

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA)
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOIA Request No.: 155929-000
Civil Action No.: 22-cv-2264

Total Withheld Page(s) = 111

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI (22-cv-2264) -532	b3-5; b6/b7C-1, 2, 3; b7D-5; b7E-4
FBI (22-cv-2264) -569	b1-1; b3-5; b6/b7C-1; b7E-1, 4
FBI (22-cv-2264) -570	b3-5; b6/b7C-4; b7E-1, 4
FBI (22-cv-2264) -572 thru FBI (22-cv-2264) -585	Referral/Consult
FBI (22-cv-2264) -592	b3-5; b6/b7C-1, 3; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -593	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-2, 3; b7D-5; b7E-2, 4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -594	b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -595	b1-1 and per DOS; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -596	b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -597	b1-1 and per DOS; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3; b7D-5; b7E-2, 4, 5, 8, 22, 35 and per DOS
FBI (22-cv-2264) -598	b3-5; b5-1; b7E-4, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -599 thru FBI (22-cv-2264) -600	b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3; b7D-5; b7E-4, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -601	b1-1; b3-5, b5-1, b6-4, b7C-4, b7D-5, b7E-2, -4, -5, -8, -22, -35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -602	b1-1, b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3, 4; b7E-2, 4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -603	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -604	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3, 4; b7D-5; b7E-2, 4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -605 thru FBI (22-cv-2264) -606	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3, 4; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -607	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3, 4; b7E-2, 4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -608	b3-5; b5-1; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -609	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-4; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -610	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-2, 3, 4; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -611 thru FBI (22-cv-2264) -613	b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -614	b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3, 4; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -615	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-4; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35

FBI (22-cv-2264) -616	b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
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FBI (22-cv-2264) -623	b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3; b7E-4, 5, 7, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -624	b3-5; b5-1; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -625 thru FBI (22-cv-2264) -626	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -627	b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3; b7E-4, 5, 7, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -628	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
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FBI (22-cv-2264) -630	b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -631	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3, 4; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -632 thru FBI (22-cv-2264) -633	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
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FBI (22-cv-2264) -635	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-2, 3; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -636	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-2, 3; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 7, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -637 thru FBI (22-cv-2264) -640	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-2, 3; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -641	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -642	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3, 4; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -643	b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3, 4; b7D-5; b7E-2, 4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -644	b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -645 thru FBI (22-cv-2264) -646	b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3, 4; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -647	b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -648	b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3, 4; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -649 thru FBI (22-cv-2264) -650	b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3, 4; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -651	b3-5; b5-1; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -652	b3-5; b5-1; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -653 thru FBI (22-cv-2264) -658	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3, 4; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35

FBI (22-cv-2264) -659	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3, 4; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -660	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-4; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -661	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -662	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3, 4; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -663 thru FBI (22-cv-2264) -664	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-3; b7D-5; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -665	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b7E-4, 5, 7, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -666 thru FBI (22-cv-2264) -667	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-4; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -668	b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-4; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
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FBI (22-cv-2264) -670 thru FBI (22-cv-2264) -672	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -673	b3-5; b5-1; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -674	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-4; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -675	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -676	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-4; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
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FBI (22-cv-2264) -679	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-4; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
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FBI (22-cv-2264) -682	b3-5; b5-1; b7E-4, 5, 8, 22, 35
FBI (22-cv-2264) -683 thru FBI (22-cv-2264) -685	b1-1; b3-5; b5-1; b6/b7C-4; b7E-4; 5, 8, 22, 35


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X Deleted Page(s) X
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X For this Page X

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FD-1087 (Rev. 5-8-10)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Collected Item Log

Event Title: ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Glenn Simpson 8GB
Verbatim thumb drive

Date: 12/12/2016

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] (U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

b6 -1
b7C -1

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

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~~Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: FBI
NSISC-20090518
Declassify On: 20411231~~

Full Investigation Initiated: 07/31/2016

Collected From: (U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Associate Deputy Attorney General
and Director of the Department of Justice's
Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task
Force (OCDEF) Bruce Ohr
Department of Justice
Department of Justice
Washington, District Of Columbia 20535
United States

Receipt Given?: No

Holding Office: WASHINGTON FIELD

Details:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Title: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ Glenn Simpson 8GB Verbatim thumb drive
Re: [REDACTED], 12/12/2016


At 3:00 P.M. on December 12, 2016, SSA [REDACTED] received an 8 GB Verbatim USB micro digital storage device (thumb drive) from Bruce OHR, currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF). The thumb drive was provided to OHR by Glenn Simpson on December 10, 2016.

b6 -1
b7C -1

Item Type
1B Digital

Description
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ 8GB Verbatim USB micro digital storage device (thumb drive)
Collected On: 12/12/2016 03:00 PM EST
Seizing Individual: [REDACTED]
Collected By: [REDACTED]
Location Area: Washington, D.C.
Specific Location: Department of Justice Headquarters Building
Device Type: USB Micro Storage Device (thumb drive)
Make: Verbatim
Data Capacity: 8 GB
Designation: Original
Number of Devices Collected: 1

b6 -1
b7C -1



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/19/2016

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

Do not disseminate outside the FBI without the permission of the originator or program manager.

Bruce OHR, [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ OHR had breakfast at Peet's Coffee, 11th and E St. NW, Washington, D.C. with Glenn Simpson at 10:00 A.M. on December 10, 2016. During breakfast Simpson provided OHR with an 8GB Verbatim USB micro digital media drive (thumb drive). OHR does not know what is on the thumb drive but believes it is in regards to the work [redacted] was hired to do for Simpson. The thumb drive was entered into evidence at WFO as original evidence [redacted] and a working copy CD-ROM was produced for investigative use. An evidence FD-302 was generated and serialized to this file.

b7E -4

(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ OHR took notes after the meeting with Simpson to preserve his memory and referred to them during the interview. OHR's notes are an attachment to this document.

(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Simpson identified Michael Cohen, a lawyer in Brooklyn, NY as having many Russian clients in the Brighton Beach, NY area. Cohen is the go-between Russia and the Trump Campaign and replaced Paul Manafort and Carter Page. Cohen's wife's last name is Shusterman [redacted] [redacted] Cohen may have attended a meeting in Prague, possibly in September, regarding the Trump Campaign and the Russians.

b6 -3
b7C -3

~~Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: FBI
NSISC-20060615
Declassify On: 20411231~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Investigation on 12/12/2016 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person):

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

Date dictated 12/14/2016

by [redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1

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~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Interview of Bruce Ohr, On 12/12/2016, Page 2 of 3

(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ According to Simpson, much of his collection about the Trump campaign ties to Russia comes from a former [redacted] Simpson does not know his name.

b6 -4
b7C -4

(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ A former Trump campaign official, possibly Rick Wilson, was talking about some of the Trump ties to Russia and the Trump Campaign tried to sue him for violating his non-disclosure agreement.

(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ A Russian senator and mobster named Torshin may be involved in running the Central Bank of Russia. Torshin's name comes up in in Law Enforcement Organized Crime circles as he is well known in a famous Spanish case that shows direct linkages between Russian Organized Crime, Torshin and the Russian Government. Torshin may have funneled Russian money to the National Rifle Association (NRA) to use in support of Trump. An NRA lawyer, [redacted] found out about the money pipeline and was very upset, but the election was over by the time she learned of it. Simpson stated there are pictures of Torshin with Trump. Simpson provided OHR with an article on the NRA and Torsion. The article is an attachment to this document.

b6 -3
b7C -3

(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Some of Simpson's staff believe the NRA spent an abnormally large amount of money during the election, possibly indicating Russian involvement, but others in his company disagree.

(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ The New York Times story from October 3, 2016, that downplayed the connection between Alfa Bank servers and the Trump campaign was incorrect. There was communication and it wasn't spam. [redacted]

b1 -1
b3 -5
b6 -3,-4
b7A -1
b7C -3,-4
b7E -3,-22

(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Simpson received a bizarre tip on December 9 that the [redacted] Simpson is not sure whether to believe this.

(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Simpson still thinks Sergei Millian is a key figure connecting Trump to Russia. Looking at Millian led Simpson's company to Cohen. Simpson would be surprised if Millian was still in the U.S. Simpson believes Millian is an SVR officer, however he is deducing this from Millian's alias, not because he was told Millian was SVR. Millian may have overseen many financial transfers from Russia to assist the Trump campaign.

(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Simpson asked [redacted] to speak to the Mother Jones reporter as it was Simpson's Hail Mary attempt.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]


Continuation of FD-302 of ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ Interview of Bruce Ohr . On 12/12/2016 . Page 3 of 3

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ OHR asked Simpson if he was concerned about his personal safety. Simpson responded that he learned from his Russian investigative reporting what they were capable of but there was no way for him to know if they were coming after him. Simpson mentioned that someone called and asked him to find out where all of the Alfa Bank stories were coming from. Simpson did not state this was a threat from the Russians, but that was the impression made upon OHR based upon the timing of the comment and using that story as a response to OHR's question.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FD-302 (Rev 5-8-10)

- 1 of 1 -



~~CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN~~
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/27/2016

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

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Bruce OHR, [redacted], [redacted], currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ On December 20, 2016, at 11:00 A.M. OHR provided writer with an 8GB Sandisk Cruzer Glide USB micro digital data storage drive (thumb drive). Glen Simpson at Fusion GPS hired OHR's wife, Nellie Ohr, to conduct research for his firm. OHR voluntarily provided his wife's research to the FBI. OHR provided the interviewing Agent with the thumb drive and indicated it contained the totality of the work Nellie Ohr conducted for Simpson, but the Fusion GPS header was stripped. Nellie Ohr is a Russian linguist/analyst and a former Russian History professor. The thumb drive was entered into evidence.

~~Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: FBI
NSISC-20090615
Declassify On: 20411231~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN~~

Investigation on 12/20/2016 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)


File # [redacted] Date dictated 12/20/2016

by [redacted]

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b3 -5
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -1

FD-1087 (Rev. 5-8-10)



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Collected Item Log

(U) **Event Title:** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Nellie Ohr research for Fusion GPS **Date:** 12/20/2016

Approved By: [redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] (U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIVERABLE MATERIAL

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~~Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: FBI
NSISC-20050612
Declassify On: 2041231~~

Full Investigation Initiated: 07/31/2016

(U) **Collected From:** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Bruce Ohr DOJ

Receipt Given?: No

Holding Office: WASHINGTON FIELD

Details:

On December 20, 2016, at 11:00 A.M. Bruce OHR, [redacted] [redacted] currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Title: ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Nellie Ohr research for Fusion GPS
Re: [REDACTED], 12/20/2016

Enforcement Task Force (OCDEF) provided writer with an 8GB SanDisk
Cruzer Glide USB micro digital data storage drive (thumb drive).

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Glen Simpson at Fusion GPS hired OHR's wife, Nellie Ohr, to
conduct research for his firm. OHR voluntarily provided his wife's
research to the FBI. OHR provided the interviewing Agent with the
thumb drive and indicated it contained the totality of the work Nellie
Ohr conducted for Simpson, but the Fusion GPS header was stripped.
Nellie Ohr is a Russian linguist/analyst and a former Russian History
professor.


Item Type	Description
1B Digital	(S//OC/NF) 8GB SanDisk Cruzer Glide USB micro digital data storage drive (thumb drive) Collected On: 12/20/2016 11:00 AM EST Seizing Individual: [REDACTED] Collected By: [REDACTED] Location Area: [REDACTED] Specific Location: [REDACTED] Device Type: USB Micro Storage Device (thumb drive) Make: SanDisk Data Capacity: 8 GB Designation: Original Number of Devices Collected: 1

b6 -1
b7C -1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FD-302 (Rev 5-8-10)

- 1 of 2 -



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/31/2017

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(U) ~~(S)~~ Bruce OHR, [redacted], [redacted], currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters, 935 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agent and Intelligence Analyst and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

(U) ~~(S)~~ On January 20, 2017, OHR received an e-mail from Glen Simpson asking OHR to contact Simpson. OHR subsequently contacted Simpson telephonically. During the telephonic conversation, Simpson told OHR that one of [redacted] has been identified and will likely be publicly named by the media within the next couple of days.

b3 -5
b6 -2,-3
b7C -2,-3
b7D -4,-5

[Large redacted block]

When OHR asked for more information regarding [redacted] and the nature of the threat, Simpson replied he would contact Steele for more information and then re-contact OHR.

(U) ~~(S)~~ In the early hours of January 21, 2017, OHR received a text message from Steele which OHR did not notice until later in the morning. Around 8:00 am on the same day, OHR received call from Steele. During this conversation Steele relayed his concerns regarding the safety of his


~~Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: FBI
NSISG-20090615
Declassify On: 20421231~~

Investigation on 01/23/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
File # [redacted]
by [redacted] Date dictated 01/25/2017

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Date of entry 01/27/2017

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

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(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Bruce OHR, [redacted], currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDEF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters, 935 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ On January 24, 2017, OHR received a WhatsApp notification from Christopher Steele. On January 25, 2017, Steele contacted and spoke with OHR via WhatsApp. During this conversation, Steele again relayed his concerns regarding the safety of his employee. Due to the possibility of the employee's identity being exposed by the media, [redacted]

[redacted]

b3 -5
b6 -2,-3
b7C -2,-3
b7D -4,-5
b7E -4,-5

(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ OHR took notes during the contact with Steele to preserve his memory and referred to them during the interview. OHR's notes are an attachment to this document.


~~Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: FBI
NSISC-20090615
Declassify On: 20421231~~

Investigation on 01/25/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
by [redacted] Date dictated 01/25/2017

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FD-302 (Rev 5-8-10)

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(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Bruce OHR, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters, 935 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ On January 27, 2017, OHR received a WhatsApp notification from Christopher Steele indicating Steele's employee was alright and Steele would like to keep the line of communication open with OHR for future contact. OHR replied in the affirmative.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.4 (b)
Derived From: FBI
NSISC-20080515
Declassify On: 20421231

Investigation on 01/27/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)


by [REDACTED]

Date dictated 01/27/2017

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- 1 of 2 -



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Date of entry 02/08/2017

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(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Bruce OHR, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters, 935 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ OHR stated he had been contacted by Christopher Steele, via WhatsApp, on January 31, 2017. On January 30, 2017, the Trump Administration fired Acting Attorney General Sally Q. Yates and Steele had contacted OHR to determine if OHR anticipated being fired as well and, if so, who in the Department of Justice could he continue to reach out to. OHR added that he had previously explained to Steele at some point, his contact with the U.S. Government would have to involve the FBI. Interviewing agents asked OHR to ask Steele if he would be comfortable getting the name of an FBI agent.

(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ OHR advised Kathleen Kavalec, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State would be meeting [REDACTED] representatives in order to discuss potential Russian influence in their upcoming Presidential elections. OHR reminded the interviewing agents Kavalec did speak with Steele several times prior to the 2016 US Presidential election and believed Steele's reporting to have generated from mainly [REDACTED]

b6 -2,-3,-4
b7C -2,-3,-4
b7D -4

(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ OHR also advised [REDACTED] an attorney representing [REDACTED] explained his client felt [REDACTED] were recently complicated by the FBI, who he

~~Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: FBI
NSICG-20090615
Declassify On: 20421231~~

Investigation on 02/06/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

Date dictated 02/06/2017

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Interview of Bruce Ohr 06

(U)

Continuation of FD-302 of February 2017

02/06/2017 2 of 2

~~felt viewed him as a criminal.~~ [REDACTED] informed OHR that [REDACTED] would like to 'clean things up' and felt the circumstances surrounding the 2016 US Presidential election had become 'too emotional.' OHR stated, as he understood it, [REDACTED] was informed of what was required during the FBI interview.


b3 -5
b6 -2,-3,-4
b7A -1
b7C -2,-3,-4
b7D -5
b7E -4,-5

(U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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Date of entry 02/15/2017

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

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(U) ~~(S)~~ Bruce OHR, [redacted], currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters, 935 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

(U) ~~(S)~~ OHR stated he had been contacted by Christopher Steele, via WhatsApp and OHR responded via FaceTime on 02/11/2017.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Steele advised OHR that [redacted]

b6 -2,-3
b7C -2,-3
b7D -4

(U) ~~(S)~~ Steele's company is continuing to work for both [redacted] another attorney for [redacted]. However, OHR explained Steele is beginning to worry about his business and was preparing [redacted] to broker a business relationship with the FBI. Steele advised OHR, 'You may see me re-emerge in a couple of weeks.'

b6 -2,-3,-4
b7A -1
b7C -2,-3,-4
b7E -4,-5

(U) ~~(S)~~ OHR responded he had yet to ask Steele if he would like to be provided with an FBI contact.

(U) ~~(S)~~ OHR also advised [redacted] was doing fine, but were still a bit "freaked out." However, it seemed to Steele that things were calming down and he was pleased about a recent CNN article that stated U.S.

~~Reason: 1.8(b)
Derived From: FBI
NSICG-20090615
Declassify On: 20421231~~

Investigation on 02/14/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

Date dictated 02/15/2017

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
~~_____~~

Interview of Bruce Orr 14

February 2017

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~Government investigations had confirmed some of the~~ ^{On} 02/14/2017 ^{Page} 2 of 2
dossier. ~~reporting in his~~

~~_____~~



~~[REDACTED]~~
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry: 04/04/2017

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DISSEMINATIVE MATERIAL

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(U) ~~[REDACTED]~~ Bruce OHR, ~~[REDACTED]~~ ~~[REDACTED]~~, currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters, 935 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

(U) ~~[REDACTED]~~ OHR stated he had recently been contacted by Christopher Steele on three separate occasions via WhatsApp or FaceTime. On 12 March 2017, Steele told OHR he was concerned about receiving a letter from Senator Grassley asking Steele to disclose additional details regarding the dossier Steele compiled on Donald J. Trump. Steele also expressed concern about ~~[REDACTED]~~

b6 -2
b7C -2
b7D -4

(U) ~~[REDACTED]~~ On 15 March 2017, Steele told OHR if asked, Steele would tell the investigating congressional committees what he could about the dossier, but Steele must protect the sources and methods used to collect the information.

(U) ~~[REDACTED]~~ On 26 March 2017, Steele told OHR he expected a letter from the congressional committee investigation at any moment. Steele was aware that Glen Simpson has already revived such a letter. Steele further told OHR that ~~[REDACTED]~~ an attorney representing ~~[REDACTED]~~ was acting in an informal capacity with Senator Mark Warner's staff, and was in contact with Steele. Steele noted since he resided in

b6 -3,-4
b7C -3,-4

~~[REDACTED]~~
~~[REDACTED]~~
~~[REDACTED]~~
~~[REDACTED]~~

Investigation on 03/27 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
File # [REDACTED] Date dictated 04/03/2017

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~~[REDACTED]~~

[REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ (U)

Interview of Bruce Orr 27

03/27

/2017

Page 2 of 2

(U)
Continuation of FD-302 of March 2017
The United Kingdom

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

On speaker could answer

written questions from investigator

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ (U)

~~(U)~~

b1 -1
b3 -5
b6 -3
b7C -3
b7D -4
b7E -1

~~[REDACTED]~~



[redacted]
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/10/2017

(U) [redacted] On 5/8/2017, [redacted] interviewed BRUCE OHR, [redacted], currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) at FBI Washington Field Office, 601 4th Street, Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

(U) [redacted] OHR and STEELE communicated via text message in WhatsApp and arranged a call for 5/3/2017 at 8:00 AM. STEELE told OHR that business was good.

(U) [redacted] STEELE had been worried about Director Comey's upcoming testimony to congress, especially his response to questions that would be raised by Representative Grassley. STEELE was specifically concerned about anything Director Comey would say [redacted]

b3 -5
b6 -2
b7C -2
b7D -4

(U) [redacted] STEELE was happy with Director Comey's response.

[redacted] In a previous conversation, STEELE had expressed concern for the well-being of a source. STEELE described the current disposition of this source as "stable".

[redacted] STEELE informed OHR that the disclosure laws in the UK were more narrow than in the United States and therefore limited his ability to testify before Congress. STEELE cited specifically that he was restricted from [redacted].

(U) [redacted] was a former [redacted] and had been on the staff of the [redacted]. At the time of the interview, [redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 05/08/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
File # [redacted] Date dictated 05/08/2017
by [redacted]

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~~████████████████████~~

~~████████████████████~~

(U)

Interview of Bruce Ohr 8 May

05/08

Continuation of FD-302 of 2017

/2017

Page 2 of 2

(U)

~~██████████~~ GLENN SIMPSON of FUSION-GPS and ~~██████████~~ would be visiting STEELE soon and were in the process of "lawyering up" (NFI).

(U)

~~██████████~~ JONATHAN WINER was bringing over a letter separately (NFI).

(U)


~~██████████~~ STEELE was interested in working with the FBI and had additional information if the FBI was interested.

~~████████████████████~~

~~SECRET~~

FD-302 (Rev 5-8-10)

- 1 of 1 -



~~[redacted]~~
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/12/2017

(U) ~~[redacted]~~ On 5/12/2017, ~~[redacted]~~ interviewed BRUCE OHR, ~~[redacted]~~, currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) at FBI Washington Field Office, 601 4th Street, Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

(U) ~~[redacted]~~ STEELE sent OHR a text message in WhatsApp some time around Tuesday and they set up a call via WhatsApp for Wednesday 2:00 PM EST.

(U) ~~[redacted]~~ Over the course of their telephone call, STEELE informed OHR that he had received a letter from the Senate Intelligence Committee (SIC). The letter requested answers to the following questions:

1. Had STEELE provided information to the US Government?
2. What was the scope of STEELE's investigation?
3. Did STEELE have any additional information to provide?

(U) ~~[redacted]~~ STEELE mentioned that SIC was considering sending staffers to the UK.

(U) ~~[redacted]~~ SSA ~~[redacted]~~ requested that OHR ask STEELE if he would be willing to have a conversation with FBI agents in the UK. OHR agreed to pass along the message.

~~[redacted]~~

Investigation on 05/12/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date dictated 05/12/2017


by [redacted]

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b3 -5
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -1

~~SECRET~~

FBI (22-cv-2264)-520



[Redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/16/2017

(U) [Redacted] On 5/15/2017, [Redacted] interviewed BRUCE OHR, [Redacted], currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) at FBI Washington Field Office, 601 4th Street, Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

(U) [Redacted] CHRISTOPHER STEELE sent OHR a text message in WhatsApp on or around Friday, 5/12/2017. The two set up a call via WhatsApp for Saturday at 9:00 AM EST.

(U) [Redacted] Per FBI's previous request, OHR asked STEELE if he would be willing to meet with FBI agents. STEELE responded that the answer was an immediate yes but that he would need to check with [Redacted]. OHR was clear that this would be nothing more than a conversation with the FBI and STEELE said that would be alright.

b6 -3
b7C -3

(U) [Redacted] STEELE informed OHR that he had information regarding a conversation between [Redacted]

(U) [Redacted] STEELE contacted OHR via Whatsapp at 9:45 AM on Monday, 5/15/2017. STEELE said [Redacted] were both ok with him talking to the FBI.

b6 -3
b7C -3

(U) [Redacted] SSA [Redacted] told OHR that he would communicate with headquarters regarding FBI agents meeting with STEELE and let him know when he received a response.

~~Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: National
Security Information SCG
Declassify On: 20271231~~

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COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/94

RUSSIA: SECRET KREMLIN MEETINGS ATTENDED BY TRUMP ADVISOR, CARTER PAGE IN MOSCOW (JULY 2016)

Summary

- TRUMP advisor Carter PAGE holds secret meetings in Moscow with SECHIN and senior Kremlin Internal Affairs official, DIVYEKIN
- SECHIN raises issues of future bilateral US-Russia energy co-operation and associated lifting of western sanctions against Russia over Ukraine. PAGE non-committal in response
- DIVYEKIN discusses release of Russian dossier of 'kompromat' on TRUMP's opponent, Hillary CLINTON, but also hints at Kremlin possession of such material on TRUMP

Detail

1. Speaking in July 2016, a Russian source close to Rosneft President, PUTIN close associate and US-sanctioned individual, Igor SECHIN, confided the details of a recent secret meeting between him and visiting Foreign Affairs Advisor to Republican presidential candidate Donald TRUMP, Carter PAGE.
2. According to SECHIN's associate, the Rosneft President (CEO) had raised with PAGE the issues of future bilateral energy cooperation and prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related western sanctions against Russia. PAGE had reacted positively to this demarche by SECHIN but had been generally non-committal in response.
3. Speaking separately, also in July 2016, an official close to Presidential Administration Head, S. IVANOV, confided in a compatriot that a senior colleague in the Internal Political Department of the PA, DIVYEKIN (nfd) also had met secretly with PAGE on his recent visit. Their agenda had included DIVYEKIN raising a dossier of 'kompromat' the Kremlin possessed on TRUMP's Democratic presidential rival, Hillary CLINTON, and its possible release to the Republican's campaign team.
4. However, the Kremlin official close to S. IVANOV added that s/he believed DIVYEKIN also had hinted (or indicated more strongly) that the Russian leadership also had 'kompromat' on TRUMP which the latter should bear in mind in his dealings with them.

19 July 2016

FBI (22-cv-2264)-524

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/101

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: SENIOR KREMLIN FIGURE OUTLINES EVOLVING RUSSIAN TACTICS IN PRO-TRUMP, ANTI-CLINTON OPERATION

Summary

- Head of PA, IVANOV assesses Kremlin intervention in US presidential election and outlines leadership thinking on operational way forward
- No new leaks envisaged, as too politically risky, but rather further exploitation of (WikiLeaks) material already disseminated to exacerbate divisions
- Educated US youth to be targeted as protest (against CLINTON) and swing vote in attempt to turn them over to TRUMP
- Russian leadership, including PUTIN, celebrating perceived success to date in splitting US hawks and elite
- Kremlin engaging with several high profile US players, including STEIN, PAGE and (former DIA Director Michael Flynn), and funding their recent visits to Moscow

Details

1. Speaking in confidence to a close colleague in early August 2016, Head of the Russian Presidential Administration (PA), Sergei IVANOV, assessed the impact and results of Kremlin intervention in the US presidential election to date. Although most commentators believed that the Kremlin was behind the leaked DNC/CLINTON e-mails, this remained technically deniable. Therefore the Russians would not risk their position for the time being with new leaked material, even to a third party like WikiLeaks. Rather the tactics would be to spread rumours and misinformation about the content of what already had been leaked and make up new content.
2. Continuing on this theme, IVANOV said that the audience to be targeted by such operations was the educated youth in America as the PA assessed that there was still a chance they could be persuaded to vote for Republican candidate Donald TRUMP as a protest against the Washington establishment (in the form of Democratic candidate Hillary CLINTON). The hope was that even if she won, as a result of this CLINTON in power would be bogged down in working for internal reconciliation in the US, rather than being able to focus on foreign policy which would damage Russia's interests. This also should give President PUTIN more room for manoeuvre in the run-up to Russia's own presidential election in 2018.
3. IVANOV reported that although the Kremlin had underestimated the strength of US media and liberal reaction to the DNC hack and TRUMP's links to Russia, PUTIN was generally satisfied with the progress of the anti-CLINTON operation to date. He recently had had a drink with PUTIN to mark this. In IVANOV's view, the US had tried to divide the Russian elite with sanctions but failed, whilst they, by contrast, had succeeded in splitting the US hawks inimical to Russia and the Washington elite more generally, half of whom had refused to endorse any presidential candidate as a result of Russian intervention.
4. Speaking separately, also in early August 2016, a Kremlin official involved in US relations commented on aspects of the Russian operation to date. Its goals had been threefold - asking sympathetic US actors how Moscow could help them; gathering relevant intelligence; and creating and disseminating compromising information ('kompromat'). This had involved the Kremlin supporting various US political figures, including funding indirectly their recent visits to Moscow. S/he named a delegation from Lyndon LAROCHE; presidential candidate Jill STEIN of the Green Party; TRUMP foreign policy adviser

Carter PAGE; and former DIA Director Michael Flynn, in this regard and as successful in terms of perceived outcomes.

10 August 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/102

**RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: REACTION IN TRUMP CAMP TO RECENT NEGATIVE PUBLICITY ABOUT
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE AND LIKELY RESULTING TACTICS GOING FORWARD**

Summary

- TRUMP campaign insider reports recent DNC e-mail leaks were aimed at switching SANDERS (protest) voters away from CLINTON and over to TRUMP
- Admits Republican campaign underestimated resulting negative reaction from US liberals, elite and media and forced to change course as result
- Need now to turn tables on CLINTON's use of PUTIN as bogeyman in election, although some resentment at Russian president's perceived attempt to undermine USG and system over and above swinging presidential election

Detail

1. Speaking in confidence on 9 August 2016, an ethnic Russian associate of Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP discussed the reaction inside his camp, and revised tactics therein resulting from recent negative publicity concerning Moscow's clandestine involvement in the campaign. TRUMP's associate reported that the aim of leaking the DNC e-mails to WikiLeaks during the Democratic Convention had been to swing supporters of Bernie SANDERS away from Hillary CLINTON and across to TRUMP. These voters were perceived as activist and anti-status quo and anti-establishment and in that regard sharing many features with the TRUMP campaign, including a visceral dislike of Hillary CLINTON. This objective had been conceived and promoted, inter alia, by TRUMP's foreign policy adviser Carter PAGE who had discussed it directly with the ethnic Russian associate.
2. Continuing on this theme, the ethnic Russian associate of TRUMP assessed that the problem was that the TRUMP campaign had underestimated the strength of the negative reaction from liberals and especially the conservative elite to Russian interference. This was forcing a rethink and a likely change of tactics. The main objective in the short term was to check Democratic candidate Hillary CLINTON's successful exploitation of the PUTIN as bogeyman/Russian interference story to tarnish TRUMP and bolster her own (patriotic) credentials. The TRUMP campaign was focusing on tapping into support in the American television media to achieve this, as they reckoned this resource had been underused by them to date.
3. However, TRUMP's associate also admitted that there was a fair amount of anger and resentment within the Republican candidate's team at what was perceived by PUTIN as going beyond the objective of weakening CLINTON and bolstering TRUMP, by attempting to exploit the situation to undermine the US government and democratic system more generally. It was unclear at present how this aspect of the situation would play out in the weeks to come.

10 August 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/136

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: FURTHER DETAILS OF TRUMP LAWYER COHEN'S SECRET LIAISON WITH THE KREMLIN

Summary

- Kremlin insider reports TRUMP lawyer COHEN's secret meeting/s with Kremlin officials in August 2016 was/were held in Prague
- Russian parastatal organisation Rossotrudnichestvo used as cover for this liaison and premises in Czech capital may have been used for the meeting/s
- Pro-PUTIN leading Duma figure, KOSACHEV, reportedly involved as "plausibly deniable" facilitator and may have participated in the August meeting/s with COHEN

Detail

1. Speaking to a compatriot and friend on 19 October 2016, a Kremlin insider provided further details of reported clandestine meeting/s between Republican presidential candidate, Donald TRUMP's lawyer Michael COHEN and Kremlin representatives in August 2016. Although the communication between them had to be cryptic for security reasons, the Kremlin insider clearly indicated to his/her friend that the reported contact/s took place in Prague, Czech Republic.
2. Continuing on this theme, the Kremlin insider highlighted the importance of the Russian parastatal organisation, Rossotrudnichestvo, in this contact between TRUMP campaign representative/s and Kremlin officials. Rossotrudnichestvo was being used as cover for this relationship and its office in Prague may well have been used to host the COHEN/Russian Presidential Administration (PA) meeting/s. It was considered a "plausibly deniable" vehicle for this, whilst remaining entirely under Kremlin control.
3. The Kremlin insider went on to identify leading pro-PUTIN Duma figure, Konstantin KOSACHEV (Head of the Foreign Relations Committee) as an important figure in the TRUMP campaign-Kremlin liaison operation. KOSACHEV, also "plausibly deniable" being part of the Russian legislature rather than executive, had facilitated the contact in Prague and by implication, may have attended the meeting/s with COHEN there in August.

Company Comment

We reported previously, in our Company Intelligence Report 2016/135 of 19 October 2016 from the same source, that COHEN met officials from the PA Legal Department clandestinely in an EU country in August 2016. This was in order to clean up the mess left behind by western media revelations of TRUMP ex-campaign manager MANAFORT's corrupt relationship with the former pro-Russian YANUKOVYCH regime in Ukraine and TRUMP foreign policy advisor, Carter PAGE's secret meetings in Moscow with senior regime figures in July 2016. According to the Kremlin advisor, these meeting/s were originally scheduled for COHEN in Moscow but shifted to

what was considered an operationally "soft" EU country when it was judged too compromising for him to travel to the Russian capital.

20 October 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/136

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: FURTHER DETAILS OF TRUMP LAWYER COHEN'S SECRET LIAISON WITH THE KREMLIN

Summary

- Kremlin insider reports TRUMP lawyer COHEN's secret meeting/s with Kremlin officials in August 2016 was/were held in Prague
- Russian parastatal organisation Rossotrudnichestvo used as cover for this liaison and premises in Czech capital may have been used for the meeting/s
- Pro-PUTIN leading Duma figure, KOSACHEV, reportedly involved as "plausibly deniable" facilitator and may have participated in the August meeting/s with COHEN

Detail

1. Speaking to a compatriot and friend on 19 October 2016, a Kremlin insider provided further details of reported clandestine meeting/s between Republican presidential candidate, Donald TRUMP's lawyer Michael COHEN and Kremlin representatives in August 2016. Although the communication between them had to be cryptic for security reasons, the Kremlin insider clearly indicated to his/her friend that the reported contact/s took place in Prague, Czech Republic.
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what was considered an operationally "soft" EU country when it was judged too compromising for him to travel to the Russian capital.

20 October 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/097

RUSSIA-US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: KREMLIN CONCERN THAT POLITICAL FALLOUT FROM DNC E-MAIL HACKING AFFAIR SPIRALLING OUT OF CONTROL

Summary

- Kremlin concerned that political fallout from DNC e-mail hacking operation is spiralling out of control. Extreme nervousness among TRUMP's associates as result of negative media attention/accusations
- Russians meanwhile keen to cool situation and maintain 'plausible deniability' of existing /ongoing pro-TRUMP and anti-CLINTON operations. Therefore unlikely to be any ratcheting up offensive plays in immediate future
- Source close to TRUMP campaign however confirms regular exchange with Kremlin has existed for at least 8 years, including intelligence fed back to Russia on oligarchs' activities in US
- Russians apparently have promised not to use 'kompromat' they hold on TRUMP as leverage, given high levels of voluntary co-operation forthcoming from his team

Detail

1. Speaking in confidence to a trusted associate in late July 2016, a Russian émigré figure close to the Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP's campaign team commented on the fallout from publicity surrounding the Democratic National Committee (DNC) e-mail hacking scandal. The émigré said there was a high level of anxiety within the TRUMP team as a result of various accusations levelled against them and indications from the Kremlin that President PUTIN and others in the leadership thought things had gone too far now and risked spiralling out of control.
2. Continuing on this theme, the émigré associate of TRUMP opined that the Kremlin wanted the situation to calm but for 'plausible deniability' to be maintained concerning its (extensive) pro-TRUMP and anti-CLINTON operations. S/he therefore judged that it was unlikely these would be ratcheted up, at least for the time being.
3. However, in terms of established operational liaison between the TRUMP team and the Kremlin, the émigré confirmed that an intelligence exchange had been running between them for at least 8 years. Within this context PUTIN's priority requirement had been for intelligence on the activities, business and otherwise, in the US of leading Russian oligarchs and their families. TRUMP and his associates duly had obtained and supplied the Kremlin with this information.

4. Finally, the émigré said s/he understood the Kremlin had more intelligence on CLINTON and her campaign but he did not know the details or when or if it would be released. As far as 'kompromat' (compromising information) on TRUMP were concerned, although there was plenty of this, he understood the Kremlin had given its word that it would not be deployed against the Republican presidential candidate given how helpful and co-operative his team had been over several years, and particularly of late.

30 July 2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE~~

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/095

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: FURTHER INDICATIONS OF EXTENSIVE CONSPIRACY BETWEEN TRUMP'S CAMPAIGN TEAM AND THE KREMLIN

Summary

- Further evidence of extensive conspiracy between TRUMP's campaign team and Kremlin, sanctioned at highest levels and involving Russian diplomatic staff based in the US
- TRUMP associate admits Kremlin behind recent appearance of DNC e-mails on WikiLeaks, as means of maintaining plausible deniability
- Agreed exchange of information established in both directions. TRUMP's team using moles within DNC and hackers in the US as well as outside in Russia. PUTIN motivated by fear and hatred of Hillary CLINTON. Russians receiving intel from TRUMP's team on Russian oligarchs and their families in US
- Mechanism for transmitting this intelligence involves "pension" disbursements to Russian emigres living in US as cover, using consular officials in New York, DC and Miami
- Suggestion from source close to TRUMP and MANAFORT that Republican campaign team happy to have Russia as media bogeyman to mask more extensive corrupt business ties to China and other emerging countries

Detail

1. Speaking in confidence to a compatriot in late July 2016, Source E, an ethnic Russian close associate of Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP, admitted that there was a well-developed conspiracy of co-operation between them and the Russian leadership. This was managed on the TRUMP side by the Republican candidate's campaign manager, Paul MANAFORT, who was using foreign policy advisor, Carter PAGE, and others as intermediaries. The two sides had a mutual interest in defeating Democratic presidential candidate Hillary CLINTON, whom President PUTIN apparently both hated and feared.
2. Inter alia, Source E, acknowledged that the Russian regime had been behind the recent leak of embarrassing e-mail messages, emanating from the Democratic National Committee (DNC), to the WikiLeaks platform.

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE~~

The reason for using WikiLeaks was "plausible deniability" and the operation had been conducted with the full knowledge and support of TRUMP and senior members of his campaign team. In return the TRUMP team had agreed to sideline Russian intervention in Ukraine as a campaign issue and to raise US/NATO defence commitments in the Baltics and Eastern Europe to deflect attention away from Ukraine, a priority for PUTIN who needed to cauterise the subject.

3. In the wider context of TRUMP campaign/Kremlin co-operation, Source E claimed that the intelligence network being used against CLINTON comprised three elements. Firstly there were agents/facilitators within the Democratic Party structure itself; secondly Russian émigré and associated offensive cyber operators based in the US; and thirdly, state-sponsored cyber operatives working in Russia. All three elements had played an important role to date. On the mechanism for rewarding relevant assets based in the US, and effecting a two-way flow of intelligence and other useful information, Source E claimed that Russian diplomatic staff in key cities such as New York, Washington DC and Miami were using the émigré 'pension' distribution system as cover. The operation therefore depended on key people in the US Russian émigré community for its success. Tens of thousands of dollars were involved.
4. In terms of the intelligence flow from the TRUMP team to Russia, Source E reported that much of this concerned the activities of business oligarchs and their families' activities and assets in the US, with which PUTIN and the Kremlin seemed preoccupied.
5. Commenting on the negative media publicity surrounding alleged Russian interference in the US election campaign in support of TRUMP, Source E said he understood that the Republican candidate and his team were relatively relaxed about this because it deflected media and the Democrats' attention away from TRUMP's business dealings in China and other emerging markets. Unlike in Russia, these were substantial and involved the payment of large bribes and kickbacks which, were they to become public, would be potentially very damaging to their campaign.
6. Finally, regarding TRUMP's claimed minimal investment profile in Russia, a separate source with direct knowledge said this had not been for want of trying. TRUMP's previous efforts had included exploring the real estate sector in St Petersburg as well as Moscow but in the end TRUMP had had to settle for the use of extensive sexual services there from local prostitutes rather than business success.

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE~~

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/095

**RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: FURTHER INDICATIONS OF
EXTENSIVE CONSPIRACY BETWEEN TRUMP'S CAMPAIGN TEAM AND THE
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COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/113

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION- REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE TRUMP'S PRIOR ACTIVITIES IN ST PETERSBURG

Summary

- Two knowledgeable St Petersburg sources claim Republican candidate TRUMP has paid bribes and engaged in sexual activities there but key witnesses silenced and evidence hard to obtain
- Both believe Azeri business associate of TRUMP, Araz AGALAROV will know the details

Detail

1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in September 2016, two well-placed sources based in St Petersburg, one in the political/business elite and the other involved in the local services and tourist industry, commented on Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP's prior activities in the city.
2. Both knew TRUMP had visited St Petersburg on several occasions in the past and had been interested in doing business deals there involving real estate. The local business/political elite figure reported that TRUMP had paid bribes there to further his interests but very discreetly and only through affiliated companies, making it very hard to prove. The local services industry source reported that TRUMP had participated in sex parties in the city too, but that all direct witnesses to this recently had been "silenced" i.e. bribed or coerced to disappear.
3. The two St Petersburg figures cited believed an Azeri business figure, Araz AGALAROV (with offices in Baku and London) had been closely involved with TRUMP in Russia and would know most of the details of what the Republican presidential candidate had got up to there.

14 September 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/100

RUSSIA/USA: GROWING BACKLASH IN KREMLIN TO DNC HACKING AND TRUMP SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Summary

- Head of PA IVANOV laments Russian intervention in US presidential election and black PR against CLINTON and the DNC. Vows not to supply intelligence to Kremlin PR operatives again. Advocates now sitting tight and denying everything
- Presidential spokesman PESKOV the main protagonist in Kremlin campaign to aid TRUMP and damage CLINTON. He is now scared and fears being made scapegoat by leadership for backlash in US. Problem compounded by his botched intervention in recent Turkish crisis
- Premier MEDVEDEV's office furious over DNC hacking and associated anti-Russian publicity. Want good relations with US and ability to travel there. Refusing to support or help cover up after PESKOV
- Talk now in Kremlin of TRUMP withdrawing from presidential race altogether, but this still largely wishful thinking by more liberal elements in Moscow

Detail

1. Speaking in early August 2016, two well-placed and established Kremlin sources outlined the divisions and backlash in Moscow arising from the leaking of Democratic National Committee (DNC) e-mails and the wider pro-TRUMP operation being conducted in the US. Head of Presidential Administration, Sergei IVANOV, was angry at the recent turn of events. He believed the Kremlin "team" involved, led by presidential spokesman Dmitriy PESKOV, had gone too far in interfering in foreign affairs with their "elephant in a china shop black PR". IVANOV claimed always to have opposed the handling and exploitation of intelligence by this PR "team". Following the backlash against such foreign interference in US politics, IVANOV was advocating that the only sensible course of action now for the Russian leadership was to "sit tight and deny everything".
2. Continuing on this theme the source close to IVANOV reported that PESKOV now was "scared shitless" that he would be scapegoated by PUTIN and the Kremlin and held responsible for the backlash against Russian political interference in the US election. IVANOV was determined

to stop PESKOV playing an independent role in relation to the US going forward and the source fully expected the presidential spokesman now to lay low. PESKOV's position was not helped by a botched attempt by him also to interfere in the recent failed coup in Turkey from a government relations (GR) perspective (no further details).

3. The extent of disquiet and division within Moscow caused by the backlash against Russian interference in the US election was underlined by a second source, close to premier Dmitry MEDVEDEV (DAM). S/he said the Russian prime minister and his colleagues wanted to have good relations with the US, regardless of who was in power there, and not least so as to be able to travel there in future, either officially or privately. They were openly refusing to cover up for PESKOV and others involved in the DNC/TRUMP operations or to support his counter-attack of allegations against the USG for its alleged hacking of the Russian government and state agencies.
4. According to the first source, close to IVANOV, there had been talk in the Kremlin of TRUMP being forced to withdraw from the presidential race altogether as a result of recent events, ostensibly on grounds of his psychological state and unsuitability for high office. This might not be so bad for Russia in the circumstances but in the view of the source, it remained largely wishful thinking on the part of those in the regime opposed to PESKOV and his "botched" operations, at least for the time being.

5 August 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/111

RUSSIA/US: KREMLIN FALLOUT FROM MEDIA EXPOSURE OF MOSCOW'S INTERFERENCE IN THE US PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

Summary

- Kremlin orders senior staff to remain silent in media and private on allegations of Russian interference in US presidential campaign
- Senior figure however confirms gist of allegations and reports IVANOV sacked as Head of Administration on account of giving PUTIN poor advice on issue. VAINO selected as his replacement partly because he was not involved in pro-TRUMP, anti-CLINTON operation/s
- Russians do have further 'kompromat' on CLINTON (e-mails) and considering disseminating it after Duma (legislative elections) in late September. Presidential spokesman PESKOV continues to lead on this
- However, equally important is Kremlin objective to shift policy consensus favourably to Russia in US post-OBAMA whoever wins. Both presidential candidates' opposition to TPP and TTIP viewed as a result in this respect
- Senior Russian diplomat withdrawn from Washington embassy on account of potential exposure in US presidential election operation/s

Detail

1. Speaking in confidence to a trusted compatriot in mid-September 2016, a senior member of the Russian Presidential Administration (PA) commented on the political fallout from recent western media revelations about Moscow's intervention, in favour of Donald TRUMP and against Hillary CLINTON, in the US presidential election. The PA official reported that the issue had become incredibly sensitive and that President PUTIN had issued direct orders that Kremlin and government insiders should not discuss it in public or even in private.
2. Despite this, the PA official confirmed, from direct knowledge, that the gist of the allegations was true. PUTIN had been receiving conflicting advice on interfering from three separate and expert groups. On one side had been the Russian ambassador to the US, Sergei KISLYAK, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with an independent and informal network run by presidential foreign policy advisor, Yuri USHAKOV

(KISLYAK's predecessor in Washington) who had urged caution and the potential negative impact on Russia from the operation/s. On the other side was former PA Head, Sergei IVANOV, backed by Russian Foreign Intelligence (SVR), who had advised PUTIN that the pro-TRUMP, anti-CLINTON operation/s would be both effective and plausibly deniable with little blowback. The first group/s had been proven right and this had been the catalyst in PUTIN's decision to sack IVANOV (unexpectedly) as PA Head in August. His successor, Anton VAINO, had been selected for the job partly because he had not been involved in the US presidential election operation/s.

3. Continuing on this theme, the senior PA official said the situation now was that the Kremlin had further 'kompromat' on candidate CLINTON and had been considering releasing this via "plausibly deniable" channels after the Duma (legislative) elections were out of the way in mid-September. There was however a growing train of thought and associated lobby, arguing that the Russians could still make candidate CLINTON look "weak and stupid" by provoking her into railing against PUTIN and Russia without the need to release more of her e-mails. Presidential Spokesman, Dmitriy PESKOV remained a key figure in the operation, although any final decision on dissemination of further material would be taken by PUTIN himself.
4. The senior PA official also reported that a growing element in Moscow's intervention in the US presidential election campaign was the objective of shifting the US political consensus in Russia's perceived interests regardless of who won. It basically comprised of pushing candidate CLINTON away from President OBAMA's policies. The best example of this was that both candidates now openly opposed the draft trade agreements, TPP and TTIP, which were assessed by Moscow as detrimental to Russian interests. Other issues where the Kremlin was looking to shift the US policy consensus were Ukraine and Syria. Overall however, the presidential election was considered still to be too close to call.
5. Finally, speaking separately to the same compatriot, a senior Russian MFA official reported that as a prophylactic measure, a leading Russian diplomat, Mikhail KULAGIN, had been withdrawn from Washington at short notice because Moscow feared his heavy involvement in the US presidential election operation, including the so-called veterans' pensions ruse (reported previously), would be exposed in the media there. His replacement, Andrei BONDAREV however was clean in this regard.

Company Comment

The substance of what was reported by the senior Russian PA official in paras 1 and 2 above, including the reasons for Sergei IVANOV's dismissal, was corroborated independently by a former top level Russian intelligence officer and Kremlin insider, also in mid-September.

14 September 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/105

RUSSIA/UKRAINE: THE DEMISE OF TRUMP'S CAMPAIGN MANAGER PAUL MANAFORT

Summary

- Ex-Ukrainian President YANUKOVYCH confides directly to PUTIN that he authorised kick-back payments to MANAFORT, as alleged in western media. Assures Russian President however there is no documentary evidence/trail
- PUTIN and Russian leadership remain worried however and sceptical that YANUKOVYCH has fully covered the traces of these payments to TRUMP's former campaign manager
- Close associate of TRUMP explains reasoning behind MANAFORT's recent resignation. Ukraine revelations played part but others wanted MANAFORT out for various reasons, especially LEWANDOWSKI who remains influential

Detail

1. Speaking in late August 2016, in the immediate aftermath of Paul MANAFORT's resignation as campaign manager for US Republican presidential candidate Donald TRUMP, a well-placed Russian figure reported on a recent meeting between President PUTIN and ex-President YANUKOVYCH of Ukraine. This had been held in secret on 15 August near Volgograd, Russia and the western media revelations about MANAFORT and Ukraine had featured prominently on the agenda. YANUKOVYCH had confided in PUTIN that he did authorise and order substantial kick-back payments to MANAFORT as alleged but sought to reassure him that there was no documentary trail left behind which could provide clear evidence of this.
2. Given YANUKOVYCH's (unimpressive) record in covering up his own corrupt tracks in the past, PUTIN and others in the Russian leadership were sceptical about the ex-Ukrainian president's reassurances on this as relating to MANAFORT. They therefore still feared the scandal had legs, especially as MANAFORT had been commercially active in Ukraine right up to the time (in March 2016) when he joined TRUMP's campaign team. For them it therefore remained a point of potential political vulnerability and embarrassment.

3. Speaking separately, also in late August 2016, an American political figure associated with Donald TRUMP and his campaign outlined the reasons behind MANAFORT's recent demise. S/he said it was true that the Ukraine corruption revelations had played a part in this but also, several senior players close to TRUMP had wanted MANAFORT out, primarily to loosen his control on strategy and policy formulation. Of particular importance in this regard was MANAFORT's predecessor as campaign manager, Corey LEWANDOWSKI, who hated MANAFORT personally and remained close to TRUMP with whom he discussed the presidential campaign on a regular basis.

22 August 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/112

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: KREMLIN-ALPHA GROUP CO-OPERATION

Summary

- Top level Russian official confirms current closeness of Alpha Group-PUTIN relationship. Significant favours continue to be done in both directions and FRIDMAN and AVEN still giving informal advice to PUTIN, especially on the US
- Key intermediary in PUTIN-Alpha relationship identified as Oleg GOVORUN, currently Head of a Presidential Administration department but throughout the 1990s, the Alpha executive who delivered illicit cash directly to PUTIN
- PUTIN personally unbothered about Alpha's current lack of investment in Russia but under pressure from colleagues over this and able to exploit it as lever over Alpha interlocutors

Detail

1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in mid-September 2016, a top level Russian government official commented on the history and current state of relations between President PUTIN and the Alpha Group of businesses led by oligarchs Mikhail FRIDMAN, Petr AVEN and German KHAN. The Russian government figure reported that although they had had their ups and downs, the leading figures in Alpha currently were on very good terms with PUTIN. Significant favours continued to be done in both directions, primarily political ones for PUTIN and business/legal ones for Alpha. Also, FRIDMAN and AVEN continued to give informal advice to PUTIN on foreign policy, and especially about the US where he distrusted advice being given to him by officials.
2. Although FRIDMAN recently had met directly with PUTIN in Russia, much of the dialogue and business between them was mediated through a senior Presidential Administration official, Oleg GOVORUN, who currently headed the department therein responsible for Social Co-operation With the CIS. GOVORUN was trusted by PUTIN and recently had accompanied him to Uzbekistan to pay respects at the tomb of former president KARIMOV. However according to the top level Russian government official, during the 1990s GOVORUN had been Head of Government Relations at Alpha Group and in reality, the "driver" and "bag carrier"

used by FRIDMAN and AVEN to deliver large amounts of illicit cash to the Russian president, at that time deputy Mayor of St Petersburg. Given that and the continuing sensitivity of the PUTIN-Alpha relationship, and need for plausible deniability, much of the contact between them was now indirect and entrusted to the relatively low profile GOVORUN.

3. The top level Russian government official described the PUTIN-Alpha relationship as both carrot and stick. Alpha held 'kompromat' on PUTIN and his corrupt business activities from the 1990s whilst although not personally overly bothered by Alpha's failure to reinvest the proceeds of its TNK oil company sale into the Russian economy since, the Russian president was able to use pressure on this count from senior Kremlin colleagues as a lever on FRIDMAN and AVEN to make them do his political bidding.

14 September 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/135

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF TRUMP LAWYER, COHEN IN CAMPAIGN'S SECRET LIAISON WITH THE KREMLIN

Summary

- Kremlin insider outlines important role played by TRUMP's lawyer COHEN in secret liaison with Russian leadership
- COHEN engaged with Russians in trying to cover up scandal of MANAFORT and exposure of PAGE and meets Kremlin officials secretly in the EU in August in pursuit of this goal
- These secret contacts continue but are now farmed out to trusted agents in Kremlin-linked institutes so as to remain "plausibly deniable" for Russian regime
- Further confirmation that sacking of IVANOV and appointments of VAINO and KIRIYENKO linked to need to cover up Kremlin's TRUMP support operation

Detail

1. Speaking in confidence to a longstanding compatriot friend in mid-October 2016, a Kremlin insider highlighted the importance of Republican presidential candidate Donald TRUMP's lawyer, Michael COHEN, in the ongoing secret liaison relationship between the New York tycoon's campaign and the Russian leadership. COHEN's role had grown following the departure of Paul MANNAFORT as TRUMP's campaign manager in August 2016. Prior to that MANNAFORT had led for the TRUMP side.
2. According to the Kremlin insider, COHEN now was heavily engaged in a cover up and damage limitation operation in the attempt to prevent the full details of TRUMP's relationship with Russia being exposed. In pursuit of this aim, COHEN had met secretly with several Russian Presidential Administration (PA) Legal Department officials in an EU country in August 2016. The immediate issues had been to contain further scandals involving MANNAFORT's commercial and political role in Russia/Ukraine and to limit the damage arising from exposure of former TRUMP foreign policy advisor, Carter PAGE's secret meetings with Russian leadership figures in Moscow the previous month. The

overall objective had been to "to sweep it all under the carpet and make sure no connections could be fully established or proven"

3. Things had become even "hotter" since August on the TRUMP-Russia track. According to the Kremlin insider, this had meant that direct contact between the TRUMP team and Russia had been farmed out by the Kremlin to trusted agents of influence working in pro-government policy institutes like that of Law and Comparative Jurisprudence. COHEN however continued to lead for the TRUMP team.
4. Referring back to the (surprise) sacking of Sergei IVANOV as Head of PA in August 2016, his replacement by Anton VAINO and the appointment of former Russian premier Sergei KIRIYENKO to another senior position in the PA, the Kremlin insider repeated that this had been directly connected to the TRUMP support operation and the need to cover up now that it was being exposed by the USG and in the western media.

Company Comment

The Kremlin insider was unsure of the identities of the PA officials with whom COHEN met secretly in August, or the exact date/s and locations of the meeting/s. There were significant internal security barriers being erected in the PA as the TRUMP issue became more controversial and damaging. However s/he continued to try to obtain these.

19 October 2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE~~

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/086

RUSSIA/CYBER CRIME: A SYNOPSIS OF RUSSIAN STATE SPONSORED AND OTHER CYBER OFFENSIVE (CRIMINAL) OPERATIONS

Summary

- Russia has extensive programme of state-sponsored offensive cyber operations. External targets include foreign governments and big corporations, especially banks. FSB leads on cyber within Russian apparatus. Limited success in attacking top foreign targets like G7 governments, security services and IFIs but much more on second tier ones through IT back doors, using corporate and other visitors to Russia
- FSB often uses coercion and blackmail to recruit most capable cyber operatives in Russia into its state-sponsored programmes. Heavy use also, both wittingly and unwittingly, of CIS emigres working in western corporations and ethnic Russians employed by neighbouring governments e.g. Latvia
- Example cited of successful Russian cyber operation targeting senior Western business visitor. Provided back door into important Western institutions.
- Example given of US citizen of Russian origin approached by FSB and offered incentive of "investment" in his business when visiting Moscow.
- Problems however for Russian authorities themselves in countering local hackers and cyber criminals, operating outside state control. Central Bank claims there were over 20 serious attacks on correspondent accounts held by CBR in 2015, comprising Roubles several billion in fraud
- Some details given of leading non-state Russian cyber criminal groups

Details

1. Speaking in June 2016, a number of Russian figures with a detailed knowledge of national cyber crime, both state-sponsored and otherwise, outlined the current situation in this area. A former senior intelligence officer divided Russian state-sponsored offensive cyber operations into four categories (in order of priority):- targeting foreign, especially

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE~~

western governments; penetrating leading foreign business corporations, especially banks; domestic monitoring of the elite; and attacking political opponents both at home and abroad. The former intelligence officer reported that the Federal Security Service (FSB) was the lead organization within the Russian state apparatus for cyber operations.

2. In terms of the success of Russian offensive cyber operations to date, a senior government figure reported that there had been only limited success in penetrating the "first tier" foreign targets. These comprised western (especially G7 and NATO) governments, security and intelligence services and central banks, and the IFIs. To compensate for this shortfall, massive effort had been invested, with much greater success, in attacking the "secondary targets", particularly western private banks and the governments of smaller states allied to the West. S/he mentioned Latvia in this regard. Hundreds of agents, either consciously cooperating with the FSB or whose personal and professional IT systems had been unwittingly compromised, were recruited. Many were people who had ethnic and family ties to Russia and/or had been incentivized financially to cooperate. Such people often would receive monetary inducements or contractual favours from the Russian state or its agents in return. This had created difficulties for parts of the Russian state apparatus in obliging/indulging them e.g. the Central Bank of Russia knowingly having to cover up for such agents' money laundering operations through the Russian financial system.
3. In terms of the FSB's recruitment of capable cyber operatives to carry out its, ideally deniable, offensive cyber operations, a Russian IT specialist with direct knowledge reported in June 2016 that this was often done using coercion and blackmail. In terms of 'foreign' agents, the FSB was approaching US citizens of Russian (Jewish) origin on business trips to Russia. In one case a US citizen of Russian ethnicity had been visiting Moscow to attract investors in his new information technology program. The FSB clearly knew this and had offered to provide seed capital to this person in return for them being able to access and modify his IP, with a view to targeting priority foreign targets by planting a Trojan virus in the software. The US visitor was told this was common practice. The FSB also had implied significant operational success as a result of installing cheap Russian IT games containing their own malware unwittingly by targets on their PCs and other platforms.
4. In a more advanced and successful FSB operation, an IT operator inside a leading Russian SOE, who previously had been employed on conventional (defensive) IT work there, had been under instruction for the last year to conduct an offensive cyber operation against a foreign director of the company. Although the latter was apparently an infrequent visitor to Russia, the FSB now successfully had penetrated his personal IT and through this had managed to access various important institutions in the West through the back door.

5. In terms of other technical IT platforms, an FSB cyber operative flagged up the 'Telegram' enciphered commercial system as having been of especial concern and therefore heavily targeted by the FSB, not least because it was used frequently by Russian internal political activists and oppositionists. His/her understanding was that the FSB now successfully had cracked this communications software and therefore it was no longer secure to use.

6. The senior Russian government figure cited above also reported that non-state sponsored cyber crime was becoming an increasing problem inside Russia for the government and authorities there. The Central Bank of Russia claimed that in 2015 alone there had been more than 20 attempts at serious cyber embezzlement of money from corresponding accounts held there, comprising several billions Roubles. More generally, s/he understood there were circa 15 major organised crime groups in the country involved in cyber crime, all of which continued to operate largely outside state and FSB control. These included the so-called 'Anunak', 'Buktrap' and 'Metel' organisations.

26 July 2015

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SECRET~~

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/080

**US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE DONALD TRUMP'S
ACTIVITIES IN RUSSIA AND COMPROMISING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
KREMLIN**

Summary

- Russian regime has been cultivating, supporting and assisting TRUMP for at least 5 years. Aim, endorsed by PUTIN, has been to encourage splits and divisions in western alliance
- So far TRUMP has declined various sweetener real estate business deals offered him in Russia in order to further the Kremlin's cultivation of him. However he and his inner circle have accepted a regular flow of intelligence from the Kremlin, including on his Democratic and other political rivals
- Former top Russian intelligence officer claims FSB has compromised TRUMP through his activities in Moscow sufficiently to be able to blackmail him. According to several knowledgeable sources, his conduct in Moscow has included perverted sexual acts which have been arranged/monitored by the FSB
- A dossier of compromising material on Hillary CLINTON has been collated by the Russian Intelligence Services over many years and mainly comprises bugged conversations she had on various visits to Russia and intercepted phone calls rather than any embarrassing conduct. The dossier is controlled by Kremlin spokesman, PESKOV, directly on PUTIN's orders. However it has not as yet been distributed abroad, including to TRUMP. Russian intentions for its deployment still unclear

Detail

1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in June 2016 sources A and B, a senior Russian Foreign Ministry figure and a former top level Russian intelligence officer still active inside the Kremlin respectively, the Russian authorities had been cultivating and supporting US Republican presidential candidate, Donald TRUMP for at least 5 years. Source B asserted that the TRUMP operation was both supported and directed by Russian President Vladimir PUTIN. Its aim was to sow discord and

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SECRET~~

disunity both within the US itself, but more especially within the Transatlantic alliance which was viewed as inimical to Russia's interests. Source C, a senior Russian financial official said the TRUMP operation should be seen in terms of PUTIN's desire to return to Nineteenth Century 'Great Power' politics anchored upon countries' interests rather than the ideals-based international order established after World War Two. S/he had overheard PUTIN talking in this way to close associates on several occasions.

2. In terms of specifics, Source A confided that the Kremlin had been feeding TRUMP and his team valuable intelligence on his opponents, including Democratic presidential candidate Hillary CLINTON, for several years (see more below). This was confirmed by Source D, a close associate of TRUMP who had organized and managed his recent trips to Moscow, and who reported, also in June 2016, that this Russian intelligence had been "very helpful". The Kremlin's cultivation operation on TRUMP also had comprised offering him various lucrative real estate development business deals in Russia, especially in relation to the ongoing 2018 World Cup soccer tournament. However, so far, for reasons unknown, TRUMP had not taken up any of these.
3. However, there were other aspects to TRUMP's engagement with the Russian authorities. One which had borne fruit for them was to exploit TRUMP's personal obsessions and sexual perversion in order to obtain suitable 'kompromat' (compromising material) on him. According to Source D, where s/he had been present, TRUMP's (perverted) conduct in Moscow included hiring the presidential suite of the Ritz Carlton Hotel, where he knew President and Mrs OBAMA (whom he hated) had stayed on one of their official trips to Russia, and defiling the bed where they had slept by employing a number of prostitutes to perform a 'golden showers' (urination) show in front of him. The hotel was known to be under FSB control with microphones and concealed cameras in all the main rooms to record anything they wanted to.
4. The Moscow Ritz Carlton episode involving TRUMP reported above was confirmed by Source E, a senior (western) member of staff at the hotel, who said that s/he and several of the staff were aware of it at the time and subsequently. S/he believed it had happened in 2013. Source E provided an introduction for a company ethnic Russian operative to Source F, a female staffer at the hotel when TRUMP had stayed there, who also confirmed the story. Speaking separately in June 2016, Source B (the former top level Russian intelligence officer) asserted that TRUMP's unorthodox behavior in Russia over the years had provided the authorities there with enough embarrassing material on the now Republican presidential candidate to be able to blackmail him if they so wished.
5. Asked about the Kremlin's reported intelligence feed to TRUMP over recent years and rumours about a Russian dossier of 'kompromat' on

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE~~

Hillary CLINTON (being circulated), Source B confirmed the file's existence. S/he confided in a trusted compatriot that it had been collated by Department K of the FSB for many years, dating back to her husband Bill's presidency, and comprised mainly eavesdropped conversations of various sorts rather than details/evidence of unorthodox or embarrassing behavior. Some of the conversations were from bugged comments CLINTON had made on her various trips to Russia and focused on things she had said which contradicted her current position on various issues. Others were most probably from phone intercepts.

6. Continuing on this theme, Source G, a senior Kremlin official, confided that the CLINTON dossier was controlled exclusively by chief Kremlin spokesman, Dmitry PESKOV, who was responsible for compiling/handling it on the explicit instructions of PUTIN himself. The dossier however had not as yet been made available abroad, including to TRUMP or his campaign team. At present it was unclear what PUTIN's intentions were in this regard.

20 June 2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE~~

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/134

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: FURTHER DETAILS OF KREMLIN LIAISON WITH TRUMP CAMPAIGN

Summary

- Close associate of SECHIN confirms his secret meeting in Moscow with Carter PAGE in July
- Substance included offer of large stake in Rosneft in return for lifting sanctions on Russia. PAGE confirms this is TRUMP's intention
- SECHIN continued to think TRUMP could win presidency up to 17 October. Now looking to reorientate his engagement with the US
- Kremlin insider highlights importance of TRUMP's lawyer, Michael COHEN in covert relationship with Russia. COHEN's wife is of Russian descent and her father a leading property developer in Moscow

Detail

1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in mid October 2016, a close associate of Rosneft President and PUTIN ally Igor' SECHIN elaborated on the reported secret meeting between the latter and Carter PAGE, of US Republican presidential candidate's foreign policy team, in Moscow in July 2016. The secret meeting had been confirmed to him/her by a senior member of SECHIN's staff, in addition to by the Rosneft President himself. It took place on either 7 or 8 July, the same day or the one after Carter PAGE made a public speech to the Higher Economic School in Moscow.
2. In terms of the substance of their discussion, SECHIN's associate said that the Rosneft President was so keen to lift personal and corporate western sanctions imposed on the company, that he offered PAGE/TRUMP's associates the brokerage of up to a 19 per cent (privatised) stake in Rosneft in return. PAGE had expressed interest and confirmed that were TRUMP elected US president, then sanctions on Russia would be lifted.
3. According to SECHIN's close associate, the Rosneft President had continued to believe that TRUMP could win the US presidency right up to 17 October, when he assessed this was no longer possible. SECHIN was keen to re-adapt accordingly and put feelers out to other business and political contacts in the US instead.
4. Speaking separately to the same compatriot in mid-October 2016, a Kremlin insider with direct access to the leadership confirmed that a key role in the secret TRUMP campaign/Kremlin relationship was being played by the Republican candidate's personal lawyer Michael COHEN. [REDACTED]

Source Comment

5. SECHIN's associate opined that although PAGE had not stated it explicitly to SECHIN, he had clearly implied that in terms of his comment on TRUMP's intention to lift Russian sanctions if elected president, he was speaking with the Republican candidate's authority.

Company Comment

6.

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b7c -3

18 October 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/94

RUSSIA: SECRET KREMLIN MEETINGS ATTENDED BY TRUMP ADVISOR, CARTER PAGE IN MOSCOW (JULY 2016)

Summary

- TRUMP advisor Carter PAGE holds secret meetings in Moscow with SECHIN and senior Kremlin Internal Affairs official, DIVYEKIN
- SECHIN raises issues of future bilateral US-Russia energy co-operation and associated lifting of western sanctions against Russia over Ukraine. PAGE non-committal in response
- DIVEYKIN discusses release of Russian dossier of 'kompromat' on TRUMP's opponent, Hillary CLINTON, but also hints at Kremlin possession of such material on TRUMP


Detail

1. Speaking in July 2016, a Russian source close to Rosneft President, PUTIN close associate and US-sanctioned individual, Igor SECHIN, confided the details of a recent secret meeting between him and visiting Foreign Affairs Advisor to Republican presidential candidate Donald TRUMP, Carter PAGE.
2. According to SECHIN's associate, the Rosneft President (CEO) had raised with PAGE the issues of future bilateral energy cooperation and prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related western sanctions against Russia. PAGE had reacted positively to this demarche by SECHIN but had been generally non-committal in response.
3. Speaking separately, also in July 2016, an official close to Presidential Administration Head, S. IVANOV, confided in a compatriot that a senior colleague in the Internal Political Department of the PA, DIVYEKIN (nfd) also had met secretly with PAGE on his recent visit. Their agenda had included DIVEYKIN raising a dossier of 'kompromat' the Kremlin possessed on TRUMP's Democratic presidential rival, Hillary CLINTON, and its possible release to the Republican's campaign team.
4. However, the Kremlin official close to S. IVANOV added that s/he believed DIVEYKIN also had hinted (or indicated more strongly) that the Russian leadership also had 'kompromat' on TRUMP which the latter should bear in mind in his dealings with them.

19 July 2016

~~SECRET~~

FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)



~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

(U) **Title:** ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Document Brief to Republican Candidate for U.S. President

Date: 08/30/2016

From: WASHINGTON FIELD
WF-CI1

Contact: [redacted] [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]
STRZOK PETER P II

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted]

(U)

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER
~~(S//OC/NF)~~ CROSSFIRE RAZOR
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

(U)

[redacted]

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b7C -1
b7E -1

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

Do not disseminate outside the FBI without the permission of the originator or program manager.

(U) **Synopsis:** ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ This communication documents writer's counterintelligence and security briefing to the Republican candidate for U.S. President Donald J. Trump, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie and General (retired) Michael Flynn.

~~Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: FBI
NSISC-20090615
Declassify On: 20411231~~

Full Investigation Initiated: 07/31/2016

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

NSC Declassification Review [EO 13526]
Declassify in Part by DJT on 1/19/2021

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(U) Title: ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Document Brief to Republican Candidate for U.S. President

Re: [redacted] 08/30/2016

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- (U) 1. ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Outline of brief given on 08/17/2016

Details:

On August 17, 2016, writer, provided a counterintelligence and security briefing to U.S. Presidential Candidate Donald J. Trump, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, and retired General Michael Flynn. The brief was held at the FBI's New York Field Office in the [redacted] [redacted] and was in support of ODNI briefings provided to U.S. Presidential candidates and two of their advisors.

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(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Writer's brief lasted approximately thirteen minutes, starting at 1555 and ending at 1608. Upon entering the room Trump, Christie and Flynn shook hands with all of the briefers. Trump, Christie and Flynn sat with their backs to the clocks facing the windows while the briefers sat across from them. An ODNI briefer, [redacted], initiated the briefing by discussing the history of the briefings and establishing the ground rules regarding the brief, specifically that the briefers would not answer policy related questions and would not discuss any operations. Gistaro then introduced writer, who provided the following brief (not verbatim, this is a summary):

(U//FOUO) Good afternoon gentlemen and welcome to the FBI's New York Field Office. My name is [redacted] and I'm a Supervisory Special Agent of a Foreign Counterintelligence Squad at the FBI's Washington Field Office. Prior to you receiving the classified presentations from the ODNI briefers, I will provide you with a counterintelligence and security brief that will give you a baseline on the methodology used by Foreign Intelligence Services to the detriment of U.S. National Security. In addition, this brief will advise you that if you are not already a target of a Foreign Intelligence Service, due to the fact you are receiving this classified briefing, you will be. Foreign Intelligence Services want information pertaining to political,

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b7C -1

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//CONFIDENTIAL~~

Title: ~~(S//FOUO)~~ Document Brief to Republican Candidate for U.S. President

Re: [redacted] 08/30/2016

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b7E -1

economic, energy, technology and military policy/plans of the U.S. This information is extremely valuable to our trusted allies. Putting it plainly, Foreign Intelligence Services look to collect inside information to give their country a competitive advantage over the U.S.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Before I speak to the methodology on how Foreign Intelligence Services collect this information, I should lay out their presence here in the United States. [redacted]

[redacted]

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(U) ~~(S//FOUO)~~ [redacted]

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(S) [redacted] (U)

(U) ~~(S//FOUO)~~ [redacted]

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b7E -4

~~SECRET//CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(U) Title: ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Document Brief to Republican Candidate for U.S. President

Re: [redacted] 08/30/2016

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(U) ~~(S)~~

[redacted]

~~(S)~~ (U)

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(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Flynn then asked writer, "How many Special Agents are in the FBI?" Writer told Flynn he thought over 10,000. Flynn stated, "You have 17,000." Flynn then asked writer, "How many HVE cases does the FBI have?" Writer stated the FBI has approximately [redacted] a statistic backed up by John Mulligan, Deputy Chief of the National Counterterrorism Center. [redacted]

~~(S)~~ (U)

[redacted]

(U//FOUO) Following that exchange, writer continued by stating,

[redacted]

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(U//FOUO)

[redacted]

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~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

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(U) Title: ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Document Brief to Republican Candidate for U.S. President

Re: [redacted] 08/30/2016

[redacted]

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(U//FOUO) [redacted]

[redacted]

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(U//FOUO) [redacted]

[redacted]

b3 -5
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(U//FOUO) Pending any questions gentlemen, that's all I have. I will also remind you the FBI is working with your transition team to provide the team with a similar counterintelligence and security brief. Thank you for your time.

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Following SSA [redacted] briefing the following ODNI briefers presented classified briefings on topics where they are

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~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(U) Title: ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Document Brief to Republican Candidate for U.S. President

Re: [redacted] 08/30/2016

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subject matter experts:

John Mulligan

[redacted]
National Intelligence Manager for [redacted]

b6 -4
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(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~

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b7C -4
b7E -4

(U//FOUO) Due to time constraints, not all ODNI briefers presented their material. At 1750 the briefing ended to allow the candidate to meet his plane at 1900. Trump, Christie and Flynn shook hands with all presenters and exited [redacted] at approximately 1751.

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b7E -2

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~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

FD-340 (Rev. 9-7-97)

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Universal Case File Number

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

Serial # of Originating Document

Date Received 8/17/2016

From

(Name of Contributor)

(Address of Contributor)

(City and State)

By

(Name of Special Agent)

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Title:

CROSSFIRE HURRICANE

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of

OUTLINE USED DURING TRUMP BASE ON

8/17/2016

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FBI (22-cv-2264)-568

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

Request #14

FBI – No Existing Collection Related to Crossfire Hurricane

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

December 22, 2020

TAB #14

Tab #14 refers to a request for "all FBI documents concerning contacts between those agencies and [redacted] or other lawyers from Perkins Coie."

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b7C -3

The FBI is not able to search its holdings for "Perkins Coie" without more information such as FBI custodians and a time period.

If the Department of Justice is able to provide additional information, please contact the FBI Office of Congressional Affairs at [redacted] Thank you.

b7E -3



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/28/2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) On February 11, 2017, JOSEPH MIFSUD, date of birth (DOB) [redacted], Director, London Academy of Diplomacy, mobile telephone number [redacted] email address [redacted] was interviewed in the lobby of the Omni Shoreham Hotel, 2500 Calvert Street, NW, Washington, DC 20008. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, MIFSUD provided the following information:

(U//~~FOUO~~) MIFSUD lives in London and is the Director of the London Academy of Diplomacy, however, he is also an adviser at the London Centre of International Law Practice (LCILP). After reviewing a photograph provided by the interviewing agents, MIFSUD immediately identified the individual as GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS. PAPADOPOULOS is also a member of LCILP, however, MIFSUD first met him in Rome when PAPADOPOULOS traveled with his boss, NAGI IDRIS, to the Link Campus University in Rome approximately 8 months ago. The meeting had approximately 8 participants and was an informational exchange focused on organizing policy seminars and building a relationship between the University and LCILP.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Approximately two months later, MIFSUD met PAPADOPOULOS for the second time when the two had coffee in the UK during the period when PAPADOPOULOS was transitioning from LCILP to a position with the DONALD TRUMP campaign. In addition to MIFSUD and PAPADOPOULOS, OLGA POLENSKAYA, an MBA student from Link Campus University, was at the meeting. POLENSKAYA was in town to meet with IDRIS and MIFSUD. There were no other persons, including foreign officials, present. MIFSUD did not believe POLENSKAYA was related to VLADIMIR PUTIN or any other Russian government officials. MIFSUD stated PAPADOPOULOS was interested in foreign policy ideas, TRUMP's recent speech, Israel, migration, Russia, and other geo political subjects. PAPADOPOULOS did not ask MIFSUD to join the TRUMP campaign during this conversation. MIFSUD described the meeting as happenstance. He was at LCILP and saw PAPADOPOULOS there, so they had lunch in the cafeteria,

~~Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: FBI
NSISC-20090615
Declassify On: 20421231
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~~~

Investigation on 02/10/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/16/2017
by [redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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b7E -1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of JOSEPH MIFSUD, On 02/10/2017, Page 2 of 2b3 -5
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -1

[redacted] followed by coffee at the hotel across from LCILP. During lunch POLENSKAYA and [redacted] were also present.

(U//~~FOUO~~) MIFSUD stated he had no advance knowledge Russia was in possession of emails from the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and, therefore, did not make any offers or proffer any information to PAPADOPOULOS. They spoke about cyber security and hacking as a larger issue. PAPADOPOULOS must have misunderstood their conversation.

(U//~~FOUO~~) MIFSUD believed PAPADOPOULOS and POLENSKAYA may have had a social engagement after the meeting. He also introduced PAPADOPOULOS to IVAN TIMOFEEV, who works at the Russian International Affairs Council, via email.

(U//~~FOUO~~) MIFSUD has not seen PAPADOPOULOS since the UK meeting. He emailed PAPADOPOULOS in December about meeting while MIFSUD was in the US, but he did not meet with him. On or about the same time, MIFSUD received an email from PAPADOPOULOS stating he had left the TRUMP campaign.

(U//~~FOUO~~) After the meeting, MIFSUD emailed one of the interviewing agents with additional information. The email, as well as the photo displayed to MIFSUD, are attached to this communication as a 1A.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Request #17

Pending with DOJ

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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b7C -1

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

December 22, 2020

TAB #17

Tab #17 refers to a request for "all FBI and DOJ records of an August 2016 meeting with FBI officials, Bruce Ohr, [redacted] and/or Andrew Weissman concerning Russia or Trump."

b6 -5
b7C -5

Without information about the FBI custodians or FBI participants, the FBI is not able to search its systems for the referenced August 2016 meeting. The FBI recommends searching the calendars for the three Department of Justice officials named in the request.

If the Department of Justice is able to provide additional information, please contact the FBI Office of Congressional Affairs at [redacted] Thank you.

b7E -3



FBI Info.
Classified by NSICG [redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reason: (C)
Declassify on: 12-31-2042
Date: 10-28-2022

Date of entry 07/12/2017

Admiral Michael Rogers, Director, National Security Agency; and Commander, United States Cyber Command, was interviewed at National Security Agency (NSA) Headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. Participating in the interview were FBI Special Agents [redacted] & [redacted], NSA General Counsel Glenn S. Gerstell, and Deputy Special Counsel Aaron M. Zebley. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the purpose of the interview, Gerstell advised he was participating in the interview in his capacity as the General Counsel for the NSA, not as personal counsel for ADM Rogers, given the substance of the interview related to ADM Rogers' interactions in his capacity as NSA Director. [redacted] advised ADM Rogers that it is a violation of criminal law to lie to the FBI in the course of an investigation, and ADM Rogers said he understood. ADM Rogers provided the following information:

[redacted]

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

Reason: 1.4(c)
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20421231

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 06/12/2017 at Fort Meade, Maryland; United States (In Person)
File # [redacted] Date drafted 06/15/2017
by [redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) Interview of Admiral Michael

Confirmation of FD-302 of Rogers

, On 06/12/2017 , Page 2 of 9

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

b(3) per NSA
b(5) per NSA

[REDACTED]

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

b(1) per NSA
b(3) per NSA

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

b(1) per NSA
b(3) per NSA

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S//NF) Interview of Admiral Michael

Continuation of FD-302 of Rogers

On 06/12/2017 Page 3 of 9

b(1) per NSA
b(3) per NSA

[Redacted]

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

b(1) per NSA and
FBI
b(3) per NSA and
FBI
b(7)(E)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(TS)

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

March 26, 2017 telephone call with POTUS:

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S//NF) Interview of Admiral Michael

Continuation of FD-302 of Rogers

, On 06/12/2017 , Page 4 of 9

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] he received a call from his staff in which he was told President Trump wanted to speak to him. ADM Rogers went to the office and placed the call to the White House. He made the decision to have his Deputy, Richard Ledgett, listen to the call, [REDACTED]

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

Following the telephone call, Ledgett authored a memo on the content of the conversation. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

According to ADM Rogers' recollection of the call and the memo, President Trump expressed frustration with the ongoing investigation into Russian interference, saying that it made relations with the Russians difficult. [REDACTED]

b(1) per NSA
b(3) per NSA
b(5) per NSA

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S//NF) Interview of Admiral Michael

Continuation of FD-302 of Rogers

, On 06/12/2017 , Page 5 of 9

[REDACTED]

b(1) per NSA
b(3) per NSA
b(5) per NSA

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

b(5) per DOJ/
OIP

[REDACTED]

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

b(3) per NSA

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) Interview of Admiral Michael

Continuation of FD-302 of Rogers

, On 06/12/2017 , Page 6 of 9

[REDACTED]

b(3) per NSA

[REDACTED]

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

April 13, 2017 meeting with POTUS:

[REDACTED]

President Trump asked ADM Rogers to stay behind to have a private conversation.

[REDACTED] ADM

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

Rogers described the conversation as President Trump "venting" and recalled President Trump saying something like the "Russia thing has got to go away." He also recalled President Trump saying something similar to "I have done nothing wrong."

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ Interview of Admiral Michael Rogers

Continuation of FD-302 of

On 06/12/2017 Page 7 of 9

[REDACTED]

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S//NF) Interview of Admiral Michael

Continuation of FD-302 of Rogers

, On 06/12/2017 , Page 8 of 9

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

b(1) per NSA
b(3) per NSA

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

b(5) per DOJ/OIP

b(3) per NSA

b(3) per NSA

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) Interview of Admiral Michael

Continuation of FD-302 of Rogers

, On 06/12/2017 , Page 9 of 9

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA~~

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b6-1
b7C-1



UNITED STATES
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(B)(6)

(U) ~~(S)~~ IN RE CARTER W. PAGE, A U.S.
PERSON.

Docket Number: [REDACTED]

(B)(6)

(U) VERIFIED APPLICATION

~~(S)~~ The United States of America hereby applies to this Court for authority to conduct [REDACTED], as described herein, pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), §§ [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (FISA or the Act).

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b7E-4,-5,-8,-9

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
1. (U) Identity of Federal Officer Making Application This application is made by Non-SES PII, a Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) whose official duties at FBI Headquarters include supervision of the FBI's investigation of the above-captioned target based upon information officially furnished to SSA PII.

NSC Declassification Review [EO 13526]
Declassify in Part by DJT on 1/19/2021

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~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA~~

Classified by:
Derived from:
Declassify on:



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OI Tracking No. 147743



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(U) 2. ~~(S)~~ Identity of the Target The target of this application is Carter W. Page, a U.S. person, and an agent of a foreign power, described in detail below. The status of the target was determined in or about June 2017 from information provided by the U.S. Department of State. [REDACTED]

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(U) 3. ~~(S)~~ Statement of Facts The United States relies upon the following facts and circumstances in support of this application.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ The target of this application is an agent of a foreign power.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ The following describes the foreign power and sets forth in detail a description of the target and the target's activities for or on behalf of this foreign power.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ This verified application reports on developments in the FBI's investigation of the above captioned target since the most recent application described herein. Unless stated otherwise herein, information presented in previous applications has been summarized or removed not because it was factually inaccurate but in order to create a more concise document.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ The Government of the Russian Federation is a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1).

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(U) ~~(S)~~ The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is an internationally recognized foreign government and, as of the execution of this application, is listed in the Diplomatic List, published by the United States Department of State, and in Permanent Missions to the United Nations, published by the United Nations, and its establishments in the United States are components thereof.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ Clandestine Intelligence Activities Of The Russian Federation

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[REDACTED]

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(S)

[REDACTED]

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b7E-4,-5

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(U) (S) Carter W. Page

[REDACTED]

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b7E-4,-5

[REDACTED] knowingly engage in clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States, or knowingly conspires with other persons to engage in such activities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

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I. (U) Overview.

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ This application seeks renewed authority to conduct [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] of Carter Page. The FBI believes that Page has been the subject of targeted recruitment by the Russian Government [REDACTED]

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Page is a former foreign policy advisor to a Candidate for U.S.

President (Candidate #1).¹ As discussed in greater detail below, the FBI believes that the Russian Government engaged in efforts to undermine and influence the outcome of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. [REDACTED]

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(U) ~~(S)~~ On or about November 8, 2016, Candidate #1 was elected President. Although Candidate #1 is now the President, in order to maintain the historical accuracy of the background information, unless otherwise stated, the original references to Candidate #1 and members of Candidate #1's campaign team will remain the same as in previous applications filed in this matter (see docket numbers [REDACTED])

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(U) II. ~~(S//NF)~~ The FBI Believes that the Russian Government Engages in Influence Operations Against the United States.

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(U) A. ~~(S//NF)~~ RIS Efforts to Influence U.S. Presidential Elections.

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ During a September 2016 interview with an identified news organization, the then Director of National Intelligence (DNI) stated, "Russia has tried to influence U.S. elections since the 1960s during the Cold War" and "there's a tradition in Russia of interfering with elections, their own and others." The then DNI commented that this influence included providing money to particular candidates or providing disinformation. The then DNI added that "it shouldn't come as a big shock to people, ... I think it's more dramatic maybe because they have the cyber tools that they can bring to bear in the same effort." Sensitive Information



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Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ In or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released a trove of e-mails from the

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Democratic National Committee (DNC). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-4,-5,-8

There has been speculation in the U.S. media that the Russian Government was behind the hack. Russia has publicly denied any involvement in the hack. Russian President Vladimir Putin said in or about September 2016 that Russia was not responsible for the hack, but said that the release of the DNC documents was a net positive: "The important thing is the content that was given to the public."

Despite Russia's denial, Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ According to information on its website, WikiLeaks is a multi-national media organization and associated library. WikiLeaks specializes in the analysis and publication of large datasets of censored or otherwise restricted official materials involving war, spying, and corruption. According to open source information, in or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released thousands of e-mails it says are from the accounts of DNC officials. [REDACTED]

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Sensitive information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In addition, according to an October 7, 2016 *Joint Statement from the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Election Security* (Election Security Joint Statement), the USIC is confident that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and institutions, including from U.S. political organizations. The Election Security Joint Statement states that the recent disclosures of e-mails on, among others, sites like WikiLeaks are consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed efforts. According to the Election Security Joint Statement, these thefts and disclosures were intended to interfere with the U.S. election process; activity that is not new to Moscow – the Russians have used similar tactics and techniques across Europe and Eurasia, for example, to influence public opinion there. The Election Security Joint Statement stated that, based on the scope and sensitivity of these efforts, only Russia's senior-most officials could have authorized these activities. More recently, on December 29, 2016, the White House issued a statement that the U.S. President had ordered a number of actions in response to the Russian Government's aggressive harassment of U.S. officials and cyber operations aimed at the U.S. election. According to this December 29th statement, the U.S. Presidential

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Administration publicized its assessment in October [2016] that Russia took actions intended to interfere with the U.S. election process and that these activities could only have been directed by the highest levels of the Russian Government [in context, this is likely a reference to the Election Security Joint Statement].

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Based on the Russian Government's historical efforts to influence

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U.S. and foreign elections

[REDACTED]

and the information discussed herein regarding Russia's coordination with Carter Page

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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to attempt to undermine and improperly and illegally influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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As stated in the legislative history of FISA:

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[REDACTED]

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Not only do foreign powers engage in spying in the United States to obtain information, they also engage in activities which are intended to harm the Nation's security by affecting the course of our Government, the course of public opinion, or the activities of individuals. Such activities may include political action (recruiting, bribery or influencing of public officials to act in favor of the foreign power), disguised propaganda (including the planting of false or misleading articles or stories), and harassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals who oppose the foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democratic institutions as well as directly threaten the peace and safety of our citizens.

HR. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 41 (1978).

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(U) B. ~~(S//NF)~~ The Russian Government's Coordinated Efforts to Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos³ and Carter Page (the target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part of his/her foreign policy team. [REDACTED]

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Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the FBI believes that the Russian Government's efforts to influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election were being coordinated with Page and perhaps other individuals associated with Candidate #1's campaign. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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(U) ³ ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-4,-5

(S) ~~(S//NF)~~ As discussed below, Page has established relationships with

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~

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[REDACTED]

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Russian Government officials, including Russian intelligence officers, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-4,-5,-8

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) III. ~~(S)~~ Carter Page.

(B)(6)

(U) A. ~~(S)~~ Page's Connections to Russia and the RIS.

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Page, a U.S. citizen, is the founder and managing partner of Global Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment management and advisory firm that focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging markets. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(B)(6)

[REDACTED]

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b7E-4,-5

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(U)

~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

from approximately 2004 - 2007, Page lived in Russia

[REDACTED]

During this time, Page began

business dealings with Gazprom

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ According to information provided by Page during a [redacted] b7E-4,-5

interview with the FBI, [redacted] Page

[redacted]

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[redacted] Sensitive Information

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) [redacted]
[redacted]
Sensitive Information

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b7C-12
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~~(S//NF)~~ Sensitive Information: [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b3-5
b7E-4,-5,-8



b6-12
b7C-12
b7E-4,-5

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ According to information provided by Page during a [REDACTED] interview

with the FBI, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b6-12
b7C-12
b7E-4,-5,-9

[REDACTED] Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ In or about January 2015, Podobnyy, along with Evgeny Buryakov and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 951 (conspiring to act, and acting as, an unregistered agent of a foreign government).

According to the complaint, Buryakov worked in the United States as an agent of the SVR. Specifically, Buryakov operated under non-official cover, posing as an employee in the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. Buryakov worked with two other SVR agents, Podobnyy and Sporyshev, to gather intelligence on behalf of

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
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Russia.⁸ The complaint states that the intelligence gathering efforts of Podobnyy and Sporyshev included, among other things, attempting to recruit New York City residents as intelligence sources for Russia.

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
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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Buryakov was arrested in or about January 2015. At the time of Buryakov's arrest, Podobnyy and Sporyshev no longer lived in the United States and were not arrested. In or about March 2016, Buryakov pled guilty to conspiring to act in the United States as an agent of Russia without providing prior notice to the Attorney General. In or about May 2016, Buryakov was sentenced to 30 months in prison. According to information provided by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Buryakov was released on March 31, 2017.

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~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//FISA~~

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(U) B. ~~(S//NF)~~ Page's Coordination with Russian Government Officials on 2016 U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities.

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ According to open source information, in July 2016, Page traveled to Russia and delivered the commencement address at the New Economic School.⁹ In addition to giving this address, the FBI learned that Page met with at least two Russian officials during this trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI confidential human source (Source #1),¹⁰ [redacted] reported that Page had a

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]

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¹⁰ ~~(TS//NF)~~ Source #1 is a [redacted] and was opened as an FBI source [redacted]. Source #1 has been compensated [redacted] by the FBI. As discussed below in footnote 22, in or about October 2016, the FBI suspended its relationship with Source #1 due to Source #1's unauthorized disclosure of information to the press. Subsequently, the FBI closed Source #1 as an FBI source. Nevertheless, the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable as previous reporting from Source #1 has been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings. Moreover, the

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FBI notes that the incident that led the FBI to terminate its relationship with Source #1 occurred after Source #1 provided the reporting that is described herein.

(U) ~~(TS//NF)~~ Source #1, who now owns a foreign business/financial intelligence firm, was approached by an identified U.S. person, who indicated to Source #1 that a U.S.-based law firm had hired the identified U.S. person to conduct research regarding Candidate #1's ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source #1 have a long-standing business relationship). The identified U.S. person hired Source #1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as to the motivation behind the research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. The FBI speculates that the identified U.S. person was likely looking for information that could be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign.

(U) ~~(TS//NF)~~ Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisite information. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s) described herein, Source #1 provided the information to the identified U.S. person who had hired Source #1 and to the FBI.

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(U) ~~(TS//NF)~~ Notwithstanding Source #1's reason for conducting the research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia, based on Source #1's previous reporting history with the FBI, whereby Source #1 provided reliable information to the FBI, the FBI believes Source #1's reporting herein to be credible.

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secret meeting with Igor Sechin, who is the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy
(S) company] and a close associate to Russian President Putin.¹² [redacted] reported

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[redacted]

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(S//NF)

[redacted]

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b7D-5
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(U) (S//NF) [redacted]

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(U) ¹¹ (S//NF) [redacted]
(S) [redacted]

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¹² (S//NF) In or about April 2014, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (USDOT) announced sanctions that would be taken against Russian Government officials and entities as a result of Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine. Sechin was identified as an official of the Russian Government, and further identified as the President and Chairman of the Management Board for Rosneft, a position he continues to hold. The USDOT announcement also stated Sechin was formerly the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation from 2008 until 2012, and from 2004 until 2008, Sechin was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Russian President Putin. The USDOT sanctions announcement identified Sechin as someone who has "shown utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin - a key component to his current standing."

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that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy cooperation and the prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related Western sanctions against Russia. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and individual [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the individual [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] sensitive information [REDACTED]

Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//FISA~~

[REDACTED] individual
[REDACTED] individual
[REDACTED] individual
Sensitive Information

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b7C-12
b7E-4,-5

[REDACTED] individual

[REDACTED] individual

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(U) [REDACTED] according to Source #1, [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] that Divyekin [who is assessed to be Igor Nikolayevich Divyekin], [REDACTED]

Sensitive Information
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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(S) [REDACTED]

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~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//FISA~~

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had met secretly with Page

and that their agenda for the meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or

"kompromat"¹⁵ that the Kremlin possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility of it

being released to Candidate #1's campaign.¹⁶ [REDACTED]

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(S)

[REDACTED]

(U)

¹⁵ (S) Kompromat is a Russian term for compromising material about a politician or political figure, which is typically used to create negative publicity or blackmail.

(U)

¹⁶ (S//NF)

[REDACTED]

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(S)

[REDACTED]

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b7D-5
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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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(S)



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b7E-4,-5

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(S)

19. ~~(S//NF)~~




b1-1
b3-5
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b7E-4,-5

(B)(6)

(S)

20. ~~(S//NF)~~



b7E-4,-5,-8

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b6-2
b7C-2
b7E-4,-5,-8

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(B)(6)




b3-1
b7D-5
b7E-4,-5

(U)



(B)(6)



(S)

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,-5

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~



(B)(6)

(S)

b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,-5,-8

(B)(6)



(B)(6)

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[REDACTED]

b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,-5

(B)(6)

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b7E-4,-5

[REDACTED] a July 2016 article in an identified news organization reported that

Candidate #1's campaign worked behind the scenes to make sure Political Party #1's platform would not call for giving weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces, contradicting the view of almost all Political Party #1's foreign policy leaders in Washington. The article stated that Candidate #1's campaign sought "to make sure that [Political Party #1] would not pledge to give Ukraine the weapons it has been asking for from the United States." Further, an August 2016 article published by an identified news organization, which characterized Candidate #1 as sounding like a supporter of Ukraine's territorial integrity in September [2015], noted that Candidate #1 had recently adopted a "milder" tone regarding Russia's annexation of Crimea. The August 2016 article further reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate #1 might recognize Crimea as Russian territory and lift punitive U.S. sanctions against Russia. The article opined that while the reason for Candidate #1's shift was not clear, Candidate #1's more conciliatory words, which contradict Political Party #1's official platform, follow Candidate #1's recent association with several people

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sympathetic to Russian influence in Ukraine, including foreign policy advisor Carter

Page.

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b3-5
b7E-4,-5

(B)(6)

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~

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(S)

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b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,-5

(B)(6)

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(S)

b1-1
b3-5
b6-12
b7C-12
b7D-5
b7E-4,-5,-8,-9

(B)(6)

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b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,-5,-19

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b6-12
b7C-12
b7D-5
b7E-4,-5,-8,-9

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[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,-5,-8

(B)(6)

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b3-5
b7E-4,-5,+8

(S)

(U) IV. ~~(S//NF)~~ Page's Denial of Cooperation with the Russian Government to Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ On or about September 23, 2016, an identified news organization published an article (September 23rd News Article), which was written by the news organization's Chief Investigative Correspondent, alleging that U.S. intelligence officials are investigating Page with respect to suspected efforts by the Russian Government to influence the U.S. Presidential election. According to the September 23rd News Article, U.S. officials received intelligence reports that when Page was in Moscow in July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencement address at the New Economic School, he met with two senior Russian officials. The September 23rd News Article stated that a "well-placed Western intelligence source" told the news organization that Page met with Igor Sechin, a longtime Putin associate and former

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
Russian deputy minister who is now the executive chairman of Rosneft. At their alleged meeting, Sechin raised the issue of the lifting of sanctions with Page.

According to the September 23rd News Article, the Western intelligence source also reported that U.S. intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another top Putin aide - Igor Divyekin, a former Russian security official who now serves as deputy chief for internal policy and is believed by U.S. officials to have responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies about the U.S. election.²²

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²²(S) As discussed above, Source #1 was hired by a business associate to conduct research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. Source #1 provided the results of his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the business associate likely provided this information to the law firm that hired the business associate in the first place. Source #1 told the FBI that he/she only provided this information to the business associate and the FBI.



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b7E-4,-5

The FBI does not believe that Source #1 directly provided this information to the identified news organization that published the September 23rd News Article.

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~~(S//NF)~~ In or about late October 2016, however, after the FBI Director sent a letter to the U.S. Congress, which stated that the FBI had learned of new information that might be pertinent to an investigation that the FBI was conducting of Candidate #2, Source #1 told the FBI that he/she was frustrated with this action and believed it would likely influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. In response to Source #1's concerns, Source #1 independently, and against the prior admonishment from the FBI to speak only with the FBI on this matter, released the reporting discussed

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
(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ According to the September 23rd News Article, certain members of Congress were "taken aback" after being briefed on the alleged meetings between Page and Russian officials and viewed the meetings as a possible back channel to the Russians that could undercut U.S. foreign policy. The September 23rd News Article also stated that, following the briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI Director, and citing the reports of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the advisor was unnamed in the letter, but the article indicated that the advisor is Page] and "high ranking sanctioned individuals" [in context, likely a reference to Sechin] in Moscow over the summer as evidence of "significant and disturbing ties" between Candidate #1's campaign and the Kremlin that needed to be investigated by the FBI.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Based on statements in the September 23rd News Article, as well as in other articles published by identified news organizations, Candidate #1's campaign repeatedly made public statements in an attempt to distance Candidate #1's campaign from Page. For example, the September 23rd News Article noted that Page's precise role in Candidate #1's campaign is unclear. According to the article, a spokesperson for Candidate #1's campaign called Page an "informal foreign

herein to an identified news organization. Although the FBI continues to assess Source #1's reporting is reliable, as noted above, the FBI closed Source #1 as an active source.

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advisor" who "does not speak for [Candidate #1] or the campaign." In addition, another spokesperson for Candidate #1's campaign said that Page "has no role" and added "[w]e are not aware of any of his activities, past or present." However, the article stated that the campaign spokesperson did not respond when asked why Candidate #1 had previously described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about September 25, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was based primarily on an interview with Candidate #1's then campaign manager. During the interview, the campaign manager stated, "[Page is] not part of the campaign I'm running." The campaign manager added that Page has not been part of Candidate #1's national security or foreign policy briefings since he/she became campaign manager. In response to a question from the interviewer regarding reports that Page was meeting with Russian officials to essentially attempt to conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government, the campaign manager responded, "If [Page is] doing that, he's certainly not doing it with the permission or knowledge of the campaign . . ."



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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ On or about September 25, 2016, Page sent a letter to the FBI Director.

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In this letter, Page made reference to the accusations in the September 23rd News Article and denied them. Page stated that the source of the accusations was nothing more than completely false media reports and that he did not meet with any sanctioned official in Russia. Page also stated that he would be willing to discuss any "final" questions the FBI may have.²³

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Additionally, on or about September 26, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was based on an interview with Page (September 26th News Article). In the September 26th News Article, Page stated that all of the accusations were complete "garbage" and that he did not meet with Sechin or Divyekin. Page also stated that he was taking a leave of absence from his work with Candidate #1's campaign because the accusations were a "distraction."



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
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b7E-4,-5

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




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(U) v. ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]

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b7D-5
b7E-4,-5,-9


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
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


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24 Sensitive Information [Redacted]
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b7E-4,-5

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(B)(6)

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b7E-4,-5,-8,-9

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Sensitive Information

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Sensitive Information

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b7E-4,-5,-8,-9

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b3-5
b7E-4,-5,-8

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²⁶ Sensitive Information

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b7E-4,-5

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,-5

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b7D-5
b7E-4,-5

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[REDACTED]

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,-5

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

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b3-5
b7E-4,-5,-8

(B)(6)

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[REDACTED]

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(B)(6)

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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(S) [REDACTED]
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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]
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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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(S) [REDACTED]
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b7E-4,-5,-8

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
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(U) G. (S//NF) Page's Letter to the U.S. Department of Justice.

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(U) (S//NF) In or around February 2017, Page sent a letter to the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, urging the review of what Page claimed was "severe election fraud in the form of disinformation, suppression of dissent, hate crimes and other extensive abuses led by members of [Candidate #2's] campaign and their political allies last year." In his letter, Page claims that he has

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not directly supported a political campaign since September 2016, but continues to be subjected to personal attacks by former members of Candidate #2's campaign based on fictitious information. Page wrote that his academic lecture and related meetings with scholars and business people in Moscow had no connection to the U.S. election. Page attributes the assertions in the September 23rd News Article that Page met with two senior Russian officials (i.e., Sechin and Diveykin) while he was in Moscow in July 2016 to give the commencement address at the New Economic School, which Page claims is "false evidence," to Candidate #2's campaign. Page further claims that the information relied on by Candidate #2's campaign, certain members of the U.S. Congress, and the media are lies that were completely fabricated by Candidate #2's paid consultants and private investigators.

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b7E-4,-5

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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
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

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
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b6-12
b7C-12
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(B)(6)

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(B)(6)

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b7C-12
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(B)(6)

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [Redacted]



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b7E-4,-5

(B)(6)



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Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

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■ Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

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Sensitive information

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Sensitive Information

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Sensitive Information

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Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

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~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//ISA~~

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

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Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

VIII. (U) Conclusion.

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ As discussed above, the FBI believes that Page has been collaborating and conspiring with the Russian Government, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Based on the foregoing facts and circumstances, the FBI submits that there is probable cause to believe that Page [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] knowingly engage in clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or on behalf of such foreign power, or knowingly conspires with other persons to engage in such activities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(B).

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(U) (S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the FBI submits that there is probable cause to believe that

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such activities involve or are about to involve violations of the criminal statutes of the United States, [REDACTED]

Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED]

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(U) (S) [REDACTED]

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b7E-4,-5,-8,-9


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b7E-4,-5,-8,-9




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Sensitive Information



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Sensitive Information

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Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//FISA~~

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

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(U) 4. ~~(S)~~ Proposed Minimization Procedures As to all information acquired

through the authorities requested herein, the FBI will follow its [REDACTED]

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Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

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Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

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[Redacted]
[Redacted]
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(U) 5. (S) Nature of the Information Sought Through the authorities requested herein, the United States is seeking foreign intelligence information with respect to the activities of the target described above and detailed further in the certification set forth below. As indicated by the facts set forth herein, the FBI is seeking foreign intelligence information that relates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by agents of this foreign power, and information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and is necessary to the national defense, security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire other foreign intelligence information, as defined by the Act.

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Sensitive Information
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Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(U) 6. ~~(S)~~ Certification The certification of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or an Executive branch official duly designated by the President as a certifying official in Executive Order Numbers [redacted]

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[redacted] as amended, is set forth below.

Sensitive information [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) The Purpose of the Authorities Requested

(U) ~~(S)~~ The FBI's foreign intelligence goals for this investigation are set forth in the certification of the Executive Branch official contained herein. However, the authorities requested in this application may produce information and material which might, when evaluated by prosecutive authorities, constitute evidence of a

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violation of United States law, and this investigation may result in an eventual criminal prosecution of the target. Nevertheless, as discussed in the certification, at least a significant purpose of this request for [REDACTED] is to collect foreign intelligence information as part of the FBI's investigation of this target.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] isitive Information [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]

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(U) 9. (S) Duration of the Authorities Requested (See also, [REDACTED])

The authorities requested should not automatically terminate when foreign intelligence information has first been obtained. Additional information of the same type will be obtained on a continuous basis throughout the entire period requested. The activities which the United States must identify and monitor are incremental and continuous, and communications relating to such activities are often disguised to appear innocuous. The type of foreign intelligence information being sought and the fact that the activities of this target are ongoing preclude the conclusion that, at a given time, all such information has been obtained and collection can be ended. Accordingly, the United States requests the authorities specified herein for a period of ninety (90) days.

[REDACTED] Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Sensitive Information [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Sensitive Information

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[REDACTED]

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~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN/TICA~~

Sensitive Information [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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~~(S)~~ **Specific Authorities Requested** Based upon the foregoing information, the United States requests that this Court authorize the FBI to conduct the activities described immediately below for the period requested herein.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

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Sensitive Information [Redacted]

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Sensitive Information

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Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Sensitive Information

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Sensitive Information [Redacted]

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Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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(U) (S) The FBI has reviewed this verified application for accuracy in accordance with its April 5, 2001 procedures, which include sending a copy of the draft to the appropriate field office(s). A copy of those procedures was previously provided to the Court.

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(U) VERIFICATION

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(U) ~~(S)~~ I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information regarding Carter W. Page is true and correct. Executed pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, § 1746 on 06 ~~11~~ 2017.

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(U) CERTIFICATION

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(U) ~~(S)~~ I, the undersigned, having been designated as one of the officials authorized to make the certifications required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, do hereby certify with regard to the [redacted]

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[redacted] requested in this verified application targeting Carter W. Page, an agent of the Government of Russia, a foreign power, as follows:

(A) (U) The information sought through the authorities requested herein is foreign intelligence information.

(B) (U) At least a significant purpose of the authorities requested herein is to obtain foreign intelligence information and, notwithstanding the related criminal matters described in this application, the primary purpose of the authorities requested herein is not to obtain information for the prosecution of crimes other than those referred to in the Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)-(e), or related to such foreign intelligence crimes.

(C) (U) The foreign intelligence information sought by the authorities requested herein cannot be reasonably obtained by normal investigative techniques.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ The type of foreign intelligence information being sought through the authorities requested herein is that described in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(C), i.e.,

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information that relates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by agents of this foreign power, and 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B), i.e., information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and is necessary to the national defense or security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire foreign intelligence information as defined by other subsections of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).

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(U) (E) (S) The basis for my certification that the information sought is the type of foreign intelligence information specified herein and that such information cannot be obtained by normal investigative techniques is as follows.

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(U) (S)

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Sensitive Information

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Sensitive information

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Sensitive Information

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
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Sensitive Information

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Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

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Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

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(U) (S) Based upon the foregoing information, it is the Government's belief that the authorities requested herein targeting Page are critical investigative means for obtaining the foreign intelligence information identified herein.

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(U) (S) Accordingly, I execute this certification regarding Carter W. Page in accordance with the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended.

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation



Andrew G. McCabe
Deputy Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Rex Tillerson
Secretary of State

John J. Sullivan
Deputy Secretary of State

Michael Pompeo
Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency

James N. Mattis
Secretary of Defense

Daniel R. Coats
Director of National Intelligence

H.R. McMaster
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence

26/2017
Date

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(U) APPROVAL

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(U) ~~(S)~~ I find that this application regarding Carter W. Page satisfies the criteria and requirements for such applications set forth in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and hereby approve its filing with this Court.

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
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[Redacted]



Rod J. Rosenstein
Deputy Attorney General of the United States

6/17
Date

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(U) ~~(S)~~ WHEREFORE, the United States submits that this application regarding Carter W. Page satisfies the criteria and requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and therefore requests that this Court authorize the activities described herein, and enter the proposed orders and warrants which accompany this application.

Respectfully submitted,

Non-SES PII

Attorney
U.S. Department of Justice

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Filed
United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court

JUN 2017

LeeAnn Flynn Hall, Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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IN RE CARTER W. PAGE, A U.S.

Docket Number:

PERSON

PRIMARY ORDER AND WARRANT

1. An application having been made by the United States of America pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ [REDACTED] (FISA or the Act), for an order and warrant (hereinafter "order") for [REDACTED] and full consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court finds as follows:

b3-5
b7E-4,-5,-8,-9

[REDACTED] 2. The application has been made by a Federal officer and approved by the Attorney General;

[REDACTED] 3. On the basis of the facts submitted in the verified application, there is probable cause to believe that:

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Derived from: Application to the USFISC
in Docket Number captioned above

b1-1
b3-5

Declassify on: [REDACTED]

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(A) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is a foreign power and Carter W. Page is an agent of Russia, as defined by

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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4. The minimization procedures proposed in the application have been adopted by the Attorney General and meet the definition of minimization procedures under [REDACTED]

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5. The application contains all statements and certifications required by [REDACTED] and the certification is not clearly erroneous on the basis of the statements made under [REDACTED] and any other information furnished under [REDACTED]

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WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred on this Court by the Act, that the application of the United States is GRANTED, and it is

FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:

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1. The United States is authorized to conduct [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] of the target as follows; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-4,-5,-8,-9

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6. The authorities approved are for the period indicated below unless otherwise ordered by this Court.

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As to all information acquired through the authorities approved herein, the FBI shall [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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• [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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| [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

— The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank. —

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[REDACTED]

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This authorization regarding Carter W. Page expires at [redacted] Eastern Time
on the [redacted] day of September, 2017.

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
Signed

06-[redacted]-2017 [redacted]

Eastern Time

Date

Time



RAYMOND J. DEARIE
Judge, United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court

[redacted] Deputy Clerk,
(B)(6), certify that this document
is a true and correct copy of the
original. [redacted]

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