

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C86W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-10-2016

Created From:

~~SECRET~~

(S)

Package:

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U//~~FOUO~~) Instrument of Deposit provided by Acquired By: SSA 

Acquired On: 03/01/2013

Attachments:

(U//~~FOUO~~) Instrument of Deposit

Attachment Classification:

~~UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~~~b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E


PETRAEUS-873

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 1 of 1 -

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 04-10-2018

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/05/2013

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] Director of Security, National Defense University (NDU), date of birth [redacted] work phone number [redacted]

[redacted] email [redacted] was interviewed at his place of employment, Lincoln Hall, NDU, Fort McNair, Washington D.C. The interview was conducted subsequent to a previous interview on this date. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] provided interviewing agents two copies of a document entitled "Instrument of Deposit" that detailed the agreement between NDU and General DAVID PETRAEUS regarding the handling of his collection donated to NDU upon his retirement. Interviewing agents reviewed the document in [redacted] presence with his permission. The document did not include a detailed description or catalogue of the materials provided by PETRAEUS in his collection. The document was signed and dated by PETRAEUS on July 19, 2010, and by a representative of NDU (illegible) on July 29, 2010. The "Instrument of Deposit" will be submitted as an enclosure to this FD-302.

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] offered to obtain the catalogue of the items in the PETRAEUS collection described to interviewing agents during his previous interview conducted earlier in the day. While agents waited in his office for approximately 10-15 minutes [redacted] went to the NDU library to obtain the catalogue which he referred to as the "Finding Index." [redacted] indicated he could not obtain the Finding Index because a military reservist attorney was currently using it to complete a response to a pending FOIA request. [redacted] then offered to attempt to obtain a copy of the Finding Index for interviewing agents early next week. Interviewing agents expressed gratitude for [redacted] efforts and indicated they would re-contact [redacted] on March 4, 2013, to coordinate this effort if deemed appropriate.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

Investigation on 03/01/2013 at District of Columbia, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File [redacted] 302 31 Date drafted 03/03/2013

by [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-10-2016

b1

b3

b7E

Created From:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(S)~~

Package:

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U//~~FOUO~~) One Non Disclosure Agreement for [REDACTED] dated 04/25/2013,
Copies of Voice Messages from subject to [REDACTED] dated 04/24/2013
Agent Notes, dated 04/25/2013, and email traffic between subject and
[REDACTED] dated 03/13/2013 03/18/2013.

Acquired By:

Acquired On: 04/25/2013

b6

b7C

Acquired From:

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]
National Defense University[REDACTED]
Washington , District Of Columbia

Attachments:

 (U//~~FOUO~~) Email Notes NDA


Attachment Classification:

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

PETRAEUS-890

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46E11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 05-10-2016

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/29/2013

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] Classified Documents Center (CDC), [redacted] National Defense University (NDU), Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., date of birth (DOB) [redacted] work telephone number [redacted] work e-mail addresses [redacted] was interviewed at the CDC, [redacted] NDU, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. The following individuals were present for this interview: Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] Special Agent [redacted] Special Agent [redacted] and [redacted] NDU General Counsel. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

(S)

(~~S~~//~~FOUO~~) On 04/24/2013, [redacted] called [redacted] at the CDC and left two voice messages, from telephone number [redacted] at 1:44pm and 3:00pm. [redacted] explained [redacted] left these messages to make arrangements to provide [redacted] several items he wanted to add to [redacted] at the NDU Archives.

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(~~S~~//~~FOUO~~) At approximately 3:30pm on 04/24/2013 [redacted] walked to the front entrance of [redacted] and met [redacted] in the NDU President's Parking Circle. [redacted] said [redacted] did not want to walk inside to the CDC, and asked [redacted] to meet him outside near his car. At this time, [redacted] proceeded to meet [redacted] by his car where he handed [redacted] the below listed items:

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

Investigation on 04/25/2013 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person:
File [redacted] 02 (S) Date dictated 04/29/2013
by [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

302 '51

Continuation of FD-302 of

. On 04/25/2013 . Page 2 of 4

b1
b3
b7E

b6
b7C
b7E

2.)

containing the following

items:

b6
b7C
b7E

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-892

~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] 302 (S) [redacted] , On 04/25/2013 , Page 3 of 4

(S)

b6
b7C
b7E

length.

(S) ~~(X//FOUO)~~ When [redacted] handed [redacted] said, (S) [redacted] Additionally, when he gave [redacted] said, (S) [redacted] did not amplify or clarify either of these statements. Furthermore, [redacted] did not respond to (S) [redacted] after these utterances. [redacted] did not know where the [redacted] originated.

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(S) ~~(X//FOUO)~~ [redacted] also provided copies of [redacted] exchanged with [redacted] Throughout this [redacted] used the [redacted] initially contacted [redacted] . However, (S) [redacted] in a [redacted] provided [redacted] with another [redacted] [redacted] explained this [redacted] dealt (S) with a request for access to [redacted] from a Department of State (S) (DOS) Historian. [redacted] denied the DOS Historian access to [redacted] [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(S) ~~(X//FOUO)~~ In the same [redacted] asked [redacted] when [redacted] would be able to collect more items from [redacted] that [redacted] wanted to donate to NDU. In reply, [redacted] confirmed access would be denied to the (S) DOS Historian and asked [redacted] how many items there were to retrieve. (S) [redacted] responded, "at some point you will need a [redacted] thanks. But it will take a while to sort things out..."

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-893

~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

302 (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of

On 04/25/2013, Page 4 of 4

(S) ~~(X//FOUO)~~ [redacted] then asked [redacted] to look through the collection for a [redacted] gave during [redacted] tenure as Commander of The Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. [redacted] agreed to do so.

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(S) ~~(X//FOUO)~~ Regarding [redacted] "Exit Interview" [redacted] told the interviewing Agents this was an odd occurrence because NDU has never been the venue for this type of event. The interview was conducted in August 2011, over the course of three or four days in one week. It was [redacted] Also present were [redacted] [redacted] thought [redacted] also had a personal [redacted] during this interview. This "Exit Interview" was arranged by Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(S) ~~(X//FOUO)~~ [redacted] added the [redacted] that [redacted] gave to [redacted] on 04/24/2013, were in fact [redacted] personal copy of [redacted] "Exit Interview." (Agent Note: As of the date of this interview, [redacted] had not reviewed these [redacted] said [redacted] would have made the determination that the content of [redacted] was classified SECRET.

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(S) ~~(X//FOUO)~~ At the end of this interview [redacted] completed a Classified Information Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA). [redacted] told the interviewing Agent [redacted] would have to notify [redacted] about [redacted] interaction with the FBI, but would not provide details of the interview. Additionally, [redacted] agreed to contact [redacted] the next time [redacted] was [redacted] contacted by [redacted] regarding access or additions [redacted] As of the date of this interview, [redacted] had not asked [redacted] about [redacted] law enforcement activity relative to [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(S) ~~(X//FOUO)~~ A copy of [redacted] between [redacted] and [redacted] and printed copies of [redacted] telephone messages to [redacted] the CDC are contained in the case file in a separate 1A.

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-894

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-10-2016

Created From: [REDACTED] (S)

Package: [REDACTED]

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U) Interview and inventory notes.

Acquired By: [REDACTED]

Acquired On: 04/25/2013

Acquired From: (U) [REDACTED]

National Defense University Library
Classified Documents Center[REDACTED]
St. McNair, District of Columbia

Attachments: [REDACTED] (U) Interview Notes

Attachment Classification:

UNCLASSIFIED

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E


PETRAEUS-901

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 1 of 11 -

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



FBI INFO
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46211
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-10-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/03/2013

b6
b7C

[redacted] Classified Documents
Center, National Defense University Library, [redacted] Ft. McNair,
D.C., telephone number [redacted] e-mail addresses [redacted]

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was
interviewed at the Classified Documents Center. The following individuals
were present for this interview: Supervisory Special Agent [redacted]
[redacted] Special Agent [redacted] Special Agent [redacted]
[redacted] Special Agent [redacted] and NDU General Counsel [redacted]

[redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents
and the nature of the interview [redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] retrieved [redacted] from the Classified Documents Center and
provided each to SA [redacted] for review. Affixed to [redacted]
was a Standard Form 707 red SECRET sticker. [redacted] contained a [redacted]
[redacted] belonging to United States Army Retired General DAVID H.
PETRAEUS. As the owner of [redacted] and its contents, [redacted] stated General
Petraeus would have made the determination that [redacted] be classified as
SECRET. [redacted] was prepared by the United States Central Command
(CENTCOM) [redacted] Although no delivery date for [redacted] was noted,
[redacted] advised no one has accessed [redacted] or any of General Petraeus'

The contents of [redacted] are described as follows:

b6
b7C
b7E

NDU [redacted] contained [redacted] and was labeled:

GEN Petraeus [redacted]

b7E

3

[redacted] were individually marked:

Investigation on 04/25/2013 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person: [redacted])

File # [redacted] 302 [S] Date dictated 04/26/2013

by [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not
to be distributed outside your agency.

PETRAEUS-902

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

302 (S)

Inventory of Classified [Redacted] Stored

Continuation of FD-302 of at NDJ

, On

04/25/2013

, Page

2 of 11

b1
b3
b7E

MG David H. Petraeus

[Redacted]

b7E

MG David H. Petraeus

[Redacted]

b7E

MG David H. Petraeus

[Redacted]

b7E

MG David H. Petraeus

[Redacted]

b7E

MG David H. Petraeus

[Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted]

PETRAEUS-903

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] 02 (S)

b1
b3
b7E

Inventory of Classified [redacted] Stored

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] at NDJ [redacted] , On 04/25/2013 , Page 3 of 11

[redacted]

b7E

MG David H. Petraeus

[redacted]

b7E

MG David H. Petraeus

[redacted]

b7E

MG David H. Petraeus

[redacted]

b7E

MG David H. Petraeus

[redacted]

b7E

PETRAEUS-904

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] 302 (S)

Inventory of Classified [redacted] Stored

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] at NDJ

, On 04/25/2013 , Page 4 of 11

b1
b3
b7E

MG David H. Petraeus

b7E

MG David H. Petraeus

b7E

MG David H. Petraeus

b7E

MG David H. Petraeus

b7E

PETRAEUS-905

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] 302 (S)

Inventory of Classified [redacted] Stored

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] at NDU

, On 04/25/2013 , Page 5 of 11

b1
b3
b7E

b7E

General David H. Petraeus

b7E

General David H. Petraeus

b7E

General David H. Petraeus

b7E

NDU [redacted] contained [redacted] and was labeled:

b7E

GEN Petraeus [redacted]

PETRAEUS-906

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] 302 (3)

Inventory of Classified [redacted] Stored

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] at NDJ [redacted] , On 04/25/2013 , Page 6 of 11

b1
b3
b7E

[redacted]

b7E

4

[redacted] were individually marked:

b7E

GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS

[redacted]

b7E

GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS

[redacted]

b7E

GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS

[redacted]

b7E

GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS

[redacted]

b7E

PETRAEUS-907

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

302 (S)

Inventory of Classified [REDACTED] Stored

Continuation of FD-302 of at NDJ

, On

04/25/2013

, Page

7 of 11

b1
b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

b7E

GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS

[REDACTED]

b7E

GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS

[REDACTED]

b7E

GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS

[REDACTED]

b7E

GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS

[REDACTED]

b7E

PETRAEUS-908

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] 302 (S)

Inventory of Classified [redacted] Stored

Continuation of FD-302 of at NDU [redacted] , On 04/25/2013 , Page 8 of 11

b1
b3
b7E

[redacted]

b7E

David H. Petraeus

General

United States Army

[redacted]

b7E

David H. Petraeus

General, U.S. Army

Commander

United States Central Command

[redacted]

b7E

NDU [redacted] and was labeled:

b7E

GEN Petraeus [redacted]

[redacted]

b7E

[redacted] were individually marked:

b7E

David H. Petraeus

General, U.S. Army

PETRAEUS-909

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] 302 (S)

b1
b3
b7E

Inventory of Classified [REDACTED] Stored

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] at NDJ [REDACTED] , On 04/25/2013 , Page 9 of 11

Commander

United States Central Command

b7E

David H. Petraeus

General, U.S. Army

Commander

United States Central Command

b7E

David H. Petraeus

General, U.S. Army

Commander

United States Central Command

b7E

David H. Petraeus

General, U.S. Army

Commander

United States Central Command

b7E

PETRAEUS-910

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

302 (S)

Inventory of Classified [REDACTED] Stored

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] at NDJ

. On 04/25/2013 . Page 10 of 11

b1
b3
b7E

David H. Petraeus

General, U.S. Army

Commander

United States Central Command

b7E

David H. Petraeus

General, U.S. Army

Commander

United States Central Command

b7E

David H. Petraeus

General, U.S. Army

Commander

United States Central Command

b7E

David H. Petraeus

General, U.S. Army

Commander

United States Central Command

b7E

PETRAEUS-911

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FD-302a (Rev. 05-08-10)

[Redacted] 302 (S)

Inventory of Classified [Redacted] Stored

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] at NDJ [Redacted] , On 04/25/2013 , Page 11 of 11

b1
b3
b7E

[Redacted]

b7E

David H. Petraeus

General, U.S. Army

Commander

United States Central Command

[Redacted]

b7E

PETRAEUS-912

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-10-2016

Created From: [REDACTED] (S)

Package: [REDACTED]

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U) Notes and signed NDA

Acquired By: [REDACTED]

Acquired On: 04/25/2013


Acquired From: (U) [REDACTED]

Attachments:  (U) Notes and signed NDAAttachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIEDb1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

PETRAEUS-913

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46H11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-10-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/26/2013

b6
b7C

[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the National Defense University (NDU). The following individuals were present for this interview: Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] Special Agent [redacted] Special Agent [redacted] and [redacted] NDU General Counsel. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C
b7E

No one at NDU has [redacted] of DAVID PETRAEUS's exit interview, but there is [redacted] at the beginning. [redacted] conducted PETRAEUS's exit interview [redacted] had done work at NDU prior to this interview. [redacted] coordinated the use of the Library for the interview. [redacted] works for [redacted] and was also present for the interview. While at NDU conducting his exit interview, PETRAEUS [redacted] An unknown female, believed to work for the NSA, brought [redacted] for PETRAEUS. [redacted] thanked the analysts for all of their hard work behind the scenes.

b6
b7C
b7E

During the exit interview [redacted] used a personal [redacted] [redacted] the sessions. [redacted] did not leave her [redacted] at NDU when the interview [redacted] was the only other person [redacted] the interview.

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] was present every day [redacted] which took place over a number of days. [redacted] believes the exit interview lasted a solid five (5) days, and then continued for two (2) additional days. The initial interview lasted Monday through Friday, with the additional two (2) days occurring over the next two (2) Wednesdays. [redacted] is not sure if [redacted] was present for the two (2) follow-up sessions.

b6
b7C
b7E

Only [redacted] was made of the exit interview. [redacted] [redacted] was made for the analysts. [redacted] is not aware of any [redacted] being taken during the [redacted] The exit interview was completed in August 2011.

[Agent Note: Following the interview, [redacted] signed a Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement which can be found in the

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Investigation on 04/25/2013 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person: [redacted])

File # [redacted]-302 (S) Date dictated 04/25/2013

by [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] 302 (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of [redacted] , On 04/25/2013 , Page 2 of 2b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

corresponding 1A-envelope.)

~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-915

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-10-2016

Created From:

~~FOUO~~

(S)

Package:

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview notes and Non disclosure agreement

Acquired By: SSA



Acquired On: 03/01/2013

Attachments:

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview notes and Non disclosure agreementAttachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E


PETRAEUS-916

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 1 of 2 -

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



FBI INFO

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46E11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-10-2016

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/05/2013

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] Director of Security, National Defense University (NDU), date of birth [redacted] work phone number [redacted] email [redacted] was interviewed at his place of employment, Lincoln Hall, NDU, Fort McNair, Washington D.C. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) NDU serves as an archive for collections of materials donated by military officers. These collections are maintained by the NDU library, directed by [redacted] and may contain both classified and unclassified information. [redacted] are typically comprised of material such as [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

The NDU library creates a catalogue / inventory to document the material donated in each collection. NDU enters into written agreements with individuals who donate collections that govern the circumstances under which their material may be accessed and reviewed.

(U//~~FOUO~~) NDU maintains a collection of material provided by General DAVID PETRAEUS when he retired. [redacted] could not remember specifically when PETRAEUS donated his collection other than it was around the time that he retired. The PETRAEUS collection contains both classified and unclassified material and is maintained by the Special Collections library directed by [redacted] believed the PETRAEUS collection contained journals, transcripts of meetings with foreign leaders, and possibly contained digital media and recordings.

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) NDU signed a written agreement with PETRAEUS regarding access to his collection. This agreement states NDU must notify PETRAEUS and obtain his approval, prior to giving individuals access to review his collection. The NDU library created a catalogue, which lists all the material in PETRAEUS's collection. The classified portion of the PETRAEUS collection is maintained by the Classified Document Center in a Sensitive

Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), located on [redacted] and is managed by [redacted] [redacted] believed the collection had been digitized.

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) When an individual requests access to the PETRAEUS collection,

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Investigation on 02/01/2013 at District of Columbia, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File [redacted] 02 [S] Date drafted 03/03/2013

by [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

[redacted] 302 (3)
Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 02/01/2013, Page 2 of 2

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

the NDU General Counsel [redacted] and Library Director [redacted] coordinate the request with PETRAEUS. In order for the FBI to access the PETRAEUS collection, [redacted] would need to coordinate with [redacted] at a minimum. [redacted] was unsure if notification to PETRAEUS would be required for the FBI to access his material, and suggested interviewing agents speak to [redacted] to determine potential notification requirements. [redacted] telephone number at NDU is [redacted].

(U//~~FOUO~~) When PETRAEUS retired, he conducted his [redacted] at NDU with [redacted]. The interview was held in the Special Collections room and was recorded. [redacted] believed the recording was not conducted with support from NDU audio-visual personnel. [redacted] surmised [redacted] may have used her own recording equipment.

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) There are multiple pending Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests at NDU related to the collections they maintain, to include the PETRAEUS collection. [redacted] specifically mentioned two separate FOIA requests pertaining to the PETRAEUS collection. One request was submitted by The Project on Government Oversight, and the other by RICK ROTHACKER, a reporter at Reuters, based in Charlotte, North Carolina. FOIA requests used to be submitted directly to NDU, but they are now routed through the Pentagon, specifically the J7's office.

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) Prior to the conclusion of the interview, [redacted] agreed to obtain a copy of the written agreement between NDU and PETRAEUS regarding his collection.

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] signed a non-disclosure agreement regarding the content of the interview which will be submitted as a physical 1A enclosure to this FD-302.

b6
b7C~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-918

~~SECRET~~

Created From: [REDACTED] (S)
Package: [REDACTED]
Stored Location: None

Summary: (U) Notes and signed NDA

Acquired By: [REDACTED]

Acquired On: 04/16/2013

Acquired From: (U) [REDACTED]

Attachments:  (U) Notes and signed NDA

Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038


DATE: 06-10-2016

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

PETRAEUS-919

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-10-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/26/2013

[redacted] was interviewed at her place of employment, the National Defense University (NDU). After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview [redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[redacted] holds a SECRET security clearance, therefore she was selected to assist with the technical aspects of DAVID PETRAEUS's exit interview. The interview was conducted in Special Collections. PETRAEUS, [redacted] [redacted] were present for the interview. [redacted] from NDU was also present. [redacted] came into the interview a couple of times. [redacted] who works in Special Collections, also attended the interview.

The exit interview was recorded with [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] had a [redacted] that she placed on the table with PETRAEUS. The reporter might have had [redacted] but he also took a lot of notes. [redacted] took her [redacted] with her when the interview was complete. The exit interview occurred over a two (2) week period.

b6
b7C
b7E

The last session of the interview occurred in the studio because PETRAEUS was also supposed [redacted] is not sure if visitors needed to be cleared to be present for the interview.

b6
b7C
b7E

[Agent Note: Following the interview [redacted] signed a Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement which can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope.]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Investigation on 04/25/2013 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person: [redacted])
File # [redacted] 302 [redacted] Date dictated 04/26/2013
by [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

#AttachmentPackages/12213276

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-10-2016

Created From: [REDACTED] (S)

Package: [REDACTED]

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U) Notes of [REDACTED] interview and signed KDA

Acquired By: [REDACTED]

Acquired On: 04/25/2013

Acquired From: (U) [REDACTED]

Attachments: [REDACTED] (U) Notes and signed KDA

Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIEDb1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E


PETRAEUS-921

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 1 of 1 -

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



FBI INFO.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-10-2016

Date of entry 04/26/2013

[redacted] General Counsel for the National Defense University (NDU), was interviewed at her place of employment. The following individuals were present for this interview: Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] Special Agent [redacted] and Special Agent [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

An investigation was conducted by a JAG representative at NDU related to the circumstances of DAVID PETRAEUS's exit interview. The investigation results, kept in a sealed envelope by [redacted] were incomplete as all information was not recovered prior to sealing the investigation results. [redacted] referred to the investigation results as the taint documents. Since the investigation was incomplete, [redacted] is not providing the FBI with these items. CENTCOM sanctioned PETRAEUS's exit interview.

[Agent Note: Following the interview, [redacted] signed a Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement which can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope.]

Investigation on 04/25/2013 at DC, Washington, United States (In Person)

File [redacted] 02 (S)

Date dictated 04/26/2013

by [redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-922

b6
b7C

b6
b7C


b6
b7C

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

- 1 of 2 -

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C46W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON 12-31-2038

DATE 06-10-2016

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/24/2013

[REDACTED] Classified Documents Center, National Defense University (NDU) was interviewed at The Classified Documents Center, [REDACTED] NDU. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information: the vast majority of the material in [REDACTED] Collection and Papers was sent directly to NDU from United States Central Command (US CENTCOM), located at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The CENTCOM portion of the collection is comprised of [REDACTED] both unclassified and classified, [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] previous assignments. Some of these assignments include the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), CENTCOM, [REDACTED] and other previous Army commands. This portion of the collection also includes [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] explained that there are [REDACTED] Finding Aides to assist in the navigation of [REDACTED] collection [REDACTED] [REDACTED] The Aides are entitled CENTCOM Finding Aid and NDU Finding Aid, respectively. The interviewing agents made copies of [REDACTED] Finding Aides, as well as the Deposit Agreement between NDU and [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) The interviewing Agents accompanied [REDACTED] to view the collection and [REDACTED] this collection took [REDACTED] [REDACTED] the collection was comprised of [REDACTED] According to the Finding Aides, approximately [REDACTED] listed were classified and half were unclassified.

b6
b7C
b7E

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

Investigation on 04/05/2013 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person: [REDACTED])

File # [REDACTED] 302 [REDACTED] Date dictated 04/24/2013

by [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

[redacted] 02 (S)
Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of [redacted] , On 04/05/2013 , Page 2 of 2

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) During the tour [redacted] Special Agent (SA [redacted]) opened [redacted] in order to get an idea of what types of documents were present should a full review of all collection-related materials be necessary. [redacted] SA [redacted] saw what appeared to be [redacted] were made by Federal Supply and carried an item number of [redacted] This [redacted] for viewing. The front cover of the [redacted] name and an (S) Army symbol on each of them. In addition to [redacted] there were also [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(S) (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] related the Deposit Agreement was not a privileged document. Additionally, [redacted] spoke of a report written by a U.S. Army Reserve Judge Advocate General (JAG) Officer upon the request of the NDU/Office of General Counsel [redacted] This report outlined the investigation into [redacted] This report is an NDU/OGC Internal Document. Based on this information, the Agents declined to read the report and asked [redacted] until further coordination could be accomplished between Washington Field and Charlotte Division to determine if a taint agent will obtain this document. (S) [redacted] also related [redacted] materials were stored [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(S) (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] provided the Agents with an unclassified [redacted] containing a [redacted] copy of the Finding Aid for [redacted] produced by [redacted] Finally, he provided the names of the two individuals with access to the collection for future FBI contact: [redacted] [redacted] both NDU [redacted] and [redacted] are the only NDU Employees that have had access to the collection.


b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-934

~~SECRET~~

- 1 of 2 -

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/24/2013

FBI INEC.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46E11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-10-2016

[redacted] Director of Security, National Defense University (NDU), Date of Birth (DOB) [redacted] Social Security Account Number (SSAN): [redacted] home address: [redacted] home telephone number: [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] NDU, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] was reminded of the Classified Information Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) he signed previously. [redacted] indicated he understood and provided the following information: he recommended the FBI obtain a search warrant in order to [redacted] [redacted] added he would contact [redacted] NDU General Counsel (OGC), to obtain her opinion as to [redacted] [redacted] also requested a Comfort Letter from the FBI for NDU's records.

b1
b3
b5
b6
b7C
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Relevant to the [redacted] [redacted] related [redacted] occurred at NDU. [redacted] did not have any further information about the [redacted] but stated there were some questions among the NDU Staff as to who scheduled, formalized, and made the arrangements for this event. He added [redacted] was also [redacted] was unsure when it occurred, or who conducted the interview but thought [redacted] may have been present. [redacted] felt [redacted] may have worked with [redacted] in the past, and added [redacted] spent a significant amount of time at the NDU Library, citing several years ago when [redacted] occupied the [redacted] while conducting a study [redacted]

b1
b3
b5
b6
b7C
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] provided the name of the NDU [redacted] that maintains physical control of the collection as [redacted] He stated the collection is maintained in [redacted] Per the [redacted] Deposit Agreement with [redacted] [redacted] express consent. Furthermore, this approval authority would have to be delegated in writing. This delegation of authority had not occurred as of the date of this interview. The NDU Library maintains an access roster for the collection. [redacted] added the NDU Library Staff "does not know how to get in touch with [redacted] in the event they would have to coordinate access to [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

Investigation on 04/05/2013 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person: [redacted])
File # [redacted]-302 [redacted] Date dictated 04/24/2013
by [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] 302 (S)
Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of [redacted], On 04/05/2013, Page 2 of 2

[redacted]. " The interviewing Agents asked [redacted] is they could sequester [redacted] [redacted] agreed to do so with OGC concurrence.

b5
b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] told the interviewing Agents his office had also received a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request from [redacted] about [redacted] As of the date of this interview, no action had been taken in response.


~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-936

~~SECRET~~

- 1 of 1 -

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/24/2013

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-10-2016

[redacted] Office of the University General Counsel (OGC), National Defense University (NDU), Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., was interviewed at the NDU Security Office, [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information: She requested a Comfort Letter from the FBI notifying NDU of an official investigation of [redacted] especially in the event the FBI removed any items as evidence. [redacted] stated she would not require a search warrant as NDU is a Government Agency and the FBI could have access to everything in [redacted] on the campus. She added she would allow the interviewing agents full access [redacted].

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] said she would allow [redacted] to be restricted from access to both the public and the staff members that work in the Classified Document Center. [redacted] told the interviewing Agents there was a Freedom of Information Action (FOIA) request about [redacted]. [redacted] however it had not yet been answered. (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Regarding questions about [redacted] said she was not aware of any Army Office that sanctioned [redacted] to conduct this interview. [redacted] added she heard from Library Staff that [redacted] had [redacted] with her during the [redacted]. Based on NDU's Donor Agreement with [redacted] anyone who wants access to the [redacted]. However, this had not yet occurred according to [redacted]. (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

Investigation on 04/05/2013 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person: [redacted])
File # [redacted] 302 (S) Date dictated 04/24/2013
by [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO


CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46E11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-10-2016

Created From:

~~FOUO~~


(S)

Package:

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U//~~FOUO~~) Agent Notes of partial review

Acquired By:



Acquired On: 04/25/2013

Acquired From:

(U//~~FOUO~~)

Classified Documents Center
National Defense University
Washington, District Of Columbia
United States

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Attachments:

(U//~~FOUO~~) AgentNotes

Attachment Classification:

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~


PETRAEUS-938

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 1 of 2 -

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/30/2013

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-10-2016

(S) (U//~~FOUO~~) On 04/25/2013, the following personnel were present for a partial review of [redacted] stored in the Classified Documents Center (CDC) [redacted] National Defense University (NDU), Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.: Supervisor Special Agent (SSA) [redacted] Special Agents [redacted] [redacted] NDU Information Technology Specialist [redacted] NDU General Counsel.

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA [redacted] conducted a review of the following (S) [redacted] taken from [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) The following items were maintained in [redacted]
[redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)~~
~~Derived From: FBI~~
~~NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20380430~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 04/25/2013 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

(S) File [redacted] 302 Date dictated 04/30/2013
by [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S) [redacted] 302

PARTIAL REVIEW OF [redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of COLLECTION AND PAPERS (S)

On 04/25/2013 Page 2 of 2

b1
b3
b7E

black ink.

b6
b7C
b7E

(U//FOUO) The following were provided by [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

- Also maintained in this envelope were two CDs labeled "NDU General Petraeus [redacted] in the NDU Studio, 19 August 2011." (Agent Note: All pictures were taken in the NDU Studio, located on the [redacted])

b6
b7C
b7E~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

PETRAEUS-940

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-10-2016

Created From:



2

(S)

Package:

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U//~~FOUO~~) 1A-envelope for Serial 56

Acquired By:



Acquired On: 04/05/2013

Acquired From: (U//~~FOUO~~) NDU/CDCAttachments:  (U//~~FOUO~~) NDU/CDC

Attachment Classification:

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-943

3/16/2016 8:57 AM

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-10-2016

Created From: [redacted] 32 (S)

Package:

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U//~~FOUO~~) 1A-envelope for Serial 57

Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 04/05/2013

Acquired From: (U//~~FOUO~~) Director of Security [redacted]
NDU

Attachments: [redacted] (U//~~FOUO~~) Notes

Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

PETRAEUS-944

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-10-2016

Created From:

32

(S)

Package:

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U//~~FOUO~~) 1A-envelope for Serial 58

Acquired By:

Acquired On: 04/05/2013

Acquired From: (U//~~FOUO~~)

Attachments:


(U//~~FOUO~~) Notes, Comfort Letter

Attachment Classification:

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-945

3/16/2016 8:58 AM

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION****Electronic Communication**

Title: (U) 1A-envelope

Date: 06/13/2013

From: CHARLOTTE

CE05

Contact: [REDACTED]

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-10-2016

Approved By [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #:

[REDACTED] 302 [REDACTED]

(S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

Synopsis: (U) To add 1A-envelopes to the case file

~~Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)~~~~Derived From: FBI~~~~NSISC-20090615~~~~Declassify On: 20380613~~

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) NDU/CDC
2. (U//~~FOUO~~) Notes
3. (U//~~FOUO~~) Notes, Comfort Letter

Details:

On or about 6/8/2013, SA [REDACTED] received the enclosed 1A-envelopes from SA [REDACTED]. These 1A-envelopes relate to Serial 56, Serial 57 and Serial 58 in the 302 subfile.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7Eb6
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Title: (U) 1A-envelope

(S) Re: [REDACTED] 302, 06/13/2013

b1
b3
b7E

◆◆

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-10-2016

Created From: [redacted] 302 (S)
Package: [redacted]

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U) Interview notes, [redacted] and Non-Disclosure Statement

Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 06/17/2013

Acquired From: (U) [redacted]

Attachments: [redacted] (U) notes, drawing, NDA


Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

PETRAEUS-948

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-10-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/28/2013

On 06/17/2013, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND (CENTCOM) by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following:

b6
b7C

[redacted] was hired by [redacted] for DAVID PETRAEUS. [redacted] served as PETRAEUS's [redacted] started [redacted] position with PETRAEUS at CENTCOM [redacted] later, [redacted] and the team deployed [redacted] with PETRAEUS.

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] might have met BROADWELL once [redacted] prior to BROADWELL's arrival in Afghanistan. At this time, [redacted] was still learning [redacted] position in Tampa. [redacted] is not sure if BROADWELL was working on her book, or dissertation, at this point. While at CENTCOM, [redacted] handled logistics, such as getting people access to base.

b6
b7C

[redacted] was PAULA BROADWELL [redacted] when BROADWELL was in Afghanistan. In this role, [redacted] set up interviews for BROADWELL. [redacted] has records [redacted] with BROADWELL's itineraries. [redacted] was responsible for getting her visa to travel to Afghanistan.

b6
b7C

Though [redacted] was deployed to Afghanistan in [redacted] it took a [redacted] for [redacted] to arrive in Afghanistan. When the team initially arrived, there were no reporters or interviews granted as they settled in. PETRAEUS normally gave a lot of personal interviews.

b6
b7C

PETRAEUS was BROADWELL's mentor, as he is very academic. PETRAEUS also helped other military personnel with their academic pursuits. PETRAEUS helped [redacted] with [redacted] dissertation. [redacted] was in the Commander's Action Group (CAG). [redacted] reviewed BROADWELL's book at PETRAEUS's direction.

b6
b7C

BROADWELL was treated like any other reporter in Afghanistan. She was credentialed as media by the International Security Assistance Force

Investigation on 06/17/2013 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted]-02-(S) Date drafted 06/24/2013

by [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] 302 (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/17/2013, Page 2 of 6

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(ISAF). BROADWELL had a visitor security badge while in Afghanistan. BROADWELL, and all other reporters, were required to have a security badge. BROADWELL arranged her own travel into Afghanistan.

A badge was required for access to the ISAF Compound. Another badge was required to access the main ISAF building.

[redacted] believed everyone knew BROADWELL was a military officer and held a security clearance.

b6
b7C

Reporters were granted access to the SCIF where the morning stand-up brief occurred. If pictures were taken, they were advised not to photograph the screens if classified information was present. [redacted] tried to review everything the reporters photographed prior to them leaving. Photographers being present in the briefings were approved prior to the briefing. Phones were not allowed in the briefing room. [redacted] is sure senior officials did not abide by the no phone rule.

b6
b7C

[redacted] saw BROADWELL with a phone, camera and audio recorders. [redacted] every interview PETRAEUS conducted. [redacted] does not believe PETRAEUS had an audio recorder. [redacted] these interviews, but PETRAEUS did not. [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] Any emails on servers in Afghanistan were [redacted]

BROADWELL had a standard recorder, but also used her phone to record as well. [redacted] is not sure if recording the morning stand-up briefs was allowed.

[redacted] does not remember ISAF providing BROADWELL with any equipment. BROADWELL used [redacted] computer to access her internet email. BROADWELL only had access to [redacted] was present when BROADWELL used her computer to access her email via the internet.

b6
b7C
b7E

Part of [redacted] job was to ensure BROADWELL got to her appointments and was doing what she said she was going to do. [redacted] did not want BROADWELL to have any downtime, so [redacted] kept BROADWELL occupied.

b6
b7C

BROADWELL came to Afghanistan several times. BROADWELL conducted interviews and based on the results, BROADWELL then interviewed additional people. [redacted] did not travel with BROADWELL when she conducted interviews outside of ISAF Headquarters (HQ). BROADWELL used [redacted] [redacted] when she traveled throughout Afghanistan. BROADWELL traveled

PETRAEUS-950

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] 302

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 06/17/2013 , Page 3 of 6

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

with military commanders on military transports within Afghanistan. BROADWELL was escorted at all times. This was standard practice for journalists.

Slide decks were prepared for the morning stand-up brief. The slide decks were stored on [redacted]. Hard copies of the slide deck were probably prepared, but [redacted] never provided these to journalists.

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] believes people provided BROADWELL with documents while she was in Afghanistan. People showed BROADWELL classified documents. [redacted] is not sure if BROADWELL was provided copies of the classified documents, or just shown them. People complained that BROADWELL saw classified documents.

BROADWELL did not have access to [redacted] therefore any classified documents she received would have been printed out for her. PETRAEUS never asked [redacted] to provide BROADWELL with any classified documents.

b6
b7C
b7E

BROADWELL had more access to PETRAEUS than other journalist because he was her mentor and she was writing a book on him. [redacted] still does not believe PETRAEUS and BROADWELL had an affair. [redacted] never saw anything unprofessional in their relationship.

There were grumblings from the staff about BROADWELL's access. People got territorial with PETRAEUS and were jealous of the time BROADWELL spent with PETRAEUS. [redacted] was a member of PETRAEUS's staff, but was on the outside of the inner circle.

b6
b7C

PETRAEUS was never alone as his security detail and enlisted aide were with him. PETRAEUS could be alone in his office, but there was a gap in the door. The windows in PETRAEUS's office looked out into the front of ISAF HQ.

[redacted] was [redacted] boss. [redacted] is currently stationed in Washington, DC. [redacted] was PETRAEUS [redacted] and was with him throughout Afghanistan.

[redacted] saw PETRAEUS use his [redacted] computers. PETRAEUS had a set of laptops that went with him when he was traveling.

b6
b7C
b7E

When PETRAEUS left Afghanistan after the change of command, BROADWELL traveled with him. [redacted] did not travel on this plane. [redacted] thought

PETRAEUS-951

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~[redacted] (S)
[redacted] 302

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/17/2013, Page 4 of 6

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

it was odd that BROADWELL flew with PETRAEUS, but figured someone was needed to document PETRAEUS's last hurrah. [redacted] was not part of PETRAEUS's transition team. [redacted] is currently a [redacted]

b6
b7C

PETRAEUS helped a lot with BROADWELL's book. BROADWELL and PETRAEUS had a lot of meetings and reviewed the text of the book. Since BROADWELL was writing about PETRAEUS, he wanted to have a hand in the book to ensure the correct interpretation appeared in the book.

[redacted] does not maintain contact with BROADWELL or PETRAEUS. [redacted] got along well with BROADWELL, but they are not personal friends. Though [redacted] was on PETRAEUS's staff, they were not close.

b6
b7C

[redacted] did not review what journalists wrote or published about Afghanistan.

[redacted] US ARMY, was the [redacted] when BROADWELL was in Afghanistan. [redacted] did not like BROADWELL as [redacted] was jealous of BROADWELL's access to PETRAEUS. [redacted] told [redacted] about BROADWELL blogging about a location which should not have been disclosed. [redacted] would have spoken to [redacted] about this issue first. [redacted] might have told [redacted] to write a letter to PETRAEUS. [redacted] does not know if there were any consequences to BROADWELL as a result of the letter. [redacted] does not remember if [redacted] spoke to BROADWELL about this issue, or if [redacted] did. [redacted] usually handled disciplinary matters.

b6
b7C

[redacted] does not know if BROADWELL or her publisher paid for her trips to Afghanistan. The military did not pay for these trips.

BROADWELL tried to get her two (2) week military training to occur in Afghanistan, but this request was declined by the US ARMY because BROADWELL did not have combat training. If she had been in Afghanistan in a training capacity, she would have had more field access which would have provided her with a different vibe.

No military personnel made special trips to ISAF HQ for interviews with BROADWELL. BROADWELL interviewed them in coordination with their scheduled trip to ISAF HQ. [redacted] does not know how many places within Afghanistan BROADWELL visited while in country.

[redacted] witnessed interviews of PETRAEUS by BROADWELL. Both [redacted] and BROADWELL [redacted] took notes of the interviews. [redacted] might still have some of the notes or audi [redacted] kept all of [redacted] emails with BROADWELL, but [redacted] is not sure if [redacted] still has them as [redacted] is unsure if [redacted] saved them properly.

b6
b7C

PETRAEUS-952

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

302

Continuation of FD-302 of

, On 06/17/2013, Page 5 of 6

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Nobody in Afghanistan was close to BROADWELL because she received personal attention from PETRAEUS. BROADWELL never complained to [redacted] about being alienated by the staff.

There was jealousy towards BROADWELL from those in PETRAEUS's inner circle. In one instance, people complained about the revealing outfits BROADWELL wore. When she was asked to tone it down, they then complained when she wore a turtleneck because it was too tight.

[redacted] was close with PETRAEUS. PETRAEUS looked at [redacted] as [redacted] and helped get [redacted] handled everything for PETRAEUS.

[redacted] had BROADWELL sign Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA) every time she was in Afghanistan. [redacted] is not sure if BROADWELL signed a NDA on her first trip to Afghanistan.

b6
b7C

While in Afghanistan, it was not possible to burn to a CD or thumb drive from the computers.

[redacted] is currently at [redacted] had some contact with BROADWELL and was told to give her stuff. [redacted] used to be a Lieutenant Colonel. PETRAEUS would have given the order for [redacted] to provide BROADWELL with stuff.

b6
b7C

[redacted] ran the [redacted] was a think tank that PETRAEUS utilized to get things done. [redacted] is a retired Marine Corp Colonel. [redacted] was PETRAEUS's [redacted] acted in more of an operational role than [redacted]

[redacted] does not know if [redacted] were a part of the [redacted] always questioned what their role was in Afghanistan. [redacted] would be able to advise of [redacted] role.

b6
b7C

[redacted] believes a foreign military officer might have provided BROADWELL with classified information. [redacted] heard [redacted] provided her with this information. This unnamed foreign military officer sat in another building on the compound. [redacted] drew a picture of where this individual's office was located. This picture can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope. BROADWELL interviewed this foreign military officer. [redacted] will check BROADWELL's itineraries to try to determine the foreign military officer's name.

b6
b7C

There were rumors that people showed BROADWELL classified documents.

[redacted] does not know why these documents were provided to BROADWELL.

PETRAEUS-953

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] 302 (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/17/2013, Page 6 of 6

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] were present when BROADWELL interviewed PETRAEUS. There were a few occasions where [redacted] were not present, but these were mentoring sessions. In these sessions, they reviewed the book and discussed getting chapters ready.

b6
b7C

[redacted] had not heard of BROADWELL's co-author until the book was published. [redacted] does not know if the military conducted an official review of BROADWELL's book. [redacted] reviewed the book. [redacted] told [redacted] a lot of things in the book needed to be fixed. [redacted] acted as a fact-checker for the book.

b6
b7C

PETRAEUS provided BROADWELL with a lot of access because he knew he could control the output of the book.

Following the interview, [redacted] signed a Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement which can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope.

b6
b7C~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-954

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-10-2016

Created From: [redacted] 02 (S)
Package: [redacted]

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U) Interview notes, organization chart, Non-Disclosure Agreement

Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 05/31/2013

Acquired From: (U) [redacted]

Attachments:  (U) notes, org chart, NDA

Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E


PETRAEUS-955

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 1 of 3 -

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-10-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/28/2013

On 05/31/2013 [redacted] was interviewed at the Honolulu Office of the FBI by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] Army-CID. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview [redacted] provided the following:

b6
b7C

[redacted] dealt with DAVID PETRAEUS while in Afghanistan. [redacted] Major General TERRY, not PETRAEUS. [redacted] arrived in Afghanistan in [redacted] reported directly to Colonel [redacted] in Regional Command (RC) South.

b6
b7C

Every morning, a command brief was conducted. [redacted] then provided a daily report on the command briefing. [redacted] typed a report summarizing the discussion from the briefing. [redacted] was based out of the Kahia International Airport in Kabul. [redacted] never met PETRAEUS in person. The command brief was conducted every day except Friday. [redacted] listened to the brief and then typed a detailed report which was sent to a number of individuals via the [redacted] did not attend the brief in person, rather [redacted] listened to the brief live via Secure Video Teleconference (SVTC). The brief was also available via Adobe Connect.

b6
b7C
b7E

Approximately once a month, the RC provided a brief to PETRAEUS. One month, [redacted] provided this brief in [redacted] absence. The brief was conducted via SVTC. Following the brief, PETRAEUS told [redacted] should get a translator since [redacted] spoke Southern.

b6
b7C

[redacted] the morning command brief were posted on [redacted] briefs created by [redacted] followed a template. The [redacted] were classified NATO SECRET and were releasable to NATO Nations. There was a process for which data from [redacted] could be transferred to [redacted] The distribution list for [redacted] report should have been made up of NATO members. [redacted] did not create the distribution list, but added and deleted names as requested. RC South was managed by a British 2 Star.

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] believes RC South created the process for producing the daily email. The distribution list was large. After a few email messages were

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Investigation on 05/31/2013 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] 302 (S) Date drafted 06/06/2013

by [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

302

Continuation of FD-302 of

, On 05/31/2013, Page 2 of 3

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

returned to [] as unable to be delivered. [] would then remove that individual from the distribution list. If [] received an email from an individual requesting to be added to the distribution list, [] would add them since they had a classified email account.

b6
b7C
b7E

If [] account was still active, [] could still be receiving the daily reports. When [] returned from Afghanistan, [] briefed units that were getting ready to deploy from Ft. Drum.

[] believes his daily email could have been received []. The attachments [] would not transfer to [] but the email text contained all of the details of the attachments. [] did not print out the daily emails. [] did not see anyone print his emails.

b6
b7C
b7E

[] has never met PAULA BROADWELL and did not know who she was prior to PETRAEUS's resignation as CIA Director.

b6
b7C

[] would not have included journalists on [] distribution list for his daily email.

The morning command brief provided information about what was occurring in theatre that day. Anyone with [] access could view [] command brief. [] used these [] his email.

b6
b7C
b7E

[] did not sit in a SCIF in Afghanistan, but since they were in theatre, open storage was allowed. There was a plans shop, which contained classified materials. The shop was manned 24 hours a day and storage up to the SECRET level was allowed.

b6
b7C

[] does not know if PETRAEUS's daily brief was conducted in a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF).

[] was a NATO compound which had both an inner and outer perimeter. A badge was required for access. If someone entered without a badge, they had to be escorted and a light flashed so everyone knew an escorted visitor was present. The whole compound was an operation center. Documents could be printed if necessary and there were shredders all over the compound. There were five (5) huge projection screens and approximately [] people working at desks on the floor. [] were located in the first row. All [] were vetted and had clearances. Because of this, US SECRET conversations did not occur on the floor.

b6
b7C

When listening to the command brief from [] boss's office, [] was

PETRAEUS-957

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] 302 (S)
Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 05/31/2013, Page 3 of 3

able to see the briefer [redacted] When listening from [redacted] desk, [redacted] only saw [redacted] as [redacted] only had [redacted] Anyone with [redacted] access was able to log on and listen to the brief.

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] does not know how many people attended the live command brief. [redacted] daily report was posted on the RC portal on [redacted] [redacted] tried to have the report finished within an hour and a half of the command brief ending, but it was distributed anywhere from a half hour to six hours following the brief.

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] never saw journalists at ISAF Joint Command (IJC) watching the command brief. [redacted] does not know if journalists were present for the command brief at ISAF HQ.

b6
b7C

[redacted] is sure [redacted] daily emails were forwarded after being initially sent out.

Nothing of particular importance comes to mind as occurring in the January - April 2011 timeframe. Operations were always occurring, but this timeframe would have been a little slower. The winter months were slower leading up to the spring fighting. There would have been a lot of operation planning preparing for the spring.

[redacted] does not know if [redacted] ever met BROADWELL. [redacted] is currently assigned to Fort Drum as Active Duty Reserve.

b6
b7C

Members of [redacted] team helped [redacted] prepare [redacted] daily email. There were [redacted] who sat on the floor. Everyone would pitch in and help with different parts of the report. [redacted] would then send out the daily email.

PETRAEUS could have been on [redacted] distribution list, but [redacted] did not look at the list to determine who was on it.

b6
b7C

[redacted] drew an organization chart which included members of [redacted] team. Following the interview [redacted] signed a Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement (NDA). Both the organization chart and NDA can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope.

PETRAEUS-958

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

Created From:

[Redacted]

02

(S)

Package:

Stored Location: *None*

Summary: (U) Notes of interview and NDA

Acquired By:

[Redacted]

Acquired On: 07/18/2013

Acquired From:

(U)

[Redacted]

Attachments:



(U) Notes and NDA

Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E


PETRAEUS-965

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 1 of 5 -

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/12/2013

On 07/18/2013, [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] office located on [redacted] Headquarters of United States [redacted]

After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview [redacted] provided the following:

In July 2009, [redacted] was stationed at [redacted] where [redacted] was issued orders to report to [redacted] [redacted] had been [redacted] to work for General DAVID PETRAEUS based on [redacted] previous work [redacted] [redacted] was responsible for collecting, organizing and storing their papers.

When [redacted] began working for PETRAEUS, [redacted] met with PETRAEUS, who advised as to how he wanted [redacted] to compile his papers. PETRAEUS's [redacted] was also present at this meeting. From [redacted] [redacted] worked for PETRAEUS. [redacted] met with PETRAEUS quarterly and provided [redacted] with status reports every [redacted] weeks. The status reports were usually transmitted to PETRAEUS through [redacted]

In June/July 2010, PETRAEUS told [redacted] to send [redacted] papers to the National Defense University (NDU). While working in Tampa, [redacted] travelled on temporary duty assignment to Afghanistan a number of times while PETRAEUS was stationed there. Upon PETRAEUS's retirement, [redacted] continued to work on his papers for a few months to clean them up. In the middle of September 2011, everything was shipped to NDU. [redacted] stayed in contact with PETRAEUS periodically after this time. After finishing work for PETRAEUS, [redacted] worked for [redacted] at United States Central Command (CENTCOM) for [redacted]

PETRAEUS's collection included both classified and unclassified documents. The classified collection contained items such as [redacted] [redacted] The unclassified collection included items such as [redacted] newspaper

(S)
Investigation on 07/18/2013 at [redacted] (In Person)
File # [redacted] 302 Date drafted 07/22/2013
by [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-966

~~SECRET~~

(S)

02

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 07/18/2013, Page 2 of 5

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

articles [REDACTED] had a Google alert set up for PETRAEUS and would be alerted to articles that could be added to the unclassified collection.

b6
b7C
b7E

PETRAEUS's physical documents were provided to NDU in September 2011. His electronic documents were provided to NDU in May or June of 2012. After all the documents were provided to NDU, PETRAEUS invited [REDACTED] to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to say thank you. [REDACTED] accepted this offer and visited PETRAEUS at the CIA.

[REDACTED] first met PAULA BROADWELL in Afghanistan. [REDACTED] first trip to Afghanistan occurred from [REDACTED]. During this trip, [REDACTED] first learned of BROADWELL, but does not believe [REDACTED] met her. During [REDACTED] second trip to Afghanistan from [REDACTED] BROADWELL made multiple trips to theatre.

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] told [REDACTED] not to provide anything to BROADWELL unless it was cleared by [REDACTED]. BROADWELL asked [REDACTED] for speeches, but did not ask for any classified items.

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] knew BROADWELL had a security clearance because he personally checked on her status. [REDACTED] believes BROADWELL had a clearance due to her reserve military status and her work for a terrorism think tank.

[REDACTED] understood BROADWELL's role in Afghanistan was as an author of a book about PETRAEUS. The idea of the book started as her dissertation, but evolved into a book. BROADWELL had media credentials in Afghanistan. [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] with the media group, headed by Colonel [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] a female Navy officer were also located in the same area. The media group told [REDACTED] that BROADWELL was in Afghanistan on media credentials.

b6
b7C

BROADWELL mostly saw INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) SECRET documents. ISAF SECRET documents are NATO documents and are shared with NATO countries. These documents must be cleared by NATO to be released. BROADWELL saw these types of documents in relation to briefings on operations, how the military worked with the Afghan military, or even situational reports from the field units.

[REDACTED] did not really use [REDACTED] while in Afghanistan. [REDACTED] took most documents from the NATO and Secret Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) systems. Most of the documents [REDACTED] dealt with were marked, but [REDACTED] would not know if they were properly classified.

b6
b7C

BROADWELL emailed [REDACTED] a few times asking for access to

PETRAEUS-967

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

302

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 07/18/2013, Page 3 of 5

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

PETRAEUS's documents. _____ told BROADWELL she would have to get access from PETRAEUS. When _____ visited PETRAEUS at the CIA, _____ asked if PETRAEUS wanted _____ to provide BROADWELL with a copy of his unclassified records. PETRAEUS authorized this access and _____ provided BROADWELL with a hard drive containing a copy of the unclassified records provided to NDU. _____ mailed the hard drive to BROADWELL's home in Charlotte around July 2012. _____ did not keep a copy of the documents that were provided to NDU or BROADWELL. BROADWELL was given access to PETRAEUS's unclassified collection at NDU. _____ did not call NDU to authorize this access.

b6
b7C

_____ did not participate in PETRAEUS's exit interview at NDU, but _____ set it up. _____ conducted the interview. _____ believes PETRAEUS personally selected _____ to conduct the interview. As the exit interview was initially going to occur in Afghanistan, _____ was set to conduct the interview. Therefore, _____ had prepared questions to ask PETRAEUS, and _____ provided these questions to _____. _____ did not have access to the interview.

b6
b7C

The majority of PETRAEUS's _____ related to his time in Iraq and ISAF, with a few predating this period. _____ sent the _____ to NDU. _____ were not marked, but _____ treated them as SECRET/TOP SECRET. _____ sent the _____ to NDU with PETRAEUS's classified documents. NDU would have then made the determination as to how to classify the _____. _____ did not put classification labels _____.

b6
b7C
b7E

_____ had a conversation with PETRAEUS about the classification level of the _____. _____ initially said PETRAEUS told him to treat _____ as TOP SECRET because they contained notes he wrote on a personal level that he did not want to get out. Upon further thought, _____ unsure if PETRAEUS said they should be treated as TOP SECRET, but PETRAEUS definitely said they were classified and should be treated with special care and close hold because they were very sensitive.

b6
b7C
b7E

Before PETRAEUS left Afghanistan he provided _____ with a lot of information, including the _____. _____ sent _____ to Tampa from Afghanistan to organize. _____ believes CENTCOM and/or NDU should have an inventory of the _____ provided. _____ were transported from Afghanistan to Tampa to NDU via courier. _____ were double wrapped and a chain of custody was maintained.

b6
b7C
b7E

BROADWELL never asked _____ for _____. _____ believes _____ told him BROADWELL could not see _____. _____ was trying to protect _____ boss. _____ never saw BROADWELL with the _____.

b6
b7C
b7E~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-968

~~SECRET~~

(S)

[redacted] 302

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 07/18/2013, Page 4 of 5

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Some of PETRAEUS's classified collection came from the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS). [redacted] would not normally include these items in a collection as there is a record of them already, but PETRAEUS wanted these items included. Therefore, [redacted] included these items in the collection, ensuring the classified documents were handled in the proper manner.

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] were [redacted] contacts at NDU.

[redacted] never saw anyone provide BROADWELL with classified documents. [redacted] had a few meetings with BROADWELL.

b6
b7C

[redacted] believes BROADWELL's book was reviewed by the Department of Defense (DoD). [redacted] is not sure which department within the DoD would review the book. The book would most likely go to the Pentagon and would then be sent to the appropriate unit for review. Forms should have been completed advising the book was reviewed.

[redacted] thought BROADWELL had more access than the average reporter, but she was writing a book about PETRAEUS. [redacted] did not see PETRAEUS having a hand in writing the book, though [redacted] talked about the book. PETRAEUS probably believed having BROADWELL write the book was a quick way to get information about Afghanistan out. PETRAEUS had a track record of being a good mentor in the military. PETRAEUS would want to help BROADWELL and writing the book would help her.

b6
b7C

The hard drives [redacted] provided to NDU contained mostly ISAF emails, but there were some CENTCOM emails as well. [redacted] emails were provided. CENTCOM has a record of a majority of the items that were provided to NDU. CENTCOM received mostly copies of electronic items and did not receive a copy of the [redacted]. A record of what was provided to CENTCOM is probably kept with either the Records Management Division or [redacted] both work in the [redacted].

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] is not sure if BROADWELL had [redacted] in Afghanistan. BROADWELL did have access to classified space. As a reporter, this would be unusual, but since BROADWELL had a clearance, it was not so unusual. BROADWELL would have been escorted in the classified space.

Archivists have a multi-pronged role. Not only are they the keepers of the documents, they also ensure the documents are preserved, catalogued and inventoried. Becoming an archivist is a career field which includes obtaining a college degree, certifications and/or on the job training. The

PETRAEUS-969

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] 302 (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 07/18/2013, Page 5 of 5

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

National Archivist would know the process for becoming a certified archivist. Archivists are more like preservists because they understand how to preserve and store documents at the proper classification level.

BROADWELL described herself as PETRAEUS's archivist on her LinkedIn page. [redacted] found it odd that BROADWELL referred to herself as PETRAEUS's archivist. It would be unusual for BROADWELL to be an archivist, but since she was also PETRAEUS's biographer, she was probably collecting documents in that capacity. [redacted] heard a rumor that BROADWELL was writing another book.

b6
b7C

[redacted] last saw PETRAEUS in [redacted] has not had contact with PETRAEUS since this time. [redacted] was shocked when [redacted] heard the announcement PETRAEUS was resigning due to an extramarital affair.

b6
b7C

Following the interview, [redacted] signed a Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement (NDA). The NDA can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope.

PETRAEUS-970

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-13-2016

Created From: [redacted] 902 (S)

Package: [redacted]

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U) Notes of interview, signed NDA form

Acquired By: [redacted]

Acquired On: 07/24/2013

Acquired From: (U) [redacted]

Attachments:  (U) Notes and NDA


Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-971

~~SECRET~~



FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/12/2013

On 07/24/2013, [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] residence located at [redacted] by [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following:

[redacted] has known DAVID PETRAEUS [redacted] PETRAEUS was [redacted] PETRAEUS was a platoon leader and later served as [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] met PAULA BROADWELL in person on one (1) occasion, the day PETRAEUS was sworn in as United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander. PETRAEUS asked [redacted] BROADWELL and [redacted] did [redacted] and BROADWELL spoke for approximately three (3) hours. Since then, [redacted] and BROADWELL have corresponded via email and mail to discuss PETRAEUS for her book.

b6
b7C

BROADWELL asked questions about [redacted] meeting PETRAEUS, [redacted] impressions of PETRAEUS and how long [redacted] has followed his career. BROADWELL was trying to get inside of PETRAEUS. BROADWELL never asked [redacted] for classified information. BROADWELL wanted personal information about PETRAEUS, not national security information. BROADWELL wanted correspondences between [redacted] and PETRAEUS.

b6
b7C

[redacted] and BROADWELL are both members of the [redacted] [redacted] discusses National Security Matters and Beltway issues. PETRAEUS has a [redacted]

[redacted] last spoke to BROADWELL via telephone on the evening PETRAEUS spoke at the University of Southern California. [redacted] does not remember if [redacted] called BROADWELL or if she called [redacted] spoke to BROADWELL on [redacted] cellular telephone while driving to dinner. [redacted] met with PETRAEUS that evening [redacted] for a few hours.

b6
b7C

BROADWELL did not ask [redacted] to facilitate a conversation with PETRAEUS. BROADWELL was wary of speaking to PETRAEUS. PETRAEUS expressed

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Investigation on 07/24/2013 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] 302 (S) Date drafted 07/29/2013

by [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] 302 (S)

Continuation of FD-302

, On 07/24/2013 , Page 2 of 4

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

concern to [redacted] about BROADWELL's job prospects. BROADWELL did not have the options available to PETRAEUS, so PETRAEUS asked [redacted] to [redacted] expressed concern for BROADWELL and asked [redacted] to keep him informed of BROADWELL's progress.

b6
b7C

[redacted] sent BROADWELL a note telling her [redacted] went to dinner with PETRAEUS and that PETRAEUS had his coming out dinner. [redacted] emails with BROADWELL approximately [redacted] mostly about the [redacted]

[redacted] would be [redacted] between PETRAEUS and BROADWELL because [redacted] and [redacted] are good friends with [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] with PETRAEUS [redacted] They rarely discuss BROADWELL. The conversations are more about where PETRAEUS is going as he moves forward.

PETRAEUS has not told [redacted] if he provided BROADWELL with classified information. PETRAEUS said he really screwed up, which [redacted] believes is in reference to his physical affair with BROADWELL.

b6
b7C

[redacted] read about the investigation involving PETRAEUS providing BROADWELL with classified information. [redacted] believes the environment in Afghanistan where BROADWELL worked would have made her privy to classified documents. It is [redacted] understanding that BROADWELL had a security clearance.

[redacted] visited PETRAEUS in [redacted] but did not visit him in [redacted]

[redacted] understanding of [redacted] is they contain [redacted] material, usually at the TS/SCI level.

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] contain [redacted] is not familiar with [redacted] being used for personal use. [redacted] never saw PETRAEUS with a [redacted] PETRAEUS did not take notes when meeting with [redacted]

BROADWELL never asked [redacted] to introduce her to other members of the military. BROADWELL already knew General SHELTON and General KEANE were mentors of PETRAEUS's.

b6
b7C

[redacted] received [redacted] from BROADWELL [redacted] BROADWELL was commenting on an obituary [redacted] for SID BERRY.

Since March, [redacted] has updated PETRAEUS on BROADWELL's well

PETRAEUS-973

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

302

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 07/24/2013, Page 3 of 4

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

being. BROADWELL has been up and down. _____ believes PETRAEUS is concerned about BROADWELL from a professional standpoint. BROADWELL is a female version of PETRAEUS and _____

b6
b7C

_____ does not know if BROADWELL's book was reviewed by the Department of Defense (DoD). BROADWELL sent _____ a copy of her book.

_____ believes the idea for BROADWELL to write the book started above board and was totally academic in nature. Once they started working on the book, BROADWELL and PETRAEUS clicked emotionally, and things went from there. _____ thinks PETRAEUS saw a lot of himself in BROADWELL. _____ does not know what role PETRAEUS played in writing the book.

b6
b7C

BROADWELL needs to do some soul searching about her future. She needs to determine if she wants to be a mom in Charlotte or work inside the Beltway. Family is very important to BROADWELL.

In PETRAEUS's world, he was treated as if he was omniscient, because he was a General and everything he did was wonderful. _____ suspects BROADWELL provided PETRAEUS with levity from this world. PETRAEUS loves intellectual stimulation.

b6
b7C

_____ is PETRAEUS _____ and levity provider, specifically after the revelation of his affair with BROADWELL. _____ has mentored and counseled PETRAEUS through his recent issues. PETRAEUS has tremendous potential. _____ PETRAEUS had intellectual insight beyond his level. PETRAEUS is always searching for another answer, specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan. PETRAEUS is not afraid of wild ideas. PETRAEUS welcomed criticism and would take time to determine if the criticism was valid.

PETRAEUS had a think tank in Afghanistan. A gentleman from Australia was part of the think tank.

_____ has no knowledge of PETRAEUS relying on BROADWELL for strategy, even though she sat in on meetings and they spoke about them. Neither BROADWELL nor PETRAEUS told _____ they had tactical conversations.

b6
b7C

While PETRAEUS was International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander, _____ was in contact with PETRAEUS about _____. _____ provided PETRAEUS with articles and mentoring points. _____ was indirectly aware that BROADWELL was in Afghanistan.

_____ does not know how BROADWELL got into Afghanistan or her

PETRAEUS-974

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] 302 (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 07/24/2013, Page 4 of 4

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

credentials while there. [redacted] is not aware of PETRAEUS influencing how BROADWELL travelled to Afghanistan or what credentials she received.

Approximately [redacted] PETRAEUS told [redacted] he was under investigation and he did not know how it would turn out. BROADWELL told [redacted] something similar about the investigation and said until the investigation was resolved, she could not make long term plans.

b6
b7C

[redacted] found out about PETRAEUS's affair from CNN. [redacted] was shocked, but not hugely surprised by the affair. [redacted] received an email from PETRAEUS shortly thereafter. [redacted] did not hear from BROADWELL immediately following the revelation of the affair. When [redacted] spoke to BROADWELL [redacted] it was one of the first times [redacted] spoke to her following the announcement.

b6
b7C

Following the interview, [redacted] signed a Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement (NDA). The NDA can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope.

PETRAEUS-975

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-13-2016

Created From: [REDACTED] 2

(S)

Package:

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U) Original interview notes and a signed Classified Information
Non-Disclosure Statement

Acquired By:

Acquired On: 06/11/2013

Acquired From:

(U)

United States Army

Attachments:



(U) Original Interview Notes

Attachment Classification:


UNCLASSIFIED

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

PETRAEUS-976

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/31/2013

On June 11, 2013, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] address [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment located at United States Army Base [redacted] by Special Agents [redacted] [redacted] Witnessing the interview was United States Army Criminal Investigative Division Special Agent [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[redacted] first assignment working with General David PETRAEUS was as a United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Protocol Officer. In the [redacted] worked at a conference [redacted] and it was there that [redacted] first had interaction with PETRAEUS' staff. The staff needed an operations officer to plan logistics and travel for PETRAEUS, and [redacted] joined PETRAEUS' USCENTCOM staff in this capacity in [redacted] It was [redacted] job to plan the logistics of PETRAEUS' travel as USCENTCOM Commander. [redacted] traveled as the advance team, coordinated all travel-related logistics, and attended to those logistics on-site while PETRAEUS traveled. In this Protocol Officer position, [redacted] and PETRAEUS knew one another, but they never had any in-depth conversations. [redacted] did not function as an advisor to PETRAEUS.

b6
b7C

In July 2010 [redacted] transitioned with PETRAEUS from USCENTCOM to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Command in Kabul, Afghanistan. [redacted] worked for PETRAEUS at ISAF Headquarters located next to the United States Embassy in Kabul. [redacted] deployed to Kabul ahead of PETRAEUS to set the stage for the transition of ISAF Command to PETRAEUS. Although [redacted] and PETRAEUS had daily interaction in Afghanistan, it was Colonel [redacted] who was [redacted] served as PETRAEUS' [redacted] at ISAF Command.

b6
b7C

While working in Afghanistan [redacted] duties continued to be logistics and coordination of travel. [redacted] monitored PETRAEUS' schedule [redacted] to keep PETRAEUS working as efficiently as possible.

b6
b7C

Investigation on 06/11/2013 at [redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [redacted] 302 (S) Date drafted 06/13/2013
by [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (S)
Interview of [redacted] on June 11, 2013
Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/11/2013, Page 2 of 5

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] described [redacted] as a bag carrier, not an advisor to PETRAEUS. In addition to [redacted] PETRAEUS had an enlisted aide who would tend to PETRAEUS' personal needs, such as laundry.

b6
b7C

[redacted] first met PAULA BROADWELL while working at USCENTCOM. BROADWELL came to Afghanistan a month or two after PETRAEUS and his team arrived. [redacted] was aware of BROADWELL's interest in writing her graduate school dissertation on PETRAEUS. It was during the fall of 2010 that BROADWELL's dissertation transitioned into writing a book on PETRAEUS. While she visited Afghanistan [redacted] described BROADWELL as media, based on her writing the book [redacted] did not arrange for BROADWELL's visits to Afghanistan, her media credentials, or her access to PETRAEUS. These matters were coordinated by Colonel [redacted] and Colonel [redacted] who was PETRAEUS' [redacted] PETRAEUS' long-time head of security prior to and during his tour in Afghanistan was [redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

While in Afghanistan, BROADWELL had daily meetings with PETRAEUS in his office. During these meetings, BROADWELL interviewed PETRAEUS for the book she was writing. She took notes and also [redacted] during these interviews. PETRAEUS' office was not a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), although it did have a classified Secret phone and computer in the office. In addition to meeting with PETRAEUS in his office, BROADWELL also attended COMISAF (ISAF Commander) daily update briefings. These briefings were conducted in a SCIF, however the briefings were classified as ISAF SECRET, not TOP SECRET/SCI. There was one Top Secret laptop located in the SCIF briefing room, however this laptop would be shut prior to the COMISAF daily briefings. [redacted] never witnessed BROADWELL using her [redacted] inside the SCIF to [redacted] a COMISAF daily brief.

b6
b7C

As presentations/briefings were delivered during the COMISAF daily updates, [redacted] presentation [redacted] would only be provided to General Officers, to include PETRAEUS, the Deputy Commander of ISAF, and Cell Heads like J-2 (intelligence) Major General FLYNN. The number of General Officers [redacted] is almost positive that BROADWELL was never provided hard copies of COMISAF daily update slides.

b6
b7C

Other journalists also attended COMISAF daily briefings, and each journalist signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement prior to attending. While in Afghanistan, BROADWELL had the same access to briefings, personnel, locations, and lodging as other journalists. Because she was writing a book about PETRAEUS, BROADWELL had greater access to PETRAEUS via private

PETRAEUS-978

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] interview of [redacted] on June 11, 2013, On 06/11/2013, Page 3 of 5

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

meetings in his office than other journalists. PETRAEUS granted this access to BROADWELL because he wanted to ensure she got all the details right. BROADWELL had unescorted badge access and could roam ISAF Command Headquarters alone. Other journalists did not have unescorted access.

[redacted] stated he justified this because other journalists did not have the same familiarity with the base that BROADWELL had.

b6
b7C

BROADWELL accompanied PETRAEUS as he attended meetings in Afghanistan. These meetings were classified as SECRET. BROADWELL would bring her [redacted] but [redacted] does not recall her [redacted] meetings. She used [redacted] to conduct mini interviews of PETRAEUS in-between these various meetings. [redacted] stated BROADWELL never attended any meeting PETRAEUS attended in CIA office space. Furthermore, [redacted] never saw BROADWELL use any laptop assigned to PETRAEUS, and [redacted] never saw PETRAEUS provide BROADWELL with any classified documents.

b6
b7C

BROADWELL returned to Afghanistan approximately six to ten times during PETRAEUS' ISAF command. She seemed to be there every other month. BROADWELL traveled throughout Afghanistan without PETRAEUS to interview soldiers for the book. PETRAEUS never gave any guidance to [redacted] regarding BROADWELL. If BROADWELL accompanied PETRAEUS on a trip in Afghanistan [redacted] and his team would accommodate BROADWELL but never went out of their way for her. Of [redacted] team, [redacted] was assigned as BROADWELL's [redacted] translator. BROADWELL went in Afghanistan.

b6
b7C

It was only after BROADWELL's initial visit to Afghanistan that [redacted] learned she was a Major and Military Intelligence Officer in the Army Reserves. However, while BROADWELL was in Afghanistan, she was there in a civilian capacity. [redacted] was never asked to provide BROADWELL with classified information. [redacted] never saw BROADWELL in possession of classified information.

b6
b7C

BROADWELL had a camera and cellular telephone in Afghanistan. Cameras and cellular telephones were not allowed inside the SCIF during the COMISAF daily briefings. This cellular telephone ban was not enforced among the General Officers. [redacted] never saw BROADWELL with a phone during a COMISAF daily briefing. [redacted] is aware of BROADWELL having a cellular telephone in Afghanistan because she would purchase international data usage for her phone.

b6
b7C

PETRAEUS' communication team maintained his laptops at all times in Afghanistan. [redacted] had the [redacted] [redacted] did not have a security waiver to possess PETRAEUS'

b6
b7C

PETRAEUS-979

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

02 (S)

Interview of [redacted] on June 11, 2013

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/11/2013, Page 4 of 5

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] for PETRAEUS on a few occasions, as PETRAEUS wanted instant access to the internet upon the completion of a meeting. He required his team to have various unclassified websites open and current, to include the Department of Defense Early Bird website and his [redacted] website, called [redacted] PETRAEUS' communication team kept all classified websites refreshed on PETRAEUS' classified laptop.

b6
b7C

Although [redacted] maintained PETRAEUS' passwords, [redacted] never read PETRAEUS' emails. PETRAEUS had a reputation of responding to emails quickly on his own. When he finished a meeting, PETRAEUS would immediately check his emails and respond. PETRAEUS had [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] The communication team had satellite access to maintain connectivity for all [redacted] laptops whenever PETRAEUS traveled in Afghanistan. PETRAEUS never received classified email on an unclassified network. [redacted] and PETRAEUS did not email one another as they were in constant personal contact.

Upon PETRAEUS' return to the United States from Afghanistan in [redacted] [redacted] assisted PETRAEUS with maintaining his computers at PETRAEUS' house on Fort Myer. [redacted] believed it to be acceptable to store the computers at the Fort Myer residence as PETRAEUS' [redacted] [redacted] the base was secure, and PETRAEUS [redacted] had a SECRET clearance should she inadvertently hear or see something classified. [redacted] stated that BROADWELL never visited PETRAEUS' Ft. Myer residence.

b6
b7C

[redacted] described PETRAEUS as being aware of security. PETRAEUS could talk around topics without divulging classified information. For the security of his laptops, PETRAEUS relied on his staff to ensure security. That is, PETRAEUS' staff would provide him a secure space in which to use his computers.

[redacted] was shocked when PETRAEUS revealed the affair with BROADWELL and resigned from the CIA. [redacted] thought the relationship between PETRAEUS and BROADWELL was cordial and professional, but nothing more. [redacted] does not believe BROADWELL had any intention to take classified information in order hurt the United States. She gathered information only for her book. [redacted] is aware that PETRAEUS frequently reviewed BROADWELL's manuscript, and [redacted] does not believe PETRAEUS would have allowed SECRET information to go into the book. [redacted] is unaware if the military reviewed the book prior to publication.

b6
b7C

[redacted] last contact with PETRAEUS was [redacted]

PETRAEUS-980

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] 302 (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] Interview of [redacted] on June 11, 2013, On 06/11/2013, Page 5 of 5

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

emailed PETRAEUS and received a prompt response. [redacted] sent another email recently to [redacted] but has not received a reply. [redacted] continues to be Facebook friends with BROADWELL and they have exchanged professional posts since leaving Afghanistan.

b6
b7C

At the conclusion of the interview, [redacted] signed a "Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement", which can be found in the corresponding 1A envelope.

PETRAEUS-981

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-13-2016

Created From:



02

(S)

Package:

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U) Original interview notes, a signed Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement, and a printed copy of email exchange with David Petraeus.

Acquired By:



Acquired On: 05/22/2013

Acquired From: (U) Colonel, United States Army



Attachments:



(U) Original Interview Notes


Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

PETRAEUS-982

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/31/2013

On May 22, 2013, [redacted] date of birth [redacted]
email address [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place
of employment located at the United States Army [redacted]
[redacted] by Special Agents [redacted]
[redacted] Witnessing the interview was United States Army
Criminal Investigative Division Special Agent [redacted] After
being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of
the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[redacted] is a Colonel (Col.) in the United States Army and is currently
studying at the [redacted] [redacted] anticipates graduating in June
2013. [redacted] has worked with General DAVID PETRAEUS on several occasions
throughout [redacted] career. [redacted] first meeting with PETRAEUS occurred while
[redacted] was a Major assigned to the [redacted] fellow officers
in the Brigade S-3 Section were practical jokers. Being familiar with
[redacted] physical fitness, these officers engineered [redacted] between
[redacted] and PETRAEUS. As [redacted] was able to [redacted] with PETRAEUS, [redacted]
gained credibility with PETRAEUS.

b6
b7C

In [redacted] deployed to Iraq [redacted]
2003. In Mosul [redacted] was [redacted]
(operations) Section. [redacted] returned to [redacted]
when PETRAEUS called [redacted] and asked if [redacted] was ready to go back to Iraq.
[redacted] then deployed with PETRAEUS to Iraq for [redacted] to establish the
[redacted] Following
this [redacted] assignment [redacted] returned to Washington, D.C. to work for
the Secretary of the Army. While accompanying the Secretary on trips to
Iraq, [redacted] continued to interact with PETRAEUS. Aside from the [redacted]
assignment, [redacted] never worked directly for PETRAEUS.

b6
b7C

Upon PETRAEUS' return from Iraq, he took command at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, where [redacted] too, was posted. In 2007, PETRAEUS returned to Iraq
as Commanding General of Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I). [redacted] also
deployed again to Iraq to work in Sadr City, Baghdad. PETRAEUS visited

b6
b7C

Investigation on 05/23/2013 at [redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [redacted] 302 (S) Date drafted 05/24/2013
by [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

02 (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of [redacted] on May 22, 2013, On 05/23/2013, Page 2 of 4

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] and [redacted] troops often. [redacted] job [redacted] was to take the Counter Insurgency (COIN) lessons learned [redacted] and apply them in [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]
[redacted] with responsibility for [redacted]

Col. [redacted] Brigade received much attention and resources from PETRAEUS. Upon [redacted] assumption of command, PETRAEUS visited from [redacted] The purpose of this visit was to send off the [redacted] however [redacted] did brief PETRAEUS on [redacted] battle plan for the above districts. PETRAEUS again visited [redacted] before PETRAEUS departed Afghanistan [redacted]

b6
b7C

On the two trips that PETRAEUS made [redacted] he was accompanied by PAULA BROADWELL. BROADWELL had researched Col. [redacted] During their transition, Col. [redacted] discussed BROADWELL with [redacted] and advised BROADWELL had spent a lot of time with Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] Col. [redacted] further advised BROADWELL was writing a book on PETRAEUS' ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) Command, Iraq Command, and development of COIN. It was widely known that BROADWELL was an Army Officer with a security clearance which facilitated her access.

b6
b7C

During the trip BROADWELL made with PETRAEUS in July 2011, she took photographs of PETRAEUS at a local school established under [redacted] command. In addition to a camera, [redacted] could only speculate that BROADWELL may have had [redacted] On this trip [redacted] and [redacted] Officers provided a VIP brief to PETRAEUS and his entourage, to include BROADWELL. These VIP briefs tended to be less classified because Afghan counterparts would be present. It was the responsibility of the S-2 Shop (Intelligence) to screen the audience and determine who should or should not attend a particular briefing [redacted] assumes BROADWELL did not [redacted] his VIP briefing to PETRAEUS. [redacted] was never personally interviewed by BROADWELL, however she did express her interest in [redacted] campaign plan. During the VIP briefing, PETRAEUS did challenge [redacted] to increase local Afghan participation in applying COIN.

b6
b7C

This VIP briefing was not conducted in a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), and there was no standard operating procedure regarding photographs in a briefing. Any photos taken during a VIP briefing would be taken by the Brigade's Public Affairs Officer (PAO). No photos would be taken of the slides used in the briefing. It would trouble

PETRAEUS-984

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

802 (S)

Interview of [redacted] on May 22, 2013

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 05/23/2013, Page 3 of 4

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] to know that an audience member photographed [redacted] briefing slides during the presentation.

When such a VIP briefing is provided, the VIP often leaves with a copy of the briefing via compact disc or hardcopy binder. [redacted] does not recall if BROADWELL asked for a copy of his briefing. However, PETRAEUS did ask [redacted] via email on [redacted] network or [redacted] network) to provide [redacted] of [redacted] briefing [redacted] assumes [redacted] was for PETRAEUS and [redacted] was for BROADWELL. [redacted] does not recall how the discs were provided, but [redacted] would have facilitated the transfer [redacted] Information on these [redacted] and the application of COIN principles, and the [redacted] should have had a classified stickers affixed to them.

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] does not recall any of his [redacted] being interviewed by BROADWELL, nor does [redacted] recall any of [redacted] forwarding information for BROADWELL's book. [redacted] did have a SCIF at his [redacted] BROADWELL never entered this SCIF while [redacted] was in command. When media members reported to [redacted] command, they would be routed to the Brigade PAO. [redacted] would then meet with or have a conference call with the journalist before directing them to the field.

b6
b7C

On June 16, 2012, [redacted] received an email from BROADWELL congratulating [redacted] acceptance to [redacted] also received a similar email from PETRAEUS at that time.

b6
b7C

In Fall 2012, [redacted] received an email from Lieutenant General [redacted] asking recipients to please provide additional COIN information to BROADWELL so that she might continue her research studies. [redacted] did not respond to this email request as [redacted] got a "weird vibe" from BROADWELL. [redacted] suspected BROADWELL was attracted to PETRAEUS' position as Commander.

b6
b7C

[redacted] emailed PETRAEUS [redacted] PETRAEUS' [redacted] PETRAEUS responded with his congratulations. [redacted] last contact with PETRAEUS was in late [redacted] sent PETRAEUS an email to say [redacted] will soon be coming to Washington, D.C. and looks forward to [redacted] PETRAEUS. This email from [redacted] was sent to PETRAEUS' AKO (Army Knowledge Online) account. PETRAEUS responded by inviting [redacted] to have dinner with him [redacted] PETRAEUS also provided [redacted] his Google email address, [redacted] provided interviewing Agents a copy of this email exchange with [redacted] which can be found in the corresponding 1A envelope.

b6
b7C

PETRAEUS-985

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FD-302a (Rev. 05-08-10)

[redacted] 02 (S)

Interview of [redacted] on May
22, 2013

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 05/23/2013, Page 4 of 4

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

At the conclusion of the interview, [redacted] signed a "Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement", which can be found in the corresponding 1A envelope.

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-986

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-13-2016

Created From:

[Redacted]

02

(S)

Package:

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U) Original interview notes and a signed Classified Information
Non-Disclosure Statement.

Acquired By:

[Redacted]

Acquired On: 05/21/2013

Acquired From: (U) Lieutenant Colonel
United States Army

[Redacted]

Attachments:  (U) Original Interview Notes

Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E


PETRAEUS-987

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 1 of 3 -

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/31/2013

On May 21, 2013, [redacted] date of birth [redacted]
office telephone number [redacted] cellular telephone number [redacted]
[redacted] FAX number [redacted] and email address [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at his place of employment
located at the United States [redacted]
[redacted] Washington, D.C. 20515, by Special Agents
[redacted] Witnessing the interview was
United States Army Criminal Investigative Division Special Agent [redacted]
[redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents
and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following
information:

b6
b7C

[redacted] is a Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) in the United States Army, and [redacted]
currently serves as the Army [redacted] Liaison to the United States
[redacted] As an Army Officer [redacted] served two tours in
Iraq and one tour in Afghanistan. [redacted] reported to Afghanistan as the
Battalion Commander [redacted] in the Zhari District near
Kandahar. [redacted] first served under Colonel (Col.) [redacted] until
late [redacted] when Col. [redacted] assumed command. [redacted] described Col.
[redacted] as a great guy. [redacted] departed Afghanistan in January 2012.

b6
b7C

[redacted] first met General DAVID PETRAEUS in Iraq during the military
surge in 2007 and 2008. During that time, [redacted] provided numerous
briefings to PETRAEUS. [redacted] had no further contact with PETRAEUS until
[redacted] when PETRAEUS attended the Relief-In-Place Ceremony to
transfer command of the Kandahar, Afghanistan battlespace from Col.
[redacted] to Col. [redacted] During this visit, PETRAEUS came to see off the
old brigade and held a meeting with Col. [redacted] and four Battalion
Commanders, including [redacted] During this meeting, PETRAEUS took a pulse
check of the battalions, and [redacted] had no additional personal contact with
PETRAEUS following this meeting.

b6
b7C

PAULA BROADWELL accompanied PETRAEUS during the Relief-In-Place
Ceremony, and she was with a grey-haired Special Forces Colonel. BROADWELL
may have interviewed Col. [redacted] and Col. [redacted] during this time.

b6
b7C

Investigation on 05/21/2013 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
File # [redacted] 02 (S) Date drafted 05/21/2013
by [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

02

Interview of [redacted] on May 21, 2013

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 05/21/2013, Page 2 of 3

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] was introduced to BROADWELL by LTC [redacted] who was an Artillery Commander in the battlespace adjoining [redacted] BROADWELL may have also interviewed LTC [redacted]

b6
b7C

Following the initial introduction to BROADWELL in [redacted] [redacted] met her again in [redacted] upon her return to Kandahar. [redacted] understood BROADWELL to be part of PETRAEUS' entourage in Afghanistan. In [redacted] granted BROADWELL a [redacted] interview in [redacted] office, where she stated she was co-authoring a book about PETRAEUS and she wanted to include information from [redacted] battlespaces in the book. During the interview, [redacted] left the door to [redacted] office open. BROADWELL asked about large battles and she wanted storyboards. [redacted] advised BROADWELL this information was classified and could only be transmitted via [redacted] the Secret classified computer system used by NATO-affiliated troops in Afghanistan. As BROADWELL did not have a [redacted] account, she asked [redacted] to forward classified information to PETRAEUS' account, as well as PETRAEUS' Commander's Initiative Group (CIG) Chief.

b6
b7C
b7E

Prior to forwarding storyboards to PETRAEUS [redacted] account, [redacted] advised [redacted] Commanding Officer, Col. [redacted] that [redacted] intended to email PETRAEUS directly. [redacted] recalled [redacted] email to PETRAEUS stated, "Please pass to PAULA BROADWELL" or "For PAULA BROADWELL's book." As the Army takes the protection of classified information to be a serious matter, [redacted] questioned BROADWELL about how the storyboards would be de-classified. BROADWELL stated "they" had a process to do this. [redacted] understood "they" to be PETRAEUS and his CIG Chief, who was perhaps Col. [redacted] Following the interview with BROADWELL, [redacted] sent the storyboards to PETRAEUS that same day [redacted] does not recall providing BROADWELL any physical documents.

b6
b7C

During BROADWELL's interview of [redacted] she identified herself as an Army Reservist and a Military Intelligence Officer. She did not discuss her clearances. [redacted] was not aware of BROADWELL [redacted] interview, however BROADWELL may have taken notes during the interview. As she was with PETRAEUS, [redacted] did not question BROADWELL's credentials or access. Following the interview with [redacted] BROADWELL departed Kandahar [redacted] and to [redacted] knowledge she did not attend any Brigade briefings during her visit.

b6
b7C

While in Afghanistan, journalists were cleared by the Division Public Affairs Officer. No journalists walked around with badges which identified them as media. [redacted] did have a journalist imbedded with [redacted] Regiment. [redacted] directive to this journalist was not to take photographs of Secret or Top Secret information and do not embarrass the Unit.

b6
b7C

PETRAEUS-989

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] 02 (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] Interview of [redacted] on May 21, 2013, On 05/21/2013, Page 3 of 3

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] did not have a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) in [redacted] office. There was a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) which was open to Afghans, who would take notes during briefings and operations.

b6
b7C

Following the interview in July 2011, BROADWELL may have written to [redacted] at [redacted] unclassified [redacted] email address. [redacted] could not recall [redacted] email address.

[redacted] was surprised by news of the affair between PETRAEUS and BROADWELL. [redacted] found the whole situation to be sad.

b6
b7C

At the conclusion of the interview, [redacted] signed a "Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement", which can be found in the corresponding 1A envelope.

PETRAEUS-990

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039

DATE: 06-13-2016

Created From: [REDACTED] (S)

Package: [REDACTED]

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U) Interview Notes

Acquired By: [REDACTED]

Acquired On: 08/28/2013

Acquired From: (U) [REDACTED]

Attachments:  (U) Interview notesAttachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIEDb1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E


PETRAEUS-1034

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 1 of 1 -

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



FBI INFO.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46211

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-13-2016

Date of entry 09/03/2013

On 08/28/2013, [redacted] was telephonically interviewed by SA [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview [redacted] provided the following:

b6
b7C

[redacted] originally provided the National Defense University (NDU) with [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

Later, [redacted] wanted to add additional information to the [redacted] so [redacted] asked NDU to return [redacted] [redacted] then combined all the unclassified information [redacted] that was provided to NDU.

The unclassified hard drive contained [redacted] DAVID PETRAEUS, newspaper articles, [redacted] [redacted] as PETRAEUS's Non-Classified [redacted] e-mail.

b7E
b6
b7C

Approximately 80 to 90 of the unclassified hard drive consists of the [redacted] The unclassified hard drive contains United States Central Command (CENTCOM) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) information.

[redacted] primarily contained PETRAEUS's [redacted] [redacted]

b6
b7C

An inventory of the physical documents was created, but [redacted] does not know if an inventory was created for [redacted]

Investigation on 08/28/2013 at [redacted] United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] 302 (S) Date dictated 09/03/2013

by [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

PETRAEUS-1035

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

Created From:

~~SECRET~~

(S)

Package:

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U) Interview notes, NDA and business card

Acquired By:



Acquired On: 08/19/2013

Acquired From:

(U)



Attachments:



(U) Notes, NDA, Business Card

Attachment Classification:

UNCLASSIFIED

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E


~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-1036

~~SECRET~~

- 1 of 3 -

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/11/2013

On 08/29/2013, [redacted] work telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] residence located at [redacted] by SA [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following:

[redacted] first worked for DAVID PETRAEUS in approximately [redacted] during the time PETRAEUS was being confirmed as the Commander of Multi National Forces Iraq (MNEI). At this time, PETRAEUS was based at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and [redacted] was an Army Officer at United States Central Command (CENTCOM). [redacted] was tasked to support PETRAEUS [redacted] Specifically, [redacted] provided [redacted] to support PETRAEUS's nomination.

b6
b7C

[redacted] worked directly for PETRAEUS in the [redacted] when PETRAEUS was named CENTCOM Commander. [redacted] worked for PETRAEUS throughout PETRAEUS's time as CENTCOM Commander. [redacted] traveled back and forth to Iraq during this time period.

b6
b7C

While serving as MNEI Commander, PETRAEUS reported to CENTCOM Commander Admiral William J. Fallon.

In the summer of 2008, [redacted] traveled to Iraq to help facilitate PETRAEUS's transition to CENTCOM Commander. [redacted] returned to the United States [redacted] later. [redacted] began formally reporting to PETRAEUS when PETRAEUS took command of CENTCOM in approximately August/September 2008.

b6
b7C

The Office of the Commander included PETRAEUS's personal staff which consisted of bodyguards, drivers, his secretary, scheduler and handlers. During PETRAEUS's transition to CENTCOM Commander, [redacted] was one of PETRAEUS's [redacted] described [redacted] position as a think tank worker. [redacted] provided assessments [redacted] and got PETRAEUS up to speed on CENTCOM issues. [redacted] provided talking points, supporting content and speeches for PETRAEUS.

b6
b7C

[redacted] position at CENTCOM was part of the Commanders Initiative

(S)

Investigation on 08/29/2013 at [redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [redacted] 802, [redacted] 802 Date dictated 08/30/2013
by [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

PETRAEUS-1037

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

302

Continuation of FD-302 of

On 08/29/2013, Page 2 of 3

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Group (CIG). Some people refer to the CIG as the Commanders Action Group (CAG). CIG or CAG can be used interchangeably. CIG's/CAG's are not a formal entity. Depending on the boss, the size of the CIG/CAG could be [redacted] Colonel [redacted] first headed the CIG and then Colonel [redacted] took over. During [redacted] time at CENTCOM [redacted] was a [redacted] and then a [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] provided information up to the Top Secret level to PETRAEUS. [redacted] has no reason to believe PETRAEUS handled this information improperly.

b6
b7C

Following [redacted] work at CENTCOM, [redacted] worked at the Pentagon. During this time, [redacted] did not have direct contact with PETRAEUS. [redacted] did not speak directly with PETRAEUS until PETRAEUS was going through the confirmation process to become the Director of the CIA (DCIA). [redacted] supported PETRAEUS throughout this process. A part of this process included answering questionnaires from the Senate Committees. These questionnaires were procedural and bureaucratic. The responses could be up to 20 pages long and were on the record. [redacted] helped answer the questions and put them in PETRAEUS's language. [redacted] did not see the final product, so [redacted] is not sure if PETRAEUS changed any of [redacted] work. [redacted] has not had any formal contact with PETRAEUS since this time.

b6
b7C

Additionally [redacted] ran into PETRAEUS on a few occasions when PETRAEUS was at the Pentagon meeting with Secretary of Defense LEON PENETTA. [redacted] did not see PETRAEUS while PETRAEUS was deployed to Afghanistan as [redacted] never deployed to Afghanistan.

b6
b7C

[redacted] left CENTCOM around the same time PETRAEUS was selected to command the troops in Afghanistan.

[redacted] attended a dinner [redacted] hosted for PETRAEUS following his return from Afghanistan, but prior to his confirmation as DCIA. [redacted] does not recall seeing PETRAEUS and BROADWELL together at the dinner. BROADWELL was not treated any differently than other journalists.

b6
b7C

[redacted] was never asked to help [redacted] with preparing PETRAEUS's papers for the National Defense University. [redacted] knows [redacted]

When PETRAEUS was transitioning from Iraq to CENTCOM, there was a month and a half period between PETRAEUS leaving Iraq and starting at CENTCOM. PETRAEUS took leave for approximately two weeks and then [redacted] spent approximately [redacted] with PETRAEUS in Washington, DC preparing for the transition. During this timeframe, possibly [redacted] PAULA BROADWELL interviewed PETRAEUS at his home on Ft. Myer as part of her

b6
b7C

PETRAEUS-1038

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

302 (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of

On 08/29/2013, Page 3 of 3

research. This was the first time [] met BROADWELL. [] believes BROADWELL was at Harvard University. [] did not sit in on the interview; rather [] sat in the car outside. [] does not know who was present for the interview. It was not unusual for [] to wait in the car for PETRAEUS because they were working out of his [] office.

b6
b7C
b7E

Following this meeting, BROADWELL contacted [] via email to ask about [] attendance at the Renaissance Weekend. This weekend involved a social gathering of people in the intelligence community. [] is a member and [] attended a Renaissance event.

b6
b7C

[] next saw BROADWELL at [] dinner party [] has not had any contact with BROADWELL since this time. [] might have run into BROADWELL on another occasion, but these are the only contacts he remembers.

[] was never given an order to assist BROADWELL in her research efforts. [] does not recall being given such an order, or sending her an email about the order. [] would be surprised if BROADWELL used [] name to show the access she had to PETRAEUS because [] name does not hold much weight.

b6
b7C

[] does not believe PETRAEUS had an inner circle; rather he just had people who worked for him.

[] sent PETRAEUS an email a few months ago and PETRAEUS responded. This was the last contact [] has had with PETRAEUS.

b6
b7C

[] believes PETRAEUS respected [] strategies when [] worked for PETRAEUS.

[] was surprised when news of the affair between PETRAEUS and BROADWELL was revealed. [] was saddened to hear about the affair. [] was surprised PETRAEUS had an affair. [] did not know BROADWELL well enough to have any opinion about her likelihood to have an affair.

b6
b7C

Following the interview, [] signed a Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement (NDA). The NDA can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope.

PETRAEUS-1039

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Created From:



[REDACTED]

[3]

Package:

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U) Interview Notes

Acquired By:



Acquired On: 09/04/2013

Acquired From:

(U)



Attachments:



(U) Interview Notes

Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-13-2016

b1

b3

b6

b7C

b7E


PETRAEUS-1040

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 1 of 1 -

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-13-2016

Date of entry 09/16/2013

On 09/4/2013, [redacted] work telephone number [redacted] was telephonically interviewed by SA [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following:

b6
b7C

(S) The [redacted] provided to the FBI by the National Defense University (NDU) were provided to NDU by United States Central Command (CENTCOM) [redacted]. The classification markings on the [redacted] were made by [redacted] does not have a written inventory [redacted]. There is no [redacted] just standard [redacted] directories and files. (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(S) PETRAEUS's collection was received by NDU in 2011. The [redacted] were probably received by NDU in [redacted] will check [redacted] notes to determine the specific dates [redacted] was received by NDU. The [redacted] were not provided to NDU at the same time, but were provided within the same general time period. (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Investigation on 09/04/2013 at [redacted] United States (Phone)

File [redacted]-302 (S) Date dictated 09/04/2013

by [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.


PETRAEUS-1041

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 1 of 1 -

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C68W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-13-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/16/2013

On September 16, 2013 [redacted] was telephonically interviewed by SA [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following:

b6
b7C

When advised by interviewing Agents that National Defense University (NDU) reported receipt of [redacted]

[redacted] from [redacted] confirmed [redacted] [redacted] were sent by [redacted] to NDU.

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] confirmed [redacted] [redacted] contains United States Secret information concerning DAVID PETRAEUS, and [redacted] contains NATO Secret information concerning DAVID PETRAEUS.

[redacted] also confirmed [redacted] sent to NDU was [redacted] containing information related to DAVID PETRAEUS. Upon further recollection, [redacted] recalled the [redacted] [redacted] sent to NDU was from a United States Department of State Official assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). [redacted] contains the State Department Official's unclassified documents related to ISAF.

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Investigation on 09/16/2013 at [redacted] United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] 802 [redacted] Date dictated 09/16/2013

by [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

PETRAEUS-1049

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG 066W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

Created From:



(S)

(S)

Package:

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U) Original interview notes from interview with [redacted]
on 09/16/2013.

Acquired By:



Acquired On: 09/16/2013

Acquired From:


Attachments:  (U) Original interview notes.Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-1050

3/16/2016 9:46 AM

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U) Interview of [REDACTED] on
09/16/2013

Date: 09/17/2013

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

From: CHARLOTTE

CE05

Contact: [REDACTED]

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-13-2016

Approved By [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID # [REDACTED]

(S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

Synopsis: (U) To submit 1A-envelope containing original interview notes.

~~Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)~~

~~Derived From: FBI~~

~~NSISC-20090615~~

~~Declassify On: 20380917~~

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. (U) Original interview notes.

Details:

(U) On 09/16/2013, [REDACTED] was interviewed telephonically by SA [REDACTED] Original interview notes were inadvertently not attached to the FD-302. Attached to this E.C. are the original interview notes for this interview,

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(S)

◆◆

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-13-2016

Created From:

~~SECRET~~

(S)

Package:

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U) Original interview notes of



on.


September 27, 2013.

Acquired By:



Acquired On: 09/27/2013

Acquired From:



United States

Attachments:



(U) Original interview notes.

Attachment Classification:


UNCLASSIFIED

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

PETRAEUS-1052

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C68W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/02/2013

b6
b7C

On September 27, 2013, [redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed telephonically by Special Agent [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

Following the interview with [redacted] conducted by SA [redacted] on September 26, 2013, [redacted] reviewed the acknowledgements contained in PAULA BROADWELL's book, "All In: The Education of General David Petraeus." [redacted] had been questioned by SA [redacted] regarding the relationship between [redacted] and PAULA BROADWELL. [redacted] noted [redacted] name appears on page [redacted] of the book. [redacted] recalled having coffee with [redacted] approximately [redacted] after returning from their military assignments in Afghanistan. During this meeting [redacted] told [redacted] BROADWELL's book prior to publication.

b6
b7C
b7E

SA [redacted] had also questioned [redacted] on September 26, 2013 regarding [redacted] kept by General DAVID PETRAEUS. Again, after reviewing the acknowledgements in BROADWELL's book, [redacted] advised PETRAEUS [redacted] may be stored at the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington, D.C. Many of PETRAEUS' papers had been designated to go to NDU.

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Investigation on 09/27/2013 at [redacted] United States (Phone) [redacted]
File # [redacted] 302 (S) Date dictated 09/30/2013
by [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039

DATE: 06-13-2016

Created From: [REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~

(S)

Package:

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U) Notes from interview, NDA [REDACTED] business card

Acquired By:

Acquired On: 09/26/2013


Acquired From: (U) [REDACTED]

Attachments:  (U) Notes, NDA, Business CardAttachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIEDb1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

PETRAEUS-1054

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/02/2013

On 09/26/2013, Colonel [redacted] (retired), cellular telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at his residence located at [redacted] by SA [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview [redacted] provided the following:

b6
b7C

[redacted] first met DAVID PETRAEUS in approximately [redacted] when [redacted] was working at the White House. They first met on a flight to [redacted] next dealt with PETRAEUS when PETRAEUS commanded the 101st Airborne Division. [redacted] was impressed with PETRAEUS's writings.

b6
b7C

[redacted] planned on retiring from the Marine Corp [redacted] after giving up command of Camp Pendleton. Around this time, [redacted] received a call asking if [redacted] would be interested in interviewing for a job with PETRAEUS. [redacted] decided to interview and got the job [redacted] the Commander's Initiatives Group (CIG). [redacted] worked with PETRAEUS for [redacted] years, until PETRAEUS's retirement from the military. They first worked together at United States Central Command (CENTCOM) for [redacted] and then in Afghanistan. While at CENTCOM they were on the road 70% of the time and worked seven (7) days a week. [redacted] had a classified computer and storage facility (safe) [redacted] so [redacted] could prepare reports for the Secretary of Defense.

b6
b7C
b7E

In [redacted] role [redacted] of the CIG [redacted] often attended meetings with PETRAEUS. [redacted] was PETRAEUS's note-taker and advisor. The CIG prepared and wrote reports for the Secretary of Defense, the President, as well as NATO. The CIG also prepared PETRAEUS's testimony and traveled with PETRAEUS.

b6
b7C

[redacted] does not keep in touch with PETRAEUS that often and when they do communicate, it is via email. Working for PETRAEUS was a privilege and [redacted] respected PETRAEUS and believes PETRAEUS respected [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

PETRAEUS liked to be in the forefront. There was not room for two people on stage, therefore PETRAEUS's subordinates stayed in the shadows.

While working at CENTCOM, [redacted] had [redacted] on [redacted] team. Some of

Investigation on	09/26/2013	at	[redacted]	United States (In Person)
File	[redacted]		302 (S)	Date dictated 09/27/2013
by	[redacted]			

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] 02 (S)
 Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] , On 09/26/2013 , Page 2 of 5

b1
 b3
 b6
 b7C
 b7E

these individuals came with the team to Afghanistan. [redacted] told the team it was a privilege to be a part of the CIG, and if at any time they did not want to be there, [redacted] would find them another place. [redacted] gave [redacted] team an opportunity to get in front of PETRAEUS. The CIG was a mix of civilian and military personnel and included [redacted] Rhodes Scholars. There was never a shortage of people who wanted to work in PETRAEUS's circle.

b6
 b7C

[redacted] was [redacted] dealt with the press for PETRAEUS. [redacted] very rarely dealt with the press, nor did [redacted] team. [redacted] facilitated internal International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) issues related to BROADWELL. [redacted] does not know how BROADWELL paid for her travel to Afghanistan

b6
 b7C

[redacted] first heard about BROADWELL while at CENTCOM, but does not believe [redacted] met her until Afghanistan. While at CENTCOM, BROADWELL conducted research for her dissertation and cataloged documents from PETRAEUS's time in Iraq.

While in Afghanistan, BROADWELL worked on her book, All In: The Education of David Petraeus and blogged. Her blog covered one of her West Point [redacted]

b6
 b7C

BROADWELL traveled to Afghanistan several times while PETRAEUS was stationed there. Additionally, BROADWELL traveled back to the United States with PETRAEUS and the team.

[redacted] is not sure how BROADWELL traveled to Afghanistan, but believes she was considered a member of the media. BROADWELL was treated differently than other media because of the access she had. BROADWELL had free reign to travel to different locations and had access to talk to PETRAEUS. No one had to be present when BROADWELL interviewed personnel. BROADWELL spent a lot of time in country, as opposed to other media members who came for a day or two. [redacted] also spent a lot of time with the team and was granted access based on [redacted] reputation..

b6
 b7C

Early on, BROADWELL asked to interview [redacted] BROADWELL cancelled interviews with [redacted] occasions at the last minute. This caused [redacted] to sour on BROADWELL because [redacted] was taking [redacted] free time to meet with her.

b6
 b7C

[redacted] spent time with BROADWELL and PETRAEUS while she interviewed PETRAEUS and realized the book was not a biography, but rather a PETRAEUS promotional. [redacted] felt the book was going to be a fluff piece, essentially an autobiography. The book was more PETRAEUS's than BROADWELL's.

b6
 b7C

~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-1056

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] 302 [redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

On 09/26/2013, Page 3 of 5

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] is mentioned once in BROADWELL's book. [redacted] assumes PETRAEUS provided BROADWELL with this information because [redacted] did not provide it to her.

b6
b7C

By the time [redacted] met BROADWELL, PETRAEUS and BROADWELL had known each other [redacted]. It was not out of character for PETRAEUS to take young officers under his wing, especially with academic pursuits. PETRAEUS said BROADWELL was a tremendous researcher, but could not close on it. [redacted] knew BROADWELL. [redacted] believes [redacted] helped BROADWELL with her research.

Most of the information the CIG disseminated was at the NATO or United States Secret level. [redacted] does not recall disseminating anything at the Top Secret level, but they handled information up to the Top Secret / Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) level.

b6
b7C

BROADWELL never asked [redacted] for classified information. [redacted] was comfortable with BROADWELL dealing directly with his team. [redacted] does not recall being asked by PETRAEUS to provide BROADWELL with classified material. PETRAEUS did ask the group to speak to BROADWELL. The CIG had unclassified slides they provided to the media which might have been provided to BROADWELL.

BROADWELL dealt with the following members of the CIG: [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] is a [redacted] who teaches at the United States Naval Academy. [redacted] is a civilian who had previously been a speech writer for the Secretary of Defense. Upon [redacted] return from Afghanistan, [redacted] studied at the [redacted]

[redacted] knew BROADWELL was a reservist, but she was not acting in her reserve capacity while in Afghanistan. [redacted] does not know if BROADWELL took advantage of her reservist status while in Afghanistan.

b6
b7C

Members of the media were sometimes required to sign a non-disclosure agreement. [redacted] does not know if BROADWELL signed such an agreement.

The CIG never briefed in front of other personnel as they were PETRAEUS's personal staff and only briefed him.

[redacted] is not aware of any operational security violations by BROADWELL while she was in Afghanistan. [redacted] is aware of personality complaints made against BROADWELL, as well as complaints about the meetings she attended. [redacted] also had concern with some of the meetings BROADWELL attended because [redacted] did not feel she needed to be in some of them. [redacted] does not remember which meetings [redacted] specifically had concerns about.

b6
b7C

PETRAEUS-1057

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

302 (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of

On 09/26/2013, Page 4 of 5

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

PETRAEUS would have been in any meeting [redacted] attended because he did not attend meetings without PETRAEUS.

b6
b7C

[redacted] is familiar with the name [redacted] but [redacted] does not know in what context [redacted] knew or heard of [redacted]

[redacted] was a [redacted] Navy officer in the CIG. [redacted] does not know if [redacted] had a relationship with BROADWELL. [redacted] was [redacted] is currently at sea, though [redacted] does not know on which ship [redacted] currently serves. [redacted] started with the CIG at [redacted] age, right out of the [redacted] school where [redacted] worked on [redacted] Master's. One [redacted] professors, [redacted] sent an email to PETRAEUS about [redacted] PETRAEUS helped get [redacted] on the CIG. [redacted] asked [redacted] to travel to Afghanistan with the team. [redacted] does not know if [redacted] had any face time with PETRAEUS.

b6
b7C

[redacted] does not remember receiving a June 2011 email from PETRAEUS about BROADWELL. [redacted] did not stand in the way of [redacted] team helping BROADWELL.

b6
b7C

[redacted] felt BROADWELL's motivation was self-promotional and did not think it was in the best interest of PETRAEUS. [redacted] did not dislike her personally, but [redacted] did not consider her a friend. To the best of [redacted] knowledge, PETRAEUS and BROADWELL did not have an affair while in Afghanistan. [redacted] believes [redacted] or [redacted] would have been aware of an affair if it occurred there because it would have been hard to hide from them.

b6
b7C

[redacted] met [redacted] through [redacted] years ago. [redacted] would not recognize [redacted] if [redacted] walked up to [redacted]

b6
b7C

BROADWELL traveled with the team from Afghanistan back to the United States. One of their stops was in [redacted] BROADWELL was the connection for this stop as she facilitated PETRAEUS's speech with a group she was a part of there. It was very unusual that BROADWELL was part of this trip home. One of the pictures in her book was taken on this trip. [redacted] believes, per the regulations, BROADWELL was allowed to fly for free on the plane, but had to pay for her own hotel room.

b6
b7C

[redacted] was uncomfortable with BROADWELL being on this trip as she was not a part of the team. They had all traveled to Afghanistan together and should have returned together [redacted] also did not like the perception of having BROADWELL disembark the plane with PETRAEUS in each country they visited. Additionally, the [redacted] stop was only made because of BROADWELL's interest and they were only on the ground for a few hours.

b6
b7C

PETRAEUS-1058

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

302 [redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

On 09/26/2013, Page 5 of 5

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

PETRAEUS took notes in his [redacted] also took notes in his [redacted] writings would be considered classified. [redacted] stored his [redacted] in [redacted] cargo pocket. [redacted] did not write Top Secret information in [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] read portions of PETRAEUS's [redacted] specifically notes related to meetings [redacted] did not attend with PETRAEUS. To [redacted] knowledge, [redacted] did not see Top Secret information in PETRAEUS's [redacted] would have never written a [redacted] and then included information related to the [redacted] in his [redacted] would not be surprised if there was Top Secret information in PETRAEUS's [redacted] and PETRAEUS's staff ensured PETRAEUS did not leave his [redacted] behind. [redacted] does not know if anyone gained access to PETRAEUS's [redacted] besides [redacted] and PETRAEUS's aide. When [redacted] returned from Afghanistan, [redacted] kept [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] first learned of PETRAEUS's affair when [redacted] wife received a text about the affair. When news of PETRAEUS's affair broke, [redacted] suspected the affair was with BROADWELL.

b6
b7C

[redacted] has not emailed with PETRAEUS in awhile, but could initiate contact if he desired.

b6
b7C

Following the interview, [redacted] signed a Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement (NDA). The NDA can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope.

PETRAEUS-1059

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-13-2018

Created From: [REDACTED] (S)
Package: [REDACTED]
Stored Location: None

Summary: (U) Original interview notes from [REDACTED] on September 18, 2013.

Acquired By: [REDACTED]
Acquired On: 09/18/2013

Acquired From: (U) [REDACTED]

Attachments:  (U) Original interview notes.

Attachment Classification:
UNCLASSIFIED

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E


PETRAEUS-1060

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 1 of 1 -

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



FBI INFO

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46E11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-13-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/15/2013

On September 18, 2013 [redacted] was telephonically interviewed by SA [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following:

b6
b7C

[redacted] sent [redacted] classified as Secret, to National Defense University (NDU). These [redacted] contain information dating from DAVID PETRAEUS' command of the [redacted] thru his retirement from the military.

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] also sent [redacted] to NDU. [redacted] of these [redacted] contains information dating from the 1980s. This [redacted] includes newspaper clippings, PETRAEUS' Ph.D. dissertation from Princeton, and information related to PETRAEUS' commands in Iraq and Afghanistan.

b6
b7C
b7E

Interviewing Agents advised [redacted] that each of the [redacted] sent to NDU have a white sticker with the label "Petraeus" affixed to each one. Although [redacted] did place classification stickers on each [redacted] does not recall putting any white stickers labeled "Petraeus" on these [redacted] believes NDU placed these white stickers on the hard drives.

b6
b7C
b7E

Investigation on 09/18/2013 at [redacted] United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] 02 (S) Date dictated 09/18/2013

by [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

PETRAEUS-1061

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46E11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-13-2016

Created From:



(U) (S)

Package:

Stored Location: None

Summary: (U) Notes and copy of email

Acquired By:



Acquired On: 10/18/2013

Acquired From:

(U)



Attachments:



(U) Notes and copy of email

Attachment Classification:


UNCLASSIFIED

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

PETRAEUS-1062

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 04-13-2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/24/2013

X (U)

On 10/18/2013, [redacted] was telephonically interviewed by Special Agent [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following:

b6
b7C

[redacted] remembers receiving physical documents for General DAVID PETRAEUS's collection on several occasions. [redacted] believes the [redacted] for PETRAEUS's collection came in two deliveries. Most of PETRAEUS's collection arrived at the National Defense University (NDU) between late summer 2011 and spring 2012. It is typical for a collection to arrive over a period of time.

b6
b7C

[Admin Note: Prior to this telephone interview [redacted] sent SA [redacted] an e-mail. A copy of this e-mail can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope.]


b6
b7C

Investigation on 10/18/2013 at [redacted] United States (Phone)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

File [redacted] 302 Date dictated 10/21/2013
by [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION****Electronic Communication**

Title: (U) Sub-file Opening Document

Date: 12/19/2012

From: CHARLOTTE

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46E11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037

DATE: 06-15-2016

CE05

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: [REDACTED]

ARMY [REDACTED] (S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Synopsis: (U) Open sub-file for captioned matter.

~~Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)~~~~Derived From: FBI~~~~NSISC-20090615~~~~Declassify On: 20371219~~

Details:

(U//~~FOUO~~) Request to open sub ARMY to house all documents related to coordination with the US Army during the course of the captioned investigation.

◆◆

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

PETRAEUS-1159

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

December 19, 2012

[REDACTED] (S)
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER
[REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~(S//NF)~~ On 12/17/2012, the Charlotte Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation initiated an investigation of [REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~(S//NF)~~ The Charlotte Division requests the assistance of the United States Army to obtain records relating to [REDACTED] during the subject's service in the United States Army. Specifically, Charlotte requests the following records and information: (S)

1. ~~(S//NF)~~ Complete email content from ALL JWICS, SIPR and NIPR accounts used by the subject to include, but not limited to, accounts associated with swa.mil, CENTCOM, and AKO from 01/01/2007 through present;
2. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Army personnel file;
3. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Any security files or background investigations that are separate and apart from those contained in subject's Army personnel file;
4. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Military lodging accommodations;
5. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Military-provided transportation;
6. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Military-provided communications gear to include cell phones and laptops;

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Page 1 of 2

~~Classified By: J81J24T84~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20371231~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

PETRAEUS-1160


7. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Complete toll records, text and SMS records from any military-provided cellular phones;
8. ~~(S//NF)~~ Any documentation that gives classification or declassification authorities during subjects tours of duty at Multi-National Force-Iraq; Central Command; and International Security Assistance Force;
9. ~~(S//NF)~~ Information concerning the subject's purchase of a US Army Panasonic Toughbook laptop;
10. ~~(S//NF)~~ Identify command staff personnel who served with the subject during subjects tours of duty at Multi-National Force-Iraq; Central Command; and International Security Assistance Force;
11. ~~(S//NF)~~ Identify any military historians who worked with subject during tours of duty at Multi-National Force-Iraq; Central Command; and International Security Assistance Force.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The Charlotte Division point of contact for this matter is Special Agent

[REDACTED]

b6
b7c

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U) Set lead to [REDACTED]

Date: 12/19/2012

b7E

From: CHARLOTTE

CE05

Contact: [REDACTED]

FBI INFO

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037

DATE: 06-15-2016

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #:

[REDACTED]

ARMY

[REDACTED]

(S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Synopsis: (U//~~FOUO~~) Set lead to [REDACTED] to conduct liaison with the United States Army.

~~Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)~~~~Derived From: FBI~~~~NSISC-20090615~~~~Declassify On: 20371219~~

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) LHM requesting assistance from the US Army.

Details:


(U//~~FOUO~~) In furtherance of the captioned investigation, Charlotte Division is providing the enclosed LHM to [REDACTED] and requesting they conduct liaison with the Army to obtain pertinent information and records.

b7E

◆◆

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

PETRAEUS-1162

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION****Electronic Communication**

Title: (U) Army Documents

Date: 03/07/2013

From: CHARLOTTE

CE05

Contact: [REDACTED]

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-15-2016

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: [REDACTED]

ARMY [REDACTED]

Sensitive Investigative Matter

(S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Synopsis: (U) Items received from U.S. Army

~~Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)~~~~Derived From: FBI~~~~NSISC-20090615~~~~Declassify On: 20380307~~

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. (U) Travel Documents

Details:

On 3/5/2013, SA [REDACTED] received two (2) e-mails from [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] U.S. Army, containing travel documentation related to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] time with the U.S. Army.

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

The first e-mail consisted of seven (7) attachments containing the following:

1. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED]
2. Defense Travel System Voucher
3. Travel Voucher for 6/5/10 - 6/12/10

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

PETRAEUS-1163

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Title: (U) Army Documents

(S) Re: [REDACTED] ARMY, 03/07/2013

b1
b6
b7C
b7E

4. Starwood Hotel Invoice for [REDACTED]
5. United States Central Command Memorandum for Commander, Comptroller/Finance Squadron dated 23 June 2010
6. Defense Travel System Voucher
7. Travel Voucher for 6/14/10 - 6/18/10

The second e-mail consisted of eight (8) attachments containing the following:

1. Travel Voucher for 6/1/10 - 6/2/10
2. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED]
3. Defense Travel System Voucher
4. Travel Voucher for 5/24/10 - 5/29/10
- 5 & 6. The Fairfax at Embassy Row Invoice for [REDACTED] (broken into two (2) attachments)
7. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED]
8. Defense Travel System Voucher


b6
b7C

b6
b7C

A copy of each e-mail and associated attachments can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope.

◆◆

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U) Army Documents

Date: 03/14/2013

From: CHARLOTTE

CE05

Contact: [REDACTED]

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICC C66N46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-15-2016

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID # [REDACTED]

ARMY [REDACTED]

:S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Synopsis: (U) Items received from U.S. Army

~~Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)~~~~Derived From: FBI~~~~NSISC-20090615~~~~Declassify On: 20380307~~

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. (U) Travel documentation

Details:

On 3/8/2013, SA [REDACTED] received an e-mail from [REDACTED] U.S. Army, containing travel documentation related to [REDACTED] time [REDACTED] with the U.S. Army.

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

The e-mail consisted of eight (8) attachments containing the following:

1. Travel Voucher for 5/21/10 - 5/21/10
2. DD Form 1251-2 for [REDACTED] and The Union League Club of Chicago Invoice for [REDACTED]
3. Defense Travel System Voucher

b6
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

PETRAEUS-1165

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Title: (U) Army Documents

(S) Re: [REDACTED] ARMY, 03/14/2013

b1
b3
b7E

4. Defense Travel System Voucher

5. Travel Voucher for 5/20/10 - 5/20/10

6. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED] and The Union League Club of Chicago
Invoice for [REDACTED]

b6
b7C


7. Defense Travel System Voucher

8. Defense Travel System Voucher

A copy of the e-mail and associated attachments can be found in the
corresponding 1A-envelope.

◆◆

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U) Army Documents

Date: 03/20/2013

From: CHARLOTTE

CE05

Contact: [REDACTED]

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-15-2015

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: [REDACTED]

ARMY [REDACTED]

(S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Synopsis: (U) Items received from U.S. Army

~~Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)~~~~Derived From: FBI~~~~NSISC-20090615~~~~Declassify On: 20380307~~

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. (U) US Army Travel Documents

Details:

On 3/20/2013, SA [REDACTED] received an e-mail from [REDACTED] U.S. Army, containing travel documentation related to [REDACTED] time with the U.S. Army.

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

The e-mail consisted of sixteen attachments containing the following:

1. Travel Voucher for 5/12/10 - 5/13/10
2. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED]
3. Defense Travel System Voucher
4. Travel Voucher for 5/10/10 - 5/10/10

b6
b7C~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

PETRAEUS-1167

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Title: (U) Army Documents

(S) Re: [REDACTED] ARMY, 03/20/2013

b1
b3
b7E

5. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

6. Defense Travel System Voucher

7. Travel Voucher for 4/24/10 - 5/06/10

8. Duplicate Invoice for [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

9. Defense Travel System Voucher

10. Travel Voucher for 4/22/10 - 4/23/10

11. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

12. Defense Travel System Voucher

13. Travel Voucher for 4/03/10 - 4/16/10

14. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED]

b6
b7C


15. Two (2) Invoices from The Fairfax at Embassy Row for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

16. Defense Travel System Voucher

A copy of the e-mail and associated attachments can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope.

◆◆

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U) Army Documents

Date: 03/19/2013

From: CHARLOTTE

CE05

Contact: [REDACTED]

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSISC C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-15-2016

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: [REDACTED]

ARMY

(S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Synopsis: (U) Items received from U.S. Army

~~Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)~~~~Derived From: FBI~~~~NSISC-20090615~~~~Declassify On: 20380307~~

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. (U) Army Documents

Details:

On 3/18/2013, SA [REDACTED] received an e-mail from [REDACTED] U.S. Army, containing travel documentation related to [REDACTED] time with the U.S. Army.

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

The e-mail consisted of eight (8) attachments containing the following:

1. Travel Voucher for 5/18/10 - 5/20/10
2. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED] and The Union League Club of Chicago Invoice for [REDACTED]
3. Defense Travel System Voucher

b6
b7C~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

PETRAEUS-1169

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

5) Title: (U) Army Documents
Re: [REDACTED] ARMY, 03/19/2013

b1
b3
b7E

4. Travel Voucher for 5/14/10 - 5/14/10

5. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

6. Defense Travel System Voucher


7. Travel Voucher for 5/13/10 - 5/13/10

8. Defense Travel System Voucher

A copy of the e-mail and associated attachments can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope.

◆◆

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U) Army Documents

Date: 04/10/2013

From: CHARLOTTE

CE05

Contact: [REDACTED]

FBI INFO:

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-15-2016

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #:

[REDACTED]

ARMY

[REDACTED]

(S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Synopsis: (U) Items received from U.S. Army

~~Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)~~~~Derived From: FBI~~~~NSISC-20090615~~~~Declassify On: 20380307~~

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. (U) Army documents

Details:

On 3/26/2013, SA [REDACTED] received an e-mail from [REDACTED] U.S. Army, containing two (2) non-disclosure forms signed by interviewees. Additionally, the e-mail contained documentation related to the storage of classified materials on Ft. Myer.

b6
b7C

A copy of the e-mail and attachments can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

PETRAEUS-1171


~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Title: (U) Army Documents
(S) Re: [REDACTED] ARMY, 04/10/2013

b1
b3
b7E

◆◆

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U) Army Documents

Date: 04/09/2013

From: CHARLOTTE

CE05

Contact: [REDACTED]

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-15-2016

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: [REDACTED]

ARMY

(S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Synopsis: (U) Items received from U.S. Army

~~Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)~~~~Derived From: FBI~~~~NSISC-20090615~~~~Declassify On: 20380307~~

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. (U) Travel Documents

Details:

Between 3/21/2013 and 4/9/2013, SA [REDACTED] received five (5) e-mails from [REDACTED] U.S. Army, containing travel documentation (S) related to [REDACTED] time with the U.S. Army.

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

The first e-mail, dated 3/21/2013 consisted of twelve attachments containing the following:

1. Travel Voucher for 3/29/10 - 4/1/10
2. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED] with receipt from Ft. Benn Ldging Fund
3. Defense Travel System Voucher

b6
b7C~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

PETRAEUS-1173

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Title: (U) Army Documents

(S) Re: [REDACTED] ARMY, 04/09/2013

b1
b3
b7E

4. Travel Voucher for 3/24/10 - 3/26/10
5. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED] with receipts from Radisson and Marriott
6. Defense Travel System Voucher
7. Travel Voucher for 3/15/10 - 3/18/10
8. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED] with receipt from the Fairfax
9. Defense Travel System Voucher
10. Travel Voucher for 3/8/10 - 3/12/10
11. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED] with receipt from the Gateway Inn
12. Defense Travel System Voucher

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

The second e-mail, dated 3/26/2013, consisted of thirteen attachments containing the following:

1. Travel Voucher for 3/2/10 - 3/6/10
2. Defense Travel System Voucher
3. Travel Voucher for 3/1/10 - 3/1/10
4. Defense Travel System Voucher
5. Travel Voucher for 2/21/10 - 2/28/10
6. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED]
7. Defense Travel System Voucher
8. Travel Voucher for 2/19/10 - 2/20/10
9. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED] with receipt from Nassau Inn

b6
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Title: (U) Army Documents

(S) Re: [REDACTED] ARMY, 04/09/2013

b1
b3
b7E

10. Defense Travel System Voucher
11. Travel Voucher for 2/14/10 - 2/18/10
12. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED] with receipts from the Gateway Inn and the Fairfax
13. Defense Travel System Voucher

b6
b7C

The third e-mail, dated 3/28/2013, consisted of eighteen attachments containing the following:

1. Travel Voucher for 2/12/10 - 2/12/10
2. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED]
3. Defense Travel System Voucher
4. Travel Voucher for 2/8/10 - 2/12/10
5. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED] with receipts from the Waldorf Astoria and SPG.
6. Defense Travel System Voucher
7. Travel Voucher for 2/4/10 - 2/5/10
8. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED] with receipt from the Fairmont Dallas
9. Defense Travel System Voucher
10. Travel Voucher for 1/29/10 - 1/29/10
11. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED]
12. Defense Travel System Voucher

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S) Title: (U) Army Documents
Re: [REDACTED] ARMY, 04/09/2013

b1
b3
b7E

13. Travel Voucher for 1/24/10 - 1/28/10
14. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED]
15. Defense Travel System Voucher
16. Travel Voucher for 1/19/10 - 1/22/10
17. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED]
18. Defense Travel System Voucher

b6
b7C

The fourth e-mail, dated 4/2/2013, consisted of sixteen attachments containing the following:

1. Travel Voucher for 1/15/10 - 1/15/10
2. Defense Travel System Voucher
3. Travel Voucher for 1/10/10 - 1/12/10
4. Receipt from Starwood Hotels
5. Defense Travel System Voucher
6. Travel Voucher for 12/30/09 - 1/3/10
7. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED]
8. Defense Travel System Voucher
9. Travel Voucher for 12/10/09 - 12/18/09
10. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED] with receipt from the Gateway Inn
11. Defense Travel System Voucher
12. Travel Voucher for 12/8/09 - 12/9/09

b6
b7B

b6
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Title: (U) Army Documents

(S) Re: [REDACTED] 04/09/2013

b1
b3
b7E

13. Defense Travel System Voucher
14. Travel Voucher for 12/3/09 - 12/4/09
15. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED] with receipt from the Fairfax
16. Defense Travel System Voucher

b6
b7C

The fifth e-mail, dated 4/9/2013, consisted of twelve attachments containing the following:

1. Travel Voucher for 12/1/09 - 12/1/09
2. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED]
3. Defense Travel System Voucher
4. Travel Voucher for 11/22/09 - 11/27/09
5. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED] with receipt from the Fairfax
6. Defense Travel System Voucher
7. Travel Voucher for 11/21/09 - 11/21/09
8. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED]
9. Defense Travel System Voucher
10. Travel Voucher for 11/19/09 - 11/19/09
11. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED]
12. Defense Travel System Voucher

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Title: (U) Army Documents


(S) Re: 04/09/2013

b1
b3
b7E

A copy of each e-mail and associated attachments can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope.

◆◆

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION****Electronic Communication**

Title: (U) Army Documents

Date: 04/11/2013

From: CHARLOTTE

CE05

Contact: [REDACTED]

FBI INFO:

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-15-2016

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #:

[REDACTED]

ARMY

[REDACTED]

(S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Synopsis: (U) Items received from U.S. Army

~~Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)~~~~Derived From: FBI~~~~NSISC-20090615~~~~Declassify On: 20380307~~

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. (U) U.S. Army travel documents

Details:

On 4/11/2013, SA [REDACTED] received an e-mail from [REDACTED] U.S. Army, containing travel documentation related to [REDACTED] time with the U.S. Army.

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

The e-mail consisted of fifteen attachments containing the following:

1. Travel Voucher for 11/11/09 - 11/18/09
2. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED] with receipt from the Fairfax
3. Defense Travel System Voucher
4. Travel Voucher for 11/10/09 - 11/10/09

b6
b7C~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

PETRAEUS-1179

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Title: (U) Army Documents

Re: [REDACTED] RMY, 04/11/2013

b1
b3
b7E

5. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED]

6. Defense Travel System Voucher

7. Travel Voucher for 11/2/09 - 11/7/09

b6
b7C

8. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED] with receipts from the Fairfax,
Newport NS and the Waldorf Astoria

9. Defense Travel System Voucher

10. Travel Voucher for 10/13/09 - 11/2/09

11. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

12. Defense Travel System Voucher

13. Travel Voucher for 10/5/09 - 10/11/09

14. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED] with receipts from the Fairfax and
the Thayer Hotel


b6
b7C

15. Defense Travel System Voucher

A copy of the e-mail and associated attachments can be found in the
corresponding 1A-envelope.

◆◆

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U) Army Documents

Date: 04/12/2013

From: CHARLOTTE

CE05

Contact: [REDACTED]

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46R11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036

DATE: 06-15-2016

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #:

ARMY

(S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Synopsis: (U) Items received from U.S. Army

~~Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)~~~~Derived From: FBI~~~~NSISC-20090615~~~~Declassify On: 20380307~~

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. (U) U.S. Army travel documents

Details:

On 4/12/2013, SA [REDACTED] received an e-mail from [REDACTED] U.S. Army, containing travel documentation related to [REDACTED] time with the U.S. Army.

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

The e-mail consisted of thirteen attachments containing the following:

1. Travel Voucher for 9/29/09 - 10/2/09
2. Defense Travel System Voucher
3. Travel Voucher for 9/22/09 - 9/25/09
4. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED] with receipts from Fort Benning Lodging,

b6
b7C~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

PETRAEUS-1181

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S) Title: (U) Army Documents
Re: [REDACTED] ARMY, 04/12/2013

b1
b3
b7E

the Fairfax and Ramstein Inns-Gen Cannon Hotel

5. Defense Travel System Voucher
6. Travel Voucher for 9/16/09 - 9/22/09
7. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED]
8. Defense Travel System Voucher
9. Travel Voucher for 9/9/09 - 9/9/09
10. Defense Travel System Voucher
11. Travel Voucher for 9/8/09 - 9/8/09
12. DD Form 1351-2 for [REDACTED]
13. Defense Travel System Voucher

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

A copy of the e-mail and associated attachments can be found in the corresponding 1A-envelope.

◆◆

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-16-2016

To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: [C] Need POC info? --- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SentinelCaseId: [REDACTED] EMAIL (S)
SentToSentinel: 8/12/2013 6:13:48 PM

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified By: J22J32P81~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 25X1-human~~

===== Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [REDACTED] EMAIL (S)

b1
b3
b7E

Hey [REDACTED]

Sorry for the delay, I was on leave last week. Please see below for [REDACTED] email address. I do not have a phone number for her, but can get one if you need it as well.

Let me know if you need anything else.

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Thanks [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Monday, August 05, 2013 10:30 AM

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: [C] Need POC info?

b6
b7C

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Can you give me contact info for [REDACTED] so I can speak with her and get someone in her organization to review some of the files I have flagged as "potentially sensitive?"

I would appreciate a phone # or [REDACTED] email if you have it?

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-1200

~~SECRET~~



b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Derived From: IAW CENTCOM Classification Guide, CCR 380-14~~
~~Declassify On: 8/5/2023~~


=====
Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-1201

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Import Form

Form Type: EMAIL (U)

Date: 08/12/2013

Title: (X) RE: (X) Need POC info?

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 06-16-2016

Approved By:

[Redacted]

Drafted By:

[Redacted]

Case ID #:

EMAIL

[Redacted]

(S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

Synopsis: (X) RE: (X) Need POC info?

(U)

~~Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)~~

~~Derived From: FBI~~

~~NSISC-20090615~~

~~Declassify On: 25X1-human~~

◆◆

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-1202

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-16-2016

To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: [U//~~FOUO~~] Investigation (data transfer) --- ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~//~~FOUO~~
Attachments: cc.pdf

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

SentinelCaseId: [REDACTED] EMAIL (S)
SentToSentinel: 8/20/2013 12:26:06 PM

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~//~~FOUO~~

===== Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [REDACTED] EMAIL (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Thanks! I'm all booked. Please see attached scanned copy of my courier card. Please let me know if there are any issues.

Thanks-

From: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 7:50 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: [U//~~FOUO~~] Investigation (data transfer)

b6
b7C

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

[REDACTED]
There are no requirements for "two person integrity" in physical transport – see you Wednesday!

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-1209

~~SECRET~~

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

REMINDER: The information in this email and its attachments is intended for the addressee(s) only. Please contact the sender if you believe you have received this email in error. Please remember that embedded hyper-links inside emails are potentially unsafe and should always be manually typed into a web browser. If you believe that this email or any of the attachments exceeds this system's classification, please immediately report it to our incident response team at



b7E


=====
Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-1210

~~SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Import Form

Form Type: EMAIL

Date: 08/20/2013

Title: (U//~~FOUO~~) RE: [U//~~FOUO~~] Investigation (data transfer)

Approved By:

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46E11

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038

DATE: 08-16-2018

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

EMAIL

(S)

Sensitive Investigative Matter

Synopsis: (U//~~FOUO~~) RE: [U//~~FOUO~~] Investigation (data transfer)

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. (U) cc.pdf

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

◆◆

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-1212

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-20-2016

To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Checking in --- ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

SentinelCaseId: [REDACTED]-EMAIL (S)
SentToSentinel: 11/21/2013 3:49:57 PM

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

===== Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [REDACTED] EMAIL (S)

Hi [REDACTED]
I left you a voicemail on your cell. [REDACTED] is reviewing [REDACTED] today to make sure it is properly classified.

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

If okay with you, I can bring [REDACTED] with me to DC and deliver to you personally on Monday. It will be double-wrapped and marked Secret. If you prefer that we mail it to your Evidence Custodian, we can send via [REDACTED] tomorrow, Friday. Just let me know.

Also, we would like to meet at [REDACTED] hotel on Monday morning at 6:45am to car pool up to Aberdeen. You could park and we can drive the rental car if that works for you.

[REDACTED] will be at the Omni Shoreham Hotel, 2500 Calvert St NW, WDC.

Please give me a call at [REDACTED]

Thanks and have a great weekend.

b6
b7C

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, November 18, 2013 3:37 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Checking in --- ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

===== Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [REDACTED] EMAIL (S)

Hey [REDACTED]

PETRAEUS-1414

~~SECRET~~

Yes, we have [redacted] with the information you requested. We are currently reviewing the audio to ensure we classify [redacted] at the proper classification level. This review should be done this week. We will then discuss the best way to get it to you.

b6
b7C
b7E

Thanks-

[redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Monday, November 18, 2013 3:35 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: Checking in

b6
b7C

Hey guys,

I was asked to ask on the status of the information requested. Has the person with the ability to transfer the data been available? Please let me know.

By the way, prior to [redacted] will try and make my way down to Norfolk to see if the friendly Lieutenant Commander has the Non-disclosure agreements in her possession.

Thanks.

V/r,

[redacted]


b6
b7C

=====
Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

=====
Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Import Form

Form Type: EMAIL

Date: 11/21/2013

Title: (U) RE: Checking in

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46E11
REASON 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 06-20-2016

Approved By:

[Redacted]

Drafted By:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Case ID #:

[Redacted] EMAIL [Redacted]

Sensitive Investigative Matter (S)

Synopsis: (U) RE: Checking in

◆◆


~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 1 of 2 -

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



FBI INFO
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C68W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-27-2016

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/11/2012

b6
b7C

Colonel [redacted] International Security Assistance Forces-Afghanistan (ISAF) Public Affairs Office (PAO), was interviewed at [redacted] office at ISAF Headquarters Kabul Afghanistan. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[redacted] advised that [redacted] had been in [redacted] current position as [redacted] ISAF [redacted] commanders were, General Lewis Boone, July 2011 to July 2012 and Admiral Vick Beck, from July 2010 to 2011. [redacted] stated that [redacted] has no personal knowledge of Paula Broadwell's time in Kabul. However, several weeks ago [redacted] was instructed to gather all documents concerning [redacted] time in Kabul and offered to share them with the FBI.

b6
b7C

[redacted] surmised that Broadwell may have been given status in Afghanistan as embedded media staff or she would have been issued invitational travel orders. [redacted] described the process for obtaining embedded media status as follows:

1. Application would be made to the host military service at the Pentagon.
2. When approved, the person would apply with the local military command for embedding with a military unit.
3. Upon approval of the previous step, the person would complete request forms at the International Joint Command in Kabul.
4. On final approval, they would deploy with a specified military unit.

b6
b7C

[redacted] described the second process (invitational travel orders) as a Department of Defense construct subject to legal review by ISAF. This process is implemented when it is determined that it is in the best interest of the government to allow access.

These access approvals are coordinated by the International Joint Command in Kabul and the point of contact is LTC [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 12/11/2012 at Kabul, Afghanistan (In Person)

File [redacted] Date drafted 12/11/2012
by [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-2209

~~SECRET~~UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[redacted] (S)
Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of Colonel [redacted], On 12/11/2012, Page 2 of 2
[redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] suggested that the FBI may want to interview [redacted]
[redacted] who was General Petraeus' [redacted]
Another was [redacted] that worked with the General [redacted]
is currently retired and is working [redacted]
[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-2210

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
Civil Action# 16-cv-00514

Total Deleted Page(s) = 2
Page 4 ~ b5; b6; b7C;
Page 21 ~ b5;

```
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X   Deleted Page(s)       X
X   No Duplication Fee X
X   For this Page         X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
```

[REDACTED] SGT USA [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, April 04, 2011 2:28 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Visa (UNCLASSIFIED)

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Ms. Broadwell,

We will be sending your new badge to ISAF HQ tomorrow. In reviewing your documents, we discovered the visa we have on file for you expired on 28 March. Please send us a copy of your current visa ASAP. If you don't have access to a scanner, you can email a photo of it to us - We just need to be able to verify the dates.

V/r,

[REDACTED] USN

b6
b7C

ISAF JC Media Embed Office [REDACTED]

DSN: [REDACTED]

Duty mobile phone [REDACTED]

<http://www.isaf.nato.int/media-visit-information.html>

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED] SGT USA [REDACTED]

b6
b7c

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2011 2:29 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc:
Subject: Paula Broadwell (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

LCDR,
Does ISAF have a copy of Paula Broadwell's intent to publish?
I have been asked to check that what she is writing is an official book but we do not have anything on file here. Is there an OCPA letter associated with her work? I want to make sure folks she is interviewing know that the book is sanctioned or not.
V/R LT [REDACTED]

b6
b7c

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED] SGT USA [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2011 12:39 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: (UNCLASSIFIED)
Attachments: Paula Broadwell draft.xls

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

This is just the draft, but we're going to try to hammer in the appointments starting... now.

Thanks for your help!

V/R

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

This E-Mail may contain ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)~~ information which must be protected under the Privacy Act and AFI 33-332. Do not post this letter on a bulletin board or disseminate this message without the approval of the origination office. If you received this message in error, please notify the sender by reply email and delete all copies of the message.

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

SGT USA

b6
b7c

From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:

Thursday, March 31, 2011 3:14 PM

Subject:

RE: Paula Broadwell visiting (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

SSG

is operating within TF battlespace and MAJ would most likely be the primary PAO contact for Ms. Broadwell to get out to visit LTC

b6
b7c

I will let know of Ms. Broadwell's intention to interview LTC and LTC and we can facilitate the LTC interview when she arrives here.

This adds a little wrinkle into the planning as she'll be visiting two different TF's to do her interviews.

-----Original Message-----

From:
Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2011 2:46 PM
To:
Cc:
Subject: FW: Paula Broadwell visiting (UNCLASSIFIED)

b6
b7c

Sir,
Please see message below. IJC is tracking this. FYI.

b6
b7c

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2011 2:43 PM
To: KDHR KAEMSCFutureOPS
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Paula Broadwell visiting (UNCLASSIFIED)

b6
b7C

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

SSG,

I told LT [REDACTED] if he was going to be escorting Ms. Broadwell the entire time, we can treat this as an embark instead of an embed. I'll keep you in the loop as the itinerary develops. She has already been credentialed by us.

b6
b7C

V/r,

[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2011 2:39 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: Paula Broadwell visiting (UNCLASSIFIED)

b6
b7C

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

LTC [REDACTED]

Paula Broadwell, Gen. Petraeus's biographer, will be coming into Afghanistan in a few days. She has specifically requested to spend a couple of days embedded with you and the [REDACTED] and I am in the process of solidifying her itinerary.

b6
b7C

She has requested to be in Kandahar from the evening of the 5th until the 8th, spending two days with you and two with LTC [REDACTED]. Before I schedule her embed through IJC and LTC [REDACTED] I wanted to touch base with you and see if the embed is possible.

b6
b7C

Thank you for your time, and I look forward to hearing back from you. Please let me know if you have any questions.

V/R,

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

This E-Mail may contain ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)~~ information which must be protected under the Privacy Act and AFI 33-332. Do not post this letter on a bulletin board or disseminate this message without the approval of the origination office. If you received this message in error, please notify the sender by reply email and delete all copies of the message.

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED] SGT USA [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2011 3:47 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Paula Broadwell visiting (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

LTC [REDACTED]

I'm waiting to hear back from the Ambassadors' offices on availability on the 9th or 10th. If they opt for interviews later in Paula's trip, we would have time for Paula to stay with you until the 8th, and over with the 2-502 for the 9-10th. That would be ideal, but we won't know for sure until the reply.

If that doesn't work, then we'll need to get her moved over on the [REDACTED]

Thanks, again,

b6
b7C

This E-Mail may contain ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)~~ information which must be protected under the Privacy Act and AFI 33-332. Do not post this letter on a bulletin board or disseminate this message without the approval of the origination office. If you received this message in error, please notify the sender by reply email and delete all copies of the message.

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2011 3:39 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Paula Broadwell visiting (UNCLASSIFIED)

b6
b7C

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Lt [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

I know she needs to get out to 2-502 as well. If she arrives late on the 5th we can get her to 2-502 in the afternoon of 7 Apr. We can handle whatever dates you send.

Please advise.

V/r

b6
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2011 3:42 PM
To: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Subject: RE: Paula Broadwell visiting (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

LTC [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Her original request was for two days with you and two with 2-502. A follow up email said she would be in Kandahar from 5-8 April, and I assumed she planned to cover both the [REDACTED] and 2-502 in that span. Could you confirm that she will be with you for the entirety of the time? I will need to make a few changes to the itinerary if so, keeping her in Kandahar for a couple more days with the 2-502.

I very much appreciate the help!

V/R,

b6
b7C

This E-Mail may contain ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)~~ information which must be protected under the Privacy Act and AFI 33-332. Do not post this letter on a bulletin board or disseminate this message without the approval of the origination office. If you received this message in error, please notify the sender by reply email and delete all copies of the message.

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2011 3:27 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Subject: RE: Paula Broadwell visiting (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

LT [REDACTED]

Thanks for the heads up. No issues. We've been expecting Ms. Broadwell to visit and will facilitate transportation as required. It will be best if she can arrive at COP Terra Nova prior to 1600 on 5 Apr to facilitate her participation on a pending operation.

We can coordinate with 2-502 to move her to Maiwand on 8 Apr if rotary wing is unavailable. We'll pick up all other admin requirements while she is in my AO.

Let me know how we can further assist.

Vr

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2011 2:39 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Subject: Paula Broadwell visiting (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

LTC [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Paula Broadwell, Gen. Petraeus's biographer, will be coming into Afghanistan in a few days. She has specifically requested to spend a couple of days embedded with you and the [REDACTED] and I am in the process of solidifying her itinerary.


She has requested to be in Kandahar from the evening of the 5th until the 8th, spending two days with you and two with LTC [REDACTED]. Before I schedule her embed through IJC and LTC [REDACTED] I wanted to touch base with you and see if the embed is possible.

b6
b7C

Thank you for your time, and I look forward to hearing back from you. Please let me know if you have any questions.

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C


This E-Mail may contain ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)~~ information which must be protected under the Privacy Act and AFI 33-332. Do not post this letter on a bulletin board or disseminate this message without the approval of the origination office. If you received this message in error, please notify the sender by reply email and delete all copies of the message.

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

*The
Penguin
Press*

375 Hudson Street, New York, NY 10014-3657
Telephone (212) 366 2844 Fax (212) 366 2843 ann.godoff@us.penguinpress.com

Ann Godoff
PRESIDENT AND PUBLISHER

6 December 2010

To: ISAF Public Affairs
From: Penguin Press
Re: Paula Broadwell/Intent to publish

To whom it may concern,

This letter confirms the forthcoming Penguin Press publication of Paula Broadwell's book, *All In: The Education of General David Petraeus*, a biographical narrative of GEN Petraeus's first year in Afghanistan. Paula also intends to publish op-eds, blogs, and journal articles in support of the book. Penguin Press supports her efforts and her commitment to observing the "media ground rules and hold harmless agreement."

Best Regards

Ann
President and Publisher
The Penguin Press
Penguin Group International (USA)

b6
b7C




PENGUIN GROUP

PETRAEUS-2243



International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan



MEDIA REGISTRATION FORM¹

Last Name: Nom de famille: Broadwell		Badge Number: ²	
First Name: Prénom: Paula		Passport No: Numero passport:	
Profession: Profession: Research Associate/Author		Nationality: Nationalite: USA	
Agency Details (in full): Research Associate, Harvard Center for Public Leadership, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138; Author, Penguin Press, 375 Hudson Street, New York, NY 10014; and free-lance journalist, Washington Post/Foreign Policy Best Defense Blog; 1899 L Street NW, Suite 550 Washington, DC 20036 and The Atlantic magazine, 600 New Hampshire Ave, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037.			
Business Address/ Adresse d'Agence: See above			
Street & Number: Contact info for Broadwell Rue et No:		Postal Code: Code Postal	
City: Charlotte, NC		Country: USA	
Phone: 		Fax: NA	
Mobile: 		E-mail: 	
Mark your type of media activity: Mettez une croix dans vos activités medias:	Print Imprimé ☒	Radio Radio ☐	Television Télévision ☐
Date(s) of your visit: Date(s) de votre visite: January 7-20, Feb 3-14, Mar TBD			
Remarks: Remarques: I will be travelling solo in January, accompanying GEN (Ret) Jack Keane as his request (who is visiting upon invitation from COMISAF) in February, and solo in March. The dates are approximate. I also intend to travel to Afghanistan in May and possibly July.			

b6
b7C


b3
b6
b7C
b7E

¹ Please provide as much detail as possible.

² Office use only



International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan




The data obtained with this registration is only for NATO and Partnership for Peace (PFP) Public Information purposes.

Les données obtenues par ce questionnaire sont uniquement pour le but des Relations Publiques du PFP et de l'OTAN.

NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC



International Security Assistance Force
Afghanistan



ISAF Indemnification Agreement and Liability Waiver, Media Representative

1. I, Paula Broadwell (PRINT NAME), on behalf of myself, my heirs, my executors and administrators, in consideration of being permitted to become registered as an accommodated media member with International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan (ISAF) from on or about 8 JAN 2011 to on or about JUNE 30, 2011, 2011, at KABUL, AFG and the surrounding area.
2. Acknowledge and agree that covering combat and other military operations is inherently hazardous and may result in death, personal injury, whether physical or otherwise, or damage to property, and wishing in any event to participate in covering combat and other military operations, voluntarily consent to participate and assume any risks that may be associated with said participation.
3. Acknowledge, agree and declare that I have been advised of the nature of covering combat and other military operations, that I have been advised of the procedures and safety measures in effect and that I agree to abide by them.
4. Acknowledge, agree and declare that I have been advised that ISAF, in pursuing the successful accomplishment of its mission, cannot guarantee my personal safety or the safety of my equipment.
5. Waive all claims of any nature or kind, including, but not limited to claims for personal injury or damage to property, against NATO, Allied Command Operations, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, ISAF, the governments and military departments of Troop Contributing Nations supporting the ISAF mission, and the military personnel and civilian employees of said organizations, to include civilian contractors employed in support of the ISAF mission, in any manner arising out of, based upon, occasioned by, attributable to or connected with my participation in covering combat and other military operations while being an accommodated media:
 - a. Agree that I will not commence or maintain against any person, any action or proceeding which will give rise to a claim against NATO, Allied Command Operations, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, ISAF, governments and military departments of Troop Contributing Nations supporting the ISAF mission, and the military personnel and civilian employees of said organizations, to include civilian contractors employed in support of the ISAF mission for contribution or indemnity;
 - b. Acknowledge, agree and declare that my signing this agreement is a condition to being registered to cover ISAF's operations and receiving assistance for that coverage; and

NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

- c. Acknowledge having read this liability waiver in its entirety and, understanding that this waiver is intended to be broad and all inclusive so as to preclude any claims, I voluntarily indicate my acceptance of this document by my signature.

DATED at 10:30 AM, this 8th day of DECEMBER, 2010

Media Representative's Organization: <u>Penguin Press</u>	ISAF Member – signature:
(Print Name) <u>Paula Broadwell</u>	(Print Name)
(Address) 	(Rank, Unit/Organisation)
(Tel)	(Tel)
(M)	(Mobile)
(E)	(Email)

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

8 DEC 2010
Date

(Print Name) Paula Broadwell

NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC



International Security Assistance Force
Afghanistan



ISAF Indemnification Agreement and Liability Waiver, Media Organization

1. The Penguin Press (MEDIA ORGANIZATION NAME), in consideration of being permitted to have organizational media representatives become registered as accommodated media with International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan (ISAF) from on or about January to on or about March, 20011, at Kabul and the surrounding area.
2. Acknowledge and agree that covering combat and other military operations is inherently hazardous and may result in death, personal injury, whether physical or otherwise, to organizational personnel, or damage to organizational property, and wishing in any event to have organizational personnel participate in covering combat and other military operations, consent to assume any risks that may be associated with said participation.
3. Acknowledge, agree and declare that The Penguin Press (MEDIA ORGANIZATION NAME) has been advised of the nature of covering combat and other military operations, and has been advised of the procedures and safety measures in effect and that organizational personnel agree to abide by them.
4. Acknowledge, agree and declare that The Penguin Press (MEDIA ORGANIZATION NAME) has been advised that ISAF, in pursuing the successful accomplishment of its mission, cannot guarantee the personal safety of our media personnel or the safety of our organization's equipment.
5. Waive all claims of any nature or kind, including, but not limited to claims for personal injury to organizational personnel or damage to property, against NATO, Allied Command Operations, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, ISAF, governments and military departments of Troop Contributing Nations supporting the ISAF mission, and the military personnel and civilian employees of said organizations, to include civilian contractors employed in support of the ISAF mission, in any manner arising out of, based upon, occasioned by, attributable to or connected with my participation in covering combat and other military operations while being an accommodated media:
 - a. Agree that The Penguin Press (MEDIA ORGANIZATION NAME) will not commence or maintain against any person, any action or proceeding which will give rise to a claim against NATO, Allied Command Operations, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, ISAF, governments and military departments of Troop Contributing Nations supporting the ISAF mission, and the military personnel and civilian employees of said organizations, to include civilian contractors employed in support of the ISAF mission for contribution or indemnity;

Liability Waiver, Page 1 of 2 _____ (media organization representative initials)

NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

- b. Acknowledge, agree and declare that The Penguin Press
(MEDIA ORGANIZATION NAME) signing this agreement is a condition to being
registered to cover ISAF's operations and receiving assistance for that coverage;
and
- c. Acknowledge having read this liability waiver in its entirety and, understanding that
this waiver is intended to be broad and all inclusive so as to preclude any claims,
The Penguin Press (MEDIA ORGANIZATION NAME)
voluntarily indicates acceptance of this document by representative signature.

DATED at NY, NY, this 6 day of Dec, 2010.

(Print Name)	<u>Ann Godoff</u>
(Address)	<u>375 Hudson St</u> <u>NY, NY 10014</u>
(Tel)	
(Mob)	
(Email)	<u>ann.godoff@us.penguinpress.com</u>


b6
b7C

12/6/10
ate

~~SECRET~~

- 1 of 2 -

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)



FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66446B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-29-2016

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/22/2012

Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) [redacted] date of birth (DOB)

[redacted] was interviewed at the International Joint Command Headquarters Public Affairs Office (PAO). After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[redacted] advised that [redacted] is the [redacted] for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) [redacted]. His office administers the Theater Media Embed Program. The purpose of this command is to vet the person applying for media credentials and to issue them after the process has been completed. The vetting process consists of several steps. First the applicant would be provided a media embed packet. They would then have to provide identification or a letter identifying them as a legitimate journalist. The PAO would gather and collect all the waivers from the applicant, verify their authenticity and assist with VISA's, badging and other administrative matters upon the applicants approval. The PAO would then assist in scheduling interviews and in theater travel. [redacted] stated that normally the PAO would maintain general visibility on where the journalist was located while in country, but lodging and other accommodations would be provided by the individual command where they were embedded.

b6
b7C

[redacted] stated that [redacted] has no personal knowledge of the visit by Paula Broadwell. However [redacted] did provide copies all of the documents that were available in their systems concerning her visit. [redacted] provided the following:

b6
b7C

1. 10 pages of printed emails concerning coordination of her trip.
2. A draft itinerary of the dates 3 April to 9 April.
3. A copy of the picture page of Broadwell's passport and two copies of her Afghan VISA.
4. 2 pages of the ISAF Media registration form.
5. 1 page of a Media Accommodating and Ground Rules Agreement.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~ (U)

Investigation on 12/18/2012 at Kabul, Afghanistan (In Person)

File # [redacted] :S: [redacted] Date drafted 12/22/2012

by [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

PETRAEUS-2255

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[S]

Interview of Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 12/18/2012 , Page 2 of 2

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

6. 2 pages of an ISAF Indemnification Agreement and Liability Waiver, Media Representative (signed by Broadwell).

7. 2 pages of an ISAF Indemnification Agreement and Liability Waiver, Media Organization (signed by Ann Godoff, President and Publisher of Penguin Press)

8. 1 copy of a Blue Cross/Blue Shield card for Paula Broadwell

9. 2 copies of a letter from Penguin Press on behalf of Paula Broadwell

10.1 copy of a Harvard University identification card for Broadwell

11.1 photograph of Paula Broadwell.

[REDACTED] advised that it appeared that all of the proper procedures were followed to issue Broadwell media credentials. [REDACTED] stated that current procedure would have required one more step, a letter from the military PAO assigned to New York, but [REDACTED] was unsure if that was the procedure during this time period.

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had been in [REDACTED] position since May 2012. Colonel's [REDACTED] were previous directors


b6
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

PETRAEUS-2256

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~
~~LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE~~
~~FOR LEAD PURPOSES~~

Common Black Book Acronyms

APRP-Afghanistan Peace Reconstruction Program
CHOD-Chief of Defense (Foreign Government)
CJSOTF-Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force
CTPT-Counter Terrorism Pursuit Team
CY-Copy
CSTC-A-Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
ECC-Electoral Complaints Commission
E/R-En route
FS-Foreign Secretary



JSOC-Joint Special Operations Command
LSF-Local Security Forces
MSN-Mission
ODA-Other Department Agency (Frequently SOF)
OGA-Other Government Agency
IEC-Independent Election Committee
IOC-Initial Operating Capability
O/C-Office Call
PICC-Presidential Information Coordination Council
PoA-President of Afghanistan
PRC-Provincial Response Committee/Peace Reintegration Conference
PSC-Private Security Company
PTDS-Persistent Threat Detection System (Blimp)
SRAP-Special Representative to AFPAK
SOC-Special Operations Command
SOF-Special Operations Forces
SOTF-Special Operations Task Force
SRSG-Special Representative of Secretary General
TFH-Task Force Helmand
VSO-Village Stability Operations
VSP-Village Stability Platform
VSSA-Village Stability Staging Areas
VSTT-Village Stability Transition Team

b6
b7c

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~
~~LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE~~
~~FOR LEAD PURPOSES~~

~~SECRET~~

To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Subpoena --- UNCLASSIFIED
SentinelCaseId: [REDACTED] MAIL (S)
SentToSentinel: 2/20/2014 10:57:16 PM
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C66W46B11
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 10-03-2016

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [REDACTED] EMAIL (S)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 5:30 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Subpoena --- UNCLASSIFIED
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case [REDACTED] EMAIL (S)

[REDACTED] and I reviewed your memo to DODIG and have no objection to the pursuit of your subpoena. Regarding the files you want to discuss, to my knowledge CART burned the DVD based on the information (Bates Numbers) you requested. If you provide us those Bates Numbers, we can go back and identify the actual file name. Just let us know.
Thanks for reaching out.
See you soon.

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 4:11 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Subpoena

Hey guys,
I drafted a memorandum to provide to DoDIG in hopes of obtaining a subpoena for [REDACTED]. It has not been submitted yet, but if you don't mind, could someone review it to ensure it is not compromising your investigation. Also, I may have to discuss a few files that were provided. The file I listened to was no [REDACTED] and may be [REDACTED] however, all I have is an identifier number and not the actual file name. Is there a way to get in contact with the person who burned the DVD, assuming it may have been an attachment to an email. Anyhow, if need be I can bring the CD to Charlotte with me and go over it with whoever I need to. Please advise.
Thanks.
V/r

(S)
b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

PETRAEUS-2767

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Charlotte, North Carolina
October 20, 2015

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Executive Summary:

[REDACTED] (S)
[REDACTED] Investigation was initiated on DAVID
HOWELL PETRAEUS [REDACTED] DOB [REDACTED] on 12/17/2012. As
these two cases are inseparable regarding [REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[REDACTED] Title 18, USC, Section 1924, Unauthorized Removal and Retention of Classified
Documents or Material [REDACTED] The following
summary is provided to close both investigations. The Prosecution Team for both matters
consisted of FBI Charlotte ASAC [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Western District of North Carolina
A/USA [REDACTED] and DOJ-CES Attorneys [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S)
[REDACTED] The discovery
occurred during a consent search related to an FBI criminal investigation into cyber stalking.
FBI Charlotte's evidence review of the paper documents, digital data, and audio files collected
from BROADWELL revealed PETRAEUS played an integral role in granting BROADWELL
access to classified information for the purpose of writing his biography.

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

More specifically, on 11/12/2012, Agents from the FBI Charlotte and Tampa Divisions
conducted a consensual search of BROADWELL's residence [REDACTED]

During the search, several items were seized to include digital media and several boxes of
documents. The purpose of the 11/12/2012 [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[REDACTED] (S)
[REDACTED] A review of the

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

seized materials identified information marked classified on both digital images maintained on various pieces of electronic media as well as on physical documents.

Of the classified documents reviewed by the Prosecution Team, the majority relate to United States military operations conducted in Afghanistan during the timeframe of January 2011 through June 2011. This timeframe is consistent with travel of BROADWELL to Afghanistan to conduct research for her biography, *All In: The Education of General David Petraeus*. Investigation reflects BROADWELL traveled into and out of Afghanistan several times from in or about September 2010 through in or about July 2011, which coincides with the time that PETRAEUS was serving as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commanding General.

Timeline of Significant Events:

6/14/2012 FBI Tampa initiated a computer intrusion investigation (288A-TP-74641) after a complaint [redacted] Tampa, Florida [redacted] alleged that she and her spouse had received threatening emails beginning in June 2012 suggesting [redacted] [redacted] PETRAEUS.

b6
b7C

6/21/2012 PETRAEUS' CIA security detail was informed of the 288A investigation and possible security breach as some of the emails listed details of PETRAEUS' schedule.

6/25/2012 FBI investigation of IP addresses associated with the [redacted] email messages identified BROADWELL as the probable sender of the emails.

b6
b7C

Mid-July '12 FBI received an email from [redacted] advising she did not want to [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] PETRAEUS. FBI Tampa advised [redacted] investigation would continue.

b6
b7C

8/10/2012 [redacted] was interviewed by FBI Tampa and she stated PETRAEUS had [redacted] "calling off the G-men".

b6
b7C

09/24/2012 FBI Tampa interviewed BROADWELL who admitted to sending the email messages [redacted] and to having had an extramarital affair with PETRAEUS. She voluntarily provided two laptops to the FBI. Subsequent review of the computers located what appeared to be classified documents.

b6
b7C

09/25/2012 BROADWELL provided consent to FBI Tampa to search her iPhone.

- 10/23/2012 FBI Deputy Director Sean Joyce contacted PETRAEUS to schedule an FBI interview regarding a cyber stalking investigation.
- 10/26/2012 PETRAEUS was interviewed by FBI Tampa. He denied ever providing Broadwell with classified documents.
- 11/2/2012 FBI Tampa re-interviewed BROADWELL who was advised that classified documents were located on her computers. She identified the documents as being from her time in Afghanistan working on her book about PETRAEUS. Broadwell denied having any arrangement with PETRAEUS to provide her access to classified information.
- 11/7/2012 FBI Deputy Director Joyce contacted PETRAEUS to advise Joyce had briefed the Director of National Intelligence about PETRAEUS' involvement in an ongoing criminal investigation involving the discovery of classified information on the computer of a woman with whom PETRAEUS was having an extramarital affair.
- 11/12/2012 FBI Tampa and Charlotte conducted a consent search of BROADWELL's residence. During this search, additional classified documents were located. A consent search of BROADWELL's assistant's electronic media was also conducted resulting in the seizure of additional classified material.

[REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

12/17/2012 [REDACTED] investigation [REDACTED] initiated on PETRAEUS based on potential violations of Title 18, USC, Section 1924 [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

1/16/2013 DOJ declined prosecution of FBI Tampa's computer intrusion investigation.

4/05/2013 Criminal search warrant executed at PETRAEUS' residence. Consent search executed for a storage unit rented by PETRAEUS. Criminal search warrants executed on BROADWELL's iPhone [REDACTED]

b3
b7E

4/27/2014 DOJ and FBI conducted a reverse proffer with PETRAEUS and his defense attorneys, and separately with BROADWELL and her defense attorneys.



(S) b1
b3
b7E

Sept 2014 All significant investigative activity completed by FBI Charlotte.

4/30/2015 Michael Steinbach, Assistant Director of the FBI Counterterrorism Division and an Original Classification Authority, certified [REDACTED] documents obtained from BROADWELL [REDACTED]

(S)
(S)

b1
b3
b7E

[REDACTED] continue to be classified SECRET.


5/23/2015 PETRAEUS plead guilty to one count of Title 18, USC, Section 1924, Unauthorized Removal and Retention of Classified Material. PETRAEUS appeared before United States Magistrate Judge David Keesler in United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. PETRAEUS received a sentence of a \$100,000 fine and two years probation.

Investigative Steps:

- Two (2) consent and twelve (12) court-authorized physical searches conducted of BROADWELL's residence and electronic media [REDACTED] media; PETRAEUS' residence, storage unit, and electronic media; and PETRAEUS' personal correspondence stored at National Defense University.
- [REDACTED]
- Coordination with [REDACTED] DoD, Army CID, AFOSI, DIA, and NSA to thoroughly review all collected physical and digital evidence for classified (SECRET, TOP SECRET, and SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM) information. Specific items for purposes of prosecution were reviewed by these agencies for formal classification review.
- Over fifty (50) interviews conducted with subjects' work and personal acquaintances.

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

b7E



b1
(S) b3
b7E

- Multiple attempts to have [REDACTED] DoD, Army CID, and DoD-CAF produce an NDS executed by PETRAEUS produced negative results. However, each of these agencies concluded PETRAEUS would have signed multiple NDS' over the course of his career at both Army and [REDACTED]
- Full copies of all digital evidence, both unclassified and classified, were made to provide to defense counsels representing both BROADWELL and PETRAEUS.

b7E

Significant Findings:



b1
(S) b3
b7E

- Review of [redacted] digital evidence collected against PETRAEUS found [redacted] classified items [redacted] (S) [redacted] contained unclassified items. FBI Charlotte notes many [redacted] pieces of evidence were collected from [redacted] NDU, not directly from PETRAEUS.

b1
b3
b7E



b1
b3
b7E

- A search of PETRAEUS' residence on 4/5/2013 found eight (8) Black Books utilized by PETRAEUS to record his daily activities and meetings as ISAF Commander from June 2010 to July 2011. Information contained in the Black Books is classified up to TOP SECRET and contained DoD SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM information. Investigation found PETRAEUS failed to properly store and secure these Black Books.
- Evidence review by FBI Charlotte determined PETRAEUS provided BROADWELL access to these eight (8) Black Books in August 2011. While in possession of the Black Books at her brother's residence in Washington, D.C, BROADWELL used her iPhone to photograph 119 images of written pages from the Black Books. Investigation further determined BROADWELL discussed access to, as well as the classified nature of information contained in, the Black Books with he [redacted] [redacted] Review of these 119 images by FBI Charlotte found multiple images to be classified TOP SECRET and SECRET. FBI Charlotte believes BROADWELL traveled internationally in Fall 2011 with her iPhone while these photographs were stored on her iPhone.

b6
b7C

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

United States Army has requested access to all FBI evidence regarding both PETRAEUS and BROADWELL. Coordination is on-going to assist Army with any administrative action it intends to take [REDACTED] As PETRAEUS' case resulted in a federal

conviction [REDACTED] (S)
matters will be closed following Army's review of FBI evidence.

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C55W46211
REASON 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2038
DATE: 11-02-2016

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

Serial # of Originating Document

Date Received

From

By

To Be Returned ☐ Yes

☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☒ No

Title:

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

b6
b7C

[Redacted] of

[Redacted]

A signed "Classified
Information Non-Disclosure Statement;
business card; West Point
orders and email regarding Paula Broadwell

~~SECRET~~

RETAEUS-3149

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
Civil Action# 16-cv-00514

Total Deleted Page(s) = 322

Page 108 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 109 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 110 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 111 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 112 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 113 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 114 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 115 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 116 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 117 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 118 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 119 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 120 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 121 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 122 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 123 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 124 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 125 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 126 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 129 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 130 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 131 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 132 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 133 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 155 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 156 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 157 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 158 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 159 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 171 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 172 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 173 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 174 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 175 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 176 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 177 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 178 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 179 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 180 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 181 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 182 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 183 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 184 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 185 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 186 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 187 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 188 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 189 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;

Page 190 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 191 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 192 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 193 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 194 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 195 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 196 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 199 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 200 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 203 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 204 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 205 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 206 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 207 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 208 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 209 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 210 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 211 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 212 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 213 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 214 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 215 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 216 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 217 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 218 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 219 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 220 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 221 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 222 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 223 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 224 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 225 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 226 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 227 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 228 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 229 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 230 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 231 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 232 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 233 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 234 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 235 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 236 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 237 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 238 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 239 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 240 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 241 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 242 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 243 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 244 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 245 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 246 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 247 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;

Page 248 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 249 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 250 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 251 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 252 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 253 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 254 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 255 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 256 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 257 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 258 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 259 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 260 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 261 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 262 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 263 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 264 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 265 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 266 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 267 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 268 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 269 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 270 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 271 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 272 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 273 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 274 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 275 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 276 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 277 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 278 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 279 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 280 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 281 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 282 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 283 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 284 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 285 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 286 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 287 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 288 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 289 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 290 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 291 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 292 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 293 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 294 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 295 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 296 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 297 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 298 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 299 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 300 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 301 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;

Page 302 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 316 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 317 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 318 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 319 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 320 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 321 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 322 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 323 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 324 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 327 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 328 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 329 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 330 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 331 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 332 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 333 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 334 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 335 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 336 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 341 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 342 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 351 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 352 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 353 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 354 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 355 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 356 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 357 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 358 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 359 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 360 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 361 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 362 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 363 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 364 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 365 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 366 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 367 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 368 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 369 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 370 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 371 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 372 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 373 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 374 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 375 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 376 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 377 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 378 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 379 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 380 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 381 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 382 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;

Page 383 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 384 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 385 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 386 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 387 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 388 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 389 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 402 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 403 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 404 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 405 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 406 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 407 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 408 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 409 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 410 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 411 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 412 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 413 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 414 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 415 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 416 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 417 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 418 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 419 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 420 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 421 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 422 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 423 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 424 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 425 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 426 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 427 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 428 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 429 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 430 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 431 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 437 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 438 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 439 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 440 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 441 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 442 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 443 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 444 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 445 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 452 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 453 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 454 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 455 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 456 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 457 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 458 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 459 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;

Page 460 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 461 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 462 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 463 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 464 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 465 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 466 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 467 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 468 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 469 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 470 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 471 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 472 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 473 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 474 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 475 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 476 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 477 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 478 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 479 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 480 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 481 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 482 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 483 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 484 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 485 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 486 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 487 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 488 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 489 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 490 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 491 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 492 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 494 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 495 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 498 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 499 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 500 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 501 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 502 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 503 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 504 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 505 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 506 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 507 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 508 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 509 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 510 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 511 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 512 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 513 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 514 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 515 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 516 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;

Page 517 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 518 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 519 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 520 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

(S)

Evidence Number	Item Number	Warrant
		Petraeus Home
		Petraeus Home
		Petraeus Home
		Petraeus Home
		Petraeus Home
		Petraeus Home
		Petraeus Home
		Petraeus Home
		Petraeus Home
		Petraeus Home
		Petraeus Home
		Petraeus Home
		Petraeus Home
		Petraeus Home
		NDU
		NDU
		NDU
		NDU
		NDU
		NDU

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E