the beginning of the war, merged with the blow from the west by our Allies into one single, common blow.

All these circumstances taken together have shaken the Hitlerites' war machine to its foundations, have changed the course of the war and created the preliminary conditions necessary for victory over Hitlerite Germany.

As a result, the enemy was forced to admit the serious worsening of his position and began to yell about the war crisis. It is true that the enemy is attempting to hide his critical situation behind the façade of total mobilization. But no façade can hide the fact that the fascist camp is, in fact, going through a serious crisis.

Blitzkrieg Boasts Silenced

The crisis in the Fascist camp finds expression primarily in the fact that the enemy was forced to abandon his original intentions for a Blitzkrieg. The boastful chatter of Blitzkrieg has been replaced by lamentations about the unavoidable, prolonged war.

If the earlier German Fascist command boasted of the tactics of Blitzkrieg, these tactics now have been discarded and the German command boasts not that they have carried out or mean to carry out a blitz offensive but that they managed skillfully to sneak away from the encircling blow of British troops in North Africa or from encirclement by Soviet troops in the area of Denyansk.

The Fascist press sparkles with reports that the German armies succeeded in escaping from a rout and in escaping from another Stalingrad on one or another sector of the Eastern or Tunisian front. Apparently the Hitlerite strategists have nothing else to boast about.

Second, the crisis in the Fascist camp is expressed by the fact that the Fascists are beginning to talk frequently of peace.

If we are to judge by reports from the foreign press, one may draw the conclusion that the Germans would like to conclude peace with Britain and the United States of America under conditions of their separation from the Soviet Union or, vice versa, they would like to make peace with the Soviet Union under conditions of its separation from England and the United States of America.

The German imperialists have the impudence to measure the Allies by their own yardstick, presuming that one of them would fall into the trap.

Proves Foes' Severe Crisis

It is clear that the German prattle about peace is not prompted by an easy life. This prattle only proves that they are going through a severe crisis.

But what sort of peace can be in question with the imperialist Fascists who have flooded Europe with blood and covered her with gallows? Is it not clear that only the complete rout of the Hitlerite armies and the unconditional surrender of Hitlerite Germany can bring Europe to peace? Is it not because they feel the approach of the coming catastrophe that the Fascists talk of peace?

The German-Italian Fascist camp is going through a severe crisis and stands before catastrophe. Taht does not mean, of course, that the catastrophe of Hitlerite Germany has begun. No, it does not mean that.

This is a clipping from page 8 of the New York Times for May 1, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Hitlerite Germany and her armies are shaken and are undergoing a crisis but they are not yet defeated. It would be naive to suppose that the catastrophe would come of its own accord and as part of teh present course of events.

Two or there more such powerful blows are necessary from the West and East as have been inflicted on the Hitlerite armies during the past five or six months so the catastrophe to Hitlerite Germany may become a fact.

Therefore the peoples of our Soviet Union and the Aed Army, as well as our allies and their armies, still have to face a hard and severe struggle for complete victory over the Hitlerite monsters. This struggle will demand of them great sacrifices, enormous staying power and iron staunchness. They will have to mobilize all their power and potentialities to smash the enemy and thus lay the way for peace.

People Back Red Army

Comrades, the Soviet people are showing wonderful solicitude for the Red Army. They are ready to give all their strength for the further increase of the military power. In less than four months the people of the Soviet Union have contributed to the fund of the Red Army more than 7,000,000 rubles. Workers, peasants and intelligentsia are working without rest bravely and gallantly, bearing all the sufferings caused by war and toiling in factories, on transports and on collective farms.

But the war against the German invaders demands that the Red Army should get ever more guns, tanks, planes, trench mortars, machine guns, tommy guns, ammunition and food. That means it is imperative that the workers, peasants and the whole Soviet intelligentsia should work for the front with double vigor.

It is imperative that all our people, all our enterprises on the home front should work with precision and accuracy like good clockwork.

Remember the legacy of the great Lenin. Since war has become unavoidable—everything for war!

At least complacency and lack of energy should be punished according to military law.

In reply to the faith of its people, the Red Army must smash even more powerfully and still more mercilessly to exterminate the German invaders. They must ceaselessly drive them from Soviet soil.

The Red Army during the war has acquired a rich store of military experience. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers have mastered their weapons to perfection. Nuerous commanders have learned to handle their troops on the battlefield. But it would be unwise to rest at that. Soldiers must learn to master their weapons well, commanders must acquire mastery in the conduct of battle.

One Cannot Stand Still

But even this is not enough. In military matters and more so in such a war as the modern war, one cannot stand still. To halt in military matters means to remain behind. And those who remain behind, as is known, are beaten.

The main point now, therefore, is that the whole Red Army must, day in and day out, perfect its combat training, that all commanders and men of the Red Army must study the experience of war and must learn to fight in such a manner as is needed for the cause of victory.

Instructions for Warfare

Comrades, Red Army and Red Navy men, political workers, men and women guerrillas, I greet you and congratulate you on the occasion of May 1!

First, all Red Army men, infantrymen, trench mortarmen, tommy gunners, artillerymen, tankmen, pilots, sappers, signalmen and cavalrymen should tirelessly continue to perfect themselves in their fighting mastery, to execute precisely the orders of their commanders, the requirements of army regulations and instructions, and sacredly observe discipline and maintain organization and order.

Second, commanders of all services and commanders of combined arms should become experts in the leading of troops, skillfully organize interaction of all arms and direct them in battle. Study the enemy, improve reconnaissance—the eyes and ears of the army—remember that without this one cannot beat the enemy. Raise the efficiency of the work of troops headquarters, so the headquarters of the Red Army units and formations will become exemplary organs of direction of troops. Raise the work of the army rear establishments to the level of requirements presented by modern warfare. Bear firmly in mind that on the full and timely supply of troops with ammunition, equipment and provisions depends the outcome of combat operations.

Third, the whole Red Army should consolidate and develop the successes of the Winter battles, so it shall not surrender to the enemy a single inch of our soil, be prepared for decisive battles with the German Fascist invaders and display a stubbornness and staunchness in defense that is characteristic of the men of our army. Display offensive resolution, correct interaction of troops, bold manouevre in the field of action, crowned by the encirclement and annihilation of the enemy.

Orders to the Guerrillas

Fourth, men and women guerrillas must strike powerful blows at the enemy's rear, communications, military stores, headquarters and factories, destroy the enemy's telegraph and telephone lines, draw a wide strata of the Soviet population in the occupied area into an active liberation struggle and thus save Soviet citizens from being driven away into German slavery and from extermination by the Hitlerite beasts. Take merciless revenge on the German invaders for the blood and tears of our wives, children, mothers, fathers, brothers and sisters. Help by all means the Red Army in its struggle with the Hitlerite enslavers.

Camrades! The enemy already has experienced several crushing blows from our troops. A new blow is approaching when the Red Army, together with the armies of our allies, will break the backbone of the fascist beast.

Long live our gallant Red Army! Long live our gallant Red Navy! Long live our courageous men and women guerrillas! Death to the German enemy!

SUPREME COMMANDER, MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION STALIN.

g from New York Times for

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

FILE

Litvinoff Says Coordinated Military Strategy Of United Nations Necessary for Victory

Warns: Too Early to Shout of Victory Yet

EDITOR'S NOTE: Following is the authentic text of the statement made by Soviet Ambassador Maxim Litvinoff to the representatives of the press in Havana, Cuba, after presentation of his credentials to President Fulgencio Batista of Cuba, on April 9, 1943. The statement has just appeared in the "Information Bulletin" of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C.

I am happy to greet you, representatives of the press in Cuba, and, through you, to express my appreciation of the spontaneous kindness I have received from the people of Havana.

The peoples of the Soviet Union follow with the utmost attention the destinies of all nations, great and small, near and far, and have always felt great sympathy for the people of Cuba. I am happy to be here as the interpreter of these feelings of sympathy.

Though we have had little first-hand knowledge of your island in the Soviet Union, Cuba has always been present to our imagination as a land of great charm and beauty, which it in reality is. I would therefore have been glad to be here in any circumstances, but feel special pleasure in being here now, amongst a people who find themselves on the same side of the front as the peoples of the Soviet Union—that front which divides the freedom-loving civilized nations from those of the Nazi-Fascist nations rattling back into barbarism.

Through the Declaration of the United Nations of January 1, 1942, our two countries, signatories to that declaration, are bound by principles and obligations of cooperation for the attainment of victory over our common foes, representing this barbarism. The formal establishment of diplomatic relations between our countries was the logical and inevitable outcome of the situation thus created. My Government received with profound satisfaction the proposal of the Cuban Government for an exchange of diplomatic missions, as a result of which I find myself here.

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The efforts of all the United Nations are now directed toward the achievement of victory over the common foe. All of them are making sacrifices, enduring privations, bearing their part of the common burden. I do not think I need emphasize the fact that my country is bearing more than its share of the common lot. The Red Army has been holding back the main forces of the foe throughout 20 months, wearing down and annihilating these forces, and preventing them from going to other theaters of war against the other United Nations.

People sometimes ask: what is the objective of the Soviet Union? First and foremost it is, through the destruction of Hitler's armed forces, and by inflicting decisive blows upon them, the destruction of Hitler himself and of his gang, the destruction of the Fascist-Nazi regime, and the establishment of an international order, under which a recurrence of the present human tragedy would be impossible.

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It would seem that this must be the aim of the other United Nations also. It m[illegible] that they have inten[illegible]ful ac-

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FILE

tivities and hurled themselves into the fight, not for the sake of defending this or that bit of territory coveted by Hitler, not for the restoration or alteration of this or that national frontier, but because they realized that the seizure of one bit of foreign territory after another, the infringement of one frontier after another, is but a part of the general Hitler plan for the destruction of the independence of all nations, their enslavement, and his domination over the whole world. This plan, having been recognized as a menace to all nations, they have accordingly combined for the destruction of its perpetrators, for the eradication of the regime capable of producing such a plan, a regime which is a disgrace to humanity.

And yet, we again hear, and with increasing frequency, questions as to the objectives of the war, or, as it is sometimes put, "the objectives of the peace." Such questions can only be raised if we forget the fundamental objectives for the sake of which the United Nations accepted the challenge of Hitler—an objective sufficiently all-embracing, sufficiently noble, and, what is more important, sufficiently inevitable—to justify any sacrifices, any privations, any efforts, of which the United Nations are capable. The attainment of this objective would in itself be an unutterable blessing for all humanity.

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The establishment of the best possible international order with maximum guarantees of peace and the satisfaction of just national aspirations, must naturally bring us face to face with problems to which we are all bound to devote much thought. They must not be overlooked. They must be discussed in the proper places. But the important thing is that we see all these problems in the right perspective, that they be not allowed to overshadow our main objective, which must first be achieved—the destruction of the foe.

There can be no differences of opinion about this. But it can hardly be right to dwell too insistently now upon potential or imaginary differences of tomorrow, thus possibly undermining the unity attained in regard to the main objective of today—to win the war.

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Stunning blows have been dealt at the foe during the preceding fall and winter. So far it has been demonstrated that he can be beaten again and again, but that he has not yet been finally beaten. He still commands sufficient reserves to recover from the blows he has received and to continue his resistance, and even gain new military victories. And so it is early as yet to shout of victory. Certainly of the United Nations will have to increase their present military efforts considerably not only in order to hasten victory, but even to make victory possible. The coordination of general military strategic plans is still much more important and timely than that of political strategy.

(Following the reading of his prepared statement, Ambassador Litvinoff was asked by one of the journalists whether Franco had declared war on the Soviet Union. **The Ambassador replied that without a declaration of war Franco, belonging to Hitler's gang, is actually waging war on the Soviet Union by sending regular divisions of Spanish troops to the Soviet-German front.)**

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FILE

Lauds Help of Small Nations

(By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

HAVANA, Cuba (Delayed). —Thousands of people waited here in a pouring rain at the entrance to the Presidential palace to catch a glimpse of Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Ambassador to the United States, who arrived here on April 9th to present his credentials as Minister to Cuba.

For the first time in Cuban memory, the Hall of Receptions was thrown open, by order of President Batista, so the public might see the distinguished visitor. Batista himself came to the balcony to wave the Ambassador off as he left the place.

At his press conference, Litvinov discussed a number of matters very freely with Cuban newspapermen. Asked about the help which smaller countries can give the USSR, Litvinov replied:

"The aid of a military nature that the small countries of the Americas can give the Soviet Union would always be estimated. There should be no differentation, when considering such aid, between small and big countries, since we are all fighting for a common cause. We are all equally affected by the war which we are waging against a common enemy."

OTHER AID

What about other forms of aid, he was asked.

"We know how to be grateful for all kinds of aid," Litvinov replied, "the shipments of medical instruments and foodstuffs help to cure wounded Red Army men and feed them until they can fight again That is why such aid should not be taken as a philanthropic gesture but as aid of a military nature also. We are profoundly grateful for everything received."

Asked about commercial relations between Cuba and the USSR, he answered:

"For the time being, due to difficulties of the war, it is not possible to think of a commercial exchange between both countries, above all in products like Cuban sugar and tobacco, which are highly appreciated in my country."

What can you tell us regarding the anti-fascist prisoners in North Africa? was another question.

"These fighters must be released," he said, "for they are sincere fighters against Nazism and Fascism."

CUBA'S AFFAIRS

One reporter asked something about internal problems in Cuba. "The internal affairs of Cuba do not interest me," the Ambassador answered. "Only those concerning international relations do."

Another reporter wondered whether Litvinov knew of the cultural and historical developments in Cuba. A broad smiled wreathed Litvinov's countenance as he said:

"About Cuba—I know her historical development, her war of liberation from the Spanish yoke, the movement against Machado, (former dictator) the events of Sept. 4, 1933 headed by your President (Fulgencio Batista). And in general, as a man concerned with international problems, the social struggles that have developed in Cuba."

In regard to the future?

"The conditions of the peoples in the post-war period," he replied, "will depend above all on the disposition of every people."

MONETARY PLANS

What about monetary proposals outlined by the United States and England?

"Although an agreement has been reached in principle," he replied, "it cannot be said that a decision has been reached. That is concretely for the post-war period."

Asked about future collaboration among the great nations, he replied:

"Surely, I believe that after the war there will be a combination of nations, a combination, I repeat, closer, more comprehensive."

One reporter queried whether the recent fishery agreement between the USSR and Japan affected China.

Litvinov replied:

"The treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan cannot affect our relations with China, because it does not affect that nation in any way. It has nothing to do with China. It deals only with fishes."

Asked whether the USSR was afraid of anything in the future, the Ambassador declared: "The Bolsheviks do not recognize fear."

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FIVE

RUSSIA'S ATTITUDE ON RELIEF AWAITED

Lehman's Talks in London Revive Speculation on Post-War View of Moscow

QUOTAS BEING DRAFTED

And the Soviet Union Is Held Likely to Be a Recipient, Rather Than Donor

Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, April 14 — Former Governor Herbert H. Lehman's conversations in London with Allied governments on post-war relief problems have revived or rather brought forward speculation upon the part Russia expects to play in this vital task.

The Russians never have adhered to the Inter-Allied Committee for Post-War Relief, headed by Sir Frederick Leith-Ross—a body of Allied experts studying the post-war needs of Allied countries—but now that preparations for the alleviation of the suffering of occupied Europe are moving forward to another phase, clarification of the Russian attitude is becoming more important.

Since his arrival in London Mr. Lehman has been in consultation chiefly with American officials familiar with the work of the committee to prepare himself for more detailed discussions with representatives of the Allied governments. But tonight he met the various Ministers of these countries charged with the duty of preparing for the day of liberation, and Friday he is to attend a meeting of members of the Leith-Ross committee at a session without agenda to talk over the general problem of the needs of occupied countries and the ability of the Allies to meet them.

Committee Is Limited

As matters stand now, the Leith-Ross committee is limited in scope to a determination of the post-war requirements of the nations that the Nazis have overrun. It consists of the representatives of Allied governments, working under the beneficent guidance of the British Government, whereas Mr. Lehman's authority begins where theirs leaves off inasmuch as the Leith-Ross committee has no means of providing the necessaries.

What the Allied governments—at least many of them—hope is that during Mr. Lehman's visit some kind of merger can be effected under Anglo-American auspices whereby the authorities charged with supplying necessary commodities can be linked up with the group that has been studying probable needs in Europe.

This study of needs has gone far beyond the original problems, having to do with food, medicine and clothing, and has taken up estimates of amounts of building materials that may be necessary to provide decent housing; the quantities of machine tools necessary for starting local industries anew and problems of transportation and communications.

Russia in the Estimates

The coordinating committee of the Leith-Ross organization has been busy in the past few days concluding its reports on the estimated requirements of member countries, to be handed over to Mr. Lehman as a kind of tentative quota for the various nations. Members of the committee, having worked for months in an effort to whittle down claims made for the record—to show to the peoples of the occupied countries—to actual bare necessities, are eager now to hear how close in Mr. Lehman's view Britain, her dominions and the United States can come to fulfilling these estimates.

In any such calculation as that, the part that Russia expects to play in the post-war administration of relief becomes important. In the view of many experts here, Russia will have very little surplus to distribute in Europe, but on the contrary will have to be on the receiving end of relief administration.

This is a clipping from page 11 of the New York Times for April 15, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Russian Clergy Tell Of Nazi Atrocities

By Janet Weaver

(By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

MOSCOW, April 13. — The Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia has just returned to Moscow from the recently liberated Russian towns of Rzhev, Sychovka, Gzhatsk and Vyazma. The trip was made in line with the Metropolitan's duties as a member of the extraordinary State Commission formed last November to establish and investigate the crimes committed by the Germans and their accomplices and the losses inflicted by them on the citizens and the state.

In an article in the latest issue of Moscow News, the Metropolitan describes his tour of these towns as "the most fearful experience I have ever had." In Rzhev he witnessed the same scenes reported by the foreign correspondents who visited there, and talked to some of the same people who had suffered under the reign of the Germans.

In Sychovka the residents told him that after the Germans had seized the town, the German commandant and a member of a newly formed municipal administration summoned a congregation of the people and addressed them.

"Only under our rule will you be at liberty to worship freely," they said.

"Before long the fascists showed what their solemn assurances meant in practice," Nikolai writes. "On the very next religious holiday the commandant had the church surrounded by troops. When they left the church after the service the people were robbed on the spot. The fascist soldiers took their overcoats, woolen shawls, fur caps, felt boots and mittens and drove the shivering people half naked into the forest.

"During their retreat from this town the Germans blew up all the seven orthodox and old believers' churches, including two cathedrals.

"On the outskirts of Sychovka the Germans set up a camp for war prisoners. Just outside the barbed wire entanglement that surrounded this scene of torture and suffering, a huge common grave was dug consisting of a number of wide ditches in which lay the bodies of some 6,000 Red Army men and civilians, brutally done to death by the fascists.

The Metropolitan describes Vyazma as a vast cemetery. Of the 5,500 buildings in the town only 50 small houses remain on the outskirts, he said. Here too the finest churches have been destroyed. In the town's cemetery, he saw a huge ditch in which lay the bodies of 3,500 civilians shot or tortured to death by the fascists.

"All these fearful scenes that have seared themselves into my memory inspire but one emotion—hatred for the enemy, who is entirely bereft of all human feeling and is moved only by a satanic evil which prompts him to destroy our churches and to torture and massacre peaceful men and women.

"Holy hatred for the enemy calls for holy vengeance," the Metropolitan declares.

This is a clipping from page 2 of the Daily Worker for April 14, 1943

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U.S.-BRITISH UNITY ON RUSSIA NEARER

London Hears of Washington Plan for Mission to Moscow, but It Is Denied Here

MONETARY ISSUE REMAINS

Commons Assured of Chance to Debate World Programs Before Allied Action

Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, April 6—It can be said with reasonable certainty that, following the recent talks in Washington, the United States and Britain are not far apart in their attitude toward Russia.

One report has it that, as an indirect result of Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's conversations with President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the United States is planning to send a special mission to Moscow soon to discuss with Premier Joseph Stalin and Foreign Commissar Vyacheslaff M. Molotoff ways and means of improving American relations with the Soviet Union.

The contemplated mission would be more diplomatic and political than military, it is expected. Its purpose would be exploratory, its aim being primarily to ascertain Russia's post-war plans and, above all, to determine what the United States must do to overcome the Russians' reticence and their reluctance to take their Western Allies more completely into their confidence.

[In Washington, the State Department denied knowledge of any contemplated mission to Moscow.]

It has been suggested that the British were somewhat more impressed with the necessity of making concessions to Russia during the war than was the United States, and while that was true in the past, it is believed that this issue now can be included in the 95 per cent of the matters in which there is agreement between the two countries.

Included in the 5 per cent in which there is a measure of disagreement, however, is solution of the post-war currency programs outlined in memoranda by Lord Keynes and by Harry D. White, monetary adviser to the United States Treasury.

It became known today that Lord Keynes and Mr. White exchanged ideas after the formulation of their original plans and that various amendments and emendations were made before they completed them. The two plans differ in some important aspects and, not being an economist, Mr. Eden was content to let the matter rest for the time being.

The matter came up in the House of Commons today. Members expressed concern lest the Government commit the country to participation in a world reserve bank without allowing time for debate. Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Kingsley Wood assured Rupert de la Bere, a Conservative member, that a white paper would be introduced at the next session showing the way the subject is being approached.

He also assured William Craven-Ellis, Conservative, that if after reading the white paper the members still wished a debate they probably could have it. Mr. Craven-Ellis asked for assurance that adoption of the American plan would not cost Britain her monetary freedom, and Sir Kingsley advised him to wait until he had read it.

Mr. Eden has not yet reported on his American journey and probably will not do so until the session after the next one. Prime Minister Churchill indicated that debate is not desired on the same day. There will be no other time for discussion until the motion for adjournment over Easter.

Next week the Chancellor will present his budget and it will be debated at the next two sessions.

This is a clipping from page 8 of the New York Times for April 7, 1943
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EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Information Bulletin

(Issued Three Times Weekly)

No. 33 Washington, D. C., April 1, 1943

PATRIOTIC WAR AND TOTAL WAR

By Mikhail Kalinin

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

Hitlerite Germany forced upon the world a new war which she calls total war. The German imperialists believe that to consummate their aggressive designs the old means are inadequate and that only the sanguinary road of total war can bring them the world supremacy.

In the present war, Hitlerite Germany set herself more far-reaching and aggressive purposes than Kaiser Germany tried to achieve. In the last war, German imperialism strove to seize and subjugate foreign territories and to occupy a number of advantageous positions in world markets; while the Hitlerite government along with this also sets itself the purpose of the physical extermination of whole nations, the destruction of their state systems and their national cultures.

Distinctive Features of German Total War

The German military believe that total war from its very outset must be accompanied by the most thorough use of all material and manpower resources of the country. It implies the use of the most diverse means and methods for routing the enemy. Among these are: the favorite method of German fascism—blackmail on the international arena; lulling of military vigilance of neighboring nations by assurances of peaceful intentions and friendship, followed by sudden attacks on them; lies, deceit and slander; deafening propaganda of the allegedly exceptional might of the German army and the superiority of its arms; hints at the possession of some special weapons so far unseen by anybody; use of diverse means of intimidation; destruction of towns, burning down of villages, mass murder of the civilian population, abduction of multitudes of men, women, girls and adolescents to penal servitude in Germany; attempts to terrorize the population of the whole occupied territory by their domination, which would paralyze its will to resistance.

Armed invasion is carried out in conditions most favorable to the attacking party, so as not to give the adversary time to muster and bring up his reserves. Crush suddenly the adversary's armed forces, shatter his morale and will to resistance, destroy and annihilate his material base—such are the distinctive features of German total war.

The peoples of Poland, Holland, Belgium and France have already a concrete idea of what total war means. But against the Soviet Union, the Hitlerite cannibals carry out this program with particular refinement. With devilish sadism they kill hundreds of thousands of defenseless Soviet people and destroy material and cultural values. And this is done not in the heat of an orgy of brigandage of the unbridled fascist horde, but on a strict plan handed down from above and worked out long before the outbreak of war.

These forms and methods of total war used by the Hitlerite gang invite historic comparison with the wars waged by Genghis Khan in Asia and by Batyi in Russia. One may gather the impression that the Germans emulate the methods of conduct of war used by those conquerors, but apply them under changed conditions with the aid of modern, highly-developed tools of war. But this resemblance is, so to speak, purely superficial. Batyi's invasion took place 700 years ago. True it was barbarous, but it was not marked by such refined brutality as the total war preached and carried out by the Germans. Here the fascists hold undisputed first place.

Total War is Plain Brigandage

During past centuries science has made great strides, and the Germans make full use of it for refining the tortures of peoples. On our land the Hitlerite hordes wage war not only against the Red Army but against the whole Soviet people. With every day the war lasts, humiliations, tortures and massacres are carried out on an ever-greater scale far eclipsing all the most terrible experiences in the history of any nation. All this is directed towards one aim—to demoralize and kill the will to struggle in the enslaved

people, and on the ground thus cleared to perpetrate freely their fascist felonies.

The German fascists call this total war, while in fact it is plain brigandage of fascist bandits on the European highway. According to the plans of total war, what the Germans perpetrate in the Soviet Union is to be on no smaller scale than in other European countries occupied by them. What prevents them from carrying this out to the full extent is the Soviet-German front. However, as far as possible they put into effect everywhere their plans for the enslavement of European nations.

Only people who deliberately shut their eyes can fail to see, for example, that German fascism pursues a consistent policy of extermination of the Polish nationality, in order to move masses of German landowners and rich farmers to the East. For instance, a sore in the Germans' eye is Holland, which stands in the way of Germany's using the sea-coast against Britain. It is not fortuitous, therefore, that the fascist government "advises" the Dutch to move to the Ukraine, in order to be able to settle their ports with picked Germans and to create thus an advanced bastion against Britain. Simultaneously the German-fascist invaders wish to make the Dutch instead of Germans the targets for the bullets of Ukrainian guerrillas.

If we analyze the policy of the fascist government, its methods of waging war and methods of administering occupied countries, we shall see that in their entirety the fascists' actions form the logical consequence of their fiendish plan, which is simple in essence: to exterminate the active part of the workers and peasants, to massacre the intelligentsia of European countries, to Germanize the part of the population which is susceptible to that, and to turn the conquered peoples into slaves.

One might say that this is pure fantasy. Well, and what would happen if the Germans won? It is absolutely indisputable that they would carry out these plans everywhere as they do in occupied districts of the Soviet Union.

Soviet People's Answer to Total War

The Soviet people's answer to Hitler's total war was the great Patriotic War, a just war in defense of its homeland from the bloody aggressor. Every citizen of the USSR deeply realizes the danger threatening not only him personally, but also his family and the whole mode of our life.

And the leader of the Soviet people called all citizens of our country to the Patriotic War, i.e., to a war of the whole people with all the means at its disposal. In his radio broadcast of July 3, 1941, Stalin explained to our people that "The war with fascist Germany cannot be considered an ordinary war. It is not only a war between two armies, it is also a war of the entire Soviet people against the German-fascist armies."

Specific Features of the Patriotic War

The practical instructions given by Stalin for actions of Soviet citizens in German-occupied territories reveal the methods of the Patriotic War and its specific features. Such a form of the peoples' participation in the Patriotic War as fighting the enemy directly, as in the guerrilla movement, is in itself a sign of its nation-wide character. And only a people who holds the freedom and independence of its country as the thing most precious in its life can display so much courage, daring and selfless heroism in the struggle against the occupationists.

To their own cost, the fascist chieftains learned the national staunchness and lofty patriotism of our urban and rural population, its profound uncompromising hostility to German fascism. And no matter how hard the German fascists try to uproot these sentiments of the Soviet people, so hostile to them, they will never succeed. The ever-mounting guerrilla struggle allows the enemy no freedom of maneuver in occupied territory and forms an insurmountable obstacle to its economic exploitation.

The absence of a submissive population places the occupation army in difficult conditions. Its losses in the struggle for conversion of the population of the occupied districts into mute slaves are growing. Our people grows more and more irreconcilable and with mounting fury fights arms in hand against the German invaders. In their holy war the peoples of the Soviet Union, imbued with a sense of their patriotic duty and love for the Soviet homeland, selflessly give their strength to the struggle for their freedom and independence.

The Soviet Union wages a people's war of liberation. The truly popular nature of this war is revealed in the lofty patriotism of the Soviet people, in the selflessness they display at the front and in the rear. One can safely say that every Soviet citizen now realizes that he must give all his strength, ability and means to the struggle against the German fascists. And by countless examples, the peoples of the USSR demonstrate their lofty sentiments in the great Patriotic War.

The most vivid manifestation of Soviet patriotism is the campaign for collection of funds for the construction of tank columns and air squadrons, begun on the initiative of collective farmers and then taken

(Continued on page eight)

(*Continued from page two*)

up by workers and intelligentsia. In one or two months our peasants, workers and intellectuals collected voluntarily several billion rubles.

Our people regards the war against the German invaders as a people's war. And this is natural, as German fascism wages war not only against the Red Army but against the entire people, whose active part it wishes to exterminate and the rest to enslave. The Patriotic War has aroused the Soviet people to an unparalleled extent and has awakened all its forces which had not been fully displayed before. Our people selflessly contributes not only its material possessions and labor, but also all its creative genius for the earliest victory over the most bitter enemy.

That this war is a people's patriotic war for us is attested best of all by the effective response which Stalin's appeal to the Soviet people evokes in the rear and on the territory temporarily occupied by the enemy. And no matter what tricks the German command plays at the front, no matter how the Hitlerite government exerts itself, the German-fascist hordes will be smashed and ousted ignominiously from our country.

The Patriotic War has become at present the main if not the sole goal of the whole Soviet people, and in this great, just war it will win.

File

Fair Enough — By Westbrook Pegler

NEW YORK, Aug. 11—I never did give much importance to the document called the resolution of the presidium of the executive committee of the Communist International which was broadcast last May and ballyhooed the world over and accepted by most of the world as an act dissolving the so-called Comintern, which is Russia's fifth column in other countries, including ours. Any government which was capable of maintaining such an organization in the first place would not hesitate to practice a small deception in its own interests, and intelligent and wary people cannot be expected to believe anything it says or rely on any of its promises.

The Communist faith is so treacherous and immoral that no act which to normal and decent human beings is wrong is forbidden a Communist if it serves his political beliefs and aims. Anything that serves Communism is right and good, and that is the only moral test that a Communist knows. To him it is not wrong to commit a wrong but it is grievously wrong to refuse to do so if the interests of Communism seem to require such commission. He is exactly like the Nazi and the Fascist in this respect and the fact that he is at odds with the Fascist and Nazi and, for this reason is killing large numbers of Nazis, should not confuse our judgment.

* * *

SOME of our statesmen and our people go in fear that if we recognize these truths and keep them to the fore by discussion Joseph Stalin will be hurt in his feelings and moved to decisions harmful to us. This is an absurd proposition and more uncomplimentary to Stalin than anything that could be said about the known duplicities of his Communists in our midst, for it assumes that he is a man who would make important decisions petulantly when the fact is that Russia's interests are his only guide in all decisions. He would neither take any action unfavorable to us for any such reason nor be swerved from any such decision out of gratitude or friendliness begotten by any act of appeasement on our part.

So even if the resolution of the presidium of the executive committee and so forth had, in fact, professed to be a dissolution of the fifth column known as the Comintern and represented here in a number of CIO unions which enjoy the favor of the New Deal Administration, no shrewd or cautious American would have had any excuse for believing it. As the resolution itself said, in the course of a long and strikingly Hitleresque confusion of ideological jargon and double talk: "Communists have never been supporters of the conservation of organizational forms that have outlived themselves." This means that if and when the Communists decide to reorganize their fifth column and reshape it and rename it, they will do so; but nowhere in the resolution is there any excuse for believing that they have any intention to abandon its activities and purposes.

But the fact is that this resolution did not announce the dissolution of the Comintern, and the further fact that editorial writers and savants and commuters of the 5:15 all thought it did constitute a triumph for those who composed the resolution. They tossed off a whole newspaper column of rhetorical rope-tricks and by the time the saps got down to the important part the effect on them was the same as that induced by a particularly goofy chapter of "Mein Kampf." This is not accidental. It is methodical.

* * *

DID the last paragraph of this resolution say the Comintern had been dissolved? Well, what do you think?

It says the presidium and so forth, "puts forth the following proposal for ratification by the sections of the Communist International."

The "following proposal" is that the Comintern be dissolved but the resolution itself is not an act of dissolution, altho it was gulped down as such all over the world and the Communists, themselves, in the United States secretly chortled over the dumb stupidity of their enemies in deceiving themselves thru careless reading.

I am afraid that it is going to be necessary to stand toe-to-toe with Joe Davies and Henry Wallace on this issue of Communism in our country because Davies, greatly swollen with self-importance, and Wallace, grim and hot-eyed with the zeal of the political bigot, would have our people trust Stalin and the Communists with unquestioning faith—which is one sure way to set our country up for a serious disappointment. They have almost succeeded in making us believe that we have had solemn promises from Stalin, the non-fulfillment of which would grieve us sore, when the fact is that he has not bound himself to serve anyone but Russia and has let us do all the promising and idealizing.

And that resolution did not announce the dissolution of the Comintern.

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Washington Daily News
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Churchill's Back, but Stalin Stays Away

What to Do if Hitler Cracks Up Believed To Be Under Discussion

By ALEXANDER H. UHL

PM's Foreign Editor

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WASHINGTON, Aug. 11.—The war is moving so fast that 'rime Minister Churchill is getting to be a regular commuter.

Less than three months after his last trip to Washington, where enough plans were supposed to have been laid to last at east six months, Churchill is back on the American Continent nd will see FDR for a badly eeded new series of conferences.

What with the fall of Mussolini, ne collapse of Sicily, the lickings nat the Germans have been taking t the hands of the Russians and ne persistent rumors that Hitler on the skids, it is obvious that ew and important plans must be id and new decisions taken.

Stalin Absent

The first question, of course, that ops into every one's mind is:

"Will Stalin be there?"

The answer is no. The President as asked at his press conference esterday whether the Russians ould be represented. He answered na the didn't think so but that that dn't mean he wouldn't be awfully ad to have them. He added that would be a British-American con- rence.

Revealing that Churchill had just rived in Canada to meet with ackenzie King, the Canadian ime Minister, FDR said that he uld not reveal the place or date his own conferences with him.

Italy on Agenda

Washington has been expecting w Churchill-FDR conferences for last two weeks. It had become ar that the timetable worked out them in Washington last May s now out of kilter. The ousting Mussolini certainly took both the S. A. and Britain, no less than rmany, by surprise and during first week or so the fumbling s obvious. Now that he's out and logna is stil keeping Italy stubbornly in the war, the whole Italian problem wil have to be threshed out over again.

News that Churchill had reached Canada and would later see the President was given out simultaneously in Quebec and Washington. Just about the time that the President was telling his press conference of it, Mackenzie King was giving out a communique in Canada announcing his arrival.

Brings Wife Along

In Churchill's party were Mrs. Churchill and his daughter, Subaltern Mary Churchill, of the British Territorial Service as well as Wing Comdr. George P. Gribson who led the squadron which attacked the Mohne and Eder dams.

It is the first time that Mrs. Churchill has accompanied her husband on such a trip.

A Reuters dispatch also reports that before Churchill left for his trip to Canada, he went to Buckingham Palace last Tuesday to get formal permission from King George to leave the country.

The Churchill, Mackenzie King preliminary discussions opened last night. High ranking officials and technical personnel represented the U. S. A., Great Britain and Canda, but it was reported that other members of the United Nations would have observers, among them a high ranking Chinese officer.

Hitler's Status

The crisis in Italy, of course, if not the only problem that needs attention. Something is going on in Germany, though exactly what is not yet clear and what little is known is clouded by an enormous amount of Goebbels propaganda. That Hitler is being kept in the background is certain. What is not so certain is exactly his present status with respect to the Nazi Party and the German High Command. For all we know he may be dead, or suffering a nervous breakdown, or just being quietly shunted aside.

There are no signs that we have any definite plans in case of a sudden German collapse any more than we had when Mussolini went out. And it is likely that neither the President nor Churchill want that to happen again.

In addition, it is becoming daily

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more clear that our relations with Russia and hers wit hus are none to good. Here is another conference of United Nations leaders and no Stalin in sight no matter how much we may want him.

Red Bogey Rising

Only a few days ago a German movement was launched in Russia, obviously with Soviet approval. Our State Dept. didn't even know about it. Its possibilities are giving American reactionaries nightmares. So much so that papers such as the New York *Daily News* and the Washington *Times-Herald* are daily making more and more open attacks on Moscow.

Russia is still calling for a second front though it is clear that the U. S. A. and Britain feel that a second front already has been opened in the air attacks on Germany and the invasion of Sicily.

Moscow, clearly, still is suspicious of the kind of Europe we want to see after the war, a suspicion that can only be strengthened by the policies we have been following in North Africa and during the Italian crisis. It will be a bad day for us if FDR and Churchill let the world think that while Moscow calls for democracy in Germany we prefer Francos, Peyroutons and Fascist-smelling kings.

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Soviet Labor Calls for 2nd Front to Shorten War

This editorial on the urgency f a second front was published st week in the fifth issue of e Soviet trade union periodi- l War and the Workingclass. was republished in Pravda, d has created general discus- on here and abroad. We pre- t the full text.)

By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

OSCOW, Aug. 10.—The present uation is such that victory the freedom-loving peoples r Hitler Germany is possible in nearest future. A change has n attained in the course of the r. It is sufficient to cite such ts as the brilliant results of the d Army's winter offensive, the rman reverses at Stalingrad, on Don and in the Caucasus, the t of the armies of Hitler's "allies" the Soviet-German Front, the eat of the Germano-Italian ops in Tunisia, the Allies succes in Sicily, the fall of Musso- indicating the bankruptcy of lian fascism and the prospect of cking Italy out of the war, the ure of Hitler's summer offensive inst the Soviet Union, and the cess of the Red Army's offensive the Orel direction.

he enemy camp is experiencing rofound crisis. The prerequisites e been created for the final de- t of Hitler. Never before since beginning of the war were con- tions as favorable for victory r Hitler Germany as today.

he history of wars knows what opportunities imply. In such es victory slipped away, the war ame drawn out, the peoples were med to endless, unnecessary rifices. And today millions of ple throughout the world ask h profound concern: is every- ng being done for taking timely antage of the possibility of vic- y over fascist Germany? And this s the problem of the second nt in Europe in bold relief.

COALITION AIMS

Hitler's predatory attack on his ghboring European countries and r on the Soviet Union called to the Anglo-Soviet-American lition. The purpose of any mili- y coalition is joint armed struggle victory over the common enemy. The anti-Hitlerite coalition was formed for armed struggle against fascist Germany and her associates to bring about their rout and to secure a lasting, just peace.

It was to be expected that the coalition members would jointly attack the enemy.

The ways of common struggle of the members of the anti-Hitler coalition are predetermined by the geographic, military and strategic situation of Germany and by the total historical experience in the struggle against German aggression. The task consists in taking Hitler Germany in an iron pincers from west and east to force her to fight a war on two fronts, dispersing her forces and reserves between them.

THREE YEARS.

It is already the third year that the Soviet Union has alone been shouldering the full brunt of the struggle against the main forces of the Hitler war machine. It was precisely this absence of a second front in Europe which enabled the Germans to gain temporary successes at the initial stages of the Soviet-German war The absence of the second front in Europe saved fascist Germany from defeat in 1942. More than this, the absence of the second front gave Hitler the possibility in the summer of 1942 of throwing all his reserves on the Soviet-German Front, creating a considerable preponderance in strength on the southwestern direction to reach Stalingrad and the approaches to Grozny. Lastly, this year the Germans dared to begin a new summer offensive only because the absence of a second front in Europe gave them the possibility of concentrating all their forces in the east.

Yet in June of 1942 it was announced that "full agreement has been reached with regard to the urgent tasks of the creation of a second front in Europe in 1942," as published in two official communiques on negotiations between Molotov and the leaders of the British and American governments in London and Washington. Nevertheless, the second front was not created in 1942.

But it was already ascertained then that at any rate there would be a second front in western Europe in the spring of 1943. However the spring came and the second front in Europe was not opened. The Anglo-American troops confined themselves to mopping up North Africa of the Germano-Italian forces.

In his report in the Commons in February 1943 on the results of his meeting with Roosevelt and the Casablance decisions, Churchill stated: We now have an exhaustive plan of action determining the designation of the armed forces and the direction of their operations, and we intend to carry out this plan in accordance with our policy during the forthcoming nine months (retranslated from the Russian.)

Thus at the Casablanca Conference on the joint plan of Allied military operations in January 1943 it was decided that during the first nine months of the present year the Anglo-American Allies intend to carry out an "exhaustive plan of action," which naturally included the opening of a second front in Europe. This nine months period is nearing its close, yet there is no second front in Europe.

SOVIET SACRIFICES

Fighting actually in single combat against all of Hitler's monstrous war machine and its allies-in-plunder in Europe, the Soviet people have made heavy sacrifices on the altar of the struggle for the common cause of the Allies. The number of German soldiers and officers destroyed on the Soviet-German Front is many times more than that on all the other fronts where the struggle is being waged against Hitler.

It is wrong to underestimate the importance of the military operations conducted by our Allies, the great importance of the numerous raids on Germany by the Anglo-American air forces, as well as the significance of the aid the Allies are rendering us in war materials and provisions. Nevertheless on the Libyan front the Allies had against them a mere four German divisions and ten Italian divisions; and in Sicily only two German and several Italian divisions. These figures show that the troops of our Anglo-American allies have not yet had real encounters with Hitler Germany's troops, and that the organization of the second front has not yet been carried out.

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THE SECOND FRONT

here is no need to enlarge upon discussions of the people who trying to prove that there gedly already exists not only a nd front, but also a "third" almost even a "fifth" and th" (including submarine, al, etc). The second front in ope is that front which, as lin said as far back as the umn of 1942, would divert, say, German divisions and some 20 sions of Germany's allies. It lies such military operations by Allies on the European conti- t which would force Hitler Ger- ny to divide its available forces divert one third or at least fourth of its ground troops to western front.

he second front in Europe ld radically change the situa- and immediately ensure a eat preponderance of our ngth over the Hitler army on Soviet-German Front, and this ans also that the opening of the ond front would decisively cut duration of the war, and that second front in Europe would ome the key to victory over Hit- already in 1943.

here are many excuses to jus- the delay in the second front western Europe, such as the dis- sion about the mythical "At- tic Wall," about the allegedly soluble" shipping problem, the zards of invasion." Yet it is wn that the "invincible" "At- tic Wall" exists only in the im- nation of those who want to believe these inventions, and no more.

SHIPPING ARGUMENT

The shipping argument favored by some has long lost even a semblance of its conviction and has many times been disproved by facts and published figures about the tremendous growth of shipbuilding in the Allied countries, particularly in the United States. Following the successful landing of the Allied troops and armaments in North Africa last year and the brilliant successes of the landing operations in Sicily, all reference to shipping difficulties should have disappeared.

As regards the "hazards of invasion" referred to repeatedly for more than a year, such an argument cannot in 1943 be offered to an army which for more than two years has been bearing the full brunt of the struggle against the Hitler war machine and which does not hesitate before any sacrifices in the struggle for the common cause of the Allies.

There is no denying it that there are circles—true very small—which are not at all interested in the speedy conclusion of the war. But it stands to reason that in such important state matters too much freedom must not be given to armaments manufacturers and others who put their private, selfish interests above all, and not the interests of the broad, popular masses, and not the interests of the occupied countries suffering under the Hitler yoke.

Two years ago, at a Congress of British trade unions, it was stated that one of the ministers at that time, Moore Brabazon, made a suggestion in the sense that the Russian and German armies should be allowed to mutually exhaust themselves meanwhile, and that his country would not lost by it. Soon afterwards the British Government rid itself of such a minister. Consequently his statement did not go by unnoticed and apparently not without a proper estimate.

ITALY BANKRUPT

The bankruptcy of Italian fascism testifies not only to the collapse of Hitler's biggest ally in Europe. Although the process is not yet finished and all sorts of coat-turning is still in progress in the Italian state, the events in Italy give a new and the strongest spur to the military-political disintegration in the Hitlerite camp and facilitates the putting of an end once and for all to the plans for the domination of Europe, for world domination.

This year Hitler Germany has encountered unparalleled difficulties on the Soviet-German Front where the Red Army is delivering one strong blow upon another on the enemy. The occupation of Sicily is about to be completed by the Allies. Italy has no other way out than complete surrender; moreover it must not be forgotten that the remarkable successes of our Allies in the Mediterranean have become possible primarily thanks to the two years of heroic struggle of the Red Army against the main forces of our common enemy and thanks to the selfless and strongest pressure of our army on the whole Soviet-German Front of late.

The question of the second front in Europe is of such great importance because on its solution depends whether the war will or will not be prolonged, whether new, tremendous sacrifices will or will not be prevented.

The opening of the second front in Europe this year will mean that with the conditions favoring it at present the anti-Hitler coalition is filled with the determination to put an end to Hitlerite tyranny and the war forced upon the peoples by Hitler, that the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition will not permit the prolongation of the war, will not permit new, tremendous sacrifices. To this end it will be backed by the powerful strength of the peoples filled with an unbending desire to put an end once and for all to the hated Hitler regime and to the war forced on them.

AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA

Events of the last few days and eeks drive home the fact that a closer iderstanding with Russia has become e great imperative of Allied strategy. 'e are in one of the major crises of e war. The news from every part of irope proves this. Italian resistance disintegrating. The Axis has been rained to the breaking point. The tellite states are wavering. Germany ces the prospect of real isolation. Her st great offensive has collapsed on e Eastern Front. Her cities are being unded mercilessly from the air. Her serves of manpower and airpower are eded desperately on distant fronts. feat as an ultimate certainty now ires her leaders in the face. We may sure that in these circumstances ey will attempt to use again the poical weapon which they have used so en and so successfully in the past, s time to divide the forces that reaten to destroy them and split Rus- from the west.

The only guarantee against this is a re realistic agreement between Rus- and her allies on all major points of erest than has prevailed thus far. ere are good reasons for believing t the American and British Govern- nts are now seeking such an agree- nt. Public opinion in this country aid them in their effort by con- ering frankly and fairly the prob- s which this involves.

There have been three major points disagreement in the past. They have olved (1) the question of the "sec- l front," now revived by Pravda; the question of the future of Po- d and the Baltic states, and (3) the stion of the future of Germany self.

(1) The Second Front

t is no secret that in the Russian w a "second front" has always ant one thing and only one: a direct ack in force across the English Chan- on the northern coast of France. Russians have not been impressed the argument that this strategy ld cost many lives. They have ed it as the only strategy which ld divert large numbers of German ops from the Eastern Front, and y have felt that their own great rifice of lives entitles them to ask ers to make an equal sacrifice.

The British and American Govern- nts have not rejected the Channel because they are any less anxious n the Russians to reach Berlin. They have believed that an alternative strategy could get them closer to Berlin, in shorter time, with more man-power left for the final drive. They have proved this, to their own satisfaction, with the conquest of North Africa and Sicily. They are now at the gates of Italy. They are pulling the Axis apart. And the enforced recall of Italian troops from France, Russia and the Balkans, necessitating immediate replacements from the German Army, has already diverted large numbers of men from the Eastern Front and will divert more as the campaign proceeds.

There is no way of convincing the Russians against their will that this was the better strategy. But it can be urged that a more adequate exchange of military information, than we have had thus far, and exchange in both directions, would bring a larger measure of agreement on the new military decisions that must be made from this point forward.

It is at this point that political considerations enter into the problem. For the failure thus far to achieve complete military agreement merely reflects disagreement or misunderstanding in the larger field of politics.

(2) Poland and the Baltic

There has undoubtedly been a fear on Russia's part that powerful influences were at work in Britain and the United States to revive the policy of the *cordon sanitaire*. This would mean an attempt to ring western Russia with a belt of fundamentally hostile states, supported by British and American power, in an effort either to keep Russian influence "within bounds", or actually to serve as the starting point for an invasion to snuff out the whole Soviet experiment if a good opportunity occurred.

It will be a pity if this idea is permitted to continue to trouble Russia's relations with her western allies. For the idea of the whole theory of the *cordon sanitaire* is really as dead as the dodo. No responsible statesman in the western democracies wants to try to revive it. No realistic layman thinks that it would work. A *cordon sanitaire* does not stop the dissemination of ideas, communistic or otherwise. It does not, in these modern days of air power, halt the expansion of military force. It is merely a shallow ditch, easily to be leaped over.

It ought to be possible to convince the Russians that American interest in Poland and the Baltic states stems not at all from a desire to use these small nations to hem Russia in or to threaten Russia's position in any way. It arises rather from a sense of loyalty to the promises we have given, under the Atlantic Charter, and to a belief that generous treatment for these small nations will be to Russia's own advantage. For the real danger is: not that a *cordon sanitaire* will be established by non-Russian Powers, but that some settlement of the eastern frontier questions will be made by Russian force, with the result of disillusioning American idealism and driving this country back once more into an embittered isolation which would weaken the future structure of every nation's security.

What American opinion urges is a settlement in a spirit of mutual accommodation between Russia and her small neighbors. And if such a settlement is to be reached, under American and British auspices, and with their full support, a beginning must be made now. The problem cannot wait, as our own Government once thought that it could wait, until the war is over. It cannot wait because it is an integral part of the immediate crisis which Allied military victories have created on the continent of Europe.

(3) Germany

No less immediate is the need of complete agreement between Russia and her western allies on a policy toward Germany.

It is obvious that at the present time we are veering in somewhat different directions. Stalin has proclaimed the Russian view that "it is not our aim to destroy Germany" and that it is not even "our aim to destroy all military force in Germany," since this would be "inadvisable from the point of view of the future." It is along these lines of policy that the "Free Germany" movement, organized in Moscow under official Russian auspices, has been working.

But this is not the policy of the British and ourselves. We mean to destroy every vestige of military force in Germany. We mean to destroy, to the best

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of our ability, Germany's power to put new armies in the field and equip those armies with new weapons of destruction that will threaten our own safety. We are fighting the war for this purpose and we shall not feel that we have won the war unless we succeed in this intention.

Clearly we must come to an agreement with the Russians on these vital questions, and the Russians with us, if we are not to present our German enemies with an opening into which they will do their best to drive a wedge. Again the question is immediate and its solution urgent. It cannot wait until the war is over. It is an essential part of the winning of the war, and agreement on it is the only possible guarantee against the losing of the peace.

To any discussion of these questions with the Russian Government the President can bring a pledge of the complete good faith of the American people. We wish an understanding with the Russian people based on friendship that will outlast the war. It is not a matter, on our part, merely of a new admiration for the courage of the Russian armies. It is not a matter merely of Orel and Stalingrad. There is a widespread belief in this country that despite all differences of ideology two great nations, each rich in its own possessions, can go forward together, in friendly competition, toward new frontiers of peace and progress.

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page _____ of the
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Standley on Urals Tour Sees Soviet Arms Plants

By The United Press. 3

MOSCOW, Aug. 9 — Admiral William H. Standley and his party returned to Moscow today from a four-day inspection tour of Soviet armament plants at Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk and Magnitogorsk. The United States Ambassador said he was "most impressed by the efficiency and quanity of Russian production."

Admiral Standley praised the efficiency of Russia's old plants as well as the new ones that were evacuated from the war zones and reassembled in the Urals.

He said he enjoyed the "closest cooperation and confidence" of Soviet officials, who placed at his disposal "valuable statistical information."

This is a clipping from page 3 of the New York Times for Aug 10, 1943

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INDIVIDUAL WEALTH IN RUSSIA DISCUSSED

London Economist Says Value of Savings May Be Illusory

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 — The wealth of individuals in Russia, which has become a subject of considerable interest since Premier Josef Stalin thanked a Kirghiz farmer for a contribution of more than 1,000,000 rubles to the Red Army fund, is discussed in the latest issue of The Economist of London to reach here.

The Economist reports in its July 3 issue that, while there is evidence of very large savings among collectivized peasants, "it is still very difficult to distinguish between the real and the illusory wealth," because of the scarcity of goods.

"There can be little doubt," the article said, "that the war has accelerated the re-emergence of high-income groups among the collectivized peasantry. It has not been possible to gauge the extent of this significant development, nor to form any opinion about the degree to which the high-income groups in the countryside have crystallized into anything like solid social layers."

It added that "a peasant may accumulate big sums of money; but money may buy very little." The evolution is still "in a state of flux," The Economist cautioned, and no definite conclusions can be drawn for the future.

"Judged by the wages paid in a number of big metal factories, the lower categories of earnings have been of the order of 300 rubles a month," the article said. "Some 8 to 12 per cent of the workers in those factories earn more than 1,200 rubles, whereas the earnings of some Stakhanovites [highly productive workers] amount to more than 4,000 rubles. The salaries of the technical staff in the same group of factories vary from 1,000 to 5,000, 6,000 and more rubles."

This is a clipping from page 6 of the New York Times for Aug 9, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government,

RUSSIAN POST-WAR ROLE OF BIG POLITICAL IMPORT

Moscow's Part in World Affairs Has To Be Considered by the United States and Great Britain

NOT OVER-MUCH FRANKNESS

By EDWIN L. JAMES E-3

The German defeat at Orel serves to call attention again to e potential position of Russia in world politics, now as well as the post-war period. Stalin is fighting a nationalist war; that eans he is fighting for Russia and he is fighting for her place the world. In other words, to suppose that the Russian dictator eks no more than to drive the Nazi invaders from Russian soil much too naive a view. He expects to have his say about what done with a victory in the winning of which, up to the present, alin thinks Russia has played the largest and most important le. It is not to be expected that feeling on his part will decrease victory comes nearer.

Of course, the four great United Nations are the United ates, Great Britain, Russia and ina. Yet it is on the record at the United States and Britain ve done much more conferring d cooperating than has gone on th respect to the other two ntries. Certainly it cannot be d, even in the Kremlin, that s represents any set plan by osevelt and Churchill. They ined Stalin to Casablanca and he ose not to go. It is no secret at Roosevelt has tried to arrange neeting with Stalin and Church- has been to Moscow to see him. lo, taking the European situa- n, in which China is not inter- ing herself directly, and it re- ins true that Washington and ndon have been working closely, ether, while Moscow has not n working with them. That this largely representative of Mos- v's position is scarcely open to stion.

oblem for the Future

here is no use denying that the ation is one which promises blems calling for nice handling. the United Nations succeed in ading the Continent of Europe l driving German forces out of ntries they now occupy, the is- of the handling of those terri- es is going to be an important

It is no secret in the State Department or in Downing Street that Stalin has ideas of his own about Europe. While the United States and Britain know he has ideas, they are not so sure what they are. Doubtless they would like to know more.

There is a recent matter which shows up the problem. When the Americans and British got hold of a considerable portion of Sicily they announced that civil administration was in the hands of AMGOT—Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories. American and British officials took over. Then came reports that if and when Italy was occupied the same plan would be followed. But it was not many days before there was another official announcement that Italy would be governed by an American-British-Russian arrangement. Whether or not this was the result of a direct word from Stalin is not as yet a part of the public record.

Some Other Straws

It is not to be overlooked that after the formation of a National Polish Committee in Moscow, by Russian action alone, there has been formed a National German Committee, also put out without consultation by Stalin with his Allies. These committees have a program of governing Poland and Germany. It is stated in Moscow that they are composed of Polish and German patriots. Maybe so, but it is no use being blind to the circumstance that prominent Communists are in their membership.

Now there is a Polish Government in Exile which ranks as an Ally. This government was not consulted on the Moscow-made committee and, in fact, is very much against it. The United States and Britain are also fighting Germany and, with Russia, seeking to break Hitler. But Washington and London had no part in setting up the German committee.

Now these committees have the blessing of the Moscow Government, and for whatever they may accomplish Moscow may be expected to take credit. It is no answer to say that the Comintern has been disbanded. Admitting that, one sees that these movements have the backing then of a national Russian Government, and as such may become important.

The Plans of Moscow?

Nor is there any room for doubt that Russia intends to seek zones of influence in Eastern Europe, perhaps in Central Europe. It has not been long since it was suggested from Russian sources that the Czechoslovak Government in Exile might better be located in Moscow than in London.

Politically Russia is on the march.

No one is going to say that Russia has no right to do these things. She is fighting hard. She has invested a large part of her wealth and manpower in the war. And that entitles her to have her say when the day of victory comes.

But the question is posed and posed sharply as to whether the United Nations are going to get together ahead of time on what they will do with victory when they get it. It has become more or less the watchword in Washington and

This is a clipping from page E-3 of the New York Times for Aug 8, 1943
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London that the thing to do now is to win the war without bothering too much at this time about post-war political plans. There is something to be said for that point of view; there is also something to be said against it.

The reason is that it would be catastrophic if after having defeated the Axis and its works, the victors were not to agree on what followed. This is not all theory. There is the matter of the Baltic States, for example. There is the matter of the eastern frontier of Poland. There is the matter of Finland. There are a score of other matters on which the United Nations are not yet in agreement.

Need for Some Agreement

The Times of London pointed out the other day that there was need for agreement on common purposes. Otherwise, this paper argued, things would drift into Russia taking charge in Eastern Europe and Britain and America in Western Europe. In that picture there is prospect of many headaches.

Some time back, Under-Secretary of State Welles in a speech in Canada said that if the United Nations did not collaborate toward unity of aims the peace conference would see as many post-war political plans as there were nations attending. That argument still holds good.

Suppose Germany is defeated decisively and surrenders unconditionally, with Russian troops on the east and British and American troops on the west. What happens? Who occupies Germany and under what regime? Will it be AMGOT's job or will it become the job of the Moscow committee? There ought to be some sort of answer ahead of time.

If Stalin has been playing a lone hand militarily and politically that does not make it sure he wishes to continue to do so. Perhaps he will have a realization that Russia will need American and British help after the war, and that may cause him to change his mind about meeting Roosevelt. Certainly a meeting of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin would bring great hopes of working toward what is surely needed.

This is especially true because there is a need for the accommodation of plans of the United Nations in the political field. We say that we can cooperate with Soviet Russia militarily while Russia keeps her form of government and the United States and Britain keep theirs. That idea seems to have had a sympathetic reception in Moscow. Certainly most Americans and Britishers do not think they are fighting to extend the Russian system to Europe or any large part of it. Doubtless Stalin has no such idea.

Because of that situation the desirability of some degree of agreement before the end of this year seems very apparent.

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TH

BERLIN EVACUATION STIRS WASHINGTON

Observers See Morale Waning and Suspect Strong Military Curb Over Hitler

RAPID CHANGES PERCEIVED

Moscow's Reticence Handicaps Full Appraisal of Events by Diplomatic Experts

By BERTRAM D. HULEN

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 7.—The partial evacuation of Berlin under the fear of air raids is being watched here with closest attention in the belief that, although the evacuation is only partial, it reflects a state of mind in the government and among the people that can only mean a weakening of morale.

This is significant enough to those who are trying to foresee the shape of things to come, but in some experienced diplomatic opinion it may mean more than a weakening of morale.

These circles frankly conjectured today whether the evacuation meant that Adolf Hitler and his chief aides had lost their authority in Germany, even though they remained physically on the scene, and that affairs were now completely in the hands of the military.

Military Decision Seen

This reasoning was based on the assumption that only a hard-boiled military decision could have produced an order for the evacuation of Berlin. It could not have been a political decision, it was asserted.

After all that Hitler and his aides have said to the German people about the impossibility of Berlin's being bombed, it was considered next to impossible for the order to have emanated from the Nazi political high command.

What all this may imply in terms of the immediate future, officials hesitated to say but the State Department is watching developments closely, not only as a matter of course, but by order of Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

The events are related, in the conjectural discussions here, not only to the British-American bombings of the Reich, but to the military campaign on the Eastern Front. The full import of the recent fighting there is not yet known because of an inability to obtain authentic information, but one fact has been definitely reported and it may hold significance. In the battle of Orel the Germans did not use their reserves.

Whether this points to a German withdrawal to some line far to the rear, or whether it may be based on political considerations, was a question officials would not attempt to answer.

Scene Alters Rapidly

There was one point, however, on which there was widespread agreement—the European scene is altering rapidly. Developments are being noted here and checked as they occur, but the absence of detailed information makes appraisal difficult. Even the recent authorization for foreign diplomats to return to Moscow from Kuibyshev has attracted more than ordinary attention.

The authorization was given before the Russians surged into Orel. Moreover, the immediate German front before Moscow has not been changed in recent weeks.

In view of the announcement from Berlin today that Hitler received the Japanese Ambassador, Hiroshi Oshima, on July 29, curiosity was expressed as to whether Naotake Sato, the Japanese Ambassador to Russia and former Foreign Minister, had returned to Moscow with the other diplomats without special notice being attracted to him and was holding conferences there, in view of Japan's apparent intense interest in the situation.

Into this picture there has now been injected the renewed Russian demand for a second front in Europe as published in Pravda yesterday. This "prodding," in all the circumstances, produced heavy tremblors in Washington—but no official retort. Similarly, there was no comment on the free German manifesto issued earlier in Russia.

There are several reasons for the absence of definite information. The United States, of course, has no representation in Germany. And information has been difficult to obtain in Moscow as Admiral William H. Standley, the American Ambassador to Russia, has more than once asserted.

Now Admiral Standley has received his first opportunity to make an inspection tour of the Russian arms industry and has gone to distant Siberia.

Furthermore, Russia has long since recalled to Moscow Maxim Litvinoff, her ambassador to Washington, and Ivan M. Maisky, her ambassador to London, for whom she is substituting a relatively young and obscure diplomat, Fedor Guseff, her Minister to Canada, who has not yet reached his new post.

With ambassadors absent from all these posts, the task of obtaining information is all the more difficult. The situation is likened by some to that of in 1939, when the Russo-German pact was concluded. At that time Constantine A. Oumansky, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, was in Moscow, having been called home for consultation a month before. In his absence the Soviet embassy was a fruitless source of information.

This is a clipping from page 12 of the New York Times for Aug 8, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Plans for East Europe?

(From the Soviet fortnightly "War and Working Class.")

EVERY logically thinking person understands that to the U.S.S.R.—the biggest power on the Continent and which in the course of the war has revealed its state and military strength—will belong one of the leading roles in the organisation of the post-war reconstruction of Europe and the whole world. Nevertheless, anti-democratic and semi-fascist elements are trying to prevent the participation of the U.S.S.R. in the organisation of the postwar world, and are building the most fantastic plans in this direction.

These groups and their press, as for example, *The Nineteenth Century and After*, the *Fortnightly Review* in Britain, the Hearst Press, in the U.S.A., and various sheets of the emigre cliques, certainly do not reflect the opinions of broad public circles in England and the U.S.A. and the democratic circles among the political emigres.

The Plans of Polish Landlords

One of the most typical projects advocated by these reactionary groups is the federation of the East European countries. Its energetic advocates are reactionary groups of Polish emigres, from the disguised supporters of Beck to the Social Democrats, as well as representatives of the Polish Government in London. Careful analysis of their plans for the organisation of post-war Europe completely betrays the imperialist aspiration of the Polish gentry.

A resolution of the Polish National Council which was adopted in April, 1942, states that a necessary condition for ensuring a lasting peace in Europe, after the destruction of Germany's military might, are closely knit in the federative unions of the Central European nations, between the Baltic, Aegean and Adriatic seas.

This resolution, together with other statements by Polish public figures, clearly bear the imprint of a sort of fixed idea of Polish politicians who claim a dominating position for Poland in Central Europe.

But the plans of all these project-builders are clearly built on sand. It is not difficult to understand, in the first place, that such a federation contains almost insurmountable internal contradictions. This is shown by the experience with the Little and Balkan Ententes. These blocs of states in Eastern Europe set themselves the aim of ensuring the security of the states comprising them, from outside interference. Yet the Little Entente in no way helped Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in the struggle against Hitlerite aggression and when war came, the members of the Balkan Entente split into three camps. Rumania perfidiously violated her obligations. Turkey has done nothing to fulfil her obligations with regard to Yugoslavia and Greece, who were subjected to aggression.

Anti-Soviet Intentions

It is not difficult to see that the plans for this federation, allegedly to be formed with the aim of the struggle against potential German aggression in the future, are in the last analysis directed against the Soviet Union.

Champions of the idea of an East European Federation, such as the *Fortnightly Review*, for example, speak without embarrassment of the fact that plans for a federation "between the Baltic and Black Seas" imply security from outside aggression "from the west and the east," that is from Germany, as well as, seemingly, from the Soviet Union.

And this is done at a moment when the Soviet Union, as recogised by honest people the world over, is heading the liberation struggle against the monstrous aggression of Fascist Germany, not only in the interests of its own people, but in the interests of the liberation of those countries of whose union into a federation so much is being written at the present, but which will not regain their freedom and independence without a Soviet victory over Germany.

The anti-Soviet character of an East-European Federation is revealed also by the Polish-Czechoslovakian discussions. Since 1942 Czechoslovakian statesmen have repeatedly declared that the formation of a Polish-Czechoslovak confederation must be carried out in agreement with the Soviet Union, which borders both on Czechoslovakia and Poland. But they have met with no support from the Polish statesmen, who are the most energetic advocates of the idea of confederation.

Remember the Alliance

Speaking of the plans for an East European federation, it would not be amiss to recall the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition which has been formed in the course of this war.

The plans for a post-war Europe and the plans for European federations in particular, must not ignore such an important historical fact as the Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance, and post-war collaboration in Europe.

But how can the recognition of the Anglo-Soviet treaty be compatible with the policy of the struggle against the "danger" from the "west and east"?

Honest supporters of the Anglo-Soviet agreement cannot defend any post-war plans which are hostile to the Soviet Union and Great Britain, or to either of these countries.

Russia

World News and Views

Aug. 7, 1943

pp. 252, 253

MOSCOW PRESSING SECOND FRONT PLEA

Pravda 'Prods' the Allies With Reminder That War Might Be Ended This Year

SOVIET OFFENSIVE POISED

Drawing of 30 German Divisions to West Would Open Weak Spots, Russians Say

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By Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, Aug. 6—There is no doubt in every Russian mind that if a second front was opened to draw off only thirty German divisions Russia would be eager to proceed with her offensive because such a shift would create weak spots in some places in the German front. Some believe that if this is done the war could be finished this year.

A significant article, partly intended for home consumption and perhaps partly to do some useful "prodding" abroad, was published in the last issue of War and the Working Class, trade union newspaper, and was fully reprinted in Pravda today. It says, recalling the Casablanca resolution on a second front that Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt agreed on "an exhaustive plan of action to be applied in the next nine months" and that these nine months are rapidly nearing an end. It asks what is happening. "The opening of a second front in 1943 means the war will be ended quickly or become a war of attrition, involving colossal new losses and sacrifices," it continues.

In other words, the Russians continue to place the strongest emphasis on the necessity to draw off from here enough divisions to guarantee full success of a large-scale Russian offensive in the near future.

"Allied Circles" Accused

MOSCOW, Aug. 6 (U.P.)—The Soviet campaign for an Allied "second front" in Europe assumed official character today when the Communist party organ Pravda republished an article from the magazine War and the Working Class charging that some Allied circles were "entirely uninterested in the war's ending quickly."

The article, published yesterday, challenged Britain and the United States to fulfill their pledge of a second front in 1943. Pravda carried the reprint as its leading article on the second page. [The article was broadcast by the Moscow radio in its English-language transmission to North America, the Columbia Broadcasting System reported.]

This is a clipping from page 24 of the New York Times for Aug 7, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government

File

Russian, 39, Named As Envoy to Britain

By The Canadian Press

LONDON, Aug. 1—Reuter said tonight in a dispatch from Moscow that it had been confirmed that Fedor Guseff, 39-year-old Russian Minister to Canada, would succeed Ivan Maisky as Ambassador to Great Britain. Reports to that effect were published here last week.

Mr. Maisky, who went to Moscow from London recently, has just been appointed Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Guseff arrived in Ottawa last year as the first Soviet Minister to Canada.

ADDITIONAL INDEXING

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35 AUG 11 1943

INDEXED

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Times for Aug. 2, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

AUG 20 1943

What's Behind the East European Federation

[The article below is from the Soviet magazine — "The War and the Working Class."]

MOSCOW *(By Wireless)*

EVERY logically thinking person understands that to the Soviet Union — the biggest power on the continent which in the course of the war has revealed its state and military strength — will belong one of the leading roles in the organization of the post-war reconstruction of Europe and of the whole world. Nevertheless anti-democratic and semi-fascist elements are trying to prevent the participation of the U.S.S.R. in the organization of the post-war world and are building the most fantastic plans in this direction, clearly hostile to the Soviet Union.

Particularly active in the discussion of the problems of the post-war world organization are precisely such bankrupt political groups as the offshoots of the Munich clique in Britain, the isolationists and various compromised politicians in the United States as [Herbert] Hoover and [William] Bullitt, and the anti-democratic groupings among the political emigres from Poland, Hungary, Austria, the Baltic and other countries.

Hostile Press Is Cited

These groups and their press, as for example **The Nineteenth Century and After**, and **The Fortnightly Review**, in Britain; the Hearst press in the United States, and the various sheets of the emigre cliques certainly do not reflect the opinions of broad public circles in England and the United States and the democratic circles among the political emigres.

These groups are exerting themselves to stir up trouble and are pulling into the hands of Hitler and his associates, who hope for a split in the camp of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. They have developed many activities, putting into play such outworn bugbears as the menace of "Bolshevization," and inventing and treating the reader to scores of anti-Soviet plans for the "reconstruction" of Europe.

There are many such projects beginning with that of forming a United States of Europe, a "Pan-Europe," and ending with the organization of a Europe broken up into various federations and confederations and regional blocs of states.

Shows Aims of Polish Gentry

One of the most typical projects for a federation is the Federation of East European countries. The most energetic advocates of the East European Federation are the reactionary groups of Polish emigres, from disguised Beck supporters to the Social Democrats, as well as representatives of the Polish Government in London.

A careful analysis of their plans for the organization of post-war Europe completely betrays the imperialist aspirations of the Polish gentry, although they are trying to disguise them by talk about the security of the central European states, the political equilibrium in Europe and the ensuring of a lasting and stable peace.

The foundation of the European Federation, according to the Polish project, must be Polish-Czechoslovak and Greek-Yugoslav Federations. The resolution of the Polish National Council adopted in April, 1942 states that the necessary condition for ensuring lasting peace in Europe after the destruction of Ger-

This is a clipping from page 3 of the MAGAZINE SECT. Daily Worker for July 25, 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

any's military might are closely nit federative unions of the cen- al European nations between he Baltic, Aegean and Adriatic eas.

erritorial Aims of olish Clique

This resolution and other state- ents of Polish public figures early bear the imprint of a sort idee fixe of the Polish politi- ans, who claim a dominating sition for Poland in central Eu- pe. It is no accident that the lish ministers who came out th these statements, together th the many official publicists, their cynical frankness go so as to say that Poland must come the "center of attraction" the other countries.

We shall not dwell here on the ct that the Polish imperialist ns contain aggressive claims to viet territory, to Lithuania and all of the Soviet Baltic in gen- l, a claim worthy perhaps only fascist aggressors. Despite all s, these Polish plans find sup- t among certain organs of the itish press, who lend their ges to the propaganda ideas of Polish reactionaries.

The authors of the plans for creation of an East European deration readily discuss the essity of ensuring "European ilibrium," and with this in w the small and medium tes in eastern Europe "must ate a bloc of states with 100 lion or 125 million population." ut the plans of all these proj- builders are clearly built on d. It is not difficult to under- nd in the first place that such ederation contains almost in- mountable internal contradic- s. Is it possible to ignore the that an East European Fed- tion must be a political union emocratic Czecho-slovakia and al Hungary, of a republican and and monarchist Rumania? it possible to count on the ility of such a politically het- eneous federation?

r take, for example the ques- of relations between states in the East European Fed- eration. Who does not know the irreconcilable territorial contra- dictions between Hungary and Rumania on the question of Transylvania, or the differences between Czechoslovakia and Po- land with regard to the question of the Teschen region, on which for several years now the Polish and Czechoslovak governments have failed to reach an agree- ment?

Consequently the internal in- stability of such a federation is beyond a doubt; such a shaky, clearly unstable federation as ex- tolled by the Polish politicians cannot afford a reliable founda- tion for the freedom, independ- ence and very security of the states involved in the project of this federation. To say nothing of the experience with the Little and Balkan Ententes.

How Soviet Union Is Slurred

Both of these blocs of states in eastern Europe set themselves the aim of ensuring the security of the states compromising them from outside interference. But what has experience shown? The Little Entente in no way helped Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in the struggle against Hitlerite aggression. When the war came the members of the Balkan En- tente split into three camps. Ru- mania perfidiously violated her obligations. Turkey has done nothing to fulfill her obligations with regard to Yugoslavia and Greece who were subjected to ag- gression.

On the other hand it is not difficult to see that the plans for this federation, allegedly to be formed with the aim of struggle against potental German aggres- sion in the future, are in the last analysis directed against the So- viet Union.

The champions of the idea of a European Federation as the "Fortnightly Review," for ex- ample, speak without embarrass- ment of the fact that the plans for a federation "between the Baltic and Black Seas" imply se- curity from outside aggression "from the west and east," that is, from Germany as well as seem- ingly from the Soviet Union.

Thus they advocate the same attitude to the "west," in other words towards Germany, as to the "east," in other words towards the Soviet Union. And this is done at a moment when the Soviet Union, as recognized by honest people the world over, is leading the liberation struggle against the monstruous aggression of fascist Germany not only in the interests of its own people but in the in- terests of the liberation of those countries of whose union into a federation so much is being writ- ten at present, but which will not regain their freedom and in- dependence without a Soviet vic- tory over Germany.

The anti-Soviet character of the East European Federation is revealed also by the following fact: In 1940 Czechoslovakia and Poland reached an agreement on a Polish-Czechoslovak Confedera- tion which is to serve as the basis for an East European Federation. Since 1942 Czechoslovakian statesmen have repeatedly de- clared that the formation of the Polish-Czechoslovak Confedera- tion must be carried out in agree- ment with the Soviet Union, which borders both on Czechoslo- vakia and Poland.

President Benes indicated the point blank necessity for reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union on the question of a Polish- Czechoslovak Confederation. Time and again he persistently defend- ed this idea, but met with no sup- port from the Polish statesmen who are the most energetic ad- vocates of the idea of confedera- tion.

Sponsors' Ignore Allies Treaty

From this it must follow that the said Polish statesmen do not deem it necessary to decide such questions on the basis of friendly collaboration with the USSR. In this one cannot but see one more proof that the said Polish states- men nurturing their plans for confederation are guided by in- tentions by no means friendly with regard to the Soviet Union.

No wonder that already at the end of last year the American journalist Callender, writing in the New York Times, pointed openly to the fact that the re- actionary Polish press in the United States was painting the Polish-Czechoslovakian Confeder- ation as a "buffer" bloc between Russia and Germany.

Lastly, speaking of the plans for an East European Federation, it would not be amiss to recall such no mean fact as the Anglo- Soviet-American coalition formed in the course of this war. The plans for post-war Europe and plans for European federations in particular must not ignore such an important historical fact as the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Al- liance and post-war collaboration in Europe.

Plans Are Hostile To the Allies

But how can recognition of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty be com- patible with a policy of struggle against "danger" from "west and east"? How indeed can support of this agreement, designed to ensure collaboration and mutual aid between the USSR and Great Britain in averting aggression on the part of Germany in the post- war period, be compatible with the aims of the formation of an East European Federation direct- ed against aggressive Germany and against the USSR, which in the future is to be one of the decisive forces in the struggle against possible new aggression by Germany?

To build plans for the creation of an East European Federation hostile to the Soviet Union is possible only by proceeding from the negation of the necessity for friendship and collaboration be- tween the USSR and its Allies in the post-war period, proceeding only from the negation of the Anglo-Soviet Agreement.

Honest supporters of the An- glo-Soviet Agreement cannot de- fend post-war plans hostile to the Soviet Union and Great Brit- ain or to any one of these coun- tries.

(By Inter-Continent News)

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Michoels and Feffer in Detroit Today

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(Special to the Daily Worker)

DETROIT, July 23.—This arsenal of democracy is preparing to meet Prof. Solomon Michoels and Col. Itzik Feffer, good-will delegates from the scorched battlefields of the Russian Front. These two distinguished guests will be welcomed at the railroad station when they arrive, Saturday morning, July 24, by the reception committee consisting of many of the outstanding leaders in the Jewish community.

The Soviet-Jewish delegation will then be received by Mayor Edward J. Jeffries, Jr., at the City Hall, where they will be officially welcomed to the city. A luncheon reception by the committee has been planned for 1 P.M. at the Book-Cadillac.

A tour of some of the war plants is being arranged to acquaint the visitors with the huge plants producing many of the tanks, planes and guns that are being used on the Soviet Front today. They will remain in Detroit until Monday, July 26.

On their return to Detroit on Sunday, Aug. 1, they will address a huge public reception at the Masonic Temple, scheduled for 7 P. M.

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This is a clipping from page 5 of the DAILY WORKER
Date 7-24-43
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50 AUG 7 1943

2000 Greet Feffer And Michoels at Pittsburgh Rally

(Special to the Daily Worker)

PITTSBURGH, July 23. — Two thousand people representing all shades of opinion of Pittsburgh Jewry rose to their feet in Carnegie Music Hall Thursday night and gave a rousing welcome to the Soviet Jewish delegation. Speaking on behalf of the Jews of Pittsburgh, Rabbi A. M. Ashinsky, who was active at the first World Zionist Congress in Basle in 1897 and is now the national vice president of Mizrachi, turned to face the delegates directly and said: "We welcome you, dear brothers, and through you we welcome the Jews of the Soviet Union. Tonight the entire Jewish community shares with you and through you with our brothers and sisters in the Soviet Union in the common effort against our common enemy. It is only the unity of these two great Jewish groups—the Soviet and American—which together with our brethren in Palestine will enable us to make every possible sacrifice for a quick victory and for a peace that will rehabilitate our national aspirations for freedom of our people, and for the Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine."

In the same spirit the other speakers paid tribute to the Soviet Union and the Jews of that country. Louis Caplan, chairman of the reception committee and active in Jewish community life; Edward O. Tabor, chairman of the Pittsburgh Committee for the United Nations; Louis Hoffman, Grand Master of Brith Abraham; and B. Z. Goldberg, of the New York Jewish Day.

The speeches of Michoels and Feffer inspired the enthusiastic audience to cheer the plea for unity of the Jews in America and the Soviet Union in their common effort to destroy fascism. Time and again the audience gave spirited applause to the stirring remarks of Michoels and Feffer.

Preceding the meeting, two hundred leading representatives of the Jewish and non-Jewish community paid tribute to the delegates at a luncheon. Speaking on behalf of the citizens of Pittsburgh, Mayor Cornelius D. Scully told that he had become convinced of the greatness of Russia two decades ago. He described how the Soviet Union had always fought for the interests of the common man, and that today the Soviet Union together with the other United Nations is fighting on the battlefield to preserve and extend the rights of the common man as so well described in Vice President Wallace's speech.

On Thursday morning the Mayor extended a warm reception to the delegates at his City Hall office.

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This is a clipping from page 4 of the DAILY WORKER

Date 7-24-43

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53 AUG 7 1943

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SOVIET HITS HEARST PRESS

Hoover, Bullitt Also Assailed for Plans 'Hostile' to Russia

MOSCOW, July 18 (AP)—The Soviet trade union magazine, War and the Working Classes, today criticized the Hearst newspapers, former President Herbert Hoover and William C. Bullitt, former Ambassador to Russia, for promoting post-war reconstruction plans which it termed "hostile to the U.S.S.R."

It declared the persons it criticized, as well as some British publications, were "Nineteenth Century," but said "the isolationists and the Munich clique fail to speak for the democratic masses."

Particular objection was made to what was described as a Polish plan for an east European federation consisting of a bloc of small and medium-sized nations.

It is not difficult to see that while the plan presumably is directed against future German aggression, it is no less directed against the Soviet Union," the magazine said.

This is a clipping from page 6 of the New York Times for July 19, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

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Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Acers
Mr. Carson
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Starke
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

Fair Enough

By Westbrook Pegler

NEW YORK, July 16—Now that the Communist International has been dissolved again and the United States has Comrade Stalin's generous permission to eliminate traitors without hurting his feelings, why don't we? Because the New Deal won't.

That our Communists are traitors there is no possible doubt. They are, as Attorney General Biddle has said—not that the obvious truth needed confirmation from him—enemies of our Government and of our form of government and of the capitalistic system on which it is based. Their method is violence, riots growing into civil war, and their objective is a dictatorship of a minority of the people over the majority under the rule of a small committee or one man.

There is proof of all this in their literature and their history, and if we accept the proof, as we must if we weigh the facts honestly and without cowardice, then we should realize that they are as dangerous to the United States as the Nazis and Fascists in our midst ever were. In fact they are more dangerous because they have enjoyed the special favor of our Government for 10 years and have been helped into a position of threatening power in our sea commerce, our radio communication, our propaganda and our bureaucracy and Government.

* * *

IN THEIR ethics, morals and purposes they are equivalent to the Nazis as two nickels are equal to a dime, and the intense, arrogant nationalism of the Nazis does not constitute a material difference because the Nazis were trying to spread national socialism, under Hitler and from Berlin as the source, just as the Communists, working out of Moscow, worked to spread Communism. Like the Communists, the Nazis used internal discord as the preparatory poison and, when their victims were thoroly confused and fighting in the streets or too badly at odds to make a united resistance, they moved in. France was a victim of disunity created by both Nazis and Communists, but the work of the Communists was the deadlier at the fatal moment because they continued their sabotage in the factories and their treason in the army up to the hour of Hitler's triumph. They did this because Stalin was then still Hitler's ally thru a treaty which touched off the war, and they were able to do it because the French then, like us today, foolishly continued to regard the Communists as liberals, or at worst radicals, and to give these enemies the protection of their equalitarian, liberal laws.

It was a mistake to do so, but we in this country, who never took any lip from Hitler, did try to appease Stalin by dealing generously with the Communists. He would have had more respect for us and the two countries would understand each other better today if we had let them go just far enough to identify themselves unmistakably and then given them the works as we gave it to the Bundists.

That, of course, would have left at large that element of sneaks known as the fellow-travelers who associate politically and otherwise with the avowed Communists but cannot be convicted under our laws of being actual members of the party or conspiracy. They would be a problem still but not dangerous if we were to treat them just as we have treated those who ran with the Nazis but didn't actually join them. Those non-joining pro-Nazis are in the doghouse if not in the jailhouse, which is as it should be, but the difference and the danger is that the pro-Communists are not only all at large but busier than ever and are cultivated, consulted and encouraged by the Government, and their power for future evil is thus enhanced.

* * *

WELL, there is absolutely no hope that they will be rebuffed, to say nothing of their being ostracized, as long as Mr. Roosevelt is President. Mrs. Roosevelt, Ickes and Joseph E. Davies and others among our rulers, who show a healthy detestation of Nazis and pro-Nazis, find these pro-Communists, or fellow-travelers, very attractive. None of these individuals ever left anyone in doubt where a pro-Nazi was concerned.

They were against them. But neither do they leave us in doubt as to how they stand on pro-Communists. They like them. Therefore we shall never be rid of the Communist and fellow-traveler under the New Deal. But Tom Dewey, for example, or Taft, or Bricker, or Jim Farley, or Harry Byrd, if elected in 1944, would start the damnedest scramble of vermin out of Washington that this country has ever seen.

The roads would be choked with them and, whatever else a new President elected from that list might do, and none of them would be pro-anything but pro-American, he certainly would go thru those bureaus with tons of bug and rat powder and no Communist leader of any big union would ever be received with ceremonies at the White House and the officers of the Army and Navy would be relieved of the humiliating necessity to treat them with deference, as they have to now.

Willkie you can cross off. On Communism and pro-Communism he can't be trusted. He may be gullible, but it is safer to suspect that, like John L. Lewis, he thinks he can use them up to a point in his business, or that, like Mr. Roosevelt, he likes them.

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Washington Daily News - 7-16-43

FILE

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The Dissolution of the Comintern —As I See It

By SENATOR CLAUDE PEPPER

(Democrat, Florida)

IT IS my opinion that the dissolution of the Communist International in the United States was of immeasurable good in improving the lations between this country and Russia and in rengthening the unity of the Labor movement the Nation against all opposing elements.

It is, of course, consistent with our good re-tions with Russia that we shall not try to inter-re with their local affairs as a government and ey shall not try to disturb ours. The Communist

The Worker is pleased to present these statements by Sen. Claude Pepper of Florida and Dr. Harry F. Ward of the Union Theological Seminary. The statements were made in response to requests by this paper.

SEN. CLAUDE PEPPER

nternational has always been the red herring hich those opposed to Labor has tried to drag cross Labor's trail. The removal of this possi-ility will add strength to Labor's cause, in my pinion.

There are enough ominous signs in this ountry to give all who believe in real democracy ause for concern, at least occasion to tighten heir lines all they can.

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NOT RECORDED
JUL 30 1943

This is a clipping from page 3 Sec. 2 of THE WORKER
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52 JUL 31 1943

By DR. HARRY F. WARD
(Professor Emeritus, Union Theological Seminary)

DR. HARRY F. WARD

THE chief contribution to national unity for the winning of the war and the defeat of Hitlerism here and abroad made by the dissolution of the Comintern is that it deprives Hitler and his colleagues here of their main propaganda weapon. So it relieves honest people who were ignorant of the facts of a fear which was artificially created. Actually the real danger of interference in this nation's policies comes from the religious international and the financial international, and these still remain to be reckoned with, especially at the points where their interests coincide.

The attack on unity by those who used the Bolshevik bogey has already shifted to the Communist Party itself, and it may be expected to sharply change its tone as the absurd naivete of its request for dissolution becomes apparent even to its authors. It should have been dissolved in Homeric laughter as soon as it was issued. The duty of capitalizing whatever possibilities for national unity are inherent in the dissolution of the Comintern falls mostly upon the progressives in the unions, the professional, farmer and cultural organizations. It is for them to insist that the achievement of the collective security and the freedom for which we are fighting requires the widest possible people's front actions in every phase of the war effort. It is for them to insist that the test of policies and program is not where they came from, but what are they aiming at. It is for them to demand that the test of any group is not its name but what it is doing and how it is behaving.

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ADDITIONAL INDEXING

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The Dissolution of the Comintern —As I See It

The Worker is pleased to present these statements by Sen. Claude Pepper of Florida and Dr. Harry F. Ward of the Union Theological Seminary. The statements were made in response to requests by this paper.

By SENATOR CLAUDE PEPPER
(Democrat, Florida)

IS my opinion that the dissolution of the Communist International in the United States was of immeasurable good in improving the lations between this country and Russia and in rengthening the unity of the Labor movement the Nation against all opposing elements.

It is, of course, consistent with our good re-tions with Russia that we shall not try to inter-re with their local affairs as a government and ey shall not try to disturb ours. The Communist International has always been the red herring which those opposed to Labor has tried to drag across Labor's trail. The removal of this possibility will add strength to Labor's cause, in my opinion.

There are enough ominous signs in this country to give all who believe in real democracy cause for concern, at least occasion to tighten their lines all they can.

SEN. CLAUDE PEPPER

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This is a clipping from
page 3 of WORKER Mag. Sect.
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Government

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JUL

By DR. HARRY F. WARD
(Professor Emeritus, Union Theological Seminary)

HE chief contribution to national unity for the winning of the war and the defeat of Hitlerism here and abroad made by the dissolution the Comintern is that it deprives Hitler and his lleagues here of their main propaganda eapon. So it relieves honest people who were norant of the facts of a fear which was artifially created. Actually the real danger of inrference in this nation's policies comes from e religious international and the financial inrnational, and these still remain to be reckoned th, especially at the points where their interests incide.

The attack on unity by those who used the lshevik bogey has already shifted to the ommunist Party itself, and it may be expected to sharply change its tone as the absurd naivete of its request for dissolution becomes apparent even to its authors. It should have been dissolved in Homeric laughter as soon as it was issued. The duty of capitalizing whatever possibilities for national unity are inherent in the dissolution of the Comintern falls mostly upon the progressives in the unions, the professional, farmer and cultural organizations. It is for them to insist that the achievement of the collective security and the freedom for which we are fighting requires the widest possible people's front actions in every phase of the war effort. It is for them to insist that the test of policies and program is not where they came from, but what are they aiming at. It is for them to demand that the test of any group is not its name but what it is doing and how it is behaving.

DR. HARRY F. WARD

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Last Issue of C. I. Magazine

MOSCOW, July 5 (Delayed) (UP).—The last issue of the magazine "Communist International," organ of the recently dissolved Comintern, appeared on newsstands today.

An editorial note reviewing the magazine's history since it was founded in 1919 expressed the editors' "profound conviction that the fraternal Communist Parties and their publications will concentrate all their efforts to facilitate the speediest destruction of Hitlerism—the most wicked enemy of workers in all countries."

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This is a clipping from page 5 of the Daily Worker for July 7, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

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57 JUL 12 1943

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Red Journal in Moscow Quits

MOSCOW, July 5 (Delayed) (U.P.) — The last issue of the magazine Communist International, organ of the recently dissolved Comintern, appeared on news stands today. An editorial expressed the editors' "profound conviction that the fraternal Communist parties will concentrate all their efforts to facilitate the speediest destruction of Hitlerism—the most wicked enemy of workers in all countries."

This is a clipping from
page 10 of the
New York Times for
July 7, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of
Government.

RUSSIAN REBUKES U. S. ISOLATIONISTS

Writer Criticizes Them for Demanding Definition of Allied War Aims

STRESSES ROLE OF SOVIET

Says It Should Have "One of the Most Decisive Voices in Post-War Reconstruction"

MOSCOW, July 2 (U.P.)—Nikolai Malinin, Soviet writer, tonight opened Russia's first public forum on post-war problems and at the same time sharply rebuked United Nations isolationists for demanding a definition of Allied war aims at a possible risk of extending the conflict.

Writing in the political review, War and Working Class, Mr. Malinin said that the Soviet Union, occupying one-sixth of the world's territory and having proved itself the most powerful Continental nation, should have "one of the most decisive voices in post-war reconstruction."

[The significance of his remarks is that they, like all discussions in the Soviet press, are assured to be officially approved.]

Since the Allies cannot yet precisely formulate post-war policies, Mr. Malinin said, open public discussions are accordingly urged among the Soviet population on the following problems:

1. How to dispose of Germany after the war: Should the country be destroyed, dismembered, occupied or restored to a republic?
2. The future of Italy: Should the House of Savoy be overthrown and should Italian colonies be restored?
3. How to dispose of Germany's vassals.
4. The problem of British, Belgian, Netherland and French colonies lost in the war.
5. The question of international air lines and bases.
6. The problem of setting up machinery for preservation ~~of international~~ public order.

Mr. Malinin did not take a stand ~~on any~~ of these questions but said popular discussion of them would be most useful in guiding the Soviet Union in its search for ways and means to achieve a lasting peace in cooperation with the United Nations.

"The discussion will also serve to answer American isolationists who unjustly are criticizing Roosevelt, Churchill and the Soviet Government for lack of clarity of their war aims," he said.

United Effort Held Hindered

Charging that isolationists still were hindering united efforts against the Hitler coalition, he added:

"It is no wonder that war aims concern American isolationists who continue to think that the United States can stand aside from the war; that the United States was drawn into it by Roosevelt's malice, and that the United States can conclude a separate peace.

"Isolationists conceive war aims as an aspiration to full solution of all interantional controversies and the establishment of a regime of the same type in all countries—in other words the establishment of a heaven on earth. Of course the impossibility of such a Utopia is ascribed to one or another member of the coalition, for instance Churchill's refusal to liquidate the British Empire or the alleged Soviet desire to bolshevise Central Europe."

Mr. Malinin said the isolationists forget that the full post-war program can result only from common decisions and that premature discussion of controversial questions "can react unfavorably on the unity of the Allies and postpone the termination of the war."

He then restated the declarations of Josef Stalin and Allied governments to fight for the freedom and self-determination of all peoples, the abolition of racial and national inequalities and the destruction of Hitlerism.

"The Soviet Union has withstood the brunt of Hitler's hordes and consequently suffered more than any other of the United Nations," Mr. Malinin said. "The Soviet Union will need a firm peace in order to restore its wrecked economy.

"Therefore it is not interested in new violations of peace. No single problem can be and must be decided without the Soviet Union. Consequently, there must be a timely discussion of these problems in our press."

This is a clipping from page 5 of the New York Times for July 3, 1943 clipped at the Seat of Government.

U. S. BID TO STALIN BELIEVED ACCEPTED

But Premier Is Thought to Have Avoided Suggesting Time for a Meeting With Roosevelt

By PERTINAX

North American Newspaper Alliance.

Indications are at hand that, in his answer to President Roosevelt's letter—the letter that Joseph E. Davies delivered in Moscow—Premier Joseph Stalin accepted the President's proposal for a meeting. At the same time, he avoided appointing or suggesting any definite date or place.

Therefore, this message of Mr. Stalin is not interpreted by all in the same way. While some feel that definite progress has been made toward an American-Russian conference of exceptional import, others hold the opinion that the Russian leader, who three times in the past turned down the idea, has not appreciably changed his mind.

They believe that, in the judgment of Mr. Stalin, Russia's relative aloofness is a form of pressure more likely to tell on her Allies than whatever argument Mr. Stalin might use in a man-to-man talk. Moreover, as a shrewd politician, he must be aware that, before the Russian people, he had better not openly share in the responsibility for a general strategy that does not entirely tally with the popular claim for an immediate second front.

Russian Accord Doubted

Five weeks have passed since Mrs. Stalin and his military advisors became acquainted with the military arrangements agreed to by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill as the outcome of their discussions in Washington. All appearances are that the Russian rulers do not consider that those arrangements conform to the standard of a war of coalition as they conceive it.

In the communiqué issued in Moscow on the anniversary of Russia's entrance in the war and also when returning thanks for Mr. Roosevelt's telegram sent on that occasion, Mr. Stalin did not do more than guardedly refer to the subject. Nevertheless, the point he touched delicately should not be overlooked or misunderstood.

It is the view of the Kremlin that each ally must give out all its strength and not try to limit its strategic objective on the calculation that, months later, its own contribution to the common cause may be lightened by the contribution of others.

Early in 1942 qualified exponents of Russian policy did not conceal their suspicion that the London government intended to have all operations on the European Continent postponed until the day when the American Army would be sufficiently expanded and trained to add its numbers to British troops.

Today, even after the North African victory, the Russians are apt to think that the British Government is prone to indulge in further delays, as regards the invasion of Europe (unless the air offensive should bring about exceptional opportunities) because it wants the American Army to grow sufficiently in size and experience so it can join on equal terms.

Churchill Quotes Daladier

Mr. Churchill is reported to have often quoted in a carping spirit a phrase of Edouard Daladier that M. Daladier did not want the French Army seriously to attack the Germans until 2,000,000 British soldiers had been transported to French territory and were ready for action.

If Moscow does not err on the subject, Mr. Churchill would seem now to have appropriated that remark of the French minister. And the Russians, to whom—since June, 1941—the enemy left no choice but to throw their whole substance onto the battlefield, cannot but disapprove of that kind of reservation.

Maxim Litvinoff's return to the Washington embassy is now held probable. Meanwhile, the appointment of Constantine Oumansky, Mr. Litvinoff's predecessor in the American capital, to the legation in Mexico, which was immediately raised to the status of an embassy, evidences a Russian trend to develop relations with the new world.

This is a clipping from page 77 of the New York Times for June 30, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

ARMY ARISTOCRACY FORMING IN SOVIET

Rapid Development of Guards Units Is Creating Military Class With Privileges

COMMUNIST LINK GROWS

Party Open to Select Fighters —New System May Influence Nation After the War

5

By C. L. SULZBERGER

By Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, June 27—The attitude of the Soviet Government toward the Red Army Guards units strongly indicates a desire to cultivate what could conceivably be called a military aristocracy. In the ranks of the Guards themselves a spirit of superiority prevails. An élite military class is clearly developing, with the distinction between soldier and officer constantly increasing. Gradually the Red Army is maturing and drawing away from its earliest concept as an amorphous organization of workers and peasants and developing along tight new lines resembling not only the traditional armies of czarist days, but those of the capitalistic Western world.

Since Premier Joseph Stalin created the first Guards unit on Nov. 11, 1941, the idea has been vastly expanded to inculcate a patriotic feeling and reward merit. However, by so doing a special military class has been developed, with special privileges. Privates in Guards units receive double pay, and officers one and a half times the usual rate. Their personal equipment often is better than that of ordinary units. They have their own insignia, banners and medals and are expected to serve as an example for the rest of the army. Guardsmen receive more medals and orders than other soldiers generally.

The Communist party, moreover, has opened its ranks wide to Guardsmen and has been making a considerable drive to get them in. In this country the Communist party represents the political élite, and it is normal for it to seek fullest collaboration with the military élite and to control it.

Because the Guards as an extensive body have not existed long enough to permit a study of its tendencies, it is impossible to foresee what is likely to be their influence on the post-war military and political social structures of the Soviet Union—if any.

The exact number of Guards corps and armies now existing in Russia is not as yet publicly known. The Sixty-second Army, which defended Stalingrad, was the first entire army to receive the Guards title. This represented a wholesale order and affected even the women nurses and cooks accompanying that force, all of whom now are entitled to call themselves Guards.

Since Armistice Day, 1941, when the First Guards Tank Brigade was created, the honor has been widely disseminated in the Red Army. To give an indication how important and widespread the Guards movement now is, the following figures are cited:

By January, 1942, the First and Second Guards Infantry Brigades had been created, and the First to Seventh Guards Cavalry Divisions. By May, 1942, there were already twenty-one Guards pursuit aviation regiments, seventy-one Guards artillery regiments, two Guards Signal Corps regiments, two Guards motorcycle regiments, three Guards motorized infantry divisions, thirty-one Guards infantry divisions and four Guards infantry brigades.

This is a clipping from page 5 of the New York Times for June 28, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

RUSSIANS ASKING ALLIES FOR REAL PARTNERSHIP

Good-Will Evidenced Toward Britain And America Is a Post-War Asset

By RALPH PARKER

By Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, June 26—In this vast and where there is a powerful political machine all publicity can be called official public opinion. It is far less easy to assess with confidence the true mood of the people based on deep traditions of popular prejudice, though this in turn is a more important factor in the shaping of the official attitude than is usually imagined.

But evidence is not lacking that the cordiality of the official Soviet attitude toward the Allies, which has been a striking feature of the Moscow scene during the past month, is reflected in the hearts of the Soviet people and that the new interest of the Soviet Government in post-war collaboration with the Allies which has emerged simultaneously with the growth of official appreciation of the Allies' present war effort meets a popular desire.

On the official side this new tendency may be said to date from the moment Marshal Stalin raised his glass under the rock crystal chandeliers of Catherine the Great hall in the Kremlin to toast the United States at a banquet for Joseph E. Davies on May 23.

Echoed by Molotoff

Three days later Foreign Commissar Vyacheslaff M. Molotoff, toasting the Anglo-Soviet treaty, stressed his Government's desire to see the one-year-old child reach manhood through a sturdy and untroubled youth and it was not long afterwards that, at a banquet in honor of Soviet-United States relations, he even more expansively dwelt on hopeful auguries to propose post-war collaboration between the Allies in arms.

These sentiments have been buttressed by the exchange of various official telegrams and the happy atmosphere prevailing at the recent ceremony when Ambassador William H. Standley presented the United States Army and Navy awards to Red fighters and by the wide publicity given by the press to the Washington project for a post-war relief and rehabilitation program.

But this new emphasis on collaboration is more than a by-product of the "bitter necessity" of the Allied coalition against Hitler or the result of leaders' whims. It is possible to trace from the Stalingrad victory a fading away of prejudices and suspicions that have hampered the Soviet approach toward the Allies. It is not unreasonable to assume that from the blood-soaked ground of the Volga steppes grew the self-assurance which resulted in sharper Soviet insistence that the outer defenses of the Western frontiers should be in friendly, capable hands.

Good-Will Grows

If you look beneath the official surface of Soviet life you will find that, despite everything that has tended to sour Russian opinion towards the Allies at various times during the past two years, a certain steady growth of good-will has been perceptible. The ground was not entirely unprepared. A people whose educational program contains a serious and extensive study of British and American literature, with special emphasis on progressive-minded writers of the past and present, may be said to have a fundamental knowledge of the Allies' ideals even though intellectual conviction is often overborne by compelling emotions springing from contemporary events.

With the material at hand—it would be ingenuous to claim that it was anything like adequate—Soviet organizations, film societies, universities, and institutes arranged a series of lectures before specialist audiences covering many aspects of American life. It is interesting that the subjects were not confined to the Allies' war effort and that lecturers have, for several months past, sought to establish in the students' minds the idea that sympathies and interests other than a partnership in arms link Russia with the United States of America and Britain. The fruits of this patient work are just now appearing.

In the Years Ahead

No observer of the development of Russian character under the war's stress could fail to detect that with the growth of ardent patriotism there has emerged a desire for Russia to play its traditional role in Europe after the war. Resilient young Russia, it seems to many here, believes firmly in its ability to recover with supreme facility from the losses, casualties and damage.

On the other hand, it is a fact that the Soviet Union will stand in need of help in feeding its millions after the war, which the Soviet delegation to the Hot Springs conference stressed and to food one might add consumer goods of a wide variety to fill the appalling gap between supply and demand which is always widening. Granted that this help is available, Russia now feels she will be strong enough to exert a steadying influence in the Eastern European zone whence so many of Europe's wars have sprung. And as a corollary, an isolated Russia might find people and government once again swept with a wave of suspicion.

There are no indications at present that, in such a mood, Russia would abandon her interests in the outer defenses of the western frontiers as she was obliged to do after the revolution and this would be to condemn the Russian people to further privations for the benefit of military strength and neighboring lands to an unstable future. It is pertinent that representatives in the Soviet Union of Eastern European lands believe that if Russia is assured of Allied good-will she will be likely to conduct a generous, liberal policy toward those lands. Both the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav ambassadors are cooperating with the all-Slav committee whose principles include protection of the rights of Russia's Slav neighbors.

Practical Help Desired

Perhaps the most hopeful augury for Russian collaboration with the Allies, beyond the ardent longing of new Russia to turn its hands to construction after destruction, is the fact that the Soviet authorities are more attracted by cooperation on a technical, businesslike plane than in attaching their signature to documents expressing vague aspirations. The idea of building up an organization for peace and prosperity on practical lines appeals to the hard-headed, realistic rulers of this country.

Though Russia can ill afford to spare experts from war work which has A-1 priority here there are indications that when the organizations for technical collaboration are created, designed to tackle the practical problems of the post-war phase without prejudice to or infringement of Russian security, Moscow will be ready to do its full share to bring the work to fruition. In the creation of such machinery would seem to lie the path to the prolongation of the coalition.

This is a clipping from page 4-E of the New York Times for June 27, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

File

As We See It---Comment

The End of the Internationale?

MOSCOW'S decision to dissolve the Comintern —the international organization of communist parties—is a move to strengthen Russia's relations with other United Nations and to solidify the united front against Hitlerism. Beyond that, postwar actions must be the principal proof of communism's decision to abandon its world revolution schemes.

A nation fighting a global war cannot be super-suspicious of its ally's offers to help defeat a common enemy. Certainly Russians at Stalingrad and Russians fighting on the 2,000-mile front from the Arctic to the Caucasus, have given proof by their valor that Russia will make any sacrifice to defeat Germany. This is no time to refuse to take Stalin's word, while accepting his help in winning our war. But the final test will come later.

There is no doubt that the dissolution of the Comintern robs Hitler's anti-Bolshevism propaganda of its punch, and provides reassurance that Russia's war ambitions are of a national rather than international scope. This move may do much toward strengthening resistance to Naziism in conquered countries, to the advantage of the United Nations, as well as alleviating fears of Russia in other allied countries. Stalin is well aware of the fact that Britain and United States hate Fascism and all its tenets, but at the same time do not intend to permit communism to usurp the democratic processes they are fighting to preserve.

As a pledge of all-out cooperation by a "general national uprising and mobilization of people for the speediest victory over the enemy"..... "carried out by the vanguard of the working class movement of each separate country working within the framework of its own country" the pronouncement is most welcome. That is Moscow's promise. For the duration, we must accept it.

* * *

Such reservation is no reflection upon Stalin nor upon Russia. It is only that we are unable to be convinced, by words alone, that the red flag has become red, white and blue overnight. Actions still speak with a louder voice than pronouncements.

The American Communist party renounced affiliation with the Internationale in 1940; but the move was inspired not so much by patriotism as by the fact that all U. S. comrades would have been forced to register under the Voorhis law as "agents of a foreign government." Certainly the acts of the communists in this country from that date, Nov. 16, 1940, until Russia's entrance into the war in June, 1941, provided no proof that the severance had been complete. The party was identified with anti-war movements and was charged with fomenting strikes and unrest. Since Germany attacked Russia, however, the communists have been for all-out war effort. How they might have reacted, as Americans, if Pearl Harbor had occurred before the Russia invasion must remain a matter of conjecture.

America would like to take Moscow's promise to keep communism at home at its face value. For the time, it is best to accept it on that basis. If future actions prove it false, we can combat it then. Right now, it is an asset in helping to win the war.

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61 JUN 21 1943

OLOTOFF PLEADS OR ALLIED ATTACK

ssian People Live in Hope f Combined Action Against Nazis, He Declares

IESS URGES QUICK ROUT

andley Applauds Unity on Post-War Aims—Moscow Sees Decision Near

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IOSCOW, June 23 (U.P.)—Soviet reign Commissar Vyacheslaff Molotoff was revealed today to e said on Tuesday during an icial ceremony attended by the ited States Ambassador, Ad- al William H. Standley, that Russian people were living in e that the enemy soon would hit by combined Allied blows.

Let us remember," Mr. Molo- f said in reply to a speech by miral Standley during which he sented sixty American Army Navy medals to Soviet mili- y men, "that millions of people o have made countless sacri- s live in profound hope that the e is not far off when the enemy k feel the full weight of the shing blows of a combined ied offensive."

oviet newspapers devoted two umns on their front pages to ceremony and also published sident Roosevelt's message to mier Joseph Stalin on the sec- l anniversary of the Russo- man war. The newspapers also erred to the necessity for a sec- l front this year.

The Soviet people will do every- ng in their power so that the ve of freedom-loving peoples uld result in a quick result and mplete rout of the German scist invaders and their allies," estia said.

Standley Backs Cooperation

MOSCOW, June 23 (Reuter)—Hope that Soviet-American cooperation would persist after the war was expressed by Admiral William H. Standley, United States Ambassador in Moscow, in presenting American decorations to Soviet soldiers, sailors and pilots at the Kremlin.

"I think it is not vain to hope that from this comradeship of arms there will develop enduring cooperation, for there is much in common between us apart from our hate of the enemy," Admiral Standley said. "This is what the Axis propaganda machine tends to forget when it tries to stress the difference between us. Differences like ours consist mainly in methods—our essential aims are the same.

"We and our Allies are striving for a secure and solid peace. We are all striving to create conditions under which people can work and create, not for class, and not for the benefit of a self-styled master race, but for the benefit of the people as a whole."

Moscow Sees Decision Near

LONDON, June 23 (U.P.)—The Moscow radio warned the Red Army tonight in a special broadcast that "the hour of decisive events is approaching" and indicated that Russia was fully prepared for the opening of a possibly decisive Summer campaign at any time.

"With his wise guidance Stalin is leading us to victory for a decisive battle," the Moscow broadcast said, as recorded here. "The hour is not far off when our great fatherland will again breathe freely. You are no longer alone in this deadly struggle. By you stand the soldiers of our Allies."

Standley Hails Cooperation

By Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, June 23—Handing United States Army and Navy decorations to Foreign Commissar Vyacheslaff M. Molotoff for award to sixty members of the Soviet fighting services, Admiral William H. Standley, the United States Ambassador, yesterday expressed the hope that a long period of peacetime cooperation would develop between the Allies now fighting together against a common enemy.

Admiral Standley said this was to be expected, since the Allies had much in common besides hatred of the enemy, and that differences in their methods did not alter the fact that their essential aims were the same. He described these aims as an effort to found a strong, secure peace in which to work for all in the interests of all.

Americans present at the ceremony, besides members of the Ambassador's mission, included Arthur Hays Sulzberger, publisher of THE NEW YORK TIMES, who is visiting Moscow as representative of the American Red Cross.

Among those receiving the American decorations were Lieut. Gen. Ivan Petroff, who commanded the Third Defense Army at Sevastopol last year; Lieut. Gen. Vasili Chuikoff, commander of the Sixty-second Army at Stalingrad; Lieut. Gen. of Tanks Vladimir Badanoff, who made an audacious thrust to Tatsinsk last Winter, and Major Gen. Sokoloff, commander of the Sixth Guards Cavalry Corps in the offensive from Voronezh.

This is a clipping from page 9 of the New York Times for June 24, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

FILE

Comintern Act Paves Way to Unity--Merrill

Taking issue with the "Michigan CIO News," Lewis Merrill, president of the United Office and Professional Workers, said the question is not whether the Communist Party should dissolve but "will those who strive for a democratic America unite?"

Mr. Merrill's discussion on the effect of the dissolution of the Communist International in labor ranks, is contained in an advance proof of his column in the forthcoming issue of the union's official paper.

LEWIS MERRILL

Deploring the failure of most labor papers to express a view on the issue, Merrill writes that the "truculent" advice in the Michigan paper that the Communist Party "dissolve" is "neither original or helpful."

"On the other hand the Communist Party is not likely to close up shop because the Michigan CIO News says it should, and if we want to understand why the movie left Goebbels bubbling with anger and Martin Dies ga-ga, and the meaning it has for us, we should put aside our rose-colored spectacles."

UNITY IN NEED

Unity of all forces for effective prosecution of the war, is the issue writes Merrill:

"But the real test is whether we in the United States hold up our end in the common struggle of the coalition. The home front has become the testing ground of our effectiveness as a nation," he continued.

Merrill noted that the Comintern decision recognizes something that has already been taking place with respect to uniting the people to bring the economic front in line with the war's needs. He goes on:

"It seems to me that the value of the Comintern's decision is that it drives this point home. It helps, therefore, to further convince the average American that it is within HIS capacity to meet the new issues propelled by international events into our domestic life. This conviction is our most important national asset.

"Our real problem is how we Americans can protect and expand our own democratic economic and political instruments to meet the full needs of the people."

LABOR IN WAR, PEACE

Mr. Merrill also sees a relationship in the way labor fights to win the war and its eventual role at the peace table.

"How we do this tomorrow, given victory, is going to be decided today," he writes. "How we organize the peace is going to be decided by the economic and political methods we use to win the war. The reactionaries, for example, are trying to determine the outcome of the 1944 Presidential elections by their practical acts today.

"This is the real explanation for Lewis insurrection, the fight against economic stabilization, the fight against national unity and the fulfillment of constitutional guarantees of political liberty to all citizens. This is why the defeatists seek to prolong the war because they hope that war weariness combined with economic and political chaos will throw power into the hand of reaction.

This is a clipping from page 5 of the DAILY WORKER Date 6-23-43 Clipped at the Seat of Government

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"My only query of any American, Communist or otherwise, is therefore: How does he stand on the winning of the war? That is why I think nothing is solved and perhaps something lost simply by the disappearance of groups. On the contrary, I welcome all regardless of the banner under which they fight who will help in the winning of the war. I accept their presence and fighting cooperation without conditions except the one of being faithful to our nation's cause. I consider this the reaffirmation in the creative capacity of democracy, of the ordinary American to face up to the job and get it done."

·ace Decisive Battles Ahead With Full Confidence, Says Pravda Reviewing War

y Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

IOSCOW, June 22.—The Soviet ple are confident of their ngth and are marching for- d to "new, decisive battles," s the Communist Party paper, vda here reviewing the two rs of war.

hile emphasizing the tremen- s sacrifices that still lie ahead, the need of coordinated blows n East and West to lessen these fices, Pravda's editorial stresses stability of the Soviet system the tremendous achievement the Soviet people in two years war, which have thwarted and t the whole Nazi strategy.

The Nazis soon lost the advan- s they had gained as a result their sudden predatory attack," vda continues.

heir political and military defeat me apparent when the pro- ted war gave the Soviet Union possibility of mustering and ging up its reserves, and gave United States and Great Britain possibility of accumulating the essary air, naval and ground es for a blow at the Germans and their allies from the west.

"In severe battles the Red Army caused the Germans and their vassals tremendous losses, exhausted their strength, destroyed their seasoned, crack divisions and captured tremendous quantities of equipment. At Stalingrad the Red Army inflicted upon the Germans a defeat unparalleled in the history of wars. Under the Red Army's blows the Germans were obliged to clear out of the Caucasus. A mass expulsion of the Germans began from the Ukraine and other parts of the Soviet Union.

ANTI-HITLER COALITION

"The struggle against the common enemy —Hitler Germany— consolidated the coalition of the freedom-loving peoples.

"For the first time in the Second World War a blow was delivered against Hitler Germany from the east which was merged with a blow from the west. The Allied response to Stalingrad was Tunisia.

"Simultaneously under the blows of the Red Army deep cracks revealed themselves in the fascist coalition. The fascist camp is fruitlessly seeking a way out of its grave crisis. The enemy is trembling in apprehension of the approaching retribution for its bloody crimes. We are on the eve of decisive battles.

"The enemy is not yet defeated. After the crushing blow inflicted on him in the winter of 1942-43 he managed, with the utmost strain of effort, to a certain extent to make up for his losses by scraping up the remnants of manpower reserves in Germany and the vassal countries. He as yet represents a serious force, and desperation may urge on the Hitlerites to the most insane steps. The Germans have not given up their gambling plans. It would be criminal folly to underestimate the danger.

"The peoples of the Soviet Union, the Red Army, and our Allies and their armies have a grim, hard struggle ahead of them. It will demand sacrifices, tremendous endurance and iron fortitude.

REQUISITES FOR VICTORY

"The two years of patriotic war have created all the requisites for the full and final rout of the sanguinary Hitlerite bandits. The Red Army, tempered in severe battles, has accumulated considerable experience in warfare, and has trained splendid fighters.

"The struggle is developing with growing tension. All the Soviet people look confidently to the future. They know that the day is coming when the patriotic war will end in the rout of the enemy, in the unconditional surrender of Hitler Germany and her allies; and they will again return to their peaceful construction, to begin the restoration of the national economy of the Soviet Union.

"This day is not far off. It will come the sooner, the greater the efforts of the Soviet people in the struggle against the hated enemy. To speed this happy day many true sons of the Soviet people, the people's heroes and defenders of Leningrad, Stalingrad, Odessa and Sevastopol, have laid down their lives. Their memory will never fade from the minds of the Soviet people.

"We are confident in our strength. With redoubled energy and with unwavering determination to win, the Soviet people under Stalin's leadership are marching to the new, decisive battles for the final defeat of the enemy."

This is a clipping from page 4 of the Daily Worker for June 23, 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

OUR FRIENDS THE RUSSIANS

When an American thinks of Russia, as all must on this second anniversary of Hitler's attack, he may have in mind a Government, an economic system or many millions of people. The Government and the economic system, if we regard them as continuous, are twenty-six years old. They must be given credit for the material strength, created, massed and effectively used, that has halted the Nazi armies in the East and inflicted upon them the tremendous losses described last night in the Russian summary of two years of fighting. In this gallantly fought struggle Russia's own losses have been severe. They entitle her to appeal, as she has now again appealed, for the greatest possible speed on our part consistent with the hope of success in opening a second land front on the continent of Europe.

We know that systems and governments evolve and change. Behind them are always the people—in Russia's case more than a majority who can be simply described as Russian, but also forty-odd racial or national minorities recognized as such by the Soviet Government itself. The people are older than any political or economic ideas. Their cultural traits persist through many differing regimes. The Soviet Government has done a wonderful thing in teaching most of them to read, and it is reasonable to conclude that it has given them a greater sense of their own individual worth and dignity than they had under the Czars. In a sense this is new. In another sense it is a release of qualities and abilities that were always there. The Russians of today are closely related to those who flung back the armies of Napoleon.

Today we do them honor for their faith and courage, which have supported them—and we may well say have supported us also—during two years of dreadful war. We need not believe their faith is exclusively the creation of Lenin and Stalin, but we must say that those men did not kill it. A great hope, a great energy came up out of the plains of Russia. The men and women who stood fast at Stalingrad until they had destroyed a Nazi army, those who stood fast at Sevastopol, choosing to consecrate the Russian soil with their dead bodies rather than surrender it living, proved that they were not and could not become slaves.

In the long run governments must take their character from the character of the people. Strength comes up out of the earth. Many of us believe we can see this happening day by day in Russia. The spectacle leaves no room for misgivings. We want to be friends, in peace or war, with such a people. We can and shall be friends.

This is a clipping from page 18 of the New York Times for June 22, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Textual Excerpts From Special Moscow Communique Reviewing War

LONDON, Tuesday, June 22 (U.P.) A summary of the text of a special Russian communiqué, recorded om the Moscow radio, follows:

Two years ago Hitlerite Germany treacherously and callously ttacked our country.

During two years the people of he Soviet Union have been carrying out a stubborn fight against he German fascist invaders. The oviet people and the Red Army ave suffered severe trials gainst the strong and dastardly nemy.

The peoples of our country have iven proof of great discipline nd staying power, gallantry and elf-sacrifice in their defense of he honor, freedom and independnce of their country.

In the summer of 1941 fascist ermany threw against this couny all the effectives of her fully obilized army, armed with thouands of tanks and aircraft.

The Soviet Union opposed all its ighty forces against the enemy. ime, however, was necessary to obilize them and put them into ction against the invaders. At hat time our allies were busy reparing themselves and could ot give speedy or considerable elp to the Soviet Union.

Setbacks in First Summer

In the first summer of the camaign the Red Army suffered rious setbacks. Nevertheless it eld out against enemy pressure, ubbornly defended itself against s blows and destroyed vast enny forces.

By the end of the first summer mpaign, in the first months of e war, it became clear that erman calculations to inflict a ghtning defeat on the Soviet mies were absolutely ununded. In the same way calcutions of the Germans to wear own the forces of the Soviet nion crashed completely. Timeorked against the Germans. The rces of the Soviet Union are deloping and growing from year year.

By the winter of 1941-42 the Red my having mobilized its main rces and having acquired the ms and equipment necessary to waging modern war, took the initiative and dealt heavy blows to the enemy. The Red Army crushed German armies at Rostov-on-Don; at Tikhvin [Leningrad front], in the Crimea and before Moscow. It broke the enemy plan to surround and capture our capital.

The rout of the German armies at the approaches to Moscow was the decisive military event of the first year of the war. At the same time it was the first solid defeat for the Germans in the Second World War. This defeat forever shattered the myth of German invincibility sedulously build up by the Germans and showed the Red Army's great military power, which not only will stand up against the pressure of the German Fascists, but is capable of breaking these troops in open fight.

In the winter of 1941-42 the Red Army threw back the Germans in places for more than 400 kilometers [250 miles].

In the summer of 1942 the Germans, taking advantage and opportunity of the absence of a second front in Europe, threw all their reserves on the Soviet-German front, sending the main pressure to the southwest. Here the Germans gained considerable tactical successes. However, the Red Army met the enemy's advance with stubborn resistance and did not allow them to substantiate their plans, having stopped the enemy at the approaches of Stalingrad.

Turning Point Last Winter

In the winter of 1942-43 the Red Army brought to nothing the German tactical successes of the summer. This year's winter campaign turned out to be the turning point of the war. It made quite clear the change of comparative strength of the forces now on the Soviet-German front. The Germans, despite orders to hold their captured positions, turned out to be unable to prevent the winter offensive by the Red Army.

The Red Army overthrew and routed the enemy, destroyed the picked Fascist armies before Stalingrad; overthrew and broke the Rumanian, Italian and Hungarian Armies, and threw the Germans from the Volga and the Terek River [Caucasus] some six or seven hundred kilometers [370 or 430 miles] to the west.

The path on which the Germans advanced in the summer of 1942 toward the east, and on which the Soviet troops advanced to the west, was littered with hundreds of thousands of corpses of Germans and fragments of shattered aircraft and guns.

The second year of the war brought to the Germans new and enormous losses, and gave them no territorial gain.

In addition, this year Soviet troops broke through the enemy blockade of Leningrad and repelled the enemy from the important strategic regions of Kursk, Rzhev, Vyazma, Gzhatsk and Velikiye Luki.

In the winter the enemy suffered heavy losses. Hitler's war machine started shaking and trembling. The enemy made desperate efforts to prevent the catastrophe that was hanging over his armies; the Germans threw more than thirty divisions from western Europe into the Kharkov region. The Germans hoped that by the strength of the fresh divisions our men at Kharkov could be destroyed and this would turn the tide, but these calculations crashed completely. After a series of heavy blows in the winter the Germans decided in the spring of 1943 to emulate the spring of 1942 and undertake an offensive.

Comparison of Losses

In two years the Red Army has inflicted enormous losses in men and material. How important these German losses are as compared with the losses of the Red Army can be seen from the following:

Grmany and her allies have lost in killed and prisoners 6,400,000 officers and men. They have lost 56,500 guns of various calibres, 42,400 tanks and 43,000 aircraft.

During the same period Russian losses totaled 4,200,000 in killed or missing, 35,000 guns of various calibres, ~~36,000~~ tanks, 23,000 aircraft. Soviet guerrillas operating in territory occuped by the enemy in two years wiped out more than 300,000 Germans, deraled 3,000 trains, blew up 895 fuel and material dumps, blew up 3,263 road and rail bridges and destroyed hundreds of tanks, armored cars, aircraft, guns and trucks.

Soviet guerrillas with courage and determination successfully cooperated with our troops.

During the war the Germans lost the greater part of their cadre divisions and most of their high-ranking officers. They also lost the greater part of the equipment upon which they were counting to seize the sovereignty of the world. These losses fundamentally weakened the German war machine and Hitler's power.

In this way, the plans of the Fascist adventurers, which were to reduce the Soviet, failed, and their military positions deteriorated greatly. The political and international position of the Germans also deteriorated greatly.

The serious weakening of German military might was proved by the fact that during last year the German Army did not score any successes, but sustained important military reverses, suffering one defeat after another on the Soviet-German front as well as in Ebypt, Libya, Tripolitania and Tunisia.

Germans Change Tone

The invaders are now compelled to refute their own blitzkrieg mentality and confess the complete inconsistency of their fundamental military and political plans, and declare openly that the war has assumed a prolonged, drawn-out character, to try to persuade the German people that victory will be won by positional warfare.

The Germans have been compelled to call for military service the remainder of Germany's male population, including old men and adolescents without military training. They are forcing the male population of the occupied countries into their armies. The fighting spirit of the troops has been fundamentally undermined.

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Clipped at the Seat of Government.

in Germany, and even the Hitlerite elements are now burying their hopes of victory.

Thus the military power of Germany has been fundamentally shattered as a result of two years of war and the Germany Army is facing a serious crisis.

Politically Germany has sharply deteriorated. The Hitlerite rear also proved very weak and now is disintegrating. This can be seen from the fact that the population is panicky. Germany is experiencing the most acute lack of raw materials. The Germans are hunting for slaves in all the occupied countries and are driving to Germany millions of foreign workers.

German industry is not succeeding in keeping up with its tremendous losses and the powerful blows of the Allied air forces on Germany's industrial centers made no small contribution toward this. Additionally, the feeling against the Germans in the occupied countries is growing more and more threatening. The hour is near when military operations of freedom-loving peoples will merge with the armed struggle of the oppressed Europeans.

The fact that the international position of the Italian-German bloc has also seriously deteriorated can be seen from the fact that Hitlerite Germany has not succeeded in drawing in new allies and cannot even feel sure of her present allies. Thus the isolation of Germany is increasing.

"Great Crisis" for Foe

Germany's attempt to split the freedom-loving nations suffered a resounding crash. All this shows that the military, political and international situations for Germany are undergoing a great crisis. Contrarily, the military, political and international position of the Soviet Union has been consolidated.

The military might of the Red Army has grown and become a dread power, tempered in battle. The Soviet commanders have become masters of the new rapid maneuver tactics and have demonstrated their superiority over the Germans.

The Red Army possesses entirely modern military equipment and is burning with the desire to finish off the fascist beast.

Simultaneously the Red Army's rear has been strengthened. Soviet factories are working at capacity and are providing the Red Army with all its needs.

Soviet workers have transplanted industry from threatened areas to the east and have built hundreds of industrial establishments. The collective farm peasantry have increased the cultivated area and are toiling selflessly.

The unity of the Soviet people is firmer than ever. The second war loan, oversubscribed in twenty-four hours and reaching more than 20,000,000,000 rubles, has been a brilliant demonstration of the patriotic spirit of our people and a testimony to the unbending will of the Soviet peoples to carry on until complete victory.

During the war a mighty anti-Hitlerite coalition has formed—the U. S. S. R., Great Britain and the United States. More than a year has passed since the agreement for war against Germany and her confederates in Europe, an agreement on mutual help and cooperation after the war. This is proof enough of the firmness of the agreement. Everything, meanwhile, has shown that our relations with Britain have im- tween the U. S. S. R. and the United States in accordance with the principles of mutual help in waging war also has shown its durability.

The rest of the summary had not been received as this edition went to press.

This is a clipping from
page _____ of the
New York Times for

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ROOSEVELT PAYS TRIBUTE TO SOVIET

Sends Felicitations to Stalin on Second Anniversary of Hitler's Onslaught

HULL PRAISES RESISTANCE

State Secretary Commends Signal Contribution to Defeat of Axis

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, June 21.—President Roosevelt today took note of the second anniversary tomorrow of Germany's attack on Russia by sending a message to Premier Joseph Stalin paying tribute to the "history-making exploits of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the almost incredible sacrifices which the Russian peoples are so heroically making."

In their "brutal attack upon the Soviet Union," he said, the Nazi leaders underestimated the military power of the Soviet Government and the valor of the "Soviet people."

The President's message follows:

Marshal Joseph V. Stalin
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R.,
The Kremlin, Moscow.

Two years ago tomorrow, by an act of treachery in keeping with the long record of Nazi duplicity, the Nazi leaders launched their brutal attack upon the Soviet Union. They thus added to their growing list of enemies the mighty forces of the Soviet Union. These Nazi leaders had under-estimated the efforts to which the Soviet Government and people had developed and strengthened their military power to defend their country and had utterly failed to realize the determination and valor of the Soviet people.

During the past two years the freedom-loving peoples of the world have watched with increasing admiration, the history-making exploits of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the almost incredible sacrifices which the Russian people are so heroically making. The growing might of the combined forces of all the United Nations which is being brought increasingly to bear upon our common enemy testifies to the spirit of unity and sacrifice necessary for our ultimate victory.

This same spirit will, I am sure, animate us in approaching the challenging tasks of peace which victory will present to the world.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

In a statement to the press Secretary of State Cordell Hull, likewise paid tribute to Russia's resistence and said that, as the third summer of the German-Russian struggle opened, the Nazis faced "millions of Russian soldiers, well equiped and of high morale, prepared not only to meet any onslaught but also to hul back the invader."

Mr. Hull's statement follows:

Tomorrow, June 22, marks the second anniversary of the Nazi attack upon the Soviet Union. For a period of two years the armed forces of the Soviet Union have been gallantly and successfully defending their country against the aggressor. In two great summer offensives the Nazis have failed to attain their avowed aim of annihilating the Red Army. As the third summer opens, the Nazi legions in Eastern Europe find confronting them millions of Russian soldiers well-equipped and of high morale, prepared not only to meet any onslaught but also to hurl back the invader.

It is appropriate that we again today give expression to our admiration of the courage and spirit of self-scarifice displayed by the whole people of the Soviet Union in successfully defending themselves and their country and in making such signal contributions to the eventual complete defeat of the powers of aggression.

This is a clipping from page 8 of the New York Times for June 22, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

SOVIET FIXES RANKS IN FOREIGN SERVICE

Career Diplomatic System Is Decreed, Giving Permanent Grades and Promotions

4

By Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, June 20—A complete career diplomatic service similar to the American Foreign Service under the State Department or the British career service with a system of permanent ranks and promotions has been established in the the Soviet Union. This marks the introduction to civilian life of a hierarchy and a permanent civil service comparable to the gradually instituted full catalogue of permanent military ranks from corporal to marshal for the first time in Soviet history.

How extensive this reform is cannot yet be judged. It has not been disclosed, for example, what types of examinations, if any, will be instituted for diplomatic applicants.

Changes Made by Decree

Accomplishment of this reform was effected in decree by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, dated June 14. It instituted the following rans: Ambassador Extraordinary and Plentipotentiary, Minister Extraordinary and Plentipotentiary First Class, Minister Extraordinary and Plentipotentiary Second Class, counselor first and second class; first secretary, first and second class; second secretary, first, and second class; third secretary and attache.

Ambassadors and Ministers are to be appointed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the rest by the Foreign Commissariat.

Salaries wer fixed for each post but these were not made public. Diplomats eligible for pensions on retirement and under the Soviet old age code will be pensioned according to the last rate of pay received.

This decree continues the gradual process of establishing a permanent service, which has been under way for two years and parallels the similar slow institution of full permanent ranks for all army officers. On May 9, 1941, a decree established the ranks of ambassador extraordinary plenipotentiary, minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary and chargé d'affaires.

Now there are more ranks and they are permanent. This means that a young Russian who is able to enter the diplomatic service can slowly climb as in other foreign services and with each advance receive a new permanent post which he holds whether working abroad or in Moscow.

Previous Ranks Temporary

Previously, in theory, a First Secretary in the Soviet Embassy in Washington held a temporary post and when he returned to Moscow did not necessarily hold the same rank in the Foreign Office, or on his next diplomatic assignment abroad.

Originally, in the Red Army, a man similarly had temporary command in his unit and was not entitled to the same position in another unit.

This decree certainly facilitates the business of international diplomacy and therefore augurs continued and increasing interest in international affairs, not a post-war mood of isolation. In line with other great powers, the Soviet Union has been gradually expanding its diplomatic representation with the United Nations, opening relations with Australia, Canada, Egypt and Cuba and raising the status of the new mission in Mexico to that of embassy.

Since this represents the first introduction of permanent ranks in any civil service body in the Soviet Union, it could augur similar reforms in other civil service branches. Russia, traditionally, had a large body of permanent civil servants with permanent ranks and it is possible that something like that may again come about.

This is a clipping from page 4 of the New York Times for June 21, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

RIBBONS REPLACE RUSSIANS' MEDALS

Moscow Decrees Change That Is in Line With Tradition and With Other Countries

WAR ADDED 9 DECORATIONS

Many Military Orders Have Parallels for Distinguished Deeds in Civilian Tasks

By C. L. SULZBERGER 4

By Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, June 20—Another step in brining the Red Army formally further in line with Russian military tradition and the accepted usage of other countries was taken today with the publication of a decree by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union designating a series of silk ribbons, each representing decoration, that must be worn instead of medals.

This ends a custom of wearing decorations on uniforms so that an exceptionally distinguished soldier sometimes had a long line of metal disks clanking on his chest. The new system is similar to the British and American armies and from now on soldiers, except on dress parade, will wear ribbons.

In publishing this decree in all newspapers the military authorities took occasion to display medals and the new ribbons, showing the old and new methods.

Red Statr, the army newspaper, in an editorial entitled "An order or a medal is the glory of the Soviet fighter," recalls the distribution of awards by Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzoff during Napoleonic days and adds that now, as then, the Russian soldier fights for the sake of his conscience rather than for reward. These days one hears more and more of traditional Russian military heroes, such as Marshall Kutuzoff, Field Marshal Alexander Suvoroff and Alexander Nevsky.

New Medals in this War

There now exist in the Soviet Union nineteen main types of military decorations, many of which have civilian parallels for distinguished service in industry, government and culture. Nine new princpal classifications of awards have been created since the German invasion, as follows: the star of a marshal, the medals for participation in the defence of Odessa, Sevastopol, Leningrad or Stalingrad, special badges for distinction in war service, the Medal for Partisan War for the Fatherland, the Order of the War for the Fatherland, the Guards Medal, the Order of Suvoroff, the Order of Kutuzoff, the Order of Alexander Nevsky.

There are varying grades of some of these awards. To these must be added the orders and medals, both civil and military that existed at the war's outbreak and which include Hero of the Soviet Union with its civilian equivalent, held by Premier Joseph Stalin, Hero of Socialist Labor, the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner and its civilian equivalen, the Order of the Red Labor Banner, the Order of the Red Star, the Medal for Bravery and its civilian equivalent, the Medal for Labor Valor, the Medal for Combat Service or its civilian equivalent, the Medal for Labor Excellence, the Medal for Twenty Years Red Army Service, the badge for labor defense and the star of a marshal of the Soviet Union, different from that of a marshal, which with its gold, diamond and platinum is the most elaborate of all.

Eighty Socialist Labor Heroes

The decorations of Hero of the Soviet Union or Hero of Socialist Labor, Order of Lenin and Order of the Red Banner must be awarded by the President of the Supreme Council. The rest may be awarded in the field but must be approved by the Presidium.

The Hero of Socialist Labor decoration has been given only eighty times. The Hero of the Soviet Union, which is the equivalent of the United States Congressional Medal of Honor. About 1,000 have been distributed since the war began.

This is a clipping from page 4 of the New York Times for June 21, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

CONSTANT READER

Nazi Attack on the USSR Brought Flood of Phony Predictions from 'Experts'

By SENDER GARLIN

T the recent Davis-Stolberg libel trial, Fr. Edmund Walsh of Georgetown University was presented by fense attorney Waldman as an "expert" on Communism. Asked by the presiding judge whether he rended this designation as an accurate one, Walsh said mething to the effect that the experts had scored so dly that he preferred to be described as a "consultant."

Walsh, an old hand at Soviet-baiting, did the canny thing to rn the "expert" epithet. For the record of most of these gentlen would provoke the greatest mirth were not the subject itself grim.

It is now two years since the Nazis made their assault upon the viet Union. From the first day of the invasion there were men in s country who substituted wishful thinking for objective military-itical analysis. There can be no argument about this for the ord is there and cannot be disputed.

* * *

On June 22, 1941, the night of the Hitler invasion, Eugene Lyons, ing over a nationwide hookup, declared that the Red Army would t last two weeks—it has no morale."

Two days later, on June 24, the "noted analyst" of the United ss, Raymond Clapper, wrote that:

"Some here [in Washington] would not be surprised to see rmany clean up in a month."

The Scripps-Howard foreign editor, William Philip Simms, ught up the rear the following day (June 25, 1941) with the nouncement that:

"Adolph Hitler is believed in certain quarters here [Washington] be counting on revolution in Russia and a Japanese invasion of eria to complete the collapse of the Soviet Union within 30 to days."

Whether Hitler himself counted on all this is not known, but re is little doubt that Mr. Simms indicated evident delight at the spect he outlined. Moreover, a momentary generous impulse mpted Simms to give the Soviet Union additional 10 days grace r that proposed by his associate, Mr. Clapper.

Expert Martin Dies of Texas, described by Earl Browder as ifth Columnist Extraordinary," also announced gleefully that he d out little hope for the Soviet Union's chances for survival. ty-eight hours after the Nazi invasion of the USSR Dies hastened reinforce Hitler by saying:

"In my judgment, Hitler will be in control of Russia within 30 ys." Dies stuck to the 30-day clause favored by most of the erts and refused for a time to grant any kind of extension.

June 24, 1941, it appears, gave birth to more phony predictions n any other day, for it was the first opportunity for radio comntators and editorial writers to offer the fruits of mature reflecn. On that day the Wall Street Journal asserted that:

"The efficiency of labor, personnel, the army and its generalship hain unknown quantities that may ultimately justify some of the simism over the military might of Russia."

* * *

The holder of the world record for cockeyed predictions is, of course, Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin, the military analyst of the New York Times. One week after the Nazi attack upon the USSR (June 29, 1941), Baldwin, after consulting his maps and boning up on the science of horoscopy, announced that the Russians, "in staff work and leadership, in training and equipment are no match for the Germans." Also, that Timoshenko and Budyenny "are not the same calibre as Keitel and Brauchitsch." Brauchitsch was fired by Hitler Dec. 19, 1941, and latest advices say that the Nazi Bureau of Missing Persons has sent out a general alarm for him.

As for Timoshenko and Budyenny, the Nazis, on the basis of bitter experience, would no doubt give them a better mark than they got from Mr. Baldwin.

Three days after his definitive estimate of the Red Army, Baldwin (on July 2, 1941), declared that the Soviet forces "faced a Tannenberg far more decisive than the first," referring, presumably, to the defeat of Czarist armies in the last war.

Two days later—in celebration of Independence Day—Mr. Baldwin proclaimed that "the Russians so far have shown no evidence that they can meet the Germans with equal force or equal skill. . . . Nor is there any prospect that as the fighting in Russia continues the situation will be reversed."

* * *

Those were the days when the New York Times did not enjoy a monopoly on this kind of prophecy. Over on the New York Post a fellow named Fletcher Pratt had desk space. Barricaded behind a typewriter, he defeated the Red Army in every edition.

On one occasion Pratt noted that "the Russians are on their way to a debacle not paralleled in history." Pratt made generous use of maps, red, green and black pins and Nazi communiques. He found Soviet communiques "utterly untrustworthy" and Nazi communiques "extremely accurate." Could anything be more fair-minded?

Just before Pratt disappeared from public view he announced that the Russians were "already smashed and can never rise again." He said that even before Hitler did, which, of course, proves that he arrived at his judgment quite independently.

America has been inundated by numerous military "experts." Some have thoroughly discredited themselves with their bombastic blunderings, while others still linger on, hoping against hope that events and the public will not catch up with them.

To sum up on this question: Our vote goes to the Veteran Commander of the Daily Worker and The Worker. A tally of his hits, runs and errors would make most of the fellows on the other papers look like a bunch of hush-leaguers.

This is a clipping from page 13 of the Daily Worker MAGAZINE Section for June 20, 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

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Labor Unity Trends

IT IS about a month since the decision was made to dissolve the Communist International. Events in a number of countries already demonstrate that this decision, which was a recognition of a new situation and a new need, is already facilitating the development of greater labor, anti-fascist and national unity.

This is said despite the decision of the British Labor Party Congress against the affiliation of the Communist Party. The three to one vote is not representative of the real state of affairs within the British labor movement, nor is it final.

As Claude Cockburn pointed out in advance of the Congress in an article in the New Masses, the effect of the Comintern decision could not be registered at the British Labor Congress because practically all of the affiliates had already committed themselves before the C. I. proposal had become known. It was therefore expected that the Communist proposal for affiliation would be defeated.

That the Congress vote could not be made to stand as the final word on the matter seemed to have been recognized by the Labor Party Executive. For they chose Herbert Morrison, who had just been repudiated by the election of Arthur Greenwood to the treasurer's post, to act as their official spokesman against the affiliation motion.

That the trend is decidedly in the opposite direction is shown by developments in Switzerland, Chile and Costa Rica.

In Switzerland, there is the immediate possibility of the affiliation of the Communist Party to the Swiss Socialist Federation, headed by Leon Nicole. This move is causing a reorientation and reshifting even within the old Socialist Party. Thus, in Switzerland the development is towards a single, unified political party of the working class.

Chile offers still another and broader perspective. Here developments seem to be taking the direction of a merger along broad lines to form something in the nature of a people's party, including not only the Communists and the Socialists, but other democratic and anti-fascist parties and groups. It would seem that in Chile a merger of the Communist, Socialist Workers and Socialist Parties might serve as the core of a broader party.

In Costa Rica, the most progressive and democratic country in Central America, the Communist Party has dissolved and reorganized itself as the People's Vanguard. Among the first results of this step is the understanding reached with the Catholic Archbishop for united action against Nazi-fascism between the Catholic workers and the workers under the leadership of the People's Vanguard.

The unmistakable trend is toward merger, combination and unification in the labor and anti-fascist people's movements within each country. This trend, becoming a strong movement in some countries and remaining temporarily confused in others, is aroused by the urgent necessities of the struggle for victory in the war.

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This is a clipping from page 8 of the DAILY WORKER
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59 JUN 23 1943

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Communist Party Russia

Kalinin Scorns Religion But Calls for Tolerance

MOSCOW, June 17 (U.P.)—President Mikhail Kalinin, while saying that religion is a misguiding institution to be struggled against by education, has advised tolerance of religious practices among older Red Army men, such as wearing crosses in battle, it was revealed today.

In a speech published by the "Agitators' Guidebook," organ of the Moscow Communist party, Mr. Kalinin said, "we are often told that among our soldiers, especially those of older age, that there are believers who wear crosses and recite prayers whom the younger people ridicule."

"We must remember that we do not persecute any one for religion," he said. "We believe that religion is a misguiding institution and struggle against it by education.

"But since religion still grips considerable sections of the population and some people are deeply religion we cannot combat it by ridicule. Of course, if some young people find it amusing, that isn't so terrible. But we mut not allow it to develop into mockery."

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This is a clipping from page 5 of the New York Times for June 18, 1943

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D ARMY SPARKED Y YOUNG LEADERS

Triumvirate Superseded Past Year by New Men Who Defeated Nazis

3

By C. L. SULZBERGER

By Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

OSCOW, June 17—One of the t significant developments in Red Army during its two years iolent warfare against the Axis been the emergence of a new of outstanding military leaders o have been tempered and ved in the furnace of battle.

When the Germans first invaded Soviet Union in 1941, the outnding figures in the Russian itary forces were the famous umvirate of marshals who comnded the three main fronts—roshiloff, Timoshenko and Buny. Ther names were blended th those of the former Czarist icer, Boris Mikhailovitch, and ris M. Shaposhnikoff, also a rshal, who for a long time ved as Chief of Staff.

These men, whose portraits on ral posters and in schools are ll well known, have gradually en submerged by newer and unger officers as the war has ne on. Marshal Shaposhnikoff, ing and ill, no longer occupies e center of the stage. Marshal moshenko holds a command in e northwest that certainly is not vitally important as when he as in charge of first, the Central id then the Southern Fronts, alough he has far from disappeared om the scene.

Marshal Klementy E. Voroshiff has had a seesaw career of active sort since he left the ain northern command in the te summer of 1941. He was acve in the reorganization and aining of reserves for a period, ten suddenly reappeared as codinator of operations on the eningrad and Volkhov fronts uring the break-through last Janary. Essentially, however, his nportance remains in his acting s a powerful elder statesman, the a voice in the fundamental ilitary decisions talked over at he Kremlin.

Marshal Semyon Budenny, who was decorated with the Order of Lenin on his last birthday last April by his old friend, Premier Stalin, is not believed to have held a field command since the beating his armies took in the Ukraine during the Summer of 1941. He has been active, however, in the organization of new armies in the rear.

The change that has taken place is perhaps best expressed in the play, "The Front," by a youthful communist leader, the Ukrainian Alexander Korneichuk. The play represents an attack on the old-line, conservative, unimaginative military leaders. The play stresses the deficiencies of the outmoded generals and contrasts them with the achievements of the younger men.

Seven Men Outstanding

Typical of the younger men who have gradually elbowed their way to prominence by sheer ability are seven marsshals and generals who perhaps today represent the best in the modernized Red Army. They include Marshal Alexander M. Vasilevsky, Marshal Alexander A. Novikoff, General Konstatin K. Rokossovsky, General Nikolai F. Vatutin, Marshal Gregory K. Zhukoff, Col. Gen. Philip I. Golikoff and Marshal Nikolai Voronoff.

Probably outstanding even among these men is Marshal Vasileysky, who in less than a year's time jumped two promotions. In May, 1942, he was raised to the rank of colonel general. Last January he was named army general and in February he attained the highest rank, Marshal of the Soviet Union.

During the past seven months he has been named Chief of Staff as well as chief of the Red Army's political administration and assistant to Premier Stalin. As Defense Commissar he has had a brilliant record, which includes the supervision of the Stalingrad offensive in November and December last year and the coordination of the Voronezh offensive this January.

Zhukoff Succeeded Timoshenko

General Vatutin, along with the six other newcomers to highest military fame singled out for particular mention in this dispatch, all received the decoration of the new Crown of Suvoroff, first class, in January.

Marshal Zhukoff was promoted to rank of marshal in January. He succeeded Marshal Timoshenko as commander of the Central Front just before the Germans began their 1941 series of Moscow offensives. Te planned the capital's defense, and in August, 1942, was named Assistant Defense Commissar. He planned the 1942 Kalinin offensive and collaborated with Marshal Vasilevsky in the supervision of the general plan for the Stalingrad counter-offensive late in 1942.

In January of this year he appeared in the Far North, where he worked with old Marshal Voroshiloff to achieve the break-through on the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts.

This is a clipping from page 3 of the New York Times for June 18, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

ATLANTIC CHARTER AND THE USSR

e principle of self-determination as observed by the Soviet Union. Alter Brody exposes the dema gy of those who dispute the validity of the Soviet's present borders.

WHEN the Soviet Union announced the rupture of relations with the Polish government over the ques- of the USSR's western boundaries a d many Americans were taken by sur- e. They were inclined to look upon the ndary disputes as merely a case of diver- t interpretations of the principles of the ntic Charter accepted by all the United ions. In this assumption they were re- rced by the form in which the contro- y was cloaked. The Polish government emigre factions of the old Baltic states ked the Charter and the principles of determination to prevent the reunion Eastern Poland," Estonia, Latvia, and uania with the Soviet Union. On the r hand the USSR also invoked the rter and the principles of self-determin- a for its White Russian and Ukrainian hers of "Eastern Poland" and for the lly conducted plebiscites by which the nian, Latvian, and Lithuanian peo- self-determined themselves back into Soviet Union. But it takes only a modi- of realistic reflection and analysis to ze that there are other things involved e controversy in addition to the Atlan- Charter and the principles of self-deter- ation.

n practice the Charter and its principles been subject to considerable interpre- n during the conduct of the war and doubtless be subject to considerable in- etation during the conduct of the e. Thus at the very time the Atlantic rter was signed, the State Department assuring the Vichy government, a pup- f the Axis, that the United States had ntention of breaking up the French ial empire. Accordingly though the ch African Empire is now in Allied s, no plebiscites such as were held in tern Poland" and the Baltic states ly after Soviet occupation, have been or are even contemplated to permit the Berber, and Negro peoples who form y-five percent of the population to self-determine their own fate. Nor is the British empire on the auction block of self-determination as Mr. Churchill, one of the original signers of the Atlantic Charter, made very clear. Since some circles are capable of such charitable interpretations of the principles of the Atlantic Charter and self-determination, it is possible that there may be other motives among them for the continued support of the emigre factions of the old Baltic state governments and the backing of Polish claims to Western White Russia and Western Ukraine. And by this time everyone should have sufficient respect for the astuteness of Soviet diplomacy to realize that it is not unaware of these motives and is reacting against the use of the principles of self-determination as a weapon against the Soviet Union. It is important to remember that the Soviet Union suffered a traumatic injury at birth in the name of self-determination and that lovely phrase coming from the lips of hidebound tories and misguided liberals in the western democracies has sinister historical echoes in Russian ears—echoes that go all the way back to Brest-Litovsk.

The treaty of Brest-Litovsk has gone down in history as the most ruthless "peace" imposed by a conqueror in modern times. By the terms of Brest-Litovsk the Soviet Republic, which is a free federation of all the emancipated peoples of the former Russian empire, was forced to surrender the territories of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and what later became part of Poland, and to recognize the "independence" of the Ukraine. It meant the loss of more than one-fourth of Soviet territory in Europe (600,000 square miles), one-third (55,000,000) of its total population, and more than three-fourths of its industrial resources. Fifteen years later when Hitler began his demagogic campaign against the "injustices of Versailles," the most effective argument that liberals could put up in answer to Hitler was to point to the far more crushing Brest-Litovsk treaty as an example of the kind of terms that Germany would have imposed on the Allies had she been the victor.

But though people have been quick to remind a Nazi Germany crying about "the injustices of Versailles" of the greater injustices of Brest-Litovsk, there is one thing that has been forgotten. It is that the Allies, by the terms of the armistice of Nov. 11, 1918, took over for themselves the crushing mortgage which German militarism secured on the political and economic life of the Soviet peoples. As Article 12 of the Armistice terms ingeniously stipulates, "German troops are to evacuate all territories which were formerly a part of the Russian empire *as soon as the Allies shall consider this desirable, having regard to the interior conditions of those territories.*" (My italics.) In less diplomatic language the German troops were not to evacuate these territories until they were replaced by Allied armies of occupation or the armies of Allied puppet governments that were to be created in that area.

FOR two bloody years, from 1918-20, the Soviets struggled against the new Brest-Litovsk which Allied intervention sought to impose on them. Fearing an ultimate

New Masses June 15, 1943.
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ni[illegible] revolutionary Russian and German proletariats, the Allies planned to reate a belt of Allied-dominated puppet overnments carved largely out of Rusan territory—cordon sanitaire, as Clenenceau called it, to keep the Russian and erman proletariat apart. In the end the oviets found it necessary to compromise ith their Allied foes as they had comromised two years before with their Gerian foes. In a series of Brest-Litovsks gned with the Allied puppet states that ad been established on Soviet territory, e Soviets surrendered more than 330,000 quare miles of their soil and 35,000,000 f their population. (By the Versailles eaty Germany lost only 22,000 square iles of her territory and 6,000,000 of her opulation.) Thus the cordon sanitaire was reated, a broad band of territory stretchg from Finland to Bessarabia, 1,500 iles long and 200 to 400 miles wide, to eep the "plague of socialism" out of urope.

That this objective and no pretended rinciple of "self-determination" was beind the creation of the "independent" ates of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and e gift of the Ukrainian provinces of essarabia and Bukovina to Rumania, was nically avowed at the time by Clemenau and Lloyd George—the chief archicts of both Versailles and the cordon sanire. At the very same time that those ates were torn away from the Soviet nion in the name of "self-determination" loyd George added 1,600,000 square iles and 35,000,000 un-self-determined atives to the British empire, whereas lemenceau added 300,000 square miles d 5,000,000 un-self-determined natives the French empire.

But the object of the cordon sanitaire as not merely to keep socialism out of estern Europe. It was also to strangle in the territory to which it was confined. the north the severance of the stonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians om their new socialist fatherland pracally shut off the Soviet peoples from e Baltic, which is as vital to them as the tlantic seaboard is to the United States. he Soviet 1,000-mile frontage on the altic was reduced to 100 miles. Riga, bau, and Reval (Tallinn), its chief Bal: ports and termini of its most important anscontinental railway systems, were amtated from the commercial and industrial dy of the Soviet Union. Leningrad, its dy remaining Baltic seaport and former pital, originally 600 miles from any forgn border, found itself an exposed fron r post within artillery range (twenty miles) of the Finnish border and less than 100 miles from the Estonian border. On the west its capital, Moscow, formerly 1,000 miles from the border, was brought within 450 miles of an enemy. In the south, Odessa, the Soviet's chief port on the Black Sea, formerly 250 miles from the border, was, like Leningrad, brought within artillery range (twenty miles) of the Rumanian frontier.

That the border states established on the western territory of the Soviet Union were merely temporary bulwarks against socialism, to be dismantled as soon as "an orderly, well established [i.e.], capitalist] government" could be brought into being in Russia, has been frequently emphasized by our own State Department, which now so persistently refuses to recognize the reabsorption of the Baltic peoples into the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. In Wilson's famous Fourteen Points (Jan. 8, 1918) outlining the American idea of a reorganized democratic Europe neither Estonia, Latvia, nor Lithuania are mentioned among the new states to be established. Of the future cordon sanitaire states only Poland is mentioned, and her boundaries are specifically restricted to "territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations," excluding, in other words, the Byelorussian and Ukrainian provinces rejoined to the Soviet Union in 1939. In a memorandum which Wilson's Secretary of State, Lansing, prepared as a draft of the American peace proposals the following recommendations are made:

"The Baltic provinces of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia shall be autonomous states of a Russian confederation. . . . The Ukraine shall be a state of the Russian confederation to which shall be annexed those portions of the Austro-Hungarian empire in which the Ruthenians predominate"—meaning eastern Galicia, Bukovina, and Ruthenia (formerly Czechoslovakian, now Hungarian). In 1920, when the State Department was considering de facto recognition of the Baltic states, E. Young, American commissioner to the Baltic states, declared:

"The leading men here [in the Baltic states] are under no illusions as to the future relation of these states to Russia and realize full well that with an orderly, well established government in Russia, the Baltic provinces will again become part of what will probably be a federated Russia."

There remains now only the southern anchor of the cordon sanitaire, the province of Bessarabia, to be accounted for, and our State Department has gone on record on that too. It is well known that the Soviet Union never recognized Rumania's seizure of Bessarabia. It is not so well known that our own State Department has never recognized Rumania's annexation of Bessarabia, and the province has consistently appeared on US government maps of Europe as Soviet territory.

Today, nearly twenty-five years after est-Litovsk and Versailles, Russia finds rself confronted with a situation which nacts the scene of the old birth trauma th disturbing fidelity. Again she finds tself allied with America and the British nd French empire) in a war against rmany and again she finds attempts at ng the principle of self-determination as veapon against her by influential groups the government of her present and for- r allies. The Soviet Union, which ac- ding to Vice-President Wallace, has ieved genuine "ethnic democracy," des itself more than any other country the world on its recognition of the prin- le of self-determination. Its very name the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics from which the word Russian has been upulously eliminated, is a tribute to that nciple. It can hardly be expected to take iously the slogan under which the at- k of reactionary groups is being launched ainst it. It knows that if it had remained apitalist state in 1917 the Baltic states, whose interests the principle of self- ermination is now being invoked, would ver have been born. And if it were a pitalist state now, its recovery of lost ter- ories would hardly be questioned. In- ad we might be hearing the same sym- hetic discussions of "Russia's traditional hts to Constantinople and the Straits" it we heard in the halycon days of the rensky regime.

NDER the circumstances any American should easily see why the Soviet Union ght conclude that in 1943 as in 1919 attempt is being made to punish it for sin of being a socialist state. This, lest be forgotten, is in itself an important lation of that lightly invoked Atlantic arter which guarantees social self-deter- nation as well as political self-determina- n to every country in the world. For it riers within it the seeds of that other dlier conflict about which Vice-Presi- t Wallace warned—an ideological cru- e this time against Socialism instead of tism.

Nor is that other fashionable device of trying to beat the Soviet Union with its own Soviet-made instrument of collective security any more soothing to the Soviet hide than the instrument of self-determination. Persuasive sirens, usually perched on the tops of New York *Times* editorial columns, sing that under postwar collective security the Soviet Union would no longer have to worry whether Leningrad was twenty miles from friendly little Finland or seventy miles, and therefore boundary questions would not matter. There is no complementary verse to their song urging that under postwar collective security, the United States could dispense with garrisons in Pearl Harbor, 2,404 miles from San Francisco, or the Panama Canal, 1,661 miles from New Orleans.

There is justifiable concern in this country about the need for improving Soviet-American relations, and all sorts of suggestions have been advanced. They range from proposals that the American Communist Party be dissolved to the suggestion that our Soviet ally surrender eight times as much territory as our enemy, Germany, was forced to surrender after the last war. In return for this dismemberment of the USSR some people generously offer to guarantee the integrity of the rest of the Soviet Union. But such territorial proposals are as ludicrous as any Soviet proposal might be that suggested that we hold plebiscites in southern California, New Mexico, and Arizona and let the 3,500,000 Mexicans of the Southwest decide whether these areas be returned to Mexico. Such suggestions might seem fantastic to many Americans, but they are the literal equivalent of the proposals which are made in all seriousness to the Soviet Union by those who, when they are not knaves, are fools.

After all, the Soviet Union never landed an expeditionary force on what corresponds to our Maine or Oregon coasts. The Soviet Union never encouraged Mexico with arms and money to reconquer California, New Mexico, and Arizona; or France to reconquer Louisiana; or Spain to reconquer Florida. All this, however, is the equivalent of what Allied governments in the last war did to the Soviet Union. Nor is the Soviet Union suggesting by way of "compromise" that our rights to California, New Mexico, Arizona, etc., be subject to international arbitration at the coming peace conference.

There is a simple formula for American-Soviet amity and that is to forgive—though not necessarily forget—the fact that the Soviet Union is a socialist state, and treat it as we would any other great and friendly power. Once that ideological incubus is off our minds it is surprising how many of the differences that supposedly divide us will melt into thin (or hot) air and the two greatest of the United Nations will slip into the role of natural allies which their geographical position plainly cries for.

ALTER BRODY.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Acers
Mr. Carson
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Starke
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

MacCynic Scents Comintern in Note Damning Finns

May I rise to make one small squeak in reply to T. N. Vuoreala, a Finn, apparently, advising his country how to behave from his advantageous position in the United States?

First let me say that I'm as sorry as Mr. Vuoreala that his country is not fighting on our side. But the reasons Mr. Vuoreala gives! They're colossal! He says the Finns don't hate the Russians. That they like the Russians, really, because when he was a little boy he remembers his father and other Finns bought bread-flour from the Russians, and therefore should join them.

My dear Mr. Vuoreala—when I was a little boy I bought a German camera—and even more recently I relieved with German aspirin headaches brought on by ridiculous statements like yours—but I still want to see the Germans smashed.

It's like saying the Irish have no right to independence because they drink a cup of British Bovril!

Frankly, I sense the communist party line in Mr. Voureala's letter. You will note his emphasis on the word "fascists." "Finnish fascists"; fascist hordes," etc., etc. This is the official party word; Joe Stalin's boys almost never speak of "Nazis." "Fascists" is the official word for the enemy, ever since the Spanish civil war. I think this is a mistake in propaganda on their part, but it's true, nevertheless. And it gives them away every time.

* * *

Mr. Vuoreala states that Finland had its greatest prosperity under Czarist Russia, that it rose under the Czars from "a feudal-peasant country to a modern industrial nation." If the Czars were so dam' democratic and progressive, why did the regime collapse?

Mr. Vuoreala says "Finland's independence has been a farcical mockery, started with a great massacre of the Finnish workers in 1918." Shades of Woodrow Wilson and the doctrine of the rights of small nations! The fighting in 1918, of course, was between Finns and Bolsheviks.

* * *

Mr. Vuoreala says "a certain class of Finnish people have 'hated Russia' at the same time they have been eating Russian bread." I wonder why? I haven't any trade figures before me, but it's my impression that Finland's pre-war trade with Russia was somewhere between seven and 10 per cent of her total.

Mr. Vuoreala says only a few Finns hate Russia with a "fanatical fire." He thinks that the bulk of the people rather like them. There must be one whale o fa lot of Finnish rank-and file fascists in that country of seven or so millions to stand off the might of kindly Stalin's ever-loving legions.

Until there is proof to the contrary, Mr. Vuoreala's allegations of "murder and pillage" must come under the heading of poppycock, for in the next breath, Mr. Vuoreala says "to the ordinary Finn (whom he has just accused of outrages) Russia is the finest, most helpful and tolerant nation." Which, of course, is still more hooey.

* * *

The plain truth of the matter is Finland did as well as she did for herself under Czarist Russia because she managed, by bitter effort, to maintain some measure of independence as a Duchy, with her own currency and border tax controls. She managed to develop the techniques of western democracy and social justice to a degree which has never been remotely attained in Russia to this day.

I regret as much as Mr. Vuoreala and Mr. Ray Clapper (whose words Mr. V. perverts to party-line usage) the existence of a secret police in Finland. But I do not forget there is a much more cruel and brutal secret police not only in Germany, but in Russia.

* * *

Americans have a pretty good understanding of the case of Finland. She was faced with the choice of capitulating to the aggressor Russia, or of allowing Germany help her fight. There was no one else around at the time.

She made a bad military choice, but not necessarily a bad moral choice. She has in all likelihood missed the point at which she could have gotten out of the war and will probably suffer for it, in the final accounting. But probably no more than those other small nations, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, which have already been gobbled up at bayonet point by one side or the other.

Meantime, Mr. Editor, can't you suggest to Mr. Vuoreala that he take his phony letters-to-the-editor to the Daily Worker or some such paper that takes the news of the dissolving of the Comminist Internationale in the same spirit as I do—that is, that the news is applesauce and it hasn't been dissolved at all and that it is potentially still the greatest aggressor-threat to the post-war world?

JAUNDICE MacCYNIC.

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Washington Daily News - 6-15-43

FILE

Two Decades of the Comintern

By ROBERT MINOR

THE Communist International was founded in 1919 under conditions of political collapse of nearly all of the workers' parties on a world scale. The present proposal to dissolve the Communist International is a result of an opposite condition.

Let us examine the two situations separated by twenty-four years.

* * *

In 1919 and for two decades thereafter, the world situation was characterized by a general movement of aggression by the dominant great powers against the rights of nations. It was a period of extreme hostility toward the right of trade union or political association of the workers, and the most violent methods to prevent any extension of organization to the great decisive fields of the basic industries, as for example in the great steel organization campaign in our own country in 1919. The policy of encirclement and military intervention by powerful victorious states was incessantly applied in an effort to destroy the one existing socialist state. Part of the heavy price of toleration of any government in the smaller European states by the great Western powers was hostility toward that socialist state.

During this period the founding and development of the Communist International were absolutely essential to the labor movement of the entire world.

Policy Of Munich

The foreign-supported rise of Nazi reaction in Central Europe, based on the spurious theory of a "bulwark" against the socialist state, inevitably led to the sacrifice of the national lives of many peoples; of Ethiopia, then Spain and Austria, by connivance of the Western democracies; followed by the martyrization of Czechoslovakia as a part of general European policy, and the crystallization of this policy in the treaty of Munich by which the military hegemony of Europe was given over to the medieval savagery of Hitler.

The general policy of arming the Nazi reaction as a gendarme for the repression of labor and as a pretended bulwark against the socialist state required further sacrifices of the national lives of great historic peoples; Poland was sacrificed in August 1939, prior to the beginning of the war, by the rejection of the Soviet Union's offer of joint military action against Germany.

* * *

The time from the rise of Hitler in 1933 until well after the opening of the present war was a period in which the governments of the great Western powers showed themselves incapable of organizing the defense of Europe against Hitler conquest. During that period the Communist International performed a heroic service in exposing the Hitler-dominated Axis military conspiracy against the democracies and peoples of the world, in revealing the falsity of "isolationist" theories, and giving clarity and inspiration to the most advanced workers of all countries of Europe, Asia, Africa and North and South America to struggle for the unity of labor and of freedom-loving peoples for the indispensable destruction of the Hitler Axis.

Changed Situation

Today the situation is entirely changed. The major portion of the people of the world, and the greatest states in the world, including the socialist state, no longer weak but superbly strong, are united in a coalition of the United Nations and are organizing the defense of the world against the Hitler Axis. The decisive characteristic of today, from the point of view of the worker and of democracy, is not political collapse, but a powerful and growing alignment of the labor movement in accord with the true interests of the workers. In the decisive struggle of today the labor movement of the world is lined up on one single side. The responsible leadership of the American trade unions are capable of meeting their obligations. The trade unions are committed to a sound policy as an indispensable and decisive part of the general democratic world movement in the all-decisive struggle in the war against the Axis powers.

Shows Strength, Not Weakness

The proposal to dissolve the Communist International under these conditions is not in any sense a phenomenon of weakness in the internationalism of the labor movement. It does not reflect a decline in the importance of the international solidarity of labor. On the contrary, it reflects the new and vastly greater needs of international unity of labor, and of unity of the freedom-loving peoples of the world, for the achievement of which it is necessary to remove all obsolete organizational forms which cannot facilitate but only impede the greater achievement. The proposal to dissolve the Communist International is made to meet the situation of an enormously expanding strength of internationalism of labor and the assumption by labor of its indispensable share in the struggle of the general democratic world movement, the war for the liberation of mankind from the Hitler Axis.

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Date 6/14/43
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23 JUN

All struggles are concrete, never abstract. From the point of view of the concrete struggle, which is this war, the dissolution of an international form of organization not adapted to its needs is an advance, not a retreat. It deprives our foreign enemies and their domestic fifth column of an opportunity to exploit unrealities.

CPUSA and The Intérnational

Our Party has a history of eleven years of past affiliation with the Communist International. The Communist Party of the United States was formed by a majority of the members of the old Socialist Party which voted in 1919 in proportion of about three to one its desire to affiliate with the Communist International. Thus it was one of the earliest of the Marxist workers' parties to uphold the international solidarity of labor through the Third, the Communist International. The American party did not then become affiliated, but was a fraternal supporter of the International from 1919 until 1929. At that time, fourteen years ago, the Communist Party of the United States became an affiliated member of the Communist International, and it remained so until two and a half years ago. Our leaving the ranks of the Communist International in 1940 was not motivated by any disagreement with the principles upheld by the International, but was based on the conclusion from our experience that, insofar as our country is concerned, any international form of organization had outlived itself and was inevitably being misrepresented by reactionary elements to the injury of the country and the labor movement.

We had found, in 1939 and 1940, that the affiliation with the Communist International, while more and more losing its practical reality, had become a convenient subject of distortion by pro-Hitler groups who sought to divide the labor movement and to influence the foreign policy of our country by pretending to identify the century-old and honorable tradition of international solidarity of the labor movement and its political parties with a fictitious "foreign control." The Communist Party's affiliation to the Communist International had been made by the supporters of Hitler in the United States into a bogy equivalent to that which the German and Japanese governments employed when they set up their military conspiracy against the United States and the entire free world under the name of "anti-Comintern Pact." Legislation aimed at abolishing the right of free political association for our Party was based on the pretended ground of its international affiliation. We recognized that a legislative denial of the right of free political association to the Communist Party would be in fact, as in all European countries, a triumph of the pro-Hitler and semi-fascist forces of our country which would quickly be carried over into assaults on the right of political association of the labor movement as a whole, in fact endangering that right for all democratic forces, and would lead to dangerous assaults upon the right of trade union association. Along with this would inevitably come a victory of pro-Hitler reaction against the trend toward a democratic foreign policy directed toward an effective world coalition such as the present. The Communist Party acted without hesitation to remove the bogy.

War-Time Importance

The correctness of our course is indicated by the present situation in the labor movement. The right of free political association is assuming ever greater importance to the American labor movement and to its contributions to the war effort of our country. If there were to be illegalization of the free association of workers holding the most advanced political views of the labor movement—which would mean those most patriotic, those most capable of seeing the enormous significance of the war and the supreme necessity of a victory of our country and its allies—then only the narrowest trade union conceptions could prevail over the more permanent and decisive interests of labor harmonious with the interests of the nation at war. The legal repression of the right to free political association in the labor movement would leave the great mass of workers defenseless before every provocation, of every adventurer, every disastrous interference with production for supposed immediate interests and at the sacrifice of military defeat and complete disaster.

Remove All Barriers to Unity

The removal of the obsolete form will strengthen the United Nations, giving assurance of endurance in the association of free peoples, giving double assurance to the call for unity of all of the democratic forces of Occupied Europe to rise and strike in unison for their national liberation.

Above all, this proposal makes its contribution to the immediate military offensive of the United Nations upon the Continent of Europe, the second front which must and will divide the huge forces of the Axis in the central theatre of war, and to bring the common victory of our American, British and French forces with our Soviet allies who have borne the heaviest military burden of all time for two years.

All tasks of the present day find reality in the immediately impending military offensive against the Axis. All impediments to the full and united efforts of the labor movement to support this offensive must be swept away at any cost. Uninterrupted production on still higher levels must and can be achieved by the vigorous initiation of the trade unions and the trade union leadership which has demonstrated that it is capable of meeting the needs of the crisis.

Trade Union Unity for Victory

Immediate coordination of support of the war by labor on a world scale, including the trade union unity of the American, British and Soviet Russian trade unions, is an immediate task.

National unity in support of the war, the sweeping away of all barriers and bogies, the elimination of red-baiting, stronger unity of the effort of the great American trade union movement, more than twelve million strong, together with all progressive forces, to defeat the anti-labor legislation in Congress, is a necessary contribution to the victory. The rallying of all patriotic forces of our country around our government is the only possible form of unity. Support of the Commander-in-Chief and the Armed Forces of our country is the supreme law of every American patriot.

n War and in Peace

Moscow Hails Unity With United States

(By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

MOSCOW, June 12.—Izvestia, Soviet government newspaper here, hails the "political rapproachment" between the United States and the Soviet Union on the first anniversary of the June 11, 1942, agreement and declares that the "paramount condition" for a "just and lasting peace" is the defeat of the Hitlerite war machine to which "all efforts and means" of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition must now be directed.

Izvestia's editorial of yesterday follows in full:

"This agreement was a new step in the successful development of the friendly relations between the USSR and the United States. Along with the Anglo-Soviet treaty of May 26, 1943, the Washington agreement provided the basis for the close companionship of the three greatest world powers in the common struggle against the brigand armies of Hitler Germany and her associates in Europe.

"The year which has elapsed since the signature of the Washington agreement has convincingly proved the effectiveness of the fighting unity of forces of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition.

"The remarkable successes of the Red Army's winter campaign, the brilliant victory of our Allies in North Africa, and the air offensive on Germany and Italy afford increasing evidence of the growing, fighting collaboration of the people united in struggle against Hitler Germany and her associates in Europe.

"The agreement of June 11, proclaimed the community of interests of the struggle of the American and Soviet peoples against predatory Hitlerite imperialism.

"The agreement strengthened and extended the basis of mutual aid for the U. S. A. and the Soviet Union in the struggle against German-fascist aggression.

"The past year was noteworthy for numerous social and cultural contacts established between the two countries, separated by ocean, but in reality neighbors.

"Numerous prejudices against the USSR, inherited from the past and exaggerated in every way by the pro-Hitler elements in the United States, were exposed and scattered to the wind in the light of the heroic fight of the Red Army.

"The Stalingrad victory exerted a tremendous influence on the minds, not only of the German people and the peoples of Germany's vassal countries, but also on

(Continued on Page 2)

In War and in Peace

Moscow Hails Unity With United States

(Continued from Page 1)

many people in the Allied camp, people fed by the prejudices against the Soviet Union and ill-Will, who frequently fell victim to machinations harmful to the common cause of struggle against Hitlerite tyranny.

"The two years of war forced upon the Soviet Union by the Hitlerite gamblers, revealed a high level of organization, inventiveness, technical efficiency and culture of the Soviet people, who coped with difficulties incommensurable with the strength of any other state.

"All this helped thousands upon thousands of people in the United States and other countries to understand the true character and peculiarities of the Soviet economic and state system, to understand the meaning of transpiring events. This facilitated rapproachment between the peoples of the Allied countries and primarily between the peoples of the Anglo-Soviet American coalition.

"Political rapproachment was accompanied by cultural rapproachment. This accounts for the strengthening of the bonds between the Soviet Union and the United States, new proof of which was offered by the recent visit of Joseph Davies to Moscow.

"The Soviet-American agreement proclaimed that collaboration between the two countries would develop fruitfully also after victory. The government of both countries agreed that they have a common cause, which together with all other like-minded states and peoples, is directed towards creating a basis for a just and lasting peace.

"The first and paramount condition for such a peace is the complete and decisive defeat of the Hitlerite war machine, the final route of the Italo-German camp, its unconditional surrender. All efforts and means of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition must now be directed towards the achievement of this aim.

"Their preparations for decisive battles are conducted in conditions favorable for further success. In 1942 for the first time since the war began, blows were inflicted on the enemy by the Red Army from the east and by the troops of our Allies from the west, merging into a single common blow.

"The last hope of the Hitlerite clique that it would succeed in sowing dissension in the camp of the United Nations crashed to pieces against the firm unbending will for unity among the members of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition, against the invincible spirit of their comradeship in arms.

"The climax is approaching. The alliance of arms of the USSR, Great Britain and United States, tested in struggle, sealed with blood, will lead the freedom-loving people to common victory."

THE WORKER
JUNE 13, 1943
p. 1 & 2

OVIET EXTOLS U. S. AS POST-WAR ALLY

avish Praise of Our War Role Predicts 'Protracted Peace' Based on Firm Accord

By C. L. SULZBERGER

By Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, June 11—To the accompaniment of the most lavish l enthusiastic praise of the ited States ever promulgated in history of the Soviet Union, the ssian people were informed to- that the British-Russian-erican cooperation, cemented in od, not only would lead to the mplete smashing of the Euro- n Axis, abetted by a direct Al- assault on the Continent, but t. increased understanding and aboration between the tri- virate of great powers would litate the establishment of a st and protracted peace" in ch the free nations of the world ld live in an atmosphere "of ative labor for the good of hu- nity."

he occasion for these pro- ncements was the first anni- sary of the signature of the sian-American agreement of e. 11, 1942, which touched off unprecedented outpouring of orials and articles in the Soviet ss. These were led by the Com- nist party organ Pravda, whose der was of such significance as indication of the guiding lines the country's present interna- al policy, both during and after war, that one cannot but con- de that its phraseology was not y approved but perhaps inspired the Kremlin.

Press Replete With Praise

This interpretation would appear have more than a modicum of nfirmation in the fact that estia, Moscow's other leading litical organ, repeated and em- llished the same phrases and the tire press was replete with lau- tory descriptions of British- nerican strength and with ex- essions of gratitude for lend- se aid in munitions, raw ma- ials and food.

At a thirty-course Kremlin luncheon given by Vyacheslaff M. Molotoff in honor of Admiral William H. Standley, the United States Ambassador, the Foreign Commissar expressed the gratitude of the Russian people for lend-lease assistance and stressed the importance of post-war cooperation between Britain, Russia and America. It was significant that these post-war aspects were so strongly emphasized. The guests included the leaders of the three great Allies here, who drank a toast honoring their armed forces and full collaboration, both now and later.

Before proceeding with citations from today's unparalleled press effusions, it is worth while to recount some of the preliminary atmosphere preceding it. This correspondent, before leaving Washington recently, was told by an American Cabinet member that the Soviet Union after this war faced two major alternatives in foreign policy: either to collaborate fully on a give-and-take basis with the peaceful outside world, facilitating international security, or to retire behind its frontiers in armed isolation, as Russia has so frequently done since the days of Catherine the Great.

"Greatest Story" Unfolding

This Cabinet member said United States policy naturally was doing everything within its power to bring out the former trend and hoped clearly for success. Another high personage said, "Perhaps when you return to Russia you will find the greatest story in the world today—the beginning of strong, honest, open, long-lived collaboration between Russia and the Western democracies."

Today it would seem that there can be little dougt that just this tendency is developing—at least at this moment. Collaboration already has begun in the case of the International food conference and its program, in which the Soviet Union is participating fully.

On the recent anniversary of the Russian-British pact the press complimented the Soviet Union's British ally. At a luncheon in the Kremlin during the visit of Joseph E. Davies, Mr. Molotoff took occasion to emphasize anticipations of Allied post-war cooperation, and Mr. Davies hailed this as a speech of the greatest significance. Friendship between the envoys of the Soviet Union and the United States has steadily progressed in an atmosphere of increasingly frank talk.

The slowly growing solidarity between the three leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition, which has had so many lapses and unfortunate periods or coolness, can now be considered to have achieved an open flourishing stage. It is carefully emphasized here that this situation is expected to bring forth not only vastly increased cooperation during the war, but continuation afterward.

Thus the atmosphere for the settlement of so many of those potential post-armistice trouble spots has been immeasurably improved and not only does Adolf Hitler's hope of dividing the Allies to win battles seem to have been completely eradicated, but the task of resurrecting the world after his defeat has been enormously simplified if today's atmosphere prevails.

Further Gestures Expected

The effusions that appeared in the Moscow press this morning represent merely a continuation and culmination of a long series of diplomatic events and pronouncements, and its can be confidently expected that still more concrete signs of this strengthening friendship will emerge.

The effects of this trend, should it be completely crystallized and reciprocated three ways, are bound to be of tremendous importance, both now and later. The Russian people themselves, who from time to time have been anxious about the disquieting coolness between the Soviet Union and the Allies a year or two ago, can be expected to be greatly pleased.

This morning's newspapers all displayed with prominence the telegrams sent by Mr. Molotoff and President Mikhail Kalinin to Secretary Cordell Hull and President Roosevelt. The Press Department, as it did in honor of the British pact's observance, staged a reception for Allied journalists.

But the fullest expression of Allied solidarity was given in long aticles in the press. Pravda recalled that when the Russian-American agreement was signed, Premier Joseph Stalin characterized it as a "serious step forward." The article continued:

"Friendly relations between the freedom-loving nations, Britain, the U. S. S. R. and the United States, tempered in the fire of the noble war for liberation against Hitler tyranny, rest on a firm foundation. Those relations have been cemented by a firm determination to carry on the war to the complete smashing of the Hitlerite armies and the unconditional capitulation of Hitlerite Germany.

Stalin's Tribute Quoted

"Soviet-American friendship is in accordance with the historical traditions of the two great nations, which feel a mutual sympathy and respect. The Soviet people highly appreciate American efficiency, which according to the definition of Comrade Stalin is 'that irresistible force that does not know or recognize any barriers, that destroys all obstacles by its efficient perseverance and cannot help but complete every task it undertakes.'

"Those traits of American efficiency, in connection with the high patriotism and example that the Soviet people and the Red Army daily display to the world, are most necessary in this war of the freedom-loving nations, led by the U.S.S.R., Britain and the United States, against Hitler Germany."

The editorial then emphasized the mutual debts of the Soviet Union and the United States, pointing out that the Atlantic no longer is an insurmountable barrier and underscoring the dangers of Hitlerism. It continued:

"If the storm of war at present is occurring far from American territory it is only thanks to the fact that Hitler's war machine, after the collapse of France, could not achieve success in the Battle of Britain and then met the heroic resistance in Eastern Europe of the Red Army and the Soviet people."

Pravda then pointed out that the Soviet Union bore the brunt of the war for two years while Britain strengthened her army, navy and air force and the United States built up a vast military force, large parts of which already are on the Eastern side of the Atlantic and now in position for an assault on Hitler's European fortress."

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June 12, 1943

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United States Forces' Role Stressed

After adding that the British and American air forces, having defeated Herr Hitler in Africa, now are battering the Continent, the editorial went on:

"Having been initiated into war, American troops have already completed preparations for the battles in which the spine of the German beast is to be broken."

The newspaper said that, no matter how much forced labor Herr Hitler drafts from Europe, he no longer can compete with Allied production. Then it declared:

"On the basis of the Soviet-American agreement and on the basis of the lend-lease law, the United States is giving military and economic aid to the Soviet Union in its struggle against Hitlerite Germany. The Soviet nation knows well about these deliveries of ammunition, food and other materials which are pouring into the Soviet Union from the great republic beyond the ocean.

"The Soviet people not only know about these deliveries, but know how highly to appreciate the support received from the American people as one of the reflections of their military cooperation in the deadly struggle against the mutual enemy.

In the course of this mutual struggle, the unity and mutual understanding of the parties to the anti-Hitler coalition have been considerably strengthened. The foundation of that unity is an understanding of the necessity of straining the general effort of the freedom-loving nations in the war against the Hitler machine, already shaken to the core, but still strong and dangerous.

"Now Hitler is striving at all costs to win time for the preparation of new desperate martial and diplomatic adventures. To frustrtae that gamble of Hitler, not to allow him to heal his wounds inflicted by th first united blow by the Allies from east and west, to organize a powerful general thrust by the Soviet, American and British armed forces against the German Fascist enslavers and to liberate the enslaved nations from the Fascist yoke means to bring near the desirable day of victory, the day of return to peaceful, creative labor for the good of all humanity."

Raids a Prelude to Landings

As if to give point to all this, Major Gen. Nikolai Zhuraleff of the Red Air Force wrote a long article in Pravda predicting that the Allied aerial offensive against Germany is "only a prelude to a land offensive" and that "British and American troops will in the future develop their activities on the European Continent." He said the Allies now have so many planes that they can cover their naval forces and armies without weakening the present aerial bombing offensive and that they can land at any point where they can obtain air mastery.

"We are firmly convinced that Africa was an experimental firing ground on which the British and American Armies learned how to defeat the Germans," he concluded.

Izvestia had its own encomia. In an editorial it said the past year had "given proof of the understanding between the U. S. S. R. and the United States, not only in the conduct of the European war, but also in other spheres of activity." It explained that more and more nationals of each land were visiting the other with growing cultural and personal exchanges and that "numerous traditional prejudices against the U. S. S. R. in the United States, inherited from the past and fanned by pro-Hitler elements have been exposed and dispersed."

One example of the growing friendliness to the United States here was given the other day by a Russian private, who dropped into the American Embassy to say, "I just wanted to tell the United States Government that my comrades and I appreciate the help we are getting from you."

This is a clipping from page_____ of the New York Times for

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

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File

Red Comintern Formally Ended

NEW YORK, June 10 (I.N.S.). Formal dissolution of the Communist International as proposed by the executive committee of the Comintern on May 15 was announced today.

The final action of the presidium of the executive committee of the Communist International was disclosed in a Moscow radio broadcast reported to the Office of War Information by U. S. Government monitors.

The dissolution was effected at the last session of the presidium on Tuesday after receipt of approval from the "most important sections" of the Third International of the proposal for disbandment.

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EDITION NUMBER 8

6-10-43

57 JUN 26 1943

FILE

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Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Soviet Trade Unions Issue New Magazine on Int'l Affairs

(By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

MOSCOW, June 8. — The first number of a new magazine, The War and the Working Class, issued by the newspaper Trud the central organ of the Soviet trade unions, appeared in Moscow last week.

The editorial defining the task of the new publication states that The War and the Working Class affords wide Soviet public circles an opportunity to express their opinion on all vital questions of the international life and foreign policy of the states engaged in the war and of the states occupying a neutral position.

The magazine will also carry information on the course and nature of the development of the national liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples against the Italo-German occupationists. Its pages will give a critical analysis of the comments of the foreign press on various current problems of an international nature.

The editorial board regards one of its tasks that of reflecting the vital question relating to the activity of trade union organizations under the conditions of the second World War.

The first issue of the magazine carries an article by the editor of the magazine, A. Danilov, chairman of the University Teachers Union, on the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee, in which the author stresses the role of the trade unions in mobilizing the masses for increasing the output of all types of arms.

"Herein lies the prime task of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee. . . . Only by being active can the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee get the trade unions of other democratic countries, including the trade unions of the United States, to strive to unite with the committee in the name of victory over the enemy, as well as to solve the tasks that will face the trade unions in the post-war period."

Under the heading "Neutrality in the Present War," Professor of Juridical Sciences, S. Krylov, analyzes Swedish neutrality.

Citing numerous facts of the violation of the Hague Convention's neutrality, especially the transit of military forces and materials via Swedish territory, Krylov states in conclusion that "voices in protest against this are being heard in Sweden itself. Sweden's impermissible practice of systematically violating her neutarility has also evoked great indignation among the broad public circles of the USSR.

Travel notes on Iran by Kemenov, chairman of the All Union Society of Cultural Relations Abroad; a review of the foreign press—"On the Talk about Peace in the fascist camp"; information about the food conference in Hot Springs; and notes on international events in May supplement the first issue of the new magazine which aims to satisfy the growing needs of Soviet readers for information on international questions.

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This is a clipping from page 8 of the DAILY WORKER Date June 9 1943

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51 JUN 24 1943
FILE

Moscow Trade Union Publishers To Issue 94 Books This Year

Union Manuals, Books on Women in War, Labor Laws, Gardening, War Production, on List

KUIBYSHEV, June 8 (ALN).—The publishing house of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions in Moscow issued 61 titles in 1941, 72 in 1942 and plans to issue 94 this year, Ivan Sevastayanov, head of the house, reported this week at a conference of its editors and authors with national union officials. The publishing program reflects recent decisions of the national executive committee of the AUCCTU, Sevastayanov said, and it is modified month by month to correspond to the changing needs of the trade union movement.

"Before the war we never expected to be publishing books on truck gardening, for example," he said. "But even before the AUCCTU set up a truck gardening commission last month, books on gardening made up an important part of our list. In the last year we published twelve books on gardening methods, in addition to a complete gardening manual. Each of these had a printing of 50,000. We are continuing to publish books on the production drive. A series of twelve books under the general title 'Fighters on the Labor Front,' reporting in detail the achievements of leading Stakhanovites and production heroes, is now complete."

Although most of the books published by the AUCCTU are written by well-known authors and journalists, some are written by rank and file workers. One of the most popular, the work of a Stakhanovite steel smelter, describes in working-man's language the way unions in the Urals organize production competitions, using illustrations from the author's own experience.

Several collections of short stories on the production drive, written by Anna Karavayeva and Fyodor Gladkov, have been published. Other general categories, Sevastayanov reported, deal with women and young people in industry. One of the house's most ambitious ventures, a profusely illustrated volume called "Women in the Patriotic War," describing the heroic exploits of women trade union members at the front and in the rear, is now ready for the press. Other titles on women in the trade unions are "The Power of Women," by N. Popova; "Mothers of Partisans," by S. Margulis, and "Soviet Women in Wartime," by K. Sveldlova.

"We are expanding our list of pamphlets, booklets and manuals designed to help union officials and active union members," Sevastayanov said. "Hundreds of thousands of copies of our booklet, 'The Nationwide Production Drive and the Defense of the Country,' have been published. We print many thousands of production posters to be distributed to union offices. Among union manuals published this year are the 'Handbook on State Social Insurance,' 'Laws Governing Labor in Wartime,' and 'Handbook for Trade Union Committees in Factories and Offices.' We have put out 50,000 copies of the 'Curriculum and program for Nursing Schools' to be used in the courses run by unions to train reserve nurses for the Red Army.

"We have enlarged the print order for our monthly magazine, 'Advice to Trade Union Committees,' which contains articles of practical use to all active union members. We now have our own print shop, and the workers in the shop, members of the Printing Workers Union, assure us that they will be able to cope with our expanded program."

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This is a clipping from page 5 of the Peoples World for 6/9/43

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

55 JUN 1 1943

Communist International File

Stalin Move Held Misinterpreted

Communism Spread Seen Likely With Comintern's Dissolution

By PETER EDSON

Peter Edson

The amazing alacrity and agility with which important public personages, commentators and people who should know better have jumped on the Soviet bandwagon, following Stalin's recent decree dissolving the Comintern, is really something to behold. The bland assumptions and conclusions so blindly leaped at have been that this Moscow order ending the Third International was a death warrant for world communism. It wasn't anything of the sort.

Communism today is just as much a world-wide political force as it ever was and the chances are good that far from passing out as a result of the Stalin death warrant, communism will continue to grow as separate nationalistic movements in all countries where there are radical minorities dissatisfied with the way things are being run now.

As a number of national movements, communism might even grow faster than it did under Soviet guidance. People of any country might be reluctant to join up with a movement run by Moscow, but willing enough to join up with a purely domestic political party which they thought offered them a better deal.

SUPPORTED BY FACTS

These statements are not made gloatingly, in support of communism. On the contrary, they are made to point out that the danger of communism—if it is a danger—still exists, and they are supported by the facts which should be obvious to anyone who can read his newspaper or listen to the repetitious windjamming that comes out of the radio.

The strongest elements of the underground opposition to the Nazis in most countries of occupied Europe are unquestionably communist. It is admitted by many of the refugee governments. It is particularly true in France. It is true of Italy, and if there is any active opposition to the Nazis in Germany itself, it comes from communists. These movements in the case of Germany and Italy were underground even before the war started. With the curse of the Third International now removed, what's to prevent the growth of Italian and German Communists parties in the post-war world of the Four Freedoms?

Gen. Charles de Gaulle has admitted that the strongest element in his support came not from the rightist Catholics, as he had expected, but from the communists. With the possible exceptions of the Netherlands and the Scandanavian countries, similar communist anti-Nazi strength can be found thruout Europe. Young communists do a lot of the guerilla fighting in the Balkans. A grave concern of many of the refugee governments in exile is that they do not represent these fighting elements that have stayed home to take the punishment, and that is the greatest weakness in their post-war position.

TRUE IN CHINA

Similarly, in China, tho Nationalists and Communists have joined for United China movement to beat the Jap, the great fear of Nationalists is that after the war is over, China will be thrown into a civil war—Communists versus the field—for ultimate domination.

Communism is perhaps weakest in the United States, where it is legally recognized as a political party. Its leadership has reportedly never stood in much esteem with Moscow, and its greatest threat has been its potential nuisance value, unless you happen to be talking to Martin Dies. But the American Communist leadership has declared that the official abolition of the Comintern and the world revolutionary ideal will make no difference in Communist aims in this country. You can take that at face value for whatever you think it worth, and govern yourself accordingly. Just don't kid yourself that communism is now dead outside of Soviet Russia and that even that great power is now becoming a capitalist state.

Washington Daily News June 9, 1943 Page 2

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OMINTERN AFTERMATH

ot an "obituary" but a weapon of war, opening new paths to the future. The need to reevaluate ong attitudes toward American Communists.

HE day on which the Axis was to mark the birth of the Anti-Comintern as a coalition for world conquest e the sensational announcement of the posed dissolution of the Communist In- ational. It was the day on which Hitler hoped to register new diplomatic tri- phs against the United Nations by fol- ing up his Katyn Forest hoax, seized n so eagerly by the Polish pro-Nazis to upt Polish-Soviet relations, with an even re sensational hoax for use by American ponents of negotiated peace to disrupt nerican-Soviet relations. But May 22 s definitely not Hitler's day. The recom- ndation to dissolve the Communist ernational was a triumphant ex- ssion of the further strengthening of Anglo-Soviet-American coalition at the y moment when Hitler thought he was ing to further weaken it. It was a mighty w for victory over Hitler, an historic ntribution to strengthening and extend- the unity of all democratic, anti-fascist ces and especially labor's role in the na- n's war for survival.

Despite the usual amount of insipid culations and misinterpretations as to the aning of this act, the democratic world to the heart of it immediately. The neral estimate of its significance was cor- t, and even the great historical per- ctives implicit in it were quickly sensed. e London correspondent of the *Christian ience Monitor*, for example, reported ree days after the dissolution was pro- sed:

"As more thought is given to the deci- n of the international Comintern to dis- lve itself, the more it is realized here that eat political happenings have been set in otion—happenings which may profoundly fect the course of history." (May 25, 943.)

This points to the crux of the whole atter, which can be muffed only at great st to the future of mankind. The main ing about the dissolution of the Commu- st International is the fact that it was carried out as a contribution to the speedi- est defeat of the Hitlerite bloc and the assurance of friendship between the anti- Hitler nations after the war. This is the essence of the act to which we must hold fast above everything else and from which bold and fruitful conclusions must be drawn by all sections of the anti-Hitler national front.

Of course the dissolution of the International closed a momentous chapter in the history of the world working class movement. But it is not this that defines its essential character. Its significance is not as an obituary closing the doors on the past but as a weapon of war opening new paths to the future. The great historical strength and promise of this act lies in the fact that it facilitates the achievement of an unlimited national upsurge and the mobilization of the entire people for victory at the exact moment when the most decisive blows of the war are to be delivered, creating the conditions thereby for the more effective collaboration and friendship of the anti-Hitler coalition after the war.

It is clear that the anti-fascist camp can ill afford to misunderstand or confuse the character of the contribution represented by the dissolution of the Communist International. It facilitates the achievement of a national upsurge by removing the "menace of communism" as a false issue, by destroying the chief weapon of the Hitlerites, the negotiated peace forces, the foes of unconditional surrender and unconditional victory. It is a contribution to victory because it will help the various sections of the national anti-Hitler camp to free themselves more rapidly from the pernicious influence of the enemy's anti-Communist line and resume the great anti-fascist advance begun in 1935. It is a contribution because it places new and enlarged democratic unity on the order of the day—a unity which, if achieved, will determine the pattern of historical development for generations to come. In a word, it is a major contribution to victory because it facilitates the mobilization of all national forces, including the Communists.

51 JUN 26

ENCLOSURE

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This is a clipping from page 11 of the NEW MASSES for June 8 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government

File

It would seem that those who hailed this act as a blow against the Hitler coalition would begin to reevaluate their attitude towards the American Communists in the light of these perspectives, and that only the exponents of negotiated peace and the professional anti-Soviet conspirators would attempt to exploit the dissolution of the International as a justification for continuing Hitler's anti-Communist line in the United States. But it appears that there are people in the anti-Hitler camp who persist in confusing the weapons of the enemy with their own weapons. When Hitler's friends clamor for the dissolution of the American Communist Party, it is plain that this is their manner of continuing the fight against anti-Hitler national unity. But when enemies of Hitler, like the New York *Times*, take up this same cry, it represents a lamentable misreading of the meaning of the dissolution of the International which is all the more dangerous because it can only be maintained by Hitlerite arguments.

Of course, if victory should require the suspension of all political parties, the Communists would not hesitate a moment to meet these conditions. But that is obviously a different matter from the clamor for the dissolution of the Communist Party. Surely, the dissolution of the International was not an admission that Hitler was correct in proclaiming that "Communism is a menace"; if that were true, the dissolution would be a victory for Hitler and not a major blow against him, as the *Times* itself has recognized. It was an historic blow against the Axis because it knocked out Hitler's anti-Communist line and showed that Communism is not a menace. There can be no other sense or meaning to this act. Where, then, is the logic in hailing the defeat of the anti-Communist line on a world scale only to assure its perpetuation on a national scale?

Earl Browder's far-sighted letter in the New York *Times* of May 29 showed clearly that the Communists do not hesitate to discuss the question of dissolution—provided it is a question of aiding the war and speeding victory over the Hitlerite bloc, and not a question of promoting the "spectre of Communism" fable, Hitler's secret weapon for defeating the United Nations. Indeed, Browder declared categorically that, although the Communist Party is strongly opposed to any suspension of the right of free political association, should such a decision be made as part of the responsible regulation of our national life for the war, the Party is prepared to submit to such a decision for the sake of victory.

If the call for the dissolution of the Party were concerned solely with victory in the war, this is the test it would go by. But it cannot stand this test, especially since the American Communist Party has been unconditionally aiding the war. The sole object of this demand is to dispose of the Communist movement, and no great imagination is required to understand that the pursuit of this object could only mean making the struggle against Communism, and not the struggle against fascism, the issue before the country. The logic of this leads straight to the victory of the Hitler-Goebbels line; there is no middle road.

This is exactly what the New York *Times* does in its editorial reply to Earl Browder's letter and his offer to cooperate in destroying Hitler's anti-Communist fable in the interest of the people's war of national liberation. The *Times* declares in effect: The loyalty of the American Communists is not to capitalism but to Communism; hence they are not really American and cannot serve American national interest which is the preservation of capitalism. The national interest of Russia, on the other hand, is the preservation of Communism; hence the only national interests the Communists can serve are those of Russia. It is true the national interests of these two countries make an alliance between them necessary, but the existence of an American Communist Party is not only unnecessary for the maintenance of such an alliance but is actually an obstacle to it.

If it is true that the American people must be kept from ever wanting to adopt a Communist social system, then the only sure way is not by denying a body of American citizens the right to advocate its ultimate adoption, but by destroying its power of example in the Soviet Union. The convenient device of declaring Communism a purely Russian national interest and then using this as a pretext for excommunicating all Americans who believe in it can only mean a line of constant suspicion and

ar of the Soviet Union backed up by re-
ttless struggle against American labor
.d the American people whose sympathy
r the Communist achievements of the So-
:t people is bound to grow. Is it necessary
ask what kind of an alliance we can ex-
ct between the United States and Russia
ıder the influence of men who are so fear-
l of the Soviet Union that they insist
the dissolution of the organization of
ose Americans who have been the most
nsistent and sympathetic champions of
: ideals which the people of Russia have
opted as the basis of their social and state
istence? Under these circumstances,
en if there were no other reason for the
istence of a Communist Party, the best
tional interests of our country which de-
ınd the closest friendship with the Soviet
nion would dictate its creation. Gener-
y, the perspectives opened up by the posi-
n of the *Times* are perspectives for a
stwar epoch of strife and turbulence
:her than of ordered and peaceful re-
ıstruction, of cooperation between all
mocratic forces in the solution of the
:at problems before the country and the
ırld.

The trouble with this position is that it
:rates with false premises and confuses
: issues. It is false and foolish on the
:e of it, in a country of capitalists and
:rkers, of poverty and wealth, of unem-
ment and crises, to insist that the inter-
s of the capitalists alone represent the
:rests of the nation. The best interests
a nation are determined by the welfare
l progress of its people and not by the
intenance of a social form or system
:rpective of whether it serves the interests
:he people. To deny labor and the people
the right to freely discuss and judge the issues arising out of American social life and form political parties to represent and defend their interests and views even to the point of insisting on a complete change in the form of our social organization is to deny the heart and spirit of American democracy.

THE fact that labor and the people in another part of the world have already decided that the continuation of capitalism is not to their best interest does not make advocates of the same views in the United States the servants of another country's national interests. To admit this principle into American public life is to import the temper and atmosphere of fascism and to surrender the very foundations of democratic progress. But this is exactly what happens when the test of loyalty to national interest is based upon belief in capitalism or Communism. The only result of this is to raise the false issue of capitalism versus Communism in the United States at the very moment when this Hitlerite weapon has suffered its most serious blow in the world at large.

This is no time for timid fears and anxiety for the future of capital. It is a time for confidence in the destiny of our nation and bold and courageous action to fulfill it. Anything short of this is to misread the meaning of history at the moment of its greatest opportunity. The dissolution of the International has shown that the chief concern of the Communists is how to solve the actual task which history poses at the given stage. Can anyone in the anti-Hitler camp afford to do less?

A. LANDY.

File

Syrian Party Approves Comintern Act

BEIRUT, June 7.—The Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon has unanimously approved the resolution of the Presidium of the Executive Council of the Communist International proposing to "dissolve the Comintern as the guiding center of the international working class movement, thus freeing the sections from their obligations arising from the statutes and resolutions of the Congress of the Communist International."

The Political Bureau, by its approval of this resolution expresses certainty that it voices the unanimous wish of all Communists, democrats and sincere nationalists of Syria and Lebanon.

The secretary of the Communist Party of Lebanon, Helou, published in the newspaper "Saoutchanb" a statement expressing "greatest satisfaction" with the decision of the Executive Committee of the Communist International to dissolve the Comintern.

"This decision," the statement reads, "is not only confirmation of what was an accomplished fact since the beginning of the war, but a natural consequence of the line pursued by the Comintern in the course of a number of years and based on granting every Communist Party complete independence in the question of its national policy, tactics and methods of work.

"The most important result of this decision for every country is that it will make easier the unification of all national forces fighting against fascism. Moreover, this decision will block the way to Fascist propaganda."

Peoples World
Page 2
June 8, 1943

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FILE

Stalin Says Move Explodes Hitler Lies

The text of Joseph Stalin's letter on the dissolution of the Comintern follows. It was written in reply to a request for comment by Harold King, Moscow correspondent for the Reuters news agency.

Dissolution of the Communist International is proper because:

(a) It exposes the lie of the Hitlerites to the effect that "Moscow" allegedly intends to intervene in the life of other nations and to "Bolshevize" them. An end is now being put to this lie.

(b) It exposes the calumny of adversaries of Communism within the labor movement to the effect that Communist Parties in various countries are allegedly acting not in the interest of their people but on orders from the outside. An end is now being put to this calumny, too.

(c) It facilitates the work of patriots in freedom-loving countries for uniting progressive forces of their respective countries regardless of party or religious faith into a single camp of national liberation—for the unfolding struggle against fascism.

(d) It facilitates the work of patriots in all countries for uniting all freedom-loving peoples into a single international camp for the fight against the menace of world domination by Hitlerism, thus clearing the way for future organization and companionship of the nations based on their equality.



JOSEPH STALIN

I think that all of these circumstances taken together will result in further strengthening of the united front of the Allies and other United Nations in the fighting for victory over Hitlerite tyranny.

I feel that dissolution of the Communist International is perfectly natural because it is exactly now when the fascist beast is exerting its last strength that it is necessary to organize the common onslaught of freedom-loving countries to finish off this beast and deliver the peoples from fascist oppression.

6-16-43

This is a clipping from page 4 Sec. 1 of THE WORKER Date June 6 1943 Clipped at the seat of Government.

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Stalin Writes on Comintern

LONDON, May 31.—Stalin, in a letter to the Moscow correspondent of Reuthers (British) News Agency, pointed out, Reuthers' dispatches disclosed today, that the Communist International was dissolved to facilitate the work of freedom-loving people in all the anti-Hitler nations.

Stalin's letter was in answer to a query from Reuther's correspondent, and read:

"Dissolution of the Communist International is proper, because:

"(a)—It exposes the lies of the Hitlerites to the effect that 'Moscow' allegedly intends to intervene in the life of other nations, and to 'Bolshevize' them. An end is now being put to this lie.

"(b)—It exposes the calumny of adversaries of communism within the labor movement to the effect that Communist parties in various countries are allegdly acting not in the interest of their people, but on orders from the outside. An end is now put to this calumny, too.

"(c)—It facilitates the work of patriots in freedom-loving countries for uniting progressive forces of their respective countries, regardless of party or religious faith, into a single camp for national liberation — for the unfolding struggle against fascism.

"(d)—It facilitates the work of patriots in all countries for uniting all freedom-loving peoples into a single international camp for the fight against the menace of world domination by Hitlerism, thus clearing the way for future organization and companionship of the nations based on their equality.

"I think that all of these circumstances taken together will result in further strengthening of the United Front of the Allies and other United Nations in the fight for victory over Hitlerite tyranny.

"I feel that dissolution of the Communist International is perfectly timed because it is exactly now, when the Fascist beast is exerting its last strength, that it is necessary to organize the common onslaught of freedom-loving countries to finish off this beast and deliver the peoples from Fascist oppression."

Chicago Herald
June 3 1943
page 2

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58 JUL 21 1943

File

The Communist International

THE proposal for dissolution of the Communist International was indeed momentous. And it is regarded so by genuine anti-fascists as well as by Hitler and his adherents in all lands. News of this historic development came shortly before we went to press and we do not have a full register of reactions at hand, but enough are here to evaluate their sum. Everywhere it was rightly interpreted—too often with basic misconceptions of the Communist International's role—as a further impulsion toward national and international unity in the war against the Axis.

To fully grasp the significance of the proposal one must evaluate the work of the Communist International since its inception in 1919.

To many millions its role was clouded by misconceptions engendered by the "Anti-Comintern" plotters in Berlin and their proselytes within the various nations. Martin Dies was the chief obfuscator in this country (like Goebbels he too was caught off-guard and was constrained to say that now perhaps his committee could terminate its activities—a belated confession that he was never genuinely concerned with the ostensible purposes of his group: the exposure and ridance of fascist activities in America.) Through the years Dies was abetted by the anti-Soviet Social-Democrats and the Trotskyist saboteurs. Goebbels' job, too, was clear; the Communist International had called fascism's number years ago; most memorably in 1935 at its Seventh World Congress when the working classes and peoples generally were urged to form popular fronts against fascism's encroachments. Collective security was the slogan on the international front. The keynote everywhere was unity against the aggressor—unity within, unity without. For that unity the Communist International had toiled unceasingly. (Had its counsels been adequately heeded, this war need never have occurred.) Goebbels, therefore, had to conspire against the increasing prestige of the Communist International and to besmirch its proposals and intentions. For many millions in all lands had come to accept the International's warnings: that fascism was the main enemy and that it could bring in its train only cataclysmic war and worldwide enslavement.

THE war has deepened that understanding and confirmed the acumen of the Communist International in all the confusing swirls of world history prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Today many millions are uniting against fascism, regardless of political and religious affiliations. The Communist International has done its job: as an international center it had helped the various parties and working class movements to attain maturity. It became clear, even before the war, Dimitrov points out, that the organizational form for uniting the workers as chosen by the First Congress of the Communist International had become outdated. The times required new forms, new methods. The conditions of this war made it impossible to maintain a single guiding center; moreover, considering the maturity of the Communist Parties, and the degree of their development in finding solutions for the specific problems of their nations, the Communist International had become unnecessary. Marxism teaches that times bring changes, and requirements of one day become unessential in another. Marxists have "never advocated the preservation of those organizational forms which have become obsolete." This was evidenced many a time: the first classic instance was Marx' dissolution of the First International which he originally formed, when this organization was no longer needed.

IN REPLY to the libels upon the Communists here, and in every country, we must draw attention to the indigenous nature of their parties. It was, for too long a time, the custom among native fascist groupings and in those circles they influenced, to contend that the Communist Party was an "importation" from Moscow. That this is a libel is obvious to any honest observer. Everywhere Communists have sprung from the grass-roots of their peoples. Nobody is more Chinese than Mao-Tse-tung; nobody more French than André

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This is a clipping from page 5 of the CIRCULARS for June 11, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government

52 JUN 23 1943

Marty; none more Cuban than Blas Roca: these men sprung from their native tradition. In our country Earl Browder is a Kansan; William Z. Foster a New Englander. They, and the party they lead, were deeply influenced by the traditions of our country and of its labor movement. The Communist Party is on a straight line from Marxists like Joseph Weydemeyer who was commissioned a colonel by Abraham Lincoln; it derives from the best traditions of the old Knights of Labor, the IWW, the native Socialist movement before 1919. And, as true patriots, Communists ever bear the banner of internationalism.

Indeed, the New York *Herald Tribune* was right in noting, May 23, that revolutionary socialism on an *international* basis "will not die." It will "wax or wane, spontaneously" so long as the world is plagued by wars or the impoverishment of economic disasters. These fundamental truths must be recognized to negate the Dies' dictum that Communist Parties are "foreign," alien to the national spirit. For that lie is the instrument the Anti-Comintern used to estrange us from our natural ally, the USSR, in its effort to whip up a worldwide "crusade" against the Soviets.

WE CANNOT in this space deal further with many aspects of the momentous proposal; we shall continue the discussion in subsequent issues. So far as this proposal concerns the American Communist Party we must recall that it disaffiliated from the Communist International in 1940. As Earl Browder said, the proposal does not affect organizationally the status of the Communist Party of the United States, which in the past three years, "maintained no affiliation outside the borders of our country." To those who continue to belabor the party and its intentions, he repeats his Party's well known position: it will continue "to fight with all its strength, as it has in the past period, for the complete unity of the United Nations, for international labor unity, and for national unity within our country, to win the unconditional surrender of the Hitler regime and its allies, Japan and Italy, and an ordered and peaceful world when victory is achieved."

THE EDITORS.

FILE

Stalin on the Comintern

ANOTHER heavy blow has been given the Hitler propagandists by Marshal Stalin's letter on the dissolution of the Comintern. Speaking as the leader of the Soviet nations and for the Soviet Government, Stalin has destroyed the new Goebbels' lie that the proposal to dissolve is merely a hoax and a maneuver.

Also those circles which feel that the Comintern decision was no more than an act of expediency and therefore not deserving of full confidence must change their approach as a result of Stalin's letter.

For he makes it clear that the Soviet Government views the Comintern decision as of great importance from the viewpoint of facilitating her own victory as well as the victory of the whole coalition.

It is considered important because: (a) it puts an end to the lie spread by Hitler that the Soviet Union intends to "Bolshevize" Europe; (b) it hits at the lie that the Communist parties of other countries act not in the interest of their own nation, but in the interest of the Soviet Union; (c) it helps the patriots of all countries unite the progressive forces "regardless of party or religious faith" into a single patriotic camp to fight fascism; (d) it helps the patriots unite all the freedom-loving peoples into a single world camp in the struggle against the Hitler menace and for the cooperation of all nations on the basis of equality.

These weighty reasons, given by so authoritative a leader as Stalin, should remove any doubt in United Nations government and popular circles as to the definitive reality of dissolving the Comintern.

This letter should also make it more difficult for the professional anti-Soviet social-democrats to continue their splitting activities within the labor movement. Other sincere labor elements, who unwittingly have become the victim of the anti-Soviet and anti-Communist conspiracy, should now find it easier to reconsider their position in accordance with the new circumstances.

Special attention should be given to Stalin's concluding thought. The Comintern decision is not only proper for the reasons given above, but it is timely, he points out:

"Because it is exactly now when the fascist beast is exerting its last strength that it is necessary to organize the common onslaught of freedom-loving countries to finish off this beast and deliver the peoples from fascist oppression."

The dissolution of the Comintern is connected with that supreme necessity of the war. Regardless of party or religious faith, labor and the people must devote their energies to finishing off the fascist beast.

DJK 61-16-A

This is a clipping from page 33 of the DAILY WORKER

Date June 1, 1943

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52 JUN 23 1943

SOVIET DIPLOMACY SEEN BARRING ACCORD ON WAR

Full Cooperation of All the Allies Meets the Obstacle of Realpolitik

By RAYMOND DANIELL

By Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, Aug. 28—Politically and militarily, Russia is fighting the war in her own way for her own purposes. It would be well to emphasize that point so that sentimental and emotional enthusiasm for the exploits of the Red Army may not turn to logical disillusionment with the Kremlin over realpolitik later.

It should not be forgotten that Russia went to war, not because of love for the principles of democracy or any other ideal reason, but plainly and simply because she was attacked. Russia is fighting today on the side of freedom and democracy, but it does not follow that her aims and aspirations are completely in harmony with those of the United States and Britain.

Common Purpose Sought

The three countries have a common enemy, but it is not by any means certain that they have a common purpose. Once that is realized, much that is inexplicable and mysterious about Russian diplomacy is understandable. Russia did not want to become embroiled in the war at all. What Premier Joseph Stalin wanted was to avoid a conflict as long as possible to carry on his great domestic social experiment without interruption and, if that were impossible, to buy time to build up his defenses.

He did the latter with the Russo-German treaty of 1939, and how well he used the time thus purchased has been demonstrated by the events since June, 1941.

But the war has not materially changed Russian policy, which remains essentially opportunistic. Before the war the Russians suspected—indeed, Marshal Stalin openly charged—that the western democracies were plotting to embroil Germany with Russia in the east and thus escape the danger of war in the west. That is one of the reasons the Kremlin entered into the von Ribbentrop treaty with Germany in 1939 after the Allies had refused to recognize Russia's strategic right to occupy the Baltic States and parts of Poland if she was to join with France and Britain in attempting to hold German aggression in check.

Russia today holds that events have proved the soundness of the strategic ideas of her military leaders. The British, who opposed them at the time, are inclined to agree that they were right, although they could not agree at the time. There are few military strategists here who would argue seriously against the premise that Moscow is still in Russian hands because the Russians pushed their frontiers westward in anticipation of the momentum of the original German drive.

Peace Is Goal

The difficulty is that the Russians are not sure that the conversion is more than temporary. In Moscow the desire for a long period of peace after this war is just as strong as was desire for peace before it began, and for the same reason—that perfection of the Socialist state depends upon peace.

All the factories and hands now devoted to making and using weapons for defense of the homeland must be diverted and expanded for peaceful purposes if Russia is to become the great modern state her leaders envisage. That can come about, in the Russian view, only if her western frontiers are so impregnable that no neighboring power will ever dare to attack.

Marshal Stalin wants to embrace within the Soviet Union all the Baltic states and parts of Poland and the Balkans, which he believes will insure this impregnability. There is not much mystery about where he thinks the boundaries should be. And he means to have what he wants. At the present time he is pretty much in the driver's seat.

Second Front Strategy

It is part of this political maneuvering that makes Russia and the Anglo-American Communists so vocal in their demand for the immediate opening of a large-scale offensive in the west. Publicly and in theory the demand is for an attack on a sufficient scale to force the Germans to withdraw some fifty or sixty divisions from the east. But it is by no means certain that the Allies could mount an offensive in the west, even if they threw in everything they have that would accomplish this.

This is a clipping from page 4 of the New York Times for Aug. 29 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

'Times' Story Is Proof Bracken Was Correct

(Daily Worker Foreign Department)

No less a person than the British Minister of Information, Brendan Bracken, declared the other day that talk of a Soviet separate peace came from the fifth column. It was on Friday, to be exact, and Bracken said "I think the greatest disservice is done to the United Nations by the suggestion that Russia is likely to make a separate peace with Germany. . . . There are a lot of unconscious fifth columnists who are spreading that story. . . . Believe me, that is what Germany would like now, but she can't achieve her objective, so she spreads this rumor to create disunity among the United Nations." Clear isn't it?

And yet, in Sunday's New York Times, Raymond Daniell writes a long piece from London, full of misrepresentations of Soviet policy, full of innuendoes and insinuations. Daniell must have spent hours to get his article to sound so weasel-worded. But the net effect is that Soviet-German separate peace is possible, and that a Soviet separate peace "with a kind of ersatz Communist regime in control of Germany" is even more probable.

The ersatz Communist regime—is the idea borrowed from the Nazi radio or does Daniell think that democracy in Germany would just be "ersatz Communism?" Hitler has been saying that about democracy for 20 years

So the question arises! How does a responsible newspaper, which printed Bracken's statement, permit itself such "unconscious fifth column talk?"

And how long does it take before "unconscious fifth column talk" becomes quite conscious?

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This is a clipping from page 2 of the Daily Worker for Aug. 31, 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

54 OCT 1 1944

There is no big burning issue dividing Russia and her Western Allies at the moment. There is ground for belief, on the contrary, that the Kremlin has seen and approved the Allied military plans for the coming months. But Russia has been acting in such a way lately that many have become alarmed over where she is heading.

There have been many reports of German moves for separate peace and, while no responsible diplomat here believes they will bear fruit, there has been disappointment that the Russians have not seen fit to repudiate them firmly. The reason is apparent to any student of Russian diplomacy—the enemy's moves of desperation fit in perfectly with the Soviet's political strategy.

The United States and Britain both need Russia in the war almost as much as Germany wants her out of it. There is one strong reason why Russia cannot quit, no matter how tempting an offer Germany makes, buttressed, as it almost certainly was, by an alternative threat and promise from Japan. That is, that anything less than a total German defeat would leave Russia exposed to the threat of another attack in twenty years or less.

Mystery in Moscow

But the United States and Britain cannot overlook the point that Russia may feel that, with a kind of ersatz Communist regime in control of Germany, she might be safe. That furnishes her with her present line. The Russians have found it expedient and convenient now to behave in a mysterious way to try to force the Allies into action that the Kremlin may believe will help win the war this year or may believe will help it come to the peace conference after the war with its own military strength at least on a par with that of the Allies.

The Russians, however, can overplay their hand. For a long time there was a feeling of shame among some people here that Britain was doing so little and Russia so much to win the war. But the people of the United States and Britain rightly regard their struggle against the German submarines, their occupation of North Africa and the conquest of Sicily as a considerable achievement. They have been taught to believe that the Anglo-American air offensive over Germany is a direct contribution to German defeat and they are getting somewhat fed up with the constant belittling of their war effort from Moscow.

They are aware that the Red Army is containing almost the whole German Army, but they would like to have it recognized that their air forces have pulled off more than half the German fighters and that they are smashing the German war potential as fast as they can.

And above all the feeling is growing here that cooperation cannot be both one-sided and effective, too. So long as there are distrust and suspicion on one side, there cannot be that complete cooperation and integration of planning that is essential to victory.

Informed quarters do not suspect Russia of wanting to absorb great masses of unassimilable populations into the U. S. S. R., but they would like to know now whether Russia is willing to let political evolution take its normal course in the liberated countries of Europe or whether Russia wants to supervise its development, as apparently she suspects her Western allies of plotting to do.

This is a clipping from page _____ of the New York Times for

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Clipped at the Seat of Government.

The French Problem Awaits Solution

by N. NIKOLAYEV

A Press Review from the Soviet fortnightly, "War and the Working Class."

UNIFICATION of all forces of the French people for the struggle for liberating France from the German Fascist invaders is of no mean importance for the course of the war against Hitler Germany.

A successful solution of this problem is in the interests of the Allied countries fighting the Hitlerite tyranny. Therefore, the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation as a centre for broader unity of the anti-Hitlerite French forces cannot be estimated as other than a positive event.

A whole group of problems connected with the French National Committee are still awaiting solution, in particular the question of official recognition of the Committee by the Allied Governments.

Originally the question of recognition was left open, since on some important questions no agreement had yet been reached within the Committee between Generals Giraud and De Gaulle. Nevertheless, even after the disputed questions were settled within the Committee the question of recognition remained unsolved.

So far only the Governments of several small and medium countries have announced official recognition. The Soviet Union's attitude in this important question is known. Some time ago the Soviet Union recognised the Fighting France Committee and maintained friendly relations with it. It had therefore all the more reason for a positive attitude towards the French Committee today when unification involves broader French circles ready to fight against Hitler. So it is understandable that as soon as the French Committee of National Liberation was formed in North Africa the Soviet Union made an attempt to send a representative there to establish personal contact and receive direct information from De Gaulle and Giraud.

Nevertheless, almost two months went by and the Soviet Union did not succeed in realising this intention as it encountered objections on the part of the Anglo-American authorities, who based their objection on military circumstances.

It will be remembered that whereas from the very beginning of the formation of De Gaulle's Committee Great Britain recognised and supported it, the U.S.A. never recognised De Gaulle's Committee nor the Fighting French Committee. As distinct from Britain, the question of recognition is a new question for the U.S.A.

During the first stage of discussion on this question, the American Press devoted much space to personal attacks against De Gaulle. Accusations of "dictatorship" and "Fascist tendencies" advanced against De Gaulle did not prevent some American newspapers and some American broadcasting stations from spreading all sorts of contrary inventions about De Gaulle, accusing him of secret contact with the Bolsheviks, and of receiving money from the Soviet Government.

This provocative work of Anti-Soviet blackmailers was completely disproved and exposed by the French Committee of National Libration itself, as well as by official Soviet communique issued by Tass.

Many voices have already been raised in the American Press expressing serious doubts of arguments raised against recognition of the French Committee.

Perhaps more than on other occasions the real reason for the U.S.A. dissatisfaction with De Gaulle is the difference in policies of the U.S.A. and De Gaulle with regard to Vichy. It is sufficient to recall De Gaulle's attitude to Darlan and the importance American circles attached to the well known experiment with Darlan.

Consequently, in order the better to understand the U.S.A. policy on the "French Question," it is necessary not to forget at least the following three things:—

Firstly, the fact that the break in diplomatic relations between the U.S.A. and Vichy did not prevent Americans from experimenting with Darlan; secondly, that the recent visit of Giraud to the U.S.A. on a personal invitation from Washington took place at a time when the French Committee of National Liberation was already formed; thirdly, that the Press went rather far in criticising De Gaulle, although one cannot say that this criticism continues today on the former scale.

It is different as regards Britain. The British Press does not publish articles against recognition of the French Committee.

Much attention is being paid to the "French Question" in U.S.A. and Britain, and various attempts are being made to bring closer the attitude of both countries. The problem is one of reluctance to have their hands tied by some final commitments with regard to the "French Question."

On the other hand it is clear, too, that this question reveals the tremendous interest of America in present and post-war affairs of Europe. The "French Question" affords a new example of changes that have taken place in American foreign policy as compared with the period of the first world war.

It is not difficult to see that British policy in this question is based now on a desire to reach certain agreement with the policy of U.S.A., whereas but recently this desire was not so strongly revealed. The "French Question" is not yet solved, but it must be solved in the interests of anti-Hitlerite France, in the interests of the anti-Hitler coalition, of the Allies as a whole.

Russia

World News & Views
Aug. 28, 1943 p. 276

BRITONS WORRIED BY SOVIET TAUNTS

Suspect the Official Story of Improvement in Relations With Russian Ally

By DREW MIDDLETON

By Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, Aug. 27—Despite the cries of "disunity" that followed the Quebec conference the official British position is that there are no outstanding differences between the British Empire and Russia and that relations are as good if not better than they were more than a year ago when the Anglo-Russian treaty was signed.

These sentiments, ow echoed by a considerable group of newspapers and periodicals, are suspected by many persons who meet in pubs and railroad trains, who are worried by the withdrawal of the Russian Ambassador to London and Washington and are sensitive to Soviet taunts that Britain is not bearing her full weight in the war.

The withdrawal of the ambassadors supplied those who berate the Government's Russian policy with ammunition. They point out that when in 1939 Maxin Litvinoff relinquished his post of Commissar for Foreign Affairs drastic changes in Russian policy followed. Soviet appeals for aid in western Europe appear to have convinced a small but vociferous minority that neither Britain nor the United States is bearing a full share in the war.

British Policy on Russia

The British policy toward Russia seems to surmount or perhaps disregard these criticisms. It is based on two premises, post-war cooperation between the British Empire and Russia and the necessity for an alliance between Britain, the United States and Russia after the end of the war.

Cooperation is guaranteed by the Anglo-Russian treaty; the alliance is the aim of statemen who feel that without a tripartite alliance the world is doomed to conflicts. They fear that a post-war Anglo-American alliance would force Russia to find allies among the defeated nations, notably Germany, thus helping to choose sides for a new world war.

Br itain's position as an "honest broker" of international affairs will have to be strengthened in the near future by firm answers to some of the questions Russians are asking. It is a moot point whether the Soviet suspects Britain more than the United States but it is clear the Kremlin, with its own special brand of imperialism, wants an answer on military rule in Sicily, on Allied policy in North Africa and on the somewhat austere Allied sentiments toward revolutionary groups in Italy.

British Try for Unity

There is no doubt the British are just as implicated in these questions as the United States. But it is equally true the British are making an effort to convince the Russians that they are necessary factors in the war effort and to strengthen the ties between the United States and Russia.

Perhaps it is unfortunate for the western Allies that the Russians, who a year ago were warm toward the British, are now cool. Many believe here, as the New Statesman and Nation writes, that it is imperative that "Churchill, as the only possible intermediary who could bridge the distance between Washington and Moscow, should himself undertake without delay a mission to discuss personally with Stalin all points of divergence which now threaten the unity of the Allies."

This is a clipping from page 2 of the New York Times for Aug. 28, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

THE SEPARATE PEACE BOGY

Brendan Bracken, the British Minister of Information, declared at a press conference in this city yesterday that those who are spreading rumors that Russia might sign a separate peace with Hitler are unconsciously fostering Nazi propaganda. His warning is timely. The fears of some Americans and Britons that Stalin may make a separate peace with Hitler may be sincere, but they are certainly not rational. It requires only a little imagination to recognize that a separate peace between Russia and Germany is today one of the least probable of human events.

There is, to begin with, a twenty-year treaty between Great Britain and Russia, signed in June of last year, in which the two nations bound themselves not to enter into negotiation "with the Hitlerite Government or any other Government of Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions," nor to enter into an armistice or peace with any state associated with Nazi Germany "except by mutual consent." This is a pledge made voluntarily by the Russian Government.

The "realists" who say that treaties mean nothing are extremely unrealistic in the present instance. They have never stopped to picture to themselves what the situation would be if a separate peace were signed between Stalin and Hitler.

Let us look at it from the German side. Suppose the terms of this peace were those frequently rumored—that Hitler would simply withdraw his armies to the point where they were on the night of June 21, 1941, before his treacherous attack was launched. He would have to make some such speech to the German people as follows: "Well, my fellow-Germans, you will be delighted to learn that our brave armies are now back to precisely where they started from more than two years ago. It appears that the whole attack on Soviet Russia was a slight error on my part. True, it has cost us billions in treasure and millions of German lives. It has, in fact, almost bled us white. Excuse it, please. I have just discovered again that the Communists are not our enemies but our friends. Our real enemies are the plutocratic democracies. Let us now, with undiminished fanaticism, throw our whole weight against them—with the exception of a million or two troops which we must keep on the Russian border in case Stalin double-crosses us."

It may be argued that the gains from a separate peace on the Russian side would be clearer. If the Germans withdraw from Russia to the 1941 border, Premier Stalin would be able to point out that the invader had been thrown from Russian soil. But this would none the less mean that after the most populous part of Russia had been ravaged and laid waste, after millions of Russian soldiers and civilians had been slaughtered, the situation would be otherwise the same as it had been on June 21, 1941. The Russians, of course, like the Nazis, would still have to keep a million or two men mobilized at their own borders—just in case. Stalin could feel morally certain that if Hitler were able to win against the United Nations he would turn once more on Russia.

The answer to such a picture is obvious. Russia cannot make peace with an undefeated Germany. Russia must make certain of Germany's defeat. The only way it can do that is to continue to throw its whole weight into the effort.

All this does not mean that the relations of Russia to Great Britain and America present no problems. They present immediate problems of full military cooperation on both sides. They will present serious future problems when victory has been secured. They present the problems of the extent to which post-war Europe will be democratic or Communist; of the extent to which regional federations in Europe will be permitted or encouraged; of whether and how the peoples of Europe are to be permitted to choose their own destiny; and of where national boundaries or "spheres of influence" are to be drawn. These problems are grave indeed. They concern the whole kind of world in which we are destined to live. They can be the cause of deep-seated differences of opinion. But they are problems that have nothing to do with the present absurd fears of a separate Russo-German peace.

This is a clipping from page 10 of the New York Times for Aug. 28, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

'We Can Rebuild'—Soviets Begin Now

(By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

MOSCOW, Aug. 26. — The Soviet government's bold plan for the reconstruction of the devastated regions of western Russia and the Ukraine will be made possible by the Soviet Man, by his "creative energy, his fervent humaneness, his courage and patriotism," says the Soviet writer, Vsevolod Ivanov, in Izvestia the other day.

"Indeed, is it not possible to argue that the war hinders construction, and therefore it would be best to postpone post - war restorations?" Ivanov asks.

"It is, and every one, even those who have suffered the most from the occupation, would agree that this is no time for construction, for transporting cattle over thousands of miles, and transporting timber and metals.

"No, argues the restoration program—we must build houses, timber and metal; we must bring the cattle back, because more than ever before we are obliged to think of the Soviet people when they are in distress.

"We realize that the program is not easy to accomplish. The cattle evacuated to the Tambov Ivanovo Gorky region are already adapted and are naturally necessary there. And how about the tractors, combine harvesters, mowing machines, ploughs and other machines? How about the construction of railway terminals, stations, etc.? Will not this require considerable labor, metal and funds—in all of which there is a shortage now?

NOT AN EASY TASK

"A foreigner, even one sympathetic to the Soviet Union, will probably shrug his shoulders while reading this program.

"Where will the Russians find the strength for the restoration of the economy ruined by the Germans, fighting as they are the third year with all the effort required during the period of retreat and now by the offensive, the evacuation of industry, the lack of sleep and food, waging battle and forging weapons for this battle?

"The urgent measures for the restoration of the economy is the bridge to the future, the bridge to peace, that is, peace in this country and in the entire world," Ivanov replies.

"The results of the rule of German "Master Race" are such as to make post-war restoration one of the most important tasks that will face mankind. This is beyond doubt. What, therefore, is the miraculous material with which the bridge to the future will be built—how is the first program of restoration to be accomplished? This material is man with his creative energy and remarkable industry, his great fervent humaneness, his response to everything that is honest and just, his courage and patriotism.

"Along recently de-mined roads, along temporary bridges, men, machines, metal and cattle all stream to war-trampled fields to build and restore, to construct railway stations and bridges. The peasant from Ayazan or the Kuibyshev region will bring back the evacuated horse and the colt raised by himself. The worker from the Urals will send sheet iron which he produced by depriving himself of an hour or two of his leisure. Transports from everywhere, Central Asia and Siberia, will stream in the river of restoration, the river of energy.

"The restoration program is a bold act, but this boldness is real. It is rooted in the character of the Soviet citizen, in his heart."

This is a clipping from page 2 of the Daily Worker for Aug. 27 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Maisky En Route To Visit London

A Tehran dispatch reporting Ivan Maisky, recently removed after 11 years as Russian ambassador to Britain, was en route to London on a visit has stirred speculation that a three-power war conference may be in the making.

Frederick Kuh reported exclusively in PM Aug. 20 that Maisky would go to London and that there was a prospect that he and Foreign Commissar V. M. Molotov might meet British and American representatives to learn the results of the Quebec Conference. The Russians are said in London to have found the Quebec announcements devoid of detail on such important matters as a second front.

This attitude was reflected in the information bulletin of the Soviet embassy in Washington which reproduced an article from the Moscow bi-monthly *War and the Working Class,* saying that "anti-democratic and semi-fascist elements . . . are striving to prevent the participation of the USSR in the organization of the world . . ." and are "doing everything they can to stir up troubled waters, playing into the hands of Hitler and his associates, helping to split the camp of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition."

This is a clipping from
page 3 of P H

for Aug. 26 1943
Clipped at the Seat of
Government

Soviet Tie Hailed By Uruguay Leader

(By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

MONTEVIDEO, Aug. 25. — Uruguay's decision to reestablish relations with the Soviet Union is no more than recognition of the popular will, and an acknowledgement that the USSR is defending the front ranks of civilization, said the Minister of Foreign Relations, Jose Serrato, here on Aug. 10.

The declaration came in the form of an interview with the editor of the Russian daily newspaper Russky Argentine who was received at the minister's offices, Jose Serrato who is a former president of Uruguay.

How have the Uruguayan people received the news of the renewal of diplomatic relations with Russia, the foreign minister was asked?

He replied:

"Because of their warm support to the cause of the Allied nations who fight against the powers of the Axis, the people of Uruguay have received with great pleasure the renewal of relations with Russia, contributing with exemplary heroism to defeat Nazi-fascist barbarism.

"The attitude of our people is an affirmation of the most determined will to contribute to the victory of civilization over the ruthless aggressors. It affects me personally because I recall that it was under my presidency, during the years 1923-27, that relations with the Soviet Union were established. Hence my total identification with the action just taken by the Government."

of Dr. Amezaga in the elections of November 29, 1942, sealed by the incontestable, overwhelming will of the people showed the solidarity of the Uruguayan spirit with the nations who fight the Axis. . . . Our officials, therefore, did nothing but express the mandate of the people. . . ."

What motives originated this decision of the Government of Uruguay?

"The impressive Soviet resistance to the Brown invasion moved the Uruguayan people. Apart from the substantial differences between the political regimes of Uruguay and Russia, the Uruguayan people admired the heroism, devotion, and will of the multitudes of the Soviet Union in the dramatic hour of decision and trial in the face of the barbarian enemy.

"Public opinion showed itself then in favor of renewing relations with the Soviet Republic. . . . Eminent citizens of the Republic headed the request to reestablish the interrupted relations. The present President of the Republic, Dr. Juan Jose Amezaga, during his electoral campaign did justice to the people of the USSR. On my side, as president of Committee for the Candidacy of Amezaga, also exalted the heroic endeavor of the Soviet nation.

"The wide and memorable triumph of the presidential candidacy

This is a clipping from page 2 of the Daily Worker for Aug. 26, 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Stalin Advised FDR of Reluctance to Attend Quebec Meeting But Offered to Come If Needed

Welles' Ouster May Thwart Future Conference With Soviet Premier

3

By I. F. Stone

(Copyright, 1943, by Field Publications)

WASHINGTON, Aug. 26.—Early last week Premier Stalin sent a message to President Roosevelt explaining, in the friendliest terms, why he preferred not to attend an Allied conference abroad but offering to do so if that was the President's wish.

Since that wire was sent, two events have occurred, one still a secret, the other about to be officially admitted:

¶ The secret is the decision reached at Quebec on whether to open a second front this year. The answer, a matter of the highest military importance, obviously can't be printed even if we were sure we knew.

¶ The other event, soon to be admitted publicly, is the ouster of Sumner Welles as Under Secretary of State by the President under pressure from a group Moscow regards as anti-Soviet.

May Alter Stand

These two events, which occurred since Stalin sent his message to Roosevelt, may have some effect on plans for a meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill.

The general impression is that Roosevelt has steadily favored a second front and still does, that Churchill and the British General Staff opposed one in 1942, and still may be reluctant to embark on full scale offensive action before the Spring of 1944. The American General Staff has been regarded recently as leaning toward the British point of view.

Speculation here is that the Russians would hardly have timed the announcement of Litvinov's retirement in a way certain to embarrass Roosevelt and Churchill if they felt certain of a second front this year.

No Mention

Attention has been called to the fact that the joint Roosevelt-Churchill communique at Quebec made no mention of a second front and from this some commentators are concluding that there will be a second front. They note that past promises of a second front were not fulfilled and conlude that this time there will be a second front because none is promised.

The true explanation may be less devious. It may be that no promise was made because the Russians are irritated by failure to eep past promises. It might have been believed that it was better to say nothing if Anglo-American leaders knew that, whatever happens in Europe, they did not feel able to initiate action this year on a scale large enough to satisfy the Russian effnitidon of a second front, which is an offensive big enough to draw off 50 divisions or more from the 200-odd facing the Russians on the Eastern front.

I am in a position to add a few details on the Stalin message to Roosevelt and also to throw some additional light on Stalin's attitude toward the post-war world.

On the message: I am told that Stalin explained that he hesitated to join in an Anglo-American conference at this time because the Russians had their hands full on the Eastern front and didn't wish to antagonize the Japanese. A Japanese attack on the Soviet Union at this time would jeopardize not only the Russians but the whole cause of the United Nations. That last sentence is my own interpretation. It may or may not reflect any explanation made by Stalin.

On Stalin's attitude toward the post-war world: One o fthe last reports made by Sumner Welles to Roosevelt was a report on a conversation the retiring Under Secretary had with Dr. Aurelio F. Concheso, the Cuban Ambassador, to the United States who recently had a long talk with Stalin in Moscow.

Concheso told Welles the first part of the conversation reflected Stalin's interest in Latin America. He asked the Cuban Ambassador many questions about conditions in that area.

Afterward, Concheso asked Stalin for some conception of the Soviet Union's attitude toward the post-war world. I have obtained only a single detail of that part of the conversation, but it is one which Welles thought highly important.

Stalin said that he felt that in order to raise the living standards of the Soviet peoples he had to bring them into the family of nations after the war.

In other words, as interpreted here by important officials, Stalin

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Josef Stalin

feels that a Communist, like a capitalist, nation benefits by the peaceful relations which make it possible to exchange its products for those of other nations.

It remains to be seen whether the successor of Welles in the State Dept. and the group which now comes to complete dominance in it will take advantage of that attitude to bring about closer relations with the Soviet, or continue policies and attitudes which may force Moscow to the conclusion that isolation would be safter, though a more costly in economic terms.

One more point:

Whatever the blindness of some of our diplomats, there is a whole section of big business men who understand what is reported here to be the Stalin point of view, who have no fear of the Red bogey, who see the Soviet Union as a vast market for American products after the war, and who are anxious to cultivate Russian good will as a matter of common sense and good business.

It is hard to get businessmen of this kind to express these views openly—for fear of the displeasure of the State Dept. and of some of the brass hats.

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WORKING CLASS UNITY

Costa Rica, Switzerland, And Chile—Model a Trend

By JOSEPH STAROBIN

THREE months have gone by since the Communist International dissolved itself, three months packed with some of the most fateful events of our time. The stream of history is moving quickly. It is rushing forward so quickly, in fact, that future generations may very well see this year as a great divide between two eras, a year in which humanity turned a new leaf.

One of the most significant things about 1943, the year when the Communist International passed into time, was the emergence of a unified working class political organization in several parts of the world. For the first time in an entire generation, the first time since the beginning of the first World War, unity was established in the political parties of the working class in several different countries.

Three small countries—Switzerland, Costa Rica and Chile—have pioneered this year in this important respect.

Swiss Workers Unite

Take Switzerland for example, the home of so many idealists and world-rebuilders of bygone times. Things had gotten badly Nicole, Edgar Woog and others were sentenced to prison terms, allegedly for "Communist propaganda."

In June of this year however, within a month after the CI's disappearance, the Communist and the Socialist Federation decided to get together. A short while later, the news came that the September conference of the Socialist Party would in all likelihood unite with all other Socialist groupings in one party of the working people.

It's an important event, arousing great enthusiasm among the ranks of all Swiss workers, and likely to have its influence in France, Italy, Yugoslavia and Austria when the war is over.

And then there is little Costa Rica, one of the most advanced of the Central American Republics, with a fine tradition of democratic life, under the genial leadership of its physician-president, Doctor Rafael Calderon Guardia.

In this country the Communists had for a long time been a leading force. Their general secretary, Manuel Mora was a member of the Senate, acknowledged on all sides as one of Costa Rica's most capable men.

Catholic Liberals

In the middle of June, came the news that the Communist Party had held a special convention, dissolved itself, given up its name, and formed a new organization, the Vanguardia Popular. This group was rapidly attracting all the progressive elements among the workers on the docks of San

In the middle of July, undoubtedly inspired by the CI's dissolution, discussions took place among the leaders of the Communist, Socialist, and Socialist Workers Party.

Proposals were agreed upon for the formation of a single party of working people. The issue is up for ratification at the Socialist Party Congress this week, and at the Confederation of Chilean Workers next week.

Senator Marmaduke Grove, the Socialist leader is strong for organic unity, as are a number of the leading trade unionists in the CTC, who take their inspiration from the Chilean Socialists and Communists.

Already we are told, the deputies of all three parties are working as one in the Chamber of Deputies. On the Communist paper, El Siglo, a major paper in the country, Socialists have already been given representation in the editorial board. Committees for organic unity have sprung up from the mine fields of Chile's far north to the docks of Valparaiso and the cattle-growing country.

Progressive History

Of course, Chile has long been in the vanguard of South American democracy, her Popular Front having been victorious in October, 1938, and her working class among the most advanced in the hemisphere.

Both the Socialists and Communists are factors in the coalition of democratic parties supporting the Radical president,

The great traditions of the working class of central Europe and western Europe will glow again. And no doubt, the example of Chile, Costa Rica, and Switzerland will make itself felt in France, Czechoslovakia, Norway and other lands.

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This is a clipping from page 6 of the Peoples World for Jun 25 1943
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NO BASIC CHANGE IN MOSCOW SEEN

Impending Czechoslavak Pact Held Evidence That Policy Remains the Same

OLD ALIGNMENT REVIVED

Treaty Will Restore Nucleus of a Collective-Security Ring Around Post-War Reich

BY PERTINAX

North American Newspaper Alliance.

Within two or three weeks, perhaps less, President Eduard Benes of the Czechoslovak Government in Exile will go to Moscow and sign a treaty that is expected to approximate the Anglo-Russian twenty-year alliance of May 26, 1942. It means that Czechoslovakia follows in the steps of Russia and Great Britain, that she is ready to assume obligations directed against Germany and Germany's satellites in the war.

Under the treaty not only does the Czechoslovak Government reassert its pledge (embodied in the pact of the United Nations) not to negotiate or conclude an armistice and peace except by common consent, but it also stands committed, after the war, "to take all measures to render impossible the repetition of aggression and violation of peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her" and "to work for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe."

In short, Chechoslovakia agrees to resume, by the side of Russia and Britain, the part that devolved on her in the French system of security—the system that went to pieces in September, 1938, in Munich.

Timing Held Significant

The moment selected for the signing of the treaty is of special significance. The Russian demand for a "second front" in western Europe is still unsatisfied and the fear has been expressed in the capitals of the United Nations that the grievance that it fosters may, in the long run, bring about the adoption of an independent policy toward Germany. But if the Russians meant to attune their course of action to the "Free Germany" committee's manifesto recently published, they would hardly choose the present time to lay down or to strengthen with Czechoslovakia the foundations of what promises to be a rigorous control of all German initiatives in the Europe of tomorrow. From the impending treaty the inference may be drawn that, for the present, no deep change of policy is being considerd in Mosew.

The draft of the Russian-Czechoslovak treaty was prepared months ago and President Benes visited Washington last May to make sure that, on behalf of America, no objection would be raised against it. But, surprisingly enough, the British Government advised Dr. Benes early in June to postpone the journey to Moscow and the formal conclusion of the treaty.

Oral Agreement Cited

To justify its interference, the Foreign Office mentioned an oral arrangement whereby both the British and the Russians agreed not to make any treaty with Governments whose territories are now under German occupation except after previous consultation and accord. British diplomacy wanted to gain time for the purpose of bringing in the Polish Government.

The Russians took strong exceptions to the interpretation placed by the Foreign Office on the oral arrangement, and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden gave way in the end. Poland will be left out.

This is a clipping from page 5 of the New York Times for Aug. 25, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Joint Quebec Statement

By The United Press.

QUEBEC, Aug. 24—The text of a joint statement made today by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill follows:

The Anglo-American war conference which opened at Quebec on Aug. 11 under the hospitable auspices of the Canadian Government has now concluded its work.

The whole field of world operations has been surveyed in the light of the many gratifying events which have taken place since the meeting of the President and the Prime Minister in Washington at the end of May and the necessary decisions have been taken to provide for the forward actions of the Fleet, Army and Air Forces of the two nations.

Considering that these forces are intermingled in continuous action against the enemy in several quarters of the globe, it is indispensable that entire unity of aim and method should be maintained at the summit of the war direction.

Further conferences will be needed, probably at shorter intervals than before, as the war effort of the United States and the British Commonwealth and Empire against the enemy spreads and deepens.

It would not be helpful to the fighting troops to make any announcements of the decisions which have been reached. These can only emerge in action.

It may, however, be stated that the military discussions of the Chiefs of Staff turned very largely upon the war against Japan and the bringing of effective aid to China. Mr. T. V. Soong, representing the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, was a party to the discussions. In this field, as in the European, the President and the Prime Minister were able to receive and approve the unanimous recommendations of the combined Chiefs of Staff. Agreement was also reached upon the political issues underlying or arising out of the military operations.

It was resolved to hold another conference before the end of the year between the British and American authorities, in addition to any tripartite meeting which it may be possible to arrange with Soviet Russia. Full reports of the decisions so far as they affect the war against Germany and Italy will be furnished to the Soviet Government.

Consideration has been given during the conference to the question of relations with the French Committee of Liberation, and it is understood that an announcement by a number of governments will be made in the latter part of the week.

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Times for Aug. 25, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

TREATMENT PLEASES PRISONERS IN RUSSIA

Many Praise Population and Communism as Well

By Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

ANKARA, Turkey, Aug. 23 (Delayed)—Many postcards have recently been sent from Russia by captured Germans and Italians expressing satisfaction with their treatment by the Red Army and in many cases praising the friendliness of the Russian population and concluding that communism had been misjudged by the Axis.

These messages have been cleared through Turkey by the German and Italian Embassies. Most of the recent German messages have been sent by officers—frequently bearing high rank and aristocratic names—and most of the Italian cards by privates and non-commissioned officers. Among one batch of messages was one sent by Field Marshal Gen. Friedrich von Paulus. He expressed satisfaction with his treatment. This is reported to have enraged Franz von Papen, the German Ambassador here.

Generally speaking, the Italian messages have been of a rather enthusiastic nature, describing in high terms both the Russian people and communism. It is known that war prisoners are permitted to read such orthodox works of dogma as those of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.

What the German and Italian authorities are doing with these messages is not known, but it is definitely known that they are disturbed by them.

This is a clipping from page 3 of the New York Times for Aug. 25, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

WHAT IS BEHIND THE EAST EUROPEAN FEDERATION SCHEME?

This article is reprinted from the new Moscow periodical called WAR AND THE WORKING CLASS, *issued twice monthly:*

In the two years of the Soviet people's heroic struggle against Hitlerite Germany there has been an immeasurable growth of the Soviet Union's authority in the international arena, and, above all, of its role in the camp of the United Nations. Every right-minded person understands that one of the leading roles in the organization of post-war Europe, and of the whole world, will belong to the USSR, the largest continental power, which in the course of war has displayed its state and military might.

Anti-democratic and semi-fascist elements, however, are striving to prevent the participation of the USSR in the organization of the post-war world, setting up the most fantastic plans in this direction, plans obviously hostile to the Soviet Union . . .

These groups are doing everything they can to stir up troubled waters, playing into the hands of Hitler and his associates, helping to split the camp of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. They have developed feverish activity, circulating such worn-out bogeys as the threat of "Bolshevization," inventing and placing before their readers dozens of plans for the reconstruction of Europe hostile to the USSR.

There are quite a few such plans, starting with the plan for the creation of a United States of Europe, Pan-Europe, and ending with the plan for creating a Europe divided into various federations, confederations and regional blocs of states . . .

An attentive scrutiny of these plans immediately and completely gives away the imperialistic intent of the Polish gentry, though they try to conceal them by verbiage about the security of the Central European States, about the political balance in Europe, and about securing a long and stable peace . . .

The authors of the plans for the establishment of an East European Federation bring forward the necessity of securing a European balance, and say that to this end the small and medium East European States should form a bloc of States comprising a population of 100 to 125 millions.

But their plans are obviously built on shifting sands. Can the circumstance be ignored that the East European Federation is to be the political union of democratic Czechoslovakia and feudal Hungary, republican Poland and monarchical Rumania? Is it possible to count on the stability of such a politically heterogeneous federation?

Or take the question of internal relations within a "European Federation." Who is not aware of the irreconcilable territorial antagonisms between Hungary and Rumania over the question of Transylvania, and also the differences about the Teschen region, on which the Polish and Czechoslovakian governments have been unable to reach any agreement whatsoever for several years past? Who can believe that such a rickety and clearly unstable federation could satisfy the strivings of the peoples of these countries for their security and for their common defense?

It is not hard to see that the plans of this federation, to be ostensibly formed for combating possible aggression by Germany in the future are, and by no means least of all, leveled against the Soviet Union.

The defenders of the idea of an East European Federation . . . say, without mincing matters, that in the plans for forming a Federation between the Baltic and the Black Sea, it is a matter of security from outside aggression, from both the west and the east, that is, both by Germany and, they allege, by the Soviet Union.

Just the same attitude to the west, in other words to Germany, is being propagated as to the east, in other words to the Soviet Union, which, as is recognized by honest people the world over, is heading the struggle of liberation against the monstrous aggression of fascist Germany, not only in the interests of its own people, but in the interests of the liberation of those very countries to be included in this Federation, about which so much is being written at present, but which can never return to freedom and independence without the victory of the USSR over Germany.

That the project for an East European Federation is directed against the Soviet Union is also evident from the following fact. As is known, an agreement was concluded in 1940 between Czechoslovakia and Poland on the Polish-Czechoslovakian Confederation, which is to serve as a basis for an East European Federation.

But it is also known that in 1942, public figures of Czechoslovakia have declared more than once that the creation of the Polish-Czechoslovakian Confederation must be carried out in agreement with the Soviet Union, on which both Czechoslovakia and Poland border. President Benes has emphasized the necessity of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union on the question of the Polish-Czechoslovakian Confederation. He has repeatedly and persistently defended his view, but has not met with support from Polish public figures who are particularly rabid supporters of the idea of the Confederation.

It follows, then, that these Polish public figures by no means consider it necessary to settle these questions on the basis of friendly collaboration with the USSR. This cannot but be regarded as further proof of the fact that the above-mentioned Polish public

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figures are harboring their plans for a Confederation with by no means friendly intentions toward the Soviet Union.

It would seem easy to understand that in the planning of post-war Europe and in particular of European federations and confederations, it is impossible to lose sight of such an important historical fact as the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Post-War Collaboration in Europe. But how can one reconcile the recognition of the Anglo-Soviet treaty with the policy of struggle against a menace from the west and from the east?

How can one possibly reconcile support of this treaty aimed at securing collaboration and mutual aid between the USSR and Great Britain for the prevention of aggression on the part of Germany in the post-war period, with the task of establishing an East European Federation aimed both against aggressive Germany and against the Soviet Union, which in the future, as well, must be one of the decisive factors in the struggle against possible new aggression on the part of Germany?

Plans for the establishment of an East European Federation hostile to the Soviet Union can be built up, but only with the renunciation of the necessity for friendship and collaboration between the USSR and the Allies in the post-war period as the point of departure, only if the renunciation of the Anglo-Soviet treaty be considered.

Honest supporters of the Anglo-Soviet treaty cannot uphold post-war plans hostile to the Soviet Union and Great Britain, or hostile to even one of these countries.

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page ____ of the
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CHANNEL INVASION BEST, PRAVDA SAYS

British Isles Seen as Logical Springboard for U. S.-British Assault on Continent

SOVIET FEARS A LONG WAR

Attack Urged Before Germans Perfect Defenses—3-Party Parley Wins Favor

By ALEXANDER WERTH

By Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, Aug. 23—Pravda, the official Communist party organ, today publishes a long article on Great Britain's wartime economy. An impressive account is given of the progress of British armament production and the enormous accumulation of arms and soldiers in the United Kingdom.

Significantly, it speaks of the present "disproportion" between the stupendous Allied arms production and the present scale of the Anglo-American land fighting. This disparity naturally suggests the large-scale operations that the Allies are preparing, but the article goes on to say that the value of the gigantic Anglo-American arsenal in Britain lies precisely in the fact that Britain is, at the same time, the best springboard against Germany because the Channel is the shortest cut to the heart of Germany.

Supplying armies from Britain, the article continues, would take twenty times less shipping than operations elsewhere. Pravda concludes:

"A smashing blow against Germany is scarcely conceivable without the utilization of the enormous strategic advantages of the British Isles as the mighty arsenal and chief base for invading the Continent."

This article, while it will unquestionably impress the Russian public with the tremendous statistics of British arms production and with American shipping production—and few articles in the Russian press have given so exhaustive an account of the Allied war effort in these directions—does not fit into the general trend of Russian comments on Quebec and inter-Allied relations generally. The gist of all these articles is that only a "second front" that will divert substantial German forces—forty, fifty or sixty divisions—from the Russian front can help to finish the war quickly.

There is a growing eagerness for a three-power conference that would come soon after Quebec. The Russians are worried over the thought of a long war, which they say is precisely what Hitler wants. In a long war the Germans would have opportunities to strengthen their defense methods to such an extent—and recent battles have shown how formidable these defense methods are—that both the Allied and Russian advances would entail enormous sacrifices that would not be the case at present.

Regarding the French coastal defenses, some military observers here hold that although the task is great, confusion can be wrought among the German defenders by the type of bombings that Pantelleria and Messina suffered and by the extensive use of paratroops preliminary to the landing. In general, however, the technical problems involved in an Allied invasion of France have not been discussed much in the Russian press.

This is a clipping from page 4 of the New York Times for Aug. 24, 1942

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Still Unanswered . . .

Why Did the USSR Replace Litvinov?

By I. F. Stone
PM's Bureau

WASHINGTON, Aug. 24.—The only solid, simple, ascertainable FACT to be obtained here today about Litvinov's retirement as Ambassador to the U. S. A., is that his successor's name was submitted to the State Dept. in advance in accordance with normal diplomatic procedure.

How long in advance cannot be learned, but it is clear that some time before the Moscow announcement the State Dept. knew that Litvinov would not return and that Andrei A. Gromyko, formerly *charge d'affaires* at the Soviet Embassy, would be the new ambassador.

From here on, however, all there is to report is pure speculation, some by informed persons, some by folk who are just guessing, none of it official. For neither the State Dept. nor the Soviet Embassy is exactly chatty about *l'affaire* Litvinov.

In the realm of speculation, the most substantial observation is that though the diplomatic shift may have been known in advance to the State Dept., the timing of the announcement from Moscow was certainly calculated to arouse embarrassing questions in Britain and the U. S. A.

Timing Significant

It seems a fair conclusion that if Stalin only summoned Litvinov home because he wanted Litvinov's advice and companionship, the announcement would hardly have been timed as it was. For the timing—as the Russians well know—was bound to make the public in the Western democracies wonder whether the Soviets were peeved and what about.

The "what about" raises afresh all the old bones of contention between the U. S. and Britain on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other: The failure to open a second front, the unwillingness to grant what the Russians regard as their strategic frontiers, the omission of Soviet representation from the Government of the European territories we have reoccupied.

Remembering what followed the eclipse of Litvinov in 1939, the announcement was also bound to stimulate fears of a separate peace.

First in Berlin

The second front question is puzzling. Judging from "dope-stories" emanating from Washington, Quebec, and London, there seems to be a behind-scenes tug between two fears. One is that if a second front is opened, the Red Army will only be able to get to Berlin faster; the other is that if there is no second front, the Western Powers may find that the Red Army will get there anyway, and they will have even less to say about the future of Central and Eastern Europe.

There is also some talk, by those who take an optimistic view of Nazi power and think there will be continuous battle on the Eastern front for some time to come, that we ought to turn our attention East and defeat Japan while the Russians are defeating the Germans.

The bright idea, as expressed by some newspapers, is that if the Russians defeat the Germans before we defeat the Japs, the Russias will be in a position to demand a quid pro quo for turning to and helping us in the Far East.

In one source, well informed on international relations and fairly well informed on Soviet affairs, there was complete rejection of the idea that any separate peace was possible.

Soviet Program

The speculation in that quarter was that the Kremlin had given up the hope of getting any clear picture of Anglo-American policy toward the future of Europe and was recalling Maisky and Litvinov in order to work out a Soviet program.

In that perspective, the formation of the Free German Committee in Moscow would only be the first step toward a general plan for post-war Europe in which Moscow would seek the leadership of the European peoples.

The formulation and publication of such a program might stimulate the formulation and publication of similar programs by Washington and London, which would have the virtue of bringing the whole post-war problem into the open where it could be discussed and a general agreement reached.

Or in the absence of a similar concrete plan by the United States and Britain, or of a plan progressive enough to be brought into the open, the consequences might only be to widen the rift between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers.

But all this, as I said before, is speculation.

This is a clipping from page 7 of P M

for Aug. 24, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government

Litvinoff's Withdrawal:

Some Comments

(Daily Worker Foreign Department)

Withdrawal of the Soviet Vice-Commissar Maxim Litvinoff as Soviet ambassador to the United States provoked a number of scattered reactions from newspapers and commentators over the week-end, but it was too early to form any real judgment of how this latest development was received throughout the United Nations world.

One thing was clear, however, from the editorial of the N. Y. **Herald Tribune**, the New York Times columnist Anne O'Hare McCormick and isolated radio comments: **everybody saw that Litvinoff's withdrawal from his Washington post, is related to the chief military-political problem of the war, the second front.**

There were no official reactions in Washington or London, as of Monday afternoon. But a number of stories from Washington and Quebec went heavily for the theme that whatever else the Soviet move meant, it did not mean a separate peace by the USSR.

MAXIM LITVINOV

Many commentators toyed with the fact that Litvinoff had been withdrawn from the Soviet Foreign Office in May 1939—prior to the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty—but no newspaper writer or commentator had the nerve to suggest that a Soviet-German peace was in the making.

Mark Sullivan in the N. Y. **Herald Tribune** and his counterpart in the **Times**, Anne O'Hare McCormick, dealt generously in question marks, the old baloney about Soviet policy being an enigma, a riddle, et cetera.

U. S. POLICY CRITICIZED

But the **Tribune's** editorial saw the point "**in matters of diplomatic politeness this country is in no position to take a self-righteous attitude.**"

The **Tribune** eleborated on the disagreeable impression that it said must have been created in Moscow by a whole series of recent diplomatic developments.

While not citing the problem of the second front, the **Tribune** stressed the insult to the Soviet ambassador Dmitri Bogomolov, in connection with the French Committee of National Liberation, as one of the episodes underlying the Soviet attitude.

"**This shift in Mr. Litvinoff's duties,**" said the **Tribune**, "**would be a minor matter if the United**

This is a clipping from page 2 of the Daily Worker for Aug. 24, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

ANDREI A. GROMYKO

States government had a firm grasp of its own intentions and had made them intelligible before the world."

PM devoted some five pages to Soviet-American relations, with its editorial declaring that "in our relationship with Russia we have strayed far down the wrong path and . . . the time has come when we must take stock of our direction before we are lost, forever and irretrievably."

PM said a "full-scale second front is beyond doubt the keystone to any full Anglo-American-Russian accord."

Citing the "persistent anti-Soviet aura" in the American press and semi-official circles, PM said it was this aura "that may be giving the Soviet Union the conviction that it is we who do not want to fight a collective peace."

CITE OUR DELAYS

Samuel Grafton, N. Y. Post columnist, agreed in his Sunday night WOR program that Litvinoff's replacement does not necessarily indicate a change in Soviet foreign policy at present, but declared "we ought to know that by this time that the Russians might take disappointment for a certain time but they will not take it forever . . ."

William S. Gallmor, on WHN Sunday night likewise stressed the Soviet Union's fight-to-the-finish attitude, but paraphrased the Soviet government as saying: "So long as our prime demand for a second front has been relegated to a second place on the agenda of the Anglo-American councils of war, there is no reason for Soviet Russia to have her prime diplomats in the U. S. and British capitals."

Gallmor said the two steps which can resolve the crisis are "the immediate opening of a second front which will put the Anglo-American bargaining power on the battle-level of Soviet Russia" and an immediate date for a three-power conference.

Larry Lesueur over WABC reported London observers as believing that Litvinoff's removal means that no immediate second front is planned at Quebec.

The USSR has been kept informed of the Quebec conferences, he said, and therefore Litvinoff's removal means that the USSR disapproved of the Quebec results.

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Replacement of Litvinov Spotlights Deteriorating Relations With Russia

Appointment of New Ambassador To U. S. Takes Quebec Conference by Surprise

Russia's recall of Maxim Litvinov from Washington and Ivan Maisky from London, ambassadors to the Soviet's two chief allies, is only the latest evidence of strain in the U. S.-British relations with Moscow.

There has been no official explanation why the Soviet Union took the step at this critical moment of the war. But these points are apparent:

¶ Litvinov's replacement followed swiftly that of Moscow's Ambassador to London.

¶ Russia is leaving the next step up to Washington and London—and, perhaps, Quebec.

All that has been announced of the change in envoys to Washington is that Litvinov, who has been in Moscow since May, will not return and will be succeeded by Andrei Gromyko who has been *charge d'affairs* of the embassy.

But the announcement, at the moment of the Quebec conference and on the heels of Russian clamor for a second front on continental Europe which will pull major Nazi forces from the Eastern front, has opened a flood of speculation.

The Axis is watching the new signs of rift within the United Nations coalition as eagerly and as hopefully as the Allies watch it anxiously.

Radio Berlin, although acknowledging that the three powers are pledged to a finish fight against Nazism, declared that they had failed to coordinate strategy and a "latent row" had become acute over the lack of a second front.

Rome Radio, with no authority whatever to support it, announced that "an ultimatum" had been sent by Stalin that unless the Allies opened a second front "the Soviets would consider themselves released from all engagements toward Britain and the United States."

That, of course, is pure Axis propaganda.

The announcement that Litvinov has been replaced was a surprise to the FDR-Churchill conference at Quebec.

Alexander Uhl, PM's Foreign Editor, now in Quebec, reports:

"As late as a week or so ago Washington was under the impression that Litvinov would be returning to his post shortly . . . officials here want to wait a while before forming any judgment as to the real meaning of the Moscow action.

"Obviously the first thought that popped into everyone's mind was that the last time Litvinov lost his job it was because Stalin had lost faith in Litvinov's hopes for international collaboration against the aggressor nations. The German-Soviet Agreement which Hitler shattered in 1941 was the result.

"Nobody here believes that the present Moscow action presages any such drastic change in Russian policy, but until there is clear-cut news to the contrary, it can only be regarded as a sign of Moscow's disappointment with the results that Litvinov has been able to achieve in Washington.

"Russian second front demands have been growing heavier in the past few weeks and it may well be that the plans formulated at Quebec, extensive as they are, still do not come up to Russian expectations.

"That Litvinov is being retained in Moscow to work on postwar planning is always possible, of course, but somehow this does not quite ring true, given the still coolish relations between Moscow and London-Washington."

Andrei Gromyko
He Replaces Litvinov

This is a clipping from page 6 of P M

for Aug. 23, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government

More Omens of Russian Post-War Policy

14

By ANNE O'HARE McCORMICK

Because Soviet policy is deduced from signs and portents rather than disclosed in such conferences as the meeting being held in Quebec, the announcement that Mr. Litvinoff will be replaced by one of his subordinates as Ambassador to the United States will stir up a good many questions.

Does the withdrawal of Litvinoff from Washington, following that of Ambassador Maisky from London, indicate that in spite of the formal alliance with Great Britain, Russia intends to treat her fighting partners alike? Is it timed to notify the Allied leaders at Quebec that Moscow is still dissatisfied with their war effort? Is it a further sign that Stalin means to follow his own line? Or does he wish to have at hand, as the political problems in Europe become urgent, the two diplomats who know most about America and Britain? It is noteworthy that neither receives a new assignment, and both retain their titles as Vice Commissars of Foreign Affairs.

Washington—and no doubt London also—would like to believe the last explanation. But nobody in the capital pretends to know what the decision means. Moscow minimizes its importance by printing it as a brief news item on the back pages of the newspapers, and American reporters in Russia follow the Government lead by saying that no change of policy is involved. But our official observers, convinced that Stalin makes no idle gestures, are anxious to know whether it confirms a policy of aloofness of which there are already too many signs.

It happens that Mr. Litvinoff, more than Maisky or any other representative of the USSR, has become a kind of weathervane of Soviet policy. When the winds blow westward, when Russia pursues a course of collaboration with the western powers, he is in the foreground. He was the Soviet spokesman in Geneva, and a great force in the League. He was Commissar of Foreign Affairs in the years before the war. His appointment to Washington in 1941 was interpreted as a sign that Russia desired closer relations with the United States.

When the wind changes he is retired to the background, as he was just before the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact, which represented the negation of his policy. It is natural, therefore, that his recall now should cause political weather prophets to wonder whether the wind is changing again.

His presence here, it should be noted, was mostly symbolic. This is more and more the role of Ambassadors as heads of Governments bypass their diplomatic representatives to communicate directly or by special envoy. So far there has been no personal contact between Roosevelt and Stalin, and little fruit from the special missions to Moscow. Yet Litvinoff was not on that account a more active liaison officer. He was extremely popular at a time when Russia was never more popular among Americans, but with all his skill, ability and good-will he was unable to establish the relations he hoped for between his Government and ours.

He was a symbol, and his recall is symbolic. Of what? On the central question of Russia's attitude toward a German move for a separate peace it shall be said at once that there is not the slightest doubt in the highest quarters, here or in England. The "Free Germany" manifesto and other signs that Stalin's approach to the peace is different from ours are not taken as warnings that he might come to terms with Germany. The Free Germany movement may be a reply to "Amgot." It may be a protest against the tendency to set up exclusively Anglo-American controls in North Africa and Italy. But Allied political and military leaders are basing all their plans on the firm conviction that the Soviet Union will be in the war to the finish.

Litvinoff's recall is further evidence that there is no such assurance regarding the answers to the political questions. If the "Free Germany" manifesto is not a bid for German surrender on Russia's terms, it is certainly an indication that the Moscow idea of a defeated Germany is not the same as ours. The same is true of other Soviet-sponsored "free" movements — Polish, Yugoslav, Italian; the characteristic of all is that they call at the same time for revolution and, even in Germany, for the retention of armed force. The inference is that Russia shares the general fear of European anarchy, and wants something to keep the revolution in bounds, but unlike the Allies, who are determined to disarm their enemies completely, she desires some force besides her own to maintain order.

Russia

Russia is none the less determined to have a stronger army than ever. This is evident in the decree issued yesterday to put into effect at once a thoroughgoing scheme for the reconstruction of the territory recovered from the Germans. There are many interesting implications in this plan in addition to the confidence it expresses that the Nazis are out of these regions for good. It proves that the Russians are most of all intent on building up their own country. The provision for nine "closed" or private schools of the type of the old Cadet schools for training a military élite forecasts more than a new military caste. To the demonstration now being made by the Red Army it adds a clear intimation that post-war Russia will be the greatest military power on the Continent. Whether she will play a lone hand depends in great part on whether she can be induced to join in the four-power agreement debated in Quebec. But every move she makes is meant to give notice that she intends to be ready to play it.

This is a clipping from page 14 of the New York Times for Aug. 23, 1943
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Litvinov and the Issue at Quebec

By James S. Allen

The substitution of Maisky and Litvinov as Soviet Ambassadors to London and Washington serves to emphasize the decisive question before the Anglo-American Conference at Quebec.

Here are gathered most of the key cabinet members and military leaders of Britain and the United States. Together with the Prime Minister and the President they must give a decision on the second front and the strengthening of collaboration with the Soviet Union, the central and most pressing questions of the war.

The Soviet diplomatic shifts do not come as a surprise. But they do underscore the insistence of the Soviet Union that the job of smashing Hitler Germany this year be taken firmly in hand by all the powers of the anti-Hitler Coalition.

The main problem of Quebec is no mystery. The Anglo-American Conference is confronted with the imperative need to open the second front in Europe.

The question is: will Quebec be known as the conference of victory or as the conference of indecision?

It is strange but true that it is the leading power not represented at Quebec, the Soviet Union, whose position is clear and unequivocal.

About the stand of the Anglo-American leaders on the second front there is as yet only speculation and rumor.

And we stand at that point in the war when it is within our power, acting jointly with our allies, to determine whether we shall finish Hitler Germany off quickly, even this year, or whether we are going to protract the war in Europe.

(Continued on Page 8)

This is a clipping from page 1 of the Daily Worker for Aug. 23, 1943
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(Continued from Page 1)

During the past days the Soviet views have been placed bluntly and simply.

Clearing the air of the vast amount of speculation as to the reasons for Soviet non-participation at Quebec, Tass, official Soviet news agency, declared that Stalin had not been invited and that the nature of the conference precluded the participation of the USSR.

The kind of a conference in which the Soviet Union could and would participate was then defined by the Soviet labor magazine, War and the Working Class.

It suggested that the three leading powers of the anti-Hitler Coalition should meet with the objective of deciding the main and central question: how to shorten the war and prevent its unnecessary protraction.

* * *

EVIDENTLY, the Soviet labor periodical thinks that once all the leaders of the anti-Hitler Coalition accept as their aim speeding victory against Hitler Germany and agree to get together to discuss how it can be done the problem will be solved satisfactorily.

Obviously, the main deterrent to the solution of the problem of the second front is lack of agreement on how long the war in Europe should last.

That the problem can be put this way shows that we are in a position to save many American lives, rescue millions of Europeans from misery and death and assure the collaboration necessary for the post-war.

* * *

By our deeds we can bring the war in Europe to an end speedily and assure more rapid victory over Japan. Everything depends upon common military action in accordance with a unified strategy.

The common action which will bring Hitler Germany to its knees before this year is out can be decided upon and planned by an Anglo-American-Soviet Conference. **Evidently, such action cannot be the immediate product of a conference which represent the views of Britain and the United States, especially when differences between them on a number of important questions impede the common understanding among all the powers of the anti-Hitler Coalition.**

EVENTS of the past weeks underscore the problem of time and speed. A special Soviet communique has just revealed that the Germans have lost 1,000,000 men killed or wounded in the last six weeks after July 5, when the Germans launched their abortive offensive on the Eastern Front.

This means that almost one-third of the German soldiers on the Soviet Front have been eliminated from combat by the relentless and purposeful action of the Red Army, which did not let a single opportunity slip by unused.

That is the kind of action which results from the determination to smash Hitler's army as soon as possible.

As a result of the brilliant Anglo-American - Canadian landing in Sicily, timed with the Soviet summer offensive, Mussolini was deposed in Italy and new and unexpected opportunities arose to take Italy out of the war.

It is already four weeks since the fall of Mussolini and there has not yet taken place the kind of military blow at Italy or elsewhere required to speed up and complete the rupture of the Berlin-Rome Axis.

Clearly, it is imperative that Quebec should revise drastically the whole Anglo-American time-table, in accordance with the real and unquestioned immediate possibilities for speeding up the defeat of the enemy in Europe by coordinated blows from the East and the West.

Among the chief influences which stand in the way of agreement on the second front is distrust and fear of the Soviet Union and the people's forces at home and in Europe.

The revelation in War and the Working class that a Soviet representative had been prevented by American authorities from contacting the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers shows the extent to which these anti-Soviet influence have penetrated.

And it was also recently revealed in the Soviet press that British authorities were delaying President Benes of Czechoslovakia, who had been invited to come to Moscow to sign a 20-Year Alliance along the lines of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty.

Naturally, the shifting of Maisky and Litvinov from their posts at London and Washington is not unrelated to the central question of the war and Soviet dissatisfaction with Anglo-American policy.

There is also a great deal of malicious speculation about the relation of the second front to the war in the Pacific. Some circles are working especially hard to create the impression that a large-scale offensive in Europe would interfere with the defeat of Japan.

No contradiction exists between stepping up the offensive in the Pacific area and launching the two-front war in Europe. The easy fall of Kiska and the Japanese retreat in the New Guinea area indicate that we have in the Pacific Front sufficient forces to press the advantages we have already won.

It is not necessary to move a single man or plane from the general European area for new offensives directed at Burma and in the South and North Pacific.

Nor is it necessary to move the forces we already have in the Pacific to supplement the great accumulation of men and material gathered on the British Isles, in Sicily, North Africa and the Middle East for the invasion of Europe.

And it is also made clear by Soviet comment that the pressing of the war in the Pacific Area need in no way interfere with an Anglo-Soviet American conference devoted to the task of speeding up the two-front war against Hitler Germany.

Today people can be in favor of protracting the war only for political reasons, which bode no good for the people and the future.

And in the field of politics, especially during war time, the people have every right and the duty to speak out clearly.

Certainly, the people are not the ones to be paralyzed by the prospect of speedy victory and the crumbling of the whole fascist structure. **The people want the war to be over as soon as possible, with the least amount of sacrifice and suffering.**

All that is required is that we have finished with the anti-Soviet attitudes and influences which prevent our country from making the decisive step towards speedy victory and collaboration with the Soviet Union.

Certainly, the people can find the few and simple words which are needed to speed the deed.

THE FUND DRIVE

This column is offering the following prizes in the competitive drive to raise funds for the Daily Worker:

For the largest contribution until Labor Day, the first issue of the People's War, organ of the Indian Communists; for the second largest donation, the first issue of the London Daily Worker; for every $5 donation, a copy of the London Daily Worker.

These are invaluable mementos of the people's war. You will want to preserve them in a library, frame them for your organization's headquarters, or keep them as family heirlooms.

We hope to make the first announcement in the next column on Thursday. Better get busy.

Soviets Replace Litvinov As Envoy

LONDON, Aug. 22 (UP).—Maxim M. Litvinoff, who negotiated U. S. recognition of the Soviet regime 10 years ago, has been relieved of his duties as Soviet Ambassador to the United States after serving almost 22 months in that post, Moscow announced early today.

The brief announcement broadcast by the Moscow radio said that Andrei A. Gromyko, counselor and charge d'affaires of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, had been appointed by the Presidium of the Supreme Council to succeed Litvinoff.

There was no immediate explanation of the change.

The announcement referred to him as "vice commissar of foreign affairs."

Litvinoff was appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States on Nov. 6, 1941, a short time after the German army had started its abortive drive toward Moscow. He arrived in Washington on Dec. 7, a few hours before Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and was at luncheon with Joseph E. Davies, former American Ambassador to the Soviet Government, when news of the attack was received.

Earlier this summer, he returned to Moscow.

The text of the Soviet announcement follows:

"The Supreme Soviet has relieved Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs M. M. Litvinoff of his duties as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the United States. The Presidium of the Supreme Council, USSR, has appointed Comrade Andrei A. Gromyko as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States."

At the time that Litvinoff left Washington last May 8, it was rumored in Washington that he might not return.

It was thought that there may

(Continued on Page 4)

This is a clipping from page 1 of the Daily Worker for Aug. 23 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Litvinov Is Replaced As Ambassador to U.S.

(Continued from Page 1)

have been some connection between the recent return to Moscow of Ivan Maisky, Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain, and his subsequent appointment as Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs on July 28.

DIPLOMATS NOT SURPRISED

MOSCOW, Aug. 22 (UP).—Diplomatic quarters believed today that one reason Maxim Litvinoff and Ivan Maisky were relieved of their duties as Soviet Ambassadors at Washington and Londo might be a desire by Premier Joseph Stalin to have his two foremost foreign affairs expert on hand for consultation and advice on peace and post-war settlements.

There was no surprise in diplomatic quarters when it was announced Saturday that Litvinoff would not return to Washington and would be succeeded by Andrei A. Gromyko, counselor of the legation, who had served as counsel since Litvinoff's return to Moscow in May.

As soon as Maisky was relieved of his post, diplomats believed that Litvinoff also would be kept here. Both are Vice Foreign Commissars.

Since his release from the Kremlin hospital in June after undergoing treatment for two weeks, Litvinoff had been seen frequently at Spasso House, residence of the American Ambassador, Adm. William H. Standley.

CBS reported from Moscow that Standley had conferred Saturday night with Viacheslav M. Molotov, Russian Foreign Commissar.

LONDON IS WORRIED BY LITVINOFF SHIFT

3

First Reaction Was That It Pointed to Separate Peace Between Russia and Reich

INVASION BELIEVED ISSUE

German Broadcast Says Stalin Wants Action, Not Promises —Doubts Allied Split

LONDON, Aug. 22 (AP)—The removal of Maxim Litvinoff as Ambassador to Washington, following Ivan Maisky's withdrawal from London, caused fears that at the worst a breach may develop between Russia and her British and American allies.

At the best, the removal of Mr. Litvinoff was interpreted here as indicating that Premier Joseph Stalin was impatient with the pace of British-American military operations and was using changes in his diplomatic representation to stress impatience at the delay in the invasion of the European mainland.

Because the removal of Mr. Litvinoff concerns only the United States and Russia, official British sources declined to comment. The first reaction here was that it could foreshadow a separate peace between Moscow and Berlin, but there seemed to be scant acceptance of the idea that a separate peace was in the making.

If Mr. Litvinoff remains an important voice in the Soviet Foreign Office concern here will be lessened, but if he is sent into a complete eclipse, as he was during the Soviet Government's 1939-40 accord with Germany, it would deepen the fears of a major schism between the western democracies and the Russians.

The attitude of the Russians can vastly affect the course of the war in the Far East, and the military might of Soviet forces is the cornerstone of all hopes for a victorious peace ~~in Europe~~ by or before next Spring.

Benes to Go to Moscow

It was announced in London that Dr. Eduard Benes, provisional president of the Czechoslovak Government, would leave shortly for Moscow to conclude a Soviet-Czech treaty of alliance similar to the 1935 pact between Moscow and Prague which was ended by the Munich agreement of 1938.

The new pact, it was reported, will provide Soviet guarantees for the integrity of Czechslovakia, and one clause implies a common land frontier, meaning recognition of the 1940 frontiers of Russia in Poland. The Russians will support a return to Czechoslovakia of Teschen, annexed by Poland after Munich, it was reported.

Dr. Benes's trip to Moscow has been delayed because the Polish Government objected to the treaty he was going to sign, and the British Government has adopted the attitude that Dr. Benes should do nothing affecting frontier problems now.

Questions are to be submitted to the House of oCmmons when it reassembles regarding reports that the Government sought to prevent Dr. Benes's trip because of Poland's anxiety.

The separate peace idea receives scant acceptance because the British-Soviet treaty bars such a step and because Premier tSalin presumably is convinced that someone must smash Germany if the Soviet is to exist. He presumably believes that if Russia withdrew from the war and the Western powers failed to carry through the job of beating Germany, the Red Army again would have to take up the task without allies. And if the democracies won in the face of a Russian wtihdrawal, he would have forfeited all chance for friendship and cooperation with them.

Some such idea seemed to be the German reaction. A Berlin broadcast, while gloating that "the latent row in the Allied camp thus again has become acute," declared "this domestic row makes neither Roosevelt, Churchill nor Stalin any less hostile toward National Socialism and they are now, as before, agreed that it must be fought to the end."

The Berlin radio summed it up thus: "Stalin does not want promises but action."

The Reuters correspondent in Moscow also reported that the diplomatic shifts "imply no change whatever in the policy of the Soviet Union or its relations with its Western Allies."

One obvious interpretation was that the Quebec conference of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill has not brought forth a program promising a full-scale invasion of ~~western~~ Europe before the snow flies.

Lists Fears on Both Sides

"Liberator," writing in the Sunday Observer, discussed the underlying political differences between Russia and her Allies. Calling for unity he wrote:

"It is feared by some in Britain and America that if the western Allies launch an attack on the continent from North Cape to the Bay of Biscay, it may be a holding matter rather than a triumphant sweep which would hurl the German defenders all the way from the coast to Berlin.

"The results, they imagine, would be enormous (and also perplexing) if the Russians, relieved of one-third of the German forces now involved in a desperate eastern grapple, marched into the eastern reaches of the Balkans and possibly even into Germany and presented the Anglo-Saxon democracies with a fait accompli of Russian dominion over a large part of Europe. This fear, let it be said at once, is without justification but it is present in the minds of many.

"To the Russians, the prospect of an eastern European bloc under Anglo-American influence is as frightening as is a Communist Europe to most conservatives. Russia sees in so many European discussions from which she is excluded—often according to her own choice—evidence of a policy which seeks to keep her out of Europe.

"In the same way she envisages in the strife that has broken out between Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communists an attempt of ~~American~~ imperialism to gain a foot in the Far East."

This is a clipping from page 5 of the New York Times for aug. 23, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

In connection with the new military schools, Anne O'hara Mc Cormick has stated;

"The provision for nine "closed" or private schools 'of the type of the old Cadet schools' for training a military elite forecasts more than a new military caste. To the demonstration now being made by the Red Army it adds a clear intimation that postwar Russia will be the greatest military power on the Continent."

New York Times, August 23, 1943, p. 14.

In connection with the development of the new military academies, the Suvoroff Military Schools, it should be noted that Klementi Voroshilov, People's Commissar of Defense of the U.S.S.R. addressing the 18th Congress of the C.P.S.U. on March 13, 1939, indicated the Red Army was already well equipped in this respect, stating, "... the Red Army has fourteen military academies and six military faculties in civil universities which together accommodate well over twenty thousand commanders, political workers, engineers, surgeons and others." (Communist International, Special Number, 1939, Vol XIV, p. 587)

Russia to Rebuild Ravaged Lands; Program Goes Into Effect at Once

Reconquered Territories Will Be Restored to Self-Sufficiency—Schools, Homes, Farms, Railways Come First

4

By ALEXANDER WERTH

By Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, Aug. 22—The entire Russian press today presents a remarkable appearance. More than three-quarters of every paper is taken up with the text of a vast program of reconstruction drawn up by the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist party. It covers a wide field and is not in any sense theoretical, because in most cases precise time limits are indicated.

The greater part of the program relates to the short-term emergency reconstruction of liberated areas. Some parts look far ahead. This is particularly true of the educational innovations, such as the establishment of nine "Suvoross Military Schools" in which boys from 8 to 17 will train to become officers. They are boarding schools of the same type as the cadet corps boarding schools that existed before the revolution. These boarding schools for future officers will be opened, for the present, in liberated areas. Although their exact status will not be known until Oct. 1, the indications are that sons of Red Army officers and soldiers will receive priority of admission. The youths in these boarding schools will be maintained at the state's expense.

The rest of the program relates to a great variety of measures for the reconstruction of liberated areas. Significant of the complete Russian confidence that the era of big German offensives is over is Section No. 1 of the program, which orders all cattle that had been evacuated during the Russian retreat to be returned to the collective farms of the northern liberated regions by Oct. 1 and to the southern liberated areas by Oct. 15. During the month preceding these dates thousands of cattle, sheep, goats and horses will be moving westward along the Russian countryside—to be precise, about 200,000 cattle, 350,000 sheep and goats, and 55,000 horses will be "going home."

Migration Carefully Mapped

It is not a simple operation, and all government departments and local authorities have been ordered to take all necessary measures to make this livestock migration successful. For example, the exact routes must be decided in advance. Fodder must be prepared along the routes and the herds must be accompanied by an adequate number of dairymaids. The army will lend for two months the necessary number of veterinary surgeons to accompany the herds.

Other sections of the vast reconstruction program relate to the future increase in the numbers of cattle—a particularly acute problem in the Soviet Union—the reconstruction of poultry farms, exemptions from deliveries of foodstuffs to the state in case the farms are in process of reconstruction and the supplying by the state of seeds to farms in the liberated areas for autumn sowing.

An elaborate program for the gradual reconstruction of tractor stations in the new area with complete details for the accumulation of gasoline and supplies for them is also set out. The plan highlights the amazing energy and determination of the Russian people to rebuild their agricultural economy without the loss of any time.

The next major section in the government program relates to the rapid restoration of railways and railway stations. Temporary stations and other emergency railway buildings must be erected before Jan. 1, 1944, as well as barracks for all railway workers lacking housing.

Self-Sufficiency Is Aim

The program lists the thousands and hundred thousands of square meters of living space that must be built before the end of the year. It indicates the exact number of railway and sapper troops to be employed in this work. Other labor will be mobilized from the local population.

Further, the program lays down the principle that all persons now living in dugouts or ruined houses should be entitled to appropriate accommodation. It instructs government departments and local authorities to carry out the necessary measures. These relate primarily to the reconstruction of brick, cement and glass works.

The general principle laid down for the reconstruction program is that transport facilities serving immediate war purposes must not be burdened and that, therefore, the bulk of the building materials must be found on the spot, making the greatest use of salvaged materials. The Forestry Commission, for instance, will decide what trees in the neighborhood may be cut.

The idea underlying the whole program is that liberated regions should be quickly put back on their feet and begin to produce, despite the enormous difficulties, rather than be a burden to the rest of the country, whose most vital task remains as the supplying of the Army.

This is a clipping from page 4 of the New York Times for Aug. 23, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

WASHINGTON CALM AT LITVINOFF EXIT

Informed Officials Discount Separate Peace Fears, See Second-Front Pressure

CITE HEAVY SOVIET LOSSES

Hold Stalin, a Realist, Would Put No More Trust in Junkers Than in Hitler

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22—Official Washington today apparently knew little more about the reasons for the removal of Maxim Litvinoff as Russian Ambassador to the United States than the average citizen who is interested in public affairs.

The speculation varied from the views of the few who are inclined to view any major diplomatic move of the Soviet with foreboding to that of those who saw Mr. Litvinoff's replacement as simply one more indication that Premier Joseph Stalin is playing a shrewd diplomatic game and that he is putting on the pressure in an effort to get a second front.

There are almost always rumors circulating in Washington that the communiqués about the fighting on the Eastern Front do not reveal all that is going on between the Russians and the Germans. There are always rumors around the Capital that there might be a separate peace between Russia and Germany.

Informed officials, however, apparently see no more reason to put credence now in these whispers that have proved unfounded in the past than at any other time since the Nazis struck at Russia.

Wanton Destruction Cited

All the circumstances, they say, including the tremendous loss of life suffered by the Soviet and the wanton destruction wreaked by the Germans upon the Russian population indicate that the Russians cannot think of the war's end until the power of Nazi Germany is crushed and crushed thoroughly. Whatever their views about communism, almost all informed Washington officials take the view that Premier Stalin is an able and patriotic leader and a realist. As such, they say, his reasons for insisting upon the downfall of Hitler and his followers are greater probably than those of Great Britain and the United States, great as these may be. Nor has there been any indication here that Premier Stalin would put any more trust in the German army leaders and Junkers than he would in the Hitler regime.

On the other hand, the dissatisfaction of Premier Stalin with the failure thus far of the United States and Great Britain to invade Europe proper is plain. This dissatisfaction and its manifestations, of which the relief of Mr. Litvinoff may be one, probably are bulking very lare in the conferences now in progress between the President and Mr. Churchill at Quebec.

Fight Is Admired

Whatever the feeling of the United States and Great Britain about Russia secretiveness with regard to military and other matters, however, there is profound admiration in this country and England for the magnificent fight put up by the Russian Armies. Both among officials and the peoples at large there is the friendliest feeling for the Russian people and a tolerance toward the Russian system that would not have seemed possible a few years ago.

There is, officials say, every disposition in this country and in Great Britain to get along with Russia and the realization that any lasting peace depends upon cooperation and understanding between the three countries. In view of Russian losses and the strong desire for peace she always has manifested in international relations, there is no disposition in official Washington to feel that this understanding and cooperation cannot be achieved, whatever the difficulties that must be overcome.

The news from Moscow and Berlin today heartened those who take the optimistic view of the Russian situation. From Moscow came word that some quarters there felt that one reason Mr. Litvinoff and Ivan Maisky, recently relieved as Russian Ambasador to Great Britain, might have been called back to Moscow was the desire by Premier Stalin to have his two foremost foreign affairs experts on hand for consultation and advice on peace and post-war settlements.

Allies in Moscow Not Worried

By Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, Aug. 22—It is officially announced that Maxim Litvinoff, now one of the vice Commisars of Foreign Affairs, will not return to Washington as Ambassador. The post in the United States was given to Andrei A. Gromyko, who is considered here to be a particularly able diplomat. The change is no longer considered in Allied or Soviet quarters here a sign of serious deterioration in inter-Allied relations but rather an indication that the Soviet Government attaches immense importance to these and wants the constant advice in Moscow of its two most experienced diplomats with intimate knowledge of the two principal Allied countries, Mr. Litvinoff and Ivan Maisky, who served as Ambassador to Britain.

This is a clipping from page 3 of the New York Times for Aug. 23 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Soviet Gains Role at Quebec By the Litvinoff Maneuver

By P. J. PHILIP

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

QUEBEC, Aug. 22—As has happened so often before, Russia, although absent, has maneuvered into a dominant position in the Quebec conference. The announcement last night of the removal of Maxim Litvinoff from his post as Ambassador to the United States was the key move in the intricate game in which, as experts here see it, the issue is whether the Russians or Washington and London are to control the destinies of Europe.

With the war still far from won, observers have noted there is a tendency among those preoccupied with the business in hand to consider this political aspect of the situation as secondary, something that can be attended to later on. This is especially the case, it is said, among those who have but of theory and good intention formulated a kind of mental blueprint of the future and incline to neglect the realities of other people's political and economic aspirations and ideas.

Moscow's Action Is a Jolt

To that attitude the direct action of the Moscow government has given, it is admitted here, a sudden and uncomfortable jolt. Just what is behind the replacement of Mr. Litvinoff has not been offered here officially. It has, of course, been in discussion for some time, but the fact that it was announced in the middle of this Anglo-American war council is considered as having very marked significance.

At the very least, it is said, it is a slap on the wrist for somebody and not necessarily for Mr. Litvinoff, who has survived more personal and political vicissitudes than any other living statesman with the possible exception of President Eduard Benes of Czechoslovakia. Again and again he has

Continued on Page Three

Continued From Page One

been a storm center in all Soviet international action ever since the last war.

At Rapallo in 1921 Mr. Litvinoff announced to the writer the signing of the German-Soviet treaty of Rapallo which broke up the Genoa conference and led to the defeat of David Lloyd George in Britain, the strengthening of the Poincaré regime in France and the occupation of the Ruhr. At Geneva, opposition to all efforts toward international cooperation and disarmament seemed to hasten as soon as Mr. Litvinoff rose to their support.

In the spring of 1939 his resignation from the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was followed by the Russian-German agreement, the occupation by Russia of the Baltic States and the division of Poland between Germany and Russia.

Now, Mr. Litvinoff's dramatic exit in the middle of this conference has marked another turning point, which some fear may be no less important than all those that have preceded it.

British and American sources here say the Moscow government has been kept fully informed of all that has been done and proposed here affecting Russian interests. It is claimed that there has been full collaboration and that the Russian attitude has been much more reserved than that of the other Allies.

The Moscow radio announcement that Russia had not been invited to the conference and the publicity given to the refusal of permission to Soviet representatives to visit Algiers to get in touch with the French Committee of National Liberation have perturbed those here who are hoping to get the war finished first and then tackle the political settlement.

French Committee Involved

In this intricate drama the status of the French committee continues to be a big issue. Washington reports that some forms of recognition may be expected during this conference have been unofficially contradicted here, but it is obvious that the last word has not been said. It is evident that the refusal of full recognition to the French committee has produced a strong inclination toward Russia support, which has seemed to get the approval of most if not all of the other European governments in exile who have already recognized the committee as a provisional government.

If that course of sympathies and events is allowed to continue unchecked, it could happen, it is admitted, that Russia would emerge from the war as the leader of continental Europe, to the detriment of American and British prestige.

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Times for Aug. 23 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS, MONDAY, AUGUST 23, 1943

Russian Enigma

By Raymond Clapper

NO MATTER how manfully Washington and London try to hide it, both capitals are uneasy about Russia's future course. They are left the more so by Stalin's strange timing in announcing Litvinoff's retirement as Ambassador to the United States.

Why did Stalin make the announcement just as the Quebec conference was at its climax? Litvinoff has been in Moscow on leave for two months. Did Stalin make the announcement at this time as a gesture of impatience with the Allies?

Litvinoff may not have had the confidence of Moscow, as has been suspected here for a long time. Still he has personified Russia's collaboration with the western world. He has come to be the weathervane of that collaboration. He was Russia's representative at Geneva until Moscow turned its back on the outside world and prepared to make a deal with Hitler. He came to America to negotiate recognition in 1933, and he was sent back here after Hitler's attack brought Russia into the war on our side.

Recently London was upset by the sudden withdrawal of Soviet Ambassador Maisky, who had served 11 years in Britain and was immensely popular. He was replaced by an obscure young Bolshevik as was Litvinoff here.

* * *

AS ISOLATED incidents neither of these diplomatic shifts would cause question. But in the context of events they provoke wonder as we try to understand our inscrutable Asiatic ally. Popular needling of Moscow Communism may occur in this country, but our Government and the British government and the British people know that Russia's co-operation is essential to both victory and real control over the peace.

Anglo-American solidarity is not enough. Regardless of our wishes, Russia's ambitions will determine the settlements in some areas, such as the Baltic states. Who will stop her? Nobody. Russia is taking credit for enormous German losses this summer, amounting to a million men or one-third of the estimated German forces on the Russian front. By emphasizing that, Russia establishes her privilege of taking independent action. In view of the giant's role Russia is playing in the war and the amount of blood she has paid, clamor for a second front is natural.

What disturbs us more is the uncertainty as to whether Russia will collaborate with the western nations or entrench in her heartland and reach out only as she wishes. Will Russia insist on going thru Iran to the Persian Gulf? American engineers have developed enormous port and transportation facilities for that route. The Soviets recently surprised the British by sending two regiments into the British zone without first requesting permission.

Finland still trembles to know what Moscow's wish is for her. Does Russia want a sphere of influence over Germany that would include Berlin? That question is discussed among continental exile governments in London. What about Japan? London thinks Russia will help with bases because Stalin will want to regain Port Arthur and other former Russian territory in the Pacific area. When Joseph E. Davies went to Moscow recently the Nazi press harped on the theme that we were trying to obtain Stalin's promise of bases for the war against Japan.

* * *

WE ARE not likely to have exactly the kind of world we want after this war. We might not even win the war if Russia should break off with a separate peace, which, however, does not make much sense from the Russian point of view, since Stalin wants to eliminate Hitler and the Nazis as much as we do.

Roosevelt and Churchill have ostentatiously tried to cultivate Stalin. They begged him to attend the Casablanca conference and would have gone anywhere to meet him. They undoubtedly wanted him to be represented in the Quebec discussions, but the Moscow press and radio have circulated haughty hints that Russia wasn't invited.

In November, 1942, on the 25th Soviet anniversary, Stalin said the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition was necessary to crush the common enemy. The coalition is equally necessary to preserve the peace.

WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
Aug. 23, 1943

FINNS URGE RYTI TO ACT FOR PEACE

50 Prominent Leaders Ask That Premier Linkomies Yield His Post to Paasikivi

FIRST MOVES REPORTED

Sweden Held Prepared to Aid Informally—Leaders Confer at Length in Helsinki

STOCKHOLM, Sweden, Aug. 21 (U.P.)—A new Finnish bid for peace appeared imminent today as press dispatches from Helsinki reported increasing pressure for a change in government that would take Finland out of the Axis camp.

A delegation representing various Finnish political groups called on President Risto Ryti yesterday to present a manifesto from fifty prominent Finns demanding definite action to explore the possibilities for a separate peace, the reports said. As an indication of rising public dissatisfaction with the government's war policies, the delegation was said to have proposed the removal of Premier Edwin Linkomies in favor of former Premier J. K. Passikivi, who conducted the peace negotiations with Russia in 1939.

The Finnish Parliament is scheduled to reconvene on Sept. 1, and observers believed that Mr. Paasikivi might be brought in at that time to form a new peace Cabinet. Meanwhile there were some indications that Finland was moving swiftly toward a separate peace without awaiting a change in government.

The Stockholm Allehanda reported that the Finns were already prepared to open peace negotiations through Sweden, although without the formal assistance of the Swedish Government. Advices from Helsinki revealed that Finland's military and diplomatic leaders had been conferring at length on the situation.

Finland's Minister to Berlin is known to be in Helsinki. Georg A. Gripenberg, Minister to Stockholm, who has just returned here after several days in the Finnish capital, is expected to leave again shortly. The critical nature of the diplomatic meetings was emphasized by the appearance in Helsinki of Field Marshal Baron Carl Gustav Mannerheim and his Chief of Staff, who hurried from the front to join the conferences.

At the same time, Berlin hastily dispatched its own Minister, Dr. Wipert von Blucher, to the Finnish capital, presumably to obtain first-hand information on the situation. Dr. von Blucher had been away from his post in Helsinki for months.

Informed observers believed that the Finnish Government had had its hand forced by the growing public pressure for peace and that it must now take a bold step in that direction to silence the opposition at home. These sources said, however, that the Finns were hesitant because they feared German reprisals and because they did not want to show any weakness that would impair their position at the peace table.

The first fear has lessened considerably since Sweden's cancellation of transit rights for German troops, but the Finnish Government still appears unable to make up its mind whether it wants the Germans to leave the country. Some quarters in Helsinki are said to fear that a German withdrawal might signal the start of a new Russian offensive against Finland.

The Finns, therefore, are believed to be looking for concrete information on the nature of Russia's peace terms before they open formal negotiations. The Russians deny all reports that any terms exist.

Swedish Press Promises Help

The Swedish people "are prepared to make all sacrifices for Finland's sake if she decides to make peace and Sweden will take it upon herself to help Finland's food situation," the Stockholm Aftontidningen said yesterday, according to the British radio.

The Svenska Dagbladet writes that Finland must act fast, because if she delays much longer she will end up in a catastrophe and will never regain her freedom," the broadcast added. It was recorded by the Columbia Broadcasting System.

This is a clipping from page 17 of the New York Times for Aug. 22, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Soviet Paper Says: Solve French Issue

By N. Nikolayev

(By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

MOSCOW, Aug. 21.—The Soviet Union sent a representative to visit the leaders of the French National Committee in Algiers, but American authorities refused to let him be received, the Soviet trade union periodical War and the Workingclass discloses in a discussion, entitled the "French Problem Awaits a Solution."

Pointing out the differences between British and American policy toward France, the article, written by N. Nikolayev, notes that the American reluctance to recognize the French Committee of National Liberation is characteristic of the "tremendous interest" of the United States in "present and post-war affairs in Europe," and the desire to have a "free hand" in them.

A Soviet representative is en route to Algiers, said the Brazzaville radio, heard by the UNITED PRESS listening post yesterday. The radio, controlled by the French National Committee, made no mention of whether the Soviet representative was assured permission to consult with the Committee (see story above).

The full article follows:

"The unification of all the forces of the French people for the struggle for liberating France from the German fascist invaders is of no mean importance for the course of the war against Hitler Germany.

"The successful solution of this problem is in the interests of the Allied countries fighting the Hitlerite tyranny. Therefore the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation as a center for broader unity of the anti-Hitlerite French forces can not be estimated otherwise than as a positive event.

RECOGNITION PROBLEM

"The whole group of problems connected with the French National Committee is still awaiting a solution, in particular the question of official recognition for the committee by the Allied governments.

"Originally, the question of recognition was left open, since as yet no agreement on some important questions has been reached in the Committee between Generals Giraud and DeGaulle. Nevertheless, even after the disputable questions

Russia

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were settled within the Committee, the question of recognition remained unsolved.

"Hitherto, only the governments of several small and medium countries have announced their official recognition. The Soviet Union's attitude on this important question is known. It is known that some time ago, the Soviet Union recognized the Fighting French Committee and maintained friendly relations with it.

POSITIVE ATTITUDE

"There is all the more grounds for a positive attitude towards the French Committee today when the unfication involves broader French circles that are ready to fight against Hitler.

"It is understandable therefore, that as soon as the French Committee of National Liberation was formed in North Africa, the Soviet Union made an attempt to send a representative there to establish personal contact and to receive direct information from DeGaulle and Giraud.

"Nevertheless, almost two months went by and the Soviet Union did not succeed in realizing this intention, as it encountered objections on the part of the Anglo-American authorities who based their objection on the military circumstances.

"The abnormality of this situation has many times been pointed out in the British and American press. The British and American press still continue their discussion on the 'French Question.'

"Whereas, from the beginning of the formation of De Gaulle's Committee Great Britain recognized and supported it, the U. S. A. never recognized DeGaulle's Committee.

"Neither did the U. S. A. recognize the Fighting French Committee which served as the foundation for the French Committee of National Liberation in Africa which united DeGaulle and Giraud.

"This alone shows that the question of the recognition of the French Committee is viewed differently in the U.S.A. than in Britain. As distinct from Britain, the question of recognition is a new question for the U.S.A.

"During the first stage of the discussion on this question, the American press devoted much space to personal attacks against DeGaulle.

"These accusations of 'dictatorship' and 'fascist tendencies' advanced in the American press against DeGaulle did not prevent other American newspapers and some American broadcasting stations from spreading all sorts of contrary inventions about DeGaulle, accusing him of secret contact with the 'Bolsheviks' and of receiving money from the Soviet government.

"This provocative work of the anti-Soviet blackmailers was completely disproved and exposed by the French Committee of National Liberation itself, as well as by an official Soviet communique issued by Tass.

"Many voices have already been raised in the American press expressing serious doubts of the arguments raised against recognition of the French Committee.

"Perhaps more than on other occasions, the real reason for U. S. A. dissatisfaction with DeGaulle is the difference in the policies of the U. S. A. and DeGaulle with regard to Vichy.

"Suffice it to recall DeGaulle's attitude to (the late Admiral Jean) Darlan and the importance American circles attached to the well-known experiment with Darlan.

"Consequently, to better understand the U. S. A. policy on the 'French question' it is necessary not to forget at least the following three things:

"First, the fact that the break in diplomatic relations between the U. S. A. and Vichy did not prevent Americans from experimenting with Darlan;

"Second, that the recent visit of Gen. Henri Giraud to the U. S. A. on the personal invitation from Washington took place at a time when the French Committee of National Liberation was already formed;

"Third, that the press went rather quite far in criticizing DeGaulle, although one can not say that this criticism continues today on the former scale.

"It is different as regards Britain. The British press does not publish articles against the recognition of the French Committee. As regards the official British position, it was recently outlined by (Foreign Secretary Anthony) Eden in the House of Commons.

"Much attention was being paid to the French question' in the U. S. A. and Britain and various attempts are being made to bring into closer positions both countries on this question.

"The most characteristic feature, perhaps, of the U. S. A. position is the reluctance to have its hands tied by some final commitments with regard to the 'French question.' On the other hand, it is clear that this question as well reveals the tremendous interest of America in the present and post-war affairs of Europe.

"The French question' affords a new example of the changes that have taken place in American foreign policy as compared with the period of the First World War.

"It is not hard to observe that the British policy on this question is based now on the desire to reach a certain agreement with the policy of the U. S. A., whereas but recently, this desire was not so strongly revealed.

"The French Question' is not yet solved, but it must be solved in the interests of anti-Hitlerite France and in the interests of the anti-Hitler coalition of the Allies as a whole."

Note

Soviet Tells Quebec: Deeds, Not Words ---

(The Worker Foreign Department)

With the Quebec conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill coming to its conclusion, the Soviet trade union periodical War and the Workingclass injected an important note in the international discussion about Quebec by stressing on Friday that the issue before the anti-Hitler coalition is whether the war shall be won quickly, or protracted.

Expressing the opinion that the Soviet Union would gladly participate in a three-power conference which made the second front issue its main purpose, War and the Workingclass declared that "in the Soviet Union, but one opinion prevails—the time has come to pass over from words to deeds, the time has come to strike a decisive joint blow from the East and the West."

Discussing the previous meetings of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, the trade union periodical said that while these meetings had played a vital role in the North African and Sicilian operations, they had not as yet resulted in the solution of the paramount problem relating to the fulfillment of the main pledge of our Anglo-American allies in the war against the common foe . . . the second front in Europe which is imperative in order to gain victory over Hitlerite Germany."

"The press in Britain and the USA are voicing all manner of conjectures and making all kinds of surmises regarding the nature of the present talks in Quebec. The results of the conference will show the extent to which these conjectures and surmises correspond to the reality. Quebec serves the cause of the united Anglo-American forces, and expresses their position," War and the Workingclass asserted.

Rejecting various speculations on why the Soviet Union did not participate at Quebec, the trade union organ's editorial in its 6th issue suggests the readiness of the USSR to participate in a three-power conference, a conference "called to shorten the war, to prevent the protraction of the war."

"A conference which would successfully carry out this important task would be a glorious landmark in the war against Hitler and in preparing a durable peace on the basis of friendly cooperation of the Allies."

This is a clipping from page 2 of the ~~Daily~~ Worker for Aug. 22 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

RUSSIA 'RELIEVES' LITVINOFF AS ENVOY

Removal of Ambassador to U. S. Announced by Radio—Gromyko Gets Post

By The United Press.

LONDON, Aug. 21—Maxim Litvinoff has been "relieved of his duties" as Ambassador to the United States, the Moscow radio announced tonight. Andrey Gromyko has been appointed to succeed him.

No Top Diplomats in West

The recall of Mr. Litvinoff leaves Russia unrepresented by a first-line diplomat at Washington, London or Ottawa.

Ambassador Ivan M. Maisky was called home from London to report and, although it was recently thought likely that he might return to wind up his affairs, it was not believed that he would resume his post. He has been made a Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs. The Russian Minister to Ottawa also has been called home.

The appointment of Andrey Gromyko as Ambassador to Washington represents the first move by Russia to change this situation, which had caused considerable speculation in the capitals of the western Allies. Mr. Gromyko is not well known here, but, in view of the efforts of Britain and the

had been under scrutiny. The efforts by Britain and the United States to solve the Italian situation created by the abdication of Mussolini and the establishment of the Badoglio government caused uneasiness in Moscow, which replied by setting up a Free German Committee representing a coalition of reactionary and leftist elements.

Russia was cold to efforts by the United States and Britain to get her to come to the Quebec conference, but after the conference had been under way professed a keen interest in the proceedings, let it be known that she looked upon the parley with a friendly attitude, and within the last few days published semi-officially a suggestion, received cordially in Washington, that a later conference be held between the three Allies.

RUSSIA 'RELIEVES' LITVINOFF AS ENVOY

Continued From Page One

United States to reach a full understanding with Russia, it is believed that his appointment will be welcomed. He is experienced in his new post, having been chargé d'affaires of the embassy during the tenure of Constantine Oumansky, Mr. Litvinoff's predecessor.

Russia's action comes after a period in which the Soviet's relations with Britain and the United States

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Times for Aug. 22, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

11 Reasons for Our Difficult Relations With Russia

PM Exclusive

On Friday PM published the exclusive report of Frederick Kuh from London that a conference with the Russians is almost certain to follow Quebec. In his dispatch, Kuh mentioned "about 10 difficulties impairing our relations with Russia, ranging from the Polish-Soviet rift to differences over the question whether an agreement exists obligating the British and Soviet governments to conclude treaties with third powers only with each other's consent."

PM believes that difficulties in our relations with Russia are so important and cry so loud for solution for the good of all that we asked Kuh to give us the whole list. To the two he cabled Friday, Kuh adds these nine, making 11 in all:

¶ The basic difficulty over a second front.

¶ Russia's absence from Quebec.

¶ British opposition to the signing now of a Czechoslovak-Soviet Alliance on the ground that the Polish government would resent it.

¶ Russia's suspension of air travel between Britain and the USSR owing to differences rising in connection with the signing of an agreement regulating that traffic between them through the Middle East.

¶ Moscow's displeasure over the U. S.-British creation of AMGOT (Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories) without consulting Russia.

¶ The vexation of Washington and London following Russia's sponsorship, without consulting them, of the Free German Committee and the Union of Polish Patriots, silhouetting the divergence of our approach to German and eastern European problems.

¶ Reported sympathetic consideration in Washington of Franco's request for armaments for Spain shortly after Franco had reinforced the Spanish Blue Division fighting alongside the Nazis in Russia.

(PM carried a story from its Washington Bureau last Thursday to the effect that consideration being given a request from Franco for shipments of aviation gas is decidedly sympathetic, and that a deal is reported in the making.)

¶ Stalin's recall of Ivan Maisky from his ambassadorship in London, Maisky's replacement by a comparatively inexperienced diplomat and the continued failure of Maxim Litvinov to return to Washington, renewing doubts whether he would resume his post at all.

¶ Soviet press criticism of the Chinese Government, coupled with chronic dissension between Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese communists.

This is a clipping from page 7 of P M
for Aug. 22, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government

Lend-Lease to Soviet Cut Again

Full Share Withheld in Spite of Shipping Improvement

By I. F. Stone
PM's Bureau

WASHINGTON, Aug. 21. — Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union has been cut sharply in recent months. This was the critical period in which the Russians were preparing for the third Nazi summer offensive, an offensive their armies are continuing to maintain.

In January, Lend-Lease Administrator Edward N. Stettinius, Jr., announced that Russia had become "the major beneficiary" of lend-lease, and pledged even greater supplies during 1943.

In February, the Soviet share of lend-lease was about one-third, the highest point it had ever reached. But by June of this year, the Soviet share had fallen to less than one-sixth while the United Kingdom's had risen to a new high—more than one half.

While lend-lease shipments rose sharply all during the first half of this year, reaching the $1,000,000,000 mark in June, the value of shipments to the Soviets fell.

Less Than in 1942

In April, lend-lease for Russia was about $250,000,000. In June, it totalled less than $150,000,000—having fallen back to the level of the summer of 1942.

Lend-lease shipments to the Soviets during the second quarter of this year were lower in value than during the first quarter, although it had been hoped that with the end of Winter and the easier shipping situation there would be a sharp increase in shipments to the U.S.S.R.

Too much stress cannot be placed on any one month's figures, for the change in the date of a convoy, the shift in the design for an important weapon of war, may cause an abnormal change in that month's totals.

It is possible that July, for which figures are not yet available, will show an increase over June.

Trend Admitted

The significant thing is that the trend during the second quarter of this year was downwards, although that was the period in which the Russians were bracing themselves for the third Nazi offensive, which began on July 5.

The statistics presented here had not previously been released by the Government but the downward trend in value of shipments to the U.S.S.R. was admitted when the figures were submitted to Lend-Lease for confirmation or denial before publication of this story.

The Lend-Lease explanation leads into another little known aspect of aid to the Soviet Union.

Lend-Lease officials said the value of shipments to the Soviets fell in recent months because the Russians were desperately in need of food and took low value foodstuffs cargoes in preference to higher value arms.

"In some cases," one official said, "we had munitions in port ready to move but the Russians decided to use their shipping space to take food instead."

This led to the closely guarded question of shipping allocations to the Soviets.

This correspondent had been informed:

¶ That only about five per cent of our shipping facilities had been allocated to Soviet supplies.

¶ That in spite of the increase in the total amount of shipping available in recent months, officials were not planning any increase in the allocation to the Soviets.

First Quarter Gain

Lend-Lease was asked to confirm or deny these reports.

The only answer was "tonnage remains high."

The last Lend-Lease report said that in the first three months of this year shipments to the Soviets—in terms of tonnage—were a third larger than in the last three months of 1942.

Lend-Lease was asked whether shipments during the second quarter showed a rise or a fall in tonnage.

If the fall in value of shipments was due only to the substitution of low value food cargoes for high value arms, the fall in value might have been accompanied by no change or an actual increase in tonnage.

But the only light which could be obtained on that question was the same answer, "tonnage remains high."

The Russian need for more foodstuffs, as explained by Lend-Lease officials, many of them sympathetic to the Soviets, is great. This is the third planting year in which the Ukraine—the Soviet breadbasket—has been in Nazi hands.

The recent shift in exports from arms to foodstuffs and the decreased volume of shipments confirms statements made by FDR and Stettinius in the past that Russian resistance has been largely dependent on Russia's own capacity to produce.

American aid in the past two years has been sizeable, probably more than $2,500,000,000 by last June 30, but this does not bulk large either beside American production figures—now about $7,000,000,000 a month—or the vast destructive toll taken by the fighting on the Eastern front.

This is a clipping from page 4 of PM
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U. S.-~~British~~ Consortium

An examination of Lend-Lease figures show that Lend-Lease has been run as an Anglo-American consortium, rather than a United Nations affair. The way in which the statistics are divided tends to hide this.

By April 1, lend-lease exports to the Soviets totalled $1,822,000,000 —as compared with $3,116,000,000 to the United Kingdom.

Actually the disproportion was much greater, for most of the remainder of lend-lease also goes to the British Empire. The British Empire total was $4,987,000,000. If cash purchases by the Empire are added, the total becomes $7,022,000,000.

To make a fair comparison on this basis one must add the value of British shipments to the Soviets to the total of our own. British shipments were $680,000,000. Added to American lend-lease this is $2,502,000,000, as compared with shipments to the Empire of $7,022,000,000.

Thus while the Soviets still face the bulk of ~~the Nazi~~ armies, they are far from getting a proportionate share of American aid.

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Government

Soviet Organ for 3-Power Parley To Prepare Big Blow Against Axis

By The Associated Press.

MOSCOW, Aug. 20—War and the Working Class, Soviet labor magazine, called today for a conference of Britain, Russia and the United States to shorten the war and prepare for peace on the basis of friendly collaboration among the Allies.

In an editorial entitled "Quebec and the Soviet Union," the magazine said that the conferences between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill were "serving the interests of the Anglo-American forces" but did not "express the opinion of the entire Anglo-Soviet-American coalition."

The editorial again presented the Soviet demand for another fighting front in Europe, saying "The time is ripe to inflict a decisive blow from the east and the west. The time is ripe to change over from words to actions."

Victory over Germany is still possible this year, it said.

Commenting on British and American press articles on the Roosevelt-Churchill conferences, the article said many newspapers forgot that the conference was a British-American affair and discussed the non-participation of the Soviet Union although the Soviet was not invited.

The magazine in another article said a Russian representative had been delayed from contact with the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers for two months because of "objections from Anglo-American authorities for supposedly military reasons."

"The French question awaits its solution," the magazine said.

It pointed out that the Soviet Union had recognized the Fighting

Continued on Page Four

Continued From Page One

French committee of General Charles de Gaulle and added that it had evenmore reason for a positive attitude toward the new committee, representing both major French factions.

In its editorial on the Quebec conference, the magazine stated that many persons, concerned about the task of directing Allied military forces for mutual advantage, demand a conference of representatives of the Soviet, Britain and the United States.

President Roosevelt's five previous conferences with Prime Minister Churchill, the magazine continued, have emphasized that the main job was to "inflict a blow against the main enemy, Hitlerite Germany."

"However," it continued, "these conferences, in which the Soviet Union did not participate, did not bring about a solution of the vital problem pertaining to the fulfillment of the main obligation of our Anglo-American Allies in the war against the common enemy. They did not result in the organization of a second front in Europe, necessary for victory."

London Expects Russians

By Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, Aug. 21—A week ago tonight this correspondent attempted to report that Vyacheslov M. Molotoff, Russian Foreign Commissar, was likely to accompany Ivan M. Maisky, former Ambassador to London, next month for consultations of a broad, far-reaching nature but the consor advised that the name of Mr. Molotoff he deleted.

Tomorrow's Daily Herald reports that Mr. Molotoff may come to London with Mr. Maisky who is expected to make a short visit to London and clear up his affairs and make his farewells.

Tomorrow's Communist Daily Worker makes this comment upon the article in the Moscow newspaper War and the Working Class, urging a three-power conference:

"It was believed in London that this demand, so clearly voiced by Moscow and backed by public opinion in Britain and the United States, might quickly lead to an effective get-together in London for the mobilization of Allied resources for an immediate blow against Hitler in Europe.

"Maisky is likely to return to London. Molotoff may also revisit London for the first time since he was here to sign the Anglo-Soviet treaty last year.

"Informed circles in London said last night that some great military conference of the kind foreshadowed by Moscow may be an immediate possibility."

It is believed here that following the Quebec conference Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and perhaps Under-Secretary of State Cyman Welles will go to Moscow to convey the decisions reached at the conferences of the political and military leaders of Russia's Western Allies.

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Times for Aug. 21, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Glad to Join Second-Front Talk

Quebec Not Enough, Soviet Union Says

By M. S. HANDLER
United Press Staff Correspondent

MOSCOW, Aug. 20—The authoritative political review, "War and the Working Class," said today that a British-Soviet-American conference called for the avowed purpose of solving the question most important to the Soviets—the second front—would be most welcome but must not be "just another conference."

Saying that the time had come "to pass from words to action," the review declared editorially that while the Quebec conference consolidated the British-American bloc and expresses its position, "Quebec as can be seen from the number of its participants does not yet express the viewpoint of the whole Anglo-Soviet-American coalition."

The statement was the first authoritative comment here on the Quebec conference since the Tass New Agency announced that Russia was not invited to participate.

SHORT WAR NO. 1 AIM

"Many people who are seriously worried about the necessity of intensifying the war effort of all three countries and who are truly interested in the common cause, raise the question of a conference of representatives of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States," the review said.

"Of course, such a conference must not be just another conference after which the most important problems, as the fight against Hitlerite Germany, will remain unsolved.

"Presently, when quick decisive actions are particularly necessary, a conference of the three powers should decide the principal and most urgent question—a question of shortening the war, a question of not allowing another prolongation of the war."

The publication maintained that the military situation was such that the coalition could accomplish a victory over Germany and its vassals this year but that postponement of the second front in Europe until next year would prolong the war and "once more put off the collapse of Hitlerite Germany."

ALLIES NEVER INVADED

"Perhaps some statesmen in Britain and the United States, on whose territories there never has been Hitlerite occupants, do not consider this an immediate task," it said. "It is different in the Soviet Union. . . . In the Soviet Union there is only one opinion as to this question—the time has come to pass from words to action. The time has come to make a decisive combined blow from the East and West—a blow which will really shorten the war and free the peoples of Europe from countless new sacrifices."

The review added that a tri-power conference called with the purpose of shortening the war would be "a glorious landmark in the war against Hitler and preparation for a solid peace on the basis of friendly co-operation among the Allies."

This is a clipping from page 4 of the ~~Daily Worker~~ WASH. DAILY NEWS for Aug. 20, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Molotov May Join Discussions Of Major United Nations Problems

By Frederick Kuh

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LONDON, Aug. 20.—A conference with the Russians is almost certain to follow Quebec.

Ivan Maisky, the newly appointed Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, is expected to arrive in London within a few days for a brief visit. He is coming for a purpose more important than winding up his affairs after his 11 years of ambassadorship in Britain and taking leave of his many friends.

There is some prospect that he may prepare a meeting of British and American statesmen with the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, possibly in London. Every one, except the enemy, would regard such a conference as highly desirable. It would, above all, create an opportunity for personally informing Russia of the Quebec decision. Molotov and his military advisers will be told the latest strategic plans.

An attempt also will be made to iron out about 10 difficulties impairing our relations with Russia and ranging from the Polish-Soviet rift to differences over the question of whether an agreement exists obligating the British and Soviet governments to conclude treaties with third powers only with each other's consent.

If Molotov comes west, the previous suggestion that Eden go to Moscow probably will be dropped.

Molotov visited London in April, 1942, and again after returning from Washington in May, his mission culminating in the signature of the 20-year British-Soviet military and political alliance.

Benes' Cancelled Trip

Edward Benes was due to go to Moscow six weeks ago to sign a similar Czechoslovak-Russian 20-year pact but did not go. The Conservative weekly *Spectator* says that the British Government dissuaded him from going "and this is very difficult to understand." It adds:

"The people who will find it most difficult to understand are the Russians. In proportion as his visit might have been fruitful in allaying suspicion, its cancellation or postponement must inevitably have the opposite effect. If it was right for Sikorski to go to Moscow and conclude an agreement with Stalin in 1941, why is it wrong for Benes to do the same in 1943?"

The liberal *New Statesman* deplores "the too many vacant chairs at Quebec," calls it "strange" that T. V. Soong was not attending the conference and then discusses Stalin's absence.

It declares that as a result of their disappointment in our failure to pull off the German troops from Soviet soil, the Russians have adopted an independent political strategy in their approach to the German question. The same journal says that the Russians smell a sanitary cordon against the USSR in British favoritism of federations among Danubian, Balkan and Northern States.

There is an intense interest here whether the American view will prevail at Quebec and we will finally induce the other Allies to hasten the plans for an invasion of Western Europe from Britain.

This is a clipping from page 6 of the P.M. ~~New York Times~~ for aug. 20, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Columnist Raps Disloyal Stories of U.S.-Soviet Rift as Dynamiting Peace

The San Francisco Chronicle columnist, Chester Rowell, sharply exposes the "malicious and disloyal" motives of recent newspaper discussions of differing viewpoints of the Soviet, British and American governments.

That differences exist is doubtless true, he says, but that is "very different from the distortion of half-truths . . . now going on in quarters chiefly concerned with estranging America from its principal European Allies, Russia and Britain."

We take pleasure in reprinting his column of Aug. 6, which he entitles, "DYNAMITING THE WAR NOW AND THE PEACE LATER":

It has long been no secret that here were differences of approach between the Russia, British and American governments on ne question of post-war security n Eastern Europe. This was one f the difficulties in getting Stalin's consent to go to the Casablanca conference, or, indeed, to ny participation since in any neeting of the heads of the three overnments. It is also no secret hat Churchill and Roosevelt and heir agents, personal and diplomatic, have been and now are busily engaged in ironing out these lifferences, with improving prosects of success.

Much of the course of that diplomacy will depend, not so much on ne arguments we make as on what e do in the military fields. And at situation, notoriously, is now normously better on all fronts. uch more could be added, if this were intended as an exhaustive analysis of the diplomatic situation, but none of it would be new or mysterious, or unfamiliar to those who have kept up with the course of events.

DISTORTIONS

But the point is that all this is something very different from the distortion of half-truths about it now going on in quarters chiefly concerned with estranging America from its principal European allies, Russia and Britain. That campaign, correct, half correct and false in its various assertions of facts, is wholly malicious and disloyal in its motives. It is, up to the last limits of the legally permissible, a direct effort to disrupt the unity of action of the United Nations, for the covert purpose of separating America in sympathy, and limiting it in action, on the European part of the war and post-war, to the end of helping Britain as little as possible and finally, co-operating with Russia not at all.

There have been two points made, both grossly distorted.

The first is the proclamation of a committee of anti-Nazi German refugees in Russia, calling on the Germans, in the interest of German liberty, to get rid of Hitler and Nazism and to establish democracy in Germany. The fact that, in censored Russia, this statement was permitted to be given out, and was displayed in the government-controlled Soviet press, indicates of course that its issuance had the approval of the government. That it has any other significance is inference, which none of us have the information to make with much assurance. But to distort it, as having said the exact reverse of its plain language, in order to discredit American cooperation with the most militarily useful of all our war allies, is inexcusable—and very much worse.

"SECOND CRUSADE".

Now comes the second crusade, that Russia "cynically plots to subdue Italy to her way through Communism." This, like the other, is based on the distortion of half-truths—which is worse than outright falseshood. One of these is the quite correct statement of a Moscow correspondent that Russia, feeling a stake in the defeat of Italy, is watching British and American attempts to force Italy to abandon Germany and give up the fight. Which is, obviously very different from the distortion of it above quoted. And the other is that the five-party anti-Badoglio revolt, includes the Communists, as one of those parties, and that, by virtue of Italian conditions, this smallest of the five parties may prove the best organized for immediate action. All of which has nothing whatever to do with the misuse of it, made by this disruptive crusade.

But it all has very much to do with the necessary policy of America, in thought and in action toward this one war, in which we are now joined, and the one peace that must follow it, if it is to be peace at all.

For Russia is a part, and just now the fightingest part, of that war, and Russia with or without our co-operation, will be a major factor in the peace to follow. These are just facts, which can not be changed by our closing our eyes to them, or looking at them through distorting glasses. All that could be changed is our own position, in seeing them clearly and dealing with them practically, or otherwise.

FINAL CLASH

It is a time of great British and American victories, in the preliminary stages of the war, but of a great Russian victory in the final stage. On all fronts, we are moving closer to the final clash with the enemy, which, when we then win it, it will be his ultimate destruction. But Russia is in that final clash and has lost more men and material in it than all the rest of us combined. If the military victory is won soon, it will be Russia first of all that will have won it. If it is delayed, it will be because, from our judgment of the necessities of the case, we have been slower in reaching the direct clash.

Either way, if we do not agree in the decisions of the subsequent peace, Russia will not need our permission to make its own decisions. It is enormously to our interest that those decisions be joint ones. Stalin, obviously, will look out for his own interests. We should be smart enough to look out for ours, and we have men smart enough, if we will use them. Then, in politics, as in business, the final conclusion should reflect both interests.

This is a clipping from page 2 of the Daily Worker for Aug. 19, 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Do Business With Russia Now; It's Cheaper, Rickenbacker Says

Declares Soviet Going Capitalistic While U. S. A. Veers to the 'Left'

By Patricia Bronte

Eddie Rickenbacker, back home from his third errand for the State Dept., says we can and should start doing business with Russia.

"We don't need to worry about Russian demands if we deal with them now," said Rickenbacker yesterday in his first public statement following a 55,000-mile tour of the fighting fronts.

"Give them something now, rather than wait till the war's end, when they will demand and get 10 times as much."

The labor-baiting Eastern Air Lines president apologized for Stalin's inability to join the Churchill-Roosevelt war parley at Quebec on the ground that "He is a very busy man," adding:

"If Stalin can't come to us, it behooves our President and Churchill to go to him. We're going to need Russia after the war, and they're going to need us."

Rickenbacker bases his new-found confidence in Russia on the theory that everything he saw in that country "indicated a trend toward capitalism and democracy."

Heading Right

"Russia is going right as we go left," said Rickenbacker. "By the end of this war, Russia is going to be the outstanding example of capitalistic democracy, while this country will be in the Bolshevist spot Russia was in 25 years ago."

Here are some of Rickenbacker's arguments in support of his belief that Russia is abandoning Communism:

¶ Some Russian officers' uniforms have been adapted (specifically, in the matter of shoulder epaulettes) from the old Czarist army uniforms.

¶ The Russian press and propaganada outlets are selling pre-Revolutionary war heroes to the people.

¶ Russian women have an "appreciation of the drawing room," now being accentuated by the progressive military rank system which prevails among women's services as well as men's.

¶ Stalin was sincere when he dissolved the Third International.

¶ The elimination of the commissars in the Army who now have been reduced to "welfare workers in uniform.'

¶ And, anyway, we've been misled about Bolshevism in Russia all this time by the Communistic enthusiasts in this country.

Admits Prejudice

Rickenbacker, who said he had made a study of Russia before he visited there, admitted he previously had been prejudiced against Russia and her intentions.

"I didn't expect to find such all-out concentration of war effort. I doubt even that Germany and Japan are so all-out war conscious as Russia. I never saw so much discipline.'

Absenteeism, which Rickenbacker used to blame on shirking American workers, doesn't exist in Russia, he said.

Rickenbacker made this discovery when he asked a Russian factory foreman about his labor difficulties. The foreman said he didn't understand.

"Well, what do you do if one of your workers drinks too much vodka on Sunday and doesn't show up Monday for work?" asked Rickenbacker. The foreman explained workers were allowed 20 minutes' leeway on tardiness, that if they were consistently late a trial board decided their guilt. If guilty, the worker's wages were cut, and if guilty a second time his food allowance was cut. If the offense was flagrant the worker was fired, put on the breadline.

Someone asked Rickenbacker if he thought this country were approaching the same situation. Rickenbacker shrugged, said:

"Well, you heard Jimmy Byrnes last night, didn't you?" (Byrnes advocated strict wage control.)

In Russia, he said, the working time is eight hours a day, six days a week, plus three hours overtime daily at time and a half pay.

Rickenbacker called Russia's contributions "the greatest all-out war effort in the world," and warned that "a lot of suspicion" is being engendered about the USSR which should be eliminated.

"Russia's major desire after the war will be to rebuild their own country, not to acquire new territories," he said.

Eddie Rickenbacker

There is absolutely no need to worry about whether Russia will make a separate peace, he continued.

"Any country that has lost as many men as they have would understand their complete determination for victory."

At the same time, he predicted that at our present rate of progress toward victory, "Germany will not even crack before the Fall of 1944 at best."

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Back From Inspection

Rickenbacker Doubts Reich Will Crack Before Fall of 1944

By Kenneth L. Dixon
Associated Press Staff Writer

New York, Aug. 17.—Capt. Edward V. Rickenbacker said today that Italy was being bombed out of the war so fast that a "complete blowup" might come any day and that Germany then would be knocked out the same way because "no people on earth can stand" the terrific blasting being unleashed by Allied air power.

But in the next breath, he learned that, even so, he doubted that Germany would crack "before the fall of 1944" at the present rate of the war's progress.

And after that, he said—barring a miracle—it would take another year of war to dispose of "savage and treacherous" Japan, whose soldiers, "unlike the Germans and Italians, will never give up."

Of Russia, he reported that "bolshevism in Russia is not as we have been led to believe by Communistic enthusiasts in this country. They have been constantly turning to the right as evidenced in many ways during the past 12 months. If they keep going on as they are, they may come out of the war the greatest democracy in the world."

Asked where he thought the United States might wind up, he laughed and said it might be where

See RICK, Page 8, Column 1.

RICK, from Page 1.

Russia was 25 years ago.

Lean and smiling, but admittedly tired from his 50,000-mile tour of world battlefronts, Rickenbacker admitted he believed in the possibility of such a miracle, and said "something is coming this winter that will shock the world—maybe sooner."

Describing himself as a "private citizen" on this third trip he has made as War Secretary Stimson's representative, Rickenbacker, who was in civilian clothes, said he was no air-power fanatic, but that Germany must be broken "from the inside" by bombing because any other way would be "to expensive."

He said Italy is ready to crack because of morale, "the same as in Hamburg. The bombing of Hamburg is something no people on earth could stand—no people on earth, including ourselves."

After speaking of the 25 days he spent in Russia during his three-month jaunt, Rickenbacker veered from his recount of the warfront scene to say that if Premier Stalin was unable to join President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in their strategy huddles, it was because "he has an all-out war on his hands," at home and added:

"If Stalin can't come to us—to meet our President and Mr. Churchill—it behooves our President and Mr. Churchill to go to him."

He asserted:

"I am certain if our frontiers were pushed back to Cleveland, Pittsburgh and Atlanta in the East, and back to Spokane, Salt Lake City and Tucson in the West, with the enemy holding both coasts—with many of our large cities destroyed—with a loss of better than four and one-half million battle casualties—and a loss of 12 to 15 million men, women and children in the occupied areas from starvation and disease, that our President would feel the same as Mr. Stalin probably does."

He said that although he found the Russians aware of, and delighted by, American and British aid—in the form of continental bombing, the Mediterranean campaign and lend-lease shipments—still "there is a lot of suspicion among the three countries which has to be eliminated."

He did not see Stalin on his trip, he said, adding, "I had no particular business with him." However, he said every opportunity was given him to visit both the Soviet fighting and home fronts and that he found "the Russian people anxious to know the Americans and British better." Fighting pilots at the front told him the quality and quantity of Nazi pilots had declined in the last six months as a result of Allied pressure from the west and south.

The hero of two wars termed the Southwest Pacific the "toughest of them all," estimated the Aleutians area probably was next and the Russian Front third. But, he said, they all were "plenty tough." He stressed that almost every one was primarily an air theater and said "we now have air superiority."

WASH. POST. Aug. 17, 1943 p. 8

Rickenbacker Pays Tribute To Soviets

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High praise for the fighting quality of the Soviet people and its fighting Red Army came yesterday from Capt. Edward V. Rickenbacker.

Returning from a 55,000-mile trip to the world battle fronts, Rickenbacker, at a press conference at the Hotel Roosevelt yesterday, said that in the USSR he "found everywhere the passionate conviction of ultimate victory on the part of the soldiers and their commanding officers."

He added that "the Russian army has tremendous reserves in men who are being well trained, and their fighting qualities are so obvious, that comment is unnecessary. The soldiers are well fed and well clothed."

Rickenbacker's public statement yesterday was the first since his ill-fated anti-labor crusade of last Spring when he utilized the absentee issue for a drive against the trade union movement.

HITS 'PEACE' SUSPICIONS

The flier said there was "absolutely no need to worry about whether Russia will make a separate peace."

"Anyone who has lost as many men as they have," he said, "will have complete determination for victory."

The Soviet war effort, he said, "is the greatest all-out war effort in the world" and declared "a lot of suspicion" being engendered about Russia should be eliminated. The Soviet's greatest desire, he said, will be to rebuild Russia, not to acquire new territory.

Rickenbacker said "it was encouraging to see the Russian farm lands so well tilled and appear so fertile."

"Upon questioning officials," he reported, "they advised that every indication pointed to Russia having

Rickenbacker Pays Tribute to Soviets

(Continued from Page 1)

a bumper crop this year, which they need so badly."

After seeing Moscow's aerial defenses, he said, "it is understandable why the Germans have not tried to bomb Moscow in over a year."

LOUDS SOVIET PILOTS

Telling how he was flown in an American manufactured DC-3 transport with a five-fighter escort to the Orel sector, Rickenbacker asserted:

"The Russian pilots are capable, keen and alert. They were overwhelmingly enthusiastic over the American types of planes they were using with a continued desire to have more because of their effectiveness in competition with the German aircraft in battle."

Rickenbacker also described his visit to the Stormovik airplane factory in Moscow where he saw "the only completely armored tank-busting airplane in existence." It is operated something like a dive bomber, he said, but always below 500 feet, with fighter protection above.

Leaving his technical speciality, Rickenbacker offered the novel opinion that "Russia has been turning to the right" while the U. S. has been going "left."

He said he believed that "only a miracle" can bring victory in Europe before the fall of 1944. Germany, he said, will not crack before that time but "anything can happen in Italy."

Rickenbacker made the suggestion that "if Mr. Stalin has not seen fit or considered it advisable to participate in conferences with our President and Mr. Churchill, we must bear in mind that he is head of a great nation fighting a total war and has little time for anything but immediate results."

This is a clipping from page 1 of the Daily Worker for Aug 18, 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

"WE WILL BRING LIBERATION TO OUR LAND"

On August 8 the Soviet press published the following "Address of Byelorussian Red Army Men to the Men and Women Guerrillas of Byelorussia and the Entire Byelorussian People":

For two years we have been waging a life and death struggle against the treacherous enemy who captured our territory, defiled our native land and rivers, demolished our towns and villages and exterminated hundreds of thousands of our people. Together with our Russian and Ukrainian brothers, together with all sons of the freedom-loving peoples of the Soviet Union, we Byelorussians have been battering the enemy and driving back his hordes. Now at the front in the Patriotic War are 108 Byelorussian generals, hundreds of colonels, and hundreds of thousands of Red Army men from our Byelorussia. Your sons are sacredly following the precepts of your fathers and forefathers concerning the inviolable unity of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples.

On more than one occasion Byelorussians fought the enemy in the ranks of the Russian Army, setting an example of gallantry and heroism. On more than one occasion the Byelorussians rose in evil times against their oppressors.

Our dear brothers and sisters, mothers and fathers, wives and children! Day and night we live with the single thought of you, of our beloved country. The Byelorussian land is held in brutal captivity. Everything we had built in the course of years was burned or destroyed, thousands of our dear ones have been driven to slavery, thousands have been done to death by the fascist beasts, thousands are languishing in bloody torture chambers. The modern German fascist has bared his bestial inner self; he assaults with equal ferocity the weak old man, the helpless child and the unarmed woman.

It was they, the accursed German barbarians, who drowned our children in bogs and rivers. It was they who burned them alive. It was they who tested the strength of children's spines against soldiers' knees. It was they who threw into the flames the 103-year-old Evgenya Miganenkoi. Endless and horrible is the list of crimes and atrocities of the German fiends—these wild fosterlings of bestial, rabid fascist dogs.

Disgrace indelible for centuries will fall upon the heads of the Germans for these crimes. We forget nothing, and each drop of innocent blood we will avenge a hundredfold. Grave and immeasurable are your sufferings, our dear brothers and sisters! But captivity has failed to break you. You did not kneel before the Germans. Byelorussia was captured—but her people is not vanquished, her will to struggle and victory is not broken! The struggle of your guerrillas evokes the admiration of all peoples; your courage and heroism thrill the world.

We proudly remember that the first to be awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for self-sacrificing struggle in the enemy rear were the brave People's Avengers—the Byelorussian guerrillas Bumazhkov and Pavlovsky. By their heroic struggle our brothers, the guerrillas, render invaluable aid to the Red Army in its struggle for liberation of its native land. In the course of the Patriotic War, in fierce and ruthless fighting, Byelorussian guerrillas have killed over 150,000 fascist officers and men including 13 generals. They have derailed several hundred enemy trains, blown up about 1,000 bridges, disabled, destroyed and burned hundreds of enemy planes and tanks, and smashed dozens of fascist headquarters.

Before the decisive battles against the enemy we pledge to execute sacredly the order of the great Stalin and will spare neither our blood nor our lives in the struggle for the holy cause of defeating the fascist hangmen. Together with our Russian and Ukrainian brothers, together with the soldiers of all peoples of the Soviet Union, we will bring liberation to our land; we will bring back freedom and joy to our much suffering Byelorussian people.

AUG. 17, 1943

Passing Epic Test Of Battle

(By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

MOSCOW, Aug. 16.—"Our country is the rock against which the surge of the German offensive has been smashed," writes Pravda, newspaper of the Soviet Communist Party in its comment on the Red Army's victory at Karachev.

The Soviet press today publishes Stalin's Order of the Day on the capture of this key city, 25 miles east of Bryansk, and reports that the 16th and 84th Guards rifle divisions and the 238th and 369th rifle divisions which liberated Karachev will hereafter bear the name of the town.

"In the life of a people there are moments when its physical and spiritual strength are revealed in full grandeur. The Soviet people are living through such a moment now in the days of the patriotic war.

"With reverential pride the descendants of the heroes of Sevastopol, Stalingrad, Orel and Belgorod will turn the pages of history dedicated to the Soviet people's big battles against the black forces of fascist reaction.

"The patriotic pride of the Soviet citizen is natural and legitimate. In a tempest of war unparalleled in the history of all peoples and all times, it has fallen to the Soviet people to shoulder the brunt of trials.

The Soviet peoples have set an example of unsurpassed stoicism, dauntlessness and readiness to sacrifice everything for the honor, independence and freedom of their country and their national dignity, for all the peoples plunged into the abyss of war against Hitler Germany.

"Our country is the rock against which the surge of the German offensive has been smashed. The waves which but recently threatened to flood the great Russian plain are now rolling back. Many serious trials and sacrifices are still ahead in the war. But the Soviet people look to the future with the greatest confidence in victory.

"There have already been celebrations in our streets, one of them Moscow recently marked with an artillery salute. The final, complete victory will be ours."

This is a clipping from page 2 of the Daily Worker for Aug. 17, 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Joe Wields the Whip Hand

U. S.-British-Russo Relations Seen Strained by Stalin's Actions

By WILLIAM PHILIP SIMMS
Scripps-Howard Foreign Editor

Mr. Simms

TORONTO, Aug. 16—From one of the most distinguished and best-informed Europeans on this side of the ocean I learn that Russo-British-American relations are now a matter of grave concern thruout non-Nazi Europe.

The chronic aloofness of Marshal Stalin from the meetings of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, according to a steady flow of well-organized intelligence reaching my informant, is regarded as having passed from the realm of remarkable coincidences into one of sinister implications if not actual menace.

Europeans believe that Stalin has gained the whip hand over Roosevelt and Churchill. Stalin, they say, has grabbed the peace initiative away from his Anglo-American partners. Whereas Roosevelt and Churchill are committed to unconditional surrender, Stalin is not. He is, therefore, in a position to offer more attractive terms—even to Germany. He can make it appear to the peace-hungry masses of Europe that Soviet Russia is their real friend whereas the western democracies, from which they had expected much, want nothing less than the total destruction of their countries and the subjugation of their peoples.

GIVES MOSCOW ADVANTAGE

This, said my informant, gives Moscow a tremendous moral and political advantage, and that is why Stalin has so persistently refrained from attending the Roosevelt-Churchill conferences.

Until the last minute, it is said, the British and American statesmen fully expected Stalin to be present at their meeting in North Africa and to join in their edict of Casablanca. But they were disappointed in both respects. Stalin, by remaining away, gained a free hand for himself in dealing with the Axis.

Stalin is not committed to the unconditional-surrender formula even in the case of Germany. He is committed only to the unconditional surrender of Hitlerite Germany—something entirely different. His speeches, orders of the day and other pronouncements all make a distinction between the German people and the Hitlerites.

But most conclusive of all is the Kremlin's sponsorship of the Free Germany Committee, whost standing offer of peace to Germany is generosity itself compared with our dictum of unconditional surrender. While we talk of dismemberment of Germany, with control of the pieces afterwards, including their schools and textbooks, the Moscow-inspired Free Germany Committee promises the people a government of their own choosing—even a capitalistic one—if they will only overthrow Hitler and his gang.

HAS MORE TO OFFER

Marshal Stalin, therefore, can outbid Roosevelt and Churchill. He has more to offer. According to my informant, other governments or national committees have already been set up in Moscow, where they are ready to move at the psychological moment. There are ready-made governments for Poland, Romania, Hungary, Austria, Yugoslavia and probably other European states farther west, including Finland. Heading the Austrian committee is the able Johan Koplinig, Vienna-born chairman of the Communist Party of Austria, who is highly regarded even by his opponents. He is in Moscow.

According to my informant, the European masses—including those of Germany and her vassals—are desperate for peace. In this mood, rightly or wrongly, they think they have only two alternatives to total annihilation in a war to the bitter end. One of these alternatives is unconditional surrender and whatever future the Allies may offer them. The other is to grab at the seemingly more attractive terms held out by Moscow.

Under the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1941 both powers are pledged not to sign a separate peace. Legally speaking, however, there is nothing in the treaty to prevent Moscow from gaining her ends thru the instrumentality of her Free Germany Committee, then putting the fait accompli up to London and Washington for acceptance or rejection. If rejected, Moscow could say that her objectives had been fully achieved and if her allies wished to continue the war regardless they could do so on their own.

SHOWDOWN NEAR

Thus, in the opinion of my informant, things have reached a showdown. Unless Roosevelt and Churchill, at their new rendezvous, can induce Stalin either to meet with them soon or else take some other equally dramatic step to demonstrate publicly Russia's solidarity with Britain and America, Europe will fear the worst and act accordingly.

Nazi propaganda is already harping on the schism in the Allied ranks. Roosevelt and Churchill have repeatedly all but begged Stalin to meet with them at some place of his own choice. It is now up to the Red Marshal to nail this propaganda as a lie or confirm it by continuing to snub his partners as in the past.

WASH. DAILY NEWS Aug. 16, 1943 p. 10

FOREIGN POLICY BODY WEIGHS RUSSIA'S AIMS

Says Access to Atlantic Via Baltic May Satisfy Moscow

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 15—The Foreign Policy Association declared today that there is "little evidence as yet to indicate that Russia would want to dominate Europe through the familiar methods of territorial control."

The Russians may be expected, it was said, to participate side by side with Great Britain and the United States and the conquered peoples of Europe in the final battle of Germany.

The association set forth its views on the basis of a survey made by Vera Micheles Dean, its research director, of the role Russia may play in post-war Europe.

"It seems improbable," the survey said, "that Russia would seek, after the war, additional territory for the sake of obtaining more people or larger resources. This prediction, however, is subject to three important qualifications: the satisfactory settlement of Russia's western border; the possible spread of Communism after the war, with or without Russian support; and the safeguards that the United Nations, acting in concert, may find it possible to erect again the resurgency of Germany."

There is no doubt in the opinion of the association that the Soviet Government, in the event of victory, will insist on obtaining for Russia as many prerequisites of a great power as possible, and among the prerequisites Russia has lacked throughout its history has been direct access to the Atlantic.

"If the other powers are ready to assure Russia unhampered access to the Atlantic through the Baltic and the Mediterranean," the survey said, "the Soviet Government might find this sufficient and not feel the need for some form of dominance over the territories of countries adjoining the Baltic and Black Seas."

This is a clipping from page 6 of the New York Times for Aug. 16, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Observers Fear Effect on Reds Of Peace Offer if Hitler Falls

By Constantine Brown.

The most important meeting between the American and British military and political leaders is scheduled to take place in the very near future. We have reached a vital crossroads of the war and political considerations again are overshadowing military problems.

From developments of the last month it is obvious that President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and their technical advisers will have to decide whether the tentative plans agreed on during the last meeting in May in Washington can continue, or whether our entire military and political strategy will have to be revamped.

Developments in the Reich in the last 10 days have attracted more attention in Washington and London political circles than appears on the surface.

Of the Axis' two European members, one, Italy, can be considered as having disappeared from the scene. Germany is left entirely alone to defend herself against a powerful combination of forces.

The Reich's political leaders have failed altogether. Hitler's "hunch strategy" has brought a relative disaster to the Wehrmacht.

In a short time we probably shall hear reliably that the Fuehrer has disappeared and in his downfall he is bound to drag all those closely associated with him since the days of the Munich beer hall putsch.

But Hitler is only an incident in Germany—much more so than Mussolini was in Italy.

Stooge for Military.

In the finaly analysis Hitler was the stooge of the military and the junkers who 10 years ago did not have enough behind them to create the new Reich. His advent to power was due to many circumstances. The help received from the old Reichswehr was not the most insignificant of these circumstances.

Hitler was accepted by the army and the junkers but he was never adopted by that ultra-aristocratic and militarist caste which has ruled Prussia and later Germany since the days of Frederick the Great.

Even in the heyday of Hitlerism Americans who used to be in close touch with the army men noticed a sarcastic smile every time Hitler was mentioned.

The war gave these men their chance. Had Hitler succeeded he would have continued to remain in power but he might have had to summon the support of the military caste to organize his world empire.

But from the day he failed the Army stepped in and decided to take over the responsibility of government.

No revolution, no upheaval in the Reich, not even the disastrous defeat of the last war, managed to shake the hold of these professional soldiers on the people of Germany.

Communism failed lamentably soon after the downfall of the monarchy because the generals did not approve of it. The masses in Germany followed the philosophy of their military men rather than the philosophy of those who wanted to make the Reich either a Communist state on the Russian pattern or a real democracy as was provided by the Weimar Constitution.

Germany accepted Hitler. He was a silver-tongued demagogue. The army saw in this starry-eyed Austrian the man who could rouse the masses as the generals could not do and re-establish the Reich as a military power, which he did.

Plans Amateurish.

His strategic plans were amateurish. The early victories of the German forces in Poland, Norway, the Lowlands and finally in France were due mostly to the utter lack of preparedness of Germany's antagonists.

In Russia things were different. The Soviet had been preparing for war for a much longer time than the Reich. The once ostracised empire in the East realized that sooner or later it would become the target of imperialistic-minded neighbors and since the death of Lenin and the downfall of Trotsky and his followers the Soviet government applied itself to the transformation of Russia into a first-class military power.

All the intelligence services of the powers in the West refused to believe that the slow-moving Russians would be able to stand up against the well-trained and "inspired" Nazi legions.

Events have proved how easy it is for men sitting behind desks and pouring over reports from doubtful sources to go wrong. The German, French, British and American intelligence services never realized how water-tight Russia had become as far as military and industrial information is concerned. They accepted fake information as truthful and their calculations went wrong.

To the allies this developed as a pleasant surprise from the day Russia joined their cause after the German attack in June, 1941, but to the Germans it meant their plans were all shot to pieces.

Instead of adopting a strategy of attrition which his generals are reported to have suggested, Hitler became stubborn and continued operations on a large scale in Egypt, for instance, where victory was actually within the reach of the forces commanded by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel.

Hitler's entire "military genius" was in jeopardy. A change of tactics would make him lose face with his own people and would give the generals too much prestige with the German people.

Russian Losses Heavy.

He believed that a change of strategy eventually would play against the Nazi cause, and to him that was more important than Germany itself. The Russians could not be cracked. Hundreds of thousands of Germans perished on the Russian plains.

But at the same time the Germans' invasion caused the Russians to lose many more men than they were willing to sacrifice, and ruined the Soviet's most productive industrial areas.

This is a clipping from
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For a long time the German generals have proclaimed their belief in a collaboration with the Soviets since it was obvious to them that the Anglo-Saxon powers, in their desire to prevent a recurrence of war, would no longer be satisfied with a skimpy peace as was concluded in 1919.

The most powerful Nazi military force was gathered on the Russian front this year. No fewer than 3,500,000 men, provided with the most modern weapons and an aviation amounting to 4,000 planes, were concentrated on a 2,000-mile front.

Unless the opinion of the American military men is wrong the Nazi generals no longer intend to deliver a final blow to the Russians. The Nazi operations early in July have been regarded here as a defensive-offensive to prevent a Soviet attempt to break through the German lines.

Since this did not succeed, it appears obvious to military observers that the Nazis have been preparing a withdrawal of their forces toward the shorter Dnieper line even though it meant a death blow to Hitler's prestige.

Of the 352 Nazi divisions about 225 have been engaged in Russia.

By shortening the front and thus losing in rearguard actions about 15 divisions, the Germans still will have 337 divisions—a powerful defensive force which can defend the German fortress for a long time.

Would Protect Oil Field.

The collapse of the Fascist regime in Italy is said to have caused only limited concern in German military quarters. From the strictly strategic point of view, it means that the German forces can establish themselves on the Po River front with an extension toward Yugoslavia in order to prevent Hungary from abandoning the ship and to protect the Rumanian oil fields.

It seems unlikely that the Nazis will make much of an effort to defend Greece.

So much for the military situation which has been created by Hitler's "hunch strategy."

Politically the situation is obscure.

In many highly responsible quarters there is unconcealed concern over what the Russian policy would be in the event Nazi-ism disappears from the Reich and is replaced by what may be described as a "military democracy."

All efforts of the American and the British governments to fathom the mind of Premier Stalin have been fruitless. The Russian leader is polite toward the unofficial Ambassadors which are dispatched to him, but so far he has stubbornly refused to get together with Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill and discuss the common problems of the United Nations.

Stalin accepts the lease-lend goods as a natural contribution of the western democracies—investments on their part for their security—and as the least they could do as a reward for the enormous sacrifices Russia has made.

The Soviet Premier considers that manpower is far more important than goods and whenever he becomes more loquacious he points out that the Allies so far have been on a military maneuver and have not yet tasted actual warfare.

It would be exceeding the bounds of discretion to say that he is strongly suspicious of the motives of the western powers. He indorsed the Atlantic Charter because as far as his own country was concerned, it was immaterial whether he accepted it or not.

Pacific Situation Satisfies.

He knew the Allies would not make another casus belli if he insisted on keeping for Russia certain territories which had been parts of the Soviet before the charter came into existence.

The Premier knew that if Germany collapsed under the Russian blows it would be he who would have the last word at any peace table. As far as we have been able to ascertain his interest in the Pacific is limited to whether or not Siberia may be the target of Japan's greed. He is said to be satisfied that such will not be the case since the Nipponese Empire is bound to have a heavy

(See OBSERVERS, Page C-3.)

Observers

(Continued From Page C-1.)

fight on its hands as soon as the Americans have finished their part in the European war.

But Stalin has stated repeatedly that the wrath of the Soviet armed forces is directed at the Nazis and he makes a strong differentiation between the Hitlerites and the rest of the German people. He went so far as to push this differentiation in regard to the Wehrmacht. All men fighting under Hitler's banner are described in the Russian official communiques as Hitlerites.

But it is feared here that the day that banner is dropped he may look on the situation from what may be described as "a realistic point of view." The practical-minded Soviet leader does not wish chaos in Europe. And he believes that the German Army—the one which no longer has the swastika as an insignia—would be an important stabilizing element.

These facts are causing a good deal of uneasiness in Washington and London.

For strong reasons President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill have adopted as a slogan for the United Nations the two momentous words "unconditional surrender." This may have been a wise or an unwise thing to do. The future alone will tell. Italy may be terrified into such a surrender because of its unbelievable weakness. It is doubtful whether Germany can be intimidated into a surrender.

But, faced with a determination on the part of the leaders of the English-speaking countries to force Germany to her knees, it seems likely that the German military chieftains must necessarily turn toward the East and Russia to try to save the Reich from being dismembered.

There is every indication, although there is nothing definite as yet, that this is the policy the German generals will adopt as soon as they find it convenient to get rid of their once "much-beloved Fuehrer."

What Stalin's reaction will be under such circumstances, and how we can reconcile with our "unconditional surrender" stand an eventual inclination on his part to discuss peace, is a matter which is bound to receive the utmost consideration at the meeting between the American and British leaders.

So will our strategy regarding the European theater of operations and some decision must be made taking into consideration the possibility that we may be confronted with a German Army which no longer will have to worry about an eastern front.

More Muddle On Russia

Everybody says that, of course, we've got to get along with the Russians, but the fact remains that our relations with Moscow today are steadily getting worse and there are no signs whatever that either we or the Russians are doing anything about it.

Take the latest little flare-up over whether Stalin was invited to attend the Churchill-Roosevelt conference in Quebec. The Soviet news agency, Tass, says Stalin was not invited. Both the White House and the State Dept. skate all around the subject, but never come clean as to whether he was or he wasn't.

On Friday there was no comment at the White House on the Tass story except a reference to FDR's press conference earlier in the week which had left the specfic question hanging in the air.

And Secretary Hull, with one of those involved answers that say nothing, told his press conference that he had not checked closely into the question because the President usually gave personal attention to such matters. He didn't seem the slightest bit aware that he was convicting himself of an extraordinary degree of ignorance in a matter which ought to be keeping any American Secretary of State awake half the night.

But he did say in classic phrases that there was no doubt FDR and the heads of the other United Nations were keeping one another informed on all phases of their respective situations and attitudes.

To which the answer is nonsense, and why can't people say what they have to say without beating about 40 bushes in which to say it?

Maybe there was no reason to ask Stalin to this conference. Maybe Churchill and FDR have enough problems of particular interest to the U. S. A. and Great Britain to warrant a wholly British-American meeting. But why let the entire business become clouded in a fuzzy, hair-splitting contest in semantics that is simply one more useless hindrance to solution of a problem that is difficult enough at best?

And the problem seems no nearer solution than it did a year ago. Militarily, the Russians still are calling for a second front in Europe. We say we've already opened a second front, that what the Russians are talking about is a third front. More semantics, this time arithmetical. Perhaps we're doing the best we can. There is good reason to think that we are and that we'll soon be doing lots more. But we've failed to convince the Russians, and, when you argue with them, all they'll answer is: "We're fighting 200 German divisions, you're fighting two or three."

Eventually, this military problem will solve itself as we really get rolling, but there still are vast political problems that are not being approached by either side with the candor that is essental. The Russians start a free Germany movement about which we know nothing, despite Hull's assurances that both sides are keeping each other informed. And we follow a policy of placating a Badoglio government in Italy that arouses a whole new train of Russian suspicions all over again.

Even now the anti-Soviet, isolationist press in the U. S. A. is in full cry against Russia with a boldness that its editors manfully curbed when they weren't quite so sure that we would win the war. In the last few weeks, we've had accusations that Russia is going to make a deal with Germany; that Russia wants to communize all of Europe; that Russia wants to keep us out of Europe, though God knows how this squares with the cordial invitations the Russians have been giving us for the past year and a half to come in. Now the latest is that the Russians want to pull some kind of a deal in the Far East that will squeeze us, the British and the Dutch out.

It's silly to stop and argue now as to whose fault it is that neither we nor the Russians have been making any progress in getting together. If FDR and Churchill and Stalin don't seem to be able to get together then, at least, some of the smaller fry ought to. Russia has had no ambasador in Washington since May 10; we have in Moscow, Adm. Standley, who, at best, is no heavyweight. The least we can do is get our respective ambassadorial relations on a sound basis.

If there is any one job that FDR and Churchill need to tackle at Quebec, it is the horrible mess into which our relations with Moscow are getting. Because if we don't solve it, we're headed for a first-class disaster.

—ALEXANDER H. UHL

This is a clipping from
page 2 of P M
for Aug. 15, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of
Government

By Joseph E. Davies

One Goal for All . . . A Decent, Peaceful World

Distrust Between Russia and Her Allies Plays Into Hands of Nazis

The Soviet Union must play a key part in the postwar world, 'ormer Ambassador to Russia Joseph E. Davies argues in the fol- owing article, the third and final in a series.

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9S

One strong impression that I had five years ago has been confirmed, namely that the Soviet people and their leaders desire, above all else, a peaceful world.

They believe in Great Britain, the United States, and he United Nations. They demand respect and confidence in their ood faith.

If they, in turn, have confidence in the good faith, and the will f the four great powers of the earth and the other United Nations o create a community of nations in the world where law and rder will be maintained, in my opinion, they will go the whole ay as high-mindedly, as altruistically, and as unselfishly as any f the nations of the earth.

There are a few in our country ho still bicker at Russia; who still arp at Russia; who still quarrel at ie way they ve and conduct ieir own gov- mment, which exclusively ieir own busi- ess.

Davies

To do this is play Hitler's ame. Every ossible thing iat Goebbels' ropaganda ma- iine can do to iake us fear and hate Russia, and iake Russia fear and hate us, Hit- r's machine is doing. It is the only ing which might save the skins of ie Nazis.

It is neither sensible, wise, nor right to encourage criticism of the good faith of the Soviet Government, or attacks upon its leaders. The conditions under which our children's children will live may depend upon what we do now.

A Decent World

And why should there not be complete mutual respect, friendship, and understanding? What we are all concerned with is a decent world, and preventing these Fascist aggressors from dominating the earth.

With Fascism dominating the world, there would be neither physical security nor freedom for either thought or spiritual aspiration anywhere.

The purposes and policies of the Soviet Union, both as to the war and as to the peace, are all in accord with what we and the decent nations of the earth desire.

These have all been publicly declared and formalized by the Soviet government. That government has an enviable reputation for maintaining its pledged and plighted word.

These declarations are briefly as follows:

¶ By a great and historic treaty with Great Britain, the Soviet Union has pledged itself to cooperate both during and after the war, and to make no separate peace,

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but to fight to the end against Hitler.

¶ The Soviet government has formally adhered to the Washington Declaration of the United Nations against Hitler.

¶ The Foreign Office of the Soviet Union has formally declared the aims and policies of the Soviet Union, and of its government. These have been authorized by their constitutional bodies, and have been guaranteed by Marshal Stalin.

Aims

These are declared to be:

¶ To completely destroy the threat of Hitler aggression and Fascism, and to make it impossible for the future; that its sole interest in Europe is to prevent conquered peoples from being enslaved by Hitler, or anyone else.

¶ That the Soviet Union seeks only that territory which is its own, and has no aggressive designs of territorial conquest.

¶ The policy of the Soviet Union is dedicated to collective security, and to the establishment of peace in the world, based upon the preservation of order through the enforcement of law.

¶ The Soviet Union has formally and publicly declared, through Marshal Stalin, that it will not interfere with the domestic policies or politics of any foreign state.

The Comintern was recently abolished by the Soviets in a desire to clearly establish this fact to the world, and in the words of Marshal Stalin: "to facilitate the organization of the common onslaught of all freedom-loving nations against the common enemy—Hitlerism; and to expose the lie of the Hitlerites to the effect that 'Moscow' allegedly intends to intervene in the life of other nations and to 'Bolshevize' them. An end has now been put to this lie."

A Suggestion

With purposes such as these, and with its past record of performing its obligations, there is every reason why the United Nations should not only accept these professions, but should accord to the Soviet Union that respect and confidence to which it is entitled as one of the great nations of the earth.

If peace is to be established for a reasonable time it must be because the great nations of the earth, including Russia and the other United Nations, shall enter into an agreement or a contract to restore peace, maintain it, and protect it.

In the consideration of the problems of world peace, to which all the best minds of the earth are addressing themselves, there are, in the experiences of our pioneer countries, and in the pioneer experience of the Soviet Union and of the great Dominions of the British Empire, facts which might well be considered in the planning of a future world order.

The community of nations on this shrunken globe is not unlike the early pioneer communities of our western frontiers. Each settler was practically a law unto himself, much the same as the nations today.

When these pioneers found that their security was violated by a neighbor, a bandit, or a horse thief who took the law into his own hands, they organized a volunteer posse, who took it on themselves to enforce an unwritten law based on right and wrong. They punished the guilty in order to protect the collective security of themselves and their families.

This is about the present status of the world community. The United Nations have organized a posse to stop a group of bandits who are breaking the peace and trying to run the community of nations.

Slow and Sure

After our ancestors in the wilderness had finished the first job of restoring peace and order, they then enacted laws and provided for officers to enforce them. But they did it, not overnight, but by slow and

sure processes of common sense and growth.

Each step forward involved giving up some individual freedom for the security of all. Each surrender of a right made the larger freedom and safety of the community in which they lived more secure.

This done, these pioneers turned to jointly building schools, lighting and water plants, hospitals and other enterprises for common benefit. Then they turned to joint efforts to bring economic betterment, and they brought new factories and new enterprises into the community to better the standard of living in the community.

That is how "collective security" and a "Brave New World" of economic and spiritual betterment came to the young, but great communities, in our pioneer countries.

That may be oversimplified for world consumption. But the best guide to the future is the experience of the past. And principles are always simple. That is why they are principles.

The overwhelming necessity of the Soviet Union and ourselves, and indeed of all the United Nations, is that out of this war there should come such postwar co-operation as would make the world a reasonably safe and decent place for people to live in, in peace. To effect this, it is clear that an agreement between the great nations of the earth is required.

Confidence

In our private lives we do not refrain from entering into advantageous contracts with other parties which are beneficial to both parties, because we happen to be of different or religious beliefs. What we do require is confidence in the word of the other party. Is it not perfectly clear that this same principle should apply to nations as well as to individuals?

We know, too, that without the aid of Russia in this war, we would have been in desperate jeopardy.

It is, I believe, not an overstatement to assert that but for the resistance of the Red Army and the Soviet Union, the Germans would have overrun Africa; might have made Tunisia impossible, and might have made junction with the Japs in India and on the Persian Gulf. Had that happened, our enemies, and not we, would today be dictating global strategy. We should not forget the tremendous debt we owe to the Soviet Union.

There can be no certain victory in this war without Russia. There can be no postwar adjustment, and no postwar peace that will be effective with Russia outside it.

Like the rest of the nation's winning this war, Russia is too big to be left out. What is more important still, is that no great enterprise for peace could be justly projected without the Soviet Union included as a respected, full and trusted partner.

They have earned it. They deserve it. The world needs it.

Clipped at the Seat of Government

The Russian View of the Post-War World

A correspondent finds that the Russians seek to be secure from foreign attack while they rebuild their devastated country and strive for national prosperity.

What role will Russia play in the organization of the post-war world? The question assumes greater importance every day. Here is an attempt to answer it by a correspondent who has been observing developments in Russia for the past three years.

By Alexander Werth

MOSCOW *(By Wireless.)*

WHILE the Russian people were fighting a life-and-death struggle against the German invader and there was no certainty when and where he would be stopped, there was no inclination to speak of post-war reconstruction problems, either internal or international. Today, though all energies and all propaganda are on the surface concerned with the prosecution of the war, there is below the surface much planning and thinking of what the Soviet Union will be like after the victory.

In the army, as among civilians, there is much day-dreaming of a happy future for Russia—a future which the Russian people feel they have so amply deserved. The main features of this post-war Russia will be prosperity, security and strength. Every Russian is conscious of the immense possibilities for developing this vast country and is conscious also of the "glorious life" that can be built up in not many years for the Russian people if anything like the energy, determination and skill shown in this war is applied to the country's reconstruction and development.

Russia is keenly interested in security, and she is unable to visualize such security without a satisfactory international settlement of the European problem. The western frontiers toward which she aims are those of 1941—that is, they include the western Ukraine, northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

The Russians are perfectly sincere in their desire for an independent Poland. Russia would genuinely prefer Poland to be independent, provided, however, she did not end by becoming the nucleus of an "East European Federation" which in effect would be a cordon sanitaire directed against Russia and eventually, if not immediately, controlled by the Germans. Certain Polish circles in London have been playing with this idea of an East European Federation, from which Russia would not only be excluded but which would be essentially directed against Russia. Russia sees her security problem as being largely solved through that cooperation between the East European countries and herself, which is exemplified in Premier Joseph Stalin's offer to the Polish people of a military alliance with the Soviet Union.

The problem of Germany is also chiefly considered by the Russians in terms of Russian security—that is, in terms of non-repetition of German aggression. This implies, among other things, the industrial weakening of Germany—a process which happily is being already substantially carried out by the Allied bombings of the Ruhr and the Rhineland. But the degree of security that the Soviet Union will obtain as a result of an international settlement of the German problem and of European problems generally is something which the future alone will show, and on this degree of security will depend the extent to which Russia will maintain a large army after the war.

There is no inclination to take any chances. Apart from the direct threat of German military revival there is, the Russians feel, always the possibility of certain European and even non-European powers becoming alarmed by the "excessive" military strength of the Soviet Union and starting an alarmist campaign, if not against "bolshevism," at least against what in effect would mean the same thing—Russian imperialism.

The Russians consider such campaigns possible, though anyone knowing Russia knows well that Russia has no imperialist ambitions, since there is nothing she needs less than "Lebensraum."

EVERY young Russian's imagination is stirred not by dreams of conquest but by dreams of development, of travel and the exploration of Arctic Siberia and central Asia. But in the first five or ten years after the war the main national effort will obviously be directed to a reconstruction of the immense areas devastated by the Germans, to the development of housing in cities like Moscow, to the transformation of part of the war industries to peace requirements, and especially to the rational reconstruction of agriculture.

Many thousands of new tractors will have to be made, and the livestock prob-

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lem will be one of the most acute at the end of the war, as, in fact, it is already. There will be an immense demand for consumers' goods, and during the initial post-war period, at any rate, there should be large possibilities in this direction for American and British industries.

With construction in Russia herself in full progress there probably will not be much she can export to America and Britain except timber, which Britain, in her rebuilding process, will require in vast quantities. Without being necessarily autarchist, Russia will, however, in not so many years after the war, become inevitably almost self-supporting.

THIS war has been an unspeakable tragedy for the Russian people, and they will avoid its repetition at any price. They will therefore be very wary of premature disarmament and there are numerous indications that Russia will continue to maintain a large army, which will be eventually reduced only if there is an excellent prospect of a lasting general peace. Measures are already being taken for maintaining large cadres of a peacetime army, and young officers are being invited to take up a military career.

Altogether there is a general tendency to take a long view of the future in Russia. A matter of serious thought is the population problem linked with the education problem.

It is freely admitted that the growth of the Russian population has suffered from many causes in the last thirty years: the 1914-18 war, the civil war with the accompanying hunger and epidemics, the relaxing of the family principle, the abortion laws which were not abolished until 1936, and also by (Continued on Page 32)

(Continued from Page 5)

the large social and revolutionary changes.

Lastly, this war, both directly and indirectly, has enormously reduced the population. There are more than 4,000,000 killed, mostly vigorous young men; there are many more wounded and some disabled. Much worse numerically are the number of Soviet citizens who are more or less in German captivity and the appalling economic conditions in the occupied areas, in which the mortality rate, especially child mortality, is fearful. In Kharkov during the seventeen months of German occupation about 100,000 persons died from hunger and disease, in addition to 40,000 or 50,000 murdered and 1,000 to 10,000 reported taken to Germany.

THE physique of the Soviet population in German-occupied territories has deteriorated terribly and it is a great question how many physically fit people with the capacity of breeding healthy children will be left from the millions under German occupation and from those sent into German captivity. The problem affects at least 60,000,000 Soviet citizens.

Much privation and physical deterioration has also been suffered in some other parts of the Soviet Union, especially Leningrad, and the mass evacuations have resulted in extremely difficult housing conditions and often difficult food conditions—though generally children and working adults have not been allowed to suffer from the food shortage.

Furthermore, during the war years, with practically no home-leave possible in the Red Army owing to the long distances, transport difficulties and because generally home-leave has a relaxing effect on the soldier, and with millions of women engaged in very hard labor in field and industry, there has been an inevitable decline in the birth rate. Both for security and for economic development Russia will require a large increase in the birth rate in the next quarter of a century.

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The propaganda and economic encouragement used in the last years before the war to encourage a solid and large family unit will undoubtedly be resumed after the war. As far as possible this is being done already.

ONE of the most significant educational developments in this respect is the end of coeducation. In Moscow this was terminated last winter in the case of children 13 to 17. But now the reform has gone many steps further and has indeed been generalized. All boys and girls from 8 years old onward will henceforth go to separate boys' and girls' schools not only in Moscow and other large cities but as soon as possible throughout Russia.

Education specialists writing in the press are careful to stress that this is not in anyway a departure from the great principle of sex equality which they say is one of the revolution's great permanent conquests, but they admit that coeducation has not produced the best results in many cases. There are psychological and physiological objections because it is a scientific fact that girls and boys do not develop at the same ages at the same rate. Girls' most rapid period of physical and mental growth is in the early teens, while boys progress most rapidly from 13 to 17. Therefore coeducation has, as it were, the disadvantages of a convoy in which the speed of all ships is determined by the speed of the slowest ship. In other words, at a certain age girls are able to make more rapid progress than boys and at another age vice versa and the one tends to be delayed by the other.

But that is not at present the main objection to coeducation. It is considered wrong from the standpoint of the future of the Soviet Union to give identical secondary education to boys and girls. Sex equality remains an undisputed principle and this is shown by the fact that boys and girls will continue to receive the same general knowledge. But the big differentiation starts when it comes to specialized knowledge.

War experience has shown that the role of men and women in the country's life and economy is essentially different in many respects. As the director of one of the principal Moscow secondary schools put it:

"There is an inevitable separation of men and women. The man must be a soldier, so every boy must prepare for the stern soldier's life. * * * He must receive a physical and military training while still at school. * * * Even at the front there is a separation of labor between men and women. Girls do invaluable work as nurses and signalers and in supply work, but so far as I know girls do not partake in attacks. They do not build bridges or roads because this is hard men's work. There are also kinds of work in the rear girls cannot do."

SO while a boy is essentially a growing soldier the girl is a future mother. The same writer says:

"The woman has an exceptional, important function in the State. She is a mother. She must know how to look after the upbringing of children."

Under the new program of segregation of the sexes in the schools, girls are taught not only anatomy, physiology, hygiene and pedology, but also such seemingly "bourgeois" trades—one might say virtues—as needlework, sewing, housekeeping and especially cooking. These last named are to be given particular attention in all extramural studies conducted after school hours by the Pioneer organization, the Komsomol, etc.

Boys will concentrate on technical studies with a view to specialization in the great economic, reconstruction and development years lying ahead of the Soviet Union and in military training, because the international situation may, for all one knows, still require the maintenance of a large army, or at any rate maintenance of a state of military efficiency and preparedness.

Thus Russia, judging from the latest trends in education, will be essentially a country of technically efficient and mil-

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(Continued from Page 32)
tarily prepared men and of family and child-conscious womanhood. This does not mean that women will be debarred from responsible positions or competition with men, but the trend is unmistakable, nevertheless. The cult of the teachers' authority and especially the parents' authority has been the subject of two long articles recently in Komsomolskaya Pravda. These have attracted much attention and aroused much discussion in youth circles. They are also typical of the present trend.

IN wartime, particularly, there has been a tendency among boys with the father at the front and the mother working in a factory to "run wild." One of the articles in question points out the dangers of such excessive independence and combats both this tendency and the earlier tendency which developed in the early years of the revolution among youngsters to treat their parents indulgently as amiable but ignorant old duffers.

The Komsomolskaya Pravda article demands from the young a solemn and earnest attitude toward parents and also toward the question of marriage. It says it is wrong when young people suddenly get married on the spur of the moment, often even without consulting parents and benefiting by the parents' experience.

"There is much to be said for the old custom, when a young man was presented to the girl's parents and 'asked for her hand,'" writes Protopopova in Komsomolskaya Pravda.

Similarly in another article recently in the same paper it was argued that the teachers' authority should be strengthened by propaganda among the youth organizations themselves. Teachers must be taken very seriously as men who, from the child's early age, instill in him essential qualities of the Soviet Union: civil sense and patriotism. "Nobody wants the reintroduction of flogging in the schools, but there must be discipline and a sense of responsibility and a feeling of respect for the teacher," and the article cites what it considers intolerable cases of cheek and answering back marking some youngsters' attitude toward teachers.

ALL this is typical of the present trend—strong family ties, civil and school discipline, solemnity of marriage and the cult of motherhood and childhood. How very unlike the wild "Bolshie" society of popular imagination this looks and also how unlike that moral relaxation which was inevitable in the midst of early years of revolutionary turmoil! It is all part of the same mental process through which the Russian people have gone. They are a nation of patriots. First and foremost, they are passionately interested in the security and prosperity of their own country. International problems they considered first and foremost with reference to this domestic security and prosperity. The Russian people and Government are completely uninterested in "bolshevizing" the outer world. I have seen Russian engineers who have come from America recently. They respect the capitalism that works efficiently and as a social service to the community and not merely for profit. One such engineer said:

"I spent several months in the United States working in an aircraft factory. And do you know, the man I liked most? It was the big boss. He worked seventeen and eighteen hours a day. He earned a lot of money, but that was not his main interest. His main interest was the efficiency of his works. He put on overalls every morning and spent the day supervising production and discussing fine points and getting new ideas. He was like the director of some of our big arms factories. They also get very high pay. There isn't much difference, really. What we do not like is capitalism for profit only. But that is rapidly disappearing."

Russia will want to feel secure and she won't worry about "bolshevizing" anybody. She has more than enough on her hands to rebuild and develop her own country. But Russia can only be a constructively peaceful member of the community of nations if she feels the good-will of other countries, especially the United States and Britain. Any encouragement given to Polish schemes to isolate Russia can only provoke Russia and create here an attitude of grave distrust and so discourage those peacefully constructive trends which are so visible now.

From page
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Clipped at the Seat of Government.

EQUALLY dangerous would be any attempt to play off Russia against Germany. It would only tend to prompt the Russians to play a similar game—playing off Germany against those who are trying to play her off against Russia. She wouldn't enjoy it.

Actually the deepest conviction of every Russian today is that the best bet for the future is the closest possible cooperation of Britain, America and herself. This is the only completely constructive alliance possible which can secure for the world a century, perhaps centuries, of peace, quiet and prosperity. It would be the ugliest tragedy if any of the three partners were to fall out.

Even today this triple alliance so immensely promising in its results, is often marred by suspicions—suspicions about eventual "bolshevization" attempts, on the one side, and suspicions about sinister political motives underlying delays in opening a full-scale second front, on the other side. On both sides there has been the accumulation of twenty-five years of suspicion and it cannot be completely lived down in two years.

Some words have a sort of hypnotizing power, and such a word is bolshevism. No one knows it better than Dr. Goebbels. I think that if the Russians became convinced in the next few months—they are not yet—that the Allies were making an absolutely 100 per cent effort to smash Hitler quickly, every suspicion would be removed on their side. And once the Russians' wholehearted friendship is thus won, there will be less need than ever for suspicions on our part about her post-war ambitions.

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Russian post-war aims include the western frontiers of 1941 shown in shaded area.

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By Joseph Davies

Russia's Rich Hinterland... An Unconquerable World

Siberia Has Thriving Boom Cities, Agricultural Wealth to Feed an Empire

Former Ambassador to Russia Joseph E. Davies tells in the following article of the vast changes he saw in the Urals and Siberia as he flew low over these once remote regions on his return from his second mission to Moscow.

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PM Exclusive

During my stay in Russia six years ago, I travelled thousands of miles over White Russia, the Ukraine, Caucasus, and the Donets Basin, inspecting industry and agriculture in a region where it was reported 60 per cent of the industry of Russia was located. This time I wanted to see more of the Urals and the Siberian country for myself, so I came back via Alaska.

In one Ural city I saw plants which had been transported bodily from Kiev and Kharkov. **With these plants families were transported by thousands of freight cars.**

Hundreds of large two-and-a-half-story brick houses in whole sub-divisions for miles on end, had been erected in 18 months for these workers. I had heard and read of it, but to see it gives one an appreciation of the terrific job these people have done.

Joseph E. Davies

As for Siberia, I shall never forget the impression it made. For hundreds of miles it is one vast expanse of beautiful rolling country dotted with lakes, groves of trees, traversed by wide sweeping rivers, and ridges.

Bread Basket

Flying over this country at an altitude of 1000 to 1500 feet, I saw a tremendous agricultural region. There were hundreds and hundreds of square miles of great fields, bigger than our townships, in different colors of grain, all planted with precision, and from the air, looking orderly and well kept.

The agricultural wealth east of Moscow in Siberia could feed an empire. And all along in this frontier, which corresponds to our West, I saw great cities—boom cities, laid out in squares like our prairie towns, dotted with factories, huge plants and chimneys all over the place—one small Pittsburgh after another; cities that a few years ago did not have a population exceeding a few thousand, now with a population in the hundreds of thousands.

Base of Strategy

I saw one plant which was turning out fighting planes, the designs of which were unknown in June, 1941; and the factories for which, and machine tools for which, did not exist two years ago.

The impression of power, innate strength, vigor, and pioneer energy which one gets from this great section, is extraordinary.

This hinterland of wealth, resources, and power, guarded by natural barriers of high mountains and great distances, and these developments, are the cornerstone of Soviet military strategy. Both their army and war plans are undoubtedly based upon this fact.

They have an unconquerable new world behind them into which, if need be, they can always retreat. Never need the military authorities of Russias allies fear that the Red Army will be destroyed.

Their strategy will be, if necessary, to fall back again and again, into the big, new bases of agricultural and armaments production, while the German lines grow longer and longer and more easy to bomb or sabotage, and more vulnerable.

(Since Davies' visit, the Red Army has launched its great Summer offensive, the question now is

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how far forward the Russians can drive—no longer how deep they can retreat and remain unconquered.

Napoleon reached Moscow to be smothered in the fastnesses of Russia. **There remain still thousands of miles of the Russian featherbed to destroy the German Wehrmacht, if Hitler penetrates it.**

Anyone seeing this country would be convinced, I believe, that Hitler, and no one else for that matter, could conquer this land and people.

Small World

The trip itself was for me an extraordinary experience. I traveled around the earth, covering 28,000 miles, a greater distance than around the world at the equator.

Leaving Moscow on Saturday morning, we crossed Asia to arrive in Seattle on the following Monday night.

In four days we had traversed a distance that formerly would have required four weeks. The world has become a mighty small place.

This shrinkage of the earth has made the Soviet Union and its relationship of exceptional and vital importance to the American continent, and particularly to us.

Right now, the war in Russia is only two days distance from our shores by modern air transport.

We will soon be still more closely interlocked with airplanes across the pole. Moscow will be only overnight from New York.

Russia, the United States and Canada—these three nations and only these three—will meet at that hub, and in fact, be that hub of the world.

To appreciate the full significance of this situation we need only to think of what might happen.

If by any mischance, Japan and Germany were to get Russia in a nutcracker and crush the Soviet Union, Hitler's and Tojo's armies would have less than 30 miles of water to cross in a land march to dictate peace in Washington, as the Japs have boasted they would do.

What is Russia's attitude toward the peace? What can be expected of her?

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Russia—II

Value of Allied Air Front Not Realized As a Major Effort in Helping Soviet

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Events yesterday and in recent ays have made it clear that, from ie Soviet point of view, there are vo major stumbling blocks in ie way of Anglo-American-Rus-an understanding.

One of them deals with post-ar ambitions. Russia is unques-onably determined to annex or to ominate the Baltic States, prob-oly eastern Poland, Bessarabia in umania, probably small parts of inland and possibly northern an. These can be assumed to be er minimum territorial ambitions.

The other major problem, one at has caused Russian suspicion this country, is Anglo-American ilure to establish what the Rus-ans call a "second front."

Actually what might properly be rmed a second front and a third ont have been established—one the Mediterranean, first in orth Africa and now in Sicily and ie skies above southern Europe, nd a "front" in the air above estern Europe. But the Russians ean by a "second front" a great nd effort on the European Conti-ent, most probably across the hannel from England. And they ill undoubtedly be dissatisfied ith existing Allied military ef-orts until such a front is estab-shed, or until they understand etter than they now do the im-ortance to them and to the Rus-ian front of the two fronts that he British and Americans have stablished.

This lack of understanding is ot wholly Russia's fault. We have ot blown our own horn very well Russia; we have not met Rus-ian realism with equal realism; e have not insisted on a real utual exchange of vital war in-ormation.

Land Front Admittedly Needed

This correspondent agrees with he Russian contention that a land ront in western Europe will prob-bly be essential to final victory. ut the Russians do not seem to ealize—partly because of their bsence from our conferences—hat this is a belief shared by most merican military men. Our lead-rs, however, are not willing to im-eril the war's outcome by great nd insufficiently prepared gam-les. We believe that time is es-ential for the preparation of an uch great venture as the invasion f western Europe.

Soviet leaders have failed to evaluate properly the effects upon the war and upon the Russian front of our efforts. Probably 500 to 1,000 planes were diverted from the Russian front last year when we invaded North Africa. Recently some planes have been transferred from Russia to western Europe and to Sicily.

Only a small number of land units have been transferred; but Germany is on the defensive in Russia today not because of the power of the Russian Army alone, but because two other fronts have been established around Europe and because these fronts and the threat of additional fronts have forced the Nazis to disperse their strength and have weakened the Reich's war potential. Were Germany free to concentrate against Russia alone, Russia might well be doomed.

The recent raid on the Ploesti oil refineries in Rumania, like nearly every other operation undertaken in Europe by Britain and the United States, was conducted largely with one end in view:

"With the strength that we now have available and the means at hand, what can we do that will most help Russia and reduce the German strength on the Russian front?"

Russia Refused Plane Bases

The Ploesti refineries have been supplying the German and other Axis forces in south and central Russia with much of their gasoline and oil. It was fully agreed by Anglo-American leaders that the damage or destruction of these refineries, no matter how costly to us, would be well worth the cost, as it would make the German position in southern Russia more difficult and would greatly complicate the Nazis' oil refining and oil transportation system.

In other words, it would directly affect German operations in the East, but would affect only indirectly German operations in the Mediterranean and in western Europe, where we were engaged against them. Despite this, it is important to note that the Liberator bombers that attacked Ploesti flew from bases across the Mediterranean, probably from Egypt or Libya. The nearest North African Allied air base to Ploesti is on the tip of the Bengazi hump, 960 miles away, 600 miles of it across enemy-held territory. From Egyptian bases, the distance is 1,065 miles, 210 miles of it across enemy-held territory. From Syrian bases, the distance is about 840 miles, 160 miles of it across enemy-held territory.

But from bases near the Black Sea in Russia, say, near Krasnodar, the distance is only 625 miles, and all except about 180 miles of this is over the waters of the Black Sea. Had our planes been based on Russia, a larger bomb load could have been carried and, to put it baldly, fewer American lives probably would have been lost.

In the Ploesti raid, the Russians' refusal to permit use of their territory as bombing bases in operations against a common enemy probably not only cost us unnecessary losses but also reduced the efficiency of the operation and thereby hurt Russia's cause as well as our own.

And the air bombardment of Germany proper could also be extended with the aid of Russian bases. British or American long-range bombers, based east of Leningrad or east of Velikiye Luki, could raid east Prussian points and other objectives in eastern Germany not now reached by bombs.

"Air Front" Is a Major Front

The Russians have refused to realize the tremendous significance to them of the "air front" over Germany. Yet the facts show that this is now a major front. Not only are many German planes that would otherwise be available in the East occupied in attempting to repel Allied air assault; not only are hundreds of thousands of Germans occupied in anti-aircraft defenses, civilian defense and other activities, but the blasting power of Allied bombs is slowly helping to reduce Germany's ability to wage war. The air bombardment of Germany is an internal blockade, and neither this nor the effects of the external blockade of Europe, enforced by Allied navies and Allied air power, is appreciated in Russia.

This is in part natural. Russia is a continental power, a land power. To her, both the sea and air are subsidiary; to us, they are major. Russia has no conception of sea warfare nor of the immense meaning, in terms of logistics, of sheer effort, of the war in the Pacific. Nor has she much comprehension of the difficulties of supply in terms of sea transport, or of the great efforts required to defeat the Nazi submarine campaign.

Mutual understanding must be the basis of any agreement. That understanding, in so far as Russia and the rest of the United Nations are concerned, is not pronounced today. It must be achieved quickly if there is to be the slightest post-war hope for a durable peace. And it must be achieved quickly if there is to be much hope of concerted strategic effort.

But it will not be achieved by one-way "cooperation"; it will not be achieved without a greater frankness and more "team spirit" on the Russian part. And it will not be achieved by hiding our own light under a bushel. The Russians must understand what Britain and America have done and are doing in this war, just as we have understood, aided and admired the courageous and indomitable sacrifices of the Russians.

This is a clipping from page ___ of the New York Times for Jan. 3, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

RUSSIA DENIES BID TO QUEBEC PARLEY

Says 'Character' of Meeting Precludes Soviet Participation —Surprise in Washington

By The Associated Press.

LONDON, Friday, Aug. 13—The Soviet Government today answered criticism of the absence of Russian delegates to the forthcoming Roosevelt-Churchill conference at Quebec by saying that such Russian participation "was not and is not suggested."

"The Soviet Government did not receive an invitation to be present at the meeting," said an official Moscow broadcast recorded by the Soviet monitor.

President Roosevelt already had disclosed in Washington that Russian representatives would not attend the conference, but he said that did not mean he would not be awfully glad to have them present.

The Moscow radio quoted the following statement, which the official agency Tass said it was "authorized" to make:

"The Tass news agency denies that Stalin or any representative of the Soviet Government will participate at the forthcoming meet-

Continued on Page Four

RUSSIA DENIES BID TO QUEBEC PARLEY

Continued From Page One

ing between President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill.

"The British Reuter agency, basing itself on the American radio station Columbia, reporting on the meeting now taking place in Quebec of Roosevelt and Churchill, suggested that leaders of the Soviet Government should be present. [The meeting actually has not occurred yet so far as is known.]

"On the other hand, the British newspapers Daily Telegraph, Morning Post and Daily Express, and some others, published a report that the Soviet Military Attaché will be present at the Anglo-American talk as an observer.

"Tass is authorized to state that these reports are based on a misunderstanding. The Soviet Government did not receive an invitation to be present at the meeting, and because of the character of the conference the participation of any one representative of the Soviet Government at the meeting in Quebec was not and is not suggested."

The Soviet Government thus took official cognizance of widespread comment in Allied countries on the lack of Russian representation at the Quebec conference.

British, American and Canadian military leadeers already are in session in Quebec and the meeting generally is regarded as a vital strategy session preceding the unfolding of important war developments.

Both British and American newspapers have expressed concern over the absence of Premier Stalin or other high Russian leaders. Axis capitals originally broadcast reports that Premier Stalin was going to attend. Then made much of the fact that he was not going to be present in order to suggest that all was not well in the United Nations coalition.

The Times of London commented yesterday that if Premier Stalin, "for perefectly comprehensible reasons," cannot leave his own country "other means of personal consultation exist or must be found."

The Daily Telegraph and Morning Post commented that the "practical inconvenience" of Premier Stalin's absence was no barrier to associating the Russians closely with the talks. This "practical inconvenience" apparently referred to Premier Stalin's position as Marshal and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army, now embarked on a big offensive in Russia. The Russians also were in the midst of a great push against the Germans last January when the Casablanca conference was held.

The Daily Express had said that Premier Stalin had been invited to the Quebec roundtable. Being unable to attend, the newspaper said, Marshal Stalin would receive a full account of it and he would send his comments on the meeting to the Allies.

Pacific Discussion Seen

LONDON, Friday, Aug. 13 (U.P.)—The official Soviet news agency's reference to the "character" of the conference as being responsible for Russian non-participation aroused speculation that the Quebec parley would deal with the Pacific theatre of war rather than with European invasion problems.

At the same time, it was taken as a clear indication that Moscow had been kept fully informed as to the British and American plans and was well aware of what President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill would discuss.

It was recalled here that President Roosevelt on Wednesday devoted considerable time to a review of matters concerning the Far East and conferred briefly with the Pacific War Council in Washington.

Surprise in Washington

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 12—The Tass announcement that Russia had not been invited to attend the forthcoming conference of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at Quebec came as a surprise here in view of the implication in the President's Tuesday press conference remark that the Russians would be welcome to participate.

The President replied to a question whether the Russians would be represented by saying he did not think so, but he hastily added that this reply did not mean we would not be awfully glad to have thhem. He then said, as a kind of afterthought, that it was to be a strictly Anglo-American conference.

Beyond that statement of the President there has been no official word here regarding the position of the Soviet Government in relation to the conference. The President's words were sufficient, however, to create the impression that the Russians had been invited but had declined.

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Times for Aug. 13, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Russia Says She Wasn't Asked to Quebec

Statement Contradicts Clear Impression FDR Had Conveyed

By United Press

LONDON, Aug. 13.—The official Russian Tass news agency announced over the Moscow Radio today that the Soviet Government had not been invited to attend the Allied war conference in Quebec.

Tass said that rumors that Soviet representatives were participating in the Quebec conferences were based upon a misunderstanding.

Participation by Soviet representatives was not contemplated and is not being contemplated, Tass said.

The text of the statement follows:

"Tass News Agency denies that Stalin or any representative of the Soviet Government will participate at the forthcoming meeting between President Roosevelt and Churchill.

"British papers published a report that Soviet military attaches would take part at the meeting as observers. Tass states that these reports are based on misunderstanding.

"The Soviet Government has received no invitation to this meeting.

"As is clear from the character of the conference, participation of any representative of the Soviet Government at the meeting in Quebec was not and is not intended."

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Tass Is Official Spokesman For Stalin and Soviet Government

Tass News Agency, which has announced that the Soviet Government had not been invited to attend the conference with Roosevelt and Churchill in Quebec, is so official it might as well be Stalin himself talking.

Thus fade into limbo rumors that Stalin had indicated that he was too busy with the Summer offensive to attend an international parley.

Thus, too, sharp significance is given the remark which Roosevelt made at his press conference Wednesday when he revealed that Churchill was in Canada and that he would meet with him.

FDR Said He'd Be Glad to Have Him

He said Stalin wouldn't be there, and that the Russians wouldn't be represented, adding that that didn't mean he wouldn't be awfully glad to have them.

It was a hint that the Russians had been asked to come. The im-

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plication was clear that the President intended to place responsibility for their absence at the council table upon them. Now they say they weren't invited. Unless there was an invitation which went astray, or was blocked en route, embarrassing confusion is being added to the volume of misunderstanding already existing in Anglo-American Soviet relations.

Russians Aroused Over Second Front Delay

It is possible that the Tass story is the Russians' way of saying they are plenty peeved. Already they have expressed renewed or continued impatience over the delay on the part of the Allies in establishing a front on the European continent. An editorial in oMscow's "Pravda," probably Kremlin inspired, recently emphasized this impatience.

Besides prodding the Allies to come to their help in Europe and divert Nazi divisions from the Eastern front, the Russians have several other matters they probably want to discuss frankly with American and British leaders. These include:

¶ The attitude of the Allies toward postwar boundaries. Russia wants no more "buffer states," but the Allies are committed to self-determination of nations.

¶ Determination of a joint point of view as to what is to happen to Germany after an Allied victory. The Russians have indicated they want a strong Germany maintained.

¶ Lend-lease and transportation problems.

¶ The question of Polish-Russian relations, which have been strained.

for
Clipped at the Seat of
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By Joseph E. Davies

'I Found Russia Thinking Only of War to the Death

Her People Will Be Satisfied With Nothing But Absolute Victory

Five years after he had completed his first mission to Moscow, former U. S. Ambassador to Russia Joseph E. Davies was sent back to the Soviet by President Roosevelt as the bearer of an historically important letter to Premier Joseph Stalin. In a series of articles he describes the changes he saw wrought by war in the people and land. This is the first.

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I went back to Russia after five years.

There are great changes. Moscow itself has been greatly improved. It shows little of the scars of war. Outside of an atmosphere of great activity it gives little appearance of a city at war.

The Army looks well clothed. The uniforms of the officers with their new epaulettes are smart. Morale appears to be very high.

Food is scarce. Generally, however, the people look sufficiently well fed. The rationing is strict. Many subsist on potatoes and cabbage alone, which they themselves must raise.

Nothing is too good to give up—nothing too great for them to contribute to the war effort. They are fighting for their homes and liberties. They have suffered unthinkable atrocities at the hands of the brutal Nazi soldiery.

Joseph E. Davies

But it is only fair to recognize, as an eminent American has said, that they are fighting for their way of life, which, after all, has brought them far better physical conditions and standards of living than that which their fathers had been able to have.

Everywhere there are evidences of sorrow and grief. The casualty lists run into millions of both soldiers and civilians. Every family in Russia lost some loved one. They are bitter.

There occured to me, in Russia, when over the battlefields there, the difference between conditions which the Russians confront, and those of our fighting men. Our men overseas are fighting on foreign soil to avert a disaster, which would otherwise stab at the heart of our peace here at home.

Differences

Our people are spared the immediate horrors of war. Not so with the Russians. They are fighting on their own land. If bombs carried by Canadian or American planes, and aimed against military objectives, happened to fall upon civilians or their homes, they would still fall upon the enemy. **But when Russians shell or bomb the enemy, they are generally bombing their own land, and possibly the homes of their own people.**

When they bomb a bridge which the Germans use, it is usually a Russian bridge. When they destroy, it is not the property of the enemy, but the results of their own toil.

It makes their war more serious, more grim, and more tragic in many respects, than ours. It means that their personal contribution, already incalculably important in contrast to ours, has cost them immeasurably more in suffering, personal tragedy and devastation.

When we think of the Soviet

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Union, and of our obligations to them, we should not forget this.

I found the Soviet Union and its people, to the last man, woman, and child, from Baku to Yakutsk, from one end of the country to the other, as it appeared to me, thinking only in terms of war to the death against Hitler.

In my opinion they will be satisfied with nothing short of absolute victory and unconditional surrender.

Marshal Stalin

I had long talks with their great leaders, Marshal Stalin, Foreign Minister Molotov, Marshal Voroshilov, and other old friends. They are all working long hours and at top speed. Somehow they manage to keep themselves fit.

Stalin looked well, strong and unworried. I was again impressed with the modesty, practical common sense and wisdom of this extraordinary man. **In my opinion, he is primarily the man responsible for the creation of the Red Army and the industrial power of Russia, and the welding of them into the machine which was able to resist and stop Hitler.** He is, above all else, a quiet man; but he reflects an immense fortitude, courage, and innate power.

Generally there is a belief that this Summer Hitler will make a last supreme effort to smash the Red Army or take the Baku oil fields. The Russians do not underestimate the power, which they think the German war machine still has. They watch it with anxiety, but without fear. They have confidence in their Red Army and in themselves.

Men Who Found Selves

They seem to me like men who have withstood the worst, and who have found themselves, and who believe that through their army, their people and themselves they cannot be beaten.

Everywhere they spoke with gratitude of Britain's aid and of Lend-Lease and the aid from the United States which is now coming through in a substantial manner.

From my trip, some outstanding impressions were left in my mind. Perhaps the most vivid and the strongest of all was Stalingrad.

Stalingrad stretched along the river for about forty-five miles. Practically all of the central and northern part of the city is utterly and completely destroyed. Nothing remained but gaunt, bare walls, roofless and windowless, which seemed to stretch up like twisted, white arms to the sky; or black, charred, huge spaces where fire had burned everything down to the very roots.

There were many, many blocks—whole districts—where there remained nothing but an occasional chimney, with all the rest stubble. All around the city for miles—and in fact the city itself—the ground is pockmarked with trenches, shell holes, dugouts wrecked tanks, crashed airplanes, and evidences of battle.

Words are not adequate to describe the horror of that scene.

All in all, it was the most terrible, horrible and damnable thing that I had even seen. It was unbelievable that such a blot on our civilization could possibly be perpetrated by so-called civilized men. **It made every one of our party burn with anger.**

But it also had another effect. It gave rise to a feeling of veneration for, and pride in, the manhood which enabled that gallant band of men to stand with their backs to the river, cut off from all retreat, and fight their way up from the verge of annihilation, foot by foot to victory, and the annihilation or capture of four hundred thousand of the enemy.

Superimpose these terrific events upon our own land and our own people, and their significance may be appreciated. This is what the invasion of Russia would have meant to us:

A conquering army would have reached the outskirts of Washington (their Moscow); 3,000,000 of the enemy, with superior mechanisms of war, would have driven hundreds of miles into the interior,

threatening the oil fields of Oklahoma and Texas (their Baku).

Our industrial territory east of the Mississippi (their Western Russia), would have been taken over by the enemy. Twenty millions of our people have been under the Nazi heel.

Our army would have stubbornly fallen back, enabling our people to move vast industries, their machinery, the workers and their families, for a thousand milles deep into the west as far as Cheyenne (their Novosibirsk).

The seat of government would have been moved from Washington to St. Louis (their Kuibyshev). Ten millions of people would have been casualties.

The enemy would have been storming the gates of Memphis (their Stalingrad), threatening to cross our Volga, the Mississippi River.

An Epic of Heroism

Our men, outnumbered, with their backs to the river, would have fought the enemy on the streets of Memphis, in wrecked buildings, in the basements, in the factories, from street to street, compelling the enemy finally to surrender—336,000 of them within and at the gates of the city.

In that battle, 96,000 of the enemy would have been killed within the city walls. Memphis would have been completely destroyed; its entire population driven from their homes.

But our men would have given the world a new epic in heroism. They would have saved our oil fields. They would have broken the back of the enemy. For that would have now been our Stalingrad.

TOMORROW: The Transformation of Siberia.

This is a clipping from page_____ of P M

for_____

Clipped at the Seat of Government

EDITORIAL PAGE OF THE DAILY MIRROR

NEW YORK, THURSDAY, AUGUST 12, 1943 PAGE 23

3 Times, Still Out

Mr. Josef Stalin has received the third invitation of Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill to attend a conference. He regrets his inability to meet with them, due to prior engagements and the fact that he has house guests—his Ambassadors home from Washington, London and Ottawa. He sends his best wishes for a happy huddle.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT at his press conference Tuesday said he would be awfully glad to have representatives of the Soviet Government present at his sixth meeting with Prime Minister Churchill, but he did not think any would be there.

Thus, the Soviet snub of America and Britain is perhaps more clearly emphasized than ever before.

Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill, the peoples of America and Britain WANT Russia in. Russia stays OUT. Russia is Joe Stalin, head of a dictatorship as absolute as any on earth.

We think it is extremely important for the American people to understand and frankly face the fact that Russia has a policy of her own, which is opposed in many respects to Anglo-American policy.

There is in the United States a cult of reds, pinks and so-called "liberals" that deplores this fact whenever it is brought into the open, and, in blind worship of the Soviet, cries that we, not Russia, are to blame for any strain upon the tenuous ties of the triple alliance.

A Few Facts and Dates

This is unadulterated hogwash. It can be cleared up with a few dates and facts:

Aug. 23, 1939—in Moscow, while British and French missions cooled their heels, Joe Stalin and the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, signed the infamous 10-year non-aggression pact. This was not the occasion for the war, or the cause. But it was the spring that released the trigger.

May 10, 1941—Rudolf Hess, Hitler's deputy, parachuted to a Scottish moor. The Hess mystery will not be quite cleared up until after the war. But it is believed he was sent to Britain to enlist aid in a crusade against Communism. At any rate, Britain immediately clapped him into prison and warned Russia of the impending Nazi attack.

June 22, 1941—the attack came. Both Britain and the United States gave immediate aid, which tipped the scales to Russia. Britain made Russia her military ally. The United States, then not at war, extended Lend-lease aid which has now totalled more than $1,000,000,000!

Stalin concealed the extent of this aid from the Russians until our Ambassador, Adm. William H. Standley, smoked a statement out of him.

Stalin has continued to "needle" us about a second front, refusing to recognize as such Africa, Sicily and the tremendous, continual, concentrated aerial assaults on Germany and Italy.

The only second front he will recognize as such is one directly across the Channel into Western Europe. He opposes Axis invasion through the Scandinavian countries or the Balkans. That would place his allies on his own flanks and leave him not so free to dominate Europe from the Baltic to the Dardanelles, which is his ambition.

A Divergence of Plans

Stalin has refused to allow any of our fighting men on Russian soil. He will permit us no bases from which to fight even the Nazis! We lost 67 four-engined bombers in the raid on the Ploesti, Rumania, oil fields. Our men had to take off from Egypt, flying a round trip of 2,400 miles, carrying heavy fuel loads and consequently lighter bomb loads. Had Stalin permitted us a base in Russia, the distance could have been cut in half. Over the route we flew, the Nazis had two hours' forewarning of the raid; from Russia they would have had but 25 minutes!

Stalin has offered Germany the prospect of a peace in which she will remain militarily strong (under Communist dominance). The United States and Britain have offered Germany only unconditional surrender.

Stalin remains at peace with our enemy, Japan.

These are major sore spots. They are as real and uncontestable as the truth that the heroic Red armies have contributed more so far to the business of killing Germans than have we or the British.

But reality must be met with reality.

Britain and the United States must form their own hard-headed policy. They must pursue it vigorously and intelligently. Above all, in attempting to win Russia to mutual understanding and to convince Stalin that his dreams will not be tolerated, they must cease the method of flattery, of "buttering up," of self-abasement, of give-all-and-ask-nothing.

Stalin cannot be dealt with that way. He does not understand that language. To him it appears a confession of weakness. He must be met with open declarations, power and determination to equal his own.

N.Y. DAILY MIRROR AUG. 12, 1943 p. 23

Russia—I

Mutual Mistrust of Soviet and Allies Viewed as a Weapon Helping Hitler

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The coming meeting between rime Minister Winston Churchill nd President Roosevelt will be, as ie President said Tuesday, "Ang-i-American" and without benefit f Soviet participation.

That was expected. Russian rep-esentatives have been invited sev-ral times previously to attend olicy-making conferences of Brit-in and the United States but have lways declined, definitely and ometimes flatly, and the impend-ng conference now coincides with enewed Russian pressure for what ney call the "second front."

"How soon will the British and mericans move from Italian psy-hology to the German fortifica-ions?" Ilya Ehrenbourg, one of ussia's best-known journalists, rote wryly the other day.

This renewed pressure comes fter a long series of events, seem-ngly minor, such as the formation f the Free Germany National ommittee. Those events rather ndicate that Russia is playing a ne hand in the United Nations, hat she is announcing her post-ar interests in much of Europe, he Middle East and China, and hey suggest that the ideological oncepts of the dissolved Comin-ern are being substituted by na-ionalistic aspirations.

Soviet Suspicious of Allies

Russia is quite clearly suspicious f the intentions of Britain and the nited States, and, conversely, here is a growing suspicion in this ountry of Russian motives. Hitler bviously hopes to turn those sus-icions into a serious cleavage and to escape defeat, and, in fact, to win a limited victory, by political as well as military means. There is grave danger, even if Hitler's hope should be dashed, as it will be if we are astute, that the great game of power politics will become the sole rule for Europe even before the war ends unless some better understanding with Russia is reached.

But that understanding must be mutual. We have given Russia cause for suspicion in the past and the Russian rulers cannot easily forget that American forces participated a quarter of a century ago in the anti-Bolshevist campaigns on Russian soil. Since Pearl Harbor, however, the United States has given more than ample evidence of good faith and has cooperated in many ways far more fully than has Russia.

It is not too much to say that American lend-lease, plus Anglo-American operations in other theatres, have enabled the Red Army to continue fighting. Yet we know less about that army, its present or potential capacities, than we do about the army of our enemies. Our armed forces have not been allowed in Russia, although the problem of defeating the Axis would be greatly simplified if they were. Our observers are not allowed at the Russian fronts. Except for Brig. Gen. Patrick Hurley, and to a considerably lesser extent Wendell Willkie, very few American or British observers have been allowed at the front. And even these observers saw limited sectors and saw none of the larger picture.

Russia is not at war with Japan, and since she has not allowed our planes to base on Russian soil in the war against Germany, many observers feel that she will never allow our planes to base on Russian soil in the war against Japan. Indeed, there is a growing fear that the Soviet may never really engage in the Pacific conflict.

This fear is strengthened by the political-economic relationships that exist between Russia and Japan in the Pacific. We tend to forget, of course, that a considerable portion of Japan's military strength is tied down in Manchuria facing the Russian frontier. We tend to forget, too, that we dealt with Japan on a commercial basis until a short time before we went to war with her.

Nevertheless, the vague and often contradictory reports of the mutual give-and-take—a guarded, strained and suspicious give-and-take—between Japan and Russia in the East is another cause for suspicion of Russian motives in this country. Some months ago, for instance, this correspondent reported on what he believed to be good authority that Russia was selling rubber to Japan. This was denied by some sources and this correspondent accepts that denial. But that report and many similar ones of fairly extensive Russo-Japanese commercial traffic still recur in Washington.

These are a few of the reasons, a very few of the small things, that have caused some suspicion in this country of Russian motives.

The big reason for this suspicion, of course, is the Communist credo itself and the record of double-dealing that the credo, expressed in practical politics, has written in history. Just as the Russians cannot easily forget the American intervention in Russia twenty-five years ago, so Americans cannot easily forget the Russo-German pact that preceded the present war.

This is a clipping from page 5 of the New York Times for Feb. 12, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Russia Lt. Inc

4,968 Miles of Rails Repaired by Soviets

MOSCOW, Sept. 29 (UP).—I. D. Gochiridze, Soviet Vice Commissar of Transport, announced today that Red Army railroad battalions had restored 8,000 kilometers (4,968 miles) of wrecked rail lines in reoccupied Soviet territory since March.

Some of the country's most important lateral and longitudinal lines, such as the Moscow-Velikie Luki line and parallel railroads running from Moscow to Rostov via Orel, Kharkov and the Donets Basin already were in operation.

In addition to the old lines, the Red Army also has constructed several short, strategic railroads in the front fighting zones.

Gochiridze said railroad battalions following close behind the advancing Red Army in two weeks restored 1,350 kilometers (838 miles) of track and many stations and junctions on the Voronezh, Southwestern and Southern Fronts. Since the beginning of the war, he said, the Soviets have restored 15,000 kilometers (9,315 miles) of wrecked railroads.

(Radio Moscow, quoting a speech by Dmitri Manuilsky, a member of the Communist Party's Central Committee, said the Red Army had liberated an area seven times the size of Denmark in two months.

("In almost two months," Manuilsky said, "The Red Army has liberated more than 300,000 square kilometers (115,830 square miles)—a territory seven times larger than Denmark and 10 times larger than Belgium.

("It has advanced a distance of 300 to 400 kilometers (186 to 248 miles."

(Radio Moscow added: "Since the start of the German summer offensive, it has been obvious that the German advance has been floundering in German blood.")

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This is a clipping from page_____ of the Daily Worker for_____ Clipped at the Seat of Government.

54 OCT 14 1944

A Report to Stalin From Orel Guerrillas

(By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

MOSCOW, Sept. 29.—As the Red Army pushes westward, the great story of what the Soviet people behind the lines were doing these last two years is now coming out. It is one of the most remarkable stories of self-sacrifice and patriotic devotion in all time.

At Orel, the guerrillas, now busy reconstructing their town, have just summed up two years of their work in a special report to Marshal Joseph Stalin.

It tells in detail of the thousands of Germans killed, ammunitions wrecked and stolen, and reveals that throughout the entire German occupation, underground newspapers continued to publish to keep the population informed of events.

REPORT TO STALIN

The report to Stalin enumerates the following achievements:

400 locomotives and thousands of cars of supplies blown up;

42 railway and 217 highway bridges destroyed;

320 tanks, seven armored trains, 1,517 trucks and 68 planes blown up or burned;

153 guns, 49 mortars, and 196 machine guns shattered;

350 kilometers of telephone cable cut;

471 ammunitions, food, fuel and supply stores burned or captured.

More than 2,000 Germans, officers and men were taken prisoner, says the report, while three tanks, 17 anti-tank rifles, 100 mortars, 500 machine guns, 6,100 rifles, 40 cannon, 13 field radio installations, 6,000 shells and more than 385,000 cartridges were taken as trophies in and around Orel alone.

During the Red Army's summer offensive the guerrillas conducted a bitter "rail" war.

During last July and August alone they blasted 17,330 rails which partially or completely paralyzed communications.

Ambushed along the German route of retreat the guerrillas killed Lieutenant General Bronemann and the officers escorting him.

Together with Red Army units the guerrillas saved up to 30,000 civilians and convoyed them to the rear.

The report further cites examples of the heroism and daring of the Orel guerrillas.

Hero of the Soviet Union Alexei Izhukin, initiator of sabotage on the enemy's communications in the Orel region, perfected a mortar design and worked out regulations for its use under conditions of guerrilla warfare.

Izhukin derailed 11 trains, blew up a munitions dump and 16 bridges, wiped out more than 3,000 Geman soldiers and officers and destroyed more than 120 trucks and no fewer than 100 carloads of ammunition.

He personally trained some 400 guerrilla sappers, every one of whom accounted for two to five German trains.

While waging their bitter struggle the Orel guerrillas published newspapers for their detachments and also for civilians.

"Partizanskaya Pravda" and other underground papers, "Brasovski Kommunar," "Narodny Mstitel," "Bolshevistskoye Znamya," "Stalinsky Klich," "Za Rodimu," appeared regularly.

The guerrilla scouts distributed Soviet newspapers, literature and the communique of the Soviet Information Bureau on German occupied territory.

In two years they distributed some 200,000 leaflets and more than 200,000 newpapers and pamphlets.

This is a clipping from page _____ of the Daily Worker for _____
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

CRIPPS SEES PERIL IN SPURNING SOVIET

Aircraft Minister Says Britain Would Face Disaster if She Was Tied Only to U. S.

URGES 4-POWER ALLIANCE

Warns of Danger of the Allies' Splitting Up After the War Into Competing Groups

By DREW MIDDLETON

LONDON, Sept. 26—Sir Stafford Cripps, Minister of Aircraft Production, warned Britain today that it would be "disastrous" to regard "friendship with the United States as an alternative to friendship with the Soviet Union" in a frank speech at Newcastle.

Sir Stafford, long known as a warm friend of the Soviet Union, advocated a post-war alliance of the United States, the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Soviet Union and China to serve as international policemen, not "as dictators of the world" during the time when the United Nations are working out a method of maintaining international security.

Britain, he declared, must be friendly with all three powers and warned that "separate and antagonistic" power groups would be the alternative.

The speech was one of the first by a Cabinet Minister to touch on a problem that has worried many diplomats since Britain, the United States and Russia became allies: Whether it will be possible for Britain in the post-war world to cooperate fully and equally with Russia and the United States in world affairs.

An influential group favors a permanent alliance with the United States while an equally numerous although probably less powerful body of opinion favors stronger ties with the Soviet Union and a strenuous attempt by Britain to organize a common policy among the three nations.

Sir Stafford pointed out that both the United States and Russia were "equally essential to the future peace of the world" and warned that the path of the four-power alliance he proposed would not be free from difficulties and dangers. The chief danger is the splitting up of the alliance into competing power groups, he said.

The Minister of Aircraft Production made a vigorous appeal to workers in all war industries but especially in aircraft factories to step up production "to make good our heavy losses" and to prepare for "the greater offensive which must come before the end is reached."

Discussing the enormous expansion of British aircraft production, Sir Stafford revealed that the structural weight of aircraft produced in the first six months of 1943 was nearly three and two-thirds times as great as that in the first six months of 1940. In the production of engines, taking the horsepower produced in the first six months of 1940 as the basic figure, production was 4⅞th times as great.

Warns On Cut In Output

Sir Stafford joined other British leaders who have recently warned against a slackening of the industrial effort. It is indeed when things are going better, when the chance of victory appears more certain, that the greatest weight of material can have its most powerful affect," he declared.

Discussing the future he said that victory, "which now seems certain" would be barren unless a four-power alliance could insure "a more stable future" for the world. "The relationships between these four powers is absolutely cardinal to the future of the world," he asserted.

Promising victory, he declared that only the time and the cost in human life were still in doubt. He added that increased industrial effort in Britain and America "may bring us earlier victory, with all that means in the saving of human life."

Discussing Britain's place in the post-war world, Sir Stafford declared that Britain must tackle international economic social problems with "the same resolution, determination and disregard for vested interests with which we have tackled the problems of war organization." He pointed out that solutions contrary to "orthodox ideas of finance and trade were easily arrived at under the stress of war."

Without readiness to sacrifice for the common good in the conquest of unemployment and disease "we shall fall back to conditions far worse than after the last war," he warned.

He said a real provision for decent standards of living must come not by state allowances but by a good standard of wages for a fully employed population.

Preserve

This is a clipping from page _____ of the New York Times for _____

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Russian Accord Is Key to Peace

By Owen L. Scott.

There is proving to be a minimum of theory and ideology and a maximum of practical politics in the task of seeking a basis for agreement with Russia on postwar settlements.

Russia apparently is interested in the good-neighbor idea upon which President Roosevelt hopes to base a peace settlement. Yet, at the same time, she prefers to talk about strategic boundaries and territory and trade rights. This talk, in turn, appears to clash at a number of points with promises to small nations that are contained in the Atlantic Charter.

Mr. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill are up against the problem of reconciling these situations. There is nothing to suggest that they will not succeed in accomplishing their purpose, but the accomplishment will come more through bargaining than through public discussion. If they do succeed, then the basis may be laid for a relative degree of political stability in the world for many years to come. If they do not succeed, the settlements after this war may be little more secure than after the last.

Some of the most difficult points at issue concern Russia's natural desire for greater security. This desire, in turn, affects the boundaries of the future Finland, Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria as well as the fate of the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Russia, too, has interests in Iran that can clash with British interests, and in the Far East she is interested in Manchuria and in any settlement affecting China.

Many Conflicting Interests.

Then, too, Russia has very definite ideas about the future of Germany. She has an economic interest in Italy. Russian interests in the Balkans are very large. At all of these points the views of Great Britain and the United States must be reconciled, so far as possible, with those of Russia in order to avoid issues that may give rise to future discord. These and other issues will be the basis for any conference now to be held between foreign ministers of the three big powers and, later, for any conference between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin.

Reconciliation of viewpoints, however, is not to be found easy. A few examples show why this is so.

In Poland, the Russians insist that they must be given a boundary that includes a large slice of what had been prewar Poland. The United States and Britain, however, oppose any settlement that would throw large numbers of Polish people into Russia. This opposition, in the case of the United States, is somewhat intensified by an important voting Polish population in large cities of the East and Midwest.

In the Balkans, Russia is very much interested in helping these groups that are friendly to her. These groups, however, often are favorable to revolutionary changes that would upset property relationships through that part of the world. The British have trade and other interests that might be affected by any violent shift of control inside these countries.

In Iran, the Russians are interested in an outlet to the Indian Ocean through the Persian Gulf and they are not unmindful of the oil resources of the area. Yet the British now control in this part of the world, with American help, and may not take too kindly to any Russian encroachment.

Chinese Communist Problem.

In China, the Russian government is friendly to the so-called Communist governments and Communist armies. The United States is friendly to the government of Chiang Kai-shek which is very much interested in breaking down the power of the Chinese Communists. There are the makings of a civil war in China here, which could become very embarrassing in the postwar period. Then, too, Russia is likely to have some scores to settle with Japan before the present war ends and in that case she will be in a position to seek return of Port Arthur, in Manchuria, which she lost to Japan back in 1905.

It may be that many of the problems, of which these are a few samples, may be resolved if Russia becomes convinced that the United States and Great Britain are intent upon dealing with Germany in a way that will prevent her from rising in a few years to serve as a spearhead of forces that would challenge the Russians. The difficulty in this case is that a Germany that is weakened industrially to the extent that would limit her military power very strictly would complicate the problem of economic revival in Europe. Yet a Germany that is permitted to remain strong industrially could, in one way or another, rebuild her military strength.

There seems to be official agreement here that nothing is more important than success in finding a basis for stability of relations with Russia. The reason is that if this stability can be established then any incipient political troubles in the world can be dealt with effectively before they generate forces that lead to another general war.

Yet an absence of stable relations with Russia can lead to a continuing political uncertainty in the postwar world that could readily be aggravated by Russia, sitting as she is in the center both of Europe and Asia. That explains why Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill are striving to find a basis for doing business with Mr. Stalin.

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What the Russians Think of Us

A Post correspondent shows how censorship gives the Reds only a sketchy picture of a nation and a people they would like to know better.

By EDGAR SNOW

Last week Forrest Davis, the Post's Washington correspondent, in an article titled The British Get Out of the Doghouse, described the current status of our relations with Russia as seen through the eyes of our nation's capital. Mr. Snow, writing from London, presents another side of the same picture.

—The Editors.

LONDON via Wireless.

WHAT do the Russians know of us and what do they think of us? The answer is important because it may influence Russia's policy in Europe in the coming months and help determine whether we can work together for a solution of postwar ills in an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect.

Last winter, Adm. William Harrison Standley, our ambassador in Moscow, startled us out of our comfortable enjoyment of a log fire in his study. He said the Russian people were being "bamboozled" about the importance of American participation in the war and "were not being given the facts about American aid to Russia." The point is, he said it for publication.

Some people interpreted this outburst to mean that the Soviet government is hostile to Americans and American influence, while others saw sinister anti-Soviet purposes behind it. The fact was simpler.

Standley, who sees himself as the architect of a new edifice of peace, especially Pacific peace, and co-operation based on mutually improved knowledge between ourselves and Russia, had decided it was time to widen the breach in the dam through which such knowledge pours. Mild-mannered and gentle most of the time, he has his old-seadog moments, and this was one of them. He chose the direct method of blasting open a passage.

Russian officials weren't particularly annoyed. No one likes a blunt frontal attack at times better than Stalin. Moscow knew the ambassador had a good case and believed in his sincerity. He had no ulterior motives. The trickle of ideas and information between us has since perceptibly broadened and the chances look brighter for co-operation on large issues in the future.

"Maybe your statement was, after all, a help," Molotov is reported to have said to Admiral Standley at a recent meeting.

But, unfortunately, the Standley affair gave some the impression that Russian people are kept in complete ignorance about America and American life, which is, of course, absurd. In some respects they are better informed about us than we are about ourselves. In the past, American news and information was carefully angled to conform to the general educational and propaganda policy of the U.S.S.R. and this naturally left unfulfilled an eager appetite for more detailed knowledge of America on the part of most Russians. Today the Marxist colorations have largely disappeared from Russia's American coverage. While we have access to a wider variety of general information and opinion on Russia than vice versa, what the Russians do get about us is perhaps more objective as far as it goes. Diplomatically, it is scrupulously correct.

"We would never keep a Russian in Washington who sent unfriendly and inaccurate reports to our press," a member of the Politburo remarked to me while objecting to alleged distortions in one American correspondent's accounts of Russia. "We would not publish his reports and we would withdraw such a man."

Which is perfectly true, though not in accord with our conception of freedom of the press. Since we became Allies nothing has been allowed to appear in the Russian press—with the exception of periodical ref-

erences to the absence of a second front—to which objection could be raised by Americans. But it is also true—and this was Standley's complaint—that not very much appears at all.

That is partly due to the Soviet policy of emphasizing domestic news almost to the exclusion of everything else. Four or five papers of national circulation give the Russian people nearly all the news they get. They are four pages each, and only the last page carries any foreign news. Usually it is confined to one or two columns and it is practically identical in all papers. The same sources suffice for radio reporting as well.

There are no feature stories, no interviews, no biographical sketches and few interpretive pieces. Very little news appears about the Pacific war. But official statements from Washington are now prominently published. President Roosevelt's speeches appear in full and are avidly read by the Russian public. He is regarded with the utmost respect and interest by most Russians as the spokesman of the capitalist world. Stettinius' reports on the operation of Lend-Lease, giving the figures of our aid to Russia, and some of the congressional debates on its administration are also widely printed.

Until recently that's about all the Russians heard of us or our war effort. The British publish their own newspaper in Russia, but we don't. Elmer Davis' OWI is practically nonoperative in the U.S.S.R. But lately Admiral Standley has been bringing in American newsreels, which, after being picked over by the Soviet censors, reach the eager Russian public.

American movies are more popular with the Russians than their own, and they stand in block-long queues to secure admission. Perhaps the most vivid impression they get of America comes from such films as prove acceptable for presentation. The choice is rather odd. Social pictures are pretty generally taboo. The Great Waltz, The Merry Widow, The Four Musketeers and a few other musical comedies and extravaganzas are the main diet, mixed with old Chaplin films, Mickey Mouses, Donald Ducks and other Disney creations.

While ideological considerations naturally cause the rejection of many of our films, I was surprised to hear even Bambi, the deer, come in for heated criticism from Olga Mishakova, the beautiful blond and brainy secretary of Comsomol, which is the second most important mass political organization in Russia.

"Technically it is a superb film," she said, "but the content is all wrong. It teaches youth that animals are man's enemies. Here we teach youth that animals are man's friends."

"But I thought you Communists were realists," I replied. "Isn't it, after all, true that animals hunt men and men hunt animals?"

"Men hunt men, for that matter," she came back. "But we don't think it is right, normal or moral. We don't glorify it. This is where we believe the educational policy of government *(Continued on Page 91)*

WHAT THE RUSSIANS THINK OF US

(Continued from Page 19)

should take control." Which is an interesting point, but again not our idea of freedom of art.

The same sort of selection is exercised in the publication of books about America and by American authors. In fiction, the titles translated are surprisingly few, but they are, from a literary standpoint, well chosen. Those published are much more widely read than any Russian authors are in America.

I asked M. Apletin, secretary of the Writers Union, to get me a list of all the American novels published in Russia since 1917. It included only twenty-one authors—an average of less than one per year.

Theodore Dreiser is highly regarded as an artist and Hemingway has had a big influence on Russian writers, but their popularity does not compare with that of Upton Sinclair, whose editions run into several millions. Translations of Mark Twain are now in their fourth million, while Jack London's books sold nearly seven million copies.

But it is the type of people who read such books that astonishes you. For example, in a casual talk with a youth of sixteen who was an electrical mechanic, I discovered he had been through The Valley of the Moon, The Sea Wolf, and Martin Eden, by Jack London, had consumed three Dreiser books, three by Mark Twain and a volume of Hemingway. But he thought Popular Physics, a translation of an obscure American textbook, more interesting than any of them. I continually encountered among adolescents a better familiarity with the physical setting of American life through their knowledge of the works of Mark Twain, Sinclair, Hemingway and Dreiser than many American adults have of the U.S.S.R. There were only seven books about America by Russians listed in the catalogue of the Lenin Library, and all are of a technical nature. In the same library there are twenty books published in America since 1939. The only American newspaper on file there was, until recently, the Daily Worker. The only other English-language paper was The London Times.

A wide selection of American technical journals is available, and it is in this field that American influence is very strongly felt. The Russians worship modern technique, of course, and regard America as the teacher of the world in industrial and other sciences. The ambition of any factory manager is to have it said that his place is run with American efficiency. The attainment of such an ambition on a national scale might be described as the chief goal of the whole Soviet industrialization program.

In visiting technical schools for the training of labor reserves, I found they were drawing heavily from American textbooks. A technical magazine published in Russian in New York by Amtorg and shipped home in large numbers is widely used in the schools of technology and in the great training program for youth.

U.S.S.R. Reads About U.S.A.

Chiefly because the Soviet regime frankly recognizes its need to borrow heavily from our industrial experience and become well acquainted with American machinery, English-language study is now becoming compulsory from the primary grades up. Which is probably one of the best concrete indications, when you stop to think of it, that Stalin does expect to draw closer to us in the future.

When, recently, the state publishing houses brought out a large edition of a new book, The United States of America, it was sold out in one day, and waiting thousands were turned away. "At the Sixteenth Party Congress," says this book, "Stalin characterized America as 'the main capitalist country.' In 1937 it produced 48.6 per cent of all industrial production in the whole capitalist world . . . holding first place amongst capitalist countries in the production per person of electricity, steel, shoes, paper and soap."

Throughout the book the world is divided into capitalist countries and the U.S.S.R. There is no doubt the Russians still think of themselves as dwellers in a quite different universe which has little in common with life in the capitalist world. But though the book mentioned gives a Marxist interpretation of American economy, it is in no sense a harangue, few facts are wrong, and it is a work of objective scholarship. The same applies to a recently published book called The Pacific Ocean. No book may be published about a foreign country without the Kremlin's approval, of course, and so these little straws are significant.

Russians admire American products of all kinds and dream of the day when they can buy them, or Russian copies just as good. I asked a number of women what they wanted most after the war and what they hoped to get out of the war.

One replied, "I hope I can buy some American aluminumware." Another wanted an American motorcar.

Give a Russian a slick-paper magazine and he becomes lost from view for some minutes as he scans advertisements and the pictures of goods on sale. He cannot believe we are taking the war seriously when he sees what Americans can still buy. I often wondered what their reaction to a mail-order catalogue would be.

I overheard, in the subway one day, an old woman expressing doubt whether the stores would ever have anything to sell again. "Of course they will," confidently replied a younger woman with her. "Postwar America will flood our country with goods of all kinds." Her idea was possibly closer to the government's expectations than many realize.

Few Russians don't occasionally indulge in daydreaming of a trip to America. Already the U.S.S.R. is sending a number of youths to the United States for special training, and a scholarship for a year or two of study in America is a coveted prize which drives many a young engineering student to greater diligence.

Any Russian returning from America is questioned about it in the closest detail by his fellow workers or villagers. We mustn't forget that hundreds of thousands of Russians have relatives in America who write back descriptions of life there. I often met Russian soldiers at the front who would come up to me and ask if I could look up brothers, cousins, and so on, in America. There are also many thousands of American-born Finns in Karelia, and they used to talk a great deal about their former homeland to the Russians. All of which helps fill out the picture presented by the Soviet government.

A Way to Friendship

In political lectures, in schools and in party organs the Russians, of course, study America through ideological lenses as a land of the classical contradictions of capitalism and of recurring economic crises. They think most of us get little share of our great wealth, and labor has less freedom than in Russia, that we live under constant fear of the return of unemployment and depressions, and that Morgan, Mellon and Rockefeller interests, not Congress, run the country. Soviet youth, as a result of its training, seems convinced their system will give them a better life than ours, in the long run.

Will the things we are doing to help the U.S.S.R. now, bring reciprocity in terms of good feeling and friendship between the mass of Russian people and ourselves? Do the Russians appreciate it? The answer is definitely yes. Not long before I left Moscow I went out into the country with Admiral Standley to visit some orphans who had been clothed in garments collected in America. All those children knew where the gifts had come from and will remember it throughout their lives. Anyone who contributes to the Russian Relief may be sure he is contributing to the larger cause of friendship too.

The fact is that the Russians are an extremely proud people and the last thing they want from anybody is charity. They would prefer not to take our help at all. No Russian really thought of Lend-Lease as a free gift on our part, but only as a duty of one Ally who had been doing comparatively little, to another carrying the main burden at appalling sacrifices in blood and life.

Unlike some Allies, the Russians say and believe they are going to repay us for the goods we send them. They think of it as a straight business deal. The government prefers it that way. It keeps emphasizing that it wants to maintain credit based on an unbroken record of fidelity to financial commitments, as high in the future as in the past.

In 1942 we shipped Russia, in addition to thousands of tanks and airplanes, and so on, some $750,000,000 worth of foodstuffs. This year we are sending more. Most of this food goes to the Red army, and the soldiers know where it comes from.

Civilians get a little of it now and then, such as cheese and dairy products, lard and flour. They think better of us for this help, even though they are too proud to speak much of it—and God knows it is meager enough.

I have seldom met any Americans who have been to the U.S.S.R. who don't acknowledge the Russian genius and like Russians as people, however much they may disapprove the regime. I believe Russians generally like Americans, or at least are less suspicious of us than of most "people of the capitalist world." We have never warred with Russia and have never had any serious disputes or rivalries so far. The Russians are aware that our role in the intervention period of the last war, under General Graves, was not counterrevolutionary. In a recently published book, The Army of the Soviet Union, American participation in the intervention is not even mentioned. The Bolsheviks now seem ready to mend the threads of an unbroken tradition of friendship

with us since before the World War. We have common enemies and many common interests, and there is no reason in the Russian mind for animosity against us.

Fortunately, we are not connected, in the Soviet view, with the Munich period, the memory of which still overcasts Anglo-Russian relations with suspicion. Nevertheless, they think our policy is bracketed with Britain's, and the organization of AMG, which excludes Russia, is taken as one more indication that American policy is being deftly guided along the lines desired by Britain. On the whole, the Russians are inclined to regard us as less devious diplomats, more frank and sincere, but also more naïve.

True, we are extremely poorly equipped with trained men with a knowledge of the history and language of Russia in the service of our state. One Russian press official remarked, when asked whether he liked his job as censor, "Yes, it's a continuous education in ignorance." He probably would feel that way about most of our diplomats too.

But whenever we meet Russians in a setting free from distrust and fear, we find them not unlike Americans in many ways. Both Russians and Americans like frank, direct, democratic manners and approach to problems. We are expansive peoples, given to exaggeration and boasting, but also given to accomplishments on a stupendous scale, a similarity doubtless influenced by geography, which, in both cases, is one of wide, limitless spaces full of challenge and possibilities.

There is something else about Russia, a childlike naturalness, a generosity of spirit, an absence of that meanness and pettiness of soul you find in some Europeans, a wholeheartedness about them, that strikes response.

But it isn't often Americans or other foreigners have been able to meet the Russian people directly in recent years to learn about their virtues. Bureaucracy is a very formidable obstacle to mixing for the Americans who get to Russia. Everyone knows a Russian cannot invite you to his home as freely as an Englishman can. But how long before he will be able to do so may depend on our behavior in the months ahead.

Lately there have been encouraging signs that the Soviet government intends to improve and enlarge its contacts with America. Several missions have been admitted and really shown things. The society for foreign cultural relations, through which all contacts with overseas aid-to-Russia movements are funneled, is sending lecturers to the front now, telling the Red army something of what is going on in America and taking them small gifts from American friends. The dissolution of the Comintern, which came as a surprise to most Russians, undoubtedly was a concession meant to allay American apprehensions, but it has also removed one of the symbols which have made Russians feel that a barrier existed between themselves and the American Government. The mere act hasn't dissolved Russian sympathy for the Socialist revolution elsewhere, of course. But, obviously, Moscow means to relieve itself of the embarrassment of being accused of authorship of every postwar insurrection which occurs.

Faith in the prophecies of Marx remains axiomatic, but "the logic of things is stronger than any other logic," says Stalin. And the present Soviet policy is clearly based on that little maxim of the chief marshal. No amount of Marxism will change the logic of things, which presents Russia with an imperative need for American economic help after the war as well as now. And no distaste for capitalism will be allowed to interfere with Russia's seeking it on a basis of equality.

In speaking with Shcherbakov, a member of the Politburo and head of the political department of the Red army, I asked if that Stalinism could, in its setting, be interpreted to mean that the spectacle of America, center of the capitalist world, closely co-operating with Russia, center of the Socialist world, against the strongest ideological enemy of Socialism, had established revolutionary new conditions which superseded the logic on which Lenin worked out his imperialist war, which has been the theoretical and philosophical basis of Soviet foreign policy. Shcherbakov agreed that it constituted the greatest dynamic change in history since the Russian revolution, and the form of imperialism for the future was as yet unforeseeable.

The same gentleman assured me the Russian government had every hope of expanding trade with the United States in machines and machine-making tools—on which the Soviet Union, naturally, will place the greatest emphasis—but also on consumer goods to restock Russian stores until their own light industry is restored.

Recently I was in Iran, where American troops have organized an amazing delivery service for American goods to Russia. A very good relationship has been established between Russian and American troops, owing no little to the Russian liaison officer, Col. Edward F. Brown, who before the war was a highly paid public-relations man, numbering Rockefeller among his patrons. Americans are studying the Russian language, and vice versa. On one occasion the Americans invited the Russians to a concert and astounded them by singing the Internationale in Russian.

The fine airport outside Iran's capital is guarded by Red-army men. As we took off from it, one of my companions said, "Look! That guy over there!" pointing out a Russian soldier.

I looked and saw a large Slavic jaw working at a furious pace. It was so long since I had seen anything like that that it took a few seconds to realize he was chewing gum.

We have known lots of people better than we know the Russians, but have been unable to make them chew gum. Which probably proves nothing. Except that if an ex-Rockefeller agent can make the Russians gum chewers, it can't be said that they are not open to persuasion.

Soviet Paper's Criticism of AMG

By L. Volinsky

(From War and the Working Class)

(By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

MOSCOW, Sept. 23.—The foreign press review in an earlier issue of this journal dealt with the activities of the Allied Military Government set up by the Anglo-American authorities in Sicily.

The characteristics of this organization's activities and its criticism in the foreign press revealed that the said activity of AMG is by no means directed towards the liquidation of the fascist regime and that actually it preserves the fascist administration and in general is built on foundations which have nothing in common with the principles of democracy.

Taking into account the interest in the question of consistent and resolute struggles against fascism, it seems expedient to acquaint the reader with certain additional facts and data about the work of AMG.

The public and press in the democratic countries cannot but take an interest in the question of the scope of the work of AMG. Is it expected to extend the activities of this organization only to German and the other countries of the fascist bloc or also to the countries now under German occupation?

Apparently there are differences of opinion on that score. At any rate there is undoubtedly a tendency towards extending the activities of AMG also to the countries liberated from the German invaders.

It is precisely this fact which explains the appearance in the press of articles and statements resolutely opposed to the creation of an AMG in someone or other of the European countries.

DUTCH NEWSPAPER COMMENTS

Thus on Aug. 28 the Dutch newspaper **"Frei Nederland"** published in London carried an article which quite resolutely pointed out in connection with the projects for the application of AMG in all the liberated countries that **"not a single intelligent person will ever even entertain the idea that such may have any success in Holland, Belgium, France, Denmark or Norway." . . .**

On Aug. 24 the Rabat, Morocco radio, broadcast an account of a speech by a representative of the French Committee of National Liberation in Washington, who stated:

"The French Committee of National Liberation will surrender power to a provisional government to be formed soon after the liberation (even a partial one) of France. Thus no foreign administration of the type of AMG can be established in France."

The head of the Belgian Government, Hubert Pierlot, said: **"At the first opportunity the government will go to the liberated regions. . . . Even during the transitory period the country will not remain without a national government."**

There can hardly be any doubt that the same position on this question is held also by the leading circles of other European states suffering under Hitler Germany's yoke.

DOUBTS UNDERSTANDABLE

In the meantime these apprehensions as to the projected application of AMG on a broad European plan are easy to understand if account is taken of the scope of preparations of numerous cadres for "Allied Military Governments."

On Aug. 20 the London radio reported that there are five centers now instructing and training special personnel for work in AMG organs. Upon graduation these special groups join the army staffs and follow in the wake of the army.

Russia

DAILY WORKER
SEPT. 24, 1943 p-2 -

Speaking of AMG one cannot but mention the Board of Economic Coordination Abroad recently formed in the United States. Herman Wells was recently appointed Associate Director of this Board.

According to a telegram from Washington he is charged with the planning of the economic activities connected with the liberated territories. Wells is now Dean of the University of Indiana, and formerly was an employe of the Indiana Bankers Association. The Director of the Board is Under-Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

As seen from an interview published in the American press, the tasks set for Welles are quite varied and involve matters of a large scope. His sphere of activity includes the organization of supplies to the population of the liberated territories, the settlement of financial problems, measures to prevent economic warfare and to facilitate the restoration of trade.

Up to the time of the liberation of one or another territory this committee will engage in drafting and unifying a program of economic measures.

Following the liberation of the corresponding territory the committee is to be transformed into a central organ receiving reports from localities and issuing instructions to the local civil administrations operating in the respective territories.

BODY EXCLUSIVELY AMERICAN

Not devoid of interest is the indication that the body headed by Acheson and Wells is exclusively American. Nevertheless it is recognized as necessary to work out some form of joint activity with Britain. Thus, for example, the Washington committee dealing with economic problems in North Africa is a joint Anglo-American committee.

It is at present difficult to imagine the scope of the restoration work necessary to raise from the ashes the cities wiped off the face of the earth, to restore whole branches of industry and a national economy depleted and ruined by the German fascist vultures.

In every case restoration is the task of the peoples themselves, and its planning as well as the realization of the restoration plans may be determined solely by their supreme will, their respect for the principles of democracy and their truly national sovereignty, for the defense of which the United Nations raised their sword.

The idea and methods of the "Allied Military Government" as revealed by the data published in the foreign press contradict the above-mentioned principles.

In the course of these debates it is becoming ever clearer that the theory and practice of AMG cannot but evoke legitimate apprehensions among all those who understand the political importance of the task of destroying fascism on the territory liberated from the Hitlerite brigands.

Following the defeat of the enemy forces and the conquest of one or another territory by the Allied troops power in the task of restoration during the initial period rests naturally on the command of the Allied troops which won the victory over the enemy.

VICTORY MUST BE CONSOLIDATED

It is at the same time clear that all subsequent problems must be settled in the light of the necessity to consolidate the victory.

And it is precisely for the consolidation of this victory that it is necessary in the shortest possible time to draw in the local elements capable of aiding the Allies in the struggle against the enemy and to set up local organs of power functioning on a democratic basis and capable of winning over the local forces to the side of the Allies.

This relates even more to the districts liberated by the Allied troops and formerly occupied by the Hitlerites and their henchmen, where the restoration of local administrations on a democratic basis is especially urgent.

Failure to solve the problems inevitably confronting the Allies on liberated territory cannot but create unnecessary difficulties seriously impeding the cause of victory over Hitlerite tyranny.

'Most Powerful Man in World'

Stalin's Accord With the Church Called His Most Important Act

By WILLIAM PHILIP SIMMS

Mr. Simms

Marshal Stalin has been called "the most powerful man in the world." And today, as the Russian Army continues relentlessly to drive the German invaders back toward Berlin, he is fast becoming literally just that.

To underestimate this would be a grave mistake. If and when President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill hold that long-hoped-for meeting with Marshal Stalin this winter, it may turn out less of a conference than a confrontation, whereat the Red Dictator will state his terms for post-war collaboration and the Anglo-American statesmen can take it or leave it.

Stalin's star has risen during the past dozen months more rapidly, perhaps, than that of any other big league leader since Napoleon. And, like Napoleon, this was due not merely to his military successes, great as these undoubtedly have been, but to his statecraft as well.

It was no small thing to meet the pick of Hitler's legions and throw them for one loss after another.

But that Stalin should make himself the most sought-after statesman in the world with the heads of the British and American governments patiently waiting in an anteroom on the off-chance that he may see them, is still more significant.

MOST IMPORTANT ACT

But perhaps Stalin's most important act of the year was his accord with the church. He virtually completed the re-establishment of the Russian Orthodox Church whose Metropolitan has just been reinstated by his order and he has been striving to win back the confidence of religionists everywhere—Church of England, Roman Catholics and others.

This is bound to have far-reaching consequences and none knows it better than the Red Marshal himself. Nothing the Bolshevists did, after they took over in Russia in 1917, aroused the conscience of mankind more profoundly than the way they treated the Church. People everywhere—even non-believers—were deeply shocked when churches were dynamited or burned, priests executed or imprisoned and houses of worship turned into movie theaters, dance centers, or halls for the meetings of the Soviets' new "Godless Societies."

Stalin has changed all this. Not that he has "got religion." He hasn't and he makes no pretense that he has. Again like Napoleon, he is fully aware of the terrific force which religion is and long ago made up his mind to use it to his advantage.

RECALL NAPOLEON VIEWS

In Egypt, Napoleon—who, like Stalin, was no believer himself—made it a point to tell the sheiks and the pashas that in his opinion the Koran was no less the word of God than the Bible. "Allah is Allah," he quoted piously, "and Mohammed is his prophet." When he returned to Paris he frankly confessed that among the Turks he was a Mohammendan. "But now," he added, "I am a Catholic."

Christianity, Napoleon readily admitted, was "one of the greatest buttresses of any state." Yet personally, he was callous, even sacrilegious. "It is doubtful," he remarked cynically, "that Christ ever lived. The one certain thing is that we can make use of Him."

When the Czardom was overthrown in 1917, the Greek-(Russian)-Orthodox establishment fell with it. Peter the Great had made the Church a state institution with himself its head. Since 1917, the Communists have trained a new generation. The priests of today are said to be as Soviet-minded as the old ones were Czarist-minded. But, quibbling aside, the fact that Soviet Russia is squaring itself with religion is one of the most potent facts in the world today.

Text of Statement by Eden on Hess

By The Associated Press.

LONDON, Sept. 22—Following is the text of the Government's official statement on Rudolf Hess:

Hess flew to Great Britain in an ME-110, from which he landed by parachute in the evening of May 10, 1941, at Eaglesham in Scotland.

He was wearing the uniform of a captain of the German air force. He gave his name as Alfred Horn and stated to the home guard and police that he was on a "special mission" to see the Duke of Hamilton, and that he had intended to land at Dungavel, twelve miles distant from the spot where he landed.

The prisoner was taken to Maryhill Barracks, and among his possessions were found photographs of himself and of a small boy, also visiting cards of Dr. Karl Haushofer and Dr. Albrecht Haushofer, his son. No other documents or identifications were found on the prisoner.

On Sunday, May 11, at 10 A. M., Wing Commander the Duke of Hamilton arrived at Maryhill Barracks and visited the prisoner, with the interrogating officer and military officer on guard.

At the prisoner's request the latter two officers withdrew. He then stated to the wing commander that the latter had lunched in his house in Berlin at the time of the Olympic Games in 1936, and added, "I am Rudolf Hess."

The wing commander had no recollection of the prisoner and was not aware that he had ever seen or met Rudolf Hess.

Made Humanity Plea

The prisoner then proceeded: "I am on a mission of humanity. The Fuehrer does not want to defeat England and wants to stop fighting."

His friend Haushofer, he stated, had told him that the wing commander was an Englishman who would understand his point of view. He had tried to arrange a meeting in Lisbon. He had three times before tried to fly to Dungavel, the first time being December, 1940, but had been turned back by weather or various other reasons.

He did not want to come during the time of British successes in Libya lest it should appear that it was the weakness of Germany which prompted his flight, but that now Germany had had some success there (Libya) he was glad to come.

He stressed that his presence showed his sincerity and German willingness for peace.

His main theme was that Hitler was convinced Germany would win sooner or later and that he (the prisoner) wanted to stop unnecessary slaughter.

He asked the wing commander to get together leading members of his party to talk over things with a view to making peace proposals.

He then stated that he could tell him what the Fuehrer's peace terms would be.

The wing commander pointed out that there was now only one party in Great Britain.

The wing commander immediately flew to London and reported this conversation, stating that though he could not be sure he believed the prisoner was in fact Rudolf Hess.

Identified by Foreign Office

Mr. Kirkpatrick of the Foreign Office, who had during the period of his official duties in Berlin before the war become acquainted with Hess, was at once flown up to Scotland to identify the prisoner. He had three interviews, on May 13, 14 and 15. At the first of these he confirmed that the prisoner was Rudolf Hess.

During these interviews Hess further elaborated the object of his visit. He stressed the enormous power of Germany in the air and in U-boats, which later, he stated, would grow much greater. He affirmed the certainty of England's defeat by blockade, if not very quickly, in the course of two or three years.

He expressed his horror at the prospect of prolongation of the struggle. He had come, he said, without the knowledge of the Fuehrer, to convince the responsible persons that since England could not win, the wisest course was to make peace at once.

He gave his word of honor that the Fuehrer had never entertained any designs against the British Empire, nor had he ever aspired to world domination. The Fuehrer would sincerely regret the collapse of the British Empire. Hitler had declared to him as recently as May 3 that he had no oppressive demands to make on England.

The solution Hess put forward was as follows:

One—That Germany should be given a free hand in Europe.

Two—That England should have a free hand in the British Empire, except that former German colonies should return to Germany.

Three—That Russia should be included in Asia, but that Germany had certain demands to make of Russia which would have to be satisfied either by negotiation or as result of war. There was, however, no truth in rumors that the Fuehrer contemplated an early attack on Russia.

Objected to Churchill Government

Four—That the British should evacuate Iraq.

Five—The peace agreement would have to contain a provision for reciprocal indemnification of British and German nationals whose property had been expropriated as a result of the war.

Six—The proposal could only be considered on the understanding that it was negotiated by Germany with an English Government other than the present British Government. Mr. Churchill, who had planned the war since 1936, and his colleagues who had lent themselves to his war policy were not persons with whom the Fuehrer would negotiate.

Hess concluded by emphasizing that the Fuehrer really wanted a permanent understanding with Great Britain on a basis which would preserve the British Empire intact. His own flight was intended to give Great Britain a chance of opening conversations without loss of prestige.

If this chance were to be rejected it would be the Fuehrer's duty to destroy Great Britain utterly and to keep the country after war in a state of permanent subjection.

These so-called "terms" were restated by Hess in a signed document dated June 10. The only new point made in this document was a provision that a simultaneous armistice and peace must be concluded with Italy.

It was throughout made clear to Hess that there was no question whatever of any talks or negotiations of any kind taking place with Hitler or his Government.

Hess has been dealt with as a prisoner of war since his arrival in this country and will so continue to be treated till the end of the war.

N.Y. Times Sept. 23, 1943 p. 10

Soviet Paper Lauds Proposal For Anglo-Soviet-U. S. Group

(By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

MOSCOW, Sept. 21. — Soviet circles consider the proposal for an Anglo-Soviet-American commission on Mediterranean affairs as most opportune, says an item in the trade union periodical here, **War and the Workingclass.**

The projected commission is characterized here as a "military-political committee," which "**would guide the realization of the armistice terms with Italy, discuss the military and political problems arising in connection with the falling away of Germany's satellites,**" and thus contribute "**to the united efforts of the Allies for striking joint blows at Hitler Germany.**"

Entitled "A Growing Necessity," the magazine carries an item in its column "International Life," noting the projects for an Anglo-Soviet-American commission now being discussed in the Anglo-American press.

War and the Workingclass quotes from leading British and American papers demanding such a commission, declares that Soviet public opinion favors it, and urges that a representative of the French Committee of National Liberation be included in it.

"Throughout the war Soviet public opinion, which favors real coordination of the operations of the members of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition to bring about the speedy rout of the common enemy in Europe, has considered that the question of the establishment of a united military-political committee is most opportune," says the magazine item.

"This committee, with the participation of a representative of the French National Liberation Committee, would become an organ contributing to the united efforts of the Allies for striking joint blows at Hitler Germany.

"It would guide the realization of the armistice terms with Italy, discuss the military and political problems arising in connection with the falling away of Germany's satellites, etc.

"New problems may arise in the course of the committee's work, the solution of which will pave the path to further strengthening of the military, political and economic cooperations of the members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition."

This is a clipping from page 1 of the Daily Worker for Sept. 22, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

CRITICISMS FROM RUSSIA

It should go without saying that we must strive for the completest possible cooperation with Russia for the prosecution of the war against Germany. But cooperation is necessarily two-sided. There is increasing evidence that the leaders of Russia are jockeying for diplomatic position, and some of the methods they are using seem likely to injure rather than improve Russian relations with America and Great Britain.

Because the Russian press is completely controlled by the Government—is, in fact, a branch of the Government itself—whatever is published in that press must be taken as an official expression of opinion. The latest criticisms of American and British policy in the Russian magazine War and the Working Class, therefore, must be viewed with some concern. According to the report cabled from Moscow by The Associated Press, the article begins with the implication that Secretary Hull's recent denials of charges that the State Department was unfriendly to the Soviet Union were forced by American public opinion. The article proceeds to challenge the truthfulness of the American Ambassador to Russia, Admiral Standley. These points in themselves might be dismissed as remarks made merely in self-defense. But the article goes on to charge, according to The Associated Press report, that the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories is "opposed to the principles of democracy." It is strange indeed for the spokesman of a totalitarian Government to be giving Britain and America lessons in "principles of democracy."

The article goes on to reveal the writer's own concept of "the principles of democracy" when it calls upon our Government to suppress the White Russian newspaper Russia published here: "Some innocent persons feign to regard this as freedom of the press. But when, where and in what democratic country have spies enjoyed legal freedom of the press and assembly? Would a newspaper that made a profession of insulting the American allies be possible in England or any other Allied country? But such a newspaper exists in the United States." It is, of course, a standard totalitarian practice to make this sort of charge against any newspaper that a Government wishes to suppress. If this charge were really justified in the present case it could have been made quietly through regular diplomatic channels. It can only be interpreted, in the form in which it is made, as a criticism of our domestic policy. The article goes on to condemn a proposal for a federation of eastern European states. It contends that such a plan is an effort "to force the countries of the Baltic and the Balkans to submit to Poland and prepare the arena for which the Polish plan could attack the Soviet Union." If a federation of this sort is at all possible, it could presumably be achieved only by the voluntary consent of the peoples concerned. Such a federation would no doubt have much more defensive strength than the present nations considered separately. But if it were on a merely voluntary basis, it is incredible that it would have either will or strength for aggression against Russia. The attempt on the part of Russian leaders to prevent in advance the serious consideration of such a union may precipitate a premature controversy over the peace terms that does not seem calculated to increase collaboration between Russia and Britain and America.

Public criticism by Russian Government periodicals of British and American policy is only likely to lead to reciprocal criticisms in our own press, which is all the more difficult to control precisely because it is free. In the interests of cooperation the Russian Government should reduce criticisms in its controlled press to a minimum.

Russia

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Times for [illegible]
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

HOARE DISCOUNTS FEAR OF RUSSIA

Says U.S.S.R. Must Be Welcomed Into Full Comity With Peoples of Europe

CITES POST-WAR DANGER

Ambassador Warns Famine and Anarchy Must Be Prevented by Allies

By Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, Sept. 20—Sir Samuel Hoare, British Ambassador to Spain, who in the past has been linked with the extreme right Conservative party declared that Russia must take her "rightful place" in "any stable Europe" in a speech here today.

That Ambassador Hoare, connected in Main Street's mind with Munich and often accused by Leftists of strong anti-Russian sentiments, should have delivered a speech dwelling on the need for Rusian "welcome into a full comity with Europsean peoples" is striking evidence of the realization by all shades of British opinion of the Russian place in the post-war world.

Speaking to arms workers in Chelsea the British representative to the most anti-Communist of all neutral European capitals told his audience that in arguing with "fearful souls" who regard Russia as the "real danger of European stability" he replied that "communism * * * is a national not an international product."

Praises Russian Armies

To those who fear it he said "you should so put your house in order that your social and political conditions will silence any demand for its introduction."

At the same time he admitted taht "we must be gfrateful for the magnificent help of the Soviet Armies and unprejudiced as to the lessons that we may learn from the Russian experiment." Sir Samuel dod not reveal whether the "fearful souls" with whom he had argued included Gen. Francisco Franco and the rest of the Spanish Government.

He asserted that the British standing in the eyes of European friends as well as "some who have no great love for us" came as a result of military victories and Empire solidarity. Britain emerged, he said, when all three fighting services were considered "the leading military power in Europe." Having achieved this power, he asserted, Britain does not intend to abandon it and "tomorrow it may be the safeguard of European stability."

Says British Aid Is Sought

As a result of Britain's growing strength, the Ambassador declared, the Continent "looks to us more intently for help and guidance in the difficult days ahead." He said he believed we are determined to prove equal to our great responsibility.

Sir Samuel placed "food and order" as the first needs of Europe. "We are prepared in full cooperation with our great Allies to prevent famine by insuring the effective distribution of food supplies and to forestall anarchy by Allied garrisons at key points on the Continent," he said.

Sir Samuel predicted that British economic help would if properly organized prove an experiment in "avoiding waste, in controlling commodity prices and in preventing periodical crises in international exchange." He admitted that he was unable to predict what kind of government would arise in Italy and Germany but said that "what matters to us is not details of constitutions or difference of habits and methods but rather the broad principles without which civilized life is impossible."

The broad principle mentioned by Sir Samuel was "dignity of human nature." This meant, he said, the end of the police state and the renaissance of "non-state" activities in Europe. Particularly he stressed the desire for a revival of "true university life" with free discussion as opposed to "State idolatry."

He said he was thankful that State idolatry had been "kept in check," but warned that the "sophistries whereon it is based are often persuasive."

Europeans, he said, were wondering "whether the great totalitarian machine that we have so successfully constrducted for war needs will not be kept permanently in commission when the war is ended. His answer, he said, what that while "there may be many changes" Britons intend to maintain "our historical and traditional liberties."

Cursor

This is a clipping from page 5 of the ~~Daily Worker~~ New York Times for Sept. 21, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

TAR, WASHINGTON, D. C., MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1943.

oviet Trade Paper ees Keen U. S. Desire or Good Relations

r the Associated Press.

MOSCOW, Sept. 20.—The Soviet rade Union magazine, War and the Vorking Classes, declared yesterday iat President Roosevelt and Secrery of State Hull's denials of iarges that the State Department as unfriendly to Russia were of reat significance."

"They demonstrated the fact that merican public opinion reacts tickly to anything connected with merican-Soviet relations," the agazine said.

"Readers recall, of course, that veral months ago the same quick finite disavowal followed the statement by United States Ambassador imiral William H. Standley, who iexpectedly made to American correspondents in Moscow a declaration alleging that the Russian people had not been given proper information as to American help to Russia, although this did not correspond to the truth."

The magazine said there "exists in American circles a great desire for friendship with the U. S. S. R. and further improvement in Soviet-American relations. This is also the aim with which the people of the U. S. S. R. are imbued."

Criticism of AMG Renewed.

At the same time, the magazine renewed criticism of AMG (Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories), asserting that the AMG was opposed to the principles of democracy.

Recognizing the necessity for the Allied high command to establish control over territory taken from the enemy, the magazine said, however, that "for the consolidation of victory it is necessary to attract quickly local forces capable of assisting the Allies in their struggle against the enemy."

"It is necessary to establish local organs of power on a democratic basis."

The magazine also protested the existence in New York of a White Russian newspaper, Russia, which it called the "legal conductor of false German information in the United States."

"Some innocent people feign to regard this as freedom of the press," the magazine said. "But when, where and in what democratic country have spies enjoyed legal freedom of the press and assembly? Would a newspaper which made a profession of insulting the American allies be possible in England or any other Allied country? But such a newspaper exists in the United States."

Objections to Polish Plan.

In another article the magazine also renewed objections to the Polish plan for a confederation of eastern European states and denounced a proposal for a "central union" of Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania.

Referring to the book "Central Union," by George Harrison and Peter Gordon, published in London, which advances an eastern European plan, the magazine declared that "discovery of fantastic countries and travel are traditionally beloved topics of English literature."

"It is true that this is a funny book, but it was not written for laughs, but to be taken seriously."

The magazine said the authors wanted Britain and the United States "to forget the countries of the Baltic and the Balkans to submit to Poland and prepare the arena from which the Polish plan could attack the Soviet Union."

'Big Three' Reach Point Where Accord's Vital

By WILLIAM PHILIP SIMMS

Mr. Simms

The coming conference between Secretary of State Hull, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden and Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov—probably in Moscow—is more than important. It is crucial.

Informed diplomats here agree that relations between Moscow and London and Washington are approaching a showdown. This does not mean that there is going to be anything like a break. It does mean, however, that the Big Three have reached a point beyond which they dare not go without an understanding.

Whatever happens, the meeting will not be undecisive. Either the three great powers will unite on a formula for political collaboration in Europe, or they will simply agree to disagree. At best, a long step will have been taken toward a just and lasting peace. At worst, Russia will make known her intention to go it alone, thus clearing up present doubts regarding her future course.

Italy clearly reveals the necessity for an early understanding. It is possible that Germany may crack up politically, soon. Hitler and his gang may be liquidated and a new regime set up.

TRAGEDY CERTAIN

Should that happen before there is a meeting of the minds of Washington, London and Moscow, it would almost certainly lead to tragedy. It would spell choas not only in the Reich, but probably thruout Eastern and Central Europe and the Balkans. Possibly it might result in serious clashes between the Allies themselves. Historically, such clashes are not without precedent.

The only way to avoid such dangers is for the principal powers to decide, in advance, on a common course of action. They must agree on the initial steps to be taken in Germany, and on a formula for Poland, Finland, the three Baltic states, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece and even Czechoslovakia, the Low Countries and France. In some cases, the problems involved are not difficult, presupposing a modicum of good will all the way around. In others, however, the signs are far from good. In other areas the seeds of civil war have already been sown. Unless Russia, Britain and the United States all live up to the spirit of their pledges under the Atlantic Charter, and make plans in advance, the harvest will be furher bloodshed.

An understanding between Moscow, London and Washington will not be easy. They think differently. Moscow's in an Oriental mind and the other two are distinctly Occidental. Each is more or less suspicious of the other, but in the case of Moscow it is carried to the extreme. To this day Marshal Stalin is just as careful to conceal his hand from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill as he is to hide his future moves from Hitler. The chances are that Nazi intelligence knows more about the Red army than do the Combined Chiefs of Staff here in Washington.

ADMITS ASPIRATIONS

With regard to Germany, Eastern Europe and the Balkans, Moscow has frankly revealed intentions considerably at variance with those set forth by the Anglo-Americans. In Eastern Europe and the Balkans, Moscow has indicated aspirations of both a territorial and political order not at all in keeping with the war aims of the United Nations. On the other hand, Britain and America have pondered a program for dismembering Germany and supervising the pieces considerably beyond anything Moscow has suggested.

Agreement, therefore, cannot be taken for granted. But the high cost of failure should frighten the conferees into leaving nothing undone to achieve success. While we know almost nothing of Moscow's intentions, she already has a pretty good idea of ours. Her consent to meet with us is taken by some as a sign that she at least thinks we may not be too far apart.

Russia

WASH. DAILY NEWS SEPT. 20, 1943 p. 17

Berle's Letter Rules Out A Cordon Around Russia

Spikes Report State Dept. Favors System of Buffer States

By United Press

WASHINGTON, Sept. 20.—Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., apparently has placed the State Dept. in firm opposition to postwar creation of a cordon of buffer states aimed at shutting Soviet Russia off from the rest of Europe.

He emphatically spiked reports that the Department favors a buffer state system in a letter to Charles Davila, former Rumanian Minister to the U. S., and long active in pro-Allied interests.

The letter constituted the strongest evidence to date that the U. S. may be preparing to accept some Russian territorial claims in eastern Europe, including the smaller Baltic states, eastern Poland and parts of Finland and Rumania.

Letter Confirmed

The Department confirmed existence of the letter, but declined to release the text or say whether it would be disclosed later.

The New York *Times* said, however, that Berle told Davila the State Dept. always has viewed the buffer state plan as absurd and is annoyed and disgusted at rumors it favors the idea. He is said to have added that the Department deprecates such attempts to sow distrust among the Allies.

Disclosure of the letter coincided with announcement that Adm. William H. Standley, U. S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, is enroute here for consultations believed pointed toward final arrangement for a Russian-British-American conference of foreign secretaries. That impending meeting in turn is considered preliminary to a long-hoped-for parley among President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Josef Stalin.

It is considered unlikely Berle would have taken such a stand without the President's approval.

While full details of the letter were unavailable a little-noticed speech by Berle at Reading, Pa., last Spring sounded the same keynote. In that address he scoffed at what he termed an anti-Russian story suggesting that after the war the Soviet Union should be set off from Europe by protecting buffer states. He charged the story was fabricated out of ignorance.

Berle wrote Davila in response to a letter from the former Foreign Minister voicing amazement at published reports that his (Davila's) activities looking toward direct and friendly Rumanian relations with Russia were disapproved by the Department.

Letter to PM

The text of that letter was not disclosed by the Department. But in another letter to PM, Davila last week set forth views understood to be identical with those given Berle.

"I have been making broadcasts to my country in the last six months over the network of the OWI, explaining to my compatriots the necessity of friendly relations with Soviet Russia and asking them to force Antonescu, Rumania's dictator, to stop fighting in the Nazi camp," he wrote.

"I have made clear to them how absurd it is to believe, as many Central Europeans do, that a *cordon sanitaire* against Soviet Russia could be set up after the common victory. Naturally, the State Dept. has had the copies of my speeches, and would have certainly intervened with the OWI if it had disapproved of them.

"Moreover, I have reasons to believe that my first conversation with Mr. Litvinov (former Russian Ambassador to the U. S. A.) was facilitated by certain talks he had had at the State Dept.

Print

This is a clipping from page 4 of P M

for Sept. 20, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government

The Stakes at Moscow

Several new facts have emerged about the coming conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Big Three. For one thing it probably will be held at Moscow, rather than at London or Washington. For another, it is unlikely that Secretary Hull will be there. Finally, the recall of Ambassador Standley to Washington, "for consultation," marks the removal of another influence that could not have helped matters for the American delegation at Moscow.

It would be a good guess that these developments have a bearing on each other. As reported from London, Russia's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotoff, feels strongly that he must be at Moscow during the conference, so that he can have Stalin's directives and advice. This may well be, but it sounds like one of those diplomatic reasons which has the right formal surface appearance, but is intended to conceal something beneath the surface.

The big fact is that Moscow is so far from Washington that it will be very difficult for Secretary Hull, who is not in the best of health, to get there. Would it be uncharitable, both to Hull and the Russians, to think that this consideration bears more heavily on Russia's request than Molotoff's reluctance to part from Stalin? The Russians don't need to read the American columnists to learn what the dominant impulses have been in State Dept. policy.

I think that Sumner Welles would have been the ideal man to represent us, but the whole unsavory scuffle between Hull and Welles has now made that impossible. It is a very melancholy commentary on the State Dept. that, given Hull's incapacity to go to Moscow, and eliminating Welles, there is no one left in the Department who has the stature for this job. Think of how the Russians would feel if First Assistant Secretary Adolf Berle or Second Assistant Secretary Breckinridge Long were suggested for the mission.

The talk is that the choice will fall on W. Averill Harriman, American Lend-Lease Administrator in London, and one of the men on the original American mission to Russia after Hitler's attack. One thing that can be said about Harriman is that he is not in the well-channeled diplomatic tradition of the State Dept. He is a hard-headed industrialist who thinks in technical terms, and is not bemused by the diplomat's lost dream of a world of power politics.

The talk is further that if Harriman is sent to Moscow for the Conference, the President may decide to keep him there as Ambassador in place of Adm. Standley, who is on his way back. That is looking pretty far ahead. But where "liberals" like Bullitt and tough old sea-dogs like Standley have failed, we could do much worse than send a good business-man like Harriman.

But I think it would be a mistake to emphasize how much harm or good our representation at Moscow can do us. A few days ago marked a decade since the recognition of the Soviet regime by the Roosevelt administration, and the resumption of diplomatic relations that had been broken off after the Russian Revolution. That decade has had in it many changes and chances, many ups and downs in Russian-American relations. Yet I think it is safe to say that those relations have been determined less by what our Ambassador said or did at Moscow than by what Russian and American policy were like elsewhere.

Let us remember this: the difficulties in American-Russian relations must be traced back not to what happened at Moscow, but to what happened at Madrid and Munich, and more recently at Algiers and Quebec.

The coming Moscow conference can do a deal of good. It can clear away some of the immediate stumbling-blocks that have come to litter the path of American-Russian relations — questions of boundaries, of lend-lease, of our political decisions in the Mediterranean.

But the real stakes at Moscow go beyond these questions. They reach to the basic attitude that the Big Three powers will take on the question of the rebuilding of the world's political and economic structure. By dissolving the Comintern the Russians have indicated that they will not play an active role in fomenting revolution. I think that what they want from us is some sort of promise that we will not play an active role in suppressing the democratic revolutions that are bound to come in Europe.

We have no Comintern to dissolve. But we have an attitude of mind that stands as much in the path of world peace as the Comintern ever did. Let us dissolve that.

—MAX LERNER

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This is a clipping from
page 2 of P M
for Sept. 20, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of
Government

Soviet Paper Says U. S. A., Britain Are After Commercial Gravy

By United Press

MOSCOW, Sept. 20.—The authoritative Russian publication *War and the Working Classes*, charges that the U. S. A. and Britain are trying to secure a leading voice in the settlement of European economic problems for "Anglo-Saxon banking, industrial and commercial groups."

The review criticized bitterly the AMG—Allied Military Government—and the American Board of Economic Action headed by Dean Acheson, U. S. Assistant Secretary of State.

It was the second attack against the Allies' administration of territory captured from the Axis that has been printed this month by the publication, which in the past frequently has mirrored the attitude of the Soviet Government.

War and the Working Classes charged that the AMG in Sicily retained the Fascist governmental machine and that it "is generally developing from foundations that have nothing in common with democratic principles."

The magazine expressed concern over "indications" that AMG does not intend to limit itself to military administrative problems that may arise during the transitional period between the liberation of Axis-held countries and the re-establishment of local government.

"On the contrary," it said, "the preparation by personnel for AMG in the U. S. A., Britain and Africa is so well and solidly organized that it leaves no doubt that the organization is intended for a prolonged period.

"Among its important tasks is the attempt to secure a leading voice in the solution of economic problems for Anglo-Saxon banking, industrial and commercial groups."

Commenting on Acheson's economic organization, the publication called attention to the fact that it includes only Americans, although its functions are international.

"Methods for the rehabilitation of devastated countries, whether motivated by duty to the nations which are making untold sacrifices for the common victory, or for the more selfish purposes of certain groups, are of extreme significance," it said.

"In all cases, rehabilitation is the affair of the peoples themselves and should be planned and materialized only with the most careful respect for the democratic principles and genuine national sovereignty for which the United Nations are fighting."

This is a clipping from
page 24 of P H
for Sept. 20, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of
Government

NEW SOVIET POLICY ON RELIGION HAILED

Bonnell Holds Recent Changes Foreshadow 'More Important Happenings to Come'

The recognition the Soviet Government has accorded to religion in Russia will do much to allay the misgivings of church-minded people in the United Nations, the Rev. Dr. John Sutherland Bonnell said yesterday in his sermon at the Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church, Fifth Avenue at Fifty-fifth street.

Dr. Bonnell characterized as significant the news of the visit of Archbishop of York to Russia as head of an Anglican mission and the installation of the Metropolitan of all the Russians with the express consent of Premier Joseph Stalin.

"It is a reversal of the Soviet policy of the last quarter of a century," Dr. Bonnell said. "Even five years ago such a happening would have been impossible. These conferences between religious leaders of two great United Nations should do much toward putting into effect in Eastern Europe one of the most important of the four freedoms for which we are fighting today, namely, freedom of religion.

"While the significance of these two events could easily be overestimated they are but foreshadowings of even more important happenings to come. The recognition which the Soviet Government under Marshal Stalin has now given to religion in Russia will do much to allay the misgivings of church-minded people in the United Nations who up to the present have had some difficulty in discovering much difference in the attitude of Stalin and Hitler with respect to religion.

"The Nazis have relentlessly persecuted religion in every occupied country because they have recognized in it a bulwark against oppression. It is their studied purpose to lead captive the soul of man. 'The individual is nothing—the State is everything,' is their slogan.

"Religion makes man invincible. It emphasizes the infinite and eternal values arising from his special relation to God. Says the Psalmist, 'Thou hast made him but a little lower than God.' Man's glory lies in his Godlike powers. When he uses his freedom to rebel against the divine will tragedy always results for himself and for the world.

"The only enduring basis for a true demonstration of human brotherhood in the post-war world is the Christian conviction that every man, no matter what his race or color may be, is a child of God. Created in the divine image he is gifted with the inalienable right to exercise his freedom of conscience and worship without governmental restraint or coercion."

This is a clipping from page 17 of the New York Times for Sept. 20, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

RUSSIANS STRESS ROOSEVELT DENIAL

Moscow Magazine Says Reply to Charge of Unfriendliness Is Significant

SEES STRONG TIES TO U. S.

Union Organ Renews Attacks on Allied Military Regime in Occupied Areas

MOSCOW, Sept. 19 (AP)—The Soviet trade union magazine War and the Working Class said today that President Roosevelt's and Secretary of State Cordell Hull's denials of charges that the State Department was unfriendly to the Soviet Union were of "great significance."

"They demonstrated the fact that American public opinion reacts quickly to anything connected with American-Soviet relations," the magazine said.

"Readers recall, of course, that several months ago the same quick, definite disavowal followed the statement by United States Ambassador Admiral William H. Standley, who unexpectedly made to American correspondents in Moscow a declaration alleging that the Russian people had not received proper information as to American help to Russia, although this did not correspond to the truth."

The magazine said there "exists in American circles a great desire for friendship with the U.S.S.R. and further improvement in Soviet-American relations; this is also the aim with which the people of the U.S.S.R. are imbued."

AMG Is Again Criticized

At the same time the magazine renewed criticism of the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories, asserting that the AMG was opposed to the principles of democracy. It recognized the necessity for the Allied High Command to establish control over territory taken from the enemy, but that "for the consolidation of victory it is necessary to attract quickly local forces capable of assisting the Allies in their struggle against the enemy."

"It is necessary to establish local organs of power on a democratic basis," it declared.

The magazine also protested the existence in New York of the White Russian newspaper, Russia, which it called the "legal conductor of false German information in the United States."

"Some innocent persons feign to regard this as freedom of the press," the magazine said. "But when, where and in what democratic country have spies enjoyed legal freedom of the press and assembly? Would a newspaper that made a profession of insulting the American Allies be possible in England or any other Allied country? But such a newspaper exists in the United States."

In another article the magazine also renewed objections to the Polish plan for a confederation of eastern European States and denounced a proposal for a "certral union" of Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania.

Referring to the book "Central Union" by George Harrison and Peter Gordon, published in London, which advances an eastern European plan, the magazine declared that "discovery of fantastic countries and travel are traditionally beloved topics of English literature."

"It is true that this is a funny book, but it was not written for laughs, but to be taken seriously," it said.

The magazine said the authors wanted Britain and the United States "to force the countries of the Baltic and the Balkans to submit to Poland and prepare the arena for which the Polish plan could attack the Soviet Union."

Roosevelt Message Quoted

By Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, Sept. 19—President Roosevelt's message to Congress received great prominence in the Russian press. The passage relating to the importance of Allied air operations in drawing off parts of the German Air Force from the Russian front was fully quoted. The Russians have been greatly impressed by the stupendous rate of American production, especially the output of planes and shipping.

Criticism of Soviet Union Same as Stalin's Red Army Hurls Foe in 1939

Russia

This is a clipping from page 2 of the New York Times for Sept. 20, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Pact vs. Russia?

Forrest Davis, an associate editor of the *Saturday Evening Post*, thinks that Washington and London have laid aside plans for a four-power pact to include Russian and China, and have agreed instead on an Anglo-American Alliance.

Davis not only believes in the existence of such an agreement, but attempts to justify it as the only possible safeguard against the "imperialistic ambitions" of the Soviet Union which, he charges, already has made plain its disinclination to come to terms with the western democracies.

Davis is a former New York newspaperman, who is reputed to be on very good terms with Harry Hopkins and who, on at least one very dramatic occasion, is credited with having gotten the inside track with the State Dept.

This happened two years ago when Davis, with Ernest K. Lindley, the author of the only existing official FDR biography, collaborated on the Book *How War Came, An American White Paper*, an inside story of prewar Washington diplomacy which, while it bore no official indorsement, was accepted in most quarters as an unofficially official version of the State Dept. viewpoint—if you know what I mean.

At any rate, no official in Washington has ever made an objection to *How War Came*, and there is no evidence that Davis has lost his "inside track" since the book was published.

All of which is an indication that Davis's latest piece, which appears in the current issue of the *Saturday Evening Post*, may be based on more than the chitchat which any newspaperman can collect over the cocktail bars and in the marble outhouses of Washington.

It was because of this evidence, plus certain internal evidence present in the article itself tending to indicate inspired sources, that PM asked its foreign editor, Alexander H. Uhl, to take up the Davis article with Secretary Hull at the latter's weekly conference Friday.

This is the question that Uhl asked Hull:

"Forrest Davis in the Saturday Evening Post *publishes an article, the implications of which are that Britain and the U. S. A. have agreed on a common Anglo-American policy in substitution for a four-power concern which would include China and Russia. Inasmuch as Davis is known to speak with high authority on State Dept. policies and that his implications may cause grave difficulties with our Allies, don't you think that any misunderstanding that may be caused by the article should be cleared away?"*

The answer Hull gave (which cannot be quoted directly) is as follows:

Naturally, the Secretary said, he could not take up every kind of implication that any or all persons may decide is an implication and give it attention. He said that he could only deal with the facts as he understood them, rather than implications. He said he did not know of any facts to support the suggestion that Uhl seemed to be bringing out.

I haven't the slightest notion of how much weight to attach to the Secretary's denial of Davis' thesis, particularly as it is not certain as to whether Hull had read the whole article before the press conference.

For the fact is that Uhl's presentation of the piece was a conservative one, designed not to draw fireworks, but a reasonable and straight answer. Actually, Davis libels our foreign policy even more than did Drew Pearson, who charged some weeks ago that Hull was "anti-Soviet" and wanted the Soviet Union "bled white."

For this, Pearson was attacked bitterly by Hull and called a "chronic liar" by the President.

The Davis article says, by implication, that not only Hull, but FDR, has been lying every time he talked of a post-war world in terms of broad collaboration, which he has done times without number.

And the Davis article implies not only that we are going to manufacture post-war alliances without the USSR, but *against* it; and that, indeed, some of our Washington "experts" already are calculating on a war with the Soviet Union which will start as soon as the war with Germany and Japan is over.

I quote from Davis:

"The Prime Minister's [Churchill's] suggestion that the English-speaking peoples might need to 'march together' in the postwar world caught the notice of the experts, who wondered if he anticipated continuing hostilities after the downfall of Germany and Japan. The Capital naturally assumed that Churchill had gained Roosevelt's approval before proposing what amounted to an Anglo-American alliance at the heart of the United Nations."

Davis quotes extensively from a Churchill speech in which the Prime Minister is quoted as having warned that if the "Atlantic Allies fall out, 'all will toss and drift for a long time on dark and stormy seas.'" And Davis adds:

"A few Washington diplomats, who follow the shadings of international affairs intently, saw in Churchill's declaration a recognition of the fears of the small nations and a promise to oppose their bolshevizing with American assistance, if that was forthcoming."

And if American assistance were not forthcoming? But Davis thinks it will be:

"Historically, the English-speaking nations have drawn together in the face of pressures from outside powers."

When Pearson intimated that Washington was ganging up on the Soviet Union, he was called a chronic liar. Davis, who says what amounts to the same thing, is not.

The obvious reason for the distinction, of course, is that Pearson is critical of our foreign policy, while Davis approves of it.

This is an obvious reason, but it is not a sound reason.

The fact is that both men, approaching from opposite directions and ascribing the facts to different causes, *do find the same facts*.

Either Davis is a liar, chronic or occasional, and should be called so by qualified experts, or he is telling the truth, and Washington and London, like Hitler are preparing to save Europe from bolshevism.

I think the American people are entitled to learn the answer from Secretary Hull.

—Victor H. Bernstein

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SOVIET MAKES PEACE WITH CHURCH

By ALEXANDER WERTH

By Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, Sept. 18—Exactly a year ago a beautifully printed, bound and illustrated book was published by the Moscow Patriarchate called "The Truth About Religion in Russia." Fifty thousand copies of this book, containing speeches and sermons by the present Patriarch Sergius and by the Metropolitans Nicholas, Alexius and other leading churchmen stating the church's attitude toward the war and the Soviet State and the church's sufferings in the occupied areas, were printed. Many foreigners in Moscow at that time treated the publication with considerable irony, saying it had been specially printed for foreign consumption and for export.

Actually, the book abounded in a variety of understatements where it touched on the Orthodox Church's difficulties during the past twenty-five years, but it was nevertheless clear that this publication was a highly important landmark in the history of the Russian Church and of its relations with the Soviet regime.

A Reply to Hitler

Much of the book was devoted to the Orthodox Church's record during the war. Patriarch Sergius himself absolutely rejected, in a statement published in the book, Hitler's alleged crusade for the "liberation" of the Russian Church.

Using the traditional archaic phrases of leading churchmen, the book referred to the Nazis as the "successors of those foul hounds, the Teutonic Knights, whom St. Alexander Nevsky routed on the ice of Lake Peipus in 1242."

The book also contained an epistle sent in the summer of 1942

Accord Is Recognition of Loyal Support and Popular Demand

to Orthodox believers in the occupied territories, reminding them that they must never forget they were Russians and must never do anything, wittingly or unwittingly, by which they would betray their homeland. There followed a sharp attack on church quislings, particularly Bishop Sikorsky who, though appointed by the Moscow Patriarchy, entered Hitler's service under the assumed title of Archbishop of Luck and Kovel.

War Service Listed

Further, the book contains interesting details of the church's acts during the war as distinct from words—a highly impressive list of money and clothes collections for the Red Army. Thus one Gorki church alone collected more than a million rubles.

Such is some of the background of the developments which led up this month to the re-establishment of the Church Patriarch and Holy Synod after a decisive interview recently between Premier Stalin and leading churchmen and the arrival from Ulianovsk on the Volga to which he was sent in 1941 of the Patriarchal Locum Tenens, 76-year-old Sergius—the man who since Patriarch Tikhon's death in 1925 has been the head of the Russian church during what in the Cathedral at Moscow he called the church's seventeen-year widowhood.

It would be absurd to assume that because the Patriarchate has been re-established with the approval of the Soviet Government that the Soviet regime has gone clerical. Stalin and the Soviet Government have always kept a finger on the pulse of Russian public opinion and closely examined the innermost desires of the Russian people.

Change in Church

As a prominent Soviet personality told me:

"We don't want any part of our population to think we are trying in any way to deprive them of something they genuinely and deeply desire—religion. The church has been patriotic and loyal and, if in the past the church was traditionally associated with the old régime and was almost automatically anti-Soviet, twenty-five years have made an enormous difference. Today the church has realized profoundly the national character of our regime and has fully 'accepted' us."

Through the Holy Synod the Government will keep contact with the church and measures will be taken, for example, for the re-establishment of a large number of churches which since the Revolution have fallen into disuse as places of worship.

There is no doubt that the re-establishment of the church fits completely into that process of a revival of the Russian national tradition which has been going on for some years, particularly since 1935. Many Russian unbelievers are very pleased with the reform because they like churches and church ritual as something belonging to Russian historical traditions. In a country where so much is said about the great heroes and statesmen of the past, including Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, there is an inevitable interest in the church.

Russia

This is a clipping from page _____ of the New York Times for _____

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Unallied U. S. Hold Best Able To Preserve Postwar Peace

By Constantine Brown.

In his recent brilliant speech at Harvard University, Prime Minister Churchill urged that the United States and Britain continue their present military alliance after the war is over.

Mr. Churchill is not alone in advocating such a solution for maintenance of peace in the world. There are many Americans who not only indorse his views but go further and say that this would be the solution to prevent another war.

The combined forces of United States and the British Empire, they say, are so vast and their power so great that no nation would dare set the world ablaze when they know that Uncle Sam and John Bull are patrolling the sea and the skies with fleets so strong that they can crush them without trouble.

Under the emotional impact of the war the formula suggested by the British Prime Minister and backed by a number of thinking Americans appears about the only hope for peace. American-British co-operation in the war has been running as smoothly as possible. It must continue until peace is signed and the map of the world is reshaped and established in such a manner that another war can be avoided for one or, if we are lucky, several generations.

But many people question the wisdom of a definite military alliance between the United States and Britain or, for that matter, with any European country.

Alliances have never guaranteed peace. If formed between strong and powerful nations they guarantee the winning of a war. In the past alliances always have called for counteralliances. All were clothed in a beautiful language assuring the world that they were intended exclusively for the good of humanity. But they always ended in catastrophe.

The German-Austrian-Italian alliance established years before the outbreak of the World War brought about an entente cordiale—another name for a military understanding—between Russian, France and Great Britain.

Axis Brought Alliance.

The foundation of the German-Italian axis led to the alliance between Britain and France. Both groups were bidding for the support of Russia, which held aloof until it decided which way to turn to serve the best interests and aspirations of the Russian people.

Historically alliances have never prevented wars—quite the contrary. They have been necessary in Europe where wars always have been endemic plagues. They have served the purpose of being pacts to help win wars and not to guarantee peace.

It is argued that in a British-American alliance a new peace ideology would be brought into play since the American people are such ardent pacifists and can derive no profits from the war. This is true and it is also true regarding Britain so long as she is not called on to defend the empire against the covetous aggressor. There is no question that the merger of the military and economic resources of both countries would present the world with an enormous power which others would be hesitant to tackle.

This combination of forces might be successful if the rest of the world thought along the same terms as the English-speaking nations. But they do not.

A military alliance between Britain and the United States would be interpreted as an attempt of the "Anglo-Saxons" to dominate the world. It would call immedaitely for counteralliances of other powers.

Soviet Leaders Suspicious.

The leaders of the Soviet are particularly suspicious men. They consider such a merger of forces as a potential danger to Russia's national aspirations and would look immediately to some other countries with the same interests as herself to combat the menace.

It is sufficient to read the frank declarations of Premier Stalin, who says that the German Army must be preserved because it is bound to be an element which would help to prevent complete chaos and destruction in Europe.

The Soviet government is not anxious to disarm Germany's forces and suppress all her military establishments where war implements are being manufactured. The Russian Premier probably would indorse a proposition calling for complete disarmament of all nations after the war.

But the idea that the present Allies keep their forces intact to prevent the threat of another world war is not in high favor in Moscow. To the Russians it smacks too much of the Versailles treaty which in the end proved such a poor one.

If a permanent peace is to be maintained and wars avoided, all nations must be disarmed immediately. It is difficult to say whether this is possible. It has never been tried. But it is safe to argue that so long as some nations want to expand they will do so by force and will find the means to fight unless the world has really learned a lesson and the necessary expansions can be done by international agreement in which all the nations decide to play fair with each other.

It is extremely doubtful that we have reached the advanced stage of civilization when each nation recognizes the other's right to share in the world's prosperity and racial hatreds are obliterated. This is particularly true as far as Europe is concerned where so many nations and races merge into ethnical groups in a small inclosure.

Dog Incident Cited.

A few days ago a group of trained dogs, led by their soldier trainers, appeared at the "Back the Attack" show in Washington. The dogs acted perfectly at the first performance, obeying the almost imperceptible signs of their trainers, jumped, laid down, fetched and carried objects at the slightest sign or whispered order.

The next day, however, a collie apparently did not like the looks or the behavior of an Alsatian police dog. He broke away from his master and in a twinkle was at the throat of the Alsatian.

This was the signal for the rest of the dogs to join in the fight and pandemonium reigned in the inclosure until the soldiers restored order and separated the howling, biting and fighting animals.

The trainer of the collie maintained that his dog was not the aggressor but that the Alsatian had growled challengingly at him. The Alsatian's trainer said his ward was perfectly under control and fought only in self-defense.

The other soldiers said they could not prevent their charges from fighting once the battle started. Some of those who tried to break up the fight came out of it with bruises and minor bites, as is inevitably the case in every dog fight.

This illustrates perfectly the history of peace and war down through the centuries.

This is a clipping from page 4 of the Daily Worker for _____
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Peace

Hundreds of years of wars which brought about a temporary glory for their makers, but only disaster to the peopel, have not taught the European nations that war does not pay. It is highly improbable that the present conflict will teach them differently. Of course, if the leaders of the victorious nations could show enough wisdom to refrain from retaliations the picture might be different.

Foregiveness Unlikely.

But this war, in which the Axis held the upper hand at first, has brought such misery and the subjected nations have been so dastardly treated by their temporary conquerors that it would be asking too much to expect foregiveness for those who have been guilty of wanton destruction and murders.

Therefore, it is unlikely that the cooling-off period after this war will be long, and during that period the victorious groups will have to remain armed while the others are disarmed.

If there were complete harmony among the victors immediately after the war is over, some sort of a stable peace might be established. But unfortunately this may not be the case. Already there have been some sharp exchanges between Moscow and some of the United Nations governments-in-exile, such as Poland and Yugoslavia.

We have indorsed the complete independence of Poland and Yugoslavia and the restoration of their territories. How will this harmonize with the Moscow views about the future boundaries of Poland?

The British government is looking sympathetically toward the monarchs in exile who have led their nations in the fight against the Axis. What will be the attitude of the British police forces in Greece, for instance, in the event the Greek people decided to change their form of government and depose King George, who is being strongly supported by the British government?

But what is more important than these local squabbles which could be ironed out eventually by the application of intelligent statesmanship is Britain's position regarding Russia.

Warm Water Port Issue.

Although it may be unwise in time of war to point it out, we cannot blind ourselves to the fact that there are some conflicting interests between Russia and Britain in the Middle East. The Russians desperately need an outlet to the warm Indian Ocean. Their best bet is the Persian Gulf.

The Soviet now has a number of divisions in Persia and, according to reports which have not been denied, the Soviet a few months ago annexed two Persian provinces bordering the Caspian Sea.

We may assume that once the war is over the Russians will wish to make arrangements with the Iranian government whereby they can reach the Persian Gulf which is now in the British zone of influence. At least two British divisions are in that area and two complete armies are in other Middle East areas.

Should the Russians, at the end of the war or at a later date, decide that they want to gain that access and should the British oppose the move, it is hard to conceive that the matter could be treated amicably.

Russia's insistence on getting to the gulf by way of Iran might be easily construed as an aggression and if United States and Britain had a military alliance this country would be pledged to support her ally. This, of course, might avert a clash of arms, but, on the other hand, it might not.

The same situation conceivably might prevail in the event the British government insisted on keeping Hong Kong as a crown colony after the Japanese have been defeated. If the Chinese were to oppose the British, who have a legal right to that Chinese city, we would be pledged to side with our ally unless the British government declared now that Britain's former holdings in China will be returned to the Chinese.

These are only instances of what could happen if an American-British alliance becomes an accomplished fact.

The United States unquestionably is the strongest military power in the world. In the past our slight influence in international affairs has been attributed to "too much ideology and pacifism" and also to the fact that we have always disarmed at the end of a war.

Should the American people who already have paid a heavy price for their hatred of militarism—as military preparedness previously has been erroneously called—decide to maintain a strong army pledged to no nation in particular, there is no doubt that we can hope to see peace in the world for a number of years.

But the picture can be changed entirely if before hand we sign up to support one particular nation or a special group of nations.

Where the News Ends

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

Why Fool Ourselves About Stalin?

It was once said that Macaulay's idea of hell would be to hear fiends misquoting history and to be unable to correct them.

But the British historian lived before the days of Ministries of Information and supposedly omniscient syndicated columnists. Had he lived in our time he might well have felt that the fiends had already appeared—in human form.

Here is Brendan Bracken, British Minister of Information, celebrating a brief visit to New York with the breathtaking statement:

"Soviet Russia has never broken its word."

This would be a pretty reckless claim to make for any great power. Made on behalf of Soviet Russia, it is simply absurd, as I shall presently cite chapter and verse to show.

Dorothy Thompson was quick to catch up Mr. Bracken's refrain.

"Russia has indeed never broken her word nor changed her policy," she recently informed her readers. This was going Mr. Bracken one better. Any informed student of Soviet foreign policy knows that there are at least five clearly distinguishable phases in its evolution, each of which represented considerable modifications in the orientation and methods and practices of its predecessors.

* * *

The first phase, from 1917 until 1921, was marked by a Messianic faith in the coming of world revolution and an open identification of the Soviet Government with the Communist parties which, under publicized instructions from Moscow, were employing every conceivable means of violence and intrigue to set up revolutionary dictatorships in their respective countries.

The second phase, from 1921 until 1934, might be described as defensive isolationism. Support of subversive movements abroad did not cease; but became more discreet. The Soviet regime sought security not in any broad system of collective guaranties, but in individual pacts with neighbor states.

Then came the phase of the Popular Front and of collaboration with the League of Nations, so often denounced in the past as an organization of capitalist bandits.

During the fourth phase, the phase of the Stalin-Hitler entente, all the fine talk about "collective security" and "respect for the rights of small nations" was put away in mothballs and the Soviet Government embarked on a career of hardboiled, predatory imperialism.

Finally came the fifth phase of military cooperation with the Western democracies. This phase, it should never be forgotten, was initiated not by Stalin but by Hitler, through his attack on Russia. It is anyone's guess whether this fifth phase will be any more lasting than its predecessors.

While Mr. Bracken and Dorothy Thompson commit themselves to the daring proposition that the Soviet international record is comparable with that of the legendary George Washington of the Cherry-Tree, Mr. Blair Bolles puts on a show of objectivity and approaches the subject in a recent issue of *The Nation* with the air of a distinctly friendly Daniel come to judgment:

> "Russia [according to Mr. Bolles] in the main has honored its treaties. Perhaps it permitted the American recognition agreement to be violated by Comintern agents and it seemed to repudiate the treaty with Finland which settled the winter war. But aside from these two instances, its diplomatic record is clear. It consistently upheld its commitments in the League. And—to our hurt, but to its own honor—it has remained faithful to its neutrality pact with Japan."

"No, never," say Mr. Bracken and Miss Thompson in a resounding bass chorus, in commenting on the impious suggestion that Stalin has sometimes defaulted on diplomatic checks. "Well, hardly ever," observes Mr. Bolles in a slightly lower key.

* * *

Now let's look at the record, which is, or ought to be, equally available to Mr. Bracken, Miss Thompson and Mr. Bolles.

In 1920 the Soviet Government recognized the independence of Georgia, a small country in the Caucasus which had a democratic socialist gov-

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ernment. In 1921 the Red Army marched in and Georgia was duly transformed into an affiliated Soviet Republic.

The Soviet Government repeatedly professed the greatest respect for the territorial integrity of China. But, by the convenient method of sending in the Red Army and thereby giving a puppet government a chance to clamp down its authority, the huge area of Outer Mongolia has been detached from China and added, in fact if not in name, to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government, one of the first countries to sign the Kellogg Pact, was also the first country to break it, by using armed force in its dispute with China over the Russian rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929. Litvinov earned much credit as an "angel of peace" among wooly-minded Western commentators by initiating and pressing through to conclusion treaties of non-aggression and neutrality with the Western neighbors of the Soviet Union, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland. Stalin broke every one of these treaties that it was psysically possible for him to break.

I don't know whether Mr. Bolles was merely ignorant or was cynically humorous when he said that the Soviet Union "consistently upheld its commitments in the League."

Has he forgotten so soon how the Soviet connection with the League was terminated—by a unanimous vote of expulsion for its unprovoked attack on Finland, an attack which copied the infamous Hitler technique of first slandering and then assassinating small nations down to the last detail?

And Stalin himself would have a good laugh if he could read Mr. Bolles's naive suggestion that it is "honor," and not obvious selfinterest, that keeps him out of the fray with Japan.

* * *

It is unfortunate for the state of our public opinion that not one of our widely syndicated commentators knows the Soviet Union well enough, either from personal residence or from study, to make his or her views on that subject worth the paper they are printed on.

Still the facts which I have cited are not secrets. That they should be so generally ignored in comment on our relations with Moscow reflects more than ignorance. It reflects a dangerous moral obscurantism that found its crudest expression, perhaps, in Mr. Joseph E. Davies' lamentable adventure in Hollywood.

It is high time that the bland assumption that anyone who opposes all but submission to Stalin's predatory imperialism is *ipso facto* a blind reactionary, should be challenged. Recently Drew Pearson suggested that it was a grave sin of our State Department not to have made itself an accomplice in piracy by turning over to the Soviet Union some ships of the Baltic Republics which Stalin annexed.

Now the Soviet Union has no more valid claim to Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and its other annexations during the period of the Stalin-Hitler pact than Germany has to Czechoslovakia, and there would be no more justification for turning over to Stalin assets of the Baltic States in this country than there would have been for giving Czechoslovak assets to Hitler.

It is a curious symptom of the moral and logical confusion that often crops up in times of stress and strain that the same people who preached the fatal consequences of trying to appease Hitler now, without any sense of inconsistency, are for all-out appeasement of Stalin's territorial demands and fall into the habit of assuming that our Government must be wrong and Stalin must be right on every disputed issue.

It is futile and childish to keep on trying to fool ourselves about Stalin's essential characteristics as a hard-boiled, ruthless, astute and utterly unscrupulous dictator whose road to power internally and externally has been strewn with broken promises. If we gauge his personality and methods accurately, we may devise realistic formulas for living together in the same world. If we build him up as a compound of Sir Galahad and George Washington of Cherry Tree legend, we are in for some dull thuds of disillusionment.

Government

The British Get Out of the Doghouse

By FORREST DAVIS

THE hottest, driest summer in Washington since the General Grant era, produced, unpredictedly, a reconciliation with our British Allies which still bates the breath of our most adamant Anglophobes. This reconciliation, or, as our diplomatic sticklers put it, *rapprochement*, kept pace with the gathering crisis in the affairs of the English-speaking powers and their reticent friend in the Kremlin, Joseph Stalin. Toward the end of June, when the volatile Rep. Clare Boothe Luce (Rep., Conn.) publicly made up with the Empire, the British already were on their way out of the doghouse where they had been incarcerated by our moral imperialists, old China hands fretted by the Japanese peril, and friends of the Soviet Union intent upon prodding the unproddable Churchill.

Only last February, Mrs. Luce had icily satirized Britain's aspirations for a place in the postwar Air Age, ribbing Henry Wallace's universalism as she went. By June she not only saw no objections to Britannia's ruling the (air) waves in sisterly collaboration with Columbia, she was all out for a permanent "military alliance" between the United States and the Empire. Mrs. Luce's reconciliation with John Bull was more symptomatic than decisive. It bespoke, as we shall hereafter note, a transition in the attitude of our international-air-transport leaders from the air imperialism of last winter to a new spirit of co-operation based, among other things, on rereadings of the global map.

More pertinent were the utterances of the Prime Minister and Mr. Roosevelt, which, although cloaked in the indirections of statecraft, betokened a drawing together of the Atlantic powers into more intimate association as victory neared. In his Guildhall speech of June thirtieth, the Prime Minister, in passages that passed unnoticed here, called in his solemnest phrases for a world-wide Anglo-American partnership. A few weeks later, the President paid the Prime Minister a thumping personal compliment, saying with meaningful emphasis that "the whole world knows what we think of Winston Churchill." In the history of this country's independent existence it is doubtful if a President has bestowed such spontaneously friendly laurels on the brow of a British statesman.

The most pregnant index to the new state of affairs occurred, as all know, at Quebec. There, unless instructed opinion in Washington was far amiss, the English-speaking statesmen contrived a joint policy toward the Europe which it was hoped their arms, and those of the Red army, were soon to free from the Nazi heel. When Roosevelt and Churchill met in the Canadian city, it was no secret that the closer we approached to victory the more divergence appeared in the postwar aims of the Kremlin on the one hand, the English-speaking powers on the other. Since Wilhelm II began to build his deep-sea fleet, the European problem to American and British statesmen had been a German problem.

Once Mussolini fell, one could not be sure that the problem of Europe was not the problem of Russia: Moscow's aims in Eastern and Central Europe, its designs in Poland, Germany, Scandinavia and the Balkans. As the Red army again proved its mettle during August and Russian reserve deepened toward the western powers, the more apprehensive statesmen in Washington and London had begun to wonder if we might not be destroying the Nazi hegemony over Europe only to open the way to civil war and a new reign of terror. There were no reassurances from Moscow. It was true, as Tass, the official Soviet news agency, reported, that Stalin had not been invited to Quebec because of "the nature of the conference." The prime purpose of this conference was agreement upon a common policy by the advanced, democratic, western powers against the day that the Germans surrendered. A corollary decision lay in the military field, the timing of the coming Anglo-American invasion of the Continent.

While Anglo-American understanding since the summer of 1942 lacked something of the strain of Bunker Hill, it had become dangerously frayed. Not only had British prestige declined in this country but American standing was at a low ebb in Britain. During the summer, evidence accumulated across the sea that the United States was also emerging from the British equivalent of the doghouse, into which the anti-Empire agitation of our impatient liberals, among

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other things, had cast us. Churchill's Guildhall speech, which arose from the unacknowledged crisis in the relations between Russia and the west, lent a massive hand toward the rehabilitation of this country in British opinion.

The Prime Minister, a congenital as well as a theoretical Anglo-American, foresaw unimaginable disasters unless the great Atlantic powers got together in behalf of the Charter and western civilization. Although he failed to identify the forces threatening an orderly, peaceable postwar world, the instructed in Washington detected notice of a serious breach between Russia and the western powers; a division of interest over the kind of Europe each wished to see arise from the war. The Prime Minister cautioned his hearers that he was not indulging in hands-across-the-sea rhetoric. It was obvious that he suggested more than he said, yet this country, although fairly deafened by a chorus of postwar plans, schemes and nostrums, unaccountably overlooked the significance of Churchill's appeal for Anglo-American leadership in the world to come.

If Churchill meant what he implied, the Guildhall declaration signified the profoundest change in international alignment since June 22, 1941, when the great democracies felt obliged to go to the aid of the Soviet Union against Nazi aggression. Last winter, Churchill had been of another mind. Then he proposed regional councils for Europe and Asia, seemingly with no thought of any special Anglo-American arrangements. Coupled with an editorial in the incongruously Russophile Times, of London, advocating Anglo-Russian "joint responsibility" for postwar Europe, the Churchill proposal aroused suspicions that the British and Russians were toying with a balance-of-power pattern calculated to deal the United States out of European settlements. That suspicion injured Britain's standing here, producing a minor congressional revolt over the war's strategy, which President Roosevelt sent Churchill in to quell by his speech to Congress on May twentieth. Yet when, four months after his council-of-Europe remarks, the Prime Minister hinted that the time had come to substitute Anglo-American hegemony for the four-power—United States, Great Britain, Russia and China—concert, his words were almost universally ignored by columnists, commentators and statesmen.

By midsummer, the British, regaining in part their White-Cliffs-of-Dover esteem among us in Tunisia and Sicily, were again being accepted in Washington as satisfactory allies. In their comeback, they rated the Russians, who had driven them into eclipse during the winter—the honeymoon of our upper classes with the Kremlin being now on the wane. As matters stood, the fluted consonants of a m'lord no longer elicited scowls in the Mayflower lounge, and our officers returning from the Mediterranean theater had less and less trouble convincing skeptics that there, at least, the English were fighting to the last Englishman—the Australians being absent, the Canadians, New Zealanders and Indians relatively few, and our own ground forces in the minority. The record of casualties in Sicily, where the British unhappily predominated, proved that point.

It was high time that our stock rose over yonder. The British, normally more indulgent with our idio-

Taking you behind the screen of diplomacy, the Post's Washington editor tells why resentment toward England has waned while our relations with Russia have worsened.

syncrasies and inconsistencies than we with theirs, were growing so weary of our righteousness that they turned to the bald realism of Moscow with some relief. So busily had our self-styled liberals been crying down the Empire, calling for its dismemberment, bleeding for Gandhi and courting the Bolsheviks, that few had paused to note that the British were retorting in kind. If we took elevated ground, so did they. If Wendell Willkie and Pearl Buck added the destruction of the Empire to our war aims, the Manchester Guardian and the "liberalized" Times, of London, sniffed at our moral inconstancy, saying, in effect: "You ran out on the conscience of mankind in 1919, and from all appearances you're fixing to do so again."

Orthodox imperialists, erroneously but happily selling the Empire short, win, lose or draw, at Washington's plushiest dinner tables, were matched by Colonel Blimp in England. It was Blimp's curdling fear that "the States," what with John L. Lewis, the New Deal and race riots, wouldn't hold together until the war could be won. The British pot, liberal and Tory, was calling the American kettle black, as well as vice versa. Had it been a novelty, the bad blood between the English-speaking peoples during the winter and spring of 1943 might have caused greater alarm. It was not. As Anthony Eden remarked, along in April, Anglo-American understanding has been characterized since the Boston Tea Party by violent "ups and downs." This was decidedly one of the downs.

The friendlessness of England in the clubs, pubs and drawing rooms of Washington—but not, happily for

THE BRITISH GET OUT OF THE DOGHOUSE

(Continued from Page 19)

the war, in the White House, State Department and higher echelons of the War Department—surprised newcomers from other parts of this country. It startled the red-tabbed Britons, here on the occasions of war in greater numbers than at any time since General Ross' Redcoats burned the Capitol in 1814. Our visitors were not accustomed to taking personal responsibility for Gandhi's imprisonment, and the ferocity with which Washington matrons fell upon perfidious Albion at cocktail routs puzzled them.

Why private sentiment in Washington should have been so virulent against our principal ally at a time when our land, sea and air forces were inextricably mingled with his around the globe defies rational explanation. The winter stalemate in North Africa and the Pacific no doubt told on nerves already frazzled by the Battle of Washington. In the Navy there was resentment at the Roosevelt-Churchill decision to concentrate first on the European enemies. The Navy's doctrine, ships and inclinations were shaped for war in the Pacific, war against Britain having been ruled out of Navy equations for more than a generation. To the desk officers in Washington, the war in Europe was an Army show. Under these impulses, many a naval officer circulating socially in Washington blamed the British for deflecting us from what they considered our foremost task. Such grumbling broadened into a general antipathy toward the British, flowering in a distrust of Churchill's intentions in the Far East.

The Navy's strategical misunderstanding was paralleled by less innocent factors of conflict based on left-wing ideology. Not only did the drumfire of attacks on the British imperial system—answered in Britain, it should be noted, by every cabinet member, Laborite as well as Tory—arouse our latent and traditional Anglophobia; it further confused the moral issues of this complex war, already rendered fairly meaningless by the strenuous attempts of American enthusiasts to paint the Russian lily. Too many Americans thought it insufficient to march with the Soviet Union; they felt they must also fall head over heels in love with it.

Reconciled for sound military reasons to the Russian alliance, the public (Continued on Page 98)

was, by and large, mystified by efforts to whitewash the senior totalitarian state into the semblance of a democracy. In this endeavor, the friends of the Soviet Union laid it on too thick. The film, Mission to Moscow, heroizing Stalin and ex-Ambassador Joseph E. Davies, backfired. Helping to break the spell created by admiration for the Red army's valor, the controversy over the film again brought into the light American misgivings concerning the Bolshevik regime: its one-party system and secret police, the ten to twelve million political prisoners held in its concentration camps and, more pertinently, Stalin's grimly acknowledged designs on his small neighbors.

A dynamic fear of the Kremlin's postwar aims gradually replaced the vague annoyance with Britain in Washington's dinner talk. The formation of *émigré* movements in Moscow—the Free Poland and Free Germany committees—was taken to mean that Stalin hoped to confer a dictatorship of the proletariat on Poland, Germany and other lands, once they were redeemed from the Nazi terror. By midsummer, Russia had become the suspect ally in Washington's moody esteem. It was not a speedy change. So determined had we been to think well of the Kremlin, so unseasoned were many of our judgments, that our critical faculties had grown somewhat relaxed. Nevertheless, it became apparent to even confirmed England baiters that our singling out of her ancient, pliable Empire for moral chastisement while condoning the roughshod imperialism of the Soviet Union in the Baltic republics, Poland and elsewhere, had been at best ingenuous. At its worst, amid a war for survival and with the Kremlin's future disposition wholly enigmatic, it was mischievous. As the Soviet Union's good fame declined, Britain's rose—such seesawing being characteristic of American public opinion in this war.

The spreading public disquietude over the Kremlin's intentions reflected a shifting sequence of events in the diplomatic affairs of the three great Allies. Instructed opinion looked for significance in the recall of Litvinov from Washington, Maisky from London. The public could only speculate on Stalin's reasons for depriving himself of experienced representation in the English-speaking capitals during this eventful summer. Nor was the assignment of Constantine Oumansky as ambassador to Mexico overlooked in Washington. The post is a demotion for Oumansky, who preceded Litvinov in Washington.

Deservedly or not, Oumansky has the reputation of being inveterately anti-American. The daily press noted that he traveled to Mexico City, the nearest window on the United States, with an outsized embassy staff scarcely justified by any conceivable volume of Soviet-Mexican relations. His appointment



coincided with Moscow's suppression of the Comintern, a development never wholly clarified in American thought.

Our Government increasingly lacked direct contact with Stalin. With Litvinov away, Moscow had no responsible voice in Washington, and the Russian dictator's refusal to see Adm. William H. Standley has been a notorious discourtesy. In any other capital it would have brought about the recall of our ambassador.

We endured this slight in Moscow as part of the pattern of appeasement adopted by the English-speaking Powers. Davies' so-called second mission to Moscow was an expedient, the President making use of the ex-ambassador's conspicuous zeal for the Soviet ally as a means of getting to Stalin an urgent personal message which, had it gone through normal diplomatic channels, might have been lost behind the veil of Russian reticence. When the history of these times comes to be written, it will be apparent that the reserve characterizing U. S.-Soviet wartime relations arose from the Kremlin, not the White House.

Churchill's Guildhall invitation to Anglo-American partnership came amid these gathering tensions. It cannot have been accidental that the Prime Minister chose this time to extend what may be the most far-reaching British proposal to the United States since, in 1823, George Canning, the Foreign Secretary, suggested a joint guardianship of the New World. Canning's overture, as everyone knows, resulted instead in the Monroe Doctrine.

Our failure to grasp Churchill's meaning was not his fault. The Prime Minister seldom had spoken with more fateful emphasis. On June thirtieth the invasion of Sicily was only ten days in the future. With the U-boat barrier dwindling, the Prime Minister looked forward to a steady flow of men and materials from this country which, joined to British forces, would soon establish the English-speaking powers on the Continent in commanding position. To him the "tremendous and awe-inspiring fact" of that moment, "staring the British and American democracies between the eyes," was that the "immediate future of the world" depended upon the "intimate alignment" of Anglo-American policy.

Hanging together, the Atlantic Allies could "help all nations safely into harbor." Should they fall out, "all will toss and drift for a long time on dark and stormy seas." As for Russia, China, France and the lesser United Nations, Churchill claimed the "loyal, faithful comradeship of all." He bespoke "no narrow or selfish combination" of Anglo-Saxon power against their "lawful interests and characteristics." "Nevertheless . . . the fraternal association of Britain and the United States" was to him paramount.

Because the political aspects of the Guildhall speech were so generally slurred at the time, the vital passages should be repeated at this point. It should be noted that the Prime Minister was speaking not of our wartime association, but of the future, when he predicted that "if we walk, or, if need be, march together in harmony and in accordance with the moral and political conceptions to which the English-speaking peoples have given birth and which are frequently referred to in the Atlantic Charter, all will be well. If they (the western democracies) fall apart and wander astray from the lines of their destiny, there is no end or measure to the miseries and confusion which would mark modern civilization."

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Eastern and Central Europe, might placate Stalin. The American people were further unprepared because so many public men, by exalting the Soviet Union's contribution to the war even beyond its great worth and excusing its dubious behavior toward its neighbors, had, actually, if unwittingly, seconded the Kremlin's diplomacy and lulled our critical senses as regards Russia.

A few Washington diplomats, who follow the shadings of international affairs intently, saw in Churchill's declaration a recognition of the fears of the small nations and a promise to oppose their bolshevizing with American assistance, if that was forthcoming. The Prime Minister's suggestion that the English-speaking peoples might need to "march together" in the postwar world caught the notice of the experts, who wondered if he anticipated continuing hostilities after the downfall of Germany and Japan. The capital naturally assumed that Churchill had gained Roosevelt's approval before proposing what amounted to an Anglo-American alliance at the heart of the United Nations. It was, therefore, expected that we were about to see the end of English-speaking appeasement and a new era of plain speaking and firm dealing with the Kremlin. Historically, the English-speaking nations have drawn together in the face of pressures from outside powers.

Partly because of this historic friendship in emergencies, the American public had not been too greatly alarmed by Churchill's winter maneuvers toward the Soviet Union. The geographical, strategical and cultural interests of the English-speaking countries are so intertwined in what Henry Adams, back in 1906, called the "Atlantic system" and Walter Lippmann currently dubs the "Atlantic community", that few thoughtful Americans supposed the British really intended excluding us from postwar consideration. It was instead shrewdly suspected that Churchill was attempting to give such reassurance as he might to the Soviet Union's concern over its western boundaries. The British consistently had taken a more lenient view of Stalin's claims to Eastern Poland, the Baltic republics and Bessarabia, territories seized by him under his 1939 compact with Hitler and subsequently overrun by the Nazis. Stalin has always insisted that his acquisition of these lands and peoples is a *fait accompli*, a position from which the small nations under the Nazi heel recoil. Churchill's council-of-Europe proposal roused the opposition of these governments, they objecting to a solution which, by debarring the United States, would leave Europe to the great imperial systems at each of its extremities.

The Nonrecognition Policy

It was at this point that Eden visited Washington. Educated opinion supposed that he came as a broker between Moscow and this Government in the matter of the Soviet Union's boundaries. One of the illusions nourished by the friends of the Soviet Union here is that the Russian government admires and respects the United States, conversely despising Britain, with whom it has a twenty-year, formal alliance. Stalin is reputed to have given that impression to American visitors, suggesting, I am told, the contrary to British callers. Throughout the discussions over the gains brought to Stalin by the Nazi-Soviet treaty, this Government has practiced a "diplomacy of principle," dictated by the Stimson nonrecognition policy of 1932 and motivated by the President's belief that the United Nations cannot initiate a co-operative world program by validating Russian conquests at the beginning of this war any more than they could condone similar deeds by the Nazis. The nonrecognition policy announced by Stimson, then Secretary of State, covering Japan's seizure of Manchuria, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by Roosevelt and Cordell Hull.

While Eden failed to induce a more indulgent view of Russia's claims by this Government, if that was his purpose, his visit was accompanied by a rash of articles in the press sympathizing with the Kremlin's point of view. A few Washington columnists who otherwise uphold moral standards in international relations, exhibited a casual willingness to sacrifice Poland and the Baltic states to the desires of an ally.

About this time a good many people in this country began to doubt that Britain genuinely intended to join the war against Japan. The doubt grew through the spring. Since Casablanca, where Churchill offered to obtain a parliamentary pledge of his government's resolve in the Pacific, the Prime Minister repeatedly had stated his determination to bring all force to bear in that area, once Europe had been pacified. Despite these affirmations, the belief spread in this country that the British planned to run out on us. That belief led to the speech by Sen. A. B. (Happy) Chandler on May eighteenth, which Churchill was impelled to answer two days later.

was further to unsettle naval opinion, already predisposed toward the Pacific war and impatient of the war in Europe. Weight was added to the Bullitt arguments by a difference of opinion then current in the Combined (Anglo-American) Chiefs of Staff over how far and how fast to push the Burma campaign. The dispute was over ways and means, not intentions, but the Navy gained the idea that the British had a procrastinating spirit in the Far East. Since the Combined Chiefs of Staff is not a policy-making body, its differences were left to be resolved by the May conferences of Roosevelt and Churchill with their ranking military advisers.

Among the factors making for better Anglo-American relations, the Prime Minister's speech of May twentieth before Congress takes high rank. The May conference, promptly followed by renewed and enlarged activity in the Pacific, likewise helped. A further influence came from pride in American military feats in North Africa, Sicily and the Mediterranean generally, supplemented by the knowledge that they were accomplished in the closest possible coordination with the British. The British 8th Army and the Royal Air Force, ceaselessly hammering Germany's industrial seats, increased British prestige. As Anglo-American military might was demonstrated in the European theater, it became natural to imagine it being disposed together in the solution of further problems.

Chandler's attempt to inject Congress into strategical decisions had the backing of a Senate minority. And, ironically, only Churchill, whose diplomatic manipulations had helped create the situation, could have rescued the President from congressional interference. Only the Prime Minister was in a position categorically to refute the imputation that the British would leave us holding the sack in the Far East. This Churchill convincingly did.

Chandler's speech, as it happened, was a paraphrase of a secret memorandum drafted by William Christian Bullitt, the former ambassador to Moscow and Paris, for the Secretary of the Navy. Bullitt, serving until recently as a special assistant to Colonel Knox, assumed that Britain and Russia had made a deal for the partition of Europe into spheres of influence and that they had also linked interests in Asia. Hence, he reasoned, neither was disposed to help us defeat the Japanese. He therefore suggested withdrawing all but an "essential minimum" of our forces from the European theater so we might concentrate on Japan.

Designed primarily for the eyes of Secretary Knox, the memorandum enjoyed a wider circulation. One effect

There were, moreover, practical reasons working for English-speaking cooperation. The foremost was a realization in both countries that their postwar air-transport needs and facilities were, roughly, complementary rather than competitive.

At the outset we said that Mrs. Luce's speech of June twentieth was symptomatic. Whether of her own choosing or not, the congresswoman has been accepted as the voice of American international air interests. Last February, when she made what was interpreted as an appeal for American air supremacy, the transport people were disposed to go it alone.

Impressed by our magnificent feats in creating airways through African jungles and the Arctic Circle, conscious of our proved capacity to operate overseas air lines and build transport planes, there were those who felt we had such a decided edge that we might do about as we pleased. Some of our air imperialists even suggested that we strive for a monopoly in the building of all postwar aircraft. Such aggressiveness disquieted the British, who demanded in the House of Commons that their government take steps to come abreast of the Americans. In turn, these utterances provoked Mrs. Luce's appeal for American air leadership. The situation held dynamite.

But by June the transport people had turned co-operative. In May, Juan Trippe, head of Pan American Airways, publicly proposed giving the British a fair shake in equipment, so they could start even after the war. In June, Viscount Knollys—pronounced "Noles"—late governor of Bermuda and now chairman of British Overseas Airways, came to Washington. Lord Knollys, a World War I pilot and an insurance magnate in private life, gave it out that he had come to have a look at the designs for transports on the drawing boards of the American aircraft industry. He was, naturally, interested chiefly in the postwar transport intentions of our Government and industry, holding frequent confabs with our leaders, including, it is said, Mr. Trippe.

Our Place on an Air Map

The American transport men had been profitably studying the maps during the spring. Their study persuaded them that while we held high cards, we did not have all the aces. On the familiar Mercator-projection maps the United States seems securely planted between its two oceans and the two old worlds. Yet on the polar-projection maps, favored by airmen, we appear to dangle obliquely from the overwhelming land mass of Eurasia. In the new air geography, we are not on the crossroads from anywhere to anywhere except from Canada to Mexico, and even that transit could be made by following the British coastal islands of Bermuda, the Bahamas and Jamaica.

Alaska, the Aleutians and Hawaii are something else. They are essential steppingstones to Asia. We have, moreover, another enormous asset—namely, the desire of any first-rate European power to trade in and out of the richest market in the world by air. Those are our advantages. When, on the other hand, we desire to fly outward from our land mass, we encounter British territory, except to the south. For anything short of a non-stop flight to Europe, we traverse Canada and Newfoundland one way, Bermuda the other. Toward the Pacific it is almost the same, Canada lying on our air routes from Chicago and the Midwest to Alaska and the Orient by Great Circle navigation.

The conclusion squarely confronted our postwar air planners that American and British interests meshed. That was true elsewhere in the world as well as in the Western Hemisphere. The Empire on which the sun still never sets complemented us in the air as it had for so long on the sea, and it became increasingly evident that, unless we wished to fight the British for their vantage points, it would be advisable to work out arrangements for mutual use. During the summer this was being done.

A Working Committee on International Transport, under the guidance of L. Welch Pogue, chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, was struggling with these questions in order to lay the relevant facts before a senior interdepartmental committee, headed by Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State. The working committee knew some air geography too. For what it is worth, the grapevine insists that the committee recognized that no solution of our air matters was possible unless it included a settlement of our affairs with the British Commonwealth of Nations. The United States Senate also had a committee at work on the problem, under Sen. Bennett Clark.

By WILLIAM PHILIP SIMMS



Mr. Simms

Russia's strange reluctance to permit her allies to know one day what she intends to do the next is causing sentiment here to swing toward caution before making specific pledges of American collaboration to enforce world peace.

Unless President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill can persuade Marshal Stalin to meet with them and loosen up with regards to his present and future intentions there is reason to believe the Senate will not now commit itself beyond the Fulbright resolution or some version thereof.

This resolution, introduced by Rep. J. W. Fulbright (D., Ark.), and unanimously approved by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, favors "the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting peace . . . and as favoring the participation of the United States therein."

To pledge the American Government beyond this, many feel, would be to invite a repetition of what happened after the last war. After President Wilson had committed the United States to membership in the League of Nations, he was repudiated by the Senate.

HURT U. S. PRESTIGE

That incident did lasting damage to American prestige. It was said that we had failed to live up to our promise; that we had run out on our friends. Later on, the other great powers also "ran out" on their pledges, and in some cases their desertion was more reprehensible than ours. For whereas we refused to join the League because of the responsibilities implied, the others quit the moment the danger became real.

But all this has not served to mitigate our "desertion" in 1920. Nor should it. The failure of others does not excuse ours, as members of the present Congress agree. At the same time, they observe, what happened after the last war should be a lesson to us now. We should not promise more than we know we can deliver.

At this point Russia enters the equation. Russia occupies one sixth of the habitable globe. Her population is approaching the 200 million mark. Once the Axis has been defeated she will be the most powerful single country in the Eastern Hemisphere if not in the world. What, then, are her plans for after the war?

STRONG IN CHINA

At present the Communists in China are extremely powerful. They have their own army. They are in control of entire areas. Outer Mongolia is a Soviet dependency. Chinese Turkestan is under Soviet influence. There are stories that when Japan is defeated, Russia will take over Manchuria again, or at least the railway zones up to and including the warm-water port of Dairen—the old Port Arthur region.

Official spokesmen for the Kremlin frankly claim the three Baltic States—Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia—as Russian territory. They also claim approximately half of Poland, part of Finland and Bessarabia. A Moscow-sponsored Free Germany Committee has offered peace terms to Germany on a basis of ousting the Hitlerites and setting up a regime satisfactory to Moscow. Other Soviet voices have made it plain that Moscow will not tolerate any federations of small nations, while underground activities in Poland, the Balkans and other parts of Europe indicate that Russia has sweeping plans of her own—plans concerning which Washington and London are completely in the dark.

In a matter of 30 minutes or so, the Senate, by unanimous vote, if it liked, could pass a resolution committing the United States to a peace plan more detailed even than the Covenant of the League of Nations. But if Russia or any other great power insists on going it alone, carving out territory to suit itself and arbitrarily disposing of the lives of peoples, the pledge would not be worth the paper it was written on. The American people would repudiate it more resoundingly than the Senate did the signature of President Wilson.

Nevertheless, most everybody seems to agree that America does owe itself and the world a duty, namely, to place herself squarely on record as being more than willing to carry her end of any post-war peace load the others are willing to undertake with her. The Fulbright resolution, many feel, would do just that. Once this was passed, the way would be open for further and more concrete action if and when Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill meet and Russia lays her cards on the table.

WASH. DAILY NEWS SEPT. 17, 1943 p. 16

Powers to Meet in Moscow in 3 Weeks

By Frederick Kuh

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LONDON, Sept. 17.—Time and place of the tripower conference is understood now to have been officially fixed.

Moscow has been chosen as the place and the meeting is due to open in three weeks.

Foreign Minister Eden and Foreign Commissar Molotov are now in Moscow awaiting the arrival of a U. S. A. representative whose identity so far has not been divulged.

Britain originally was contemplated as the scene of the meeting, partly in hope Secretary Hull would attend. Now it is doubtful that he will participate and the Russians have shown a strong preference for Moscow as a meeting place. Churchill and Roosevelt are said to have agreed.

As the hour of the conference nears it is assuming growing importance. Washington, London and Moscow are each completing their own list of topics for discussion. The U. S. A. and Britain probably will harmonize theirs in advance.

Approach of the meeting is compelling the Western democracies to define more clearly than before their political strategy for the coming war and postwar periods. Even before the delegates assemble and probably within the next few days, the U. S. and British Governments will issue statements clarifying the methods and purposes of AMG. They are expected to explain that in the liberated Allied countries the function of the great powers will be consultative rather than executive.

The impending conference ought to bring our long term as well as our short term aims and those of the Russians into greater consonance. The meeting also should serve as an inducement to us to whip our ideas into more concrete shape.

What topics will this meeting cover? The Russians have indicated their desire that the conference encompass a wide field. Nor are they likely to be content to have the sittings devoted to spadework for an indeterminate meeting of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin. They prefer that the conference make certain important decisions.

The words *second front* are sure to cross Molotov's lips at the conference table. And the deliberations will tend to roam over Germany's future, and the frontiers of Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Far East. In fact, it would be surprising if no attempt were made to start redrawing the map of the world.

This is a clipping from
page 6 of P M
for Sept. 17, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of
Government

YORK ARCHBISHOP VISITING MOSCOW

Liberal Anglican Leader Goes to Soviet on Invitation of Orthodox Spokesman

NEW SIGN OF AMITY SEEN

Parley on Religious Freedom Follows Stalin's Restoration of Metropolitan's Rights

By JAMES MacDONALD

By Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, Sept. 15—A rapprochement between this country and Russia on the hitherto controversial matter of freedom of religion, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, gained added impetus today with the unexpected announcement that the Archbishop of York, who like the Archbishop of Canterbury is a liberal thinker, had arrived in Moscow as head of an Anglican Church mission.

The Archbishop's visit is strictly ecclesiastical and nonpolitical, but the fact that such a high dignitary—he is second only to the Archbishop of Canterbury—has gone to Russia is interpreted as another sign that the Church of England has relaxed its conservative prewar point of view. Only about eighteen months ago the Archbishop of Canterbury, Primate of England, made a public utterance about the rights of the common man versus capitalists that attracted a great deal of attention.

Government Not Concerned

The Archbishop of York's visit to Russia is being made at the invitation of the Russian Orthodox Church, whose Metropolitan recently was reinstated by order of Premier Joseph Stalin. Neither the Soviet Government nor the British Government is officially linked up with the visit.

Dr. Hewlett Johnson, venerable Dean of Canterbury, who is commonly known as "the Red Dean" because of his strong sympathies with Russia, even before that country joined the cause of the Allied nations, hailed the Archbishop's visit as another milestone on the road to Anglo-Soviet understanding. He said it was a fitting gesture on the part of the Anglican Church to meet the fresh evidence of religious toleration as seen in Marshal Stalin's recent action bringing about the reinstatement of the Metropolitan of all the Russias.

That action on the part of Marshal Stalin, the dean said, was in line with the policy of the Soviet Union throughout the last two decades, "although from the first the granting of freedom of worship to the Church and other freedoms, such as propaganda and freedom of the clergy to vote, had been denied."

Sees Sign of Soviet Stability

"There were reasons for this," the dean continued, "reasons which departed progressively as the Soviet Government grew stronger and more stable.

"The Soviet Union does not interfere with the convictions of believers or meddle in the private affairs of religious bodies, nor is any one church, as in Italy or Spain, allowed to dominate the others. Religious communities numbering some 30,000 possess full rights of ritual and worship and election of their own office holders. The clergy enjoy equal rights with other citizens and each sect may perform its religious ceremonies in its own language—a privilege denied in Czarist Russia.

"Marshal Stalin's present further instalment of religious liberty is a natural outcome of the loyal sympathy of the church with the Soviet regime and its whole-hearted assistance in the anti-Fascist war.

"The public recognition of the church is parallel in the religious sphere to the dissolution of the Comintern in the political sphere. The one removed a fear which had no ground in fact. The other proclaims to all the world that religious persecution has ceased to exist in the Soviet Union. Both bear witness to the strength and stability of the Soviet regime."

Pension

This is a clipping from page 3 of the New York Times for Sept. 16, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

BRITISH MAGAZINES CIRCULATED BY U.S.S.R.

Originated in London, They Are Printed in Russian

To provide Russians in key positions with an opportunity to acquaint themselves with the complexities of English life, the Ministry of Information has started a bimonthly publication, Britanskaya Chronica (The British Chronicle), the first copies of which, printed on air-mail paper in London, were recently flown to Moscow. The first issue contained Prime Minister Churchill's address to Congress of this year, a Montgomery Order of the Day, a long article by Sir William Beveridge about his plan for social security, and many articles reprinted from the British press.

About eighteen months ago the press attaché's office in the British Embassy at Kuibyshev began to publish Britanski Soyuznik (The British Ally), a news-sheet containing stories and photographs collected in London, flashed out to Russia and published there fortnightly.

The editorial office was a hotel bedroom in a provincial town. A Russian staff was not easy to find; ink, acid, type and paper even more difficult. Yet from the beginning the Soviet authorities, it is acknowledged, did their very best to help The British Ally get into its stride. They distributed it widely. Farmers in distant Siberia, sailors on the Pacific coast, soldiers on the western front, schools and libraries everywhere received it.

Now The British Ally is in its second year. It is reckoned that eight to ten people read every one of its 20,000 fortnightly copies. It contains nearly four times as much reading matter as when it was launched, and is published in Moscow.

Russia

This is a clipping from page 9 of New York Times

for Sept. 15, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government

THE RUSSIAN PATRIARCH

Thousands of worshipers crowded into a Moscow cathedral on Sunday and thousands more waited in the streets outside while the Metropolitan Sergius of the Greek Orthodox Church was solemnly installed as the Patriarch for all Russia. Officially not much was changed, for Sergius had been recognized for some time as Acting Patriarch. Actually, this ceremony, performed with the consent if not with the approval of Stalin, marked the end of a quarter-century war against organized religion—or at least a truce in that war. The socialism of Marx and the communism of Lenin had no place for religion.

The struggle between church and state in Russia passed through many phases. Economic penalties were imposed. Atheist organizations were encouraged and atheist publications subsidized. There were persecutions in which religious leaders were executed or exiled, though the reasons assigned were not that they preached or practiced religion but that they conspired against the Government. These campaigns were relatively ineffectual. One Russian authority in this field, Prof. N. S. Timasheff, estimated in his "Religion in Soviet Russia," published last year, that "about half the population is still Christian, demands religious liberty and is opposed to religious persecutions." He added that "most of the other half is neutral."

The Moscow ceremonies are more probably the result of opinion in Russia than of pressure from without. They encourage the hope of a common meeting ground between Russia and the democratic world, not on the basis of any one religion but on that of religious liberty.

This is a clipping from page 22 of the New York Times for Sept. 14, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Hull's Speech

SECRETARY OF STATE HULL'S speech reemphasized that there is a basic field of agreement among the Allies in their common need to defeat the Axis and to prevent future aggression in the post-war. Moreover he stressed that the need for cooperation on these questions far outweighs the differences which exist and which are bound to arise between the Allies.

In line with this the Secretary of State in his speech reiterated that it is the intention of our government to strengthen the anti-Hitler Coalition for the purpose of winning the war and establishing the peace.

In this connection the American people will welcome Hull's declaration on American-Soviet relations that: "It is our desire and our settled policy that collaboration and cooperation between our two countries shall steadily increase during and following the war."

Secretary Hull was correct in placing first the need to defeat Hitlerism and the Axis.

Only by indirection did he touch upon the central question of shortening the war by opening the Western Front, when he referred to the mutual assistance derived by the Soviet Union and the Anglo-American armies from the offensive on the Eastern Front and the invasion of Italy.

But it is precisely here that the speech failed to take note of the need to speed up victory over Hitler Germany, and thereby the whole Axis, by the immediate development of full two-front coalition war through the opening of a major land front from the British Isles and thus assure the speedy defeat of Hitler and the Axis.

The American people will also hope that there will be forthcoming some real evidence that those elements in the State Department who have been responsible for the vicious anti-Soviet bias and sniping at the USSR will be prevented in the future from standing in the way of our stated policy of increasing collaboration and cooperation with the Soviet Union. Certainly our attitude on Finland and towards the Smetonas and Matushevskis as well as the shameful treatment accorded the Soviet representative in Algiers, are not helpful in establishing this necessary collaboration.

Clarity with regards to our policy in Italy, towards the French Committee of Liberation and other European countries, like Yugoslavia, and evidence of a policy of greater reliance on the anti-fascist masses, would go a long way to reassure the American people and at the same time help strengthen the anti-Hitler coalition.

As regards the post-war, Hull has stated in his own way the principle of world collaboration for the maintenance and safeguarding of peace. We await with great interest his promised declarations of policy on many important specific questions, related both to the war and the post-war, with the hope that these will result in the further clarification of our nation's foreign policy.

This is a clipping from page 8 of the Daily Worker for Sept. 14 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

2nd Front Issue Confused at TUC

By J. R. Campbell
(By Cable to the Daily Worker)

LONDON, Sept. 12.—There was one dark blot on the good work of the 75th Trades Union Congress. It failed completely to face up to the new war situation created by the collapse of Italy and the victorious advances of the Red Army.

That failure threw a shadow over the rest of its work.

The opening days of the Congress encouraged the hope that it was going to be one of the best in Britain's trade union history.

Its composition was good. There were many fresh young delegates who imparted an atmosphere of enthusiasm and serious purpose to the Congress. The decisions on domestic policy were progressive and far-sighted. The speeches of the younger delegates on the second day gave grounds for hoping that a new vigorous leadership will be available for the post-war trade union movement.

The Congress forced the withdrawal of the "black circular"—which excluded Communists from many trade union activities. It is true that the General Council withdrew the circular only after uttering many threats to reimpose it if Communists should continue "disruptive activities." Still these threats cannot obscure the fact that a notable advance in trade union unity has by this action been achieved.

"MISS BUS" ON SECOND FRONT

Yet on the major issue of securing "full employment" of the main British and American forces in a second front in Western Europe, the Congress fell far below the level that had been attained at the previous year's Congress in Blackpool.

This flop was due to two causes.

The capitulation of Italy had induced an attitude of wait-and-see among delegates who would previously have supported the plan for a Second Front in Western Europe. It was argued by some delegations that now, since a firm foothold had been obtained on the Continent, the Allies would be able to land as many divisions as they dared to and that perhaps a large scale front engaging scores of German divisions would be established in Northern Italy.

And the scale was tipped most decisively by the announcement from the platform that large scale military exercises had commenced between Boulogne and Dunkirk. This announcement followed a series of reports of Allied landings on the Italian mainland, and was taken by the delegates to mean landing operations in France also. Indeed, the delegates cheered this announcement of "military exercises" much more loudly than they did that of the Allied landings in Italy.

DELEGATES DECEIVED

They regarded the news as implying a further great extension of the Allied offensive. They were grossly deceived.

It was in this atmosphere that the unions which had offered an amendment on the Second Front withdrew their amendment.

Thus the major question of how to exploit the new situation in Europe in order to secure a speedy victory was never discussed at the Congress. All the rest of the good work done during the week cannot redeem this cardinal weakness.

In a less confusing situation there is no doubt that a Second Front policy would have been carried in Congress, but clearly the failure to find one's way amid the changing events is a colossal weakness for which the British Labor Movement has had to pay dearly in the past. This is why our enthusiasm for the positive advances registered by the Congress must be severely restrained.

On most other questions the Congress was good.

It ended the indefensible exclusion of the Chemical Workers Union, and insisted on the General Council surveying the structure of the labor movement with a view to ending the overlapping and competition and to improving labor unity.

It decided on a closer examination in the near future of the problems of post-war reconstruction in order that a comprehensive plan could be presented to the Congress.

Of great importance was the rejection of the Vansittartite resolution, which sought to put the war blame on all the people of Germany, fostered by an influential group of leaders.

The road has now been cleared for international policy which will encourage the fight of the German anti-fascist opposition movement.

WORLD LABOR UNITY

While it did not agree to an extension of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee, it approved of the General Council making an effort to summon an International Trade Union Conference to establish world trade union unity. This is an advance—under pressure—beyond the negative position which the General Council delegation took when it was in Moscow.

The Unions of Technical, Scientific and Administrative Workers were exceptionally active in the Congress.

It was due to them that the resolution was carried demanding that employers be compelled by law to recognize trade unions, along the lines followed by the National Labor Relations Board of the United States.

The General Council frowned on such a proposal and advanced the extraordinary argument that "it was not possible by legislation to compel recognition in favor of a particular union, and perhaps in the same place of employment to determine that recognition should be withheld from yet another." That the question of what union should represent workers in that particular establishment could easily be determined by ballot vote on the lines in vogue in America was ignored.

However, when it came to a vote on the resolution for compulsory employer recognition of trade unions, the General Council allowed the resolution to go through unanimously.

The relations of the Congress to the Labor Party in the Government were nowhere explicitly debated, but there is no doubt that this question was in the minds of the delegates when the Trades Disputes Act was discussed in a private session.

Two definite points appeared to emerge out of this session.

First, that the General Council's attitude in accepting the affiliation of the Union of Post Office Workers was not a surprise sprung upon the Labor Ministers and the Labor Executive. So far from the General Council dodging consultation with these bodies, the Congress was convinced that all evasion was on the part of the Labor Party.

It was clear from the attitude of these delegates, however, that no big trade union chief will be able to jockey the movement into a postwar coalition with Churchill. The unions will consent to a coalition for war production but they will on no account accept Churchill as the leader for postwar reconstruction.

This attitude of independence is a healthy one. It is doubly unfortunate, therefore, that it does not manifest itself on those vital questions of foreign policy and strategy on which the labor movement, not out to govern the country, must have its own independent viewpoint.

This is a clipping from
page _____ of the
Daily Worker
for _____
Clipped at the Seat of
Government.

Hull Says Soviet Amity Is U.S. Policy

WASHINGTON, Sept. 12. (UP).—Secretary of State Cordell Hull tonight proposed the establishment of an international police force and court of justice to preserve the peace of the world.

In a nationwide radio address marking his first major foreign policy pronouncement since mid-1942, he disclosed the basic pattern of the nation's after-war international relations, the formulation of which was specifically directed by President Roosevelt. Work toward final definition of this program continues, he said.

Hull included Soviet Russia for a major role in the over-all peace structure, saying it is "our settled policy" that co-operation between Russia and the United States "shall steadily increase during and following the war."

Hull emphasized that whatever the country's postwar objectives, the immediate goal of its foreign policy is "to defeat our enemies as quickly as possible." Toward that end, he said, "we are in continuous consultation with our allies on various phases of military, economic and political activity as required by the exigencies of a constantly changing situation."

Paramount among his specific recommendations for a successful world peace system were:

1. An international police force—"indispensable if effective substitutes for war are to be found."

2. An international court of justice to decide legal differences as opposed to other conflicts between nations.

3. Sound trade and other economic relations with other countries, based on a comprehensive plan of mutually beneficial collaboration.

4. Assistance to aspiring dependent peoples toward material and educational development which will enable them to assume duties and responsibilities of self-government and to attain liberty.

"The Mediterranean operations weakened the German Air Force available on the Soviet front; just as the Russian resistance, by holding the German armies on the eastern battle line, prevented Hitler from parrying our thrust toward his southern flank," he said.

"Meanwhile, our constant military pressure against Japan had its inevitable effect in deterring Japan from aggression against the Soviet Union."

He took credit for the "diplomatic foresight and patient and vigorous activity by the agencies of our foreign policy" which led to successful pressure on Vichy France not to surrender North Africa and the French fleet to Hitler, and helped influence Spain not to enter the war on the Axis side as the Nazis hoped.

This defense of past policy was the only time Hull drew close to the area of controversy in which the State Department has become increasingly enmeshed in recent weeks.

REBUKES ARGENTINA

As a model of the sort of cooperation among nations which he said is desirable during and after the war, he cited the relationship of the western hemispheric nations—"with all but one" of whom the United States has close ties of solidarity. This was a new reference to recalcitrant Argentina, whom Hull rebuked sharply last week for failure to collaborate with the Allies against Germany and Japan.

He emphasized that international cooperation can be successful only if the nations of the world are willing to endorse three fundamental propositions:

1. Maintenance of its own government on a stable footing, free of interference as to form and details so long as its conduct of affairs does not menace other countries.

2. Conduct of its economic activities in a manner designed to promote the most effective of human and material resources and the greatest practicable measure of economic welfare and social security for all citizens.

3. Willingness of each nation to submit differences between it and others to processes of peaceful settlement and readiness to carry out other obligations devolving upon it in an effective world peace system.

Russia

This is a clipping from page 1 of the Daily Worker for Sept. 13, 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

FILE

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Soviet War Posters to Go On Exhibit

War posters produced by the foremost artists of the Soviet Union and used by the Soviet government as one of the most important tools in welding its 180,000,000 people into a fighting unit will go on exhibit in the American British Art Center, 44 W. 56th St., on Wednesday, Sept. 15, under auspices of Russian War Relief.

The posters were brought from the Soviet Union recently by Lieut. J. D. Stamm, U.S.N.R., naval aide to former Ambassador Joseph E. Davies on his mission to Moscow last summer.

There are 40 posters in the collection, most of them huge, larger than lifesize caricatures based on war news. They are the outstanding recent examples of a daily series issued by Tass, Russian news agency. The posters tell the story of how Russia boosts morale and tells the home front of Red Army exploits.

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Soviet Blows Doomed Italy, Says Izvestia

We publish below the full text of the editorial from Izvestia, Soviet government newspaper, on the surrender of Italy. The text arrived by wireless to Inter-Continent News.

MOSCOW, Sept. 10 (ICN).—The Italian government was compelled to accept unconditionally the armistice terms presented by the commander-in-chief of the Anglo-American armed forces, terms earlier approved by the governments of England, the United States and the Soviet Union.

Hostilities between the Allies and Italy have ceased. The fascist "Axis" is cracked. The Italian wheel has been broken off from the Hitlerite chariot, and this chariot continues to race ahead to disaster under the blows of the Red Army.

Why is it that the course of military events forced Italy to lay down her arms? **Because both Hitler and Mussolini suffered bitter defeat on the Soviet-German Front.** Italy suffered a winter catastrophe on Soviet soil where the Red Army inflicted a heavy defeat on the Hitlerite troops and in particular wiped out a contingent of picked Italian troops sent to the Soviet-German Front.

RED ARMY CRACKED AXIS

The crushing Red Army blows on the German fascist troops descended like a hammer on the fascist "Axis," shattering and destroying the Hitlerite coalition. **The Red Army victories enabled our Allies to land troops in Sicily.**

The downfall of Mussolini on July 25, 1943, formed an ominous crack in the Italo-German camp. At his last meeting with Hitler on July 18 and 19 Mussolini demanded troops and arms. But Hitler's troops and arms were tied down at Belgorod, at Orel and at other sectors of the Soviet-German Front. This sealed the fate of Mussolini. Mussolini fell; the "Axis" cracked but did not crumble.

This is a clipping from
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Government.

The Badoglio government announced the continuation of the war and its loyalty to the alliance with Germany. Berlin intensified its pressure on Italy, threatened and sent messengers in a feverish attempt to maintain its political and military base in Italy. Hitler dispatched Ribbentrop to Italy. But Ribbentrop could not replace German divisions, and Hitler failed to become the master of the situation in Italy.

Hitler could not give Mussolini troops in July and certainly not in August and September. Hitler could not supply troops because it would have meant withdrawing them from the Soviet-German Front where the Red Army on the offensive is routing the Germans and giving them no respite.

The collapse of the German July offensive and the passing over of the Red Army to a summer offensive along the vast front played a decisive role in the capitulation of Italy. It was not accidental that Italy has laid down her arms precisely now when the Soviet troops have victoriously entered the Donets Basin and when the German invaders are being driven off en masse from Soviet soil when every day the fighting on the Soviet-German Front brings new defeats to the Nazi armies.

It is precisely the events on the Soviet-German Front which determined the whole international situation, the whole course of events during the last few months. The Soviet troops are hammering away at the Germans' main link in the chain connecting the whole gang of fascist bandits, and every blow struck by the Red Army sets all the links of the Hitlerite chain to rattling. We are hitting out at the Germans and are thus continuously striking at all the vassals tied to the German chariot.

SATELLITES TREMBLING

Is it Italy alone who felt these blows? Are not Hungary and Rumania trembling from these blows? Here too the "Axis" is cracking and creaking . . . in Italy it has snapped. The Red Army victories that have been achieved are the reason why Berlin is shivering just like Budapest, whose Hitlerite ringleaders are trembling, just like their Rumanian and other vassals.

To any person who has an elementary understanding of politics it is obvious that the Red Army blows are directed at the breast and head, the heart and brain of the fascist monster, and that if its left hand is paralyzed today it means that its head is injured.

It is precisely because Hitler is suffering defeats in the Soviet theatre of the war . . . that Italy's fate

(Continued on Page 5)

Soviet Blows Doomed Italy, Says Izvestia

(Continued from Page 1)

was sealed, and the same fate awaits the other German accomplices.

On the night following June 9, 1940, when Italy entered the war on the side of Germany, Mussolini proclaimed from the balcony of the Palazzo Venice in Rome: "We have but one slogan burning in the hearts of the Italians from the Alps to the India Ocean—this slogan is to be victorious."

Italy, which has now surrendered, can summarize the results. In three years of war it "glutted itself to death with victories." It lost more than a million of its picked troops, a good number of which found their graves in the Don steppes, on the Voronezh plains and in the Severny Donets. Italy lost its "empire," which exceeded the area of its own territory tenfold. Italy lost a great part of its navy and mercantile fleet and a considerable part of its air force. In North Africa and beyond the Volga camps are filled with Italian war prisoners.

STRAIGHT TO BERLIN

Now when Italy is out of action and the Nazi camp is split it is clear to all thinking people that new and extremely favorable conditions are at hand for the speedy destruction of Hitlerite Germany itself—the enemy Number One of all the freedom-loving nations.

Shortly before the capitulation of Italy the German Berliner Boersenzeitung wrote: "The outcome of this war will be decided not by the cunning of political combinations but by the actions of the Germans on the field of battle." What these actions of the Germans on the battlefield are we see in the Donbas and on all the other sectors of the Soviet-German Front, where the Red Army is striking incessant blows at the Hitlerite troops.

The outcome of the war will be decided in this way alone. Only the speedy and active operations of the Allies on the European continent can and must hasten the day of victory over Hitlerite Germany.

Never before have the conditions for the speedy destruction of the whole Hitlerite coalition been so favorable as today when Italy has fallen away from this coalition, when the fascist camp is experiencing a grave crisis and extreme tension, when the Red Army has put out of commission another one and a half million Nazi soldiers within the past two months and has effected a new breach in the German war machine.

Italy has been knocked out of the war. The capitulation of the first Hitler ally in Europe marks the aggravation of the crisis in the fascist camp and the approaching disaster of this camp. The Soviet people who jubilantly saluted the Red Army on its major victory in the Donbas over the German invaders will receive with great satisfaction the news of Italy's capitulation, which will help hasten the final victory over the main and most evil enemy—Hitlerite Germany.

RUSSIAN FINISHES MISSION IN LONDON

Maisky Has Final Talk in the Moves for Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin Conference

WILL GO TO MOSCOW SOON

Hull, Eden and Molotoff Are Expected to Meet to Prepare For Chiefs' Parley

By Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, Sept. 10—The first phase of the conversations designed to arrange a Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin meeting ended today. Ivan M. Maisky, Russian Foreign Vice Commissar met a representative of Secretary of State Cordell Hull this afternoon and will leave soon for Moscow.

These preliminary talks evidently succeeded for there is every indication that Mr. Hull, Foreign Commissar Vyacherlaff, M. Molotoff and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden will meet in London next month to start the second phase of the conversations.

Mr. Eden did not take part in the meeting with M. Maisky and the American official today. He has been up night and day all week and spent the last twenty-four hours at his country home in Kent. There is little doubt, however, that in the series of conversations M. Maisky has had here since his appointment on July 27 as a Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs that he reached an agreement on the agenda for the Hull-Eden-Molotoff meeting.

No Agreement by Stalin

The agreement on the meeting does not mean that Premier Joseph Stalin has agreed to meet President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. That all depends on the Hull-Eden-Molotoff meeting. How they get along depends in great part on the policy the Allies adopt about opening a second front in Western Europe and on the question of incorporating the Baltic States into the Soviet Union.

The attitude of the Soviet Union about the Baltic States is clear and direct. They are no more prepared to concede our right to suggest that they give the Baltic States their freedom than we are prepared to concede their right to suggest that we give Texas back to Mexico. The new Russian maps include the Baltic States as part of the Soviet Union and the Russians have constantly made it clear that they expect our public approval of their policy toward the Baltic States as evidence of our willingness to cooperate with them on a realistic basis after the war.

The attitude of the United States and Britain on a second front is identical: We will open a second front not for political reasons but only when in the opinion of our military commanders that adventure would be most effective.

Differ on the Baltic States

The attitude of Britain and the United States on the Baltic states, however, is not identical. Britain has been willing to accept Russia's incorporation of the Baltic states for some time but the United States has taken the position that this is not the time to discuss the matter. It is now pretty clear, however, that we have at least reached the point where we are willing to discuss the question and that it will undoubtedly be done when the foreign secretaries meet.

The Russian questions about the second front and the Baltic states are matched by the British-American questions about whether Russia is prepared to cooperate with the Allies in an attack on Japan after the defeat of Germany and whether Russia intends to follow a nationalistic policy after the war or intends to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations.

These questions will undoubtedly decide whether the conversations will move from the second into the final stage.

This is a clipping from page 5 of the New York Times for Sept. 11, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

IN human charm and literary form Winston Churchill's Harvard address marked the climax of his distinguished career as an orator. All who speak the English tongue must have been charmed by his fluent and flexible use of it. His jocular reference to the Boston tea party marked the end of nearly 170 years of international hurt stemming from two wars. As a declaration of British-American interdependence this address immediately became a historic document.

But as a declaration of purpose by one of the supreme leaders of the United Nations in their war against the Axis, this document exhibits deep and disturbing limitations. The New Leader has often advocated a realistic and organic approach to the problem of world organization for the preservation of peace. More than thirty nations are now bound together in this gigantic struggle. In various ways—and especially by committing themselves to the Atlantic Charter—they have achieved a general unity of purpose. The simple and straight-forward way of going on to a world organization would be maintaining and expanding this war union for peace times and peace purposes.

At Cambridge the Prime Minister presented a sharp and vivid picture of the actualities of cooperation between the United States and the British Commonwealth. Our general staffs have learned to function as one. All over the world our resources are pooled and used interchangeably. At General Eisenhower's headquarters the men and materials of the Anglo-Saxon nations are used as though they were under the same flag. The good feeling of the men in the lines is but a picture of the unity of ideas among the officers at the top. For all our sakes, Mr. Churchill said, we are bound to keep this "smooth-running and immensely powerful machinery" in running order after the war is over.

Near the end of his address the British leader spoke of the League of Nations and referred briefly to varying ideas of world federation. The purpose of forming an inclusive combination for the maintenance of order has not faded from his mind. After developing at length his ideas on the desirability of an Anglo-British treaty, he tied them in with the large world program. "Whatever form your system of world security may take . . . nothing will work soundly or for long without the united efforts of the British and American people."

But the address as a whole is a presentation of a project for an Anglo-Saxon power bloc. It has already been seized upon by American conservatives as nothing less than a proposal for the creation of an old-fashioned offensive and defensive alliance. As this is being re-interpreted it will, despite all of its administrative improvements, parallel the historic British alliances to maintain the balance of power in Europe. What we are about to witness is a play for a world balance of power. In the short view, some good might flow from such a policy. It is conceivable that it might give us a considerable period of peace. But all history reminds us that such a period would inevitably be followed by another war.

Russia was not mentioned in this address, but every intelligent reader was conscious of the fact that it was aimed at Moscow. Mr. Churchill, after days of conference with President Roosevelt, was saying to Joseph Stalin: If you refuse to play with us, we will form a combination strong enough to do without you. It was like exhibiting a Theodore Rooseveltian big stick.

As a tactical move this declaration has its virtues. We may all entertain hope of its success. But as part of a plan for world peace there is danger of its giving form to retreat. This danger is in emphasis and implication rather than in direct statement. Into the foreground we have now shoved the engaging picture of two mighty nations, combined for self-protection. Their present degree of cooperation far outstrips what we have achieved with Russia or China or—let us say—Brazil. There will be a strong temptation—especially in this country—to retreat to this inner line of defense in all of our planning for post-war safety. As the hard realities press more and more heavily upon us, the vision called up by

Basic Empire

Winston Churchill and Franklin Delano Roosevelt as they stood one day two years ago on a certain war vessel in the Atlantic tends to fade. As this fade-out proceeds, there will be strong temptation to substitute for a world union based on the Atlantic Charter this easily attainable and tight little alliance. It is easy to foresee the beginning of a fatal whittling-down process.

The Prime Minister, to be sure, presented his picture of combined power with every possible reservation with regard to purpose and method. All is to be carried out, "not for territorial aggrandizement or the vain pomp of earthly domination, but for the sake of service to mankind." No one doubts Mr. Churchill's sincerity. But suppose for a moment that his fast alliance becomes reality and that our union of more than thirty nations fades out—that no world federation is constituted—we shall have an Anglo-Saxon power bloc balanced by a European and Asiatic combination dominated by Russia. No more horrifying picture of the future can be imagined.

There is real danger that this eloquent and convincing address by Britain's great man may become the Bible of American conservative post-war planners. Omitting all references to world federation, the followers of Walter Lippman's line of reasoning will be for it. Governor Dewey, who leads all the opinion polls for the Republican presidential nomination, grabbed the headlines at Mackinac with the statement that "an alliance with Britain is very likely and in our interest." This power bloc project threatens to become the central feature in the foreign policy of President Roosevelt's enemies during the 1944 campaign. It may become the substitute for isolationism and America First. Mr. Churchill may inadvertently become international leader of those who expect very limited returns on the enormous investment of blood and tears in this war. The advantages of basic English were very winningly presented at Cambridge, but what sounded loudest in conservative ears was the hope for world leadership secured by means far more persuasive than some hundreds of simple words.

2nd Front Urged by Russian Church Head

(By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

MOSCOW, Sept. 10.—The Patriarch Sergei, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, returned to Moscow on August 31 after a two-year absence.

In an interview with the press, he said, "I left Moscow when the fate of our country was in the balance, and I return to find her rejoicing at the new victories scored by our armies."

He said the Red Army was winning victories because it is fighting for a "just and righteous cause," and because it is backed up by the people.

"I lived for two years in Ulyanovsk, a small town on the Volga," he went on, "and I have seen how indefatigably its people are toiling for victory. All who could shoulder arms have gone to the front. Their place has been taken by the wives, mothers and daughters of our warriors. When I appealed to my flock to collect funds for the Dimitri Donskoi tank column, the believers of Ulyanovsk brought not only money but warm clothing as well. The same thing happened all over the country."

GAVE MONEY

More than eight million rubles have been collected for the tank column among the congregations, he said, many clergymen contributing all of their savings and donating as much as 150,000 rubles at a time. Beside the collection for a tank column, the believers and clergy have donated several million rubles this year for airplane squadrons, for a defense fund for wounded soldiers and war orphans and for the restoration of liberated districts.

"These collections," he said, "have proved once again that the Church is at one with the people; that for the liberation of our country from the enemy it is ready for any sacrifice."

The talk turned to the Red Army's summer offensive, and the victories at Orel, Kharkov and in the south.

"I am not a military expert," he said, "but it seems to me that the time for the complete annihilation of Hitler has arrived. If the Red Army alone has been able to force the Germans back, it is not difficult to predict how speedily the war will terminate when our troops receive real help from our Allies."

When a correspondent suggested that some people believe it unwise to hurry the Second Front, Sergei said firmly, "I don't think you will find such people in Russia. I don't know of them. Only those who would turn a deaf ear to the groans of the millions who are being ground under the ruthless heel of fascism and are crying for immediate help could argue thus."

SPILT BLOOD

"The thought of all the innocent blood that is still being spilt in the towns and villages of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Belgium and France—in all of Europe—gives me no rest. I refuse to believe that the mothers of English and American soldiers would wish to see this war drag on.

"It is obvious that the war is a calamity not only for those nations and countries whose soil the German jackboot is defiling at this moment.

"Patience! Let us not prate about patience! We Russians are the most patient people in the world, but the cup of our patience is overflowing. Our Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian lands, once rich and flourishing, have been laid waste. Our long-suffering Kharkov, our heroic Stalingrad, Voronezh, Rostov, Vyazma, Orel and the many hundreds of other Russian towns built up and beautified by our people throughout the ages are in ruins.

"Our holy churches and monasteries, schools, universities and museums have been reduced to ashes. Millions of our people have been deprived of hearth and home. Hundreds of thousands of ragged, emaciated and starving women, children and old people are roaming the regions and countries occupied by the Germans. Surely their cries of distress can be heard by those who are calling for patience?"

Patriarch Sergei assured the press representatives that the hundreds of churches destroyed by the German vandals would be restored. The local government authorities in Tula, Kalinin and other liberated places are helping now to restore the churches, he said.

This is a clipping from page 2 of the Daily Worker for Sept. 11, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Will Russia Invade Germany?

By Edgar Snow

Saturday Evening Post
Sept. 11, 1943

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WILL RUSSIA INVADE GERMANY?

(Continued from Page 17)

superiority against all the air power Germany is now able to concentrate on that front. They also apparently had a similar superiority in tanks and at least parity in guns. It must be emphasized that this offensive represented in all three respects Hitler's last great effort to smash Russia before the Allies could enter Europe.

In the long cheerless months since the Stalingrad debacle, the Nazis had been keeping up their courage by much talk of total-mobilization measures through which they once more promised success in a great spring offensive. Hoping to rehabilitate his lost prestige by a victory in Russia, Hitler reduced his defense forces in Sicily and dangerously exposed the Balkans and Northern Europe, but his 2500 combat planes on the Soviet front proved insufficient. His 4000 tanks, the most formidable mass of armor yet used on such a narrow front, were obliterated in a few days.

Once more the Nazis lamely excused their defeats by references to incredible reserves pouring in from Russia's Asiatic hinterland. But thousands of Germans now know the truth, that in fact there's no longer any hope of destroying Soviet power. Hitler may strike another major blow or two against the Russians, but they are plainly foredoomed to failure.

With the seizure of Sicily and the collapse of Italy heralding early control of Allied bases on the Continent, Hitler is obliged to deploy tens of new divisions in the Balkans and along the coast of France and the Lowlands. Passing of the initiative from Nazi hands also means—and this is very important—that the harvest of continuous Allied bombings of the German transport system and the in-

Will Russia Invade Germany?

By EDGAR SNOW

LONDON, via Wireless.

NEARLY all of them were wrong about Russia in 1941 and some are still off base this year, but that will not prevent a few of our self-styled experts from again predicting Russian collapse in 1944. Sometimes even now you hear talk in presumably informed circles of the dangers of a separate peace.

Rarely do men who have actually seen Russia at war and the Red army itself echo such fears. Perhaps they don't know much about Russia either. But they do know this: that only a breach of faith on our part which would enable the Germans to concentrate everything on the eastern front for another year could again raise legitimate doubts about Soviet stability. And obviously we are not going to provide the Axis with any such jack pot at this late date.

Yet it's still permissible and highly pertinent to inquire whether our Slavic Allies can finally cap their triumphs by invasion of Germany itself. We know their power in limited offensives now as well as their superb defense. But what of their ability to put in motion an irresistible drive westward synchronized with our own landings on the Continent?

A Post correspondent weighs the Red army's growing might, considers the possibility Stalin may beat his Allies to Berlin.

Having taken the weight of all Hitler could mobilize in men and armor and fire power for the past two years and more, can Stalin still summon the strength necessary to bring about a complete reversal of roles? Will he be able to climax the Russian achievements with a brilliant march on Berlin? If so, he would be incomparably the most successful strategist in Russian history.

Speculation upon this subject frequently engages Allied observers in Moscow. Few agree. The majority view seems to be that a German crack-up will come on the western and other European fronts much earlier than in Russia and that the odds are against a Russian army ever reaching Berlin.

One of the shrewdest foreign military men in Moscow, however, and one who has been right when most people scored zero minus, believes otherwise. The Red army may get into Germany as soon as we do, he thinks, and perhaps sooner.

"Even now," he told me, "an outsider's estimate of Russia's strategic reserves is very largely guesswork. What we don't know about men and materials here is probably more than what we don't know about the Axis.

"Strategic reserves will decide the issue and determine the location of the Red army in the final phase of the war. Personally, I think the Russians are keeping a last surprise for us. My guess is they have enormous concealed power which they plan to use at such a moment and in such a way as to astonish the world—particularly Hitler's world."

This was said before the Nazis launched their July offensive—for which my friend predicted speedy failure. He also foresaw six months ago that it would be

NEAL DOUGLASS

Literary admirers meeting Dobie are often dumfounded at discovering their hero dressed in rumpled khaki, cowboy hat and boots.

ELWOOD M. PAYNE

A one-man society for preserving Texas folklore, Dobie tirelessly seeks it out from old-timers at campfires, chuck wagons, trading posts.

dustry behind it will now be reapable for the first time. Unable to shift his main forces from one front to another quickly enough to meet the requirements of a new phase of the war, Hitler must attempt to be strong at a half dozen points. As a result he cannot be other than weak at all of them.

Hitler has lost his victory where he planned to win it—in the time-space area between two fronts. Germany has lost all possibility of disposing its strategic reserves in the most favorable manner. Henceforth its power of concentration facing Russia must dwindle, and once we are firmly established in Europe the initiative on the eastern front will pass entirely to the Red army.

The more mobility Hitler loses, the more the Russians are gaining. This is demonstrated by the spectacular improvement in Soviet air power. While Germany's reserves and production of planes and tanks are daily reduced by Allied air attacks, the Red army's reserves are constantly augmented by Allied shipments, and home production is increasing at a pace few outside Russia realize. It is significant that the Russians are now making their finest aircraft in close proximity to the front without any fear of attack. All through the winter months I spent in Moscow, and on through the sharp, clear, sunny days of spring, not a single German bomber ventured over the factory districts where splendid weapons were being produced less than 100 miles from the front.

Germany's inactivity in the air puzzled many of us then and we attributed it to Hitler's desire to avoid wastage in minor efforts. Now we see what he was thus able to accumulate in striking power and we see that it was not enough. Clearly, the Nazis were out of the air last winter because their losses in Russia, combined with the results of Allied bombings, vastly reduced their strength.

Allied Matériel Aid

Recently released figures on deliveries to Russia justify the guess that the Allies are now sending to her through the southern route alone about 200,000 tons of vital goods and around 500 tanks and combat planes monthly. Tank deliveries include heavy Churchills and our own sturdy M4's, while the planes are of the latest types and in balanced force.

"The Russians here have assured us," I was told in Teheran recently, "that every plane we send them is in operation in combat areas within forty-eight hours after delivery."

However, most of our weapons—though not lend-lease items—apparently were little needed till recently. Anyway they were little used. I visited four different sectors of the Russian front earlier this year, but at only one had Allied weapons been tried in battle and then to a very limited extent, according to commanding officers. The Russians told me Churchill tanks would be employed for the first time in "our summer offensive" and they have undoubtedly played havoc with the German thrust at Kursk. Together with stout Russian KV tanks and the remarkable Stormoviks—planes which in effect are flying antitank guns—they wrecked Hitler's tank offensive before it had advanced a dozen miles.

Russia's Industrial Speed-Up

Our help was important in the sense that it freed Russian reserves earlier than would have been possible otherwise, but it is erroneous to assume that it is more than a small fraction of the total weapons needed. Despite German seizure of some areas which less than a decade ago held about 2000 Soviet basic industrial plants, the fact is the Russians are now putting out by far the greater part of the weapons with which they have achieved the stalemating of the German army.

Here is but one example of the speed of Russian recovery which I happen to know about personally. Between my arrival in Russia and my departure some months later, the Reds planned, built and put into production, in a region once evacuated, an entirely new aircraft plant now turning out every month several hundred fighter-bombers called by one American expert "the finest in the world."

The Russian war is now organized on such a basis that official claims are made that there are twice as many skilled and semi-skilled workers in Soviet industry now as before the war. A training system has been established which every year brings into production more than 1,000,000 new technicians from among the nation's adolescents—quite aside from those recruited elsewhere. Nowhere else is production maintained at the pace set in Russia. And the Soviet concentration on making of war goods to the exclusion of everything else—and I mean everything—vastly surpasses anything in our experience.

"I'm not buying anything! I just don't wanna miss it when she gets fed up!"

All the foregoing facts suggest that the tempo of growth in Russian military superiority henceforth will rapidly increase. A new and second phase, a phase of great offensive war in which Soviet strategy benefits from direct action by her Allies, is about to open. The same signs indicate that remaining German hopes on the Russian front must now rest on defense works and a war of attrition which might produce from its agony at best a negotiated peace.

Tremendous efforts have been made lately by the Nazis to build up so-called impregnable defense lines in the east. Samples of these which I have seen usually consist of chains of blockhouses and pillboxes provided with lines of wire covering endless mine fields, antitank ditches and other barriers. Sometimes the Russians found as many as sixty fortified blockhouses and firing points within one kilometer of soil.

But the recent German war doctrine has taught Nazi chiefs to distrust anything but offensive strategy and it is improbable that they will put much faith in fortified lines. In January, 1942, Fritz Todt is supposed to have warned Hitler of their ultimate uselessness. General Todt, who built the West Wall, visited the Soviet front, studying especially the places where the Red army breached his defense works. The Russians say he later reported his doubts about the security of any fortifications against the Soviet type of attack. This suggestion was supposed to have infuriated the Führer, and in the Soviet press it was connected with the general's death in an airplane accident which occurred shortly afterward.

In any event, the Russians are in no doubt about their ability to nullify the strongest static defense scheme the Nazis can erect. Last winter they carried out an offensive which began with the attack on Z, where German fortified points such as I described extended to a depth of twelve kilometers, and were joined in a maze of thousands of kilometers of protected communication trenches. Although limited in aim, this offensive, conducted under unbelievable weather conditions and without any decisive help from us, resulted in over 1,000,000 enemy casualties, recovery of nearly 500,000 square kilometers of territory and the capture and destruction of 5000 enemy planes and over 7000 tanks.

Another winter is approaching. For the Germans it is a specter, but for the Red army it is the awaited open season. Certainly the latter will renew offensive fighting on a big scale. And in this case, as in every other, the army that is better trained, better equipped and better supplied for fighting under the conditions given, and is further armored with psychological and strategic forces, will of course win. Who would now contend that the Nazis answer that description?

There is another factor often overlooked in charting the curve of Soviet power. The success of our own operations against the Japs in the Pacific represents a real strategic gain for Russia in Europe. As the year wears on, the weakness of Japan will become more apparent and the menace she constitutes for Russia will visibly wane. Consequently, Stalin may be able to draw heavily on his eastern reserves for ground and air forces, until now immobilized, in time for use against the Nazis.

Hitler may still believe Soviet combat efficiency must soon decline owing to the severe deprivations which another winter must impose on the Russian people, who already have made the heaviest sacrifices of this war. Goebbels keeps cheering the Germans with tales of mass starvation in Russia and predictions of breakdowns in morale. No one can deny the gravity of the food crisis in Russia during the third winter without the Ukraine. Even if new production compensated for losses, the problems of transport threaten certain regions with shortages verging on famine.

But serious as the Russian ordeal is, there is no evidence to support German propaganda of widespread starvation. Reserves and new crops helped by the people's gardens are adequate to keep the Red army well fed, and the rationing system will provide enough for workers in essential production, nearly all the farming population and all children. At any rate there will be enough, especially in view of the now universal conviction of victory not later than the summer of 1944, to sustain Soviet morale at a high level through the coming winter.

This examination leads to the conclusion that the Red army will possess the conditions for success when the possibility of a drive across Germany matures. It seems safe to assume that Stalin and the marshals who have skillfully carried on a defensive war on a scale and against odds such as we shall never have to meet, have not failed to plan and provide also for the fullest exploitation of the now inevitable Nazi retreat.

This assumption is all the more justified when one remembers the Kremlin has never doubted the necessity for physical occupation of Germany to secure basic political war aims which it deems necessary. The latter extend not only to Nazi-occupied Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania. In a different sense they include Germany itself.

Recently there was formed in Russia a Free German committee, composed of captured officers, soldiers and former German politicians. This highly significant development can be regarded as a logical outgrowth of the conviction of every Red general that the final act of the war must consist of a systematic on-the-spot liquidation of the Nazi regime by the Red army.

In some quarters it is thought that once the Germans see the end near they'll suddenly open the gates of the west. They will invite us into their country to avoid a worse fate—Soviet penetration. Is not this naïve? For things to happen that way the Germans ought right now to be issuing an invitation to us and not after the second front is established on the Continent. Once the latter exists, the heavy diversion of German strength will at once result in a shortening of the Russian front, marked gains in Soviet superiority in arms and speedier accumulations of strategic reserves which dominate the judgment. Nor need the Red army commit itself prematurely in the use of its power initiative.

To date, the Germans have fought us as they have fought the Russians, often to the last bullet and sometimes to the last man, but always till their position was rendered hopeless. Is there reason to believe they will do otherwise against us in Europe—give up before being beaten, in order to stop the Russians? Is it plausible to imagine that the demoralized Nazis or their successors would be strong enough inside the country, once having capitulated in the west, to hold back a mighty Russian army from the east?

Perhaps it is. But Russians don't think so. "We shall meet next," many Red army officers said to me, "in Berlin." They count on the operation of the objective fact I have mentioned. They think the cards for the last hand will be dealt their way.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

TROUBLE

Never go out to meet trouble. If you just sit still, nine times out of ten someone will intercept it before it reaches you.

—CALVIN COOLIDGE.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

an offensive with limited aims and that it would be answered promptly by a Russian counterpush which he believed would roll the Nazis back to White Russia.

Of course, those who were right about the Red army were not depending on guesswork alone; they were careful analysts of information many chose to ignore. But it is true we still are largely in ignorance, for example, about even such a basic factor as manpower. And manpower—and morale—can easily be more decisive than matériel in winning final judgment on the Russian front.

A year ago Wendell Willkie gave out in a Moscow interview, after speaking with Stalin at the Kremlin, the figure "5,000,000 casualties" for the Red army. Since the statement was passed by the censors it was widely considered authoritative. Just before the German offensive the Soviet government officially declared their killed and missing were 4,200,000—an amazing admission. Most people assumed it was an understatement, perhaps a gross one. Yet one reliable Russian source insisted to me that the official figures of casualties were rather on the fat side, thereby to deceive the Germans about reserves. All I can say is he should have known, and I think he believed what he said.

Before the present offensive the Nazis themselves claimed to have killed and wounded 12,800,000 Russians and captured 5,400,000. We know positively that this assertion is fantastic. Yet by what percentage fantastic?

At the beginning of the war the Russians were supposed to have a combat force of about 6,000,000 men. By January, 1942, the number mobilized may have risen as high as 15,000,000, although some believe that figure was not reached till late in the year.

About 70,000,000 people lived in the Soviet areas occupied by the Nazis. It is thought not more than 20,000,000 were able to evacuate to free Russia. This left Stalin with the remnants of his original army plus a population of about 150,000,000 to draw upon for further conscripts. By calculations applied elsewhere Russia should then have had a mobilizable reserve of around 15,000,000 to 20,000,000.

But are normal means of calculating acceptable here? Nowhere else—and I have now been in every theater of the war except the Pacific—is there mobilization which it is permissible to call "total" in the Russian sense. The hands of war are long here; their fingers go into the remotest corners to pull forth men in dozens of places where we would consider them indispensable workers.

Red Reservoir

A BIG category of exemptions allowed in America and Britain does not apply in Russia, where the age limit also runs quite high. For instance, one of my own acquaintances was called to active duty after his sixtieth birthday.

There are practically no jobs in which Russian women do not substitute for Russian men. There are few tasks which youths cannot undertake by the age of sixteen. And probably most boys between the ages of twelve and sixteen are averaging a third to a half manpower day each. Except for those definitely disabled and children under school age, nonproducers are literally almost unknown. Artists are an exception, of course, but in Russia art itself is canalized as a part of the war effort.

Thus it is hard to reject outright the suggestion made to me by several Russians to the effect that in a pinch as much as 20 per cent of the population can be mobilized for the military machine. Nor can one of us say with certainty that it would gravely impair production and supply behind the front.

If we double the official Russian figure mentioned, in order to allow for the wounded, which are not included, it will be seen that it is a little less than half the German claims for the number of Russians killed, wounded and captured. Suppose we accept 8,500,000, then, as a plausible guess. About 3,000,000 of the total would be wounded and half of those would be curable and returnable to active service. That would give a total of around 7,000,000 Russians killed, incapacitated and taken prisoner. That figure seems to me high enough on the conservative side. Even were it somewhat larger, however, it is evident that potential mobilizable reserves available to the Russian High Command are still adequate to carry on an offensive of grander scale than any yet attempted.

Concerning matériel, the July battles gave proof that the Russians already possess technical and perhaps even numerical *(Continued on Page 48)*



Babe and Little Joe followed. And there was the cow, standing close under the concave side of the stack. More than that, she had a fine, white-faced calf beside her.

Bessie did not seem to care about the calf, though, and she hardly gave the kids a glance as they ran to her. While Babe scolded her fondly for hiding from them, the calf kept trying to suck, but Bessie would push it away.

"So this is Molly!" cried Babe, rubbing the calf's white forehead. They had had the calf's name picked out for days.

"He's a bull calf," Little Joe pointed out.

Babe was startled. Bessie had always had heifer calves before.

"Anyway, his name's Molly," Babe decided. "It's such a pretty name."

"It ain't no name for a bull," Little Joe objected. "Say! Bessie's sick! She don't act right."

"Perhaps she's just sleepy," Babe suggested.

"She's sick!" cried Little Joe with growing alarm. "I'm goin' to get pop!"

He started off toward the barnyard on the run, and the mist was so thick that he was soon lost to sight. Babe remained to comfort Molly because his mother would not give him any breakfast. She remonstrated with Bessie, but the cow paid no attention. The calf sucked at Babe's hand and slobbered on her dress, but Babe did not mind that because her dress was wet anyway.

Pretty soon, pop and Uncle Pete came striding up through the mist with Little Joe trotting beside them. Big Joe was large-bodied and broad-shouldered. His eyes and hair were black like Little Joe's. Beside him, Uncle Pete looked small and wizened up. Uncle Pete's face was thin and pinched, marked with purplish veins. His eyes were watery and red-rimmed.

He was a tough old coot, Uncle Pete was. Not genteel, the way Miss Hans wanted him to be. In spite of the housekeeper's reforming zeal—and she was a determined old maid who fancied herself as "a refining influence" in the family—Uncle Pete kept on being stolidly disreputable. *(Continued on Page 53)*

"Say!" he cried, pausing with the arrowheads in his hand. "I bet she's hiding!"

Time for Decisive Blow, Says Izvestia

MOSCOW, Sept. 9 (UP).—The Soviet press today hailed Italy's capitulation in front page editorials as a "grim warning to the remainder of Hitler's vassals" and gave the Red Army a large share of the credit for the Italian surrender.

The editorials said that staggering Axis losses on the Eastern front and the victorious Soviet summer offensive, still rolling forward, had prevented Hitler from going to Italy's aid.

Izvestia asserted that Italy's fate was shaking the whole Axis to its foundation.

"There isn't the slightest doubt that Italy's unconditional surrender will cause the most serious repercussions among all Hitler's Allies and the accomplices in his murderous coalition," this newspaper said.

PRESTIGE UNDERMINED

"Italy's fate awaits them at any moment. Like Italy, they will be abandoned to their own destiny. Germany's prestige, already undermined, is being further undermined as a result of defeats on the Soviet front.

"Italy's exit increases Germany's isolation and worsens its military strategic position.

"The great victories of the Red Army and the victories of the Anglo-American troops have created all the conditions for inflicting the death blow on Nazi Germany and the speediest achievement of final victory. Italy's unconditional surrender facilitates this task even more. Now, more than any other time, the most favorable conditions exist to enable the Allied armed forces to deal a decisive blow at the common enemy, Nazi Germany."

Pravda said that the "principal cause" of Italy's capitulation was the "Red Army's heroic struggles and victories." It pointed out that the winter campaign cost the Axis 1,200,000 men and two months of summer fighting had knocked out 1,500,000 more. Pravda said 200,000 Italians were killed or taken prisoner the Soviet front last winter.

"The new victory in the Donets basin coincided with the joyful news of the Italian capitulation," Pravda said, testifying that the enemy is experiencing a serious crisis on the eve of the catastrophe. The Soviet people are confident the hour of decisive victory is approaching."

This is a clipping from page 1 of the Daily Worker for Sept. 10, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

RUSSIA CITES ROLE IN FALL OF ITALY

Press Says Victories in East Barred Hitler From Aiding Mussolini or Badoglio

PUBLIC HAILS COLLAPSE

Way Is Now Believed Open for Smashing Reich Blows—Satellites Warned of Fate

MOSCOW, Sept. 9 (AP)—News of Italy's capitulation was received jubilantly in the Soviet Union, where it was attributed largely to the Red Army's victories on the Eastern Front.

It was interperted to mean that the way is now open for the early defeat of Germany. The broken Axis camp, said the government newspaper Izvestia, "is approaching its catastrophe."

The official Izvestia said in explaining the Italian surrender:

"It is because of defeats on the Soviet front in which all contingents of picked Italian troops were exterminated.

"The victory of the Red Army gave our Allies the possible opportunity to land troops in Sicily."

Benito Mussolini appealed to Adolf Hitler on July 18 and 19 for arms, Izvestia said, but the Germans were tied up on the Orel and Belgorod fronts and were unable to spare them.

"Events on the Soviet-German front," said Izvestia, "determined the whole international situation * * *. Every blow of the Red Army makes all the links of the Hitlerite chain shake."

The government organ estimated that Italy, during three years of war, lost more than a million of her best troops, most of them on the Don, Voronezh and northern Donets fronts.

Soviet Approval Noted

The official Russian press had reserved judgment overnight, but came out today with the claim that the Red Army deserved the lion's share of the credit for Italy's capitulation.

Reports of the negotiations and subsequent surrender of Italy were fully published here and the dispatches underlined the fact that the armistice conditions were approved by the Soviet Union.

No official comment from responsible Soviet authorities was immediately available.

Despite the expression of pleasure at the news, the reaction of the Russian man in the street was also that of skepticism as to the exact ~~size of the~~ battle of Italy and what the future effect of these battles would be on the situation on the Soviet-German front.

When questioned whether it was considered a second front or not, the answer was usually "vryadly," which is Russian for "scarcely."

Until the Germans begin drawing away large numbers of divisions from the Soviet front, the Allied operations could not be considered a second front, was the conclusion of the man in the street.

The first sign of the Soviet reaction was a cartoon entitled "Serious Amputation" by Boris Yefimoff, published in the Soviet Army newspaper, Red Star. It showed two hands on the left, presumably American and British, and one hand on the right, presumably Russian, cutting the Italian leg off Hitler.

More "Big Things" Expected

People who heard the news on the way to work discussed it excitedly and agreed that "more big things are coming."

Izvestia said:

"~~Now that~~ Italy is out of the ranks and the Hitlerite camp is split, all thinking people will have no doubt that new, extremely favorable conditions have been created for the quickest defeat of Hitlerite Germany, itself, main enemy of all freedom-loving people."

The Communist party organ Praavda said:

"The summer victories of the Red Army compelled Hitler to abandon completely his Italian ally.

"No doubt the capitulation of Italy will make a strong impression on the Allies and adherents of Hitler in Europe who still remain in his robbers' coalition. The fate of Italy is a warning to them.

"The Soviet people are sure that the date of final victory over the enemy is approaching."

The party newspaper made no direect mention of the second front question, but in between the lines of the article could be read a second front sermon.

Both Izvestia and Pravda appeared with an unusual make-up, devoting half of the front page to the announcement of the re-occupation of the Donets Basin and most of the other half to editorials on the Italian capitulation.

The back foreign news pages were dominated by dispatches from abroad reporting the surrender.

This is a clipping from page 6 of the New York Times for Sept. 10, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

A THING OR TWO: *Soviet Hot Potato*

WASHINGTON

I think it time to bring up an unpleasant subject. Until we face it, little progress can be made toward an understanding with the Soviet Union on the postwar world. The unpleasant subject is the USSR's western boundary.

Moscow has made it plain that it intends to regain and retain those territories the USSR annexed in 1939 and 1940, principally the Baltic States, the Ukrainian and White Russian sections of Poland, and Bessarabia, the province Rumania seized from Russia after the last war.

The British Government was prepared to recognize these territorial acquisitions in the Anglo-Soviet pact, but Washington asked that boundary questions be postponed. From all indications, our Government was opposed then and is opposed now to these proposed boundaries. The formal basis of this opposition is the Atlantic Charter, which would bar "territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned."

These are other reasons. Poland wants its old boundaries restored, and the Polish vote in New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois and Michigan will be important in the next Presidential election. One of the principal elements in our foreign policy is the maintenance of cordial relations with the Vatican, and the Vatican has always been pro-Polish.

There are those in the State Dept. and the British Foreign Office who would like to revive the *cordon sanitaire;* and the proposed boundaries would hand most of the cordon over to the USSR. The dominant forces in our State Dept. seem to gravitate naturally toward the feudal and reactionary forces in Europe; the ruling classes of these little Eastern European countries are a prize collection of decayed aristocrats. Latvia and Estonia were useful centers of anti-Soviet intrigue in the 1919-39 period. There are important oil fields in that section of Poland claimed by the USSR.

If the Administration agrees with Moscow, it will be accused of betraying the Atlantic Charter in favor of the Reds. Under the Charter, the proper thing would seem to be an independently supervised plebiscite. Nobody seems to want this. The Russians say there has already been a plebiscite in the Baltic States and Polish White Russia and Ukraine. The Poles would probably lose an honest plebiscite, for both White Russians and Ukrainians suffered under Polish domination.

Except for our own country, which is preparing to give freedom to the Filipinos, the Western Powers might object to a plebiscite as a dangerous precedent. The Atlantic Charter pledges "the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live," but Britain has no intention of permitting a plebiscite in India, or Holland in Java.

The Atlantic Charter is a tiny island of idealism surrounded by an ocean of exceptions. The exceptions one prefers will depend largely on one's own sympathies. The State Dept. doesn't seem to object to the refusal of the British and Dutch to apply the Charter to Africa and Asia. Many of its officials, in their anxiety to restore kings and cartels, seem prepared to forget the Charter in Western Europe and the Balkans. The one place they seem determined to apply the Atlantic Charter are the marshes of what was Eastern Poland.

The Russian armies, when Hitler collapses, will occupy those territories the USSR feels are necesssary to her security. The question will be: Are we prepared to fight our Soviet ally to reestablish Baltic barons and feudal Polish landlords over populations that never cared for their rule anyway?—I. F. STONE.

This is a clipping from
page 2 of P M
for Sept. 8, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of
Government

THE WORLD

FDR Reports 'Progress' On Meeting With Stalin

Russian Ambassador Confers With Hull

A Roosevelt - Churchill - Stalin meeting appears to be nearer reality today. President Roosevelt told his press conference yesterday that progress in this direction had been made since the end of the Quebec talks on August 24.

FDR said he could not say how much progress had been made or supply any details. He added that he hoped there would be additional progress within the next 24 to 48 hours. He would not comment on a suggestion that the headway toward a tripartite conference already made involved a forthcoming parley between U. S., British and Russian Foreign representatives.

But President Roosevelt made his remarks shortly after a conference with Secretary of State Hull, who received a visit yesterday morning from the new Soviet Ambassador, Andrei A. Gromyko.

In London, Foreign Secretary Eden has been conferring with Ivan Maisky, former Russian ambassador to Britain, who returned to that country, ostensibly to clear up his affairs, last week.

Major Development

Moreover, Prime Minister Churchill said in his Quebec address that he hoped for an immediate meeting between Russian, British and U. S. representatives, which could clear the ground for a conference between Allied leaders. The United Press said last night that a meeting of Allied foreign ministers had been definitely arranged.

Meanwhile, FDR resumed his talks with Prime Minister Churchill, whose protracted visit to the U. S. A. has aroused speculation that both leaders are awaiting some major development—possibly Italy's acceptance of Allied peace terms or the opening of new land front—which would require additional important conferences.

After FDR's news conference, a highly-placed source in Washington said the Mediterranean Commission, the existence of which was disclosed by official quarters last Saturday, was designed to "get the Mediterranean out of the war." Russia is represented on the Commission.

Aim a Mystery

Beyond that brief description, the new organization's purpose remained somewhat of a mystery, although its first job is believed to be concerned with rule of Italy after capitulation. The Rome radio has already picked up reports about the USSR's representation on the Commission and has made indignant objections to the idea of bringing "Bolshevism to the Mediterranean."

Cordell Hull, however, professed ignorance of the Commission's existence at his press conference Monday.

At the same time, the Washington source said that there would be no hastily-signed peace pacts after the war, but rather a lengthy cooling off period during which the victorious Allies would prepare for an enduring peace.

The idea of a cooling off period has been repeatedly stressed by former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, whose resignation has not yet been officially announced.

This is a clipping from page 5 of P H

for Sept. 8, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government

ORTHODOX CHURCH ACTS

Bishops to Meet Within Week To Elect a Patriarch

MOSCOW, Sept. 6 (AP)—Orthodox church authorities said today that a congress of Bishops to elect a patriarch and organize a holy Synod would be held within a week.

Premier Joseph Stalin has approved the calling of a congress in a step advancing reconciliation of the Russian State and the church, estranged for twenty-five years since the revolution.

Acting Patriarch Sergius, who is Metropolitan of Moscow, is expected to be made permanent head of the church. Sergius headed the educational committee of the old synod, was chief of the Russian church mission to Japan, head of the Russian Embassy church in Athens in 1894 and Archbishop of Finland in 1905.

This is a clipping from page 8 of the New York Times for Sept 7, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

'Russia — Partner Or Rival'

By Israel Amter

III.

There certainly were reasons why the Soviet Government did not participate in the Quebec Conference. Conferences are good if they make decisions and if the decisions are carried out. More than a year ago, in June 1942, agreement was arrived at between the President and Molotov for the opening of a second front in 1942. There have been conferences since June 1942, but the second front has not been opened.

Israel Amter

There are those who say that the Soviet Government asks for the second front only when it is hard pressed. This is sheer nonsense. If the Soviet Government asked for it in the summer of 1942 when Hitler had the initiative, surely in the summer of 1943 Hitler has not the initiative, but on the contrary is completely on the defensive and his armies are being driven back very rapidly.

As David Lawrence says: "We, on our side, have tried by camouflaged words, to answer that we already have a second front and will open a third and a fourth." But these fronts, important as they are, have not taken away one Nazi soldier from the Eastern Front, nor in any way relieved the Red Army. What then may be the reason for the failure to open a second front?

The last time Prime Minister Churchill was in Washington, in a speech before Congress he stressed aerial warfare and said he saw no harm in trying to see if a war could be won by air power alone, provided other measures were not excluded. Lawrence is correct, therefore, when he says: "Russia isn't interested in seeing America and Britain withhold their huge armies from battle while 'experiments' are tried." While Churchill seems to have been an advocate of air warfare as an "experiment," Lawrence declares that "most of the American military advisers have wanted such a front (a land front) for a long time." If this is true, it might explain in part the failure to land allied expeditionary forces in Western Europe.

On the other hand, there are those who declare that Stalin demands the second front only in order to relieve the Red Army. Certainly relief of the Red Army is a justified demand. The Red Army has suffered tremendous losses, many times more than those of the United States, Britain and all the other United Nations combined. Secondly, millions of the Soviet people have been murdered or driven into Germany to work as slaves. Thirdly, large sections of the territory of the Soviet Union, its towns and cities which have fallen into the hands of Hitler's fascist beasts, have been destroyed.

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If the United Nations are really united nations, then it is their duty to work in such a manner that none will be overburdened, and each one will do his part. If the Soviet Union should, by any mishap, not be able to continue the war with the same energy, not only would this make the war unnecessarily long, but at the same time face the United States and Britain with the task of self-preservation through the throwing into Western Europe of hundreds of thousands of troops protected by navy and air fleet. In other words, the second front is for the benefit of all of us and not of the Soviet Union alone.

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If again there are those who express the fear today that the Red Army may reach Berlin before the American and British soldiers, then the question must be asked, what do you expect the Soviet Union to do? Shall it hold up the Red Army and not press the present offensive which can drive the Nazi army into a defeat, if not a rout? The failure to follow up upon advantages in Sicily is not good military strategy. This we can learn from the Eastern Front. It is true that the bombing of Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Cologne, Stettin, Kiel, Rome, Naples, Milan, etc., is of tremendous importance and has helped to soften up the people of Germany, Italy, etc. But now, with the Red Army on the offensive and the peoples of the occupied countries prepared and waiting for the call, the task is the **immediate launching of the second front no matter what the cost may be. For this cost will be incomparably smaller as far as lives and property are concerned, than what we will have to pay if the war is** allowed to drag on month after month and year after year.

Perhaps this was one of the decions of Quebec. The President pointed out that preparations for the invasion of North Africa (in November, 1942) began in May. Perhaps preparations for the carrying out of the second front are under way. But in any case, even if they should be carried out this year, we are already one year late according to the pledge of last year. Therefore, we also will have to be shown. Millions of troops are in England waiting to invade the Continent.

How long then are we going to force the Soviet Government to carry on the fight alone? How long are we going to allow the fascists to exploit the contradictions that exist between the leading powers, and the reactionary, pro-fascist, anti-Soviet press of the United States and the various organizations that sympathize with them, use them to agitate for a negotiated peace—a Hitler peace?

The same forces demand a withdrawal of the United States from the European continent and concentration upon Japan. These same anti-Soviet forces are demanding that the Soviet Government grant air bases in Eastern Siberia to the United States so that from these bases Japan itself can be bombed. Although such demands seem plausible, nevertheless they are provocative. How often must it be said (1) that the Red Army in Eastern Siberia has immobilized one million Japanese troops—forcing them to be on the alert but with nowhere to go; and (2) granting air bases to the United States is equivalent to declaring war or facing a declaration of war by Japan. And what would this mean in military terms? It would mean that the Soviet Government would have to fight on two fronts, taking away troops and equipment from the Eastern Front to be thrown into the Far Eastern Front.

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In such a situation, the danger confronting the United States and

This is a clipping from page 2 of the Daily Worker for SEPT. 6, 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Britain would be increased manifold. The Red Army on the Eastern Front might be seriously weakened. This would jeopardize the whole position of the United Nations. Therefore, our government, immediately after Pearl Harbor, recognized the correctness of the position of the Soviet Government and made no further demand in that direction. But the Daily News, the Hearst press, the Chicago Tribune and fascists of all sorts, have made these demands. Even David Lawrence, in his otherwise good article, "Russia—Partner or Rival?" also declares that "we must exact pledges from Stalin that, when the time is opportune, he will permit us to bomb Japan from Siberian bases."

There is one sector of the war to concentrate upon now—that is the war in Europe. Let us win that war, strengthen our forces in the Far East, and do it not in due time, but immediately.

Win-the-war forces cannot but give full support to the suggestion for a conference of the three leading powers—United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain—particularly for discussing and deciding on action to shorten the war and strengthen the coalition. The fascists have had their heyday, profiting by the many untoward incidents that seem to pile up and dominate the whole situation. But this is not true. Conducting coalition warfare among democratic nations is a serious and difficult task.

If the various nations and their representatives enter into this task sincerely, unity can be achieved. Lawrence correctly says: "Russia can be our partner or our rival. The choice is with us." (Emphasis mine. I. A.) That is correct. And the American people have already chosen. Gallup polls have shown that 80 per cent of those canvassed declared they are for cooperation with the Soviet Union not only now, but after the war as well.

We are partners in this war, not rivals. The Soviet Union is our MOST powerful partner! We are passing through a crisis in our relations. This crisis will disappear if the U. S. and Britain take as energetic steps on the war front as are being pursued on the Eastern Front; if in their diplomacy, the United States and the British governments are completely above board; and if, finally, which is most decisive, we base ourselves upon the anti-fascist forces in the occupied countries which are representative of the broadest sections of the people, who have been working in the underground, conducting sabotage and destruction of Nazi forces and uniting the people for the day of liberation.

This will be an unbeatable combination. Faith in the people, based upon the consciousness of this being a just war, will bring victory. It is up to us to decide.

This is a clipping from
page _____ of the
Daily Worker
for _____
Clipped at the Seat of
Government.

RED ARMY'S PLEA BACKED BY SERGIUS

'Real Help' From West Russia's Need, Says Acting Patriarch After Seeing Stalin

CHURCHACCORD PUBLISHED

Soviet Press Gives Emphasis to Step for Re-establishing the Orthodox Holy Synod

MOSCOW, Sept. 5 (U.P.)—Acting Patriarch Sergius of the Russian Orthodox Church today called for "some real" military help from the Allies in a statement following the conference with Joseph Stalin in which the Premier gave his approval to the complete restoration of the church in the Soviet Union.

The 76-year-old Metropolitan of Moscow, who came to Moscow in a specia ltrain, ending his two years' semi-exile at Kazan in the Tartar Republic, said:

"I am not a military expert, but it seems to me that the time for the complete annihilation of Hitler has arrived. If the Red Army alone was able to force back the Germans, it is not difficult to predict how speedily the war will terminate when our troops receive some real help from the Allies.

"I refuse to believe that the mothers of English and American soldiers want this to drag on. Let us not prattle about patience. We Russians are the world's most patient people. But the cup of our patience is overflowing."

Stalin Declared Sympathetic

Premier Stalin and Foreign Commissar Vyachesloff M. Molotoff received Acting Patriarch Sergius, Metropolitan Alexei of Leningrad and Nikolai, Primate of the Ukrainian Church, in the Kremlin yesterday. An official statement later said that Premier Stalin viewed sympathetically their proposal to elect a permanent Patriarch of all Russia and to re-establish a Holy Synod of Bishops, supreme executive council of the Russian Orthodox Church.

The announcement that the Soviet Government would place no obstacle in the way of the church reorganization had front-page prominence in all Russian newspapers today and the step was regarded as the most important development in relations between the Soviet State and the Church since the Holy Synod was disbanded in the early days of communism.

The three Metropolitans will soon call a national council of Bishops to elect the Patoriarch—an action previously opposed by the government.

Sergius, who saw Premier Stalin three days after he came from Kazan, where he had been conducting efforts to restore the Church to its ancient rights and privileges and had spurred the Church's contribution to the Russian war effort, said that the Church had contributed more than 8,000,000 rubles for a tank column.

Additionally, he said, priests and laity had donated personal savings amounting to tens of millions of rubles for aircraft squadrons, the relief of wounded and orphans and for the restoration of liberated areas.

Unsatisfied at Italian Landings

News of the Allied landings in Italy was conveyed to American and British correspondents visiting the Kharkov front by Soviet officers.

The Russians appeared happy over the Allied success and cheerfully responded to the correspondents' toasts.

However, reaction was typified by a guard captain who had just returned from the Merefa front. Replying to correspondents' questions, he said:

"The landing in Italy is very good so far, but when are you really going to help up? Now that you are here you can see for yourselves what an effective blow in the West would mean. Every Russian soldier is asking, 'When are our Allies going to strike?'"

Moscow newspapers published a delayed dispatch by the Tass news agency datelined New York and quoting American commentators demanding a "second front."

Moscow's Statement on Accord

MOSCOW, Sept. 5 (AP)—The text of the announcement of the Soviet Government's agreement with the Orthodox Church leaders, as printed today by all oMscow newspapers, is:

Sept. 4 the Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., Comrade J. V. Stalin, received Acting Patriarch Metropolitan Sergius, Leningrad Metropolitan Alexei, and the Metropolitan of the Ukraine, Kiev and Galicia, Nikolai.

During the reception Metropolitai Sergius informed the Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars that leading circles of the Greek Orthodox Church intend to hold a congress of Bishops in the very near future.

The head of the Government, Comrade J. V. Stalin, expressed his sympathy with this decision and said the Government would not hinder this in any way.

The Vice Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars, Comrade V. M. Molotoff, was present at the reception.

Church Congregations Joyful

Authoriztion for the Orthodox congress meant that the Church would now receive full facilities to carry on its work. The news was received joyfully by congregations this morning.

The announcement represented no formal change in the position of the Soviet State Constitution, which provides for freedom both for the practice of religion and anti-religious propaganda. It is important as evidence of a rapprochement of the Soviet State with the Orthodox Church.

The wartime truce between Church and State was thus confirmed following numerous indications of a reconciliation. S. A. Lozovsky, Soviett spokesman, told a pness conference that freedom of religion existed, citing provisions in the Constitution of 1936.

The Orthodox congress or council will be the first since 1925, when the Church discussed a split with the "New" church headed by Metropolitan Alexander Vidensky. The latter was not represented at last night's meeting.

Local Soviet authorities were reported assisting in the restoration of churches destroyed by the Germans. Metropolitan Sergius said the Nazi invaders had wrecked several hundred.

This is a clipping from page 4 of the New York Times for Sept. 6, 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

USSR to Restore Greek Church Synod

The Holy Synod, Supreme Executive Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, disbanded in the early days of the Russian revolution, is to be re-established.

Sergius, Metropolitan of Moscow, and other church leaders, informed Stalin of the desire to re-establish the Synod, and an official announcement said Stalin would raise no objection.

Sergius in an interview spoke of the second front saying: "It seems to me that the time for the complete annihilation of Hitler has arrived. We Russians are the world's most patient people, but the cup of our patience is overflowing."

This is a clipping from page 6 of P H

for Sept 7, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government

Russian Church Head Asks 'Real' Allied Aid

MOSCOW, Sept. 5 (UP).—Acting Patriarch Sergius of the Russian Orthodox Church today called for "some real" military help from the Allies in a statement following the conference with Premier Joseph Stalin.

The 76-year-old Metropolitan of Moscow, who was sped to the Soviet capital in a special train ending his two years' evacuation to Kazan, said:

"I am not a military expert but it seems to me that the time for the complete annihilation of Hitler has arrived. If the Red Army alone was able to force back the Germans it is not difficult to predict how speedily the war will terminate when our troops receive some real help from the Allies.

"I refuse to believe that the mothers of English and American soldiers want this to drag on. Let us not prattle about patience. We Russians are the world's most patient people. But the cup of our patiences is overflowing."

Stalin and Foreign Commissar V. M. Molotov received the Acting Patriarch and the Metropolitans Alexei of Leningrad and Mikolai, Primate of the Ukrainian Church, in the Kremlin yesterday. An official statement later said that Stalin viewed sympathetically their proposal to elect a permanent Patriarch of All Russia and the reestablishment of a Holy Synod of Bishops, supreme executive council of the Russian Orthodox Church.

The three Metropolitans shortly will call a National Council of Bishops to elect a Patriarch.

Sergius, who saw Stalin three days after he came from Kazan in the Tartar Republic where he had aided the church's contribution to the Soviet war effort, said today that the church had contributed more than 8,000,000 (M) rubles for the construction of a tank column.

This is a clipping from page 1 of the Daily Worker for SEPT. 6, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Make-up of Postwar Europe Tough Problem for Diplomats

By Constantine Brown.

The Quebec conference is over. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill have met again in Washington where political matters of the highest importance were carefully considered.

From the few scraps of information obtained after the Quebec meeting and from the important moves now being planned in the political-diplomatic field, it appears probable that political developments in the next six months will overshadow military operations.

Military operations are not undertaken on the spur of the moment. Even those which are prompted by political rather than strategic motives must be carefully and minutely prepared. Hence, it is believed that this fall and winter will witness the execution of the decision taken by the chiefs of staff at their meeting here last May.

The Quebec conference likely further confirmed the plans drawn in May and prepared the ground for Allied combat operation in the summer of 1944.

Political matters, however, are more dynamic than military matters. As with military strategy, it is wise to plan them carefully beforehand. But many unforeseen or vaguely foreseen developments may occur with lightening speed. And the best that can be done is to prepare for them and leave no stone unturned in order to avoid what we do not want to happen.

Russians Advance Steadily.

The Russians are advancing steadily on the eastern front. The Germans are not routed. They are withdrawing to a much shorter line on the Dnieper River. That, at least, is the assumption of American military observers who must make their deductions from the reading of the official Russian and German communiques.

There is always, of course, the possibility that the Germans will withdraw even farther and abandon the Ukraine altogether. If such a retreat is performed in an orderly manner with the Germans keeping their armies intact, the Russians may be placed strategically in an unfavorable position since they will be so much farther from their main supply bases which are being fed with American and British lease-lend materials, principally through Persia.

This is the military situation on the eastern front as it appears at the present.

The political situation is much more confused.

There is ample evidence that the Soviet government is not whole-heartedly subscribing to the views of the American Government regarding the postwar world. From the little information available about our political role in Europe, it is evident that we are favoring a reconciliation of the different interests on the basis of what we consider equitable.

It is believed here that the British are on our side so far as Europe is concerned. They have gone into the war to defeat the totalitarian ideology and to defend the independence of those small nations which have been bullied by the dictators.

Wants Weak to Unite.

They overlook the rape of Austria and Czechoslovakia because their appeasers who were then in power believed that the Germans were not entirely wrong when they claimed that Austria and the Sudetenland were overwhelmingly German.

But when Hitler attempted to put the Nazi hooks into Poland, Britain and France entered the war in spite of their utter lack of military preparations. This is a historical fact and it would be unfair to believe that Mr. Churchill's government has changed its point of view so far as the small nations of Europe are concerned.

It is true that some months ago he suggested that these countries, which are weak while they are alone and must choose a patron among the great powers to protect them, should get together into some sort of a federation. This would make them more independent of the larger states and might avoid some scrapping among themselves.

The idea was accepted in principle by the American Government. We are not foolish enough to insist that all the states of Europe should be resurrected in the same shape they held in 1939. Hence, if on their own accord they would care to join a federation after Hitler's defeat the United States would be only too glad to help them get back on their feet.

Unfortunately, this does not seem to please the leaders in Moscow.

The Russian government has definite ideas of its own about Eastern and Central Europe.

On February 2, Pravda, official organ of the Kremlin, published an editorial discussing the question of the Baltic States. It said that "there still exist such extraordinary people who are ready to present the U. S. S. R. with their own territory, as, for instance, the Baltic States."

Polish Question Raised.

It added significantly that "these people pretend not to know that the constitution of the U. S. S. R.—our basic law—has consolidated the ties of these republics with other republics of our union."

The statement was made when the American Government still recognized the independence of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, whose fully accredited Ministers still are in Washington with diplomatic privileges.

In recent months the question of how much of Poland will remain independent has also come to the fore. After the relations between the Polish government-in-exile and Moscow were broken off because Poland had insulted Russia by accepting the Nazi version of what had happened to 10,000 Polish prisoners which the Nazis claimed had been executed by the Red Armies, all attempts from London and Washington to mend the Polish-Russian fences were futile.

On August 25 out of a clear sky the Russian Embassy in Washington issued a sharp attack on Poland, which was accused of showing unfriendly intentions toward Russia because it advocated a postwar Central European federation.

In urging the establishment of such a federation the Polish government was following suggestions from Washington and London. The Poles were accused of "stirring up troubled waters, playing into the hands of Hitler and his associates and helping split the Anglo-Soviet-American camp." The Embassy implied naively that the kind of federation acceptable to Moscow would be worked out with Russian co-operation.

$14,000,000,000 in Lease-Lend.

Ironically this blast at Poland, and indirectly at the tentative British-American plans for Central Europe, was issued the same day Mr. Roosevelt transmitted to Congress his quarterly lease-lend report announcing that so far the American taxpayer had contributed $14,000,000,000 to help our Allies with lease-lend goods.

The President went further to say that "the Congress in passing and extending the Lease-Lend Act made it plain that we want no war debt to jeopardize the coming peace. Victory and a secure peace are the only coin in which we can be repaid."

Those who remember the hatred and anger this country brought on itself in Europe after the last war because we insisted that the war debts should be repaid can only applaud the wisdom of Congress and Mr. Roosevelt who devised the lease-lend formula whereby we help our Allies without expecting one cent in return. This caused some wits in Washington to describe money as "spinach."

But Mr. Roosevelt emphasized the question of a secure, that is to say, durable, peace after the Axis has been defeated.

His political experts are frankly worried. How can a durable peace be established in the event the Russians follow a policy of their own? Stalin declared a few months ago that "we have not and

This is a clipping from page A-1 of the WASH. STAR New York Times for SEPT. 5, 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

cannot have any war aims such as the seizure of foreign territory—irrespective of whether they are the people and territories of Europe or the people and territories of Asia, including Iran."

Why the Russian leader should have singled out Iran is a puzzle to everybody. Recent reports which continue to be hushed up (Iran is far away) say that two of the Iranian provinces bordering Russia have recently incorporated into the Soviet, naturally after a plebiscite of their inhabitants was taken and they had declared themselves in favor of such a union. Soviet forces are garrisoned in these provinces for the purpose of protecting the lease-lend communication lines.

American Leaders Worried.

The view of the Moscow government regarding Poland is equally obvious although it is not yet quite clear whether the Russians consider the Ribbentrop-Molotov line established after the defeat of Poland in 1939 to encompass Russian territory.

Under these circumstances, there seems to be some doubt as to how secure a peace we shall have in Europe to repay the $14,000,000,000 the American people have contributed out of their pockets for the cause of peace. Nobody speaks about the casualties the American forces will have to suffer before the Nazis can be brought to their knees.

These factors are worrying the American and British leaders.

On the one hand there are the continuous rumors of a possible peace between Russia and Germany the day the Germans agree to get rid of Hitler and withdraw to their borders of 1914, west of the Vistula River. These rumors are not being taken into account officially and are treated as propaganda. Unofficially, however, they are causing a good deal of concern.

No doubt, should a new German government offer peace terms acceptable to the Soviet, Moscow will keep us informed and will discuss with us why we should not become partners to such a proposition. Russia has never indorsed the "unconditional surrender" policy adopted at Casablanca. Should the German proposals meet its purpose and requirements it seems likely that the Russian government will follow the course it considers to its best interests after the British and American governments have been given a chance to consider them.

On the other hand, there is also the possibility that the Germans will not make sufficiently acceptable propositions and will not be ready to give the necessary guarantee that their peace offering is not a trap. In this case, of course, we shall witness the complete disintegration of the Reich next summer or fall.

Must Fix Policy Quickly.

But here again, there is the all-important question of how the repayment to the United States—that is to say, lasting peace in Europe—will be accomplished. It does not appear probable that the views of Russia will harmonize with the views of the American people regarding the make-up of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe. And no mean factor is the fact that there are several million American voters of foreign extraction who come from these nations of Europe. This cannot be overlooked with the presidential election coming up in November, 1944.

Hence, competent observers say the next six months will be devoted to intense diplomatic negotiations among Washington, London and Moscow. The Russians' position, of course, is far better than ours. The Soviet government knows exactly what it wants; it need not worry about an electoral vote; it has definite views about what it expects peace to bring. What is more important, it has the power to force and at the same time tempt the Germans to offer peace.

President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill have come to realize that merely applauding the superb actions of the Russian armies and providing them with lease-lend goods is not sufficient. If they want to avoid a mess in Europe, and at the same time prevent Stalin from considering peace terms from the Reich, they must talk fast and strong. They know that some territorial concessions must be made to Russia from areas which we regard as alien to the Russians, but which the Kremlin considers as "national."

For the next six months the statesmanship of the American President and the British Prime Minister will be of greater importance than the generalship of their army, air and navy leaders.

'Russia — Partner or Rival'

By Israel Amter

II.

There is a way, however, of avoid-
ng the necessity of policing the
hole country, if open cooperation
undertaken with the anti-fascist
orces that have existed in Italy
or years in the
nderground and
ow, since the
riving out of
Mussolini, have
ome more and
nore to the fore-
round. These are
he five anti-fas-
ist groups that
ave united and
re conducting a
oint fight for the
ights of the peo-
le of Italy. It
as this under-
round leadership that mobilized
he workers and people in Northern
taly, particularly in Milan, Turin
nd Genoa, at first for support of
he King and Badoglio but with
he demand that they bring peace
Italy. Since the King and Ba-
oglio have failed to do so, the
orkers have come out into the
reets of the cities in demonstra-
ons and strikes, demanding the
verthrow of the Badoglio - Victor
mmanuel Government and the ac-
ptance of peace terms.

Israel Amter

Badoglio, on the other hand,
fter being urged by President
oosevelt and General Eisenhower
surrender unconditionally, used
he time to aid Hitler in the trans-
ort of troops into Italy and in the
rtification of the northern part
Italy against the Italian people.
To date, one month after the re-
oval of Mussolini, steps to invade
aly, following upon the splendid
nclusion of the Sicilian campaign,
ave not taken place. This is due
nothing else than that allied
ratogy is against cooperation with
the people, and is seeking "reliable" forces that supposedly will ease the path towards the liberation of the Italian people. This is nonsense. The people of Italy are not only ready to fight but are fighting. Every day they are risking their lives in the streets and factories, in their strikes and demonstrations. The five groups—the Italian Party of Action, the Party of Reconstruction, the Christian Democratic Party, the Communist Party and the Socialist Party—are united and are mobilizing their forces for the struggle.

As Don Luigi Sturzo, leader of the Democratic Popular Party and an outstanding Catholic, has stated: "New leaders are needed who have the trust of the people. London and Washington up to now have shown themselves afraid of the people . . . they have always been looking out for compromises with anybody, even Ciano, Grandi, Federzoni and Badoglio (all fascists—I. A.) who could provide the King Victor, or his son."

Even parts of the army can be relied up—to be sure, not the top officers who are leaders of the Fascist Party. But as Count Sforza, another outstanding Italian leader, has said: "Soldiers have refused to fire against the people of Turin and Milan who had been demonstrating for peace against the Badoglio Government."

This shows that we have reached the stage where there is only one force in Italy, as in all other occupied countries, that can free the people. That force is the people itself, aided by the Allied armies and led by the leaders who have come out of their ranks, as in Italy, in the two decades of struggle against Mussolini fascism, and now also against Hitler and Badoglio fascism.

It is this failure to see the decisive forces and this downright fear of the masses of people, based upon the policy of wanting to see "few changes in the world after the war," that have led to hesitancy toward invading the Italian mainland—and also the West Coast of the Continent. This can only lead to a lack of confidence of the oppressed peoples of Europe in the Allies, and particularly the leading powers.

Was the Soviet government consulted on this? This, of course, we don't know. However, in face of the invasion of North Africa and now the hesitancy about invading the Italian mainland, it is arrogant on the part of others to state, as does the Hearst-McCormick-Daily News press, etc., that "the Soviet Union wants to go it alone." Might there not be reason to ask what we of the United States and Britain are doing? Are we not going it alone? Are we not conducting the war in a fashion that is decided upon by the military staffs of two countries, without regard to opinions and ideas of the third partner? Is not this method one simply of making decisions and then informing the Soviet Government?

This is not yet coalition warfare. Such practices can only lead to misunderstanding; and most serious of all, merely feed the Axis powers and reactionaries and fascists in the United States, who naturally place the blame for the situation chiefly upon the Soviet Union.

Consider the following: The De Gaulle movement was first recognized by the Soviet and the British Governments. The United States Government was opposed to recognition of De Gaulle and insisted upon Giraud obtaining all support. At last unity has been established between De Gaulle and Giraud. But when the Soviet Government wished to send an emissary to Algiers to consult with this Committee, permission was denied him by the British Government. At last the French National Committee has received recognition: by the United States in a very circumscribed form; by Britain with fewer limitations; and only by the Soviet Union without any strings attached.

There are movements in the U. S. and Britain for giving arms and aid to Butcher Franco, provided he will get off the seat of "non-belligerency" and take a new seat called "neutrality." Why does Franco want arms? Against Hitler? Today this is nonsense. He wants arms because he too "wants to see few changes in the world." He wants to smash the rising movement of the Spanish people for freedom.

Or how can we explain the refusal of the British Government to approve the trip of President Benes to Moscow, where he intended to sign a mutual aid pact with the Soviet Union? (And, by the way, the British Government has such a 20-year mutual aid pact with the Soviet Government!)

And who are the impertinent people who declare that it is perfectly correct for a reactionary Polish government-in-exile and a reactionary Yugoslav government-in-exile to be established in London, while it is considered impermissible for a Free Germany Committee and a Free Polish Committee to be established in Moscow? And the difference between these committees is that the Polish and Yugoslav governments-in-exile are the same reactionaries in their own country who, oppressed the people, and now in London change their composition as they see fit, removing, expelling and adding anyone they please; whereas in Moscow, the committees are made up of soldiers, officers and refugees from Germany and from Poland, who want to carry on the fight against Hitler and to aid in the rehabilitation of their countries.

(To Be Concluded Monday)

DAILY WORKER SEPT. 4, 1943 p. 2

Where the News Ends

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

Russia and the Future

IN discussing the future of Russia this column is fully conscious of being out on a long and brittle limb. The shape of things to come is obscure enough in countries like the United States and Great Britain, where public forums are often held to discuss this very subject. How much more difficult to predict the future in Russia! — where any unauthorized speculation about possible change would be as dangerous now as it was under the iron autocracy of Nicholas I.

As it happens, however, I have been doing a good deal of reading of Soviet newspapers and magazines of recent years; and the question itself is interesting. So I will furnish potential ammunition for my ill-wishers to use against me when and if my suggestions are conspicuously confounded by the course of events.

First of all it seems to me unlikely that the existing order can remain static and unchanged after being subjected to the impact of a war of such colossal proportions, a war in which Russian losses, according to Soviet statements, are already numbered in many millions. In no war has Russia suffered such a tremendous loss in human lives and in territory occupied by the enemy.

And every war of modern times in which Russia has been engaged has left its mark on the political and social progress of the nation. The *Decabristi*, the Army officers who led an unsuccessful revolt in St. Petersburg in 1825 and wished to establish a constitutional order in Russia, had been influenced by service in Europe during the Napoleonic Wars and by contact with the ideas of the French Revolution. The Crimean War, in which Great Britain and France proved superior to Russia in military efficiency, discredited the absolutism of Nicholas I and paved the way for the abolition of serfdom and other reforms of Alexander II.

The popular ferment during the Russo-Japanese War found expression in the 1905 Revolution, which led to the setting up in Russia of the Duma, the first national parliament of modern times. And, if it had not been for the First World War, a Tsar might still be sitting on the Russian throne. It was the intolerable strain and suffering of this unsuccessful war that created the political and economic and psychological conditions for the two revolutions of 1917.

* * *

IT seems almost incredible that the present war, with its still greater losses and sacrifices, will not bring about important modifications in the Soviet system. One of the reasons why Stalin made every effort to stay out of war was his realization that war would create unpredictable dangers and problems for his system of personal rule, based on a one-party dictatorship.

Some changes are already visible. The Red Army is playing a greater role in national life. While there has been a careful effort to prevent any single commander from acquiring too much personal publicity and glory, the power and prestige of the officer class have been steadily growing. The political commissars have disappeared; the officer wears larger and more ornate epaulettes, and enjoys the privileges of officers in other armies. This new and greatly enlarged officer class will very probably be crowding the old Party bureaucracy for a share in the power of the dictatorship after the end of the war.

It is also significant that revolutionary internationalism has been dropped from the propaganda programme of the Red Army, so far as one can judge from the Soviet press. All the appeals to the Army and the people are expressed in terms of conventional oldfashioned patriotism. The quintet of approved national heroes is com-

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posed of two Tsars, Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, one medieval prince, Alexander Nevsky, and two Tsarist Marshals, Suvorov and Kutuzov.

The exaltation of Tsars and Generals is perhaps safe enough, from the standpoint of an absolutist dictatorship. But there is a more hopeful aspect of the Russian nationalist revival. The Russian literature of the nineteenth century is saturated with humanistic ideals. If the Russian youth today is beginning to read and ponder over the ideas of such men as Pushkin, Herzen, Belinsky, Tolstoy and Kropotkin, the ice-crust of the dictatorship, thick as it may be, cannot remain impervious forever.

It has always been a psychological puzzle to me how Stalin and his henchmen, in their war propaganda and in the ballyhoo for the Soviet Constitution of 1936, could endorse the theories of liberty and democracy when so much of Soviet administrative practice has been in the most flagrant contradiction to these ideals. One is always tempted to seek the solution of a puzzle, however baffling.

* * *

AND I think there are two principal explanations of this curious gap between Soviet professions and the actualities of Soviet life. First of all, there has been a merciless decimation of individuals who think critically and independently. Second, the Russian generation has been very much absorbed in what is called "mastering technique." In striking contrast to the theorizing intellectuals of Turgenev and Chekhov, the typical young Russian of recent years has been intensely concerned with learning some trade or profession. As a result his faculty of political criticism has been largely atrophied.

But this one-sided absorption in the technical side of life will scarcely last forever. It would not be surprising if the war should stimulate the old educated Russian's tendency to question and to doubt.

The methods of dictatorship do not permanently solve problems. The practical effects of freedom and democracy in political elections and trade-union organization would be just as beneficial in the Soviet Union as anywhere else.

Even in the carefully controlled Soviet press before the war one could find clear proof that the peasants felt they were not getting a square deal as to pay in the collective farms. All sorts of warnings and threats are addressed to those peasants who prefer to work on their own homesteads, rather than labor on the collective farm fields. If they were getting a fair return for their work for the collective farm these warnings and threats would be unnecessary. And it is scarcely to be imagined that the industrial workers, if they were free as voters and trade-union members, would tolerate edicts making tardiness a criminal offense and punishing with imprisonment anyone who changes his job without official permission.

These are only two of many internal reforms which the people may well demand after the end of the war.

There are other interesting questions about the Russian future.

Will the extravagant praise of Tsars and Generals lead to Bonapartist militarist tendencies in foreign policy?

How will the numerous non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union react, in the long run, to a propaganda of purely Russian nationalism?

I venture to suggest that the Russian future after the end of the war will not be static, that it will produce more changes and surprises than we can reasonably anticipate at the present time.

'Russia — Partner or Rival?'

By Israel Amter

I.

In the Aug. 20 issue of U. S. News, David Lawrence, editorial writer, has an article entitled "Russia—Partner or Rival?" This article appeared before the Quebec Conference ended, and yet it correctly characterizes the present situation with the anti-Soviet forces in the country having a feast-day in their fomenting of anti-Soviet propaganda. Doubtless, also, the Axis forces are gloating, in spite of the fact that cities and towns in Germany and Italy, and strategic points in the occupied countries, are being bombed almost daily, and the fascist leaders of these countries are beginning to feel what war means when brought to their own lands, even in this fragmentary form.

Israel Amter

The Quebec Conference was not satisfactory. A representative of the Soviet Union was absent—this giving rise to all kinds of interpretations even to the point of "assurances" from "authoritative sources that cannot be divulged" that this indicates that the "Soviet Government is going to make a separate peace with Hitler." At the same time, Maxim Litvinoff was recalled as Soviet Ambassador to the United States; Sumner Welles' resignation was reported on President Roosevelt's desk; Vice-President Wallace had only recently received a slap from the President; the Soviet press was again demanding that a second front be opened without delay; and "War and the Working Class," the Moscow trade union paper, declared emphatically that the Soviet Government demands a full part in world affairs and will not tolerate the building of a cordon sanitaire around the Soviet Union through the organization of various so-called regional federations, etc.

Of course, the President could not report in detail on what was decided at Quebec. There is no doubt that warfare in the Far East will be intensified. This is necessary and good. The President hinted that a tri-partite conference will be sought. This means that the Soviet Union will be drawn into the making of decisions, and not merely be informed after conferences between the President and the Prime Minister take place. The President was also correct when he declared that the decisions of the Quebec Conference cannot be made known through public pronouncements which would only help the enemy, but would be felt by them very soon on the battlefield.

Hitler may think that he gained

Russia

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something from the Quebec Conference, and particularly from the apparent lack of unity in the thinking, deciding and acting on the part of the three leading powers—the United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain. In democratic countries it is quite natural that the various governments have their individual points of view and that public opinion be expressed. This should act as a guide, but at the same time might be construed as an obstacle to coming to rapid and complete agreement. However, the prophecies of the enemies of the Soviet Union will not be fulfilled. The Soviet Union has given its pledge—and the Soviet Union keeps its pledge.

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However, it would be extremely dangerous if the situation were allowed to drift. The holding of a conference of the leading powers, including China, is of paramount importance. Let us hope the events at Quebec and the relations at Quebec have become a real warning to the President and the Prime Minister so that henceforth decisions will be made jointly by the four leading powers.

These things take place at a time when the Axis powers are decidedly on the defensive, while the Red Army, taking the summer offensive, has entered Kharkov and is pushing on to further goals before the rainy season begins and winter is upon us.

The raining of bombs on Germany, Italy and the occupied countries, the advances, though relatively small, in the Far East, indicate quite clearly that the Axis powers have the wrong end of the stick. However, it would be fatal to conclude therefore that the war is "practically over"—this being the attitude of some people in the United States. Some of these people believe it honestly, while others are utilizing the present advantageous position of the Allied military forces to put forward more energetically than ever before proposals for a negotiated peace, which would only help Hitler.

Quite correctly, therefore, David Lawrence entitles his article, "Russia—Partner or Rival?" Let us therefore look into this situation a little bit more deeply.

It is well known that Winston Churchill wants very few changes in the present world constellation. We all remember the statement in one of his speeches to Parliament, that the British Parliament would remain intact. Mr. Churchill, according to the U. S. News, goes even further. The U. S. News says:

"As to arrangements in the occupied territories of Africa and Europe, Mr. Churchill favors maintenance of the regimes which existed before the war."

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After having failed to get unconditional surrender from King Victor Emanuel and Bagdolio in Italy, the U. S. News comments that "they (Roosevelt and Churchill) face the question of what kind of government to support there. . . . Churchill says that in Italy order must be preserved to avoid the necessity of diverting Allied troops to police the whole country."

That is correct—but surely Mr. Churchill could find certain forces in Italy that can be thoroughly relied upon if liberation is the goal of the United Nations.

Then we have the further fact that after considerable disagreement between Roosevelt and Churchill before the invasion of North Africa, Churchill deferred to Roosevelt, who accepted the main responsibility for the invasion of Algiers, Churchill becoming Roosevelt's "lieutenant" in this period. As against this, however, Churchill took the lead in the matter of the invasion of Sicily, and it now appears that his ideas are prevailing as far as Italy is concerned. This is borne out by the fact that Churchill declared that "anarchy and chaos" must be eliminated from Italy. Hence, AMG (Amgot) works with local fascists, all of whom in public office in Italy were appointed by Mussolini. (The dissolution of the Fascist Party should not be construed as meaning that fascists suddenly were turned into democrats.) At the same time, AMG has forbidden all political activities. Meetings, demonstrations, etc., are prohibited.

How can one talk about avoiding "policing of the whole country" if collaboration with such people is being cultivated by the Allied forces?

(To Be Continued)

Soviet Paper Sharply Flays Rule by AMG

By the Associated Press

Moscow, Sept. 2.—AMG—the Allied military government for occupied territories, formerly called AMGOT—was sharply criticized today in the Soviet magazine, War and the Working Class.

The magazine said "the administration itself is of a military government based on principles which have nothing in common with the principles of democracy."

Divorcing the Soviet government from any affiliation with AMG in Sicily, the magazine said: "The Soviet government does not participate in this organization."

Following its usual style of quoting foreign press reports, the magazine emphasized the dissolution of the Fascist Party in Sicily and the dismissal of Fascist leaders from civilian posts, but said the "disrespectful name of 'Gauleiter Schools'" had been given to places where officers are prepared for posts under AMG.

War and the working class remarked it was no wonder "sharp criticism in press and political circles in England and America" had resulted, after quoting various dispatches as stating there is absence of freedom of speech in Sicily and that high standing former Fascists are on the Allied pay list.

The article concluded with the comment that "AMGOT is not undertaking the necessary measures for the actual destruction of facism. AMGOT has retained the old Fascist government apparatus and is not attracting democratic elements to its administration."

Wash Post
Sept 3-43. p 2

Soviet Ire Rises

There can be no doubt about it: the Russians are sore.

The latest issue of the periodical *War and the Working Class* contains even more articles than previous numbers castigating various phases of Allied policy.

There was renewed clamor for a second front, and some new angles.

One writer criticised the AMG in Sicily, charging that it permitted Fascists to keep official jobs. It hinted that there was fear among "democrats in Allied countries" that "AMG, besides Hitlerite bloc, will take control over countries liberated from German occupation." Russia, it will be recalled, was not invited to participate in the formation of AMG.

This is a clipping from page 7 of P M
for Sept. 3, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government

TURKS AID NAZIS, RUSSIAN CHARGES

Writer Says Neutral Policy Prolongs War by Guarding Reich's Balkan Flank

AMG ALSO IS DENOUNCED

Cooperation With Fascists in Sicily Alleged—'Democrats' Pictured as Uneasy

MOSCOW, Sept. 2 (U.P.)—A charge that Turkey is conducting a policy of benevolent neutrality toward Germany, and by insuring the safety of Germany's Balkan flank is prolonging the war, was made today by a commentator in the Soviet publication War and the Working Class.

Other writers brought up again the question of the second front and criticized the Allied Military Government administration in Sicily, especially charging that it was cooperating with Fascists and that some "democrats" felt it might try to take control over countries freed from Germany.

The article on Turkey said Turkish Premier Shukru Saracoglu had visited Franz von Papen, German Ambassador, on the anniversary of an alleged attempt to kill the Berlin envoy. This writer said two Russians had been imprisoned for alleged connection with the affair. Mr. Saracoglu's visit to Herr von Papen, he said, might well agitate some circles.

Pact With Reich Cited

He recalled that Turkey had signed a non-aggression pact with Germany four days before Adolf Hitler attacked Russia.

"If Turkey had not been neutral, Germany could not have fought on the Soviet front," he said.

One writer in the weekly, replying to proposals that Russia give the Allies bases from which to bomb Rumania, said every facility had been offered to the Allies to join Russia in fighting the real enemy, Germany, on Russian soil.

In his discussion of the AMG in Sicily, the writer charged that Fascists were permitted to go about freely and even keep official jobs while anti-Fascists were still in jail in Italy.

"Especial uneasiness has been caused among democrats of Allied countries," he wrote, "by reports leaking through the press that AMG is designed for a grand European plan and, besides administering countries of the Hitlerite bloc, will take control over countries liberated from German occupation."

Comment in U. S. Criticized

Maj. Gen. Galaktionoff, military commentator for War and the Working Class, discussed the military situation. He criticized American commentators, among whom he mentioned Hanson W. Baldwin of THE NEW YORK TIMES, for their comments on Russia and said that men of "that ilk" would like to see a long war of attrition between Russia and Germany.

General Galaktionoff said Russia had repeatedly proopsed that the Allies send troops and planes to fight with her men against the Germans, but that the Allies had not been willing. He indicated that the Allies had proposed last fall to base planes on Baku and Tiflis, in the Caucasus, but commented that there was no front there and the Allied forces could not have fought the Germans.

"Isn't it clear that it would have been more correct to base them somewhere nearer the front, in the North Caucasus or on the central front, where they would have been able to help our troops?" he asked.

He referred also to a proposal that Russian troops be withdrawn from the whole Transcaucasus region and sent to fight the Germans, while non-Russian troops take over the quiet Transcaucasus country.

"How can such a proposal be regarded as a desire to fight side by side with the Soviet?" he asked.

Relations Cordial, Hull Says

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Sept. 2—In reply to a question whether Russia had been invited to participate in the Allied military government of Sicily, Secretary of State Cordell Hull said today that Russia was being kept fully informed.

Asked about Harry Hopkins' statement in a magazine article that we might "lose" Russia as an ally, Mr. Hull replied that our relations were whole-heartedly cordial and friendly and would not be remotely affected by microscopic points that might be brought up concerning them.

This is a clipping from page 2 of the New York Times for Sept. 3, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

GETTING ALONG WITH RUSSIA

Critics of the President and the State Department have chosen to open an attack on the Russian policy of the Administration precisely at a time when it is most important not to upset the applecart of Anglo-American diplomacy. Among these critics are familiar fellow-travelers of the old days before 1939. To them has now been added a miscellaneous company of excited right-wingers and despairing left-wingers whose admiration for the splendid achievements of the Red Armies has now reached such proportions that they are ready to accuse the President of double-dealing with Russia merely because he fails to take a Russian point of view on every question which arises.

The most persistent accusation against the President, of course, is that he is betraying Russia by failing to open a second land front on the Continent. It is confidently assumed and freely charged by his more violent critics that this failure to come to Russia's aid results from the fact that some of his closest advisers in the State Department, and notably Secretary Hull, counsel delay because they would really like to see Russia "bled white" before the war is finished. This is the main item in the bill of particulars against the Administration's Russian policy, but it is supplemented by other charges which allege the existence of a consistent pattern of unfriendliness or deviousness or even outright hostility toward Russia in the White House and the State Department. It is charged that we deliberately affronted Russia by "making a deal with Darlan." It is charged that we deliberately snubbed Russia by failing to give her a share in the work of AMG in Sicily. It is charged that the President is surrounded by close counselors who would like to revive the discredited policy of the *cordon sanitaire* and ring Russia on the west with a belt of hostile states under the domination of the Anglo-American democracies.

What do all these accusations really add up to?

In our judgment, it is a case either of extreme naïveté or extreme arrogance for the President's critics to undertake to instruct him in matters of military strategy. This newspaper is as eager as anyone else for a successful new front to be opened on the coast of France. But we should regard it as beyond our right and beyond the limits of our knowledge to attempt to tell Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill and their combined General Staffs when and where and how to strike across the English Channel. Not one of the President's critics has the necessary information to make a wise decision on that question. Not one of them knows how many ships and men and tanks are available for such an undertaking. Not one of them has any real idea of what opposition we should meet. Not one of them is in a position to study the facts and figures concerned in the immense problem of supply and reinforcement. Not one of them has talked about these questions with the ranking admirals and generals of the American and British navies and armies and air forces. But it is all much simpler than this, for the President's critics. Russia wants a new land front in France; therefore a new land front in France should at once be opened—even, apparently, if such an undertaking at this time were condemned in advance to a complete and disastrous failure that would be just as costly for the Russians as for ourselves.

* * *

As for the other items in the bill of particulars against the President's Russian policy:

To many of us it seems clear that the "deal" with Darlan was made wholly without thought either of pleasing or displeasing our Russian allies; it was made under the pressure of an immediate emergency in order to save time and lives in the landing of an Anglo-American expeditionary force, and for the purpose for which it was contrived it worked. AMG is merely administering territory occupied by this Anglo - American expeditionary force as it advances; AMG is defining no larger policies of political importance with regard to the future of Italy, and on these larger questions the views of the American and British Governments are promptly made known to Moscow. There is no justification for charging Mr. Roosevelt with a desire to revive the dead-as-a-dodo policy of the *cordon sanitaire* merely because he remains faithful to the support of the rights of little nations which he and Mr. Churchill expressed in the Atlantic Charter.

This is a clipping from page 14 of the New York Times for 4.25.1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Not the least remarkable fact about this criticism of the President is the ease with which his critics assume that if there are any flaws in our present relations with Russia the fault must all be ours, and none of it can possibly be Russia's. A great deal of recent history is brushed airily aside, in order to arrive at this conclusion. The Stalin-Hitler pact of 1939, which really gave the signal for the beginning of the war, is explained as a necessary move on Stalin's part, in order to gain time; but no similar charity is granted to Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier for their performance at Munich. The failure to consult Moscow regarding the best method of achieving a foothold on the coast of North Africa is sharply criticized as an affront to Russia; but no mention is made of the consistent failure of Russia to give her western Allies the slightest information about her military resources or of the use she is making of the weapons that have been furnished her in such prodigious quantity under the lend-lease arrangement. AMG is roundly denounced; but little is ever said by the President's critics of the "Free Germany" policy of Russia; or, if anything is said, it is explained that this is a natural and entirely justified Russian retaliation for the policy we have followed in North Africa and Sicily, though that policy has been strictly military and the "Free Germany" policy is unmistakably political.

We have no wish to emphasize or to aggravate the points of actual or potential disagreement between Russia and her western Allies. On the contrary, we believe that the only thing that matters now is the closest possible cooperation that can be achieved from this point forward, between Russia, Britain and the United States, in complete good faith, both for the winning of the war and the safeguarding of the peace. But to this end we do not think that the present wave of indiscriminate and almost hysterical criticism directed against Mr. Roosevelt, and Mr. Churchill as well, is helpful. It is encouraging the myth that Russia and Russia alone is always right, whatever the point at issue. Much more serious, it builds distrust in the purposes of our own Government.

This is a clipping from page _____ of the New York Times for _____

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Churchill and FDR Anxious About Russia

Despite Hull, They Are Uncertain of Soviet's Intentions

By ALEXANDER H. UHL
PM's Foreign Editor

PM Exclusive

WASHINGTON, Sept. 3. —Despite the insistence of the State Dept. that our relations with Soviet-Russia are perfectly swell, it is becoming increasingly apparent that both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill are seriously concerned over the way things are going.

Ever since Quebec we have had a wave of reassuring statements though no concrete example of any real improvement. One highly placed diplomat in Washington told PM that so far as he was aware neither the U. S. A. nor Britain know for a certainty just what Russia's intentions are. He cited the Litvinov withdrawal as an example of what is going on. No one, he said, really knew its significance and added that the paucity of information was symbolized by the fact that the best clue any one was able to get was a report from Moscow that Litvinov was being treated with great consideration.

Hull Dodges

At his press conference yesterday Secretary Hull insisted that our relations with Russia are wholeheartedly cordial and friendly. And he added that microscopic points between the two countries would not affect this situation in the least.

Perhaps—but it is hard to see why FDR tore into Drew Pearson so vehemently and why there should be a whole series of reassuring statements in the past few days unless the President and State Dept. felt they were needed.

Hull dodged the question of whether Russia had been invited to participate in the Allied government of Sicily, saying that the British and American armies were maintaining law and order there. The Soviet government, he added, was being kept informed of what was going on.

Second Front the Issue

Russia again popped into Hull's press conference when a reporter asked for comment on Harry Hopkins' article in the October issue of the *American Magazine* in which Hopkins predicted a long war "if we lose Russia."

Hull reiterated his previous statement that relations with Russia were cordial.

Although the Burma campaign probably is one of the chief matters still being cleared up in the Churchill-FDR conferences now going on in Washington, it is believed that this whole question of relations with Russia is playing a prominent part, too.

It is obvious that some kind of meeting with Russia must be held soon, but it is equally obvious that the only thing the Russians are interested in talking about right now is a second front.

This is a clipping from page 7 of P M
for Sept. 3, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government

Soviet Journal Says Turkey's Neutrality Benefits Germany

MOSCOW, Sept. 2 (UP). — A charge that Turkey was conducting a policy of benevolent neutrality toward Germany, and by ensuring the safety of Germany's Balkan flank was prolonging the war, was made today by a commentator in the publication War and the Working Class.

The Turkish article said that Turkish Premier Sukru Saracoglu had visited Baron Franz von Papen, German ambassador, on the anniversary of an alleged attempt to kill Papen.

"If Turkey had not been neutral, Germany could not have fought on the Soviet front," he said.

One writer in the weekly, answering proposals that the U.S.S.R. give the Allies bases from which to bomb Rumania, said that every facility had been offered the Allies to join the Soviets in fighting the real enemy, Germany, on Soviet soil.

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"Especially uneasiness has been caused among democrats of Allied countries," he wrote, "by reports leaking through the press that AMG is designed for a grand European plan and besides administering countries of the Hitlerite bloc will take control over countries liberated from German occupation."

HITS COMMENTATORS

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Galaktionov said that the Soviet Union had repeatedly proposed that the Allies send troops and planes to fight with its men against the Germans but that the Allies had not been willing. He indicated that the Allies had proposed last fall to base planes on Baku and Tiflis, in the Caucasus, but commented that there was no front there, and the Allied forces could not have fought the Germans.

"Isn't it clear that it would have been more correct to base them somewhere nearer the front, in the North Caucasus or on the Central Front, where they would have been able to help our troops?" he asked.

This is a clipping from page 2 of the Daily Worker for Sept. 2 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Complex Problem

By Mark Sullivan

Russian Negotiations

THIS COLUMN aims to make a small number of elementary points which it is desirable the public should bear in mind, about a delicate and serious situation.

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, now together in Washington, are approaching negotiations with Premier Stalin of Russia. The purpose is to arrive at agreement about an extremely wide and complex group of intricately related matters—including conduct of the war from now on, policy about Germany when the war ends, and about postwar arrangements for world peace. That the negotiations should succeed is vitally desirable.

There is every reason to have confidence that Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill will conduct the negotiations with skill and wisdom, including consideration for Russia. There is proof, among other evidences, in the extraordinarily able speech of Mr. Churchill this week. That Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill should have the confidence of their countries is essential to success. If in their conclusions there is anything unacceptable to America, the country has a check, for any conclusions involving international agreement must be laid before the Senate for ratification.

THE DIFFERENCES necessary to be bridged are many and deep. A few are:

Russia wishes to hold onto three small countries along her border which she seized in 1939-1940—Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. Russia says she needs these countries for safety against attack. The United States regards these countries as independent, and recognizes exiled governments representing them. The possibility of compromise here lies in arriving at a program for international peace satisfactory to Russia, so that she would feel safe in permitting these countries to be independent.

The United States and Britain are waging war against both Germany and Japan (with Italy and other Axis satellites). Russia is fighting only against Germany—with Japan she has a pact of nonaggression. This bears on the problem of the United States and Britain setting up a second front in Europe. They are obliged to use some of their forces against Japan, and to remember, that after Germany is defeated they will still have the task of defeating Japan.

There is a broad difference between the circumstances in which Britain went to war and those in which Russia became involved. Britain, although not attacked, went to war immediately after Hitler set out on his career of conquest in September, 1939, for the purpose of stopping Hitler. Russia did not go to war at that time—on the contrary, she had recently made a treaty of nonaggression with Hitler. Russia went to war only after and because Hitler, breaking his treaty with her, invaded her territory. This was after Britain had been fighting for a year and nine months.

THERE WAS a specific difference between Britain and Russia, at the time the war broke out, about Poland. Britain, as she went to war, announced that Poland must be saved. Russia, within two weeks after the war broke out, seized part of Poland. This condition figures in the present negotiations. Russia wishes to hold on to the part of Poland she seized. Britain is bound by her pledge to rescue Poland.

Britain and the United States have announced that the end of the war must be "unconditional surrender" by the Axis nations. Russia has never united in this position. Russia can, under certain conditions, make a separate peace with Germany. There is a treaty between Britain and Russia, covering the making of peace, but the exact terms of this treaty are not commonly understood. As Dorothy Thompson has pointed out, the Russian-British treaty pledges Russia merely not to make peace with "a Hitlerite government or any government of Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions." Apparently Russia could make a treaty with the German people, or representatives of them, other than Hitler.

Between the United States and Britain, and on the other hand Russia, there is a deep chasm of ideology. The United States and Britain practice parliamentary government, freedom of speech and press, freedom of religious worship and teaching, the right of individuals to own property and conduct businesses. All this the Russian government denies. This difference becomes important as respects whatever government is to be set up in Germany after the war. Presumably the United States and Britain would wish a form of government having their characteristics; presumably Russia would prefer a form of government having its characteristics.

Obviously the negotiations are difficult. Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill deserve, within proper limits, immunity from some kinds of criticism.

WASHINGTON POST
SEPT. 3, 1943
PAGE 10

Russian Verdict Looms

By William Philip Simms

THE die is cast. The next few days, or weeks at most, will tell the story of how we stand with Soviet Russia—whether relations are better than some believe or worse than many fear.

Despite official predictions of a long war, it is admitted that the end may come much sooner than people think. In a world-wide broadcast yesterday, Pope Pius XII said that "hostilities are reaching a climax" and warned the victors to prepare a just peace. At a press conference here, Brendan Bracken, British Minister of Information, recalled that in the First World War people were reading about the fighting one day and woke up the next to learn that the war was over. We don't want to be caught unprepared for peace like that again, he said.

That is why both Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt are now humbly begging Marshal Stalin for a tripartite meeting as soon as possible. A few months ago Mr. Churchill was saying that now was no time for such matters. Today he acknowledges that "it is most necessary and urgent."

Today it can be said that plans for the meeting are being hurried along. Mr. Churchill has come here from Quebec for further discussions with Mr. Roosevelt before he returns to England. In London, Foreign Secretary Eden and American Ambassador Winant are discussing the matter with Ivan M. Maisky, former Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain, and yesterday Secretary of State Hull intimated that he and Mr. Eden may meet somewhere soon with Russian Foreign Commissar Molotov.

* * *

IN THE opinion of United Nations envoys here, therefore, the most important diplomatic showdown of the war is almost at hand. Seldom, if ever, have the responsible heads of two great powers so humbly and so publicly pleaded with the head of another power for a meeting. On the other hand seldom, if ever, has so much been at stake.

If Stalin agrees to meet with Roosevelt and Churchill, it is pointed out, it will mean that an understanding between Russia, the United States and Great Britain has already been worked out, at least in principle, at the preliminary conferences referred to above. If he refuses, it will indicate just the reverse. It will be the equivalent of announcing to our enemies that Soviet Russia intends to go her own way, regardless.

And that, it is unanimously agreed here, would be one of the greatest tragedies of all time—as great a tragedy as the war itself. For without Russia, there can be no lasting peace in Europe. There can be no permanent or worth-while post-war collaboration. Russia occupies one-sixth of the habitable globe. She is three times the size of the United States. She can make or break any peace set-up that all the rest of the world put together could contrive.

* * *

NO ONE, least of all President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, expects the Big Three to settle everything at a "peace conference" of their own while the war is still on. But diplomats here point out that if they can not agree now on fundamentals and set up certain broad principles to guide them thru the dangerous days of reconstruction ahead, they can never agree. On the contrary, the tendency after the armistice will be to fly apart more than ever.

I myself witnessed what happened in the first and second Balkans wars. In the first Balkan War of 1912, Bulgaria was the ally of Serbia and Greece against Turkey. They defeated Turkey and dismembered her, or that part of her which lay in Europe. In 1913, however, they fell out. Bulgaria went to war against her allies. In the melee, Turkey staged a comeback and re-won most of what she had lost and Romania intervened and grabbed off part of Bulgaria.

It is an open secret that Adolf Hitler is now hoping that there will be a repetition of that sort of thing, but on a far larger scale. That is his one and only chance to escape the doom that is now closing in about him. Obviously he will leave nothing undone, however devilish or unprincipled, to bring that about. Only Stalin and Churchill and Roosevelt can outplay him.

WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
SEPT. 2, 1943
PAGE 25

Soviets Ship Cattle to Areas Freed from Nazis

(By Cable to Inter-Continent News)

MOSCOW, Aug. 31.—The decisions of the Soviet government on immediate measures to restore the economy of the liberated districts is being carried out.

The collective farms of the Yaroslavl region have already transported to the Kalinin region 11,000 cows and 10,000 sheep which had been evacuated earlier. Three thousand five hundred cows and five thousand sheep are ready to be sent back to the Smolensk region.

More than 2,500 cows were returned to the Serafimovich district in the Stalingrad region.

In addition to this more than 4,000 cows have been brought in to the neighboring districts to increase the herd, and the number of heads of big-horned cattle in the district are reaching the planned figure.

Horses and agricultural implements are being sent by the collective farms of the Kuibyshev region to the Smolensk region.

The population of the liberated districts is responding enthusiastically to the help rendered them. At a meeting in the liberated Podkletnoye village of the Voronezh region one of the collective farmers said: "The government is giving us a helping hand in everything. It is now up to us to show what we can do."

In answer to this the meeting decided to speed up repairs of the cattleyards and to redouble efforts in reaping the crop.

From the Smolensk region it has been reported that 600 herdsmen, milkmaids and cattle drivers have left ~~to drive~~ the cattle back from the eastern regions.

This is a clipping from page 2 of the Daily Worker for Sept. 1, 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

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The American
MERCURY

RUSSIA'S AIMS IN EUROPE

BY DAVID J. DALLIN

THE frenzied search for clues to Russia's aims for postwar Europe reminds one of Poe's purloined letter. While experts were hunting for it in clever hiding places, it was on the surface all the time, ignored because in full view.

Consider the excitement churned up by the publication recently of a manifesto of a self-styled National Committee of Free Germany in Moscow. As astute an observer as Dorothy Thompson set it down as a sudden Russian gesture: "Stalin has lost his patience and taken up the program we should have launched." Yet there is nothing in the manifesto not clearly outlined in previous statements from Soviet sources and by German exiles under Soviet influence. The manifesto of July 21 was little more than the expression of a policy for Germany long and openly prepared.

The Kremlin has been no less outspoken on most other aspects of the European reshuffling. On February 23, 1942 Stalin listed Lithuania, Esthonia and Latvia (which he had acquired during the life of the Berlin-Moscow pact) as "Soviet land." Thereafter his officials and newspapers specifically and repeatedly assumed that the

DAVID J. DALLIN *is a Russian historian and economist who has been writing on European politics for over two decades. His book* Soviet Russia's Foreign Affairs, 1939–42 *was published last December and a companion volume,* Russia and Postwar Europe, *will soon be brought out by the Yale University Press.*

American Mercury Oct., 1943 391 – 402

line of June 22, 1941 — the westernmost line on the day Hitler struck at the USSR — represents the country's European border. Outright annexation of the Baltic countries, Eastern Poland and portions of Finland and Rumania is thus indicated.

Beyond this stretches a belt, from East Prussia to the Adriatic, populated chiefly by Slav peoples, which the Kremlin has no less candidly designated as its "security sphere." The intentions implicit in the activities of communist-led underground groups, such as the "partisans" in Yugoslavia and Poland, have been made explicit in the statements of Slav leaders in Moscow; in broadcasts from Soviet soil; and in the activities of Moscow committees (such as the Union of Polish Patriots) functioning in effect as rival governments-in-exile.

Finally, there is the program for a resuscitated Germany without Hitler, militarily and industrially vigorous, but geared to the old Bismarckian principle of a Russo-German bloc as a counterweight to the West.

There is little novelty in this general outline of aspirations. Some of it harks back to the Napoleonic era. Much of it follows accurately the claims advanced by the Tsar's government in the first World War. And even more is a throwback to the program of Russo-German cooperation promoted by Lenin and after him by Stalin until it was interrupted by the Nazi régime.

In view of the fact that Moscow does not screen its plans for postwar Europe, it seems curious that so many American publicists should insist on concealment. They resent plain speech on the subject, though the plainest comes directly or indirectly from Moscow. It is not at all a question of whether Russia is "right" or "wrong." The problem is not one of political morals but of political engineering. It is sheer nonsense to expect that the German invasion of Russia should automatically have wiped out historical and geographical factors operating for centuries. Nothing is gained by smudging over the inevitable contradictions. On the contrary, the only hope of evolving compromises and adjustments lies in an unblurred understanding of the facts. In the political struggles already shaping up among the enemies of Hitler as his eclipse approaches, delusions can lead only to confusion and disaster.

Only the wilfully blind can fail to see the many areas of disagreement between Russia and the other Axis foes, especially the Anglo-

American group. Against the Churchill-Roosevelt formula of unconditional surrender, Moscow in effect offers to Germany a tempting conditional peace. Washington accords full recognition to small nations whose soil Russia considers integral parts of its own sovereign domain. The Anglo-Saxon powers incline towards regional European federations; Russia is determined to prevent such groupings. Refugee committees and underground forces under Soviet leadership espouse policies in direct competition with exile governments and with other underground groups.

Refusal to face these realities would amount to an admission that the picture is hopeless. Diagnosis is the first step towards cure. The Soviet government has on many occasions shown its flexibility and spirit of compromise — not from sentiment but from a sense of realism. Its country has been brutally hurt — perhaps ten million soldiers and civilians dead, a major portion of its industry in ruins, its food resources depleted to the point of starvation for a majority of its people. Russia needs peace more urgently than any of its allies; its problems of reconstruction are more pressing. Such factors offer points of contact and mutual interest on which an understanding with England and America might be built.

All of this emphasizes the urgent need for the appraisal of Soviet aims in Europe.

II

The Kremlin is deeply pessimistic about the prospects of durable peace. It does not accept the prevalent division of the history of the last thirty years into war and peace periods, regarding it as a continuous series of upheavals in which the sharp edges of peace and war are blurred. This view it projects into the immediate future. Where Americans and Britishers look for the war to *end*, Soviet leaders expect it merely to *subside* in greater or lesser measure.

Right or wrong, this conception has a determining effect on Soviet policy. The USSR has never put any trust in the pacific claims of other governments. It has accepted skeptically, even with irony, assurances of friendship. Lacking faith in the durability of postwar alliances, it seeks to win strategic positions, in territory and politically, for its own protection. Its long struggle with "capitalist encirclement" has made Russia what Americans call "isolationist" and "Russia-First" in temper.

Russia seeks to insure its interests by widening its sphere of influence in Europe on the territory which separates her from Germany and Italy. The Soviet régime hopes to accomplish this by extending its "strategic frontiers" as far west as possible, and by drawing the remaining area, with a population of over one hundred million, under its political "protection."

The pattern for such "protection" was drawn long ago in Outer Mongolia. That country is not a component part of the USSR. But Red Army forces are garrisoned there and infringement of its borders or interests are accepted as a direct challenge to Russia. The instrument of "protection" is the Mutual Assistance Pact made between the USSR and Outer Mongolia on March 12, 1936.

The same kind of instrument was used to bind the Baltic countries into the Soviet sphere — until an opportunity presented itself for Sovietizing them completely. In August and September 1939 Stalin concluded an agreement with Hitler regarding the division of spheres in Eastern Europe which has not been made public to this day, although its general content is known. Six territories with a combined population of over twenty-three million came under Soviet tutelage. The agreement bound Russia not to "Sovietize" the Baltic states. Moscow therefore concluded Pacts of Mutual Assistance with them. Though Red troops were garrisoned, there was no intervention in internal life — until June 1940, when Hitler had his hands full in the West. Then the Soviet government effected the full absorption of those territories.

The pact for Poland proposed by Stalin on May 4, 1943 (nine days after the rupture of relations with the Polish government-in-exile) is in essence a Mutual Assistance instrument. An analogous relationship is foreseen with Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and other regions. The extent of Russian control cannot be estimated in advance. But the principle is clear enough. Instead of federating among themselves, and thus achieving real political and military weight *vis-à-vis* Russia, these countries and regions would depend exclusively on Russia. Instead of Churchill's proposed "confederations of states side by side with the great powers," Stalin favors "independent" states, each bound by "mutual assistance" arrangements with its big neighbor.

While the Quebec conference was under way, a new Moscow magazine, *War and the Working Class* (started after the magazine

Communist International was suspended) made Stalin's opposition to any sort of federation amply clear. The importance attached to the editorial is manifest in the fact that the Soviet Embassy in Washington released the full text to the American press. The editorial says in part:

> Anti-democratic and semi-fascist elements are striving to prevent the participation of the USSR in the organization of the postwar world, setting up the most fantastic plans in this direction, plans obviously hostile to the Soviet Union. There are quite a few such plans, starting with the plan for creating a Europe divided into various federations, confederations and regional blocs of states.

The editorial puts talk of a United States of Europe in the same category of "anti-Soviet plans." But the proposal for an East European Federation, including Poland and Czechoslovakia, is the one that draws Moscow's hottest condemnation.

The Soviet counter-proposal, for a divided East Europe, under Russian protection, is presented in the propaganda as an alliance between Russia and the Slav countries — a new Pan-Slavism.

The present Pan-Slav movement has only a remote resemblance to the nineteenth century Pan-Slavism. There is no mystic faith in the unique character of the "Slav soul," no talk about a special historical mission. It is a more elementary and opportunist design to meet a current political situation.

The first All-Slav meeting was staged in Moscow at the very beginning of the Russo-German war, on August 10–11, 1941. Not a word was said about communism or revolution by the professors, writers and military men who attended. The emphasis was on national survival under the big-brother protection of Russia. An All-Slav Committee was elected as a permanent body.

The Second All-Slav meeting took place on April 4–5, 1942. It ended its appeal to all Slavs with the words:

> Light comes from the East!
> Victory will be ours!

A third meeting took place this May 9, just after the break of relations with the Polish government. It was at this meeting that the creation of a new Polish army, openly hostile to the Polish armies outside the USSR, was announced. It was here, too, that the Moscow-designated leader of the Union of Polish Patriots, Wanda Wasilewska (married to an Assistant Commissar of Foreign Affairs), denounced the Polish government in London as "traitors who agree to serve the Germans."

The organ of the Pan-Slav movement, *Slavyanie*, began publishing in Moscow in July 1942, and described its purpose as aiding "the struggle for national liberation on the part of the Slav peoples, and also *the liberating rôle of the Red Army*." The last formula sums up its general content. The rôle of America and Britain is soft-pedalled or ignored, and Russian friendship is offered as the sole salvation of Slavdom. The magazine has consistently supported the pro-Soviet "partisan" minorities in the guerilla movements, and in general, *Slavyanie* has been little more than a tool of Soviet diplomacy.

The main rôle in the curious Pan-Slav agitation is played by Russians and non-Russian pensioners of Moscow. Admiration for the heroic resistance of the Red forces has enabled them to rally people of Slav origin in the United States, England, Argentine and elsewhere to serve as pressure groups for the Soviet viewpoint. Radio broadcasts in all Slav tongues emanate from Soviet soil. All urge alliance with Russia and encourage new organizations in opposition to the London governments recognized by the United Nations. The official organ of the Union of Polish Patriots in Moscow, *Wolna Polska*, has stated bluntly that after Germany's defeat Poland must choose between the victors — in favor of the Soviet Union:

> The national interests of Poland demand that after the war she lean on our great, democratic neighbor, the Soviet Union. Every policy aiming at tying up the fate of Poland to that of any imperialism . . . is bound to lead to a new national catastrophe.

That choice is also involved in the notorious struggle between the pro-Allied and pro-Russian guerilla fighters in Yugoslavia. The refusal of the Chetniks, under General Mihailovich, to accept the Pan-Slav formula made him the object of a world-wide defamation. Broadcasts from Soviet soil warned against "the traitors, the Chetniks of Mihailovich." The *Communist International* wrote in May 1942: "The partisans swear to fight for their Yugoslavia and to struggle together with the Red Army" — an unsubtle hint that they would resent intrusions of Allied armies.

In Poland, too, the "partisans" are in open conflict with the rest of the underground forces. The latter recognize and are closely integrated with the London government, whereas the "partisans" look to Moscow for leadership and to the Red Army and the new Polish Kosciusko Division as the spearheads of liberation.

It should be noted here that

Russian and Allied views on the European "underground" have been sharply different. London and Washington hope to prepare European nations for a free choice of governments *after* the liberation, but Russia favors revolutionary political action *now*, in advance of liberation.

The dominant tendency in the underground and guerilla resistance to the Axis has been one of restraint — sabotage and terror but no actual uprisings until the approach of liberating Allied armies. United Nations propaganda has warned against premature rebellions. This is unacceptable to Moscow, which views guerilla resistance as a synthesis of anti-German military action and popular revolutionary action. In Eastern Europe, "partisan" organizations have become essentially points of support for the future sphere of Soviet dominance, and in Western Europe communist-led underground groups have become nuclei of social revolution.

Moscow broadcasts have called for immediate uprisings while British, American, Dutch and other spokesmen were urging caution. The Russian station "Free Yugoslavia" has denounced the Yugoslav government and its supporters for "proclaiming the slogan of inaction." *Wolna Polska* has declared: "We regard the policy of passivity, of waiting, as treason to the interests of Poland." Similar clashes of view — covering but not concealing a great gulf between the London governments and the part of the underground under Kremlin influence — have also appeared in relation to Holland, France, Czechoslovakia and other countries. It cannot be denied that the struggle inside the occupied nations has some of the elements of a contest between Eastern and Western orientations.

Security spheres, of course, can assume a variety of forms, from total inclusion in the Soviet Union to loose ties on the basis of treaties. Czechoslovakia, through the Beneš government, for instance, has accepted the security sphere idea in the hopes that its own ties can remain very loose. Moscow understands well enough that the actual forms of its dominance in the sphere will depend in large measure on the attitude of other victorious great powers, and upon public opinion in Europe as a whole. Its chief purpose at this stage is to obtain United Nations acceptance of the general principle. Stalin will probably agree to any political or legal form, provided it gives Russia actual supremacy in the political

life of the given sphere. It may, for instance, be willing to undertake not to "Sovietize" these countries — its dissolution of the Comintern was in part a gesture in this direction. But it will require, as a minimum, that the governments in this area conform their foreign and military policies to those of Moscow.

Thus, to sum up, in Eastern Europe the Soviet government aims to extend a kind of protectorate, as an initial move, with closer integration of policy and economy in the future, as opportunity permits. It will readily forego Sovietization, being content with "democratic" governments of the most varied social composition, provided their military and diplomatic life is tied firmly into the Soviet scheme. Moscow will regard every attempt at federation that would raise the aggregate self-reliance of the Slav areas, Hungary, Rumania and Finland as a hostile combination.

III

Soviet aspirations with regard to Germany are, of course, central to the entire Moscow view of postwar Europe. Indications of the Russian views are many and impressive.

"We have always maintained that a strong Germany was the condition for a durable peace," Foreign Commissar Molotov said on October 31, 1939. Strangely enough, this remained the Russian view, with variations, even after Hitler broke the Soviet-Nazi neutrality and friendship pact. A German Communist Party broadcast from Moscow on July 20, 1941, a month after the Germans invaded the Soviet Union, still called "for the restoration of the inviolable alliance between the German people and the USSR."

From the start the Soviet leaders made it clear that they were fighting Hitler and his associates, but had no desire to weaken, let alone destroy, Germany. In a magazine article reporting his visit with Stalin (*American Magazine*, December 1941) Harry Hopkins made an observation which few people took the trouble to understand at the time. Stalin, he said, directed his passionate hatred against Hitler, not against the German people — *or the German General Staff.* And on February 23, 1942, Stalin said:

> Occasionally the foreign press engages in prattle to the effect that the Red Army's aim is to exterminate the German people and destroy the German state. This is, of course, a stupid lie and a witless slander against the Red Army. . . . It would be ridiculous to identify

Hitler's clique with the German people and the German state. History shows that the Hitlers come and go, but the German people and the German state remain.

On November 6, 1942, he repeated this assurance in stronger form. "It is not our aim to destroy all military force in Germany," he said; Hitler's armies must be defeated, but "the destruction of all German military force is inadvisable from the point of view of the victor."

This approach, obviously, is out of tune with United Nations views and propaganda. Official speeches and democratic public opinion in Britain and the United States have left little doubt of a determination to smash Germany beyond easy resurrection as a great power. That it will be totally disarmed and deprived of its war industries is taken for granted, and there has even been talk of dismemberment.

But the more dire the American threats against Germany, culminating in the unconditional surrender formula, the more outspoken have been Russia's counterproposals. As against a "hard" peace from the Anglo-American bloc, Moscow propaganda held out the chance for a "soft" peace from the East. However the facts may be disguised, they have amounted to a kind of bargaining between two contrasting tendencies within the coalition of Germany's enemies.

The idea of Russo-German cooperation as a counterweight to the might of Western nations is not new. It was central in Prince von Bismarck's thinking in his day, and Lenin's in his. Soviet Russia from the outset opposed the Versailles settlement, demanding — and secretly helping — the rearming of Germany. (The Communist Party and the Nazis outdid each other, during the Weimar period, in condemning Versailles.) The relations between the Reichswehr and the Red Army were friendly. Many phases of military activity forbidden to the Germans by the Versailles Treaty were conducted on Russian soil, so that an intimate exchange of military information developed. Many of the military techniques now used by the Germans against Russia — and by the Russians against the Germans — were first worked out cooperatively before 1933.

Both within the Nazi Party and the German Army there have been strong elements favoring alignment with Russia against the West. These tendencies had their day of triumph when Molotov and Von Ribbentrop signed their pact in August 1939. The scrapping of the

pact marked the defeat of such views — but not their extinction. Moscow has never forgotten the fact that it had friends within the Nazi fold, and especially within the German Army: Germans who saw in a combination with Russia their only hope of checkmating the West.

Almost immediately after Hitler struck, Stalin began to implement his program of a purged but effective Germany. German prisoners were sifted, investigated and indoctrinated to provide *cadres* for an eventual pro-Russian revival in Germany. As early as October 8, 1941, the first conference of German war prisoners took place — in Soviet Camp No. 58. Nazis were not excluded; on the contrary, ex-members of the Hitler Youth were given a place of honor. While German communist exiles took the lead, all segments of German society were represented.

The conference issued a manifesto condemning "atrocities of the Hitler gangsters in the occupied regions of Soviet Russia, *the country that has always opposed the Versailles Treaty.*" It added that

> in overthrowing Hitler, the German people will take a very important step towards regaining the confidence of the Soviet people. And this confidence will be a guarantee of the freedom and independence of Germany.

Walter Ulbricht, German communist leader now prominent in the National Committee of Free Germany, ran the show at this first of many political congresses of "reformed" war captives. Prisoners from Slav satellites of the Axis also held meetings and made statements. They promised to "brother Slavs" an "hour of vengeance" and asserted that the freedom of Slav peoples must come under the protection of the Red Army — "our hope and our shield." Thus, four months after the start of Russo-German hostilities, Moscow was in essence outlining both its security sphere and its promise of a strong Germany enjoying the friendship of Russia after the overthrow of Hitler.

In the following years the Slav phase flowered in the Pan-Slav movement, the "partisan" organizations, the Union of Polish Patriots, Free Yugoslavia, etc. The German phase found expression in Stalin's pronouncements and in an array of magazines, articles, pamphlets by so-called "Free Germany" groups. One of the most active of these groups is located in Mexico City, where it publishes *Freies Deutschland.* Its propaganda, ever since 1941, has been an almost verbatim forecast of the recent Moscow manifesto.

In March 1942, a proclamation

in approximately the same vein — promising a strong Germany as reward for a surrender to Russia — was signed by former German deputies, writers, trade unionists residing both in Moscow and in Mexico. And in its issue of March 1943, *Freies Deutschland* made public a declaration, allegedly drawn up in the Rhineland, which proposed a coalition of

> parties and organizations, those eliminated by Hitler as well as forces in the army and the opposition inside the National Socialist camp. . . We have in view the adherents of the big former parties — the Center Party, the Deutschnationale Volks-Partei, the Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party; the members of the former Christian and Free Trade Unions. . . Former member of the SA and even those who technically are members of the National Socialist organization at present.

That declaration ended with an appeal "to all honorable officers and soldiers who are inspired with a truly national spirit to construct together with the people law and order in Germany."

Far from being startlingly new, therefore, the recent Moscow manifesto is simply a reiteration of familiar Soviet proposals. It is signed by leading German communists like Pieck and Ulbricht, but its social composition is as varied as that indicated in the supposed Rhineland proclamation. Both in the personnel and in the text there is an open appeal to German nationalism and a promise of "amnesty for all Hitler adherents who in good time will renounce him." A great-grandson of Bismarck, Count Heinrich von Einsiedel, is among the signatories — token of the Bismarckian policy of Russo-German rapprochement. Standard heroes of the new German youth — "von Stein, Arndt, Clausewitz, York and others" — are invoked. They have in common the fact that they served their fatherland by collaborating with Russia.

The manifesto poses two alternatives before Germans, in particular before German Nazis and Army men. The first is the "overthrow of Hitler by the coalition armies," which would lead to "the end of national independence," "dismemberment of our fatherland," and a treaty harsher than Versailles. The second is a revolutionary overthrow of Hitler and

> Formation of a genuine national German Government . . . on an equal footing with other nations . . . a strong democratic power that will have nothing in common with the helpless Weimar régime; a democracy that will be implacable, that will ruthlessly suppress any attempt at new plots against the rights of free people or against European peace.

Despite the use of the word "democratic" — a word which the

Kremlin applies to its own dictatorship, too — what is promised to revolting military men, Nazis and others is a strong, regimented régime. That's the *motif* of "law and order" we noted in the "Rhineland proclamation." What is apparently envisaged is a new authoritarian coalition composed of Prussian officers, ex-Nazis and national communists. Their "Eastern orientation," now as in the past, would be the cementing element; the fear of national annihilation by British and American conquerors would be the unifying force.

Russia, facing the colossal tasks of reconstruction, needs the support of German technical skills and German industry. It cannot regard the blotting out of that industrial might with the same equanimity as Americans or Englishmen do. Deprived of the backing of German industry, it would be too dependent on British and American economy, and thus at a disadvantage in the political maneuvering which Stalin foresees in the years ahead. There has been nothing in Stalin's behavior to indicate that he has relaxed his deep-rooted distrust of the Western "plutocracies," and it is not unnatural that he should want a Germany strong enough to act as a brake on them.

Such, in sketchy outline, are the Soviet aims for Europe. This does not mean that the Kremlin will not accept less. The Bolsheviks are opportunists in foreign affairs. Everything depends on the course of military events.

London as well as Washington foresee that in case the Allied armies, rather than the Red Army, act as the direct liberating force in the Balkans and Central Europe, the political weight of Russia will be reduced, and the cards will necessarily be reshuffled. The German officers and the Nazi dissidents to whom the Moscow manifesto is primarily addressed may be unable to "deliver," even if they should wish to act on Moscow's tempting offer. The fall of Hitler may bring with it such social convulsions that these groups will find themselves helpless; possibilities for popular action outside of extreme Rightist and communist elements may then be opened up.

But as an indication of Soviet political strategy and aspirations for the immediate future the aims here outlined cannot be ignored. British-American public opinion faces a decisive challenge. Their chances of success will be much greater if the American and British people comprehend the nature of the tasks and the difficulties.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Moscow's Responsibility

PERHAPS those commentators are correct who insist that America's participation in any international federation or alliance depends more on the decisions of the Kremlin than the decisions of the United States Senate.

Everyone is familiar with the fact that in Britain and the United States there are conflicting interests, contradictory tendencies and opposing viewpoints. Britain has her Tory imperialists, her conservatives, her liberals, as well as her trade unions, her Labor Party, and her socialists. Likewise in the United States there are reactionary, conservative, and liberal Republicans, New Deal and Bourbon Democrats, trade unions, socialists, and communists. In both countries there are isolationists and internationalists. There are those who advocate an inclusive federation of nations, and those who want an alliance with Britain. There are imperialists and anti-imperialists.

But in totalitarian Russia there is only one party, one opinion, one policy.

There is hope that in the western democracies the progressive forces will triumph. But this is impossible if they are paralyzed by the devious politics of the Soviet Government.

How paradoxical and ironic it will be if the "socialist fatherland" becomes the main obstacle on the road to internationalism and progress! Unfortunately the "revolutionary Soviets" have played such a role before. And now the territorial ambitions of Russia are obviously a threat to any plan for a new world order. Russian demands conflict with the aspiration of mankind for collective security through democratic self-determination of their destiny by all people, small and great. Rather the Russian expansionist plans conform to the old system based on fear, with military alliances and spheres of influence.

It is no wonder that the New York *Daily News*, ultra-reactionary sheet, praises "the realism" of the Soviet dictator and urges our statesmen to exercise the same hard-boiled realism. The New York *Herald-Tribune*, Republican apologist for neo-imperialism, supports *Pravda*'s assertion that the Soviet borders are no more a matter for discussion than the borders of the United States. Does the *Herald-Tribune* reflect American plans for an alliance with Russia in the struggle for world domination?

There is a very simple answer to the problem, advocated by Woodrow Wilson and approved traditionally by the American and British people: let the people of Poland, Latvia, Esthonia, Lithuania, Rumania, etc.—and, if Russia insists, the people of California and Texas—decide for themselves by democratic referendum whether or not they desire to be independent, or part of some other nation.

Soviet Russia argues that she must absorb these lands because she needs strategic frontiers and bases. Against whom? If against Germany, then why does Stalin declare that Germany must remain a strong military power after the destruction of Hitlerism?

Russian power politics may torpedo plans for permanent democratic peace. Russian demands violate the Atlantic Charter. All the forces of imperialism, reaction, militarism, will be strengthened throughout the world if Russian demands are granted. England and the United States will not have a progressive foreign policy if Russia does not.

If the tripartite conference in Moscow fails, it will mean only one thing, preparation for World War III. Soviet Russia must realize this. In her hands are the destinies of the war-weary people of the world. Russia carries a fearful responsibility—the future of peaceful development of civilization.

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Show the occasions on which the Soviet press has criticized the U.S. and Britain, in internal matters. Note the editorial in Pravda which said that American unpreparedness was due to the Republican Party. Note Varga's article in Information Bulletin, Nov 30, 1943, that American people are more interested in postwar reconstruction than in winning the war.

Memo re Nazifying tendencies on part of Soviets. Article by Alexander Werth re setting up series of Suvorov schools. Termination of co-educational schools - in future, relegation of women to home and accent on teaching them housewifely duties.

To this should be added the Soviet viewpoint on disarmament found in The Struggle Against Imperialist War and the Tasks of the Communists. Possibly also in the Program of the Comintern.

Russia's Educational 'Reforms' – A Step to a New Militarism

By SOLOMON SCHWARZ
Noted Russian Scholar

RECENT educational "reforms" in Russia afford some clue as to the kind of future the benign Soviet Government envisages for its people. These reforms do not pose the problem of education in general, but they affect some important details of the school system. The way they were handled indicates the "climate" toward which the Kremlin is striving, its policy in the field of education.

Coeducation has long been accepted as a progressive policy in many countries, and it was hailed as one of the triumphs of the revolution in Russia. In reporting that the coeducational system is being scrapped, American correspondents of the American press faithfully reflected the explanations given by Soviet officials for this quasi-reform. It is necessary, they declared, because of the differences in the development of boys and girls. Girls develop mentally more rapidly than boys between the ages of ten and thirteen; but between thirteen and sixteen, boys make faster progress. This is hardly an impressive argument.

In Moscow newspapers that reached here recently, this problem is dealt with in quite a different way and in its broader aspects. *Izvestia* of August 10 published an extensive article on *Separate Instruction in the Schools*, by A. Orlov, the head of the Moscow City Board of Public Education. In Moscow, the separate instruction of boys and girls, beginning with the fifth grade, *i.e.*, at the age of thirteen, was adopted during the last school year. In that way, Orlov asserts,

> "conditions have been created which are necessary for an adequate organization of the elementary and pre-military and physical training of boys and girls, because in the two cases the programs differ essentially."

Since September 1, 1943, the system of separate instruction, beginning with the first grade, came into force throughout the country in all the schools of the larger cities and industrial centers. For the time being, the system of coeducation will continue in small towns and in the country. Yet it is stated that "its historic role in the development of the Soviet school system is played out." Orlov writes:

> "At present the system of coeducational schools has begun to cause various inconveniences. Under this system it is impossible to pay heed to the peculiarities in the physical development of boys and girls, to their training for work, practical activities and military service. . . .
>
> "The elementary and pre-military and physical training must not only provide the youngsters with the knowledge of certain facts and ideas concerning the army's regulations, training system, supply service, armament, etc. It must also ensure the actual military education of our youth. This task can be accomplished only if our youth is imbued with the elements of military education from the time of early childhood. Therefore, separate instruction is being introduced in all elementary and high schools starting with the first grade. A program of pre-military and physical training and its adequate application is possible only under a system of separate instruction."

* * *

Military Education Predominant in Soviet Schools

IN plain words, *it is the military education from the pupils' "early childhood" that dominates everything else.* Accordingly, different programs are being developed even for "general" branches of instruction. In particular,

> "schools for boys must have a differentiated program for instruction in geography. The future fighter or commander must be capable of making use of maps unerringly, know topography, be able to orient himself by the use of maps and to apply a map to a terrain. . . ."

The "reform" has evidently caught the pedagogs by surprise. A great many teachers apparently have become nonplussed and terrified. The author of the *Izvestia* article tries to reassure them. Yet he himself is so much confused that his argument is almost humorous:

> "There is no intention of building a 'Chinese Wall' between the boys and girls, of making them stroll on different sidewalks. Only their instruction is to be separated. This is the crux. It should not be imagined that after the introduction of separate instruction there will be no intercourse between boys and girls. They will meet together in Pioneer Houses, in extra-school institutions, in theatres, at school parties, et al. Yet there is a definite danger that the essence of separate instruction has been misunderstood quite absurdly. This

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has become evident from several memoranda presented to the All-Russian Conference on Public Education when the problem of separate instruction was discussed."

Not only instruction but also the schools are to be separated even though "the peculiar local conditions will be taken into account."

"It would be an unforgivable mistake to plan the network of schools so that children would have to walk 3-4 kilometers to school. . . . If this becomes necessary in definite cases, it is quite possible to organize, with the permission of competent agencies, two schools, for boys and girls, in the same building, with separate head masters and staffs of teachers."

Military Schools Train Leaders For Post-War World

THE first step is the hardest. After the change in the system of education, still another "reform" measure was taken, *viz.*, the establishment of military schools bearing the name of Field Marshal Suvorov. This reform was announced on August 22. Moscow newspapers commenting on it have not yet reached this country. Yet the Moscow correspondent of *Newsweek* used the following excerpts from an article dealing with this significant reform in *Red Star*, the mouthpiece of the Red Army:

"Cadets will get not only a secondary education but also an elementary military education so that upon graduating from these schools they will become Soviet officers. The entire system of education will be organized in such a way that military principles will penetrate into the flesh and blood of the pupils from their childhood. The pupils will wear epaulets and insignia so that they should from their childhood get accustomed to them and feel love and respect toward a military uniform. The Soviet officer will consider it an honor that his sons should also be in the ranks of the Red Army."

These military schools will be established in nine cities: Maikop, Novocherkask, Astrakhan, Voronesh, Chuguyev, Kursk, Yelets, Kalinin and Stavropol. Boys of eight years and over will be admitted to them, preference being given to sons of those who in the ranks of the Red Army, guerilla units, etc., lost their lives fighting against Hitler's hordes. The students of these schools will live at the schools under a stern military regime. The schools will be headed by Major Generals. Each class will consist of four training sections of twenty-five each. Each section will be directed by an officer-teacher. An experienced soldier will assist him. Each summer four senior grades will go into camps.

The establishment of the Suvorov schools is one step more on the way to the creation of a professional officer caste in the Soviet Union. At the same time, it highlights the educational policy the Soviet Government envisions for the post-war period. This policy evidently aims at making militarism the bedrock of the school system. Its meaning can hardly be misjudged. It is the educational system of a government which is adopting the idea of an *armed truce* as the basis of its future foreign policy.

Clipped at the Seat of Government

Moslem Clergy In Soviet Asia Greet Stalin

(By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

MOSCOW, Oct. 24.—A congress of representatives of the Moslem clergy and faithful of Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenia, Kirghizia and Kazakhstan, held in Tashkent on Oct. 17, sent a message of greeting to Marshall Joseph Stalin, expressing the hope that the "Great Allah" would help him "in the realization of the great historic mission" that had fallen to his lot.

"At the beginning of the war of the peoples of the Soviet Union against Hitler Germany and her accomplices in Europe, the Moslem clergy in Central Asia and Kazakhstan called their faithful to the defense of their country and blessed them for the battle," the message said.

"Today we note with satisfaction that our fervent prayers have been heard by the Great Allah—under your supreme command the Red Army is clearing the Soviet soil of the enemy and is daily liberating dozens and hundreds of inhabited points and towns.

HISTORIC MISSION

"The convention of the Moslem clergy and faithful assures you that the Moslem clergy will in the future also, in prayers and sermons, call upon their faithful on the front and enroute to the front to exterminate the enemy ruthlessly by giving unstintingly of their strength, and if need be also their life.

"We are offering our ardent prayers to Allah and we wholeheartedly wish you good health and a long life. May the Great Allah help you in the realization of the great historic mission that has fallen to your lot in the liberation of your country and all the peoples of Europe oppressed by Hitler Germany. Amen."

The greetings are signed by leading Moslem leaders of the central Asiatic Soviet republics, among them the head of the Central Ecclesiastical Administration of Moslems in Ufa.

This is a clipping from page 2 of the Daily Worker for Oct. 28, 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Moscow Cheerful Over Conference

Moscow reporters see indications that Foreign Ministers Hull, Eden and Molotov and their aides have reached agreement on some of the questions before their conference and a successful conclusion to the meetings is expected in about another week.

An atmosphere of optimism reflected satisfaction with the progress made thus far by the conferees and it was reported that no major differences had arisen during the seven business sessions to last night.

One of the most favorable signs was said to be the fact that at no time has there been any necessity for one minister to mediate between any other two.

Radio Moscow disclosed that Secretary Hull was received yesterday by Premier Stalin. Hull has been reported resting between sessions in order to conserve his strength for working hours.

Russia

This is a clipping from page 8 of P M

for Oct. 26, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government

Soviet Paper's Text On 3-Power Unity

(By Cable to Inter-Continent News)

MOSCOW, Oct. 25.—In an editorial entitled "The Moscow Conference," the Soviet trade union periodical War and the Working Class declares that "no system of international security is conceivable without ensuring the unity of the principal, leading world states and that the preservation of this unity is indispensable for a firm lasting peace."

After a brief review of the factors which led to the present war, the Soviet journal stresses the importance of the Anglo-Soviet twenty year alliance, and the "quite important successes" in the collaboration between the Soviet Union and the United States despite the absence of a similar alliance between them. It says this collaboration must be strengthened "not only in the political and economic fields but in present conditions, also absolutely in the military field."

Declaring that the collaboration of the three powers is entering a new phase, with the formation of the Mediterranean commission and the Moscow conference, the editorial says that the conference "must remove no small difficulties" connected with the "further conduct of the war as well as for post-war world organization."

SEES HITLER'S HOPES CRUSHED

It expresses confidence that "the Moscow conference will live up to its important task, smashing calculations of the Hitlerites for prolonging the war, and displaying determination in this main, fully-ripe question."

It expresses the belief that the conference will unite "the efforts of the Allied countries on the basis of joint, friendly collaboration for solving the urgent military questions facing them and the post-war problems now arising."

The editorial follows in full. [This is the only complete text of the editorial to appear in any American newspaper.]

"As the possibility of the speedy defeat of Hitler Germany by the combined efforts of the Allied countries looms ever clearer, the peoples ever more persistently and frequently ask themselves: what prerequisites must be created today to insure, on the basis of victory over Hitler Germany, a firm and lasting peace and security for all peoples? What must be done now in order not only to win the war, but also to win the peace?

"These questions figure ever more frequently in widespread discussions in the democratic countries. Our thoughts naturally turn to the experience of the recent past. The two decades between the first and second world wars have given ample food for thought. How many times during the war of 1914-18 was it proclaimed that it was the last war which would be followed by an almost eternal, inviolable peace between nations and well-being on our sinful earth!

"Alas, these promises remained an empty phrase. For the second time in the life of one generation, the world was swept by the storm of war with even greater bloodshed and devastation.

"Following the first World War, much hope of securing a lasting

(Continued on Page 6)

This is a clipping from page 1 of the Daily Worker for Oct. 26 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Soviet Paper's Text On Unity

(Continued from Page 1)

peace was placed on the League of Nations. This organization inscribed on its banner the noble principles of peace and the security of peoples. At the same time, alongside and frequently even behind the scenes, intrigues were plotted against peace and new armed conflicts were feverishly prepared.

"It is now universally recognized that the League of Nations failed to justify the hopes placed in it. More than this, to a certain extent the League even weakened vigilance and led to the demobilization of the forces capable of defending peace by creating certain illusions of security remote from the real facts.

"Only the representatives of the Soviet Union steadily fought against the spreading of these illusions by those in the League of Nations who tried to weaken vigilance.

"One could naturally mention many reasons which ruined hopes for a lasting peace during the period following the first World War. However, the most important and decisive lesson of that period is clear. **Owing to a lack of unity among the major peace-loving powers, which could have become the bulwark of peace and security had they combined their efforts in this direction, the League of Nations proved helpless.**

"The facts in this respect are universally known. They are: withdrawal of the United States into an illusory shell of isolationism; a deliberate and consistent policy of artifical estrangement of the great Soviet power from participation in the decision of international problems; the policy of isolating the USSR, pursued by near-sighted politicians in the victor countries; the dissension and disagreement in the camp of the victor powers, primarily between Britain and France.

"Added to this, in the last few years separating from the present war, some great powers made attempts to buy off the aggressor by giving him a free hand in central and eastern Europe and inciting him against the USSR.

"It isn't in place here to probe into the causes and dig into the roots of these phenomena. Suffice it to recall that the German imperialist vulture took advantage of this to recover from the 1918 debacle, arm himself to the teeth, and prepare a new predatory adventure aimed at establishing domination over Europe and the world.

THE GREAT LESSON FOR PEACE

"If it is true that history is a great teacher of life, mankind cannot afford to ignore these sad lessons of the recent past. It is necessary to draw the proper conclusions from them. The most important of these conclusions consists, obviously, is this: **that no system of international security is conceivable without ensuring the unity of the principal leading world states and that the preservation of this unity is indispensable for firm and lasting peace.** This lesson has cost mankind streams of blood, incalucable suffering and destruction.

"This conclusion, unanimously arrived at by world public opinion, find its reflection in the public pronouncements and press of the democratic countries.

"From the scientific point of view it is indisputable that as long as modern society, with contradictions tearing it apart, exists, it would be utopian to count on an absolute guarantee against war.

"At the same time the vital interests of the nations demand the rejection of every kind of fatalism and a consistent, stubborn struggle for maximum measures to avert the danger of war, tie the hands of all possible aggressors, and render difficult, if not prevent, armed conflicts.

"Taking account of the experience of the past, the peoples of the world are already waiting for effective measures to establish a system of international security and lasting peace.

"In authoritative statements, the political leaders of the Allied countries have repeatedly stressed that the guarantee of international security is a lasting post-war agreement, primarily between Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and China which, drawing in other opponents of aggression, must act jointly to eliminate all possibilities of new armed conflicts in any part of the globe.

3-POWER UNITY

"Of decisive significance for much suffering Europe is naturally the question of securing lasting collaboration, primarily among the three powers heading the anti-Hitlerite coalition: **the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States which in conditions of the present epoch, have become the rallying center for all freedom-loving peoples.**

"True, there are some individual voices which sound a discord in the general chorus. For example, the opinion is sometimes voiced that the joint efforts of Britain and the United States are allegedly sufficient for creating a system of world security, that the isolated alliance of Anglo-Saxon powers is allegedly capable of taking the world's destiny into its own hands.

"There is no need to dwell on the negative aspect of such unilateral plans and calculations for world hegemony at the expense of the interests of other nations. Such plans, it is to be presumed, are not aimed at rallying the peoples against aggression.

"The peoples of the world, and especially of Europe, have paid dearly for the desire of individual powers to decide the destinies of the world. **And is the attempt to place the destinies of nations in the hands of an alliance of two united powers different in principle from the attempt to establish world hegemony of one power?**

"It would be entirely unrealistic to build various schemes for achieving world security while ignoring the historically formed, principal forces at present leading the struggle of the peoples against the bloody Hitlerite yoke. These

principal forces are the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States.

POLITICAL REALISM

"Does political realism permit, for example, in building such schemes, leaving out the United States, one of the greatest industrial countries of the world, with a powerful production apparatus ensuring the output of enormous mass industrial and agricultural products, with a high level of technique and a powerful war potential, with vast interests in the matter of strengthening its economic ties with other people of the world?

"Is it possible in projects of the future world to underestimate the British Empire which possesses tremendous economic and manpower resources, the biggest maritime power whose territory is scattered all over the globe, and whose interests demand political equilibrium in international relations?

"Is the post-war world organization, ensuring people's security and peaceful labor, conceivable without the active participation of the Soviet Union which comprises one-sixth of the globe, is the world's greatest land power and the most reliable bulwark of the policy of peace between peoples, and which now represents the great stabilizing political factor in Europe?

"Precisely the alliance of these powers leading the anti - Hitlerite coalition is naturally called upon to become the nucleus for rallying the nations of the world who are striving for lasting peace and security.

"The collaboration between these countries, resulting from the definite coincidence of their basic vital interests, originated in urgent necessity during the war, and its prime task is the defeat of the common enemy. This collaboration has already yielded indisputable positive results.

FOUNDATIONS FOR UNITY

"It is sufficient to recall such facts as the war supply deliveries and the extensive economic aid in general rendered by the United States and by Britain to the Allied countries, as Allied collaboration in Iran, the coordination achieved in the conclusion of the armistice with Italy and the creation of a military-political commission of the Allied countries.

"A solid foundation for collaboration between the Soviet Union and Great Britain was decided by the Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance. This agreement must serve as the political foundation for developing and deepening Anglo-Soviet collaboration.

"Between the Soviet Union and the United States there is as yet no such political agreement, as incidentally, there is not between Britain and the United States. Nevertheless, it cannot but be recognized that collaboration of the Soviet Union with the great North Atlantic republic has already achieved quite important successes.

"On the further successful development of collaboration of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States depends the positive solution of the most important problems of our day.

"This collaboration must be broadened and strengthened not only in political and economic fields but in present conditions, also absolutely in the military field. Precisely here, it must now be much more effective to frustrate the enemy's calculations for prolonging the war which is the last trump of the Hitlerite gamblers.

MUST BROADEN MILITARY AID

"Therefore military operations cannot be restricted by our Allies to air raids on Germany, which have their important significance, or as yet small scale operations in Italy. The inadequacy of this kind of Allied military operations from the point of view of the basic task — speeding the end of the war and the defeat of Germany—is more than obvious.

"The collaboration of the three powers is now entering in a certain sense a new phase in connection with the creation of the military-political commission of the allied countries and especially in connection with the conference of the representatives of the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States in Moscow.

"There is no need to point out the essential importance of the problems awaiting solution at the Moscow Conference which must remove no small difficulties involved here.

"As everybody understands it is a question of solving practical problems of cardinal importance primarily for the further conduct of the war against Hitler Germany as well as for post-war world organization.

"The paramount task is the real and urgent unification of all forces of the anti-Hitler coalition for hastening the end of the protracted war.

"The peoples who have been suffering for years under the yoke of Hitler tyranny, to whom the prolongation of the war would mean new incalculable sacrifices and suffering, are waiting for this.

"Hitler and his associates who are banking on prolonging the war, would like to prevent this.

"The Moscow conference will live up to its important task, smashing the calculations of the Hitlerites for a prolonged war, displaying determination in this main, fully-ripe question, uniting the efforts of the Allied countries on the basis of joint friendly collaboration to solve the urgent military questions before them and the post-war problems now arising.

Russians See Parley Unity

Russian optimism concerning the three-power conference in Moscow, has found voice in the authoritative *War and the Working Class*.

The magazine said collaboration has already entered a new phase. It asserted that the meeting of Hull, Eden and Molotov would shatter Hitler's plans for a long way by uniting the three powers in military, political and economic spheres, and referred to solution of "practical problems of paramount importance for the further conduct of the war."

Noting that the 20-year Anglo-Soviet alliance provided a strong basis for co-operation, but that there was no such pact with the U. S. A., the magazine said:

"One cannot but admit that co-operation between the Soviet Union and the great trans-Atlantic republic has already yielded important benefits. Such collaboration must be widened and strengthened."

This is a clipping from page 5 of P M

for Oct. 25, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government

Communists and Democrats In Europe's Underground

By Joseph Starobin

Russell Hill, the N. Y. Herald-Tribune correspondent in Cairo has been listening to various refugees from Europe, and in Friday's dispatch, he offers a summary of how the peoples of Europe feel today. Unlike other Cairo correspondents I can think of, Hill seems to have his eyes and ears open. And so is his mind. Yet his report on Europe broaches more fundamental problems than the correspondent himself may have realized.

Europe, he says, is in an "unqualifiedly revolutionary" mood. The terrible ordeal of the past four years has made all peoples ready for a change, a complete break with the past. People are bitter not only against Hitler, but also against their old rulers, the men who shared responsibility for bringing on the war.

"Any attempt by non-continental powers to repropose the economic and social system which existed before this war would be strenuously resisted," the correspondent declares.

TRIBUTE TO COMMUNISTS

He also reports, with a mixture of amazement and concern, that the Communist Parties of Europe have by no means been crushed, despite the fierce repression of these years and the many reorientations which events have forced these parties to make. He might have recalled that in eastern Europe—as well as Italy—the Communist Parties have faced not four, but almost 20 years of continual repression. But his tribute is nonetheless impressive.

After three years, he says "these Communist Parties, which one thought would never rise again, represent the strongest single organized force of resistance in practically every occupied country."

Now if the peoples of Europe are in an "unqualifiedly revolutionary" mood and the Communists are so strong, what about the future? Russell Hill is worried. And after talking to one of the Greek ministers, he comes to the conclusion that the Communists must abandon the "dictatorship of the proletariat," while the capitalist elements, whom he names as Mikhailovitch in Yugoslavia, Zervas in Greece, etcetera, must abandon capitalism. Everything will be happy if both groups work together on such a basis.

It is at this point that the Tribune correspondent mis-states the problem. And it is a dangerous mis-statement. The issue in Europe is not one of cooperation between the Communists and Mikhailovitch; and it is not one of abandoning capitalism on the one hand, or Communism on the other. Unless I am very wrong, that's not the way the real issue is posed in real life.

TWO SIDES

The first line of division among various European forces is between those who are fighting Hitler and those who are not. The deep hatred for Mikhailovitch in Yugoslavia has developed not only because he represents the old regime of Serbian landlords, but first of all because he hasn't done any real fighting to free Yugoslavia from Hitler. He stands by idly while the People's Army fights. And before long that leads him to cooperation with the enemy against the People's Army.

The same thing can be said of the Polish government-in-exile, whose chief crime remains that it refused to allow its major armed forces to fight for Poland in the only direct way that could have been done—alongside the Red Army.

The reason why the Communist Parties are strong in Europe is not simply because they are historically identified with a new social order, but because they are fighters. Because they pitched in to organize the salvation of their countries when it counted.

The second line of division in Europe is between those who would salvage the political regimes that helped bring on the catastrophe, and those who would not. Europe feels deeply about the traitors; Europe also feels that the future will have to bring forth new leaders from among those who did the fighting when the fight was at its hardest. In this respect Russell Hill is quite right. Any effort to restore the old regimes from the outside will lead to resistance within Europe.

The worst of the governments-in-exile are those which have the least connection with what is happening at home, and think that having switched to the Allied side after compromising their own countries, they can simply walk in after the show is over. The best of the exiled governments, such as the Czechoslovak, have pledged to submit all their acts to a review by the people at home immediately after the war. The most hopeful are those like the French Committee of National Liberation which was born out of the struggle, and is intimately linked with the resistance movement.

But notice that all this has nothing to do with the "dictatorship of the proletariat" or with the future of capitalism. The Communists don't renounce their beliefs in socialism; they simply say that the issue of liberating their homelands by the widest participation of the people is the all-embracing task of the moment. The question of socialism is today irrelevant.

And Communists don't judge other democrats, or other national forces from whatever class by their readiness to abandon their belief in capitalism. On the contrary, in most of eastern Europe, the capitalist stage—the stage of bourgeois democracy—has yet to be reached. All the Communists ask for is recognition of their right of participation in this common struggle of all forces that want their countries liberated. And this is not something yet to be accomplished. On the contrary, it is being accomplished every day in the week.

In France, Yugoslavia, Poland, Italy, Greece, Norway, Communists are already working side by side with non-Communists. The issue of capitalism versus socialism does not arise because it is not the real issue. And if the Communists are strong, it is not because millions already believe in socialism and are ready to put it into practice. It is because millions have learned that the Communists are fighters among the very best, in the major fight that faces everyone today—defeating the enemy and eradicating his traces from the earth. And so far as the European Communists are concerned this collaboration with non-Communists could very well proceed into the indefinite future. Not on the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialism, but on the basis of democracy and capitalism.

There is, therefore, no bogey of Bolshevism in the strength of the European Communists. That strength is, however, a guarantee that Hitlerism will be defeated, and that the peoples of Europe will have their self-determination. None of this should worry Americans since both aims are direct expressions of the Atlantic Charter.

And all this has a meaning for Americans beyond what Russell Hill seemed to realize. Americans will have to ask themselves whether our government's policy is in harmony with the "facts of life" in Europe or not. And this will be found to underlie our future relations with Soviet Russia. And if Europe has discovered that its liberation is speeded when Communists and non-Communists work together, there's something in that for Americans to learn also.

But these are things that need more discussion. At least we can thank Hill for bringing some of the European realities to a wider American audience. And if this audience thinks the thing through a little more deeply than Hill has, we'll all be making some progress.

Remarks

ing from the

1943

Seat of

U. S. Military Mission in Moscow Ends Embassy Friction

By United Press

MOSCOW, Oct. 25.—W. Averell Harriman began his duties as U. S. Ambassador yesterday following what members of the embassy described as a "housecleaning" which eliminated a situation that had embarrassed retiring ambassador Adm. William H. Standley throughout his administration.

Informants said that behind the announcement of the establishment of the U. S. Military Mission to Russia headed by Maj. Gen. John R. Deane there lay a story of intramural misunderstanding and disagreement, which led to a serious lack of cooperation among various departments within the embassy's jurisdiction.

The military mission is supplanting and combining the former offices for lease-lend and those of the Army and Navy attaches.

Disagreements among the departments of the embassy had reached such proportions during the latter part of Standley's ambassadorship that the Admiral was largely ignorant of the operations of lend-lease in Russia and was unable to obtain information from Brig. Gen. Phillip Faymonville, chief of the lend-lease supply mission. Lend-lease, the Office of the military attache, Brig. Gen. Joseph Michela, and other departments in the embassy, were operated as entirely separate units without exchanges of information, it was said.

Faymonville on one hand and Standley and Gen. Michela on the other not only did not exchange information and ideas with the Ambassador, but avoided all possible official and social contact, informants said.

Standley, it was said, received complete cooperation from Michela and the naval attache, Rear Adm. Jack Duncan, but the three of them were not able to work out any scheme of collaboration with Lend-Lease officers headed by Faymonville.

Standley's position with regard to Russian officials further was complicated by the fact that representatives of the President and other persons who arrived made contact with the Soviet officials direct rather than through the Embassy as is customary.

These visitors included Wendell Willkie, Brig. Gen. Patrick Hurley, the President's roving representative; former Ambassador Joseph E. Davies, and Harriman himself, who came here on Lend-Lease missions.

It was an open secret in Moscow that Standley resented the fact.

Deane's mission consists of three brigadier generals, a naval commodore, and a large staff of officers.

This is a clipping from page 5 of P M

for Oct. 25, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government

Gromyko's Speech For Allied Unity

Following is the text of the address of Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador to the United States, broadcast over the March of Time Thursday night:

My American Friends. Today I am very glad to convey to you the warmest greetings from the peoples of the Soviet Union. Recently, the great honor of representing the Union in Soviet Socialist Republics of this country as its ambassador has fallen to my lot; of serving the cause of mutual friendship and cooperation between two great countries of the world.

I hope that my words—friendship and cooperation—will be understood not as a mere diplomatic gesture and expression of diplomatic courtesy. I consider that friendship and cooperation between our countries and peoples are the expression of their basic interests. The progress of this war, our successes in the struggle against our common enemy—Hitlerite Germany and her satellites—and the price at which victory and peace are achieved, will, to a great extent, depend on how firm our friendship is, and how successful is the cooperation between our countries.

The firmer our friendship, and the more active the cooperation between our countries in military as well as other spheres, the sooner victory will be achieved, and the fewer will be the sacrifices necessary for the destruction of the enemy. Everyone knows what this decrease in sacrifices, necessary for achieving victory, means.

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The decrease in sacrifices means the decrease in destruction, by the Nazi barbarians, of the material and cultural values created by the efforts of the peoples in the course of centuries; it means the cessation of destruction of thousands of cities and towns in the countries and regions occupied by Hitlerite troops. It also means the preservation of hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of human lives, the sacrifice of which cannot be estimated in any kind of values.

The fruitful and working cooperation between our countries, as well as the cooperation among the United Nations as a whole, will help to draw nearer the liberation of enslaved epoples of Europe from the Nazi yoke, from want and from starvation. It will hasten the removal of the threat of Nazi enslavement which is hanging over the world.

What could be leftier and nobler than these aims to which the peoples of our countries, as well as the other freedom-loving peoples of the world are striving? The historic mission of our countries, together with the other United Nations, is the liberation from the fascist yoke of the French, Czech, Polish, Norwegian, Greek, Yugoslav and other oppressed peoples of Europe.

The fulfillment of this honorable historic mission of liberation demands the maximum exertion of strength, resources and energy on the part of the United Nations, and, first of all, on the part of the most powerful and most active members of the United Nations. The war has now entered a phase in which it is evident that ~~its course~~ has turned in favor of the United Nations.

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Millions of Nazi officers and soldiers have found their graves in the Russian steppes and rivers. After the defeat suffered by the Nazi troops at Stalingrad, further defeats in the Caucasus, the Rostov, Kharkov, Donbas, Smolensk and many other cities have followed.

At present, battles of exceptional

(Continued from Page 2)

severity are taking place at the Dnieper River, where the enemy is trying to hold ground at any price. The Nazi army has also suffered serious defeats from British-American troops in North Africa, Sicily, and southern Italy. Thus the enemy has already suffered many severe defeats from the armed forces of the powerful Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. As a result of the serious blows inflicted upon the enemy, his gang, created for the purpose of the plunder and enslavement of other peoples, has begun to disintegrate.

Germany has lost its main ally in Europe—Italy—whose decayed fascist regime fell apart like a house of cards after the first serious blows inflicted upon it by the British-American troops. All these successes have created a situation in which the correlation of forces between fascist Germany and her satellites on the one hand, and that of the United Nations on the other, has definitely changed in favor of the latter.

It would, of course, be unwise to underestimate the strength of the enemy. He still has at his disposal certain reserves, created to a great extent at the expense of the enslavement of other peoples.

This is a clipping from page 2 of the Daily Worker for Oct. 23 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

The stubbornness of the enemy is in proportion to the increasing hopelessness of his situation, but the irrevocable fact remains that the present strength of Nazi Germany is far weaker than that of the United Nations. Not only are she and her satellites weaker than the potential forces of the Allies—this was so at the beginning of the war—but she is greatly weaker than those real forces of the Allies which may be brought into action at any time. There is no doubt that the enemy will continue to resist stubbornly, to cling to every piece of occupied territory.

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Having lost hope in victory, he is using all efforts to prolong the war and thereby postpone his final defeat. He has tried, and will, doubtless, in the future, try to introduce dissension into the ranks of the Allies, to weaken their unity, to weaken the will of the peoples of the United Nations in this struggle. Needless to say, the Hitlerite enslavers would like, most of all, to see the absence of coordinated action on the part of the Allies.

But what is in the interests of the enemy is contrary to the interests of the United Nations, whose task it is to utilize to the utmost heir strength and resources for the infliction of coordinated blows upon the enemy. Speedy, decisive and coordinated action by the Allies against Hitlerite Germany and her satellites in Europe is not only the shortest road to victory but also the most economical one.

The confidence of the Soviet people in the possibility of a speedy victory over the enemy in the present military-political situation, favorable as it is to the Allies, did not originate in the quiet of studies. This confidence was born to the Soviet people on the field of battle, among the ruins of Stalingrad, in the fire of Orel, Smolensk, Kharkov, Poltava and other recaptured cities—in mortal struggle against the hated enemy. It was born after a number of temporary setbacks in the initial period of the war and as a result of the subsequent successes of the Red Army that have amazed the world.

A long and hard road has lain between the explosions of the first bombs, discharged by the Germans on the peaceful cities and triumphant sound of the cannon salutes in Moscow, announcing the liberation by the Red Army of still more cities and regions from the Nazi invaders.

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The faith of the Soviet people in victory over the enemy was forged in the fire of this great war of liberation of the Fatherland. The Soviet peoples estimate the strength and the weakness of the enemy. Their confiednce in the inevitability of victory has grown stronger, from a consciousness of the fact that they are not alone in this fight. They feel a moral as well as material support from the other freedom-loving countries.

In this fight the peoples of the Soviet Union are receiving support from the friendly American people in the form of military equipment and other supplies, for which support they are grateful and appreciative. At the present time this support is not limited to material support only. In the fight against the Nazi enslavers not only the supplies received from the United States and used by the Red Army men take part, but American troops in the Mediterranean theatre take part as well, having already distinguished themselves in battles against the common enemy.

In order to withstand the onslaught of the enemy, to stop him and then to launch counter-offensive operations, the greatest exertion of all the material and spiritual strength of the people was necessary. The hardships that the Soviet people had to suffer and are suffering to exceptionally severe and hard, as it fell to their lot to bear the main brunt of the fight against Hitlerite Germany and its satellites.

Every citizen of my country, whether in civilian dress or in military uniform, has given and is giving all his strength to the cause of defense of the fatherland. That particular exertion has made it possible for them to undermine, to a great extent, the strength of the enemy.

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In the course of the present struggle against the common enemy the foundations of a still more close and fruitful collaboration between our countries are being laid. The present common struggle has strengthened the ties between our peoples. Now these ties and friendship betewen our countries and our peoples are consolidated by blood, shed by their best sons on the field of battle.

Everybody knows that friendship born in the process of common struggle in the face of danger and in the course of severe trials is the firmer. Real friends make themselves known in misfortune, says an old proverb.

I should like to express my confidence that the ties binding our countries will grow stronger and stronger in the course of our mutual military efforts, and our cooperation will become more and more active and fruitful.

This is a clipping from
page_____ of the
Daily Worker
for_____
Clipped at the Seat of
Government.

Suggestions for Conversation in the Kremlin

POLITICS is not quite the game for sentimentalists. The success of Joseph (Stalin) Djugashivilli has in good part been due to a shrewd, hard-headed and calculating realism. He has his "ideals" and his "basic values," but he never permits their verbal forms and moral atmosphere to obscure his tasks and the movement of events.

One does not recommend "Stalinist" politics as a copy-book for Allied diplomats, but realistic understanding of modern history ought to be the least equipment the Americans and British are bringing to the conversations in Moscow.

Max Eastman, author of many books and articles on Soviet Russia, offers in this piece a few historical sidelights on the man whom Cordell Hull and Anthony Eden are facing across the table of state in the Kremlin. What is his political background? Is there a consistent theoretical line to his thinking? Why has there been so much misunderstanding of "the mystery man of Communism?" A few pointed footnotes for Americans abroad and at home may be found in Mr. Eastman's memorandum.

THERE is something pathetic in the eagerness of our statesmen to have a "personal interview" with Stalin. A year's intensive study of the works of Marx and Lenin, the history of the Bolshevik party and the Comintern, and Stalin's manifestoes and key-note speeches, would be worth a hundred conversations in the Kremlin.

Stalin's closest colleagues never know his specific intentions. His best friends couldn't find out whether they were going to be shot the next morning until the hand of the GPU dropped gently on their shoulders. How is Cordell Hull or Franklin Roosevelt going to plumb the world plans of this secretive schemer in a few tedious confabs through an interpreter? That is only one more in the long series of consolation pipedreams about totalitarian Russia.

But they could find out Stalin's general ideas, the attitudes of his mind, the conceptual frame-work in which he thinks, by doing some good hard work in a library. Or more simply, they could take along as conversational guide a man who really knows this world into which they are jumping abruptly, and with as little sense of its peculiar logic—the logic of Marxism-in-reverse—as Alice had in Wonderland. Here is a quotation from one of Stalin's key-note speeches which might form the subject of a fruitful conversation:

"We know from the history of Europe that every time treaties are made concerning the realignment of forces for a new war, these treaties are called treaties of peace. Treaties are signed defining the elements of a future war, and always the signing of such treaties is accompanied by a lot of noise about peace." (At the 14th congress of the All-Union Communist party, December 1925, stenographic report p. 15.)

* * *

Secret Clauses in Russo-Jap Treaty

A GOOD cram-tutor for American greenhorns visiting the Kremlin would be Boris Nicolaevsky, one-time head of the Office of Historical Revolutionary Records in Moscow, author of a hundred articles and editor of six volumes on the history of the Social Democratic movement in Russia, author also of a warmly human life of Karl Marx and a penetrating life of the Russian spy-revolutionist, Asev. He probably knows as much as anyone in this country of what needs to be known—including the inside aspect of a Bolshevik prison.

In a recent series of articles in "Novy Zhournal," Nicolaevsky pointed out that Russia's treaty with Japan in 1925 contained a secret clause not yet published, but described by Bessedovsky (head of the

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Soviet legation in Tokio the following year), as "a guarantee of Japan's rear in case of a conflict with America." An interview Stalin gave at that time to a correspondent of the Japanese newspaper, "Nichi Nichi," might become the topic of another fruitful conversation in the Kremlin. In reply to a question Stalin said:

"It is true that the Japanese people are the most advanced in the East, and are interested in the success of the movement for the liberation of the oppressed peoples. A union of the Japanese people with the people of the Soviet Union would be a decisive step in the cause of liberating the peoples of the East. Such a union would be unconquerable. . . . The colonial countries are the essential rear of imperialism. The revolutionizing of that rear cannot but undermine imperialism, not only in the sense that imperialism will be left without a rear, but in the sense that the revolutionizing of the East should give the final impetus to a sharpening of the crisis in the west. Attacked on two sides—from the rear and the front—imperialism will have to admit itself condemned to death."

* * *

A Warped View of the World

STALIN did not fail to throw out a hint in that interview as to the need of political change in Japan, and it can not of course be assumed that those are his present thoughts on Far Eastern questions. But those are *the terms in which he does his thinking* about such questions. No man is likely to change his basic concepts after his sixtieth year, and there is no evidence that Stalin has. He was always a Russian nationalist as well as a power-addict, and was so described by Lenin. But his nationalism only warped, it did not displace, his Bolshevik-Marxian view of the world.

Any pronouncement of Stalin on world affairs which does not contain such words as "imperialism," "finance capital," "monopoly capital," "colonial exploitation," "revolt of the colonies," "capitalist disintegration," "temporary stabilization of capitalism," etc., and which does not put the word "bourgeois" before the word "democracy," should be regarded by our statesmen as—at the best, a concession to their ignorance, a gracious condescension from the true, the esoteric doctrine—at the worst, a lure cast by a scientific fisherman in troubled waters. They should remember that Stalin was trained to regard them as the predestined dupes of the Historic Process, himself and his party as representing that Process in its triumphant self-understanding.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 21—Following is the prepared text of the address of Ambassador Andrei Gromyko, broadcast tonight:

My American Friends: Today I am very glad to convey to you the warmest greetings from the peoples of the Soviet Union. Recently, the great honor of representing the Union in Soviet Socialist Republics of this country as its ambassador has fallen to my lot; of serving the cause of mutual friendship and cooperation between two great countries of the world.

I hope that my words—friendship and cooperation—will be understood not as a mere diplomatic gesture and expression of diplomatic courtesy. I consider that friendship and cooperation between our countries and peoples are the expression of their basic interests. The progress of this war, our successes in the struggle against our common enemy—Hitlerite Germany and her satellites—and the price at which victory and peace are achieved will, to a great extent, depend on how firm our friendship is, and how successful is the cooperation between our countries.

The firmer our friendship, and the more active the cooperation between our countries in military as well as other spheres, the sooner victory will be achieved, and the fewer will be the sacrifices necessary for the destruction of the enemy. Everyone knows what this decrease in sacrifices, necessary for achieving victory, means.

Saving of Lives and Cultures

The decrease in sacrifices means the decrease in destruction, by the Nazi barbarians, of the material and cultural values created by the efforts of the peoples in the course of centuries; it means the cessation of destruction of thousands of cities and towns in the countries and regions occupied by Hitlerite troops. It also means the preservation of hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of human lives, the sacrifice of which cannot be estimated in any kind of values.

The fruitful and working cooperation between our countries, as well as the cooperation among the United Nations as a whole, will help to draw nearer the liberation of enslaved peoples of Europe from the Nazi yoke, from want and from starvation. It will hasten the removal of the threat of Nazi enslavement which is hanging over the world.

What could be loftier and nobler than these aims to which the peoples of our countries, as well as the other freedom-loving peoples of the world are striving? The historic mission of our countries, together with the other United Nations, is the liberation from the fascist yoke of the French, Czech, Polish, Norwegian, Greek, Yugoslav and other oppressed peoples of Europe.

The fulfillment of this honorable historic mission of liberation demands the maximum exertion of strength, resources and energy on the part of the United Nations, and, first of all, on the part of the most powerful and most active members of the United Nations. The war has now entered a phase in which it is evident that its course has turned in favor of the United Nations.

Nazi Defeats in Russia

Millions of Nazi officers and soldiers have found their graves in the Russian steppes and rivers. After the defeat suffered by the Nazi troops at Stalingrad, further defeats in the Caucasus, the Rostov, Kharkov, Donbas, Smolensk and many other cities have followed.

At present, battles of exceptional severity are taking place at the Dnieper River, where the enemy is trying to hold ground at any price. The Nazi army has also suffered serious defeats from British-American troops in North Africa, Sicily and southern Italy. Thus the enemy has already suffered many severe defeats from the armed forces of the powerful Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. As a result of the serious blows inflicted upon the enemy, his gang, created for the purpose of the plunder and enslavement of other peoples, has begun to disintegrate.

Germany has lost its main ally in Europe—Italy—whose decayed fascist regime fell apart like a house of cards after the first serious blows inflicted upon it by the British-American troops. All these successes have created a situation in which the correlation of forces between fascist Germany and her satellites on the one hand, and that of the United Nations on the other, has definitely changed in favor of the latter.

It would, of course, be unwise to underestimate the strength of the enemy. He still has at his disposal certain reserves, created to a great extent at the expense of the enslavement of other peoples.

The stubbornness of the enemy is in proportion to the increasing hopelessness of his situation, but the irrevocable fact remains that the present strength of Nazi Germany is far weaker than that of the United Nations. Not only are she and her satellites weaker than the potential forces of the Allies—this was so at the beginning of the war—but she is greatly weaker than those real forces of the Allies which may be brought into action at any time. There is no doubt that the enemy will continue to resist stubbornly; to cling to every piece of occupied territory.

Tells Efforts to Split Allies

Having lost hope in victory, he is using all efforts to prolong the war and thereby postpone his final defeat. He has tried, and will, doubtless, in the future, try to introduce dissension into the ranks of the Allies, to weaken their unity, to weaken the will of the peoples of the United Nations in this struggle. Needless to say, the Hitlerite enslavers would like, most of all, to see the absence of coordinated action on the part of the Allies.

But what is in the interests of the enemy is contrary to the interests of the United Nations, whose task it is to utilize to the utmost their strength and resources for the infliction of coordinated blows upon the enemy. Speedy, decisive and coordinated action by the Allies against Hitlerite Germany and her satellites in Europe is not only the shortest road to victory but also the most economical one.

The confidence of the Soviet people in the possibility of a speedy victory over the enemy in the present military-political situation, favorable as it is to the Allies, did not originate in the quiet of studies. This confidence was born to the Soviet people on the field of battle, among the ruins of Stalingrad, in the fire of Orel, Smolensk, Kharkov, Poltava and other recaptured cities—in mortal struggle against the hated enemy. It was born after a number of temporary setbacks in the initial period of the war and as a result of the subsequent successes of the Red Army that have amazed the world.

A long and hard road has lain between the explosions of the first bombs, discharged by the Germans on the peaceful cities and triumphant sound of the cannon salutes in Moscow, announcing the liberation by the Red Army of still more cities and regions from the Nazi invaders.

Soviet "Grateful" for Aid

The faith of the Soviet people in victory over the enemy was forged in the fire of this great war of liberation of the Fatherland. The Soviet peoples estimate the strength and the weakness of the enemy. Their confidence in the inevitability of victory has grown stronger, from a consciousness of the fact that they are not alone in this fight. They feel a moral as well as material support from the other freedom-loving countries.

In this fight the peoples of the Soviet Union are receiving support from the friendly American people in the form of military equipment and other supplies, for which support they are grateful and appreciative. At the present time this support is not limited to material support only. In the fight against the Nazi enslavers not only the supplies received from the United States and used by the Red Army men take part, but American troops in the Mediterranean theatre take part as well, having already distinguished themselves in battles against the common enemy.

In order to withstand the onslaught of the enemy, to stop him, and then to launch counter-offensive operations, the greatest exertion of all the material and spiritual strength of the people was necessary. The hardships that the Soviet people had to suffer and are suffering are exceptionally severe and hard, as it fell to their lot to bear the main brunt of the fight against Hitlerite Germany and its satellites.

Every citizen of my country, whether in civilian dress or in military uniform, has given and is giving all his strength to the cause of defense of the fatherland. That particular exertion has made it possible for them to undermine, to a great extent, the strength of the enemy.

Hails Basis of Closer Tie

In the course of the present struggle against the common enemy the foundations of a still more close and fruitful collaboration between our countries are being laid. The present common struggle has strengthened the ties between our peoples. Now these ties and friendship between our countries and our peoples are consolidated by blood, shed by their best sons on the field of battle.

Everybody knows that friendship born in the process of common struggle in the face of danger and in the course of severe trials is the firmer. Real friends make themselves known in misfortune, says an old proverb.

I should like to express my confidence that the ties binding our countries will grow stronger and stronger in the course of our mutual military efforts, and our cooperation will become more and more active and fruitful.

Russia

N.Y. Times
Oct. 22, 1943
p. 10

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

By Drew Pearson

Russia Edges Balkans

SOMETHING has happened regarding those two-fisted Yugoslavs, and the question of Allied recognition.

Two weeks ago, a spokesman of the War Department said that Allied gun-running up the Adriatic to guerillas in Yugoslavia would be in favor of the "Patriot" forces of Mikhailovitch, since he was the British-recognized leader of Yugoslav forces, and the Minister of War in the cabinet of the government-in-exile.

But today, the chief fighting is being done by the Russian-supported "Partisan" forces of "Drug Tito." An Associated Press staff writer, Daniel De Luce, was sent to the headquarters of the Partisans to cover the war, and Partisans headquarters have been set up in London as well.

Tito is a Croat who volunteered with the Spanish Loyalists and distinguished himself in the battle of Barcelona. Later he studied in Russia, presumably in the Comintern School. When the Germans attacked Yugoslavia, he organized the Partisans, and later offered to put his forces under the command of Gen. Draja Mikhailovitch, but the latter refused.

Whether it is the military feats of the Tito forces, or the political pressure of Moscow which has caused the switch, it is apparent that the Communist-led forces are now getting recognition. The British are still clinging to young King Peter, but there are many straws in the wind that the pro-Russian Yugoslavs will never let a King come back to the throne and that Russia will dominate the "Southern Slavs" of the Balkans.

WASH. POST. OCT. 21, 1943

3-Power Parley Opens in Moscow

By Henry Shapiro
(United Press Staff Correspondent)

MOSCOW, Oct. 19 (UP). — The long-awaited conference among the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union opened in Moscow today amid indications that the Soviet Union was hopeful the frank, realistic conversations would produce a solid foundation for military and political cooperation among the three great Allied powers, both during and after the war.

GREETED ENVOYS

MAXIM LITVINOFF

The meeting was opened formally this afternoon when Soviet Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov, strictly observing diplomatic protocol despite the extreme friendliness among the conferees, visited U. S. Secretary of State at the luxurious American Embassy, "Spasso House." He then visited Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden at the British Embassy.

A joint meeting of the three was to be held later in the day for the first broad exchange of views.

Hull and Eden, who arrived by airplane yesterday, conferred most

(Continued on Page 6)

Sign New Pact for Aid to USSR.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 19 (UP). — The State Department announced today, less than 24 hours after Secretary of State Cordell Hull's arrival in Moscow for the tri-partite conference, the signing of a new agreement under which the United States, Canada and Britain will supply the Soviet Union with food and war supplies.

Details were not revealed but it was reported the pact will mean increased supplies for the Red Army and the Soviet population, with additional fighter planes and bombers as well as a greater amount of wheat and other foodstuffs, machine tools and other strategic equipment.

3-Power Parley Opens in Moscow

(Continued from Page 1)

of the day with their respective staffs of experts preparing for the first session. The two visiting dignitaries also met briefly this morning but informed quarters understood there was no question of presenting a joint Anglo-American agenda for the conferences. It was understood each of the three ministers probably would present suggestions of his own government and then they would proceed to work out a joint program for discussion.

SECOND FRONT

The ministers, it was said, would endeavor to achieve an identity of views and discuss frankly and realistically every pertinent military, political and economic subject. It was indicated in the Soviet press during the past week that the issue of an Anglo-American second front in western Europe would take precedence over all other problems.

A meeting of Hull, Eden and Premier Joseph Stalin had not been arranged, it was reported, but it was believed one would be before the end of the conferences, which will be conducted with translators serving as intermediaries between the English and Russian-speaking leaders.

Simultaneous with the opening of the conference Soviet newspapers published a series of announcements regarding the activities of the Polish divisions fighting with the Red Army, one being an editorial in the government organ Izvestia saying that the Soviet Army is fighting for the Ukraine from "Kiev to Lwow." Lwow is in the part of eastern Poland, which became a part of the Soviet Union after the German invasion of 1939.

(London reported a broadcast over Radio Moscow by Deputy of the Supreme Soviet Boris Vedeneyev demanding that Germany pay for war damage done in the Soviet Union.

("Germany will have to produce to replace all that is necessary to rehabilitate the devastation," Vedeneyev said. "The extent of the indemnification for material damage must be such as to assure full restoration and further the development of the national economy of the Soviet Union. It will require much labor and effort to restore all the damage. It is just that Germany should have to make good the destruction of her hordes.")

This is a clipping from page 1 of the Daily Worker for Oct. 20, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Soviets Hint Firm Stand at Moscow Parley

The Moscow Conference was formally opened yesterday by Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov who paid visits to the U. S. and British embassies for separate talks with Secretary of State Hull and British Foreign Secretary Eden.

A joint meeting of the three was to be held later in the day.

Dispatches from Moscow said it was understood that Hull and Eden would not present a joint Anglo-American agenda for the conferences, but would present the views of their respective governments. Hull and Eden met briefly during the morning and each held conferences with their own staffs in preparation for discussions with Molotov.

Indications in the Soviet press that there were at least three points on which the Russians would refuse to retreat were discussed widely in London and Washington:

¶ Moscow newspapers still insisted that the second front problem would get priority at the conference.

¶ An editorial in *Izvestia* saying that the Red Army is fighting for the Ukraine from "Kiev to Lwow" was taken to mean that Russia would not discuss restoration of the old Polish borders. Lwow is in part of Eastern Poland taken by Russia in 1939.

¶ A Moscow radio broadcast declared that the Germans must pay with the last cent and last ounce of labor for war damage done in Russia.

This is a clipping from page 9 of P M

for Oct. 20, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government

Russia Not Planning For World Spread Of Communism, Says Speaker

Stalin is a nationalist, without Trotsky's fervor for international revolution and any fear of Russia on the ground that it contemplates extending Communist rule over the world can be dismissed as groundless.

That was the declaration of Dr. Hubert Phillips, professor of social science of Fresno State college, long a close student of Russian affairs, speaking at the Adult Center public forum in the Horace Mann school last night on the question "Need the World Fear Russia?"

Russia, rebuffed by her allies of the united nations and for that reason charting a course of her own in the international field, Dr. Phillips declared, might well occasion alarm in the future. Such a situation might arise, Dr. Phillips emphasized, "if the united nations do not show a spirit of full cooperation both during and after the war"; "if there is any alliance, open or secret, against Russia"; "if the united nations are tempted to leave any of the roots of nazism in Europe because of their fear of communism" or "if the united nations seek to crowd out the leftist parties in Germany and her satellites when these countries set up post-Hitler governments."

Of Russia's contribution to the war against the axis, Dr. Phillips declared in his judgment that had it not been first for the magnificent defense of the Russian armies against Hitler's troops, and next its amazing offensive strength, Britain would have been defeated "and the United States alone would be battling for its existence against axis attacks from both oceans."

Dr. Phillips emphasized in conclusion that Russia, like her allies in the united nations, is interested in security "for despite her vast resources and territory, Russia has learned that even her very existence can be threatened in a world of anarchy and strife." Russia, like her allies, Dr. Phillips said, wants some kind of an international organization capable of providing that security "to which all nations may adhere without conforming to any particular pattern as to their domestic economy."

The session was the second in a series of three devoted specifically to Russia on the general theme "Russia, Britain and the United States—Can They Create a Better World?" George J. Rony, Russian-born motion picture director and producer, speaks next Monday night on "Russia in the World of Today and Tomorrow."

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Lad
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

Private file

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ALLIES TO SWELL SOVIET LEND-LEASE

U. S., Britain and Canada to Sign Protocol Today Calling for Staggering Increase

3

By JAMES MacDONALD

By Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, Oct. 18—A protocal will be signed in London tomorrow extending the lend-lease agreement between the United States, Britain, Canada and Russia whereby the U. S. S. R. will receive tremendous supplies of implements of war and foodstuffs, it was reported in reliable quarters here today.

In furtherance of the Allied desire to strengthen the Russians so that they will continue winning sweeping victories over the Germans and thereby help to bring about the speediest possible finish of the war the new protocol will provide for substantial increases in the amount of the supplies to be sent to Russia and it is believed that the total will be over a billion dollars.

Among these supplies will be planes, principally fighter machines, but a number of bombers also. Also the Russians will get many hundred tons of wheat from Canada to avert a possible food shortage this winter, together with fats and tinned foods. They will also get machine tools and such raw materials as copper, tin, nickel and aluminum, of which they stand in much need.

Provisions in Reverse

The protocol, it was said, will contain provisions for Lend-Lease in reverse from Russia. These provisions will merely reiterate the principle that so far as possible Russia, like the other Lend-Lease signatories, will meet the requirements of the other partners to the agreement and that Russian deliveries will be determined as needs arise.

The protocol will be signed by Ambassador John G. Winant for the United States, by Oliver Lyttelton, Minister of Production, for Britain, by Fedor Guseh, the new Soviet Ambassador to Britain and by a Canadian official whose name could not be learned today.

The fact that the extended Lend-Lease agreement will be signed here at this time was mailed today as all the more significant on account of the Moscow conference.

Also protocol comes at a time when convoys carrying supplies to Russia via the historic North Cape to Murmansk must be about to be resumed.

With the closing in of the long northern nights of pitch darkness under the cover of which Allied merchant vessels and their naval escorts have greater safely in eluding enemy submarines, surface craft and spotter planes, these lifelines of supplies to Russia will undoubtedly soon be re-established if they have not been done so already.

Vast Shipments Sent

The lend-lease agreement with Russia was signed in Moscow on Oct. 1, 1941 and the second one in Washington in Oct, 1942.

Since October, 1941, the United States alone has sent Russia supplies worth approximately $2,444,000,000 up to June 30 this year. In 1941 shipments were valued at $545,000. Those of 1942 amounted to $1,349,170,000 and those for the first six months of this year to $1,887,951,000.

Moreover, up to June 30 this year the United States lend-lease shipments everywhere — USSR, Britain, Africa, the Middle East, the Mediterranean theatre, China, India, Australia, New Zealand and other areas reached the staggering sum of $4,262,448,000.

This is a clipping from page 3 of the New York Times for Oct. 19 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

New Lend-Lease Pact to Oil the Gears at Moscow

It's Expected to Improve Atmosphere for Momentous Talks

By Frederick Kuh

(Copyright, 1943, by Chicago Sun and Field Publications)

LONDON, Oct. 18.—An important four-power lend-lease agreement among Russia, the U. S. A., Great Britain and Canada will be signed in London tomorrow, almost simultaneously with the opening of the three-power conference in Moscow.

The new lend-lease pact is expected to improve the atmosphere for the momentous political and military talks in the Kremlin.

Hull and Eden are expected to have arrived in Moscow with their staffs.

Owing to the growing emphasis Russia is placing on the strategic aspect of the negotiations, special interest is attached to the news from American quarters that Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, of the U. S. Army Air Corps, is accompanying Hull as the American military delegate to the conference. This clearly points to the major role expected to be played by aerial warfare. He, presumably, is the opposite number to Maj. Gen. Sir George Hastings, Churchill's military adviser, who will be at Eden's side in Moscow.

Signatories to the new lend-lease protocol will be John G. Winant, U. S. Ambassador to England; British Minister of Production Oliver Lyttelton, the new Soivet Ambassador to Britain Feodor Gusiev, the Soviet trade representative Dmitri Borisenko and a Canadian representative, possibly High Commissioner Vincent Massey, brother of the actor Raymond Massey.

Increase in Supplies

The agreement, which provides for a substantial increase in supplies to the Soviet Union, covers the period until July 1, 1944.

The most conspicuous feature of the Lend-Lease accord is the striking growth of Canada's contribution to Allied supplies for Russia, especially wheat.

The principal item of our deliveries to the USSR will be fighter planes, but we will also be providing great numbers of bombers and tanks. Foodstuffs that we are sending to Russia beside wheat, are fats, concentrates, and preserves.

The pact declares that the Soviet Government will deliver to the United States, Britain, and Canada what is required as far as possible in return for lend-lease. Russian deliveries are to be discussed as need arises. The USSR will provide the U. S. A. with manganese ore, timber, asbestos, platinum and other materials.

Signing Delayed

This protocol was originally intended to be signed early in July, but it is officially emphasized that the three and a half months' delay which was due to technical factors, did not affect the flow of supplies.

The first lend-lease agreement with Russia was signed in October, 1941, in Moscow and the next one, October, 1942, in Washington.

Stalin, meanwhile, has designated a new Ambassador to the exiled Allied governments, excepting Poland with which Russian relations remain broken. He is middle-aged, suave Ivan Lebedoff. He replaces Alexander Bogomoloff who arrived in Algiers lately with numerous staff members, as envoy to the French Committee of Liberation.

This is a clipping from page 8 of P M

for Oct. 18, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government

Russia

DISCIPLINE FEATURE IN SOVIET SCHOOLS

Respect for Authority Said to Be the Most Important Phase of Training

ARMY ANGLE SECONDARY

Plans for Next Year Call for More Specialization for Boys and Girls

29

By RALPH PARKER

By Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, Oct. 16—The most notable features of recent developments in the educational field in Russia are the measures providing for separate schools for boys and girls in urban districts, the appointment of military experts to conduct drills and preconscription classes, the drive to improve the teaching of Russian history and foreign languages and the launching of a resolute campaign to improve discipline and conduct.

Coeducation was introduced in 1918 and played an important part in the Soviet schools' development. More than half the pupils in schools and universities last year were girls. But it was pointed out that coeducation had made it impossible to make due allowances for the different physical development of pupils, thus handicapping the preparation for participation in practical military activities. During the past six months as a result of separating the boys and girls, pupils became better organized and more homogeneous in their interests. During 1944 it is intended to adopt different programs for boys and girls, the secondary education of boys specializing on technical subjects so that, in the words of one authority, on leaving school the boys will know how to repair simple electrical installations and household articles and read maps, while the girls will be trained in such subjects as pedagogy, handicrafts, domestic science, personal hygiene and the care of children. The new programs also are expected to pay more attention to Russian history and classical literature.

It is stressed here that the new measures are in no way intended to create a barrier between the sexes and some school activities which form an important feature of Soviet education will continue to run along mixed lines. It should be remembered that the war interrupted the vast national building program and that in the future Russian women will find in improved homes a wider scope for domestic virtues.

This is a clipping from page 29 of the New York Times for oct. 17 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Welles Urges Soviet Tie, Praises F.D.R.

(By United Press)

Sumner Welles, former Under-Secretary of State, declared today that a stable post-war world cannot be achieved unless Britain, the Soviet Union, China and the United States immediately reach a mutual agreement and set up a United Nations Executive Council to decide political questions.

Welles, addressing the Foreign Policy Association in his first speech since his resignation, urged the executive and legislative branches of the government "boldly to assume leadership by urging the adoption of that policy which in its considered judgment will most fully respond to the need of our nation for security, social progress and prosperity in the post-war years."

"In none of the foreign wars in which we have been engaged since we won our independence have the determination of military strategy and the direction of our armed forces been so brilliantly successful," said Welles, "as in the case in the present struggle under our Commander-in-Chief and the great military, naval and aviation leaders to whom he has entrusted authority."

URGES SOVIET TIES

At another point, Mr. Welles declared of President Roosevelt that "the people look to him once more for that inspired leadership of which he is so supremely capable, and of which he has given such convincing evidence on so many occasions in the past."

Praising our closer relations with the British Commonwealth and with China, the former Under-Secretary of State said:

"What we must imperatively strive to secure is that same full measure of understanding with the Russian people and their government. I know of no point where the long-range interests of the Soviet Union are antagonistic to our own. Certain measures of far-reaching significance recently enacted by the Soviet government have done much to facilitate mutual comprehension. Reciprocal recriminations and the engendering of popular suspicions can only be beneficial to our common enemies. Both peoples can in their own interest best afford to emphasize the many points of accord between them, and minimize such differences as may appear still to exist. In that spirit I am confident that agreement can be found."

"We have lived and are living in a rotten world," Welles said. "We are now paying the penalty for the lack of courage and of intelligence of which we and all other nations have been guilty.

"Only by handling the old structure roughly, only by conquering our inertia, only by daring to venture on to new ways, can we hope to see a better day."

Russia

THE WORKER, OCT. 17, 1943 P. 1

2nd Front Key to Parley—Izvestia

MOSCOW, Oct. 16 (UP) — The Soviet Government organ Izvestia, on the eve of the tripartite conferences, hinted strongly today that a "Second Front" in Western Europe was necessary to any successful agreement among the Allies on post-war problems.

In an editorial entitled "on the eve of the Moscow conference," Izvestia said:

"The solution to post-war problems can only be successful on the condition that everything has been done politically, militarily and economically to bring about a speedy termination of the war. . . . Undoubtedly the problem of decisive shortening of the duration of the war and achievement of victory within the shortest time is organically connected with the problem of opening a second front in Western Europe."

Izvestia warned that the Germans were planning to delay the end of the war as long as possible to "create for the Allies difficulties arising from a prolongation of the war." Therefore, it said, the main task of the Allies now was to knock the weapon of time from Adolf Hitler's hands and deal a crushing and decisive defeat to the Nazis.

Indicating that the USSR was willing to cooperate with the other Allied nations on war and post-war problems, Izvestia said "if there is agreement on the primary problems brought about by the course of the war it will be easier to decide all other urgent problems. The Hitlerite camp fears the Moscow conference."

CITES COORDINATED EFFORTS

The editorial cited the Italian armistice, the creation of a Mediterranean Commission and the increasing economic cooperation exemplied by the recent Hot Springs Food Conference as three major examples of coordinated Allied action on problems arising from the war.

(Continued on Page 2)

(Continued from Page 1)

"There is a need to discuss great problems arising from our common struggle," the newspaper said. "There is necessity for coordination of views of action. Those problems pertain to various aspects in the conduct of the war. Naturally, there are problems of post war settlement which are of great importance to the Allied countries and one should prepare for decisions on many such post war problems, especially in the political and economic fields."

Izvestia said the post war period should be preceded by "more or less coordinated conduct of the war and victorious termination of the war.

. . The main characteristic of the present international situation created by the Red Army's successful offensive and growth of allied military power and successes brings to the forefront the most vital and important of problems for all nations—the problem of the duration of the war. . . .

". . . The military and political situation is favorable for our Allies. Not to take advantage of it would mean taking upon oneself the political responsibility for great sufferings to tens of millions of people, for prolonged disorganization of the political and economic life of the whole world."

This is a clipping from page 1 of the ~~Daily~~ Worker for Oct. 17, 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Eugene Varga, outstanding Soviet economist and analyst was equally contemptuous of the capitalist system. He is the author of a study of the manner in which the Sovet Union and otheroccupied countries can be paid for the damage done by the Hitlerite forces.

He is of the belief that the Soviet Union, due to its particular type of economy should be paid in kind, and in this connection he asserted;

"For the Soviet Union, with its planned economy under which no discrepancy between production and consumption is possible and the supply never exceeds the demand - with the consequence that economic crises are out of the question - it would be positively desirable to receive compensation for damage done not in the form of money but of goods."

With reference to Britain and the United States however, he was of the opinion that;

"Great Britain and the United States, who will not necessarily depend on deliveries in kind for the restoration of their economy, might have their reparations claims satisfied partly by the transfer to them of the foreign investments of the aggressor countries."

Information Bulletin, Embassy of USSR, Nov 30, 1943, p. 6.

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1943

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Initial	Indicate index references
See me	
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SUPERVISOR

The reasoning in the attached clipping follows implicitly that used by the Comintern in 1928, when it asserted;
"Just as the world war of 1914-1918 led directly to the victorious proletarian revolution in the former Tsarist Empire, to the development of the liberation movement in the colonies and to uprisings and revolutionary mass movements among the European proletariat, so that a new war will rouse a might revolutionary movement that will embrace the industrial workers of America, the broad masses of peasants in agrarian countries and the millions of oppressed peoples of the colonies."(The Struggle Against Imperialist War and the Tasks of the Communists, p. 7.)

to the victory of revolution in one or several countries."

From Socialism To Communism In The Soviet Union, by Joseph Stalin, International Publishers, page 12.

Addressing the 17th Congress of the C.P.S.U. in 1934, Stalin warned that a second war

"... will certainly unleash revolution and put in question the very existence of capitalism in a number of countries, as was the case in the course of the first imperialist war."

Again he declared in the same speech;

"As is well known, during the first imperialist war it was intended to destroy one of the Great Powers, viz., Germany, and to profit at her expense. **** But instead, they got the smash-up of capitalism in Russia, the victory of the proletarian revolution in Russia and - of course - the Soviet Union. What guarantee is there that the second imperialist war will produce 'better' results for them than the first? Would it not be more correct to assueme that the opposite will be the case?

Stalin Reports, International Publishers, 1934, p. 18.

Again in the same speech he asserted;

"It can hardly be doubted that a second war against the U.S.S.R. will lead to the complete defeat of the aggressors, to revolution in a number of countries in Europe and in Asia, and to the overthrow of the bourgeois-landlord governments in these countries."

Ibid, p. 21.

Again on March 10, 1939, addressing the 18th Congress of the C.P.S.U. Stalin declared;

"... the first imperialist world war led to the victory of the revolution in one of the largest countries."

He suggested that

"... the second imperialist world war may also lead

"Imperialism, the monopolist stage of capitalism, sharpens all the contradictions of capitalism..."

The Struggle Against Imperialist War and the Tasks of the Communists, p. 9.

The Soviet trade union journal THE WAR AND THE WORKING CLASS discusses Harry Hopkins' article in the AMERICAN MAGAZINE.

The article below appears in the current issue of The War and the Workng Class, Soviet trade union magazine. The article appears under the title: "Regarding the Duration of the War," and discusses Harry Hopkins' article in the October American Magazine.

MOSCOW *(By Wireless)*

HARRY Hopkins, who is known as an active champion of the United Nations' cause, recently wrote in the **American Magazine** an article on the prospects of the war. The author undoubtedly has the right to take exception to those who are inclined to underrate the enemy's strength and who expect an "easy victory," by air bombardment alone for instance.

However, from the correct assumption that the enemy is still strong, the author draws the conclusion that the Allies are still faced with at least two years of heavy fighting on the world war fronts. This view of the author is also shared by American military circles.

"I assume," he writes, "that we will achieve victory in 1945 over both Germany and Japan. I do not regard this as too long a period for such victory."

Thus, according to Hopkins, the war in Europe will last at least six years. He does not find this period too long, taking into consideration the difficulties of fighting against such a tenacious enemy as Hitler Germany.

Other Aspects Of the War

We regard this viewpoint as reflecting a rather one-sided approach to the matter. Of course from the narrow military and technical standpoint a war conducted in such a way, where the training of big armies possessing unparalleled numerical and technical superiority proceeds calmly and without haste and where only after this training do these armies embark on decisive battles against the enemy, may seem most attractive. It is possible that viewed from this angle another two years is not such a long period.

However this picture of the future course of the war fails to cover certain other aspects which are just as important under conditions of protracted war. War is not only a titanic clash of war machines. War is fundamentally a social and political phenomenon, and the present war has set in motion many tens and hundreds of millions of people throughout the world; it has radically changed the conditions of their existence, forcing them to think and act differently.

War sharpens the contradictions existing in modern society; it aggravates them and calls forth new, acute political processes which further sharpen as the war drags out. This aspect naturally cannot be discarded when discussing the perspectives of the war, and especially the question of its duration.

The Viewpoint Of the Soviets

The standpoint of the Soviet Union concerning the duration of the war is quite clear. For the third year now our country has been engaged in mortal struggle against almost the full weight of the Hitler war machne. The richest areas of the Soviet Union have been subjected to monstrous devastation by Hitler's plunderers, and a considerable part of our territory is still in their hands today.

Every day of the war takes its toll in lives of Soviet people and causes no small damage to our country. Is any further proof necessary to show that the Soviet Union is vitally interested in speeding up victory and in preventing the war from being drawn out!

But how does the matter stand from the viewpoint of our Anglo-American Allies? Can it be assumed that they are more or less indifferent as to how long the war will last and that their policy regarding the duration of the war is connected with no negative aspects whatsoever? Of course not.

Among a number of consequences arising now from a protracted war, particular note should be taken of the fact that the relations between the military and political factors determining the course and outcome of the war inevitably change to the degree the war is protracted. The longer the war lasts the greater significance is attached to the political factors as compared to the purely military factors.

Experiences of the First World War

The military factors are the operations of armed forces under full control of their governments, while the political factors, that is the complicated and contradictory social processes, are to a lesser extent subject to the control and influence of the governments of the belligerent countries. This assumption is fully legitimate. It is borne out by the entire experience of the annals of past wars.

Let us recall the experience of the First World War. That war lasted for more than four years. What did the protraction of the war lead to at that time? One of the most important results of the First World War and the political crisis connected with it was the utter collapse of the Tsarist empire in Russia which took place in the third year of the war and which brought about vast changes in the system of international relations.

Eight months after the overthrow of Tsarism, when the war was still in progress and the political crisis had grown more acute, the October Revolution brought into being a state of an altogether new type—a Soviet State of workers and peasants, which is now the greatest bulwark of the peoples in their struggle against fascism.

What Poincaire and Lloyd George Said

As is known, the world-historic events in Russia were by no means the only consequences of the political crisis caused by the war. Other countries, too, especially those which suffered defeat in the war, were shaken by great upheavals. Under the influence of a protracted war and the obvious inability of the German army to offer further resistance, Germany's home front caved in even before the armies of the victorious countries entered her territory.

Irrespective of how the developments in Germany, Italy, Hungary and throughout central Europe at the end of the First World War and during the transition from war to peace are viewed, one thing is beyond doubt—these events were pregnant with very serious consequences both in the sphere of international political and economic relations.

Of course, unwise people found dubious consolation in ascribing the actions of the popular masses, who had been reduced to despair, to the intrigues of "malicious agi-

Exactly as Stalin argued in 1934 in "Stalin Reports" p. 15-21

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tators"; everywhere they looked for the insidious "hand." But did this affect the outcome in any way?

Moreover the protraction of the war led to an extremely tense internal political situation and the aggravation of social relations in the victor countries as well. Recall the state of affairs in France. Already in the summer of 1917, that is at the end of the third year of war, the indignation behind the lines and at the front at the protracted nature of the war reached such a scale that the French Government found itself in a very difficult position.

It is not for nothing that Poincare in his memoirs calls 1917 a "year of unrest." In his diary recordings of mass strikes and unrest alternate with notes about mutinies and mass shootings at the front.

Characterizing the situation in the same year of 1917 in Britain, Lloyd George wrote: "When reflecting on the ever increasing violence of the struggle, the ever remoter prospect of peace and . . . the provocative attitude of the employers, you were surprised not so much by the disturbances that are widespread in the country but at the very fact that they did not develop on a wider scale."

More Countries Now Involved

And Winston Churchill, describing the situation at the end of the war, characterized it in the expressive words: "So many strange things have happened, the collapse of established systems has been so terrible, the peoples have suffered for so long that every state organization has been shaken as if by an earthquake."

Let us now turn to the present war. More countries are participating in this war than was the case in the war of 1914-1918. This war is truly global. It is beyond dispute that the violence and destructive power of the present war is greater than in the war of 1914-18. Finally it should be borne in mind that it is already longer than the First World War.

In these circumstances can anyone doubt that every extra day and month of the war adds to the tension of the social atmosphere in the countries involved in the vortex of the war, above all in the countries of Europe?

Hunger and epidemics, plunder, desolation, injustice and bloody terror unleashed by the invaders —such is the terrible daily lot of tens of millions of people in the countries under the heel of Hitler tyranny. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, France and Belgium, in Holland, Norway, Denmark, Yugoslavia and Greece the peoples are undergoing incredible suffering and torments, which are giving birth to boundless hatred, despair and wrath.

This can be seen not only from the heroic struggle of the Yugoslav partisans, from the popular vengeance wreaked on the Hitler butchers in Poland, France and Holland, but also from the example of "peaceful" Denmark.

Discontent Among Axis Satellites

Naturally the peoples of the Hitler occupied countries are striving to liberate themselves from the yoke of the German fascist invaders. The peoples of the Soviet Union, who are experiencing exceptionally severe trials, readily appreciate this desire of the occupied countries to lessen the duration of the war and put an end to Hitler tyranny.

At the same time discontent is mounting in the countries allied to Germany at the protracted nature of the war, and particularly in connection with the increasingly new military defeats suffered by Hitler and his satellites. This is strikingly reflected by the events in Italy where the masses of the people are burning with a desire to get out of the war. Only the Hitlerites, who have lost all faith in victory, can be interested in prolonging the war.

Harry Hopkins undoubtedly is right when he points out that the Nazis are displaying considerable stubborness in the struggle for their existence. He writes: **"They fear the angry masses of Europe, the wrathful Russian people and the just punishment of the United Nations. Yes, they have every reason to fear this. It is possible they no longer believe in victory, but they are hoping for a long, drawn-out war and compromise."**

But one cannot rest at this. The calculations of the German fascists on drawing out the war, in which they see their last sheet anchor, must be frustrated. The Nazis continue to bolster themselves up and are still trying to derive joy from the difficulties of their enemy.

Recently the **Berliner Lokalanzeiger** in an article entitled "Whom Is Time Working For?" wrote: "The prolongation of the war intensifies more and more the hunger and ruin in the countries controlled by Britain and the United States at present, as for instance in the Near East, North Africa and India."

Allies Can Give The Knockout Blow

But this malicious gloating is merely an attempt to conceal the alarm and fear felt by the Hitlerites at the approaching hour of there reckoning. Only recently the Hitlerites believed in victory and were winning military successes. Al this is now a thing of the past.

As a result of the major successes of the Red Army expressed in the mighty offensive along the whole of the Soviet German Front, from Smolensk to the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, and following the big successes of the Anglo-American troops in the Mediterranean theater, which ensured the landing operations of Allied troops on the territory of Italy, the military situation of Hitler Germany has fundamentally changed for the worse. Naturally the Nazis are now looking for a way out by prolonging the war and speculating on the sharpening political crisis in Europe.

Meanwhile the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States, who constitute a powerful, political and military coalition, today possess enormous military resources, the biggest armies and all the necessary arms to prevent the enemy from prolonging the war. The Allied countries now possess the prerequisites to decisively shorten the war, using for this purpose all the military factors at their disposal with maximum effect. It is now only a question of corresponding positive decisions.

The greatest interest of the peoples of the Allied countries today is that the question of shortening the war be solved in practice by those upon whom it depends, and that there be no further procrastination on this question. The solution to the question of shortening the war is the urgent common affair of the Allied countries.

(By Inter-Continent News)

Where the News Ends

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

Cooperation With Stalin? (II)

LONG RANGE cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union depends on finding mutually satisfactory answers to three sets of questions, concerning Russia's post-war boundaries in Europe and Asia, concerning the aims of Soviet influence beyonds those boundaries and the methods by which those aims will be promoted and concerning the degree of international cooperation that may prove feasible between two countries with profoundly different political systems. A conference of foreign ministers cannot hope to work out the answers to all these questions. It will be fortunate if it can reach a formula of agreement on certain immediate military and political problems, mentioned in last week's column, which have become acute as the United Nations are getting into position to strike decisive offensive blows. But these three sets of questions are worth bearing in mind as touchstones for the future improvement or deterioration of American-Soviet relations.

Stalin has made clear in official and unofficial public statements that he regards the Soviet western frontier of 1941, not of 1939, as an imperative minimum demand for the settlement after the war. In order to reinforce this demand he has broken off relations with the Polish Government-in-exile, which has refused to concede any modification of the Polish border. One may expect him to resort to every conceivable device of pressure and blackmail, including calculated hints of a possible separate agreement with Germany, in order to obtain American and British confirmation of this demand.

Now in this demand for arbitrary annexation of territory, without regard for the will of the inhabitants (for one would have to be as naive as the Dean of Canterbury to accept "plebiscites" held under Soviet military occupation as a free expression of popular desires), there is a clear challenge to a principle of the Atlantic Charter and to a cornerstone of the American conception of the basis of an enduring peace. There is a challenge to the right of peoples, small as well as large, to selfdetermination.

THE Soviet moral case in regard to these projected annexations is markedly weak. Except in the case of Bessarabia, the Soviet Government for two decades never raised any complaint about the justice of its Western frontier. The right to independent existence of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, was repeatedly recognized in Soviet official documents and unofficial comment. The existing frontiers were solemnly reaffirmed through a system of mutual non-aggression pacts, concluded by the Soviet Union with its Western neighbors at Soviet initiative in the early thirties.

It may be that the course of military events will lead to a Soviet occupation of the desired regions. But there is no good reason why the United States and Great Britain should make Stalin's predatory imperialism easier by recognizing its legality. It is a curious fact that some of the individuals who have been most earnest in denouncing "appeasement" in relation to Germany and Japan are willing to swallow unlimited doses of the same medicine in relation to Russia.

The unanswerable argument against appeasement is that it doesn't "appease." It was easy in 1938 to argue quite sincerely that some sacrifice of justice in relation to Czechoslovakia was preferable to the unlimited agony and desolation of a Second World War. But the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia did not avert the Second World War. In the same way there can be no assurance that unqualified acquiescence in Soviet annexation of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, part of Finland and part of former Polish territory would be any guaranty against future territorial demands. The sense of security of all the peoples in Eastern and Southeastern Europe would be diminished, not enhanced by such a development.

Every alternative solution should be considered by the Anglo-American negotiators. There should be a strenuous effort to induce Stalin to resume discussion with the Polish Government-in-exile. In regard to the Baltic area it is possible that the creation of international air and naval bases, with the participation of Soviet contingents,

would assure Russian security and at the same time preserve the political independence of the small Baltic states.

* *

CHINA will provide another test of the possibility of a Soviet-American entente. Evidently eager to keep out of war with Japan, Stalin has been altogether reticent about his ideas for the future of the Far East. While Stalin does not take his foreign stooges into his confidence, I think Earl Browder, who was so sure that there could never be a Stalin-Hitler pact on the very eve of August 23, 1939, was guessing more prudently and more accurately when he said recently:

"All chatter about the Soviets giving us 'bombing bases' in Siberia is harmful nonsense."

The odds are heavily against Soviet cooperation in our Far Eastern war until Europe has been cleared up to Stalin's satisfaction and until Japan is clearly rocking under Anglo-American-Chinese blows and is ripe for collapse. Then, and only then, Stalin might move into Manchuria, not for our interests or for China's but for his own. Our aims and ideals in the Orient will be best served if we can obtain and implement an Anglo-American-Soviet selfdenying ordinance, with all three powers honestly abstaining, after the defeat of Japan, from stationing troops on Chinese territory or using military action, or the threat of such action, as a means of influencing Chinese policy.

The spread of Communism of the 1917 vintage is no longer a major issue. This is not because of the dissolution of the Comintern: for there is no evidence that Stalin's hold on Communist parties throughout the world has been weakened. But the conservative internal evolution of the Soviet regime makes its leaders psychologically unable to carry through a genuine social revolution in another country. What will be important for the future of American-Soviet relations will be an abandonment by Moscow of the familiar Comintern technique of secret agents, intrigue and propaganda in other countries, a technique that could be and has been used for Russian national purposes just as well as for the support of the supposed interests of world revolution.

Finally there remains the question how far a democracy and a totalitarian state can cooperate in international affairs. There are some obvious limits to such cooperation. There can be no give-and-take, no building up of close social and intellectual contacts, of an informed international Russian-American opinion until Russians are as free to speak and write and mingle with foreigners as Americans are. A dictatorship cannot be held to the observance of an international agreement, for limitation of armaments, for instance, by that independent force of public opinion that acts as a restraining influence in a democracy.

But, while it would be stupid and humiliating for us to act as if we were citizens of a twelfth affiliated Soviet Republic, forbidden to utter a word of criticism of Soviet policies, we also cannot run international affairs on the basis of a social club. We must try to "do business with Stalin" until and unless events show that this is an impossible job. Insofar as the Soviet Union sets its course on internal reconstruction, rather than on foreign expansion, insofar as Soviet postwar policies are honestly directed toward the maintenance of international peace, we should cooperate to the limit of our ability on a basis of equality of status and mutual interest.

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Short War Is Issue At Parley--Pravda

(By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

MOSCOW, Oct. 13.—Pravda, official newspaper of the Soviet Communist Party, reviews foreign press comments on the forthcoming three-power conference, and declares that the major question confronting the United Nations at this conference is **"the immediate unification of all efforts to shorten the protracted war."**

Hitting out at defeatist papers in this country, **Pravda** declared that the Soviet Union's borders are no more a subject for discussion than the borders of California, and suggested that post-war questions could be discussed in a concrete fashion, as arising out of coordinated military action to speed Hitler's defeat.

CITES PRESS COMMENT

"The foreign press today is devoting considerable space to the forthcoming conference of representatives of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States," **Pravda** begins.

"The papers of the Allied and neutral countries stress the great significance of this conference which will be convened at a time when the Red Army successes on the Soviet-German Front and the successful operations of the Allies in the Mediterranean have turned the tide of the war and made it possible to decisively shorten the war and hasten victory over the enemy.

"The Swedish paper **Stockholm Tidningen** notes that diplomatic circles in London attach particular importance to the forthcoming meeting of representatives of the three great powers which head the anti-Hitler coalition.

"Another Swedish paper **Nya Daglicht Allehanda** writes that no conference since the outbreak of the war has been anticipated with such keen interest. The correspondent of the American International News Service points to a similar estimation of the forthcoming conference by Washington diplomatic observers.

"But it is the British press which is devoting the most space to the significance of the forthcoming conference. The **Daily Telegraph** and **Morning Post** writes that no wartime meeting could be of greater significance for the future peace.

WAY TO SOLVE DIFFERENCES

"The **Sunday Times** considers that the three power conference is the best possible way to eliminate prejudices and misunderstandings, to solve differences and to ensure the full concentration of forces for the great common aims of the United Nations.

"The British press sees the prime significance of the conference in the fact that it will contribute to the strengthening of the cooperation of the three countries and the establishing of a full understanding between them.

"Despite the fact that there have been no official communiques about the conference agenda and the nature of the forthcoming talks the British papers are discussing the questions which from their point of view should come up for discussion in Moscow. Commenting on the tasks of the conference, the British papers connect these tasks directly with the successful offensive of the Red Army on the Soviet-German Front and the successes of our Allies in Italy.

"However, when determining what questions are of paramount importance in the light of the Russian victories, the British papers by no means display the same unanimity observed in estimating the general significance

(Continued on Page 6)

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of the conference.

"Thus certain papers are inclined to pass over in silence such a cardinal question as the problem of the second front. They pass over in silence the main and principal question today confronting the Allied countries, namely that of solving the task to shorten the war and hasten the destruction of Hitler.

"Other newspapers, as for instance the News Chronicle, more or less recognize the importance of this aspect of the matter. Some British papers, avoiding the question of the opening of the second front, reckon that the subject of discussion at the conference in Moscow should primarily be concerned with questions linked with the post-war organization of Europe and Allied policy in the countries liberated from Hitler occupation.

"The Daily Herald is of the opinion that the Allies should now define their policy in relation to Germany following her defeat. In connection with the question of the policy of the Allies on the countries liberated from Hitler occupation the papers raise the question of extending the sphere of activity of the recently formed Military-Political Commission of the Allied countries, or as it is frequently called in the foreign papers, the Mediterranean Commission.

HOSTILE ELEMENTS ACTIVE

"It should be noted that also the elements hostile to the unification of the forces of the Allied nations in the Allied and neutral countries have grown active in connection with the forthcoming conference.

"Certain organs of the press in the neutral and even in the Allied countries reflect a provocative campaign, the thread of which leads to Berlin or to its fascist friends, a campaign which aims at sowing doubts and distrust between the Allies.

"Parallel with provocative rumors about some kind of invented "vagueness" of the policy of the Soviet Union, different versions are being circulated about the nature of the talks at the forthcoming conference.

"Rebuffing the different kinds of rumors and inventions about the Soviet Union, the British Observer writes about the hostile voices which practically simultaneously express two contradictory assertions.

"On the one hand it is hinted that the Russians are prepared to conclude a separate peace with Germany when the Red Army reaches the 1940 border; on the other hand there are outcries that the Russians are trying to be the first to enter Berlin in order to have a chance to dictate the peace terms and the future organization of Europe.

"The American press, too, devotes considerable attention to the forthcoming three-power conference, evaluating its significance first and foremost from the viewpoint of strengthening the relations between the Allied countries in general and the relations between the USSR and the United States in particular.

"It is known that wide public circles in the United States as well as influential American business circles regard close cooperation with the Soviet Union both in the struggle against the common enemy as well as in securing the post-war peace as corresponding to vitally important interests of the United States. The section of the American press reflecting these views welcomes the idea of the conference being convened and expects positive results from it.

RAP HEARST, McCORMICK

"On the other hand, a certain part of the American press—the papers of Hearst and McCormick, isolationist organs—has lately intensified its hostile campaign against the Soviet Union with the object of sowing suspicions and doubts among Americans, in relation to their Soviet ally.

"In connection with the preparations for the three-power conference certain papers are now specially engaged in inventing all kinds of alleged 'insoluble differences' between the Allies, which clearly hinders the strengthening of cooperation and brings grist to the mill of the Hitlerites.

"Certain idle gossipers, in an attempt to cause confusion, make ridiculous conjectures regarding the agenda of the forthcoming conference, going so far as to foretell that the subject of discussion will allegedly be 'the question of USSR frontiers' or the 'status of the Baltics' although it is clear to everybody that the frontiers of the Soviet Union can be the subject of discussion no more than, let us say, the frontiers of the United States or the 'status of California.'

"The New York Times writes that London and Washington allege

dly do not intend to discuss military questions at the conference and consequently the second front. Therefore, you see, the main questions on the agenda will be post-war problems.

"At the same time the New York Times, like many other American papers, consistently expresses the thought in its columns that political questions and particularly those relating to the post-war organization of Europe, and not military questions, will be the main subject of discussion at the conference.

"These papers seem to forget that the paramount task of the United Nations at the given moment is to bring nearer the post-war period! Drawing all kinds of conclusions and inferentes in connection with the conference, certain American papers sometimes forget that the cooperation between the United Nations is built up on a most realistic basis, and is very concrete.

"The extensive economic assistance given by the United States as well as Great Britain to the Allied countries, the unanimity reached during the armistice talks with Italy, the formation of the Military Political Commission of the Allies states—this can serve as examples of the developing cooperation of the Allied countries.

"Undoubtedly the three-power conference is confronted with the practical tasks of extending and strengthening this cooperation in the different spheres and not only in the economic and political, but also all in the military sphere, because joint action directed at hastening the rout of Hitler is an absolute prerequisite for solving all the other questions of post-war organization and for long post-war cooperation of the USSR, the United States and Britain to establish lasting peace.

THE MAJOR QUESTION

"At the end of September the American political reviewer Walter Lippmann, calling for the establishment of a fundamental and stable treaty with the Soviet Union, wrote: 'We are the allies of Russia in war. We will have to live in one and the same world with Russia after the war. Ways and means must be found to work together in solving the major questions, which are of greater importance than petty episodes.' (Retranslated from the Russian.)

"As is known, such a major question is the paramount task confronting the whole anti-Hitler coalition, namely, the immediate unification of all efforts to shorten the protracted war.

"The more complete and effective the military, political and economic cooperation of the three great powers—the USSR, Britain and the United States—the sooner will Hitler Germany be destroyed, the stronger will be the foundation of the future peace and the more successful will be the solution of the problems of post-war organization in the interests of all the Allied countries.

"Such is the light in which the significance of the forthcoming three-power conference should be viewed.

U. S. ARMY IN IRAN DISTURBS RUSSIANS

Stalin Wants Assurance Force Manning Supply Line Will Leave Area After War

LONDON CALM OVER BALTIC

3.

British Agree War Comes Before Question of 3 States—But May Dispute Poland's Fate

By JAMES B. RESTON

By Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, Oct. 14—Marshall Joseph Stalin has shown some apprehension in recent days about the present situation in Iran and has indicated that he wished Foreign Commissar Vyacheslaff Molotoff to discuss future of Iran with Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Secretary of State Cordell Hull during the tri-power conference tha will open in Moscow next week. It is understood that the Soviet Union has shown some uneasiness about the expanding United States Army in Iran, Maj. Gen. Donald D. Connolly's Persian Gulf Command, and while it has been pointed out that the one and only purpose of this army is to expedite the flow of war supplies from the United States to Russia, nevertheless Marshal Stalin evidently wants to be reassured that General Connolly will be taking his industrious and ingenious engineers back home when the European war is over.

Of all the questions that are on the agenda at the forthcoming conference, the future of the United States Army in Iran is likely to cause the least trouble. This is true for the obvious reason that neither the United States nor the men of the Persian Gulf command want to stay there a day longer than is necessary to their task of supplying Russia with arms.

Indication of Misunderstanding

But the fact that the Russians raised the question at this particular time is interesting as an indication of the misunderstandings even on the smallest points that have arisen between the three great Allies.

Coincidental with the communication from the Soviet Government on Americans in Iran, Minister of Communications and Railways A. H. Hajir arrived in London to discuss with the British Government the future of the railroad over which United States goods are moving to Russia.

The purpose of his visit is to talk about the future of the railroad across Iran and its equipment. In the last eighteen months most of Iran's original equipment on the railroad has been worn out because of heavy arms traffic and the Iranians wish to be reassured not only that they will get their railroad and their engines and rolling stock back after the war but that their sovereignty will be restored as well. At the present time even the Iranian officials have to get Russian permission to go into certain parts of their own country.

Baltic Stand Accepted Calmly

The article in Pravda emphasizing the military aspects of the three-power conference and insisting that Russia would not concede anybody's rights to discuss the Baltic States has caused little surprise and produced not a single word of disagreement in the press here. British officials say calmly that obviously Pravda is right in declaring that winning the war comes before anything else and so far as the Baltic States are concerned nobody is prepared to risk disagreement with Russia on these points.

It used to be the practice in London, as in Washington, to put out an official list of foreign missions recognized by the British Government. The Baltic States had missions here and when Russia incorporated the three States the question rose as to what to do about the aBltic diplomats. This fine diplomatic problem was solved in a typically British way. They stopped publishing the list altogether for a few months and when they finally restored it they put the Baltic States in a separate appendix at the bottom. This they explained meant that the Baltic diplomats were entitled to get diplomatic rations and privileges, but that their missions were no longer recognized as such.

Position of Russia

It is clear therefore that while Russia is evidently willing to reject the device of dividing Europe into zones of influence and wants to talk about a general European settlement on the basis of "joint responsibility," she starts with the assumption that Russia is the Russia of 1940 after incorporation of the Baltic states and eastern parts of Poland.

This means that Russia will not bring up the question of the Baltic states and neither, so far as can be learned here, will Britain.

The question of Poland is another thing. This is the country over which Britain went to war; she is in close and friendly thought sometimes exasperating relations with the present Polish Government while Russia is giving more and more evidence that Moscow is not interested in dealing with the present Polish Government at all.

Similarly the Russians also are saying that the present Finnish Government, with which the United States still has diplomatic relations, does not represent the Finnish people and is merely an instrument of German policy. These questions, with the future of Germany, France and Italy, were thought here to provide enough headaches without bringing up Iran.

This is a clipping from page 3 of the New York Times for Oct. 15, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Russia

DULLES POINTS OUT RUSSIAN DYNAMISM

Sees Rebuilt Nations Leaning to Soviet if U. S. Does Not Revive 'Creative Spirit'

As a dynamic and confident nation, Russia holds the balance of power in this war, John Foster Dulles, chairman of the Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace of the Federal Churches of Christ in America, declared yesterday. Addressing a group of Protestant ministers of the New York area at the Collegiate Reformed Church of St. Nicholas, Fifth Avenue and Forty-eighth Street, Mr. Dulles urged them to revive the creative spirit in America to assure a lasting peace.

"Russia's confidence and her realization of her ambitions is contagious to nations trying to rebuild their Governments in the post-war world," the commission chairman asserted. "Her influence may spread because countries could derive inspirational material from her actions. Possibly the France, Germany, Italy and Czechoslovakia of the future may develop governments patterned on that of the Soviet Union."

Loss of Creative Mood Seen

Although America possessed this creative mood during the last century, heasserted, she has lost it over the pasttwenty-five years. In his opinion, the world would have looked to the United States for leadership if this war had occurred in the 1800's but not today, because the nation has adopted an "idea of mature economy." The majority of the public must rid themselves of the false concept that a lasting peace can be achieved through "a clever formula devised by a clever statesman" and based upon the premise of a return to a status quo ante, he declared.

"Cooperation between a dynamic and a static power is impossible and therefore it is imperative that the public realize that the problems of peace demand constant readjustment," Mr. Dulles warned. "The problems of a future peace depend almost entirely on whether you ministers can revive the creative spirit within each individual in the country."

Lack of Peace Aims Deplored

Mr. Dulles deplored the fact that the "period of urgent peril" had passed for the United Nations without the appearance of an agreement between them stipulating their demands and desires in the future peace. He characterized the Atlantic Charter as an "essentially Anglo - Saxon document" lacking suggestions for a peacetime international system.

"To date there has been no statement by President Roosevelt as to either war or peace objectives," Mr. Dulles said. "First, he has no clear convictions on the matter. Second, he is being politically cautious because he realizes the mistakes committed by the late President Woodrow Wilson in acting without public approval, and last, it is impossible to know what Russia wants. The little we do know about her demands we don't like."

Walter W. Van Kirk, director of the Christian Mission on World Order, which will be launched at a meeting in the Cathedral of St. John the Divine on Oct. 28, also spoke. Held as a part of the Christian Mission, yesterday's meeting was attended by ministers of the Greater New York and Queens Federations of Churches and the Brooklyn Church and Mission Federation. Sumner Welles, Senator Joseph H. Ball, and Mr. Dulles are scheduled to speak Oct. 28.

This is a clipping from page 3 of the New York Times for OCT. 15, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

TURKS VOICE HOPE FOR BALKAN UNITY

Ankara Seeking to Overcome Soviet Opposition to Plan for New Federation

By Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

ISTANBUL, Turkey, Oct. 13 (Delayed)—The impending conference of the Foreign Ministers of the three principal Allied powers is distracting attention from the battlefield and focusing it on Moscow.

The Turkish people are conscious that important questions affecting their own intrests probably will be discussed there and are sharing the general curiosity and concern, and one of the first duties of the new Turkish Ambassador to Moscow, Husein Ragip Baydur, who left for his post last week, will undoubtedly be to keep his Government informed on the discussions and decisions of the conference.

One question on which Moscow and Ankara seem to be at variance is that of a Balkan federation, against which Soviet political circles apear to be prejudiced. This Russian objection to a plan that enjoys ful sympathy and support in Turkish political circles is causing deep regert and much surprise in Ankara and these feelings have been voiced lately in the Turkish press.

It should be noted that responsible opinion in Turkey never has favored a plan for a huge federation of States extending from the Baltic to the Aegean. The Turkish idea of a federation is much more modest and does not go beyond the boundaries of the Balkan Peninsula, where a similar attempt was made before the war under the name of the Balkan Entente.

It is believed in Turkey that when Soviet statesmen raise objections to a Balkan federation they are influenced by their prejudice against the Baltic States and Poland and the Little Entente, which during the period between the two wars may have at times adopted an attitude that did not altogether tally with Russian views and interests. Such was not the case with the Balkan Entente, the origin and scope of which were totally different from those of other similar organizations.

The Balkan Entente did not owe its origin to the initiative or encouragement of any great power, but was a spontaneous movement that sprang up from the Balkan peoples themselves. Its purpose was to promote etter understanding and good-will among the Balkan peoples, encourage closer cultural relations and harmonize their economic resources and interests.

This program had no political background and when the Balkan Governments became interested in the movement they were careful to avoid anything that might give offense to the great powers. Turkey insisted on inserting a proviso by which she declared that her obligations should never compel her to infringe her friendly relations with Russia, and subsequently Greece added a similar rider with regard to her relations with Italy.

The political bearing of the Balkan entente was confined to Bulgaria as a precaution against that country's territorial claims at the expense of her neighbors. Bulgaria's obstructive policy aroused the suspicions of other Balkan countries and events of this war show that their suspicions were not groundless.

There is a tendency to deride the Balkan Entente for its inefficiency and failure to withstand the test of war; these criticisms are not quite fair, because its short existence coincided with upheavals so wide and violent that the frail and imperfect cemented structure of the newly built organization could not resist the impact.

As for the future, a general world organization for the maintenance of peace would relieve the Balkan federation of apprehensions concerning its members' security and therefore would make superfluous any common military precautions except those arising from their obligations under that organization. Political intrigues and machinations of individual states—of which the Soviet Union appears to be apprehensive—would be less probable under the federation than if each Balkan state were free to follow a policy of its own.

These arguments are being put forward in Turkey with the hope that Russian statesmen, realizing that their prejudices and objections against a Balkan federation are not justified, may alter their attitude of suspicious hostility toward it into one of friendly encouragement, without which, it is felt here, no political organization in eastern and southern Europe could endure.

This is a clipping from page 3 of the New York Times for Oct. 15, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

FILE

Liverpool Dock Workers Get Shvernik Plea

(Special Cable to Allied Labor News)

LONDON, Oct. 13.—"Work as though you were fighting on the battlefield," Nikolai K. Shvernik, chairman of the All-Union Council of Soviet Trade Unions, this week wrote Liverpool dockworkers after inspecting the docks.

Shvernik and the Soviet trade union delegation which attended the British Trades Union Congress convention last month are now touring war production centers in England.

"Every port worker is a fighter on whose devoted efforts depend to a great extent the success of our comrades on the battlefield," the letter declared.

"Enemy agents sometimes try to assume the character of championing the interests of the workers by calling on them to work less and by pushing them along the strike path," he continued.

"But striking in war time means helping the enemy. Comrades of the Liverpool docks, your work is of exceptional importance when the enemy is suffering heavy defeats on all fronts, especially on the Soviet-German front. Your ports are one of the most important sectors of the front behind the lines.

"We, delegates of the Soviet trade unions, appeal to you to swiftly dispatch all cargoes passing through Liverpool."

This is a clipping from page 2 of the

DAILY WORKER

Date Oct. 14, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government

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MOSCOW BARS TALK ON FRONTIER ISSUES

Military Cooperation for Defeat of Hitler to Be Basic Topic at Parley, Pravda Says

By W. H. LAWRENCE

By Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, Oct. 13—A long editorial appearing today in Pravda on the eve of the foreign ministers' conference declares flatly that military cooperation must precede economic and political decisions "because mutual operations directed toward quickening Hitler's defeat are a necessary premise for deciding all post-war questions."

The editorial also forecloses discussion of the Baltic States or concerning other Russian boundaries.

Some newspapers and persons in neutral and Allied countries, Pravda asserts, are attempting to create discord among the Allies and are "trying to make the water dirty" by prophesying that the Foreign Ministers will discuss Russia's borders or the Baltic States' status, "although everyone must know that the Soviet Union's borders can no more be a topic of conversations than, for example, the borders of the United States or the status of California."

This is the first extended discussion of the Foreign Ministers' conference that has appeared in the Soviet press.

Pravda makes this clear when it

Continued on Page Twelve

MOSCOW BARS TALK ON FRONTIER ISSUES

Continued From Page One

quotes, apparently with disapproval, comment in American newspapers, including THE NEW YORK TIMES, that military questions will not be discussed.

"The editor of THE NEW YORK TIMES, James, writes that London and Washington do not intend to discuss military questions at the conference, and as a consequence do not intend to talk about the second front," Pravda says.

"Together with this, THE NEW YORK TIMES, as well as many other American newspapers, prints the thought that the main topic of the conference will be not military questions but political questions, and particularly the question of post-war relations in Europe. These papers lose sight of the fact that at this moment the main task of the United Nations is to bring nearer the post-war period."

[In an article published on Sept. 19, Edwin L. James, managing editor of THE NEW YORK TIMES, wrote: "It is certainly not the idea of Washington and London that the coming meeting will deal with military issues, such as the oft-repeated Russian desire to see a 'second front' in France. This is to be promarily a meeting of diplomats and not of generals. That leads to the conclusion that political post-war plans will be the leading subject on the agenda."]

"First Vital Task" Set

There has been no public comment from the British or American Embassies here pending the arrival of the parley's principals, but they are obviously hopeful that all difficulties will be ironed out.

Pravda sounds the Russian keynote in its editorial's final paragraph, declaring "the first vital task that stands before the anti-Hitlerite coalition" to be "the urgent unity of mutual efforts to speed the end of the protracted war."

"The more full and effective is the military, political and economical cooperation of the three great powers, the U. S. S. R., Britain and the United States, the quicker will be the defeat of Hitlerite Germany and the stronger will be the foundation of the future peace and the more successful will be the solution of the post-war problems in the interests of all the Allied nations," it says. "In this light is silhouetted the significance of the conference of representatives of the three powers."

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Times for Oct. 14, 1942
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Denounce Separate Peace Rumors

Reds Insist Parley Begin With 2d Front

By United Press

MOSCOW, Oct. 13—The first Soviet pronouncement on the American-British-Russian foreign ministers' conference said emphatically today that primary consideration must be given to immediate joint Allied military action—in other words, the second front.

Commenting on the forthcoming meeting of Foreign Commissar V. M. Molotov with U. S. Secretary of State Hull and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, the Communist Party organ Pravda said that discussion of such problems as post-war settlements and politico-economic co-operation can only be achieved as a result of the conferees' recognition of the need for immediate military action.

The editorial further made clear the Soviet Union's uncompromising position regarding Russian frontiers. The Baltic States are considered an integral part of the U. S. S. R., comparable to the relation of California to the United States, it said.

NO SEPARATE PEACE

Pravda at the same time denounced rumors of a possible separate Russian-German peace when the Red Army reaches the frontier and of Russian intentions to enter Berlin first in order to dictate post-war reorganization of Europe.

Pravda condemned what it called a "provocative campaign" in Allied and neutral countries by elements hostile to the union of all Allied forces.

"Such a campaign is traceable to Berlin or Berlin's Fascist friends, and is designed to sow mutual distrust and doubt among the Allies," the newspaper said.

HITLER AIDED

It cited a contrast between what it called the consensus of American public opinion favoring close war and post-war collaboration with Russia as against the attitude expressed by parts of the U. S. press "which recently intensified an anti-Soviet campaign aimed to stir suspicion among the Americans regarding their Soviet ally."

Those circles, Pravda said, deliberately aid Hitler by predicting the conference will discuss Russia's post-war frontier or the status of the Baltic countries. The newspaper insisted that the Soviet borders or the fate of the Baltic countries are beyond discussion.

Main purpose of the meeting, Pravda said, will be to work out a program for the quick defeat of Germany and the establishment of a lasting peace.

Mr. Hull

Molotov

F. D.-Churchill-Stalin Parley Hull's Top Aim

The conference of foreign ministers convening shortly in Moscow will be judged close to 100 per cent successful if it leads to a reasonably early Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin meeting.

(The London Daily Sketch said today that Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is expected to attend the possible Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin conference at Moscow.)

Secretary of State Hull was reported yesterday to be somewhere east of Brazil and may already be in Moscow.

Mr. Roosevelt probably eased some Communist fears at his news conference yesterday in a summary of reasons why the Soviet Union might not be expected at this time to provide Siberian bases for use against Japan.

WE'RE NOT PRESSING

Earl Browder, American Communist Party chairman, said last month that

(Continued on Page 40)

2d Front

(Continued From Page 5)

talk of such bases was "nonsense." Mike Gold, editorial columnist for the Communist Daily Worker, suggested this week that publication of Jap atrocity stories was designed to arouse popular demand here for Siberian bases.

But there is no evidence of any Administration intention to press the matter while the Red Army is fighting Germany.

From Washington's standpoint, the most significant subject to be explored at Moscow probably will be the matter of a mutually satisfactory policy toward Germany, including an understanding agreeable to Russia on the "unconditional surrender" policy adopted by Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt at Casablanca.

HULL'S STATUS DUBIOUS

There is some evidence that Hull may be handicapped. The Daily Worker, which uniformly reflects Communist thinking, has been critical of the State Department and especially this week in connection with publication of the department's review of 1931-41 diplomatic history. An editorial discussion said:

"A laborious effort is made . . . to build up Secretary Hull as an omniscient who as early as 1933 urged an arms embargo against aggressor nations. But it is difficult to picture Hull as anything but a verbose, confused old man."

If that represents Stalin's and Molotov's estimate of Hull, the U. S. conferee in Moscow may have an unhappy time.

WASH. DAILY NEWS
OCT. 13, 1943

ARCHBISHOP FINDS RUSSIA RELIGIOUS

York, Back in London, Declares Millions Are Turning to God —Calls Stalin 'Wise Man'

By Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, Oct. 11—There are millions of Russians who are turning to God "for guidance help and comfort in their sorrow and agony," the Archbishop of York said here today, in making public some of his observations on the Soviet Union from which he has just returned.

The best reason for assuming that the church had come to stay in Russia was its abandonment of the old regime and the acceptance of new, nonreligious State government, he said.

On the question why Premier Joseph Stalin approved of the election of the Patriarch and the summoning of the Council of Bishops which had been puzzling many persons here, the Archbishop said:

"Stalin is a wise man who recognizes that religion is inherent in the majority of the Russian people. He has had to take from them in the national cause much that they value, but he feels that he can give them something in making it plain that there is no hindrance to their worship."

The Archbishop saw no conflict on the part of the Russian Church in its relationship with the state. It has accepted the existing Constitution with loyalty and has "thrown itself heart and soul into the national cause in its prayers and work for victory," the Archbishop explained.

Vast crowds, exceeding 10,000 persons, attended the services in which he participated, crowding around him afterward with cries of "English Archbishop, thank you, thank you," he recounted. Their age ranged from young to middle age. Reports that the majority of them were old the Archbishop dismissed as sheer nonsense.

Russia

N.Y. Times Oct. 12, 1943 p. 5

Davies in Mexico Assails Anti-Soviet Smear Rumors

(Special to the Daily Worker)

MEXICO CITY, Oct. 2 (Delayed).—"Russia will not break or violate her promises to England and the other allied nations. The word of the Soviet government is as good as that of any other nation whatever fighting against Germany and her satellites," Joseph E. Davies, former U. S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, declared, counteracting "separate peace" rumors that had been circulating here, when he arrived in this country last week.

Mr. Davies, in this country on a "vacation," paid courtesy visits to Foreign Relations Secretary Ezequiel Padilla and to U. S. Ambassador George S. Messersmith.

"Russia will not impose nor even try to impose her political, social or economic doctrines on Europe or the rest of the world after the war. Russia has no territorial ambitions. Stalin wants for himself what he wants for others, that they respect his doctrines as he will respect those of others," the author of "Mission to Moscow" told newsmen here.

Davies emphasized that he himself is a capitalist.

"That means I sympathize and defend the capitalist regime," he said. "But I am what is called a liberal, a democrat, which in other words means a Christian."

In this interview the former Ambassador explained that he is sure that the conference between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin will take place soon.

"The three are in agreement concerning all plans that are being developed. It would be suicide not to be. Personally, I have not the slightest doubt that they are in agreement and that they will come to an agreement on everything," he declared with emphasis.

A question concerning Russia's future policy toward Japan, Mr. Davies answered as follows: "Japan has treaties and pacts with Russia, but I believe she will break them whenever she considers it convenient. Japan considers Russia as her natural enemy and will therefore break or violate her promise whenever she thinks it necessary. I trust in the word of Russia which to me is as good as that of any other allied nation. Russia desires peace but does not reject war."

Russia

Note

This is a clipping from page 2 of the Daily Worker for Oct. 12, 1943 Clipped at the Seat of Government.

De Gaulle Sees 'Natural' Tie With USSR

(Daily Worker Foreign Department)

Reporting to the French Committee of National Liberation on the popular enthusiasm which greeted his visit to newly-liberated Corsica, Gen. Charles de Gaulle expressed himself very warmly toward "dear powerful Russia," and suggested that for France the "natural alliance" with the Soviet Union remains.

De Gaulle's statement came as the Soviet ambassador to the French Committee, Alexander G. Bogomolov, arrived in Algiers to begin his work there. He had been delayed for some time by the reluctance of Allied military attaches to grant him a visa.

The co-president of the French Committee described his unexpected visit to Ajaccio and other towns only a few days after the complete ouster of German troops from the island was carried out by French patriots, units of the regular French army, Italian soldiers, and American "Rangers."

Gen. Giraud had visited the island during the fighting, but in the report of de Gaulle's visit, the chief of the cabinet, Gaston Palewski, took the occasion to emphasize that people of Corsica understood the distinction between Giraud's military leadership and de Gaulle's political leadership, and said the latter was received accordingly.

This is a clipping from page — of the Daily Worker for [illegible]
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Inter-Allied Body Seen Needing Wider Powers

(By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

MOSCOW, Oct. 10 (ICN). — The **War and the Working Class**, Soviet trade union journal, writes the following regarding the Military and Political Commission of the Allied countries:

Among the first tasks the Military - Political Commission intends to examine are the questions connected with the armistice terms with Italy, measures for controlling the realization of these terms and joint discussion of other similar problems on enemy territories liberated by the Allies.

This, however, is but a general outline of its work, its purpose in principle, if one may so express it, of the future activity of the Military-Political Commission. As yet we do not have a more detailed characterization of the tasks of this commission. However enough has been said already to get an idea of the importance of the questions scheduled for consideration by this commission.

It is to be assumed that these questions wil include primarily those connected with different measures regulating the political and administrative life of the countries. They evidently will also cover the matter of drawing up different kinds of declarations, proclamations, instructions and other documents which are to be issued in the name of the United Nations or in the name of the Military-Political Commission to the local authorities or to the local population.

MILITARY QUESTIONS

It stands to reason that questions of a military nature will be referred directly to the Allied High Commands. An important part of the work of the Military-Political Commission probably will be the measures to control the realization of armistice terms.

The commission should take into account the experience of the first period of the capitulation of Italy and see to it that in the future no deficiencies are permitted, such occurrences as for instance the flight of Mussolini and a number of other Italian fascist leaders who slipped through the hands of the Allies.

In speaking of the functions of the Military-Political Commission, such as supervising the realization of armistice terms in Italy and the discussion of military and political problems connected with the fate of the satellites of Germany who are ready to break away from her, The **Times** emphasized that the Military-Political Commission must be given wide powers in order to carry out these functions.

One cannot but agree with this viewpoint of **The Times** for without wide powers capable of ensuring maximum effectiveness of the functions of the Military-Political Commission it is more than difficult to imagine how this commission could function.

Incidentally it should be noted that the viewpoint expressed by **The Times** regarding the competence of the Military-Political Commission does not harmonize with the opinion of the paper's diplomatic correspondent, an opinion which in effect is that the Military-Political Commission is composed of experts whose functions should consist merely of submitting their conclusions and advice to their representatives. This idea of the competence of the Military-Political Commission is not in keeping with the tasks of this commission as characterized by the afore-mentioned official Soviet and British statements.

U. S. PRESS

The American press also attaches great significance to the cooperation of the three powers—the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain—on questions relating to the Mediterranean. In the Soviet Union major importance is attached to the Military-Political Commission in view of the tasks set it by the governments of the three leading powers of the anti-Hitler bloc.

It is to be hoped that the Military-Political Commission, composed of representatives of these states and with the participation of a representative of the French Committee for National Liberation, will by its activity contribute to the further strengthening of cooperation between the Allied countries and of all other countries fighting against Hitler Germany and her satellites during the war and also in the post-war period. The Military-Political Commission in all probability will be taking up its functions within the near future.

Russia

DAILY Worker
OCT. 11, 1943 p.2

Where the News Ends

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

Co-operation With Stalin?

THE question whether and how far co-operation with Stalin is possible has been pushed more and more into the foreground as the tide of the war has turned against the Axis. So long as the Red Army was playing a defensive, holding role on the Donets or the Volga the military interest of the United States and Great Britain was simple and obvious. It was to give all possible aid to this Russian resistance, in order to tie up the large German forces engaged in Russia and wear down the German military machine.

But the two big forward sweeps of the Red Army, from the Volga and the Caucasus to the Donets and the old line in Central Russia last winter, and from these positions to the Dnieper during the last months, combined with the successful Anglo-American campaigns in Africa, Sicily and Southern Italy and the persistent bombings of Germany, bring certain questions from the theoretical to the practical stage. Another thrust by the Red Army equal to its predecessors in territorial gains would bring the Soviet forces to the frontier line that existed at the time of the German invasion in 1941.

Suppose there should be an internal overturn in Germany, eliminating Hitler and his closest associates and setting up a regime which would offer Stalin peace on the basis of the *status quo*. Is it possible to predict with any assurance the Soviet dictator's reaction to such a proposal? What are Stalin's aims in regard to that vast belt of territory, inhabited by peoples of many nationalities, Poles, Czechs, Yugoslavs, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Finns, Letts, Lithuanians, Estonians, Greeks, that lies between the lands inhabited predominantly by Russians and by Germans? What are Stalin's views about the role of Germany in the postwar world? About the organization of world peace through such means as a collective security system, limitation of armaments, international co-operative action to solve economic difficulties? Will Stalin fight Japan?

SOME of these questions are more urgent, as regards the immediate conduct of the war, than others. But all are important from the standpoint of estimating the prospects of stable and enduring peace. It is against a background of such questions that the prospective conference of American, British and Soviet Foreign Ministers, which may or may not have become a reality by the time this column appears in print, acquires so much importance.

Louis Fischer wittily and correctly remarked in the course of a radio discussion that Stalin had been very co-operative in unloading lend-lease supplies from our ships, but not so co-operative in other fields. Now that the problem of co-operation with Stalin has become so vastly more complex than merely despatching the maximum quantity of supplies to sustain Russian resistance, I think it is worthwhile to devote two successive articles to examining the prospects and conditions of such co-operation. While there is no absolutely hard-and-fast line between present and future problems, I will try to discuss today some of the immediate war issues and next week some of the more long range questions on which the future prospect of Anglo-American-Soviet co-operation depends.

On the question of whether Stalin would, under certain circumstances, accept a German separate peace offer I am not inclined to line up either with the dogmatic optimists or with the dogmatic pessimists. Stalin's entire career stamps him as a super-opportunist, a Machiavellian power politician in the grand style. As I pointed out some time ago, it is absurdly and pathetically naive to believe that he is a Cherry-Tree George Washington who simply could not tell a lie and whose

decisions are influenced by a scrupulous regard for his pledged word.

And if one looks closely into the wording of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942 one finds that Stalin has an arguable "out" for separate peace negotiations, once Hitler is eliminated. The British and Soviet Governments, under this treaty, are pledged not to enter into peace negotiations "with a Hitlerite Government or any Government of Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions."

* * *

ASSUMING a replacement of Hitler by the kind of regime that is foreshadowed in the appeals of the Free Germany Committee which has been functioning in Moscow, certainly with Stalin's full approval, it would be possible for the Soviet dictator to maintain that he was breaking no engagement by discussing peace with such a government. There are several considerations that might incline Stalin to an agreement with a defeated and chastened Germany.

For one thing, the awkward question of the peoples of Eastern Europe, with their inconvenient claims to independent national existence, would be disposed of. Stalin would not be dependent exclusively on the United States and Great Britain for postwar reconstruction material; the idea of a working agreement between the German and Russian economics, conceived by Chicherin and Rathenau at the Rapallo Conference in 1921, could be revived and extended. And what a land bloc from the Rhine to the Pacific, with Stalin in a dominant position, would mean in terms of international power politics is formidable to contemplate. It would be a bad augury, one fears, for the long postponement of World War III.

On the other hand there are deterrent considerations that must operate in Stalin's mind. There is the fierce desire for revenge which has been excited in the Russian people by the German invasion and its accompanying cruelties. There would be the danger involved in complete isolation from the United States and Great Britain: for it is easier to live down the memory of one treacherous pact than of two. I suspect that Stalin is rather characteristically keeping the doors open for two alternative policies, whichever may seem more opportune in the light of military and political considerations.

To a certain extent the Anglo-American failure to formulate any policy for postwar Germany beyond "Unconditional Surrender" plays into Stalin's hands diplomatically and makes it possible that the fruits of military victory may be lost through a sudden change of Russian orientation. It seems to me that our reasonable and commonsense war aim for Germany, after the liquidation of Hitlerism, should be the creation of a more genuinely democratic Weimar Republic, a regime that would not only wipe out the last remnants of Nazism, but put effective curbs on the Junkers and the big business interests. If this is what we want (and, apart from a few paranoid and psychopathic hate-mongers, I think almost everyone would agree that this would be the best solution of the German problem) why shouldn't we say so? Hitler's tottering prestige would be undermined further and the chances of a deal between Stalin and a stooge regime in Germany would be forestalled. Germany should be reclaimed as part of a free Europe, not pushed into a power bloc with the Soviet Union. With this question of postwar policy toward Germany solved we shall be in a stronger position to discuss with Stalin on equal terms such questions as Russia's future frontiers in Europe and Asia, possibilities of economic collaboration, the implications of the Atlantic Charter as regards the freedom of the small and medium-sized states of Eastern Europe. It is with these questions that this column will be concerned next week.

Soviets Hit U. S. Press as Anti-Red

By United Press

MOSCOW, Oct. 7 — A dispatch in "War and the Working Class," Soviet publication, yesterday bitterly denounced a large section of the American press on grounds that it had recently intensified an anti-Soviet campaign in an effort to undermine Soviet-American relations and jeopardize the common war effort.

It named newspapers published by William Randolph Hearst, R. R. McCormick, Joseph M. Patterson and Roy Howard as among those "representing reactionary, defeatist, isolationist circles whose anti-Soviet campaign is designed to throw suspicion on Soviet foreign policy."

Naming the New York World-Telegram, the Chicago Tribune, the New York Daily News and New York Journal-American, the dispatch said the newspapers under attack "circularize false, fabricated conflicts between the Soviet Union and its Allies—a line which fully corresponds to the interests of Hitler's agents who are speculating on disruption of the unity of the anti-Hitler coalition."

The trade union review said the anti-Soviet newspapers represent an influential group and boast a circulation of over 10,000,000 but asserted "they are at sharp variance with the views of the American people and contradict the general line of American foreign policy, which stands for strengthening collaboration with the Soviet Union."

It mentioned the New York Herald Tribune and the newspaper PM as among those "trying to offset the poison generated by the anti-Soviet campaign," and praised Thomas Lamont and Walter Lippmann for understanding the necessity of advocating Soviet-American rapprochement.

Russia

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Russia

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OCT. 7, 1943
PAGE 2

Moscow Radio Adopts Caustic Attitude Toward Japan

But Commissar Warns Allies Not To Repeat Policy of Isolating Russia

By Frederick Kuh

(Copyright, 1943, by Chicago Sun and Field Publications)

LONDON, Oct. 5.—Several declarations, emanating from Soviet leaders in the past few days, suggest the Russian attitude towards issues that provide the background for the impending tri-power conference.

The Moscow radio, which has long avoided words capable of offending the Japanese, last Tuesday introduced a new note of irony towards Japan.

Obviously indulging in good, clean fun at Japan's expense, the Soviet broadcaster discussed Japanese press efforts to make Italy's defection appear as a nice, juicy piece of luck for the Axis.

"The big Japanese newspapers," remarked Moscow's radio commentator, "in their anxiety to bolster up the spirit of the people, maintain that Italy's capitulation is an unexpected blessing, and that had it not come, Germany and her allies would have been much worse off. Certain papers say they regard the capitulation with relief.

Others Collapsing

"The Tokyo *Asahi* wrote, 'Now that Italy has withdrawn, the burden on Germany is much less. She will be able henceforth to direct all her forces to defending the European fortress and reinforcing her positions on the Eastern front.'"

The Soviet broadcaster, with the tongue in his cheek, comments: "Italy's Axis partners must long have been awaiting this good fortune."

The Soviet commentator holds out fresh hopes to Japan and says that the Japanese may soon have cause to rejoice, for other dangerous allies like Italy, namely, Finland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, "as one can see, are on the verge of going under."

Now, it would be wrong to attach exaggerated importance to this public exhibition of Russia's pleasure at Japan's discomfort, and entirely off the mark to draw conclusions about Soviet air bases in the Far East. Japan, moreover, is absent from the tri-power conference's agenda. But the sudden change in the Moscow radio's tone towards Japan is, nevertheless, interesting, even if it tells only what every child should know about Russia's real thoughts on Japan.

Blames All Germans

Last Wednesday an influential member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Dimitri Manuilski, spoke on another crucial topic, and he deviated strikingly from the more familiar Soviet distinction drawn between the German people and the Nazis. His inclination was to lump them together and to hold all Germans under arms responsible as war criminals.

Manuilski first described the savage horror the German army is leaving in the wake of its retreat. "Let them not tell us," he cried, "that these crimes are perpetrated by the Gestapo, SS troops and special incendiary detachments. We know that the power is in the hands of the German generals and that the weapons are in the hands of German soldiers. They could halt these brutalities at any moment. Therefore, the Soviet people and the Red Army hold the whole German army responsible for these criminal acts."

He concluded: "Our task is to wipe out German manpower."

Coming from one of the leaders of Russia's ruling party, this utterance may be an illuminating commentary on the suggestion we occasionally hear nowadays that Stalin is contemplating a separate deal with the German army.

Strong Warning

Finally, the voice of Commissar of Education Vladimir Potemkin is raised in the magazine *The War and the Working Class* in what appears to be a strong warning to America and Britain on the use of the "Three Powers" meeting to avoid repeating the blunder of the between-the-wars period, by again driving Russia into isolation.

Potemkin, Russia's ex-ambassador to France and Italy and often Soviet delegate to the League of Nations, in this article describes Moscow's early attempts after the last war to form a united front against German militarists.

He alleges that Britain used Germany as a counterweight against French mastery in Europe and as a force "handy to destroy Bolshevik Russia." He says that "America needed European peace to recover the loans granted to the Allies and later to preserve the capital invested in Germany. Germany was using the peace to sharpen its knife against the Western democracies. The Western states' anti-Soviet policy played into Germany's hands and enhanced German power by isolating Russia."

Russian Tip

Potemkin mentions Stresemann's secret letter of Sept. 7, 1925, to the German ex-Crown Prince, wherein Stresemann foreshadowed the reconciliation with the Western Powers to better Germany's eastern frontiers, to ease the reparations burden and to improve the position of 10 or 12 million Germans under foreign rule. In that program Potemkin sees the germ of Hitler's later plans.

He alludes to the Oct. 16, 1925, Locarno treaty binding Germany to her western frontiers, but leaving her free to extend those in the east. In June, 1932, the Allies relensed Germany from the reparations payments "and thus," concludes Potemkin, "the beast which was to be let loose upon the Soviet Union was nuttured and fed."

These remarks sound like a tip straight from the Bear's mouth, as the American and British representatives are packing their trunks for the Moscow conference.

This is a clipping from page 7 of P M for Oct. 5, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government

SOVIET ENVOY SEES U. S.-RUSSIAN AMITY

Ambassador Gromyko Offers Credentials to Roosevelt in White House Ceremony

RUSSIA THANKS U.S. FOR AID

President Praises U.S.S.R. for Her Courage—Predicts a Lasting Collaboration

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 4—While the Government was continuing preparations for the forthcoming tri-partite conference at Moscow, Andrei A. Gromyko, the new Soviet Ambassador, today assured President Roosevelt that development of "friendly relations and closest collaboration" with the American people was the "unswerving desire and aspiration" of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Gomkyo, who replaced Maxim Litvinoff as Ambassador Aug. 22, presented his credentials at the White House. Meanwhile, Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, declined to discuss whether he would proceed to Moscow for the important meeting.

Reviewing the conduct of the war by the Allied nations, the young Soviet envoy added:

"I firmly bleieve, Mr. President, that the present joint struggle against our common foe, Hitlerite Germany and her allies in Europe, will bring about closer collaboration of our countries in the post-war period in the interests of general peace and security."

He declared that the "mutual understanding and mutual confidence" between the two countries would be "forged to the maximum degree in the fire of our joint military efforts."

Praising the aid given to the Soviet Union by the United States, Ambassador Gromyko said the assistance comprised "not only moral but substantial material support as well in the form of airplanes, tanks, guns and other military material and also foodstuffs."

President Roosevelt, in reply, lauded the "fortitude, courage, self-sacrifice of the armed forces and the people of the Soviet Union," which, he declared, have "aroused the undying admiration" of the people of the United States.

Mr. Roosevelt concluded by saying that he was confident that the "unity of purpose" that bound the United States and Russia during the war would be "translated into a close and lasting collaboration" to establish an enduring peace.

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS

WASHINGTON, Oct. 4 (AP)—The text of remarks exchanged between Soviet Ambassador Gromyko and President Roosevelt today follows:

By AMBASSADOR GROMYKO.

Mr. President:

I have the honor to present to you the letter of credence by which the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics accredits me to you as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and also the letter of recall of my predecessor.

In presenting you with the letter of credence, I feel it my duty to state that the people of the Soviet Union entertain for the American people feelings of friendship and deep respect, and that the maintenance and further development of friendly relations and closest collaboration with them constitute the unswerving desire and aspiration of my Government.

The friendship of the peoples of our countries is not accidental. It is the expression of the basic interests of our peoples and our nations. This friendship has grown stronger under the grim trial of this war, in which the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States fight against their common enemy—Hitlerite Germany and her allies in Europe. The bonds of friendship uniting our peoples are being still further strengthened by the blood which the best sons of our countries are shedding in the struggle against the German fascist gangsters.

During the entire two years of this stubborn struggle, in which the heaviest burden of effort and sacrifices have fallen upon the Soviet Union, the peoples of the Soviet Union received and are receiving from the friendly American people not only moral, but substantial material, support as well in the form of airplanes, tanks, guns and other military material, and also foodstuffs. The Soviet people highly value this support, for which I express to you, Mr. President, and through you to the whole American people, the warm gratitude of my Government and the peoples of my country. The armed forces of the Allies, including those of the United States of America, are taking an increasingly greater part in our common struggle against Hitlerite Germany and have already inflicted a number of heavy defeats upon the cunning foe. The successes of the Red Army in its struggle against the Hitlerite hordes during more than two years, its present victorious advance on the Soviet-German front, the remarkable successes of Anglo-American arms in North Africa and Sicily, as well as the developing military operations of the Anglo-American forces on the territory of Italy, have created a favorable military-political situation for inflicting decisive blows upon the hated enemy.

Sees Post-War Collaboration

It is now clear that the war is turning in favor of the United Nations. However, for delivery of the final blow upon the enemy, exertion of the total strength of our countries and also of all the United Nations will be required. I firmly believe, Mr. President, that the present joint struggle against our common foe, Hitlerite Germany and her allies in Europe, will bring about closer collaboration of our countries in the post-war period, in the interest of general peace and security.

Believe that the mutual understanding and mutual confidence between our countries, which are so necessary both during wartime and in the post-war period as well, will be forged to the maximum degree in the fire of our joint military effort. I am prepared to devote all my endeavors to further the consolidation of this mutual understanding and confidence between our countries, certain of the success and fruitfulness of our mutual effort, directed to the achievement of this high purpose. I hope, Mr. President, that in executing my duties as the Ambassador accredited to you I may rely upon your support and likewise that of the Government which you head.

I beg you, Mr. President, to accept the assurance of the warm sympathy of the peoples of the Soviet Union for the American people, and the expression of full confidence in the further fruitful development and strengthening of the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, for the benefit and prosperity of our great peoples and of all friendly countries.

This is a clipping from page 10 of the New York Times for Oct. 5 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

Mr. Ambassador:

I am happy to receive from Your Excellency the letters by which the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics accredits you as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Government of the United States, and I welcome you in that capacity.

I am deeply gratified at the expression of your determination to develop further the friendly relations of understanding and confidence which so happily exist between our two countries, and continue thereby the work of your distinguished predecessor whose letters of recall you have handed to me. I can assure you, that in the performance of this high task with which your Government has entrusted you, Your Excellency may count upon receiving the full cooperation and support of the Government of the United States.

The fortitude, courage and self-sacrifice of the armed forces and people of the Soviet Union in their terrible hours of trial have aroused the undying admiration of the American people, and we rejoice with the ~~people~~ of the Soviet Union in the ever growing tide of success which is crowning Soviet arms.

Envisages Enduring Peace

Since the day of the treacherous assault upon your country by Nazi Germany it has been, and it is, the unswerving intention of this country to lend maximum assistance to your gallant armies. Our two countries are united against a common enemy. The Government and people of the United States have bent every effort to bring to bear as speedily and as effectively as possible the might of our armed forces against that enemy.

The enemy has felt, is feeling, and will to an ever increasing degree feel the weight of the combined forces of the United Nations, and when the final and complete victory is achieved, as it will be, I know that every one of the United Nations will have made its full contribution toward that victory.

Our countries are joined together in a high cause, and I fully share your confidence that the unity of purpose which binds our peoples and countries together in the prosecution of the war will be translated into a close and lasting collaboration, together with other like-minded countries, in the establishment of a just and enduring peace.

The Enigma Is Not In Soviet Policy

By James S. Allen

Is Soviet foreign policy a puzzle?

Is it necessary to have an inside pipe-line to the Kremlin, such as the Communists are accused of having every-time they make a forthright statement on foreign policy, to know the essential groundwork of Soviet war and peace policy?

That question must be asked because in discussion even of the more serious type about the projected three-power conference of foreign ministers it is assumed that one must possess a secret code to read Marshal Stalin's speeches.

This comment is called forth by a dispatch from London in yesterday's New York Times by James B. Reston, in which the correspondent summarizes the "objective tentative conclusions" on the subject of Soviet policy by "the most responsible sources" available to him in Britain.

The heart of his findings is to be found in the following paragraph:

"Russia is not, in the opinion of these observers, following an enigmatic foreign policy; she has, in their opinion, two separate policies, one of cooperating with the western Powers when she has what she calls 'safe boundaries' and a second, to be put into effect when the first fails, of allying herself with a Communist Germany and with whatever Communist governments attain power in Europe and elsewhere after the war."

ON SOVIET POLICY

Evidence is cited that the Soviet Union is "following one policy and preparing another in case the first should fail." This evidence consists of: the creation of the Free Germany Committee in Moscow, the break of relations with the Polish exile government in London, and support of the Yugoslav People's Army combined with strong criticism of the Yugoslav government in exile.

That is the heart of the analysis.

In reality, it casts more light on the policy of Reston's "responsible sources" than it does on Soviet policy.

Their conclusions, fortunately "tentative," reveal many misconceptions, and an unbelievable simplicity of thought on social questions. The usual charge is that such people underestimate the strength of the Soviet Union. In this case, it might be said, their error consists in overestimation to the point of foolishness when they can seriously suggest that Stalin has the power to push one button marked "Communist" and another labelled "non-Communist" and thus determine the complexion of post-war Europe.

But the basic misconception of these "authorities" lies elsewhere. It is in their belief that a policy which supports the Free Germany movement, the Yugoslav People's Army, and the Polish people's forces is a "Communist" policy and in contradiction to a policy of Anglo-Soviet-American collaboration.

By inference, therefore, only a policy which supports the anti-democratic and anti-Soviet clique calling itself the Polish Government-in-Exile, and the Pan-Serb and feudal Yugoslav exile government, and which stays clear of German anti-fascists can be considered as fully in accord with a policy of Anglo-Soviet-American collaboration.

In other words, according to the "authorities" whose views Reston reports, Soviet policy would become fully clarified to their satisfaction if it supported General Mikhailovitch in Yugoslavia, who has just very effectively punctured his own hoax by admitting boastfully that his forces are not engaged in any fighting against the German troops and their puppets.

WHAT THEY WANT

In other words, Soviet policy would become entirely satisfactory if it supported those very forces in and out of Poland who, by their own admission, are preparing to fight the Soviet Union.

And Soviet policy would become an object of enduring love if, after defeating the bulk of Hitler's armies, it would obligingly agree to say not a word about the German settlement.

And by what twisted reasoning is it possible to conclude that Soviet policy on the point brought forth as "evidence" is a policy of exporting Communism to Europe?

There is absolutely no contradiction between Soviet policy towards Europe and the basic anti-fascist, pro-democratic aims of the war, as understood by all democrats and anti-fascists throughout the world.

Soviet war aims have been defined very precisely on a number of occasions. They are to destroy the Hitlerite army, the Hitlerite state and the Hitlerite "New Order" in Europe. Neither the Polish exile government nor Mikhailovitch are engaged in these tasks; they are doing just the opposite. General Tito's Liberation Army and the Polish anti-Hitler forces are engaged in these tasks; therefore, they receive the full support and encouragement of the Soviet Union.

Is that a contradictory, an alternative policy to collaboration? If it is, we would like to know for what end and purpose Reston's "experts" want collaboration.

CLEAR POLICY

Soviet enunciation of policy towards the European peoples is also very clear. In his speech of November 6, 1942, Stalin defined the Soviet approach and stated that this is a sufficient program for the Coalition.

"Abolition of racial exclusiveness, equality of nations and integrity of their territories, liberation of enslaved nations and restoration of their sovereign rights, the right of every nation to arrange its affairs as it wishes, economic aid to nations that have suffered and assistance to them in attaining their material welfare, restoration of democratic liberties, the destruction of the Hitlerite regime."

From the actual record of the war thus far it would seem that there is an "alternate" policy, violating the principle of self-determination as defined by Marshal Stalin and in the Atlantic Charter.

But that "alternate" policy is not to be found in the programs and deeds of the Soviet Union.

This is a clipping from page 2 of the Daily Worker for Oct. 5, 1944
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Soviet Envoy, FDR See Closer Ties

WASHINGTON, Oct. 4 (UP).—Soviet Ambassador Andrei A. Gromyko told President Roosevelt today he firmly believes the joint war effort against Adolf Hitler's Germany will result in closer U. S.-Soviet post-war collaboration "in the interests of general peace and security."

Presenting his credentials as successor to Maxim Litvinov, he said his government's "unswerving desire and aspiration" is to maintain and further develop friendly relations and closest collaboration with the American people.

He believed that "the mutual understanding and mutual confidence between our countries which are so necessary both during wartime and in the post-war period as well, will be forged to the maximum degree in the fire of our joint military efforts."

Mr. Roosevelt replied that he fully shared Gromyko's confidence that "the unity of purpose which binds our peoples and countries together in the prosecution of the war will be translated into a close and lasting collaboration together with other like-minded countries to the establishment of a just and enduring peace."

Gromyko also lauded the help the Soviet Union has received and is receiving from the United States, "not only moral but substantial material support as well, in the form of airplanes, tanks, guns and other military material and also foodstuffs."

As he took note of the Anglo-American successes in North Africa, Sicily and Italy. These, coupled with the Soviet advance, he said, made it clear that the war

(Continued on Page 2)

See Close Ties

(Continued from Page 1)

is turning in favor of the United Nations.

But, he added, the total strength of all the United Nations will be required to deliver the final blow.

In reply, Mr. Roosevelt praised the "fortitude, courage and self-sacrifice of the armed forces and people of the Soviet Union." He said they have aroused the "undying admiration" of the American people.

This is a clipping from page 1 of the Daily Worker for [illegible] 1944
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

2 RUSSIAN POLICIES SEEN UNDER WAY

Stalin Said to Favor Union With Allies Holding Communist Germany as Alternative

By JAMES B. RESTON

By Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, Oct. 3—The forthcoming three-power conference among Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Foreign Commisar Vyacheslaff M. Molotoff and, it is hoped here, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, has revived what are regarded here as the three most important questions in European affairs. They are:

What is the foreign policy of Premier Stalin? Is he essentially nationalistic or is he an international revolutionary? What does he want from the other powers at the peace table? These questions, rather than the site and personnel of the conference, have priority in the minds of diplomat, officials and historians here.

While it is possible to get a great variety of picturesque, emotional and often contradictory answers to them, it is also true that at least some officials are reaching a few

Continued on Page Seven

Continued From Page One

objective tentative conclusions. The remainder of this dispatch is an attempt to put down the conclusions of the most responsible sources open to this correspondent.

Stalin Seen Seeking World Group

The first general conclusion is that Marshal Stalin—now that he sees the certainty of defeating Germany—is willing to join, in good faith, but under certain conditions, with the United States and Great Britain in establishing some kind of world authority to maintain the peace after the war.

The second conclusion is that he is going to attempt to reach that settlement without attempting to export communism outside eastern Europe, but that, at the same time, he is preparing an alternate policy on which he can fall back if he does not get the cooperation and the teritory that he considers essential to Russia's security.

The third conclusion is that he considers two things essential to creation of the kind of world authority that will guarantee the security of Russia and other nations after the war:

1. The cooperation of the United States and Britain in that world authority.

2. The acquisition by Russia of:

a. The Baltic States.

b. Roughly the 1939 boundaries with Poland including Vilna and Lwow.

c. The Finnish territory that he originally demanded from Finland before and after the "winter war," especially a base at Hangoe, which will enable Russia to protect the Gulf of Finland and Leningrad against attack from the west.

d. Bessarabia and parts of Bukovina now in Rumania. Access to the Mediterranean and through the Persian Gulf.

Many Questions Unanswered

These points, of course, leave many important questions unanswered. What, for example, does access to the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf mean? The truth is that Marshal Stalin is not saying precisely what he wants. It is also true, however, that, in framing a Russian policy, people in this part of the world make up their minds on the information available. As nearly as one can determine, these are matters that Russia beleives essential to her securtiy.

What this summary means, in minds of those observers who are trying to reach an objective analysis of Russia's position, is that it is now open to the United States and Britain, if they choose, to deal with Russia without fear of her attempting to establish some kind of Communist federation in Europe or entering upon an era of unlimited expansion.

Russia is not, in the opinion of

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Times for Oct. 4, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

these observers, folowing an enigmatic foreign policy; she has, in their opinion, two separate policies, one of cooperating with the western powers when she has what she calls "safe boundaries" and a second, to be put into effect if the first fails, of allying herself with a Communist Germany and with whatever Communist governments attain power in Europe and elsewhere after the war.

In other words, as these sources see it, Russia is doing no more now than she did after the First World War, when the new revolutionary government attempted to reach an agreement with the western powers and, failing, reverted to an alternate policy of signing the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany in 1922; or—as happened in 1939—when, having failed to make a deal on her own terms with Britain and France, Russia again swung to a treaty with Germany.

No Insincerity Found

This does not mean, in the opinion of these sources, that Russia is insincere in her attempts to reach an agreement with the United States and Britain. They are sure not only that she is sincere in her dealings but that, during the forthcoming conference and through the machinery of the Allied political commission that is scheduled to begin work this month in Algiers, we have a good chance of reaching an understanding with Russia that will produce an effective authority for maintaining peace.

The evidence that Russia is following one policy and preparing another in case the first should fail is on the record, the observers say. In support of their contention that Russia prefers the policy of collaboration with the Allies, they point to the following facts:

Marshal Stalin has indicated to officials of the United States and Britain that, now that victory is in sight, he is ready to end his isolation from Anglo-American councils and join the Allies in discussing not only Allied policy in liberated territories during the war but the policy to be followed by the Allies in those countries after the war.

Marshal Stalin, not Prime Minister Churchill or President Roosevelt, who suggested the creation of the permanent Allied political commission to deal with these problems after the Foreign Ministers and, perhaps, the Chiefs of State themselves had defined the general policy.

As further evidence of this trend toward a pro-Allied policy, the observers note the dissolution of the comintern, the changed attitude—at least outwardly—toward religion in Russia, the tendency within Russia to modify strict Socialistic theories in favor of a system in which merit is rewarded and officers and diplomats receive special privileges, and Marshal Stalin's willingness not only to make agreements with the United States but to sign a twenty-year treaty of alliance with Britain.

The 3-Power Conference

by James S. Allen

World Today

THE conference of British, American and Soviet foreign ministers which seems scheduled for the near future will certainly be important and, perhaps even decisive. But it is necessary to dismiss illusions with respect to what it can do.

At the outset, it should be clear that it cannot take the place of a second front. The decisive conference on that subject was held at Quebec. There it was decided not to open the second front this year. It was a thoroughly deliberated decision, made by the President and the Prime Minister in full consultation on the spot with their leading Cabinet members and the high military staffs.

It was made after the downfall of Mussolini and during the peace discussions with Badoglio, events which revealed the inner rottenness of the whole Axis structure in Europe. It was made after the Soviet summer offensive had become a sweeping advance towards the Dnieper, thus providing added weight to the thesis that immediate two-front war could strike the decisive blows at Hitler Germany this year.

No decision is eternal. It is still somewhat possible that the Soviet offensive, now pouring through the Smolensk gate to the West and battering its way across the Dnieper, may force a reversal of the Quebec decision.

Fear of the great political repercussions which would result from a single-handed Red Army victory takes place—with or without a second front—it would prove a fantastic illusion to expect that it is being held for the sole purpose of placing demands upon the Soviet Union.

Some press and radio commentators seem to think that it is the duty of the British and American ministers to act as the representatives of the plutocratic, pro-fascist cliques which claim to speak for the Baltic countries, Poland, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland. Such an approach would turn the conference into a fiasco even greater than previous military and political conferences held in Moscow in the fateful spring and summer of 1939.

No matter how serious the miscalculations of our leaders on the tempo of the war, certainly they will not be guilty of misunderstanding the Soviet position on such questions, already made very clear by Marshal Stalin in a number of speeches.

* * *

STILL other political adventurers approach the conference as a kind of slot-machine in which we can drop our coin and receive in return whatever we may want from the Soviet Union in the way of bases and military aid against Japan. The purveyors of this illusion are not as innocent as they may seem at first sight. Among them are certainly some who are deliberately attempting to wreck the conference in advance.

Among other illusions is the idea that a solid Anglo-American front, in the nature of an alliance to offset the Soviet position, can accomplish much of positive value at the Conference. The British Labor Party's **Daily Herald** (London) smacked that illusion in the right place, when of a tripartite meeting has to be to shorten the war, to prevent its prolongation. The Soviet position is also clear with respect to the anti-fascist, democratic forces of Europe and the objective of realizing self-determination of the peoples. On neither question can there be further uncertainty, delay or paralysis of action on our part.

* * *

IT SEEMS to me that our government will have to show a much greater inclination than it has yet shown to deal with the Soviet Union on an equal and friendly basis. The Allied Mediterranean Commission is a case in point.

In his speech to Parliament on Sept. 21, Churchill revealed that it was only after Stalin had himself suggested it that the Commission was agreed upon by the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt. Stalin's request was made in August in reply to a message from the British and U. S. leaders informing the Soviet Premier of the Italian peace proposals.

In the same speech in which he revealed these facts, the Prime Minister took pains to delimit and circumscribe the powers of the Commission in the following words:

"The Commission cannot, of course, supersede the authority or diminish the responsibilities of the Governments, but its members will be kept fully informed of all that passes and will have the power of individual or collective representations to their governments."

The appointments to the commission indicate how differently the governments involved, view its importance. The Soviet Union assigned Andrey Y. Vishinsky, a vice-commissar of Foreign Affairs and

for Oct. 9, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Stalin Rejects U.S. Plea to Confer in London

Russia

By Frederick Kuh

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PM Exclusive

LONDON, Oct. 2.—Russia is reliably reported to have rejected politely an American request to hold the three power conference in London instead of in Moscow.

According to trustworthy American sources, President Roosevelt personally intervened in the preparations for the conference by cabling Premier Stalin and asking that the meeting place, already fixed as Moscow, be shifted to London. The reason the President gave was that the health of Secretary of State Cordell Hull made the longer journey undesirable.

Stalin's reply, while friendly and courteous, was reported to have said regretfully that a last minute change of the scene would involve serious difficulty. The Soviet Premier apparently made clear his government's hope that Hull would be able to attend the Moscow conference.

The British have said throughout that they are ready to agree to any place Washington and Moscow might name.

What is the real explanation of the Russian attitude on this point?

¶ First, so much publicity has been given to Moscow as the place of the conference that an eleventh hour change might be considered humiliating.

¶ Second, since V. M. Molotov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs went to London and Washington last year he probably feels that Hull and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden should return the visit.

¶ Third, Molotov's present position renders his prolonged absence abroad highly undesirable from the Soviet viewpoint.

Stalin is again at the front and is likely to remain there, so Molotov is acting Premier.

Furthermore, Andrei Vishynski is soon going to Algiers to assume his new post as Russia's representative of the tri-power Mediterranean Commission and his departure will deprive Molotov of his deputy, as Vishynski deputizes for Molotov both in commissariat and foreign affairs and as vice premier.

As a result of latest developments, Moscow seems almost certain to be the scene of the conference and the question remains whether Hull will be able to stand the voyage there.

This is a clipping from page 7 of P M

for Oct. 3, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government

festoes than orations. Their ruggedness has not the Elizabethan quality nor the saberlike phrases of Churchill. They have none of the smooth, you-and-I-see-alike persuasiveness of Roosevelt.

Joseph Stalin's words read as though they had been carved with a sickle and pounded with a hammer. They are not the words of a man given to phrase-making. Had they much eloquence not all of the original thrill would be lost in translation. Thoughts are adequately but not very attractively clothed, and sometimes the speaker is as factually obvious as Calvin Coolidge.

But Coolidge was politically minded; Stalin was never under the necessity of carrying his own ward and never had to charm either a parliament or an electorate. These are the words of a man of direct action, a pamphleteer and an administrator. They are the words of a man who does not put wings to his thoughts. Except for calling Hitler a "cannibal" and declaring that the Great Intuitionist "no more resembles Napoleon than a kitten resembles a lion," one finds in these addresses few words which stick.

Each address and order of the day ends conventionally with a series of slogans and mouth-filling war cries: "Hail the victory of the Anglo-Soviet-American fighting alliances! Glory to our Red Army! Glory to our Red Navy! Damnation and death to the German fascist invaders, to their state, their army, their new order in Europe!"

While the Stalin addresses

Associated Press.
Joseph V. Stalin.

have not the eloquence of Roosevelt or Churchill, they match them in courage. Not even Churchill made more daring prophecy than did Stalin speaking before the Moscow Soviet, Nov. 6, 1941, when the Germans were almost outside the gates of Moscow. To the outside world the Russians at this time appeared making their last desperate stand.

But Stalin's words show calm confidence that Hitler had overreached himself, as indeed he had. With his back to the Kremlin, Marshal Stalin saw inevitable defeat for Germany. He saw the Nazis incapable of controlling their conquered territory. He saw the German home front another peril to Hitler; and the third inevitable factor in Germany's doom was a predicted "coalition" of United States, Britain and USSR.

Some of these things which Joseph Stalin foresaw in his darkest hour have already come true.

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File
Mr. McIntire

Communist Party - Russia

THE NEW YORK TIMES

Fighting Words From Moscow

IE WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION. By Joseph Stalin. Wartime Addresses of the Soviet Premier, in two volumes, 55 pp. and 40 pp. New York: International Publishing. 75 cents.

By S. T. WILLIAMSON

"F President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill should meet with the head of Soviet Russia, and if that eeting should be held in Washgton, then, in all probability, ight take place an event which ould have been fantastic even ree years ago: Joseph Stalin ight address a joint session of e Congress of the United ates.

What sort of a speech-maker is arshal Stalin? How does he ite with two other orators—oosevelt and Churchill—whose ords are heard 'round the world? These two slim little books, which contain Stalin's war addresses, give us clues, though sometimes no more than hints.

Here are four speeches and five "orders of the day" which Marshal Stalin delivered between July, 1941, when the Master Racers were cutting through the Ukraine like a knife through unrationed butter, and last May Day, after something had happened at a place called Stalingrad. Also reprinted are four Stalin letters in reply to questions of the moment from newspaper correspondents—Messrs. Parker of THE NEW YORK TIMES, Cassidy of The Associated Press and King of Reuters. Apparently this is the complete file of the wartime public utterances of the man in the Kremlin.

These addresses confirm two fairly general impressions. First, Joseph Stalin is still considerable of an enigma. Second, he got where he is by means other than climbing a stepladder of words. These impressions stand out even after conceding that we are not reading Stalin in his own language and that he appears to have been abominably translated. There are no phrases here which will go ringing down the ages. Judged by the speech-making fare to which English-speaking peoples are accustomed, the Stalin addresses are more manl-

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NOTE RECORDED
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This is a clipping from page 22 of the New York Times Book Rev. Sect. Oct. 3, 1943
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Emigre 'Socialists' Violate 1933 Treaty

When diplomatic relations were established in 1933 between the United States and the Soviet Union, it was expressly provided in the agreements signed by governmental representatives of both countries that no group of persons would be permitted on the soil of either country to advocate the overthrow of the other country's government.

Today, ten years after the signing of that agreement, groups of persons are actively operating on American soil to bring about the overthrow of the Soviet Government. They are openly advocating such overthrow in their press and public meetings, and they are helping to finance attempts at subversion on and in the neighborhood of Soviet territory.

Not only is this actively going on in flagrant violation of the diplomatic commitments made jointly in 1933, but it is going on in wartime, with attacks directed against a government allied to our own in a struggle which President Roosevelt has called a "war for survival."

Who are the people who thus make scraps of paper of treaties to which the United States Government is a party?

Who are the people who thus help Hitler by trying to smash the unity of the United Nations?

SOCIAL DEMOCRATS

They are chiefly Social Democratic emigres.

Among them are the Russian Social Democrats: Raphael Abramovich, N. Avksentiev, Nathan Chanin, Victor Chernov, and Nikifor Grigorieff, with whom may be counted the Socialist Revolutionary, Alexander Kerensky.

Among them also are the German Social Democrats: Friedrich Stampfer, Albert Grzezinski, and Rudolf Katz.

The activities of these emigres have been described often in the articles of Hans Berger and others in the **Daily Worker**, and are described by Arthur Speare in the October number of **Soviet Russia Today**. It is important to review them and bring them to the attention of American citizens.

Working with these emigres and accepting their influence and leadership are a number of American Socialists and Social Democrats, including David Dubinsky, Matthew Woll, Isadore Nagler (who made that disgraceful anti-Soviet speech in Southport, England, the other day), Luigi Antonini, Eugene Lyons, Algernon Lee and Norman Thomas.

Take the case of the Russian Social Democratic emigre, N. Avksentiev, who said at a dinner in New York, Dec. 13, 1940:

"It is time to understand that the Bolshevik system which oppresses freedom and the people in Russia is for all of us the same enemy as Hitler barbarism. It is impossible to liberate the world so long as Russia remains enslaved."

This Avksentiev, along with most of the others named above, signed a public declaration on July 1, 1941, saying that it was necessary to "use all means of moral and economic pressure to hasten the liquidation of Bolshevism."

Among the other signers of this declaration was the Russian Menshevik, Raphael Abramovich, who advised the United Nations to "bring about a situation of prolonged war." This is hardly a sentiment that Americans would approve, but Abramovich wants a long war as a way of injuring the Soviet Union.

Significantly, Abramovich was identified in a Moscow court as one of the foreign-based supporters of the Menshevik Fifth Columnists in a Soviet trial in 1931. Testimony by one of the defendants brought out the fact that Abramovich urged the carrying on of sabotage of Soviet industry as **"a preparatory stage . . . for the carrying out of (military) intervention."**

After this trial Abramovich wrote a pamphlet—published in London—in which he admitted that **"there has been an illegally active organization of our Party"** in the Soviet Union, which made reports to a head office in Berlin.

CHANIN'S "LAST SHOT"

Nathan Chanin is already infamous for his statement in **The Friend**, January, 1942:

"The last shot has not yet been fired. It will still be fired. And the last shot will be fired from free America—and from that shot the Stalin regime, too, will be shot to pieces."

Chanin also revealed in a pamphlet some years ago that he and others were carrying on underground work on Soviet territory. He issued an appeal for funds to support **"the difficult struggle our comrades carry on in Russia against Bolshevism."** Then he added: **"It is particularly important that the secret Social Democratic cells now at work in Russia should not cease, but should grow stronger and strike deeper roots. . . ."**

Victor Chernov is active in the Committee for the Promotion of Democracy, which agitates for the "independence of the Ukraine," which means separation of the Ukraine from the Soviet Union. Imagine what we would think if people in the USSR were agitating for the separation of Texas or California from the United States!

Chernov's "Social Revolutionary Party" publishes a magazine in New

This is a clipping from page 4 of the Daily Worker for Oct. 3, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

York, called Za Svobodu (For Freedom). In the May, 1943, issue there was a reference to an article in a whiteguard magazine Novoe Slovo (New Word), published in Berlin, telling about the anti-Soviet Underground. What this means is that while we are at war with Germany, Chernov somehow gets hold of anti-Soviet material from Nazi Germany.

Most surprising, in a way, is Nikifor Grigorieff, who only reached the United States in 1939. But ten years before his arrival here, he combined anti-Soviet propaganda with anti-Semitism in his magazine Suspilstvo (Community), published in Prague.

"A great anti-Jewish struggle will take place on the territory of the Ukraine, White Russia, Lithuania and Poland," he decared. Insisting that "both Soviet Russia and the Soviet Ukraine are in the hands of the Jews," he argued that "the rebirth of peoples, by force of circumstances, will turn in the first instance against the Jews."

ANTI-SEMITIC YARN

In Detroit, on Nov. 1, 1942, Grigorieff was still circulating anti-Semitic propaganda. He also distributed a pasphlet advocating that Ukrainians in the Red Army should desert from its ranks.

Kerensky's latest anti-Soviet act was the publication in Eugene Lyons' American Mercury of a scurrilous article entitled, "Russia Is Ripe for Freedom."

The German Social Democrats chime in with everything anti-Soviet.

Friedrich Stampfer said, at that same dinner at which Avksentiev spoke about liberating Russia:

"You Russian Socialists fought against the Tsar; we against the Kaiser; you now have the super-Tsar in Moscow—and we the super-kaiser in Berlin."

Stampfer thus slanders Stalin by comparing him with Hitler. But he lies when he says he fought against the Kaiser. He stuck to the Kaiser all through the First World War. Then when Hitler came to power, Stampfer and his colleagues capitulated to fascism without lifting a finger.

Grzezinski, pal of Stampfer, was the Prussian Police President who smashed down labor and left-wing groups but treated the Nazis tenderly.

Rudolf Katz is one of the editors of the Social Democratic paper published in the United States, the Volkszeitung, which on Nov. 8, 1941, spoke of the danger of trading "the devil Hitler for the Beelzebub Stalin."

Why doesn't the FBI crack down on these people who are giving aid and comfort to the Nazi enemy? Why doesn't the State Department take note of these violations of State treaties, which are part of the law of the land?

INDUSTRY IS WARNED OF POWER OF RUSSIA

Manufacturer Says U. S. S. R. May Dominate Europe After War

TORONTO, Oct. 2 (U.P.)—The terms of the Atlantic Charter might prevent Britain and the United States from opposing Russian domination of the Baltic States, Poland and the Danube Basin, the Balkans, Germany, France and Italy, Ralph E. Flanders, past president of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, said today.

Addressing a joint meeting of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers and the Engineering Institute of Canada, he said the greatest international post-war problem would be posed by the relations between the United States and Britain on the one hand, and Russia on the other.

That problem, he said, "overrides and overwhelms all planning of ideal world states, international police forces, world banks and other paper organizations on which we are so busily engaged."

"Don't be surprised," Mr. Flanders said, "if Russia comes out of the war dominant in the Baltic states, Poland, the Danube Basin and the Balkans; and if the only popular government that can be formed in Germany is one that accepts Russian political opinions. This may also be true in France and Italy—and it is probable that the British Empire and the United States together will be unable to prevent it under the Atlantic Charter.

Mr. Flanders, president of the Jones and Lamson Machine Co. of Springfield, Vt., said the only effective protection that the people of the western world would have against the spread of "unfortunate ideology" would be "active, rapid and effective development of our own economy to higher levels of employment, both profitable and productive to the mass of ordinary citizens."

Russia

This is a clipping from page 17 of the New York Times for Oct. 3, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Stalin's Quislings—Kremlin Rallies Intern'l Circles To Support Soviet Maneuver for 'Free Germany'

By Ruth Fischer

THE old machinery has been pressed into service again, and in a dozen key political centres all over the world noisy drums can be heard beating for Josef Stalin's latest international maneuver—the Moscow "Free German" Committee.

In London the fellow-traveler circles have set up an adjunct to the "Free German" committee, which now includes leading captured members of Hitler's SS corps.

In Mexico, the old standbys, Ludwig Renn and André Simon, are organizing the new apparatus on the Kremlin's cue.

In the United States, *The German-American*, the weekly magazine of German Stalinists here, is taking up its positions—with the familiar network of Kremlin-Set anti-fascists—Lion Feuchtwanger, Carl Zuckmayer, Oscar Maria Graf, Prof. Walter Rautenstrauch, Alfred Kantorowicz, Henry Kassirer, with some of the old-timers like Albert H. Schreiner and Hermann Duncker.

On all sides praises are being sung for the "wise" policy of the Moscow manifesto, the new promise of a "democratic" way out for the German people. The Soviet Embassy in Washington (and other capital offices) is receiving "heartiest greetings" all the time.

"We hail with utmost optimism your manifesto as a concrete step toward the liberation of the German people . . ." Carl Zuckmayer writes "Genuine democracy" is now on the agenda for Germany.

In somewhat similar accents the *American Friends of German Freedom*, approached by Tass, the Russian news agency, formulated a "welcoming" statement. It was signed by Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, without doubt, one of the many honest victims of the flexible political skill of the "veterans." Paul Hagen is a member of the American Friends of German Freedom and Hagen knows many of these "genuine democrats" from long, intimate personal experience. *The German-American* features with glee the greeting from the *American Friends*, and of course makes no mention of Hagen. The influence of the old-timers can apparently be reliably counted upon. . . . What obvious mechanics, but how efficiently it all works!

WHAT few really innocent admirers there are of Stalin's "Free German" maneuver, do not seem to be facing the fundamental facts.

The backbone of the Moscow Committee consists of two well-known German communists, Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck. These are old-timers, educated and tested by GPU methods; they have survived as the "fittest," by virtue of unscrupulous character, cynical adjustment to Stalinist party requirements, not to mention their efficient criminality. They are, simply put, Stalin's hench-men—and a long and disgusting record is easily available of murder (in Russia and in Spain of dissident socialists and communists) and assassination, and of police provocation of the most dirty kind.

Wherever men like Ulbricht and Pieck have operated, "democracy" and the "free labor movement" have been in danger. Their organizations have never been anything but special divisions of the Stalinist apparatus, branches of the GPU system.

Were it not so tragic, it would seem like an absurd joke to see here in New York the cream of the German emigration freely serving as dressing for Stalin's latest maneuver! Many of these men are forthright anti-fascists and no "political babies," but they are playing willingly and consciously the Kremlin's cards.

Nor is any closer attention paid to the actual content of the manifesto, in which there is a direct offer to the German Army. The manifesto states:

"There are forces in the army that are

George Dimitroff

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loyal to the country . . . One hundred and thirty years ago when German troops still stood on Russian soil as enemy, it was precisely from Russia that the finest sons of the Germans—von Stein, Arndt, Clausewitz, York and others—appealed to the conscience of the German people over the heads of their traitors, the German rulers, and called upon them to wage a *liberation war*."

This offer is of the highest political significance. It involves without doubt the possibility of a re-arrangement of Russian-German relationship after the "purging" of Hitler and the Hitlerites, under the leadership of the High Command of the German Army. It is just these passages—in combination with the appeal to the Bismarck myth (impersonated by the figure of his great grandson), Lutvinov's and Maisky's withdrawl, the whole tense atmosphere during and after the Quebec conference between Washington and Moscow— that has started a discussion about the possibility of an imminent walkout by Russia. This much can be said—Any policy which leaves intact, or promises to leave intact the German Army of Bismarckian tradition, "restored and improved" as it has been under Nazi rule, is deadly dangerous for any future socialist, liberal and labor movement in Germany. It was just the conservation of this army, its innumerable illegal formations, its "black" Reichswehr, that gave birth to the Nazi movement and prepared the grave for German labor.

"Genuine democracy" together with a tradition of York von Wartenburg and Ernst Moritz Arndt, most reactionary promotors of German militarism, is a revolting farce.

* * *

BUT this policy of combining a new German militarism and nationalism, blended together with the Stalinist "Free German" movement, characterizes not only this manifesto, but all of Stalinist policy towards Germany from the beginning of the Russian-German war. The "line" is well-prepared and well-planned, and the manifesto is only the conclusion of a long series of organizational steps, to build up a new kind of a nationalistic German movement under Russian leadership.

The writers and prominent anti-fascists, who hail here and in Mexico the "Clever Policy of the Wise Father Stalin," are only of the ideological branches of the whole system. In the same issue of the magazine "*German-American*, Erich Weinert, the president of the Moscow Committee, reports the efforts that are being made "with considerable success" among the German war prisoners in Russia. The anti-fascist "veterans," communists, socialists and catholics, were the backbone at the beginning of the new movement. "The slow development during the first period had its reasons in the fact, that many officers and soldiers would not believe in the *patriotic character* of the anti-fascist front. . . ." Officers were boycotted at the beginning, but the building up of a "United Front" of war-prisoners and emigrants, soldiers and officers soon became established. Initiating committees were formed in various war-prison camps, which asked the Moscow center for the preparation of a "national committee."

This report of Weinert confirms other news about the intense organizational and propagandistic preparations of the Stalinist apparatus for the day of Hitler's breakdown.

Clearly, tens of thousands of future Stalinist German agents, of a new type and of a new political character, are being trained in these camps.

In an other issue of the same *German-American* Oberleutnant Charisius, Captain Dr. Hadermann, a Professor in civil life, Major Carl Hetz and Major Homann are mentioned as the speakers of the national committee in Moscow. "In his speech, Oberleutnant Charisius described how from an active member of the Hitler party he became an opponent of Hitler." And the list continues, Corporal Hans Zippel, commercial employe from Berlin; Captain Fleischer, an economist in civil life; Corporal Helmschrott, a peasant; Corporal Sintz, a building worker; Corporal Eschborn, a Catholic, came out for the "freedom of religion;" Lieutenant Frankenfeld; a young soldier Kessler, *etc.* And after the speech of Wilhelm Pieck entitled "There must not be a new 1918" and a speech of Lieutenant Graf von Einsiedel, the Protestant minister Mathias Klein took the floor. . . .

To underestimate the possible impression and influence of such combinations in the confused and tense atmosphere of Germany and of Europe today would be naive and stupid.

* * *

STALIN has over a long period played a very complicated game of give-and-take with the nationalistic movement in Germany, before Hitler came to power, and in the years of Hitler's rule.

The Russian-German agreement of August 1939 was not a delaying action for better military preparation, but a day of triumph for a policy of long standing.

The rapid breakdown of France upset Stalin's plan of waiting in a corner of the theater of the Second World War —his intention was "not to get the chestnuts out of the fire" for the others and to come in with his own aspirations and claims at the propitious moment. The turn of events, the rapid growth of the Nazi power transformed this political line; but behind the screen of the victories of the Red Army, the prospects for a new form of the long-schemed Russian-German continental block appear strong. (It should not be overlooked that the honeymoon between Gen. deGaulle and Fernand Grenier, communist chieftain of Paris-St. Denis and "the Ulbricht type" fits wonderfully into this pattern*)

Is it too late for a return of the partners, Russia and Germany? The war's destruction of the industrial potential in both countries may have gont too far. Perhaps the continental block will not be possible for a defeated Germany, too

(Continued on Page Seven)

Kremlin's Policy Towards Reich

(Continued from Page Five)

weak to perform complicated political maneuvers. Perhaps the disruption of Russia's economy, makes her much more dependent on Washington and London than it seems today. Perhaps all this noisy campaign against Washington is nothing more than an empty masquerade to squeeze out more military and economic help, more political concessions.

But the problem of the "Free Germans" would remain in any case one of the major problems with regard to the key question of post-war Europe: "What will happen to Germany?".

IT does appear that post-war Germany, whatever forms of political and economic life it may have in the first phases after the defeat of Hitler, will be in the orbit of Stalinist Russia.

No treaties or agreements will hinder Stalin from organizing his influence through thousands of different committees, organizations, through a rich assortment of various, well-selected and obedient personalities. In the coming gigantic battle for the answer to the problem "Whither Germany after Hitler?", the Stalinists are the only force with organizational preparation.

It is an error, to believe that these emigrants will not be an important influence in post-war Germany. They include the best-known (and to my great regret I must add the most talented) writers in exile—and what an amazing amount of propaganda-literature will come forth! They all know Germany well, have roots in the past of their country and are for the most part "real Germans." . . . In the midst of this crowd move the controlling agents, the "veterans" and the orchestra.

Stalin's tender regard for the finest sons of Germany, von Clausewitz & Co., is not only a political weapon in the entangled diplomatic duel between Moscow and Washington today—but a serious attempt to incorporate the whole militaristic heritage of Nazi-Germany into the Russion post-war system. This includes the "Landsknechts," the elite-troopers, and as many generals as possible.

For the realization of such a plan, the "veterans" are necessary and most valuable. Nowhere more than in the German milieu has the totalitarian ideology accumulated strength and tradition.

The enigma of the dissolution of the Comintern was speedily interpreted as gesture of "good will and of good neighborliness" towards the West. But it was at least as much a gesture for the winning over of the nationalistic German elements.

In the September issue of *Freies Deutschland*, the monthly magazine of the Mexican group of the German Stalinists, Paul Merker, another old veteran (and specialist for the "Red Trade-Union Movement") writes in an article entitled "The dissolution of the Comintern:" *"The independence and the national character of the German anti-Nazi opposition was emphasized by this decision."*

In addition to the "Free Germans" all kind of "Free Europeans" in the underground and in the "overground" are moving in this direction. Students of the problems of "post-war Europe" and all blue-printers of the future world would do well to examine and analyze the "Free German Movement."

Will Stalinism be able to export its goods, not only as means for pro-Russian propaganda, but for home consumption in the ruined and decaying social systems of the war-stricken countries?

And how long will Stalin be able to handle the situation under circumstances where one crisis will follow the other?

To answer is difficult. There has been, unfortunately, no serious attempt to understand the profound changes which have taken place inside Russia under the terrible strain and the new experiences of the war. The future of Europe may be said to depend to a very large extent on the scope and the direction of these changes. "Genuine democracy" under the shadow of Russian totalitarian rule is an empty phrase. "Free Germans" under this leadership are nothing else than the future Quislings (or Ulbrichts) of a new slave-society.

With regard to complicity in international offenses, the position is even more involved. The machinery at work in such cases is highly ramified and composed of a whole system of interconnected links, and accordingly the threads between the confederates are even more delicate and tangled. Herman Bucher, the proprietor of an electric concern, or Ernst P., the steel king, are not posted outside to keep a lookout while the German soldiery dispersed over Europe plunders civilians and burns the property of Soviet collective farms.

In the vast majority of cases they do not know the actual perpetrators of these crimes and are not interested in knowing them. Yet they do keep a lookout, not in the technical sense as the term is used in the underworld, but in a deeper and more pernicious sense. They, the financial magnates, stand guard for the Hitlerite clique.

For with their funds, factories and guns they support and maintain the system of governmental banditry. Thus, the financial sharks, too, must not be absolved from legal responsibility. By determining the policy of the fascist party and helping to put it into practice, and by action in concert with the other participants in these offenses, the German financial magnates, too, are accomplices in the organization of these fascist crimes, accessories to these acts.

In enumerating the culprits, we cannot omit to mention the private invidivuals who, while not endowed with any lofty titles and not holding any official position in the German government machine, and not enrolled in Germany's armed forces, yet have been and are guilty of criminal complicity in acts of Nazi violence and plunder.

There are two species of violations of rights by private individuals to be singled out: The offense of exploiting the forced labor of civilians deported against their will into fascist servitude, and that of receiving goods known to be stolen or obtained by plunder in the occupied territories.

The fascists endeavor to invest both these offenses with a fictitious semblance of legality. The forced labor is supplied by the state, the plundered property is sold by the state. But the persons guilty of appropriating slave labor and the property of others are not absolved thereby from criminal responsibility. The criminality of Hitlerite policy is by now well enough known inside Germany, too! It has long ceased to be a secret.

Moreover, the acts in question themselves bear all the features qualifying them as punishable under every code of law in the world. For the labor relations existing in Germany between the imported laborer and his master are not at all the relations of hired employment even under the exploiters' law of the capitalist state, which does formally assume that the individual is a free agent in respect of his labor power and does include certain, though of course very insufficient, regulations governing working conditions.

Forcible deportation to servitude in fascist Germany, the master's unlimited authority over the laborer and the brutal exploitation of the latter involve actions and proceedings constituting specific criminal offenses, including assault and battery, unlawful imprisonment, maiming and others.

It is accordingly with every justification that V. M. Molotov's Note of May 11, 1943, states:—

"At the same time the Soviet Government holds fully responsible also those private persons in Germany who are inhumanly exploiting at their enterprises or in their households the forced labor of peaceful Soviet citizens. These private persons must bear their full responsibility for the countless privations and sufferings they have brought to the Soviet people."

Similarly the purchase of factory equipment removed from the occupied territories or of factories or real estate belonging to institutions of the occupied territories, which are not and cannot be regarded as the property of the occupation authorities, is tantamount to receiving goods known to be stolen, for which private individuals, too, must be held to be responsible.

Summary

Thus the criminal responsibility of the members of the international fascist criminal organizations may be defined as follows:—

Hitler and his cabinet ministers, the fascist party leaders and the German army command, Hitler, Goering, Hess, Goebbels, Himmler, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg and the rest, and Hitler's commissioners and representatives in the occupied areas, are the organizers and perpetrators of these grievous violations of the principles of international intercourse and human ethics. The heads of the financial or industrial concerns supporting them are the organizers of these crimes and associates in them. All of them, as members of the Hitlerite clique, are members of a gang of offenders against international law.

At the same time all of them are the organizers of the innumerable and atrocious criminal offenses committed by the Hitlerite hordes. For these latter offenses, moreover, the full measure of responsibility must be laid at the door of the persons guilty of their actual commission: the actual thieves, murderers, incendiaries, violators of personal rights, exploiters of slave labor and receivers of stolen goods.

For these heinous crimes against the life, liberty and culture of the nation stern punishment must be meted out to all the culprits.

Note; The Soviets choose to prosecute as war guilty, the capitalists behind the Hitler regime.

It is pointed out;

"It is well known that the Hitlerite ruling circles, Hitler and his clique, have their social basis. They are maintained by the big financial and business magnates. Are these a party to the Hitlerite crimes?"

Information Bulletin, Embassy of USSR, Oct 2, 1943, p. 6.

The answer is then given in the following terms;

"They, the financial magnates, stand guard for the Hitlerite clique.

For with their funds, factories and guns they support and maintain the ysstem of governmental banditry. Thus, the financial sharks, too, must not be absolved from legal responsibility. By determi ing the policy of the fascist party and helping to put it into practice, and by action in concert with the other participants in these offenses, the German financial magnates, too, are accomplices in the organization of these fascist crimes, accessories to these acts."

Ibid, p. 7.

In speaking of the criminal responsibility of those who use slave labor in Germany, it was pointed out that

"... labor relations existing in Germany between the imported laborer and his master are not at all the relations of hired employment <u>even under the exploiters' law of the capitalist state.</u>"

Ibid, p. 7.

This should be significant as showing that the official view of the Soviet Union concerning the exploiting character of all capitalist states has not changed.

THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR NAZI CRIMES

By Professor A. Farrin

The following article was published in the Moscow periodical, WAR AND THE WORKING CLASS:

Among the questions which concern the Allies, and which will become urgent after the defeat of the fascist army, is the question of who is to be held personally responsible for the crimes committed by the fascist hordes.

This question of the individuals on whom the responsibility for fascist crimes is to be laid is already a subject of discussion, and is viewed in different lights by different strata of society. Some judges are more or less inclined to be lenient. It is the duty of the Soviet legal profession to discuss the matter in accordance with the principles of international and Soviet law.

Responsibility of the Guilty State

It must be recognized quite definitely that the aggressor state can and must bear political responsibility, e. g., through disarmament, and material responsibility, e. g., through restitution of war damage. It is perfectly clear, however, that the state as such cannot bear criminal responsibility. Since a state cannot be brought before the criminal court, there at once arises the question of the criminal responsibility of parties representing the state and acting on its behalf.

It should be borne in mind that the state as such cannot act as a party to a court suit, criminal or otherwise. The state functions and acts through its machinery of government. The responsibility of the state, both political and material, which is generally recognized under international law, also arises as a result of the actions of the state authorities, its representatives and agents.

Accordingly, responsibility for criminal actions committed in the name of the state, or on behalf of the state, rests on the actual perpetrators of these acts, the individuals actually invested with the authority of government, its representatives and agents.

To say that it is not Hitler and his clique that should be in the dock, but the German state, would be a gross distortion of historical truth. It would amount to the substitution of a pernicious figment for definite individuals and indisputable facts. The state cannot be absolved of its responsibility for the crimes which the war involves, but this responsibility is political and material.

Criminal responsibility, on the other hand, must be laid at the door of the individuals who carried out policies violating the laws humanity has made and the canons of the international code.

Such is the principle in broad outline. It should be most specifically applied, so that the individual responsible for Hitlerite crimes may be seen in his true light, as regards both the place he has occupied and the role he has played.

Responsibility of the German People

Whoever speaks of the responsibility of Germany and the German people for this war and for all the crimes perpetrated by the Hitlerite hordes, whoever speaks of the great burden of guilt resting on them for all the outrages they have committed on the orders of the Hitlerite government and the German army command, naturally has in mind moral, political and material responsibility. That responsibility admits of no question.

But the responsibility of the German people cannot be defined in terms of criminal law. On this subject a pertinent remark was made in a work examining German crimes during the first world war, which said: "The nation as a whole is to blame, and it must be penalized in the person of those of its members who carried out the plan of hatred and revenge." The author is A. Merignat, writing in the *Revue Generale* of January-February, 1917.

The millions of German people cannot be brought before the criminal court as the collective accomplice in Hitler's crimes. Not only is that impracticable; it would be politically false, for one should constantly bear in mind Stalin's revealing remark that "Hitlers come and go, but the German people and the German state continue."

Thus, in deciding the problem of Nazi responsibility under the criminal code, it is essential to determine quite definitely and specifically which individuals or groups of individuals are to be regarded as the instigators, organizers and perpetrators of Hitlerite crimes, or accomplices in these crimes.

Responsibility of the Actual Perpetrators of Crimes

But first of all let us examine the nature of the actual perpetrators. The general run of fascists are callous, brutal and avaricious. They plunder and kill on the orders of their superiors. They also plunder and kill of their own accord, actuated by the cruelty and ferocity of a beast that has broken loose.

But these men are not the instigators or organizers of governmental banditry. They are not concerned with world problems; but with the private business

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of plunder. Accordingly, the German soldier who kills a Soviet collective farmer, outrages the collective farmer's wife, or burns down a building that is the property of the collective farm, is responsible for these particular offenses of banditry, murder or arson.

It is he who actually commits these criminal offenses, and he will not escape responsibility for them, even if he was carrying out the orders of his superiors. Even the Imperial Court of Leipzig, before which Germany staged her mock trial regarding responsibility for the war of 1914-1918—even this Court at Leipzig, trying the case of Ditmar, who torpedoed a British hospital ship on his submarine commander's order, did not absolve Ditmar of criminal responsibility. This is recorded in the *Voelkische Zeitung* of July, 1921.

Such is the role and responsibility of the rank and file of fascist soldiers who carry out the orders of their gangster chiefs.

Responsibility of the Nazi Chiefs

Very different is the position of these chiefs themselves, or the men in command. It is they who devise and put into effect this whole system of militarized crime. It would accordingly be wrong to regard them merely as associates in the criminal offenses committed by the Nazi officers and men.

The responsibility of the men in command is of another order, a different quality. They are guilty of other offenses, of grave offenses of their own commission, of working out and pursuing a policy the whole of which is an outrage against the principles of international law, a system of organized governmental banditry. They are the perpetrators of these crimes against international law.

Specifically this category of worst offenders against international and criminal law include first and foremost the head and members of the German government, Hitler and his cabinet ministers. This is the first, most dangerous, most vicious body of international offenders.

They took the lead in preparing, organizing and perpetrating the most heinous crime in the history of the human race, the perfidious attack on the Soviet Union, accompanied by the flagrant violation of all human standards and all the canons and regulations of international law.

Inseparably connected with this governing group is another body of criminals, the fuehrer and the members of the fascist party, great and small. By the law of the unity of the party and the state, published on December 3, 1933, the Nazi organization was organically tied up with the German government machine.

The heads of the government departments are at the same time the leaders of the party. The men at the head of the local authorities are simultaneously in charge of the local party branches. It follows that the government fuehrer and the party fuehrer are closely associated in their political and criminal activities, and must be held equally responsible for Hitlerite misdeeds.

The German army command organizing and directing the operations of this army of plunder is also to be classed with these criminal leaders of the party and government. And finally, immediately associated with this group are the numerous officials and deputies, commissioners and gauleiters who are putting into practice the policy of terror, plunder and violence in the occupied territories and in Germany itself.

V. M. Molotov, in his Note of May 11, 1943, stated:—

"The Soviet Government places the whole responsibility for these vile crimes, which are being committed in flagrant violation of the universally accepted rules governing the conduct of war, in the first place upon the ruling Hitlerite clique and the command of the German-fascist army. The Soviet Government also holds fully responsible for the above crimes all those Hitlerite officials who are in charge of the recruitment, abduction, transport, maintenance in camps, selling into slavery and inhuman exploitation of Soviet peaceful citizens, forcibly carried from their native country to Germany."

Hitler and his ministers, the Nazi party, the army command, the Hitlerite government commissioners, have all engaged in a policy of unbridled government banditry, a policy involving the systematic violation of all the traditions of international law, perfidious aggression, terror, violation of international obligations and customs of war and the organization of military banditry.

All these most grievous crimes against law and man, all these criminal outrages against human beings and nations are their handiwork, although it is not their hands that are burning towns and murdering civilians. They are the real organizers and perpetrators of these crimes.

Complicity in International Offenses

It is well known that the Hitlerite ruling circles, Hitler and his clique, have their social basis. They are maintained by the big financial and business magnates. Are these a party to the Hitlerite crimes?

Complicity in crime may take various forms. The individual members of a gang or group may not be known to one another, and may yet be responsible for all the crimes the gang or group commits.

Russia

Europeans Watch Russia 3

By HAROLD CALLEDNER

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Sept. 30—While Britons and Americans tend to regard the Russian problem, soon to be discussed by the three foreign ministers as part of the task of the three-power agreement for world peace, the European view, as reflected in diplomatic and informed American circles here, is that it poses the issue who is to dominate Europe after the defeat of Germany.

This view, as expressed in similar terms by experts of various nationalities, is in substance as follows:

Europe seems likely to face the alternative of an easterly or westerly orientation—of linking up with Moscow or with an Anglo-American entente, however informal. The present negotiations between Washington and London on the one hand and Moscow on the other may determine which alternative may be imposed, regardless of their will, upon the European States.

For twenty years, as one diplomat put it, Europe has been flooded by fascist and communist propaganda to the effect that the democracies were feeble and decadent. The appearance of American soldiers on European soil will tend to confute it and will revive Europeans' faith in the democracies and in democracy, but only if behind those troops is a policy that offers Europe some hope of democratic revival—that is, of a Western orientation that can succeed.

The United States, these observers believe, cannot permanently condone or support a Europe divided into spheres of influence, but they conclude that this will happen unless there is a British-American policy to prevent it.

Some Europeans are shocked and frightened by the assumption, often heard here and in London, that Russia is fated to dominate Europe and that Britain and the United States must seek a rapprochement with her accordingly. The Scandinavians, the Poles, even the Yugoslavs in spite of their affinity with Russia, inquire anxiously whether this is to be our policy.

"We can find the road to Moscow if we must," said one European expert, "but we would like to know whether we must."

These observers recall that France and Britain were never fully united, that they were further divided by the collapse of France and that there now has developed a chilliness between the United States and the French leaders in Algiers. Yet they believe that France must play a vital role in the European picture and that logically she should be the strongest single national force in favor of a westerly orientation.

They note meanwhile that Premier Stalin has sent to Algiers as his representative, and as the Russian member of the new Mediterranean Commisison, A. A. Vyshinsky, former Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs and the prosecutor in the famous trials of 1936 to 1938. This is taken in all quarters here to indicate the importance that Mr. Stalin attaches to France and to Russian connections with France after the war.

This naturally is related in Europeans' minds with the whole picture of the continent which they fear may become a series of spheres of influence, with Moscow's being the greatest, at least in Eastern and Central Europe.

This is a clipping from page 3 of the New York Times for Oct. 1, 1943

Clipped at the Seat of Government.

End of Moscow Pact Conf.

Russia Suggested Eden Talks With Turks, Washington Hears

By BLAIR BOLLES.

The conversations between Foreign Secretary Eden of Great Britain and Turkish Foreign Minister Menemencioglu were undertaken at the suggestion of the Soviet Union, it was learned yesterday, with a view to facilitating a Russian advance into the Balkans by getting the Turks to open the Dardanelles, Sea of Mamora and the Bosphorus to ships carrying war materials for Russia.

The Russian request that Mr. Eden, representing a country which has an established treaty relationship with Turkey, talk with the Turks was one of the final actions at the Moscow conference. The Russians already have laid the groundwork for vigorous political penetration of the Balkans by the appointment of V. G. Dekanosov as Minister to Bulgaria. A former Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dekanosov is one of the most energetic and ablest Russian diplomats.

New Details Revealed.

New details of what took place during the historic Moscow sessions among Secretary of State Hull, Mr. Eden and Foreign Commissar Molotov are now coming to light.

Before Mr. Hull set out for Russia, he received a suggestion that he meet Mr. Eden en route. The British government wanted an American-British understanding on territorial questions.

Secretary Hull declined the British invitation. He wanted to approach the Moscow conference without previous commitments. He feared that the Russians would suspect in a Hull-Eden conversation some planning injurious to the Soviets.

On arrival in Moscow Mr. Hull took a sounding of Russian wishes—whether they wanted to talk about general matters or to get down to details. He soon reached the conclusion they wanted above all to establish a general understanding.

Avoided Two Issues.

The Secretary approached the conference with a determination that it was going to succeed. He did not want to endanger it by pressing on the Soviets questions with which they did not wish to deal. With that in mind, he passed up two matters:

1. Territorial questions, in which the future nature of Germany is involved.

2. The nature of military occupation: What is to be the role of occupying armies?

Mr. Hull took to Moscow the principal proposition in which he was interested—the four-nation collective security declaration. He had tried in his September speech to give the world the gist of the nature and implication of that declaration, which was prepared here by Sumner Welles, Hamilton Fish Armstrong of the Council on Foreign Affairs, and other experts.

The inclusion of China in the declaration was an American suggestion. American official declarations repeatedly emphasized the role of China as one of the leading powers.

Stand on War Criminals.

The immediate interest of the Russians was the declaration on the treatment of war criminals. Mr. Molotov presented that document to the conference. It followed closely and went beyond a statement on war criminals which had been circulated earlier from the Soviet Embassy here.

At the suggestion of Andrei Vishinsky, former vice foreign commissar, the Italian Declaration was brought up for consideration. In his duties as Soviet representative on the Mediterranean Commission (known officially as the Military-Political Committee), Mr. Vishinsky had reported to Moscow his views on how the political side of the war being fought in Italy could be improved.

The Russians apparently had it in mind that something like the Italian Declaration would be adopted when they announced their "acceptance" of the Italian armistice. The word conveyed something less than approval. The Italian Declaration was intended to guarantee that the fight against Fascism would bring the triumph of democracy.

Polish Question Dropped.

The British took a sounding as to whether the Russians would consider re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the Polish government. The British did not get enough encouragement to pursue the question. It is believed the British had the Polish question in mind when they suggested the preliminary Eden-Hull conversation. The British are said to have hoped that some Polish territorial compromise would open the way for resumption of diplomatic relationships.

In view of the present speed of the Russian advance, the absence of diplomatic relations between Poland and Russia grows daily more embarrassing, for each Soviet triumph takes the Red armies nearer to Poland.

The Polish view is that the time for territorial adjustments, if they are to come, is after the cessation of hostilities, and that in the meanwhile the territories of Poland up to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact of 1939 must be considered still the territories of Poland. Those territories were defined in the Treaty of Riga, 1921, and Russia repudiated the Ribbentrop-Molotov settlement in the agreement signed between the Polish and Soviet Governments in London on July 30, 1941.

Indirect Soviet Claims.

The Soviet Government has made no direct claim to eastern Poland. Ambassador Ourjansky in Mexico City made an inferential claim to the territory eight days ago, and Russian journals, which are subject to rigid government control, have made the territorial claim.

In the absence of Polish-Russian relations, the nature of Russian occupation of a region in which it has a direct interest would raise absorbing questions. The Americans and British have no direct interest in the occupation of Italy beyond its usefulness in the development of the war.

To show their desire to deal with all questions, the Russians joined with the British and Americans in creating the London Commission, whose province is to deal with the political problems left unsolved at Moscow.

The Russian interest in the Turkish question arose out of the desirability of improving the route of supply to the Red armies, which now are fed from the outside through Iran.

In response to the British proposal that they open the straits, the Turks parried with a demand for a guarantee of the integrity of European Turkey. The British could not guarantee it from the Germans, and they could not guarantee it from the Russians, since they were not speaking directly for the Russians, but the prospect of agreement on this question with the Russians is said to be good. The Turkish view is that to open the straits is to invite war.

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politics would no longer be needed.

Toward Agreement

Both Mr. Hull and the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, in his report to Parliament, made clear that it had been agreed at Moscow to postpone settlement of many important issues. The nature of some of the postponed problems was indicated by Constantine Oumansky, Russian Ambassador to Mexico, who said that Red Armies still had 280 miles to go to reach the Soviet borders, indicating that Russia would insist on keeping the territory she acquired in Poland in 1939. Also important was the report of the Russian newspaper, Izvestia, that the Russian Foreign Commissar V. M. Molotoff opposed establishment of the federations of small states favored by the Western Allies. All this seemed to indicate that while an agreement to agree had been established at Moscow, large problems remained before that agreement could be implemented.

One of the big problems was a general settlement of the thirty-odd boundary disputes inside Europe. The Moscow conference, Mr. Hull said, had agreed to leave these to be arranged after hostilities end. But one among them affected two of the United Nations—Russia and Poland. In 1939 and 1940 Russia occupied some 165,025 square miles containing a population of 22,000,000 persons in Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Rumania. Russia has declared that these frontiers were outside the bounds of discussion with her allies. But in many quarters there were hopes that if the Soviet Government were certain that friendly governments would be established in those countries and if she were assured of a general guarantee of the peace, a compromise might be effected.

Another problem was the question of Germany's fate in the post-war world. A pattern for encouraging democracy and suppressing fascism in defeated enemy lands had apparently been set at Moscow. Remaining to be decided were specific problems on what would happen in Germany after hostilities ended. There was speculation in Europe

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Spread of Russian Influence In Postwar Europe Forecast

By Constantine Brown.

More than three weeks have elapsed since the world learned of the Moscow agreements—and the news of the pacts have been described as the most momentous since the start of the war.

In this cooling-off period the various agreements signed in the Soviet capital have been carefully examined along with Secretary Hull's assurance that there were no "secret" understandings. They provide comfort to us from the military point of view and for the immediate future. But they suggest many questions for which only the future can provide an answer. The nature of these questions should be examined, and to do so does not detract from the value of the Moscow conference.

America's neutrality ended in March, 1941, when Congress passed the Lease-Lend Act empowering the President to lease-lend or give to the nations opposing aggression all they needed to bring their fight to a successful conclusion.

At that time we regarded as the foes of democracy all the nations fighting the countries which at least on the surface had subscribed to preserve democratic principles. These four nations were Germany, Italy, Japan and Russia. By some unfortunate trick of fate the Russians, who today are fighting more brilliantly than any other nation to destroy Hitlerism, were on the side of our enemies, and we have to be thankful that Hitler was so blinded that he decided to turn against Premier Stalin, the leader of his most powerful associate in the early days of the war.

Had Feared Peace Move.

For several months prior to the Moscow conference of the representatives of the United States, Britain and Russia there had been discussion in Washington and London of the possibility that the Russians might make a separate peace with the Germans if the Germans agreed to certain terms which were said to include the surrender of all occupied territories as far as the Russian-German border of 1941 was concerned and the expulsion of Hitler and his Nazi gang from control of German affairs.

It is impossible to ascertain how well founded this possibility was. It was, at least, a possible contingency which required study. We do not know whether this contingency was supported by any actual intentions in that field by the Russians. Until the history of the war is written many years hence we shall remain in the dark as far as this phase is concerned.

But the fact remains that the question was seriously discussed by the American and British leaders at various meetings and it was decided to hold the Moscow meeting to learn what was going on and to get Russia's point of view on this and other matters in connection with the war and the peace which will follow the war.

At any rate, the conversations, superintended by Premier Marshal Stalin, ended with a complete agreement on a point of supreme importance to us—the Russians will continue to fight until the unconditional surrender of the Nazis. Whether their continuation in the war will be predicated on an Allied offensive across the channel next spring is not yet clear. It is assumed that the promise for such an offensive has been reiterated in Moscow.

The Russian press, which is the best mouthpiece for the Soviet government, has ceased its daily demands for an offensive and is now recognizing that the air activities of the Allied air forces in the west and the operations of our forces in Italy are a valuable contribution to final victory in Europe.

Some of the Questions.

The rest of the agreements reached in Moscow were taken at their face value. They are highly encouraging, although they are silent on a great many things we would like to know. We have, for instance, given expression more than once to the thought that the smaller nations, whose independence has been destroyed by the totalitarians that their political and territorial sovereignty will be safeguarded. How much will a new working alliance with Russia change our views on the self-determination of the smaller nations.

No news has yet come out of Moscow as to what will happen to all those king-

Russia

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doms and republics which have been in the democratic camp since 1939. We saw one document whereby Austria, which was occupied by a Nazi military force in 1939 and compelled to hold a plebiscite indorsing her union with the Reich, was again considered an independent state. The State Department had officially recognized the obliteration of that small country. It is only just that this recognition should now be withdrawn and Austria re-created. But there are three Baltic republics which suffered the same fate in 1940.

Unfortunately, our present associate, Russia, was involved in the disappearance of Lituania, Latvia and Estonia. Their representatives are still officially recognized by the United States. Nothing was said about their future except that some time ago the Moscow press pointed out that they were as much a part of the Soviet as California or Alaska is a part of the United States.

We do not know of the postwar plans for Poland and Yugoslavia, two minor Allies who have been subjected to violent aggression—one from Russia and Germany, the other from Germany and Italy and their satellites.

Territorially they may not have to suffer much. Poland may not even resent a small territorial amputation. But politically we see beyond a shadow of a doubt that they may be swallowed in the Russian orbit. There is a Polish government in Moscow. It is in full ideological sympathy with the Moscow government which created it. There is little doubt that since the Russians will reach Poland long before ourselves, the Polish government at Moscow will be given preference to the Polish government-in-exile in London.

Moscow Favors Tito.

In Yugoslavia the newly created Communist force, the Partisans commanded by a veteran Communist revolutionary, Drug Tito, is believed slated to become the guiding force of the future Yugoslav state, whatever that may be.

Moscow regards as a traitor Gen. Draja Mihailovich, the representative of the King of Yugoslavia who decided to accept a hopeless fight against the Nazis merely because he had received formal assurances from President Roosevelt that he risked only a temporary defeat and that his country would be reinstated after the defeat of the Nazis.

The Yugoslavs-in-exile read in this a very definite sign that when the Nazis are crushed the political orientation of their country will be directed from Moscow and will be intrusted to the same men who are now fighting King Peter legions.

Reports from London now reaching Washington say that among the questions discussed at Moscow was what might be done to give Russia access to the warm seas of the Mediterranean and that in all probability the question of the straits—the connecting link between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea—has been settled in a manner pleasing to the Soviet.

It is only proper that Russia should have an outlet to the Mediterranean. She may even make a satisfactory arrangement with Britain regarding her access to the Indian Ocean through the Persian Gulf.

Pressure on De Gaulle.

The Moscow agreements have resulted in a tremendous increase in Russia's prestige throughout Europe. The Communists, representing the French underground, are now attempting to dictate to Gen. Charles De Gaulle the policies he must follow. Their demands, which at present are confined principally to obtaining for one of their ranks the vital post of commissioner for propaganda at Algiers, will soon become more exacting.

Either Gen. De Gaulle will have to go along with his Communists or he will have to suffer the fate of his colleague, Gen. Henri Giraud. And Gen. De Gaulle is too smart a politician to stick his neck out. He is bound to recognize the supreme authority of Moscow either now or after France has been liberated.

So great has the prestige of Russia become that any early ending of the war—with an allied victory—would make it probable that a very large part of Europe from Pas-de-Calais to the

(See RUSSIA, Page C-3.)

Russia

(Continued From Page C-1.)

Orals would come under the Soviets' zone of influence.

Nowadays political supremacy also means an economic dictatorship. Russia is fighting bravely alongside the Allies. Our political views are no more obnoxious to her than her political system is obnoxious to us. But at no time has Russia indicated that she is willing or finds it advantageous to do away with its totalitarian form of economic life.

Russia has made tremendous strides under her economic totalitarianism, which is not much different from that of the Germans or the Japanese. Economic totalitarianism means that the government is the principal producer and employer; the raw materials produced in a totalitarian state are at the disposal of industry to produce whatever is needed.

Private Initiative Disappears.

A government cannot go bankrupt commercially. Hence, a totalitarian government can undersell anybody else in the world without its people suffering any disturbing consequences. There are no strikes, no wage and price arguments. Everybody works for one employer—the state—and private initiative must necessarily disappear.

This system works well in some countries and there is no reason why it shall not continue to work well in them. But in other countries such as the United States, which owes its progress to the initiative of individuals and where, in spiae of its maiuy drawbacks, individualistic economics have not been a failure, it is doubtful that economic totalitarianism would be accepted.

So long as totalitarianism was an isolated form of economics there were only insignificant repercussions in our own system which is now described by some as antiquated.

But a Europe under the wing of the Soviet Union must follow the pattern of its ~~chief~~ protector and necessarily is bound to become as totalitarian as the Soviets are. The principal benefits of political supremacy invariably are translated into economic advantages. There is no question in the minds of those who look without bias to the future that Europe within a short time after her liberation from the fangs of the German system will by necssity embrace the Russian form of totalitarianism.

Europe is no mean competitor. She has skilled workmen, fine engineers and almost everything she needs to expand economically, provided there are no conflicts or wars. Under the totalitarian system Europe can produce goods far cheaper than the country with an individualist economy.

Serious Problems Ahead.

Once tariff barriers are broken down between the various European states and the raw materials produced by one are available to the other without nationalistic restrictions, some American economists venture to say that Europe will be able in less than a quarter of a century to excel our own production.

Her production eventually will more than suffice for her own needs. A totalitarian and well-disciplined Europe will then seek economic expansion and a head-on clash with our American economy will appear inevitable. What the consequences will be, it is difficult to forecast.

The Moscow agreements have given us immediate security. We know that the Russians will fight until the Nazis are beaten. They have signed a document to that effect and to doubt their signature would mean losing faith in all treaties. Our leaders say emphatically that we must not do so.

But the Moscow agreements have increased the prestige of Russia throughout Europe to such an extent that a brand-new set of problems, not anticipated in the beginning, are taking shape. The good thing about the Moscow conference is that it seems to have laid the framework for a rational and friendly approach to the solution of these problems.

Izvestia Statement Scoring 'Federations'

[We publish in full today the Soviet editorial on post-war federations in eastern Europe which appeared in the Soviet government paper, "Izvestia" yesterday and was widely quoted in yesterday's press. The editorial is particularly important since the major proponents of an artificial federation at this time come from the Polish government-in-exile, in cooperation with defeatist elements here. Text is via Inter-Continent News.)

* * *

It is known that the decisions of the Moscow conference evoked a sympathetic response in Britain and the United States. It is also known that the Anglo-American press has devoted much space to stressing their significance.

All this shows that the decisions correctly reflected the sentiments of the broad masses of the Allied countries.

One cannot, however, but note certain discords in the chorus of comments on the decisions and the fact that some commentators permit errors and entirely arbitrary conclusions and afterthoughts which do not correspond to the facts.

This is true, for example, of the statements published in the New Statesman and Nation on Nov. 10 and in the Economist on Nov. 11 concerning the question of federations of small powers in post-war Europe.

Referring to the declaration of the Moscow conference on Austria, the New Statesman wrote: "This means that Russia no longer objects against all groupings of the central and east European states."

The Economist in turn stated that the declaration on Austria might become the forerunner of a Danube Confderation.

REAL PREREQUISITES

On what basis did they arrive at such conclusions? Where in the declaration on Austria have they read anything resembling their assertions, anything which gives them ground for such assertions and statements?

Neither the declaration on Austria nor any other decisions of the Moscow conference give the slightest ground for such conclusions.

Apparently these conclusions represent the product of their authors' imagination, the product of wishful thinking. In reality the decisions of the Moscow conference have nothing in common with the above cited deliberations and conclusions of the London journalists with regard to the Soviet Union's point of view concerning the question of federations of small countries of Europe. The Soviet viewpoint on the question of federations is as always based not on abstract theorizing but on concretely real prerequisites.

The Soviet viewpoint fully recognizes the liberation of the small countries, the restoration of their independence and sovereignty as one of the most important tasks of the post-war reconstruction of Europe and the creation of a stable peace.

However, the Soviet viewpoint takes into consideration the concrete conditions in which the small nations will find themselves immediately after the war.

STATE OF FLUIDITY

What will really be the situation? It is entirely obvious that in the early period after the cessation of hostilities, all European relations will be in a state of great fluidity and uncertainty. The small countries will require a certain period of time to take full stock of the situation which has arisen as a result of the war. Time will be needed to appraise new relations with neighboring and other states without any outside intervention or foreign pressure designed to induce small countries to join one or another new group of states.

They will have to organize their internal affairs and determine the character of their relations with other states.

Some countries will be able to accomplish all this faster, other slower, but at any rate, they must all inevitably go through a transition period.

At the Moscow conference, the Soviet delegation, proceeding from the above-outlined considerations of principle, stated with sufficient clarity that the premature and possibly artificial hitching of small countries to theoretically planned groups would be pregnant with dangers both for the countries themselves and for the future peaceful development of Europe.

And this is fully conceivable, for such an important step as confederation with other countries and possible limitation of one's own sovereignty is permissible only as a result of the free and conscious expression of the people's will.

COMPLICATED SITUATION

The above said suggests a number of important conclusions. Firstly, it may be considered that the emigre governments of the German-occupied small countries, lacking sufficiently strong contact with their peoples, won't be able to insure to the full extent the expression of the real will of their peoples, to decide such an important problem as the question of federation.

Every attempt on the part of the emigre governments, who, as is known, are in a peculiar situation, to do anything of the kind may be interpreted by their peoples as forcing decisions contrary to their desires and permanent aspirations.

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Secondly, it is quite probable that even the new governments formed in the now occupied countries immediately after the war will lack sufficient authority and stability to undertake the solution of the federation problem without risking the violation of the people's will and thereby causing complications.

Thirdly, and lastly, there can be no doubt that only after the post-war situation becomes more or less settled and the small countries acquire the necessary calm and confidence in their independence, can the discussion of the question of federations assume a fruitful character.

In accordance with the above, the Soviet viewpoint holds that it would be premature today to plan and thus artificially encourage the formation of any kind of federations or other forms of association of small states.

This does not preclude the Soviet Union's readiness at the proper time to reconsider a given problem in the light of the experience of post-war collaboration with the other United Nations and take into account post-war circumstances.

The explanation of the Soviet viewpoint on the question of federations of small European countries would be incomplete if mention of two more essential factors were omitted. First of all, from the Soviet viewpoint it would be especially unjust if small countries who became Germany's satellites would today, as members of some or other federations be placed in equality favorable conditions with the small countries which were attacked and occupied by the enemy, and by the same satellites in particular.

Hitler Germany's satellites, even if they are small countries, cannot and must not escape the consequences of their complicity in the crimes of Hitler and Mussolini.

Furthermore, and this must be especially stressed, the Soviet point of view resolutely rejects all attempts to revive a policy of cordon sanitaire against the U.S.S.R. under any guise whatever.

Yet justice demands the admission that some of the projects for federations advanced in the west of late clearly exhume the rotten smell of this long bankrupt anti-Soviet policy.

Such is the Soviet position on the question of federations and similar forms of association of small states in Europe.

This viewpoint was convincingly outlined at the Moscow conference.

At any rate, no objections to this were raised at the conference. Whence and wherein, then, lie the sources of such inspiration of some London weeklies which go so far as direct distortion of facts?

Is it because some authors lack the good will to march in step with the Moscow conference based, as is known, on the friendly collaboration of Great Britain and the United States with Soviet Union?

Whatever the answer to this question, the above makes clear one thing at any rate: the source of such inspiration is neither facts nor an objective, conscientious attitude to them.

The facts above cited convincingly prove this.

STATEMENT OF EXTRAORDINARY STATE COMMITTEE

For the ascertaining and investigation of crimes committed by the German-fascist invaders and their associates, and the damages caused by them to citizens, collective farms, public organizations, State enterprises and institutions of the USSR

On the destruction wrought by the German-fascist invaders upon the industry, municipal economy and cultural-educational institutions of Stalino Region.

Stalino Region is the most important coal mining and metallurgical center of the USSR. Over 14,000 tons of high-grade coal were mined daily in the 152 coal pits of the Stalinugol coal-mining trust. Powerful electric stations generated up to three billion kilowatt hours of electric power. From their 78 coking batteries, the combined coking-chemical works produced annually 8,500,000 tons of high-grade coke, and processed Donets Basin coal into chemicals.

At the iron and steel works, 22 blast furnaces produced annually 5,000,000 tons of pig iron, and 43 open-hearth furnaces produced over 4,000,000 tons of steel. Three blooming and 34 rolling mills produced over 3,000,000 tons of rolled metal.

The Stalino Region had widely developed the production of high-grade cement, glass, technical porcelain, ceramics, red brick, alabaster, fire-clay and granite. Fifteen mining, metallurgical and chemistry institutes and technical schools were engaged in training highly-skilled personnel. During Stalin's Five-Year Plans, the towns of Stalino, Gorlovka, Yenakievo, Konstantinovka, Kramatorsk, Makeyevka, Mariupol and others had grown into large cultural and industrial centers.

The German-fascist invaders and their accomplices, acting on the plan of the German supreme command, destroyed the coal-pits, power-stations, metallurgical, chemical and machine-building works, cultural institutions, schools, hospitals, theaters and museums, and the municipal economy of the towns and settlements of the Donets Basin.

In their bestial hatred of the Soviet people, the fascist blackguards tortured and massacred the peaceful population and abducted the Soviet people to German slavery.

By secret instructions dated September 2, 1943, No. 1-313-43 G, the leader of administration of the group of southern armies ordered army leaders and leaders of the administration squads to effect the complete demolition of industrial enterprises, coal-pits, power-stations and industrial structures of the Donets Basin, and also to carry away to Germany all valuable properties and equipment. Issued at the time when the Soviet troops had pierced the German front on the Mius River and started to liberate the Donets Basin from the fascist invaders, these instructions ordered all the equipment of eight electric sub-stations of the water-supply system, and the equipment of the tool-shop, laboratories, factory restaurant and factory administration building, to be carried away.

Before the retreat from Mariupol, the German occupation authorities burned down 1,593 houses, all the 68 schools, 17 kindergartens, 101 libraries and the Palace of Pioneers, and put out of commission the tramways and electricity.

"The whole Donets Basin east of the 'Turtle' position must be evacuated in respect of its economy and completely demolished." " . . . Whatever cannot be evacuated must be demolished. In particular waterworks and power-stations, factory buildings, means of production of all kinds, and crops which cannot be carried away." " . . . the destruction should be effected not at the last moment when the troops will already be fighting or retreating, but well in advance." " . . . All the administrative organs and squads, the Society for the Exploitation of the East ("Oestgesellschaft"), and branches of private firms ("Paternfirmen"), must detail all persons suitable for this purpose to take part in the work of evacuation and demolition." " . . . Army administration leaders must report summaries every night to the headquarters of the group administration leader of the armies of the south. In Stalino they should transmit every evening a brief review on the situation in the Donets Basin to Headquarters No. 1, to Major Pauls." *Signed:* Southern Group of Armies. On Instructions: Administration Leader of Army Group Nagel."

On the basis of documentary data, statements of victims, testimonies of eyewitnesses and findings of technical and medical experts, as well as by visits to formerly occupied towns and districts by a Special Committee, the Extraordinary State Committee ascertained the facts of the barbarous destruction of industry, municipal economy, dwellings, schools, hospitals, cultural and educational institutions, and of the monstrous crimes committed by the German-fascist invaders.

The Destruction of the Coal-Mining Industry

During the occupation and at the time of their retreat, the German-fascist invaders almost completely destroyed the coal-mining industry of the Stalino Region and carried away the most valuable equipment to

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Germany. The fascist blackguards put out of commission and demolished 140 coal-pits. Only 12 small coal-pits with an aggregate daily output of 500 tons of coal escaped destruction.

The German invaders blew up and demolished 154 shafts, 192 pitheads, 292 hoists and 189 ventilating fans. Out of 526 boilers, 393 were put out of commission. Out of 268 surface coal-pit buildings, 241 had been blown up or burned down. The occupationists destroyed 266 machine-houses, 183 buildings of transformer sub-stations and 161 stockades. They destroyed the compressors, the coal-grading installations, the warehouses and mechanical shops. Before retreating they destroyed or flooded in the coal-pits 1,900 coal-cutting machines, 1,209 conveyors, 802 mechanical trolleys, 1,651 scraper winches and 4,155 pneumatic hammers.

The German invaders did not confine themselves to the destruction of the coal-pits, the industrial buildings and equipment, but also demolished and burned down workers' houses, clubs, kindergartens, nurseries, public dining rooms, schools, hospitals, stores and parks of culture and rest. In the Stalinugol coal-mining trust alone they demolished houses totaling 1,126,900 square meters of living floor-space.

According to preliminary data, the damages inflicted by the German-fascist invaders upon the coal-mining industry of the Stalino Region are estimated at two billion rubles.

Destruction in the Town of Stalino

The German occupationists demolished the industrial and cultural center of the Donets Basin—Stalino. In Stalino they demolished the largest industrial enterprises, the cultural institutions and dwelling houses. The Stalino metallurgical works had supplied with its production the Soviet machine-building, ship-building, automobile and tractor industries. Over 12,500 workers were employed at the works.

The Hitlerites turned this works into a heap of debris. Before their retreat they blew up the blast furnace, the open hearth, the rolling mill, tool departments, the compressor station, the laboratory of the works and the main office; they put out of commission the blast furnaces, the boiler cranes, the ladling machines and the turbo-generator. They demolished the Palace of Culture, the Club of Engineers and Technicians, the building of the Factory Apprenticeship School, nurseries and warehouses of materials.

The German-fascist occupationists blew up the structural steel works which manufactured girders for railway bridges. blast-furnaces, dams and sluices. They also demolished the Stalino Olyaninovo Mushketovo Rutchenkovo coking and chemical works, the Don Energo, the nitrate works, machine-building works, repair shops, and other works.

Tremendous destruction was wrought by the German-fascist invaders on the municipal economy of the town of Stalino. They burned down the tramway depot, 89 cars, four electric trolleys; destroyed 35 kilometers of tramway track, 35 kilometers of tramway powerlines and 10 new trolley buses, and destroyed the electric power system of the town.

Before retreating from Stalino, the Hitlerites completely demolished 3,761 houses with a total living space of 1,207,470 square meters, 113 schools, 62 kindergartens, 390 stores, the Summer and Winter Theaters, the Palace of Pioneers, the Radio Theater, the Museum of the Revolution, the Art Gallery, the Dzerzhinsky Club and other finest buildings of the town. Special squads of sappers made the rounds of the schools, poured inflammatory liquid over them and set fire to them. Soviet people who tried to extinguish the fires were shot on the spot by the fascist scoundrels.

War prisoner Lance Corporal Johann Gold, of the 574th Infantry Regiment of the 304th Division, stated: "In the town of Stalino I personally burned down one house and blew up two more big buildings. Two houses had been tenanted by civilians and the third was a grain store. Before the explosion I did not warn the tenants and did not think it necessary to warn them, as we were ordered not to do any talking, but to blow up and burn down buildings regardless of whether there were people in them. Immediately after the explosion in one house, I heard shrieks and wailing of women and children and saw the killed and wounded among them crushed by bricks and timbers, but I did not pay any attention to it. I was acting on the orders of my superiors."

The fascist invaders plundered the valuable property and equipment of the Palace of Pioneers, the Children's Agricultural Station and the Bureau of Excursions. Exceptionally heavy damage was caused by the occupationists to the medical institutions of the town. They burned down and completely demolished the Children's Hospital, which had 2,000 beds, the Voroshilov Clinical Hospital with 1,000 beds, 12 medical institutions with a total of 2,000 beds, and five polyclinics. The valuable apparatus and equipment of the hospitals was wholly ransacked by the German occupationists. The Medical Institute, a model scientific institution with an enrollment of 2,000 students, was smashed. All the buildings of the Industrial Institute named for Khrushchev, which had an enrollment of 15,000 students, were burned down. Together with the Institute, the Germans burned down the Students' Polyclinic, the dormitories and auxiliary premises. Five hundred and thirty thousand volumes of scientific literature and fiction out of 600,000 were burned by the Hitlerites.

Destruction in the Town of Kramatorsk

The German-fascist invaders destroyed the whole industry of Kramatorsk, including one of the finest machine-building works—the Novokramatorsk plant named for Stalin, the Starokramatorsk machine-building works named for Ordzhonikidze, the metallurgical works named for Kuibyshev, the heavy machine-tool building works, the cement, coking-chemical, eternite and other plants.

The Novokramatorsk machine-building works named for Stalin manufactures equipment for blast, open-hearth and coking furnaces, rolling mills and coal-pits. The plant occupied a territory of 200 hectares and consisted of 20 basic and 10 auxiliary departments. The cost of all the factory buildings, equipment, transport and the system of power supply was 900,000,000 rubles. Twenty thousand workers, engineers, technicians and employees were engaged at the works. The German occupationists put out of commission 1,113 machine tools; they carried away to Germany the equipment of the press department and pumping stations; they blew up a 300-ton hydraulic horizontal press; they demolished the open hearth furnaces; they carried away the steam boilers of the coal-gas stations. The Hitlerites destroyed the power supply system of the plant, all the boilers of the heat and power-generating station, the electrical equipment and over 100 kilometers of power lines. They destroyed and demolished the factory hospitals, clubs, nurseries, schools, a summer theater seating 1,200 persons and three cinema houses. Two hundred and four out of 247 many-storeyed apartment houses of the works were burned down.

In the town of Kramatorsk the occupationists burned down and blew up the Palace of Culture, the Pushkin Theater, the "Shturm" Club; they demolished the Stadium and burned down more than 1,300 of the finest houses. Only three schools out of 18 remained in the town. Three hospitals, two polyclinics, the children's hospital and the maternity home were burned down.

Destruction in the Town of Makeyevka

The Makeyevka metallurgical works named for Kirov was one of the biggest iron and steel works in the Soviet Union. Before the war 20,000 workers, engineers, technicians and employees were engaged at the works. During the occupation and at the time of their retreat, the Hitlerites converted the plant into a heap of debris. The German occupationists carried away from the works to Germany part of the equipment of the power sub-stations, ladling machines, two steam hammers and the machine tools and the electrical equipment of the mechanical department. They blew up and burned down the factory school, three nursery buildings, the hotel, theater and 186 apartment houses. Altogether the invaders blew up, burned down or demolished 2,867,000 cubic meters of industrial and auxiliary buildings and apartment houses belonging to the works. At the Staro-Makeyevsky coking and chemical works, the "East" Joint-stock Company was in charge at the beginning, then the German "Kolin" firm, and finally, most recently, the German "Otto" firm. The German invaders carried away part of the equipment from this plant and before their retreat burned down and blew up the crushing and batching departments, the machine house, six conveyors, six grading machines and 89 coking furnaces; they blew up the machine house in the chemical department, the gas mains of 12 gas-cooling installations and the ammonium and benzol departments, the chemical laboratories, four boilers, the pumping and water-purifying installation, the ventilation installations in the boiler department. In the town of Makeyevka, the German-fascist invaders destroyed the tramways, the lighting system and the waterworks; they blew up and burned down the building of the Town Soviet, the hotel, the Club of Engineers and Technicians, the town theater, the circus, 49 schools, 20 nurseries and 44 kindergartens.

On orders from the town commandant Vogler, 35,000 books from the Gorky Central Library were burned in a bonfire.

Destruction in the Town of Gorlovka

During the years of the Stalin Five-Year Plans, the town of Gorlovka had grown into a big coal mining and industrial center of the Donets Basin, with powerful industrial enterprises and numerous cultural institutions. Twenty-one very large coal pits with a daily output of 15,000 tons of coal functioned in the territory of the Gorlovka District. In Gorlovka there were 13 big factories and plants, including a nitric fertilizer plant named for Ordzhonikidze, a coking-chemical plant, a machine building works named for Kirov, and others.

The German-fascist invaders blew up and flooded all the mines, together with their equipment and machinery, demolished and burned down the plants, the power stations and other structures in the town. The Ordzhonikidze nitric fertilizer plant was totally demolished. The damages caused by the German occupationists, according to preliminary estimates, amount to 243,300,000 rubles.

At the coking-chemical plant, the German occupationists blew up and burned down all 25 industrial buildings. In the Gorlovka District, the occupationists demolished the following plants: the Kirov machine-building works, which manufactured equipment for the entire coal-mining industry of the Donets Basin, the Nikitovka mercury works, the Gorlovka pipe works, the enterprises of the trust for the subterranean gasification of coal, the Dolomite combined

works, three mechanized bakeries, the huge Gorlovka meat-packing plant, and many enterprises of the local industries.

The fascist scoundrels demolished the central power station, three powerful pumping stations and 632 dwelling houses, and thus left the population of Gorlovka without lighting, water or shelter. They destroyed in the town 32 schools with an enrollment of 21,649 pupils, they burned down the town hospital, five polyclinics, a church, the buildings of the House of Soviets, the Don Energo trust and the Palace of Culture.

Destruction in the Town of Yenakievo

In Yenakievo the occupationists demolished and put out of commission the metallurgical works, equipped with up-to-date machinery. Before the war it employed 14,500 workers. The German invaders carried away from the works to Germany over 60,000 tons of metal and metal articles, as well as a large quantity of equipment and machine tools; they dismantled the blooming mill and carried away its main parts. In Yenakievo the German-fascist scoundrels completely demolished the Novoyenakievo and Staroyanakievo coking-chemical plants and the cement and other works; they wrecked the tramways and carried away the tracks to Germany. They blew up and burned 505 dwelling houses, the Palace of Pioneers, the Town Soviet building, the cinema, the First and Second Tuberculosis Hospitals, the Sanatorium for Osteal Tuberculosis Cases, two town polyclinics and other medical institutions.

Destruction in the Town of Konstantinovka

There were 13 large plants in Konstantinovka. The German-fascist bandits completely demolished the Avtosteklo coking-chemical plant, the metallurgical, chemical, zinc, glass, bottle, refractory materials, the Krasny Oktyabr and other plants. The occupationists blew up and burned down the town power-station, the waterworks, 226 houses, all of the 25 town schools, two cinema houses, the central town library with 35,000 volumes, the Pioneers' Club, the children's technical station and the town hospital and nurseries; they blew up the House of Soviets, the post office and other institutions.

Destruction in the Town of Mariupol

The town of Mariupol was the largest industrial center of the Soviet south. There were 47 industrial enterprises in it: the Ilyich metallurgical works, the Ordzhonikidze Azovstal works, the coking-chemical, the Kuibyshev pipe-rolling, structural steel and radiator plants, the fish cannery, the ultramarine, graphite and other plants. The German occupationists turned the first-class Mariupol metallurgical plant named for Ilyich into ruins. At the Azovstal works the occupationists completely wrecked the blast-furnace department with its four furnaces, three gas-cleaning installations, the open-hearth department with six 400-ton tilting furnaces, the compressor building with its system.

The Extermination of the Peaceful Population and the Abduction of Soviet Citizens to German Slavery

During the occupation of the Stalino Region the German-fascist invaders established a regime of slavery and serfdom for the population. The able-bodied population was driven to German penal servitude. The Germans engaged in outrageous violence, plunder and the extermination of Soviet citizens everywhere. Thousands of Soviet people were tortured to death or shot. The unspeakable crimes of the fascist scoundrels have been proved by numerous witnesses and documents, the protocols of committees and the findings of legal-medical experts at the disposal of the Extraordinary State Committee.

Over 3,000 Soviet citizens—women, children and old men—had been shot or tortured to death on orders of the German commandant of the town of Artemovsk, Major von Zobel. Bodies of Soviet citizens were immured in a tunnel of the quarries of the alabaster plant. The Special Committee established that:

"Two kilometers east of the town of Artemovsk, in a tunnel of the quarries of the alabaster plant, at a distance of 400 meters from the entrance, there is a small aperture walled up with bricks. When this aperture was forced open, there was discovered an extension of the tunnel ending in a wide oval cave. The entire cave was filled with human bodies. Only a small space near the entrance and a narrow strip in the center were free of bodies. All the bodies are pressed close to each other, with their backs turned toward the entrance of the cave."

The German invaders committed monstrous atrocities in the town of Kramatorsk. On September 25, 1943 the Special Committee excavated three pits on the northern outskirts of Kramatorsk in an old clay and chalk quarry. "Upon removal of the upper layers of soil to the depth of 20 centimeters to one meter," reads the Protocol of the Committee, "bodies of Soviet citizens lying in layers, face downward were discovered. Eight hundred and twelve bodies were exhumed from these three pits. In the course of the investigation it was established that there were 740 bodies of men, 50 of women and 22 of children; 126 bodies were identified. Legal-medical experts established that 761 bodies had bullet holes in the skull, 40 bodies had bullet wounds in the back of the neck. In all the 812 cases examined, it has been proved that death resulted from a shot from light firearms in the back of the head at close, almost point-blank, range."

The shootings of civilians in Kramatorsk were

executed on orders of German commandant of the town, Lieutenant Meuschke. One kilometer from the town of Stalino, the German-fascist scoundrels tortured to death or shot tens of thousands of civilians and flung them into a shaft of Kalinovka coal-pit 4-4[1]. In order to hide the traces of their sanguinary crimes, the Hitlerites blew up the pithead and thus blocked the pit.

The Regional Committee for ascertaining the crimes of the German-fascist occupationists is carrying out excavations and exhuming the bodies. In the town of Stalino, the German invaders drove and herded all the tenants of a professor's house into a shed, blocked its entrance, poured petrol over the shed and set fire to it. All the people in the shed, except two little girls who escaped by mere chance, perished in the fire. On September 11, 1943 the Special Committee excavated the debris of the burned shed. The Committee discovered 41 charred human bodies.

A camp for war prisoners and civilians was located in Stalino on the territory of the Lenin Club and in the building of the Central Polyclinic. The Red Army men Plakhov and Shatsky, who escaped from this camp, reported: "We were starved in the camp. There were no panes in the windows of the building in which we were kept. There were mass cases of frostbite. During the hot summer months war prisoners who were suffering from heat were given no drinking water for three to five days. We were beaten on the slightest pretext. As a result of this regime, the mortality among war prisoners was as high as 200 men per day." The Special Committee established that no less than 25,000 Soviet citizens were buried in the territory of the camp near the Lenin Club and the Central Polyclinic.

The extermination of Soviet people and the outrages against them were committed on instructions and with the direct participation of the camp chief, German Officer Gabfel.

On September 14, 1943 the Special Committee discovered 25 graves on the territory of the military camps beyond the northern railway station of the town of Artemovsk. The Committee established: "that about 3,000 bodies of Soviet citizens who were confined in the camp located on the territory of the military camps, were buried in 25 graves on its territory."

During the occupation of the Stalino Region, the German-fascist authorities forcibly drove to Germany under pain of death over 125,000 Soviet citizens. The Extraordinary State Committee established that together with the Hitlerite government, responsibility for all these brutal crimes is borne by the following German-fascist officers and other persons:

Economic leader of the group of armies Nagel; former commandants of the town of Stalino Colonel Peters and Lieutenant Colonel Lenz; the assistant commandant, Military Counselor Naruschat; chiefs of the Gestapo, obersturmfuehrers Moor and Leunstein; directors of concentration camps obersturmfuehrer Domnik and Captain Trom; technical director of the "East" Joint Stock Company, chief General Winacker, his assistant Doctor Brans; commandant of the town of Kramatorsk Lieutenant Meuschke, Burgomaster Schopen; commandants of the town of Makeyevka Vogler, Major Fuchs, assistant commandant Captain Mueller, Chief of Security Police Captain Rosenthal; commandant of the town of Yenakievo Lieutenant of Gendarmerie Fischer, Oberleutnant of Gendarmerie Schohing, Director Streckenbach, Chief Engineer Benscheidt; commandants of the town of Mariupol, feldcommandant General Hofmann, commandant Michel, his assistant Oberleutnant Huck, leader of SD Six Squad, Oberleutnant Wulf, leader of schutz-police Oberleutnant Schalert; commandant of the town of Artemovsk von Zobel, Counselor Herd Schmock and Captain Gerhardt.

In addition the following persons also share the responsibility for the above-mentioned crimes: field inspector of justice Steckert, burgomaster Eichmann, senior inspectors Oberleutnant Ley and Mommsen, field inspector of justice Stolz, ober-inspector Kruetner, Captain Brandt, counselor Doctor Meer, Lieutenant Baas, Captain Doctor Hayde, military inspector Doctor Frank, Captains Mailink and Schneider, chief doctors Hellindorf and Kuchendorf, Oberfeldarzt Roll, head doctor of hospital Trommer, representative of "Dortmunder Unumn" Firm Willi Manik, director of the plant of the same firm Brueckenbrau-Baecker, chief engineer Altfeldt, production managers Smied and Kaemper, Captain Schenk, sonderfuehrers Gebhardt and Huss, Captain Kauermann, chief of power supply group Doctor Butler, sonderfuehrer Vogel; chiefs of departments of "East" Company; Captain Rellesmann, Oberleutnant Kruemmer, Captain Schunt, administration manager Jakob Kuhn; former directors of mines: Oberleutnant Brans, sonderfuehrer Fuld, von Felsen, administration manager Kleber, Director Oberleutnant Steff and his assistant Lieutenant Tebel, administration managers Offenmann and Reutetsch, technical director Fleuter, sonderfuehrer Laschner, director Shubert; representatives of "East" Joint Stock Company Rufus, of the "Kolin" Firm chief director Jakobs, of the "Otto" firm director of plant Renkhof; commercial director Form, chief of blast furnace and coking departments Baecke, sergeant major Peckers; director of "Artemugol" Trust Miller, his assistant Horschz; Lance Corporals Johann Gold, Hermann Ferholz, Sergeant Major Filler.

All these criminals must suffer stern punishment for their monstrous crimes against the Soviet people.

Izvestia Statement Scoring 'Federations'

[We publish in full today the Soviet editorial on post-war federations in eastern Europe which appeared in the Soviet government paper, "Izvestia" yesterday and was widely quoted in yesterday's press. The editorial is particularly important since the major proponents of an artificial federation at this time come from the Polish government-in-exile, in cooperation with defeatist elements here. Text is via Inter-Continent News.)

* * *

It is known that the decisions of the Moscow conference evoked a sympathetic response in Britain and the United States. It is also known that the Anglo-American press has devoted much space to stressing their significance.

All this shows that the decisions correctly reflected the sentiments of the broad masses of the Allied countries.

One cannot, however, but note certain discords in the chorus of comments on the decisions and the fact that some commentators permit errors and entirely arbitrary conclusions and afterthoughts which do not correspond to the facts.

This is true, for example, of the statements published in the New Statesman and Nation on Nov. 10 and in the Economist on Nov. 11 concerning the question of federations of small powers in post-war Europe.

Referring to the declaration of the Moscow conference on Austria, the New Statesman wrote: "This means that Russia no longer objects against all groupings of the central and east European states."

The Economist in turn stated that the declaration on Austria might become the forerunner of a Danube Confderation.

REAL PREREQUISITES

On what basis did they arrive at such conclusions? Where in the declaration on Austria have they read anything resembling their assertions, anything which gives them ground for such assertions and statements?

Neither the declaration on Austria nor any other decisions of the Moscow conference give the slightest ground for such conclusions.

Apparently these conclusions represent the product of their authors' imagination, the product of wishful thinking. In reality the decisions of the Moscow conference have nothing in common with the above cited deliberations and conclusions of the London journalists with regard to the Soviet Union's point of view concerning the question of federations of small countries of Europe. The Soviet viewpoint on the question of federations is as always based not on abstract theorizing but on concretely real prerequisites.

The Soviet viewpoint fully recognizes the liberation of the small countries, the restoration of their independence and sovereignty as one of the most important tasks of the post-war reconstruction of Europe and the creation of a stable peace.

However, the Soviet viewpoint takes into consideration the concrete conditions in which the small nations will find themselves immediately after the war.

STATE OF FLUIDITY

What will really be the situation? It is entirely obvious that in the early period after the cessation of hostilities, all European relations will be in a state of great fluidity and uncertainty. The small countries will require a certain period of time to take full stock of the situation, which has arisen as a result of the war. Time will be needed to appraise new relations with neighboring and other states without any outside intervention or foreign pressure designed to induce small countries to join one or another new group of states.

They will have to organize their internal affairs and determine the character of their relations with other states.

Some countries will be able to accomplish all this faster, others slower, but at any rate, they must all inevitably go through a transition period.

At the Moscow conference, the Soviet delegation, proceeding from the above-outlined considerations of principle, stated with sufficient clarity that the premature and possibly artificial hitching of small countries to theoretically planned groups would be pregnant with dangers both for the countries themselves and for the future peaceful development of Europe.

And this is fully conceivable, for such an important step as confederation with other countries and possible limitation of one's own sovereignty is permissible only as a result of the free and conscious expression of the people's will.

COMPLICATED SITUATION

The above said suggests a number of important conclusions. Firstly, it may be considered that the emigre governments of the German-occupied small countries, lacking sufficiently strong contact with their peoples, won't be able to insure to the full extent the expression of the real will of their peoples, to decide such an important problem as the question of federation.

Every attempt on the part of the emigre governments, who, as is known, are in a peculiar situation, to do anything of the kind may be interpreted by their peoples as forcing decisions contrary to their desires and permanent aspirations.

Secondly, it is quite probable that even the new governments formed in the now occupied countries immediately after the war will lack sufficient authority and stability to undertake the solution of the federation problem without risking the violation of the people's will and thereby causing complications.

Thirdly, and lastly, there can be no doubt that only after the post-war situation becomes more or less settled and the small countries acquire the necessary calm and confidence in their independence, can the discussion of the question of federations assume a fruitful character.

In accordance with the above, the Soviet viewpoint holds that it would be premature today to plan and thus artificially encourage the formation of any kind of federations or other forms of association of small states.

This does not preclude the Soviet Union's readiness at the proper time to reconsider a given problem in the light of the experience of post-war collaboration with the other United Nations and take into account post-war circumstances.

The explanation of the Soviet viewpoint on the question of federations of small European countries would be incomplete if mention of two more essential factors were omitted. **First of all, from the Soviet viewpoint it would be especially unjust if small countries who became Germany's satellites would today as members of some or other federations be placed in equality favorable conditions with the small countries which were attacked and occupied by the enemy, and by the same satellites in particular.**

Hitler Germany's satellites, even if they are small countries, cannot and must not escape the consequences of their complicity in the crimes of Hitler and Mussolini.

Furthermore, and this must be especially stressed, the Soviet point of view resolutely rejects all attempts to revive a policy of cordon sanitaire against the U.S.S.R. under any guise whatever.

Yet justice demands the admis-

DAILY Worker Nov. 20, 1943 p.2

sion that some of the projects for federations advanced in the west of late clearly exhume the rotten smell of this long bankrupt anti-Soviet policy.

Such is the Soviet position on the question of federations and similar forms of association of small states in Europe.

This viewpoint was convincingly outlined at the Moscow conference.

At any rate, no objections to this were raised at the conference. Whence and wherein, then, lie the sources of such inspiration of some London weeklies which go so far as direct distortion of facts?

Is it because some authors lack the good will to march in step with the Moscow conference based, as is known, on the friendly collaboration of Great Britain and the United States with Soviet Union?

Whatever the answer to this question, the above makes clear one thing at any rate: the source of such inspiration is neither facts nor an objective, conscientious attitude to them.

The facts above cited convincingly prove this.

Error in the Moscow Text

Stalin

THE statement on atrocities signed by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, issued at the Moscow conference, included the following statement *as originally transmitted*:

> "Thus, Germans who take part in the wholesale shooting of *Polish officers* or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian, or Norwegian hostages, or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in territories of the Soviet Union . . . will be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged."

But the American State Department made a correction in this statement on Nov. 10. The words "Polish officers" should have read "Italian officers," the official declaration states. There was an error in transmission; the mistake was made in Moscow.

There are two interpretations of this episode. One is that the statement was correctly transmitted, but changed afterward in response to indignant protests. As originally transmitted and printed in the press throughout the world, the statement gave official sanction to the Russian propaganda version of the slaughter of the Polish officers captured by the Russians when they first invaded Poland in 1939.

The story was related by Alexander Kerensky in The New Leader for Oct. 16: Sikorski knew for two years that these Polish officers—7,900 of them—had vanished, presumably shot by the Red Army. But he remained silent for the sake of cooperation against the common enemy. The Nazis announced in April, 1943, that the bodies of the officers had been found in a common grave near Smolensk. Then the Polish Government-in-exile requested the International Red Cross to investigate.

☆ ☆ ☆

THE Kremlin seized upon this request as a pretext to break relations with the Polish Government, denouncing the story as Nazi propaganda. (Naturally Goebbels made full use of the episode for his own purposes.)

> **Sikorski had sought to find out for two years about the fate of the Polish officers. Only after breaking relations with the Polish Government did Moscow deign to tell the world that they had been engaged in work as prisoners of war near Smolensk, had been captured by the Germans and shot. If this is so, why did Moscow refuse an investigation by the Red Cross? Why remain silent on this question for two years?**

The Stalinists naturally wanted to give their version the official confirmation of the United Nations. Hence they either "slipped one over" on the other signatories, or intentionally made an "error" in transmission. In either event, the protests of the Poles and of liberals and labor throughout the world forced a face-saving correction. But the correction appeared inconspicuously in the back pages of most newspapers, whereas the original, erroneous statement that the Polish officers had been murdered by Germans was played up on the front pages.

RUSSIA BARS UNION OF SMALL STATES

Izvestia Views Federation as 'Cordon Sanitaire'—Gives Hope for Future

BRITISH SEEN IN ACCORD

London Is Held Disinclined to Oppose Moscow on What Is Termed a Minor Issue

MOSCOW, Nov. 18 (U.P.)—Russia has firmly banned any federation of small European States which might be used as a "cordon sanitaire" similar to that drawn around the new Soviet State after World War I, it was disclosed today.

Further, Russia has made it known that she opposes the federation principle itself until a sufficient time has elapsed after the war for the small States to establish themselves firmly, and she does not believe that Germany's satellites should then receive equal status with countries the Germans have overrun.

Izvestia, the government newspaper, revealed in an editorial today that Foreign Commissar Wachesloff M. Molotoff had outlined Russia's stand "emphatically" at the recent Moscow conference, and said that Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden had offered no objection.

Izvestia based its editorial on articles in the British publications The Economist and The New Statesman and Nation, which, it said, held that the Moscow Declaration that Austria would be freed implied that Russia did not object to a Central European federation. Any such interpretation is "mistaken and irresponsible and does not correspond to reality and reasonableness," Izvestia said.

M. Molotoff, Izvestia said, told the Moscow conferees of his objection in principle to any artificial union of small nations "which would be fraught with most serious consequences not only for those nations but for the future peace of Europe."

Satellites Not to Escape

Izvestia said that M. Molotoff's view was that the exiled governments of small States were not in sufficiently close touch with their people to insure full expression of popular will on the subject, that even governments formed after the war might lack sufficient authority and stability to commit their people to a federation, and that only after stabilization would small nations have sufficient confidence in their own independence to start discussing the federation idea.

Two additional objections were cited. First, Izvestia said—apparently reflecting views Mr. Molotoff had outlined—Russia considers it unjust that small German satellites should enjoy equal status in any federation. Such countries as Finland, Hungary and Rumania cannot and must not escape the consequences, even though they are small, of their complicity with Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, it was held. Secondly, Izvestia said:

"The Soviet Union—and this must be especially emphasized—firmly rejects any attempts to launch a policy of sanitary cordon regardless of the form in which it may be masked. It must be recognized that several projects for federation that have emanated recently from the West reeked pungently of the long bankrupt anti-Soviet policy."

British See Unanimity

LONDON, Nov. 18 (AP)—Indications of a unanimity of British, American and Russian views on the settlement of Europe's post-war boundaries were apparent here today as rumors were widespread that President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Joseph Stalin would meet soon on neutral ground. The rumors were without official confirmation.

A proposal by the Soviet Government newspaper Izvestia for a transition period to give small nations time to determine their own futures found agreement in the British policy of leaving the map of Europe alone until well after victory.

The same general view was expressed by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who declared in Washington that boundary settlements would be left until after the war.

The possibility that this attitude may be put into any tri-power declaration by Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Stalin is not overlooked in London.

In addition to fixing a positive date for a 1944 invasion of northwest Europe in coordination with Russian campaigns, the three leaders are expected to solidify further a tri-power formula for dealing with the small Allies as well as enemies after the war.

In this connection the disposition in London apparently is to soft-pedal any post-war confederation of small states.

Concession to Russia

Although British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in the past has given British endorsement to Czech-Polish and Yugoslav-Greek agreements for post-war economic and military collaboration, Britain is not inclined to support these movements in opposition to Russia.

Instead, the British ursue a policy which Mr. Eden succeeded in having adopted at the Moscow Conference of deciding all such issues on a tri-lateral basis.

It may be assumed that the British have no intention of imperilling the paramount military alliance with Russia by a fruitless argument over secondary non-urgent issues like the future borders of Poland or the status of the Baltic States. "Liberate them first," is the Allied motto.

Britain lately has given no public encouragement to the Polish Government which is the principal sponsor of the European federation.

This is a clipping from page 3 of the New York Times for Nov. 19, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Information Bulletin

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THE CONSOLIDATION OF SOVIET-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP

In an editorial, "The Consolidation of Soviet-American Friendship," IZVESTIA *writes:*

Ten years have passed since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. On November 16, 1933 letters were exchanged in Washington between President Roosevelt and Maxim Litvinov. These letters expressed in identical form the hope that the relations now established between the two peoples would remain normal and friendly forever and that henceforward the two peoples would be able to collaborate for their mutual benefit and for the maintenance of peace throughout the world.

Soviet-American friendly relations were fated to undergo many trials, but now it is apparent that as a result they have gained strength, and acquire ever greater significance not only for the two countries but also for all the peoples of the world.

The act of November 16, 1933 was an expression of the realization of leading political circles of the

United States of the fact that the prolonged isolation which existed previously, and which divided the United States and the USSR, was not in accordance with the basic and vital interests of the two peoples. On the contrary, these interests insistently demanded the overcoming of the former separation—the more so, that the interests of the United States and the USSR did not clash anywhere. A realization of the community of interests of the USSR and the United States, both in economic and commercial relations as well as in the cause of insuring universal peace, to which great importance was always attached in the USSR, gradually penetrated to ever-wider sections of the public in the United States, as the danger of approaching Hitlerite aggression became more clearly outlined.

In his well-known Chicago speech in October, 1937 President Roosevelt stated that war is an infection which might spread to states and nations far from the original theater of hostilities, and he called for an effective quarantine against this infection.

The further course of events, the unleashing of the war in Europe by Hitlerite Germany and especially Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, served as a powerful impetus to the strengthening of friendly relations between the United States and the USSR, relations which later grew into a fighting alliance against a common enemy.

In November, 1941 Stalin stated: "One may say with certainty that the coalition of the United States of America, Great Britain and the USSR is very real, and that it is growing and will continue to grow for the benefit of our common cause of liberation." Stalin's statement was fully confirmed by the course of further events. The signing of the "Agreement Concerning Principles Applied to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War Against Aggression," signed in June, 1942, during the visit to Washington of People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Molotov, marked an important step forward in relations between the USSR and the United States.

The experience of the common struggle against Hitlerite Germany, and of mutual aid, has shown what a real force is the unity of action of the largest world powers in the solution of their national and international problems. It is impossible not to see that the effective meetings between representatives of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain have seriously contributed to the consolidation of the camp of the anti-Hitler coalition.

The participation of the United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull in the recent Moscow Conference of the three ministers was especially important in strengthening the friendship and collaboration between the USSR and the United States. The military collaboration of the USSR and the United States has already been of great benefit to the peoples of the two countries and to all the United Nations. The American public realizes very well the invaluable contribution made by the Soviet Union and its Red Army to the cause of the defeat of the common enemy in the historical battles at Moscow, Stalingrad, Orel and Smolensk, Kharkov, at Kiev on the Dnieper, and in the Crimea.

The message of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship recently published in the United States expresses the essence of the relations between the United States and the USSR by saying that profound interests demanded the collaboration begun 10 years ago, which was of mutual advantage. Today this collaboration, which has turned into a fighting alliance, has become a cornerstone of victory itself.

The heroism of the Soviet people, the staunchness and great victories of the Red Army, showed the entire world the strength of Soviet patriotism, the loyalty of the Soviet people to their country, and the noble greatness of the Soviet people which bodily defends the whole world from the Hitlerite invaders.

The Soviet people highly values the aid rendered to the Red Army by our Allies—the United States and England—in the struggle against Hitlerite Germany. Stalin more than once pointed out the importance of this aid. In his report on November 6, 1943 Stalin stated: "This year the Red Army's blows at the German-fascist troops were supported by the combat operations of our Allies in North Africa, in the Mediterranean Basin and in Southern Italy. At the same time, the Allies subjected and are still subjecting important industrial centers of Germany to substantial bombing, and thus considerably weakening the enemy's military power. If to all this is added the fact that the Allies are regularly supplying us with various munitions and raw materials, it can be said without exaggeration that by all this they considerably facilitated the successes of our summer campaign."

The military tasks now facing our Allies are of major importance. The anti-Hitler coalition possesses a real superiority of forces over fascist Germany and her vassals. How soon victory comes now depends on how quickly and fully this superiority is brought to bear on the enemy in combined combat efforts.

The peoples of the USSR and the United States display a live and growing interest in each other, and a desire to understand more deeply the character, customs and peculiarities of a friendly nation. The political rapprochement and the strengthening of cultural relations contribute to the abolition and the overcoming of a number of prejudices regarding the Soviet country in the United States, prejudices which at times overcast and hindered the development of friendly relations between the United States and the USSR.

Much has been done in the United States and the USSR to prevent poisonous weeds from overrunning the road of mutual trust and understanding. Close collaboration demands a struggle against the sowers of nettles of mistrust and suspicion. How many times have the accessories of our enemies tried to frighten the American public with horrible tales about the USSR, and how many times have they failed together with their prophecies! Quite recently they foretold the failure of the Moscow Conference—the reality has shown what such prophecies are really worth.

Events have shown, and Stalin pointed this out in his report of November 6, 1943 that: " . . . the anti-Hitler coalition is a firm association of peoples, and rests on a solid foundation." In the same report, Stalin stated: "The victory of the Allied countries over the common enemy has come nearer, while the relations among the Allies, the fighting partnership of their armies, far from weakening have, contrary to the expectation of their enemies, grown stronger and more enduring."

The recently concluded Moscow Conference showed that the collaboration between the USSR, the United States and Great Britain, which grew stronger during the war against Hitlerite Germany, has every basis for continuing to grow stronger, as a foundation for the quickest termination of the struggle against Hitlerite Germany and her satellites, and as a basis for the postwar collaboration of all large and small peace-loving peoples.

THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE

The following editorial appeared in Number 11 of the Soviet publication WAR AND THE WORKING CLASS:

The Moscow Conference of the Foreign Secretaries of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union focused the attention of the world to a greater degree than any other meeting of the leaders of foreign policy of these or other powers. This is quite natural. It was the first meeting of authoritative representatives of all the three Allied powers which head the anti-Hitler coalition of freedom-loving nations.

This meeting took place at the stage in the struggle against Hitler Germany and her allies when, as a result of the splendid victories of the Red Army and the successful operations of British and American troops, every possibility had been created to carry defeat to the common enemy by the united efforts of the Allies.

No one can doubt that the success of the Moscow Conference represents a substantial contribution to the struggle against Hitler Germany and her satellites, as well as to the task of insuring a durable and stable peace after the war.

The success of the Conference is all the more significant for the fact that the tasks confronting it were by no means simple or easy. The present stage of the war demands clear and unambiguous decisions, both as regards the further conduct of the war and as regards the establishment of a firm postwar order which will safeguard the peace-loving nations against the threat of aggression.

There were plenty of difficulties in the way of such decisions, as will be clear to everyone. The Soviet public and press, like the public and press of our Allies, were fully alive to the complexity of the tasks confronting the Conference. On the other hand, these difficulties were speculated upon by the Hitlerites, who prophesied that the Conference would end in failure. Nor is it a secret that a note of "skepticism" regarding the Moscow Conference was struck in the columns of certain British and American press organs which maintain an unfriendly attitude toward the Soviet Union. By coping with the difficulties of the tasks confronting it, the Moscow Conference defeated the expectations of enemies and their accomplices.

Naturally the Conference focused its attention in the first instance on the urgent problems relating to the conduct of the war, as well as on the more mature problems of the postwar period. Documents published by the Conference made it perfectly clear that the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States are fully determined to work together in accomplishing the tasks confronting them in the war and after the war.

As we had occasion to say prior to the Moscow Conference, the fundamental condition for the strengthening of friendly cooperation between the three powers both during the war and after the war is that they unite their military efforts to shorten the already protracted war.

The need to shorten the war, which with pardonable insistence was stressed by the Soviet public, has now, as a result of the Moscow Conference, been officially recognized by the Governments of the Allied countries. Expressing the will of their peoples, the Governments of the three countries unanimously recognized at the Moscow Conference that the shortening of the war was their prime task.

It is to be presumed that the "definite military operations with regard to which decisions have been taken, and which are already being prepared" referred to in the communique of the Conference, will defeat Hitler's last trump, his hope of protracting the war.

The thing now is to put the measures which are recognized to be of prime importance and urgency into practice. The thing now is to give effect to the adopted decisions, the significance and value of which will be determined by how and in what degrees and at what speed they are put into effect. This is fully understood by the peoples of all countries which have drained the cup of suffering and humiliation caused them by the hated Hitler tyranny. It is extremely important that the obligations assumed by our Allies and now confirmed at the Moscow Conference be carried out promptly.

Highly important in this connection will be the attitude of certain states—Turkey, for example—which to this day adhere to a policy of neutrality. The adoption by such neutral states of a policy of direct support to the anti-Hitler coalition in its fight against the already undermined German fascism, which is the enemy of all freedom-loving countries, will be of immense significance in solving the problem of shortening the war.

The Moscow Conference was a demonstration of the unanimous desire of the peoples of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States to continue their present close cooperation after the war as well, with the purpose of insuring a stable peace and security for all peace-loving nations. The declaration on general security in which the Governments joined during the Conference marks out ways and means of solving the problem of world security.

This declaration of the four nations represents the development of a number of analogous intra-national documents published during the war, and at the same time favorably differs from them, inasmuch as it contains the first concrete expression of the idea governing the international kernel in the shape of the four leading world powers. This is of the highest importance for the defeat of the common enemy of the freedom-loving nations and for further international development generally, and especially in the matter of uniting all freedom-loving nations, large and small, in the interests of their national security and general peace.

Particularly noteworthy is the decision to establish a postwar international organization open to membership by all freedom-loving states, large and small. This organization should certainly draw a lesson from the history of the prewar decades, when the League of Nations was unable to fulfil its mission as an instrument of peace and security owing to the absence of an agreed policy among the major peace-loving states, which opened the door to fascist aggression. The experience of history in the period between the First and Second World Wars demonstrates how great are the difficulties in the way of insuring a durable peace in Europe.

On the other hand, in the present war the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition shows that ground exists for broad cooperation between the great democratic powers: the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The examination of European problems at the Moscow Conference brought out all the importance of broad cooperation between these three great powers. So unfortunate a feature of the earlier period as the withdrawal of the United States from European affairs is a thing of the past.

The common decisions arrived at between the three Allied powers showed that they fully recognize, for the establishing of a stable postwar order, that their responsibility has been laid upon them by the whole course of history.

The principle, proclaimed in the declaration, of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states belonging to the international organization, defeats the malicious attempts of the Hitlerites and their echoers to sow distrust of the great peace-loving powers among the small and medium nations.

As we know, particularly zealous in this respect are the reactionary circles of the Polish emigration, whose divorcement from their own people is becoming ever more manifest. From these circles emanate diverse artificial plans for the creation of a federation of states in Central and Eastern Europe. These plans envisage the formation of permanent groups of states by the emigre governments, which for the most part lack a sufficiently strong contact with the people.

Furthermore, these plans provide for the union in one and the same federation of the countries which have been victims of the Hitlerite bandits and the countries which abetted the Hitlerites in their banditry. It is likewise clear that under the guise of federation it is intended to resurrect the policy of the notorious "cordon sanitaire" against the Soviet Union.

The harmfulness of artificially encouraging such projects, which may result in violating the genuine will of the sovereign nations by imposing all sorts of political combinations upon them, is only too obvious.

As for the Soviet Union and its relations with other European countries, a definite step forward may be noted. As we know, for several months past preparations were being made for the conclusion of a Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty on the pattern of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty. The obstacles in the way of the conclusion of this treaty, which our readers are aware of, have now been removed, and the arrival in Moscow of Eduard Benes, President of the Czechoslovak Republic, is expected shortly for the signing of the treaty with the Soviet Union.

The Conference agreed to insure joint examination on the part of the three powers of European questions arising out of the war by the setting up of a European Advisory Commission in London, composed of representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. This Commission should undoubtedly

play a big part in promoting cooperation between the three great powers.

Noteworthy, too, is the establishment of an Advisory Council for matters relating to Italy, which in the first instance will be composed of representatives of the three Allied Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation, with the subsequent addition of a representative of Greece and Yugoslavia. This Council will have to deal with serious questions as military operations develop in Italy and the Mediterranean generally.

The declaration regarding Italy confirms the policy of the Allies to restore democracy in Italy, a policy which the Soviet public has consistently advocated, and therefore particularly welcomes. The declaration holds the position that fascism and all of its evil consequences must be utterly destroyed in order that the Italian people may be given every opportunity to establish a government and other institutions based on the principles of democracy.

The principle of establishing democracy in Italy, proclaimed in Moscow on behalf of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, must be made the basis for the revival of the political life of the Italian people. It defines the general policy of the three Governments toward other analogous cases.

The declaration on Austria is a blow at Hitler Germany and a demonstration of the determination of the Allied powers to obliterate all consequences of the Hitlerite aggression.

The declaration of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and the head of the Soviet Government, Stalin, on the responsibility of the Hitlerites for atrocities perpetrated by them is a solemn warning to the Hitlerite bandits. The Allied powers declare that the Hitlerite criminals will be pursued to "the uttermost ends of the earth" and will be delivered to their accusers in order that justice may be done.

The success of the Moscow Conference has added to the confusion and dismay in the enemy camp. On the eve of the Conference the Hitlerites croaked in dull monotony that it was bound to be a fiasco, and asserted that the camp of the enemy was torn by contradictions. Now that the Conference has proved a success they have set up the cry that in Moscow the Allies surrendered Europe to the Bolsheviks. This falsehood is not only stupid, but utterly threadbare, and is not even fit to serve as a screen for retreat in the face of facts against which Hitler's futile propaganda has proved impotent. Evidently the dismay of the Hitlerites is such that they are unable to think of anything new.

The Conference of the three Foreign Secretaries was held in Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union, which is bearing the main burden of the struggle against the German-fascist bandits and their satellites. The Moscow Conference was held on the eve of the 26th anniversary of the establishment of the Soviet regime. Granted that this is a chance coincidence, it is none the less profoundly symbolical. Ever since the birth of Soviet power all the forces of international banditry and aggression, as well as the abettors of these forces in the countries which were fated to become victims of the aggressors, pursued a policy making for the international isolation of the Soviet Union. The fascist bandits, and all the "appeasers," who connived at the acts of the bandits, strove not only to isolate the Soviet Union, but also to lay upon it the blame for this isolation.

Now, in the light of the events of the past years, it is clear to everyone that attempts to exclude the Soviet Union from the decision of cardinal questions of international policy can only benefit the forces which are inimical to the vital interests of peace-loving nations.

From its very inception the great Soviet power has been a firm bulwark of peace among nations. When Hitler Germany treacherously attacked the Soviet Union the latter proved to be a wall of steel against which the Hitlerite imperialist marauder broke its teeth. Our country not only stood firm in the face of trials which no other country in the world could stand; it dealt staggering blows to the war machine which Hitler Germany created for the conquest of world dominion—blows which make the defeat of the enemy by the united forces of the Allies at an early date quite feasible.

The power and significance of these blows are once more eloquently attested by the results of the Red Army's summer campaign. The Red Army's victories in the summer and autumn of 1943 have laid a firm foundation for the rapid and complete defeat of Hitler Germany. The sacrifice made by the Soviet people to the common Allied cause is now clearer than ever.

The Moscow Conference was the natural result of the present development of cooperation between the three great powers which head the anti-Hitler coalition; at the same time it marks a new stage in the relations of these powers. Now when the contours of future victory have become clear and distinct, it is particularly important that the chief Allied States should insure an agreed line on the major questions of the war in Europe, and, in the first instance, in the matter of shortening the war; and should also lay down definite guiding principles of policy for the postwar period, with the object of paving the way for a stable peace and general security.

It would be a mistake to minimize the difficulties which will inevitably arise in the solution of these problems. But these difficulties can be overcome, and the successful work of the Moscow Conference of representatives of three leading world powers is a token of this.

Moscow Pact Misconstrued

Reds Won't Permit Europe Federation

By United Press

MOSCOW, Nov 18—Unalterable Russian opposition to any post-war European federation of small nations was reaffirmed emphatically today in the Soviet government organ Izvestia.

The Soviet stand was made clear to U. S. Secretary of State Hull and British Foreign Secretary Eden at the three-power conference here and the American and British delegates expressed no objection, an Izvestia editorial said.

The pronouncement came on the eve of the arrival of President Edouard Benes of Czechoslovakia to sign a pact with the Soviet government along the lines of the Anglo-Russian agreement.

Izvestia took emphatic exception to views recently expressed in London publications that the Moscow conference declaration on Austria implied that the Soviet Union had no objections to European federations. Such an interpretation introduces the only false note in the universal chorus of approval of the tripartite meeting, Izvestia said, is "mistaken and irresponsible and does not correspond to reality or reasonableness."

WASH. DAILY NEWS Nov. 18, 1943 p. 3

MOSCOW PACT GETS CHURCH APPROVAL

Federal Council Sees 'Notable Step' Toward Realization of World Order

17

John Foster Dulles, chairman of the Commission On a Just and Durable Peace of the Federal Council of Churches, yesterday hailed the Moscow Declaration as "a notable step toward realizing international order as envisaged by our 'Six Pillars of Peace'" and "a great development from the Atlantic Charter."

"The Christian forces of this country," he said, "can be grateful that their Government has cooperated with the Governments of Great Britain, Russia and China to make a sound beginning for world order.

"We can legitimately feel that we have done much to create here a public opinion that has made this possible. We must not, however, be complacent or relax our efforts. To move words into functioning institutions infused with the spirit of Christian fellowship remains a political and spiritual task of immense proportions."

Approved by Committee

Mr. Dulles' analysis of the Moscow Declaration in the light of the "Six Pillars of Peace," formulated by the commission last March, was approved by the executive committee of the Federal Council of Churches. He said the declaration marked a development from the Atlantic Charter, which proposed no international institutions and made no references to religious and intellectual freedom.

While the Moscow statement omits dealing with colonial and economic matters as advocated by the "Six Pillars" and contains some ambiguities, according to Mr. Dulles, its "positive aspects are sound, rejecting as they do any attempt to base world order merely on the military alliance of a few."

"But," he went on, "as said in our 'Long-Range Peace Objectives' (Sept. 18, 1941), the end of the present war will find an overwhelming concentration of power in one or two nations. That power will be a reality, the implications of which we cannot avoid.

International Institutions

"Our task will be to make it a beneficent reality. That requires that we use our power not to perpetuate itself, but to create and support and eventually give way to international institutions drawing their vitality from the whole family of nations. That appears to be the spirit and objective of the Moscow decisions."

Commenting on the Moscow recognition of "the necessity of establishing a general international organization based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States," Mr. Dulles said:

"The phrase 'peace-loving States' might, of course, cover an intent to postpone indefinitely membership by States which are now our enemies, or it may mean to defer such memberships only until their peoples have installed governments genuinely disposed to cooperate with others for peace with justice. If the latter is intended, the Moscow Declaration conforms in all substantial respects with our first and basic proposition (first pillar)."

Russia

This is a clipping from page 17 of the New York Times for Nov. 18, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Russia

stroyers.

RUSSIAN PROMISES HELP TO BELGIANS

Oumansky Praises 'Effective' Sabotage Against Germans

By Telephone to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MEXICO CITY, Nov. 17—Constantine Oumansky, Soviet Ambassador, pledged Russia's all-out support for Belgian independence in a speech late last night at a Free Belgian meeting in the presence of many members of the diplomatic corps and of the Belgian colony.

Mr. Oumansky extolled Belgian underground activities as "effective sabotage" and went out of his wa yto pay a warm tribute to the patriotic and anti-Nazi attitude of the Belgian clergy.

"We bow," he said, "before your priests who refuse to officiate for the traitors and to bless the weapons of those few who accepted to march to the front to fight their Russian brothers. We bow before those priests who refused to give to the Nazis the list of their faithful and disciples, thus preventing the latter from being drafted for forced labor in Germany, and we bow before those priests who are ex-communicating the traitors of their country."

"Only ten days ago," he concluded, "Marshal Stalin mentioned Belgium in second place and soon after your traditionalally immortal France, as the countries that will be liberated and at the same time guaranteed against another threat on their freedom."

This is a clipping from page 9 of the New York Times for Nov. 18, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Izvestia Sees Growing Role Of Soviet-American Ties

(By Wireless to Inter-Continent News)

MOSCOW, Nov. 16.—Izvestia, the Soviet Government's newspaper, declared here today that Soviet-American relations have been strengthened and are acquiring "ever greater significance" for the two countries as well as for the world.

Reviewing the tenth anniversary of Soviet recognition, Izvestia laid stress on the struggle "against persons sowing thistles of disbelief and suspicion" of the USSR, and emphasized that the "date of victory" depends on how soon the obvious superiority of the anti-Hitler coalition is expressed in actual fighting efforts.

"On Nov. 16, 1933, letters were exchanged in Washington between President Roosevelt and Litvinoff," Izvestia begins. "Soviet-American friendship was destined to pass through many trials but now it is seen that as a result Soviet-American relations strengthened and are acquiring ever greater significance not only for the two countries, but for all peoples of the world as well.

"The act of Nov. 16, 1933, expressed the recognition by all leading political circles of the United States of the fact that the protracted isolation which separated the United States and the USSR was not in keeping with the fundamental vital interests of the two nations.

"On the contrary, these interests insistently demanded that this past isolation be overcome, all the more so since the interests of the United States and the USSR never clashed anywhere.

"The realization of the community of interests of the USSR and the United States both in the sphere of economic trade relations and in the matter of ensuring universal peace to which the USSR always attached great importance gradually penetrated to ever wider sections of the public of the USA as the danger of Hitlerite aggression loomed ominously.

"In his famous Chicago speech October, 1937, President Roosevelt stated that war is an infection which can spread to states and peoples situated far beyond the primary theatre of military operations and called for effective quarantine against this disease.

"The further course of events, the

(Continued on Page 2)

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(Continued from Page 1)

war unleashed in Europe by Hitlerite Germany and particularly Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, served as a powerful impulse in strengthening the friendly ties between the United States and the USSR which subsequently developed into a fighting alliance against the common enemy.

MOLOTOV VISIT

"'The Agreement on Principles on Mutual Assistance in the Conduct of War Against Aggression' signed in June, 1942, during Molotov's visit to Washington marked a big step forward in the relations between the USSR and the United States.

"The peoples of both countries and of all of the United Nations benefited greatly from the military cooperation between the USSR and the USA.

"The American public is well aware of the inestimable contribution made by the Soviet Union and its Red Army in routing the common enemy.

"The Soviet people highly appreciate the assistance rendered to the Red Army by our allies in the struggle against Hitlerite Germany. Stalin has on more than one occasion noted the great importance of this assistance.

"Of paramount significance today are the military tasks confronting our allies. The anti-Hitlerite coalition possesses tangible superiority of forces over fascist Germany and its vassals. The date of victory now depends on how soon and how completely this superiority will come down on the enemy in the joint of fighting efforts.

"The peoples of the USSR and the United States are displaying a keen, growing interest in each other, striving better to understand the nature, customs and peculiarities of the friendly nation.

PREJUDICES IN U. S.

"Political rapprochement and the strengthening of cultural ties are helping to overcome a number of prejudices in the United States in relation to the Soviet country.

"Much has been done in the United States and the USSR to prevent the road of mutual confidence and understanding from being bestrewn with poisonous weeds.

"Close cooperation calls for a struggle against persons sowing thistles of disbelief and suspicion. **How many times have the accomplices of our enemy frightened the American public with terrible tales about the USSR and how many times have their ridiculous predictions proved to be an utter fiasco!**

"Events have proved, and this is stated by Stalin in his report on Nov. 6, that the anti-Hitlerite coalition is a firm union of peoples and is based on a strong foundation.

"The Moscow conference has shown that cooperation between the USSR, the United States and Great Briain, which has strengthened in the course of the war, has every ground for continuing to strengthen as the base for the speedy completion of the struggle against Hitlerite Germany and its satellites and as a base for post-war cooperation of all large and small peace-loving nations."

HULL URGES POLICY OF MOSCOW PACTS

He Sees Baltic States' Rights Protected—Will Address Congress on Thursday

By BERTRAM D. HULEN

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Nov. 15—Secretary of State Cordell Hull, at a press conference today, described the accomplishments of the Moscow conference as a great forward step and one that held out hopeful and encouraging prospects for world peace.

Mr. Hull will appear Thursday before an informal joint session of the Senate and House to report on the conference to the members of Congress.

He will speak informally at a meeting in the House chamber at 12:30 P. M. It is understood there will be no broadcast of his address, but the session will be open to the public.

Mr. Hull will appear in response to a request from Congressional leaders after several resolutions to that end had been offered. Leaders of Congress could not recall that a member of the Cabinet had ever addressed a joint session of Congress before in the history of the Republic.

Presumably Mr. Hull's remarks at his press conference, his first

Continued on Page Five

Continued From Page One

since his return from Moscow, were a preview of some of the things he will have to say before Congress. He particularly emphasized the significance of the Joint Four-Nation Declaration—of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and China—for collaboration during the war and in the post-war period.

He attached — importance to the pronouncement by the three powers, exclusive of China, regarding Italy. That pronouncement stipulates that the Italian people will eventually have the right to select their own government.

The pronouncement on Italy, in Mr. Hull's opinion, would seem to dispose of problems that otherwise might arise over buffer states and questions of annexation or of spheres of influence in such areas as the Baltic States or the Balkans.

He had no comment to make on the intimation reported to have been given by Constantine A. Oumansky, Soviet Ambassador to Mexico, on Friday, that Russia intended to retain that part of prewar Poland in which she was specially interested.

Secretary Hull looked rested and physically fit. He spoke of the Moscow Conference for more than an hour to a large group of newspaper correspondents.

Specific Points of Moscow Accord

In addition to giving a broad outline of the Moscow Conference and its accomplishments Mr. Hull made a number of specific points.

He announced that no secret agreements had been entered into.

He denied, in response to a question, that the principles of the Atlantic Charter had been compromised.

He asserted that the Free Germany Committee in Moscow had no influence from the time Vyaheslaff M. Molotoff, Soviet Foreign Commissar, signed the Four-Nation Declaration.

He said he had made encouraging progress in proposing at Moscow that efforts be made in due time to bring about liberal trade policies in the post-war world.

As for the treatment to be accorded Germany after her defeat, he said that matter would be reached through a larger organization of nations than was represented at Moscow. There was some casual comment on the subject at the tripartite conference but only as revealed in the published agreements.

As for our home front, Mr. Hull made clear that he was hopeful of unity and collaboration in foreign policy and implied that he would favor similar declarations on the

This is a clipping from page 1 of the New York Times for Nov. 16, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

dect in the platforms of the two
jor parties next year.

ack of this position was the
t that he had sought the as-
ance of representatives of many
itical views and of many groups
framing the draft of the Four-
ver Declaration that he took to
scow with him.

He had been conferring for a
ar, he said, with the leaders of
political parties and groups with
object of cooperation in foreign
icy.

We had to find a way to do it,
said, and that is why he pleaded
th everybody to be patient with
e another. We were passing
rough a most dangerous period
d we would not get through it
scathed unless we recognized it
a dangerous period and co-
erated with patience and for-
arance, he maintained.

Mr. Hull said that the Moscow
eclaration contained a broad
sic policy of international co-
eration and in that was the best
idence that we were taking a
al step in the course of unity. He
d not mean by that that every-
ody was in agreement but that
ther the great body of the Ameri-
an public would either carry
is program forward or there
ould be no progress.

Away From Isolationism

The Four-Nation Declaration,
Mr. Hull said, came about because
ach of the four nations was un-
ertaking to initiate some interna-
ional movement away from isola-
ionism and in the direction of
ractical, modern international co-
operation.

As for this nation, he declared, we had determined, before we went to Moscow, that we should be going forward with the preparation of the main features of a broad basic program of international cooperation. This we must give attention to, he said, unless we were to run the serious risk of utterly confusing it at a belated stage.

Asked whether there was discussion at Moscow of the political future of the Balkans or the Baltic states, Mr. Hull said that there was no general discussion other than of the doctrines set out in the Declaration Regarding Italy.

That pronouncement, he asserted, was an example of the doctrines and policies that the three Governments—the United States, Britain and Russia—unreservedly stood for as suitable in their application to any and all countries, especially the liberated areas of Europe.

The main point, he said, was that each country in the end should have the untrammeled right by the people to select their own form of government and their own leaders.

"Does Russia agree to the principles in the Italy declaration as applicable to the rest of Europe?" he was asked.

That was exactly what all three of us were doing, as he understood it, Mr. Hull replied.

There in the Italian pronouncement, he said, was an example of the rules and policies that should apply to areas that had been restored. Underneath all of these things, he explained, was the doctrine that the people of every nation in Europe should have the right by a free plebiscite to select their form of government and their officials.

Asked whether all three of the major powers would assure that the people would have this right, Mr. Hull said it depended upon what military organization might go into country and restore it.

Pressed as to whether a military organization in occupation of a country would supervise a plebiscite, Mr. Hull replied that it would not be supposed to.

It would be supposed to establish law and order, he said, and welcome any and all organizations or groups of nationals who were willing to cooperate in preserving law and order, without the military organization's taking part in any political movement.

The question of the situation of liberated countries, he added, was referred to the European Advisory Commission set up at London, which would deal with any new or modified question that might arise.

In denying that the principles of the Atlantic Charter were compromised at Moscow, Mr. Hull said no one of the three governments desired to compromise those principles.

Unless we could go forward in that manner, he warned, we would naturally be subjected to some controversy and some attacks.

Mr. Hull recalled that groups here had long been working within the Government on post-war trade problems and also with foreign governments on the many questions involved. He brought up the whole subject at Moscow and laid down ideas that the nations would consider as time went on.

It was at this time that Mr. Molotoff informed him that Russia was sending a monetary representative here to participate in discussions at the Treasury on stabilization and trade questions. He knew of no matters more mutually desirable and with fewer obstacles between us and Russia than the whole economic situation.

The Struggle For Asia

By HARRY PAXTON HOWARD

EDITOR'S NOTE: This is the first of two articles by Mr. Howard on the behind-the-scenes struggle by the great powers for Asia. The second will appear in an early issue.

STALIN'S AMAZING VICTORY at the Moscow Conference, where he gained formal pledges from the American and British governments to support him both during the war and during the peace to follow, with the boundaries of the Soviet Union to be decided by Moscow alone, is linked closely with the situation in Asia.

Howard

For the past two months, the lines of the British diplomatic retreat before Moscow have become ever more clear. Prime Minister Churchill's (and President Roosevelt's) ambitions on behalf of King Victor Emmanuel, Churchill's frank determination to maintain the Fascist "existing structure" of the Italian state as of August this year, Churchill's determination to restore the Serbian ("Yugoslav") and Greek kings to their thrones in opposition both to democratic elements and to Stalin's Communists and "Partisans," are meeting utter defeat.

Behind this retreat of British before Red imperialism lies the struggle for Asia. Britain cannot afford seriously to antagonize Moscow—if the British want to retain India. The United States cannot afford seriously to antagonize Moscow—if American imperialism wishes to retain its foothold in China.

Russia's First Interest

So Moscow has gotten its demands in Europe—and Persia—and is now headed for direct ascendancy on the European continent as well as in Persia. As a part of these deals—which have been taking place behind the scenes for the past three months—the Russians staged an ostensible retreat in Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang), where they withdrew their advisors and their industrial establishments and permitted the Chiang Kai-shek regime to establish itself.

For Europe is of central and vital interest to Moscow. If Stalin can gain control of the populous and productive European continent, he can return to China later. For Soviet Russia, Europe is of primary importance.

The actual position of China was quite clearly shown by the decision to include the Chinese government in the "Joint Four-Nation Declaration" at Moscow. The official communique on the Tri-partite Conference made it wholly clear that the Chinese government did not participate at any time. The three powers reached their decisions, however, and Secretary Hull suggested that China's name be added to the Declaration. Molotov and Eden agreed, and the Chinese envoy, at Moscow obediently came over and signed. So much for "sovereign" China!

Meanwhile, at a heavy cost in blood, sweat and tears, Gen. Douglas MacArthur and his brave boys are

THE PROGRESSIVE
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step by step recovering British New Guinea for the Empire. So also with the Solomon Islands, New Britain, New Ireland. In the wake of the armies follow the British imperial officials who re-established themselves and resume their rule over the natives of those areas.

At the present rate of progress, we may look forward to recovering all of British New Guinea for the Crown in the course of the coming Winter,—or Spring at any rate. Then will come the western part of this immense island, which is to be recovered for Queen Wilhelmina, formerly of Holland, whose present capital is a migratory one. But before this is done, there are more urgent things to be accomplished. Burma must be recovered for the British Crown.

Empire In Asia

Preparations are already being made for the attack on Burma—to the disgust and resentment of Gen. MacArthur, who insists with some justice that if all available forces were diverted to the area under his command we might reconquer the Philippine Islands within a couple of years. In the meantime, to the anger of President Roosevelt and his Filipino friends and dependents, the Japanese-patronized "Philippine Republic" has issued a "declaration of independence," formally recognized by the Japanese and their Asiatic associates.

Unlike the Burmese, the Filipinos did not declare war upon the United States (and Great Britain), though they agreed to give the Japanese military and naval facilities in the islands. Their President, Jose P. Laurel, appealed to the United States, in the name of the Filipino people, "to prove to the entire world the sincerity of her protestations of friendship toward us by not placing obstacles in the path of the new republic."

Roosevelt's angry response was to have been expected. Not only was the Filipino-Japanese move a reply to his promise to "liberate" the Philippines, but it was a further move in the liquidation of American imperialism in Asia. It was Theodore Roosevelt who actually launched us on our career as a Far Eastern power in 1898, when as Undersecretary of the Navy he sent instructions to Admiral Dewey at Hongkong to attack the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. Secretary Long was having a day off. President McKinley stated that he could not locate the Philippines "within a thousand miles." A satirist might remark that Teddy got us into the Far East, and Frankie got us out.

In the vast territories of Asia and its fringing islands and archipelagoes, containing 1,300 million inhabitants—an actual majority of the human race—the only independent and non-imperial countries today are Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan.

The war for Asia is a war for empire. Whether it is India or Burma, Persia or Palestine, China or Java, New Guinea or the Philippines, that are immediately involved, the struggle is primarily one between great powers for imperial domination.

During the 19th Century, Britain and Russia were the great rival empires. The rivalry has continued down to the present day, but other powers have come into the picture. The Japanese Empire, built up by Britain and the United States as an ally and tool against China and against Russian Empire, expanded into a great imperial power, utilizing the political, military, and industrial techniques of its Western teachers and developing some wrinkles of its own.

Japan Sets Up Shop

A little isolationist country, forced out of its determined isolation by superior western armaments, subjected for a time to virtual colonial status, it escaped from that status by becoming an ally of British and American imperialism against China.

Finally it went into business for itself, becoming our enemy instead of our ally. This change coincided with a change in our official propaganda concerning it. Roosevelt the First ballyhooed Japan as a "great, modern, progressive" country. Roosevelt the Second—after building it up for eight years—denounced it as "brutal," "savage," and "treacherous."

The Japanese militarists now exercise hegemony over some 500,000,000 Asiatics, in a vast area covering more than 4,000,000 square miles. The Japanese Empire is as populous today as is the British Empire. In Asia, it is more populous, and has far more native support. The Japanese have an effective fifth column in India, prepared to cooperate with and welcome a Japanese invasion. There are few Burmese or Malayans who would welcome a British reconquest of their territories.

Soviet Asia covers even greater territories than those under Japanese hegemony. Its population, however, is much sparser—some 60,000,000 persons. For more than a century the rulers of Russia—whether Romanoffs or Bolsheviks—have been trying to press southwards into the warmer and more densely populated areas, but have been repeatedly checked by the British, who for many momentous years succeeded in enlisting the Japanese in their support—and for even more years have succeeded in getting American support.

CZECH-SOVIET PACT

FOR several months it has been generally known that a Czecho-Slovakia and Russia had completed a new pact. It was understood that announcement of this achievement was delayed because of diplomatic objections raised by an outside power. The announcement is now made, however, and it is taken for granted that the go-ahead sign was given during the preliminary discussions at Moscow.

The terms of this new pact have not yet been made public. What hints and statements have been released, however, give rise to justified fears. The principal objection is to the revelation that "Russia and Czecho-Slovakia recognize their common boundaries." This appears to mean that the Czechs recognize the authority of the 1939 Hitler-Stalin pact which partitions Poland. This pact was signed when Hitler was at war with the democracies, after Poland had been crushed. It is a partition of the spoils of war that is now to be recognized as permanent.

This type of treaty settles problems and territories without regard to the wishes of the people concerned. It flies straight against the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Any revision of it will involve bitter diplomatic struggles among the United Nations powers, and if left unrevised, it is an open invitation to future war.

It remains to be seen how far the Moscow pact makes this a war for the freedom of all "peace-loving nations."

editorial in The NEW LEADER Nov. 13, 1943 p. 8

Where the News Ends

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

Was Moscow an East-European Munich?

WE know much too little about the negotiations which preceded the publication of the tripartite agreement after the Moscow conference to pass final and definite judgment on its significance. As anyone who has had the experience of journalistic work in Moscow would have anticipated, the conference was one of the most secretive in the annals of diplomacy. The Soviet censorship is unexcelled, both in stifling news at the source and in preventing its communication if it leaks out.

So we have practically no knowledge of the arguments and trains of thought with which Hull, Eden and Molotov identified themselves during the conference. We do not know as yet whether such an important subject as the future European boundary of the Soviet Union was simply left unmentioned or whether a failure to reach an agreement was discreetly covered by silence on this subject. We do not know whether any of the participants in the conference proposed or discussed any schemes for the political reconstruction and economic rehabilitation of Europe more positive and far-reaching than the published resolutions on Italy, Austria and the intention to mete out retribution to German officers and Nazi officials found guilty of committing war crimes. We do not know whether the phrase about "Germans who take part in the wholesale shooting of Polish officers" is the product of an exhaustive and objective analysis of the evidence in the mysterious disappearance of the ten thousand Polish officers who were captured at the time of the Soviet invasion of Poland and never heard from afterwards or whether it was a mere polite gesture of acceptance of the Soviet official version of this incident.

* * *

THERE were some noteworthy positive achievements of the Moscow conference; and these have naturally dominated comment in United Nations capitals. But there were also significant gaps and omissions. Unless these are corrected by later developments or fuller information about Soviet intentions, it may prove in the end that Stalin played at Moscow something of the role of Hitler at Munich and imposed his will in the matter of territorial annexations which are in no sense an expression of the will of the peoples affected.

Let's look at the bright side of the picture first. The Soviet Union now stands pledged to much closer military cooperation in the war against Germany. Stalin is committed to continue hostilities against Germany until the German armies surrender unconditionally. Presumably, this means an end—or at least a considerable curtailment—of the flirtation with that curious Comintern-Junker amalgam, the so-called Free Germany Committee in Moscow.

It is all to the good that certain principles of post-war international cooperation have been accepted by the three powers and by China. Stalin's willingness to admit China as a signatory of the general four-nation declaration probably reflects his conviction that the war in the Far East is definitely swinging against Japan, just as the tide of battle in Europe has unmistakably turned against Germany.

"A general international organization, based on the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security," is an ideal which most Americans would now share, provided (and the provision is important) the world order over which such an organization should stand guard is not vitiated in advance by obvious injustice, and provided that reasonable opportunity is afforded for peaceful and orderly change. The self-denying clause under which the signatories promise that "they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint

The New Leader Nov. 13, 1943 p. 8

consultation" is a step in the right direction. If words have any value, this should mean no British, American or Russian troops in any part of China, no British or American troops in North Africa or in non-Axis European countries, no Soviet troops in Poland or the Baltic States or the Balkans.

* * *

IT is on this last point that grave doubts arise because of the total absence of specific references to the countries of Eastern Europe in the decisions of the conference. The Poles, second to no people among the United Nations in the steadfast courage with which they have fought the Nazi terror through their well-organized underground, must be haunted by torturing doubts. They see that the future frontiers of their country are not indicated after a conference from which Poland was excluded, just as Czecho-Slovakia was excluded from the Munich conference.

It is difficult to understand on what basis of equality among the major United Nations the Soviet Union can claim an active voice in the dispositions regarding Italy, while America and Great Britain, on the evidence of the published record, have enjoyed no voice in the settlement of Eastern Europe. Has there been a complete capitulation to Stalin's territorial demands, demands which ninety-nine per cent of the Poles, regardless of politics and class and occupation, consider just as unwarranted as Hitler's demands at Munich seemed to the Czechs?

One can hardly believe that there has been such a capitulation until there is positive evidence of such a betrayal of the principle of self-determination, in the shape of formal United States and British recognition of the Soviet annexation of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Eastern Poland. But the profound silence that has enveloped this question at Moscow is not reassuring. Perhaps the representatives of the Western democracies have decided to play the role of Pontius Pilate, to avoid all definite reference to Poland and the Baltic States and to let the advancing Red Army draw Russia's western frontier wherever it wishes.

Such a policy would not only be in glaring contradiction to the high ideals expressed in the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms; it would be anything but a hopeful guarantee of the peace in Eastern Europe. Polish national consciousness has been raised to a new high pitch by the brutal efforts to extinguish it during the last years. There is reliable evidence that the underground movement has taken on the character of an unofficial but generally recognized government. *Men and women who have been risking and often sacrificing their lives in defiance of the Gestapo will not let themselves be terrorized into silence by the agents of the Ogpu. The genuine Polish patriots, in distinction to the Communist stooges who have misappropriated that name in Moscow, will recognize no territorial settlement that has not been reached by free negotiation with the legitimate Polish Government.*

There is every reason to believe that Secretary Hull, whose understanding of international morality is much clearer and straighter than that of some of our diplomats, amateur and professional, who fancy themselves as more sophisticated, put up as good a fight as he could for American ideals, as well as for American interests at Moscow. But what seems to be the best attainable solution may fall far short of being ideal or permanent. The silences of Moscow are ominous and disquieting.

One cannot feel much confidence in the stability of a world settlement that ignores and tramples under foot, in any part of the world, "the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states," to quote a phrase on which the signatories of the Moscow declarations agreed. A just world order is the prerequisite of effective international cooperation for maintaining that order.

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SOVIET WAR EFFORT IMPRESSED NELSON

He Lauds Industrial Production and the Will and Determination of the People

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SILENT ON ACTUAL MISSION

WPB Chairman Says Stalin's Pledge of Repaying Obligations Referred to Post-War Goods

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Nov. 10—The ature and results of Donald M. Nelson's mission to Moscow re- nained a mystery today when the hairman of the War Production Board, reporting at a press confer- nce on his month-long journey, nthusiastically praised the Rus- ian war program but declined to eveal the chief purpose of his isit.

He explained that he had spent ree weeks in Russia on a "special ission for the President," which could not discuss because it volved "certain things in the ate Department — Presidential tegory."

In a chronological account of his p to England, Africa, the Near st and Russia, however, he left room for doubt about his admiration for the Russians, especially their production accomplishments, as well as for the British industrial program, the United States Army's achievements in supplying the troops of its forces and those of its allies and the efficiency of the Air Transport Command in building and maintaining a world air line.

He was particularly enthusiastic in his praise of the Russian people, reporting that "everyone is continually working for the Red Army" and "there is no sacrifice too great."

"I didn't know what an all-out war was until I saw the all-out war Russia was making," he said.

He found Russian production to be "excellent," better than American production in one respect, that being control of the flow of material into and out of plants.

"Crazy" About Jeeps

"Russia is now a great industrial nation and as far as I can see is going to be a greater industrial nation," he declared.

The Russians had "great admiration for American industry," and liked the American equipment sent to them, especially the Bell Airacobra fighter plane, because, they told him, "it kills a lot of Germans"; the jeep, which they call a Willys and are "crazy about" because "it will almost fly," and the 2½-ton truck, which they call a Studebaker, although other manu-

Mr. Nelson explained that Premier Marshal Stalin's pledge to him that Russia would pay obligations to the United States "in full and not by token payments" did not apply to lend-lease war materials but to products Russia received from this country after the war. His quotation of Marshal Stalin in a speech Monday in New York City had been interpretd by some as meaning that Russia intended to pay in full for war materials. He referred strictly to post-war matters.

Stalin a "Regular Fellow"

In a conversation lasting an hour and a half, Mr. Nelson found Marshal Stalin to be "a regular fellow" who showed a "tremendous grasp of war and post war problems." He was well informed, had "marvelous" sense of humor, was straight-fosward, a man of few words and, all in all, "a very, very friendly sort of fellow."

The Russians wasted no time on finish or the appearance of war materials, the sole consideration being that they were fit to "kill Germans." They spoke frequently of "killing Germans" rather than of winning battles or driving the enemy from Soviet soil.

Women in Russia were as productive as war workers as the men they replaced. Most war industries worked two eleven-hour shifts, six days a week. Some of the industries involving heavier work worked three eight-hour shifts. Synthetic rubber was being produced very efficiently.

There was not a building left standing in Stalingrad, but some production had been resumed. The picture impressed upon Mr. Nelson the "will and determination of the Russian people as I couldn't have imagined it."

The Russians "didn't hold back a thing" from him, but took him everywhere he requested, including Siberia, and "showed me anything I wanted to see."

The capacity of the railroad from the Persian Gulf to Russia had been increased six times by the ingenuity of United States Army men and the Russians were "terrifically impressed" by the "amazingly fine job" and "tremendously grateful."

U. S. Fliers in England

It was an "inspiration" to see what United States airmen in England were doing with the equipment furnished to them by American industry and this emphasized the need for industrial workers to increase their production and give the fliers even more support. The work of the Eighth Air Force gave Mr. Nelson a "great feeling of confidence in American production."

British production he found was "good," showing "great strides" in mass production. Many of the plants were as good as those in the United States, despite blackouts, bombing and other obstacles.

In Algiers, Mr. Nelson talked to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower about materials he needed the most to carry out his job. Some of these requests Mr. Nelson sent to Washington by telephone while in Algiers.

This is a clipping from page 5 of the New York Times for Nov. 11, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

MOSCOW PACT CALLED HAZY ON COOPERATION

Imperialism and Boundaries Not Touched, Thomas Asserts

Asserting that a durable peace must be based upon cooperation designed to deal with economic and political problems, Norman Thomas, Socialist, criticized yesterday the recent Moscow declarations for "conspicuous silence" on the future of imperialism and the principles on which boundary questions would be decided and for reaffirmation of unconditional surrender "as the only approach to the German and Japanese people."

Speaking at a forum on foreign policy in Town Hall, Mr. Thomas observed that "It looks as if Stalin andn Roosevelt had underwritten the British Empire—Indian famine and all—and hurchill and Roosevelt had underwritten whatever boundaries Stalin chooses to draw for the U. S. S. R. in Europe."

"Cooperation is good," he said, "but the basic question is how shall we cooperate and for what? Until that question is better answered, our foreign policy is not satisfactorily solvent and we head toward a Third World War, the product of the same basic failures in racial and national fraternity and the same mismanagement of our marvelous productive capacity as the two wars before."

Stanley High, writer and lecturer, asserted that the Moscow pact was a foundation stone under a new and solvent American foreign policy and James C. McMullin, news analyst and editor, declared that it was a great step toward successfuul prosecution of the war and a lasting peace.

This is a clipping from page 15 of the New York Times for Nov. 10, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

ONA 3 NEW YORK RUSSOCZECH

COPYRIGHT, 1943, OVERSEAS NEWS AGENCY, INC.

NEW YORK, NOV. 9. (ONA) -- A COMMON FRONTIER BETWEEN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND SOVIET RUSSIA, IN THE CARPATHO-RUSSIA REGION, IS AMONG THE PROVISIONS OF THE 20-YEAR TREATY OF ALLIANCE ABOUT TO BE SIGNED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS IN MOSCOW, IT WAS RELIABLY LEARNED TODAY.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROVISION IS THAT IT DISPOSES OF TERRITORY WHICH IS IN DISPUTE BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN AND POLISH GOVERNMENTS AND IMPLIES THAT THE RUSSO-POLISH TERRITORIAL DIFFERENCES WERE AMONG THE QUESTIONS DISCUSSED AT MOSCOW AND SETTLED IN RUSSIA'S FAVOR.

PRESIDENT EDUARD BENES OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE IS EN ROUTE TO MOSCOW TO SIGN THE 20-YEAR PACT, WHICH HAD BEEN DRAWN UP READY FOR SIGNATURE SOME TIME AGO BUT WHICH HAD BEEN HELD UP ON ADVICE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT PENDING AGREEMENT AMONG THE THREE POWERS ON OTHER MATTERS. PRESIDENT BENES HAD BEEN SCHEDULED TO GO TO MOSCOW LAST SUMMER BUT HIS DEPARTURE WAS REPEATEDLY POSTPONED.

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Overseas News Agency Night Report No. 1027, Nov. 9, 1943

Abroad

Stalin Harnesses Old Horses to the Soviet Machine

By ANNE O'HARE McCORMICK

Kiev is as much the symbol of old Russia as Stalingrad is the symbol of the Soviet era. What Rome is to Italy and Western Christendom Kiev is to Russia and the Eastern Church: it is the mother town, seat of the first Czars and the most ancient cathedrals. It fought the Revolution in eleven bitter battles, fought for a separate Ukraine, and though today the scars of 1918-19 must be obliterated by more than two years of occupation and the awful wreckage the Germans leave as they retreat, it would be strange if they were able to dissolve the aura of Holy Russia that clings to Kiev as to no other great city of the Soviet Union. Smaller places like Novgorod, Rostov, Yaroslavl, Vladimir remember the praying past of a traditionally religious people, or did before the invasion, but nowhere is the face of old Russia glimpsed so clearly as in the sweeping bend of the Dnieper that reflects the three levels of Kiev, with its wide wandering streets, its bright domes, the vast monastic compound called the Lavra.

On the same day that Kiev was recaptured by the Russians—"as a present to Stalin," one reporter wrote, on the eve of the twenty-sixth anniversary of the Revolution—Vatican City was bombed for the first time by a single, unidentified plane which circled low over St. Peter's Dome as if to demonstrate that Rome's most conspicuous target was not hit by mistake.

This is an odd coincidence, because there is a dim connection between the two events. The lone marauder was not an Allied bomber. General Eisenhower's authoritative disclaimer is not needed to convince the world that we would not wantonly and senselessly attack the neutral and sacred enclosure the President promised to respect. It was probably a Nazi plane, scouting in contemplation of further raids or trying to throw the onus on the Allies. But it could be an Italian machine, piloted by a vengeful and desperate fascist of the Farinacci school, determined before the end to strike a blow against the Pope, always regarded by the pro-Nazi extremists in Mussolini's dusty entourage, as anyone knows who read their daily diatribes, as "our enemy" and latterly as one of the plotters for the overthrow of the regime.

The Soul of Russia

The connection between this incident and the evacuation of Kiev is obviously more symbolic than real. The Vatican is a symbol, and so is the "Holy City" of the Russians, and what they symbolize, paradoxically enough, are things more alike than different. Stalin and the Red Army wanted to crown the anniversary of the Revolution by reconquering Kiev because it represents tradition older and deeper than the Revolution, and because these traditions have become as precious to the Soviet leaders as the achievement typified by Stalingrad.

Stalin has tapped the roots of Russia and found them strong. He has discovered in a fiery test the mighty force of patriotism, and so he has abandoned the rusty weapon of the Comintern, which in twenty years did not win a single nation to communism, in favor of the flaming sword of nationalism. There was a time when Russia was taught that the world began in 1917 and that economics determined history. Now Stalin knows better. Now he revives the Russian past and its heroes, revives the military caste of the Cadets' School, revives the great Czars, re-establishes the old religion. It is hardly too much to say that he has discovered the soul of Russia, and from that it is a short step for a clever leader to appraise the power of spiritual empires.

It would be a grave mistake, however, to decide that Stalin has any thought of modifying the Soviet system. On the contrary, the strength it has shown in the supreme trial of war more than ever convinces him of its value as a form of government. His anniversary speech is a remarkable document in revealing his satisfaction in the results of the Moscow conference, in repeating its declaration that Europe will be reorganized on the basis of "national states" with full freedom to choose their own type of state, and in announcing once more, when he speaks of liberating "the people of Crimea and Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldavia and Karelia, the Finnish republic," where he expects the western boundaries of Russia to be fixed.

Russia

Soviet System Stronger

But the speech is even more striking as a paean to the strength of the Soviet state.

As far as Stalin can answer—and today he is more than ever the sole voice of Russia—this answers those who imagine that the Soviet system will be weakened by the war or that the Communist party will not remain for a long time in complete control. It is plain that the regime is stronger than it was when the fighting began. Stalin is more confident of his leadership and Soviet Russia is more sure of herself than ever in her history, more a force to be reckoned with in the world. And this is because the system, which is not communism, of course, but state socialism in its most absolute form, has been at last grafted on the deep roots and fibers of Russian tradition. Stalin has seen that Hitler can destroy socialist construction but not Russian spirit, can possess territory by force but cannot possess nations, can bomb the Vatican without touching the church. This is the change that has taken place, and its consequences are already apparent.

This is a clipping from page 18 of the New York Times for Nov. 8, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Complete Text of Marshal Stalin's Speech

Compete text of Marshal Stalin's speech on the 26th Anniversary of the Soviet Union made Saturday at a meeting of the Moscow Soviet and broadcast by the Moscow radio follows:

Comrades, today the people's Soviet Union is celebrating its 26th anniversary of the great socialist revolution for the third time under war conditions.

In the first year our troops had to retreat. It took the entire effort of the army and nation to stop the enemy and impose fierce blows against him. In October, 1942, the position improved.

Soon after October of last year our troops went over to the offensive and inflicted against the Germans new and heavy blows—first at Stalingrad and the Middle Bend of the Don and then at the beginning of 1943 at the approaches to Leningrad and the area of Lgov and beyond.

After this the Red Army never let the initiative from her hands. In the summer of this year the Red Army blows increased in power all the time, steadily every month the strength of the Red Army grew. The Germans suffered one defeat after another and, however much they tried, they could NOT achieve any serious success.

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In the present year the Red Army, between the 25th and 26th anniversary of the revolution, experienced a state of alert. In the summer the offensive was fully implemented and the enemy was compelled to leave territory he had occupied. The Germans had only one recourse—fleeing and abandoning huge quantities of equipment, wounded and stores on the field of battle.

The success of the second campaign this year—the summer campaign—was only a continuation and implementation of the winter offensive which preceded it. This explodes once and for all the theory and superstition that the Red Army is unable to carry out an offensive in summer time. The Red Army proved it, and launch successful summer and winter offensives, and in the central areas of the front the enemy was thrown back for 600 kilometers and 1,300 kilometers in the south.

Our troops liberated almost two-thirds of the territory previously occupied by the enemy. Enemy troops were thrown back from Vladikavkaz to Kherson, from Stalingrad to Kiev, from Voronezh to Gomel, from Vyazma and Rzhev to the approaches to Orsha and Vitebsk.

The enemy constructed important defense lines, especially along rivers. During the last half year the Red Army destroyed many of these defense points and forced four very important water barriers.

These water barriers were the Northern Donets, the Desna, the Sozh and the Dnieper

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The enemy also made important defense bases west of Rostov and near Melitopol on the Molochnaya river which were destroyed by the Red Army.

Now the Red Army is successfully routing the enemy in the Dnieper Bend.

During the first year it was considered that the Red Army could NOT prevail for long against the excellent cadres of the German fascist troops.

The German fascist cadres fighting on the eastern front lost more than 4,000,000 officers and men during the last year. Of these four million, 1,800,000 were killed. Additionally, more than 14,000 aircraft, more than 25,000 tanks and NOT less than 40,000 guns were destroyed.

In this way the best German cadres have been destroyed and they cannot get indispensable reserves. Red Army cadres, on the contrary, are growing and will continue to grow. Indispensable reserves are at hand and it is the task of military authorities to recognize promising candidates and bring them forward to responsible positions.

Instead of 240 divisions standing on our front last year, of which 179 divisions were German and the others vassal states, now there stand 257. The Germans had a complement of deteriorated quality troops at the front and to keep up their effective numbers. However, the defeat of German troops during the past year shows the worsened quality of their divisions which cannot be compensated by increased numbers.

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From a purely military point of view, the defeat of the German Army was decided beforehand, at the end of last year, and was fulfilled by events, both by the Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle of Kursk. The battle of Stalingrad ended with the destruction of an army of 300,000 men, which meant the rout of about one-third of the German defensive troops.

In order to get a clear view of the extent of the slaughter—unheard of in military history—which took place at Stalingrad one must realize that at the end of the Stalingrad battle 147,210

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officers and men were picked up from the battlefield—and buried.

Forty-six thousand seven hundred Soviet fighting men also were picked up from the battlefield at Stalingrad.

After the Stalingrad slaughter the Germans were unable to recover.

As for the fighting at Kursk, it witnessed the destruction of the main forces of the German fascists. The Germans did NOT expect such a powerful reply from the Red Army. The fighting at Kursk, which began with local fighting from the north and south, was the last German attempt to materialize the so-called German offensive. The offensive ended in a complete fiasco. The Red Army NOT only repulsed the enemy offensive but started one herself.

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During the summer period the Germans were thrown back. If Stalingrad was a defeat for the German Army, Kursk was a catastrophe. The much-vaunted German offensive was limited and the success of the Red Army on the battlefields greatly deteriorated the positions of the Fascists inside Germany.

The Red Army smashed all plans and calculations of the German High Command and drove the Germans westward and trampled on all the prestige of German arms. The Germans attempted to hold positions on intermediate lines, but here, too, the Red Army frustrated all German calculations. The success of the Red Army continued without pause.

The Germans wanted to improve their position and carried out total mobilization. The summer campaign cost Germany two-thirds of her mobilized manpower so Germany might have to carry out another total mobilization but even this can hardly ease the position.

The Germans intended to hold the Ukraine and use its produce for the benefit of their armies and population. They meant to make use of railways for transport for Germany. But here they miscalculated.

As a result of the successful Red Army offensive the Hitlerites lost NOT only the Donets coal but a large part of the fertile land of the Ukraine. There is NO reason to suppose that they will NOT lose in the future even the remaining portions of the Ukraine.

Obviously all these miscalculations worsened, even considerably worsened, the economic and political position of Fascist Germany.

Fascist Germany is suffering an acute crisis and stands face to face with catastrophe.

The successes of the Red Army would NOT have been possible without the support of the peoples in the rear and the self-sacrificing work of Soviet workers, intelligentsia, miners and farmers who constantly produced the necessary raw materials as well as manufactured products while constantly improving the methods of work.

During all periods of the war still greater and greater quantities of armament and equipment have been sent to the front.

Last year was the turning point NOT only of military operations but also of production from our industries. We had to face problems such as the removal of our factories to the east, and switching over from peacetime to wartime production.

The Soviet people quickly adopted themselves to wartime industry and organization and succeeded constantly in increasing and improving production in armaments, especially of tanks, planes and guns.

The Red Army, supported by the nation-wide effort, increased the defeat inflicted on the enemy and rained millions of bombs on him, and threw into the battle thousands of tanks and planes.

History will recognize as an act of world heroism the self-abnegatory efforts of the people in the rear who contributed their share to the heroic struggle of the Red Army.

The industry of the Soviet Union has proved itself capable through its socialist construction of defeating such an enemy and has thereby given evidence of its great power. Everyone knows Hitler had at his disposal not only a strongly developed industry in Germany but also the fully developed manpower of other nations and despite this he did not succeed in keeping the numerical superiority of war equipment. If now the enemy's numerical superiority in tanks, guns, planes, mortars, rifles and other equipment is liquidated, if now the Red Army does not feel the lack of equipment or ammunition, the credit lies with our working men.

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The transition from peacetime to wartime production in agriculture is shown by an output unsurpassed in history. Their self-sacrifice to bring help to the front has shown that Soviet farmers consider the present war against the German fascists as a war for lives and freedom.

As a result of the invasion of the fascist hordes our country for a while was deprived of the main productive region of the Ukraine, the Don and the Kuban. And still our collective farmers supplied the Red Army and the country with provisions. Of course, without the collective farm system and without the self-sacrificing labor of our farmers, we would have been unable to solve the most difficult problem.

If in the third year of the war the Red Army does not suffer from any lack, and if the supply of food and the war materials for work are satisfactory, this is a testimony to the strength and vital force of the collective farm system, and the patriotism of the collective farmers.

The great part of the supply of our front is played by the transport organization. Railway, river, sea and motor transport each has played a part in providing connection between the rear and the front. It must be stated that the uninterrupted services played a major part in the supply of arms, ammunition, etc., to the front.

That the country itself never lacked for food and fuel also goes to the credit of the transport workers.

The intelligentsia did not lag behind the workers and the farmers. The Soviet intelligentsia was devoted to our work in constantly perfecting [illegible] Army and organizations for the producers, the support of the workers, farmers and industry in the tasks.

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All peoples of the Soviet Union, united in support of our fatherland, entered the fight without regard for nationality or religion. They all united in the struggle against the German Fascist invaders, justly considering this was as a common cause of all of them. Herein lies the strength of the Soviet state.

The leading force in the country in peace and in war is the Communist Party—the party of Lenin. No other party had or has such authority as the Bolshevist party. This is quite obvious, as under the leadership of our party, the workers, farmers and intelligentsia created socialist order. The party is the inspiration and organizer of all people warring against the Fascist invaders.

Organizing workers of the party joined and directed all forces of the Soviet people, having subordinated all our forces to the paramount task of defeating the enemy. During this war the party strengthened the bond between all creative powers. The present war once more has proved the saying of Lenin that war puts on trial all the materials and all the forces of a country. The history of war teaches us that it is only those countries that are able to withstand trials that surpass [illegible] techniques in development and

organization of economy.

The war has shown that our country is just such a country. The Soviet state never has been so firm and unshakable as now—the third year of war. The Soviet state has shown that a socialist state is NOT only the best form of organization in building up the country in peacetime but also the best form of uniting all forces of the people to repulse the enemy.

During 26 years the socialist state has converted our country into an uncrushable fortress. Red Army compared with all the armies in the world has the firmest, stable hinterland. There is NO doubt that the Soviet Union will emerge from the war a powerful and even more strengthened country.

The German invaders have been pillaging and laying waste our territories and striving to undermine the power of our state. The Red Army offensive revealed to an even greater extent the barbarous and vandalistic character of the Hitlerites' army.

Like medieval barbarians and hordes of killers they carry away our peaceful civilians and burn down our towns and villages. They destroy our industrial cen-

continued next page.

ters. All this speaks for the weakness of the fascist invaders. For only mercenaries act in such a way—they themselves do NOT believe in their victory.

The more hopeless the situation of the Hitlerites becomes, the more they run riot, the greater their atrocities and the greater their pillage.

Our people will NOT forgive the German monsters for these crimes. We shall compel the German criminals to answer for all atrocities and for all crimes.

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In areas which were temporarily under the control of the fascist pogromists we are carrying out the great task of restoration of towns and villages. We restore cultural institutions, industry, transport and farming, create living quarters with all amenities for the population, and restore production and agriculture in areas liberated from the enemy.

But this is only the beginning. We must completely erase the result of German misrule in districts liberated from German occupation. This is a great national task. We must and shall solve the problem.

The results and consequences of the Red Army victories have changed the whole course of the war. During the year elapsed there have been changes NOT only in the fatherland's war but in the whole world situation. Changes have taken place this year in the military field and in the field of foreign relations there has been profit among friendly nations to the detriment of Germany and her companions in the plunder of Europe.

The results and consequences of the Red Army victories have gone far beyond the limits of the Soviet-German Front. They have altered the course of the world war and acquired enormous international importance.

The victory of the Allies over the common enemy has come nearer. The relations between them, the fraternity in arms of their forces, despite the expectations of the enemy NOT only did NOT weaken but on the contrary have grown firmer.

The historic decisions of the Moscow Conference gave shining proof of this when the representatives of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States met and reached decisions recently published.

Now the United Nations are fully decided to deal concerted blows to the enemy. These will lead to final victory over the enemy.

This year's blows which the Red Army dealt the German-Fascist armies were assisted by the military operations of our Allies in Northern Africa and the Mediterranean as well as in Southern Italy.

Now at this very moment also our Allies are subjecting—and continue to subject—to a smashing bombing which shatters to the foundations the important industrial centers of Germany and by so doing are considerably weakening the military might of the enemy. And so, if we add up all factors, including the fact that the Allies are regularly supplying us in various munitions, armaments and war materials, we can say without prejudice by all this they have rendered considerably easier the successes of our troops on the fronts.

Of course, the present operations of the Allied armies in the south of Europe cannot yet be regarded as a Second Front. Nevertheless this is something like it.

It is clear that the opening of the Real Second Front in Europe, which is NOT far off, will considerably speed up the victory over Hitlerite Germany. And it will consolidate still further the alliance of the Allies with the USSR.

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In this way it will be shown that the anti-Hitlerite Coalition is a firm union of peoples and one built on solid foundations.

It is now clear to everyone that the Hitlerite clique by starting the present war has led Germany and her satellites into an impasse. The defeat of the Fascist armies on the Soviet German Front and under the blows of our Allies on the Italian-German Front has shattered the structure of the fascist myth which now is crumbling before our eyes.

Italy has fallen from the Hitlerite coalition. Mussolini cannot change anything in that situation, being in fact a prisoner of the Germans.

Take in turn the other participants of the Hitlerite coalition: Finland, Hungary, Rumania and other Hitlerite vassals. Discouraged by the present position of Germany, they now entirely have lost faith in their enterprise and are worried by the manner of getting out of the abyss into which Hitler led them.

The leaders of these vassals, until so recently still obedient to their master, now recognize the time has come to answer for their robbery and are taking to the bushes and trying to find a favorable moment to slip away unnoticed from the robber giant.

Entering the war, the participants of the Hitler gains divided up in advance what pieces would fall to whom: to whom the cakes and the buns, to whom the bumps and the bruises. Of course the bumps and the bruises were reserved for their enemies. For themselves the cakes and the buns.

But now it is clear that Germany and her vassals won't get the cakes and the buns and instead the Allies reserve for them the bumps and the bruises.

Foreseeing the inevitable future they try to break off the chain. Each of them now is trying to find a way out of the war, having received the least of the bumps and the bruises. They understand that the longer they delay their rupture with Hitler and allow the Germans to lord it over their countries, the more devastation is awaiting their countries, the greater the sufferings of their peoples.

The Germans have shown NOT even a dream of defending the vassal countries and only use them for the purpose of war, intending to throw part of the German rout on the shoulders of the vassals.

The cause of the Hitlerite Fascists is lost, and on the other hand, the front of the freedom-loving great powers has been constituted.

In the occupied countries of Europe the people's wrath is growing and bringing growing popular forces to fight against the fascist oppressors. The prestige of Germany is lost irretrievably. The prestige of the Allies is growing. The feeling of indignation against Germany is rising. Political and economic links with all neutral countries have been undermined for Germany.

The time when the Hitlerite clique was able to conquer positions toward implementing world domination is left far behind. Now, as you know, Hitler has NOT won world domination. He didn't live up to it—may he now go to hell.

In this way, the course of the war has shown the alliance of fascist states has not, and did NOT, have a firm underlying foundation. The Hitlerite coalition was founded on the basis of companionship in robbery and

conquest. From the first defeat, the fascist coalition was sent cracking.

While it had successes, of course, the Hitlerite coalition appeared strong. Hitler Germany has proved unequal to the situation.

The victory of the Allies will set the urgent and most important task of restoration and organization of the state, economic and cultural life of European countries. Together with our Allies, we must first:

Free countries subjected by the fascist invaders and give assistance for the establishment of national states which were dismembered by the Fascist oppressors. The peoples of France, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Greece and other countries under the fascist yoke must recover full rights of freedom and independence.

Secondly: The liberated countries of Europe must be given full right and freedom to decide for themselves their form of state.

Thirdly: Fascist criminals, guilty instigators of the present war and suffering of peoples, must be dealt stern punishment, whatever countries in which they may hide themselves. They must bear retribution for their crimes.

Fourthly: Such order must be established in Europe as to completely preclude the possibility of new aggression by Germany.

Fifthly: Economic, political and cultural collaboration of the peoples of Europe must be created and based on mutual trust and assistance with the object of restoring what has been destroyed.

This year the Red Army achieved great successes together with the Soviet people against the German invaders. We have turned the course of the war so that it now favors our country and the war unfolds itself in a final conclusion — the complete rout of the Hitlerites.

But it is NOT befitting the Soviet people to rest on their laurels and be inebriated by success. Victory can slip if all efforts are NOT constantly applied to achieve the final decision. Victory does NOT come of itself. It must be carried in fighting.

Victory is near.

But to achieve victory a new mustering of all forces, the self-sacrificing labor of all in the rear and the skillful conduct and decisive action of the Red Army on the front are necessary. It would be criminal toward the fatherland and the Soviet peoples temporarily under the fascist yoke, and to the people of Europe suffering under the fascist yoke, if we didn't seize every opportunity for speeding the rout of the enemy.

Everything must be done to smash the enemy. The Soviet peoples and the Red Army well see the difficulties ahead but are cheered by a consciousness that the day of victory is nearing. The war has entered a phase when the complete ousting of the fascist invader is at hand. The day is NOT far off when we will completely liberate the Ukraine, and the Byelo-Russia, Leningrad and Kalinin regions from the enemy; when we will liberate from the invaders the people of Crimea and Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldavia and the Karelo-Finnish Republic.

Comrades! To the victory of the Anglo-American-Soviet fighting alliance, to the liberation of the peoples of Europe from the fascist yoke!

To the complete ousting of the German fascist monsters from Soviet soil! Glory to the Army! Glory to the Red Fleet! Glory to daring men and women guerrillas! Glory to the great fatherland! Death to the German invaders!

BOARD TO DIRECT ATROCITY TRIALS

United Nations Commission Will Supervise Punishment of War Crime Perpetrators

DOSSIERS BEING PREPARED

Laws of Several Countries to Be Changed to Meet Needs of Unprecedented Program

By DAVID ANDERSON

By Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, Nov. 7—The capture, conviction and punishment of the Nazis and all others who have perpetrated atrocities as set forth in the Moscow declaration will be supervised by the United Nations Commission for Investigation of War Crimes. A decision has been reached here to change the laws of several countries to meet the special needs of this situation, which is believed to be without precedent in history.

Already the commission has drawn up a list of offenses against civilization roughly defined at Moscow as "atrocities, massacres and executions," and carefully prepared dossiers of the guilty are being added daily.

One point known to be attracting the most thoughtful consideration of some of the world's highest ranking international lawyers is that outlined in the words of the declaration:

"Those who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part [in war crimes] will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries."

Although no final decision has yet been taken by the commission, it is understood that members are of the opinion that there are no insuperable legal difficulties about having Nazis extradited from Germany, possibly through a clause to be included in the armistice or other surrender terms.

Courts of the now occupied countries will be qualified under normal peacetime practice to handle cases of crimes committed in each country or against their citizens in Germany.

Death Penalty to Be Applied

What changes in laws have been made and by what nations are closely guarded secrets. One of the foremost questions will be the use of capital punishment by countries where normally it is outlawed—and there is no doubt whatever that the death penalty will be applied with full severity within the law.

More than 90 per cent of all war criminals are expected to be tried by the national courts of different European countries suffering from German aggression. A select group of enemy leaders will probably be called to answer for their crimes before the international commission.

There will be far too many for the machinery to operate in any other fashion. The writer was told it would take fifteen years for any single court to handle the mass of from ten to twenty thousand cases. Even the solution being worked out at present has its complexities.

High legal authorities in London argue in favor of treating enemy criminals, presumably Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, Heinrich Himmler and company, on a political basis rather than through the medium of a formal court. The Congress of Vienna set this precedent when Napoleon was banished to Elba, and before that the "trial" of Charles the First, the British king who was executed in 1649, was actually a decision taken by Parliament. The principles of justice lean against creating a court to fit the crimes.

This question is still under review by the commission, of which Viscount Simon is chairman.

Justice on High Level Sought

The commission, sitting in London, will have a twofold duty to perform when the courts start functioning again on the Continent. The crimes will be tabulated and the men to be punished will be named. No war trials other than those prescribed by the United Nations representatives here are planned. This system of "rationing" will settle disputes where more than one nation wants a particular Nazi and, more important, it will act as a check on excesses.

Runaway tribunals tending to condemn the beaten enemy in wholesale lots will be impossible, it is explained, so long as firm control is maintained by the international group.

Murder heads the list of crimes. There are many variants of how it was done, however, these including outright assault, shooting of civilian hostages, death due to privation and so forth, and the estimate of those guilty is not confined to the actual perpetrators of the deed. Responsible authorities extending to the highest quarters will be held equally guilty.

Looting is a crime, along with willful destruction of property. Deportation and forced labor are likewise listed. The range naturally covers such statutory offenses as rape.

Those working out the formula for the war crime trials appreciate that it is "dynamite" that they are handling. There is a sincere wish to attain justice at the highest possible level, because the future peace of Europe hinges on mutual confidence of nations. The Germans, it is said, must be taught a lesson with severe punishment, yet it would be fatal to give them a lingering sense of injustice.

This is a clipping from page 7 of the New York Times for Nov. 8, 1943
Clipped at the Seat of Government.

Open 'Second Social Front'

Guests Throng Soviet Embassy On Revolution Anniversary

By Hope Ridings Miller

Basking in the warmth generated by the recent Moscow Conference, Washington officialdom in droves called at the Soviet Embassy yesterday to celebrate the 26th birthday anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.

From 5 to 7 o'clock, almost 1500 guests climbed the scarlet-carpeted stairway, smiled their way through one of the biggest reception crowds since Pearl Harbor, and tossed off countless glasses of vodka—all by way of proving that Washington is in the greatest "loving-Russia" mood in its history.

Traditionally a barometer of international developments and trends, the annual Soviet reception marking "The Great October Revolution"—celebrated in November because of the 13 days' difference in the old and new Russian calendars—never fails to write a colorful chapter into Washington history.

This year, at least, it launched the second social "front" of the season, the first having been opened only a few days ago when several hundred of the same guests attended the reception at the Turkish Embassy.

The type of party that rates a "wow" in Washington, yesterday's fete drew tophotch "names" by the carload—among them the Vice President and Mrs. Henry A. Wallace, House Speaker Sam Rayburn, Mrs. Cordell Hull, Admiral William D. Leahy, a brace of Cabinet members and their wives, several Supreme Court justices, diplomats by the dozen, and enough celebrities from out of town to add a special note of interest in the crowd of familiar faces.

Down from New York especially for the party were Paul Robeson, whose dark face set off with his Othello beard towered above the throng, and Dr. Serge Voronoff, of ape gland and rejuvenation fame, who arrived with his dashing blonde wife (the former Gertrude Schwaets, cousin of Mme. Lupescu.)

The new Soviet Ambassador, Andrei Gromyko and Mme. Gromyko, standing in the spacious reception hall in full view of the heroic canvas that depicts the final battle of the October revolution, shook hands with Capital celebrities for almost two hours. Wearing a softly draped frock of black chiffon and crepe accented with touches of sequin, Mme. Gromyko was smiling as cheerfully and greeting as graciously toward the end of the party as at the beginning. The Ambassador, however, was beginning to show signs of strain as guests continued to arrive after 7 o'clock.

Motion picture and still cameras clicked on for half an hour after

See RED, Page B2, Column 1.

that . . . and notables lingered on much longer than at the average diplomatic reception.

They came by the hundreds, and they came early—with invitations in hand. Guests who forgot those important crested pasteboards were detained at the door until their names could be checked on the list of the 2000 who were asked.

Many who stayed until after 7 o'clock missed the unscheduled climax to the evening's entertainment—the impromptu scene that centered around a cake that would not cut. It happened shortly after the Vice President and Mrs. Wallace and their daughter, Miss Jean Wallace, arrived. Accompanying the Soviet Ambassador and Mme. Gromyko to the dining room, the quintet soon was surrounded by a solid flank of cameramen. Their high-powered lights were focused on the big two-tiered birthday cake, covered with icing and decorated with a toy Soviet tank on top.

"Please cut the cake," urged photographers, and Mme. Gromyko took knife in hand to comply with the request. The crowd pushed in closer. Mme. Gromyko made an attempt to cut the cake once . . . twice. Being made of papier-mache, it resisted remarkably. But by that time cameras had clicked out their record of the cake-cutting anyway, and everybody roundabout, including the host and the Vice President, had enjoyed the interlude.

Wreathed in smiles, members of the Soviet Embassy staff mingled in the crowd that jammed the huge drawing room to the walls and overflowed into the second drawing room, the big dining room, and the adjoining picture gallery. Yard-long sturgeon from the Siberian steppes and caviar by the bowlfuls, along with sliced turkey, chicken, ham and every other teatime dainty you can imagine were served in the dining room, and at buffet tables on both the second and third floors. It was a menu of no-rationed proportions, and it served as Sunday supper for just about everybody there. Good will eddied and flowed freely through the champagne and a variety of other drinks that went the rounds time and time again.

"Of course I'm here. I came—even when it wasn't the popular thing to do," said Leon Henderson. He was referring, of course, to the Soviet party back in 1939, which happened to fall on the heels of Molotov's blast at President Roosevelt. Capitalites showed their displeasure then by staying away in great numbers. Marjorie Maverick was another who proved himself a friend of La Belle Soviet back in her less popular days; and yester-

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Soviet Embassy Fete Marks Red Anniversary

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day, he and Mrs. Maverick were among the first to arrive and the last to leave.

There were no "incidents" at yesterday's party—nothing, that is, similar to the flurry back in 1941 when Admiral Nomura, Japanese Ambassador, put in an appearance at a similar reception, . . . and met an array of frozen smiles above stiff handshakes. Yesterday's was definitely a "Red"-letter, United Nations event, turning the spotlight strongly on notables whose war-effort activities need no "plugs" here.

Very much a center of attention was Mrs. Cordell Hull, just back from a sojourn at Hot Springs and now awaiting the return of the Secretary of State from his sensationally successful mission to Moscow. House Speaker Sam Rayburn came early, with plans well laid for an early departure. An hour later, he was still there, completely surrounded with friends who were urging him to stay even longer. Donald Nelson, Mr. and Mrs. Herbert Lehman, the Secretary of the Navy and Mrs. Frank Knox, Mrs. Henry L. Stimson and the Undersecretary of State and Mrs. Edward Stettinius were seen in the crowd moving down the reception line during the first half of the party.

Generals and gold-braided admirals were all over the place. Just to mention a few—there were Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Maj. Gen. William N. Porter, Maj. Gen. George F. Lull, with Mrs. Lull; Rear Admiral Ben Moreell, Rear Admiral J. S. McCain, Maj. Gen. Lewis Hershey, Maj. Gen. Philip B. Fleming, Cuban Military Attache Col. Felipe Munilla, accompanied by Senora de Munilla and Col. Oneta Culp Hobby, WAAC director.

"Why there's Bill Bullitt!" That whisper rippled through the crowd watching each contingent of newly arrived guests, as the one-time United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, William E. Bullitt, came in with Attorney General Francis Biddle. Although Mr. Bullitt is just recovering from a crushed ankle and a crushing defeat in the Philadelphia mayoralty race, he smiled and bowed as if he had never been happier in his life and stayed at the party for quite a while, gayly greeting old friends.

Another former envoy to the Soviet Union, Joseph E. Davies, was among those present, arriving early with Mrs. Davies. The State Department's Stanley K. Hornbeck, just back from London, was greeting friends on all sides. Mr. and Mrs. William L. Batt, the former of whom is another notable recently returned from a wartime mission outside the country, were among those present, as were Justice and Mrs. Hugo Black, Senator and Mrs. Lister Hill, Senator Scott Lucas, Senator and Mrs. Guy V. Gillette, and enough Representatives to pass a Congressional bill.

"You see, I've started something," boasted Senator Arthur Capper, as he displayed an autograph on his shirt cuff. It had just been written by the Soviet Ambassador. Even more avid in the autograph-gathering group was a small, unidentified woman who had a sizable blank book in her hand. Among the celebrities toward whom she thrust it, and a fountain pen, before the evening was over were the British Ambassador, Viscount Halifax; Secretary of Agriculture and Mrs. Claude Wickard, Mr. and Mrs. Paul V. McNutt, Justice and Mrs. Stanley Reed, and Mrs. William E. Borah, Senator Pat McCarran, Senator and Mrs. Ralph O. Brewster, Senator and Mrs. Tom Connally, Representative Sol Bloom and his daughter, Miss Vera Bloom, Mr. and Mrs. William H. Davis, Mr. and Mrs. Warren Lee Pierson, Mrs. William D. Byron and so on—through the diplomatic blue book, the Congressional Directory, the social register, and any other record of important names in wartime Washington.

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FILE

2,000 Scientists Who Saved the World

By J. B. S. HALDANE
(Fellow of the Royal Society)

LONDON.

IN THEIR preparation for the assault which took Orel the Red Army is reported to have fired ten times the weight of shells per hour that the French fired at Verdun in 1918. And yet the main center of Soviet steel production before the war was in the Ukraine, using the coal of the Donetz basin and the iron ore of Krivoi Rog. The Nazis conquered this area in 1941, and only now is it being retaken.

How has this extraordinary recovery been possible? There are three reasons. One is the extreme efficiency of the Soviet economic system, the system of socialism which, according to anti-socialists "cannot possibly work." The second is the devotion of the Soviet mine, factory, and transport workers, who are toiling under terrible conditions to preserve their way of life.

But these would not have been enough without a third factor namely Soviet science. Most of the details of how science is applied in the Soviet factories are secret as they are in Britain. But we do know something of the work of the geologists who made it possible to move industry east.

If the Midlands of England were invaded, it would be no use moving steelwork to the Scottish Highlands, for there is no coal there, and not much iron. It would be little use moving them to Lancashire, Durham, or to the Clyde, for the output of coal could not be doubled in a year, even if all the miners were moved.

Lenin saw that his country could not be industrialized without a full knowledge of its geology. The Soviet Government rapidly built up the world's greatest geological survey. By 1940 it employed 2,000 fully trained geologists, besides many more assistants, and cost a thousand million roubles a year.

If you take the rouble's purchasing power at about 12 cents, this is $125,000,000; and I think this is a fair estimate, based on the price of bread, though before the war the rouble went much further than sixpence in buying books or theatre tickets, and not so far with clothes.

The British geological survey, if I remember, employed ten geologists in the field, though we still have a lot to find out, for example the extent of the Kent coalfield. The geology of the British Empire is largely unknown, and much of the knowledge is a secret of mining and oil companies. No area of comparable size has been half as well studied as the Soviet Union.

Apart from the Lena goldfields, the only minerals in Siberia which were being mined on any great scale before the Revolution were the coals of the Kuznetz

J. B. S. HALDANE

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This is a clipping from page 11 Sec. ___ of
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basin, but even this had been barely scratched. It is now believed that this area and the Tungus basin contain enough coal to last the whole world at its present rate of consumption for seven centuries. The Karaganda coalfield is smaller, but very important because it lies between two great metalliferous areas. The Tungus and Karaganda coalfields were only found after the Revolution.

The Karaganda coal is used to smelt the copper of Kounrad, also discovered by Soviet geologists, and the iron and other metals of the Ural region round Magnitogorsk, which was enormously developed after the Revolution.

The Caucasian oilfields were, of course, known before the Revolution, but the new oilfield discovered between the Urals and the Volga was of great importance when the Nazi thrust to Stalingrad cut the main lines of supply from the Caucasus.

Supplies of many other metals were discovered, for example, magnesium, which is used for aeroplane construction, and for firebombs, at Selikamsk, along with the world's biggest potash deposits. Even tin, which is one of the few metals of which the Union is short, has been found in Siberia.

"Move industry east" was one of the tasks of the second and third Five Year Plans, not merely as a safeguard against invasion, but to equalize the development of different nations in the Soviet Union. It was not merely uneconomic to take steel from thousands of miles from Ukraine to Siberia, when it could be made on the spot, or to take raw cotton from Tashkent to Moscow, and send cotton goods back again. Stalin saw that the formerly subject peoples had a right to industrial development.

The war speeded up this movement vastly. Factory equipment and workers from Ukraine were loaded into trains and put down in Kazakhstan or Siberia to start new factories. This was possible because the newly discovered minerals were near the surface.

A hundred and fifty years ago we were still working coal outcrops in Britain. The coal was a few feet below the surface, and no deep shafts had to be sunk. This is the case today in the newly found Soviet coalfields. A factory can be built near an outcrop and get its coal in carts. So production started very quickly. Of course, there were other advantages, notably the absence of landlords to bargain with. But Socialism would not have been enough without science.

The two thousand Soviet field geologists played a big part in building up the resistance of the Red Army, and thus helped to save the world!

—Soyfoto

Geologists on a prospecting expedition in the Pamir mountains examine rock for mineral content.

J. B. S. HALDANE, a regular contributor to The Worker, is one of England's foremost scientists. Fifty-one years old, his birthday was last Friday, Nov. 5. He is associated with Britain's most famous scientific societies and schools, viz: Fellow of the Royal Society since 1932; Professor of Genetics at London University since 1933; Fellow of New College from 1919-22; Reader in biochemistry at Cambridge University 1922-32; Corresponding member of the Societe de Biologie in 1928. At present he is engaged in work for the British Government. He is the author of numerous books and papers on human chemical physiology, genetics and natural selection. He served in the Black Watch in France and Iraq in World War I, was twice wounded, and was promoted to a Captain in 1915.

Sir Hubert Wilkins Sees Future Russia Stronger Than U. S.

By the Associated Press.

NEW YORK, Nov. 6.—Sir Hubert Wilkins, British scientist and explorer, predicted today that "it will not be long, as world time is measured, before the USSR, with her multitudinous population and tremendous resources, will tower far and high above the United States in material and economic magnitude, and in influence in world affairs."

Addressing 1,500 delegates at the opening session of a three-day congress of American-Soviet friendship marking the 10th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries, Sir Hubert declared "there is no doubt in my mind that the Soviet deserves all the help we can give her."

E. C. Ropes, Russian specialist of the Commerce Department reported to the delegates, who represented civic, labor and educational organizations, that Lease-Lend shipments from the United States to Russia from October 1, 1941 through June, 1943 totaled $2,444,000,000.

"We have even sent complete factories, such as an electric plant and an automobile tire factory," Mr. Ropes said. "To reinforce the overburdened Soviet railroads, we have sent over 100,000 tons of rails and accessories."

Dorothy Thompson, columnist, declared that "there is no peaceful world imaginable that does not recognize the strength and power of the Soviet Union."

"As long as Russia and the United States agree not to go to war with each other," she said, "nobody else can go to war against either of them, for no nation can go to war against one of them without the other."

Russia

WASH. STAR Nov. 7, 1943 p. 4

Celebrating Russians Believe War Has Turned the Corner

By EDDY GILMORE,
Associated Press Foreign Correspondent.

MOSCOW, Nov. 6.—Prouder perhaps than at any time in their nation's history, the Russian people made ready today for celebration tomorrow of the 26th anniversary of the establishment of the Council of People's Commissars, the Soviet cabinet.

There was an atmosphere in Moscow such as I have never before seen in three Novembers of war in the Soviet Union—a definite feeling that the war has turned the corner and that the long suffering and sacrifices of the people may be nearing an end.

Moscow put on its best colors, dressed up its buildings and got ready for a hot time in the old town tomorrow.

Moscow was a picture of color. Red Square, which is the heart of the city, was gaily decorated. The great stone mausoleum which houses the body of Russia's beloved Lenin stood out sharply against the tall green trees between it and the high red brick walls of the Kremlin.

Women Polish Wall.

As I walked past the tomb a few minutes ago a corps of Russian women were polishing the red stones from top to bottom. The sun in a high blue sky sparkled on the domes in the Kremlin, and the nine domes of the 13th-century Annunciation Cathedral towered above all.

Across from Lenin's tomb and the Kremlin stands a commercial arcade, a large and impressive gray stone building of pseudo-Russian architecture. It has three huge banners:

"Long live the 26th anniversary of the great October Socialist Revolution which dethroned the power of the imperialists in our country and which proclaimed peace between the nations of the entire world."

"Long live the freedom and independence of our fatherland."

"Long live the all-union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the party of Lenin and Stalin—inspirer and organizer of the struggle for victory over the German invader."

The Bolshoi Theater in Revolution Square was gaily bedecked in red bunting and also sported four large paintings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin between its tall pillars.

Banners Praise Allies.

There are banners about the city praising the accomplishments of British and American troops in Italy, and others which proclaim the valor of American and British flyers who are bombing Germany. There are still others hailing the alliance among the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain.

Dozens of other Moscow buildings were decorated with red banners and slogans for the holiday. Many supported pictures of Stalin in the center and on either side of him large paintings of other members of the government. The city's loudspeakers already were pouring forth music to thronged streets.

Various institutions and factories have begun their holiday parties, with dancing and many toasts to the Red Army and the Union of the United Nations.

Already there are parades in the streets. As I write this there are a group of banner-bearing young pioneers in red neckties marching past behind a boy-and-girl band.

Russia

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Stalin Says Real Second Front Is Near, Finns Seeking Way Out

Nazis Declared on 'Edge of Catastrophe,' Premier Praises U. S.-British War Aid

By the Associated Press.

MOSCOW, Nov. 6.—Premier Joseph Stalin confidently told the people of Soviet Russia tonight that a "real second front" is near and declared that Adolf Hitler's vassal countries of Finland, Hungary and Rumania now are "anxious to find a way" out of the war in which an Allied "victory is near."

Stalin, speaking before a special meeting of picked Soviet and Red Army officials and distinguished Russians celebrating the 25th anniversary of the Bolshevist revolution and the fall of Kiev, earlier today, assured the Russian people that the Soviet Union soon would be completely liberated from the Germans and declared that Germany now stands at the edge of catastrophe."

Nazi defeats on the Russian front and blows by our allies at the Italo-German troops has shaken the whole edifice of the Fascist bloc which is crumbling now before our very eyes," the Soviet Premier declared.

"Italy has dropped out of the Hitlerite coalition never to return again," he said. "Next in line are other partners of the coalition. Finland, Hungary, Rumania and other vassals of Hitler are discouraged by Germany's military defeat and now finally have lost faith in any outcome of the war favorable to them and are anxious to find a way out of the bog into which Hitler dragged them.

"In entering the war the partners in the Hitlerite bloc counted on a quick victory. "Before hand they had allotted who would get the buns and pies and who would get the bumps and blackeyes. They naturally meant the bumps and blackeyes for their adversaries and the buns and pies for themselves.

"But now it is obvious Germany

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Stalin

(Continued From First Page.)

and her flunkies will get no buns or pies but will have to share the bumps and blackeyes."

The Premier paid tribute to American and British war aid; promised liberation of German-occupied countries and their freedom to choose their own form of government, and punishment for Axis war criminals; foresaw an early end to the war, and declared Germany faced disaster.

Assurance of Real Second Front.

Stalin assured the Communist leaders that "a real second front is not far behind the hills," using a Russian idiom meaning "not far off."

The Soviet leader's speech, delivered from the rostrum of the Supreme Soviet Council Chamber in the Kremlin, was his most optimistic since the start of the war.

Thousands of persons jammed the streets of Moscow to hear the broadcast.

Stalin asserted the recent Moscow conference had proved the union of the Allies had grown stronger, with the United States and Britain determined to strike a joint blow at Germany.

With the German coalition "on the verge of disaster," Stalin declared postwar problems are moving to the front and that with her allies the Soviet "proposes first to liberate the European nations," including "Poland, France, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Greece and other states under the German yoke."

Freedom to Choose Government.

"This is our first aim, that the peoples of Europe must have freedom to choose their own government," the Soviet leader asserted. "We must also see that there is not in the future any chance for aggress[illegible]rmany."

Publ[illegible] paying tribute to the part the United States and Britain have played in Russian victories during the last 12 months, Stalin said:

"This year the Red Army's blows at the German-Fascist troops were

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supported by combat operations of our Allies in North Africa, the Mediterranean basin and in Southern Italy.

"At the same time, our Allies subjected and still are subjecting the important industrial centers of Germany to substantial bombing and thus are considerably weakening the enemy's military power.

"If to all this is added the fact that the Allies are regularly supplying us with various munitions and raw materials, then we can say without exaggeration that by all this they have considerably facilitated the successes of the summer campaign."

First of "Big Three" to Speak.

Stalin, the first of the "big three" national leaders to speak publicly of the Moscow conference since its conclusion, confirmed the widespread feeling that the joint meeting of the Foreign Seecretaries of the United States, Britain and Russia brought full agreement on a military program for the early defeat of Germany as well as opening new vistas of American-British-Russian co-operation in the postwar world.

The marshal, making one of his rare public appearances, said the "collaboration of the Allies has become stronger and better" through the past year, climaxed by the Moscow sessions.

In a confident 45-minute speech, during which he reviewed the crises brought to the Soviet Union during three years of war and the Russian successes in overcoming them, Stalin said the last 12 months "brought the turning point of the war."

During the darkest moments of the war, Stalin related, the "troops of the Red Army did not lose heart."

"They steadfastly withstood all trials," he continued. "They found enough strength to hold back the enemy and to inflict counterblows. * * * Last year our troops went over to the offensive and delivered a neat and mighty blow. First, before Stalingrad in the Caucasus and in the area of the middle reaches of the Don, and then at the beginning of 1943 at Velikie Luki and before Leningrad and in the area of Rzhev. * * * Since then our troops have won big successes while the Germans have suffered one defeat after another. * * *"

4,000,000 Nazi Casualties.

The Red Army drive, Stalin declared, had "succeeded during this year in liberating about two-thirds of the area temporarily captured by the enemy during the previous two years."

He said the Germans had lost over 4,000,000 casualties on the Russian front in the past year, of which 1,800,000 were killed, with 147,200 dead buried at Stalingrad.

As a result of this severe mauling, he continued, "untrained young troops have been thrown in" by the Germans, while "Red Army cadres have become stronger and will grow still more strong."

As the Soviet deputies cheered he told them "No army can surpass ours in equipment and in the quality of its equipment" and "any numerical superiority the Germans may have possessed at the beginning of the war has been liquidated."

Touching on one of the declarations of the Moscow conference, Stalin accused the Germans of destroying whole towns "like medieval barbarians" and declared "our country will not forgive them their crimes." The tri-power conference promised that Nazis guilty of atrocities would be punished.

Praises Workers and Farmers.

Stalin praised the workers and farmers of the Soviet Union for assuring the successes of the Red Army, pointing out particularly that "our collective farmers have been able to make good the shortage of food" despite the temporary loss of the rich Ukraine and Donets land.

The Russian Premier lauded the Bolshevik party as "the organizer and inspirer of our victories" and declared "there is no doubt that our country will emerge from the war stronger and still more firm."

Continuing, Stalin said:

"The present war has fully confirmed that war is an all-around test of the material and spiritual qualities of people. The history of war teaches us that a State will pass this test which proves itself stronger than its opponents in the development and organization of its economy; in experience and skill in battle operations, and in the staunchness and unity of its people during the whole course of the war. This is the sort of State that our State is.

"The Soviet state has never been so firm and unshakable as it is now during this patriotic war. The experience of this war has shown that socialism is not only the best form of organization of economic and cultural structure in years of peaceful construction, but also the best form of mobilization of all the energies of the people for repulsing the enemy in time of war. The years of Soviet power have transformed our country into an invincible fortress."