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Trial Attorney, Counterespionage Section,
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Before: HONORABLE RONALD L. ELLIS
United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of New York

----- x	:	SEALED
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	:	<u>COMPLAINT</u>
-v.-	:	Violation of
	:	18 U.S.C. §.371
ANNA CHAPMAN, and	:	
MIKHAIL SEMENKO,	:	
Defendants.	:	COUNTY OF OFFENSE:
----- x	:	NEW YORK

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, ss.:

AMIT KACHHIA-PATEL, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and charges as follows:

COUNT ONE

Conspiracy to Act as Unregistered Agents of a Foreign Government

1. From in or about the 1990s, up to and including the present, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, ANNA CHAPMAN and MIKHAIL SEMENKO, the defendants, and others known and unknown, unlawfully, willfully and knowingly, did combine, conspire, confederate, and agree together and with each other to commit an offense against the United States, to wit, to violate Section 951 of Title 18, United States Code.

2. It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that ANNA CHAPMAN and MIKHAIL SEMENKO, the defendants, and others known and unknown, unlawfully, willfully and knowingly, would and did act in the United States as agents of a foreign government, specifically the Russian Federation, without prior notification

to the Attorney General, as required by law, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 951.

Overt Acts

3. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the illegal object thereof, the following overt acts, among others, were committed in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere:

a. On or about June 26, 2010, ANNA CHAPMAN, the defendant, met with an individual purporting to be a Russian Government official in Manhattan, New York, at which she (CHAPMAN) received a fraudulent passport.

b. On or about June 26, 2010, MIKHAIL SEMENKO, the defendant, met with an individual purporting to be a Russian Government official in Washington, D.C.

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.)

The bases for my knowledge and the foregoing charges are, in part, as follows:

4. I have been a Special Agent with the FBI for approximately five years. Currently, I am assigned to the Counterintelligence Division within the New York Field Office of the FBI. The focus of my counterintelligence efforts has been on the foreign intelligence activities of the Russian Federation. I have learned the facts contained in this Complaint from, among other sources, my personal participation in this investigation, my discussions with other law-enforcement agents, searches that I have conducted, surveillance that I have conducted, and my review of documents, video and audio recordings, and other evidentiary materials. Because this Complaint is being submitted for the limited purpose of establishing probable cause, it does not include every fact that I have learned during the course of this investigation. Further, any statements related herein are related in substance and in part only.

I. THE "ILLEGALS" PROGRAM

5. The FBI has conducted a multi-year investigation of a network of United States-based agents of the foreign

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intelligence organ of the Russian Federation (the "SVR").¹ The targets of the FBI's investigation include covert SVR agents who assume false identities, and who are living in the United States on long-term, "deep-cover" assignments. These Russian secret agents work to hide all connections between themselves and Russia, even as they act at the direction and under the control of the SVR; these secret agents are typically called "illegals." As set forth in more detail in the attached Complaint, see Attachment A, which is incorporated by reference herein, illegals receive extensive training by the SVR before being assigned to a foreign country under a false identity to operate on behalf of Russia. See Complaint ¶¶ 8-9 (describing illegals' training, and use of false identities).

6. The SVR also operates a subset of illegals - who perform the same work as illegals, but operate in foreign countries under their true names. This subset of illegals is generally trained in roughly the same trade-craft as the other illegals (including agent-to-agent communications, invisible writing, and the use of a cover profession), but their training is typically shorter. In addition, these illegals are not generally paired with another illegal.

7. The FBI's investigation has revealed that a network of illegals (the "Illegals") is now living and operating in the United States in the service of one primary, long-term goal: to become sufficiently "Americanized" such that they can gather information about the United States for Russia, and can successfully recruit sources who are in, or are able to, infiltrate, United States policy-making circles.

8. The SVR spelled out the purpose of the Illegals' presence in America in a 2009 message to two co-conspirators who are named as defendants in the attached Complaint. That message, which was sent by Moscow Center, has been decrypted by the FBI and reads, in part, as follows:

You were sent to USA for long-term service trip. Your education, bank accounts, car, house etc. - all these serve one goal: fulfill your main mission, i.e. to search and develop ties in policymaking circles in US and send intels [intelligence reports] to C[enter].

¹ The SVR headquarters in Moscow is known as "Moscow Center" or "Center."

9. Based on the facts set forth below, I believe that ANNA CHAPMAN and MIKHAIL SEMENKO, the defendants, are part of the subset of Illegals who, as described above in Paragraph 7, operate under their true names.

10. I am aware that federal law requires individuals who are acting as agents for foreign governments to notify the Attorney General of the United States. The Department of Justice ("DOJ") maintains files of all individuals who have registered as agents of foreign governments. A recently-conducted review of DOJ files indicates that ANNA CHAPMAN and MIKHAIL SEMENKO, the defendants, have never notified the DOJ that he or she is an agent of the Russian Federation.

II. MEANS AND METHODS OF THE CONSPIRACY:
COVERT COMMUNICATIONS BY PRIVATE WIRELESS NETWORKS

11. To further the aims of the conspiracy, Moscow Center has arranged for the defendants clandestinely to communicate with the Russian Federation. In particular, the conspirators have used a number of methods of secret communications. See Complaint III.A. As set forth below, these include covert communications by means of private wireless networks.

12. In general terms, covert communication via a private wireless network is a form of electronic communication through paired laptop computers. Such covert communication utilizes temporary wireless networks that spring up between two computers and can be used to transmit data between them. The way this system typically works is as follows: a laptop computer ("LAPTOP A") is pre-configured to create its own private wireless local area network. This wireless network is programmed to only communicate with another specific laptop ("LAPTOP B"), based on LAPTOP B's Media Access Control ("MAC") address.² Once LAPTOP A transmits the signal to establish its own private wireless network, it will be "joined" by LAPTOP B when LAPTOP B comes within a certain physical distance of LAPTOP A. Once the two laptop computers are both on the private wireless network, they can communicate with each other by

² A MAC address is a unique identifying number assigned by a manufacturer to electronic communications devices, such as laptop computers and Wi-Fi network cards. All computers that access the internet through a wireless network do so by publicly broadcasting their MAC addresses via radio transmission in order to locate a device connected to the internet.

exchanging data. The data can be encrypted so that it can only be read with the aid of specialized decryption software, similar to that used to decrypt messages hidden through steganography, as described in the Complaint attached hereto.

1. ANNA CHAPMAN'S USE OF PRIVATE WIRELESS NETWORKS

13. Since in or about January 2010, law-enforcement agents, acting pursuant to judicial orders, conducted surveillance of ANNA CHAPMAN, the defendant, at various locations in New York City. On approximately ten Wednesdays between January 2010 and June 2010, law-enforcement agents observed CHAPMAN in the physical vicinity of an individual ("Russian Government Official #1") who has, on multiple occasions, been observed entering the Russian Mission to the United Nations in Manhattan. Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that on each of these ten occasions, CHAPMAN and Russian Government Official #1 covertly exchanged electronic communications via a private wireless network, as described above.

14. Set forth below are certain examples of Wednesdays on which ANNA CHAPMAN, the defendant, and Russian Government Official #1, were in the vicinity of each other, in order to exchange electronic messages covertly.

- a. On January 20, 2010, law-enforcement agents, acting pursuant to judicial orders, performed video surveillance on a coffee shop located near the intersection of 47th Street and 8th Avenue in Manhattan, New York (the "Coffee Shop"). CHAPMAN was seated near the window of the Coffee Shop and had with her a bag (the "Tote Bag"). After approximately ten minutes, I observed a minivan pass by the window of the Coffee Shop. Based on my conversations with another law-enforcement agent, I know that Russian Government Official #1 has been observed driving the minivan, recognized by its license plate, on a number of occasions subsequent to January 20, 2010. As part of the surveillance operation, law-enforcement agents utilized a commercially available tool that can detect the presence of wireless networks. The agents detected the presence of a particular network (the "AD HOC NETWORK") with two associated MAC

addresses ("MAC ADDRESS A" and "MAC ADDRESS B"). Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that on January 20, CHAPMAN (from the Coffee Shop) and Russian Government Official #1 (from the minivan) used their laptop computers (which bore "MAC ADDRESS A" and "MAC ADDRESS B") to create the AD HOC NETWORK and to use it to communicate with one another.

- b. On March 17, 2010, law-enforcement agents, acting pursuant to judicial orders, performed video surveillance on a book store located in the vicinity of Greenwich and Warren Streets in Manhattan (the "Book Store"). CHAPMAN was inside the Book Store. At the same time, Russian Government Official #1 was across the street from the Book Store, carrying a briefcase. I observed CHAPMAN pull a laptop out of the Tote Bag. CHAPMAN stayed in the Book Store for approximately thirty minutes; Russian Government Official #1 was in the vicinity of the Book Store (but outside) for approximately twenty of those thirty minutes. As part of the surveillance operation, law-enforcement agents utilized a commercially available tool that can detect the presence of wireless networks. Law-enforcement agents were able to detect a particular MAC address - MAC ADDRESS A - at the time that CHAPMAN was observed powering on her laptop computer; law-enforcement agents were also able to determine that the electronic device associated with MAC ADDRESS A created the AD HOC NETWORK. Approximately three minutes after the creation of the AD HOC NETWORK, another electronic device with MAC ADDRESS B was detected joining the AD HOC NETWORK.
- c. On April 7, 2010, law-enforcement agents, acting pursuant to judicial orders, performed surveillance on Russian Government Official #1 starting from the point that he left his office in mid-town Manhattan. According to a law-enforcement agent who was

performing surveillance on Russian Government Official #1, it appeared that Russian Government Official #1 noticed the presence of the surveillance team and returned to his office. As part of the surveillance operation, law-enforcement agents utilized a commercially available tool that can detect the presence of wireless networks. On this occasion, the agents detected the presence of MAC ADDRESS A, but not MAC ADDRESS B. Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that on April 7, Russian Government Official #1 set out to communicate covertly with CHAPMAN, who was using a laptop computer that bore MAC ADDRESS A - but that he (Russian Government Official #1) aborted his efforts to communicate with CHAPMAN because he detected the FBI's surveillance of him.

- d. On April 21, 2010, May 5, 2010, June 9, 2010, and June 16, 2010, law-enforcement agents, acting pursuant to judicial orders, observed CHAPMAN in the vicinity of Russian Government Official #1. On each of these four occasions, law-enforcement agents discerned the presence of MAC ADDRESS A and MAC ADDRESS B using the commercially-available tool described above, and were able to determine that after the electronic devices associated with MAC ADDRESS A and MAC ADDRESS B joined the AD HOC NETWORK, the electronic devices transferred data between each other.

B. MIKHAIL SEMENKO'S USE OF PRIVATE WIRELESS NETWORKS

15. On or about June 5, 2010, law-enforcement agents performed surveillance on MIKHAIL SEMENKO, the defendant, at a restaurant in Washington, D.C. (the "Restaurant"). According to an FBI special agent who was present for the surveillance ("Special Agent-1"), at approximately 11:00 a.m., SEMENKO entered the Restaurant carrying a bag. Approximately ten minutes later, a law-enforcement agent observed a car with a diplomatic license plate for Russia enter the Restaurant parking lot, drive around the parking lot, and then park (the "Car").



The individual seen driving the Car has been identified as a Russian government official ("Russian Government Official #2").³ The Car remained in the parking lot for approximately twenty minutes and then drove away. Within a few minutes, SEMENKO left the Restaurant.

16. According to Special Agent-1, on June 5, 2010, during the surveillance of MIKHAIL SEMENKO, the defendant, law-enforcement agents, pursuant to judicial order, utilized the same commercially available tool that can detect the presence of wireless networks as described above, that was used during the surveillance operations on ANNA CHAPMAN, the defendant. The device was able to detect the presence of two MAC addresses on an ad hoc network during the time that SEMENKO and Russian Government Official #2 were in the vicinity of each other inside the Restaurant and its parking lot, respectively. Therefore, based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, and as further informed by SEMENKO's statements to an undercover agent described below, I believe that SEMENKO was trying to utilize the private wireless network system to communicate with Russian Government Official #2.

III. ANNA CHAPMAN'S JUNE 26, 2010 MEETING WITH AN UNDERCOVER AGENT POSING AS A RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL

17. As set forth in greater detail below, on June 26, 2010, an FBI undercover agent ("UC-1"), purporting to be a Russian consulate employee, arranged a meeting with ANNA CHAPMAN, the defendant, in Manhattan, New York, after telling her that it was urgent to meet with her in order to provide something to her. During this meeting, among other things: (a) CHAPMAN and UC-1 discussed her "Wednesday" covert laptop communication sessions, see supra II.A; (b) CHAPMAN provided UC-1 with her laptop computer, which apparently was having

³ Law-enforcement officers have observed the person who appears to be Russian Government Official #2 entering and leaving the Russian Mission. In addition, law-enforcement officials have obtained from the United States Department of State the visa application of an individual identified as a "second secretary" of the Russian Mission. The photograph of the applicant in that visa application is a photograph of Russian Government Official #2.

Furthermore, Russian Government Official #2 was observed, in 2004, engaging in a brush-pass with a co-conspirator named as a defendant in the Complaint at a train station in Forest Hills, New York. See Complaint ¶¶ 53-54.

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technical difficulties, so that it could either be fixed, or sent back to Moscow; and (c) UC-1 provided CHAPMAN with a passport bearing a fictitious name, which UC-1 instructed CHAPMAN to provide to another illegal, who was based in New York and who, unlike CHAPMAN, was operating in a false name.

18. On June 26, 2010, at approximately 11:00 a.m., UC-1 placed a consensually-recorded telephone call to ANNA CHAPMAN, the defendant.⁴ In that call, which was conducted in Russian, UC-1 stated that he needed to meet with CHAPMAN that day, in order to provide her with something.

19. Later that day, at approximately 12:30 p.m., ANNA CHAPMAN, the defendant, placed a telephone call to UC-1, which was intercepted pursuant to a judicial order. In that call, which also was conducted in Russian, CHAPMAN stated that it would be difficult to meet that day, and asked whether it would be possible to meet the next day instead. UC-1 stated that the meeting was urgent, but agreed to meet with CHAPMAN the following morning. At approximately 1:00 p.m., CHAPMAN again placed a call to UC-1, which call was also intercepted pursuant to a judicial order. In this third call, which was also conducted in Russian, CHAPMAN stated that she would return to New York from Connecticut for a meeting with UC-1 and would call UC-1 at approximately 4:00 p.m. UC-1 directed CHAPMAN to meet at a particular coffee shop in downtown Manhattan, New York.

20. At approximately 4:30 p.m., UC-1 met with ANNA CHAPMAN, the defendant, at the previously agreed upon location in Manhattan. This meeting was recorded by a hidden recording device worn by UC-1. At the outset of this meeting, UC-1 identified himself as the person who had spoken with CHAPMAN on the phone earlier in the day. At the beginning of the meeting, UC-1 and CHAPMAN spoke to each other in Russian, but then UC-1 suggested that they speak in English so as to draw less attention to themselves. Based on my review of the recording of the meeting, I have learned the following:

- a. UC-1 asked, "Tell me how is everything? How are you doing?" CHAPMAN replied, "Everything is cool apart from connection." Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that this is a reference

⁴ Certain of the recorded conversations referred to in this Complaint were conducted in Russian. The quotations and descriptions of these conversations are based on preliminary translations of the conversations, and are subject to revision.

to the technical difficulties with the laptop-to-laptop covert communications between CHAPMAN and Russian Government Official #1.

- b. CHAPMAN stated, "I just need to get some more information about you before I can talk." UC-1 replied, "I work in the same department as you, but I work here in the consulate. Okay. My name is Roman. My name is Roman, I work in the consulate."
- c. UC-1 stated, "There is a situation that I need your help with tomorrow, which is why it's not like regular email contact or website contact and this could not wait until your Wednesdays, you know." UC-1 then asked, "When was the last Wednesday that you So this Wednesday, now you will do it?" CHAPMAN replied "no," but stated that it would be "next Wednesday."
- d. UC-1 stated, "I know you are having some problems with the connections. I am not the technical guy I don't know how to fix it, but if you tell me, I can pass it up. But, basically I know you are going back to Moscow in two weeks. . . . So, ah when you go back they will sit down with you and talk officially about your work, your performance, ah-but, for now I just wanted to see how you are doing, how everything is going and then I have a task for you to do tomorrow."
- e. UC-1 then explained, "[T]his is not like, this is not like the Wednesdays with the notebooks, this is different it is, it is the next step. You are ready for the next step. Okay?" CHAPMAN replied, "Ok."
- f. UC-1 stated, "This had to get done, okay, because I will explain. There is a person here who is just like you okay. But, unlike you, this person is not here under her real name. . . . So she was in the country and to do that we have to give her new documents. Understand? So, I have the documents for you to give to her tomorrow morning. Once you do that, once you give her the document that's it." CHAPMAN replied, "Okay." UC-1 stated, "So, I have it. I can show you, but this is what I mean by next step because this is not laptop to laptop, this is person to person."

She is just like you OK." CHAPMAN then asked, "Is she in New York?" UC-1 then asked, "Are you ready for this step?" CHAPMAN replied, "Shit, of course."

- g. UC-1 asked, "So, tell me the notebooks? Are you still having a problem with the notebook? With the connection?" CHAPMAN replied, "Yes. I thought you were flying back so it is alright." UC-1 stated, "Do you want me . . . well [sic] can give it to consulate if you want them to look at it or you can wait and take it home yourself to Moscow." CHAPMAN stated, "It would be more convenient if I gave you it." Later, in the course of the meeting, CHAPMAN provided the laptop computer to UC-1 (hereafter the "Laptop"). Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that the Laptop is the computer, which was beset by technical difficulties and which was used for laptop-to-laptop covert communications between CHAPMAN and Russian Government Official #1.
- h. UC-1 described to CHAPMAN where she would need to go the next day at 11:00 a.m. to meet with the person described above in subparagraph (f). UC-1 explained that the purpose of the meeting would be for CHAPMAN to convey a passport bearing a fictitious name (the "Fraudulent Passport"). UC-1 provided the Fraudulent Passport to CHAPMAN during the meeting. As he did so, UC-1 stated: "[s]o this is the passport. This is the person, this is not her real name but you can call her this name if you wish. Okay, this is what she looks like. So, she will come to you, give her the passport and you are done."
- i. UC-1 then stated, "When you are done, I need you to come back here to this location . . . so that I know that everything is okay. . . . You can't see from here, but when I walk out there is a city map Go to the map after you are done. Come up to the map and, I will give you the thing, all you do is [place a postal] stamp, all you do is put it on the side of the map like you are looking at the map Just come to the map and put it on the side and then I will check it and I will know that everything is okay."

- j. UC-1 then described how she (CHAPMAN) would recognize the person ("I-1") to whom she (CHAPMAN) was to give the Fraudulent Passport. I-1, UC-1 explained, "will come to you so, so the way that she will know you is, you just hold this in your hand like this. Just hold it in your hand and she will come to you." At the time that UC-1 said this to CHAPMAN, he (UC-1) provided her (CHAPMAN) with a magazine to hold, so that I-1 would recognize her (CHAPMAN) at the meeting where the Fraudulent Passport was to be handed over.
- k. UC-1 then stated that I-1 "will tell you . . . 'excuse me, but haven't we met in California last summer?' And you will say to her, 'No, I think it was the Hamptons.'" CHAPMAN asked, "The Hamptons?" UC-1 stated, "The Hamptons and that is it. That is how you know and you just exchange, just give her the document [that is, the Fraudulent Passport] and then after this I need you to come back, put the stamp and then after this it is all normal schedule, okay, you can go back to Wednesday." UC-1 then asked CHAPMAN to repeat all of his instructions to her, which CHAPMAN substantially did. Specifically, CHAPMAN confirmed, "Okay, tomorrow at 11, I am going to be sitting at one of the benches, she is going to ask me if she saw me in California. I am going to say no, it was in the Hamptons. I will take the documents, tell her to sign. I will hold the journal, this is how she will recognize me and I got back and put the [postal] stamp."
- l. CHAPMAN asked, "You're positive no one is watching?" UC-1 replied, "You know how long it took me to get here? Three hours. So here I am comfortable. But when you go, you know, be careful." Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that CHAPMAN understood "three hours" as a reference to the time that UC-1 had spent conducting circuitous "surveillance detection routes," to insure that he was not being followed.
- m. Toward the end of the meeting, UC-1 stated, "[Y]our colleagues back in Moscow, they know you

are doing a good job and they will tell you this when they see you. So keep it up."

21. At approximately 6:00 p.m., about an hour after the meeting described above in Paragraph 21 concluded, law enforcement agents conducting surveillance of ANNA CHAPMAN, the defendant, observed the following: CHAPMAN entered a CVS Pharmacy store located in Brooklyn, New York. Thereafter, CHAPMAN entered a Verizon store in Brooklyn, New York. CHAPMAN then left the Verizon store, entered a Rite Aid Pharmacy, and then returned to the Verizon store. After CHAPMAN left the Verizon store for the second time, law enforcement agents observed that she threw a Verizon bag (the "Verizon Bag") into the garbage. After CHAPMAN left the vicinity, law enforcement agents retrieved the Verizon Bag that CHAPMAN had just discarded. Inside the bag, the agents found the following items, among others:

- a. The Verizon Bag contained a customer agreement for the purchase of a Motorola cellphone. The customer agreement was in the name of "Irine Kutsov," and indicated a customer address of "99 Fake Street."
- b. The Verizon Bag also contained the packaging for a "Tracfone" calling card, and for a Verizon calling card. Based on my training and experience, and my involvement in this investigation, I know that both of these calling cards may be used to make international calls.
- c. The Verizon Bag also contained an unopened charging device for the Motorola cellphone indicated on the customer agreement.

22. Based on the foregoing observations by the surveillance agents, as well as my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that ANNA CHAPMAN, the defendant, following her meeting with UC-1, entered a series of stores to avoid being followed or surveilled. On these same bases, I believe that her use of a false name and address in the customer agreement form, as well as her throwing of the cellphone charger, suggest that CHAPMAN was seeking to use the Motorola cellphone only temporarily so as to avoid detection of her conversations.

23. On June 27, 2010, ANNA CHAPMAN, the defendant, did not appear at the designated time at the location agreed upon in the meeting with UC-1.

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VI. MIKHAIL SEMENKO'S JUNE 26, 2010 MEETING WITH AN UNDERCOVER AGENT POSING AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT

24. On or about June 26, 2010, an FBI undercover agent ("UC-2"), who was posing as an agent of the Russian Government, placed a call to MIKHAIL SEMENKO, the defendant, at a cellular telephone number used by SEMENKO. That call was recorded pursuant to judicial authorization. At the beginning of the conversation, UC-2 asked SEMENKO, "could we have met in Beijing in 2004?" SEMENKO responded, "Yes, we might have, but I believe it was in Harbin." UC-2 and SEMENKO then arranged to meet at approximately 7:30 p.m. near the intersection of 10th Street N.W., and H Street N.W. in Washington, D.C. (The "Washington Street Corner"). During the conversation, which was recorded by a hidden device, UC-2 asked SEMENKO whether SEMENKO remembered "the sign," and SEMENKO responded that he did. Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that SEMENKO was affirming that he remembered what object he was supposed to carry during any in-person meeting with an SVR operative in order to allow the operative to identify SEMENKO.

25. At approximately 7:28 p.m. on June 26, 2010, UC-2 saw MIKHAIL SEMENKO, the defendant, at the Washington Street Corner. SEMENKO stood at the Washington Street Corner for approximately two minutes before UC-2 walked up to him. The meeting between UC-2 and SEMENKO was recorded by a hidden recording device worn by UC-2. After UC-2 approached SEMENKO, UC-2 repeated the phrase that he had used during the telephone conversation earlier that day, asking SEMENKO whether the two men could have met in Beijing during 2004. SEMENKO again responded that it was possible, but that the meeting had been in Harbin. UC-2 and SEMENKO then exchanged greetings in Russian and walked together to a nearby park (the "Washington Park"). In the Washington Park, UC-2 and SEMENKO sat together on a park bench where they talked to one another for approximately 30 minutes. Among other things, UC-2 and SEMENKO had the following discussions:

- a. UC-2 told SEMENKO that he wanted to discuss SEMENKO's attempted communication at the Restaurant on June 5, 2010. UC-2 told SEMENKO that UC-2 believed the communication attempt had not been successful, to which SEMENKO responded "I got mine." SEMENKO further explained that equipment he had been using for the communication had automatically turned itself off at the end

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of the communications session, which SEMENKO stated was a sign that the communication was successful. SEMENKO further explained that, when he turned the equipment on again after it had shut down, he "saw the stuff [he] received," and also said that when the communication went through he was "like . . . totally happy."

- b. UC-2 asked SEMENKO whether he had seen "our officer" during the June 5, 2010 attempted communications. SEMENKO responded, "no, I am not supposed to look, though - I'm not supposed to be looking out."
- c. UC-2 asked SEMENKO to describe the steps SEMENKO took during the June 5, 2010 attempted communication. SEMENKO explained that he had positioned his communications equipment so that it was "open" and so that it was facing "the right direction." SEMENKO further stated that, prior to the communication, he restored his equipment to "default settings," which SEMENKO explained was necessary if SEMENKO had "used [the equipment for [his office]]." In describing how he prepared data for transmission via the ad hoc network, SEMENKO stated, "I just create the file, Zip it"
- d. UC-2 asked SEMENKO who had trained SEMENKO to use his communications equipment as described above, and SEMENKO responded, "the Center guys, the Center guys." Later in the conversation, UC-2 asked SEMENKO how much time SEMENKO had spent in the "Center," and SEMENKO responded, "ahh . . . a week." When UC-2 indicated that he was surprised that SEMENKO could have been trained on his communications equipment in only one week, SEMENKO responded that he had previously received an additional two weeks of training.
- e. SEMENKO and UC-2 also discussed the safety of SEMENKO's communications equipment. Specifically, UC-2 told SEMENKO that, "as far as the computer goes, [he should] be careful with it, [because] it is very



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sensitive." SEMENKO responded that he knew the equipment was sensitive, and that he was being careful with it. In response to a question from UC-2 about how he was keeping his communications equipment safe, SEMENKO responded that he did not have anything that looked suspicious, and that he (SEMENKO) was the only person using the communications equipment. SEMENKO further stated that the one other thing he had was "a book, basically like other books." Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that SEMENKO was saying that there was nothing suspicious about the outward appearance of his communications equipment, and that the only other item he possessed for that communication was a book, which was largely indistinguishable from other books.

- f. UC-2 asked SEMENKO what he would do with his communications equipment if "something goes down." SEMENKO responded that he would erase the hard drive of the communications equipment. Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that SEMENKO was saying that, if he were subjected to scrutiny by law-enforcement or intelligence personnel, he would erase the hard drive of the communications equipment.
- g. UC-2 asked SEMENKO about the pre-arranged meeting places that SEMENKO had within the United States for use when SEMENKO received a particular signal. SEMENKO responded that his only meeting place for such occasions was the Russian Consulate in New York City. SEMENKO further explained that, although the Washington Street Corner had been proposed as a potential meeting site, it had never been approved - presumably by Center.

26. After the discussions described above, UC-2 handed SEMENKO a folded newspaper inside which an envelope containing \$5,000 in cash was concealed. UC-2 told SEMENKO, "There is an envelope in there; there is money in it. The money has to go to a park in Arlington tomorrow. It has to be there between 11:00 a.m. and 11:30 a.m." SEMENKO then asked UC-2 for

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a description of the location where the money was to be delivered, and UC-2 gave SEMENKO a map which showed the location, including information about a particular spot underneath a bridge where SEMENKO was to deliver and hide the money (the "Drop Site"). After SEMENKO indicated that he had memorized the information from the map, he gave it back to UC-2 to be destroyed.

27. At the end of the June 26, 2010 meeting between UC-2 and SEMENKO, UC-2 asked SEMENKO whether he had any last concerns. SEMENKO responded that he wanted UC-2 to "figure out" the problem with the communications via the private wireless network. The meeting concluded with SEMENKO asking UC-2 whether he was now going to report the communications problem to "them."

28. On or about June 26, 2010, the FBI installed video surveillance cameras in the vicinity of the Drop Site. The footage recorded by those cameras reflects the following:

- a. At approximately 11:00 a.m., MIKHAIL SEMENKO, the defendant, approached the area of the Drop Site by crossing over the bridge underneath which the Drop Site is located. SEMENKO's face is clearly visible in the footage from one of the cameras, and SEMENKO can also be seen carrying a white bag.
 - b. Video footage recorded at approximately 11:06 a.m. shows SEMENKO removing from the white bag the newspaper concealing an envelope containing \$5,000 that UC-2 had given to SEMENKO the previous day. That footage also shows SEMENKO placing the newspaper in the Drop Site.
 - c. At approximately 11:07 a.m., SEMENKO is seen for the last time on the video footage from the vicinity of the Drop Site. The footage does not reflect SEMENKO leaving the area by crossing back over the bridge on which he had originally arrived.
29. At approximately 11:50 a.m., FBI agents searching the Drop Site recovered the newspaper that MIKHAIL SEMENKO, the defendant, had placed there, and which UC-2 had given to SEMENKO the previous day. When the agents opened the newspaper, they found it to contain the envelope containing \$5,000 that had been inside the newspaper when UC-2 had given it to SEMENKO the previous day.

Video
Footage


5

WHEREFORE, deponent prays that a warrant be issued for the arrests of ANNA CHAPMAN and MIKHAIL SEMENKO, the defendants, and that they be arrested and imprisoned, or bailed, as the case may be.



AMIT KACHHIA-PATEL
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Sworn to before me this
27th day of June, 2010



UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/27/2010

On June 26, 2010, at approximately 07:15 p.m., in Washington, D.C., a body recorder was activated by an Undercover Agent (UC), portraying himself as an Agent of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) to record his attempted conversation with MIKHAIL SEMENKO (SEMENKO). During the meeting the UCE and SEMENKO discussed the below described topics of interest. All the discussions were consensually recorded, hence all the details can be found in the translation of the body wire.

UCE met with and had consensual monitored conversations with MICHAEL SEMENKO. The meeting/conversation was in English with several Russian words interchanged intermittently throughout the conversation.

The following is a summary of the conversation and does not purport to be a verbatim of the conversation:

SEMENKO verbally acknowledged his visits and training received at the "Center" (SVR's HQ/training facility in Moscow, Russia).

SEMENKO confirmed he indeed had a successful covert communication session with a Russian Intelligence Officer (IO) in Washington, D.C. on 06/05/2010.

SEMENKO explained to the UCE how he used the communications equipment (laptop) to communicate with the Russian IO. SEMENKO also confirmed he successfully received information/file from the Russian IO during the covert communications on 06/05/2010.

SEMENKO advised except for the Russian Consulate in New York City there were no other meeting sites for SEMENKO and the SVR to meet in the United States (US). SEMENKO said he offered the H Street and 10th St., NW, Washington, D.C. to the SVR as a meeting site in Washington, D.C., but it was never confirmed/finalized. SEMENKO added he knew only one other meeting site abroad, but did not specify the country and/or location.

During the meeting, the UCE provided SEMENKO with an envelope, which contained \$5000.00. The UCE instructed SEMENKO to place the envelope under the bridge in a park in Arlington, VA. SEMENKO never asked for the reason and/or explanation and only asked for the address/description of the park. After SEMENKO looked at the map

Investigation on 06/26/2010 at Washington, D.C.

File # [redacted]
by UCE Date dictated Not Dictated

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

(S)

[Redacted]

b1

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 06/27/2010, Page 2

provided to him by the UCE, SEMENKO said he memorized the address/description and returned the map back to the UCE for destruction.

The UCE then left the area. The UCE turned off the recorder approximately at 08:15 p.m.

The recorder was turned over to SA [Redacted] on 06/27/2010, approximately at 2:15 a.m.

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 12-02-2010
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-02-2035

(S)

Subject: Dark De Day & Date: Saturday, June 5, 2010
 (S) ICI-Russia (S) Shift: Team:
 Conducted by:

b1

- Subject Observed
- Subject Not Observed
- Contact Observed
- Assessment Data Obtained
- Photos Taken
- by _____
- Unusual Activity
- Video Taken
- by IS
- IS

b6
b7C

Analysis / Administrative Data

Prepared by: IS
Approved by: SIS/TC

(S)

Surveillance conducted reconnaissance of the area.

(S)

b1

(S) File #

Derived from:
FBINSISCG20080301
Declassify on: 20350605

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [Redacted] (NY) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, June 07, 2010 3:16 PM
To: [Redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Cc: [Redacted] (NY) (FBI)
Subject: FW: [Redacted] (NY) (FBI)

b6
b7C

3

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
RECORD [Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

b1

[Redacted]
CD-1, NYO
[Redacted] desk
[Redacted] cell

b6
b7C

From: [Redacted] (OTD)(FBI)
Sent: Monday, June 07, 2010 1:54 PM
To: [Redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: WFO WIP Survey

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
RECORD [Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

b1

(S) [Redacted]

(S)



b1


DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
SECRET//NOFORN

DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
SECRET//NOFORN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
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DATE: 12-02-2010
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REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-02-2035


~~SECRET//NOFORN//FISA~~



(S)

b1

~~Derived From: FBI NSISCG 20080301~~
~~Declassify On: 26 June 2035~~
~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~



(S)

b1



(S)

MT
/SLP

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN//FISA~~



(Rev. 05-01-2008)

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/31/2010

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field

Contact: [Redacted]

Approved By: [Redacted]

RS/SLP

Drafted By: [Redacted]

krs (P)

Case ID #: (S) [Redacted]

Title: (S) [Redacted]

FBI-Russia

5

(U) Synopsis: (S) \$5,000.00 recovered from dead drop location

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301
Declassify On: 20350831~~

(U) Details: (S) On or about June 27, 2010 at approximately 11:50 a.m., FBI Agents from the Washington Field Office recovered \$5,000.00 in cash wrapped in a newspaper from the dead drop location in Arlington, VA. The dead drop location was the exact location that the FBI Undercover (UC) agent told Semenko to place the money the previous night during their interaction. The agents determined after opening the newspaper that it contained the same envelope with \$5,000.00 that had been inside the same newspaper when the UC gave it to Semenko the previous day.

ks102431.ec

~~SECRET~~

402
MNT

(S) [Redacted]

b1
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b7C

b1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-02-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc

19i, 56, 62, 63

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/14/2009

To: Seattle

Attn: SA [redacted]

From: New York [redacted]

(S) Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted] *ELH/mjr*

Drafted By: [redacted] *JAS*

(S) Case ID #: (S) [redacted]
(S) [redacted]

(S) Title: (S) [redacted]
OO-NYO

(S) (S) [redacted]
OO-SE

(S) Synopsis: (S) To attach DVD of highlights from video of the
operational activity between [redacted]
[redacted] on 09/26/2009.

(U) (S) ~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301~~
~~Declassify On: 20341014~~

(S) (S) [redacted]

(U) Administrative: (S) NO DOCUMENTS IN THIS SUBFILE WILL BE
UPLOADED WITH TEXT.

(S) Details: (S) Attached for the [redacted] file is video in DVD format of
highlight from the cameras used to capture [redacted] the area
(S) of DeKalb Avenue, Brooklyn, NY, 11205. A copy is also attached
for Seattle.

(S) (S) The attached video shows subject [redacted] arrive at the
corner of DeKalb and Vanderbilt Avenues at approximately 10:59 am
(S) on 09/26/2009. The subject [redacted] shows up approximately 3 minutes
later. [redacted] continue from the bus stop area on the north

(S) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

(S) [redacted]

b1
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b7C

b1

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: New York
(S) Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 10/14/2008

west corner of DeKalb and Vanderbilt Avenues to the coffee shop on the south west corner. The attached video also shows [redacted] leave the coffee shop and continue west towards the Fort Greene Park. The two spend approximately two hours together on a park bench. Lastly, the attached video shows [redacted] giving a bag to [redacted] and a second small package to [redacted]

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

b1

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DATE 12-02-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc

19g, 55b

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/04/2006

To: New York

Attn: CD, SAC

✓ Seattle

Attn: SA [redacted]

From: New York

(S)

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

:msp

(S)

Case ID #: (S) [redacted]

(S)

Title: (S) [redacted]

FCI-R

(S)

(S) [redacted]

FCI-R

(U)

Synopsis: (S)

To submit video of captioned subjects from 06/08/2006.

Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X-1

(S)

(S) [redacted]

NON USPER

(U)

Enclosure(s): (S)

One (1) copy of DVD from 06/08/2006.

Details: (S)

On 06/08/2006, captioned subjects conducted intelligence related operational acts. These operational acts

(S)

occurred in the vicinity of [redacted]

ATTRIBUTES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
JUN 06 2007	
FBI SEATTLE	

b1
b6
b7C

b1

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b7C

~~SECRET~~

To: New York From: New York
Re: (S) [redacted] 12/04/2006

b1

(S)

LEAD(s):


Set Lead 1: (Action)

SEATTLE

AT SEATTLE

♦♦ (U) ~~(S)~~ Read and clear.

~~SECRET~~



(Rev. 01-31-2003)

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/07/2004

To: Counterintelligence (S)

Attn: [redacted] Room [redacted]
SSA [redacted]

✓ Seattle

✓ Attn: SA [redacted]

From: New York

(S) [redacted] Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted] *[Signature]*

Drafted By: [redacted]

(S) Case ID #: (S) [redacted]

(S) Title: (S) [redacted]
FCI-R

(S) Synopsis: (S) [redacted]

(U) (S) ~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(S) (S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

◆◆

~~SECRET~~

(S) [redacted]

b1
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b7C

b1

b1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 12-02-2010
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-02-2035

~~SECRET~~




(S)

b1


~~DERIVED FROM: G-3
DECLASSIFY ON: X-1~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)



b1




(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~

(S)



b1

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-02-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc

54c, e, f, g

(0131/2003)

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/17/2004

To: Counterintelligence (S) Attn: [redacted] ROOM [redacted]
UC [redacted]
(S) [redacted] ROOM [redacted]
SSA [redacted]
Attn: SSA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

✓ Seattle

From: New York
Squad [redacted]
Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted] *ja*

Drafted By: [redacted]

(S) Case ID #: (S) [redacted]
(S)

(S) Title: (S) [redacted]
FCI-R

(S) (S) [redacted]
FCI-R

(S) Synopsis: (S) FBI-NYO Post Operation Report for 06/19/2004
through 06/20/2004 meeting between [redacted]

(U) (S) ~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X-1~~

(S) (U) [redacted]

Administrative: (S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]
X

~~SECRET~~

b1
b6
b7C

b1

~~SECRET~~

(S) To: ~~(S)~~ New York From: New York
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 06/21/2004

INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN ON THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS COMMUNICATION WITHOUT FBIHQ AUTHORIZATION. NO DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE BUREAU SHOULD BE MADE OF ANY INFORMATION DERIVED FROM SOURCE WITHOUT BUREAU AUTHORITY.

(U) Details: ~~(S)~~ WARNING:

(S) ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

(S)

~~(S)~~ A surveillance [redacted] targeting the subjects of [redacted] took place on 06/19/2004 and 06/20/2004.

b1

(S) ~~(S)~~ The following details the results of the FBI coverage of the meeting between the [redacted] subjects:

[redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) To: New York From: New York
Re: (S) [redacted] 06/21/2004

(U) (S) Friday, 06/18/2004:

(S) (S) On 06/18/2004 [redacted]
[redacted] They further confirmed the subjects' departure from Seattle:

(S) (S) The [redacted] subjects arrived at Newark International Airport on 06/18/2004

(S) [redacted]

(U) (S) Saturday, 06/19/2004:


(S) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

b1

~~SECRET~~

(S) To: New York From: New York
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 06/21/2004




(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) To: New York From: New York
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 06/21/2004



(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) To: New York From: New York
Re: (S) [redacted] 06/21/2004

(S)



b1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) To: New York From: New York
Re: (S) [redacted] 06/21/2004

(S)

[redacted]

(U) (S) Sunday, 06/20/2004:

(S)

[redacted]

b1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) To: New York From: New York
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 06/21/2004

b1

(S) ~~(S)~~ Photographs and video will be forwarded at a later
date. [redacted]

◆◆

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-02-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc

54d

~~SECRET~~

SURVEILLANCE LOG COVER SHEET

(S) SUBJECT:

DAY & DATE: Friday, June 18,
2004

SHIFT: 6am-4pm

TEAM: Merged

CONDUCTED BY:

SUBJECT OBSERVED

ASSESSMENT DATA
OBTAINED

UNUSUAL ACTIVITY

SUBJECT NOT OBSERVED

PHOTOS ATTEMPTED

VIDEO ATTEMPTED

CONTACT OBSERVED

by:

by:

ANALYSIS/ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

PREPARED BY:

PURPOSE: To monitor and observe the activities of Subjects 1 and 2 leading up to, and including, the boarding of an aircraft at Seatac Airport.

b1
b6
b7C

(S)

(S)

1 - case agent:

(S)

FILE #

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SURVEILLANCE LOG COVER SHEET

(S)

SUBJECT:

DAY & DATE: Friday, June 18,
2004

SHIFT: 6am-4pm

TEAM: Merged

(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SURVEILLANCE LOG

(S) Physical Surveillance of: Date: Friday, June 18, 2004

(S) File

Time	Initials	Observations

(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~

SURVEILLANCE LOG

(S)

Physical Surveillance of:

Date: Friday, June 18, 2004

(S)

File

Time	Initials	Observations


(S)

b1

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b7C

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 12-02-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc



54g

(0131/2003)

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/29/2004

To: Counterintelligence

(S)

Attn:

[Redacted]

ROOM [Redacted]

SSA [Redacted]

✓ Seattle

✓ Attn:

SA [Redacted]

From: New York

(S)

Contact: SA

[Redacted]

Approved By:

[Redacted] *gm*

Drafted By:

[Redacted]

(S)

Case ID #:

(S)

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

Title:

(S)

[Redacted]

FCI-R

(S)

(S)

[Redacted]

FCI-R

(U)

Synopsis:

(S)

To enclose photographs.

(U)

(S)

~~Derived From: G-3~~

~~Declassify On: X-1~~

(S)

(S)

[Redacted]

(U)

Enclosures:

(S)

For FBIHQ, two (2) sets of photographs. For Seattle, one (1) set of photographs.

Details:

(S)

Enclosed photographs were taken during the

06/20/2004 meeting between [Redacted]

The

first set of 25 photographs were taken by a NYO SA [Redacted]

[Redacted] These photographs were already provided to

Seattle under separate cover. The second set of photographs (8 pages) were taken [Redacted]

(S)

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
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
b1

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



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
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
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-02-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc



(Rev. 01-31-2003)

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/25/2004

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: SSA [redacted]

(S) [redacted] Room [redacted]

✓ Seattle

Attn: ✓ SSA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

From: New York

(S) [redacted]

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted] *js*

Drafted By: [redacted]

(S) Case ID #: (S) [redacted]
(S)

(S) Title: (S) [redacted]
FCI-R

(S) (S) [redacted]
FCI-R

(S) [redacted]

(U) (S) ~~Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1~~

(S) (S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
JUL 01 2004	
[redacted]	[redacted]

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b7C

~~SECRET~~

To: New York From: New York

(S)

Re: ~~(S)~~

[Redacted]

b1

(S)

[Redacted]

◆◆

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 12-02-2010
FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-02-2035

~~SECRET~~


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
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


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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 12-02-2010
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-02-2035

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

New York, New York 10278

June 19, 2004


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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-02-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc



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(SURVEILLANCE LOG COVER SHEET

SUBJECT: SUBJECT 1 and SUBJECT 2 DAY & DATE: Monday,
June 5, 2006

(S) SHIFT: []

(S) TEAM: []

CONDUCTED BY:

[]

SUBJECT OBSERVED

ASSESSMENT DATA OBTAINED

UNUSUAL ACTIVITY

SUBJECT NOT OBSERVED

PHOTOS ATTEMPTED

VIDEO ATTEMPTED

CONTACT OBSERVED

by:

by:

ANALYSIS/ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

PREPARED BY: []

PURPOSE: To observe the travel habits and patterns of SUBJECT 1 and SUBJECT 2

[]

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1 case agent: []
1 []

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FILE# []

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(SURVEILLANCE LOG COVER SHEET)

SUBJECT: SUBJECT 1 and SUBJECT 2 DAY & DATE: Monday,
June 5, 2006

(S)

(S)

SHIFT:

TEAM:

ANALYSIS/ASSESSMENT: FISUR finds the following noteworthy:

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 12-02-2010
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-02-2035

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SURVEILLANCE LOG

Physical Surveillance of: SUBJECT 1 and
SUBJECT 2

Date: June 5, 2006

(S) File #:

Time	Initials	Observations
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SURVEILLANCE LOG

Physical Surveillance of: SUBJECT 1 and
SUBJECT 2

Date: June 5, 2006

(S) File #:

Time	Initials	Observations			
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-02-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 12-02-2010
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-02-2035

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/20/2006

To: Seattle

Attn: SA [Redacted]
Squad

From: Washington Field

(S) [Redacted]
Contact: SA [Redacted]

Approved By: [Redacted] DA/BKS

(S) Drafted By: [Redacted] slp

Case ID #: (S) [Redacted]
(S) [Redacted]
(S) [Redacted]

(S) Title: (S) [Redacted]
FCI - R

(S) (S) [Redacted]
FCI - R

(S) (S) [Redacted]
FCI - R

(U) Synopsis: (S) Surveillance log 06/09/06-06/13/06.

(U) (S) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

[Large Redacted Block]

(S)

sp061712.ec


~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S) To: Seattle From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [redacted] 06/20/2006




(S)

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~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(S) To: Seattle From: Washington Field
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 06/20/2006




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~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(S) To: Seattle From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [redacted] 06/20/2006




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(S) To: Seattle From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [redacted] 06/20/2006



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
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~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

To: Seattle From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [redacted] 06/20/2006

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~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S) To: Seattle From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [redacted] 06/20/2006



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
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~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

To: Seattle From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [redacted] 06/20/2006

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
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To: Seattle From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [redacted] 06/20/2006

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~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S) To: Seattle From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [redacted] 06/20/2006



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
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~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

To: Seattle From: Washington Field


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Re: (S)



06/20/2006

(S)



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~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-02-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc

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~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/26/2006

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: SSA [redacted]

From: New York

(S)

Room [redacted]

(S)

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

(S)

Case ID #: (S) [redacted]

(S)

Title: (S) [redacted]

(S)

Synopsis: (S) [redacted]

(U) (S)

Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X1

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(S)

[Large redacted area]

Opening EC

UNLOADED
BY [redacted]
DATE 10/17/06

~~SECRET~~

Handwritten notes: OHA D, SA, 9/26/06, (AD)

(S)

Stamp: SERIALIZED, FILED, SEP 26 2006, FBI-NEW YORK

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
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(S)

Re: (S)



(S)



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE.

Date: 08/19/2009

To: New York

Attn: File

From: New York

(S) [redacted] contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

(S) Case ID #: (S) [redacted]

(S) Title: (S) [redacted]
OO-NYO

(S) (S) Synopsis: (S) To submit [redacted] surveillance log and photographs
for the operational activity of [redacted] on 06/06/2009.

(U) (S) ~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301
Declassify On: 20340819~~

(S) (S) [redacted]

(U) Administrative: (S) NO DOCUMENTS IN THIS SUBFILE WILL BE
UPLOADED WITH TEXT.

(S) Details: (S) Attached are photographs [redacted]
from the area of the North White Plains metro station on
06/06/2009.

(S) [redacted]

(S) CD-1 (S) The following is a time line of events conducted by
[redacted] on the day of 06/06/2009:

(S) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~


b1
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(S)

To: Counterintelligence From: New York
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/19/2008



(S)


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~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: New York
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/19/2008

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Surveillance Log Cover Sheet

(S) Subject: [Redacted] Day & Date: Saturday, June 6, 2009

(S) Shift: 10am-6pm Team: [Redacted]

Conducted by:

SI	[Redacted]	IS	[Redacted]	_____	_____
IS		IS		_____	_____
IS		IS		_____	_____
IS				_____	_____
IS				_____	_____

- Subject Observed
- Subject Not Observed
- Contact Observed
- Assessment Data Obtained
- Photos Attempted
- by IS [Redacted]
- Unusual Activity
- Video Attempted
- by _____

Analysis / Administrative Data

Prepared by: IS [Redacted]
Approved by: IS [Redacted]

[Large Redacted Area]

File #: [Redacted]

(S)

~~Derived from: G-3~~
~~Declassify on: X-1~~

~~SECRET~~

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Surveillance Log Cover Sheet

(S)

(S)

Subject: [Redacted]
File #: [Redacted]

Day & Date: Saturday, June 6, 2009

Shift: 10am-6pm Team: [Redacted]

Analysis / Administrative Data (continued):

(S)

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[Redacted]

(S)

CD-1

Prepared by: IS [Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

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(Rev. 01-31-2003)

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE ,

Date: 08/19/2009

To: New York

Attn: File

From: New York

(S)

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

(S)

Case ID #: (S) [redacted]

Title: (S) [redacted]

(S)

OO-NYO

Synopsis: (S) To attach DVD format video for the operational activity of [redacted] on 06/06/2009.

(S)

(U) (S)

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301
Declassify On: 20340819~~

(S)

(S) [redacted]

(U)

Administrative: (S) NO DOCUMENTS IN THIS SUBFILE WILL BE
UPLOADED WITH TEXT.

Details: (S) Attached are 21 videos in DVD format [redacted] from the area of the North White Plains metro station on 06/06/2009. The attached videos show [redacted] the area of the North White Plains Metro Station on 06/06/2009.

(S)

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
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 12-02-2010
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-02-2035



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
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DATE: 12-02-2010
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REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-02-2035

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Page 1


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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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~~SECRET~~

DATE: 12-02-2010
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/ls
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-02-2035

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Page 1

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
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DATE: 12-02-2010

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CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C, D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-02-2035

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
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE: 12-02-2010
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-02-2035




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
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DATE: 12-02-2010
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REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-02-2035

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
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE: 12-02-2010
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-02-2035



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
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DECLASSIFY ON: 12-02-2035



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
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE: 12-03-2010
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-03-2035

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
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DATE: 12-03-2010
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-03-2035



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
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE: 12-03-2010
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DECLASSIFY ON: 12-03-2035



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DATE: 12-03-2010
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-03-2035

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9/14/07
7/22/11/2007

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/24/2009

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field

(S)

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

mrf MRJ

(S)

Case ID #: (S)

(S)

Title: (S)

FCI - RUSSIA

(S)

Synopsis: (S)

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~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG20080301
Declassify On: 20341027~~

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DO NOT UPLOAD

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[Redacted box]

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(S) To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [redacted] 11/24/2009



(S)

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DO NOT UPLOAD

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 12-03-2010
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-03-2035


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[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/24/2009

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field

(S) [redacted] Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted] KR

Drafted By: [redacted] mrfMK7

(S) Case ID #: (S) [redacted]
(S)

(S) Title: (S) [redacted]
FCI - RUSSIA

(S) [redacted] X

(U) (S) Derived From : FBI NSISCG20080301
Declassify On: 20341027

(S) (S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

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PMT

(S) [redacted]


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(S) To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [redacted] 11/24/2009

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
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 12-03-2010
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-03-2035


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Derived From: ~~FBI NSISCG 20080301~~
Declassify On: ~~13 October 2034~~
Reason: ~~1.4(c)~~

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
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CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-03-2035


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(Rev. 01-31-2003)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 03/09/2010

To: Washington Field

Attn: SA [redacted]
(S) [redacted]

From: New York

(S) [redacted] Contact: SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted] (A)

Drafted By: [redacted] dp

(S) Case ID #: (S) [redacted]
(S) [redacted]
(S) [redacted]

(S) Title: (S) [redacted]
FCI-R

(S) (S) [redacted]
FCI-R

(S) (S) [redacted]
FCI-R

(S) Synopsis: (S) To provide a post-operational report regarding
the meeting [redacted] on
03/07/2010

(U) (S) ~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301
Declassify On: 20341014~~

(S) (U) [redacted]

(U) Administrative: (S) NO DOCUMENTS IN THIS SUBFILE WILL BE
UPLOADED WITH TEXT.

(S) Details: (S) [redacted] the surveillance log for the
operation on 03/07/2010 under separate cover.

~~SECRET~~

(S) [redacted]
[redacted]

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
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(S) To: Counterintelligence From: New York
Re: (S) [redacted] 03/09/2010

(U) (S) This summary does not substitute the FISUR logs that were made contemporaneously with the surveillance.

(S) In summary, on 03/07/2010, FBI FISUR teams [redacted]

(S)



(S) (S) At approximately 11:00AM, [redacted] observed to arrive and meet at the corner of DeKalb and Vanderbilt Avenues.

(S) (S) After initial meeting, [redacted] were observed to cross the street and enter Tillie's Cafe, which is a coffee shop. They purchased coffee and sat at a table within Tillie's for approximately an hour and fifty minutes and talked. At the end of that time [redacted] was observed handing [redacted] a large plastic bag. (S) Shortly thereafter, [redacted] departed the cafe.

(U) (S) Video surveillance of the meeting on the corner of DeKalb and Vanderbilt avenues was utilized.

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(S) (S)


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NOFORN Product Page 1 of 3

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[Redacted]

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
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE


DATE: 12-03-2010
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-03-2035

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~~NOFORN~~ Product Page 1 of 1



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
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 12-03-2010
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-03-2035

(S)

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Surveillance Log Cover Sheet

(S) Subject: [redacted] (S) Day & Date: Saturday, March 6, 2010
FCI-Russia (S) Shift: [redacted] Team: [redacted]

Conducted by:

[redacted] _____
[redacted] _____

- Subject Observed
- Subject Not Observed
- Contact Observed
- Assessment Data Obtained
- Photos Taken
- by _____
- Unusual Activity
- Video Taken
- by _____

Analysis / Administrative Data

Prepared by: IS [redacted]
Approved by: SIS/TC [redacted]

(S) [redacted] Surveillance instituted in the vicinity of [redacted] residence.

(S) [redacted] was observed departing the residence with his wife as passenger [redacted]
[redacted]

(S) [redacted]

File #: [redacted]
(S) [redacted]

Derived from: ~~FBI NSISCG 20080301~~
Declassify on: ~~20350306~~

~~SECRET~~

PW
3/22/10

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Approved: Michael Farbiarz
MICHAEL FARBIARZ/GLEN KOPP/JASON SMITH
Assistant United States Attorneys

KATHLEEN KEDIAN
Trial Attorney, Counterespionage Section,
National Security Division, Department of Justice

Before: HONORABLE JAMES L. COTT
United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of New York

----- x	:	
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	:	SEALED
	:	<u>COMPLAINT</u>
-v.-	:	
	:	Violations of
DEFENDANT #1,	:	18 U.S.C. §§ 371,
a/k/a "Christopher R. Metsos,"	:	1956
DEFENDANT #2,	:	
a/k/a "Richard Murphy,"	:	
DEFENDANT #3,	:	
a/k/a "Cynthia Murphy,"	:	COUNTY OF OFFENSE:
DEFENDANT #4,	:	NEW YORK
a/k/a "Donald Howard Heathfield,"	:	
DEFENDANT #5,	:	
a/k/a "Tracey Lee Ann Foley,"	:	
DEFENDANT #6,	:	
a/k/a "Michael Zottoli,"	:	
DEFENDANT #7,	:	
a/k/a "Patricia Mills,"	:	
DEFENDANT #8,	:	
a/k/a "Juan Lazaro," and	:	
VICKY PELAEZ,	:	
	:	
Defendants.	:	
----- x	:	

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, ss.:

MARIA L. RICCI, being duly sworn, deposes and says
that she is a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI") and charges as follows:

COUNT ONE

Conspiracy to Act as Unregistered Agents of a Foreign Government

1. From in or about the 1990s, up to and including the present, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, DEFENDANT #1, a/k/a "Christopher R. Metsos," DEFENDANT #2, a/k/a "Richard Murphy," DEFENDANT #3, a/k/a "Cynthia Murphy," DEFENDANT #4, a/k/a "Donald Howard Heathfield," DEFENDANT #5, a/k/a "Tracey Lee Ann Foley," DEFENDANT #6, a/k/a "Michael Zottoli," DEFENDANT #7, a/k/a "Patricia Mills," DEFENDANT #8, a/k/a "Juan Lazaro," and VICKY PELAEZ, the defendants, and others known and unknown, unlawfully, willfully and knowingly, did combine, conspire, confederate, and agree together and with each other to commit an offense against the United States, to wit, to violate Section 951 of Title 18, United States Code.

2. It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that DEFENDANT #1, a/k/a "Christopher R. Metsos," DEFENDANT #2, a/k/a "Richard Murphy," DEFENDANT #3, a/k/a "Cynthia Murphy," DEFENDANT #4, a/k/a "Donald Howard Heathfield," DEFENDANT #5, a/k/a "Tracey Lee Ann Foley," DEFENDANT #6, a/k/a "Michael Zottoli," DEFENDANT #7, a/k/a "Patricia Mills," DEFENDANT #8, a/k/a "Juan Lazaro," and VICKY PELAEZ, the defendants, and others known and unknown, unlawfully, willfully and knowingly, would and did act in the United States as agents of a foreign government, specifically the Russian Federation, without prior notification to the Attorney General, as required by law, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 951.

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.)

COUNT TWO

Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering

3. From in or about the 1990s, up to and including the present, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, DEFENDANT #1, a/k/a "Christopher R. Metsos," DEFENDANT #2, a/k/a "Richard Murphy," DEFENDANT #3, a/k/a "Cynthia Murphy," DEFENDANT #4, a/k/a "Donald Howard Heathfield," DEFENDANT #5, a/k/a "Tracey Lee Ann Foley," DEFENDANT #6, a/k/a "Michael Zottoli," DEFENDANT #7, a/k/a "Patricia Mills," DEFENDANT #8, a/k/a "Juan Lazaro," and VICKY PELAEZ, the defendants, and others known and unknown, unlawfully, willfully and knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate and agree together and with each other to violate Sections 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 1956(a)(1)(b)(i) of Title 18, United States Code.

4. It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that DEFENDANT #1, a/k/a "Christopher R. Metsos," DEFENDANT #2, a/k/a "Richard Murphy," DEFENDANT #3, a/k/a "Cynthia Murphy," DEFENDANT #4, a/k/a "Donald Howard Heathfield," DEFENDANT #5, a/k/a "Tracey Lee Ann Foley," DEFENDANT #6, and a/k/a "Michael Zottoli," DEFENDANT #7, a/k/a "Patricia Mills," DEFENDANT #8, a/k/a "Juan Lazaro," and VICKY PELAEZ, the defendants, and others known and unknown, in an offense involving and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, knowing that the property involved in certain financial transactions, to wit, transfers of thousands of dollars in cash, delivery of Automated Teller Machine ("ATM") cards, and the purchase and rental of residences, among other things, represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, unlawfully, willfully and knowingly, would and did conduct and attempt to conduct such financial transactions which in fact involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, to wit, felony violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, Title 22, United States Code, Sections 612(a) and 618, with the intent to promote the carrying on of the specified unlawful activity, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).

5. It was also a part and an object of the conspiracy that DEFENDANT #1, a/k/a "Christopher R. Metsos," DEFENDANT #2, a/k/a "Richard Murphy," DEFENDANT #3, a/k/a "Cynthia Murphy," DEFENDANT #4, a/k/a "Donald Howard Heathfield," DEFENDANT #5, a/k/a "Tracey Lee Ann Foley," DEFENDANT #6, a/k/a "Michael Zottoli," DEFENDANT #7, a/k/a "Patricia Mills," DEFENDANT #8, a/k/a "Juan Lazaro," and VICKY PELAEZ, the defendants, and others known and unknown, in an offense involving and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, knowing that the property involved in certain financial transactions, to wit, transfers of thousands of dollars in cash, delivery of ATM cards, and the purchase and rental of residences, among other things, represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, unlawfully, willfully and knowingly, would and did conduct and attempt to conduct such financial transactions which in fact involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, to wit, felony violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, Title 22, United States Code, Sections 612(a) and 618, knowing that the transactions were designed in whole and in part to conceal and disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership and the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).

(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1956(a)(1) and 1956(h).)

The bases for my knowledge and the foregoing charges are, in part, as follows:

6. I have been a Special Agent with the FBI for approximately eight years. Currently, I am assigned to the Counterintelligence Division within the New York Field Office of the FBI. The focus of my counterintelligence efforts has been on the foreign intelligence activities of the Russian Federation. I have learned the facts contained in this Complaint from, among other sources, my personal participation in this investigation, my discussions with other law-enforcement agents, searches that I have conducted, surveillance that I have conducted, and my review of documents, video and audio recordings, and other evidentiary materials. Because this Complaint is being submitted for the limited purpose of establishing probable cause, it does not include every fact that I have learned during the course of this investigation. Further, any statements related herein are related in substance and in part only.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE "ILLEGALS" PROGRAM

7. The FBI has conducted a multi-year investigation of a network of United States-based agents of the foreign intelligence organ of the Russian Federation (the "SVR").¹ The targets of the FBI's investigation include covert SVR agents who assume false identities, and who are living in the United States on long-term, "deep-cover" assignments. These Russian secret agents work to hide all connections between themselves and Russia, even as they act at the direction and under the control of the SVR; these secret agents are typically called "illegals."

8. "Illegal" agents of the SVR generally receive extensive training before coming to the United States. This training has typically focused on, among other things: foreign languages; agent-to-agent communications, including the use of brush-passes;² short-wave radio operation and invisible writing; the use of codes and ciphers, including the use of encrypted

¹ The SVR headquarters in Moscow is known as "Moscow Center" or "Center."

² A brush-pass (also known as a "flash meeting") is the clandestine, hand-to-hand delivery of items or payments - made as one person walks past another in a public place.

Morse code messages; the creation and use of a cover profession; counter-surveillance measures; concealment and destruction of equipment and materials used in connection with their work as agents; and the avoidance of detection during their work as agents.

9. Upon completion of their training, Russian illegal agents are generally provided with new - false - identities; an illegal's false identity is referred to as his "legend." The cornerstones of an illegal's "legend" are false documents. These false documents concern, among other things, the identity and citizenship of the illegal. Through the use of these fraudulent documents, illegals assume identities as citizens or legal residents of the countries to which they are deployed, including the United States. Illegals will sometimes pursue degrees at target-country universities, obtain employment, and join relevant professional associations; these activities deepen an illegal's "legend." Illegals often operate in pairs - being placed together by Moscow Center while in Russia, so that they can live together and work together in a host country, under the guise of a married couple. Illegals who are placed together and co-habit in the country to which they are assigned will often have children together; this further deepens an illegal's "legend."

10. The FBI's investigation has revealed that a network of illegals (the "Illegals") is now living and operating in the United States in the service of one primary, long-term goal: to become sufficiently "Americanized" such that they can gather information about the United States for Russia, and can successfully recruit sources who are in, or are able to infiltrate, United States policy-making circles.

11. The SVR has spelled out the purpose of the Illegals' presence in America in a 2009 message to DEFENDANT #2, a/k/a "Richard Murphy" and DEFENDANT #3, a/k/a "Cynthia Murphy," the defendants. That message, which was sent by Moscow Center, has been decrypted by the FBI and reads, in part, as follows:

You were sent to USA for long-term service trip. Your education, bank accounts, car, house etc. - all these serve one goal: fulfill your main mission, i.e. to search and develop ties in policymaking circles in US and send intels [intelligence reports] to C[enter].

B. THE DEFENDANTS³

12. CHRISTOPHER R. METSOS, the defendant, purports to be a Canadian citizen. FBI investigation has revealed that METSOS does not reside in the United States. However, METSOS has, in the past, traveled to the United States regularly, and has met at least one of the other defendants on numerous occasions in New York City.

13. RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant, purports to be a United States citizen, born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. RICHARD MURPHY is married to CYNTHIA MURPHY, the defendant; CYNTHIA MURPHY purports to be a United States citizen, born in New York, New York under the name "Cynthia A. Hopkins." RICHARD MURPHY and CYNTHIA MURPHY (collectively, the "New Jersey Conspirators"), previously lived together in Hoboken, New Jersey in an apartment ("Hoboken Apartment"); since the fall of 2008, they have lived in a house in Montclair, New Jersey ("Montclair House"). The New Jersey Conspirators have lived in the United States since the mid-1990s.

14. DONALD HOWARD HEATHFIELD, the defendant, purports to be a naturalized United States citizen, born in Canada. HEATHFIELD is married to TRACEY LEE ANN FOLEY, the defendant, who purports to be a naturalized United States citizen, born in Canada. HEATHFIELD and FOLEY (collectively, the "Boston Conspirators") live together near Boston, Massachusetts. Until this month, HEATHFIELD and FOLEY had long lived in a townhouse ("Boston Townhouse"). HEATHFIELD and FOLEY have lived in the United States since 1999.

15. MICHAEL ZOTTOLI, the defendant, purports to be a United States citizen, born in Yonkers, New York. ZOTTOLI is married to PATRICIA MILLS, the defendant, who purports to be a Canadian citizen. ZOTTOLI and MILLS (collectively, the "Seattle Conspirators"), have lived together over the years in a number of locations, including in a Seattle, Washington apartment ("Seattle Apartment"). During October 2009, ZOTTOLI and MILLS moved from Seattle to an apartment in Arlington, Virginia ("Arlington Apartment"). ZOTTOLI has lived in the United States since 2001,

³ For ease of reference, each of the defendants, with the exception of VICKY PELAEZ, is referred to hereinafter by the name by which he or she is known in the United States, as if that assumed name were the defendant's true name. For example, DEFENDANT #1, a/k/a "Christopher R. Metsos," the defendant, is referred to hereinafter as CHRISTOPHER R. METSOS, the defendant.

and MILLS has lived in the United States since 2003.

16. JUAN LAZARO, the defendant, purports to be a citizen of Peru, born in Uruguay. LAZARO is married to VICKY PELAEZ, the defendant, who is a United States citizen born in Peru. LAZARO and PELAEZ, (collectively, the "Yonkers Conspirators"), live together in Yonkers, New York in a house ("Yonkers House"). LAZARO and PELAEZ have each lived in the United States for over twenty years.

17. I am aware that federal law requires individuals who are acting as agents for foreign governments to notify the Attorney General of the United States. The Department of Justice ("DOJ") maintains files of all individuals who have registered as agents of foreign governments. A recently-conducted review of DOJ files indicates that none of the defendants enumerated in the instant Complaint has ever notified the DOJ that he or she is an agent of the Russian Federation.

C. THE INVESTIGATION

18. In the course of investigating the activities in the United States of the defendants, the FBI has used a variety of investigative methods. For example, the FBI, acting pursuant to judicial orders, has conducted extensive electronic surveillance of the defendants - including the covert placement of microphone-type listening devices in certain of the defendants' residences; the covert placement of video cameras in public locations and in hotel rooms; and the monitoring and recording of the phone calls and e-mails of certain of the defendants. In addition, and among other things, the FBI has, pursuant to judicial orders, conducted numerous searches. For example, the FBI has surreptitiously entered certain of the defendants' residences; photographed evidence and copied electronic media while inside; and then left the residence in question. This Complaint describes evidence obtained in the course of certain of these judicially-authorized clandestine residential searches - in particular, searches that were conducted at the Boston Townhouse, on or about July 29, 2006 ("2006 Boston Search"); the Seattle Apartment, on or about February 17, 2006 ("2006 Seattle Search"); and the Hoboken Apartment, on or about July 27, 2005 ("2005 New Jersey Search").

II. OVERT ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY⁴

19. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the illegal objects thereof, the following overt acts, among others, were committed in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere:

- a. On or about January 14, 2000, in a South American country, VICKY PELAEZ, the defendant, received a package containing money from a representative of the Russian government.
- b. On or about May 16, 2004, in Queens, New York, CHRISTOPHER METSOS, the defendant, received a bag, containing money, from an official associated with the Manhattan-based Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations ("Russian Mission").
- c. On or about June 20, 2004, in Manhattan, New York, RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant, met with MICHAEL ZOTTOLI, the defendant, and gave him (ZOTTOLI) money that he (MURPHY) had received from METSOS.
- d. On or about September 23, 2004, in Hoboken, New Jersey, CYNTHIA MURPHY, the defendant, advised RICHARD MURPHY, as to how he could effectively gather information in the United States for provision to Moscow Center.
- e. During 2004, DONALD HOWARD HEATHFIELD, the defendant, met with an employee of the United States Government with regard to nuclear weapons research.
- f. On or about October 3, 2004, TRACEY LEE ANN FOLEY, the defendant, discussed with HEATHFIELD a method for sending secret messages to Moscow Center.
- g. On or about June 8, 2006, PATRICIA MILLS, the defendant, traveled to the vicinity of Wurtsboro, New York, with ZOTTOLI, where ZOTTOLI dug up a package containing money that had been buried in the ground by METSOS.

⁴ The conspiracies charged in Count One and Count Two are referred to hereinafter collectively as "the conspiracy."

- h. On or about August 25, 2007, JUAN LAZARO, the defendant, in a South American country, received a package containing money from a representative of the Russian government.
- i. On or about September 26, 2009, in Brooklyn, New York, RICHARD MURPHY gave MICHAEL ZOTTOLI money that he (MURPHY) had received from an official associated with the Russian Mission.

III. MEANS AND METHODS OF THE CONSPIRACY

A. SECRET COMMUNICATIONS

20. To further the aims of the conspiracy, Moscow Center has arranged for the defendants clandestinely to communicate with the Russian Federation. In particular, the conspirators have used, among others, the secret communications methods described below - steganography and radiograms.

1. STEGANOGRAPHY

21. Steganography is the process of secreting data in an image. Moscow Center uses steganographic software that is not commercially available. The software package permits the SVR clandestinely to insert encrypted data in images that are located on publicly-available websites without the data being visible. The encrypted data can be removed from the image, and then decrypted, using SVR-provided software. Similarly, SVR-provided software can be used to encrypt data, and then clandestinely to embed the data in images on publicly-available websites.

22. As is set forth below, certain of the Illegals have communicated with Moscow Center by means of steganography. In each of the three judicially-authorized residential searches referenced above (the 2006 Boston Search, the 2006 Seattle Search, and the 2005 New Jersey Search), law-enforcement agents observed and forensically copied a set of computer disks ("Password-Protected Disks"). Based on subsequent investigation as described below, I believe that the Password-Protected Disks contain a steganography program employed by the SVR and the Illegals.

a. THE NEW JERSEY CONSPIRATORS

23. During the 2005 New Jersey Search, law-enforcement agents observed and photographed a piece of paper; the paper said "alt," "control," and "e," and set forth a string of 27

characters. Using these 27 characters as a password, technicians have been able successfully to access a software program ("Steganography Program") stored on those copies of the Password-Protected Disks that were recovered during the 2005 New Jersey Search and at subsequent searches of the New Jersey Conspirators' residence.

24. In the course of the 2005 New Jersey Search, law-enforcement agents also saw, among other things, a computer; the hard-drive of the computer was copied and analyzed. This analysis led to an electronic address book that contained links to website addresses, as well as information as to various website addresses that the computer's user had accessed. These addresses, in turn, had links to other websites. Law-enforcement agents visited some of the referenced websites, and many others as well, and have downloaded images from them. These images appear wholly unremarkable to the naked eye. But these images (and others) have been analyzed using the Steganography Program. As a result of this analysis, some of the images have been revealed as containing readable text files. These text files - of which there are well over 100 - are referred to hereinafter as the "New Jersey Conspirators' Electronic Messages."

b. THE BOSTON CONSPIRATORS

25. During the 2006 Boston Search, law-enforcement agents observed and copied numerous computer disks. A number of these computer disks contained traces of deleted electronic messages. Technicians recovered these "deleted" messages. Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that the "deleted" messages (hereinafter, "Boston Conspirators' Electronic Messages") were drafts of messages that were subsequently conveyed between Moscow Center and the Boston Conspirators, using steganography.⁵

26. I base this conclusion on a number of facts. For example, the Steganography Program was extracted from a computer disk recovered during the 2005 New Jersey Search - and that

⁵ In addition to the "deleted" messages described above, law-enforcement agents have visited websites that contain images; upon analysis, it has become clear that these images contain encrypted text files. Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that these text files contain communications between Moscow Center and the Boston Conspirators. These text files are referred to hereinafter as the "Boston Conspirators' Internet Messages."

computer disk appears substantially similar to one of the computer disks recovered during the 2006 Boston Search. Both disks, for example, call for a 27-character password. In addition, and among other things, a number of the Boston Conspirators' Electronic Messages appear directly to concern communication by means of steganography. For example, one message, dated December 15, 2004, discussed the process of "decrypt[ing]" messages embedded in images; another message, dated February 22, 2005, discussed "decypher[ing] [sic]" data embedded in images. Similarly, on or about October 3, 2004, law-enforcement agents, acting pursuant to a judicial order, intercepted aural communications taking place inside the Boston Townhouse. TRACEY LEE ANN FOLEY, the defendant, was heard saying to DONALD HOWARD HEATHFIELD, the defendant: "Can we attach two files containing messages or not? Let's say four pictures" Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that this was a reference to conveying messages by means of steganography - placing "files containing messages" in "pictures." On or about March 7, 2010, law-enforcement agents, acting pursuant to a judicial order, intercepted aural communications taking place inside the Boston Townhouse. As a final example, in or about March 2010, FOLEY and HEATHFIELD were heard discussing FOLEY's use of steganography and the schedule of her communications with Moscow Center.

2. RADIOGRAMS

27. Radiograms are coded bursts of data sent by a radio transmitter that can be picked up by a radio receiver that has been set to the proper frequency. As transmitted, radiograms generally sound like the transmission of Morse code. As is set forth below, the Illegals have communicated with Moscow Center by means of radiograms.

28. For example, as a result of the 2006 Boston Search, technicians recovered the Boston Conspirators' Electronic Messages. Approximately five of these messages describe the sending or receipt of an "RG." Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that "RG" connotes "radiogram."

29. In a similar vein, large numbers of the New Jersey Conspirators' Electronic Messages mention the sending or receipt of an "RG." For example, a January 2009 message from Moscow Center for the New Jersey Conspirators reads, in relevant part: "Pls, make sure your radioequipment [sic] for RG rcptn is in order. We plan to send a couple of test Rgs[.]" Based on my

training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that "RG" and "Rg" connote "radiogram."

30. Furthermore, during the 2006 Seattle Search, law-enforcement agents entered the Seattle Apartment and observed there a radio that can be used for receiving short-wave radio transmissions. In addition, agents observed and photographed spiral notebooks, some pages of which contain apparently random columns of numbers. Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that the radio in the Seattle Apartment was used by the Seattle Conspirators to receive radiograms - and that the spiral notebook contains codes used to decipher radiograms as they came in.

31. Finally, throughout 2003, law-enforcement agents, acting pursuant to judicial orders, intercepted aural communications taking place inside the Yonkers House. On at least five occasions in 2003, this aural surveillance revealed the irregular electronic clicking sounds associated with the receipt of coded radio transmissions. Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that the clicking electronic sounds heard in the Yonkers House are the sounds of a radio transmission being received from Moscow Center. In addition, the aural surveillance indicated that, on or about May 6, 2003, JUAN LAZARO, the defendant, told VICKY PELAEZ, the defendant, that he was "receiving" "radio" "from over there."

B. SECRET PAYMENTS TO THE CONSPIRATORS

1. COMPENSATION OF THE CONSPIRATORS BY MOSCOW CENTER

32. To further the aims of the conspiracy, Moscow Center has arranged for the conspirators clandestinely to be compensated for their work on behalf of the Russian Federation.

33. For example, certain of the Boston Conspirators' Electronic Messages are itemized reports prepared by the Boston Conspirators of payments that Moscow Center has made to them. One message reads, in part, as follows: "Exchange rate used is 1 Euro = \$1.29. Got from Ctr. 64500.00 dollars, income 13940, interest 76. Expenses: rent 8500, utilities 142, tel. 160, car lease 2180, insurance 432, gas 820, education 3600, payments in Fr. 1000, medical 139, lawyers fees 700, meals and gifts 1230, mailboxes, computer supplies 460, business (cover) 4900, trip to meeting 1125."

34. To cite another example, during the summer of 2009, the New Jersey Conspirators argued with the SVR in a series of encrypted messages about the status of the Montclair House, into which the New Jersey Conspirators had recently moved. The New Jersey Conspirators contended that they should be permitted to own the Montclair House; Moscow Center responded that the Director of the SVR had personally determined that Center would own the Montclair House, but would permit the New Jersey Conspirators to live in it. The New Jersey Conspirators wrote:

In order to preserve positive working relationship, we would not further contest your desire to own this house. . . . We are under an impression that C. views our ownership of the house as a deviation from the original purpose of our mission here. We'd like to assure you that we do remember what it is. From our perspective, purchase of the house was solely a natural progression of our prolonged stay here. It was a convenient way to solve the housing issue, plus to 'do as the Romans do' in a society that values home ownership. . . . [W]e didn't forget that the house was bought under fictitious names.

2. CLANDESTINE FOREIGN PAYMENTS TO THE CONSPIRATORS

35. To receive compensation from the SVR, certain of the conspirators have engaged in clandestine meetings with representatives of the Russian government outside of the United States. The Yonkers Conspirators have routinely traveled to a particular South American country ("South American Country") to receive payments from the SVR.

36. During 2002, for example, law-enforcement agents, acting pursuant to judicial orders, intercepted aural communications taking place inside the Yonkers House.⁶ On February 20, 2002, just after VICKY PELAEZ, the defendant, had returned from a trip to the South American Country, JUAN LAZARO, the defendant, and PELAEZ were recorded engaging in a conversation about money hidden inside PELAEZ's luggage.

37. On February 23, 2003, pursuant to a judicial

⁶ Certain of the conversations between JUAN LAZARO and VICKY PELAEZ, the defendants, were conducted in Spanish. To the extent those conversations are quoted or described herein, those quotations and descriptions are based on preliminary translations of the conversations, and are subject to revision.

order, the Yonkers Conspirators were overheard counting what sounded like a large amount of money. VICKY PELAEZ, the defendant, who had just returned from the South American Country, stated, in substance, that they had eight bags of "ten," and that she had divided up the remaining two bags so that they would not be so bulky. PELAEZ and JUAN LAZARO, the defendant, then discussed whether, after accounting for certain expenses, they had "72,500" remaining or, as they later determined, "76." Based on my training, experience, and participation in his investigation, I believe that, in the South American Country, PELAEZ picked up eight bags, each containing \$10,000 ("ten"), which money was compensation for the Yonkers Conspirators' work on behalf of Russia.

38. Law-enforcement agents have also conducted video surveillance of the Yonkers Conspirators in the South American Country. For example, on or about January 14, 2000, law-enforcement agents conducted video surveillance of VICKY PELAEZ, the defendant, meeting with an individual at a public park in the South American Country ("the Park"). PELAEZ received a bag from the individual during their meeting. After having reviewed the video surveillance, based on my training, experience, and involvement in this investigation, and the facts set forth in this section, I believe that the individual gave PELAEZ money during their meeting in the Park which represented payment from the SVR to the Yonkers Conspirators. On the same day, on or about January 14, 2000, judicially-authorized interceptions of telephonic communications associated with the Yonkers Conspirators indicate that LAZARO and PELAEZ discussed PELAEZ's meeting in the South American Country that is described in the preceding paragraph. During the call, PELAEZ told LAZARO, in part, that "all went well." Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that PELAEZ was confirming for LAZARO that, while in the Park, she had successfully received funds from a representative of the Russian government.

39. In a similar vein, on August 25, 2007, law-enforcement agents observed and video-taped JUAN LAZARO, the defendant, meeting with a Russian government official ("Russian Government Official #1").⁷ The meeting took place in the Park in

⁷ A still photo from the surveillance video of the August 2007 meeting between LAZARO and Russian Government Official #1 has been shown to a United States official ("U.S. Official #1"). U.S. Official #1 identified Russian Government Official #1 as a Russian government employee that U.S. Official #1 has met and who

the South American Country where PELAEZ had received money in 2000 from Russian Government Official #1. The videotape of the meeting between LAZARO and Russian Government Official #1 captured, among other things: the two men walking together in the park, sitting together on a bench, and Russian Government Official #1 placing a shopping bag into a plastic bag held by LAZARO. Having reviewed the video-tape footage of the meeting, based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that during the meeting, Russian Government Official #1 gave a payment to LAZARO for his work on behalf of Russia. I base this conclusion, in part, on the fact that prior to LAZARO's trip to the South American Country in August 2007, judicially-authorized interceptions of telephonic communications indicated that LAZARO was struggling financially; after LAZARO returned from the South American Country, however, judicially-authorized interceptions of telephonic communications associated with the Yonkers Conspirators indicate that LAZARO paid off nearly \$8,000 in county and city taxes - all within days of his return from the South American Country.

40. The trips JUAN LAZARO and VICKY PELAEZ, the defendants, have taken to the South American Country have served another purpose as well - passing covert messages to Russian government officials. On January 8, 2003, shortly before a trip that PELAEZ took to the South American country, judicially-authorized interceptions of aural communications taking place inside the Yonkers House captured the following conversation between LAZARO and PELAEZ:

LAZARO: [W]hen you go [to the South American Country]
. . . I am going to write in 'invisible' . . .
. and you're going to pass them all of that
in a book

PELAEZ: Oh, o.k.

. . . .
LAZARO: I'm going to give you some blank pieces of
paper and it will be there . . . about
everything I've done

Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that LAZARO was giving PELAEZ

introduced himself to U.S. Official #1 as an employee of the Russian embassy in the South American Country.

instructions about delivering a message to Russian government officials during her meeting in the South American Country; this message, LAZARO indicated, would be written "in invisible" - with invisible ink.

C. USE OF FALSE IDENTITIES

41. In furtherance of the conspiracy, the defendants, including but not limited to those enumerated below, have assumed false identities.

42. RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant, purports to be a United States citizen, born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. On or about October 3, 2006, law-enforcement agents, acting pursuant to a judicial order, searched a bank safe deposit box located in Manhattan, New York. The safe deposit box is registered in the name of "Richard J. Murphy." Inside the safe deposit box, law-enforcement agents observed and photographed a birth certificate for "Richard Joseph Murphy," which birth certificate bears a particular number ("Murphy Birth Certificate Number"). Local officials in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania have caused a search to be conducted of relevant municipal records. These officials report that there are no records indicating the existence of the Murphy Birth Certificate Number.

43. TRACEY LEE ANN FOLEY, the defendant, purports to be a naturalized United States citizen, and a native of Canada. On or about January 23, 2001, law-enforcement officials, acting pursuant to a judicial order, searched a safe deposit box located in Cambridge, Massachusetts ("Cambridge Safe Deposit Box"). The Cambridge Safe Deposit Box is registered in the name of "Tracey Lee Ann Foley" and "Donald Howard Heathfield." Inside the Cambridge Safe Deposit Box, officials observed and photographed a series of photographic negatives; the negatives appear to be of FOLEY when she was in her 20s. On all the negatives of the younger FOLEY save one, the name of the company that produced the film on which the negatives were printed has been excised. On one negative, the name of the film company remains visible. The name on the film is "TACMA"; based on law-enforcement research I know that TACMA was a Soviet film company.⁸

44. DONALD HOWARD HEATHFIELD, the defendant, purports

⁸ The photographic negatives were present in the Cambridge Safe Deposit Box when law-enforcement officials performed the most recent judicially authorized search in late April 2010.

to be a naturalized United States citizen, and a native of Canada. During the above-described January 23, 2001 search of the Cambridge Safe Deposit Box, law-enforcement agents observed and photographed "A True Photostatic Print of a Record on the File At the Office of the Registrar General, Toronto, Ontario, Canada" for "Donald Howard Graham Heathfield" (the "Canadian Birth Certificate"). While the Canadian Birth Certificate appears to be real, I have learned that the real "Donald Howard Heathfield" is dead. Law-enforcement agents have located an announcement published in a Canadian newspaper on or about June 25, 2005. The announcement ("Death Announcement") indicates that "Howard William Heathfield" has died; the Death Announcement states that Howard's son, "Donald Heathfield," is also dead.⁹

45. Finally, JUAN LAZARO, the defendant, purports to be a native Uruguayan with Peruvian citizenship. On or about April 17, 2002, acting pursuant to a judicial order, law-enforcement agents intercepted aural communications taking place inside the Yonkers House. LAZARO was heard describing his childhood to VICKY PELAEZ, the defendant. In particular, LAZARO said: "we moved to Siberia . . . as soon as the war started [.]"

D. USE OF FALSE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS

46. In addition to using false and/or fraudulent identities and associated documents to support their "legends" in the United States, the Illegals have been provided with false travel documents for their travel back to Russia.

47. By way of example, as described below in more detail, in early 2010, Moscow Center provided instructions to RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant, for his trip from the United States to Russia via Italy, where he was to receive a false Irish passport for travel from Europe to Russia.

⁹ It is clear that the Death Announcement and the Canadian Birth Certificate describe the same people. Both the Death Announcement and the Canadian Birth Certificate suggest that Donald Howard Heathfield's mother was named "Shirley." Similarly, if Howard William Heathfield was 70 years old at his death on June 25, 2005 (as the Death Announcement indicates), he would have been 27 years old on February 4, 1962. In turn, February 4, 1962 is the date of birth listed on the Canadian Birth Certificate for Donald Howard Heathfield - and, according to the Canadian Birth Certificate, Donald Howard Heathfield's father was 27 when he (Donald Howard Heathfield) was born.

48. Similarly, TRACEY LEE ANN FOLEY, the defendant, has traveled on a fraudulent British passport prepared for her by the SVR. One of the Boston Conspirators' Internet Messages provided instructions for FOLEY with respect to her then-upcoming trip to Moscow:

Itinerary to M. [Moscow] for D.; Paris - Wien (by train), Mar 18 in Wien exch[ange] doc's for British pass[port] - [Moscow] (Mar 19, flight OS 601). Very important: 1. Sign your passport on page 32. Train yourself to be able to reproduce your signature when it's necessary. 2. Pls, be aware that you just visited Russia (see stamps on page 14 - entry - Mar 16, departure - Mar 17). If asked, we suggest you use the following story: you flew to Moscow on Mar 16 from London for example flight SU 211 to participate in business talks (your business is international consultancy seminars - pls, copy sample of your husband) on invitation by Russian Chamber of Commerce.

In the passport you'll get a memo with recommendation. Pls, destroy the memo after reading. Be well.

IV. THE ROLE OF METSOS - AND RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS - IN DIRECTLY ASSISTING THE NETWORK OF SVR ILLEGALS

A. METSOS

49. CHRISTOPHER R. METSOS, the defendant, is a secret SVR agent who is based abroad, and who has repeatedly entered the United States to meet with certain Illegals and, among other things, to pay them on behalf of Moscow Center. On four separate occasions during the period from on or about February 24, 2001 through on or about April 17, 2005, METSOS and RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant, met together at a restaurant in Sunnyside, New York ("Sunnyside Restaurant"). Pursuant to a series of judicial orders, law-enforcement agents conducted audio and visual surveillance of these Sunnyside Restaurant meetings.

50. On or about March 31, 2002, CHRISTOPHER R. METSOS and RICHARD MURPHY, the defendants, met at the Sunnyside Restaurant. Pursuant to a judicial order, the meeting was recorded and video-taped. During the meeting, MURPHY expressed a series of frustrations about his work, to which METSOS responded: "Well, I'm so happy I'm not your handler." METSOS and MURPHY also discussed the amount of money that MURPHY received in salary from "our office," and, at the end of the meeting, METSOS stood up and said: "there's forty [unintelligible] black bag." Based

on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that, at this meeting, METSOS gave MURPHY a bag containing \$40,000 - as compensation for MURPHY's work on behalf of Moscow Center.

51. Similarly, on or about April 17, 2005, CHRISTOPHER R. METSOS and RICHARD MURPHY, the defendants, met at the Sunnyside Restaurant. At the Sunnyside Restaurant, METSOS provided MURPHY with an ATM card, a personal identification number associated with the ATM card, and directions as to how to use the card. Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that the ATM card that METSOS gave MURPHY was to be used to withdraw money from an account funded for MURPHY by Moscow Center, as compensation for MURPHY's work on behalf of the SVR.

B. THE 2004 BRUSH-PASS: METSOS RECEIVES MONEY FROM RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL #2 AND THE MONEY IS GIVEN TO SVR ILLEGALS

52. As is set forth more fully below, during 2004, CHRISTOPHER R. METSOS, the defendant, was surreptitiously handed money in New York by a Russian government official ("Russian Government Official #2"), a purported diplomat associated with the Manhattan-based Russian Mission.¹⁰ METSOS then divided this money into two portions. First, METSOS secretly buried some of the money in upstate New York - and two years later, in 2006, the Seattle Conspirators flew to New York and dug it up. Second, during 2004, METSOS gave some of the money to RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant; shortly thereafter, MURPHY gave some of the money to the Seattle Conspirators.

53. On or about May 16, 2004, pursuant to a judicial order, law-enforcement agents conducted video surveillance from multiple cameras positioned in the immediate vicinity of the Long Island Railroad's Forest Hills Station in Queens, New York ("Forest Hills Train Station"). The May 16, 2004 video surveillance of the Forest Hills Train Station reflects that

¹⁰ On numerous occasions, law-enforcement officers have observed the person who appears to be Russian Government Official #2 entering the Russian Mission. In addition, law-enforcement officials have obtained from the United States Department of State the visa application of a particular individual. This visa application bears a photograph of Russian Government Official #2. According to this visa application, the visa applicant is a "second secretary" of the Russian Mission.

CHRISTOPHER R. METSOS, the defendant, and Russian Government Official #2, were initially in the vicinity of the Forest Hills Train Station, and that METSOS and Russian Government Official #2 were each carrying an all-but identical orange bag. CHRISTOPHER R. METSOS, the defendant, and Russian Government Official #2 then converged on a staircase at the Forest Hills Train Station. METSOS walked up the stairs; Russian Government Official #2 walked down the stairs. Toward the middle of the stairs, as they passed one another, METSOS quickly handed Russian Government Official #2 his orange bag, and Russian Government Official #2 quickly handed METSOS his orange bag. METSOS then continued ascending the stairs and Russian Government Official #2 continued descending the stairs.

54. Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that Russian Government Official #2's orange bag contained a large sum of money, and that, after receiving the orange bag filled with the money, CHRISTOPHER R. METSOS, the defendant, caused the money to be given to the New Jersey Conspirators and the Seattle Conspirators through the following sequence of events:

- a. On or about May 16, 2004, hours after METSOS's meeting at the Forest Hills Train Station with Russian Government Official #2, METSOS and RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant, met at the Sunnyside Restaurant. Pursuant to a judicial order, law-enforcement agents conducted audio and video surveillance of the meeting. During this meeting, METSOS provided MURPHY with a package which METSOS suggested contained MURPHY's "cut," and further suggested that the "rest of the money" was in a category separate from MURPHY's "cut." METSOS then told MURPHY: "you will meet this guy, tell him Uncle Paul loves him . . . he will know . . . It is wonderful to be Santa Claus in May."
- b. In the hours after this conversation, data from a Global Positioning System device ("GPS Device") that had been installed pursuant to a judicial order on a car associated with METSOS indicated that the car was traveling north, and that it stopped in the vicinity of Wurtsboro, New York, on or about May 17, 2004.¹¹

¹¹ During the fall of 2004, law-enforcement agents searched in the area where, according to the GPS Device, the car

- c. About two weeks after these events, law-enforcement agents, acting pursuant to a judicial order, intercepted a call between MICHAEL ZOTTOLI, the defendant, and MURPHY. During that call, ZOTTOLI and MURPHY agreed to meet on "June 19" at "3:00." No meeting place was discussed.
- d. On or about June 18, 2004, ZOTTOLI and PATRICIA MILLS, the defendants, boarded an airplane at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, bound for Newark International Airport. Following their arrival at Newark International Airport, ZOTTOLI and MILLS checked into a hotel in Manhattan ("Manhattan Hotel").
- e. On or about June 19, 2004, at approximately 3:00 p.m., ZOTTOLI arrived at an entrance to Manhattan's Central Park (the "Park Entrance"). After ZOTTOLI arrived, a member of an FBI surveillance team saw MILLS sitting on a bench in the vicinity of the Park Entrance. MILLS remained on the bench for approximately one-and-a-half hours, looking toward the Park Entrance where ZOTTOLI was. Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that MILLS was engaging in counter-surveillance - watching the area where ZOTTOLI was trying to meet MURPHY, in order to determine whether the meeting was being surveilled.
- f. While ZOTTOLI was in the vicinity of the Park Entrance, MURPHY was nearby, but ZOTTOLI and MURPHY did not appear to see each other, and ZOTTOLI ultimately returned to the Manhattan Hotel without meeting with MURPHY. Later that day, pursuant to a judicial order, law-enforcement agents intercepted a call between ZOTTOLI and MURPHY. During the call, MURPHY explained to ZOTTOLI that "we might have, ah, have different place in mind. I was there at three." ZOTTOLI

associated with METSOS had stopped. In that area ("Bury Location"), law-enforcement agents saw a partially buried brown beer bottle. Law-enforcement agents cleared away approximately five inches of dirt, and, buried in the ground, observed a package wrapped in duct tape. The agents photographed the package, and then replaced the dirt at the Bury Location.

replied, in part, "I was there at three o'clock, too." ZOTTOLI and MURPHY then agreed to try to meet again the next day.

- g. On or about June 20, 2004, at approximately 4:00 p.m., ZOTTOLI arrived in the vicinity of the metallic globe near the subway entrance located at Columbus Circle. ZOTTOLI and MURPHY met near the subway entrance and were observed and photographed by FBI agents as they talked to one another. Neither ZOTTOLI nor MURPHY was carrying anything - but MURPHY was wearing a backpack. ZOTTOLI and MURPHY then entered Central Park together. Approximately three minutes later, ZOTTOLI and MURPHY separately left Central Park, heading in different directions. Now, ZOTTOLI was carrying something - a red paper bag with the logo of a museum on it.
- h. On or about June 24, 2004, ZOTTOLI and MILLS boarded an airplane at Newark International Airport bound for Seattle, Washington, and then returned to the Seattle Apartment.

55. Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, and as set forth more fully in the sub-paragraphs that follow, I believe that, approximately two years after the events described in the preceding sub-paragraphs, the Seattle Conspirators returned to New York - and retrieved that portion of the money that CHRISTOPHER R. METSOS, the defendant, had received in 2004 from Russian Government Official #2 and that METSOS had buried during 2004 in upstate New York.

- a. On or about June 5, 2006, MICHAEL ZOTTOLI and PATRICIA MILLS, the defendants, boarded a plane at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport bound for the John F. Kennedy International Airport, located in New York City. On or about June 8, 2006, ZOTTOLI and MILLS traveled in the direction of Wurtsboro, New York - to the Bury Location, where, two years before, METSOS had gone just after receiving money from Russian Government Official #2 at the Forest Hills Train Station.
- b. At the Bury Location on June 8, 2006, court-authorized video surveillance was being conducted by the FBI. On the surveillance video, ZOTTOLI

can be seen digging at the Bury Location, and retrieving from the Location a small package – in the immediate vicinity of where the brown beer bottle was partly dug up by law-enforcement agents during the fall of 2004. On the surveillance video, MILLS is visible in the vicinity of the Bury Location.

- c. Shortly after visiting the Bury Location, on or about June 9, 2006, ZOTTOLI and MILLS traveled to Washington, DC. In Washington, DC, they stayed in a hotel ("Washington Hotel"). In their room at the Washington Hotel, audio and visual surveillance was being conducted pursuant to judicial order. In the surveillance video, ZOTTOLI is seen with what appears to be a "money belt" which seems full. The surveillance video reflects that, when ZOTTOLI and MILLS left the Washington Hotel, ZOTTOLI generally wore the money belt; and when they were in the room, ZOTTOLI generally placed the belt out of view, including underneath a pillow on the bed. The video also shows ZOTTOLI apparently dividing the money among several wallets.

C. THE 2009 BRUSH-PASS: RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL #3 GIVES MONEY TO DEFENDANT RICHARD MURPHY

1. MOSCOW CENTER ARRANGES THE 2009 BRUSH-PASS

56. As set forth in more detail below, in the summer of 2009, and at the direction of Moscow Center, a Russian government official who works at the Manhattan-based Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations ("Russian Government Official #3") surreptitiously gave cash and a flash memory stick to RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant, during a "brush-pass" at a New York-area train station. Soon thereafter, MURPHY handed over a portion of the money (and the flash memory stick) to MICHAEL ZOTTOLI, the defendant, just as, in 2004, when MURPHY handed over SVR money to ZOTTOLI in Central Park.

57. During the spring and summer of 2009, the New Jersey Conspirators exchanged messages with Moscow Center about a United States meeting between RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant, and Russian Government Official #3. For example, one of the New Jersey Conspirators' Electronic Messages, which is dated from April 2009, indicated the purpose of the meeting (for MURPHY to be given money, which MURPHY would provide to another illegal);

where the meeting would take place; and what the "field station rep[resentative]" bringing the money would look like. In this Message, and in others, MURPHY was identified as "A," Russian Government Official #3 was identified as "R," and Moscow Center was identified as "C":

C plans to conduct flash meeting w. A to pass him \$300K from our experienced field station rep (R). Half of it is for you. Another half is to be passed to young colleague (known to you) in fall '09-winter '10. . . .

Place: North White Plains train station (Harlem Line), quiet and deserted on weekends. No surveillance cameras. R - male in early 30s, dark brown hair

Scheme of flash meeting: . . . A and R meet in lower part of staircase, in dead zone. R hands over and A gets pack w. money (A's BN [Barnes and Noble] bag stays in your hands, A hides pack w. money into his tote).

58. In subsequent messages, the date and time of the meeting was set - and it was agreed that RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant, would give a man called "Mike" the flash memory card and some of the money that he (MURPHY) was to receive from Russian Government Official #3. Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that "Mike," is MICHAEL ZOTTOLI, the defendant - who MURPHY passed SVR money to in Central Park in 2004.

2. THE 2009 BRUSH-PASS

59. On June 6, 2009, pursuant to judicial order, law-enforcement agents conducted video surveillance of the North White Plains train station ("White Plains Train Station") located in White Plains, New York. As described below, that surveillance captured RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant, receiving a shopping bag from Russian Government Official #3 during a brush-pass.

60. The surveillance video reflects that Russian Government Official #3 was holding a shopping bag ("Shopping Bag").¹² As Russian Government Official #3 descended from the

¹² On numerous occasions, law-enforcement officers have observed the person who appears to be Russian Government Official

train platform, RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant, walked up the same stairs. As Russian Government Official #3 and MURPHY passed one another on the stairs, MURPHY held out his backpack and Russian Government Official #3 placed the Shopping Bag that he had been holding into MURPHY's backpack. MURPHY and Russian Government Official #3 did not seem to speak to one another; they paused on the stairs just long enough to make the transfer. MURPHY then continued up the stairs to the train platform, and Russian Government Official #3 continued down the stairs and walked away.

61. Soon after the brush-pass described above, the FBI preserved a message from the SVR to the New Jersey Conspirators that read, in part, as follows, "Flash meeting: well done, A, good job. Thank you. R. and our tech. people in NY didn't notice anything suspicious[.]"

3. MURPHY GIVES THE MONEY HE RECEIVED DURING THE 2009 BRUSH-PASS TO ZOTTOLI

62. After RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant, received money and a flash memory card from Russian Government Official #3 as described above, MURPHY gave some of this money and the flash-memory card to MICHAEL ZOTTOLI, the defendant. In the months after the above-described June 2009 brush-pass at the White Plains Train Station, the New Jersey Conspirators and the SVR communicated on numerous occasions as to precisely where and when MURPHY would meet with "Mike." Among other things, the New Jersey Conspirators were told that MURPHY could definitively recognize "Mike" by having the following exchange with "Mike":

["]Excuse me, did we meet in Bangkok in April last year?" Reply: I don't know about April, but I was in Thailand in May of that year.

63. On or about September 26, 2009, law-enforcement agents, acting pursuant to a judicial order, conducted audio and video surveillance of a particular street corner located in Brooklyn, New York ("Brooklyn Street Corner") as well as the area around it. On that date, agents saw MICHAEL ZOTTOLI, the

#3 entering the Russian Mission. In addition, law-enforcement officials have obtained from the United States Department of State the visa application of a particular individual. This visa application bears a photograph of Russian Government Official #3. According to this visa application, the visa applicant is a "third secretary" of the Russian Mission.

defendant, standing in the immediate vicinity of the Brooklyn Street Corner when he was approached by RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant. MURPHY was wearing a backpack. MURPHY and ZOTTOLI shook hands, and then appeared to speak with one another. The men then walked around together and ultimately sat down on a park bench in Fort Greene Park in Brooklyn ("Brooklyn Park") where they appeared to be talking to each other. While sitting on the bench, after approximately 90 minutes, MURPHY gave ZOTTOLI a bag and a smaller item. MURPHY and ZOTTOLI then stood up from the Brooklyn Park bench and walked away in separate directions.

64. In a September 28, 2009 communication to Center (that identified RICHARD MURPHY and MICHAEL ZOTOLLI, the defendants, by the initials A and M, respectively), the New Jersey Conspirators told Center, "Meeting with M was successful. A passed to M the card and \$150K."

65. Based on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I believe that on or about September 26, 2009, RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant, handed MICHAEL ZOTTOLI, the defendant, the money ("\$150k") and the flash memory card ("the card") that had been given to him (MURPHY) by Russian Government Official #3 a few weeks before, on or about June 6, 2009.

D. MURPHY'S 2010 DELIVERY OF COMPUTERS TO MOSCOW CENTER AND ZOTTOLI

66. As set forth below, in early 2010, the SVR instructed RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant, to return to Moscow Center, and to buy and to bring with him a particular model of laptop computer. After receiving these directions, MURPHY bought the computer and took it to Moscow Center, as instructed. MURPHY returned to the United States from Moscow Center with the same model of laptop, and then met MICHAEL ZOTTOLI, the defendant, in Brooklyn, New York. During that meeting, MURPHY gave ZOTTOLI a laptop computer, and explained to ZOTTOLI how ZOTTOLI was to use the laptop to communicate with Center.

1. MOSCOW CENTER ARRANGES FOR MURPHY TO TRAVEL TO CENTER

67. Center outlined the plans for the above-described travel in a series of January 2010 messages, in which RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant, was identified as "A," and Center was identified as "C." Center described the dates and route for the travel, and also explained that, after MURPHY arrived in Europe, he would receive - by means of a "brush-pass" or "flash meeting"

with an SVR official - a false passport for his continued travel to Russia.

[W]e expect A to arrive to C in February. . . .

[L]et us know A's itinerary: date and time of docs exchange (including reserve ones) en route to and from C; duration of his stay in C. (for business issues we need 2-3 days). A's route (old one): USA-Europe(Rome) on US passport; exchange of docs - in Rome. Than [sic] Rome-Milan by train. In Milan A. takes flight SU-286 (combined Aeroflot-Al Italia flight). We'll provide A w[ith] two-way e-ticket Milan-Moscow-Milan.

We confirm that A's docs'll be in Rome by Jan.23, so A may plan F[lash] M[eeting] with C's repr[esentative] for documents exchange any day after that time. Meeting place in Rome (same) - MP "Stan" (at the show-window of the shop "Libreria", address Via Illiria, 14 under address pointer of the house, subway station San Giovanni)[.]

68. In another January 2010 message, Center explained how RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant, and the SVR's agent would be able to identify each other in Rome, and also described for MURPHY the false Irish "transit passport" that he would receive in Rome for travel from Rome to Moscow:

Password (C's rep[resentative]) - "Excuse me, could we have met in Malta in 1999" (key words: Malta, 1999).
A's rep[ly] - "Yes indeed, I was in La Valetta, but in 2000" (key words: La Valetta, 2000).

A's recognition sign: "Time" magazine in A's hands (title to be seen from outside). Sign of danger: "Time" magazine in A's left hand (title to be seen from outside).

Transit passport (old one) - Ireland. . .
- Name Doherty Eunan Gerard;
- d.o.b. . . .
- nationality irish;
- d. of issue 30 Jul. 01, exp. date 30 Jul. 2011;
- place of issue Dublin;
- . . . purpose of the visit - business trip. Legend - interpreter or IT specialist (at A's [sic] discretion) by invitation of [Russian Executive] . . . (the print-out copy of invitation will be in the envelope

w[ith] transit docs).

69. In a January 28, 2010 message, Moscow Center elaborated on the defendant RICHARD MURPHY's travel plans, explaining that Center would "buy [an] e-ticket (using [MURPHY's] Ir[ish] passport data)," and that MURPHY could access a copy of documents related to the ticket in the drafts folder of a particular email address if necessary. The SVR also explained that the discussions at Moscow Center would involve the "usual stuff," including "intel[ligence]."

2. MURPHY BUYS COMPUTER EQUIPMENT

70. In addition to arranging the defendant, RICHARD MURPHY's travel to Moscow Center, in its January 2010 messages, the SVR also instructed MURPHY to buy certain computer equipment using "all necessary precautions [sic]: no preliminary order, pay cash, destroy receipts, etc.," and to bring that computer equipment to Center.

71. After RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant, received these instructions, on or about February 9, 2010, law-enforcement agents conducting surveillance of MURPHY saw him enter a computer retailer (the "Computer Store") in Manhattan, and then leave the store a short time later carrying what appeared to be a laptop computer box. Later that day, three Computer Store employees spoke with investigating agents and identified MURPHY from a photograph as having bought a laptop computer from the Computer Store earlier in the day. One of the employees reported that MURPHY had said his name was "David." A database of sales maintained by the Computer Store reflected that, earlier that day, an individual who identified himself as "David Hiller" had paid cash for, inter alia, an ASUS EEE PC 1005HA-P laptop computer. This was the make and model of computer that the SVR had directed MURPHY to buy.

3. MURPHY TRAVELS TO MOSCOW CENTER AND RETURNS WITH A LAPTOP

72. Records maintained by the United States Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection ("CBP"), reflect that RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant, was a passenger on Continental Airlines flight 40 to Rome, which departed Newark Airport on February 21, 2010 - which is consistent with Center's instruction that MURPHY fly to Rome before receiving a false Irish passport for his continued travel to Moscow Center. CBP records also reflect that RICHARD MURPHY returned to the United States via Continental Airlines flight 41, which arrived at

Newark Airport from Rome on March 3, 2010.

73. Agents conducting visual surveillance at Newark Airport on March 3, 2010, saw MURPHY arrive from an inbound flight, where an official with the United States Department of Homeland Security searched MURPHY's luggage. MURPHY's luggage contained the same make and model of laptop computer that MURPHY had bought using the name "David Hiller" on February 9, 2010.¹³

4. MURPHY DELIVERS A LAPTOP COMPUTER TO ZOTTOLI

74. On or about March 6, 2010, at approximately 12:25 p.m., agents conducting visual surveillance of MICHAEL ZOTTOLI and PATRICIA MILLS, the defendants, saw them leave the Arlington Apartment in a grey BMW sedan registered in ZOTTOLI's name. ZOTTOLI and MILLS drove from the Arlington Apartment to a Manhattan Hotel (the "Upper East Side Hotel"), which they were seen entering at approximately 6:00 p.m. that day.

75. On or about March 7, 2010, agents established surveillance in the vicinity of the Fort Greene neighborhood of Brooklyn, New York, where RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant, had previously been seen meeting with MICHAEL ZOTTOLI, the defendant, in September 2009. As described below, on or about March 7, 2010, ZOTTOLI went to the vicinity of the Brooklyn Park, where he met with MURPHY in a coffee shop and received a laptop computer for communicating with Center.

- a. At approximately 11:00 a.m., agents conducting surveillance in Brooklyn observed MURPHY and ZOTTOLI meet at a pay phone located at the corner of Vanderbilt and DeKalb Avenues, and then walk to a nearby coffee shop (the "Coffee Shop"). When MURPHY and ZOTTOLI entered the Coffee Shop, MURPHY was carrying a backpack and ZOTTOLI was carrying a duffel bag.

¹³ Although the computer that MURPHY brought back from Moscow Center was the same make and model as the one he bought on February 9, the two computers appear to have different serial numbers. The Homeland Security official who conducted the above-described airport search saw a sticker on the bottom of the laptop that MURPHY brought back from Moscow Center bearing what appeared to be a serial number ending in "9719." The serial number of the laptop purchased from the Computer Store ended in "1432."

- b. ZOTTOLI and MURPHY sat down together at a table where they stayed for approximately one hour and fifty minutes. During that time, law-enforcement agents stationed inside the Coffee Shop overheard MURPHY and ZOTTOLI discussing problems that the Seattle Conspirators were having with the computer equipment that they used for communicating with Center. In response to ZOTTOLI's description of these communications problems, MURPHY stated (in substance and in part), "this should help." MURPHY further responded (in substance and in part), "if this doesn't work we can meet again in six months," and also said "they don't understand what we go through over here."
- c. At approximately 12:50 p.m., MURPHY removed a plastic shopping bag from his backpack and put the plastic bag into ZOTTOLI's duffel bag; MURPHY and ZOTTOLI then left the Coffee Shop.

76. In one of the New Jersey Conspirators' Electronic Messages, dated March 9, 2010, the New Jersey conspirators reported that during the March 7, 2010 meeting at the Coffee Shop, RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant, had successfully delivered a laptop and cash to MICHAEL ZOTTOLI, the defendant. In that communication, ZOTTOLI is identified by the initial "M" and MURPHY is identified by the letter "A." The New Jersey Conspirators also relayed to Moscow Center ZOTTOLI's description of the communications problem the Seattle Conspirators were experiencing:

Meeting with M went as planned . . . A passed to M laptop, two flash drives, and \$9K in cash. From what M described, the problem with his equipment is due to his laptop "hanging"/"freezing" before completion of the normal program run. . .

In the March 9 message, the New Jersey Conspirators also relayed to Center the Seattle Conspirators' concerns regarding the sufficiency of the defendant PATRICIA MILLS's fraudulent travel documents:

. . . Neither can his wife leave the US, because whatever papers she has now are no longer sufficient for travel, because as of this year the doc requirements for entry from the US to wherever she needs to go have changed. M needs your advice on the situation and his options.

V. PASSING INFORMATION TO MOSCOW CENTER AND RECRUITING SOURCES

77. As was described above, the primary long-term goal of the Illegals is becoming sufficiently "Americanized" such that the Illegals can: (i) recruit sources who can infiltrate United States policy-making circles; and (ii) gather information to send it back to Russia. Set forth below are some selected instances of how the Illegals - even as they live in America, working to deepen their cover stories - have begun to pass information and to recruit sources.

A. THE BOSTON CONSPIRATORS

78. As is set forth more fully below, over the years, the Boston Conspirators have been collecting information at the request of Moscow Center:

- a. The Boston Conspirators have received "info tasks" - directives with respect to information that Moscow Center wanted them to focus on obtaining, such as, among other things, United States foreign policy. For example, a Boston Conspirators' Internet Message from in or about April 2006, set forth the "[i]nfo task for May and Jun [sic]," which was to include gathering information regarding, among other things, United States policy with regard to the use of the internet by terrorists, United States policies in Central Asia, problems with United States military policy, and "western estimation of [Russian] foreign policy."
- b. In response to the "info tasks" received from Moscow Center, the Boston Conspirators composed and sent a number of messages. For example, a Boston Conspirators' Electronic Message to Moscow Center from in or about May 2006, focused on turnover at the head of the CIA and the 2008 U.S. presidential election. This information was described as having been "received in private conversation with [name omitted], former legislative counsel for US Congress, specialist in [information omitted], member of faculty in economics of [information omitted]. Has contacts within Congress and policymakers of Washington."

79. As a corollary to their information-collecting efforts, the Boston Conspirators have cultivated sources of information within the United States. Thus, for example:

- a. One of the Boston Conspirators' Electronic Messages, dated September 23, 2005, reported that "Dv." - a term often used for DONALD HOWARD HEATHFIELD, the defendant - has "established contact" with a particular person. That person is a former high-ranking United States Government national security official, whose name is provided in the September 23 message.
- b. Another one of the Boston Conspirators' Electronic Messages, dated December 3, 2004, reads in part as follows: "During the seminar at [location, omitted] Dv made contacts w. [name and title, omitted] working for [a United States Government research facility, name omitted] in [geographical location of facility, name omitted]. He works on issues of strategic planning related to nuclear weapon development. Dv. had conversations with him about research programs on small yield high penetration nuclear warheads recently authorized by US Congress (nuclear 'bunker-buster' warheads)."
- c. In or about 2007, the SVR checked its own files about potential sources identified by the Boston Conspirators and provided the Boston Conspirators with instructions regarding how to proceed with certain potential sources: "Got your note . . . and signal No info in our files about E.F., BT, DK, RR Agree with your proposal to use 'Farmer' to start building network of students in DC. Your relationship with 'Parrot' looks very promising as a valid source of info from US power circles. To start working on him professionally we need all available details on his background, current position, habits, contacts, opportunities, etc. . . . Plus, you should observe our security rules and recommendations in working with contacts. . . . Agree with you [sic] proposal to keep relations with 'Cat' [the same person mentioned in the September 23 message above] but watch him."

B. THE YONKERS CONSPIRATORS

80. The Yonkers Conspirators have also worked to gather information on behalf of the SVR. Thus, for example, throughout 2002 and 2003, law-enforcement agents, acting pursuant to judicial orders, intercepted aural communications taking place inside the Yonkers House. On September 10, 2002, JUAN LAZARO and VICKY PELAEZ, the defendants, were recorded discussing Moscow Center's disappointment with the quality of LAZARO's then-recent reporting:

LAZARO: They tell me that my information is of no value because I didn't provide any source . . . it's of no use to them.

PELAEZ: Really?

LAZARO: Yes. They say that . . . " . . . without a source . . . without stating who tells you all of this . . . It isn't . . . your report isn't . . . "

PELAEZ: [Interrupts] Put down any politician from here!

. . .

LAZARO: I'm . . . I'm going to give them what they want. But, I'm going to continue what I'm telling them . . . If they don't like what I tell them, too bad . . . but, [unintelligible] work because they like it . . . they're [unintelligible]. They say their hands are tied. On the inside, they don't even care about the country. . .

PELAEZ: So . . . why do they have you? If they don't care about the country . . . what do we have Intelligence Services for?

C. NEW JERSEY CONSPIRATORS

81. As is set forth more fully below, and as reflected in the following subparagraphs drawn from the New Jersey Conspirators' Electronic Messages, over the course of their years in the United States, the New Jersey Conspirators have spent a great deal of time collecting information and passing it to Moscow Center:

- a. The New Jersey Conspirators have received "info tasks" - directives with respect to the information that Moscow Center wanted them to focus on obtaining. Thus, for example, in an "[i]nfo task" from the spring of 2009, in advance of "Obama's visit to [Russia]," the SVR requested information on the U.S. position with respect to a new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, Afghanistan, and Iran's nuclear program. Moscow Center indicated that it "needs intels (related to this [sic] topics) which should reflect approaches and ideas of '[Russia] policy team members': [four names of sub-cabinet United States foreign policy officials, omitted]. Try to outline their views and most important Obama's goals which he expects to achieve during summit in July and how does his team plan to do it (arguments, provisions, means of persuasion to 'lure' [Russia] into cooperation in US interests)."
- b. In a message dated "Oct. 18," Moscow Center encouraged the New Jersey Conspirators "to send more info on current international affairs vital for R, highlighting US approach and providing us w. comments made by local expert (political, economic) scientist's community. Try to single out tidbits unknown publicly but revealed in private by sources close to State department, Government, major think tanks."
- c. On a number of other occasions, the SVR specifically indicated that information collected and conveyed by the New Jersey Conspirators was especially valuable. Thus, for example, during the summer and fall of 2009, CYNTHIA MURPHY, the defendant, using contacts she had met in New York, conveyed a number of reports to Center about prospects for the global gold market. In October of 2009, the SVR responded: "Info: on gold - v. usefull [sic], it was sent directly (after due adaptation) to Min[.] of Fin[ance], Min[.] of ec[onomic] devel[opment]."

82. Throughout their time in the United States, the New Jersey Conspirators have proceeded with great caution when it comes to seeking employment with the United States Government - for fear that their "legends" are not strong enough to survive a

background check. Thus, on September 23, 2004, law-enforcement agents, acting pursuant to a judicial order, intercepted aural communications taking place inside the Hoboken Apartment. In particular, CYNTHIA MURPHY, the defendant, advised her husband, RICHARD MURPHY, the defendant, that he should improve his information-collection efforts. CYNTHIA MURPHY explained to RICHARD MURPHY that he would not be able to work at the top echelons of certain parts of the United States Government - the State Department, for example. CYNTHIA MURPHY suggested that RICHARD MURPHY should therefore approach people who have access to important venues (the White House, for example) to which he could not reasonably expect to himself gain direct personal access.

83. Moscow Center's advice was similar. In a 2009 message, for example, Moscow Center stated: "C reminds you [CYNTHIA MURPHY, the defendant] that placing a job in Government (direct penetration into main object of interest) is not an option because of vulnerability of your vital records' docs."

84. Against this backdrop of an inability to "direct[ly] penetrat[e]" the United States Government (the "main object of interest"), the New Jersey Conspirators have worked to begin targeting other people, who can be recruited as sources on behalf of Moscow Center.

85. The following sub-paragraphs are drawn from the New Jersey Conspirators' Electronic Messages, and relate to the New Jersey Conspirators' source-targeting efforts:

- a. In a message dated "Feb 3 09," the New Jersey Conspirators reported that, through her work, CYNTHIA MURPHY, the defendant, "had several work-related personal meetings with [a prominent New York-based financier; name omitted] and was assigned his account"; the message accurately described the financier as "prominent in politics," "an active fundraiser for [a major political party, name omitted]," and "a personal friend of [a current Cabinet official, name omitted]." A response from Moscow Center indicated that the financier "is checked in C's database-he is clean. Of course he is very interesting 'target'. Try to build up little by little relations with him moving beyond just [work] framework. Maybe he can provide [MURPHY] with remarks re US foreign policy, 'roumors' [sic] about White house internal 'kitchen', invite her to


venues (to [major political party HQ in NYC, for instance), . . . etc. In short, consider carefully all options in regard to [financier]."

- b. During 2009, the SVR directed CYNTHIA MURPHY, the defendant, to "strengthen . . . ties w. classmates on daily basis incl. professors who can help in job search and who will have (or already have) access to secret info," and to "[r]eport to C[enter] on their detailed personal data and character traits w. preliminary conclusions about their potential (vulnerability) to be recruited by Service." In response, and on many occasions, the New Jersey Conspirators conveyed names of University affiliates to Center - which then conducted checks in "C's database" to determine if a particular potential "target" was or was not "clean." Thus, for example, when an SVR database check revealed that a particular contact of CYNTHIA MURPHY's had been suspected by a then-Soviet bloc intelligence service of belonging to a "foreign spy net[work]," MURPHY was told "to avoid deepening contact with them for sec[urity] reasons."
- c. In addition, the SVR has directed CYNTHIA MURPHY to collect information on certain University associates: "C suggests that N [MURPHY] keeps trying to 'dig up' personal data of those students who apply (or are hired already) for a job at CIA."
- d. Furthermore, Moscow Center has directed the careers of RICHARD MURPHY and CYNTHIA MURPHY, telling them to take on work that could benefit the SVR. Thus, for example, in a 2010 message, the SVR advised that CYNTHIA MURPHY should consider taking a certain job because "this position . . . would expose her to perspective contacts and potential sources in US government."
- e. In a January 19, 2010 communication to Center, the New Jersey conspirators explained that CYNTHIA MURPHY was interested in taking a job with a private sector entity that would involve "lobbying," and "dealing with US and foreign governments[.]" MURPHY was concerned that such work "might require an extended background check."

In a January 21, 2010 communication, in which MURPHY is identified by the initial "N," Center responded:


[W]e consulted doc[umentation] department. They don't see any hazards They . . . don't dig too deep during one's background check. C[enter] is interested in N's getting this position which would expose her to perspective contacts and potential sources in US government. Keep us informed on developments.

WHEREFORE, deponent prays that warrants be issued for the arrest of DEFENDANT #1, a/k/a "Christopher R. Metsos," DEFENDANT #2, a/k/a "Richard Murphy," DEFENDANT #3, a/k/a "Cynthia Murphy," DEFENDANT #4, a/k/a "Donald Howard Heathfield," DEFENDANT #5, a/k/a "Tracey Lee Ann Foley," DEFENDANT #6, a/k/a "Michael Zottoli," DEFENDANT #7, a/k/a "Patricia Mills," DEFENDANT #8, a/k/a "Juan Lazaro," and VICKY PELAEZ, the defendants, and that they be arrested and imprisoned, or bailed, as the case may be.



MARIA L. RICCI
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Sworn to before me this
25th day of June, 2010



UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
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Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 5
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