FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76318T80
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-07-2016

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

February 25, 2014

To: [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

National Security Agency
9800 Savage Road, Suite 6814
Fort Meade, Maryland 20755-6247

From: [redacted] b1 b3 b6 b7C

Subj: [redacted] (S)

~~(S//NF)~~ As the NSA is aware, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is conducting [redacted] (S) Attached for the NSA is an FBI letterhead memorandum (LHM) requesting assistance for ongoing investigation. As always, the FBI greatly appreciates the assistance of the NSA. b1 b3 b7E

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The FBIHQ point of contact in this matter is Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] b6 b7C b7E

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~Classified By: F32M74K74~~
~~Declassify On: 20390225~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T80
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-07-2016

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

February 25, 2014

[redacted] (S)

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LETTERHEAD MEMORANDUM

~~(S//NF)~~ As the National Security Agency (NSA) is aware, the Federal Bureau of Investigation Charlotte Division (FBI CE) is currently conducting [redacted] (S)

~~(S//NF)~~ Pursuant to the investigation [redacted] FBI CE requests the NSA conduct a classification review of [redacted] (S) [redacted] (S)

~~(S//NF)~~ Copies [redacted] are currently maintained at FBI CE and at a US Army office at the Pentagon. The NSA is requested to conduct the review [redacted] (S) [redacted] at the Pentagon in coordination with [redacted] to FBIHQ/Counterintelligence Division [redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] to NSA, will assist in this matter as required.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Please direct your response and any questions or concerns to Supervisory Special Agent (SSA [redacted] The FBI CE contacts for this matter are ASAC [redacted]

b6
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~~(U//FOUO)~~ ~~Unclassified by: F78M16K11~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20390225~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FD-1036 (Rev. 10-16-2009)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Import Form

Form Type: OTHER **Date:** 02/26/2014

Title: (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI Cover Letter and LHM to NSA

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T80
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-07-2016

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] (S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

(S) [redacted] (SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER)

(S) [redacted]

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

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Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ (U) On 02/25/2014, FBIHQ [redacted] disseminated an FBI Cover Letter and LHM to NSA requesting a classification review [redacted] (S) [redacted] discovered during the investigation [redacted] Scanned copies of the referenced Cover Letter and LHM were transmitted via SIPR email to [redacted] FBIHQ [redacted] Detailee to NSA, for passage to appropriate NSA personnel.

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~~Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)~~
~~Derived From: FBI~~
~~NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20390226~~

◆◆

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

FBI INFO
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T80
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041
DATE: 06-07-2016

b1
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Created From: [redacted] (S)

Package: [redacted]

Stored Location: *None*

Summary: ~~(S//NF)~~ NSA/OIG Report of Investigation

Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 04/08/2014

Acquired From: (U) SSA [redacted]

Attachments: ~~(S//NF)~~ NSA/OIG Report of Investigation

Attachment Classification:
SECRET//NOFORN
~~Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC 20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20390624~~

PETRAEUS-554

~~SECRET~~

FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U//~~FOUO~~) NSA/OIG Report of Investigation **Date:** 06/24/2014

From: CHARLOTTE
CE05
Contact: [redacted]

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T80
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-07-2016

b1
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b7E

Approved By: SSA [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

(S)

Case ID #: [redacted]

Sensitive Investigative Matter

Synopsis: (U//~~FOUO~~) To include NSA/OIG Report of Investigation to the case file.

~~Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)~~
~~Derived From: FBI~~
~~NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20390624~~

[redacted] **Investigation Initiated:** 12/17/2012 b7E

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. ~~(S//NF)~~ NSA/OIG Report of Investigation

Details:

On 4/8/2014, SA [redacted] received the enclosed OIG Report of Investigation from SSA [redacted] This report outlines the [redacted] and can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope. b3 b6 b7C

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

FBI INFO
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T80
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041
DATE: 06-07-2016

b1
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Created From: [redacted] (S)

Package: [redacted]

Stored Location: *None*

Summary: (U) LEM to US Army Field Support Command

Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 10/01/2014

Acquired From: (U)

Attachments: ~~(S//NF)~~ LEMtoDoDCAF.docx (29 kB)
(U) LEM

Attachment Classification:
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
~~Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC 20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20391001~~

PETRAEUS-557

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T80
REASON: 1 4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-07-2016

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

October 1, 2014

To: Director
Attn: [redacted]
Army Technical Cover Support Office
US Army Field Support Command
Ft. Meade, MD 20755

From: [redacted]

Subj: [redacted] (S)

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~~(S//NF)~~ The above-captioned investigation involves the extensive mishandling of classified information by a name US Army officer. In furtherance of this investigation, the FBI [redacted] Section requests the Army Technical Cover Support Office provide any documents or non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) relating to the briefing of the captioned subject into any level of clearance or classified programs, including Special Access Programs if applicable. The specific nature of the program is not required, solely the signed NDAs or briefing agreements. The subject of this investigation is listed as:

b7E

Name: David Howell Petraeus
DOB: [redacted]
SSN: [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

(U) The FBI point of contact in this matter is Supervisory Special Agen[redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~Classified By: F86M55K51~~
~~Declassify On: 20381112~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~

FD-1057 (Rev 5-8-10)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Official Record

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U) Request to Transmit LHM to US Army Field Support Command

Date: 10/01/2014

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T80
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-07-2016

CC: [redacted]

From: CHARLOTTE
CE05
Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: SSA [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [redacted]

Sensitive Investigative Matter

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Synopsis: (U) Charlotte Division requests [redacted] transmit the attached LHM to US Army Field Support Command.

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~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
~~Derived From: Multiple Sources~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~

[redacted] **Investigation Initiated:** 12/17/2012

b7E

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. (U) LHM

Details:

(U) As part of captioned investigation, Charlotte Division is seeking any Non-Disclosure of Classified Information statement signed by [redacted] in the course of his employment with the United States Army. (S)

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(U)The attached LHM requests assistance from Director, Army Technical Cover Support Office, US Army Field Support Command, Ft. Meade, MD, POC

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Title: (U) Request to Transmit LHM to US Army Field Support Command
(S) Re: [redacted] 10/01/2014 b1 b3 b7E

[redacted] Specifcally, this office is requested to provide FBI [redacted] Section any documents or non-disclosure agreements relating to the briefing of the captioned subject into any level of clearance or classified programs, including Special Access Programs if applicable. b6 b7C b7E

(U) Charlotte requests [redacted] transmit the attached LHM to [redacted] b6 b7C b7E

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~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T80 b1
REASON: 1.4 (C) b3
DECLASSIFY ON 12-31-2041 b7E
DATE: 06-07-2016

Created From [redacted] (S)

Package [redacted]

Stored Location: *None*

Summary: ~~(S//NF)~~ Email Attachments

Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 10/02/2014

Attachments: [redacted] LEMtoDoDCAF (2014.10.02).pdf (0 bytes) (S)

[redacted] LEMtoDoDCAF (2014.10.02).pdf b1 b3

Attachment Classification:
SECRET//NOFORN (S) b6 b7C b7E
~~Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC 20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20391002~~

PETRAEUS-561

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T60
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-07-2016

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

October 2, 2014

To: Director
Attn: [redacted]
Army Technical Cover Support Office
US Army Field Support Command
Ft. Meade, MD 20755

From: [redacted] b1 b3 b6 b7C b7E

Subj: [redacted] (S)

~~(S/NF)~~ The above-captioned [redacted] involve the alleged extensive mishandling of classified information [redacted] In furtherance of this investigation, the FBI [redacted] Section requests the Army Technical Cover Support Office provide any documents or non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) relating to the briefing of the [redacted] into any level of clearance or classified programs, including Special Access Programs where applicable. The specific nature of the program is not required, solely the signed NDAs or briefing agreements. The [redacted] listed as: b7E

Name: David Howell Petraeus

[redacted] b6 b7C

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~~Classified By: F86M55K51~~
~~Declassify On: 20591002~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~

Name: [redacted]
DOB:
SSN:

b6
b7C
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(U) The FBI point of contact in this matter is Supervisory Special Agent [redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~Classified By: F86M55K51~~
Declassify On: ~~20591002~~
~~Derived~~ From: FBI NSISC-~~20090615~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T80
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-07-2016

To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted] CE) (FBI)
Subject: FBI Request for Information --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
SentinelCaseId: [redacted] (S)
SentToSentinel: 10/2/2014 6:23:18 PM

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: F86M55K51~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~

==========

Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] (S)

Good afternoon [redacted]

Attached is the request for information previously discussed by yourself and SS/ [redacted] Please let myself or [redacted] know if you have any questions.

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[redacted] (S)
[redacted] LHMtoDoD

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Thank you!
[redacted]

[redacted]

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b7C

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FD-1036 (Rev. 10-16-2009)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Import Form

Form Type: EMAIL Date: 10/07/2014

(U) Title: (~~S//NF~~) FBI Request for Information

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T80
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-07-2016

Approved By: UC [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] (S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

[redacted] (S)

(U) Synopsis: (~~S//NF~~) FBI Request for Information

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

(S) 1. [redacted] LHMtoDoDCAF (2014.10.02).pdf

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~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
~~Derived From: Multiple Sources~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T80 b1
REASON: 1.4 (C) b3
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041 b6
DATE: 06-07-2016 b7C
b7E

Created From: [redacted] (S)

Package: [redacted]

Stored Location: *None*

Summary: (U) LEM to US Army Field Support Command

Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 12/09/2014

Attachments: ~~(S//NF) LEMtoDoDCAFWitressDec10.docx~~ (30 kB)
(U) LEM to US Army Field Support Command

Attachment Classification:
SECRET//NOFORN
~~Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC 20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20391209~~

FBI INFO
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T80
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-07-2016

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

December 10, 2014

To: Director
Attn: [redacted]
Army Technical Cover Support Office
US Army Field Support Command
Ft. Meade, MD 20755

From: [redacted]

Subj: [redacted] (S)

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~~(S//NF)~~ The above-captioned investigations involve the alleged extensive mishandling of classified information by named US Army officers. In furtherance of this investigation, the FBI [redacted] Section requests the Army Technical Cover Support Office provide a Department of Defense (DoD) witness, who can be qualified as a business records custodian, to testify truthfully to the following:

1. The the Government maintains a database that documents when Department of Defense employees were briefed into Sensitive Compartmentalized Information (SCI) compartments and Special Access Programs (SAPs);
2. That a review of this database was conducted and shows that our male subject (as listed below) was granted access to various SCI compartments and Special Access Programs in 2005 and 2008, as reflected in a September 25, 2014 Letterhead Memorandum (attached);
3. Additionally, the DoD witness needs to be able to answer foundational questions about the DoD's standard SCI Non-Disclosure Agreement and Secrecy Agreement such that those items can be entered into evidence.

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~~Classified By: F86M55K51~~
~~Declassify On: 20381112~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~

4. The male subject of this investigation is listed as:

Name: David Howell Petraeus
DOB: [redacted]
SSN: [redacted]

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(U) The FBI point of contact in this matter is Supervisory Special Agen[redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~Classified By: F86M55K51~~
~~Declassify On: 20381112~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~

FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U) Request to Transmit LHM to US Army Field Support Command

Date: 12/09/2014

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T80
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-07-2016

From: CHARLOTTE
CE05
Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: SSA [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] (S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

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Synopsis: (U) Charlotte Division requests [redacted] transmit the attached LHM to US Army Field Support Command.

~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
~~Derived From: Multiple Sources~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~

[redacted] **Investigation Initiated:** 12/17/2012

b7E

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. (U) LHM to US Army Field Support Command

Details:

(U) As part of captioned investigation, Charlotte Division is seeking assistance from the US Army. Specifically, the Army Technical Cover Support Office should provide a Department of Defense (DoD) witness, who can be qualified as a business records custodian, to testify truthfully to the following:

1. The the Government maintains a database that documents when Department of Defense employees were briefed into Sensitive Compartmentalized Information (SCI) compartments and Special Access

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Title: (U) Request to Transmit LHM to US Army Field Support Command
(S) Re: [redacted] 12/09/2014 b1 b3 b7E

Programs (SAPs);

2. That a review of this database was conducted and shows that [redacted] (S) [redacted] was granted access to various SCI compartments and Special Access Programs in 2005 and 2008, as reflected in a September 25, 2014 Letterhead Memorandum; b1 b3 b7E

3. Additionally, the DoD witness needs to be able to answer foundational questions about the DoD's standard SCI Non-Disclosure Agreement and Secrecy Agreement such that those items can be entered into evidence.

(U) Charlotte respectfully requests [redacted] transmit the attached LHM to Director, Army Technical Cover Support Office, US Army Field Support Command, Ft. Meade, MD, POC [redacted] b6 b7C b7E

◆◆

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

Created From: [redacted] (S)

Package:

Stored Location:

Summary: ~~(S)~~ Email Attachments

Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 12/10/2014

Attachments: ~~(S)~~ 9 26 14 LHM from DoD.pdf (0 bytes)

~~(S)~~ 9 26 14 LHM from DoD.pdf

Attachment Classification:

SECRET//NOFORN

~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~

~~Declassify On: 20391231~~

~~(S)~~ LHM for expert witness.pdf (0 bytes)

~~(S)~~ LHM for expert witness.pdf

Attachment Classification:

SECRET//NOFORN

~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~

~~Declassify On: 20391231~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T80
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041
DATE: 06-07-2016

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PETRAEUS-573

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY NSICG J76J18T80
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-07-2016

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, December 10, 2014 12:53 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: Request for CAF assistance --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

SentinelCaseId: [redacted] (S)

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b7C
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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: C11W58B93~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
==========

[redacted]

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Our Charlotte Field Office is working with the USAO in this matter (previously discussed) and they have requested that we send this request to the DoD CAF for assistance in identifying an expert witness to testify about non-disclosures, etc. given to Petraeus. Please review the attached documents and let us know if you can assist in fielding this request or if it needs to be forwarded on to another person.

LHM for expert witness.pdf

9-26-14 LHM from DoD.pdf

Thanks in advance for your help.

[redacted]

b6
b7C

Confidentiality Statement:
This message is transmitted to you by the Office of the General Counsel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The message, along with any attachments, may be confidential and legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, please destroy it promptly without further retention or dissemination (unless otherwise required by law). Please notify the sender of the error by a separate e-mail or by calling [redacted]

Official Record

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Import Form

Form Type: EMAIL

Date: 12/10/2014

Title: ~~(S//NF)~~ Request for CAF assistance

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T80
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-07-2016

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] (S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

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Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ Request for CAF assistance

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. (S) LHM for expert witness.pdf
2. (S) 9-26-14 LHM from DoD.pdf

~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC,~~
~~dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

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FBI INFO
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T80
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041
DATE: 06-07-2016

Created From: [redacted] (S)

Package:

Stored Location: *None*

(U) **Summary:** ~~(S//NF)~~ LEM

Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 01/05/2015

(U) **Acquired From:** ~~(S//NF)~~ FBI EQ

Attachments: ~~(S//NF)~~ LEM for expert witness 1.pdf (339 kB)
~~(S//NF)~~ LEM

Attachment Classification:
SECRET//NOFORN
~~Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC 20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20400105~~

PETRAEUS-585

~~SECRET~~

FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

(U) **Title:** (~~S//NF~~) To add LHM request to file. **Date:** 01/05/2015

From: CHARLOTTE
CE04
Contact: [redacted]

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T80
REASON: 1 4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2040
DATE: 06-07-2015

b1
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b7E

Approved By: SSA [redacted]

Drafted By [redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [redacted]

Sensitive Investigative Matter

Synopsis: (~~S//NF~~) To add LHM request to the US Army Field Support Command to file

~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
~~Derived From: Multiple Sources~~
~~Declassify On: 20401231~~

[redacted] **Investigation Initiated:** 12/17/2012 b7E

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
(U) 1. (~~S//NF~~) LHM

Details:

The attached LHM was transmitted to the DOD in December 2014. The attached LHM requests assistance in identifying and providing a witness for testimonial purposes.

◆◆

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FD-1057 (Rev 5-8-10)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U) To remove serial **Date:** 01/06/2015

From: CHARLOTTE
CE04
Contact: [redacted]

FBI INFO
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T80
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2040
DATE: 06-07-2016

Approved By: SSA [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

(S) **Case ID #:** [redacted]

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Sensitive Investigative Matter

(S) **Synopsis:** ~~(U)~~ Request removal of [redacted] from Sentinel.

~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
~~Derived From: Multiple Sources~~
~~Declassify On: 20401231~~

[redacted] **Investigation Initiated:** 12/17/2012 b7E

Details:

On 1/5/2015, SSA [redacted] Unit [redacted] advised information received
(S) from the DOD, which was uploaded via [redacted] was prematurely
provided to the FBI. The document had not obtained the necessary
approvals for dissemination. DOD has requested we remove this
correspondence from FBI files. Therefore, FBI Charlotte requests the
(S) removal of [redacted] from Sentinel.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76318T80
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041
DATE: 06-07-2016

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Created From: [redacted] (S)

Package:

Stored Location: *None*

Summary: (U) FD 597

Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 01/27/2015

Acquired From: (U) [redacted]

Attachments: (U) FD 597

Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

PETRAEUS-596

FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: ~~(S//NF)~~ CENTCOM Evidence **Date:** 02/02/2015

From: CHARLOTTE
CE04
Contact: [redacted]

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T80
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2040
DATE: 06-07-2016

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] (S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

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Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ To document the release of a copy of evidence to CENTCOM

~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
~~Derived From: Multiple Sources~~
~~Declassify On: 20401231~~

[redacted] **Investigation Initiated:** 12/17/2012 b7E

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. (U) FD-597

Details:

On 1/27/2015, SA [redacted] provided [redacted] US CENTRAL COMMAND (CENCTOM) with [redacted] [redacted] contained [redacted] previously provided to the FBI by CENTCOM. A copy of the signed FD-597 can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope. b6 b7C b7E

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (~~S//NF~~) Correction of a Data Source Cited in [redacted] (S)

Date: 09/28/2015

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T80
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2040
DATE: 06-08-2016

From: CHARLOTTE
I-04
Contact: [redacted]

Approved By [redacted]

Drafted By:

Case ID #: [redacted] (S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

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Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ To correct attribution of items sent to HQ to reflect CENTCOM instead of NDU.

~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~
~~Derived From: FBI~~
~~NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20401231~~

[redacted] Investigation Initiated: 12/17/2012

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Reference: [redacted] (S)

Details:

Per [redacted] of the captioned investigation, on 9/23/2015, SOS [redacted] provided ASC [redacted] FBI HQ, JEH 4865, with [redacted] via FEDEX overnight delivery tracking number [redacted] (S) [redacted] that documents the exported item numbers and their associated legal processes. [redacted] misattributed items from evidence number [redacted] to the National Defense University (NDU). These items should be sourced to CENTCOM.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Title: ~~(S//NF)~~ Correction of a Data Source Cited in [redacted] (S)
(S) Re: [redacted] 09/28/2015

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SECRET [redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-10-2016

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Created From: [redacted] 202 (S)

Package:

Stored Location: *None*

Summary: (U) [redacted] Declaration

Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 12/01/2012

Acquired From: (U) [redacted]
DLA [redacted]
[redacted]

Attachments: (U) [redacted]
(U)

Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

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b6 per AFOSI
b7C per AFOSI
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PETRAEUS-803

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 06-09-2016 BY C66W46B11 NSICG

Statement of [redacted] b6 b7C

I am [redacted] also a reserve military officer and special agent with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), having joined AFOSI in 2007 following [redacted]

I attended the Aspen Security Forum from [redacted] at the Aspen Institute in Aspen, Colorado. My civilian employer paid the attendance fee and expenses. On Friday, [redacted] Ms. Paula Broadwell was seated [redacted], she was approached by [redacted] I recognized [redacted] as he was a panelist that day. At the time, I was hunched over my laptop and working on legal matters. b6 b7C

Upon being approached [redacted] Ms. Broadwell came to her feet and the two chatted briefly. I overheard [redacted] indicating to Ms. Broadwell that once "the Director was back from his trip" from overseas they would attempt to arrange a meeting with "the Director." It was clear from the reference that the "Director" referenced Director, CIA. I was somewhat surprised at the conversation, as I had not anticipated a biographer to also be involved in meetings involving a large government contractor. I was also was somewhat surprised at the open reference to a senior official's foreign travel. However, since I did not know Ms. Broadwell [redacted] I also thought that the conversation could potentially have been related to personal or charitable items and that the travel reference could have been to a personal vacation. Ms. Broadwell agreed very much with [redacted] suggestion of a meeting and the brief conversation ended. b6 b7C

At no time have I ever spoken or had any other form of contact with either Ms. Broadwell [redacted] In hindsight, given recent circumstances, I felt the conversation was odd and have elected to unilaterally and voluntarily report it. b6 b7C

Signed [redacted] Dated: 15 Nov 12

b6 Per AFOSI
b7C Per AFOSI

Witnessed:

Signed [redacted] Dated: 15 Nov 12

Name: SA [redacted]

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-09-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/07/2013

b6 Per AFOSI
b7C Per AFOSI

[redacted] Special Agent, Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI), Vandenebrg Air Force Base, Vandenberg, California, provided the **attached** declaration. The declaration details a conversation [redacted] overheard while attending the Aspen Security Forum in Aspen Colorado from [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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Investigation on 01/07/2013 at Santa Maria, California, United States (Mail)

File # [redacted] 02, [redacted] 302 (S) Date drafted 01/07/2013

by [redacted]

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SECRET [redacted]

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

Created From: [redacted] 202 (S)

Package: [redacted]

Stored Location: *None*

Summary: (U) Notes from interview, team listing, Non Disclosure statement

Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 05/29/2013

Acquired From: (U) [redacted]

Attachments: (U) Notes, team listing, NDA

Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

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PETRAEUS-959

SECRET

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/28/2013

On 05/29/2013, [redacted] was interviewed at the Davis-Monthan Air Force Base by SA [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following: b6 b7C

[redacted] was assigned to U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND (CENTCOM) before General DAVID PETRAEUS arrived. [redacted] was hired by [redacted] did not know PETRAEUS personally prior to his arrival at CENTCOM. [redacted] job was twofold: [redacted] was PETRAEUS's personal communicator, ensuring all of his communication devices were working properly, and [redacted] handled establishing forward communications. This team traveled to locations where PETRAEUS [redacted] traveled with PETRAEUS the majority of the time. [redacted] traveled with PETRAEUS when [redacted] needed a break. [redacted] did not travel to Afghanistan with the team. [redacted] also kept PETRAEUS's staff's communication systems running as well. PETRAEUS required almost 24 x 7 access to his systems. PETRAEUS and his team used big and little antennas and aircards. [redacted] team would get the internet established for PETRAEUS. The data is secured at the device level through encryption. For example, a laptop is connected to SECNET 54, a NSA crypto device, which then allows internet transport. [redacted] b6 b7C b7E

PETRAEUS's travel was split 50/50 between international and U.S. travel. While overseas, [redacted] traveled with PETRAEUS to countries in CENTCOM's AOR, including Central Asia, the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as Europe. b6 b7C

[redacted] did not attend meetings PETRAEUS conducted. PETRAEUS did offer [redacted] the opportunity to attend these meetings as he said it would be good for [redacted] career.

[redacted] deployed with PETRAEUS to Afghanistan. PETRAEUS requested that [redacted] deploy with him. Most of the team working for PETRAEUS at CENTCOM went with him to Afghanistan. b6 b7C

When they arrived in Afghanistan, they found that a lot of

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Investigation on 05/29/2013 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] 02 (S) Date drafted 06/05/2013

by [redacted]

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communication equipment had been taken with General team when they traveled to Washington, DC. Since team did not return to theatre, the communication equipment did not either. arrived in Afghanistan before PETRAEUS and during this time found computers and printers for PETRAEUS and his staff.

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While at CENTCOM, PETRAEUS had a staff of approximately people. When he traveled, usually members of his staff traveled with him. In Afghanistan, his staff consisted of approximately members. PETRAEUS's advance team went from members at CENTCOM to members in Afghanistan.

While at CENTCOM, PETRAEUS was able to be live on his systems in his car and airplane. At the time, even the Secretary of the Defense did not have this capability. When they arrived in Afghanistan, they found things were 20 years behind the times due to the equipment and territory issues they faced. needed supplies and CENTCOM was able to get the supplies to them in theatre team were then able to provide PETRAEUS with the same level of service he received at CENTCOM.

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monitored PETRAEUS's computers to ensure they were connected and the proper webpages and email were working. PETRAEUS had computers, In Afghanistan, PETRAEUS also had a computer. PETRAEUS's computers were password protected and does not remember if signed a waiver to have permission to PETRAEUS Normally, a General's is not sure if PETRAEUS's did not read PETRAEUS's emails, but did see items in his inbox from time to time.

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While in Afghanistan, approximatel minutes prior to PETRAEUS waking, a member of his team would enter his room and conduct a communications check. This individual would ensure PETRAEUS's computers were up and running.

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PETRAEUS would have been required to take INFOSEC training. did not observe PETRAEUS take this training, but believes he did in fact take the training. PETRAEUS was very aware of information security and made sure rking for him.

was classified NATO SECRET. PETRAEUS had a top secret computer in the ~~Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF)~~, but mostly had his staff deal with was PETRAEUS' office was not located in the SCIF. PETRAUES's office was located in a different building than

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[redacted] has met PAULA BROADWELL, but tried not to have much contact with her. This was a personal decision on [redacted] part to not interact with BROADWELL. [redacted] did not understand why BROADWELL was in Afghanistan and why she was given such access. [redacted] viewed BROADWELL as an outsider. [redacted] team members were told BROADWELL had all access because she was writing a book. [redacted] team was suspicious of the access BROADWELL was provided. When required, [redacted] would assist BROADWELL. [redacted] does not remember giving BROADWELL anything. BROADWELL traveled with PETRAEUS and was treated as his personal guest. BROADWELL dealt with [redacted] and complained to him that the team was being mean to BROADWELL. [redacted] was not asked to provide BROADWELL with a [redacted] account. [redacted] was asked to provide the [redacted] and PETRAEUS [redacted] with access. When the [redacted] arrived in Afghanistan they were demanding because they needed computers and printers.

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BROADWELL did make complaints that she was not getting everything she needed. [redacted] never saw BROADWELL with a [redacted] device. PETRAEUS's staff had BlackBerry's, but [redacted] does not think BROADWELL was issued one. At the time, [redacted] did not know that BROADWELL was a military officer, but [redacted] knows others knew of BROADWELL's military status. BROADWELL had a badge that granted her access to the compound.

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[redacted] never saw BROADWELL use PETRAEUS's computer. BROADWELL was provided a laptop while she was in Afghanistan. [redacted] is not sure if it was unclassified or classified. To be provided access to a computer, BROADWELL would have had to take an Information Awareness training. This is an online training that military members take prior to deploying. Before being provided access to a computer, [redacted] should have confirmed she had taken this training. [redacted] does not know if BROADWELL was issued a tablet.

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BROADWELL used email and the internet while traveling on [redacted] planes. [redacted] does not know if BROADWELL took notes on the computer. When they traveled throughout Afghanistan [redacted] stayed with the plane while PETRAEUS and BROADWELL visited different locations. [redacted] confirmed everything was up and running prior to PETRAEUS's return to the plane.

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[redacted] does not know if BROADWELL saved anything to the laptop she was provided. BROADWELL did not ask for a copy of her emails. The USB ports were disabled on regular computers, though some Generals had waivers for their USB ports. It was not odd for BROADWELL to be given a laptop while in theatre. BROADWELL was [redacted] PETRAEUS's [redacted] and PETRAEUS was

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[redacted] When computers were lent out, they were wiped clean when returned, then issued to the next guest who required one.

PETRAEUS's secret email was [redacted] b7E
PETRAEUS received a ToughBook while in Afghanistan. Prior to this, PETRAEUS used Dell computers.

PETRAEUS had a residence [redacted] His residence was set-up for communications. PETRAEUS had a waiver to keep his unclassified [redacted] laptops at his home. [redacted] believes [redacted] helped facilitate these waivers. [redacted] believes these laptops were brought to the CIA. [redacted] believes PETRAEUS also kept an unclassified aircard, and possibly a travel printer. PETRAEUS did not use a BlackBerry. b6 b7C b7E

PETRAEUS had an Army security detail. PETRAEUS received a CIA security detail following his confirmation as CIA Director. The CIA security detail did not travel to Afghanistan.

PETRAUES and his team, including BROADWELL, left Afghanistan on July 18, 2011 and arrived in Washington, D.C. on July 23, 2011. They stopped in [redacted] on their way to Washington. PETRAEUS used [redacted] laptops on these trips. PETRAEUS was allowed to keep his aides to assist in his transition to the CIA. When [redacted] left PETRAEUS in [redacted] his [redacted] computers were still [redacted] believes the CIA took over these computers as they were in and out of [redacted] when [redacted] was there. b6 b7C b7E

BROADWELL came to PETRAEUS's [redacted] PETRAEUS, but [redacted] never saw BROADWELL [redacted]

[redacted] was impressed with PETRAEUS's security awareness. PETRAEUS was very aware of the message he was sending with his awareness. Once, PETRAEUS asked about using a wireless network and was told it was not allowed. PETRAUES rolled his eyes, but complied with the answer. [redacted] never saw PETRAEUS mishandle classified information. PETRAUES tried to stay on unclassified systems as much as possible. Though [redacted] did not review PETRAEUS's emails, [redacted] did observe emails and was never concerned that ~~SECRET~~ information was being transmitted via unclassified email. b6 b7C

PETRAEUS received a lot of email from both government and non-government individuals. PETRAEUS responded to every email he received. b6 b7C

[redacted] was suspicious of BROADWELL and PETRAEUS's relationship, but had

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no confirmation that they were having an affair until the news broke of PETRAEUS's resignation. [redacted] was not surprised when the news of the affair was revealed.

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In Afghanistan, the SCIF was used for different purposes, and was not always at the TOP SECRET level. BROADWELL was in the SCIF, but [redacted] is not sure in what capacity. BROADWELL attended briefings just as other journalists did.

No one on [redacted] team ever came to [redacted] voicing concerns over items they were asked to provide to BROADWELL.

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[redacted] does not know if BROADWELL was ever reported for OPSEC violations.

BROADWELL was part of PETRAEUS's inner circle. BROADWELL tried to insert herself as his staff, but she was viewed as an outsider. BROADWELL was treated differently than other journalists. BROADWELL was given more calendar time with PETRAEUS than anyone else.

[redacted] provided a listing of members of [redacted] team in Afghanistan. Following the interview, [redacted] signed a Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement (NDA). Both the team listing and NDA can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope.

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~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

Created From: [redacted] U2 (S)

Package:

Stored Location: *None*

Summary: (U) Interview notes of [redacted] and NDA

Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 08/09/2013

Acquired From: (U) [redacted]

Attachments: (U) Interview notes and NDA

Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

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PETRAEUS-1009

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FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/03/2013

On 08/09/2013, [redacted] was interviewed at his office located at [redacted] Virginia by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] Army-CID. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following: b6 b7C

[redacted] worked indirectly for DAVID PETRAEUS. During this time, [redacted] was General [redacted] on a task force. The task force worked on security for a Forward Operating Base (FOB), a detention center and protection for Judges in Iraq. [redacted] met with PETRAUES approximately [redacted] times during this timeframe. PETRAEUS was [redacted] at this time. b6 b7C

While on leave [redacted] received an email from PETRAEUS in which PETRAEUS advised that [redacted] would be [redacted] served in this capacity from [redacted] including PETRAEUS's time in Afghanistan. [redacted] were the [redacted] on PETRAEUS's personal staff. b6 b7C

[redacted] served in Iraq from [redacted] and his original assignment was in the [redacted] had a [redacted] background and the PAO needed someone with this background. [redacted] was then traded to the [redacted] Following this assignment, [redacted] worked for General [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] and PETRAEUS were very close. [redacted] recommended [redacted] as PETRAEUS's [redacted] Prior to this assignment [redacted] was not a PETRAEUS guy, but once he started working for him, he tried to protect his boss. b6 b7C

When PETRAEUS found out he was going to Afghanistan, he told [redacted] they were going with him. [redacted] was a Marine who [redacted] Commander's Initiatives Group. b6 b7C

[redacted] first met BROADWELL in the [redacted] traveled with PETRAEUS on his speaking engagement at [redacted] PETRAEUS is good friends with [redacted] who works at

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(S)

Investigation on 08/09/2013 at McLean, Virginia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted]-302 Date drafted 08/12/2013

by [redacted]

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[redacted] met BROADWELL at this event, he thought she was just another PETRAEUS groupie. PETRAEUS had already met BROADWELL before this event as she was well into her dissertation.

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[redacted] next saw BROADWELL approximately [redacted] later at Fort Benning, possibly in [redacted] asked [redacted] what BROADWELL's deal was, and was told she was working on her dissertation about PETRAEUS. [redacted] does not know for sure when the dissertation turned into writing a book, but believes the turning point came when PETRAEUS took command in Afghanistan.

BROADWELL came to UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND (CENTCOM) to meet with PETRAEUS. [redacted] believes she came to CENTCOM after their trip to Fort Benning. BROADWELL interviewed PETRAEUS on this trip. [redacted] took BROADWELL around. [redacted] also took BROADWELL around when they were in Afghanistan. [redacted] is a Lieutenant Commander in the United States Navy. By this time, BROADWELL knew a lot of people and was treated as a member of the media. While at CENTCOM, PETRAEUS conducted a lot of interviews on Saturdays. These interviews were with A-list members of the media.

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There was a big question as to whether BROADWELL was a member of the Army or a journalist, because technically she was both. BROADWELL was a reservist at West Point and held a security clearance.

BROADWELL was treated differently than other journalists by [redacted] and PETRAEUS. BROADWELL had access to people that other journalists would not have gotten. BROADWELL was also able to embed with units that would have been off limits to other journalists.

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There is a PAO in Afghanistan that handles media, including transporting journalists to different areas in the country. A Department of Defense directive allows journalists to fly on helicopters in country.

BROADWELL developed relationships with people in Afghanistan and developed plans for her trips to Afghanistan. [redacted] then had to make her schedule work. [redacted] told BROADWELL that she was [redacted] because it looked like she was getting preferential treatment.

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BROADWELL prided herself on being a female version of PETRAEUS. BROADWELL did not take no for an answer and would always push forward. BROADWELL tried to go around [redacted] by sending notes to PETRAEUS directly, advising him of her plans. When BROADWELL told [redacted] of her plans and he said no, she went back to PETRAEUS, who told [redacted] to make it happen.

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When BROADWELL was in country, [redacted] worked [redacted] hours a day because she [redacted] BROADWELL in addition to the other aspects of her job. BROADWELL tried to observe interviews PETRAEUS conducted with other journalists. Since BROADWELL was writing PETRAEUS's biography, she said she needed access to these interviews.

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BROADWELL came to Afghanistan for trips lasting approximately [redacted] at a time. BROADWELL wanted to do the best she could and [redacted] was often the bump in the road for her. [redacted] was just trying to protect PETRAEUS.

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On the first trips BROADWELL made to Afghanistan, she spent a lot of time in the field. PETRAEUS and BROADWELL did not see each other most of the trip.

Towards the end, BROADWELL felt PETRAEUS was being obtuse to her because she believed PETRAEUS wanted to write his own book. If PETRAEUS gave her everything, it would be in her book, not his book. Therefore, BROADWELL felt she was only getting information that every other reporter was also getting. BROADWELL wanted more in-depth and candid thoughts from PETRAEUS to put in her book.

[redacted]

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PETRAEUS stayed on message when speaking with journalists. PETRAEUS had talking points for most topics he knew he would be questioned on.

BROADWELL's first trip to Afghanistan was on September 28, 2010. [redacted] believes she traveled as a journalist. Journalists were credentialed through the IJC Public Affairs Office (IJC PAO). The IJC PAO was located at the airport in Kabul. When BROADWELL landed in Kabul, she would have been picked up by a Public Affairs Officer and credentialed. [redacted] might have been listed as BROADWELL's sponsor.

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BROADWELL's publisher paid for her to travel to Afghanistan. A number of journalists who were writing books came to Afghanistan. Bloggers also traveled to Afghanistan.

PETRAEUS wanted journalists to attend the Morning Stand Up Brief (MSUB). The MSUBs were conducted at the Secret level, but to the lowest sense of the term. There was also an after meeting in which Secret information was discussed. Members of the media were not invited to the after meeting, including BROADWELL. Members of the media were required to sign non-disclosure forms. Approximately 30-40 journalists attended the MSUB during [redacted] time in Afghanistan. Handouts were not provided to attendee's of the MSUB. A summary of the MSUB was prepared, but [redacted]

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does not know where it was posted, or in what form it was produced. [redacted] never saw BROADWELL with minutes or slides of the MSUB. b6 b7C

PETRAEUS had a very flat leadership style. Everyone had PETRAEUS's email and could go directly to him. PETRAEUS made everyone feel like they had a special relationship with him.

Members of the media were provided with unclassified slides. When PETRAEUS was interviewed, [redacted] prepared a preparation pack for PETRAEUS that included the journalists' biography, slides, talking points and the expected questions. If the interview was with a heavy hitting reporter, [redacted] prepared PETRAEUS one-on-one. All members of the media received the same unclassified slide packet. b6 b7C

[redacted] described the environment of the Army as death by PowerPoint. In this regard, since BROADWELL spent a lot of time in the field, it is probable she received slides while there.

If [redacted] saw BROADWELL with classified documents, she would have told [redacted] BROADWELL never brought back anything from the field to ask about proper classification levels or if she could use it in her book. BROADWELL would not have shown [redacted] any classified information because she knew [redacted] would take it away from her. BROADWELL had a sense of entitlement. b6 b7C

[redacted] was always with PETRAEUS when BROADWELL interviewed him. There were [redacted] occasions where PETRAEUS and BROADWELL had dinner together and [redacted] was not present. On these occasions, dinner was not behind closed doors as the door was open. [redacted] asked PETRAEUS if he wanted him to be there, and PETRAUES usually did. On two occasions, PETRAEUS said no because they would just be eating. On another occasion, [redacted] were busy during a scheduled interview time, but PETRAEUS said it was fine they were not present. Towards the end of their time in Afghanistan, BROADWELL's time with PETRAEUS was random. BROADWELL also got time with PETRAEUS when they went running, but others got time with PETRAEUS in this same manner. b6 b7C

Both BROADWELL and [redacted] recorded interviews between BROADWELL and PETRAEUS. PETRAEUS did not record the interviews as that was [redacted] job. Following the interviews, BROADWELL transcribed the recordings. [redacted] recorder was a backup in case BROADWELL's failed. [redacted] does not recall BROADWELL using [redacted] that looked like a pen. [redacted] remembers BROADWELL having a [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] was close to PETRAEUS. [redacted] was with PETRAEUS for [redacted] BROADWELL worked for [redacted] BROADWELL did her annual training for [redacted] while in Afghanistan. b6 b7C

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[redacted] told [redacted] he was going to read every word of BROADWELL's book.

At some point, possibly around [redacted] PETRAEUS realized he could make the book portray him favorably, therefore helping solidify his legacy. Legacy was everything to PETRAEUS. [redacted] would not be surprised if PETRAEUS read some of the book before it was published. PETRAEUS started providing BROADWELL with more information. b6 b7C

[redacted] knows [redacted] on a professional basis, but not in any fashion related to BROADWELL's book. [redacted] did not have any contact with Penguin Press. BROADWELL needed help writing the book, and [redacted] was someone who could assist with this task. Since BROADWELL was an unknown, [redacted] had the name recognition along with a good reputation, which could help sales. b6 b7C

Other reporters were interested in writing PETRAEUS's biography. [redacted] believes PETRAEUS will write his autobiography. PETRAEUS often said you have to participate with the media, because refusing to talk could get you crucified. b6 b7C

BROADWELL interviewed others at International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Headquarters. [redacted] did not sit in on these interviews. [redacted] set the interviews up through the PAO, who had their own people sit in on the interviews.

BROADWELL attended the weekly Special Operations Forces (SOF) meetings. Other journalists were not allowed to attend the SOF meetings. No journalists raised any issues with [redacted] about BROADWELL having access to these meetings. BROADWELL's book dealt with SOF topics; therefore BROADWELL spent a lot of time with SOF units. PETRAEUS authorized BROADWELL to attend the SOF meetings. b6 b7C

[redacted] is not aware of any formal operational security violations by BROADWELL. BROADWELL wrote about a village that was bombed. [redacted] did not write BROADWELL up for this article, but thought it was stupid of her to write. [redacted] believes BROADWELL regretted writing the article. [redacted] felt BROADWELL flaunted her access and [redacted] about this issue. b6 b7C

[redacted] does not believe the Department of Defense reviewed BROADWELL's book, but believes [redacted] was going to review it. [redacted] felt comfortable because [redacted] was going to review the book. [redacted] was going to review the book because BROADWELL worked for him and to also help PETRAEUS. [redacted] would ensure the book did not contain classified information. b6 b7C

Many books are written about the Army and Army personnel. Not all books are approved by the Army. [redacted] does not know if BROADWELL needed

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to have her book reviewed by the Army.

BROADWELL respected both [redacted] and PETRAEUS and would not have done anything that would have taken her out of their good graces. b6 b7C

It was not odd that BROADWELL traveled with PETRAEUS on his farewell tour back to the United States. Reporters traveled with the team in the past. Reporters offered to pay for their flights, but most times they did not pay. The purpose of the farewell tour was to thank countries for their support with the war efforts. They stopped in [redacted] Each of these countries had a connection to the war and PETRAEUS provided them with an update. b7E

[redacted] did not attend PETRAEUS's outbrief at the National Defense University (NDU). [redacted] stayed in Washington, DC for approximately [redacted] [redacted] following their return from Afghanistan to wrap up some interviews. [redacted] went [redacted] and then returned to Washington, DC for work in [redacted] has been at his current job since [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] has stayed in contact with both BROADWELL and PETRAEUS. [redacted] visited PETRAEUS at the Central Intelligence Agency and met with his Public Affairs Officer. [redacted] saw PETRAEUS at the COSMOS CLUB in March and they discussed PETRAEUS's re-emergence. PETRAEUS is paying a lot of money to reform his image. b6 b7C

[redacted] was supposed to attend [redacted] has not had much contact with BROADWELL since news of the affair broke. BROADWELL wanted to know if [redacted] spoke to a reporter about her. BROADWELL did not make a lot of friends on the staff. b6 b7C

[redacted] believes PETERAEUS and BROADWELL were thinking about working on another book together. Since PETRAEUS finally [redacted] does not know what information PETRAEUS shared with BROADWELL. BROADWELL said PETRAEUS was opening up his attic, but [redacted] does not know what type of information PETRAEUS was providing. [redacted] believes this meant BROADWELL was going through PETRAEUS's books and notes throughout the years. b6 b7C

All of the information [redacted] had on PETRAEUS went to NDU. It is possible PETRAEUS's [redacted] contained classified materials. b6 b7C

While serving in Iraq, PETRAEUS did not take notes in case he was ever subpoenaed. PETRAUES did take notes [redacted] in Afghanistan. [redacted] believes these notes were to-do lists.

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BROADWELL may have asked to see PETRAEUS's [redacted] asked to see [redacted] never saw what PETRAEUS [redacted] [redacted] never saw BROADWELL with [redacted] [redacted] GUNHUS does not know if BROADWELL saw [redacted] [redacted] upon PETRAEUS's return from Afghanistan.

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[redacted] was stunned when news of the affair between PETRAEUS and BROADWELL was revealed. When [redacted] first heard PETRAEUS had an affair, [redacted] did not even think there was a possibility of PETRAEUS having an affair with BROADWELL. [redacted] was also surprised by the affair [redacted] PETRAEUS's [redacted] BROADWELL always spoke highly of [redacted] BROADWELL [redacted] BROADWELL was pretty serious at times, especially about security clearances.

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During the first few interviews between BROADWELL and PETRAEUS, PETRAEUS was very standoffish. PETRAEUS said [redacted] needed to be present because she was a pretty lady. It took from the time PETRAEUS and BROADWELL met at Harvard, until [redacted] for PETRAEUS to get comfortable with BROADWELL.

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BROADWELL asked [redacted] for items that were classified, but [redacted] did not provide them to her. BROADWELL never told [redacted] she could have classified documents because she had a clearance. [redacted] PETRAEUS told BROADWELL she could not see classified documents.

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[redacted] told other personnel dealing with BROADWELL, that if the information she requested was classified and you did not think she should have access, do not provide her with the information. [redacted] further told them BROADWELL had special access from PETRAEUS, but it was their call as to what to provide BROADWELL.

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Following the interview, [redacted] signed a Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement (NDA). The NDA can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope.

SECRET [redacted]

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

Created From: [redacted] 12 (S)

Package:

Stored Location: *None*

Summary: (U) Original interview notes and a signed "Classified Information Non Disclosure Statement".

Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 08/02/2013

Acquired From: (U) Major [redacted]
Unites States Army
[redacted]
Alexandria , Virginia
United States

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Attachments: (U) Interview notes and NDA

Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

PETRAEUS-1017

SECRET

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

Official Record

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/13/2013

On August 2, 2013, United States Army Major [redacted] date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at her residence located at [redacted] Alexandria, Virginia, by Special Agents [redacted] Witnessing the interview was United States Army Criminal Investigative Division Special Agent [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

While stationed in Afghanistan [redacted] was assigned as [redacted] at the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Headquarters. In this position, [redacted] handled a variety of [redacted] matters. [redacted] b6 b7C

PAULA BROADWELL may have visited Afghanistan for the first time in fall 2010. ISAF and United States Army Public Affairs Offices were asked to support both BROADWELL's travel in country and the research she was conducting. [redacted] was told BROADWELL was writing a book on General DAVID PETRAEUS, and [redacted] was asked by United States Army [redacted] Colonel [redacted] to assist BROADWELL. b6 b7C

When entering Afghanistan, media members are credentialed and supported by a media organization. On BROADWELL's initial visit, she did not have any support from a recognized media organization. Despite this, it was made known that BROADWELL was a military reserve officer and she should be given access beyond that of a normal journalist.

[redacted] questioned both Colonel [redacted] and [redacted] United States Navy Lieutenant Commander [redacted] regarding BROADWELL's status. It was cloudy as to whether BROADWELL was a journalist, a military officer, or both. BROADWELL did try to receive military reserve credit while in Afghanistan. [redacted] does not know if BROADWELL received this credit. In the beginning, BROADWELL was escorted around ISAF Headquarters. As she came back on additional trips, BROADWELL had unescorted access around the Headquarters. b6 b7C

On [redacted] trip to Afghanistan, she did have the backing of b1 b3 b6 b7C b7E

(S) [redacted]

Investigation on 08/02/2013 at Alexandria, Virginia, United States (In Person)

File [redacted] 302 Date drafted 08/12/2013

by [redacted]

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a media organization. Although BROADWELL never interviewed [redacted] Colonel [redacted] asked [redacted] to schedule some interviews for BROADWELL and get BROADWELL access to meetings such as Special Operations Forces (SOF) briefings. BROADWELL did attend some SOF briefings, which were classified as Top Secret/SCI, as well as COMISAF (ISAF Commander) daily updates.

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[redacted] took issue with BROADWELL's attendance at the SOF briefings. [redacted] recalled the presence of one other journalist, CNN reporter [redacted] at a SOF meeting. [redacted] believed BROADWELL did not have a need to know regarding SOF briefings. When [redacted] questioned BROADWELL's presence at SOF briefings with General PETRAEUS, she was told by Colonel [redacted] and Colonel [redacted] of PETRAEUS' Commander's Action Group (CAG), that BROADWELL was a military intelligence officer with a clearance and General PETRAEUS wanted BROADWELL in attendance. [redacted] never witnessed BROADWELL's attendance at a SOF meeting without General PETRAEUS. [redacted] does not recall BROADWELL using an audio recorder during the SOF briefings.

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During the COMISAF daily updates, PowerPoint slides were displayed on a screen. Sometimes there were handouts distributed to attendees which were classified as Secret. As an attendee, BROADWELL would have received a handout copy. Each recipient was responsible for handling and destroying these handouts properly. At the conclusion of the update, these copies should have been placed in a burn bag upon exiting the room. [redacted] does not recall if BROADWELL ever left a COMISAF daily update with hardcopy documents, and [redacted] never witnessed BROADWELL mishandle classified documents. [redacted] does not recall BROADWELL using an audio recorder during COMISAF daily updates.

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While in Afghanistan, BROADWELL blogged for the Foreign Policy Post. In one blog posting, BROADWELL included a slide/picture provided to her by Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] This slide may have had classification markings on it which were scratched out. [redacted] ISAF Foreign Disclosure Officer, who was most likely a NATO Officer. [redacted] that General PETRAEUS said the blog posting was okay.

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In Afghanistan, nationally accredited journalists traveled with PETRAEUS throughout the country on trips called "Battlefield Circulation Tours". When BROADWELL went on one of these tours, it meant other journalists did not get to go or would have to take more dangerous ground transportation. BROADWELL was permitted to travel without PETRAEUS to war zone locations which should not have been disclosed in public circles; however, when she traveled to forward operating bases, BROADWELL openly

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[redacted]-302 (S)

Interview of [redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of August 2, 2013, On 08/02/2013, Page 3 of 3

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discussed her locations on her Facebook page. During these trips, BROADWELL was accompanied by ISAF Public Affairs Officer [redacted] a First Lieutenant with the United States Air Force. [redacted] that General PETRAEUS was okay with BROADWELL's actions.

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[redacted] assumes BROADWELL's book, "All In: The Education of General David Petraeus", was reviewed by the United States Army, but she does not know this for certain. The book should have been reviewed by the Army's Public Affairs Office at the Pentagon.

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[redacted] was not surprised to learn of the affair between BROADWELL and PETRAEUS. The affair could potentially have started in Afghanistan, but it would have been difficult given the constant presence of PETRAEUS' staff. While in Afghanistan, [redacted] witnessed an inappropriate relationship between BROADWELL and PETRAEUS, but not an affair. [redacted] described PETRAEUS as liking sycophants and loved to be treated like God. BROADWELL's access to PETRAEUS was couched as her being his biographer who needed to eat, drink, and sleep PETRAEUS.

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[redacted]

At the conclusion of the interview, [redacted] signed a "Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement", which can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope.

SECRET [redacted]

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

Created From: [redacted] (S)

Package: [redacted]

Stored Location: *None*

Summary: (U) Original interview notes, a signed Classified Information Non Disclosure Statement, and an email dated August 5, 2013.

Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 08/01/2013

Acquired From: (U) [redacted]
Fairfax, Virginia
United States

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Attachments: (U) Interview notes, NDA, and email dated 8/5/2103.

Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

PETRAEUS-1021

SECRET

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON 12-31-2038
DATE 06-13-2016

Official Record

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/13/2013

On August 1, 2013, Retired United States Navy Lieutenant Commander [redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security number [redacted] was interviewed at his residence located at [redacted] Fairfax, Virginia, by Special Agents [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

[redacted] first contact with PAULA BROADWELL occurred in approximately [redacted] while he was stationed at International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan. [redacted] was interviewed twice by BROADWELL for her book, "All In: The Education of General David Petraeus." BROADWELL first contacted [redacted] via his AOL email account. [redacted] advised he may have copies of email correspondence with BROADWELL archived in his AOL account; however, he was unable to produce copies of these emails during the interview. b6 b7C

[redacted] reported to Afghanistan to work under the command of United States Army General [redacted] who was ISAF Commander (COMISAF). Shortly after [redacted] arrival, [redacted] PETRAEUS' arrival in Afghanistan, [redacted] briefed PETRAEUS' Commander's Action Group (CAG). [redacted] believes someone from the CAG staff passed his name along to BROADWELL as someone she should interview for her book. b6 b7C

At ISAF Headquarters [redacted] was assigned to the [redacted] and BROADWELL had their first personal meeting in [redacted] at a coffee shop located across the street from the main ISAF Headquarters building. This meeting lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes. BROADWELL explained her purpose for being at ISAF Headquarters, her career history and experience, and why she wanted to talk to [redacted] In return, [redacted] discussed his assignment at [redacted] which was to [redacted] commanders. To accomplish [redacted] developed a plan and wrote a paper along with his commanding officer, a Major General, for PETRAEUS' review and approval. b6 b7C b7E

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Investigation on 08/01/2013 at Fairfax, Virginia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] 302 (S) Date drafted 08/13/2013

by [redacted]

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Following this initial exchange of information, BROADWELL wanted to meet [redacted] again. Between their two meetings, BROADWELL and [redacted] did exchange emails. Their second meeting occurred [redacted] weeks after the first at the same coffee shop. At this hour-long meeting, [redacted] provided BROADWELL hardcopies of some classified documents. BROADWELL claimed to be a military officer with a clearance. As BROADWELL had access to ISAF Headquarters [redacted] did not question [redacted] his paper and supporting documentation and then pass along [redacted] recommendations to PETRAEUS. [redacted] passed the classified documents and a draft version of his unclassified paper, titled [redacted] to BROADWELL in a manila folder that was less than 100 pages total.

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It was [redacted] intention to publish [redacted] in a journal. However, [redacted] work and paper were squashed by ISAF Command. It was PETRAEUS' intention to the break the back of the [redacted] with them.

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[redacted] had no additional meetings with BROADWELL, although he did continue email contact with her via his email account, [redacted] BROADWELL expressed her interest in maintaining contact with [redacted] last communication with BROADWELL was an email he received inviting him to a book signing in Washington, D.C. [redacted] did not attend. BROADWELL also sent [redacted] an invitation to connect on LinkedIn, which [redacted] ignored. [redacted] has had no contact with BROADWELL since [redacted] did not have any contact with BROADWELL [redacted]

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Outside of their two personal meetings, [redacted] did observe BROADWELL attend three COMISAF daily updates. [redacted] attended these meetings on a rotational basis with others assigned to the [redacted] did not observe BROADWELL use any [redacted] at the COMISAF updates; however, BROADWELL did use [redacted] during her two interviews of [redacted] was aware that BROADWELL also had a camera in Afghanistan, but he never observed her using it. [redacted] also saw BROADWELL on two occasions at the ISAF Headquarters gym.

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FD-302a (Rev. 05-08-10)

[redacted]302 (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of [redacted] on August 1, 2013, On 08/01/2013, Page 3 of 3

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[redacted] did not provide BROADWELL any passwords to access his [redacted] military email accounts. It would trouble [redacted] to know that BROADWELL has/had such passwords. [redacted] does not share his passwords with anyone, to include his wife.

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[redacted]

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[redacted] stated he was [redacted] by ISAF Command from Afghanistan because of an article he published on [redacted] had contacted [redacted] because of other articles [redacted] had authored for Small Wars Journal. In this article, [redacted] Afghan President KARZAI and the steps ISAF must take to improve its relationship with KARZAI. The title of the article was altered by [redacted] prior to posting which made the article appear derogatory toward KARZAI.

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At the conclusion of the interview, [redacted] agreed to look for additional email correspondence with BROADWELL and forward those emails to SAs [redacted] signed a "Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement", which can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope.

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Administrative Note: Following the interview [redacted] forwarded a copy of his last email correspondence with BROADWELL to SAs [redacted] on August 5, 2013. The email is from BROADWELL at email address [redacted] is addressed to undisclosed recipients, and is dated January 16, 2012. A copy of this email can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope.

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~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1 4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

Created From: [redacted] 302 (S)

Package:

Stored Location: *None*

Summary: (U) Original interview notes, a signed Classified Information Non Disclosure Statement, and a business card for [redacted] attorney.

Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 07/26/2013

Acquired From: (U) Colonel [redacted]
United States Army

Attachments: (U) Original Interview Notes

Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

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PETRAEUS-1025

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

Official Record

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/31/2013

On July 26, 2013, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security Account Number [redacted] was interviewed at his place of employment located at [redacted] by Special Agents [redacted] Witnessing the interview was United States Army Criminal Investigative Division Special Agent [redacted] and [redacted] attorney, [redacted] Major, United States Army Senior Defense Counsel, Fort Benning Trial Defense Service. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

[redacted] is a Colonel in the United States Army and is [redacted] served under General DAVID PETRAEUS while PETRAEUS was Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from [redacted] served as a Lieutenant Colonel and [redacted] which was deployed to Arghandab Valley, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. [redacted] personally met with PETRAEUS on [redacted] occasions while in Afghanistan. On these occasions, PETRAEUS traveled to Kandahar and sought [redacted] insights into battlefield operations. Although PETRAEUS and [redacted] had in-depth conversations, they never discussed PAULA BROADWELL. b6 b7C

[redacted] was first contacted by BROADWELL in late [redacted] had [redacted] and BROADWELL requested background information from this battle to include in her book, "All In: The Education of General David Petraeus". [redacted] believed his name was provided to BROADWELL by ISAF Public Affairs Officer, Colonel [redacted] was considering writing his own book, he began an email liaison with BROADWELL. In these email exchanges [redacted] provided BROADWELL his [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] chain of command was aware of his working relationship with BROADWELL, but he never received any special instructions from his military superiors to provide BROADWELL with information. b6 b7C

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Investigation on 07/26/2013 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] 302 (S) Date drafted 07/30/2013

by [redacted]

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FD-302a (Rev. 05-08-10)

[redacted]302 (S)

Interview of [redacted] on July 26, 2013

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 07/26/2013, Page 2 of 3

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BROADWELL came to [redacted] battlespace and walked the battlefield in [redacted] BROADWELL was not accompanied by PETRAEUS on these trips. During these visits, BROADWELL interviewed [redacted] and his staff of officers. BROADWELL had full access to [redacted] staff and [redacted] when she interviewed them, however [redacted] does not remember if BROADWELL recorded her interview with him. It was Colonel [redacted] who coordinated with [redacted] to allow BROADWELL to travel to [redacted] battlespace. [redacted] could have refused her travel, but he did not want to turn media members away that could tell the stories of his soldiers.

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While in Afghanistan, BROADWELL attended briefings given by [redacted] which included instructions provided to all reporters working in [redacted] area of responsibility. It was unclear as to what BROADWELL's role was in Afghanistan. [redacted] understood BROADWELL to be writing a biography on General PETRAEUS showing how PETRAEUS' strategic guidance was implemented in the field. [redacted] treated her as an author and member of the media. BROADWELL said she had a security clearance. In working with BROADWELL, [redacted] intent was to tell his soldiers' stories as transparently as possible.

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[redacted] did not have a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) in his battalion operations center, and [redacted] battalion had no access to Top Secret information. However, in the briefings BROADWELL attended which were provided by [redacted] she probably saw information classified as Secret. [redacted] does not remember BROADWELL walking away from these briefings with any classified documents. During his tour in Afghanistan, [redacted] had two journalists removed from the field for publishing classified information. [redacted] read BROADWELL's blogs which were posted on the internet while she was in Afghanistan, and [redacted] did not consider any of her postings to be classified. [redacted] reviewed one of BROADWELL's blogs before it was posted and made some comments and recommendations to BROADWELL on information that was not classified. [redacted] was not aware of any Operational Security (OpSec) violations committed by BROADWELL while she was in Afghanistan.

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[redacted] never sent BROADWELL anything via a Secret Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) account. [redacted] does not recall telling BROADWELL to get a [redacted] account. She would need such an account to receive classified information. Although [redacted] could not recall specifics, BROADWELL told him she could not use Secret or classified information in her book. She also said the book was to be vetted by ISAF and a friend of BROADWELL's [redacted] does not know if BROADWELL's book was vetted.

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Although [redacted] agreed to provide BROADWELL with what information he could, he did not provide her with [redacted] with documents. When prompted by interviewing Agents about an email exchange between [redacted] and BROADWELL regarding [redacted] still denied providing BROADWELL [redacted] only provided BROADWELL with verbal [redacted] did not provide BROADWELL access to his [redacted]

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Following BROADWELL's visits to Afghanistan, [redacted] continued to maintain contact with her in [redacted] During this time, BROADWELL asked [redacted] to review and edit chapters of her book, especially those concerning [redacted] battalion. [redacted] continued to have sporadic contact with BROADWELL up until [redacted] when he was unable to attend a Wounded Warrior event in Charlotte, North Carolina to which BROADWELL invited [redacted] This sporadic contact was mostly via email with limited telephonic contact.

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During BROADWELL's visits to [redacted] battlespace, he [redacted] ffered [redacted] described his relationship with BROADWELL as friendly. He knew she was married and was surprised to learn of the affair between BROADWELL and PETRAEUS in November 2012. [redacted] was surprised BROADWELL would have an affair. [redacted] BROADWELL, [redacted]

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[redacted] was familiar with [redacted] and knew [redacted] was helping BROADWELL write her book. [redacted] exchanged emails with [redacted] and provided [redacted] with the same type of background information he had given BROADWELL. [redacted] saw [redacted] as filling-in for BROADWELL to collect information for the book. [redacted] does not recall any telephone conversations with [redacted] and the last email he received from [redacted] was a thank you email.

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At the conclusion of the interview, [redacted] signed a "Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement", which can be found in the corresponding 1A envelope.

SECRET [redacted]

FBI INFO
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-18-2016

Created From: [redacted] 302 (S)

Package:

Stored Location: *None*

Summary: (U) Original interview notes and a signed Classified Information Non Disclosure Statement

Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 06/21/2013

Acquired From: (U) [redacted]
United States Army

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Attachments: (U) Original Interview Notes

Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

PETRAEUS-1029

SECRET

Official Record

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/31/2013

On June 21, 2013, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] [redacted] Social Security Account Number [redacted] was interviewed at his place of employment located at United States Army Base Fort Polk, Vernon Parish, Louisiana, by Special Agents [redacted] [redacted] is a [redacted] and Fort Polk. Witnessing the interview was United States Army Criminal Investigative Division Special Agent [redacted] [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the intervie[redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

[redacted] first worked for General DAVID PETRAEUS as a Battalion Commander in the summer of 2002 when PETRAEUS took command of the 101st Air borne. In 2003 [redacted] worked as the [redacted] Commander and served with PETRAEUS in Iraq. [redacted] returned to Iraq in 2005 working for PETRAEUS from July to September as part of the Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq. [redacted] then served as a Brigade Commander in Iraq from October 2007 to September 2008. b6 b7C

From July 2009 to July 2010, [redacted] was assigned to PETRAEUS' personal staff at United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida. PETRAEUS was Commanding General of USCENTCOM during this time. Finally, [redacted] served as PETRAEUS [redacted] in Afghanistan from July 2010 to July 2011. While working on PETRAEUS' personal staff and as his Executive Officer [redacted] accompanied PETRAEUS on nearly all official travel and events. b6 b7C

[redacted] first met PAULA BROADWELL in 2009 while accompanying PETRAEUS on a trip to Fort Benning Georgia. PETRAEUS [redacted] PETRAEUS delivered the speech at [redacted] graduation [redacted] at Fort Benning. At this time, BROADWELL was writing a dissertation on PETRAEUS. PETRAEUS had first met BROADWELL at Harvard University. BROADWELL [redacted] at Fort Benning to interview PETRAEUS and hear his speech on leadership. BROADWELL accompanied PETRAEUS and [redacted] on the plane from Tampa to Fort Benning. b6 b7C

While [redacted] and PETRAEUS were deployed to Afghanistan, BROADWELL came

Investigation on 06/21/2013 a [redacted] United States (In Person)

File [redacted] 302 (S) Date drafted 06/24/2013

by [redacted]

b1 b3 b6 b7C b7E

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to Afghanistan several times, staying two to four weeks at a time. These visits began in the fall of 2010 and became more frequent in the spring of 2011. When asked in what capacity BROADWELL visited Afghanistan, [redacted] replied, "I hope as media." [redacted] is unsure who at International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) command made the determination that BROADWELL was media on her first visit to Afghanistan. [redacted] and PETRAEUS discussed BROADWELL's media status with Colonel [redacted] who was the ISAF Public Affairs Officer. BROADWELL could not have come into Afghanistan as a civilian (without media credentials), and she was not under Army Reserve orders to come into country. [redacted] would not allow BROADWELL to be in Afghanistan as a Military Intelligence Officer unless she received orders issued by her reserve command. BROADWELL did request to be embedded in a Special Operations Unit, but [redacted] denied this request.

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While BROADWELL was in Afghanistan, [redacted] saw her on 80% of the days she was stationed at ISAF Headquarters in Kabul. BROADWELL did go out with field units in Kandahar and Regional Command East. Neither [redacted] nor PETRAEUS accompanied BROADWELL on these trips. Media were permitted to ride on military helicopters on such trips. While in Afghanistan, [redacted] understood BROADWELL was collecting information for her book on PETRAEUS. The dissertation that BROADWELL had been writing morphed into a book on PETRAEUS during BROADWELL's trips to Afghanistan.

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While in Afghanistan, [redacted] PETRAEUS, and [redacted] had discussions of what the embedded media members would be exposed to for purposes of reporting. This included BROADWELL's exposure. BROADWELL did have access at ISAF headquarters, but her access was not "out-of-bounds".

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BROADWELL attended ISAF Commander (COMISAF) daily updates. Again, it was normal for media members to attend these daily updates. Each media member signed a non-disclosure statement to have access to the COMISAF updates. Fifty to sixty people attended the updates. Of the presentation slides which were displayed on the screen, hard copies were not handed out. These slides, along with COMISAF update notes, would be uploaded daily to the [redacted] Network and Afghan Mission (NATO) Network. BROADWELL did not have access to [redacted] [redacted] Network in the ISAF Operations Center, and thus would not have access to electronic copies of COMISAF updates or presentation slides.

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To attend the COMISAF updates, BROADWELL needed an escort from the ISAF Public Affairs Office. This would have included [redacted] and two officers working for him. One officer was from the Navy and came with the team from USCENTCOM.

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BROADWELL had a trailer at ISAF headquarters which served as her sleeping quarters. She had unescorted access to all common areas around the base, and [redacted] never saw BROADWELL alone in any space which would require an escort. [redacted] never provided BROADWELL with classified information. However, after returning from Afghanistan [redacted] did give BROADWELL unclassified information regarding Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Operations in Mosul, Iraq for her dissertation [redacted] does not recall receiving any email directing him to provide BROADWELL with classified information. He would be very surprised if such an email existed.

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While working in Afghanistan [redacted] described PETRAEUS' security awareness as being good. [redacted] never received classified information from PETRAEUS on an unclassified network [redacted] did not possess PETRAEUS' [redacted] never witnessed BROADWELL using any of PETRAEUS' computers. [redacted] is not aware of anyone providing BROADWELL documents following a meeting or briefing, such as the COMISAF daily update [redacted] is not aware of any military officer being instructed to provide BROADWELL with copies of emails.

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When meeting with members of the media, PETRAEUS did not use an audio recorder. [redacted] would be present for PETRAEUS' interviews with the media and [redacted] BROADWELL used [redacted] when interviewing PETRAEUS. Upon the initial meeting between [redacted] and BROADWELL at Fort Benning in 2009, BROADWELL [redacted] minute interview with [redacted]

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PETRAEUS and his staff departed Afghanistan in July 2011 and made multiple stops in Europe while en-route to the United States. BROADWELL was the only media member on this trip. It was not normal for her to be there, but [redacted] is unaware if her presence and transport via military aircraft violated policy. [redacted] believes [redacted] would know if this was a policy violation. BROADWELL had her own hotel rooms in Europe, and she should have paid for her own accommodations. She may not have had to pay for the flight.

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Upon their return from Afghanistan in July 2011, [redacted] was unaware of the continuing relationship between PETRAEUS and BROADWELL. [redacted] saw the relationship between PETRAEUS and BROADWELL as professional and that of a mentor/mentee. The affair between PETRAEUS and BROADWELL did not take place in Afghanistan. [redacted] first became aware of the affair when PETRAEUS resigned from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) [redacted] was surprised PETRAEUS allowed the affair to happen. [redacted] did exchange emails with BROADWELL between July 2010 and PETRAEUS' resignation from the CIA. [redacted] last saw PETRAEUS at the CIA in October 2012 while on a tour

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with other military officers. Since the CIA resignation [redacted] and PETRAEUS have emailed each other on two occasions. b6 b7C

At the conclusion of the interview, [redacted] signed a "Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement", which can be found in the corresponding 1A envelope.

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

Created From: [redacted] 12 (S)

Package:

Stored Location: *None*

Summary: (U) Original interview notes of [redacted] signed "Classified Information Non Disclosure Statement" [redacted] business card; US Army Reserve orders for Paula Broadwell; and email exchange between Paula Broadwell and West Point staff.

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Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 09/05/2013

Acquired From: [redacted]

United States

Attachments: (U) Interview notes; signed NDA; business card; military orders; and email.

Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

PETRAEUS-1044

~~SECRET~~

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/16/2013

On September 5, 2013, retired United States Army [redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security number [redacted] was interviewed at his place of business, [redacted] by Special Agents [redacted] Witnessing the interview was United States Army Criminal Investigative Division Special Agent [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

[redacted] first met DAVID PETRAEUS in 1989 at an Army Navy football game. PETRAEUS had attended Princeton University in the mid 1980s, and [redacted] followed in PETRAEUS' footsteps and attended Princeton in the late 1980s. Both [redacted] and PETRAEUS received a Ph.D. from the university. b6 b7C

In 2001, PETRAUES deployed to Bosnia. PETRAEUS' Executive Officer [redacted] was recalled from Bosnia back to the Social Sciences Department at West Point. During this time [redacted] was a professor at West Point, and from January 2002 to July 2002 [redacted] took a six-month sabbatical to serve as PETRAEUS' Executive Officer in Bosnia. b6 b7C

In 2003, PETRAUES served as the Commander of the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul, Iraq. PETRAEUS called [redacted] to join him in Iraq, which [redacted] did during the summer of 2003. b6 b7C

In October 2003, [redacted] gave a lecture at the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government on PETRAEUS' leadership style. This lecture was used by Harvard to develop a case study in its graduate program. b6 b7C

From January to March 2007, [redacted] wrote the surge plan in Iraq under the direction of [redacted] continued to have contact with PETRAUES during this time. b6 b7C

From January to March 2009, [redacted] worked with [redacted] on force withdrawal from Iraq. [redacted] coordinated with PETRAEUS on this effort as PETRAEUS was Commander of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM). b6 b7C

(S) [redacted] b1 b3

Investigation on 09/05/2013 at [redacted] United States (In Person) b6 b7C

File [redacted]-302 Date drafted 09/13/2013 b7E

by [redacted]

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Following PETRAEUS' command at USCENTCOM, he became Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. From July 2010 to July 2011 [redacted] again took a sabbatical from West Point to serve as the Assistant Chief of Staff of Operations at ISAF. [redacted] was integrated into the international staff and reported to French 3-Star General GILLES FUGIER. It was [redacted] assignment to bolster the relationship between PETRAEUS and the ISAF international staff of allies. Prior to his departure from ISAF [redacted] facilitated the transition of ISAF command from PETRAEUS to General JOHN ALLEN.

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From July 2011 to January 2013, [redacted] completed his military career as a professor and Chair of the Social Sciences Department at West Point.

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[redacted]

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which was based on [redacted] 2003 speech at Harvard. [redacted] recalls the speech and case study was titled "Leadership In A Time Of Crisis." It was [redacted] who first contacted [redacted] and subsequently interviewed [redacted] Following this interview, [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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BROADWELL's dissertation on PETRAEUS became a book. [redacted] was surprised when he learned of BROADWELL's big book advance. [redacted] saw BROADWELL on

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her trips to Afghanistan. [redacted] attempted to help get BROADWELL Army Reserve credit for her time in Afghanistan. [redacted] as BROADWELL's senior rater, advised [redacted] not to make any special accommodation for BROADWELL in this regard. [redacted] never saw BROADWELL in uniform while in Afghanistan. BROADWELL was there as a journalist. b6 b7C

While at ISAF Headquarters, [redacted] saw BROADWELL on multiple occasions attend the 7:30am morning briefings delivered to PETRAEUS. During these briefings, BROADWELL sat in chairs reserved for journalists. During the briefings, notes were taken of what PETRAEUS said or directed by the Tri-Services Joint Information Operations Center staff. The Tri-Services Joint Information Operations Center staff included cleared members of the Afghan and Pakistan militaries. Approximately 300 people would participate in the 7:30am briefings via Adobe Connect. b6 b7C

The notes taken during the 7:30am briefings were posted on the [redacted] was capable of handling up to ISAF Secret information. [redacted] provided hardcopies of some 7:30am briefings to BROADWELL. These hardcopies were first scrubbed by [redacted] for classified information so that only unmarked unclassified summaries were provided to BROADWELL. [redacted] provided approximately twenty days worth of briefings which consisted of about forty printed pages. [redacted] provided these briefings to BROADWELL with full knowledge and permission of PETRAEUS and [redacted] could identify the copies of briefings provided to BROADWELL if shown the copies. [redacted] did not provide BROADWELL any classified information. BROADWELL never asked [redacted] for classified information, only the unclassified hardcopies of the 7:30am briefings. b6 b7C b7E

[redacted] reviewed BROADWELL's book, "All In: The Education of General David Petraeus." It was unclear whether BROADWELL, as a reservist, needed the Army to review the book prior to publication. As the publisher did not want PETRAEUS to preview the book, [redacted] agreed to review it and considered it the prudent thing to do to ensure the book did not include any classified information. During [redacted] review of the book, he suggested BROADWELL delete passages containing classified information about special operations forces. These passages may have been from Chapter 5 of the book. To [redacted] knowledge, BROADWELL took his suggestions and removed the sensitive information. b6 b7C

[redacted] does not recall receiving classified information, notes, or questions from BROADWELL via an unclassified email. [redacted] is not aware of PETRAEUS providing BROADWELL with classified documents. [redacted] is familiar with PETRAEUS' Black Books, which were used by PETRAEUS to take notes during b6 b7C

FD-302a (Rev. 05-08-10)

[redacted]302 (S)

Interview of [redacted] on

Continuation of FD-302 of September 5, 2013, On 09/05/2013, Page 4 of 4

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most meetings. [redacted] does not know if the Black Books contain classified information.

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SECRET [redacted]

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

Created From: [redacted] 302 (S)

Package:

Stored Location: *None*

Summary: (U) Interview Notes, NDA

Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 11/25/2013

Acquired From: (U) [redacted]

Attachments: (U) Interview Notes, NDA

Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

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PETRAEUS-1064

SECRET

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1 4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2015

Date of entry 12/05/2013

On 11/25/2013, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] cellular telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at the [redacted] by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] Army-CID. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following: b6 b7C

[redacted] first worked under General DAVID PETRAEUS while serving in Afghanistan. [redacted] first met PETRAEUS at a pinning ceremony for a battle [redacted] and his men fought in Afghanistan. This battle was chronicled in PAULA BROADWELL's book, All In: The Education of General David Petraeus. At the pinning ceremony, PETRAEUS asked [redacted] to tell the story of the battle for the book. After the ceremony, while at [redacted] received an email from PETRAEUS introducing [redacted] to BROADWELL. [redacted] provided a couple of pages of information about the battle and that was the last he heard until the book came out. b6 b7C

[redacted] left the United States for Afghanistan in [redacted] most likely arriving in Afghanistan in [redacted] reported to [redacted] two days after a big battle. [redacted] left Afghanistan in [redacted] and arrived in the United States on [redacted] was the last of his company to leave Afghanistan. b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

The clearance mission occurred in approximately [redacted] unit received [redacted] awards from PETRAEUS and another [redacted] awards b6 b7C

Investigation on 11/25/2013 at [redacted] United States (In Person) b1 b3

File # [redacted] 302 (S) Date drafted 11/27/2013 b6 b7C

by [redacted] b7E

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were granted at a later date. PETRAEUS awarded the [redacted] awards at the [redacted]

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[redacted] received an email from PETRAEUS following the ceremony. PETRAEUS had seen some write ups on the battle and had spoken to the Public Affairs Officer (PAO). PETRAEUS asked [redacted] if he could provide a write up on the battle.

[redacted] did not initially believe he provided storyboards to PETRAEUS related to this battle. If storyboards were provided, it would have been done over the [redacted] The information provided might have been classified Afghan releasable. There were [redacted] which would possibly be classified SECRET-ISAF NATO. These were standard forms used to brief our partners.

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[redacted] does not remember what items BROADWELL specifically asked for. [redacted] does not remember BROADWELL asking for PETRAEUS to handle the transfer of material from [redacted] to herself. [redacted] does not have records of the emails between himself, PETRAEUS and BROADWELL. [redacted] believes these records are kept downrange and someone should have copies.

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[redacted] knew BROADWELL was writing PETRAEUS's biography. [redacted] did not know BROADWELL was a military officer or that she possessed a security clearance. [redacted] does not recall BROADWELL asking for classified material. [redacted] does not remember feeling uncomfortable by any request.

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[redacted] does not remember providing [redacted]. These provided an overview of the [redacted] would have accompanied the overview which should have had a general summary in text format.

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[redacted] is not sure if there was a request to receive these items [redacted] could have been provided if BROADWELL requested. [redacted] was provided, [redacted] would have let the PAO ensure BROADWELL had the proper clearance.

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[redacted] would be surprised to know that pieces of classified [redacted] related to the battle appear in BROADWELL's book. That would not be good. [redacted] cannot say for sure that he sent the classified [redacted] but it they are in the book, he must have sent them.

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[redacted] would have provided the [redacted] because PETRAEUS asked him to provide them to BROADWELL. If BROADWELL would have contacted [redacted]

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directly, he would not have provided her with information because he did not know who she was.

[redacted] probably carbon copied BROADWELL and PETRAEUS when he sent the emails. The emails would have been sent on [redacted] but [redacted] believes they were sent via [redacted] because he did not have to change computers to send the emails. [redacted] believes BROADWELL was carbon copied on the emails, but he is unsure of her email address. b6 b7C

PETRAEUS wanted to use this battle to tell the story that the fighting was still ongoing. PETRAEUS was probably briefed about the battle once the fighting started. Additionally, there was [redacted] at one point, so PETRAEUS would have been made aware of this. PETRAUES was probably not moving the pieces during the battle, but was aware of the activity. b6 b7C

Colonel [redacted] was [redacted] in Afghanistan. While in Afghanistan, [redacted] was a Captain. Since this time, [redacted] has been promoted to Major. b6 b7C

If the information from the storyboards appears in the book, [redacted] sent the storyboards with the narrative. [redacted] would have expected that the storyboards would not have been used in the book. This is plagiarism with a punch in the face since it contained classified information. b6 b7C

[redacted], has not read BROADWELL's book. [redacted] was shocked to hear of the affair between PETRAEUS and BROADWELL. b6 b7C

Following the interview, [redacted] signed a Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement (NDA). The NDA can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope.

SECRET [redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1 4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Created From: [redacted] U2 (S)

Package:

Stored Location: *None*

Summary: (U) Interview notes.

Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 12/11/2014

Attachments: (U) Interview notes.

Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

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PETRAEUS-1072

SECRET



FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/11/2014

On December 3, 2014, [redacted] Combined Arms Center, United States Army [redacted] telephone number [redacted] was interviewed telephonically by Special Agents [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

[redacted] never provided any Non-Disclosure Statement (NDS) or Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) to DAVID PETRAEUS upon PETRAEUS' posting as Commanding General of Fort Leavenworth in 2005. United States Army Generals have Top Secret clearances. As an incoming General, [redacted] believes PETRAEUS arrived at Fort Leavenworth with a Top Secret clearance and would not have been required to execute any paperwork, to include an NDS or NDA, to maintain his clearance. As per Army procedure, the Officer's "Losing Unit" sends a "Transfer In Status" to the Officer's "Gaining Unit". This "Transfer In Status" provides an accounting of all clearances being transferred for the Officer. b6 b7C

[redacted] found no records of any NDS or NDA signed by PETRAEUS in Fort Leavenworth's security records. b6 b7C

[redacted] advised no security-related documents, to include an NDS or NDA, are located in a locked safe used by PETRAEUS while he was Commanding General at Fort Leavenworth.

~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629, FBI NSICG-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 12/03/2014 at [redacted] United States (Phone) b1 b3

File [redacted] 2 (S) Date dictated 12/08/2014 b6 b7C

by [redacted] b7E

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Official Record

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2040
DATE: 06-14-2016

Date of entry 02/02/2015

[redacted] West Point Installation Security Office, was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment located at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York by Special Agents [redacted] Also present for the interview were FBI SA [redacted] and U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Command SA [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

[redacted] most likely does not have a copy of any Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA) signed by [redacted] To verify [redacted] clearances, [redacted] would have logged into JPASS to confirm a signed NDA was on file. [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] does not keep NDA's for active duty military members at West Point. Their NDA's are submitted to her OPF. [redacted] only retains NDA's for contractors. b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

Investigation on 01/14/2015 at West Point, New York, United States (In Person)

File [redacted] 302 (S) Date drafted 01/20/2015

by [redacted]

b1 b3 b6 b7C b7E

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302a (Rev. 05-08-10)

[redacted] 302 (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 01/14/2015, Page 2 of 2

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[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] does not have any security paperwork for DAVID PETRAEUS.

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2040
DATE: 06-14-2016

Created From: [redacted] (S)

Package:

Stored Location: *None*

Summary: (U) Non Disclosure Statement for [redacted]

Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 01/30/2015

Acquired From: (U) [redacted]

Attachments: (U) Non Disclosure Statement

Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

b1
b3
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b7E

PETRAEUS-1093

~~SECRET~~

FD-1057 (Rev 5-8-10)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U) Submission of Non-Disclosure Statement for [redacted]

Date: 02/02/2015

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2040
DATE: 06-14-2016

b1
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From: CHARLOTTE
CE05
Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] (S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

Synopsis: (U) To submit Non-Disclosure Statement to file for [redacted]

b6
b7C

~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
~~Derived From: Multiple Sources~~
~~Declassify On: 20401231~~

Reference [redacted] (S)

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Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. (U) Non-Disclosure Statement

Details:

(S) As per [redacted] was interviewed by SA [redacted] on January 15, 2015. SA [redacted] failed to have [redacted] sign a Non-Disclosure Statement (NDS) at the conclusion of the interview. SA [redacted] contacted [redacted] via email on the evening of January 15, 2015 to schedule an appointment for [redacted] to sign the NDS.

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On January 22, 2015, SA [redacted] met [redacted] who then signed the NDS. The hard copy of this NDS can be found in the

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Title: (U) Submission of Non-Disclosure Statement for [redacted]

(S) Re: [redacted]302, 02/02/2015

b1
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corresponding 1A envelope.

◆◆

SECRET [redacted]

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2040
DATE: 06-14-2016

Created From: [redacted] 302 (S)

Package:

Stored Location: *None*

Summary: (U) Interview notes and Non Disclosure Statement.

Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 01/30/2015

Acquired From: (U [redacted]

Attachments: (U) Interview Notes and NDS

Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

b1
b3
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PETRAEUS-1096

SECRET

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2040
DATE: 06-14-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/03/2015

On January 27, 2015, [redacted] United States Central Command, HQ USCENTCOM/CCDC-HO, 7115 S. Boundary Blvd., MacDill AFB, FL 33621, telephone number [redacted] email address [redacted] was interviewed at his place of employment by Special Agents [redacted] Witnessing the interview was FBI Liaison to CENTCOM SA [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: b6 b7C

There are two ways items are sent from CENTCOM to National Defense University (NDU): via [redacted] email with attachments or via courier. The collection of documents known as the Petraeus Documents were handled by [redacted] and transferred from CENTCOM to NDU via CENTCOM's Records Management Department. b6 b7C b7E

[redacted] had [redacted] own team who organized the Petraeus Documents and transferred the documents to NDU. Any Chain of Custody forms used to track documents which were classified SECRET and below are kept in CENTCOM Records Management database, TRIM. Lt. Col [redacted] is the Head of the Command Records Branch at CENTCOM and can be contacted at telephone number [redacted] for access to the TRIM database. b6 b7C

If General DAVID PETRAEUS gave a [redacted] to [redacted] for inclusion in the Petraeus Documents, it would be have been sent to NDU. The Petraeus Documents included both personal and official documents. b6 b7C

At the conclusion of the interview, [redacted] signed a "Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement", which can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope.

Investigation on 01/27/2015 at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, United States (In Person)

File [redacted]-302 (S) Date drafted 01/30/2015

by [redacted]

b1 b3 b6 b7C b7E

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-16-2016

To: [redacted]
Cc:
(S) **Subject:** RE: (U) NSA Review o[redacted] --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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SentinelCaseId: [redacted] EMAIL (S)
SentToSentinel: 8/20/2013 7:21:34 PM

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J22J32P81~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 25X1-human~~
==========
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case[redacted] EMAIL (S)

b1
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[redacted]

Thoughts on the best way to get these clearances passed?

Thanks-
[redacted]

From [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 3:18 PM
To [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
(S) [redacted]
Subject: RE: (U) NSA Review of [redacted] --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[redacted]

I checked with the security office that handles our clearance transfers and NSA doesn't normally use [redacted] (S) but I'd rather find another way to send them. Is there another way to send them to you? NSA does use Scattered Castles if that helps.

[redacted]

From [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, August 07, 2013 3:06 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc:

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b7C

[redacted]

(S) **Subject:** RE: (U) NSA Review of [redacted] -- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[redacted]

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Hope you guys have been doing well. Sorry, I'm just seeing this now, I've been tied up with the recent [redacted] so I haven't been around a SIPRNet computer. I'll check on the JPAS issue, not sure why it wasn't done when we traveled down there. I'm going to try to check SIPR every couple days, but if you do send me something, please send me an unclass email a[redacted] to remind me.

Take care

[redacted]

From [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, July 02, 2013 3:11 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]

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[redacted]

(S) **Subject:** RE: (U) NSA Review of [redacted] -- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J33J56T10~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC~~
~~Declassify On: 20381231~~
==========

[redacted]

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Hope you've been well. I'm writing to ask a quick favor w/r/t our cases in Charlotte. Based on the continued review of the [redacted] that you [redacted] viewed, DoD has determined that the [redacted] contain multiple references to various SAPs. As such, DoD will be creating an overarching SAP for
(S) [redacted] I am compiling a list of all individuals who have had access to the evidence in Charlotte in order to grandfather everyone into the new SAP. I believe I will be in touch soon to provide you [redacted] with non-disclosure forms to sign.

In the meantime, we still need for your NSA Security POC to formally pass your clearances to FBIHQ via JPAS. Our FBI JPAS account is: FBIDC2. If you could please have someone follow up, that would be much appreciated.

Thanks again and Happy 4th of July.

[redacted]

b6
b7C

From: [redacted]
Sent: Friday, May 17, 2013 3:20 PM
To: [redacted]
(S) **Subject:** RE: (U) NSA Review of [redacted] --- ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

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Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Great, thank you.

Thank you for all your help.

[redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Friday, May 17, 2013 3:04 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
(S) **Subject:** RE: (U) NSA Review of [redacted] -- ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~
==========
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] (S)

[redacted] address is [redacted] If that doesn't work try [redacted]

b1
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Thanks again for your help.

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C

From: [redacted]
Sent: Friday, May 17, 2013 2:20 PM
To [redacted]
Cc [redacted]
(S) **Subject:** RE: (U) NSA Review of [redacted] -- ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

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Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

[redacted]

b3
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I was a little worried that you didn't mention the Hampton Inn [redacted] is off today and [redacted] has left so at this point it'd be a hassle to change the hotel. We have a rental car though, so we'll be mobile.

I'll send you the classification guides, but what is your JWICS address? I saw a couple [redacted] but not you.

All three of us have [redacted] and I also have [redacted]

[redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Friday, May 17, 2013 1:01 PM
To: [redacted]
(S) **Subject:** RE: (U) NSA Review of [redacted] -- ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

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Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~
==========

Your [redacted] would be fine. We can get you temp badges once you get here as well. I'd reconsider the hotel though, but your call. If you have a rental car, it is worth the extra 5 minute ride to either South Park area or Ballantyne. You'll want to do something after work and the area where you have chosen is not that great. Your call.

Send me the classification guides on JWICS since [redacted] won't be here.

b3
b6
b7C

Fly safe and see you on Monday-

[redacted]

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From: [redacted]
Sent: Friday, May 17, 2013 10:31 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
(S) **Subject:** RE: (U) NSA Review of [redacted] -- ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

[redacted]

We've gotten the logistics worked out and are scheduled to fly out Sunday, 19 May. There will be three of us [redacted] We're planning to fly back in the morning on Friday, 24 May. We're staying at the Hampton Inn and Suites – Arrowhead Road, which looks like it's just around the corner from your office.

b3
b6
b7C

Our security office should've passed our clearances to you this morning. Should we bring ou[redacted] or CAC cards? Also, I was thinking it might be helpful to have some of our classification guides down there, so could I email those to [redacted] account? I was thinking that would be easier than hand carrying them.

We'll plan on getting there at 0800 on Monday, if that works for you. If anything else comes up, my cell phone number is [redacted]

b6
b7C

Thank you and see you Monday,

[redacted]

b3
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b7C

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, May 14, 2013 10:56 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
(S) **Subject:** RE: (U) NSA Review of [redacted] -- ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

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Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~
==========

That works fine for us. Please let me know when you nail it down. Some admin stuff which may help you:

1. Location: Our office is a stand-alone facility located at 7915 Microsoft Way, Charlotte NC 28273 (704)672-6100. We are about 10 minutes from the airport. When you arrive at the guard shack, pass through and make your way to the front doors and our office

receptionist. You can ask to either page me on the intercom or call through the switchboard. We will take care of the admin stuff first, and there will be time for you to leave during the day for any breaks/lunch (no food on premise). We do have plenty of refrigerators/microwaves which you are welcome to use. Plenty of parking.

2. Lodging: There are some hotels right down the road from our office, but I'd recommend 3 areas of town for a longer stay. All of these areas put you within 15 minutes of the office. Check online for hotels in these areas;
   a. SouthPark: There is the SouthPark Mall which has upscale shopping and dining;
   b. Ballantyne: Plenty of food/shops and convenient to office
   c. Downtown Charlotte: Tons of stuff to do downtown and easy ride to the office which is about 10 minutes south of the city.
3. Clearances: Each of you should have a TS/SCI and [redacted] clearance. If not, please get with your security rep and ensure you get the needed clearance prior to arriving;
4. Dress: Business casual. No jeans. The reviewing room temperature tends to fluctuate, but we keep it cool due to all of the computers;
5. Review: We have nearly [redacted] information which we have reviewed and [redacted] more ongoing. We are still acquiring evidence including [redacted] This information will be viewed using a dual-monitor to make it easier. All of the reviewers will sit in one room specifically designated for this investigation. Expect to do a significant amount [redacted] We will provide you everything you need for your review; (S)
6. Classified: This investigation is managed [redacted] and is focused on the Mishandling of Classified Information. There is a Litigation Hold and Preservation Notice on all communications related to this case, so please be careful about what you say and email. As such, only those with a need to know should be briefed on the details.

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[redacted]

b6
b7C

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, May 14, 2013 8:41 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
(S) **Subject:** RE: (U) NSA Review of [redacted] --- ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

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Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

[redacted]

Just wanted to give you an update- It's looking like we'll be able to put together a trip for next week (20-24 May). We're waiting on a third person to be assigned to the TDY team. Do those dates still work for you?

I have the number for [redacted] from your earlier email, so I'll get in touch with her when we have our third person.

b3
b6
b7C

Thanks,

[redacted]

From [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, May 08, 2013 1:22 PM
To [redacted]
Cc [redacted]
Subject: RE: (U) NSA Review of [redacted] -- ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

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(S)

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~
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Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

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Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

****

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are addressed. If you have received this email in error please notify

the system manager.

This footnote also confirms that this email message has been swept by

MIMEsweeper for the presence of computer viruses.

www.mimesweeper.com

****

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

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Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FD-1036 (Rev. 10-16-2009)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Import Form

Form Type: EMAIL Date: 08/20/2013

Title: ~~(S//NF)~~ RE: (U) NSA Review of [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By:

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-16-2016

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b7E

Case ID #: [redacted] EMAIL [redacted] (S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ RE: (U) NSA Review of [redacted] (S)

~~Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 25X1-human~~

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-20-2016

To: [redacted]
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

SentinelCaseId: [redacted] MAIL (S)
SentToSentinel: 2/11/2014 10:11:16 PM

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J22J32P81~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
==========
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

Thank you!!

From [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2014 5:00 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1
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b7E

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J79J97T40~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
==========
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

He[redacted] I have a [redacted] at NSA. I give you a call when I hear something.

[redacted]

From [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2014 3:54 PM
To [redacted]
Cc
Subject: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J22J32P81~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
==========
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

Hi [redacted]

I just left you a voicemail, but figured I would also drop you a line as I called your bb and assume you do not have access to it during the day.

As you are aware, we have been working [redacted] with a number of outside agencies. One of our partners, the US Army, recently requested a number of files for review to determine if [redacted] based on evidence discovered in the course of our investigation. As part of the Army's review, they sent a number of items for classification review. They recently contacted us and advised they believe some of the information they are reviewing is owned by the NSA and are requesting assistance from the NSA for classification review. We are hoping you could put us in contact with the right person to help with this review. [redacted] and his team were in Charlotte in the past to review evidence, but I am not sure if he would be the one to provide the classification review. We would like to get someone from the NSA to travel to Charlotte to review the two pieces of evidence. We do not believe it would be more than a day trip for whoever is assigned this task. Any help you can provide would be greatly appreciated.

(S) b1 b3 b6 b7C b7E

Please feel free to give me a call to discuss further. My office line is [redacted] b6 b7C

Hope all is well with you!

Thanks-
[redacted]

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FD-1036 (Rev. 10-16-2009)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Import Form

Form Type: EMAIL

Date: 02/18/2014

Title: ~~(S//NF)~~ RE: NSA Review

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-20-2016

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] EMAIL [redacted] (S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

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b7C
b7E

Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ RE: NSA Review

~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-20-2016

To: [redacted]
Cc:
Subject: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

SentinelCaseId: [redacted] EMAIL (S)
SentToSentinel: 2/11/2014 8:54:13 PM

b1
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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J22J32P81~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~

==========

Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

b1
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b7C
b7E

Hi [redacted]

I just left you a voicemail, but figured I would also drop you a line as I called your bb and assume you do not have access to it during the day.

As you are aware, we have been working [redacted] with a number of outside agencies. One of our partners, the US Army, recently requested a number of files for review to determine if [redacted] based on evidence discovered in the course of our investigation. As part of the Army's review, they sent a number of items for classification review. They recently contacted us and advised they believe some of the information they are reviewing is owned by the NSA and are requesting assistance from the NSA for classification review. We are hoping you could put us in contact with the right person to help with this review. [redacted] and his team were in Charlotte in the past to review evidence, but I am not sure if he would be the one to provide the classification review. We would like to get someone from the NSA to travel to Charlotte to review the two pieces of evidence. We do not believe it would be more than a day trip for whoever is assigned this task. Any help you can provide would be greatly appreciated.

(S)

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b3
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Please feel free to give me a call to discuss further. My office line is [redacted] [redacted]

b6
b7C

Hope all is well with you!

Thanks-
[redacted]

==========

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FD-1036 (Rev. 10-16-2009)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Original Record

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Import Form

Form Type: EMAIL

Date: 02/18/2014

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-20-2016

Title: ~~(S//NF)~~ NSA Review

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] EMAIL [redacted] (S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ NSA Review

~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC,~~
~~dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-20-2016

To: [redacted]
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

SentinelCaseId: [redacted] EMAIL (S)
SentToSentinel: 2/21/2014 8:25:16 PM

b1
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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J33J56T10~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~

==========

Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

Hi [redacted]
I do. It's [redacted]

[redacted]

b1
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From: [redacted]
Sent: Friday, February 21, 2014 3:13 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1
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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J79J97T40~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~

==========

Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

Do either of you have a SCION account?

From [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 4:47 PM
To [redacted]
Cc [redacted]
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6
b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J22J32P81~~

~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
==========
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

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(S) They are not new. They might have [redacted] but I do not think they would have [redacted] (S)

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 4:41 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1
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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J79J97T40~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
==========
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

(S) Do you know if NSA [redacted] they were in CE or are they new?

From [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 4:36 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J22J32P81~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
==========
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

[redacted]

(S) The information believed to contain [redacted] At this time, we are unable to provide them via the high side. Per the Army, the [redacted] (S)

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The DOD created a SAP that encompasses this investigation. Please let me know if you need anything further.

As always, thank you for your help!

Thanks-
[redacted]

b6
b7C

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 4:02 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J79J97T40~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
==========
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

b1
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[redacted] has asked if CE could scan the docs to the highside or can you catorgorize what is in the
(S) [redacted] You can send the information to [redacted]

(S) Did DIA create a SAP for what was in the [redacted] Does DIA have all the clearance info they need for NSA?

[redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2014 3:54 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6
b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J22J32P81~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
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Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

b1
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b7E

Hi [redacted]

I just left you a voicemail, but figured I would also drop you a line as I called your bb and assume you do not have access to it during the day.

As you are aware, we have been working [redacted] with (S)
a number of outside agencies. One of our partners, the US Army, recently requested a number of files for review to determine if [redacted] based on evidence discovered in the course of our investigation. As part of the Army's review, they sent a number of items for classification review. They recently contacted us and advised they believe some of the information

they are reviewing is owned by the NSA and are requesting assistance from the NSA for classification review. We are hoping you could put us in contact with the right person to help with this review. [redacted] and his team were in Charlotte in the past to review evidence, but I am not sure if he would be the one to provide the classification review. We would like to get someone from the NSA to travel to Charlotte to review the two pieces of evidence. We do not believe it would be more than a day trip for whoever is assigned this task. Any help you can provide would be greatly appreciated.

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Please feel free to give me a call to discuss further. My office line is [redacted]

Hope all is well with you!

Thanks-
[redacted]

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FD-1036 (Rev. 10-16-2009)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Import Form

Form Type: EMAIL

Date: 02/21/2014

Title: ~~(S//NF)~~ RE: NSA Review

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-20-2016

b1
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b7E

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] EMAIL [redacted] (S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ RE: NSA Review

~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC,~~
~~dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~

◆◆

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FBI INFO
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-20-2016

To: [redacted]
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

SentinelCaseId: [redacted] EMAIL (S)
SentToSentinel: 2/21/2014 9:02:46 PM

b1
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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J33J56T10~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~

==========

Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

Can you please come back over?

[redacted]

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b7E

From [redacted]
Sent: Friday, February 21, 2014 4:02 PM
To [redacted]
Cc
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J22J32P81~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~

==========

Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

We both do.

From [redacted]
Sent: Friday, February 21, 2014 3:13 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc:
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6
b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J79J97T40~~

~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
==========
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

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Do either of you have a SCION account?

From [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 4:47 PM
To [redacted]
Cc [redacted]
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1
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b7C
b7E

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J22J32P81~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
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Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

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Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 4:41 PM
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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J22J32P81~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~

~~Declassify On: 20391231~~

==========

Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

[redacted]

b1
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b7E

The information believed to contain [redacted] At this (S)
time, we are unable to provide them via the high side. Per the Army, the [redacted]
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From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 4:02 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1
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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J79J97T40~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~

==========

Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

(S) [redacted] has asked if CF could scan the docs to the highside or can you catorgorize what is in the [redacted] You can send the information to [redacted]

(S) Did DIA create a SAP for what was in the [redacted] Does DIA have all the clearance info they need for NSA?

[redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2014 3:54 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6
b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: J22J32P81
Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629
Declassify On: 20391231
==========
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Hi [redacted]

I just left you a voicemail, but figured I would also drop you a line as I called your bb and assume you do not have access to it during the day.

As you are aware, we have been working [redacted] with a number of outside agencies. One of our partners, the US Army, recently requested a number of files for review to determine if [redacted] based on evidence discovered in the course of our investigation. As part of the Army's review, they sent a number of items for classification review. They recently contacted us and advised they believe some of the information they are reviewing is owned by the NSA and are requesting assistance from the NSA for classification review. We are hoping you could put us in contact with the right person to help with this review. [redacted] and his team were in Charlotte in the past to review evidence, but I am not sure if he would be the one to provide the classification review. We would like to get someone from the NSA to travel to Charlotte to review the two pieces of evidence. We do not believe it would be more than a day trip for whoever is assigned this task. Any help you can provide would be greatly appreciated. (S)

Please feel free to give me a call to discuss further. My office line is [redacted] b6 b7C

Hope all is well with you!

Thanks-
[redacted]

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Classification: SECRET//NOFORN

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FD-1036 (Rev. 10-16-2009)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Import Form

Form Type: EMAIL

Date: 02/21/2014

Title: ~~(S//NF)~~ RE: NSA Review

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1 4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-20-2016

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b7E

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] EMAI [redacted] (S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ RE: NSA Review

~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC,~~
~~dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-20-2016

To: [redacted]
Cc:
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

SentinelCaseId: [redacted] EMAIL (S)
SentToSentinel: 2/20/2014 9:35:49 PM

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b6
b7C
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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J22J32P81~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
==========
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

[redacted]

b1
b3
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b7C
b7E

The information believed to contain [redacted] At this (S)
time, we are unable to provide them via the high side. Per the Army, the [redacted]
[redacted] (S)

The DOD created a SAP that encompasses this investigation. Please let me know if you need anything further.

As always, thank you for your help!

Thanks-
[redacted]

From [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 4:02 PM
To [redacted]
Cc
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J79J97T40~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
==========
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

b1
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b7C
b7E

(S) [redacted] has asked if CE could scan the docs to the highside or can you catorgorize what is in the [redacted] You can send the information to [redacted]

(S) Did DIA create a SAP for what was in the [redacted] Does DIA have all the clearance info they need for NSA?

[redacted] b6 b7C

From [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2014 3:54 PM
To [redacted]
Cc [redacted]
Subject: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J22J32P81~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
==========
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

Hi [redacted]

I just left you a voicemail, but figured I would also drop you a line as I called your bb and assume you do not have access to it during the day. b1 b3 b6 b7C

As you are aware, we have been working [redacted] with (S) b7E
a number of outside agencies. One of our partners, the US Army, recently requested a number of files for review to determine if [redacted] based on evidence discovered in the course of our investigation. As part of the Army's review, they sent a number of items for classification review. They recently contacted us and advised they believe some of the information they are reviewing is owned by the NSA and are requesting assistance from the NSA for classification review. We are hoping you could put us in contact with the right person to help with this review. [redacted] and his team were in Charlotte in the past to review evidence, but I am not sure if he would be the one to provide the classification review. We would like to get someone from the NSA to travel to Charlotte to review the two pieces of evidence. We do not believe it would be more than a day trip for whoever is assigned this task. Any help you can provide would be greatly appreciated.

Please feel free to give me a call to discuss further. My office line [redacted] b6 b7C

Hope all is well with you!

Thanks-
[redacted]

==========
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FD-1036 (Rev. 10-16-2009)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Official Record

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Import Form

Form Type: EMAIL

Date: 03/12/2014

Title: ~~(S//NF)~~ RE: NSA Review

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-20-2016

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] EMAIL [redacted] (S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ RE: NSA Review

~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC,~~
~~dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~

◆◆

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-20-2016

To: [redacted]
Cc:
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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SentinelCaseId: [redacted] EMAIL (S)
SentToSentinel: 2/20/2014 9:47:27 PM

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J22J32P81~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
==========
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

They are not new. They might have [redacted] but I do not think they would have (S)
(S) [redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 4:41 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc:
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (U)

~~Classified By: J79J97T40~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
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Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

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From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 4:36 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc:
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J22J32P81~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
==========
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

[redacted]

The information believed to contain [redacted] At this time, we are unable to provide them via the high side. Per the Army, the [redacted] (S) b1 b3 b7E

The DOD created a SAP that encompasses this investigation. Please let me know if you need anything further.

As always, thank you for your help!

Thanks -

[redacted] b6 b7C

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 4:02 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J79J97T40~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
==========
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S) b1 b3 b6 b7C b7E

[redacted] has asked if CF could scan the docs to the highside or can you catorgorize what is in the (S) [redacted] You can send the information to [redacted]

Did DIA create a SAP for what was in the [redacted] Does DIA have all the clearance info they need for (S) NSA?

[redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2014 3:54 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1 b3 b6 b7C b7E

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J22J32P81~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
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Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

Hi [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
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I just left you a voicemail, but figured I would also drop you a line as I called your bb and assume you do not have access to it during the day.

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(S)

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b6
b7C

Hope all is well with you!

Thanks-
[redacted]

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FD-1036 (Rev. 10-16-2009)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Official Record

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Import Form

Form Type: EMAIL

Date: 03/12/2014

Title: ~~(S//NF)~~ RE: NSA Review

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-20-2016

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID # [redacted] EMAIL [redacted] (S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

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Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ RE: NSA Review

~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC,~~
~~dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1 4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-20-2016

To: [redacted]
Cc:
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

SentinelCaseId: [redacted] EMAIL (S)
SentToSentinel: 2/21/2014 9:02:16 PM

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J22J32P81~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
==========
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

We both do.

From [redacted]
Sent: Friday, February 21, 2014 3:13 PM
To [redacted]
Cc
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J79J97T40~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
==========
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

Do either of you have a SCION account?

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 4:47 PM
To [redacted]
Cc
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J22J32P81~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
==========
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

They are not new. They might have [redacted] but I do not think they would have (S)
(S) [redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 4:41 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J79J97T40~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
==========
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

(S) Do you know if [redacted] they were in CE or are they new?

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 4:36 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J22J32P81~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~
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Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

[redacted]

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The information believed to contain [redacted] At this (S)
time, we are unable to provide them via the high side. For the Army, the [redacted]
[redacted] (S)

The DOD created a SAP that encompasses this investigation. Please let me know if you need anything further.

As always, thank you for your help!

Thanks-
[redacted]

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From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 4:02 PM
To: [redacted]

Cc [redacted]
Subject: RE: NSA Review --- SECRET//NOFORN

Classification: SECRET//NOFORN

Classified By: J79J97T40
Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615
Declassify On: 20391231
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Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

(S) [redacted] has asked if CE could scan the docs to the highside or can you catorgorize what is in the [redacted] You can send the information to [redacted]

(S) Did DIA create a SAP for what was in the [redacted] Does DIA have all the clearance info they need for NSA?

[redacted]

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From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2014 3:54 PM
To [redacted]
Cc [redacted]
Subject: NSA Review --- SECRET//NOFORN

Classification: SECRET//NOFORN

Classified By: J22J32P81
Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629
Declassify On: 20391231
==========
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [redacted] EMAIL (S)

Hi [redacted]

I just left you a voicemail, but figured I would also drop you a line as I called your bb and assume you do not have access to it during the day.

As you are aware, we have been working [redacted] with a number of outside agencies. One of our partners, the US Army, recently requested a number of files for review to determine if [redacted] based on evidence discovered in the course of our investigation. As part of the Army's review, they sent a number of items for classification review. They recently contacted us and advised they believe some of the information they are reviewing is owned by the NSA and are requesting assistance from the NSA for classification review. We are hoping you could put us in contact with the right person to help with this review. [redacted] and his team were in Charlotte in the past to review evidence, but I am not sure if he would be the one to provide the classification review. We would like to get someone from the NSA to travel to Charlotte to review the two pieces of evidence. We do not believe it would be more than a day trip for whoever is assigned this task. Any help you can provide would be greatly appreciated.

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Please feel free to give me a call to discuss further. My office line is [redacted] b6 b7C

Hope all is well with you!

Thanks-

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Classification: SECRET//NOFORN

FD-1036 (Rev. 10-16-2009)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Import Form

Form Type: EMAIL

Date: 03/12/2014

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 06-20-2016

Title: ~~(S//NF)~~ RE: NSA Review

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID # [redacted] EMAIL [redacted] (S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

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Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ RE: NSA Review

~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC,~~
~~dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20391231~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2040
DATE: 06-22-2016

To: [redacted]
Cc:
Subject: Interview Request --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

SentinelCaseId: (S) [redacted] EMAIL
SentToSentinel: 1/9/2015 5:25:22 PM

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: J33J56T10~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20401231~~

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Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Cas [redacted] EMAIL (S)

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Hi [redacted]

Happy New Year. We are nearing the finish line on our [redacted] (S) [redacted] in Charlotte. DOJ has asked that we knock out a couple more interviews in the next week. Specifically, AFOSI has identified a [redacted] who had some interaction with [redacted] while stationed in Iraq (circa 2003). We've asked OSI to set up the interview and would like to get this done Wednesday or Thursday (1/14 or 1/15) next week.

Could you please obtain SAC Concurrence for [redacted] and I to travel up for this interview? Please let me know if you need an EC from the file or have any questions.

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Thanks for your help and have great weekend.

[redacted]

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FD-1036 (Rev. 10-16-2009)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Import Form

Form Type: EMAIL **Date:** 01/09/2015

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2040
DATE: 06-22-2016

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(U) **Title:** ~~(S//NF)~~ Interview Request

Approved By: SSA [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] EMAIL [redacted] (S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

(U) **Synopsis:** ~~(S//NF)~~ Interview Request

~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated 20120629~~
~~Declassify On: 20401231~~

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Date of entry 09/25/2012

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PAULA BROADWELL, date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] cellular telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at her residence [redacted] Interviewing agents advised Broadwell of their identities and requested she participate in an interview. Broadwell requested to conduct the interview in the interviewing agent's vehicle outside of the residence, as her in-laws were visiting and present inside the residence. Interviewing agents advised Broadwell that they wanted to discuss several cyber stalking emails sent [redacted] Tampa, Florida. Broadwell asked if her attorney should be present for the interview. Interviewing agents advised her it was her choice but that the interview was completely voluntary and that she was free to leave at any time. Further, she was advised that she did not have to answer every question asked by interviewing agents. Broadwell initially asked interviewing agents whether the investigation would continue if [redacted] Broadwell then consented to the interview and provided the following information: b6 b7C

Broadwell admitted that she sent emails to [redacted] and what Broadwell perceived to be [redacted] She used information from forwarded emails sent to her by David Petraeus to draft her emails. b6 b7C

Broadwell is friends with [redacted] and is aware that he knows [redacted] to Petraeus, who then sent it to Broadwell. She sent the e-mail to [redacted] on May 11, 2012, to [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

Broadwell has only met [redacted] once. [redacted] to Petraeus, which he then b6 b7C

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Investigation on 09/24/2012 at Charlotte, North Carolina, United States (In Person)

File # 288A-TP-74641 Date drafted 09/25/2012

by [redacted] b6 b7C

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forwarded to Broadwell. She sent the e-mail to [redacted] from [redacted] on May 11, 2012, t[redacted]

Broadwell has met [redacted] She is acquaintances with his wife. [redacted] to Petraeus, which he then forwarded to Broadwell. She sent the e-mail to [redacted] from [redacted] on May 11, 2012, to warn him of [redacted] After she sent the e-mail, she asked herself [redacted]

Broadwell sent the emails from [redacted] on May 11, 2012, from San Francisco, California. She was there to speak at an event for Google. She consumed a few glasses of wine before she sent the emails. She did not send any other emails from that account. Broadwell [redacted]

On June 3, 2012, Broadwell decided to send [redacted] an e-mail in an effort to [redacted] She was also trying to [redacted] David Petraeus [redacted] She knew [redacted] e-mail account from an e-mail forwarded to her by Petraeus. It is her understanding that [redacted] She created and used the e-mail account [redacted] to send the emails to [redacted] She sent the first e-mail from the Thayer Hotel at the U.S. Military Academy while she was on Army Reserve Duty. She was there to teach at West Point. She is a Major in the Army reserves and possesses a TS/SCI clearance. She sent additional emails to [redacted] e-mail account on June 5, 7, 11, 18, and 22, 2012. Broadwell does not possess any photographs as referred to in the e-mail sent to [redacted] nor did she intend to contact the media as indicated in the e-mail. Both were empty threats.

Broadwell created and used the fictitious accounts [redacted] and used public wireless networks in order to mask her identity. She did not initially believe the emails to be of a criminal nature. After researching her emailing activity on Google, she became aware that the emails were illegal and stopped sending them. Broadwell characterized the action of sending the emails as [redacted] Broadwell sent the last stalking e-mail on June 22, 2012. She stopped sending the emails because she felt remorseful and regretful, and typically acted more honorably.

Broadwell is friends with the FBI Bosto[redacted] whom she identified as [redacted]

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During a visit over the summer, Broadwell discussed the FBI's Cyber capabilities with [redacted] When told by [redacted] of the FBI's cyber capabilities, Broadwell grew concerned that she may be caught for sending the stalking emails, and said to herself [redacted] b6 b7C

Neither Petraeus nor any other person colluded with her to send or was aware of the stalking emails.

Broadwell [redacted] Petraeus [redacted] b6 b7C
2012 [redacted] Petraeus and [redacted]
Petraeus [redacted] Broadwell [redacted]
Petraeus then [redacted]
Broadwell told Petraeus [redacted]
Petraeus sent an e-mail to [redacted]

In addition to the [redacted] Petraeus [redacted] b6 b7C
Broadwell which she found [redacted] Broadwell also
[redacted] Petraeus told Broadwell that [redacted]
Petraeus [redacted]
Broadwell [redacted] as she considers
Petraeus [redacted]
Broadwell admitted to acting [redacted]
Broadwell feels that [redacted]
Petraeus [redacted] She characterized
[redacted]

Petraeus sends Broadwell much of his correspondence because she serves as his archiver and biographer. They are currently working together on a book titled "Relentless" which is based on Petraeus leadership principles. She is also planning to write his official biography which Petraeus does not want published until after his death. Petraeus has authorized Broadwell to act as his [redacted] b6 b7C

Broadwell was asked by [redacted] to speak at the Republican National Convention. She was also asked by the Obama administration to speak at the Democratic National Convention. Additionally, Mitt Romney's campaign staff asked Broadwell to serve as a [redacted] Petraeus told Broadwell that she b6 b7C

could not be his [redacted] if she chose to become a political [redacted] She chose to not speak at either convention or serve as anyone else's [redacted] b6 b7C

Broadwell has never spoken to [redacted]

Broadwell was adamant that Petraeus does not share classified information with her. He has discussed "sensitive" information with Broadwell, and she further clarified "sensitive" as meaning "off-the-record." Broadwell has never shared sensitive or classified information with members of the media.

Broadwell was asked for consent to search her computers and removable media, which she declined to give. Broadwell was advised by interviewing agents that they were aware of Broadwell's and Petraeus illicit affair. After learning that interviewing agents were aware of her affair with Petraeus, Broadwell agreed to provide consent to search her computers and removable media. Broadwell's initial reluctance to provide consent was due to her desire to prevent the discovery of her affair with Petraeus.

Broadwell and Petraeus [redacted] Broadwell used the [redacted] Petraeus with [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

[redacted] other than she has compartmentalized her frustration [redacted] b6 b7C

On approximately June 23, 2012, Petraeus asked Broadwell via e-mail if she sent emails [redacted] Broadwell denied sending the emails. A short time later, he asked her again, in person, if she was sending [redacted] emails. He told her that if she was that she should stop. Broadwell was concerned about how Petraeus found out about the emails. When interviewing agents asked if there were any other discussions between she and Petraeus about the emails, she stated "it was an ugly period and we haven't talked about it anymore." b6 b7C

Broadwell thinks that [redacted] Petraeus discussed the stalking emails, and that is why Petraeus confronted Broadwell. b6 b7C

Broadwell knew the FBI was investigating the e-mails she sent [redacted] and others. When questioned on how she knew, Broadwell stated it was because it was intimated by Petraeus in his questions to her about the emails. Petraeus heavily implied that there was an investigation into the emails. Upon further questioning, Broadwell admitted that Petraeus did in b6 b7C

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fact tell her there was an investigation. He did so via e-mail in their [redacted] which she clarified as their [redacted]

Broadwell also [redacted] She [redacted] She used the [redacted] to register the [redacted] which is one of the [redacted] Broadwell [redacted] Broadwell [redacted]

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Petraeus never threatened or coerced Broadwell to disrupt the investigation or destroy evidence. Broadwell does not think of Petraeus as the Director of the CIA, but instead [redacted] Broadwell asked interviewing agents if they thought Petraeus was having an affair with [redacted] Broadwell also asked if President Obama would be notified about the investigation and her affair with Petraeus.

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Broadwell signed a completed FD-941, Consent to Search Computer(s) form, authorizing the consensual search of her computers. Broadwell provided investigators with two laptop computers and two external hard drives. When Broadwell provided her Macbook Air laptop to interviewing agents, she stated [redacted] as she handed it over.

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Date of entry 11/02/2012

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PAULA BROADWELL, date of birth (DOB) [redacted] social security account number [redacted] cellular telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at the Marriott City Center, Charlotte, North Carolina. Broadwell was advised that several classified documents were found during a forensic review of her computers. During the interview, she was shown each document and asked to provide a statement as to how she obtained them. After being advised of the nature of the interview, BROADWELL provided the following information:

Broadwell identified several of the documents shown to her as being from her time in Afghanistan, but was unable to provide specifics as to how she obtained them. Several of the documents related to briefings she attended. She was unable to identify most of the classified documents she was shown. Broadwell spent several months in Afghanistan researching her book on David Petraeus. During her time there, she was given access to several briefings at the "Secret" classification level and below. Reporters were often given such access in order to provide them with situational awareness of the war. In order to receive the briefings she signed an "off the record" agreement which meant she could not write about classified information she observed. She would sometimes obtain a paper copy of briefings she attended in order to preserve as research for her book.

Broadwell is unaware of the full contents of the documents she maintains on her computer. She received CD's full of documents relating to time periods of David Petraeus' life for research purposes related to her book. She does not believe that all of the documents are still classified, only that they bear the classification markings. Some of the documents shown to her contained hand-written notes and markings, which she confirmed as her own.

Broadwell had boxes full of documents related to Petraeus' various

Investigation on 11/02/2012 at Charlotte, North Carolina, United States (In Person)

File # 288A-TP-74641 Date drafted 11/02/2012

by [redacted]

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military assignments which she has since returned to their original owners, or destroyed. She [redacted] so that she could keep them to use as research for her book and doctoral dissertation. [redacted] Broadwell. [redacted] Broadwell prior to [redacted] Although [redacted] never acknowledged seeing classified data, Broadwell believes it is likely that she did.

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While in Afghanistan, Broadwell received two CD's from U.S. Army Colonel [redacted] which contained several power point presentations, some of which were classified as "Secret." The presentations covered events pertaining to the war in Iraq. She did not realize there were classified documents on the CD until after she returned to Charlotte. She believed the documents were no longer sensitive because they pertained to historical events. Broadwell currently has possession of the CD provided to her by [redacted]

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Broadwell did not use any classified information in writing her book. The book was reviewed by a military public affairs office and approved for release before it was published.

Broadwell interacted with various uniformed military members while researching her book. Some of her military acquaintances provided her with large volumes of printed and digital information, which she saved for later review. "Secret" documents were sometimes included in the documents she was provided. Broadwell also received large quantities of documents from military archive units in order to use for her book research.

Broadwell believed that much of the classified information located on her computer was no longer classified, as the classified information on those documents were events that had already occurred. Additionally, she advised that several documents in her possession were "over classified" as part of operational security for military actions in Afghanistan.

Broadwell has never received classified information from Petraeus. She characterized Petraeus as very procedure oriented and security conscious. She further stated that he allowed her to see unclassified documents, such as his daily brief, but would not let her have copies of them. Further, Petraeus is unaware of what documents she received or maintained copies of and stated that he would be "very upset" with her for keeping classified documents on her personal computer.

Broadwell did not have specific arrangements with any military personnel to provide her with classified information. She did not access any classified military computers, nor did she print any classified

information from any classified systems. She did not use any other persons computer accesses to obtain classified information.

Broadwell characterized her time in Afghanistan as "fast paced" and stated that she never intended to improperly receive or store classified information. Rather, she received a large volume of documents and intended to review them upon her return to the U.S.. She characterized her having classified documents on her computer as "a huge mistake for anyone to make, especially a former intel officer."

As of the time of the interview, Broadwell had not deleted any of the classified information from her laptop. She was advised not to delete any data from her computer by interviewing agents.

Broadwell saw Petraeus in Washington D.C. sometime during the week of October 22, 2012. They were both attending a gala. She saw him only briefly and did not have the opportunity to speak with him, other than to exchange a greeting.

Broadwell and Petraeus have talked candidly since each of their interviews with the FBI. They confirmed their FBI interviews to each other. Petraeus told her he "was not diluting himself anymore that everything was going to turn out ok." [redacted] She believes that if Petraeus "doesn't work for the greater good of the country, he'll die." She clarified that she did not think he would commit suicide. Petraeus did not disclose to her any details of his FBI interview. b6 b7C

Broadwell and Petraeus currently have limited communication and she is unsure of where their professional relationship currently stands.

Broadwell has long been [redacted] David Petraeus life. She has been suspicious of Petraeus [redacted] Petraeus. She understands that Petraeus [redacted] are [redacted] During the [redacted] Petraeus [redacted] Broadwell [redacted] Petraeus [redacted] Petraeus told her [redacted] She directed him [redacted] Petraeus [redacted] and provided it to Broadwell. [redacted] Petraeus and [redacted] Petraeus then admitted [redacted] b6 b7C

On [redacted] weekend of 2012 [redacted] Petraeus' [redacted] Petraeus and [redacted] He told Broadwell that [redacted] Broadwell [redacted]

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Broadwell sent [redacted] an e-mail to warn him about [redacted] She saw e-mail exchanges between [redacted] Petraeus. The email exchanges contained [redacted] She also saw [redacted] from the [redacted] Broadwell discussed [redacted] who told her that he felt [redacted]

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Broadwell sent emails to [redacted] because she saw [redacted] as she did [redacted] She does not know of any specific [redacted] Broadwell considers [redacted]

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Shortly after his [redacted] on June 22, 2012, Petraeus asked Broadwell if she was sending [redacted] emails. He told her that [redacted] law enforcement and that there was an investigation into the emails. She advised him that she had not sent them and he did not question her further about it. Some weeks later she confessed to him over the telephone that she was the person who sen[redacted] the stalking emails. He was very upset with her and told her how "stupid it was", but did not direct her to take any actions.

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Petraeus told Broadwell that [redacted] knew the sender of the emails was a woman from Charlotte with two kids. He also told her that [redacted] was provided this information by "an FBI friend." Petraeus told [redacted] that the description matched the description of his biographer, which [redacted] surmised to be Broadwell.

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Broadwell's [redacted] David Petraeus [redacted] They [redacted] Charlotte and he was in Afghanistan. [redacted] During [redacted] she and Petraeus [redacted]

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Broadwell and Petraeus [redacted] after his retirement from the military. She stated she could [redacted] Washington D.C.. She [redacted] Their [redacted]

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Broadwell attended the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) at West Point from 1991-1995. She then served on active duty for five years. She was recalled to active duty three times after 9-11. She changed her status to Individual Ready Reserve in 2005. In 2011, she became an active reservist, and teaches summer school at the USMA. She was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel as of August, 2012.

Broadwell was asked if she would provide consent to search for any of her remainin[redacted] should any be identified. She advised she "would have to think about it."

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/10/2012

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PAULA BROADWELL contacted interviewing agent telephonically and provided the following information:

Broadwell is [redacted] She believes that members of Congress were briefed about this investigation. She expressed concern with some of the media leaks and advised she planned to meet with an attorney later in the day. She received a telephone call from a friend saying he had met with [redacted] and needed to speak with her. b6 b7C

Interviewing agent explained to Broadwell that he needed to meet with her to obtain all of the classified information in her possession. Interviewing agent also advised her he would need to meet with [redacted] [redacted] to obtain any classified information in [redacted] possession. Broadwell stated she would assist with this effort. She expressed concern with the fact that the media is positioned around her house and that she did not know how to get to her home without running into the media. b6 b7C

Broadwell advised she would call interviewing agent later in the day after she had met with her attorney.

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Investigation on 11/10/2012 at Tampa, Florida, United States (Phone)

File # 288A-TP-74641 Date drafted 11/10/2012

by [redacted] b6 b7C

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