

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/080

US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE DONALD TRUMP'S
ACTIVITIES IN RUSSIA AND COMPROMISING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
KREMLIN

Summary

- Russian regime has been cultivating, supporting and assisting TRUMP for at least 5 years. Aim, endorsed by PUTIN, has been to encourage splits and divisions in western alliance
- So far TRUMP has declined various sweetener real estate business deals offered him in Russia in order to further the Kremlin's cultivation of him. However he and his inner circle have accepted a regular flow of intelligence from the Kremlin, including on his Democratic and other political rivals
- Former top Russian intelligence officer claims FSB has compromised TRUMP through his activities in Moscow sufficiently to be able to blackmail him. According to several knowledgeable sources, his conduct in Moscow has included perverted sexual acts which have been arranged/monitored by the FSB
- A dossier of compromising material on Hillary CLINTON has been collated by the Russian Intelligence Services over many years and mainly comprises bugged conversations she had on various visits to Russia and intercepted phone calls rather than any embarrassing conduct. The dossier is controlled by Kremlin spokesman, PESKOV, directly on PUTIN's orders. However it has not as yet been distributed abroad, including to TRUMP. Russian intentions for its deployment still unclear

Detail

1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in June 2016 sources A and B, a senior Russian Foreign Ministry figure and a former top level Russian intelligence officer still active inside the Kremlin respectively, the Russian authorities had been cultivating and supporting US Republican presidential candidate, Donald TRUMP for at least 5 years. Source B asserted that the TRUMP operation was both supported and directed by Russian President Vladimir PUTIN. Its aim was to sow discord and

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disunity both within the US itself, but more especially within the Transatlantic alliance which was viewed as inimical to Russia's interests. Source C, a senior Russian financial official said the TRUMP operation should be seen in terms of PUTIN's desire to return to Nineteenth Century 'Great Power' politics anchored upon countries' interests rather than the ideals-based international order established after World War Two. S/he had overheard PUTIN talking in this way to close associates on several occasions.

2. In terms of specifics, Source A confided that the Kremlin had been feeding TRUMP and his team valuable intelligence on his opponents, including Democratic presidential candidate Hillary CLINTON, for several years (see more below). This was confirmed by Source D, a close associate of TRUMP who had organized and managed his recent trips to Moscow, and who reported, also in June 2016, that this Russian intelligence had been "very helpful". The Kremlin's cultivation operation on TRUMP also had comprised offering him various lucrative real estate development business deals in Russia, especially in relation to the ongoing 2018 World Cup soccer tournament. However, so far, for reasons unknown, TRUMP had not taken up any of these.
3. However, there were other aspects to TRUMP's engagement with the Russian authorities. One which had borne fruit for them was to exploit TRUMP's personal obsessions and sexual perversion in order to obtain suitable 'kompromat' (compromising material) on him. According to Source D, where s/he had been present, TRUMP's (perverted) conduct in Moscow included hiring the presidential suite of the Ritz Carlton Hotel, where he knew President and Mrs OBAMA (whom he hated) had stayed on one of their official trips to Russia, and defiling the bed where they had slept by employing a number of prostitutes to perform a 'golden showers' (urination) show in front of him. The hotel was known to be under FSB control with microphones and concealed cameras in all the main rooms to record anything they wanted to.
4. The Moscow Ritz Carlton episode involving TRUMP reported above was confirmed by Source E, [REDACTED], who said that s/he and several of the staff were aware of it at the time and subsequently. S/he believed it had happened in 2013. Source E provided an introduction for a company ethnic Russian operative to Source F, a female staffer at the hotel when TRUMP had stayed there, who also confirmed the story. Speaking separately in June 2016, Source B (the former top level Russian intelligence officer) asserted that TRUMP's unorthodox behavior in Russia over the years had provided the authorities there with enough embarrassing material on the now Republican presidential candidate to be able to blackmail him if they so wished.
5. Asked about the Kremlin's reported intelligence feed to TRUMP over recent years and rumours about a Russian dossier of 'kompromat' on

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Hillary CLINTON (being circulated), Source B confirmed the file's existence. S/he confided in a trusted compatriot that it had been collated by Department K of the FSB for many years, dating back to her husband Bill's presidency, and comprised mainly eavesdropped conversations of various sorts rather than details/evidence of unorthodox or embarrassing behavior. Some of the conversations were from bugged comments CLINTON had made on her various trips to Russia and focused on things she had said which contradicted her current position on various issues. Others were most probably from phone intercepts.

6. Continuing on this theme, Source G, a senior Kremlin official, confided that the CLINTON dossier was controlled exclusively by chief Kremlin spokesman, Dmitry PESKOV, who was responsible for compiling/handling it on the explicit instructions of PUTIN himself. The dossier however had not as yet been made available abroad, including to TRUMP or his campaign team. At present it was unclear what PUTIN's intentions were in this regard.

20 June 2016

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COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/086

RUSSIA/CYBER CRIME: A SYNOPSIS OF RUSSIAN STATE SPONSORED AND OTHER CYBER OFFENSIVE (CRIMINAL) OPERATIONS

Summary

- Russia has extensive programme of state-sponsored offensive cyber operations. External targets include foreign governments and big corporations, especially banks. FSB leads on cyber within Russian apparatus. Limited success in attacking top foreign targets like G7 governments, security services and IFIs but much more on second tier ones through IT back doors, using corporate and other visitors to Russia
- FSB often uses coercion and blackmail to recruit most capable cyber operatives in Russia into its state-sponsored programmes. Heavy use also, both wittingly and unwittingly, of CIS emigres working in western corporations and ethnic Russians employed by neighbouring governments e.g. Latvia
- Example cited of successful Russian cyber operation targeting senior Western business visitor. Provided back door into important Western institutions.
- Example given of US citizen of Russian origin approached by FSB and offered incentive of "investment" in his business when visiting Moscow.
- Problems however for Russian authorities themselves in countering local hackers and cyber criminals, operating outside state control. Central Bank claims there were over 20 serious attacks on correspondent accounts held by CBR in 2015, comprising Roubles several billion in fraud
- Some details given of leading non-state Russian cyber criminal groups

Details

1. Speaking in June 2016, a number of Russian figures with a detailed knowledge of national cyber crime, both state-sponsored and otherwise, outlined the current situation in this area. A former senior intelligence officer divided Russian state-sponsored offensive cyber operations into four categories (in order of priority):- targeting foreign, especially

western governments; penetrating leading foreign business corporations, especially banks; domestic monitoring of the elite; and attacking political opponents both at home and abroad. The former intelligence officer reported that the Federal Security Service (FSB) was the lead organization within the Russian state apparatus for cyber operations.

2. In terms of the success of Russian offensive cyber operations to date, a senior government figure reported that there had been only limited success in penetrating the "first tier" foreign targets. These comprised western (especially G7 and NATO) governments, security and intelligence services and central banks, and the IFIs. To compensate for this shortfall, massive effort had been invested, with much greater success, in attacking the "secondary targets", particularly western private banks and the governments of smaller states allied to the West. S/he mentioned Latvia in this regard. Hundreds of agents, either consciously cooperating with the FSB or whose personal and professional IT systems had been unwittingly compromised, were recruited. Many were people who had ethnic and family ties to Russia and/or had been incentivized financially to cooperate. Such people often would receive monetary inducements or contractual favours from the Russian state or its agents in return. This had created difficulties for parts of the Russian state apparatus in obliging/indulging them e.g. the Central Bank of Russia knowingly having to cover up for such agents' money laundering operations through the Russian financial system.
3. In terms of the FSB's recruitment of capable cyber operatives to carry out its, ideally deniable, offensive cyber operations, a Russian IT specialist with direct knowledge reported in June 2016 that this was often done using coercion and blackmail. In terms of 'foreign' agents, the FSB was approaching US citizens of Russian (Jewish) origin on business trips to Russia. In one case a US citizen of Russian ethnicity had been visiting Moscow to attract investors in his new information technology program. The FSB clearly knew this and had offered to provide seed capital to this person in return for them being able to access and modify his IP, with a view to targeting priority foreign targets by planting a Trojan virus in the software. The US visitor was told this was common practice. The FSB also had implied significant operational success as a result of installing cheap Russian IT games containing their own malware unwittingly by targets on their PCs and other platforms.
4. In a more advanced and successful FSB operation, an IT operator inside a leading Russian SOE, who previously had been employed on conventional (defensive) IT work there, had been under instruction for the last year to conduct an offensive cyber operation against a foreign director of the company. Although the latter was apparently an infrequent visitor to Russia, the FSB now successfully had penetrated his personal IT and through this had managed to access various important institutions in the West through the back door.

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5. In terms of other technical IT platforms, an FSB cyber operative flagged up the 'Telegram' encrypted commercial system as having been of especial concern and therefore heavily targeted by the FSB, not least because it was used frequently by Russian internal political activists and oppositionists. His/her understanding was that the FSB now successfully had cracked this communications software and therefore it was no longer secure to use.
6. The senior Russian government figure cited above also reported that non-state sponsored cyber crime was becoming an increasing problem inside Russia for the government and authorities there. The Central Bank of Russia claimed that in 2015 alone there had been more than 20 attempts at serious cyber embezzlement of money from corresponding accounts held there, comprising several billions Roubles. More generally, s/he understood there were circa 15 major organised crime groups in the country involved in cyber crime, all of which continued to operate largely outside state and FSB control. These included the so-called 'Anunak', 'Buktrap' and 'Metel' organisations.

26 July 2015

**RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: FURTHER INDICATIONS OF
EXTENSIVE CONSPIRACY BETWEEN TRUMP'S CAMPAIGN TEAM AND THE
KREMLIN**

Summary

- Further evidence of extensive conspiracy between TRUMP's campaign team and Kremlin, sanctioned at highest levels and involving Russian diplomatic staff based in the US
- TRUMP associate admits Kremlin behind recent appearance of DNC e-mails on WikiLeaks, as means of maintaining plausible deniability
- Agreed exchange of information established in both directions. TRUMP's team using moles within DNC and hackers in the US as well as outside in Russia. PUTIN motivated by fear and hatred of Hillary CLINTON. Russians receiving intel from TRUMP's team on Russian oligarchs and their families in US
- Mechanism for transmitting this intelligence involves "pension" disbursements to Russian emigres living in US as cover, using consular officials in New York, DC and Miami
- Suggestion from source close to TRUMP and MANAFORT that Republican campaign team happy to have Russia as media bogeyman to mask more extensive corrupt business ties to China and other emerging countries

Detail

1. Speaking in confidence to a compatriot in late July 2016, Source E, an ethnic Russian close associate of Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP, admitted that there was a well-developed conspiracy of co-operation between them and the Russian leadership. This was managed on the TRUMP side by the Republican candidate's campaign manager, Paul MANAFORT, who was using foreign policy advisor, Carter PAGE, and others as intermediaries. The two sides had a mutual interest in defeating Democratic presidential candidate Hillary CLINTON, whom President PUTIN apparently both hated and feared.
2. Inter alia, Source E, acknowledged that the Russian regime had been behind the recent leak of embarrassing e-mail messages, emanating from the Democratic National Committee (DNC), to the WikiLeaks platform.

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The reason for using WikiLeaks was "plausible deniability" and the operation had been conducted with the full knowledge and support of TRUMP and senior members of his campaign team. In return the TRUMP team had agreed to sideline Russian intervention in Ukraine as a campaign issue and to raise US/NATO defence commitments in the Baltics and Eastern Europe to deflect attention away from Ukraine, a priority for PUTIN who needed to cauterise the subject.

3. In the wider context of TRUMP campaign/Kremlin co-operation, Source E claimed that the intelligence network being used against CLINTON comprised three elements. Firstly there were agents/facilitators within the Democratic Party structure itself; secondly Russian émigré and associated offensive cyber operators based in the US; and thirdly, state-sponsored cyber operatives working in Russia. All three elements had played an important role to date. On the mechanism for rewarding relevant assets based in the US, and effecting a two-way flow of intelligence and other useful information, Source E claimed that Russian diplomatic staff in key cities such as New York, Washington DC and Miami were using the émigré 'pension' distribution system as cover. The operation therefore depended on key people in the US Russian émigré community for its success. Tens of thousands of dollars were involved.
4. In terms of the intelligence flow from the TRUMP team to Russia, Source E reported that much of this concerned the activities of business oligarchs and their families' activities and assets in the US, with which PUTIN and the Kremlin seemed preoccupied.
5. Commenting on the negative media publicity surrounding alleged Russian interference in the US election campaign in support of TRUMP, Source E said he understood that the Republican candidate and his team were relatively relaxed about this because it deflected media and the Democrats' attention away from TRUMP's business dealings in China and other emerging markets. Unlike in Russia, these were substantial and involved the payment of large bribes and kickbacks which, were they to become public, would be potentially very damaging to their campaign.
6. Finally, regarding TRUMP's claimed minimal investment profile in Russia, a separate source with direct knowledge said this had not been for want of trying. TRUMP's previous efforts had included exploring the real estate sector in St Petersburg as well as Moscow but in the end TRUMP had had to settle for the use of extensive sexual services there from local prostitutes rather than business success.

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/94

RUSSIA: SECRET KREMLIN MEETINGS ATTENDED BY TRUMP ADVISOR, CARTER PAGE IN MOSCOW (JULY 2016)

Summary

- TRUMP advisor Carter PAGE holds secret meetings in Moscow with SECHIN and senior Kremlin Internal Affairs official, DIVEYKIN
- SECHIN raises issues of future bilateral US-Russia energy co-operation and associated lifting of western sanctions against Russia over Ukraine. PAGE non-committal in response
- DIVEYKIN discusses release of Russian dossier of 'kompromat' on TRUMP's opponent, Hillary CLINTON, but also hints at Kremlin possession of such material on TRUMP

Detail

1. Speaking in July 2016, a Russian source close to Rosneft President, PUTIN close associate and US-sanctioned individual, Igor SECHIN, confided the details of a recent secret meeting between him and visiting Foreign Affairs Advisor to Republican presidential candidate Donald TRUMP, Carter PAGE.
2. According to SECHIN's associate, the Rosneft President (CEO) had raised with PAGE the issues of future bilateral energy cooperation and prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related western sanctions against Russia. PAGE had reacted positively to this demarche by SECHIN but had been generally non-committal in response.
3. Speaking separately, also in July 2016, an official close to Presidential Administration Head, S. IVANOV, confided in a compatriot that a senior colleague in the Internal Political Department of the PA, DIVEYKIN (nfd) also had met secretly with PAGE on his recent visit. Their agenda had included DIVEYKIN raising a dossier of 'kompromat' the Kremlin possessed on TRUMP's Democratic presidential rival, Hillary CLINTON, and its possible release to the Republican's campaign team.
4. However, the Kremlin official close to S. IVANOV added that s/he believed DIVEYKIN also had hinted (or indicated more strongly) that the Russian leadership also had 'kompromat' on TRUMP which the latter should bear in mind in his dealings with them.

19 July 2016

**RUSSIA-US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: KREMLIN CONCERN THAT POLITICAL FALLOUT FROM
DNC E-MAIL HACKING AFFAIR SPIRALLING OUT OF CONTROL**

Summary

- Kremlin concerned that political fallout from DNC e-mail hacking operation is spiralling out of control. Extreme nervousness among TRUMP's associates as result of negative media attention/accusations
- Russians meanwhile keen to cool situation and maintain 'plausible deniability' of existing /ongoing pro-TRUMP and anti-CLINTON operations. Therefore unlikely to be any ratcheting up offensive plays in immediate future
- Source close to TRUMP campaign however confirms regular exchange with Kremlin has existed for at least 8 years, including intelligence fed back to Russia on oligarchs' activities in US
- Russians apparently have promised not to use 'kompromat' they hold on TRUMP as leverage, given high levels of voluntary co-operation forthcoming from his team

Detail

1. Speaking in confidence to a trusted associate in late July 2016, a Russian émigré figure close to the Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP's campaign team commented on the fallout from publicity surrounding the Democratic National Committee (DNC) e-mail hacking scandal. The émigré said there was a high level of anxiety within the TRUMP team as a result of various accusations levelled against them and indications from the Kremlin that President PUTIN and others in the leadership thought things had gone too far now and risked spiralling out of control.
2. Continuing on this theme, the émigré associate of TRUMP opined that the Kremlin wanted the situation to calm but for 'plausible deniability' to be maintained concerning its (extensive) pro-TRUMP and anti-CLINTON operations. S/he therefore judged that it was unlikely these would be ratcheted up, at least for the time being.
3. However, in terms of established operational liaison between the TRUMP team and the Kremlin, the émigré confirmed that an intelligence exchange had been running between them for at least 8 years. Within this context PUTIN's priority requirement had been for intelligence on the activities, business and otherwise, in the US of leading Russian oligarchs and their families. TRUMP and his associates duly had obtained and supplied the Kremlin with this information.

4. Finally, the émigré said s/he understood the Kremlin had more intelligence on CLINTON and her campaign but he did not know the details or when or if it would be released. As far as 'kompromat' (compromising information) on TRUMP were concerned, although there was plenty of this, he understood the Kremlin had given its word that it would not be deployed against the Republican presidential candidate given how helpful and co-operative his team had been over several years, and particularly of late.

30 July 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/100

RUSSIA/USA: GROWING BACKLASH IN KREMLIN TO DNC HACKING AND TRUMP SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Summary

- Head of PA IVANOV laments Russian intervention in US presidential election and black PR against CLINTON and the DNC. Vows not to supply intelligence to Kremlin PR operatives again. Advocates now sitting tight and denying everything
- Presidential spokesman PESKOV the main protagonist in Kremlin campaign to aid TRUMP and damage CLINTON. He is now scared and fears being made scapegoat by leadership for backlash in US. Problem compounded by his botched intervention in recent Turkish crisis
- Premier MEDVEDEV's office furious over DNC hacking and associated anti-Russian publicity. Want good relations with US and ability to travel there. Refusing to support or help cover up after PESKOV
- Talk now in Kremlin of TRUMP withdrawing from presidential race altogether, but this still largely wishful thinking by more liberal elements in Moscow

Detail

1. Speaking in early August 2016, two well-placed and established Kremlin sources outlined the divisions and backlash in Moscow arising from the leaking of Democratic National Committee (DNC) e-mails and the wider pro-TRUMP operation being conducted in the US. Head of Presidential Administration, Sergei IVANOV, was angry at the recent turn of events. He believed the Kremlin "team" involved, led by presidential spokesman Dmitry PESKOV, had gone too far in interfering in foreign affairs with their "elephant in a china shop black PR". IVANOV claimed always to have opposed the handling and exploitation of intelligence by this PR "team". Following the backlash against such foreign interference in US politics, IVANOV was advocating that the only sensible course of action now for the Russian leadership was to "sit tight and deny everything".
2. Continuing on this theme the source close to IVANOV reported that PESKOV now was "scared shitless" that he would be scapegoated by PUTIN and the Kremlin and held responsible for the backlash against Russian political interference in the US election. IVANOV was determined

to stop PESKOV playing an independent role in relation to the US going forward and the source fully expected the presidential spokesman now to lay low. PESKOV's position was not helped by a botched attempt by him also to interfere in the recent failed coup in Turkey from a government relations (GR) perspective (no further details).

3. The extent of disquiet and division within Moscow caused by the backlash against Russian interference in the US election was underlined by a second source, close to premier Dmitriy MEDVEDEV (DAM). S/he said the Russian prime minister and his colleagues wanted to have good relations with the US, regardless of who was in power there, and not least so as to be able to travel there in future, either officially or privately. They were openly refusing to cover up for PESKOV and others involved in the DNC/TRUMP operations or to support his counter-attack of allegations against the USG for its alleged hacking of the Russian government and state agencies.
4. According to the first source, close to IVANOV, there had been talk in the Kremlin of TRUMP being forced to withdraw from the presidential race altogether as a result of recent events, ostensibly on grounds of his psychological state and unsuitability for high office. This might not be so bad for Russia in the circumstances but in the view of the source, it remained largely wishful thinking on the part of those in the regime opposed to PESKOV and his "botched" operations, at least for the time being.

5 August 2016

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: SENIOR KREMLIN FIGURE OUTLINES EVOLVING RUSSIAN TACTICS IN PRO-TRUMP, ANTI-CLINTON OPERATION

Summary

- Head of PA, IVANOV, assesses Kremlin intervention in US presidential election and outlines leadership thinking on operational way forward
- No new leaks envisaged, as too politically risky, but rather further exploitation of (WikiLeaks) material already disseminated to exacerbate divisions
- Educated US youth to be targeted as protest (against CLINTON) and swing vote in attempt to turn them over to TRUMP
- Russian leadership, including PUTIN, celebrating perceived success to date in splitting US hawks and elite
- Kremlin engaging with several high profile US players, including STEIN, PAGE and (former DIA Director Michael Flynn), and funding their recent visits to Moscow

Details

1. Speaking in confidence to a close colleague in early August 2016, Head of the Russian Presidential Administration (PA), Sergei IVANOV, assessed the impact and results of Kremlin intervention in the US presidential election to date. Although most commentators believed that the Kremlin was behind the leaked DNC/CLINTON e-mails, this remained technically deniable. Therefore the Russians would not risk their position for the time being with new leaked material, even to a third party like WikiLeaks. Rather the tactics would be to spread rumours and misinformation about the content of what already had been leaked and make up new content.
2. Continuing on this theme, IVANOV said that the audience to be targeted by such operations was the educated youth in America as the PA assessed that there was still a chance they could be persuaded to vote for Republican candidate Donald TRUMP as a protest against the Washington establishment (in the form of Democratic candidate Hillary CLINTON). The hope was that even if she won, as a result of this CLINTON in power would be bogged down in working for internal reconciliation in the US, rather than being able to focus on foreign policy which would damage Russia's interests. This also should give President PUTIN more room for manoeuvre in the run-up to Russia's own presidential election in 2018.
3. IVANOV reported that although the Kremlin had underestimated the strength of US media and liberal reaction to the DNC hack and TRUMP's links to Russia, PUTIN was generally satisfied with the progress of the anti-CLINTON operation to date. He recently had had a drink with PUTIN to mark this. In IVANOV's view, the US had tried to divide the Russian elite with sanctions but failed, whilst they, by contrast, had succeeded in splitting the US hawks inimical to Russia and the Washington elite more generally, half of whom had refused to endorse any presidential candidate as a result of Russian intervention.
4. Speaking separately, also in early August 2016, a Kremlin official involved in US relations commented on aspects of the Russian operation to date. Its goals had been threefold - asking sympathetic US actors how Moscow could help them; gathering relevant intelligence; and creating and disseminating compromising information ('kompromat'). This had involved the Kremlin supporting various US political figures, including funding indirectly their recent visits to Moscow. S/he named a delegation from Lyndon LAROCHE; presidential candidate Jill STEIN of the Green Party; TRUMP foreign policy adviser

Carter PAGE, and former DIA Director Michael Flynn, in this regard and as successful in terms of perceived outcomes.

10 August 2016

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: REACTION IN TRUMP CAMP TO RECENT NEGATIVE PUBLICITY ABOUT
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE AND LIKELY RESULTING TACTICS GOING FORWARD

Summary

- TRUMP campaign insider reports recent DNC e-mail leaks were aimed at switching SANDERS (protest) voters away from CLINTON and over to TRUMP.
- Admits Republican campaign underestimated resulting negative reaction from US liberals, elite and media and forced to change course as result.
- Need now to turn tables on CLINTON's use of PUTIN as bogeyman in election, although some resentment at Russian president's perceived attempt to undermine USG and system over and above swinging presidential election.

Detail

1. Speaking in confidence on 9 August 2016, an ethnic Russian associate of Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP discussed the reaction inside his camp, and revised tactics therein resulting from recent negative publicity concerning Moscow's clandestine involvement in the campaign. TRUMP's associate reported that the aim of leaking the DNC e-mails to WikiLeaks during the Democratic Convention had been to swing supporters of Bernie SANDERS away from Hillary CLINTON and across to TRUMP. These voters were perceived as activist and anti-status quo and anti-establishment and in that regard sharing many features with the TRUMP campaign, including a visceral dislike of Hillary CLINTON. This objective had been conceived and promoted, inter alia, by TRUMP's foreign policy adviser Carter PAGE who had discussed it directly with the ethnic Russian associate.
2. Continuing on this theme, the ethnic Russian associate of TRUMP assessed that the problem was that the TRUMP campaign had underestimated the strength of the negative reaction from liberals and especially the conservative elite to Russian interference. This was forcing a rethink and a likely change of tactics. The main objective in the short term was to check Democratic candidate Hillary CLINTON's successful exploitation of the PUTIN as bogeyman/Russian interference story to tarnish TRUMP and bolster her own (patriotic) credentials. The TRUMP campaign was focusing on tapping into support in the American television media to achieve this, as they reckoned this resource had been underused by them to date.
3. However, TRUMP's associate also admitted that there was a fair amount of anger and resentment within the Republican candidate's team at what was perceived by PUTIN as going beyond the objective of weakening CLINTON and bolstering TRUMP, by attempting to exploit the situation to undermine the US government and democratic system more generally. It was unclear at present how this aspect of the situation would play out in the weeks to come.

10 August 2016

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: FURTHER DETAILS OF TRUMP LAWYER COHEN'S SECRET LIAISON WITH THE KREMLIN

Summary

- Kremlin insider reports TRUMP lawyer COHEN's secret meeting/s with Kremlin officials in August 2016 was/were held in Prague
- Russian parastatal organisation Rossotrudnichestvo used as cover for this liaison and premises in Czech capital may have been used for the meeting/s
- Pro-PUTIN leading Duma figure, KOSACHEV, reportedly involved as "plausibly deniable" facilitator and may have participated in the August meeting/s with COHEN

Detail

1. Speaking to a compatriot and friend on 19 October 2016, a Kremlin insider provided further details of reported clandestine meeting/s between Republican presidential candidate, Donald TRUMP's lawyer Michael COHEN and Kremlin representatives in August 2016. Although the communication between them had to be cryptic for security reasons, the Kremlin insider clearly indicated to his/her friend that the reported contact/s took place in Prague, Czech Republic.
2. Continuing on this theme, the Kremlin insider highlighted the importance of the Russian parastatal organisation, Rossotrudnichestvo, in this contact between TRUMP campaign representative/s and Kremlin officials. Rossotrudnichestvo was being used as cover for this relationship and its office in Prague may well have been used to host the COHEN/Russian Presidential Administration (PA) meeting/s. It was considered a "plausibly deniable" vehicle for this, whilst remaining entirely under Kremlin control.
3. The Kremlin insider went on to identify leading pro-PUTIN Duma figure, Konstantin KOSACHEV (Head of the Foreign Relations Committee) as an important figure in the TRUMP campaign-Kremlin liaison operation. KOSACHEV, also "plausibly deniable" being part of the Russian legislature rather than executive, had facilitated the contact in Prague and by implication, may have attended the meeting/s with COHEN there in August.

Company Comment

We reported previously, in our Company Intelligence Report 2016/135 of 19 October 2016 from the same source, that COHEN met officials from the PA Legal Department clandestinely in an EU country in August 2016. This was in order to clean up the mess left behind by western media revelations of TRUMP ex-campaign manager MANAFORT's corrupt relationship with the former pro-Russian YANUKOVYCH regime in Ukraine and TRUMP foreign policy advisor, Carter PAGE's secret meetings in Moscow with senior regime figures in July 2016. According to the Kremlin advisor, these meeting/s were originally scheduled for COHEN in Moscow but shifted to

what was considered an operationally "soft" EU country when it was judged too compromising for him to travel to the Russian capital.

20 October 2016

RUSSIA/UKRAINE: THE DEMISE OF TRUMP'S CAMPAIGN MANAGER PAUL MANAFORT

Summary

- Ex-Ukrainian President YANUKOVYCH confides directly to PUTIN that he authorised kick-back payments to MANAFORT, as alleged in western media. Assures Russian President however there is no documentary evidence/trail.
- PUTIN and Russian leadership remain worried however and sceptical that YANUKOVYCH has fully covered the traces of these payments to TRUMP's former campaign manager.
- Close associate of TRUMP explains reasoning behind MANAFORT's recent resignation. Ukraine revelations played part but others wanted MANAFORT out for various reasons, especially LEWANDOWSKI who remains influential.

Detail

1. Speaking in late August 2016, in the immediate aftermath of Paul MANAFORT's resignation as campaign manager for US Republican presidential candidate Donald TRUMP, a well-placed Russian figure reported on a recent meeting between President PUTIN and ex-President YANUKOVYCH of Ukraine. This had been held in secret on 15 August near Volgograd, Russia and the western media revelations about MANAFORT and Ukraine had featured prominently on the agenda. YANUKOVYCH had confided in PUTIN that he did authorise and order substantial kick-back payments to MANAFORT as alleged but sought to reassure him that there was no documentary trail left behind which could provide clear evidence of this.
2. Given YANUKOVYCH's (unimpressive) record in covering up his own corrupt tracks in the past, PUTIN and others in the Russian leadership were sceptical about the ex-Ukrainian president's reassurances on this as relating to MANAFORT. They therefore still feared the scandal had legs, especially as MANAFORT had been commercially active in Ukraine right up to the time (in March 2016) when he joined TRUMP's campaign team. For them it therefore remained a point of potential political vulnerability and embarrassment.

3. Speaking separately, also in late August 2016, an American political figure associated with Donald TRUMP and his campaign outlined the reasons behind MANAFORT's recent demise. S/he said it was true that the Ukraine corruption revelations had played a part in this but also, several senior players close to TRUMP had wanted MANAFORT out, primarily to loosen his control on strategy and policy formulation. Of particular importance in this regard was MANAFORT's predecessor as campaign manager, Corey LEWANDOWSKI, who hated MANAFORT personally and remained close to TRUMP with whom he discussed the presidential campaign on a regular basis.

22 August 2016

RUSSIA/US: KREMLIN FALLOUT FROM MEDIA EXPOSURE OF MOSCOW'S INTERFERENCE IN THE US PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

Summary

- Kremlin orders senior staff to remain silent in media and private on allegations of Russian interference in US presidential campaign
- Senior figure however confirms gist of allegations and reports IVANOV sacked as Head of Administration on account of giving PUTIN poor advice on issue. VAINO selected as his replacement partly because he was not involved in pro-TRUMP, anti-CLINTON operation/s
- Russians do have further 'kompromat' on CLINTON (e-mails) and considering disseminating it after Duma (legislative elections) in late September. Presidential spokesman PESKOV continues to lead on this
- However, equally important is Kremlin objective to shift policy consensus favourably to Russia in US post-OBAMA whoever wins. Both presidential candidates' opposition to TPP and TTIP viewed as a result in this respect
- Senior Russian diplomat withdrawn from Washington embassy on account of potential exposure in US presidential election operation/s

Detail

1. Speaking in confidence to a trusted compatriot in mid-September 2016, a senior member of the Russian Presidential Administration (PA) commented on the political fallout from recent western media revelations about Moscow's intervention, in favour of Donald TRUMP and against Hillary CLINTON, in the US presidential election. The PA official reported that the issue had become incredibly sensitive and that President PUTIN had issued direct orders that Kremlin and government insiders should not discuss it in public or even in private.
2. Despite this, the PA official confirmed, from direct knowledge, that the gist of the allegations was true. PUTIN had been receiving conflicting advice on interfering from three separate and expert groups. On one side had been the Russian ambassador to the US, Sergei KISLYAK, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with an independent and informal network run by presidential foreign policy advisor, Yuri USHAKOV

(KISLYAK's predecessor in Washington) who had urged caution and the potential negative impact on Russia from the operation/s. On the other side was former PA Head, Sergei IVANOV, backed by Russian Foreign Intelligence (SVR), who had advised PUTIN that the pro-TRUMP, anti-CLINTON operation/s would be both effective and plausibly deniable with little blowback. The first group/s had been proven right and this had been the catalyst in PUTIN's decision to sack IVANOV (unexpectedly) as PA Head in August. His successor, Anton VAINO, had been selected for the job partly because he had not been involved in the US presidential election operation/s.

3. Continuing on this theme, the senior PA official said the situation now was that the Kremlin had further 'kompromat' on candidate CLINTON and had been considering releasing this via "plausibly deniable" channels after the Duma (legislative) elections were out of the way in mid-September. There was however a growing train of thought and associated lobby, arguing that the Russians could still make candidate CLINTON look "weak and stupid" by provoking her into railing against PUTIN and Russia without the need to release more of her e-mails. Presidential Spokesman, Dmitriy PESKOV remained a key figure in the operation, although any final decision on dissemination of further material would be taken by PUTIN himself.
4. The senior PA official also reported that a growing element in Moscow's intervention in the US presidential election campaign was the objective of shifting the US political consensus in Russia's perceived interests regardless of who won. It basically comprised of pushing candidate CLINTON away from President OBAMA's policies. The best example of this was that both candidates now openly opposed the draft trade agreements, TPP and TTIP, which were assessed by Moscow as detrimental to Russian interests. Other issues where the Kremlin was looking to shift the US policy consensus were Ukraine and Syria. Overall however, the presidential election was considered still to be too close to call.
5. Finally, speaking separately to the same compatriot, a senior Russian MFA official reported that as a prophylactic measure, a leading Russian diplomat, Mikhail KULAGIN, had been withdrawn from Washington at short notice because Moscow feared his heavy involvement in the US presidential election operation, including the so-called veterans' pensions ruse (reported previously), would be exposed in the media there. His replacement, Andrei BONDAREV however was clean in this regard.

Company Comment

The substance of what was reported by the senior Russian PA official in paras 1 and 2 above, including the reasons for Sergei IVANOV's dismissal, was corroborated independently by a former top level Russian intelligence officer and Kremlin insider, also in mid-September.

14 September 2016

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: KREMLIN-ALPHA GROUP CO-OPERATION

Summary

- Top level Russian official confirms current closeness of Alpha Group-PUTIN relationship. Significant favours continue to be done in both directions and FRIDMAN and AVEN still giving informal advice to PUTIN, especially on the US
- Key intermediary in PUTIN-Alpha relationship identified as Oleg GOVORUN, currently Head of a Presidential Administration department but throughout the 1990s, the Alpha executive who delivered illicit cash directly to PUTIN
- PUTIN personally unbothered about Alpha's current lack of investment in Russia but under pressure from colleagues over this and able to exploit it as lever over Alpha interlocutors

Detail

1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in mid-September 2016, a top level Russian government official commented on the history and current state of relations between President PUTIN and the Alpha Group of businesses led by oligarchs Mikhail FRIDMAN, Petr AVEN and German KHAN. The Russian government figure reported that although they had had their ups and downs, the leading figures in Alpha currently were on very good terms with PUTIN. Significant favours continued to be done in both directions, primarily political ones for PUTIN and business/legal ones for Alpha. Also, FRIDMAN and AVEN continued to give informal advice to PUTIN on foreign policy, and especially about the US where he distrusted advice being given to him by officials.
2. Although FRIDMAN recently had met directly with PUTIN in Russia, much of the dialogue and business between them was mediated through a senior Presidential Administration official, Oleg GOVORUN, who currently headed the department therein responsible for Social Co-operation With the CIS. GOVORUN was trusted by PUTIN and recently had accompanied him to Uzbekistan to pay respects at the tomb of former president KARIMOV. However according to the top level Russian government official, during the 1990s GOVORUN had been Head of Government Relations at Alpha Group and in reality, the "driver" and "bag carrier"

used by FRIDMAN and AVEN to deliver large amounts of illicit cash to the Russian president, at that time deputy Mayor of St Petersburg. Given that and the continuing sensitivity of the PUTIN-Alpha relationship, and need for plausible deniability, much of the contact between them was now indirect and entrusted to the relatively low profile GOVORUN.

3. The top level Russian government official described the PUTIN-Alpha relationship as both carrot and stick. Alpha held 'kompromat' on PUTIN and his corrupt business activities from the 1990s whilst although not personally overly bothered by Alpha's failure to reinvest the proceeds of its TNK oil company sale into the Russian economy since, the Russian president was able to use pressure on this count from senior Kremlin colleagues as a lever on FRIDMAN and AVEN to make them do his political bidding.

14 September 2016

**RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION- REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE TRUMP'S
PRIOR ACTIVITIES IN ST PETERSBURG**

Summary

- Two knowledgeable St Petersburg sources claim Republican candidate TRUMP has paid bribes and engaged in sexual activities there but key witnesses silenced and evidence hard to obtain
- Both believe Azeri business associate of TRUMP, Araz AGALAROV will know the details

Detail

1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in September 2016, two well-placed sources based in St Petersburg, one in the political/business elite and the other involved in the local services and tourist industry, commented on Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP's prior activities in the city.
2. Both knew TRUMP had visited St Petersburg on several occasions in the past and had been interested in doing business deals there involving real estate. The local business/political elite figure reported that TRUMP had paid bribes there to further his interests but very discreetly and only through affiliated companies, making it very hard to prove. The local services industry source reported that TRUMP had participated in sex parties in the city too, but that all direct witnesses to this recently had been "silenced" i.e. bribed or coerced to disappear.
3. The two St Petersburg figures cited believed an Azeri business figure, Araz AGALAROV (with offices in Baku and London) had been closely involved with TRUMP in Russia and would know most of the details of what the Republican presidential candidate had got up to there.

14 September 2016

RUSSIA: KREMLIN ASSESSMENT OF TRUMP AND RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Summary

- Buyer's remorse sets in with Kremlin over TRUMP support operation in US presidential election. Russian leadership disappointed that leaked e-mails on CLINTON have not had greater impact in campaign
- Russians have injected further anti-CLINTON material into the 'plausibly deniable' leaks pipeline which will continue to surface, but best material already in public domain
- PUTIN angry with senior officials who "overpromised" on TRUMP and further heads likely to roll as result. Foreign Minister LAVROV may be next
- TRUMP supported by Kremlin because seen as divisive, anti-establishment candidate who would shake up current international status quo in Russia's favor. Lead on TRUMP operation moved from Foreign Ministry to FSB and then to presidential administration where it now sits

Detail

1. Speaking separately in confidence to a trusted compatriot in early October 2016, a senior Russian leadership figure and a Foreign Ministry official reported on recent developments concerning the Kremlin's operation to support Republican candidate Donald TRUMP in the US presidential election. The senior leadership figure said that a degree of buyer's remorse was setting in among Russian leaders concerning TRUMP. PUTIN and his colleagues were surprised and disappointed that leaks of Democratic candidate, Hillary CLINTON's hacked e-mails had not had greater impact on the campaign.
2. Continuing on this theme, the senior leadership figure commented that a stream of further hacked CLINTON material already had been injected by the Kremlin into compliant western media outlets like Wikileaks, which remained at least "plausibly deniable", so the stream of these would continue through October and up to the election. However s/he understood that the best material the Russians had already was out and there were no real game-changers to come.
3. The Russian Foreign Ministry official, who had direct access to the TRUMP support operation, reported that PUTIN was angry at his subordinate's "over-promising" on the Republican presidential candidate, both in terms of his chances and reliability and being able to cover and/or contain the US backlash over Kremlin interference. More heads therefore were likely to roll, with the MFA the easiest target. Ironically, despite his consistent urging of caution on the issue, Foreign Minister LAVROV could be the next one to go.
4. Asked to explain why PUTIN and the Kremlin had launched such an aggressive TRUMP support operation in the first place, the MFA official said that Russia needed to upset the liberal international status quo, including on Ukraine-related sanctions, which was seriously

disadvantaging the country. TRUMP was viewed as divisive in disrupting the whole US political system; anti-Establishment; and a pragmatist with whom they could do business. As the TRUMP support operation had gained momentum, control of it had passed from the MFA to the FSB and then into the presidential administration where it remained, a reflection of its growing significance over time. There was still a view in the Kremlin that TRUMP would continue as a (divisive) political force even if he lost the presidency and may run for and be elected to another public office.

12 October 2016

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: FURTHER DETAILS OF KREMLIN LIAISON WITH TRUMP CAMPAIGN

Summary

- Close associate of SECHIN confirms his secret meeting in Moscow with Carter PAGE in July
- Substance included offer of large stake in Rosneft in return for lifting sanctions on Russia. PAGE confirms this is TRUMP's intention
- SECHIN continued to think TRUMP could win presidency up to 17 October. Now looking to reorientate his engagement with the US
- Kremlin insider highlights importance of TRUMP's lawyer, Michael COHEN in covert relationship with Russia. COHEN's wife is of Russian descent and her father a leading property developer in Moscow

Detail

1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in mid October 2016, a close associate of Rosneft President and PUTIN ally Igor SECHIN elaborated on the reported secret meeting between the latter and Carter PAGE, of US Republican presidential candidate's foreign policy team, in Moscow in July 2016. The secret meeting had been confirmed to him/her by a senior member of SECHIN's staff, in addition to by the Rosneft President himself. It took place on either 7 or 8 July, the same day or the one after Carter PAGE made a public speech to the Higher Economic School in Moscow.
2. In terms of the substance of their discussion, SECHIN's associate said that the Rosneft President was so keen to lift personal and corporate western sanctions imposed on the company, that he offered PAGE/TRUMP's associates the brokerage of up to a 19 per cent (privatised) stake in Rosneft in return. PAGE had expressed interest and confirmed that were TRUMP elected US president, then sanctions on Russia would be lifted.
3. According to SECHIN's close associate, the Rosneft President had continued to believe that TRUMP could win the US presidency right up to 17 October, when he assessed this was no longer possible. SECHIN was keen to re-adapt accordingly and put feelers out to other business and political contacts in the US instead.
4. Speaking separately to the same compatriot in mid-October 2016, a Kremlin insider with direct access to the leadership confirmed that a key role in the secret TRUMP campaign/Kremlin relationship was being played by the Republican candidate's personal lawyer Michael COHEN. [REDACTED]

Source Comment

5. SECHIN's associate opined that although PAGE had not stated it explicitly to SECHIN, he had clearly implied that in terms of his comment on TRUMP's intention to lift Russian sanctions if elected president, he was speaking with the Republican candidate's authority.

Company Comment

6. 

18 October 2016

**RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF TRUMP
LAWYER, COHEN IN CAMPAIGN'S SECRET LIAISON WITH THE KREMLIN**

Summary

- Kremlin insider outlines important role played by TRUMP's lawyer COHEN in secret liaison with Russian leadership
- COHEN engaged with Russians in trying to cover up scandal of MANAFORT and exposure of PAGE and meets Kremlin officials secretly in the EU in August in pursuit of this goal
- These secret contacts continue but are now farmed out to trusted agents in Kremlin-linked institutes so as to remain "plausibly deniable" for Russian regime
- Further confirmation that sacking of IVANOV and appointments of VAINO and KIRIYENKO linked to need to cover up Kremlin's TRUMP support operation

Detail

1. Speaking in confidence to a longstanding compatriot friend in mid-October 2016, a Kremlin insider highlighted the importance of Republican presidential candidate Donald TRUMP's lawyer, Michael COHEN, in the ongoing secret liaison relationship between the New York tycoon's campaign and the Russian leadership. COHEN's role had grown following the departure of Paul MANNAFORT as TRUMP's campaign manager in August 2016. Prior to that MANNAFORT had led for the TRUMP side.
2. According to the Kremlin insider, COHEN now was heavily engaged in a cover up and damage limitation operation in the attempt to prevent the full details of TRUMP's relationship with Russia being exposed. In pursuit of this aim, COHEN had met secretly with several Russian Presidential Administration (PA) Legal Department officials in an EU country in August 2016. The immediate issues had been to contain further scandals involving MANNAFORT's commercial and political role in Russia/Ukraine and to limit the damage arising from exposure of former TRUMP foreign policy advisor, Carter PAGE's secret meetings with Russian leadership figures in Moscow the previous month. The

overall objective had been to "to sweep it all under the carpet and make sure no connections could be fully established or proven"

3. Things had become even "hotter" since August on the TRUMP-Russia track. According to the Kremlin insider, this had meant that direct contact between the TRUMP team and Russia had been farmed out by the Kremlin to trusted agents of influence working in pro-government policy institutes like that of Law and Comparative Jurisprudence. COHEN however continued to lead for the TRUMP team.
4. Referring back to the (surprise) sacking of Sergei IVANOV as Head of PA in August 2016, his replacement by Anton VAINO and the appointment of former Russian premier Sergei KIRIYENKO to another senior position in the PA, the Kremlin insider repeated that this had been directly connected to the TRUMP support operation and the need to cover up now that it was being exposed by the USG and in the western media.

Company Comment

The Kremlin insider was unsure of the identities of the PA officials with whom COHEN met secretly in August, or the exact date/s and locations of the meeting/s. There were significant internal security barriers being erected in the PA as the TRUMP issue became more controversial and damaging. However s/he continued to try to obtain these.

19 October 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/166

US/RUSSIA: FURTHER DETAILS OF SECRET DIALOGUE BETWEEN TRUMP CAMPAIGN TEAM, KREMLIN AND ASSOCIATED HACKERS IN PRAGUE

Summary

- TRUMP's representative COHEN accompanied to Prague in August/September 2016 by 3 colleagues for secret discussions with Kremlin representatives and associated operators/hackers
- Agenda included how to process deniable cash payments to operatives; contingency plans for covering up operations; and action in event of a CLINTON election victory
- Some further details of Russian representatives/operatives involved; Romanian hackers employed; and use of Bulgaria as bolt hole to "lie low"
- Anti-CLINTON hackers and other operatives paid by both TRUMP team and Kremlin, but with ultimate loyalty to Head of PA IVANOV and his successor/s

Detail

1. We reported previously (2016/135 and /136) on secret meeting/s held in Prague, Czech Republic in August 2016 between then Republican presidential candidate Donald TRUMP's representative, Michael COHEN and his interlocutors from the Kremlin working under cover of Russian 'NGO' Rossotrudnichestvo.
2. [REDACTED] provided further details of these meeting/s and associated anti-CLINTON/Democratic Party operations. COHEN had been accompanied to Prague by 3 colleagues and the timing of the visit was either in the last week of August or the first week of September. One of their main Russian interlocutors was Oleg SOLODUKHIN operating under Rossotrudnichestvo cover. According to [REDACTED], the agenda comprised questions on how deniable cash payments were to be made to hackers who had worked in Europe under Kremlin direction against the CLINTON campaign and various contingencies for covering up these operations and Moscow's secret liaison with the TRUMP team more generally.


3. [REDACTED] reported that over the period March-September 2016 a company called XBT/Webzilla and its affiliates had been using botnets and porn traffic to transmit viruses, plant bugs, steal data and conduct "altering operations" against the Democratic Party leadership. Entities linked to one Aleksei GUBAROV were involved and he and another hacking expert, both recruited under duress by the FSB, Seva KAPSUGOVICH, were significant players in this operation. In Prague, COHEN agreed contingency plans for various scenarios to protect the operation, but in particular what was to be done in the event that Hillary CLINTON won the presidency. It was important in this event that all cash payments owed were made quickly and discreetly and that cyber and other operators were stood down/able to go effectively to ground to cover their traces. (We reported earlier that the involvement of political operatives Paul MANAFORT and Carter PAGE in the secret TRUMP-Kremlin liaison had been exposed in the media in the run-up to Prague and that damage limitation of these also was discussed by COHEN with the Kremlin representatives).
4. In terms of practical measures to be taken, it was agreed by the two sides in Prague to stand down various "Romanian hackers" (presumably based in their homeland or neighbouring eastern Europe) and that other operatives should head for a bolt-hole in Plovdiv, Bulgaria where they should "lay low". On payments, IVANOV's associate said that the operatives involved had been paid by both TRUMP's team and the Kremlin, though their orders and ultimate loyalty lay with IVANOV, as Head of the PA and thus ultimately responsible for the operation, and his designated successor/s after he was dismissed by president PUTIN in connection with the anti-CLINTON operation in mid August.

13 December 2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**FOI/PA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET****Civil Action No.: 19-CV-01279****Release Date: June 30, 2020****Total Withheld Page(s) = 157**

Bates Page FBI(19-cv-1279) Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19-cv-1279) -262 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -264	Duplicate of FBI(19-cv-1279) -225 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -227
FBI(19-cv-1279) -265 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -266	Duplicate of FBI(19-cv-1279) -230 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -231
FBI(19-cv-1279) -267 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -268	Duplicate of FBI(19-cv-1279) -228 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -229
FBI(19-cv-1279) -269 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -275	Duplicate of FBI(19-cv-1279) -232 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -238
FBI(19-cv-1279) -276 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -285	Duplicate of FBI(19-cv-1279) -241 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -250
FBI(19-cv-1279) -288 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -289	Duplicate of FBI(19-cv-1279) -253 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -254
FBI(19-cv-1279) -290 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -291	Duplicate of FBI(19-cv-1279) -239 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -240
FBI(19-cv-1279) -292 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -420	Consultation/Referral

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For this Page

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

(U) Title: ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Documents provided to FBI
Director Comey by Senator McCain.

Date: 12/14/2016

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041

DATE: 01-24-2020

b6 -1

b7C -1

b7E -5,-1

From: WASHINGTON FIELD

Contact: [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: [REDACTED]

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

b1 -1

b3 -1

b7E -6

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

Do not disseminate outside the FBI without the permission of the originator or program manager.

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ To provide a memorandum for the record regarding documents provided to FBI Director James Comey by Senator John McCain.

~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~~~Derived From: FBI~~~~NSISC-20090615~~~~Declassify On: 20411231~~

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

- (U) 1. ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ McCain reports to Comey 120916

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(U) Title: ~~S//OC/NF~~ Documents provided to FBI Director Comey by Senator McCain.

Re: [REDACTED] 12/14/2016

b3 -1

b7E -6

Details:

To provide a memorandum for the record regarding documents provided to FBI Director James Comey by Senator John McCain. The documents provided by Senator McCain appear to be reports provided to the FBI by

b1 -1

b3 -1

b6 -4

b7C -4

b7D -1

b7E -4,-7

(S) [REDACTED] Director Comey received the documents from Senator McCain on December 9, 2016 and the highlighted sections were on the documents prior to the Director receiving them. McCain stated he received the documents from [REDACTED] and McCain has not discussed the documents with anyone.

◆◆

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/080

**US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE DONALD TRUMP'S
ACTIVITIES IN RUSSIA AND COMPROMISING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
KREMLIN**

Summary

- Russian regime has been cultivating, supporting and assisting TRUMP for at least 5 years. Aim, endorsed by PUTIN, has been to encourage splits and divisions in western alliance
- So far TRUMP has declined various sweetener real estate business deals offered him in Russia in order to further the Kremlin's cultivation of him. However he and his inner circle have accepted a regular flow of intelligence from the Kremlin, including on his Democratic and other political rivals
- Former top Russian intelligence officer claims FSB has compromised TRUMP through his activities in Moscow sufficiently to be able to blackmail him. According to several knowledgeable sources, his conduct in Moscow has included perverted sexual acts which have been arranged/monitored by the FSB
- A dossier of compromising material on Hillary CLINTON has been collated by the Russian Intelligence Services over many years and mainly comprises bugged conversations she had on various visits to Russia and intercepted phone calls rather than any embarrassing conduct. The dossier is controlled by Kremlin spokesman, PESKOV, directly on PUTIN's orders. However it has not as yet been distributed abroad, including to TRUMP. Russian intentions for its deployment still unclear

Detail

1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in June 2016 sources A and B, a senior Russian Foreign Ministry figure and a former top level Russian intelligence officer still active inside the Kremlin respectively, the Russian authorities had been cultivating and supporting US Republican presidential candidate, Donald TRUMP for at least 5 years. Source B asserted that the TRUMP operation was both supported and directed by Russian President Vladimir PUTIN. Its aim was to sow discord and

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE

disunity both within the US itself, but more especially within the Transatlantic alliance which was viewed as inimical to Russia's interests. Source C, a senior Russian financial official said the TRUMP operation should be seen in terms of PUTIN's desire to return to Nineteenth Century 'Great Power' politics anchored upon countries' interests rather than the ideals-based international order established after World War Two. S/he had overheard PUTIN talking in this way to close associates on several occasions.

2. In terms of specifics, Source A confided that the Kremlin had been feeding TRUMP and his team valuable intelligence on his opponents, including Democratic presidential candidate Hillary CLINTON, for several years (see more below). This was confirmed by Source D, a close associate of TRUMP who had organized and managed his recent trips to Moscow, and who reported, also in June 2016, that this Russian intelligence had been "very helpful". The Kremlin's cultivation operation on TRUMP also had comprised offering him various lucrative real estate development business deals in Russia, especially in relation to the ongoing 2018 World Cup soccer tournament. However, so far, for reasons unknown, TRUMP had not taken up any of these.
3. However, there were other aspects to TRUMP's engagement with the Russian authorities. One which had borne fruit for them was to exploit TRUMP's personal obsessions and sexual perversion in order to obtain suitable 'kompromat' (compromising material) on him. According to Source D, where s/he had been present, TRUMP's (perverted) conduct in Moscow included hiring the presidential suite of the Ritz Carlton Hotel, where he knew President and Mrs OBAMA (whom he hated) had stayed on one of their official trips to Russia, and defiling the bed where they had slept by employing a number of prostitutes to perform a 'golden showers' (urination) show in front of him. The hotel was known to be under FSB control with microphones and concealed cameras in all the main rooms to record anything they wanted to.
4. The Moscow Ritz Carlton episode involving TRUMP reported above was confirmed by Source E, a senior (western) member of staff at the hotel, who said that s/he and several of the staff were aware of it at the time and subsequently. S/he believed it had happened in 2013. Source E provided an introduction for a company ethnic Russian operative to Source F, a female staffer at the hotel when TRUMP had stayed there, who also confirmed the story. Speaking separately in June 2016, Source B (the former top level Russian intelligence officer) asserted that TRUMP's unorthodox behavior in Russia over the years had provided the authorities there with enough embarrassing material on the now Republican presidential candidate to be able to blackmail him if they so wished.
5. Asked about the Kremlin's reported intelligence feed to TRUMP over recent years and rumours about a Russian dossier of 'kompromat' on

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE

Hillary CLINTON (being circulated), Source B confirmed the file's existence. S/he confided in a trusted compatriot that it had been collated by Department K of the FSB for many years, dating back to her husband Bill's presidency, and comprised mainly eavesdropped conversations of various sorts rather than details/evidence of unorthodox or embarrassing behavior. Some of the conversations were from bugged comments CLINTON had made on her various trips to Russia and focused on things she had said which contradicted her current position on various issues. Others were most probably from phone intercepts.

6. Continuing on this theme, Source G, a senior Kremlin official, confided that the CLINTON dossier was controlled exclusively by chief Kremlin spokesman, Dmitriy PESKOV, who was responsible for compiling/handling it on the explicit instructions of PUTIN himself. The dossier however had not as yet been made available abroad, including to TRUMP or his campaign team. At present it was unclear what PUTIN's intentions were in this regard.

20 June 2016

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: FURTHER DETAILS OF KREMLIN LIAISON WITH TRUMP CAMPAIGN

Summary

- Close associate of SECHIN confirms his secret meeting in Moscow with Carter PAGE in July
- Substance included offer of large stake in Rosneft in return for lifting sanctions on Russia. PAGE confirms this is TRUMP's intention
- SECHIN continued to think TRUMP could win presidency up to 17 October. Now looking to reorientate his engagement with the US
- Kremlin insider highlights importance of TRUMP's lawyer, Michael COHEN in covert relationship with Russia. COHEN's wife is of Russian descent and her father a leading property developer in Moscow

Detail

1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in mid October 2016, a close associate of Rosneft President and PUTIN ally Igor' SECHIN elaborated on the reported secret meeting between the latter and Carter PAGE, of US Republican presidential candidate's foreign policy team, in Moscow in July 2016. The secret meeting had been confirmed to him/her by a senior member of SECHIN's staff, in addition to by the Rosneft President himself. It took place on either 7 or 8 July, the same day or the one after Carter PAGE made a public speech to the Higher Economic School in Moscow.
2. In terms of the substance of their discussion, SECHIN's associate said that the Rosneft President was so keen to lift personal and corporate western sanctions imposed on the company, that he offered PAGE/TRUMP's associates the brokerage of up to a 19 per cent (privatised) stake in Rosneft in return. PAGE had expressed interest and confirmed that were TRUMP elected US president, then sanctions on Russia would be lifted.
3. According to SECHIN's close associate, the Rosneft President had continued to believe that TRUMP could win the US presidency right up to 17 October, when he assessed this was no longer possible. SECHIN was keen to re-adapt accordingly and put feelers out to other business and political contacts in the US instead.
4. Speaking separately to the same compatriot in mid-October 2016, a Kremlin insider with direct access to the leadership confirmed that a key role in the secret TRUMP campaign/Kremlin relationship was being played by the Republican candidate's personal lawyer Michael COHEN. [REDACTED]

b6 -3
b7C -3

Source Comment

5. SECHIN's associate opined that although PAGE had not stated it explicitly to SECHIN, he had clearly implied that in terms of his comment on TRUMP's intention to lift Russian sanctions if elected president, he was speaking with the Republican candidate's authority.

Company Comment

6.

b6 -3
b7C -3

18 October 2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**FOI/PA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET****Civil Action No.: 19-CV-01279****Release Date: July 31, 2020****Total Withheld Page(s) = 476**

Bates Page FBI(19-cv-1279) Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19-cv-1279) -421	(b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -5, -6, -7, -8, -9
FBI(19-cv-1279) -422	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -423	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1, (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -5, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -424	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -5, -6, -7, -8, -9
FBI(19-cv-1279) -425	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -9, -13
FBI(19-cv-1279) -426	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -427	(b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7
FBI(19-cv-1279) -428	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -430	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7
FBI(19-cv-1279) -431 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -433	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7
FBI(19-cv-1279) -436	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -5, -6, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -437	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -6, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -438	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -3, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -439	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -440	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -5, -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -441	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -442	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8

FBI(19-cv-1279) -443 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -444	(b)(3) -1 (b)(7)(E) -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -445	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -446	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) 1, -3, -4, -5 (b)(7)(D) -2 (b)(7)(E) -5, -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -447	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4, -5 (b)(7)(D) -2 (b)(7)(E) -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -448	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2, -3 (b)(7)(E) -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -449	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -450	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -5 (b)(7)(D) -2 (b)(7)(E) -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -451	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -3 (b)(7)(D) -2 (b)(7)(E) -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -452 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -453	(b)(3) -1 (b)(7)(E) -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -454	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4, -5 (b)(7)(D) -2 (b)(7)(E) -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -455	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4 (b)(7)(D) -2, -3 (b)(7)(E) -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -456 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -457	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(7)(D) -2 (b)(7)(E) -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -458	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1, -2 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -5, -6, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -459	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1, -2 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -460 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -461	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -462 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -463	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -464	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -465	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -3, -4, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -466	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -467	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -12
FBI(19-cv-1279) -468	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -11

FBI(19-cv-1279) -469 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -470	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -471	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -472 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -474	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -475	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -476	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -477	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -478 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -481	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -482	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -483	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -484	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -485	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -6, -7, -8, -12
FBI(19-cv-1279) -486	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -6, -7, -8, -10, -11
FBI(19-cv-1279) -487	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1, (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -488 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -491	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -492	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -11
FBI(19-cv-1279) -493	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -494	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -5, -6, -7, -8, -9
FBI(19-cv-1279) -495	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -496	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -497	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -498 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -499	(b)(3) -1 (b)(7)(E) -7, -8

FBI(19-cv-1279) -500	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -501	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -502 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -505	Duplicate of FBI(19-cv-1279) -430 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -433
FBI(19-cv-1279) -510	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -5, -6, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -511	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -512 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -513	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -514 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -515	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -516	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -517	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -518	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -6, -7, -8, -10, -11
FBI(19-cv-1279) -519	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -5, -6, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -520	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -521 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -522	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -523 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -524	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -525 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -526	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -527	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -528	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -529	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -530	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -6, -7, -8, -10, -11
FBI(19-cv-1279) -533	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -5, -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -534	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10

FBI(19-cv-1279) -535 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -537	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -538	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -539	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -3, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -540	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -541	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -12
FBI(19-cv-1279) -542	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -11
FBI(19-cv-1279) -543	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -544	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -545	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -546 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -548	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, 10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -549	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -550	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, 10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -551	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -3, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -552	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -553	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -554 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -556	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -557	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -558	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -559	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -560	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -2 (b)(7)(E) -4, -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -561	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1, (b)(7)(E) -4, -6, -7, -8, -10

FBI(19-cv-1279) -562	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -6, -7, -8, -10, -11, -12
FBI(19-cv-1279) -563 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -568	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -571	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -3, -4, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -5, -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -572	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -573	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -574	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -575 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -576	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1, -3 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -577 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -579	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -580	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -581	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -582 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -583	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -584	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -585 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -586	(b)(3) -1 (b)(7)(E) -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -587	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1, -3 (b)(7)(E) -4, -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -588 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -589	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -590	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -591	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -3, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -5, -6, -7, -8, -10, -13
FBI(19-cv-1279) -592	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -593	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -594 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -595	(b)(3) -1 (b)(7)(E) -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -596 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -597	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -8, -10

FBI(19-cv-1279) -598 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -600	Duplicate of email chain within FBI(19-cv-1279) -608 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -612
FBI(19-cv-1279) -601 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -603	Duplicate of email chain within FBI(19-cv-1279) -608 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -612
FBI(19-cv-1279) -604 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -607	Duplicate of email chain within FBI(19-cv-1279) -608 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -612
FBI(19-cv-1279) -613	Duplicate of email chain within FBI(19-cv-1279) -616 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -618
FBI(19-cv-1279) -614 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -615	Duplicate of email chain within FBI(19-cv-1279) -616 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -618
FBI(19-cv-1279) -619	(b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7
FBI(19-cv-1279) -623	Duplicate of FBI(19-cv-1279) -619
FBI(19-cv-1279) -624 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -627	Duplicate of email chain within FBI(19-cv-1279) -608 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -612
FBI(19-cv-1279) -633 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -634	Duplicate of email chain within FBI(19-cv-1279) -616 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -618
FBI(19-cv-1279) -635 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -647	Referral/Consultation
FBI(19-cv-1279) -648 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -649	Duplicate of email chain within FBI(19-cv-1279) -681 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -683
FBI(19-cv-1279) -657 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -659	Duplicate of email chain within FBI(19-cv-1279) -681 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -683
FBI(19-cv-1279) -660	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -5, -7
FBI(19-cv-1279) -661	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -13
FBI(19-cv-1279) -662	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -3 (b)(7)(E) -4, -7, -13
FBI(19-cv-1279) -663 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -665	Duplicate of email chain within FBI(19-cv-1279) -666 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -669
FBI(19-cv-1279) -666	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -5, -7
FBI(19-cv-1279) -667	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -5, -7, -13
FBI(19-cv-1279) -668	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -3 (b)(7)(E) -4, -5, -7, -13
FBI(19-cv-1279) -669	(b)(7)(E) -7
FBI(19-cv-1279) -670	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -4 (b)(7)(E) -4, -5, -7
FBI(19-cv-1279) -671	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -4, -5, -7, -13
FBI(19-cv-1279) -672	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -3 (b)(7)(E) -4, -5, -7, -13
FBI(19-cv-1279) -673	(b)(7)(E) -7
FBI(19-cv-1279) -674 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -676	Duplicate of email chain within FBI(19-cv-1279) -635 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -638

FBI(19-cv-1279) -677 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -680	Duplicate of email chain within FBI(19-cv-1279) -643 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -647
FBI(19-cv-1279) -681 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -683	Referral/Consultation
FBI(19-cv-1279) -684	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5)-1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -3, -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -685	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5) -1 (b)(7)(E) -3, -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -686 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -780	Referral/Consultation
FBI(19-cv-1279) -781	(b)(5)-1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -1, -4, -7
FBI(19-cv-1279) -782	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5)-1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -3, -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -783	(b)(3) -1 (b)(5)-1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -3, -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -784	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5)-1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -3, -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -785	(b)(3) -1 (b)(5)-1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -3, -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -786 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -787	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5)-1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -3, -4, -7, -8, -13
FBI(19-cv-1279) -788 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -790	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5)-1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -3, -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -791	(b)(3) -1 (b)(5)-1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -3, -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -792	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5)-1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -3, -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -793	(b)(3) -1 (b)(5)-1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -3, -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -794	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5)-1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -3, -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -795	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5)-1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -3, -4, -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -796	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5)-1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4 (b)(7)(D) -1, -3 (b)(7)(E) -3, -4, -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -797	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5)-1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4, -5 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -3, -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -798	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5)-1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -3, -4, -6, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -799	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5)-1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -3, -4, -6, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -800	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5)-1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3, -4 (b)(7)(D) -1 (b)(7)(E) -3, -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -801	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5)-1 (b)(7)(E) -3, -4, -7, -8

FBI(19-cv-1279) -802	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5)-1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3 (b)(7)(E) -3, -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -803	(b)(1) -1 (b)(3) -1 (b)(5)-1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3 (b)(7)(E) -3, -4, -7, -8, -10
FBI(19-cv-1279) -804	(b)(3) -1 (b)(5)-1 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3 (b)(7)(E) -3, -4, -7, -8
FBI(19-cv-1279) -805 to FBI(19-cv-1279) -931	Referral/Consultation

Deleted Pages
No Duplication Fee
For these Pages

From: [redacted]
To: [redacted]
Subject: FW: Thoughts about this for the AD? --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
Date: Thursday, December 12, 2019 12:48:44 PM
Attachments: [redacted]

b1 -1
b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -7

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSICG
Declassify On: 20441231~~

b6 -1
b7C -1

Per request.



b6 -1
b7C -1

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, February 23, 2017 3:55 PM
To: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: Thoughts about this for the AD? --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -1

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20421231~~

b6 -1
b7C -1

Given new status, not sure how we want to classify this (so made it S//NF), but would like your thoughts about delivery.

~~Classification: SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classification: SECRET//NOFORN~~

From: [REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: [REDACTED] -- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]
Date: Thursday, December 12, 2019 12:57:06 PM
Attachments: [REDACTED] (S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -1,-4,-5
b7C -1,-4,-5
b7D -1,-2
b7E -7,-8

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT

b3 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -8

~~Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: FBI NSICG
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM~~
=====

Per request.



b6 -1
b7C -1


From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, May 02, 2017 4:48 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED] -- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -1,-7,-8

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT

~~Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM~~
=====

b6 -1
b7C -1




b3 -1
b7E -8

Here's the first wave,

Let me know your thoughts/questions, and we can parse stuff out tomorrow as well!



b6 -1
b7C -1



b5 -1
b7E -7

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ 

b3 -1
b7E -8

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ 

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1 -1
b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -7,-8

(S) From: [redacted]
To: [redacted]
Subject: FW: [redacted] -- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]
Date: Thursday, December 12, 2019 12:49:10 PM
Attachments: [redacted]

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSICG
Declassify On: 20441231
=====

Per request.



b6 -1
b7C -1

From: [redacted]
Sent: Monday, February 27, 2017 12:03 PM
To: PRIESTAP, E. W. (CD) (FBI) [redacted]; CORSI, DINA M. (CD) (FBI)
[redacted] BOONE, JENNIFER C. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] STRZOK,
PETER P. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -1,-7,-8

(S) Subject: [redacted] -- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20421231
=====



b3 -1
b7E -8

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b3 -1
b7E -8

FBI(19-cv-1279)-506

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b3 -1
b7E -8

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2044
DATE: 12-27-2019

From: [REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: [REDACTED] -- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]
Date: Thursday, December 12, 2019 12:57:30 PM
Attachments: [REDACTED] (S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -2
b7E -7,-8

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT

~~Classified By: [REDACTED]~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSICG~~
~~Declassify On: 50X1-HUM~~
=====

Per request.



b6 -1
b7C -1

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, May 10, 2017 5:10 PM

To: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]


Cc: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Subject: [REDACTED] --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -1,-7,-8

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT

~~Classified By: [REDACTED]~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301~~
~~Declassify On: 50X1-HUM~~
=====



b3 -1
b7E -8

(S) Good Afternoon Everyone,

To make things a little more accessible, I have separate [REDACTED]

b1 -1
b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -2
b7E -7,-8

FBI(19-cv-1279)-508

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

b5 -1
b7E -7

See attached,

Thanks,

[Redacted]

b3 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -8

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2044
DATE: 12-23-2019

(S) From: [redacted]
To: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]
Date: Thursday, December 12, 2019 12:49:42 PM
Attachments: [redacted]

b1 -1
b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -2
b7E -7,-8

(S) Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]
Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSICG
Declassify On: 20441231
=====

Per your request.

[redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, February 28, 2017 9:43 AM
To: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI) [redacted]

b1 -1
b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -2
b7E -1,-7,-8

(S) Cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]
Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20421231
=====

[redacted] - If you're good to go with this, it can be officially passed to [redacted] team.

b6 -1
b7C -1

Best,

[redacted]

[redacted]

b3 -1
b7E -8

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

b3 -1
b7E -8

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~//NOFORN [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~//NOFORN [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [redacted]
To: [redacted]
Subject: FW: [redacted] ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]
Date: Thursday, December 12, 2019 12:50:46 PM
Attachments: [redacted] (S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -1,-4,-5
b7C -1,-4,-5
b7D -1,-2
b7E -7,-8

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSICG
Declassify On: 20441231
=====

Per request.

[redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, March 28, 2017 8:58 AM
To: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: FW: [redacted] ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -1,-7,-8

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]
Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20421231
=====

FYI

[redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1

From: [redacted]
Sent: Monday, March 27, 2017 2:45 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -7,-8


Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]
Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20421231
=====

[redacted]

b3 -1
b7E -8

FBI(19-cv-1279)-569

~~SECRET~~



=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ 
=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
=====

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSIC [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041
DATE: 01-24-2020

b6 -1
b7C -1

MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)

From: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 10:10 AM
To: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Latest [REDACTED] -- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By:~~ [REDACTED]
~~Derived From:~~ FBI NSIC dated 20130301
~~Declassify On:~~ 20411231
=====

b6 -1
b7C -1

They do. They were highlighted when he received them by someone on the McCain side of things presumably.

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 8:08 AM
To: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Latest [REDACTED] -- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By:~~ [REDACTED]
~~Derived From:~~ FBI NSIC dated 20130301
~~Declassify On:~~ 20411231
=====

b6 -1
b7C -1

D said they had highlighting on them?

From: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 6:27 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED]

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1

Subject: RE: Latest [REDACTED] -- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By:~~ [REDACTED]
~~Derived From:~~ FBI NSIC dated 20130301

b6 -1
b7C -1

FBI(19-cv-1279)-608

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~Declassify On: 20411231~~

I should add that none of them are new and all of them are duplicative [redacted]

b7E -4,-7

J

From: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)

Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 6:25 AM

To: [redacted]

b6 -1,-4

Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); [redacted]

b7C -1,-4

b7D -1

Subject: RE: Latest [redacted] --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]

b6 -1

Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301

b7C -1

~~Declassify On: 20411231~~

I have an envelope of [redacted] that the D received from John McCain as well that can be added to

[redacted] swing by this morning and I'll give them to you to [redacted]

b6 -1,-4

b7C -1,-4

b7D -1

b7E -1,-4,-7

Thanks,

J

From: [redacted]

Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 4:19 PM

To: [redacted]

b6 -1,-4

b7C -1,-4

b7D -1

Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); [redacted]

Subject: RE: Latest [redacted] --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]

b6 -1

Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301

b7C -1

~~Declassify On: 20411231~~

FBI(19-cv-1279)-609

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -1,-4,-7

Following up on the new information on the thumb drive -- please see [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 2:04 PM

b6 -1
b7C -1

FBI(19-cv-1279)-610

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: [REDACTED]

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1

Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED]

Subject: Latest [REDACTED] -- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20411231
=====

b6 -1
b7C -1

Folks,

As many of you know we obtained a USB drive from Glenn Simpson via a DOJ colleague. We are
handling as evidence [REDACTED]

b1 -1

[REDACTED] A cursory look at the file
appears they are indeed [REDACTED] Please review and lets discuss tomorrow morning.

b3 -1

b6 -4

b7C -4

b7D -1

In addition, we will resume 0900 meetings every Wednesday until we no longer need to meet. Lets
up again tomorrow.

b7E -1,-4,-5,-7

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -1,-5

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FBI(19-cv-1279)-611

~~SECRET~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b6 -1
b7C -1

STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, January 05, 2017 6:38 PM
To: RYBICKI, JAMES E. (DO) (FBI); [REDACTED]
Cc: PRIESTAP, E. W. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: [REDACTED] - ~~SECRET~~
Attachments: [REDACTED].pdf (S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM
=====

b6 -1
b7C -1

<[REDACTED].pdf>

b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

From: RYBICKI, JAMES E. (DO) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, January 05, 2017 6:07 PM
To: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED]
Cc: PRIESTAP, E. W. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: [REDACTED] - ~~SECRET~~
(S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM
=====

b6 -1
b7C -1

Thanks. That might be helpful - soft copy is fine.

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, January 05, 2017 6:05 PM
To: RYBICKI, JAMES E. (DO) (FBI); [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Cc: PRIESTAP, E. W. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Subject: RE: [REDACTED] - ~~SECRET~~
(S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -1,-4,-7

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM
=====

b6 -1
b7C -1

FBI(19-cv-1279)-616

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

I can email or bring you [redacted] if it would be helpful.

From: RYBICKI, JAMES E. (DO) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, January 05, 2017 5:06 PM
To: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); [redacted]
Cc: PRIESTAP, E. W. (CD) (FBI); [redacted]
Subject: RE: [redacted] ~~SECRET~~ (S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM
=====

b1 -1
(S) b3 -1
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, January 05, 2017 4:55 PM
To: RYBICKI, JAMES E. (DO) (FBI); [redacted]
[redacted]

Cc: PRIESTAP, E. W. (CD) (FBI); [redacted]
[redacted]

Subject: [redacted] ~~SECRET~~ (S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -1,-4,-7

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM
=====

Jim - re D question as [redacted]
[redacted] (S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

Thanks,

Pete

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~
=====

FBI(19-cv-1279)-617

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

=====
Classification: SECRET

=====
Classification: SECRET

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b6 -1

b7C -1

RYBICKI, JAMES E. (DO) (FBI)

From: RYBICKI, JAMES E. (DO) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, January 05, 2017 6:55 PM
To: COMEY, JAMES B. (DO) (FBI)
Subject: FW: [REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~
Attachments: [REDACTED].pdf (S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM
=====

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, January 05, 2017 6:38 PM
To: RYBICKI, JAMES E. (DO) (FBI); [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Cc: PRIESTAP, E. W. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Subject: RE: [REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~
(S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -1,-4,-7

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM
=====

From: RYBICKI, JAMES E. (DO) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, January 05, 2017 6:07 PM
To: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED]
Cc: PRIESTAP, E. W. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: [REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~
(S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

FBI(19-cv-1279)-620

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM
=====

b6 -1
b7C -1

Thanks. That might be helpful -- soft copy is fine.

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, January 05, 2017 6:05 PM

To: RYBICKI, JAMES E. (DO) (FBI) [REDACTED]

Cc: PRIESTAP, E. W. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~
(S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -1,-4,-7

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM
=====

[REDACTED]

b1 -1
(S) b3 -1
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

I can email or bring you [REDACTED] if it would be helpful.

From: RYBICKI, JAMES E. (DO) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, January 05, 2017 5:06 PM

To: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED]

Cc: PRIESTAP, E. W. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~
(S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM
=====

[REDACTED]

(S) b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

FBI(19-cv-1279)-621

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)

Sent: Thursday, January 05, 2017 4:55 PM

To: RYBICKI, JAMES E. (DO) (FBI)

Cc: PRIESTAP, E. W. (CD) (FBI)

Subject:

~~SECRET~~

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -1,-4,-7

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By:

Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301

Declassify On: 50X1-HUM

Jim - re D question as

(S)

Thanks,

Pete

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

Classification: SECRET

Classification: SECRET

Classification: SECRET

Classification: SECRET

Classification: SECRET

Classification: SECRET

FBI(19-cv-1279)-622

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b6 -1
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED b7C -1
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 6:29 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: FW: Latest [redacted] --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20411231
=====

background

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 2:52 PM
To: [redacted]

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1

Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); [redacted]

Subject: RE: Latest [redacted] --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20411231
=====

Please see latest [redacted]

b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

~~SECRET~~

FBI(19-cv-1279)-628

~~SECRET~~

b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 4:19 PM
To: [REDACTED]

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1

Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Latest [REDACTED] -- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FBI(19-cv-1279)-629

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6 -1
b7C -1

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301

Declassify On: 20411231

=====

b3 -1
b5 -1

Following up on the new information on the thumb drive -- please see [REDACTED]

b6 -4
b7C -4

[REDACTED]

b7D -1

b7E -1,-4,-7

FBI(19-cv-1279)-630

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b5 -1
b7E -4,-7

[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 2:04 PM
To: [Redacted]

Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); [Redacted]

Subject: Latest [Redacted] --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [Redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20411231
=====

Folks,

As many of you know we obtained a USB drive from Glenn Simpson via a DOJ colleague. We are handling as evidence [Redacted]

b1 -1

(S)

[Redacted] A cursory look at the file appears they are indeed [Redacted] Please review and lets discuss tomorrow morning.

b3 -1

b6 -4

b7C -4

b7D -1

In addition, we will resume 0900 meetings every Wednesday until we no longer need to meet. Lets
up again tomorrow.

b7E -1,-4,-5,-7

Thanks,

[Redacted]

b6 -1

b7C -1

b7E -1,-5

[Redacted]

FBI(19-cv-1279)-631

~~SECRET~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSIC [redacted] b6 -1
REASON: 1.4 (C, D) b7C -1
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041
DATE: 07-16-2020

[redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7D -1, -4

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 8:55 AM
To: [redacted]

Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); [redacted]

Subject: RE: Latest [redacted] --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20411231
=====

Duhadaway at 0900

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 4:19 PM
To: [redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7D -1, -4

Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); [redacted]

Subject: RE: Latest [redacted] --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20411231
=====

Following up on the new information on the thumb drive -- please see [redacted]

b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -1, -4, -7

FBI(19-cv-1279)-650

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -4, -7

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 2:04 PM
To: [REDACTED]

b6 -1
b7C -1

Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED]

FBI(19-cv-1279)-651

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]
Subject: Latest [redacted] ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20411231
=====

Folks,

(S)

As many of you know we obtained a USB drive from Glenn Simpson via a DOJ colleague. We are
handling as evidence [redacted]

b1 -1

[redacted] A cursory look at the file
appears they are indeed [redacted] Please review and lets discuss tomorrow morning.

b3 -1

b6 -4

b7C -4

b7D -1

In addition, we will resume 0900 meetings every Wednesday until we no longer need to meet. Lets
up again tomorrow. b7E -1,-4,-5,-7

Thanks,

[redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -1,-5

[redacted]

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FBI(19-cv-1279)-652

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b6 -1
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED b7C -1
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted]

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 2:52 PM

To: [redacted]

Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); [redacted]

Subject: RE: Latest [redacted] ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20411231
=====

b6 -1
b7C -1

Please see latest [redacted]

[redacted]

b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1

Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 4:19 PM

To: [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Subject: RE: Latest [Redacted] -- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [Redacted]

Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301

Declassify On: 20411231

=====

Following up on the new information on the thumb drive -- please see [Redacted]

b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -1,-4,-7

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 2:04 PM
To: [REDACTED]

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1

Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Subject: Latest [REDACTED] --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FBI(19-cv-1279)-655

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301

Declassify On: 20411231

=====

Folks,

As many of you know we obtained a USB drive from Glenn Simpson via a DOJ colleague. We are handling as evidence [REDACTED]

b1 -1

(S)

[REDACTED] A cursory look at the file appears they are indeed [REDACTED] Please review and lets discuss tomorrow morning.

b3 -1

b6 -4

b7C -4

b7D -1

In addition, we will resume 0900 meetings every Wednesday until we no longer need to meet. Lets up again tomorrow.

b7E -1,-4,-5,-7

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

b6 -1

b7C -1

b7E -1,-5

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: [REDACTED] (b)(5)-1
To: [CORSI; DINA M. \(CD\) \(FBI\)](#) [REDACTED]; [BOONE; JENNIFER C. \(CD\) \(FBI\)](#) [REDACTED]; (b)(6)-1,-4
[PRIESTAP; E. W. \(CD\) \(FBI\)](#) [REDACTED]; [MOFFA; JONATHAN C. \(CD\) \(FBI\)](#) [REDACTED]; (b)(7)(C)-1,-4
[REDACTED]; [STRZOK; PETER P. \(CD\) \(FBI\)](#) [REDACTED] (b)(7)(D)-1
Subject: [REDACTED] --- TOP SECRET (b)(7)(E)-1,-4,-7
Date: Friday, January 13, 2017 10:40:40 PM
Attachments: [REDACTED]

Classification: TOP SECRET Classified By: [REDACTED] Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301 Declassify On: 20271231

=====
FBINET, please find attached the [REDACTED] Per my email via [REDACTED] I have also (b)(5)-1
attached the [REDACTED]. Regards, [REDACTED] (b)(6)-1,-4
=====
Classification: (b)(7)(C)-1,-4
(b)(7)(D)-1
(b)(7)(E)-4,-7

~~TOP SECRET~~

DATE: 2/24/2020
FBI INFO. CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4(B,C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12/31/2095

(b)(6)-1
(b)(7)(C)-1

~~TOP SECRET~~

FBI(19-cv-1279)781

b3 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -3,-8

(U) ~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]
(U) Annex A

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ **Additional Reporting From an FBI Source on Russian Influence Efforts**

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ An FBI source, using both identified and unidentified subsources, volunteered highly politically sensitive information from the summer to the fall of 2016 on Russian influence efforts aimed at the US presidential election.²⁷⁴ We have only limited corroboration of the source's reporting in this case and did not use it to reach the analytic conclusions of the CIA/FBI/NSA assessment.

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ The source is an executive of a private business intelligence firm and a former employee of a friendly foreign intelligence service who has been compensated for previous reporting over the past three years. The source maintains and collects information from a layered network of identified and unidentified subsources, some of which has been corroborated in the past. The source collected this information on behalf of private clients and was not compensated for it by the FBI.²⁷⁵

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ The source's reporting appears to have been acquired by multiple Western press organizations starting in October.²⁷⁶

(U) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] Some of the FBI source's reporting is consistent with the judgments in this assessment. The FBI source claimed, for example, that Putin ordered the influence effort with the aim of defeating Secretary Clinton, whom Putin "feared and hated," [REDACTED]

b1 -1
b3 -1
b7E -3,-4,-7

(TS) [REDACTED]
(U) • ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] The FBI source quoted three sub-sources who reported that Moscow's aim in its campaign was to upend the international liberal order, cause tensions with European allies, shift US policy on key Russian interests, and undermine US politics regardless of the electoral result [REDACTED]

b1 -1
b3 -1
b7E -3,-4,-7

(TS) [REDACTED]
(U) • ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ The FBI source also quoted a subsource who said that the Kremlin was providing a select number of Russian journalists with privileged access to pre-published Wikileaks material on Clinton and other Democratic Party officials, and that Russian journalists were being pressured not to publish critical pieces on the President-elect or favorable stories on Clinton,²⁸³ consistent with our assessments of Russian state control of the media and its demonstrated preference for the President-elect.

(U) • ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] The FBI source also reported that the Kremlin curbed its influence efforts following the media outcry in the US in late July and August, and that Putin [REDACTED] regretted his decision to intervene [REDACTED]

b1 -1
b3 -1
b7E -3,-4,-7

(TS) [REDACTED]
(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ The most politically sensitive claims by the FBI source alleged a close relationship between the President-elect and the Kremlin. The source claimed that the President-elect and his top campaign

(U) ~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]
b3 -1
b7E -3,-8

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3 -1
b7E -3, -8

advisers knowingly worked with Russian officials to bolster his chances of beating Secretary Clinton; were fully knowledgeable of Russia's direction of leaked Democratic emails; and were offered financial compensation from Moscow.²⁸⁶

- (U) • ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ The FBI source claimed that the Kremlin had cultivated the President-elect for at least five years, had fed him and his team intelligence about Secretary Clinton and other opponents for years, and agreed to use WikiLeaks in return for policy concessions by the President-elect—assuming he won the election—on NATO and Ukraine.²⁸⁷
 - (U) • ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ The FBI source also claimed Russian authorities possessed compromising material on the President-elect's activities when he was in Russia, as well as a compromising dossier on Secretary Clinton's political activities that was controlled by the Kremlin and not shared with the President-elect or his team.²⁸⁸
 - (U) • ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ The FBI source claimed that secret meetings between the Kremlin and the President-elect's team were handled by some of the President-elect's advisers, at least one of whom was allegedly offered financial remuneration for a policy change lifting sanctions on Russia.²⁸⁹
-
- (U) • ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ The same source provided the FBI with additional information not developed by the layered subsource network. The FBI source caveated that, although similar to previously provided reporting in terms of content, the source was unable to vouch for the additional information's sourcing and accuracy. Hence this information is not included in this product.

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3 -1
b7E -3, -8

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
Civil Action# 19-cv-1279

Total Deleted Page(s) = 33

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b7E - 4,-7;

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4,-7;

Page 8 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1,-2; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3; b7D - 1; b7E -
4,-7;

Page 9 ~ b5 - 2;

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- 4,-7;

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7;

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- 4,-7;

Page 13 ~ b5 - 2;

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1; b7E - 4,-7;

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- 4,-7;

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b7E - 4,-7;

Page 20 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1,-2; b6 - 4; b7C - 4; b7D - 1,-2; b7E -
4,-7;

Page 21 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1,-2; b6 - 1,-3,-4; b7C - 1,-3,-4; b7D -
1,-2; b7E - 4,-7;

Page 22 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1,-2; b6 - 1,-3,-4; b7C - 1,-3,-4; b7D -
1,-2; b7E - 4,-7;

Page 23 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1,-2; b6 - 1,-3,-4; b7C - 1,-3,-4; b7D -
1,-2; b7E - 4,-7;

Page 24 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1,-2; b6 - 1,3,-4; b7C - 1,-3,-4; b7D -
1,-2; b7E - 4,-7;

Page 25 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1,-2; b6 - 1,-3,-4; b7C - 1,-3,-4; b7D -
1; b7E - 4,-7;

Page 26 ~ b5 - 2; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;

Page 27 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1,-2; b6 - 1,-3,-4; b7C - 1,-3,-4; b7D -
1; b7E - 4,-7;

Page 28 ~ b5 - 2;

Page 29 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1,-2; b6 - 1,-3,-4; b7C - 1,-3,-4; b7D -
1,-2; b7E - 4,-7;

Page 30 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1,-2; b6 - 1,-3,-4; b7C - 1,-3,-4; b7D - 1; b7E - 4,-7;
Page 31 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1,-2; b6 - 1,-3,-4; b7C - 1,-3,-4; b7D - 1; b7E - 4,-7;
Page 32 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 2;
Page 33 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1,-2; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3; b7D - 1; b7E - 4,-7;
Page 34 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1,-2; b6 - 1,-3,-4; b7C - 1,-3,-4; b7D - 1; b7E - 4,-7;
Page 35 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1,-2; b6 - 4; b7C - 4; b7D - 1; b7E - 4,-7;

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~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2042
DATE: 12-19-2019

b6 -1
b7C -1

b6 -1
b7C -1

From: ARCHEY, DAVID W. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 05, 2017 9:42 AM
To: ZEBLEY, AARON M [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: [REDACTED] --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b5 -2
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -1,-8

SentinelCaseId: TRANSITORY RECORD

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -8

~~Classified By:~~ [REDACTED]
~~Derived From:~~ FBI NSIC CG
~~Declassify On:~~ 20421231

=====

TRANSITORY RECORD
Aaron,

Please see below for document you requested. It was prepared by [REDACTED] and his team. Please let us know if you have any questions.

b6 -1
b7C -1

David W. Archey
Deputy Assistant Director
Special Counsel's Office
Desk: [REDACTED]
Mobile: [REDACTED]

b7E -1

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From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, December 04, 2017 7:58 AM
To: ARCHEY, DAVID W. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED] --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b5 -2
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -1,-8

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -8

~~Classified By:~~ [REDACTED]
~~Derived From:~~ FBI NSIC CG
~~Declassify On:~~ 20421231

=====

TRANSITORY RECORD

Dave,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

--

b5 -2
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1

51

b1 -1
b3 -1
b5 -2
b7E -8

15

Supervisory Intelligence Analyst

b6 -1
b7C -1

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b5 -2

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

135

b1 -1
b3 -1
b7E -8

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
Civil Action# 19-cv-1279

Total Deleted Page(s) = 13

Page 1 ~ Referral/Consult;

Page 2 ~ Referral/Consult;

Page 3 ~ Referral/Consult;

Page 4 ~ Referral/Consult;

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Page 9 ~ b5 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 7;

Page 10 ~ b5 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 7;

Page 14 ~ Duplicate;

Page 15 ~ Duplicate;

Page 18 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1; b6 - 1,-4; b7C - 1,-4; b7D - 1,-2; b7E
- 4,-7,-8;

Page 19 ~ Duplicate;

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X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -7

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2016 8:49 AM
To: PRIESTAP, E. W. (CD) (FBI); STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: [redacted]
[redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6 -1
b7C -1

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20411231
=====

b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -7

FYI below. As context about why it was interesting, the below is from [redacted]
[redacted]

b5 -1
b7E -4, -7

b6 -1
b7C -1

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2016 7:50 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: FW: [redacted]
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -7

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
=====

b7E -7

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
=====

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2042
DATE: 01-27-2020

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -7,-8

From:

Sent:

Sunday, January 15, 2017 9:54 PM

To:

BOONE, JENNIFER C. (CD) (FBI)

Subject:

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Attachments:

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By:

Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301

Declassify On: 50X1-HUM

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -8

All -

b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1

-- I've scanned all of the reporting in report sequence order, including the most recent XBT
Holding related report (#166)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -7,-8

-- I will uplift this to TS so that there is a copy on that side as well.

Best,

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -7,-8

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FBI(19-cv-1279)-943

~~SECRET~~

STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, April 11, 2017 10:04 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: FW: [redacted] Paras --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
Attachments: [redacted] Summary_v1.docx

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20421231
=====

b6 -1
b7C -1

For your records. I did not send to OCA

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, April 11, 2017 8:50 AM
To: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: [redacted] Paras --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20421231
=====

b6 -1
b7C -1

Pete,

Please see attached. Let me know if this is OK, or if it needs additional info. I tweaked some of the language from the validation report (which I'll be sending via Lync, as the file is quite large)

[redacted] b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -4,-7,-10

[redacted] b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -4,-7

Best,

[redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1

b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1

<<[REDACTED] Summary_v1.docx>>

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

PRIESTAP, E. W. (CD) (FBI)

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1

From: PRIESTAP, E. W. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, May 04, 2017 12:05 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: RE: How much [redacted] was paid in total --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20421231
=====

b6 -1
b7C -1

Thank you [redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, May 04, 2017 11:42 AM
To: PRIESTAP, E. W. (CD) (FBI); [redacted] STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -1

Subject: How much [redacted] was paid in total --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20421231
=====

b6 -1
b7C -1

Came up in the prep session this AM. From the validation report -

-- For the time of being operated, VMU notes [redacted]

b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1,-3
b7E -4,-10

[redacted] However, the closing EC documents paying [redacted]

\$95,000.00. [redacted]

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
=====

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (B,C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041
DATE: 01-27-2020

STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, November 22, 2016 4:41 PM

To:

[REDACTED]

Cc:

Subject:

[REDACTED]

(S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -7

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301

Declassify On: 50X1-HUM

=====

b6 -1
b7C -1

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

(S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -7

Separately, Bill advised he spoke with Jim Baker. Baker had spoken with David Corn; Corn told him both Elijah Cummings and Nancy Pelosi have the reports. Further, Corn said he got the reports from a Republican [NFI, presumably someone who had hired [REDACTED] but that he [Corn] had followed up directly with [REDACTED]

b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1

Peter P. Strzok II
Deputy Assistant Director
Branch I, Counterintelligence Division

[REDACTED]

b7E -1

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, April 10, 2017 5:46 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: Couple of requests --- ~~SECRET~~

b6 -1
b7C -1

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM
=====

H [redacted] a couple of requests from you. Im not sure if [redacted] relayed the first to you. The second is new.

b5 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

Thanks,
Pete

Peter P. Strzok II
Deputy Assistant Director
Branch I, Counterintelligence Division

b7E -1

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~

STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, April 11, 2017 10:04 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: RE: [redacted] Paras --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20421231
=====

Thanks very much

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, April 11, 2017 8:50 AM
To: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: [redacted] Paras --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20421231
=====

Pete,

Please see attached. Let me know if this is OK, or if it needs additional info. I tweaked some of the language from the validation report (which I'll be sending via Lync, as the file is quite large)

[redacted] b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -4,-7,-10

[redacted] b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -4,-7

Best,

[redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1

<< File: Summary_v1.docx >>

b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, May 04, 2017 2:59 PM
To: [redacted] PRIESTAP, E. W. (CD) (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: RE: How much [redacted] was paid in total --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20421231
=====

b6 -1
b7C -1

Rgr. [redacted]

b5 -1

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, May 04, 2017 11:42 AM
To: PRIESTAP, E. W. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -1

Subject: How much [redacted] was paid in total --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20421231
=====

b6 -1
b7C -1

Came up in the prep session this AM. From the validation report -

-- For the time of being operated, VMU notes [redacted]
[redacted] However, the closing EC documents paying
\$95,000.00. [redacted]

b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1,-3
b7E -4,-10

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041

DATE: 01-30-2020

b6 -1
b7C -1

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Friday, October 14, 2016 10:40 AM

To: [REDACTED]

b6 -1
b6 per NSD
b7C -1
b7C per NSD

Cc: [REDACTED] STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA,

JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Follow-up Questions --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Signed By: [REDACTED]

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [REDACTED] Attorney, OI, NSD, DOJ Derived From: DOJ/NSI SCG 1 MIS dated 20120701 Declassify On: 20411231 =====

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

b5 per NSD
b6 -1
b7C -1

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Friday, October 14, 2016 9:49 AM

To: [REDACTED]

b6 -1
b6 per NSD
b7C -1
b7C per NSD
b7E -1

Cc: [REDACTED] Strzok, Peter (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan (FBI); [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Follow-up Questions --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: DOJ/NSI SCG 1 MIS dated 20120701 Declassify On: 20411231
=====

b6 -1
b7C -1

Additionally, I spoke to [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] this morning [REDACTED] and he provided additional clarification:

b1 -1
b3 -1
b5 -1,-2
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7D -2
b7E -4,-5,-7

(S)

FBI(19-cv-1279)-635

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1 -1
b3 -1
b5 -1,-2
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7D -2
b7E -4,-7

(S)

b5 -1,-2
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4

b5 -1,-2
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4

b5 -1,-2
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -4

Regards,

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -1,-5

A/SSA

-----Original Message-----

From:

Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2016 3:22 PM

To:

Cc:

STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI);

MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)

Subject: RE: Follow-up Questions --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6 -1
b6 per NSD
b7C -1
b7C per NSD

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By:

Derived From: DOJ/NSI SCG 1 MIS dated 20120701 Declassify On: 20411231

=====

b6 -1
b6 per NSD
b7C -1
b7C per NSD

we are working on answers to all of these questions to ensure we can accurately answer. We have reached out to the and will get back to you shortly. Where we felt comfortable answering - we provided those

FBI(19-cv-1279)-636

~~SECRET~~


~~SECRET~~

answers below.



b6 -1
b7C -1

b5 -1,-2
b7E -4



-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted]

[mailto:[redacted]]

Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2016 2:25 PM

To: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: Follow-up Questions --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6 -1
b6 per NSD
b7C -1
b7C per NSD

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By [redacted] NSD USA GOV Derived From: DOJ/NSI SCG 1 MIS
dated 20120701 Declassify On: 20411231

=====



b5 per NSD

~~SECRET~~

FBI(19-cv-1279)-637

b5 per NSD
b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD



=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041
DATE: 01-30-2020

b6 -1
b7C -1

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, October 14, 2016 10:44 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED] STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA,
JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Follow-up Questions --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
Signed By: [REDACTED]

b6 -1
b6 per NSD
b7C -1
b7C per NSD

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By [REDACTED] Attorney, OI, NSD, DOJ Derived From: DOJ/NSI SCG 1 MIS dated
20120701 Declassify On: 20411231

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

b5 per NSD

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, October 14, 2016 9:49 AM
To: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED] Strzok, Peter (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan
(FBI) [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Follow-up Questions --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6 -1
b6 per NSD
b7C -1
b7C per NSD
b7E -1

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: DOJ/NSI SCG 1 MIS dated 20120701 Declassify On: 20411231
=====

Additionally, I spoke to [REDACTED] n [REDACTED] this morning [REDACTED] and
he provided additional clarification:

b1 -1
b3 -1
b5 -1,-2
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7D -2
b7E -4,-5,-7

(S)

~~SECRET~~

FBI(19-cv-1279)-639

~~SECRET~~

b1 -1
b3 -1
b5 -1,-2
(S) b7E -4,-7

b5 -1,-2
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4

b5 -1,-2
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4

b5 -1,-2
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -4

Regards,

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -1,-5

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2016 3:22 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED] STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI);
MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b6 -1
b6 per NSD
b7C -1
b7C per NSD

Subject: RE: Follow-up Questions --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: DOJ/NSI SCG 1 MIS dated 20120701 Declassify On: 20411231

[REDACTED] we are working on answers to all of these questions to ensure we can accurately answer. We have reached out to the [REDACTED] and will get back to you shortly. Where we felt comfortable answering - we provided those answers below.

b6 -1
b6 per NSD
b7C -1
b7C per NSD

FBI(19-cv-1279)-640

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b5 -1,-2
b7E -4

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted]

[mailto:[redacted]]

Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2016 2:25 PM

To: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: Follow-up Questions --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted] NSD USA GOV Derived From: DOJ/NSI SCG 1 MIS
dated 20120701 Declassify On: 20411231

=====

b6 -1
b6 per NSD
b7C -1
b7C per NSD


b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

b5 per NSD

FBI(19-cv-1279)-641

~~SECRET~~

b5 per NSD
b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD



=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041
DATE: 01-30-2020

b6 -1
b7C -1

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, October 14, 2016 11:08 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED] STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Follow-up Questions --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
Signed By: [REDACTED]

b6 -1
b6 per NSD
b7C -1
b7C per NSD

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [REDACTED] Attorney, OI, NSD, DOJ Derived From: DOJ/NSI SCG 1 MIS dated 20120701 Declassify On: 20411231

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

b5 per NSD

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, October 14, 2016 11:04 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED] strzok, Peter (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan (FBI); [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Follow-up Questions --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6 -1
b6 per NSD
b7C -1
b7C per NSD
b7E -1

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: DOJ/NSI SCG 1 MIS dated 20120701 Declassify On: 20411231
=====

TRANSITORY RECORD

b5 -1,-2
b7E -4

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
[mailto: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, October 14, 2016 10:44 AM

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

FBI(19-cv-1279)-643

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED] STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI);
MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Follow-up Questions --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6 -1
b6 per NSD
b7C -1
b7C per NSD

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [REDACTED] Attorney, OI, NSD, DOJ Derived From: DOJ/NSI
SCG 1 MIS dated 20120701 Declassify On: 20411231
=====

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

[REDACTED]

b5 per NSD

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, October 14, 2016 9:49 AM
To: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED] Strzok, Peter (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan
(FBI); [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Follow-up Questions --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6 -1
b6 per NSD
b7C -1
b7C per NSD
b7E -1

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: DOJ/NSI SCG 1 MIS dated 20120701 Declassify On: 20411231
=====

Additionally, I spoke to [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] this morning [REDACTED] and
he provided additional clarification:

b1 -1
b3 -1
b5 -1,-2
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7D -2
b7E -4,-5,-7

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b5 -1,-2
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4

[REDACTED]

b5 -1,-2
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4

~~SECRET~~

FBI(19-cv-1279)-644

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

b5 -1,-2
b7E -4

[REDACTED]

b5 -1,-2
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -4

Regards,

[REDACTED]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -1,-5

[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From:

[REDACTED]

Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2016 3:22 PM

To:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED] STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI);

MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI);

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Follow-up Questions --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6 -1
b6 per NSD
b7C -1
b7C per NSD

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By:

[REDACTED]

Derived From: DOJ/NSI SCG 1 MIS dated 20120701 Declassify On: 20411231

=====

[REDACTED] we are working on answers to all of these questions to ensure we can accurately answer. We have reached out to the [REDACTED] and will get back to you shortly. Where we felt comfortable answering - we provided those answers below.

b6 -1
b6 per NSD
b7C -1
b7C per NSD

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b5 -1,-2
b7E -4

FBI(19-cv-1279)-645

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b5 -1,-2
b7E -4

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]

[mailto:[REDACTED]]

Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2016 2:25 PM

To: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: Follow-up Questions --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ ---

b6 -1
b6 per NSD
b7C -1
b7C per NSD

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [REDACTED] NSD USA GOV Derived From: DOJ/NSI SCG 1 MIS
dated 20120701 Declassify On: 20411231

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

=====

b5 per NSD

FBI(19-cv-1279)-646

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b5 per NSD
b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted] b6 -1
REASON: 1.4 (C, D) [redacted] b7C -1
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041
DATE: 01-30-2020

STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 8:15 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: FW: --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b3 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -8

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20411231
=====

TRANSITORY RECORD

Detail you may not want/need, but below is more accurate.

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 7:51 AM
To: [redacted] STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); [redacted]
Subject: RE: --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b3 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -8

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20411231
=====

TRANSITORY RECORD

[redacted] (S)
b1 -1
b3 -1
b5 -2

[redacted]
b6 -1
b7C -1

FBI(19-cv-1279)-681

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Assistant General Counsel
National Security & Cyber Law Branch

[REDACTED]

b6 -1
b7C -1

This message is transmitted to you by the Office of the General Counsel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This message, along with any other attachments, may be confidential and legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, please destroy it promptly without further retention or dissemination (unless otherwise required by law). Please notify the sender of the error by a separate e-mail or by calling

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 6:53 AM
To: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED]
Subject: --- ~~SECRET~~//NOFORN [REDACTED]

b3 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -8

Classification: ~~SECRET~~//NOFORN [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20411231

=====

TRANSITORY RECORD

b1 -1
b3 -1
b5 -1,-2
b6 -1,-5
b7C -1,-5
b7E -7,-8,-13

FBI(19-cv-1279)-682

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b5 -1,-2
b7E -5,-7,-8

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b3 -1
b7E -8

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

FBI(19-cv-1279)-683

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (U)
~~FBI INTERNAL USE ONLY~~
(Effective 11-14-2016)

Human Source Validation Report

[REDACTED] Validation Management Unit b6 -1

b7C -1

b7E -4, -5

Classified by [REDACTED]
Derived from: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify on: 50X1-NOFORN

(U//~~FOUO~~) Human Source Validation Report: [REDACTED]

b7E -4

(U) Summary

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Validation Management Unit (VMU) concurs with the closing of [REDACTED] VMU assesses it is likely" [REDACTED] has contributed to the FBI's Criminal Program. VMU makes this assessment with medium confidence,^b based on the fact that [REDACTED] reporting has been minimally corroborated; his or her access and placement is commensurate with his or her reporting; and on the presence of one major control issue noted in [REDACTED] Delta file. He or she provided information regarding various issues of value to the US Intelligence Community (USIC). However, [REDACTED] exposed his or her relationship with the FBI. As a result, he or she was closed. VMU has provided a list of recommendations should he or she be re-opened.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//NOFORN~~
~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(U) Administrative

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

b7E -4

(U) Details

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ This Human Source Validation Report (HSVR) conveys VMU's validation review and assessment of [REDACTED] for the period [REDACTED] October 2013 to 01 November 2016.

CPS Score: 10 (Resides outside US and extra-territorial traveler)

Purpose of Review: Special Request

Primary Reporting Program: [REDACTED]

Secondary Reporting Program: Counternintelligence Division (CD)

Field Office: [REDACTED]

b7E -4

b7E -5

^a (U) See Appendix A (Expressions of Likelihood).

^b (U) See Appendix B (Confidence in Assessments and Judgments Based on a Body of Information).

^c (U) This validation review includes a check of the following databases: [REDACTED]

b7E -4, -5, -10

[REDACTED] conducted database checks on 09 February 2017.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (U)
~~FBI INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

Confidential Human Source Coordinator (CHSC): [REDACTED]
Handling Agent: [REDACTED]
Date CHS was Opened/Closed: [REDACTED] October 2013; Closed 01 November 2016

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -4

(U) Background

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] is a foreign national currently employed at his or her own business [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was closed on 01 November 2016 due to disclosing his or her relationship to an online publication website. This is the first HSVR completed on [REDACTED] (S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b7D -1
b7E -4, -7, -9

(U) Suitability

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ VMU assesses it was likely [REDACTED] was suitable for continued operation at the time based on his or her authenticity and reliability. However, due to the disclosure of his or her relationship with the FBI to an online publication, [REDACTED] was subsequently closed. (S)

b7E -4

(U) Authenticity

- (U) • ~~(S//NF)~~ **Identity:** According to information contained in the Delta file, there are no reasons to doubt his or her identity. [REDACTED] has sufficiently verified [REDACTED] identity through background investigations and updated criminal history checks during the operation. (S)
- (U) • ~~(S//NF)~~ VMU conducted [REDACTED] on 09 February 2017 and verified the existence of [REDACTED] privately owned company. (S)
- (U) • ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (S)
- (U) • ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (S)
- (U) • ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -3
b7C -3
b7D -1
b7E -4, -7

b3 -1
b7D -1
b7E -4, -5

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -3
b7C -3
b7D -1
b7E -4, -7

[REDACTED]

b7E -4,-10

- ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b3 -1
b7E -4,-5,-10

(U) Reliability

- ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b7E -4

(U) Control

- ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b7E -4

(U) Production Review/Investigative Support

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b7E -4

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Since being opened [REDACTED] reporting resulted in the dissemination of 10 IIRs.

b7E -4

- ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b7D -1
b7E -4,-7,-9

- ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b7E -4

(U) Corroboration

- ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b7E -4

b6 -5
b7C -5
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7,-9

- (U) • ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]
[redacted] (S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -3
b7C -3
b7D -1,-3
b7E -4,-7

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ *Collection Requirements*

- [redacted]
• [redacted]
• [redacted]
• [redacted] (S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b7E -6,-7

(U) *Threat Issues*

- (U) • ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] (S)
[redacted]
• (U//~~EX~~) [redacted]
[redacted]

b1 -1
b3 -1
b7E -6,-7

(U) *Key Intelligence Questions:*

- (U) • ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] (S)
[redacted]
• [redacted] (S)
[redacted]
• [redacted] (S)
[redacted]

b1 -1
b3 -1
b7E -7
b1 -1
b3 -1
b7E -7

(U) *Compliance Issues*

- (U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]
[redacted]

b7E -4,-10

[REDACTED]

b7E -4

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Even though [REDACTED] resides outside the US, [REDACTED]

b1 -1
b3 -1
(b7E -4,-5)

[REDACTED]

(U) Caveat

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

b7E -4

(U) Analyst Comments

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] notes as a result of the disclosure of his or her relationship to an online publishing company, [REDACTED] was closed. [REDACTED]

b7E -4,-5

[REDACTED]

(U) Recommendations

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

b7E -4

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

b3 -1
b7D -1
b7E -4,-5

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

b7E -4,-5

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] b7E -4,-5
[redacted]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] b7E -4,-5
[redacted]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] b7E -4,-5
[redacted]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ According to the Delta file, VMU notes potential information being provided to FBI through [redacted] privately owned company. [redacted] b7E -4
[redacted]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] b7E -4
[redacted]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] b3 -1
[redacted] b7D -1
b7E -4

(U) Outlook

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] b3 -1
[redacted] b7D -1
[redacted] exposed their relationship with the FBI b7E -4
[redacted]

(U) Consumers: SSA [redacted] b3 -1

(U) From: VMU b6 -1

(U) Drafted by: IA [redacted] b7C -1
b7E -6

(U) Case ID #: [redacted]

(U) Approval: UC [redacted] 5/23/17
SSA [redacted]

(U) Contact: IA [redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN (U)~~
~~FBI INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

(U) This HSVR was prepared by VMU. Please address any comments or questions to IA [redacted]
[redacted] or to SSA [redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1

~~FBI INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN (U)~~

(U) Appendix A: Expressions of Likelihood (or Probability)

(U) Phrases such as “the FBI judges” and “the FBI assesses,” and terms such as “likely” and “probably” convey analytical judgments and assessments. The chart approximates how expressions of likelihood and probability correlate with percentages of chance.

UNCLASSIFIED

<i>Terms of Likelihood</i>	Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain(y)
<i>Terms of Probability</i>	Remote	Highly Improbable	Improbable (Improbably)	Roughly Even Odds	Probable (Probably)	Highly Probable	Nearly Certain
	1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%

(U) Unless otherwise stated, the FBI does not derive judgments via statistical analysis.

(U) **Appendix B: Confidence in Assessments and Judgments Based on a Body of Information**

(U) Confidence levels reflect the quality and quantity of the source information supporting judgment. Consequently, the FBI ascribes high, medium, or low levels of confidence to assessments, as follows:

(U) **High confidence** generally indicates the FBI's judgments are based on high quality information, from multiple sources. High confidence in a judgment does not imply the assessment is a fact or a certainty; such judgments might be wrong. While additional reporting and information sources may change analytical judgments, such changes are most likely to be refinements and not substantial in nature.

(U) **Medium confidence** generally means the information is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence. Additional reporting or information sources have the potential to increase the FBI's confidence levels or substantively change analytical judgments.

(U) **Low confidence** generally means the information's credibility or plausibility is uncertain, the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or the reliability of the sources is questionable. Absent additional reporting or information sources, analytical judgments should be considered preliminary in nature.

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
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b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Import Form

Form Type: EMAIL

Date: 11/18/2016

(U) Title: ~~(S//NF)~~ SIA Notes from [] with []

Approved By: []

Drafted By: []

b3 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-6

(U) Case ID #: [] ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ Notes compiled by SIA [] from []
meeting with []

b3 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4

Reason: 1.4(c)


Derived From: FBI NSIC dated
20130301

Declassify On: 20411231

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~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

(U)

Title: ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ [redacted]

Date: 12/14/2016

From: WASHINGTON FIELD

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -1,-4,-5,-7

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted]

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;
[redacted] (U) SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER
~~(S//OC/NF)~~ [redacted]
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT-RUSSIA;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER
[redacted] (U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ [redacted]
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

b3 -1
b7E -6,-13

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

Do not disseminate outside the FBI without the permission of the originator or program manager.

(U)

Synopsis: ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ This document memorializes the [redacted]
[redacted] as of December 14, 2016.

b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

Reason: 1.4(b)

Derived From: FBI

NSISC-20090615

Declassify On: 20411231

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

- (U) 1. ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ [redacted]

b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b3 -1
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-6,-7

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(U)
Title: ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ [redacted]

Re: [redacted] 12/14/2016


Details:

This document memorializes the [redacted] as of
December 14, 2016. [redacted] is attached to this serial.

b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7

◆◆

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

(U) Title: ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Document information provided

Date: 02/17/2017

(S) From: WASHINGTON FIELD

Contact: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
 REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
 DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2042
 DATE: 11-23-2020

b1 -1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED b3 -1

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXC b6 -1,-4

WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE b7C -1,-4

b7D -3

b7E -1,-5,-7

Approved By: STRZOK PETER P II
 PRIESTAP E W

Drafted By: [REDACTED]
 STRZOK PETER P II

(U) Case ID #: [REDACTED] ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;
 FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
 RUSSIA;
 SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

b3 -1

b7E -6

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

Do not disseminate outside the FBI without the permission of the originator or program manager.

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Document information provided [REDACTED]

b1 -1

b3 -1

b6 -4

b7C -4

b7D -3

b7E -7

~~Reason: 1.4(b)
 Derived From: FBI
 NSISC-20090615
 Declassify On: 20411231~~

Details:

This communication documents information provided to Counterintelligence Division Assistant Director (AD) E. W. Priestap and Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Peter P. Strzok [REDACTED]

AD Priestap and DAD [REDACTED] (S)

b1 -1

b3 -1

b6 -4

b7C -4

b7D -3

b7E -7

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -3
b7E -6,-7

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(U) Title: ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Document information provided [Redacted]

(S)

Re: [Redacted] 02/17/2017

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -3
b7E -4,-7

(S) Strzok met [Redacted] in late November. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ [Redacted]

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1,-3
b7E -4,-7

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ [Redacted]

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -3,-4
b7C -3,-4
b7D -1,-3
b7E -4,-7

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ [Redacted]

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1,-3
b7E -4,-7

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ [Redacted]

b1 -1
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b7C -4
b7D -1,-3
b7E -4,-7

(S) [Redacted]

♦♦


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~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~



b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

(U) Title: ~~(S//NF)~~ Telcal with [redacted]

Date: 10/12/2017

CC: [redacted]

From: SCO

SCO Team

Contact: [redacted]

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -1,-6

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] ~~(U)~~ ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ Document telephone conversation with [redacted] on 10/06
/2017.

b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1

~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~

~~Derived From: National
Security Information SCG
Declassify On: 20421231~~

Details:

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] contacted SSA [redacted] via [redacted] on 10/06/2017 in order to discuss the 10/05/2017 and 10/06/2017 news articles regarding the recent FBI interview of [redacted] advised he did not believe the leak came from his side, although acknowledged he was aware that one individual he knew had "leaked" a report that [redacted] was willing to speak with United States Congressional committees regarding the dossier. [redacted] advised this report was not true, and he had no intention of speaking with Congress. [redacted] trusted FBI and Special Counsel, but he did not trust Congress. [redacted] thought this made him appear to be uncooperative, but he was happy to continue working with FBI and Special Counsel. [redacted] advised the recent news reports were

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-8

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -6

(U) Title: ~~(S//NF)~~ Telcal with [redacted]
Re: [redacted] 10/12/2017

thin, and because they did not contain any real details of the meetings with Special Counsel, he was not terribly concerned.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] advised he planned to meet with his primary sub-source [redacted]
[redacted] advised he would speak to the source about coming forward to Special Counsel and would let SSA [redacted] know if the source was ready to meet. [redacted] further advised he had some information regarding [redacted]
[redacted]


b3 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] advised he wished to meet again with Special Counsel, and further wished to provide information on the above topics, as well as others. SSA [redacted] advised no decision had yet been made about taking the new information. [redacted] advised he would be in touch with SSA [redacted]

b6 1,-4
b7C 1,-4
b7D -4

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~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

(U) Title: ~~(S//NF)~~ Telcal with [redacted]

Date: 12/28/2017

From: SCO

SCO Team

Contact: [redacted]

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -1,-6

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

(U) Case ID #: [redacted]

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ To document a [redacted] conversation between [redacted]
and SSA [redacted] on October 14, 2017.

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -8

~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~

~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-
20090615~~

~~Declassify On: 20421231~~

Details:

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ On 10/13/2017, [redacted] reached out to SSA [redacted] via [redacted]
[redacted] and requested [redacted] call, as he had updates and issues to
discuss. SSA [redacted] responded that [redacted] would call him the following
day. On 10/14/2017, SSA [redacted] reached out to [redacted] via [redacted]
[redacted] advised of the following:

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -4
b7E -8

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Regarding his primary subsource, [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] advised if Special Counsel (SCO) personnel wished, they

b3 -1
b6 -3,-4
b7C -3,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b6 -4
b7C -4
b7D -1
b7E -6

(U) Title: ~~(S//NF)~~ Telcal with [redacted]
Re: [redacted] 12/28/2017

could meet [redacted]
[redacted]

b3 -1
b6 -3,-4
b7C -3,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] advised he had new leads and new information he wished to share with the Special Counsel. SSA [redacted] advised [redacted] that decisions had not yet been made regarding receiving new information from [redacted] and [redacted] was not able to accept new information at that time.

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] advised he continued to be concerned with the leak situation regarding the Special Counsel meeting with [redacted] [redacted] SSA [redacted] advised although the SCO was always concerned with leaks, the SCO was not particularly concerned at that time, as there had been no new reports, and no substantive information had been reported regarding their meeting at all.

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] advised he wanted to switch from [redacted] [redacted] for further communication. [redacted] also wished to email information to the SCO via protonmail. SSA [redacted] advised she would discuss the above with SCO management.

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -8

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~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

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Civil Action# 19-cv-1279

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Page 22 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4; b7E - 7,-8;
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Page 24 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4; b7E - 7,-8;
Page 25 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4; b7E - 7,-8;
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Page 44 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b6 - 1,4; b7C - 1,-4; b7E - 7,-8;
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Page 46 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b6 - 4; b7C - 4; b7E - 7,-8;

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Page 59 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b6 - 4; b7C - 4; b7E - 7,-8;
Page 60 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4; b7E - 7,-8;
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Page 62 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4; b7E - 7,-8;
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Page 66 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4; b7E - 7,-8;
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Page 73 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4; b7E - 7,-8,-9;
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
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Civil Action# 19-cv-1279

Total Deleted Page(s) = 65

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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Civil Action# 19-cv-1279

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b7E - 4,-5,-7;
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Page 14 ~ b3 - 1; b5 - 1; b6 - 4; b7C - 4; b7D - 1; b7E - 4,-7;
Page 15 ~ b3 - 1; b5 - 1; b6 - 1,-4; b7C - 1,-4; b7E - 4,-5,-7;
Page 16 ~ b3 - 1; b5 - 1; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4; b7E - 4,-7;
Page 17 ~ b5 - 1; b7E - 4,-7;
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Page 19 ~ b3 - 1; b5 - 1; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3; b7E - 4,-7,-9;
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Page 22 ~ b3 - 1; b5 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 4,-7,-8,-9;
Page 23 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1; b6 - 1,-4; b7C - 1,-4; b7E - 7,-8,-9;
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
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Civil Action# 19-cv-1279

Total Deleted Page(s) = 50

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Page 13 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 1,-3,-4; b7C - 1,-3,-4; b7E - 4,-7,-8;
Page 14 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 1,-3,-4; b7C - 1,-3,-4; b7E - 4,-7,-8;
Page 15 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 1,-3,-4; b7C - 1,-3,-4; b7E - 4,-7,-8;
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Page 25 ~ b3 - 1; b5 - 1; b7D - 1; b7E - 4,-5,-7,-9,-10;
Page 26 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1,-3; b7E - 4,-6,-7,-9,-10;
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Page 31 ~ b5 - 1;
Page 32 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-4; b7C - 1,-3,-4; b7D - 1; b7E - 4,-7,-8,-11;
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7,-8;
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From: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, November 18, 2016 10:57 AM
To: PRIESTAP, E. W. (CD) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: White Paper --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b3 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -8

SentinelCaseId: NON-RECORD

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT

~~Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI-NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20411231~~



b5 -1

Jon Moffa, Section Chief

[redacted]
Counterintelligence Division
[redacted]
[redacted]

b7E -1,-5



b3 -1
b7E -8

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2092
DATE: 11-24-2020

b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1

~~Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20421231~~

Current situation:

- WFO conducted an interview of Bruce OHR on 05/15/2017. OHR advised he spoke with Christopher Steele via WhatsApp on both 05/13/2017 and 05/15/2017. OHR asked Steele if he would be willing to meet with FBI agents, and Steele agreed. FBIHQ in turn contacted [REDACTED] and AD Priestap will interview Steele. [REDACTED]

(5)

!

34

Upcoming activities:

-
-
-
- FBIHQ will set up an interview with Steele and look to interview as soon as possible.

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -3,-4
b7C -3,-4
b7D -1,-3
b7E -4,-5,-7,-8

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -1, -5

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

b6 -1, -4
b7C -1, -4
b7D -1
b7E -1

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, October 4, 2017 12:05 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: My notes re: first day --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
Attachments: 20170918-[redacted].Debriefing_Part_B_Draft.docx

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT

~~Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC CG
Declassify On: 20421231~~

b6 -1
b7C -1

[redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1

See what you think. Add/clarify anything please.

[redacted] for your review as well.

Out of abundance of caution – though we need to determine one way or another how we’re handling classification – I’m classifying this email ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~.

Best,

[redacted]

Supervisory Intelligence Analyst

NOTICE: This email (including any attachments) is intended for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed. It may contain information that is privileged, confidential, or otherwise protected by applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient (or the recipient's agent), you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, copying, or use of this email or its contents is strictly prohibited. If you received this email in error, please notify the sender immediately and destroy all copies.

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

From: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, January 13, 2017 4:40 PM
To: PRIESTAP, E. W. (CD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] CORSI, DINA M. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: Draft --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

SentinelCaseId: NON-RECORD

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20421231
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b6 -1
b7C -1



b5 -1

Jon Moffa
Section Chief

[redacted]
Counterintelligence Division

b7E -1,-5

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (DO) (FBI)

From: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (DO) (FBI) [REDACTED]

Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 9:31 AM

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: [REDACTED] stuff--- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Attachments: [REDACTED]
(S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -1,-4,-7

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2042
DATE: 11-24-2020

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: FBI NSIC CG
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM
=====~~

b6 -1
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED b7C -1
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[REDACTED] (S)

b1 -1
b3 -1
b6 -4
b7C -4

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FBI(19-cv-1279)-1191

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

b6 -1

b7C -1

b7E -1

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, December 22, 2016 8:06 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Comparison Chart --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041
DATE: 11-23-2020

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: FBI-NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20411231~~

b6 -1

b7C -1

FY:

[REDACTED]

b6 -1

b7C -1

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2016 10:55 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: Comparison Chart --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6 -1

b7C -1

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: FBI-NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20411231~~

b6 -1

b7C -1

(S)

[REDACTED]

b1 -1
b3 -1
b5 -1
b6 -1,-4
b7C -1,-4
b7D -1
b7E -4,-7,-8,-10

~~SECRET~~

FBI(19-cv-1279)-1227

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
Civil Action# 19-cv-1279

Total Deleted Page(s) = 83

Page 27 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1 and per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3;
b7E - 4,-7,-8;

Page 28 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1 and pe DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4;
b7E - 4,-7,-8;

Page 29 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1 and pe DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4;
b7E - 4,-7,-8;

Page 30 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1 and pe DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4;
b7E - 4,-7,-8;

Page 31 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1 and pe DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4;
b7E - 4,-7,-8;

Page 33 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1 and per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E -
4,-7;

Page 34 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1 and per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4;
b7E - 4,-7,-8;

Page 35 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1 and per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E -
4,-7;

Page 36 ~ b3 - 1; b5 - 1 and per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 4,-7;

Page 37 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1 and per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4;
b7E - 4,-7,-8;

Page 38 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1 and per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4;
b7E - 4,-7,-8;

Page 39 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1 and per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4;
b7E - 4,-7,-8;

Page 40 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1 and per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4;
b7E - 4,-7,-8;

Page 41 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1 and per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4;
b7E - 4,-7,-8;

Page 42 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1 and per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4;
b7E - 4,-7,-8;

Page 43 ~ b3 - 1; b5 - 1 and per DOJ/OIP; b7E - 4,-7,-8;

Page 44 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1 and per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4;
b7E - 4,-7,-8;

Page 45 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - 1 and per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4;
b7E - 4,-7,-8;

Page 46 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 1; b5 - per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 4,-7;

Page 47 ~ b3 - 1; b5 - per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3; b7E - 4,-7;

Page 48 ~ b3 - 1; b5 - per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 4,-7;

Page 49 ~ b3 - 1; b5 - per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 4,-7;

Page 50 ~ b3 - 1; b5 - per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 4,-7;

Page 51 ~ b3 - 1; b5 - per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 4,-7;

Page 52 ~ b3 - 1; b5 - per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 4,-7;

Page 53 ~ b3 - 1; b5 - per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 4,-7;

Page 54 ~ b3 - 1; b5 - per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 4,-7;

Page 55 ~ b3 - 1; b5 - per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 4,-7;

Page 56 ~ b3 - 1; b5 - per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 4,-7;

Page 57 ~ b3 - 1; b5 - per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 4,-7;

Page 58 ~ b3 - 1; b5 - per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 4,-7;

Page 59 ~ b3 - 1; b5 - per DOJ/OIP; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 4,-7;

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X Deleted Page(s) X

X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 FOI/PA
 DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
 Civil Action No.: 19-cv-1279

Release Date: April 30, 2021

Total Withheld Pages = 188

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19-cv-1279)-327	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1,-3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-328	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-5,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-329	(b)(1) -1 and per NSA; (b)(3) -1 and per NSA; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-330	(b)(1) -1 and per DOS; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-331	(b)(1) -1 and per DIA and DOS; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-332	(b)(1) -1 and per NSA and DOS; (b)(3) -1 and per NSA; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9 and per DOS
FBI(19-cv-1279)-333	(b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8
FBI(19-cv-1279)-334	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8
FBI(19-cv-1279)-335	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8
FBI(19-cv-1279)-336	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-5,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-337	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-5,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-338	(b)(1) -1 and per NSA and DOS; (b)(3) -1 and per NSA; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-339	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-5,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-340	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-341	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-342	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-5,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-343	(b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-344	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9,-13

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19-cv-1279)-345	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9,-13
FBI(19-cv-1279)-346	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-347	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-348	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-349	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9,-13
FBI(19-cv-1279)-350	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-351	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-352	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9,-13
FBI(19-cv-1279)-353	(b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-354	(b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-355	(b)(1) -1 and per DOS; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-356	(b)(1) -1 and per NSA and DOS; (b)(3) -1 and per NSA; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9,-10
FBI(19-cv-1279)-357	(b)(1) -1 and per NSA; (b)(3) -1 and per NSA; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-358	(b)(1) -1 and per NSA; (b)(3) -1 and per NSA; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9,-10
FBI(19-cv-1279)-359	(b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-360	(b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-361	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-362	(b)(1) -1 and per NSA; (b)(3) -1 and per NSA; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-363	(b)(1) -1 and per NSA; (b)(3) -1 and per NSA; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-364	(b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-365	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-366	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19-cv-1279)-367	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-368	(b)(1) -1 and per NSA; (b)(3) -1 and per NSA; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9,-10
FBI(19-cv-1279)-369	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-370	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-371	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-5,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-372	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-373	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-374	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-375	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-376	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-377	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-378	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-5,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-379	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-380	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-381	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-382	(b)(1) -1 and per NSA; (b)(3) -1 and per NSA; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-383	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-384	(b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) 3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-385	(b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) 3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-386	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-387	(b)(1) -1 and per NSA; (b)(3) -1 and per NSA; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-388	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19-cv-1279)-389	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-390	(b)(1) -1 and per DIA; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-391	(b)(1) -1 and per DIA and NCIS; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-392	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-393	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-394	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5 and per DHS; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9,-10 and per DHS
FBI(19-cv-1279)-395	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -1,-3,-4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9,-10
FBI(19-cv-1279)-396	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-397	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-398	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-399	(b)(1) -1 and per NSA; (b)(3) -1 and per NSA; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10
FBI(19-cv-1279)-400	(b)(1) -1 and per NSA and DOS; (b)(3) -1 and per NSA; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9,-10
FBI(19-cv-1279)-401	(b)(1) -1 and per NSA, DIA, and DOS; (b)(3) -1 and per NSA and DIA; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4,-5 and per DHS; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10 and per DHS and DOS
FBI(19-cv-1279)-402	(b)(1) -1 and per NSA and DOS; (b)(3) -1 and per NSA; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6) -4,-5 and per DOS; (b)(7)(C) -4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,- 4,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10
FBI(19-cv-1279)-403	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10
FBI(19-cv-1279)-404	(b)(1) -1 and per NSA; (b)(3) -1 and per NSA; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10
FBI(19-cv-1279)-405	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10
FBI(19-cv-1279)-406	(b)(1) -1 and per DOS; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10
FBI(19-cv-1279)-407	(b)(1) -1 and per NSA and DOS; (b)(3) -1 and per NSA; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19-cv-1279)-408	(b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-409	(b)(1) -1 and per NSA; (b)(3) -1 and per NSA; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10
FBI(19-cv-1279)-410	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9,-10
FBI(19-cv-1279)-411	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4,-5 and per DHS; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10 and per DHS
FBI(19-cv-1279)-412	(b)(1) -1 and per NSA; (b)(3) -1 and per NSA; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-7,-8,-9,-10
FBI(19-cv-1279)-413	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10
FBI(19-cv-1279)-414	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10
FBI(19-cv-1279)-415	(b)(1) -1 and per NSA; (b)(3) -1 and per NSA; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5 and per DHS; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10 and per DHS
FBI(19-cv-1279)-416	(b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -3,-4,-5 and per DHS; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10 and per DHS
FBI(19-cv-1279)-417	(b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-6,-7,-8,-9
FBI(19-cv-1279)-418	(b)(1) -1 and per DIA and NCIS; (b)(3) -1 and per DIA; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4,-5 and per DHS; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10 and per DHS
FBI(19-cv-1279)-419	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10
FBI(19-cv-1279)-420	(b)(1) -1; (b)(3) -1; (b)(5) -1; (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C) -4,-5; (b)(7)(D) -1; (b)(7)(E) -3,-4,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10
FBI(19-cv-1279)-687 through FBI(19-cv-1279)-780	Duplicate to FBI(19-cv-1279)-327 through FBI(19-cv-1279)-420

3 January 2018

(U) Background on the Steele Corroboration Matrix

(U)(~~S//NF~~) The following document reflects the status of FBI efforts as of 6 April 2017 to corroborate reporting collected by Christopher Steele related to the 2016 Presidential Election. This is the last draft of the matrix that had been completed prior to the establishment of the Special Counsel's Office. The matrix reflects an internal deliberative analytic product that leveraged a wide range of FBI, open source, and other agency sources in an effort to assess Steele's reporting.

(U)(~~S//NF~~) This document is provided with the following redactions:

- (U) • (~~S//NF~~) Other Government Agency (OGA) classified information for which the FBI is not the originator has been redacted. Each OGA redaction includes an annotation identifying the originating owning agency of that information.
- (U) • (~~S//NF~~) Information that would identify Steele sub-sources or sub-sub-sources has been redacted. Information that could identify other FBI human sources has also been redacted.
- (U) • (~~S//NF~~) FBI case file numbers have been redacted.

(U)(~~S//NF~~) The document was created for internal investigative use only and was not intended to be disseminated; therefore, sensitive U.S. Person information was included for the purposes of advancing internal FBI investigative and analytic efforts. Prior to any use or dissemination of this information, the FBI will have to assess the release of the U.S. Person information in accordance with applicable policies and procedures.