

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1353814-000

Total Deleted Page(s) = 8

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Page 7 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6; b7C; b7E;

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X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
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REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041
DATE: 04-12-2024

b6
b7C

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-04)

File Number [redacted]

Field Office Address [redacted]

b1
b3

Serial # of Originating Document 9

Date Received FEB 26, 2016

b6
b7C

From [redacted]
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By [redacted]

b6
b7C

- To Be Returned Yes No
- Receipt Given Yes No
- Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
 Yes No
- Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
 Yes No

1A7

MIDYEAR EXAM

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of

- NOTES OF INTERVIEW w/ [redacted]

- NDA

- REF DOCS/EMAILS

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b1
b3

b6
b7C

International Component
Private Sector engagement

Articles of Impact (DoS equities)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

in communication

Both unclass & class info exchange
as "whatever easiest @ time"

[redacted]

b6
b7C

Jack Sullivan traveling w/ Sec most often - mostly
phone/email both ↑ & ↓ low

| | | |
|---------------|--------|--------|
| | JS | CM |
| POEMS unclass | ✓ | ✓ |
| SIPR | ✓ | ✓ |
| JWICS X | Assume | Assume |

C. Mills met with: USAID & Comms
 JS Policy - prep for DC/PC
 Huma - logistics
 Philippe R. - Comms
 Exec Sec / Special Asst.

Not aware of people @ State using private email for
DoS business

Have personal email from CM & JS but don't recall
exchanging work ee

[redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C

2-26-2016

[redacted]

→ died Dec 2020.

Halbrooke hired [redacted] on as [redacted]

Started ^{discussions in} in [redacted] Started in [redacted]

[redacted]

b6 per FBI, DOS
b7C per FBI, DOS

Nov/Dec 2012 departed

became [redacted]

office in DC but traveled 1-3 weeks per mo during tenure.

Atq Pak - 1 x every mo - 6 weeks

Halbrooke dom connection w/ 7th floor

→ direct contact w/ Sec Clinton

[redacted] would have direct contact on occasions

→ not frequent

[redacted] "external facing" - Congressional, Inter. Engagements, Economic Engaging.

b6
b7C

[redacted] w. C. Mills [redacted]

[redacted] w/ J. Sullivan knew a little prior

When Halbrooke passed [redacted] just started traveling

w/ Sec. to countries in region

[redacted] more focused on Pak [redacted] more Atq.

b6
b7C

Discussions w/ CM & JS - anything re Atq Pak needing attn of Sec.

1328

[Redacted]

~~(S)~~ want have access to High Side

b1
b3
b6
b7C

~~(S)~~ on interest in

generic policy response - didnt
Not preferred method but on occasion would be sent
on low side b/c of timing.

Specific Rules / Guidance on - No

[Redacted]

~~(S)~~

b1
b3
b6
b7C

[redacted]

don't recall email

unusually large distribution

[redacted]

X

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Cc: [redacted] not sure if TS clearance
Mansoor Khan Mission

[redacted]

[redacted]

tried to remember circumstances

don't know where located @ time

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

X

[redacted]



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

601 4th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20535

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NON-DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

[redacted]

b6
b7C

I, [redacted], certify that on this date, 2/26/2014, I was informed by Special Agent(s) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of a sensitive national security matter. I understand that disclosure of any classified information related to this matter is strictly prohibited.

I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this agreement.

I understand that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified information related to this matter by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

I understand that all classified information related to this matter is now and will remain the property of, or under the control of, the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined by an authorized official or final ruling of a court of law.

These provisions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter employee obligations, rights or liabilities created by existing statute or Executive order relating to: (1) classified information; (2) communications to Congress; (3) the reporting to an Inspector General of a violation of any law, rule, or regulation or of mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or of a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety; or (4) any other whistleblower protection. The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are controlling.

Unless and until I am released in writing by the FBI, I understand that all conditions and obligations of this agreement apply during this interview and at all times thereafter.

b6
b7C

[Large redacted signature area]

[redacted]

Date of Birth

2/26/2014

Date

~~(S)~~

[Redacted]

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-27-2018 BY [Redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
NSICG

From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, December 27, 2011 11:57 AM
To: H
Subject: FW: (SBU)

DOS READING ROOM:
F-2014-20439: C05785980

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DaS on 2/29/2018
~ Class: SECRET ~ Reason: 1.4(C), 1.4(D) ~
Declassify on: 12/28/2038

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, December 27, 2011 11:38 AM
To: Mills, Cheryl D
Cc: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: RE: (SBU)

b1 per FBI, DOS
b3
b6
b7C

~~(S)~~

[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, December 27, 2011 11:02 AM
To: Mills, Cheryl D
Cc: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: RE: (SBU)

b1 per FBI, DOS
b3
b6
b7C

~~(S)~~

[Redacted]

From: Mills, Cheryl D
Sent: Tuesday, December 27, 2011 5:45 AM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Re: (SBU)

b6
b7C

What happened on this?

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Friday, December 23, 2011 10:38 AM
To: Mills, Cheryl D

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

~~(S)~~

b1
b3

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
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X For this Page X
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b1
b3
b6
b7C

Subject: RE: (SBU)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

From: Mills, Cheryl D

Sent: Friday, December 23, 2011 10:36 AM

To: [Redacted]

Subject: RE: (SBU)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [Redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 03-27-2024

b6
b7C

Thanks – you good with this

From: [Redacted]

Sent: Friday, December 23, 2011 10:22 AM

To: Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J

Subject: FW: (SBU)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b6
b7C

I'm sure you know already, but just in case

From: [Redacted]

Sent: Friday, December 23, 2011 10:12 AM

To: [Redacted] Ruggiero, Frank J

Subject: (SBU)

b1
b3
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

Frank

[Redacted]

Cameron

~~(S)~~

[Redacted]

b1
b3

b1
b3
b6
b7C

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-27-2018 BY [redacted] NSICC



From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, February 25, 2012 1:15 PM
To: H
Subject: Fw: Alert

This is hitting the news, with Taliban or HQN claiming responsibility.

From: [redacted]
Sent: Saturday, February 25, 2012 10:31 AM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Fw: Alert

b6
b7C

Unbelievable.

From: [redacted]
Sent: Saturday, February 25, 2012 10:10 AM
To: Grossman, Marc I; Ruggiero, Frank J; [redacted] Raphael, Robin L; Jones, Beth E (S/SRAP)
Cc: [redacted] Pratt, Jonathan G; Kofmehi, Scott; Moss, Mitchell R; Stroh, Mark E; 'ken.keen@ibab.afcent.af.mil' <ken.keen@ibab.afcent.af.mil>
Subject: Alert

b6
b7C

Marc:



b1
b3
b6
b7C

Dick

Amb. Richard E. Hoagland
Deputy Chief of Mission
U.S. Embassy Islamabad
TEL: 92 51 208 2502
FAX: 92 51 208 2559
E/M: HoaglandRE@state.gov

SBU
This email is UNCLASSIFIED



b1
b3

HRC-12279

[redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C

From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, April 27, 2012 7:27 AM
To: H
Subject: Fw: Day 2

DOS READING ROOM
F-2014-20439:005792212

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on 2/28/2008
- Class: SECRET - Reason: 1.4(b), 1.4(D)
- Declassify on 4/26/2037

FYI

----- Original Message -----

From: [redacted]
Sent: Friday, April 27, 2012 03:44 AM
To: Nides, Thomas R; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Day 2

b1 per FBI, DOS
b3
b6
b7C

I'm stuck en route home in Kuwait, but after a decent first day [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Marc can also make calls back when he's wheels up, which is around 9 am EST. If I hear more, I'll let you know.

[redacted]

b1
b3

~~— PENDING REVIEW —~~

34 5 7 3 1
~~ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-27-2018 BY [redacted] NSICG~~

From: [redacted]
Sent: Monday, May 30, 2011 12:11 AM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Fw: Update

CLASSIFIED BY NSICG [redacted] b6
REASON: 1.4 (C) b7C
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 03-27-2024

Didn't see this before we talked.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

----- Original Message -----

From: JBI [redacted] ~~X~~
Sent: Sunday, May 29, 2011 11:46 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: Update

b1
b3
b6
b7C

~~X~~

They talked.

[Large redacted area]

Have a good night.

Jeremy

~~— PENDING REVIEW —~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1353814-000

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- Page 13 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
- Page 14 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
- Page 15 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
- Page 16 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
- Page 17 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
- Page 18 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 19 ~ b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
- Page 20 ~ b1; b3; b5; b7E;
- Page 21 ~ b1; b3; b5; b7E;
- Page 22 ~ b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
- Page 23 ~ b1; b3; b5; b7E;
- Page 24 ~ b1; b3; b5; b7E;
- Page 28 ~ b1; b3;

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X For this Page X
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1A9

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-00)

File Number

[redacted]

b1
b3

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041
DATE: 03-27-2024

Field Office Acquiring Evidence wfc

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Serial # of Originating Document 11

Date Received 3-15-16

From

[redacted]

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

b6
b7C

(Address)

Washington DC

(City and State)

by

[redacted]

b6
b7C

- To Be Returned Yes No
- Receipt Given Yes No
- Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e) Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
- Yes No
- Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
- Yes No

Midyear Exam

Reference: Interview Notes

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

Original notes re interview of

[redacted]

b6
b7C

1A9



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

601 4th Street, N W.
Washington, DC 20535

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NON-DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

I _____, certify that on this date,
_____, I was informed by Special Agent(s) of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) of a sensitive national security matter. I understand that disclosure of any classified
information related to this matter is strictly prohibited.

I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce
this agreement.

I understand that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of
classified information related to this matter by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United
States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I further understand that I am obligated to
comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

I understand that all classified information related to this matter is now and will remain the
property of, or under the control of, the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined
by an authorized official or final ruling of a court of law.

These provisions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter
employee obligations, rights or liabilities created by existing statute or Executive order relating to:
(1) classified information; (2) communications to Congress; (3) the reporting to an Inspector General of a
violation of any law, rule, or regulation or of mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or
of a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety; or (4) any other whistleblower
protection. The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by
controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are
controlling.

Unless and until I am released in writing by the FBI, I understand that all conditions and
obligations imposed upon me by this agreement apply during this interview and at all times thereafter.

Signature

Date of Birth

Witness

Date

b7E per DOS

not common but sometimes happen

[redacted] laugh & draws out to "see high side is down
so summarizing"

"Fawning" "Yeah I remember that"

Timing interesting:

[redacted]

[redacted]

Me 1 - Ministry of Int. Raymond Malle
powerful

short summary of what [redacted] said.

More detailed reports would have included info about


"getting close to line obviously"

no concerns - "business as usual" others conducted
same way. No formal guidance "if pref.
you know how to do it & how much to do"

b6
b7C
Att
Options
Secure call
to Ops etc.
or carefully
worded summ
"like this one"

[Large redacted area]

b1
b3



Never direct comms w/ Dos.

As prot Dip follow COA

through A. Sec of State — think Richard Boucher
Maybe Robert Blake.

emails could get forwarded


Dont think ever directly copied JS, HA, CM b/c not
in COA

b6
b7C

[redacted] before Sec visit to Khaz in'

protocol didnt change for urgent matters - go to Op Ctr

Didnt know Sec Clinton had private email or server.



~~X~~



- "very vague" but pointed out closed recipients

b7E

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1353814-000

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Page 4 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;

Page 6 ~ Duplicate;

Page 7 ~ Duplicate;

Page 11 ~ Duplicate;

Page 12 ~ Duplicate;

Page 16 ~ Duplicate;

Page 17 ~ Duplicate;

Page 18 ~ Duplicate;

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X No Duplication Fee X

X For this Page X

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1A11

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number [redacted]

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WFO

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 4/9/14

From Cheryl Mills
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By [redacted]

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

Misappor Exam

Reference: Interview Notes
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of Cheryl Mills

From: "Mills, Cheryl D" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/MILLSCD>
Sent: 2/13/2009 4:42:37 PM +00:00
To: 'hdr22@dintonemail.com'
Subject: FW: Update

b6
b7c

B

Re: State's Information Assurance Directorate (IAD) - [redacted]

b3 per DOS

I am pleased to hear that you are working on the Blackberry requirement. I will ask my Executive Assistant [redacted] to work with Lori to make this happen. I am confident we can get to YES on this!

Cheryl

From: [redacted]
Sent: Friday, February 13, 2009 11:08 AM
To: Mills, Cheryl D
Cc: McLean, Lori A, [redacted]
Subject: Update

b3 per DOS

Cheryl,

Debbie Plunkett, D/Chief of our Information Assurance Directorate, is personally assembling a knowledgeable team to work with you and other members of your staff to move forward on your Blackberry requirement. She will engage State's CIO and DS/comms security folks to ensure everyone is aware of the art of the possible. She asked me to provide dates/times when you may be available to meet - I will ask my Executive Assistant [redacted] to work with Lori to make this happen. I am confident we can get to YES on this!

b3 per DOS

The reports we discussed are at a higher level than can be forwarded on the high side, so we will deliver them to your office today (our reporting staff is retrieving them now)

Thank you so much for making the time for Dick and me today. All the best, [redacted]

PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESS
AGE_ID:
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:
PR_RIM_MESSAGE_SUBMI
SSION_ID:

[redacted]
state.sbu>
-667286318
[redacted]

b7E per DOS

From: Anne-Marie Slaughter [redacted]
Sent: Saturday, June 4, 2011 11:00 AM
To: Mills, Cheryl D; H; slaughter [redacted]
Cc: Abedin, Huma; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: RE: Google email hacking and woeful state of civilian technology

DOS READING ROOM:
F-2014-20439:
C05780317

[redacted]

b6 per DOS

From: Mills, Cheryl D [mailto:MillsCD@state.gov]
Sent: Saturday, June 04, 2011 5:52 AM
To: hdr22@clintonemail.com; slaughter [redacted]
Cc: Abedin, Huma; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Re: Google email hacking and woeful state of civilian technology

[redacted]

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Friday, June 03, 2011 07:27 PM
To: 'slaught' [redacted]
Cc: Abedin, Huma; Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Re: Google email hacking and woeful state of civilian technology

b6 per DOS

[redacted]

From: Anne-Marie Slaughter [redacted]
Sent: Friday, June 03, 2011 10:35 AM
To: H
Cc: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>; Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>; Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
Subject: Google email hacking and woeful state of civilian technology

I'm sure you've thought of this, but it would be a great time for someone inside or outside to make a statement/ write an op-ed that points out that State's technology is so antiquated that NO ONE uses a State-issued laptop and even high officials routinely end up using their home email accounts to be able to get their work done quickly and effectively. Further cuts to State's budget just makes matters much much worse. We actually need more funds to significantly upgrade our technology. AM

DOS READING ROOM
F-2017-12272
C06336460

From: svcsmart(mf)
Sent: 6/28/2011 6:42:47 PM
To: SMART Core
Subject: Securing Personal E-mail Accounts

UNCLASSIFIED



MRN: 11 STATE 65111
Date/DTG: Jun 28 2011 / 232223Z JUN 11
From: SECSTATE WASHDC
Action: ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE/RO/AMT
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: APCS ASEC AADP AMGT
Subject: Securing Personal E-mail Accounts

UNCLAS STATE 055111

E.O. 13526 N/A
TAGS: APCS, ASEC, AADP, AMGT
SUBJECT: Securing Personal E-mail Accounts

Reference

A) 12 FAM 544.3

1. Department of State users are encouraged to check the security settings and change passwords of their home e-mail accounts because of recent targeting of personal e-mail accounts by online adversaries. Security guidelines have been posted on the DS:SI/CS Cyber Security Awareness web page <https://intranet.ds.state.sbu/DS/SI/CS/Awareness1/Content/Personal%20Email.asp>.

2. Recently, Google asserted that online adversaries are targeting the personal Gmail accounts of U.S. government employees. Although the company believes it has taken appropriate steps to remediate identified activity, users should exercise caution and follow best practices in order to protect personal e-mail and prevent the compromise of government and personal information. The DS:SI/CS Cyber Security Awareness web site contains guides to help secure the web-based e-mail accounts of users and their families. This information can be accessed at <https://intranet.ds.state.sbu/DS/SI/CS/Awareness1/Content/Personal%20Email.asp>.

3. What can you and your family members do?
(a) Follow the personal e-mail guides posted on the Awareness site to change your password. To ensure that messages are not

- auto-forwarding to an unintended address, and to verify that other security settings are properly configured.
- (b) Beware of e-mail messages that include links to password reset web pages. These can be easily faked.
 - (c) Create strong passwords for all of your online accounts, change them often, and never use the same password for more than one account.
 - (d) Avoid conducting official Department business from your personal e-mail accounts.
 - (e) Do not reveal your personal e-mail address in your work "Out of Office" message.
 - (f) Do not auto-forward Department e-mail to personal e-mail accounts, which is prohibited by Department policy (12 FAM 544.3).

4. Questions regarding cyber security awareness should be addressed to awareness@state.gov
CLINTON

Signature: CLINTON b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

Drafted By: DS/SI/CS [redacted] 06/23/11 [redacted]

Cleared By: DS/DSS:JCULVER, DS/SI [redacted] DS/SI/CS [redacted] DS/SI/CS [redacted]
AF/EX: LANDRE, WHA/EX: JBERTOT, NA-SCA/EX: ATEPLITZ, EUR/EX: JARBIN, EAP/EX: DCHRISTENSEN, IRM/OPS: STAYLOR, IRM/IA: JSTREUFERT, S/ES-O: NLMACKLIN

Approved By: DS:EBOSWELL

Info:

XMT: AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

Attachments: metadata.dat

Action Post:

Dissemination Rule: Archive Copy

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASE IN PART
B1, 1.4(G), 1.4(E), B7(C), B6, 1.4(D)

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, Dos on
2/24/2023~Class:SECRET~
Reason: 1.4(c), 1.4(e), 1.4(g)-
Declassify on: 2/24/2038

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~
DECL: 03/02/2019

INFORMATION MEMO FOR CHERYL D. MILLS - S

FROM: DS - Eric J. Boswell

SUBJECT: Use of Blackberries in Mahogany Row

1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1

We have worked closely [redacted] to review all options that would allow Secretary Clinton, you, and a small number of staff to use Blackberries [redacted]

[redacted] Our review reaffirms our belief that the vulnerabilities and risks associated with the use of Blackberries in the Mahogany Row [redacted] considerably outweigh the convenience their use can add to staff that have access to the unclassified OpenNet system on their desktops [redacted]

1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1

[redacted] We also worry about the example that using Blackberries in Mahogany Row might set as we strive to promote crucial security practices and enforce important security standards among State Department staff.

As an alternative, we suggest that DS work with S/ES-IRM to make access to the Secretary's OpenNet account on her desktop workstation as easy and convenient as possible. For example, we are happy to work with IRM to lengthen or even eliminate the time-out function to allow the Secretary's Special Assistant to log-on to review her emails and schedules.

b1 per DOS

[redacted] While we cannot recommend using Blackberries inside the Mahogany Row we do not want to stand in the way of issuing Department Blackberries to the Secretary and her senior staff for use outside Mahogany Row. Those Blackberries can be synchronized with your OpenNet Microsoft Outlook accounts, provide full cellular, e-mail, and internet functionality, and provide unclassified mobile technology when you are away from Mahogany Row.

1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1

I cannot stress too strongly, however, that any unclassified Blackberry is highly vulnerable in any setting to remotely and covertly monitoring conversations, retrieving e-mails, and exploiting calendars. I am attaching reports from DS's

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

Classified by: DS - Eric J. Boswell
E.O. 12958, Reasons: 1.4 (c), (d), and (e)

DS/D

Office of Computer Security's Cyber Threat & Analysis Division that give further background on those risks

[Redacted]

~~1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1~~

If, after considering the vulnerabilities that I describe above and the alternatives that I propose, the Secretary determines that she wants a limited number of staff to use Blackberries in the Mahogany Row

[Redacted]

~~1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1~~

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Excerpts from DS/CS/CTAD Reports on Blackberry Vulnerabilities


Tab 2 - [Redacted]

Tab 3 - New York Times Article: "Obama's Phone Security and Yours"

Tab 4 - Washington Post Article: "Your Cell and Your Berry: Tools for the Enemy"

~~1.4(C)
1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1~~

Drafted: DS/SI/IS
DS/C/ST



B6
B7(C)

Cleared: DS/DSS - G.Starr (ok)
DS/SI/CS - M.Holland (ok)
DS/SI - D.Reid (ok)
DS/C - P.Donovan (ok)
INR [redacted] (ok)
M [redacted] (ok)
IRM [redacted] (ok)

B6
B7(C)

From: Mills, Cheryl D
Sent: Tuesday, December 11, 2012 7:15 PM
To: Johnson, Brock A
Subject: Re: Significant FOIA Report

b6
b7C

DOS READING ROOM:
F-2015-09700: C06402791

Thanks

From: Johnson, Brock A
Sent: Tuesday, December 11, 2012 05:39 PM
To: Mills, Cheryl D
Subject: FW: Significant FOIA Report

FYI on the attached FOIA request from:

- Anne Weismann of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) requesting "records sufficient to show the number of email accounts of or associated with Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton, and the extent to which those email accounts are identifiable as those of or associated with Secretary Clinton."

From: IPS-STAFF-Assistants
Sent: Tuesday, December 11, 2012 4:11 PM
To: Larkins, Neal B
Cc: Johnson, Brock A; Finney, Clarence N; Walter, Sheryl L; Reid, Rosemary D; A Staff Collective; Wasser, Jonathon D; Stein, Eric F; Davis, Jonathan E; Smilansky, Gene
Subject: Significant FOIA Report
Importance: High

All:

Attached is the Significant FOIA Report for this week. Please contact me if you have any questions.

Thank you,

Olivia Woods
Staff Assistant to the Director
U.S. Department of State
Office of Information Programs and Services
A/GIS/IPS
(202) 663-1012
SA-2, Room 5081-A

Our Mission is to meet the needs of our customers and the United States Government

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1353814-000

Total Deleted Page(s) = 72

Page 6 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 9 ~ b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 10 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
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Page 12 ~ b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 13 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 14 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 15 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 16 ~ Duplicate;
Page 17 ~ Duplicate;
Page 18 ~ Duplicate;
Page 19 ~ Duplicate;
Page 20 ~ Duplicate;
Page 21 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 22 ~ Duplicate;
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Page 24 ~ Duplicate;
Page 25 ~ Duplicate;
Page 26 ~ Duplicate;
Page 27 ~ Duplicate;
Page 28 ~ Duplicate;
Page 29 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 30 ~ Duplicate;
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Page 33 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 34 ~ b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 35 ~ b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 36 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
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Page 38 ~ b1; b3; b5; b7E;
Page 39 ~ b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 41 ~ Duplicate;
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Page 43 ~ Duplicate;
Page 44 ~ Duplicate;
Page 64 ~ Duplicate;
Page 65 ~ Duplicate;
Page 66 ~ Duplicate;
Page 67 ~ Duplicate;
Page 68 ~ Duplicate;
Page 69 ~ Duplicate;
Page 70 ~ Duplicate;
Page 71 ~ Duplicate;
Page 72 ~ Duplicate;
Page 73 ~ Duplicate;
Page 78 ~ Duplicate;
Page 79 ~ Duplicate;
Page 80 ~ Duplicate;
Page 82 ~ Duplicate;
Page 83 ~ Duplicate;
Page 89 ~ b5 - per DOS;
Page 94 ~ b5 - per DOS; b6 - per FBI, DOS; b7C;
Page 102 ~ Duplicate;
Page 105 ~ Duplicate;
Page 106 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 110 ~ b1 - per DOS; b5 - per DOS;
Page 112 ~ b7E - per DOS;
Page 113 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 114 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 115 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 116 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 119 ~ b1 - per DOS; b5 - per DOS;
Page 122 ~ Duplicate;
Page 123 ~ Duplicate;
Page 125 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 126 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 127 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;

Page 128 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 129 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 130 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 131 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 132 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;

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X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Cheryl Mill

- May or may not

Lawyer

LR - planning Committee

7 1/2 yrs w/ Coun.

@ DOS - Coun & Chief of Staff

May 2009 - PT to Full time - Both positions entire tenure.

Counselor - policy Food Security / Haiti

Deputies - Ops / Travel Policy

HA →

JS →

[redacted]

but separate from

[redacted]

b6
b7C

Clearance - TS / Compartment

Dont recall training, but sure did prob by DS.

Retained clearance after DoS. / ^{original} can retain 5 after office

OCA - didnt know she was one - "they didnt tell me"
didnt declassify

↓

COMMS -

For TS brought up in person & taken away after review - ~~BAR~~

[redacted]

DOS email system not perfect system went down

Any # of reasons to use

[redacted]

could have received info on [redacted] too.

b6 per FBI, DOS
b7C

TAB ① Requests to change Pswd. But dont know
dont recall, but not unfamiliar
group someone snagg might be targeted CM. told
one of them - not sure by who
[] had different circumstances b/c traveling a lot.
common to use personal email b/c couldn't get
access

b6
b7c

TAB ② Dont recall - probably connects w/ tab 1
Dont know if changed policy perfectly.

TAB ③ sub; line Dont recall what that meant [Note: Personal -
dont recall last line either? wasn't something
Dept. conscious of need to understand federal
rec. - Much more conscious now.

Devices

BB - synced.
not everybody @ Dos had BB but most
no other Dos devices

TRAVEL

Briets depend on relative country - provide by DS.

Transition

Role - Help ID Sec. Priorities. ^{ID} Individuals for staff
ensure transition took into account how to
balance her life w/ transition

No rec. of discussions of IT Infrastructure.

TABU Recall issue.

6A Sec used BB / not Computer. Wanted way for Sec.
to communicate write in DOS Mahog. Rew.

NSA - indicated possibly tech existed so researched
outcome - was ability but Dos didn't feel it
could be implemented @ Doc.

BB not used in SCIF.

didn't know about waiver for Rice

Goal - was for Sec b/c she didn't have a comp.
but not sure of other 4

sure DS provided briefing on Security tasks

TAB7

Don't recall, but not unfamiliar

in ~~the~~ line w/

inaccurate - about using BB in sensitive spaces

Advised not to use BB in SCIF - not one w/
voice / disabled.

to check email - would leave

but most info on phone / face to face
"please print."

not aware of anyone w/ access to HRC email.

don't know where stored

TAB 8 Remembers not able to get on BB
more of a continuation of what she had
conversations since
Subj to FOIA if knew name looking for.
could have known / personal email known / server.
not known

TAB 9 Do remember context.
How would she check BB if not
Standalone - not a possibility - couldn't use a computer.

tried to create best flow to Secretary
CM would forward
office connected.

~~not~~ as a general matter no concerns for handing
unless

Server
Devices

AT&T BB - email associated w/ AT&T ^{when 1st} came on
~~was~~ few months
transitioned over to @clintonemail
don't know why - just realized transition
~~don't know~~ not aware of anyone @ the time
responsible for transition / DOS or outside

practice to email on Dos.gov when doing
Dos ~~records~~ business
Not aware of of any efforts to archive while
@ DOS for Fed Records Retention or otherwise

Bryan Pag - quite possible conversations about FRA
understanding was everything of
~~Met~~ w/ Br Pag a lot trying to bring

1 Pad received for news articles - don't know if she emailed from device
- not aware of who set up @ DOS

don't recall ^{see} w/ a flip phone.
only ^{telephone} # for HRC

During Sandy - people called / in person.
don't recall any temporary accounts during that time

Server / Records

Front office understanding of maintaining records.

Dec 2012 FOIA request - aware now but don't know if recall @ time

Significant FOIA made executives aware.
wasn't typical to respond to FOIA / not relevant.
couldn't say who FOIA response fell on

Confirmed Classified Emails

TAB 14 Remember event. (see outline)
could have called - standard / not standard.

TAB 15 (see outline)

TAB 16
Don't know why he would send. (see outline)

PC with planning involvement + participation

(depending on topic

don't recall

Report - not familiar

(don't know who would have drafted

general process

something might start in business & later decided
not sure who decided for policy related matters

b6
b7c

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 03-28-2024


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted]

b6
b7C

~~ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-27-2018 BY [redacted] NSICG~~

Cheryl Mills Interview Outline - Tenure with Department of State



b5
b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE


CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 03-28-2024

~~ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-27-2018 BY [redacted] NSICG~~



b6
b7C

Cheryl Mills Interview Outline – Tenure with Department of State



b5
b7E

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b1
b3

File Number [Redacted] -302

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

1A19

Serial # of Originating Document

Date Received 7/2/2016

From (Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

b6
b7C

(City and State)

By SA [Redacted] / SA [Redacted]

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (c)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

**MIDYEAR EXAM;
MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED**

Reference: (Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of

Hillary Clinton

~~T~~ [Redacted] ~~OFFICE~~

b1
b3



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

601 4th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20535

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NON-DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

I, Katherine M. Turner, certify that on this date, _____, I was informed by Special Agent(s) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of a sensitive national security matter. I understand that disclosure of any classified information related to this matter is strictly prohibited.

I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this agreement.

I understand that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified information related to this matter by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

I understand that all classified information related to this matter is now and will remain the property of, or under the control of, the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined by an authorized official or final ruling of a court of law.

These provisions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter employee obligations, rights or liabilities created by existing statute or Executive order relating to: (1) classified information; (2) communications to Congress; (3) the reporting to an Inspector General of a violation of any law, rule, or regulation or of mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or of a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety; or (4) any other whistleblower protection. The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are controlling.

Unless and until I am released in writing by the FBI, I understand that all conditions and obligations imposed upon me by this agreement apply during this interview and at all times thereafter.

[Signature]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Date of Birth

7/2/16
Date

b6
b7C



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

601 4th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20535

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NON-DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

[redacted], certify that on this date,
7/2/16, I was informed by Special Agent(s) of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) of a sensitive national security matter. I understand that disclosure of any classified
information related to this matter is strictly prohibited.

b6
b7C

I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce
this agreement.

I understand that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of
classified information related to this matter by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United
States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I further understand that I am obligated to
comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

I understand that all classified information related to this matter is now and will remain the
property of, or under the control of, the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined
by an authorized official or final ruling of a court of law.

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(1) classified information; (2) communications to Congress; (3) the reporting to an Inspector General of a
violation of any law, rule, or regulation or of mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or
of a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety; or (4) any other whistleblower
protection. The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by
controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are
controlling.

Unless and until I am released in writing by the FBI, I understand that all conditions and
obligations imposed upon me by this agreement apply during this interview and at all times thereafter.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Date of Birth

7/2/16
Date

b6
b7C



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

601 4th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20535

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NON-DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

I, Heather Samuelson, certify that on this date,
July 2, 2016, I was informed by Special Agent(s) of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) of a sensitive national security matter. I understand that disclosure of any classified
information related to this matter is strictly prohibited.

I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce
this agreement.

I understand that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of
classified information related to this matter by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United
States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I further understand that I am obligated to
comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

I understand that all classified information related to this matter is now and will remain the
property of, or under the control of, the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined
by an authorized official or final ruling of a court of law.

These provisions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter
employee obligations, rights or liabilities created by existing statute or Executive Order relating to:
(1) classified information; (2) communications to Congress; (3) the reporting to an Inspector General of a
violation of any law, rule, or regulation or of mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or
of a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety; or (4) any other whistleblower
protection. The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by
controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are
controlling.

Unless and until I am released in writing by the FBI, I understand that all conditions and
obligations imposed upon me by this agreement apply during this interview and at all times thereafter.

Heather Samuelson
[redacted]

[redacted]
Date of Birth
7/2/16
Date

b6
b7C



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

601 4th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20535

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NON-DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

I, David E. Kennell, certify that on this date, _____, I was informed by Special Agent(s) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of a sensitive national security matter. I understand that disclosure of any classified information related to this matter is strictly prohibited.

I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this agreement.

I understand that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified information related to this matter by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

I understand that all classified information related to this matter is now and will remain the property of, or under the control of, the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined by an authorized official or final ruling of a court of law.

These provisions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter employee obligations, rights or liabilities created by existing statute or Executive order relating to: (1) classified information; (2) communications to Congress; (3) the reporting to an Inspector General of a violation of any law, rule, or regulation or of mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or of a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety; or (4) any other whistleblower protection. The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are controlling.

Unless and until I am released in writing by the FBI, I understand that all conditions and obligations imposed upon me by this agreement apply during this interview and at all times thereafter.

David E. Kennell
Signature

[redacted]
Date of Birth

11/2/2018
Date

[redacted]

b6
b7C

Date 7/2/2016

NAME OF DIVISION OR SECTION

ADMITTED

DEPARTED

| Log Date | Name of Visitor (P) Print (S) Signature | Badge # and/or Title | Agency | Point of Contact/Signature/Initial/Purpose | Time | Initials | Time | Initials |
|----------|--|----------------------|--------------|--|------|----------|------|----------|
| | | | USAO EDVA | Meeting | 7:30 | | | |
| | P DAVID H. CARPMAN S [Signature] | | NSD/ LES | | 7:30 | DM | | |
| | | | USAO EDVA | | 7:30 | | | |
| | | | DOJ LES | | 7:55 | JR | | |
| | | | DOJ | | 7:55 | RJS | | |
| | P [Signature] S [Signature] | | | | | | | |
| | P [Signature] S [Signature] | | | | | | | |
| | P [Signature] S [Signature] | | | | | | | |
| | P [Signature] S [Signature] | | | | | | | |
| | P [Signature] S [Signature] | | | | | | | |
| | P [Signature] S [Signature] | | | | | | | |
| | P [Signature] S [Signature] | | | | | | | |
| | P [Signature] S [Signature] | | | | | | | |
| | P [Signature] S [Signature] | | | | | | | |
| | P [Signature] S [Signature] | | | | | | | |

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

HRC/CM/15/CR/WT

- Mark State - several phones - reg - black [redacted] - white [redacted]
 - no computer [redacted]
- Whitehaven - VConfon (never used), black [redacted] - yellow [redacted]
 - [redacted] combo lock - small safe - large safe
 - I had combo only - secure self when I left residence
 - I rarely used DC [redacted] phone calls. [redacted]
- NY - Fax - email - preface - Sense
 - No Computer.
 - Burn bag is [redacted] for class print.
- Domestic - No support other than [redacted] - in person - [redacted]
 - in paper.
- International - usual protocol - depending upon country
 - [redacted]
 - verbal
 - Some briefing - [redacted] everything in the plane. Dip security to set up comm.
 - 2nd para - That's why we left - I left D.D. [redacted].
 - I never took it off the plane -
- Don't recall guidance - about
- Don't recall clearance specifically - don't know how did State
- Don't recall briefing on handling - O/H
- Don't recall briefing on handling - See
- No State guidance on records retention.
- Tab 4 - personal correspondence is official. Senate had official vs personal.
 - No guidance - My way.

b7E per DOS

- No knowledge of SMART system.
- I don't know I was an OCA as FOS.
 - Don't recall frequency.
 - Determination of class - don't recall.
- I relied professionals to make those determinations.
 - No guidance of DeLoach - Don't recall doing that.
- Don't recall a lot of CA - Some - circumstances required.
 - Situation room. discussing here.
- SAP briefing - Don't recall. Any process. Counsel would bring paper. Someone would come to my office.
 - I'm sure I sized papers. No process.

~~SECRET~~
b1
b3

Mobile - DAS didn't issue - I brought Senate.

- Tried to get secure. No.
- Continued practice - convenience - Powell - used private. Others before him.
- Password on BD - I don't recall how many BD.
- This looks like number in BD - Had "Fly phone a '100,000 go"
- Senate time.
- Don't recall at State
- Think it's # on BD
- DD
- Process to get BD - aides would help me.
 - after SIM was taken out disposed of by aides.
 - don't recall how data was destroyed.
- Don't recall security.
 - relied on someone else to do that
- No tangony with. - Never lost.
- Few occasions travel team provided with a secure cell phone.
 - No knowledge of staff - don't know how many times.
- Secure phone - don't recall how or why it didn't happen.
 - Pres had one. - seemed convenient.
 - not concerned about on my device. Future - what's coming?

- since & have seen photo.

- never brought DD in not that I recall.

b7E per DOS

Tab 7 - not recommended for all reasons outlined.

- DD during the day. Drives, speech, outside office.

- I don't recall ever feeling that it shouldn't be on work system.

- Relyed on OWS officials.

- Never raised concerns - 8:30 meeting with staff - constant walk-out
walk-out meeting.

2 - all address - set-up on DD - denote the personal and official.

- Cooper register chatroom on con - wasn't focused on it - don't recall.

- matter of convenience - husband staff. I don't recall connectivity with
others. At some point learned as system - since been advised
before RP.

- Powell email - I don't want to guess precisely - if you were any convenience for official business.

- Patricia's Email - didn't continue to receive & att. Not that I recall.

- Some had access to DD. Don't recall.

- Process for deleting. Work related emails to state.gov.

- Justin Cooper set that up for you.

- Size restrictions.

- if email was backed up so

- No security protocols. I'm aware of

- Occasional old looking emails.

- @ - domain is only me on domain. - Personal matters.

- other account and deleting.

- who in State? - everyone connected with several hundred.

- Others communicated through top level staff.
- recipient could be determine if it should go to me.
 - no one expressed concern to me.
- Other personal acct? Practice to state.gov - would not be personal if state.gov use down.
- I'm not aware of hacky or intrusion of around - restriction with system -
 - Don't recall.
- Personal policy email - not preferred - send to state.gov email account.
- Table - Can't say. All calls go out with name of Sec. Constant.
 - No correlation with BP.
 - Consider security to state.gov - recall reports of hacky into state.gov.
 - I don't recall deleting emails - I'm not I did.
 - FAM - don't recall that?
 - I don't recall
 - Didn't agree at State tell you could use personal email.
 - Don't recall you knowing about.
- Regulations - Personal email system - Don't know about hacking.
 - Never been breached.
- Inquiries security protocols - My understanding that email set-up by husband had excellent record.
 - I relied on DOS prior to read the right thing
- 3- who approved move to server - don't know.
 - don't recall why BP - assume Justin Cooper.

b6 per DOS

- why installed in basement?
- no thought of commercial provider.
- don't recall.
- secure against intruders.
- General Powell-
- No connections with avidly FOIA. I thought it could be in the system.
- N don't recall knowing [redacted] or connection.
- Don't recall conversation about security.
 - I would reach out to Justin Cooper. - More operational of the device.
 - I don't recall reaching out to BP.
- No backups. Don't know.
- Server was down? - there issues - cell phone system / PD down
 - was able to communicate on laptop.
 - remember email continuity issues.
- Don't recall mini laptop until after. No netbook or laptop.

b6
b7C

Sid - long time friend. freq sent interaction - conversations he had. I would read and forward to appropriate people. I know [redacted]

b3
b6 per FBI, DOS
b7C per FBI, DOS
b7E

- officer - no concerns of class sources. Journalistic.
- He doesn't read-in - Moore currently in government.
- Prodigious writer - don't recall requesting. I think size of his info was not accurate - some leads were worth pursuing.

Contingency Five - Some were trying to get into on Egypt.

OCA-15 - Don't recall it. - Speculatively - he was working at DoD [redacted] before.

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

I do not have a concern. [redacted] high regard - well acquainted
Rely on him.

Tab 16

~~Don't recall~~

b1
b3

[Redacted]

Tab 17 - Don't recall specific instance.

- Specificity - look at names - ex. insurance professionals
- hitting the news.

[Redacted]

b1
b3

Tab 18 - Didn't see frequently - more already talked. Discussion
 deliberation document. Try to determine response. I relied
 on judgment of people in the thick. No reason to not do so.
 - Don't recall m. & why small frequently.

Tab 19 - Don't recall specifically. CA - let us know what you can
 via this channel. 'No concerns?' No concerns. This
 is state deliberate

[Redacted]

b1
b3

[Redacted]

Tab 20 - I don't recall specifically. Don't know context. No reason
 to doubt - SRU - front lines - people soundly it.

Tab 21

[Redacted]

Don't recall specifically.

b1
b3

[Redacted]

~~Tab 22~~

Tab 22 - Don't recall specifically. Can't answer that it always was. M. M.

- Process around holidays. Necessary to communicate in code, figure out
 what happened, but they could.

Tab 23 - Don't recall specific email

b1
b3

Tab 24: Non-pager - no identifying marks - no connection with US Government.
Can be given to foreign government. Goes back 200 years.

No classified - could be used for talking points.

No OOS letterhead - No info. No intention to remove classification markings.

Tab 25: I recall event not specific email.

(1) I would have to speculate - reference paragraph that would be put in alphabetical order.

(2) Can't tell you for sure if that's used. It says Confidential I don't know if that's why.

- Nothing that I find classified. Condolence call.

- You are aware of T, S, C - I'm not.

- didn't pay attention to level - took it seriously

- I'm a victim. No retraction

b1
b3

Tab 21- Not always classified talking points.

- No specific recollection that non-pager was sent
-
- Principal meeting talking points are typically classified.
- Do not recall

Tab 22- Difference into about leaders for D.K. Corruption pointed out, etc.

- Pakistan gov sometimes provides information.
- Don't rec that this could have added more fuel to a big fire.
- CM, F- could convey information - My thought it was SDO
- no state.gov account - no class account
- in person, meetings, pager - phone call.

- During your tenure, did you raise concerns regarding your
use of a personal email account? I do not recall anyone
server? I do not recall anyone

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

7/2/2016 - Hillary Clinton

5 records - no instructions or directions from State. Concussion in Dec 2012, then blood clot. Could only be @ State a few hours/day.

- Physical records boxed up - handled by aides.
- Did not discuss turning over email @ that time - not asked. Believed work being captured by sending to gov. Didn't know printed record required.

(28) • Does not recall request. ^{never came to HRC} Not aware of FOIA related to HRC email account. Knew of FOIA dept @ State - relied on them.

b7E per DOS

• State took all [redacted] equip shortly after turnover
• No memory of read-out clearances

• hdr22 → hrad17 - Blumenthal hack - changed address

• was advised to change address - no memory of who advised.

- doesn't know who made change
- no memory of access to old email or not
- No awareness of archive created
- no memory of emails deleted at that time
- no knowledge of laptop or thumb drive
- does not know if staff accessed email to write hard choices
- PRN - unaware of movement of email
- no knowledge of PRN using personal gmail account

• unaware of others who have archive

(7) • Move to PRN - husband's staff wanted different level of service. Handled through his aides -

- Federal records no memory of discussion
- doesn't know timeline
- not knowledge of movement
- No reason for 500

(8) • State request - Fall 2014. letter sent to Sec. Powell, Rice, Albright

- State concerned gaps in their preservation, so ^{they} asked for help. HRC wanted to help, so directed lawyers to assist.
- Not aware of July or Sept. requests ~~to~~ to PRN.

b6
b7c

- not aware of laptop deletions
- not involved in discussions of process
- not aware of sources checked for email
- HRC expected anything work related or arguably work related would be turned over to State.
- Did not develop or give guidance on method for cut down
- No memory of consulted on specific emails as work related.
- HA - scheduling - No knowledge why exclusive HA small

② - recalled wikileaks - spent time on phone
 - no knowledge of why wouldn't be in ~~the~~ 30
 - would expect to be turned over

- 62k - unaware of current existence
- 30k - unaware
- 32k - unaware
- After production to state over - ^{asked what to do, said} doesn't need email anymore
- No knowledge on process/BC - trusted attorneys.
- Classified - did not send/rec. marked classifi.
 - No conversations, b/c didn't think was going there

- Retention policy change - part of change to personal office

DEC 30

DEC 31

• Congressional preservation SPRN - trusted lawyers would comply.

• No knowledge of inventory request

• No knowledge of instruction to SPRN to delete pst or hrcarchive mailbox. March 25th or Sept.

• ~~Not aware of~~ ^{No} instructions to delete to avoid FOIA, FRA, state, FBI requests.

• hrcoffice.com domain ~~move~~ → had personal staff, but no office or common email acct.

• decided to move to common email acct.

+ physical office

- no memory of sending/rec. email on clintan@mail.com after moving to hrcoffice.com.

- no memory of continued access to clintan@mail.com

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 03-28-2024

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-27-2018 BY [redacted] NSICG

b6
b7C

[redacted]

~~(S)~~

b1
b3

From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, October 13, 2012 10:11 AM
To: H
Subject: Fw: This am Green on Blue

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on 01/29/2016
~Class: SECRET ~ Reason: 1.4(C), 1.4(D) ~
Declassify on: 10/12/2027

----- Original Message -----

From: Reines, Philippe I
Sent: Saturday, October 13, 2012 09:53 AM
To: Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Fw: This am Green on Blue

----- Original Message -----

From: Bash, Jeremy CIV SD (mailto:[redacted])
Sent: Saturday, October 13, 2012 09:45 AM
To: Little, George CIV OSD PA [redacted] Reines, Philippe I
Cc: Kelly, John LtGen SD [redacted] Waldhauser, Thomas LtGen SO [redacted]
Subject: This am Green on Blue

b6
b7C

As you'll be hearing from ISAF, an Afghan NDS officer pulled the ripcord on a vest in front of coalition guys loading a helicopter. Total of 14 either killed or wounded -- some US, some Afghans.

Right now, we think 1 US mil killed and one wounded.

[redacted]

~~(S)~~

b1 per FBI, DOS
b3
b6 per DOS

George, please lash up wi [redacted]

[redacted]

~~(S)~~

[redacted]

~~(S)~~

b1
b3

From: "Mills, Cheryl D" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/MILLSCD>
Sent: 2/13/2009 4:42:37 PM +00:00
To: 'hdr22@clintonemail.com'
Subject: FW: Update

DOS READING ROOM:
E-2015-06322/C0590100

HRC:

See below

Remind me to discuss with you, particularly should they pull this off

b3 per DOS
b6 per DOS

In meeting with the NSA person today [redacted] (NSA's rep to DOS) - she indicated they could address our BB so that BB could work in the sciff and be secure based upon some modifications that could be done to each BB (more below).

cdm

From: [redacted]
Sent: Friday, February 13, 2009 11:08 AM
To: Mills, Cheryl D
Cc: McLean, Lori A [redacted]
Subject: Update

b3 per DOS
b6 per DOS

Cheryl,

--Debbie Plunkett, D/Chief of our Information Assurance Directorate, is personally assembling a knowledgeable team to work with you and other members of your staff to move forward on your Blackberry requirement. She will engage State's CIO and DS/comms security folks to ensure everyone is aware of the art of the possible. She asked me to provide dates/times when you may be available to meet - I will ask my Executive Assistant [redacted] to work with Lori to make this happen. *I am confident we can get to YES on this!*

--The reports we discussed are at a higher level than can be forwarded on the high side, so *we will deliver them to your office today* (our reporting staff is retrieving them now)

b3 per DOS
b6 per DOS

Thank you so much for making the time for Dick and me today. All the best, [redacted]

PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESS
AGE_ID:
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:
PR_RIM_MESSAGE_SUBMI
SSION_ID:

[redacted]
state.sou>

b7E per DOS

RELEASE IN PART
B1, 1.4(G), 1.4(E), B7(C), B6, 1.4(C)

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS, on
2/24/2023 - Class. SECRET
-Reason 1.4(c), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) -
Declassify on: 2/24/2028

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~
DECL: 03/02/2019

INFORMATION MEMO FOR CHERYL D. MILLS - S

FROM: DS - Eric J. Boswell

SUBJECT: Use of Blackberries in Mahogany Row

1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1

We have worked closely [redacted] to review all options that would allow Secretary Clinton, you, and a small number of staff to use Blackberries [redacted]

[redacted] your review remains our belief that the vulnerabilities and risks associated with the use of Blackberries in the Mahogany Row [redacted] considerably outweigh the convenience their use can add to staff that have access to the unclassified OpenNet system on their desktops [redacted]

b1 per DOS
1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1

[redacted] we also worry about the example that using Blackberries in Mahogany Row might set as we strive to promote crucial security practices and enforce important security standards among State Department staff.

As an alternative, we suggest that DS work with S/ES-IRM to make access to the Secretary's OpenNet account on her desktop workstation as easy and convenient as possible. For example, we are happy to work with IRM to lengthen or even eliminate the time-out function to allow the Secretary's Special Assistant to log-on to review her emails and schedules.

[redacted] While we cannot recommend using Blackberries inside the Mahogany Row [redacted] we do not want to stand in the way of issuing Department Blackberries to the Secretary and her senior staff for use outside Mahogany Row. Those Blackberries can be synchronized with your OpenNet Microsoft Outlook accounts, provide full cellular, e-mail, and internet functionality, and provide unclassified mobile technology when you are away from Mahogany Row.

1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1

I cannot stress too strongly, however, that any unclassified Blackberry is highly vulnerable in any setting to remotely and covertly monitoring conversations, retrieving e-mails, and exploiting calendars. I am attaching reports from DS's [redacted]

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

Classified by: DS - Eric J. Boswell
E.O. 12958; Reasons: 1.4 (c), (d), and (e)

DS/10

Office of Computer Security's Cyber Threat & Analysis Division that give further background on those risks

[Redacted]

1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1 ~~(S)~~

If, after considering the vulnerabilities that I describe above and the alternatives that I propose, the Secretary determines that she wants a limited number of staff to use Blackberries in the Mahogany Row

[Redacted]

1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1 ~~(S)~~

Attachments.

- Tab 1 - Excerpts from DS/CS/CTAD Reports on Blackberry Vulnerabilities
- Tab 2 - [Redacted] ~~(S)~~
- Tab 3 - New York Times Article: "Obama's Phone Security and Yours"
- Tab 4 - Washington Post Article: "Your Cell and Your Berry: Tools for the Enemy"

1.4(C)
1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1

Drafted: DS/SI/IS
DS/C/ST



B6
B7(C)

Cleared: DS/DSS - G.Starr (ok)
DS/SI/CS - M.Holland (ok)
DS/SI - D.Reid (ok)
DS/C - P.Donovan (ok)
INR [redacted] (ok)
M [redacted] (ok)
IRM [redacted] (ok)

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

B6
B7(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6
b7C

From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>

DOS READING ROOM
C06187054/C06174690 in
F-2016-07895

Sent: 8/22/2011 2:52:37 PM +00:00

To: Oscar Flores <Oscar@presidentclinton.com>

Subject: Fw: Quint call readout

Classified by: DAS, A/GIS.
Dos on 9/30/2015 ~ Class.
CONFIDENTIAL ~ Reason
1.4(b), 1.4(d) ~ Declassify
on 8/23/2026

Pls print

From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:Sullivan.JJ@state.gov]
Sent: Monday, August 22, 2011 10:38 AM
To: H
Subject: FW: Quint call readout

DOS READING ROOM:
C05786844/C05782118 in
F-2014-20439

For the Quint call, this is a readout of the morning. We will get you paper in the next 45 minutes.

From: Gordon, Philip H
Sent: Monday, August 22, 2011 09:24 AM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J; Dibble, Elizabeth L; Abedin, Huma; Burns, William J;

[redacted] Feltman, Jeffrey D [redacted]

b6 per DOS

Cc: Hanley, Monica R; S, SpecialAssistants; Kimbrell, Rebecca J; Shapiro, Jeremy
Subject: RE: Quint call readout

Quick readout from 8 a.m. Quint Poldirs conf call.

- Others agree to an 1130 EST conf call, including with Turkey, UAE, Qatar, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Jordan. Quint ministers available (except Hague) but need to reach out to the others.

[redacted]

b5 per DOS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: Anne-Marie Slaughter [redacted]
Sent: Saturday, June 4, 2011 11:00 AM
To: Mills, Cheryl D; H [redacted]
Cc: Abedin, Huma; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: RE: Google email hacking and woeful state of civilian technology

DOS READING ROOM:
C05780317-F-2014-20439

b6 per FBI, DOS
b7C

I take this point – Jake also has concerns. Perhaps a better approach is to make the point more quietly to legislators through H. AM

From: Mills, Cheryl D [mailto:MillsCD@state.gov]
Sent: Saturday, June 04, 2011 5:52 AM
To: hdr22@clintonemail.com [redacted]
Cc: Abedin, Huma; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Re: Google email hacking and woeful state of civilian technology

b6 per FBI, DOS
b7C

I think this is easier to do as a former employee rather than current; second and more significantly, as someone who attempted to be hacked (yes I was one), I am not sure we want to telegraph how much folks do or don't do off state mail b/c it may encourage others who are out there.

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Friday, June 03, 2011 07:27 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: Abedin, Huma; Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Re: Google email hacking and woeful state of civilian technology

b6 per FBI, DOS
b7C

AM- I think this makes good sense. How should we follow up?

From: Anne-Marie Slaughter [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Friday, June 03, 2011 10:35 AM
To: H
Cc: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>; Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>; Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
Subject: Google email hacking and woeful state of civilian technology

b6 per FBI, DOS
b7C

I'm sure you've thought of this, but it would be a great time for someone inside or outside to make a statement/ write an op-ed that points out that State's technology is so antiquated that NO ONE uses a State-issued laptop and even high officials routinely end up using their home email accounts to be able to get their work done quickly and effectively. Further cuts to State's budget just makes matters much much worse. We actually need more funds to significantly upgrade our technology. AM

From: "Macmanus, Joseph E" <CLASSSTATE/CBPC ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP/RECIPIENTS/MACMANUSJE>
Sent: 10/6/2009 6:07:49 PM +00:00
To: "Mills, Cheryl D" <MillsCD@state.sgov.gov>; "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SullivanJJ@state.sgov.gov>; "Abedin, Huma" <AbedinH@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: IT security in Moscow

b6
b7C

Our Mobile Communications Team sent in an email on electronic surveillance and monitoring in Russia, which I've excerpted below. The gist of it is: what's yours is theirs.

We will brief staff at the airport before departure, and post the necessary warnings in the hotel.

From: Mobile Communications Team, Moscow Advance
Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2009 10:40 AM
Subject: IT security in Moscow

b7E per DOS

Yesterday at the RSO's security briefing, the RSO stated that the IT threat level here in Moscow currently [redacted]

[redacted]

The following are recommendations regarding IT security in Moscow:

b7E per DOS

Strong recommendation against any classified material or conversations in the hotel, including STE conversations and any printed materials, whether brought to the hotel by the party or delivered by courier. No matter how well [redacted]

[redacted] The Secretary's suite as well as the Senior Bureau, the Secretariat, and all bedrooms will be [redacted]

file: //C:\Users\ [redacted] AppData\Local\Temp\adtemp\ad_1mp_b44bd046-2067-43a8-b0f... 11/27/2016

b6 per FBI, DOS
b7C

HRC-12507

[Redacted]

Strong recommendation against the use of BlackBerries: when you bring your BlackBerry online in Moscow

[Redacted]

Strong recommendation against computers connected to the Internet in the hotel,

[Redacted]

Authorized the use of FOBs in the hotel ONLY for use with government-owned laptops under 100% continuous positive control by a cleared American.

[Redacted]

NOTE: a lost or stolen FOB here in Moscow is a major security threat. All must take great care not to loose their FOBs.

[Redacted]

DS Lead and DS Logistics indicated that they did not want computers and printers in their bedrooms per the IT requirements and would rather work in the Embassy. The laptops intended for them are being stored in the Embassy.

Communications set-up in Moscow:

b7E per DOS

Computers issued by MCT or supported by MCT (e.g., Abedin, Sullivan, Macmanus) will

[Redacted] the Marines and DS will restrict access. Anyone in a bedroom outside of the [Redacted] must keep their laptops in their possession at all times

file:///C:/Users/[Redacted]/AppData/Local/Temp/adtemp/ad tmp_b44ed046-2067-43a8-b0f... 1/27/2016

b6 per FBI, DOS
b7C

store them at the Embassy (for example in [redacted])

b7E per DOS

Computers we set up in S offices and bedrooms will be laptops owned by the Embassy and will remain in our custody while outside of the Embassy. The traveling party should be notified that we will have to use laptops instead of desktops at this stop.

STEs in the S suite: the Secretary should be briefed [redacted]
[redacted]

RSO recommends courier of documents to the hotel [redacted]
[redacted]

RSO permits use BlackBerries. AS SOON AS users return to Washington, their Blackberry will need to be cleaned [redacted]
[redacted]

Any government laptop used in the hotel and returned to Washington will need to be [redacted]

The use of a personal computer is not recommended [redacted]
[redacted]

b6 per FBI, DOS
b7C

file:///C:/Users/[redacted]/AppData/Local/Temp/adtemp/ad_imp_b44bd046-2067-43a8-b0f... 1/27/2016

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-06322 Doc No. C05956435 Date: 05/31/2016

b6
b7C

From: Huma Abedin
Sent: Sunday, March 22, 2009 11:57 AM
To: hdr22@clintonemail.com; JilotyLC@state.gov
Subject: Re: Follow up

B6

RELEASE IN PART
B6

We've discussed this.
I can explain to you when I see u today.

----- Original Message -----
From: H <hdr22@clintonemail.com>
To: Huma Abedin, Lauren Jiloty <JilotyLC@state.gov>
Sent: Sun Mar 22 08:58:21 2009
Subject: Follow up

Dear Lauren and Huma--

I have just realized I have no idea how my papers are being treated at State. Who manages both my personal and official files?

I am sending out material the way I did w/ Lauren in the Senate, but I don't know what's happening w/ it all. For instance, I've sent a few things to Cheryl but she says she hasn't read them. Does Claire manage this or does it all go to Joe? Are there personal files as well as official ones set up? If I don't write anything on a paper--as I mostly don't--Lauren knew how to file it all in the Senate. I'm sending out a mix which sometimes Claire and other times Lauren picks up from the out box. What happens then is a mystery to me!

So I think we need to get on this asap to be sure we know and design the system we want. Let me know what you both think. Thx

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-06322 Doc No. C05956435 Date: 05/31/2016

HA 09/01/2015

HRC-12511

From: hhdr22@clintonemail.com
Sent: 2/12/2009 2:11:16 AM +0000
To: Diane Reynolds
Subject: Re: New cell

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED b6
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED b7C
DATE 11-27-2018 BY [redacted] NS/LGG

I just got my voice mail set up today. So pls try again. But during the day, call my office if you want to reach me. pls call [redacted]

b6 per DOS

From: "Diane Reynolds"
Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2009 15:07:00 -0500
To: hhdr22@clintonemail.com
Subject: Re: New cell

-Hi Mom left a message for you at the # below earlier this week and just tried you now but he you and Gaddy can't even have a message! Hope we talk soon I love you
xo

Original Message:
From: hhdr22@clintonemail.com
To: Diane Reynolds
Sent: Sun Feb 08 07:04:12 2009
Subject: New cell

Here's my new # for you and Mark [redacted] use it often! I love you, googles, Mom

b6 per DOS

Message Headers:

[Large redacted area]

Reply To: hhdr22@clintonemail.com

[Redacted area]

b6 per DOS
b7E per DOS

To: Diane Reynolds [redacted]
Subject: Re: New cell
From: "H" hhdr22@clintonemail.com
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2009 02:11:16 +0000

[Large redacted area]

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG:
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:
PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID:
PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE:
PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_5:
PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS:

To: "David Petraeus"

Subject: Re: Follow up

From: "H"

Date: Sun, 1 Feb 2009 22:20:10 +0000

DP--we're working this but waiting for a DOD \$ commitment to put on the table. I should have that tomorrow. I'll keep you informed. H

-----Original Message-----

From: "Petraeus, David H. GEN USA"

Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 15:09:58

To: "H"

Subject: RE: Follow up

Thx, Madame Secretary. And thx for the phone call that [redacted]

[redacted]

b5 per DOS

[redacted]

Best - Dave

-----Original Message-----

From: H [mailto:hdr22@clintonemail.com]

Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2009 9:33 PM

To: Petraeus, David H. GEN USA

Subject: Re: Follow up

David--Sorry to be so tardy in responding. I've had blackberry blues. I can't use mine all day long since my whole office is a SCIF. I don't yet have a computer and I had to change my address and lost some of my traffic. [redacted]

b5 per DOS

[redacted]

All the best.

-----Original Message-----

From: "Petraeus, David H. GEN USA"

Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 07:55:52

To: "H"

Subject: RE: Follow up

Madame Sec: Thx again [redacted]

[redacted]

b5 per DOS

[Redacted]

Break. Strongly recommend

that

[Redacted]

b5 per DOS

Vr - Dave

-----Original Message-----

From: hr15@att.blackberry.net [mailto:hr15@att.blackberry.net]

Sent: Sunday, January 18, 2009 1:46 PM

To: Petraeus, David H. GEN USA

Subject: Re: Follow up

Glad it worked out. Look forward to talking w you after the 20th.

-----Original Message-----

From: David Petraeus

To: Hillary Clinton

Sent: Jan 18, 2009 6:24 AM

Subject: RE: Follow up

Thx for making it happen in Saudi Arabia. Amb Fraker has been asked to stay on until April to help with transition. Great news -

-----Original Message-----

From: hr15@att.blackberry.net [mailto:hr15@att.blackberry.net]

Sent: Wednesday, January 14, 2009 9:23 PM

To: Petraeus, David H. GEN USA

Subject: Re: Follow up

I asked that he be kept and was told that he would be. Let me know if you hear of any glitches. Glad to hear that you and Richard are starting to work together. Best, H

-----Original Message-----

HRC-12514

From: David Petraeus

To: Hillary Clinton

Sent: Jan 14, 2009 3:14 AM

Subject: RE: Follow up

P.S. Any feedback on possibility of keeping AMB Ford Fraker on the job in Riyadh until his replacement is confirmed? As you'll recall, this was a personal request from King Abdullah. Best
- Dave

-----Original Message-----

From: hr15@att.blackberry.net [mailto:hr15@att.blackberry.net]

Sent: Saturday, January 10, 2009 3:57 PM

To: Petraeus, David H. GEN USA

Subject: Follow up

Dear Dave, Thanks for giving me so much of your time the last two nights. I appreciated our conversations and enjoyed the chance to see you and Richard becoming acquainted. I'm looking forward to working w you both. If there is ever anything you need or want me to know, pls use this personal email address. All the best, Hillary

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Monday, January 31, 2011 3:32 PM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Fw: H: Significant new intel from Drumheller and Lang on Egypt. Sid
Attachments: hrc memo intel egypt 013111.docx

Pls print

----- Original Message -----

From: [redacted] **b6 per FBI, DOS**
To: H **b7C**
Sent: Mon Jan 31 11:25:34 2011
Subject: H: Significant new intel from Drumheller and Lang on Egypt. Sid

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 31, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Intel on Egypt

I have had conversations today with Tyler Drumheller and Pat Lang on the Egyptian crisis. Drumheller has been in close contact with high level European intelligence officials with direct sources on the ground in Egypt. Lang is an old friend of Omar Suleiman. Below are notes on their information, followed by options based on our conversations:

1. The situations in Alexandria and Suez are exponentially worse than in Cairo - no police, no government, no magistrates, more violence, more deaths. The military wants to maintain itself and that means Mubarak will have to go. He wants to hold on for a couple of weeks so he doesn't have to flee.
2. Last fall Suleiman fell out of favor Mubarak for an unknown reason, probably because of Gamal's ambition. Suleiman has been much abused and tormented by Mubarak. He has been promised the VP job for 15 years, but never got it because Mubarak was afraid he would succeed him instead of Gamal. It was supposedly planned that Suleiman was to be in place while Gamal was trained, but it never happened. Suleiman is not popular with rest of military. He's from intelligence, not the army. He's not disliked, but the military also knows he's unacceptable to the people now.

The military knows it must reach an accommodation with the Muslim Brotherhood and is reaching out to the MB. Most of radical MB leaders are imprisoned; the military is talking to moderates. There's no Khomeini or Nasrallah out there. The problem is not the MB. The problem is the general level of religiosity among the lower classes that lack jobs.

4. The military wants a general as president and a civilian, someone like ElBaradei, as PM, but probably not EB, who has no political base, though his standing is growing.
5. The army has control of the situation, at least for now. This is not a bunch of young people playing with social media as depicted in the US press. The situation, however, has potential to go either way. But suppressing the crowds could mean a bloodbath, unacceptable to the military. The army hates the police. In 1985, the army fought the police in the streets. The police are disappearing or in some places completely gone. The police are burning their uniforms.
6. The military knows Mubarak must go. But when? If he holds on too long the situation will spin out of control. Another week may be too long. The general staff has to look Mubarak in the eye and tell him to go. Have they done it? Can they? They know he can't stay, but will they force him to leave?
7. The best case scenario would be a transition to elections with Suleiman as an interim head of state. But even that may be dicey at this point. Every day Mubarak stays the potential for disaster looms greater.
8. After some poor initial positioning, the US government has it right with your statements on Sunday. The idea of propping up Mubarak is gone. Obama calling Mubarak would do no good. He cannot be the messenger. The military should be praised for restraint in beginning to facilitate the transition. But the US may have to send an emissary to meet face-to-face with Mubarak to tell him he has to go. That person might be Admiral Mullen, but that puts the matter on a military to military basis. The Egyptians do not respect Colin Powell. One possibility who could do the job would be James Baker. A week is too long to wait

b6
b7C

m: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
nt: Sunday, June 24, 2012 3:40 PM
To: 'sullivanj@state.gov'
Subject: Re: H: Here it is: latest, latest intel on MB/SCAF inside deal. Sid

Former US intell w continuing contacts.

From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:SullivanJJ@state.gov]
Sent: Sunday, June 24, 2012 03:36 PM
To: H
Subject: Re: H: Here it is: latest, latest intel on MB/SCAF inside deal. Sid

Will do. Wonder who his source is.

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Sunday, June 24, 2012 03:16 PM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Fw: H: Here it is: latest, latest intel on MB/SCAF inside deal. Sid

Fyi. Worth forwarding.

m: sbwhoeop [redacted] b6 per DOS
nt: Sunday, June 24, 2012 02:36 PM
To: H
Subject: H: Here it is: latest, latest intel on MB/SCAF inside deal. Sid

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 24 2012

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: The deal between MB & SCAF

SOURCE: Sources with access to the highest levels of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. On the evening of June 23, 2012, senior officials attached to the Guidance committee of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) were called to an emergency, secret meeting with officers of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). During this session the MB was informed that on the following day Egypt's Electoral Commission would announce the victory of Mohammed Morsi, the MB/Freedom and Justice Party (MB/FJP) candidate for President of Egypt. The SCAF officers stated that their commander, Field Marshall Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, was concerned that the MB followers, as well as many of the secular/liberal groups were becoming increasingly volatile during the extended vote

counting period. The MB representatives, after a call to Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie, assured the SCAF that there would be no violence before the election results were announced. The SCAF officers reiterated their previous position that Tantawi and the SCAF do not want to rule the country, but they will not tolerate any move that limits either their budget, or their position of respect in society. The MB officials, who were extremely happy with the news they had just received, assured their SCAF interlocutors that Badie, Morsi, and the rest of the MB leadership were committed to this position.

2 According to a very sensitive source, the MB officials added that Morsi would choose government officials from a wide spectrum of parties and movements, ranging from the Salafist al Nour party to secular/liberal groups like the April 6 Movement. The SCAF officers had no problem with this, but added that the current military decrees would remain in place, at least until the constitution is drafted and a new parliament is elected. In the opinion of this individual, the MB representatives were under instructions from Badie to avoid getting into an argument on this point, at this particular time. Having won the presidency, Badie and his advisors believe that public opinion and political momentum will allow the MB to dominate the entire government. In this regard he also believes it is important that the MB not overreach, as Morsi, and the FJP speaker of Parliament, Saad Al-Katany had done in the weeks leading up to the second round of voting.

3 (Source Comment: In the opinion of this individual, Badie believes that the aggressive tactics of the MB/FJP supporters, in the period immediately before the second round of voting, led to Tantawi moving to dissolve parliament, and redefine the duties of the president. The Supreme Guide wants Morsi to realize that if they maintain their studied pace, they will get everything they want. The MB polling noted that despite the fact that Morsi's opponent Ahmed Shafik is a former commanding general of the Air Force, approximately seventy (70) per cent of the regular army troops supported the MB candidate. At the same time, as many as forty (40) per cent of the members of the April 6 movement also voted for Morsi. The MB leadership also intends to include Coptic Christians and some women in the new government, in an effort to the new Egypt as an inclusive, moderate Islamic State. Their challenge is to find individuals who they feel they can trust, and who are willing to serve under Morsi. According to this individual, the Coptic community in particular is frustrated over what it sees as voter fraud and intimidation of its members by the FJP in Christian areas.)

4 At the end of this meeting, according to this source, the MB and SCAF representatives agreed to stay in contact and to do what is necessary to prevent any violence, while recognizing the important role the military will continue to play in Egyptian society. Both sides recognize that there will be incidents resulting from the political passions at play in the country and agree that they must prevent these incidents from getting out of hand. The SCAF officers also agreed that they would not overreact to statements from MB supporters regarding a reduced role for the military in government. The SCAF officers added that Tantawi was not unhappy with the result of the election, as he and Shafik have a poor personal relationship and a history of competition for power within the military under the regime of the former President Hosni Mubarak.

5 (Source Comment: According to this individual, both sides agreed that their first order of business together in the new Egyptian political situation will be developing a coherent policy toward Israel. The SCAF officers pointed out that Israel is extremely concerned about the changes in Egypt. The MB officials added that they would like to maintain and enhance the policy the SCAF and MB developed during the 2011 uprising, maintaining the Peace Treaty with Israel, while limiting joint activity and cooperation on sensitive security matters. Both sides also agreed that, after the election, it will be important to create a positive working environment for foreign firms, particularly those from the United States and Western Europe. The MB officials stated that Badie and Morsi are firmly committed to a dual Islamic/Western banking system and good relations with Western firms. He regularly states that the West has dealt with Saudi Arabia for many years and the system he anticipates for Egypt will be far less restrictive than the one put in place by the Saudi rulers. Badie also believes the fact that Morsi was educated in the United States and has many good contacts in that country.)

6. The representatives of the MB and the SCAF will meet again during the week of June 25, and will continue regular contact as they prepare for the drafting of the new Constitution and parliamentary elections. Both sides agreed that they must also keep a careful eye on the situation in Syria, which could spread to Lebanon and other countries potentially creating a situation affecting Egypt's security.

~~SECRET//REL FVEY~~

b6
b7C

From: "Abedin, Huma" <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: 7/4/2009 11:42:28 AM +00:00
To: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
Subject: Fw: Follow Up: Summary of 1055 EDT DPRK Conference Call

Fy: [Classified by DAS. Dos on 2/29/2016 ~ Class. SECRET ~ Reason: 1.4(b) 1.4(c) 1.4(d) ~ Declassify: 07/03/2034]

From: Beale, Courtney A Kramer b6 per DOS
To: Sullivan, Jacob J; [redacted] Abedin, Huma; Mills, Cheryl
Cc: S_SpecialAssistants; Macmanus, Joseph E
Sent: Sat Jul 04 07:35:08 2009
Subject: Fw: Follow Up: Summary of 1055 EDT DPRK Conference Call

FYI on Japanese statement on North Korean missile launches.

From: Pascual, Michael T
To: Smith-Wilson, Shelby V; SES_DutyDeputies; Barks-Ruggles, Erica J; Park, Pamela P;
S_SpecialAssistants; Macmanus, Joseph E
Cc: SES-O_SWO-Only; Rosenberger, Laura M
Sent: Sat Jul 04 02:03:32 2009
Subject: RE: Follow Up: Summary of 1055 EDT DPRK Conference Call

Further to Shelby's email, Embassy Tokyo forward the following (unofficial) translation of a statement issued by Japanese MOFA:

MOFA released a press announcement at 13:00 (MOFA: G-0738)

July 4, 2009

Regarding Japan's protest against the launch of a ballistic missile by North Korea.

Through the diplomatic route in Beijing, around 12:00 noon Japan sent North Korea the following message regarding today's North Korean ballistic missile launch:

~~SECRET//REL FVEY~~

1. The launch of a ballistic missile by North Korea is a significant act of provocation in terms of the security of neighboring countries, including our country, and a violation of UNSCR 1895, 1718 and 1874. Concerning today's launch of a ballistic missile, Japan strictly protests, and expresses sincere regret.

2. Japan urges North Korea to implement all related UNSC Resolutions, including suspension of all activities related to the ballistic missile plan immediately and completely. In addition, on this occasion, (we) strongly urge (North Korea) again to take concrete action toward the comprehensive resolution of related issues, such as the abduction issue, the nuclear issue and the missile issue.

From: Smith-Wilson, Shelby V

Sent: Saturday, July 04, 2009 12:13 AM

To: SES_DutyDeputies; Barks-Ruggles, Erica J; Park, Pamela P; S_SpecialAssistants; Macmanus, Joseph E

Cc: SES-O_SWO-Only; Rosenberger, Laura M

Subject: Follow Up: Summary of 1055 EDT DPRK Conference Call

To clarify a few points below:

b5 per DOS



From: Smith-Wilson, Shelby V

Sent: Friday, July 03, 2009 11:42 PM

To: SES_DutyDeputies; Barks-Ruggles, Erica J; Park, Pamela P; S_SpecialAssistants; Macmanus, Joseph E


Cc: SES-O_SWO-Only; Rosenberger, Laura M

Subject: Summary of 1055 EDT DPRK Conference Call

~~SECRET//REL FVEY~~

b1 per DOS
b5 per DOS

Dan.



~~SECRET//REL FVEY~~

HRC-12525

~~SECRET//REL FVEY~~



Shelby Smith-Wilson

Senior Watch Officer

U.S. Department of State (S/ES-O)

202-647-1512

b7E per DOS

Message
Headers:



From: "Abedin, Huma" <AbedinH@state.gov>
To: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>



Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2009 07:42:28 -0400
Subject: Fw: Follow Up: Summary of 1:55 EDT DPRK Conference Call
Thread-Topic: Follow Up: Summary of 1:055 EDT DPRK Conference Call
Thread-Index:



~~SECRET//REL FVEY~~

From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Friday, June 17, 2011 5:21 AM
To: 'sullivanj@state.gov'
Subject: Re: [redacted]

If they can't, turn into nonpaper w no identifying heading and send nonsecure

From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:SullivanJJ@state.gov]
Sent: Friday, June 17, 2011 08:17 AM
To: H
Subject: Re: [redacted]

b5 per DOS

They say they've had issues sending secure fax. They're working on it.

From: Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Friday, June 17, 2011 08:00 AM
To: 'HDR22@clintonemail.com' <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
Subject: Re: [redacted]

?!!! Checking

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Friday, June 17, 2011 07:52 AM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Re: [redacted]

b5 per DOS

I didn't get the TPs yet.

From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:SullivanJJ@state.gov]
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2011 05:51 PM
To: H
Subject: Fw: [redacted]

You'll get tps this eve. They're coming together.

From: Spence, Matthew J. [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2011 04:15 PM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: [redacted]

b5 per DOS
b6 per FBI, DOS
b7C

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6
b7c

From: Hanley, Monica R <HanleyMR@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, April 9, 2012 6:43 AM
To: H
Cc: Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: Call to President Banda

The call is confirmed for 730am. Marina will have the call sheet, the bio and action memo for your reference.

----- Original Message -----

From: Hanley, Monica R
Sent: Sunday, April 08, 2012 10:41 PM
To: 'HDR22@clintonemail.com' <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
Cc: 'huma@clintonemail.com' <huma@clintonemail.com>
Subject: Re: Call to President Banda

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on
1/29/2016 ~ Class CONFIDENTIAL ~
Reason: 1.4(d) ~ Declassify on: 4/7/2027

Thanks - will get back with you as soon as we hear back from them.

----- Original Message -----

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Sunday, April 08, 2012 10:37 PM
To: Hanley, Monica R
Cc: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Subject: Re: Call to President Banda

7:30 works for me.

----- Original Message -----

From: Hanley, Monica R [mailto:HanleyMR@state.gov]
Sent: Sunday, April 08, 2012 10:18 PM
To: H
Cc: Huma Abedin
Subject: Call to President Banda

I'm sorry for the late email but we just received a call sheet for Malawi President Banda.

Are you open to taking this at 7:30am tomorrow? If so, we can reach out overnight. Otherwise, we will find other widows that work tomorrow for you.

This did not make it with the pouch but we can ask Marina to print this and her bio for you if a 7:30am call works for both you and President Banda.

The Secretary's Call Sheet for Malawi President Joyce Banda

(C) Purpose of Call: To offer condolences on the passing of President Mutharika and congratulate President Banda on her recent swearing in.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HRC-12534

From: Mills, Cheryl D
Sent: Tuesday, December 11, 2012 7:15 PM
To: Johnson, Brock A
Subject: Re: Significant FOIA Report

Thanks

From: Johnson, Brock A
Sent: Tuesday, December 11, 2012 05:39 PM
To: Mills, Cheryl D
Subject: FW: Significant FOIA Report

FYI on the attached FOIA request from:

- Anne Weismann of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) requesting "records sufficient to show the number of email accounts of or associated with Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton, and the extent to which those email accounts are identifiable as those of or associated with Secretary Clinton."

From: IPS-STAFF-Assistants
Sent: Tuesday, December 11, 2012 4:11 PM
To: Larkins, Neal B
Cc: Johnson, Brock A; Finney, Clarence N; Walter, Sheryl L; Reid, Rosemary D; A Staff Collective; Wasser, Jonathon D; Stein, Eric F; Davis, Jonathan E; Smilansky, Gene
Subject: Significant FOIA Report
Importance: High

All:

Attached is the Significant FOIA Report for this week. Please contact me if you have any questions.

Thank you,

Olivia Woods
Staff Assistant to the Director
U.S. Department of State
Office of Information Programs and Services
A/GIS/IPS
(202) 663-1012
SA-2, Room 5081-A

Our Mission is to meet the needs of our customers and the United States Government

DOS READING ROOM
F-2016-07895, C06131656

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: Huma Abedin <huma@clintonemail.com> on behalf of Huma Abedin
Sent: Friday, November 26, 2010 6:59 AM
To: H
Subject: MbZ call - 7:15am

Classified by Director A/GIS/IPS
Acting DoS on 11/3/2016 ~
Class: CONFIDENTIAL ~
Reason: 1.4(B), 1.4(D) ~
Declassify on: 11/26/2030

In addition to note from Jeff I emailed and faxed you. Reminder Jeff spoke with Abu yesterday and Yousef has been in regular touch with many of us:

The Secretary's Call Order for VAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef

b5 per DOS

Purpose of Call:

[redacted]

[redacted]

Background:

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b1 per DOS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: Cheryl Mills [redacted] b6 per FBI, DOS
Sent: Monday, March 09, 2015 2:39 PM b7C
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted] David Kendall
Subject: Re: Email/Data Systems

Dear [redacted]

b6
b7C

Thank you for reviewing the existing tapes you collected with other equipment from the Clinton's residence when Platte River took over the systems in June 2013. I appreciate your review of those tapes, which you have stored in the data center since that time.

As we have discussed in the last week and consistent with the preservation email David Kendall shared with you, please do continue to preserve all relevant materials.

Thank you so much.

best

edm


On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 2:10 PM [redacted] wrote:
Cheryl,

b6
b7C

Upon review of your email/data systems, we have not found any backups or any data that existed before we took over in June of 2013. However, we are backing up the data as it exists today, and continue to keep and maintain that retention policy. To our knowledge there are no backups or data on the systems that would hold any data previous to our involvement; that is not to say there could have been older backups that have since been overwritten or deleted, and could still be forensically found on the disks by means of advanced software. But this is not to our knowledge, and thus out of our control. Please let us know if you have any further questions or concerns.

Thank you.

b6
b7C



PLATTE RIVER NETWORKS

Microsoft

Microsoft Software Assurance Solution
Network Solutions
Small Business Specialist Communities
Office Deployment Tool

TECHNOLOGY

This email has been scanned for email related threats and delivered safely by Mimecast.
For more information please visit <http://www.mimecast.com>

[redacted]

~~(S)~~
b1
b3

b6
b7C

From: "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
Sent: 8/25/2010 3:46:05 PM +00:00
To: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
Subject: Fw: NY Times article on Salehi

Fyi

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on
2/29/2016 - Class. SECRET -
Reason: 1.4(c) - Declassify on :
8/24/2035

----- Original Message -----
From: Holbrooke, Richard
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Wed Aug 25 11:32:24 2010
Subject: Fw: NY Times article on Salehi

Jake make She is aware

[redacted]

~~(S)~~

b1 per FBI, DOS
b3

----- Original Message -----
From: Feldman, Daniel F
To: Holbrooke, Richard
Sent: Wed Aug 25 11:27:03 2010
Subject: FW: NY Times article on Salehi

-----Original Message-----
From: Lussenhop, Matthew R
Sent: Wednesday, August 25, 2010 11:21 AM
To: Crowley, Philip J; Toner, Mark C; Hart, Erin M; Kabul Press; Singh, Vikram J; Bommer, Ashley F;
Simon, Jessica L; Guice, Stephen A; Benini, Carla A
Cc: Keith, James R; Ensor, David B
Subject: NY Times article on Salehi

All,

NY Times Dexter Filkins has been in touch today seeking Embassy comment on a story he says the Times will run tomorrow alleging that Muhammad Zia Salehi has been on the Agency payroll. Embassy's line has been and will be the standard approach - that we refrain from comment on stories discussing intelligence matters.

Regards,

Matt

Matt Lussenhop

Public Affairs Counselor

[redacted]

~~(S)~~

b1
b3



b1
b3

US Embassy Kabul

b6 per DOS

office: (93-0)700-108-239 / US: (301) 490-1042




lussenhopmr@state.gov


kabul.usembassy.gov facebook icon
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<http://www.facebook.com/usembassymalaysia>

SBU
This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

Message Headers:



From: "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
To: H <brod17@clintonemail.com>




b7E per DOS

Date: Wed, 25 Aug 2010 11:46:05 -0400
Subject: Fw: NY Times article on Sale!!!




b1
b3



b1
b3

Thread-Topic, NY Times article on Sa-ah:

b7E per DOS



b1
b3

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1353814-000

Total Deleted Page(s) = 14

- Page 6 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 7 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 8 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 9 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 10 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 11 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 15 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 16 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 17 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 18 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 19 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 20 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 21 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 22 ~ Duplicate;

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

[Redacted]

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

HQ-004

Serial # of Originating Document

Date Received

7/10/2015

From

Meeting of ICSG

[Redacted]

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

b6
b7C

Reston 3

(Address)

Washington, DC 20511

By

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes

No

Receipt Given Yes

No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes

No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes

No

Title:

Reference:

EC serial

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

Original notes re interview of

- Meeting of ICSG on 7/10/15

- SII Referral

- Classified e-mails and supporting documents

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

ICIG 7/10/15

- * Copy of preservation letters to DOS.
- * Who at IG of DOS received ^{copy of 811 Referral. Have they called back?} ~~the preservation letter~~
- * Will the FOIA requests still be processed and reviewed?
 - Can we put on hold?
 - when will next batch be released? disclosed via FOIA?
- * - Need to maintain Bigot list / need to know who in ICIG should be on it?
- * Do you have copy of recommendations to kill?
 - Item 3 on page 2 of US Senate Letter - look for classified
 - Clinton is only one who said yes to HPSCI's questions regarding when all Sec. of State Post 5 DOS Secretary of State
 - Not just one email.

* who actually reviewed e-mail and identified possible classified
 William Frank Rucker - expert in classification - reviewed docs
 Reviewed 296 emails, found e-mail regarding e-mail dated/included in
 referral to FBI.

* ~~Platt River~~ was at ICIG last week for meeting. Next of meeting?
 - Per Platt River ^{William Conroy} attorneys have thumb drives.
 - who asked attorneys for thumb drives. → on state.gov. FBI's website. Frank has these.

* Secretary + Frank was at DOS reviewing 30K docs, found 296 on inwmt, + 40 ICIG has,
 Kennedy at State is in charge of FOIA response - difficult to work
 - ICIG just reviewed yesterday ^{7/10/15} a copy of 30K from State. ^{with one week}
 Kennedy said he would not go back to judge with request to change
 side of releasing 1,000 docs per month.

Want 1,000
coming July 30th

* ~~David Scott~~ Steve A. Linick needs to be interviewed.
 * ~~Scott~~ also received referral at State.

EO. provides OOS-

- SBA in initial stages, but changes to S/WF once released or disseminated.
 - publish
 - Does not apply to 3rd party mail only, but conversations between diplomats, only when released.
-
- From random sampling - all e-mails seem to only be inbound.
only
- State has NOT yet searched their mainframe for her e-mails.
- Two e-mails in 296 contained classified
 - one was redacted, one ~~was~~ was NOT.
 - Frank has asked for unredacted versions.
 - The 4 new e-mails provided we sent at 40 Frank looked at.

Senat^E Korker: will be informed by ICIS today. -

07/10/15

- Of the five secretaries of State and their immediate staffs
Eich is the only one that said yes.
- Made recommendations to USDS
- John Hackett is head of USDS information management unit. He
Saw some court orders staff.
- He kept some over. Picked out 40 docs that they have
with Frank Buckner
- up to 5 classified documents from a random sample.
- AFRICOM doc: NGA says still class ~~XXXX~~
- Hackett thinks there are hundreds of emails.
- USDS has a unique authority to upgrade (cases in FOUO) then it goes
up.
- USDS sent DS over to get thumb drives he said no. (3 copies all in one
in law firm). Try to determine if law firm is cleared
- Pat Kennedy is in charge of FOIA and he is coming up in a lot of
the emails. He is a relative of her. Rumors are that he
might be de-sec state.
- IG made a report to Steve Lbrick (IG)
- FOIA is past admin stage. Court has them on 1000 docs every 30 days.
- was with presumption it was all unclassified when they set
the schedule.
- DOD office of Information Policy deals with it.
- DNI wants them to file a declaration.
- 3/12 stem was head of Global Information Services. (GIS) of USDS control 26
5.12 also is proxy for campaign. (what first purpose from liability issue) to open FOIA
81 is actual security information. B5 is declassification process.
- USDS has a special executive order to upgrade if it is going to be released.

will get mandatory.

- 30,000 docs are on a DVD.
- 296 docs are on the Internet, 1000 published on the Internet
- 40 emails selected by DNI. 30000 request is fairly abstract work
- Hackett originally thought he saw court order documents
- Platte River is Chazy, NY group by USSS (gov)
- Frank would be person who would tell us
- Another issue w/ the server
- will get us the presentation letter.

07/10/15

Jay Hackett is the staffer on Foreign Affairs Center's Act of State will be told and will connect Center at Johnson

- 54,000 pages of material. 4 little ones from 30,000 pages
- Visak - is USDS attorney.
- John Hackett wrote in an email to his argument that there are hundreds of classified ones
- July 30 the next batch of 1000 are supposed to go out.
- They will give us the USC contacts who are backtracking the classification determinations.
- All emails are in box (no sent).
- Bishop is addressed as # or 5.
- IG hasn't required a maintenance search of USDS servers for her email address

Recently Blumenthal provided some Benignioli emails at request to 30000 15 were missing on server the USDS mainframe. They took their preservation letter. IG will send preservation letter to USDS.

- USDS.gov has FOIA reading room.
- DNI Information management office (IMO) said

2 out of 296 in APR 18 on FBI reported a BI on case that was redacted we don't know where the new 4 from today came from. Frank's 40

Gay to give us [redacted] Enballe & lower emails. b6 per DOS

- Today or Monday: Center will find out it is referred to FBI

- USDS E.O. for updates - emails for what/blank?
- 40 docs - 30,000 emails
- preservation letter - new USDS mainframe preservation letter.
- Contact info

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

March 12, 2015

U.S. Department of State
Office of Inspector General
Room 8100, SA-3
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20520-0308

Dear Inspector General Linick:

We write to you today concerning the recent revelations that former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and other top aides used non-State Department email addresses and servers to conduct official U.S. Government business. We are concerned that diplomatically sensitive, and possibly classified, information may have been transmitted and stored in an insecure manner.

Foreign intelligence organizations and malicious actors continuously probe our government's information systems for weaknesses and attempt targeted intrusions. As you know, the federal government has experienced a number of sophisticated intrusions in recent years, and the threat is only growing. The use of privately maintained information systems that are not protected by federal government experts and key technical capabilities raises serious concerns as those networks may be less secure. Moreover, if a non-government server was known to be a repository for the Secretary's emails, it would almost certainly become—if it is not already—a priority target for foreign intelligence services and others.

To ensure appropriate security protections for sensitive but unclassified information the State Department's Foreign Affairs Manual policy, in place since 2005, requires that "normal day-to-day operations be conducted on an authorized AIS [Automated Information System], which has the proper level of security control to provide nonrepudiation, authentication and encryption, to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the resident information." The policy also states that "employees are expected to use approved secure methods to transmit SBU [sensitive but unclassified] information when available and practical." Furthermore, it is our understanding that the State Department has specifically instructed its employees, ostensibly during Secretary Clinton's tenure, to avoid conducting official Department business from personal e-mail accounts.

In addition, there are serious questions about the use of such non-government accounts on federal recordkeeping and transparency, particularly if it results in non-compliance with the Federal Records Act and National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)

regulations. Potential noncompliance with these requirements, many of which are imposed by federal law, is a serious matter.

We ask that your office, in coordination with the Inspector General for the Intelligence Community, and any other appropriate Federal entities, conduct a thorough audit related to electronic communications by State Department employees, including former senior officials, that were principally carried out on non-government-owned, or non-government-protected, information networks. Further, we ask that you provide a written report to the relevant congressional committees detailing your findings and any recommendations. The report should include the following:


1. The names and positions of State Department officials who regularly used non-official email to conduct official government business.
2. A specific description of the non-government information networks or systems that were used to transmit such email, to include:
 - a. the network security measures in place on such networks and systems from 2009 to 2013;
 - b. the means, if any, by which the network's security incorporated classified cyber security threat information controlled by the U.S. government;
 - c. the type of wireless communication devices that connected to the systems;
 - d. the location and ownership of the servers and other components of such networks or systems;
 - e. the names of individuals and entities that had authorized access to such networks or systems, including specifically those with authorized administrative access; and
 - f. the funding source for the system, its maintenance, upkeep, and administration.
3. An assessment of whether any of the State Department or other U.S. or foreign government information transmitted or received on such networks or systems contained classified, sensitive but unclassified, diplomatically sensitive, or otherwise nonpublic material.
4. A determination of whether any non-government emails used to conduct official government business or other government information has been deleted from these information networks or systems or altered from their original content, and, if applicable, an estimate of the number of emails or material that was deleted or altered.
5. A determination of whether all emails and other information that was required to be archived pursuant to the Federal Records Act or other legal or regulatory requirements were provided to the State Department or other government agencies for archiving, and whether the timing and nature of these actions was consistent with State Department policy, as well as applicable federal law and regulations.

We ask that this be an unclassified report, and that a classified annex be provided if necessary. Thank you for your time, and we look forward to working with you on this important matter of national security.

Sincerely,



Chairman Bob Corker
Senate Foreign Relations Committee



Chairman Richard Burr
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence



Chairman Ron Johnson
Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1353814-000

Total Deleted Page(s) = 6

Page 4 ~ OTHER - See DOS Reading Room F-2014-20439 Doc. No. C057962;

Page 5 ~ OTHER - See DOS Reading Room F-2014-20439 Doc. No. C057962;

Page 7 ~ b1 - per DOS; b5 - per DOS; b6; b7C;

Page 8 ~ b1 - per DOS; b6; b7C;

Page 9 ~ b1 - per DOS; b6; b7C;

Page 10 ~ b1 - per DOS; b6; b7C;

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X Deleted Page(s) X

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X For this Page X

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[redacted]

[redacted]

b5 per DOS

RELEASE IN PART
B5, B6

From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, November 27, 2010 4:17 PM
To: H
Subject: Fw: Follow Up

DOS READING ROOM.
F-2014-20439; C05771810

Fyl

----- Original Message -----

From: Crowley, Philip J
To: Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J; Mull, Stephen D; Burns, William J; Smith, Dana S
Sent: Sat Nov 27 15:00:20 2010
Subject: FW: Follow Up

FY: [redacted] PJ b5 per DOS B5

-----Original Message-----

From: Shane, Scott [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Saturday, November 27, 2010 12:41 PM
To: Crowley, Philip J
Cc: Baquet, Dean; Corbett, Rebecca
Subject: Re: Follow Up

b6 per DOS

PJ, do you have an ETA of any on record statement? Would greatly appreciate getting it asap.

Also, the editors asked me to share with you our decisions on government concerns about the first batch. We have redacted the Libya and China cables with vulnerable sources; we are not posting the Russian cable at all. (We are redacting other Russia and China cables.) We are not posting the Van Diepen US-Russia missile cable at all. And we are redacting the Thailand refugee route from the Seoul cable.

However, we are naming MtZ, AbZ and King Hamad; we are running Mr. Ruggiero's name; and we are posting the Humint collection cable.

Even where we've disagreed, we greatly appreciate your team's time and care in pointing out hazards. In some cases your advice has prompted changes in the wording of stories, in addition to what we've cut out.

More decisions to come.

Best

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau

[redacted]

b6 per DOS

[Redacted]

----- Original Message -----

From: Crowley, Philip J <CrowleyPJ@state.gov>
To: Shane, Scott
Sent: Fri Nov 26 18:31:22 2010
Subject: Re: Follow Up

We are actually sorting through who will provide comment. It will be tomorrow early afternoon before we square this away. I will keep you posted.

PJ

----- Original Message -----

From: Shane, Scott [Redacted]
To: Crowley, Philip J
Sent: Fri Nov 26 16:22:36 2010
Subject: RE: Follow Up

B6

Thanks, PJ, and thanks for your continuing input and good humor. Please don't forget the on-record stuff when you have a minute. [Redacted] asked if we wanted something from DNI and I said she was free to send it but that State was the logical commenter on behalf of the government.

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau

b6 per DOS

[Redacted]

From: Crowley, Philip J [CrowleyPJ@state.gov]
Sent: Friday, November 26, 2010 4:19 PM
To: Shane, Scott
Subject: Follow Up

On GTMO, I'm told there is an active negotiation with Ukraine that if revealed may jeopardize it. That is the one country that everyone asks not be mentioned.

PJ

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

b6
b7C

RELEASE IN PART
E1.B5.1.4(D)

b5 per DOS

From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Sunday, September 13, 2009 7:48 AM
To: 'millsent@state.gov'
Cc: 'sullivanj@state.gov'; 'abedinb@state.gov'
Subject: Re: For S -- for discussion on Afghanistan tomorrow

DOS READING ROOM
F-2014-20439; C05759633

Yes. Thx.

Classified by DAS A/GIS. Dos on
1/29/2016 ~ Class: CONFIDENTAL ~
Reason: 1.4(D) ~ Declassify on:
09/12/2024

----- Original Message -----

From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
To: H
Cc: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>; Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Sun Sep 13 07:47:17 2009
Subject: FW: For S -- for discussion on Afghanistan tomorrow

Is this what you are speaking of?

-----Original Message-----

From: Slaughter, Annie-Marie
Sent: Saturday, September 12, 2009 9:23 PM
To: Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J
Cc: Choilet, Derek H; Steinberg, James S; Abedin, Huma
Subject: For S -- for discussion on Afghanistan tomorrow

b1 per DOS
b5 per DOS

I had a long talk with [redacted]

(D)
(D)

X

UNCLASSIFIED
U.S. Department of State
Case No. F-2015-04841
Doc No. C65739658
Date: 05/13/2019

STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.

RELEASE IN
FULL

From: Abedin, Huma <Abedini1@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, April 10, 2011 10:14 AM
To: H
Subject: Fw: Stevens Update (Important)

Importance: High

Jake may have shot but in case not..

----- Original Message -----

From: Davis, Tommy T
Sent: Sunday, April 10, 2011 09:40 AM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J; Abedin, Huma; Wells, Alice G; S. Special Assistants
Subject: Stevens Update (Important)

(SBU) Per Special Envoy Stevens:

- The situation in Ajdabiyah has worsened to the point where Stevens is considering departure from Benghazi. The envoy's delegation is currently doing a phased checkout (paying the hotel bills, moving some comms to the boat, etc). He will monitor the situation to see if it deteriorates further, but no decision has been made on departure. He will wait 2-3 more hours, then revisit the decision on departure.
- He received reports of shelling last night in Ajdabiyah as well as snipers shooting people in the city. AFRICOM reported Qadhafi's forces took the eastern and western gates of Ajdabiyah, with 5 vehicles at the eastern gate and 50 at the western gate. More Qadhafi forces are heading to Ajdabiyah from Brega.
- The Brits report Qadhafi forces are moving from Sirte to Brega, which they interpret as preparation for another assault on Ajdabiyah today.
- He plans to discuss the situation further with the Brits, Turks, and the TNC to see if this is an irreversible situation. Departure would send a significant political signal, and would be interpreted as the U.S. losing confidence in the TNC. Initial message to the TNC would frame the departure as due to security grounds and as a temporary measure only.
- Palaschik said she would discuss these developments with Amb. Cretz.
- If the group departs, the contract for the boat stipulates they return to Greece. One scenario could be the group stages elsewhere for a few days.

Ops will continue to monitor the situation.

UNCLASSIFIED
U.S. Department of State
Case No. F-2015-04841
Doc No. C65739658
Date: 05/13/2019

STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
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STATE-0000048040