ERNMENT UNITED STATES G

## Memorandum

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DATE 09-30-2013 ADG F85M26K45 Clasper

- Mr. Bishop

Mr. Sullivan

Callahan Contad

W. C. Sullivan CONFIDENT

DATE:

3/22/6EALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT

WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE Mr. Cotter

- Liaison

Mr. Cregar

- Mr. Rachner

Mr. Manning

JACK ANDERSON ARTICLE IN "WASHINGTON POST," 3/20/68

ESPIONAGE - X

R. D. Cotter

TO

SUBJECT:

This memorandum reports extreme concern of top Defense Department officials and the apparent concern of the Chinese Nationalist Embassy over disclosure of highly sensitive information by Jack Anderson, Drew Pearson's legman, in 3/20/68 column which appeared in the "Washington Post. (attached). Defense Department plans to initiate investigation.

Anderson Reported that the U.S. in strictest secrecy was preparing to ask CHIANG Kai-shek to withdraw his troops from Quemoy and Matsu, the two Chinese Nationalist occupied islands just off the Chinese Mainland. Anderson pointed out that the proposed change in U.S. policy concerning the U.S. commitment to furnish military assistance to defend these islands was predicated upon desire to cut defense expenditures. Anderson goes on to set forth in some detail the position of the military assistance group in Taiwan which is unalterably opposed to the proposed change in policy.

Close liaison contacts in the Air Force and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff confided on 3/22/68 that the Joint Chiefs and other top Defense officials are incensed over the disclosures in Anderson's column. Defense has determined that the column is generally accurate and many of the details reported unquestionably taken almost verbatim from two "special" documents relating to the matter. It is noted that Anderson makes references to two "senet" documents. Defense officials reportedly feel that copies of the documents or information therein was leaked to Anderson by some officer or official with the military assistance group in Taiwan who possibly felt the disclosure would embarrass the U.S. into denying the proposed policy change and thus result in continuance of military assistance for defense of the islands. It was pointed out that the U.S. has not previously discussed this matter with the Chinese Nationalists.

Enclosure

MAR 28 1968 CONTINUED - OVER

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Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan RE: JACK ANDERSON

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t	Liaison contacts confided further that General arle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, plans o order an "in house" investigation of the leak. There is o indication that Defense Department will make any requests f Bureau for investigation.	b3

ACTION:

(S)

(5)

For information. You will be kept advised of any further pertinent developments.

Wellow

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes

Gandy -

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, March 20, 1963

## U.S. Will Ask Chiang to Quit 2 Isles



Jack

Anderson

secrecy, the United States is great a drain. preparing to ask Chiang Kaishek to withdraw his troops from the two offshore islands, and 12 miles off the Chinese of the heavy defense cuts." mainland.

deter Red China from inter-Taiwan. vening in the Vietnam war.

partment national paper, dated Sept. 11, 1964.

gists would like to change the amount to \$5.2 million in fispolicy. They are compelled by cal years 1969-73. Even more the demands of the Vietnam money could be saved in war to put the squeeze on mil-ground and air forces.
itary expenditures in other The two divisions on the

areas and have decided that millions could be saved by pulling back from the offshore islands.

This possibility first came up at a secret strategy meeting in Honolulu on Jan. 11. Robert Barnett, speaking for the State Department, complained that the cost of de-TAIPEI-In the strictest of fending the islands was too

## Saving Money

Samuel Berger, presiding, Quemoy and Matsu, only 3 icy change is involved in view

Following up this meeting. Chiang still dreams that the Defense Department presome day these islands could pared a systems analysis on also become springboards for how to cut Chiang's forces and an invasion of the mainland. While many Westerners don't sis, which considered only the agree with him, this threat at defensive uses of the offshore least has tied up Communist islands, concluded that they troops across the straits from could be written off without Javan and has helped to jeopardizing the defense of

"Several substantial reduc-The U.S. is firmly opposed tions could be made in GRC to any adventures on the Government of the Republic mainland but is officially com- of China) naval forces were it mitted to helping Chiang de- to negotiate with the CPR fend the islands, as pro- (Chinese Peoples' Republic) an claimed in a secret State De-offshore island settlement," policy the analysis declared.

Naval savings alone, accord-Today, however, our strate-ing to the analysis, would

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The Washington Post
Times Herald
The Washington Daily News
The Evening Star (Washington)
The Sunday Star (Washington)
Daily News (New York)
Sunday News (New York)
New York Post
The New York Times
World Journal Tribune
(New York)
The Sun (Baltimore)
The Worker
The New Leader
The Wall Street Journal
The National Observer
People's World
Date 3/20/68

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the

Marines on the Peng-hus as reinforcements." fense of that area."

The U. S. "country team," exception to the analysis.

## U.S. Military Opposed

"the GRC will not 'negotiate tary standpoint. with the CPR' for an offshore "b. Deny effective use of island settlement. Removal of over 200 miles of China established personnel from coastal waters by coastal traf-Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu fig. would:

"a. Eliminate an invaluable for air defense. source of intelligence on CPR coastal movements to and from the major ports of Amoy and Foochow . . .

"b. Increase USN patrol re-China routes . . .

"c. Release several hundred cause of the GRC presence on these islands."

offshore islands.

DOD (Department of Defense) @ 1968, Bell-McClure Syndicate, Inc.

Taiwan study," pleaded the secret re-Straits could also be with- sponse, "reflect a need to redrawn, the analysis suggested. view the importance of the "The ability to land 5000 OSI (offshore islands). It is contended highly impractical to consider the secret analysis, "would be the OSI groups of Kinmen more than adequate for de-and Matsu from purely a military point of view. These islands must also be evaluated representing both the Ameri-for their political and psychocan Embassy and our military legical impact on the GRC. at Taipei, has taken vigorous From a military point of view these islands serve to:

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"a. Block the significant seaports of Amoy and Foochow In a secret response, the from a commercial as well as country team declared that an offensive amphibious mili-

"c. Provide early warning

"d. Provide an excellent advance electronic monitoring point.

"e. Provide much the quirements along mainland needed additional depth to the Peng-hus.

thousand CPR troops pres-GRC, these islands are the "From the viewpoint of the ently positioned in the last vestiges of the GRC's in-coastal area immediately oppo-fluence over the mainland. site Kinmen and Matsu be-They serve as a daily rem nder to the Asiatic free nations, as well as to the CPR The country team also that they do not dominate the raised the political and psy-entire Chinese world. The fact chological importance of the that these islands have not fallen to the Communists adds "Several statements in the prestige to the GRC forces."