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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-07-2017 BY F54M93K42

SECRET

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

3/6/75

SECRET

LEGAL ATTACHE

MONTONEROS;
ERP

On 3/6/75, an official of the Argentine Army Intelligence Service (SIE), provided the following information: (S) (U)

Several SIE sources planted in Villa Devoto Prison have reported during the past week that several medium level ERP prisoners have bitterly accused various Montonero prisoners of selling out the principals of the Montonero organization to JOSE LOPEZ REGA. (S) (U)

Specifically, the SIE sources reported that the ERP members indicated that the Juventud Peronista Region I and its corresponding Montonero supporters have been bought out by Agents of JOSE LOPEZ REGA. The SIE sources reported that the ERP members stated that other members of the Montonero organization were cooperating with the ERP in their battle against the Government and specifically mentioned joint ERP-Montonero cooperation in the province of Tucuman. (S) (U)

This information was [rated A-1 by SIE]. (S) (U)

1 - Addressee
1 - POL
1 - POL/R
1 - SY
1 - DAO
4 - Buenos Aires
(1 - 109-38)
(1 - 109-Montoneros)
(1 - 109-103)
[(1 - 80-Lucero)] (S) (U)

RWS:jn
(9)

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-96 PAGE 1 ONLY
SP6 Ag/CAL/DK 10-1-96
#90-0371

Classified by: DPMGJC
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89

284394
3/23/01 39063 EIN Oct/Sat

CLASSIFIED BY: SP6 Ag/CAL
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X X (1)

SECRET
Classified by 5931
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on IMDBT

argentina proyecto 2495

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(S)(U)

[12 31]

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THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

3/11/75

LEGAL ATTACHE

Classified by [illegible]
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

MONTONERO THREAT AGAINST
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION

On 3/11/75, JACK BARTHOLF, President, Union Carbide Corporation, Buenos Aires, advised that between the hours of 11:20 A.M., 3/10/75, and 3:30 A.M., 3/11/75, nine separate telephone calls were received from an anonymous caller, speaking in the Spanish language, at the offices of Union Carbide. BARTHOLF advised that the unidentified caller claimed he represented the Montoneros and stated that unless Union Carbide normalized their Eversady Battery production within 72 hours an attack would be carried out against the company's office. (S)(U)

BARTHOLF stated that the caller, according to Union Carbide employees who took his calls, spoke with a provincial accent. BARTHOLF indicated the caller stated that Union Carbide was an enemy of the Fatherland and that he uttered slogans such as "Remember Vandor" and "Remember Ellis." (S)(U)

BARTHOLF advised that at 11:30 A.M., a call was received at the Union Carbide factory's shipping department during which similar threats were made. (S)(U)

BARTHOLF advised that the Union Carbide factory in Jesus Maria, Cordoba Province, had been subjected to an apparent surveillance by various unknown individuals driving a Torino and a Fiat automobile. (S)(U)

BARTHOLF advised that approximately two weeks ago an unidentified male and female approached the owner of a residential hotel located at the rear of the Union Carbide office and attempted to secure permission from the hotel management to observe the Union Carbide's office building. BARTHOLF stated that the hotel management refused but delayed notifying Union Carbide until today. (U)(S)

BARTHOLF advised that the foregoing information had been provided to the Federal Police of Argentina (FPA) and that FPA were conducting appropriate investigation. (S)(U)

1 - Ambassador
1 - POL
1 - POL/R
1 - ECOn Counselor
1 - SY
2 - Buenos Aires (109-103)
(1) - 109-Montoneros)

RWS:jn
(7)

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(U)(S)

105-767-327

DECLASSIFIED BY 5/26/89 KAL/39063 ELW/BCE/SM
ON 11-1-95 5/23/90
APPEAL # 90-0371

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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-06-2018 BY: F57M88K71
FBI INFORMATION ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ A-103

Department of State

Dept. Pass: USCINCSO for POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS APRIL 25, 1975
TAGS: FINS, ASEC, AR

AmEmbassy BUENOS AIRES

Text of a Letter Mailed to the Embassy by the Montoneros Terrorist Organization

Begin ~~Confidential~~

The following is an English translation of a letter mailed to the Embassy on April 7, 1975, purportedly by the Montoneros terrorist organization. The letter is dated April 2, 1975. It provides a short history of the formation of the right-wing Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance and gives some details of its activities and victims. Except for a minor reference [redacted] the letter attaches no culpability to the Embassy for AAA activities. Although obviously biased in favor of the Montoneros, it is judged that the information contained therein is largely accurate.

b1 per CIA

End ~~Confidential~~

HILL

105-767-33

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APR 29 1975
LEGAL ATTACHE—BUENOS AIRES

Montoneros file

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BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED

1. On this date, the "Gustavo Natalio Stenfer" combat unit, integrated by the platoons "Atilio López" and "Julio Troxler", of the MONTONEROS organization, launched an attack against the Operating Chief of the "Alianza Anticomunista Argentina", also known as "AAA", Commissioner of Police Major Juan Ramón Morales. During the ambush, the unexpected action of military troops which came to help this sinister murderer, made it impossible to complete the execution. As a consequence of the struggle the death took place of Lieutenant Colonel Colombo, in charge of the men in the "Dirección Remonta" as well as of one of the bodyguards of Commissioner Major Morales, who was wounded. Another member of his numerous custody was also wounded.

There were no deaths or wounded persons in the Combat Unit of our Organization.

2. LOPEZ REGA, THE POLITICAL HEAD OF AAA.

The AAA was born immediately after May 25, 1973, as the armed branch of the Social Welfare Minister José López Rega's politics.

The purpose of this politics is to destroy Peronism, distorting its political values, depriving it of its social contents and identifying its economic purposes with those of American imperialism.

Theoretically it is a caricature of Fascism, which has been expressly asserted by López Rega's ideological spokesmen: the "Las Bases" and "El Caudillo" papers. In practice it adulterates the acting and governing channels of Peronism, it liquidates its historical structures and prosecutes and exterminates its best men.

3. HOW THE "AAA" WAS BORN.

Immediately after assuming his position as Minister of Social Welfare, LOPEZ REGA evidenced an obsessive desire to create its own "military power", equivalent to the Nazi SS.

Lacking major support, and while he planned to get control of the Federal Police, he had to satisfy himself with creating a parallel police force within the Ministry. For that purpose he chose Commissioner VILLAR, whose brutal methods were well known by popular militants during LANUSSE's dictatorship.

Commissioner VILLAR surrounds himself with the dregs of three generations of policemen: about a hundred former policemen who had been discharged without honors, subject to legal processes and even jailed as thieves, "Mexicans", counselors, drug traffickers and pimps.

For these reasons, and a few more, retired sub-Commissioner MORALES and retired sub-Inspector Rodolfo Eduardo Almiron managed to reach outstanding positions.

MORALES was appointed Security Chief of the Social Welfare Ministry, while ALMIRON entered the Presidential corps of bodyguards. At the death of General Perón he displaced Juan Esquer and currently holds omnipotent powers on the bodyguards surrounding the President Isabel Martinez.

To reach those high positions it was essential to destroy their relative records, which were stained with shameful crimes, and it made a laughing stock of the police grades, the model of which was LOPEZ REGA himself, who was promoted from retired corporal to General Commissioner. On October 11, 1973, through Decree No. 1858, MORALES and ALMIRON were reinstated to the Federal Police. In a few months MORALES jumped two grades (from sub-Commissioner to Inspector Commissioner) and ALMIRON four (from sub-Inspector to sub-Commissioner).

The assault forces under LOPEZ REGA and VILLAR acted in Ezeiza, on June 20, 1973, with the tragic results we know. But it was only in September 1973 that the "AAA" was finally structured, under the political command of Minister LOPEZ REGA, the supervision of Commissioner VILLAR and military coaching of C ommissioner MORALES and ALMIRON.

The appointment of VILLAR as chief of the Federal Police and of General Commissioner Luis MARGARIDE as underchief, asserted at the beginning of 1974 the full power of Minister LOPEZ REGA on the most important police organization of the country and represented a return to the old anti-Peronist "gorilas". and their repressive methods. From that time, the AAA enjoyed the internal structure of the Federal Police and was assured the complete impunity for its crimes. For example, whenever the AAA decided to "operate" in a given area, the police stations received instructions not to patrol said areas.

At the same time, even the Presidential bodyguards, through ALMIRON, were incorporated to the AAA, through military and policemen, about whom the people shall be duly informed as justice is being done.

4. AN ANTIPERONIST ALLIANCE

The AAA made its public appearance in October 1973, attacking and nearly murdering Radical Senator Hipólito Solari Yrigoyen, linked to the defense of the Trelew martyrs. Its real organization, though, was carried out between November 1973 and July 1974, through a series of attacks which, as evidenced by their very up-to-date and powerful weapons, clearly exceeded the scope of the forces which, as the

Organization Command and the GN , has protected so far the right wing "gorila" and reactionary vanguard.

Scores of sites of the "Juventud Peronista", "JTP" and "GUP" were dynamited. Five bombings during the dawn of December 13 and nineteen during January 26, 1974 signalled the start of an escalation of violence from which no "Unidad Básica" or any of the press organs of the authentical Peronism managed to escape.

The first execution clearly marked with the "AAA" trademark was the murder of the priest Carlos Mújica, ambushed at the entrance of a church, in 1974, as retaliation for having objected to the policy of Minister López Rega as regarded the "shanty towns" (villas), and for having condemned the murder of "villero" Alberto CHEJOLAN, during March of that year.

On July 31, the AAA murdered in the center of downtown and two blocks away from Police Station 15th, the Peronist Deputy Rodolfo Ortega Peña.

On August 6 and 7 kidnapped and murdered in La Plata the Peronist militants Horacio Chaves, Rolando Chaves, Luis Macor and Carlos Pierini, whose corpses, sadistically mutilated, were found in different empty lots.

On August 22, the Montoneros militants Eduardo Beckerman and Pablo Van Lierde were kidnapped and murdered in Quilmes. On September 7, 1974, the AAA placed a bomb in the flat of the Dean of the Buenos Aires University, Raúl Laguzzi, and killed his baby son Pablo, four months old.

On September 11, Dr. Curuchet, legal counsel for the mechanical workers in Córdoba, was kidnapped and murdered with a volley of shots. On September 16, Atilio López, Vice-Governor until he was destituted by the police sedition commanded by Colonel Navarro, was kidnapped from the hotel where he was staying and his body appeared afterwards, badly shot.

On September 20 Julio Troxler was murdered and on October 13, Pedro Barraza. What all these men had in common was the fact that they were Peronists and during two decades participated in a struggle to which Minister LOPEZ REGA was alien. He was never sent to jail, never tortured, never committed in any liberating project, but he managed to infiltrate himself at the side of General PERON. The events reveal more eloquently than "communications" and written initials, the real essence of this organization that started by calling itself "Anti-Imperialist Alliance", then "Anti-Communist Alliance" and is, in fact, an "Anti-Peronist Alliance" which has taken hold of the government over the blood and

sacrifices of authentic Peronists.

5. ISABEL MARTINEZ: AN ACCOMPLICE

The methods used by the AAA made routine of the procedure whereby a people's militant man is violently removed from his home by a group of men who exhibit official documents and use ultramodern cars. He then surfaces in the empty lots of Lugano or in the Ezeiza swimming pools, his hands tied behind his back, blindfolded, and with the body perforated by thirty, fifty and even one hundred shots of the most modern firearms.

As from December last, the AAA incorporated a perverse modality, learned from the CIA, that mass-executes people using explosive charges on the bodies of three and even five persons tied together.

Even though most victims were Peronists, other militants have not been spared: members of the PRT, delegates from the PST, activists from the Communist Party and even leaders of the VIP and the "Revolutionary Communist Party".

Either directly or through different groups which have adopted their techniques, the AAA, in eight months, has murdered 150 persons. Only in December 1974 their victims numbered twentynine. They have built their own jails, where they keep condemned men for weeks at a time, until their bodies are found somewhere. They have attacked foreign citizens that tried to find a haven in our country, from General Prats, Minister of the War of President Allende, up to former "Tupamaros". They have even taken the liberty to air ship to Uruguay five prisoners, to be executed by the army of that country, after its Military Attaché was murdered in Paris.

Yet none of the AAA members have been detained, none of their headquarters has been burglared, none of its members has been officially identified. If no other evidences were available, those are enough to ensure that THE AAA IS THE GOVERNMENT.

But there are other evidences, and President Isabel MARTINEZ is aware of them, at least from the last multiparty meeting, when Doctor Ricardo Balbin delivered to her a confidential report containing the names of the AAA members, headed by LOPEZ REGA. Morales and Almirón, and the individuals who constitute her guard and surround her every day. After that, Isabel MARTINEZ did not receive BALBIN again and she is now either the direct accomplice of the AAA murders or at least their accessory after the fact. It may also be that due to her intimate association with Minister LOPEZ REGA she may share its political leadership.

6. WHO IS MORALES

He represents the typical AAA member. At the beginning of the 60's and together with sub-Inspector AIMARON, sub-officer Edwin FARQUARSON (now an active member of the AAA) and others, they constituted a group that was closely associated to the gang of the Miguel Prieto, delinquent, alias "El Loco" (the Crazy Man). When their criminal activities were uncovered, thanks to the disloyalty of one of their own members, they started to massacre their former companions. There is a long list of victims, all of which were found in empty lots, sadistically shot and with their hands tied and burned. This culminated in the Villa Devoto Penitenciary, where "Crazy Prieto" "committed suicide" ... by ... being burnt alive ...

Though they were legally prosecuted, and found innocent, nobody doubted that they were guilty of the very crimes they were committed to prosecute, as members of the Police force. This was reasserted when MORALES was again detained and processed in 1968, as thief and smuggler of motorcars.

The record of his disciple AIMIRON, Chief of bodyguards of the President Isabel MARTINEZ, is equally shameful. In addition to a similar record, there is a very strange circumstance in his criminal career: he participated in the murder of Earl Davis, a lieutenant of the American Army, which took place on June 9, 1964, in an Olivos night club. The material murderer of Earl Davis was José Vicente LAVIA, to this day MORALES' secretary and active member of the AAA gang.

7. THE MEANING OF THIS OPERATION

This attack means that the Montoneros organization shall be loyal, up to its last drop of blood, to the Peronist order of "meeting the brutal force of the enemies of our country with the organized people's forces". It means that, as it was the case with all other attempts to overpower Peronism, since 1955, this one shall also be defeated. It means that the authentic Peronism shall not join the choir of all the accomplices who, being aware of the full truth regarding the AAA (which have ceased to be a mystery a long time ago) have kept silent before the people, and keep doing so, without denouncing or publicly attacking the responsible parties in this monstrous conspiration against our country.

And it also means that the authentic Peronism is ready to join forces once again against the Armed Forces, which have enthusiastically shared in the repression of the people and which directly justify the AAA methods, such is the case of the tortures and killings of common citizens and militants that are being carried out in Tucumán.

The Montoneros Organization shall keep intensively attacking the wide net of accomplices which are the basis of the AAA operations, the main structure of which is to be found in the Federal Police and some units of the Provincial Police Stations. Each police unit where a people's militant has been murdered or tortured shall be attacked by us. We have never attacked, and we shall not attack, those policemen who limit themselves to comply with their duties within the legal framework now in force. But we shall have no mercy regarding policemen belonging to units where the people are repressed, tortured and murdered and particularly in the case of the units cooperating with the AAA.

We know that there are thousands of Peronist police members who have never participated or are ready to participate, in crimes against the people. We ask their fullest collaboration to keep on identifying the torturing and murdering policemen.

THE AUTHENTIC PERONISM COMES BACK - PERON OR DEATH, LONG LIVE OUR FATHERLAND UNTIL WE SUCCEED, OUR GENERAL! - MONTONEROS

FINISH UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

FILE 109-103

5/7/75

LEGAT ROBERT W. SCHERRER

(U)

(S) ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

Classified by ORLAC 90
Declassify on: OADR 10/10/89
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On 5/3/75, I contacted Comisario General DEGASTALDI, Deputy Chief, Buenos Aires Provincial Police (BAPP), and Comisario Inspector OSVALDO DE BALDRICH, at the request of RSO GEORGE BECKETT, in order to ascertain whether the BAPP had recovered any information indicating that CPO STAMER of the Defense Attache's Office had been targeted for kidnapping by the ERP. (S)(U)

It should be noted that STAMER's guard on his residence, who is an employee of the Brown Security Agency, was informed by a neighbor, identified only as Mr. DURAN, who resides at Anchorena 502, La Lucila, that the latter had been advised by two BAPP officers named ROSSI and OJEDA, whom DURAN employs at his factory in Vicente Lopez, as security guards; that papers were recovered from the bodies or body of terrorists killed in a shootout on 4/26/75 in Munro, while apparently conducting a casing operation against a Sub-Comisario of the Federal Police of Argentina. (S)(U)

According to information provided by DURAN, which he obtained from ROSSI and OJEDA, among the papers recovered was a notation that a member of the "Yanqui" military mission resided at the corner of Anchorena and Castellano and apparently had been under observation for some terrorist act. The BAPP, 1st Precinct, in Vicente Lopez conducted initial investigation into the attempted assassination of the FPA Sub-Comisario, but once it had been established that this was a Federal crime, all evidence and information developed during the preliminary BAPP investigation was turned over to the FPA. (S)(U)

BECKETT advised that inquiry at the First Precinct of the BAPP and the FPA failed to develop any information indicating that STAMER's identity or residence had been listed among documents recovered at the scene of the shootout on 4/26/75. (S)(U)

BECKETT requested that I contact the BAPP Deputy Chief of Intelligence, in order to attempt to verify this information. When he contacted, Deputy Chief DEGASTALDI and Chief of Intelligence DE BALDRICH, both appeared amazed that any information regarding the American Embassy or its personnel had been recovered after the 4/26/75 shootout. They promised to immediately conduct approp- (S)(U)

1 - 105-767 (Montoneros) (S)(U)
1 - 80-BAPP (S)(U)
RWS:jn
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1 - 80-De Baldrich (S)(U)
1 - 109-38 (ERP)

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riate inquiries and advise me as soon as any results had been obtained. S/U

Deputy Chief DEGAS advised that the BAPP recently uncovered information linking a Police Comisario with the surname "ESTELLA" to the Montonero guerrilla organization. DEGAS noted that ESTELLA's name had been picked up among various documents in a Montonero command house located in Buenos Aires Province. DEGAS noted that the BAPP had tentatively identified Comisario ESTELLA as a retired FPA Comisario, who was in charge of security guards service program at the U. S. Embassy. DEGAS noted that Comisario ESTELLA, who is employed by the Embassy has two other brothers, who also have the rank of Comisario, one of whom is employed by the BAPP and the other is a retired FPA Comisario. DEGAS requested that the foregoing information be maintained on a confidential basis until it could definitely be established which of the ESTELLA brothers is the Montonero collaborator. S/U

During the evening of 5/3/75, I passed on the above information regarding Comisario ESTELLA to RSO GEORGE BECKETT, who agreed not to take any action or disclose the information to any other individual until DEGASTALDI was able to positively establish the identity of the Montonero collaborator. S/U

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DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42

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BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE:

6/1/01 390635/lw BCE/sam argentina project

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

CLASSIFIED BY: 5964 8/26/75
REASON: 1.5 (B) (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (5) X (6)
#90-037 11295

LEGAT ROBERT W. SCHERRER

Declassified/Released
Declassify on: OADR 10/15/69
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(U) ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

On 8/25/75, a ranking official of the Federal Police of Argentina (FPA) Intelligence Service provided the following information regarding the recent death of Montonero leader MARCOS OSATINSKY in Cordoba: (U)

According to the FPA delegation in Cordoba, OSATINSKY, whose Montonero code name was "SANTIAGO," was picked up approximately three weeks ago by Cordoba Provincial Police and members of Governor LACABANNE's Security Detail. OSATINSKY was severely tortured by members of Governor LACABANNE's Security Detail over an extended period of time; however, he refused to divulge any information. OSATINSKY was in such bad shape that it became obvious he would have to be killed rather than produce him alive since the marks of torture would be obvious. In order to dispose of OSATINSKY, whose detention was known among extremists in Cordoba, it was decided to stage his assassination in connection with a fictitious rescue attempt. Three Cordoba Provincial Police Officers volunteered to take part in the charade with the understanding they would have to submit to being slightly wounded during the performance. (U)

The hijacking of the hearse transporting OSATINSKY's body from Cordoba to Tucuman was not carried out by the Montoneros as indicated in the press, but by the same members of Governor LACABANNE's Security Staff, who had tortured OSATINSKY. The purpose of stealing his body was to prevent the body from being subjected to an autopsy, which would have clearly shown that he had been tortured. It is doubtful that OSATINSKY's body will ever turn up. (U)

Attached is a photograph of OSATINSKY taken during 1972 at Rawson Prison. (U)

Addressee
Buenos Aires
(1 - 109-2)(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 105-Montoneros)(1 - 80-Lovetto)
(1 - 105-1098-OSATINSKY)
JM

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EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(2)
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THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

8/28/75

LEGAT ROBERT W. SCHERRER

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MONTONEROS

On 8/27/75, I met with Inspector General ENRIQUE EVERARDO SILVA, Chief of the Buenos Aires Provincial Police (BAPP), and Comisario General ANGEL DE GASTALDI, the Deputy Chief of the BAPP, in La Plata. Both of these officials advised that the BAPP Intelligence Service has instituted an extremely secret and sensitive investigation in order to identify a Montonero collaborator named Comisario STELLA, whose name had been picked up in documents seized in a BAPP raid against the Montoneros during mid-April, 1975. (S)(U)

Inspector General SILVA and Comisario General DE GASTALDI advised that through high level liaison with the State Secretariat for Information (SIDE), it was ascertained that the name of Comisario STELLA had been picked up during an independent Army Intelligence Service (SIE) raid against the Montoneros during May, 1975. The officials pointed out that in both instances only the name "Comisario STELLA"had been discovered in file indices and other papers seized during the two independent raids. According to the above named officials, it wasn't clear whether Comisario STELLA was a target or a collaborator of the Montoneros. According to Inspector General SILVA and Comisario General DE GASTALDI, intensive BAPP Intelligence Service investigation indicates to date that Comisario STELLA is probably a collaborator, unwitting or willing, of the Montoneros. (S)(U)

The above mentioned officials indicated that to date Comisario STELLA had not been positively identified; however, BAPP Intelligence Service investigation established there is a family named "STELLA," which has two brothers, who are Comisarios with the BAPP, and one a retired Comisario with the Federal Police of Argentina (FPA). The above officials identified the retired FPA Comisario as DANIEL STELLA, who is retained at the U. S. Embassy, Buenos Aires, Security Office. (S)(U)

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1 - Addressee
1 - SY
3 - Buenos Aires (S)(U)
(1 - 105-767)(1 - 64-81)
(1 - 109-103)
RWS:jn (5)

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MONTONEROS

Inspector General SILVA and Comisario General DE GASTALDI emphasized that the situs of both the SIE and BAPP raids was in Buenos Aires Province and that in all probability the Comisario STELLA contained in the Montonero documents refers to one of the BAPP Comisarios named STELLA. These officials requested that no action be taken against Comisario STELLA, inasmuch as there is no positive evidence to establish that he is the individual mentioned in the Montonero documents. Inspector General SILVA and Comisario General DE GASTALDI promised to advise of the outcome of the BAPP Intelligence Service investigation with regard to Comisario STELLA.

The foregoing information should not be discussed or mentioned to any foreign government officials, including those of the Argentine Government.

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CONFIDENTIAL

THE AMBASSADOR 8/29/75

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

MONTONEROS

On 8/28/75, Herb Lishinsky, Managing Director, Chrysler Corporation of Buenos Aires, Argentina, made available the following information: (S)(U)

On 8/8/75, several carloads of armed individuals attacked the guard post at the Chrysler San Justo plant with hand grenades and kept the guards at bay with automatic weapon fire. A portion of the attackers entered the Chrysler San Justo grounds, while the others kept the guards pinned down with gunfire. The group that entered the Chrysler grounds proceeded to the section where the administrative offices are located, threw hand grenades and raked the building with automatic weapon fire. (S)(U)

On 8/15/75, a letter was received from the Montonero organization claiming credit for the 8/8/75 attack. The Montoneros accused Chrysler of planting widespread missery among their workers by discharging them in large numbers. (S)(U)

On 8/22/75 letters were received at the residences of the Chrysler Personnel Director and the Director of Quality Control from the Montonero organization condemning them to death should Chrysler carry out large-scale personnel reductions in September, 1975. (S)(U)

DECLASSIFIED BY 3906 3 E/W BCE/SOM ON 10-24-95 6-1-01 Argentina Project

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1 - Addressee XEROX

NOV 3 1989

cc: 1 - POL
1 - POL-R
1 - SY
1 - Economic Counsellor (S)(U)
2 - Buenos Aires (105-767) Montoneros
(1 - 109-103.
Argentine Terrorist Activities)
RWS:gjk
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DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42

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TELETYPE URGENT-PRIORITY

TO: DIRECTOR NR. 132 -03

LEGAT, BRASILIA NR. 029 -03

SECRET FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-103)

ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA. (S) (U)

FOR INFORMATION, THE ARGENTINE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ADVISED THAT INFORMATION TAKEN IN A RAID AGAINST THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION APPROXIMATELY SIX WEEKS AGO IN BUENOS AIRES UNCOVERED INFORMATION THAT THE MONTONEROS WERE CONDUCTING A CASING OPERATION AGAINST LT. COL. ARTHUR F. ELIASON, U.S. MARINE CORPS WHO WAS IS ASSIGNED TO THE U. S. MILITARY GROUP IN ARGENTINA. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE ARGENTINE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, THE MONTONEROS APPARENTLY SELECTED COL, ELIASON FOR EITHER A KIDNAPPING OR ASSASSINATION OPERATION; HOWEVER, FROM DATA COLLECTED BY THE MONTONEROS, IT APPEARED THAT THE CASING OPERATION WAS NOT BEING PROFESSIONALLY CONDUCTED AND HAD DEVELOPED LITTLE INFORMATION OF VALUE IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT AN ACTUAL OPERATION. (S)

UTL. Bu. Original
CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-96 PAGE 1 & 2
Appeal # 90-0371 SP6 Ag/CAL/DL

CLASSIFIED BY: SP6 Ag/CAL
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (1)

THE ARGENTINE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ADVISED THE MAIN (S) (U)

39063 ELW/BCE/DG 5-23-01
Argentina Project
Appeal # 90-0371

2 - Bue (109-103)
(1) [105-767] Montoneros)

RWS:gjk
(2)

(S) (U)

NOV 3 1989

XEROX

Classified by: DDIAB (1)
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

SECRET

(S) (U)

[105-767-38]

SECRET

POINT OF THE ELIASON EPISODE IS THAT THE MONTONEROS CONTINUE TO TARGET U. S. EMBASSY PERSONNEL IN BUENOS AIRES WITH TERRORIST ACTS. ALL EMBASSY COMPONENTS AND THEIR HEADQUARTERS ARE AWARE OF THE FOREGOING INFORMATION AND IT IS PROVIDED TO THE BUREAU ONLY FOR INFORMATION. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT NO DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION BE MADE. (S) (U)

COL. ELIASON HAS BEEN SCHEDULED TO DEPART ARGENTINA WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931, XGDS- 1, 2 AND 4.~~

END.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42

CONFIDENTIAL

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-96 page 1 only

9/4/75
UTL Bur. Original
CLASSIFIED BY: SP6 A9/CAL
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (U)

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

A9/CAL/DK appeal 96-0321
3906 EL/PUCE 10-24-95 5-25-01
Argentina Project

APPEAL #96-0321
3906 EL/PUCE 10-24-95
Argentina Project 5/31/01

ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

On 9/3/75, an official of the Argentine Army Intelligence Service (AAIS) provided the following information: (S) (U)

In addition to the raids noted in the press which were carried out by the Buenos Aires Provincial Police (BAPP) during the weekend of 8/30-9/1/75, the AAIS, through a penetration agent in the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), extralegally detained a high ranking official of the ERP, ranking third or fourth in that organization, immediately after Mario Roberto Santucho and Enrique Haroldo Gorriaran Merlo, in Buenos Aires Province. This individual was detained with the assistance of the BAPP and is currently being interrogated by an AAIS and BAPP interrogation team. The source emphasized that the individual under detention is one of the most important ERP leaders to have been detained during the past year. (S) (U)

On 9/3/75, an official of the BAPP Intelligence Service, who is aware of the above-described detention of the ERP leader, advised it is the opinion of the BAPP that the assassination of BAPP Chief of Investigations, Comisario Alfonso Vergel in La Plata, and the attack against an Argentine Army truck during which Sgt. Anselmo Rios was killed, were acts of retaliation carried out by the ERP in answer to the extra-legal detention of the ERP offidal, as noted above. (S) (U)

The foregoing should not be discussed with foreign officials, including those of the Argentine Government. (S) (U)

1 - Addressee
cc: 1 - POL
1 - POL-2
1 - DAO
1 - SY
5 - Bue (109-103 Montoneros)

NOV 3 10/5189 284394

(U) (S) (105-767)

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Classified By 5931
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on IMDET

(1 - 109-38 ERP)
(1 - 80-185 Baldrich)
(1 - 80-173)(Lucero)

RWS:gjk (S) (U)

(10)

(S) (U)

105-767-39

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-07-2017 BY F54M93K42

[redacted]

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-96 PAGE 1 of 2 pgs
APPEAL FOR

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY: SP6AG/CAL 9/8/75
REASON: 1.5 (B) (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X(5) X(6)
APPEAL #90-0327 10-31-95
39063 ELW/ABE/Cpt Argentine Desk
Classified by OADR
Declassify on: OADR 8/31/59
5/31/01
22/394

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

LEGAT ROBERT W. SCHERRER

[FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA)] (S) (U)

On 9/8/75, a ranking official of the FPA, Department of Federal Security, provided the following information: (S) (U)

Within the FPA Department of Federal Security, the responsibility for the activities of the Montoneros has been assigned to the Departamento de Asuntos Politicos (Department of Political Activities)(DAP). The DAP's function is to follow and monitor the activities of the various political parties in Argentina with a view towards identifying subversive infiltration and illegal activities of these parties. DAP activities are carried out by developing sources in the various political parties, electronic surveillance and by compiling public source material on the background and activities of the leaders of these parties. (S) (U)

Also in Federal Security, the Departamento de Sumarios (Department of Indictments)(DS), formerly known as the Departamento de Informaciones Policiales Antidemocraticos (Department of Antidemocratic Police Briefs)(DIPA). Among other duties, this Department handles illegal guerrilla organizations and individuals. This Department, in addition to having an information-gathering function, is charged with the actual repression of subversive organizations and individuals. DS utilizes various aggressive and frequently extra-legal methods of neutralizing the activities of subversive organizations and individuals. (S) (U)

During the week of 9/1/75, the newly designated Director of Federal Security, Comisario General JORGE CROVETTO, made the secret recommendation that the responsibility for the investigation of the Montoneros be shifted from DAP to DS. It is noted that DS is responsible for the suppression of the (S) (U)

1 - Addressee
1 - POL
1 - POL/R
1 - SY
1 - DAO
3 - Buenos Aires
(1 - 64-2)
[(1 - 105-767)(Montoneros)] (S) (U)
(1 - 80-Crovetto)
RWS:jn (8)

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 3B(2)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Indet

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XEROX
NOV 3 1989

(S) (U)
[105-167-40]

(U) FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA)

Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP) and other Argentine terrorist groups. CROVETTO forwarded his recommendation to the FPA Chief, Comisario General (R) OMAR ENRIQUE PINTO, citing the fact that the Montoneros had declared war against the Argentine Government and had carried out numerous well documented acts of bombings, kidnappings, extortion and murder. CROVETTO reasoned that the time had come for the FPA to officially take the gloves off, as it were, and recognize the Montoneros for what they are--an illegal terrorist organization. CROVETTO's request was channeled through PINTO to the Minister of the Interior, Colonel (R) VICENTE DAMASCO. Within a day an answer was received from DAMASCO, which was forwarded to CROVETTO through PINTO without any comment from the latter, instructing that the FPA's handling of the Montoneros remain with DAP and further instructing that all FPA repressive activities against the Montoneros should cease. (U)

DAMASCO's instructions are viewed by FPA officials as a further indication that DAMASCO is attempting to build support among leftist-leaning Peronists and that he is even willing to resort to protecting the Montoneros from FPA repression. (U)

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CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE:

9/9/75

CLASSIFIED BY: SP6 ag/CAL
REASON: 1.5 (B) (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (S) X (6)

CODE

Appeal #90-0371 10-25-95
Argentina Project 5/31/01

CABLE

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-96 page 1, 2 & 3 ONLY
SP Ag/CAL/DK 10-2-96

URGENT (PRIORITY)

Classified by OPLAG
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

TO: DIRECTOR NR. -09

LEGAT BRASILIA NR. -09

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS; IS - ARGENTINA; [ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.] (S) (U)

A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN OFFICIAL WITH THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) ADVISED THAT DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 9/8/75, A POWERFUL BOMB EXPLODED IN AN AUTOMOBILE PARKED IN FRONT OF THE ECONOMIC SCIENCE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BELGRANO IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL. SOURCE NOTED THAT THE AUTOMOBILE, WHICH WAS UNOCCUPIED, WAS PARKED DIRECTLY ACROSS THE STREET FROM THE JAPANESE EMBASSY AND THE RESIDENCE OF THE AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR TO ARGENTINA. SOURCE REPORTED THAT ONE PERSON WAS KILLED AND FOUR SERIOUSLY INJURED AS A RESULT OF THE DETONATION. SOURCE ALSO NOTED THAT A GUARDHOUSE IN FRONT OF THE JAPANESE EMBASSY SUFFERED STRUCTURAL DAMAGE AND THAT TWENTY CARS PARKED IN THE STREET WHERE THE BOMB DETONATED RECEIVED SERIOUS DAMAGES. SOURCE REPORTED THAT THE AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR'S WIFE WAS WALKING HER DOG ALONG THE STREET, WHEN THE BOMB DETONATED; HOWEVER, SHE WAS UNINJURED. SOURCE ADVISED (S) (U)

END PAGE ONE

1 - 105-767 (MONTONEROS)

(S) (U)

(U) (S)

[105-767-41]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

BUE 109-2; 109-103

THAT FPA BOMB SQUAD EXPERTS WERE UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHAT TYPE EXPLOSIVE DEVICE WAS UTILIZED AND THAT FPA INVESTIGATION HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE REASON FOR THE BOMBING, SPECIFICALLY WHETHER THE JAPANESE EMBASSY OR THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE MAY HAVE BEEN THE ACTUAL TARGETS OF THE BOMB. SOURCE NOTED THAT THE UNIVERSITY OF BELGRANO HAS NOT BEEN THE RECENT SCENE OF ANY STUDENT DISORDERS AND THUS IF THE UNIVERSITY OF BELGRANO WAS THE TARGET OF THE BOMBINGS, THE MOTIVE IS NOT CLEAR. (S) (U)

SOURCE REPORTED THAT ON 9/8/75 THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT DECLARED THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION ILLEGAL, PLACING IT IN THE SAME CATEGORY WITH THE TROTSKYITE GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION, PEOPLE's REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP). SOURCE NOTED THAT AT ONE TIME THE MONTONEROS CONSTITUTED A LEGAL POLITICAL ENTITY IN ARGENTINA AND IN FACT HAD SUPPORTED THE RETURN OF DECEASED ARGENTINE PRESIDENT JUAN DOMINGO PERON TO POWER IN 1973 (S) (U)

THE SOURCE NOTED THAT ALMOST ONE YEAR TO THE DAY PRIOR TO THE MONTONEROS BEING DECLARED ILLEGAL BY THE ARGENTINE (S) (U)

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CONFIDENTIAL

GOVERNMENT, THE ORGANIZATION HAD ISSUED A DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND INDICATING THAT ITS MEMBERS WERE GOING UNDERGROUND IN ORDER TO WAGE THEIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

SOURCE IS COMISARIO INSPECTOR JUAN CARLOS GATTEI, CHIEF OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FPA. (S) (U)

~~FBA~~ COORDINATED LOCALLY. (S) (U)

END.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

MRS. INGREY ADVISED THAT THE MONTONEROS DISCLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INGREY KIDNAPPING. (U)

ACCORDING TO THE FIRST SOURCE, FPA RECORDS AND THE FILES OF OTHER ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES CONTAIN NO REFERENCE TO THE AGRUPACION ALBORADA. (U)

A SECOND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN EXECUTIVE OF AN AMERICAN WIRE SERVICE IN ARGENTINA, ADVISED THAT AFTER THE DEATH OF ARGEN[redacted]RESIDENT JUAN DOMINGO PERON ON JULY 1, 1974, UP TO SEPT[redacted]1975, 705 INDIVIDUALS WERE KILLED AS A RESULT OF THE MOU[redacted]TICAL VIOLENCE IN ARGENTINA. THE SOURCE NOTED THAT INCLU[redacted]E 705 VICTIMS WERE 75 POLICE OFFICERS AND 34 MILITARY[redacted]L WHO LOST THEIR LIVES AS A RESULT OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIE[redacted]OURCE NOTED THAT A MORE ACCURATE FIGURE OF VICTIMS OF POL[redacted]OLENCE IN ARGENTINA DURING THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PERIO[redacted] CONSIDERING CLOSE TO 800 TO 850 [redacted] INDIVIDUALS DIS[redacted] NEVER HAVE BEEN HEARD FROM AGAIN PRESUMABLY WERE [redacted] POLITICAL VIOLENCE. (U)

SECRET

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~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931, XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. FIRST CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD IS COMISARIO GENERAL PEDRO BRUNO GIACOMELLO, CHIEF OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, FPA. (S) (U)

SECOND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD IS MORTON ROSENBLUM, BUENOS AIRES Bureau CHIEF, ASSOCIATED PRESS. (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY. (S) (U)

END

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DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42

SECRET

9/12/75

TELETYPE URGENT-PRIORITY

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC) DATE: 7-10-96 PAGE 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 ONLY SP6Ag/CAL/DK 10-3-96

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284394

TO: DIRECTOR NR. -12

LEGAT, BRASILIA NR. 12

Original Not found

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

CLASSIFIED BY: SP6Ag/CAL
REASON: 1.5 (B) (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (5) X (6)

39063 ELW/BCE/cpb Argentina Project 5/31/01

#90-0371 10-25-95

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA. (S) (U)

ON SEPTEMBER 11, 1975 A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS A RANKING FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) OFFICIAL, ADVISED THAT ON SEPTEMBER 10, 1975, FPA IDENTIFICATION DIVISION TECHNICIANS, AFTER A LENGTHY PAINSTAKING EXAMINATION, MANAGED TO CLASSIFY FINGERPRINTS TAKEN FROM A BADLY DECOMPOSED BODY OF A MURDER VICTIM THAT HAD BEEN DISCOVERED IN LUJAN, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE ON APRIL 10, 1975. SOURCE NOTED THAT THE VICTIM HAD BEEN SHOT IN THE BACK NUMEROUS TIMES AND DUMPED BY THE SIDE OF A RURAL COUNTRY ROAD. SOURCE ADVISED THAT THE FINGERPRINTS CORRESPONDED TO FRANK INGREY, AN EXECUTIVE (S) (U)

5 - Bue
(1 - 109-2)
(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 163-611 Ingrey Kidnapping)
(1 - 80- NEW Morton Rosenblum) (S) (U)
(1 - 105-767 Montoneros)
RWS:gjk
(5)

(S) (U)

NOV 3 1989

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(S) (U)

[105-[illegible]-42]

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

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Via _____ (Priority)

PAGE THREE

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PROVINCE. (S) (U)

ON SEPTEMBER 12, 1975, Mrs. NORMAN INGREY, MOTHER OF VICTIM FRANK INGREY, ADVISED THAT AFTER HER SON'S KIDNAPPING ON APRIL 1, 1975, THE FAMILY, ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE KIDNAPPERS, ATTEMPTED TO MAKE A RANSOM PAYMENT IN SAN ISIDRO, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE, ON APRIL 4, 1975; HOWEVER, THE RANSOM WAS NOT PICKED UP. MRS. INGREY NOTED THAT BETWEEN THE TIME OF THE ABORTIVE RANSOM PAYMENT AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF HER SON'S FINGERPRINTS ON SEPTEMBER 10, 1975, THERE HAD BEEN NO CONTACT WITH HER SON'S KIDNAPPERS. MRS. INGREY NOTED THAT BECAUSE HER SON'S BROTHER-IN-LAW/ CHARLES LOCKWOOD AND HER SON'S UNCLE MY MARRIAGE, CHARLES LOCKWOOD, HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED BY THE MONTONERO ORGANIZATION, ROBERTS FINANCIAL COMPANY EXECUTIVES APPROACHED ATTORNEYS WITH THE BUNGE & BORN INVESTMENT COMPANY, WHO AT THE TIME WERE ACTIVELY NEGOTIATING WITH THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION FOR THE RELEASE OF JUAN AND JORGE BORN, IN ORDER TO USE THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE BUNGE AND BORN ATTORNEYS TO RE-ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE MONTONEROS, PRESUMED TO BE HER SON'S KIDNAPPERS. (U) (S)

Approved: _____ Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

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DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42

FBI

Date:

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Via _____ _____
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

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OF THE ROBERTS FINANCIAL COMPANY (ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT FINANCIAL-INVESTMENT COMPANIES IN ARGENTINA) WHO HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED ON APRIL 1, 1975 BY A GROUP CALLING ITSELF THE AGRUPACION ALBORADA (DAWN GROUP). SOURCE NOTED THAT INGREY WAS MARRIED TO THE DAUGHTER OF CHARLES ROBERTS, THE AILING INCUMBENT DIRECTOR OF THE ROBERTS FINANCIAL COMPANY. SOURCE RECALLED THAT INGREY'S BROTHER-IN-LAW, CHARLES "CARLITOS" ROBERTS, (ALSO A ROBERTS FINANCIAL COMPANY EXECUTIVE) WAS ALSO KIDNAPPED ON APRIL 1, 1975, IN A SEPARATE INCIDENT FROM THE INGREY KIDNAPPING, BY THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION AND RELEASED A SHORT TIME THEREAFTER AFTER THE ROBERTS FAMILY HAD PAID A RANSOM OF $300,000. SOURCE ALSO NOTED THAT CHARLES LOCKWOOD, AN EXECUTIVE WHO ~~SITS ON~~ (IS A MEMBER OF) THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF SEVERAL IMPORTANT BUENOS AIRES CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING THE ROBERTS FINANCIAL COMPANY, IS MARRIED TO THE SISTER OF CHARLES ROBERTS, SR., SUPRA. SOURCE NOTED THAT LOCKWOOD WAS KIDNAPPED ~~DURING~~ ON JUNE 6, 1975, BY THE MONTONERO ~~GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION~~ AND RELEASED AFTER A RANSOM OF TWO MILLION DOLLARS WAS PAID. IN ADDITION, SOURCE NOTED THAT LOCKWOOD HAD AGAIN BEEN KIDNAPPED IN JULY 1976, THIS TIME BY THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP) GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION AND HAD BEEN FREED DURING AUGUST, 1975 BY THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE AFTER A VIOLENT SHOOTOUT IN BUENOS AIRES. (U)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

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SECRET

9/12/75

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

MONTONEROS

On 9/12/75, an official of the Buenos Aires Provincial Police (BAPP) provided the following information: (S) (U)

During the late evening hours of 9/11/75, the BAPP conducted a raid against a Montonero stronghold at Florencio Varela, Buenos Aires Province (BAP), in the general area of the Pepsi Cola Bottling Company. The BAP found that the Montoneros were thoroughly entrenched in a private residence and firepower available to the BAPP was not sufficient to dislodge the Montoneros. In order to terminate the long shootout, the BAPP, who were acting in concert with members of the Argentine Army Intelligence Service (SIE), requested the Army to provide heavy weapons. A field cannon was provided from the Argentine Army arsenal in La Plata and Army personned fired the cannon several times at the Montonero stronghold resulting in virtually complete destruction. (S) (U)

The source noted that the BAPP and SIE have been collaborating very closely during recent weeks against the terrorist targets; however, the source noted that this collaboration has always been well guarded and known only among the hierarchy of the BAPP. The source pointed out that the immediate assistance of the Argentine Army in providing a field cannon to dislodge the Montoneros in what was a strictly police function, is a good indication of the seriousness of the Argentine Army and its commanders to involve the Army in the anti-terrorist campaign. (S) (U)

1 - Addressee

cc: 1 - POL
1 - POL-R
1 - SY
1 - DAO
3 - Bue (1 - 105-767) (S) (U)
(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 80-185 Com de Baldrich)
RWS:gjk
(8)

Classified by
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

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Exemption Category 5B(2)
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ON 10-25-95 Appeal # 90-0371 Argentine project
5-23-01

SECRET

105-9 43 (S) (U)

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THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, a.i. 9/23/75

LEGAT ROBERT W. SCHERRER

MONTONEROS

On 9/23/75, a prominent member of the Anglo-Argentine community in Buenos Aires provided the following information: (X) (U)

THEO AUDENHOVEN, the President of the St. Andrews School Parent-Teachers Association, departed Argentina with his entire family for Miami, Florida, on 9/21/75, because of numerous recent threats by the Montonero guerrilla organization. (X) (U)

AUDENHOVEN owns his own business and resides at Darwin 233, La Lucila. The AUDENHOVEN family is very close to the INGREY family, whose son, FRANK, was kidnapped and killed in April, 1975. (X) (U)

1 - Addressee
1 - Ambassador's Briefing Book
1 - POL/R
1 - SY
1 - CON GEN
3 - Buenos Aires (X) (U)
(1 - 105-767 (Montoneros)
(1 - 109-103 (Arg. Terrorist Activs.) (X) (U)
(1 - 80-181) (NORMAN INGREY) (X) (U)

RWS:jn
(8)

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39063 E/W BcE/Sam

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ON 10-25-95 6/1/01
APPEAL # 90-0371

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NOV 3 1989

(U) (X)

[105 767-44]

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SECRET

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

9/26/75

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

(U)

ANTICIPATED DISTURBANCES ON 10/17/75

On 9/26/75, an official of the Army Intelligence Service (SIE) provided the following information: (U)

Several SIE sources operating within the Montonero guerrilla organization have reported that the Montoneros anticipate that the Verticalista Sector of the Peronist movement will organize a large public demonstration in the Plaza de Mayo, which will be presided over by President PERON. The Montoneros believe that the Verticalistas will attempt to use the demonstration of 10/17/75 to bring large numbers of workers to the Plaza de Mayo, in order to demonstrate a show of strength for the Verticalistas to act as a counter-balance to those in the Peronist movement, who are opposed to the continued leadership of President PERON. (U)

The SIE sources, as noted above, reported that should a large scale rally presided over by President PERON be scheduled for 10/17/75 in the Plaza de Mayo, the Montoneros are planning to initiate acts of violence to disrupt the demonstration and further discredit the government. (U)

CLASSIFIED BY: SpAg/CAL
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X X (1)
Appeal #90-0371
39063 ECW/BCE/cpt Argentina Project 5/31/01

CLASSIFIED BY 5931
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(2)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON IMDET

1 - Addressee
1 - POL/R
1 - SY
3 - Buenos Aires (U)
(1 - 109-103) (X)
[1 - 105-767] (Montoneros) SECRET
[1 - 80-Lucero] (S) (U)
RWS:jn
(6)

Classified by OPLAB
Declassify on: CADR 10/3/89
284394

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-96 page 1 ON 11
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SECRET

[15 167-45] (U)

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DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42

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CLASSIFIED BY: Spec Agt C
REASON: 1.5 (B) (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: (5) x (6)
Appeal # 90-0321 11-22-95
39063 EEW/BCE/tpk Argentina Desk

10/6/75

CODE

CABLE IMMEDIATE (O)

Classified by 2014 C5C
Declassify on: OADR 10131 89
284394

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. -06

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS; IS - ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA. (S)(4)

ON OCTOBER 6, 1975, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS A RANKING OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA), PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S)(U)

THE FPA RESIDENT AGENCY IN FORMOSA PROVINCE, ARGENTINA, REPORTED THAT IN CULMINATION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST POLICE AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN ARGENTINA DURING THE PAST THREE DAYS, THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION IN A COORDINATED THREE-PRONGED ATTACK, HIJACKED AN AEROLINEAS ARGENTINA BOEING 737 JET, WHICH WAS COMPLETING FLIGHT 706 TO CORRIENTES DURING THE AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 5, 1975. EIGHTEEN GUERRILLAS FORCED THE PILOT TO LAND AT THE FORMOSA AIRPORT, WHERE THE GUERRILLAS ANTICIPATED PICKING UP SEVERAL OF THEIR IMPRISONED COMPATRIOTS WHO WERE BEING HELD IN ARGENTINE STATE PENITENTIARY NUMBER 10 IN FORMOSA. AN EARLIER MONTONERO (S)(U)

(S)(4)
1 - 105-767 (Montoneros)
1 - 80-87 (Crovetto) (S)(U)
RWS:jn (4)

NOV 3

SECRET

4R (S)(4)

DECLASSIFIED Decisions FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DRC) DATE: 7-10-96 Appeal # 90-0321 11-22-95

CLASSIFIED BY DECLASSIFY ON: DATE:

CONFIDENTIAL

BUE 109-2; 109-103

ATTACK AGAINST THE PENITENTIARY FAILED AND WAS REPULSED BY GUARDS THEREBY FRUSTRATING MONTONERO PLAN TO LIBERATE THEIR COMPANIONS FROM THE PENITENTIARY AND FLY THEM OUT TO SAFETY ON THE HIJACKED AEREOLINEAS ARGENTINA AIRCRAFT. DURING THE AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 5, 1975, THE MONTONEROS CARRIED OUT A DIVERSIONARY ATTACK AGAINST THE ARGENTINE ARMY 29TH MOUNTAIN INFANTRY REGIMENT BASED IN FORMOSA, IN ORDER TO DRAW ATTENTION AWAY FROM THE ATTACK AGAINST THE STATE PENITENTIARY NUMBER 10 IN FORMOSA. MONTONERO GUERRILLAS REALIZING THAT THEIR COMPANIONS HAD FAILED IN THEIR ATTEMPT TO LIBERATE THEIR IMPRISONED COMPANIONS FROM STATE PENITENTIARY #10 FORCED THE AEREOLINEAS PILOT TO TAKE OFF FROM THE FORMOSA AIRPORT AND LAND ON A DIRT LANDING STRIP ON A SUBURBAN RANCH IN RAFAELA, SANTA FE PROVINCE. (S) (U)

AS OF THE EARLY MORNING OF OCTOBER 6, 1975, SIXTEEN TERRORISTS HAD BEEN KILLED IN FORMOSA WITH TEN MILITARY CASUALTIES. ALL PASSENGERS ABOARD AEREOLINEAS FLIGHT 706 WERE RELEASED UNHARMED AFTER THE LANDING IN RAFAELA. THE LANDING CARRIAGE (S) (U)

END PAGE TWO

SECRET

NOV 3 1975

CONFIDENTIAL

BUE 109-2; 109-103

OF THE HIJACKED AEREOLINEAS AIRCRAFT WAS SEVERELY DAMAGED AS A RESULT OF LANDING ON THE DIRT STRIP. (S) (U)

THE MONTONERO COORDINATED ATTACK OF OCTOBER 5, 1975, IS THE FIRST INSTANCE THAT ~~EM~~ THIS GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION HAS RESORTED TO A LARGE SCALE FIELD OPERATION, IT BEING NOTED THAT HERETOFORE THE MONTONEROS HAD CARRIED OUT ONLY URBAN GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - SOURCE IS COMISARIO GENERAL JORGE CROVETTO, DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA. (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY. (S) (U)

END.

SECRET

NOV 3 1985

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM	CLASSIFICATION
Amembassy BUENOS AIRES	LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

11652: N/A
TAGS: PINS, PINT, AR
BJECT: Montoneros ~~First~~ Attack Against Military

ACTION: Secstate WASHDC IMMEDIATE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BUENOS AIRES 6675

RXX

MB
OL-3
OL/R
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COM
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ILGP-2
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F
HRON

1. The Montoneros claimed responsibility, through newspapers, for a three-stage assault operation against the military yesterday (Oct 5) in Formosa Province. The three-stage attack, including a skyjacking, left at least 26 extremists and security officials dead. The assault was similar to that in Trelew Aug 22, 1972 to release several prisoners from the military base. The government has not yet made a statement on the attack.

2. The Montonero attack was their first major assault against the military and the largest such operation any extremist group has yet carried out against the government. The terrorists simultaneously skyjacked a Aerolineas Argentinas domestic flight en route to Corrientes, took control of the Pacu Airport in Formosa, and began the assault against the 29th

105-767-47

FTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED
POL:RMartin:cc RM	10/6/75	121	POL:WSSmith

ARANCES:
DAO:JBohach JB
POL/R:DSmock

DCM:JJMontllor
AMB:RCHill

NOV 3 1989

SECRETED
SENIALIZED
CLASSIFIED
1975
ROSA FRANCHE - BUENOS AIRES

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
CLASSIFICATION

RM FS-413

Regiment army base where several terrorist prisoners are held.

3. The attack against the base met heavy resistance and failed. Security forces then chased the attackers into the surrounding wooded area. Border guards freed the airport, and only about 18 terrorists escaped in the airplane to a private landing strip of an estancia in Santa Fe Province. Cars were waiting to take the terrorists to safety from the Rafaela estancia (the city, incidentally, where Interim President Italo Luder was born).

4. Though the attack was the largest yet against a military garrison, it does not, in itself, indicate any change of tactics on the part of the terrorists. They have in the past attacked other military, if followed quickly by other major attacks, however, it will indicate an increased pace and level of their activities. Clearly, their objective is to provoke the military to seize power--which the terrorists believe would bring about conditions in which they could win popular support and eventually perhaps overthrow the govt.

5. The military, however, is well aware of what the terrorists are up to, and is unlikely to be provoked to irrational acts as a result of the Formosa attack. It might, however, push for a strengthening and fast approval of the proposed Defense Council (see septel).

HILL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Classification

FORM 4-68 FS-413A
CONTINUATION SHEET

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42

~~SECRET~~

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

10/7/75

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

MONTONEROS

On 10/7/75, an official of the Argentine Army Intelligence Service (SIE) made available the following information: (S) (U)

SIE Montonero sources reported prior to the Montonero attacks in Formosa that the Montoneros were planning a two-front offensive which would be initiated in the near future. The two fronts were identified as the provinces of Corrientes and Formosa and the provinces of Salta and Santiago del Estero. The SIE believes that the recent Montonero activities in Formosa represented the first phase of the foregoing information. (S) (U)

The above information should not be discussed with any foreign officials, including those of the Argentine Government. (S) (U)

39063 E/W BCE/Sam

CLASSIFIED BY: SpLAG/CAL
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (1)

Classified by: [illegible]
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

Appeal 90-037 / argentine project
10-25-96

1 - Addressee
cc's: 1 - POL
1 - POL-R
1 - DAO
1 - SY
3 - Bue [105-767] (S)
4 (1 - 109-103)
(U) (1 - 64-91) (U)
1 - 80-205 Sub (Securi
Col. Valin RWS:gjk
(8)
9

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 9-10-96 page 1 only
SpLAG/CAL/DK 10-2-96

~~SECRET~~
~~Classified by: 5031~~
~~Exempt from General Declassification~~
~~Schedule of Executive Order 11652~~
~~Exemption Category 5B(2)~~
~~Automatically declassified on Indefinite~~

~~SECRET~~

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

105-767-48 (S) (U)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
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DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42

6/1/01
CLASSIFIED BY: SP6Ag/CAG
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (1)
Appeal #90-0371 10-25-95

10/8/75

TELETYPE 39063ELW/BCE/cpb 5/31/01 argentina project URGENT

TO: DIRECTOR NR. 17 -08

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2)

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC) DATE: 7-10-96 PAGE 1, 2 ONLY SP6Ag/CAG/DK 10-2-96

~~SECRET~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; [ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.] (S)(U)

ON OCTOBER 7, 1975, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS A PROMINENT OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

SEVERAL AAIS PENETRATION SOURCES WITHIN THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION REPORTED PRIOR TO THE OCTOBER 5, 1975 MONTONERO ACTIVITIES IN FORMOSA, WHICH INCLUDED COORDINATED ATTACKS AGAINST AN ARGENTINE ARMY INSTALLATION AND AN ARGENTINE PENITENTIARY WHERE GUERRILLA PRISONERS WERE BEING HELD, AS WELL AS THE HIJACKING OF AN AEROLINEAS ARGENTINAS BOEING ~~727~~ 737 JET AIRCRAFT, THAT THE MONTONEROS WERE PLANNING TO INITIATE A TWO FRONT OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD BE INITIATED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE TWO-FRONTS WERE IDENTIFIED BY THE AAIS MONTONERO PENETRATION SOURCES AS THE (S) (U)

3 - Bue (109-2)
(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 105-767 (Montoneros)
RWS:gjk
(3)

(S)(U)

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284394

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COMBINED PROVINCES OF CORRIENTES AND FORMOSA AND THE COMBINED PROVINCES OF SALTA AND SANTIAGO DEL ESTERO. THE AAIS BELIEVES THAT THE OCTOBER 5, 1975 MONTONERO OPERATIONS IN FORMOSA REPRESENTED THE FIRST PHASE OF THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED TWO-FRONT OFFENSIVE. (S) (U)

CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.

ADMINISTRATIVE. SOURCE IS COL. ALBERTO VALIN, CHIEF, AAIS. (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY. (S) (U)

END.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA THE DCM

11/7/75

LEGATT ROBERT W. SCHERRER

BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE;
MONTONEROS

For your information, the Buenos Aires Provincial Police (BAPP) advised that an Ingram machine gun clip was recovered on 10/26/75 in San Isidro at the scene of the Montonero ambush and assassination of four BAPP officers. The clip bears an inscription that it had been issued to the Republic of Indonesia.

The FBI is currently conducting investigation in the United States to assist the BAPP in their investigation

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE BY

Classified by
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED BY
ON 10-25-95

1 - Addressee
2.- Bue (64-81)
(1 - 105-767 Montoneros)
RWS:gjk
(3)

CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by 5131
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B (1) (2)
Automatically declassified on Indefinite.

SECRET

105-767-50

11/7/75

CABLE URGENT-PRIORITY

TO: DIRECTOR NR. -07

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (64-81)

CONFIDENTIAL

RELATIONS WITH THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE (BAPP); REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON INGRAM MACHINE GUN CLIP SERIAL #C153427. (U) (S)

FOR INFORMATION, FOUR BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE (BAPP) OFFICERS WERE ASSASSINATED ON OCTOBER 26, 1975 DURING A MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION AMBUSH. (S) (U)

ON NOVEMBER 7, 1945, COMISARIO GENERAL ANGEL DEGASTALDI, DEPUTY CHIEF, BAPP, ADVISED THAT BAPP OFFICERS RECOVERED AN INGRAM MACHINE GUN CLIP SERIAL NUMBER C153427, APPARENTLY 11.25MM, AT THE SCENE OF THE AMBUSH. DEPUTY CHIEF DEGASTALI ADVISED THAT THE CLIP BEARS AN INSCRIPTION INDICATING THAT IT WAS ISSUED OR PURCHASED BY THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA. (S) (U)

DEPUTY CHIEF DEGASTALDI REQUESTS THAT THE FBI TRACE THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED CLIP THROUGH THE INGRAM ARMS COMPANY IN THE UNITED STATES IN ORDER TO DEVELOP ANY INFORMATION WHICH MIGHT ASSIST THE BAPP IN THEIR INVESTIGATION. (S) (U)

2 - Bue (S) (U)
(105-767 Montoneros)
RWS:gjk
(2)

DECLASSIFIED BY 39063 ... BCE/SAM
ON 10-25-95 6-1-01
Appeal 90-0371 Argentina Project

Classified by ... DADR 10/13/89
Declassify on: 2 84394

(U) (S)

[105-16051]

BUE 64-81 (S) (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

A CABLE REPLY WOULD BE APPRECIATED. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931, XGDS- 1 AND 2, INDEFINITE.~~

END.

SECRET

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DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42

SECRET

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA A/DCM

1/13/76

LEGATT ROBERT W. SCHERRER

MONTONEROS

On 1/12/76, an official of the Argentine Army Intelligence Service (SIE) provided the following information: (S) (U)

Acting on information provided by Montonero guerrilla leader Roberto Quieto, the SIE raided a bakery in Buenos Aires and recovered a tremendous amount of arms and ammunition. In order to remove the weapons and ammunition, seven Army lorries were filled to capacity and the loading process took over six hours to complete. It was one of the most impressive terrorist arms cache ever discovered in Argentina. (S) (U)

The foregoing information should not be discussed with foreign officials, including those of the Argentine Government. (S) (U)

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-96 page 1 only
SP6Ag/CAL/DK 10-3-96

Classified by: [illegible]
Declassify on: CADR 10/3/89
284394

1 - Addressee
cc's: 1 - POL
1 - POL-R
1 - SY
1 - DAO
Bue 1 - (105-767 Montoneros)
1 - (105-1099 R. Quieto)
1 - 80-173 Capt. Lucero)
RWS:gjk
(8)

(U) (S) [SOURCE IS CAPT. LUCERO.]

CLASSIFIED BY: SP6Ag/CAL 10-25-95
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (1)
#90-0371
39063 ELW/BCE/cpb
Argentina Project 5/31/01

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Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B (1) (2)
Automatically declassified on Indefinite

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OTHERWISE

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(U) (S)
[105-767-52]

NOV 3 1989

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY FROM:
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DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42
FBI INFORMATION ONLY

10-25-95

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-96 page 1,2
Sp6Ag/CAL/DK 10-3-96
#90-0371

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1/13/76

CLASSIFIED BY: Sp6Ag/CAL
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (1)
Appeal #90-0371
39063 ELW/BLE/cpl Argentina Project 3/31/01
Classified by: OPIA GJC
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

TELETYPE , IMMEDIATE

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12201) NR. -13

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~SECRET~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; [ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.] (S) (U)

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12356
DATE 10/3/89
S-1 is approp govt Agency

ON JANUARY 11, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS A RANKING OFFICER OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

A PENETRATION SOURCE OF THE AAIS IN THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION ADVISED THAT THE MONTONEROS ARE PLANNING A SPECTACULAR ACT IN ORDER TO PRESSURE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO RELEASE ROBERTO QUIETO, A MONTONERO LEADER WHO WAS EXTRA-LEGALLY DETAINED BY THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) AND THE AAIS. THE AAIS SOURCE REPORTED THAT AS OF JANUARY 12, 1976, NO DEFINITE COURSE OF ACTION HAD BEEN DECIDED UPON BY THE MONTONERO LEADERSHIP. (S) (U)

IN ANALYZING THE ABOVE INFORMATION, THE AAIS BELIEVES THAT THE MONTONEROS MIGHT ATTEMPT TO KIDNAP A RANKING ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL OR A FOREIGN DIPLOMAT IN ORDER TO ATTEMPT TO EXCHANGE THIS INDIVIDUAL FOR QUIETO. THE AAIS ALSO BELIEVES THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE MONTONEROS MIGHT INSTITUTE A CAMPAIGN (S) (U)

5 - Bue (109-2) (109-103) (U) (105-767 (S) Montoneros)
[(105-1099 R. Quieto) (80-205 Col. Valin)] (S) (U)

RWS:gjk
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[105-767-53] (S) (U)

NOV 3 1988

~~SECRET~~

OF INDISCRIMINATE ASSASSINATIONS OF ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR FOREIGN DIPLOMATS UNTIL QUIETO IS RELEASED. INASMUCH AS QUIETO IS BEING HELD EXTRALEGALLY BY THE AAIS, THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY THAT ANY NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE ENTERED INTO WITH THE MONTONEROS FOR HIS RELEASE. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS- 1 AND 2 INDEFINITE.~~ (U)

ADMINISTRATIVE. [SOURCE IS COL. ALBERTO VALIN, CHIEF, AAIS] (S)

REMYCABLE, JANUARY 9, 1976, CAPTIONED, "FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA," [REPORTING THE EXTRALEGAL DETENTION OF QUIETO BY THE AAIS.] (S) (U)

(U) [THE FOREGOING (S) AAIS] INTELLIGENCE IS EXCLUSIVE AND HAS BEEN (S) COORDINATED LOCALLY [ ] b1 per CIA

BASED ON THE FOREGOING INFORMATION, THE AMBASSADOR HAS INSTITUTED RADICAL SECURITY MEASURES, SINCE THERE IS A POSSIBILITY (U) (S)

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THAT AN EMBASSY OFFICER MAY BE TARGETED BY THE MONTONEROS. CERTAIN EMBASSY OFFICERS HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED NOT TO REPORT TO THE EMBASSY AND TO REMAIN AT THEIR RESIDENCES DURING THE NEXT TWO WEEKS, WHICH IS THE CRITICAL PERIOD FOR THE MONTONEROS TO TAKE ACTION. ADDITIONAL PATROL AND ESCORT CARS ARE BEING SECURED AT CAR RENTAL COMPANIES AND BODYGUARDS ARE BEING ASSIGNED TO VARIOUS EMBASSY OFFICERS WHO AT THE PRESENT TIME DO NOT HAVE THEM. CERTAIN EMBASSY OFFICERS ARE BEING ORDERED BY THE AMBASSADOR TO TEMPORARILY VACATE THEIR RESIDENCES AND RESIDE AT THE SHERATON HOTEL IN BUENOS AIRES UNTIL THE CRITICAL PERIOD HAS PASSED. (S)U

I AM FOLLOWING THIS MATTER VERY CLOSELY AND WILL TAKE ALL NECESSARY SECURITY MEASURES TO PROTECT MYSELF AND MY STAFF. BUREAU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED. (S)U

end

END

SECRET

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DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42

SECRET

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 2-10-96 page 1, 2 only
SP6Ag/CAL/DK 10-3-96

SECRET

1/9/76

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA A/DCM

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

[ROBERTO QUIETO] (S) (U)

On 1/8/76, an official of the Argentine Army Intelligence Service (SIE) provided the following information: (S) (U)

Captioned subject, a ranking Montonero leader, was picked up extra-illegally from a beach in Martinez, Buenos Aires Province, by members of the Federal Police of Argentina (FPA), who had been assigned to SIE to assist in anti-terrorist activities. Quieto was in turn delivered to an SIE safehouse in Buenos Aires Province where he was taken into the exclusive custody of the SIE. He was subsequently moved to another SIE safehouse for in-depth interrogation. (S) (U)

Quieto has disclosed complete information regarding the Montoneros and their operations, past and future. Quieto made a full confession of Montonero participation in a number of assassinations, kidnappings and other terrorist activities. (S) (U)

According to information provided by Quieto, the SIE is of the opinion that the general philosophy of the Montonero guerrilla organization leadership has changed radically and now more closely adheres to the philosophy of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), i.e., Castrista. According to information provided by Quieto, various Montoneros who had been leaders and members of the FAR have imposed the FAR philosophy and strategy on the Montoneros. (S) (U)

Quieto, as of the late evening of 1/8/76, was still alive and in condition to be produced publicly. SIE is currently debating as to Quieto's ultimate destiny, since the range of (S) (U)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
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cc's: 1 - Addressee
1 - POL
1 - POL-R
1 - SY
1 - DAO
3 - Bue [(105-1099)]
(S) (1 - [105-767] Montoneros)
[1 - 80-205 Col. Valin)]
RWS:gjk
(8)

CLASSIFIED BY: SP6Ag/CAL 10-25-95
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (1)
Appeal # 90-0371
39063EW/BCE/cpb
Argentina Dir
Classified by: DRAGSC
Declassify on: OADR 6/3/89
284394

(S) (U)
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Classified By 5931
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Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B (1 & 2)
Automatically declassified on Indefinite

(S) (U)

NOV 3 1980 XEROX

SECRET

[105-767-54] (U) (S)

(U)

RE: ROBERTO QUIETO

disclosures made by Quieto of violent terrorist activities is believed by several SIE officials to be sufficiently shocking and disgusting to the general Argentine public that the Montoneros would suffer considerably, should Quieto be produced on nation-wide television repeating these disclosures. Another line of thinking within the SIE is to eliminate Quieto and avoid any further problems. (U)

The foregoing information should not be discussed with any foreign officials, including those of the Argentine Government. (U)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42

~~XXEXXX~~
2/10/76

TELETYPE IMMEDIATE

TO: DIRECTOR NR. -10

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA. (S) (U)

ON FEBRUARY 9, 1976, A RANKING OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

AT APPROXIMATELY 7:30 P.M., FEBRUARY 9, 1976, A POWERFUL BOMB DETONATED IN THE APARTMENT OF MARCOS LANUSSE DELL, THE SON OF FORMER ARGENTINE PRESIDENT LT. GENERAL ALEJANDRO AGUSTIN LANUSSE. FORMER PRESIDENT LANUSSE'S DAUGHTER-IN-LAW MARIA CARIDE DE LANUSSE, WHO WAS INSIDE THE APARTMENT WHEN THE BOMB DETONATED, WAS KILLED IMMEDIATELY. FORMER PRESIDENT (S) (U)

5 - Bue
1 - 109-2
1 - 109-103
1 - 80-205 Gen. Valin
1 - 80-173 Capt. Lucero (S) (U)
1 - 105-767 Montoneros
(5)
RWS:gjk (S) (U)

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Classified by [redacted]
Declassify on: [redacted] 10/3/59

284394 10-25-96

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-16-96 1, 2, 3 only CLASSIFIED BY: SP6Ag/CAL
SP6Ag/CAL 10-3-96 REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (1)
Appeal #90-037 39063 ELW/BCE Agent Judgment 5/31/01

NOV 8 19

55 (U) (S)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42

SECRET

2/17/76

CODE

CABLE ROUTINE (NITEL)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. 025 -17

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)(P)

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;

ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA. (S) (U)

ON FEBRUARY 16, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA), ADVISED AS FOLLOWS: (S) (U)

DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF FEBRUARY 16, 1976, THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION BOMBED A FORD MOTOR COMPANY SHOWROOM IN BUENOS AIRES. THERE WERE NO PERSONAL INJURIES AND MODERATE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. (S)(U)

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC) DATE: 2-10-96 page 1 only

CLASSIFIED BY 5931, XGDS-2, INDEFINITE. 5P60g/tal/BK 10-3-95

ADMINISTRATIVE - SOURCE IS COMISARIO GENERAL ENRIQUE BESTEIRO, DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FPA. (S) (U)

CLASSIFIED BY: 5P60g/tal 10-3-95
REASON: 1.5 (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (6)

COORDINATED LOCALLY. (S) (U)

39063 Ellwood/tal Argentine Project 5/31/ pmuf # 90-0321

Classified by 21186
Declassify on: OADR 10/3189

(S)(U)

1 - 105-767 (MONTONEROS)
1 - 80-2?? (BESTEIRO) (S) (U)
RWS:jn
(4)

284394

NOV 3 1980

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SECRET [105-767-56]

SECRET

LANUSSE, WHO WAS OUTSIDE OF BUENOS AIRES ON FEBRUARY 9, 1976, HAD BEEN SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO BUENOS AIRES WITH HIS SON MARCOS, WHO IS A PARAPLEGIC, BUT DELAYED HIS RETURN TO THE CITY DUE TO A LAST MINUTE OCCURRENCE. SHOULD FORMER PRESIDENT LANUSSE HAVE FOLLOWED HIS ORIGINAL SCHEDULE, HE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE APARTMENT WHEN THE POWERFUL BOMB DETONATED (S) (U)

ON FEBRUARY 10, 1976, ANOTHER OFFICIAL OF THE AAIS PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

THE AAIS, THROUGH A PENETRATION SOURCE OF THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION, ASCERTAINED THAT THE MONTONEROS WERE PLANNING TO ASSASSINATE ARMY GENERAL ADEL VILAS, WHO HAD COMMANDED THE ARGENTINE ARMY ANTI-GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN IN THE PROVINCE OF TUCUMAN. IT IS NOTED THAT GENERAL VILAS IS SCHEDULED TO TAKE OVER THE COMMAND OF THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS IN BAHIA BLANCA ON FEBRUARY 11, 1976. ACTING ON THE INFORMATION THAT GENERAL VILAS HAD BEEN TARGETED FOR ASSASSINATION, THE AAIS ASCERTAINED THAT THE MONTONEROS PLANNED TO POISON GENERAL VILAS UTILIZING AN ARGENTINE ARMY DRAFTEE TO PLANT THE POISON IS GENERAL VILAS' FOOD. THE DRAFTEE INVOLVED WAS (S) (U)

XEROX
NOV 3 1989

SECRET

PAGE THREE

IDENTIFIED AND IS UNDER INTENSIVE INTERROGATION AT THE PRESENT TIME. (S) (U)

THE AAIS BELIEVE THAT THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED TERRORIST ACTS WERE CARRIED OUT BY THE MONTONEROS IN RETALIATION FOR THE EXTRA-LEGAL DETENTION OF MONTONERO GUERRILLA LEADER ROBERTO QUIETO, WHO WAS PICKED UP BY AGENTS OF THE AAIS AND FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) OFFICERS ON DECEMBER 28, 1975. (S) (U)

THE SECOND SOURCE NOTED THAT THERE IS KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PLANNED PROJECTED POISONING OF GENERAL VILAS IS THE FIRST INSTANCES OF TERRORISTS UTILIZING THIS MEASURE. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. FIRST SOURCE IS COL. ALBERTO VALIN, CHIEF, AAIS. (S) (U)

SECOND SOURCE IS CAPTAIN JUAN LUCERO, COMMANDER, AAIS POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE BATTALION. (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY. (S) (U)

END

XEROX
JUN 3 1989

SECRET

SECRET

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42

SECRET

2/19/76
CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 10-26-76 page 1,2 only
SP6A9/CAL/10K MPOK

CODE

CABLE IMMEDIATE (O)

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI NR. -19

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-103)

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED BY: SP6A9/CAL
REASON: 1.5 (B) (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X(S)X (6)
Classified by: OADR
Declassify on: OADR
39063 E.W. Declassified Argentina Project 5/31/01 (S)(U)
MPOK 99-0371
1013189
284394

ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA.

ON FEBRUARY 18, 1976, AN UNIDENTIFIED MALE, SPANISH-SPEAKING INDIVIDUAL CALLED THE PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS (PAWA), RESERVATIONS DEPARTMENT, IN BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA. THE CALLER STATED THAT THE LIFE OF HAL WILLIAMS, PAWA, MANAGING DIRECTOR FOR ARGENTINA, CHILE AND URUGUAY, WAS IN DANGER, AND THAT WILLIAMS WOULD BE EXECUTED. THE CALLER INDICATED HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE MONTONERO ALA 22 (WING 22). (S)(U)

THE FOREGOING INFORMATION WAS REPORTED TO THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA DURING THE AFTERNOON OF FEBRUARY 18, 1976. A RANKING OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA ADVISED THAT RECORDS OF THAT ORGANIZATION CONTAINED NO INFORMATION REGARDING THE ALA 22 FACTION OF THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION. SOURCE REPORTED THAT MONTONERO UNITS ARE GENERALLY NAMED AFTER FALLEN MONTONERO MEMBERS AND ARE CALLED COMMANDOS (COMMANDS(. SOURCE NOTED THAT WHILE THE THREAT AGAINST WILLIAMS' LIFE MAY BE FROM THE MONTONEROS, BASED ON THE DESIGNATION OF THE ALA 22 FACTION THREATENING WILLIAMS, (S)(U)

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC) DATE: 10-26-76 page 1,2 only SP6A9/CAL/10K MPOK
Memo 98-0371 SP6A9/CAL/10K 11-24-98

2 - 105-767 (Montonero)
1 - 80-Crovetto

(S)(U)

SECRET NOV 2 1989 105-767-57 (S)(U)

RWS:jn (3)

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

BUE 109-103

[THE SOURCE DOUBTS THAT THE THREAT ORIGINATED WITH THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION.] (S)(U)

ON FEBRUARY 17, 1976, DR. RALPH NEGRI, ARGENTINE DELEGATE, PAWA, BUENOS AIRES, ADVISED THAT PAWA IS IN THE MIDST OF RE-NEGOTIATIONS OF WAGES FOR EMPLOYEES, AND THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE ABOVE DESCRIBED THREAT AGAINST THE LIFE OF WILLIAMS MAY BE RELATED TO WAGE NEGOTIATIONS CURRENTLY BEING CONDUCTED BY PAWA. (S) 4

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS 2 AND 3 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - [SOURCE IS COMISARIO GENERAL JORGE CROVETTO, FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA.] (S)(U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY (S) 4

END.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42

CONFIDENTIAL

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA ACTING DCM

SECRET

2/19/76

ROBERT W. SCHERRER, LEGAL ATTACHE

Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89

MONTONERO ALA 22 THREAT AGAINST
HAL WILLIAMS, PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS (PAWA)
MANAGING DIRECTOR FOR ARGENTINA, CHILE AND URUGUAY

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 4-10-91

During the afternoon of 2/18/76, an unidentified Spanish-speaking male individual called the Reservations Department of PAWA in Buenos Aires and stated that the life of HAL WILLIAMS was in danger and that he would be executed. The caller stated he was a member of the Montonero guerrilla organization, Ala 22, (Wing 22). From his mode of speech, it is believed the caller is an Argentine. The caller spoke slowly, clearly and according to the PAWA employee receiving the call, had a pleasant tone to his voice. The aforementioned information was provided to the Federal Police of Argentina, Department of Federal Security, during the afternoon of 2/18/76. (U)

A ranking official of the FPA, Department of Federal Security, advised that there is no such sub group of the Montonero guerrilla organization known as Ala 22. The source noted that the Montoneros have traditionally named their sub groups after deceased Montonero members, designating the sub groups as Commandos. (U)

During the evening of 2/18/76, Dr. RALPH NEGRI, Argentine delegate, PAWA, advised that PAWA is in the process of negotiating wage increases with the employees, and there is a possibility that the above described threat may in some way be related to the ongoing wage negotiations. (U)

It is noted that WILLIAMS is residing with his wife in the Hotel Presidente, Room 1511. (U)

1 - Addressee
1 - POL
1 - POL/R
1 - RCON COUNSELOR
1 - FAA Attache, Lima, Peru
3 - Buenos Aires
(1 - 109-103) (U)
(1 - 105-767) (Montoneros)
(1 - 80-Crovetto) (U)
RWS:jn (8)

CLASSIFIED BY: 1.5 (B) (D)
REASON:
DECLASSIFY ON: X (5) X (6)

CONFIDENTIAL

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SECRET

105-117-58 (U)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42

SECRET

SECRET

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA A/DCM

3/5/76
39063 EIWBCE/SIM

6/1/01
CLASSIFIED BY: SP6Ag/CAC
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (1)
Appeal # 90-0371
Argentina project

LEGATT ROBERT W. SCHERRER

(U) (S) ROBERTO QUIETO

On 3/3/76, an official of the Argentine Army Intelligence Service (SIE) provided the following information: (S) (U)

Captioned subject, who was extralegally detained by the SIE, has been moved to an Argentine Army cuartel, where he is presently being held. Subject was previously held at several SIE safehouses and his ultimate fate was in question. SIE, acting on orders from Argentine Army G-2, transferred the subject from the custody of his interrogators at various SIE safehouses to an Argentine Army cuartel indicating that the Argentine Army G-2 did not intend to eliminate the subject. Subject's interrogators in SIE became enraged when they learned that the subject would be allowed to live and administered what they considered to be a lethal dose of poison to the subject prior to transferring him to the Argentine Army cuartel; however, the subject, although violently ill, survived the poisoning. (S) (U)

The foregoing information probably explains innumerable rumors circulating in Buenos Aires approximately three weeks ago indicating that the Army had eliminated Quieto. It is interesting to note that the source reported that no disciplinary action was taken against those who poisoned Quieto and that the incident was dismissed in the form of a practical joke. (S) (U)

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Classified by: ODAGS
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-96 page 1 only
SP6Ag/CAC/DK 10-3-96

cc's: 1 - Addressee
1 - POL
1 - POL-R
1 - DAO
1 - SY
3 - Bue (105-1099) (U) (S)
(U) (1 - 80-205) (S)
(1 - 105-767)
Montoneros

SECRET

Classified by 5931
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on Indefinite.

RWS:gjk
(8)

(U) (S)

SECRET

[105-787-59]

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42

3/23/76 ~~SECRET~~

CODE

CABLE ROUTINE(~~XXXXX~~ NITEL)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. -23

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA. (~~S~~) (U)

ON MARCH 22, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (~~S~~) (U)

DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF MARCH 22, 1976, THE MONTONEROS, AN ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, CARRIED OUT A BOMB ATTACK ~~XXXXXXX~~ AT A STORAGE LOT OF THE CHRYSLER CORPORATION IN SAN JUSTO, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE. THERE WERE NO PERSONAL INJURIES AND MODERATE MATERIAL DAMAGE. (~~S~~) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS#2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - COORDINATED LOCALLY. SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR VICENTE GATEAZZO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE, FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (~~S~~) (U)

END. (~~S~~) (U)

1 - 105-767(Montoneros)
RWS:jn (3)

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC) DATE: 2-19-96 Spelling Corr Ltr 10-3-95

CLASSIFIED BY: Spelling Corr (C)
REASON: 1.5
DECLASSIFY ON: X (1)
10-26-95
Appeal # 90-0371 Declassification Review Spelling Corr

NOV 3 [illegible]

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [illegible] 10/3/89
Declassify on: OADR
284394

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42

[redacted]

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA RCH

3/30/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

MONTONERO BOMB ATTACK
AGAINST CHRYSLER CORPORATION,
BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA, 3/22/76

As reported in the news media, the Montoneros carried out a bomb attack on 3/22/76 at a storage lot of the Chrysler Corporation in San Justo, Buenos Aires Province. There were no personal injuries and moderate material damage as a result of the bombing.

On 3/30/76, MEER LESHINSKY, Chrysler Managing Director, advised that the above described bombing almost resulted in the loss of considerable lives at the Chrysler factory in San Justo. LESHINSKY explained that the Montonero bomb had been placed in a Dodge pick-up truck, which was stored on a holding lot in preparation to be re-introduced into the assembly line inside the Chrysler facility. LESHINSKY noted that the Dodge pick-up truck in which the Montonero bomb had been placed would have entered the assembly line within ten minutes after the bomb exploded. LESHINSKY noted that if the Dodge pick-up truck had entered inside the Chrysler facility as part of the assembly line, approximately seventy-five workers would have been in the immediate vicinity should the bomb have detonated inside the Chrysler facility.

LESHINSKY reported that the bomb was extremely powerful and that the Dodge pick-up truck in which it had been placed was reduced to scrap metal. LESHINSKY noted that the roof of this Dodge pick-up truck was projected approximately fifty yards through the air landing on the roof of a storage shed on the holding lot.

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Classified by 5931
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on Indef.

1 - Ambassador
1 - POL/R
1 - RCON COUNSELOR
1 - SY
2 - Buenos Aires
(1 - 109-2)(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 105-767)(Montoneros)
RWS:jn
(7)

61

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

5/4/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

Classified by [illegible]
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

(U) (S) MONTONERO WARNING TO CHRYSLER

On 5/3/76, HERB LESHINSKY, Managing Director, Chrysler Corporation, Buenos Aires, provided the following information: (S) (U)

During the past several days four key executives of Chrysler Fevre Argentina have received copies of a Montonero communique, which had previously been circulated among the business community in Buenos Aires. This communique had not previously been received by Chrysler. (S) (U)

The four Chrysler executives receiving the communique were identified as follows: (S) (U)

(U) (S)

EDUARDO "TED" BEACH	- Director of Industrial Relations
ARMANDO STRADA	- Administrative Assistant to the Managing Director
LUIS J. FEVRE	- President
JOHN W. WATSON	- Director of Manufacturing

In addition to receipt of the Montonero communique, numerous threatening telephone calls have been received at the Chrysler offices in San Justo. (S) (U)

The foregoing data was provided to the Buenos Aires Provincial Police, San Justo, by Chrysler on 5/4/76. (S) (U)

DECLASSIFIED BY Sp6 Ag/CAL 39063 EIW BCE/Sam 6-1-01
ON 10-26-95
Appeal #90-0371 ARGentina Project

1 - Addressee
1 - POL/R
1 - ECON
1 - SY
2 - Buenos Aires
(U) (S) (105-Montoneros)
(109-103)
RWS:jn
(6)

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by 5931
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified Indefinite

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SECRET

NOV 3 1989 (S) (U)

105-767-62

CONFIDENTIAL

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

5/7/76

SECRET

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

AN ADDITIONAL MONTONERO WARNING
TO CHRYSLER

Reference my memo dated 5/4/76, which reported that four non-American citizen executives of Chrysler Fevre Argentina had received copies of a Montonero communique.

On 5/6/76, HERB LESHINSKY, Managing Director, Chrysler Corporation, Buenos Aires, provided the following information:

On 5/5/76, a Montonero communique was received at the Chrysler offices in San Justo, Buenos Aires Province, which was directed to JOHN DAY, the former Managing Director of the Chrysler Corporation, Buenos Aires. It was noted that DAY, an American citizen, was replaced by LESHINSKY upon the former's departure from Argentina several years ago. It is apparent therefore that the individuals who directed the communique to DAY are not well informed regarding current Chrysler executives in Buenos Aires. It was noted that the Directory of American Business in Argentina for the years 1972-1973 issued by the American Chamber of Commerce in Argentina listed DAY as the Managing Director of Chrysler Fevre Argentina.

1 - Addressee
1 - POL/R
1 - ECON COUNSELOR
1 - CONSUL GENERAL
1 - SY
2 - Buenos Aires
(1 - 105-767)
(1 - 109-103)
RWS:jn
(7)

DECLASSIFIED BY 39063 E/WBC E/Sam
ON 10-26-95
Appeal # 90-0339
ARGentina Project

Classified by
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

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Classified by 5931
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on Indefinite

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[105 ... 63]

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
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DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42

5/28/76

SECRET

CODE

CABLE URGENT (PRIORITY)

TO: DIRECTOR NR. [illegible]-28

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-103)(105-1089) (S)(U)

SECRET

ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA; (S)(U)

ARAB TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; IS - MIDDLE EAST. (S)(U)

ON MAY 28, 1976, AN OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S)(U)

ON OR ABOUT MAY 19, 1976, THE FPA DETAINED AN INDIVIDUAL, WHO WAS IDENTIFIED AS A FEDAYEEN TERRORIST IN LA PAZ, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE. UNDER INTERROGATION THIS INDIVIDUAL ADMITTED HE HAD ILLEGALLY ENTERED ARGENTINA ALONG WITH A NUMBER OF OTHER FEDAYEEN TERRORISTS IN ORDER TO COLLABORATE WITH THE MONTONEROS, AN ARGENTINE GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION, IN PLANNING ASSASSINATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER FOREIGN OFFICIALS OF VARIOUS PETROLEUM COMPANIES. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER FOREIGN-OWNED PETROLEUM COMPANIES WILL INCREASE THEIR PERSONNEL IN ARGENTINA IN CONNECTION WITH PROJECTED ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT CONTRACT TO THESE FOREIGN COMPANIES FOR PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND OTHER TECHNOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE IN THE PETROLEUM FIELD. (S) (U)

CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.

(1) - 105-767 (MONTONEROS) (1 - 80-20 (REY)) (S) (U)

RWS:jn (4)

CLASSIFIED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 5-28-76
CLASSIFIED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE:
CLASSIFIED BY: 5931
REASON: 1.5 (B)(D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X5 (S)(U)
June 30-1991
Classified by: 2480
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
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SECRET

PAGE TWO

BUE 109-103 [105-1089] SECRET (U)

ADMINISTRATIVE { SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR EMILIO RAMON REY (NA), FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA. } (S) (U)

END.

SECRET

SECRET

NOV 3 1989

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

5/28/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

[ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES;] (S) (U)
[ARAB TERRORIST ACTIVITIES] S (U)

On 5/28/76, an official of the Federal Police of Argentina (FPA) provided the following information: (S) (U)

On or about 5/19/76, the FPA detained an individual, who was identified as a Fedayeen terrorist in Jose Paz, Buenos Aires Province. Under interrogation this individual admitted he had illegally entered Argentina along with a number of other Fedayeen terrorists in order to collaborate with the Montoneros, an Argentine guerrilla organization, in planning assassinations of the United States and other foreign officials of various petroleum companies. It is anticipated that the United States and other foreign-owned petroleum companies will increase their personnel in Argentina in connection with projected Argentine Government contract to these foreign companies for petroleum exploration and other technological assistance in the petroleum field. (S) (U)

CLASSIFIED BY: SP6AG/CAL
REASON: 1.5 (B) (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X(5) X(6)
Appeal #90-0371

Classified by: DDA 3/90
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

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~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-96 page 1 only
SP6AG/CAL/DK 10-1-96

Classified by 5031
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified Indefinite

1 - Addressee
1 - POL/R
1 - SY
1 - DAO
1 - ECON COUNSELOR
4 - Buenos Aires (1 - 109-103)(1 - 105-1089) (S) (U)
(1 - 105-767)(1 - 80-29)

RWS:jn
(9)

(S) (U)

SECRET

NOV 3 1976

(U) (S)

[105 - 65]

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 09-19-2017 BY: C32W33B91

4186
25 JUN 76
1400

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM	CLASSIFICATION
Amembassy BUENOS AIRES	CONFIDENTIAL

11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: CIVS, PINS, ASEC, AR
JECT: Visas: Applicability of Section 212(A)(28)(F) to Montoneros and ERP

DECLASSIFIED BY SP6AG/CAG
ON 10-26-95
AMAL 90-0071

TION: Secstate WASHDC

INFO Amembassy LA PAZ FBI Info only
" MONTEVIDEO
" SANTIAGO

FOI/PA # 284394
APPROVED
CITY
T.O. # 12356
DATE 10/3/89 INITIALS SC
S-1 is FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 4186

REF State 128059

1. Embassy recommends that Montoneros be placed within purview of Section 212(A)(28)(F) of the INA and that membership in that organization from 1975 on be considered prima facie grounds for visa ineligibility. Prior to 1975 the Montoneros represented the radical wing of the Peronist Youth, but members were not necessarily involved in terrorist/subversive activities. Indeed, during one period in 1973-74, the Montoneros maintained that they supported the government. As of late 1974, however, they went underground and took as their primary objective the violent overthrow of the Argentine Government. Since that time the Montoneros have represented one of the two (the other being the ERP) most important and dangerous terrorist/guerrilla

MB
OL-3
OL/R
COM
SIS
AO
ILGP
CI
EGATT
F
HRON
SY
S-2

(U)
(S)
105-767-66

ED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY
POL:WSSmith:cc WBS	6/24/76	128	AMB ROBERT G. HILL

ANCES:
CONS:GHuey (in draft) WBS ~~CONS:WHitchock~~ A/DCM:WBea
LEGATT:RScherrer (in draft) WBS POL/R:DSmock
RSO:GBeckett (in draft) WBS

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
INDEXED
FILED
JUN 25 1976
LEGAL ATTACHE
BUENOS AIRES

NOV 3 1989
Montoneros file

organizations in Argentina. There is abundant information in the Department's files on Montonero activities since 1975--including murders of policemen and military officers, kidnappings and murders of government officials and of foreign businessmen, assaults on military installations and police stations, and threats to U.S. Embassy personnel.

2. Given the publicity resulting from the terrorist activities of the Montoneros, and the large-scale and much-publicized efforts of the government security forces against that organization, it is not conceivable that anyone could have been affiliated with that organization from 1975 on without being aware of its terrorist nature. Membership prior to 1975, however, would have to be considered on a case-by-case basis to determine whether or not individual participated in terrorist/subversive activities.

3. While reftel asked only for recommendation regarding Montoneros, Embassy also recommends that ERP (Ejercito Revolutionario Popular--~~Popular~~ People's Revolutionary Army) also be placed within purview of Section 212(A)(28)(F) of the INA if that has not already been done. The ERP is a Trotskyite terrorist organization that since its inception in the late 1960s has been dedicated to the overthrow of the constituted government by violence.

HILL

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-10-2017 BY: F54M93K42

SECRET

39063 E/W BCE/SEM

CLASSIFIED BY: SP6Ag/CAL
REASON: 1.5 (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (6)
Appeal #90-037
argentina Project

7/2/76

CODE

CABLE IMMEDIATE (O)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. 153-02

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA; [ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.] (S) (U)

ON JULY 2, 1976, AN OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA), DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY (INTELLIGENCE DIVISION), PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

AT THE NOONTIME LUNCH HOUR AT FPA DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY HEADQUARTERS, A POWERFUL BOMB DETONATED IN THE CAFETERIA KILLING AT LEAST TWENTY-FIVE FPA OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES AND INJURING OVER THIRTY INDIVIDUALS. THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION CLAIM CREDIT FOR THIS ATROCITY. (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - [SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR CARLOS VICENTE MARCOTE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FPA.] (S) (U)

END.

1 - 105-767
1 - 80-217 (MARCOTE) (S) (U)
RWS:jn (4)

Classified by DDHGJC
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

[FOS-767-67] (S) (U)

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-96 Page 1 only
SP6Ag/CAL/DRC 10-3-96

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SECRET

SECRET

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA ACTING DCM

7/2/76

LEGAT ROBERT W. SCHERRER

Classified by
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

MONTONEROS

On 7/2/76, HERB LESHINSKY, Chrysler Managing Director, Buenos Aires, Argentina, provided the following information: (S) (U)

During the past week, four Chrysler executives received threatening mimeographed letters from the Montonero guerrilla organization. The mimeographed message received by the Chrysler executives indicates that this message had been directed to 2000 individuals in Argentina. Arrangements were made to meet with LESHINSKY on 7/5/76, at which time he will provide a copy of this message. (S) (U)

LESHINSKY advised that prior to his departure for Brazil on Chrysler business approximately one month ago, information had been received that a terrorist cell had targeted LESHINSKY for kidnapping; however, the cell had been captured by security forces, thus apparently aborting the plan. LESHINSKY indicated that the kidnap plan was assigned a code name and was extremely detailed. LESHINSKY indicated he would provide additional information during the 7/5/76 meeting. (S) (U)

LESHINSKY indicated that on 6/30/76, Chrysler spirited an executive out of the country, against whom surveillance had been detected for a considerable period of time. LESHINSKY indicated that Chrysler was not certain whether the surveillance had been carried out by terrorists or common criminals. (S) (U)

It should be noted that the above information was provided telephonically by LESHINSKY and necessarily was cryptic. (S) (U)

1 - Addressee
1 - POL/R
1 - ECON COUNSELOR
1 - SY
2 - Buenos Aires
RWS:jn (1 - 105-767) (S) (U)
(6) (1 - 109-103)

Classified by 5931
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified INDET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

[105-767.68] (S) (U)

DECLASSIFIED BY 39063 E/W BCE/Sam
ON 10-26-95 6-1-01
Approval 90-037
Argentina Project

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SECRET

THE AMBASSADOR 7/2/76
VIA ACTING DCM

LEGAT ROBERT W. SCHERRER

DECLASSIFIED BY 506 Ag/CAL
ON 10-26-95 Appl # 90-0371

THE MONTONEROS

On 7/1/76, JUAN HARRY MARPLES, Vice President, Braniff International Airways, provided the following information: (S) (U)

At approximately 1:00 A.M., 7/1/76, the sister of his son-in-law, accompanied by her boyfriend, were returning to the former's residence located at J. C. Varela 1085, Acassuso, in the boyfriend's Fiat automobile. After turning right off Avenida Libertador on to Varela, the couple were overtaken by another Fiat containing five male individuals in their early 20's. The second Fiat cut off the couple's car and the five male individuals, three of whom carried machine guns, while the other two were armed with .45 caliber automatic pistols, forced the couple out of their car and made them disrobe. During the disrobing process, the five armed individuals identified themselves as Montoneros and told the couple that they were taking their car for use in a Montonero operation, and that the car would be abandoned after the operation had been carried out. Also during the disrobing process, the couple were harangued by the five armed individuals with typical Montonero propaganda and were accused of being oligarchs. Money and jewelry were returned to the couple by the five armed individuals, who took the couple's car and their clothing with them, when they departed the area. The couple obtained clothing from the girl's residence and they immediately went to the Buenos Aires Provincial Police Precinct located on Balcarce in Martinez, in order to make the appropriate denuncia. At the Buenos Aires Provincial Police Precinct the couple was told that their's was the third such incident involving Montoneros that had taken place in the jurisdiction of the precinct during the past week. (S) (U)

1 - Addressee
1 - POL/R
1 - DAO
1 - SY
2 - Buenos Aires
(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 105-767) (S) (U)
RWS:jn (6)

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10/3/59
284394

NOV 3 1989

(S) (U)

SECRET

105-767-69

7/6/76

SECRET

TELETYPE URGENT-PRIORITY

TO: DIRECTOR NR. -06

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; [ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.] (S) (U)

ON JULY 5, 1976, HERBERT LESHINSKY, MANAGING DIRECTOR, CHRYSLER FEBRE ARGENTINA, A SUBSIDIARY OF THE CHRYSLER CORPORATION OF THE UNITED STATES, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

DURING THE PAST WEEK, NINE EXECUTIVES OF CHRYSLER FEBRE ARGENTINA HAVE RECEIVED A FORM LETTER FROM THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION THREATENING RETALIATION SHOULD THE EXECUTIVES COOPERATE WITH SECURITY FORCES IN IDENTIFYING CHRYSLER FEBRE ARGENTINA EMPLOYEES AS GUERRILLAS. A POSTCRIPT TO THE MONTONERO FORM LETTER INDICATES THAT SIMILAR LETTERS WERE BEING SIMULTANEOUSLY MAILED TO MORE THAN 2,000 OTHER EXECUTIVES FROM 200 COMPANIES IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL OF BUENOS AIRES AND BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE. (S) (U)

4 - Buenos Aires
(1 - 109-2)
(1 - 109-103) (S) (U)
(1 - 105-767 Montoneros)
[1 - 109-38) ERP)
RWS:gjk (S) (U)
(4)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP6AG/PAL 39063 EIW BCE/Sam
ON 11-1-95 Appeal # 90-0371 Argentina Project

Classified by 284394
Declassify on: OADR 10/5/89 (S) (U)

[105-767-70]

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SECRET

SECRET

BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE TWO CONFIDENTIAL

ON JUNE 30, 1976, IT WAS NECESSARY TO SPIRIT A CHRYSLER FEBRE ARGENTINA EXECUTIVE OUT OF THE COUNTRY TO SAO PAOLO, BRAZIL BECAUSE OF SURVEILLANCE AND SHADOWING ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT AGAINST THE EXECUTIVE, WHO IS THE CHIEF OF ADMINISTRATION AND PERSONNEL FOR CHRYSLER FEBRE ARGENTINA. IN ADDITION TO SHADOWING AND SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES AGAINST THIS EXECUTIVE, THREATENING TELEPHONE CALLS FROM THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION WERE ALSO RECEIVED BY THE EXECUTIVE AT HIS RESIDENCE AND AT THE CHRYSLER FEBRE ARGENTINA PLANT. (S) (U)

ON MAY 29, 1976, THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS) ADVISED LESHINSKY THAT MEMBERS OF A CELL OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP), ANOTHER ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, HAD BEEN EXTRALEGALLY DETAINED BY THE AAIS AND UNDER INTERROGATION PROVIDED DETAILS OF AN OPERATION IDENTIFIED BY THE CODE NAME "MORON." ACCORDING TO INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE AAIS, "OPERATION MORON" ENTAILED THE ASSASSINATION OF LESHINSKY. THE AAIS ADVISED THAT LESHINSKY HAD BEEN UNDER (S) (U)

XEROX
NOV 3 1989

SECRET

SECRET

SURVEILLANCE AND THAT HIS COMPANY CAR AND VEHICLES USED TO TRANSPORT HIS BODYGUARDS HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED. THE AAIS ADVISED THAT THE LEADER OF THE ERP CELL, IDENTIFIED AS "CAPTAIN MIGUEL", HAD MANAGED TO ESCAPE; HOWEVER, APPROXIMATELY 60% OF THE ERP CELL ASSIGNED TO "OPERATION MORON" HAD BEEN DETAINED BY THE AAIS. THE ASSASSINATION OF LESHINSKY WAS SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE ON MAY 31, 1976. IT IS NOTED THAT LESHINSKY SPENT THE MONTH OF JUNE, 1976 IN BRAZIL ON CHRYSLER CORPORATION BUSINESS. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931, XGDS-2 AND~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. COORDINATED LOCALLY. (S) (U)

END

SECRET

XEROX
NOV 3 1989

SECRET

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA ACTING DCM

7/12/76

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LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

(U) (S) ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
DIRECTED AGAINST THE CHRYSLER CORPORATION

Reference my memo of 7/2/76 captioned "Montoneros."

As indicated in referenced memo arrangements were made to personally contact HERB LESHINSKY, Chrysler Managing Director, after the July 5th Reception at the Embassy Residence. I contacted LESHINSKY on 7/5/76 and he provided the following information: (S)(U)

During the week of June 28-July 2, 1976, the following Chrysler executives received a mimeographed form message from the Montonero guerrilla organization: (S)(U)

O. L. VIGIL
Personnel Director

F. MUNOZ
Director of Tax and Insurance

N. JARVIS
Sales Manager

(U) (S) A. STRADA
Director of Legal Affairs and Government Relations

A. GALLI
Industrial Engineer

J. TORRES
Export Director

H. LESHINSKY
Managing Director

Classified by DPIAG
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

39063 E/W/BCE/SAM

DECLASSIFIED BY SP6 AG/CAL
ON 11-1-95 6-1-01
Appeal # 90-0371
Argentina Project

NOV 3 1995

1 - Addressee
1 - POL/R
1 - ECON COUNSELOR
1 - SY (Encs.9
3 - Buenos Aires
(U)(S) (1 - 105-767)
(1 - 109-38)
(1 - 109-103)

RWS:jn
(7)

SECRET
Classified by 5931
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)(4)
Automatically declassified on Indefinite

SECRET

(S)(U)
7

In addition, VIGIL's friend reported that the streets Almafuerte and Irigoyen were mentioned, together with the hour 7:00 P.M. LESHINSKY noted that VIGIL's residence is about 150 meters from the intersection of Almafuerte and Irigoyen. Additionally, LESHINSKY noted that VIGIL had the custom of departing from the Chrysler Plant in San Justo for his residence at 7:00 P.M. each day.

LESHINSKY said that VIGIL's friend also overheard a statement to the effect that the date of the operation would be communicated at a later date. LESHINSKY stated that the evaluation of the above overheard telephone conversation led Chrysler security personnel to believe that VIGIL had been targeted for some type of hostile action. Accordingly, VIGIL changed his residence on June 5, 1976, and returned on June 19, 1976.

LESHINSKY advised that on June 28, 1976, a friend of the VIGILS visited him at his residence, in order to relate an incident which took place during the week of June 21, 1976, at the Club Raiz de Veiga in Buenos Aires Province where VIGIL and his friend are members. VIGIL's friend related to him that individuals were asking questions at the Club concerning VIGIL's presence on weekends, etc. According to information provided by VIGIL's friend, the individuals conducting these inquiries arrived in a Rambler Cross-Country Station Wagon and a medium-sized Fiat, and did not give the impression of being connected with Argentine security forces.

LESHINSKY advised that Chrysler Security officials interpreted the inquiries at the Club Raiz de Veiga to be part of a surveillance on VIGIL, in order to set him up for hostile action, possibly kidnapping or assassination.

LESHINSKY advised that another incident took place at the Club Raiz de Veiga during January or February, 1976, when CARLOS SUAREZ, an employee of the Chrysler Transmission Factory was detected on the grounds of the Club. LESHINSKY noted that the Club Raiz de Veiga is a private club, which was founded by Spanish immigrants, and is located in San Justo near the Chrysler Factory in Buenos Aires Province. LESHINSKY noted that CARLOS SUAREZ has been identified as a follower of ROLANDO HECTOR JESUS ASTARITA, a Marxist union official. LESHINSKY stated that when interviewed during January or February, 1976, with regard to his unauthorized presence on the grounds of the Club Raiz de Veiga, SUAREZ stated that he had been invited by other associates of the Club. According to LESHINSKY, SUAREZ's claim of being invited could not be verified.

LESHINSKY indicated that Chrysler Security officials inter-

Argentine Terrorist Activities
directed against the Chrysler Corporation

A. CATTANEO
Plant Security Chief

L. J. FEVRE
President

SECRET

The above described mimeographed form message from the Montoneros was undated and contains a warning for recipients not to collaborate with Argentine security forces in any manner. A postscript to the above described message indicates that copies were being simultaneously mailed to 2,000 executives employed by some 200 businesses in the Federal Capital and Buenos Aires Province. It is interesting to note that in the mimeographed form message, the Montoneros claim credit for the assassination of Chrysler Executive JORGE KENNY, who had been recently assassinated at his residence in Buenos Aires Province.

The transmittal envelopes for the Montonero mimeographed form message were all typewritten with some containing misspelling and typing errors. All were directed to the above-listed executives at the Chrysler Plant in San Justo, Buenos Aires Province. Seven of the letters were directed by certified mail with postage stamps affixed. Two of the letters were sent in the regular mail without being certified with machine stamps imprinted.

Copies of the mimeographed Montonero form letters are attached for the Security Officer.

LESHINSKY stated that on June 30, 1976, OSCAR LUIS VIGIL, the Chrysler Director of Administration and Personnel was posted out of Argentina to Sao Paulo Brazil, because it was believed that he had been targeted by terrorists for some hostile action. LESHINSKY noted that on April 28, 1976, a telephone call was received at the Chrysler San Justo Plant allegedly from the Montoneros warning that VIGIL should not take any action against Chrysler personnel, such as dismissals and that salary increases should immediately be granted, otherwise the Montoneros would begin to "eliminate executives.

LESHINSKY advised on April 29, 1976, another telephone message was received at the Chrysler San Justo Plant from the Montoneros during which VIGIL was warned that he should pay attention to the needs of the workers and not take reprisals against them.

LESHINSKY advised that during the latter part of May, 1976, a personal friend of VIGIL accidentally heard a telephone conversation between two men during which VIGIL's name was mentioned.

SECRET

preted SUAREZ's presence at the Club Raiz de Veiga as an attempted surveillance to gather information for future use against VIGIL. (S)(U)

LESHINSKY stated that for the above described reasons, VIGIL was evacuated from Argentina on June 30, 1976, as previously mentioned. (S)(U)

LESHINSKY advised that on May 29, 1976, the Argentine Army Intelligence Service (SIE) contacted Leshinsky to advise him that certain members of an ERP cell had been extra-legally detained by SIE and under interrogation provided details of a projected ERP activity known by the code name "Operacion Marron." According to information provided by SIE to LESHINSKY, "Operacion Marron" involved the assassination of LESHINSKY, which was to take place on May 31, 1976. SIE advised LESHINSKY that a major portion of the ERP cell had been detained; however, an individual identified as "Captain MIGUEL" managed to escape. SIE told LESHINSKY that Captain MIGUEL knew of the details of "Operacion Marron" involving LESHINSKY's assassination. SIE told LESHINSKY that he had been under surveillance by the ERP cell and that his company car and security vehicles had been identified. LESHINSKY departed Argentina for Brazil on business on June 1, 1976, and subsequent to his departure SIE informed Chrysler that other members of the ERP cell responsible for carrying out LESHINSKY's assassination had been killed off. SIE informed Chrysler that it was believed that "Operacion Marron" had been aborted because of the elimination of most of the ERP cell members, who were to participate in its execution. (S)(U)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-10-2017 BY: F54M93K42

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-96 page 1, 2 only
SP6 Ag/CAL/DK 10-4-96
#90-037

SECRET 7/15/76

CODE

CABLE URGENT (PRIORITY)

Classified by: DRIAGJC
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-2 (1)) NR [170-15] (S) (U)

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)

SECRET

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA; [ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.] (S) (U)

ON JULY 14, 1976, AN OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

DURING THE PERIOD JULY 11-12, 1976, AAIS UNITS IN JOINT OPERATIONS WITH THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE AND THE CORDOBA PROVINCIAL POLICE, DISCOVERED TWO PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP), AN ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, PRINTING FACILITIES IN BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE AND CORDOBA PROVINCE. (S) (U)

THE AAIS BELIEVES THAT THE ERP HAS BEEN SO BADLY MAULED BY ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES THAT THE ORGANIZATION WILL PROBABLY TURN TO THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE. (S) (U)

AS AN INDICATION OF SECURITY FORCES' SUCCESS OVER THE ERP, THE STATE SECRETARIAT FOR INFORMATION (SIDE), RECENTLY DETAINED TWO OF MARIO ROBERTO SANTUCHO'S BROTHERS, AND CAME VERY CLOSE TO PICKING UP SANTUCHO, HIMSELF. IT IS (S) (U)

[1 - 105-767] (S) (U) (Montoneros) [1 - 109-38] (ERP) (S)
[1 - 80-VALIN] RWS:jn (5)

(S) (U)

SECRET

[105-767-72] (S) (U)

CLASSIFIED BY: 39063 E/W/8-7-96 SP6 Ag/CAL/CIS/SEM
REASON: 1.5
DECLASSIFY ON: X (1)
Appeal # 90-037/UTL Buenos Aires Argentina Project

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~~SECRET~~ SECRET

PAGE TWO ~~SECRET~~ BUK 109-2 109-103

NOTED THAT ROBERTO MARIO SANTUCHO IS THE LEGENDARY LEADER OF THE ERP. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~ (S)

ADMINISTRATIVE - SOURCE IS COLONEL ALBERTO VALIN, CHIEF, AAIS. (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY. (S) (U)

END.

NOV 3 1985

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-10-2017 BY: F54M93K42

7/15/76

CODE

SECRET

CABLE URGENT (PRIORITY)

(109-12-201)

TO: DIRECTOR NR. 171-15

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)

SECRET

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA. (S)(4)

ON JULY 15, 1976, BRIGADIER GENERAL ALBANO EDUARDO HARGUINDEGUY, ARGENTINE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES: (S) (U)

ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES HAVE SCORED CONSIDERABLE SUCCESSES AGAINST THE ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, THE PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP). ARGENTINE SECURITY ~~KKKK~~ SERVICES HAVE DEVELOPED INFORMATION JUDGED TO BE RELIABLE THAT THE ERP AND THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS WILL JOIN FORCES AND WILL ANNOUNCE THEIR MERGER IN A PUBLIC MANIFESTO, WHICH WILL BE ISSUED ON AUGUST 22, 1976, THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF THE SOCALLED TRELEW INCIDENT, DURING WHICH SEVERAL ARGENTINE TERRORISTS WERE KILLED BY ARGENTINE (S) (U)

2 - 109-38 (ERP) 1 - 105-767 (MONTONEROS) (S)(4)
RWS:jn
(4)

NOV 3 1989

Classified by: 2800 SCG 1
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394 (4)

SECRET

105-767-73 (S)

CLASSIFIED BY: SP6 Sag 1/96 39613 IWBCP/SAW
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (C)
CLASSIFIED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 2-10-98 case # 12 only
Flag Cat IIIC 10-4-96
Appeal #90-037 Argentine Project
U.S. Embassy

SECRET

MXXXTARX SECURITY FORCES DURING AN ESCAPE ATTEMPT FROM AN ARGENTINE MILITARY DETENTION CENTER. THE REASON FOR THE MERGER IS THAT THE ERP HAS BEEN SEVERELY CRIPPLED DURING THE PAST THREE MONTHS BY ARGENTINE SECURITY FORDES. (U)

ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES BELIEVE THAT ERP LEADER, MARIO ROBERTO SANTUCHO, IS IN BUENOS AIRES, AS WELL AS MONTONERO LEADER, MARIO EDUARDO FIRMENICH. (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS 1 AND 2, INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - RE MY ERRLIER CABLE OF JULY 15, 1976, WHICH REPORTED INFORMATION DEVELOPED ON JULY 14, 1976, FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, INDICATING THAT THE AAIS BELIEVED THAT THE ERP WOULD TURN TO THE MONTONEROS FOR SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE. ABOVE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY MINISTER OF INTERIOR CONFIRMS INFORMATION. (U)

THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS SECURED FROM THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR DURING A PRIVATE AUDIENCE BETWEEN HIM, THE AMBASSADOR AND ME. (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY. (U)

END.

SECRET

NOV 3 1989

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-10-2017 BY: F54M93K42

SECRET

THE AMBASSADOR 7/16/76
VIA ACTING DCM

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

THE MONTONEROS

On 7/15/76 a ranking official of the Federal Police of Argentina (FPA), Department of Federal Security (Intelligence Division), advised that information has been obtained from several recently detained Montoneros, that the Montoneros plan to institute large scale random attacks against senior military and police officials with intelligence responsibilities. (S) (U)

The source reported that the Montoneros plans also include retired military and police officers, who had been identified as having intelligence functions. The source reported that the Montoneros apparently at the present time are moving personnel into the Federal Capital from the surrounding provinces in order to implement this assassination campaign, which is scheduled to commence on 7/20/76. (S) (U)

39063EW/BCE/cpb 10-26-95
CLASSIFIED BY: Sp6Ag/CAL
REASON: 1.5 (B) (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X(5) X(6)
Appeal # 90-0371
Argentina Project

Classified by: OPIA GJO
Declassify on: OADR 10/31/89
284394

1 - Addressee
1 - POL/R
1 - SY
1 - DAO
1 - MILGRP
2 - Buenos Aires (S) (4)
(1 - 105-767) (Montoneros)
(1 - 80-Marcote) (S) (U)

RWS:jn
(7)

SECRET

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-96 page 1 only
Sp6Ag/CAL/DK 10-4-96

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Exempt from General Declassification
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Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified IMDET

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Rwx

NOV 3 1986

SECRET

(S) (4)
[105-767-74]

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-10-2017 BY: F54M93K42

SECRET

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA ACTING DCI

7/16/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

Classified by [redacted]
Declassify on: OADR 10/13/89

TERRORIST UTILIZATION OF ROADBLOCKS POSING AS SECURITY FORCES

CLASSIFIED BY: 15
REASON:
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

On 7/15/76, an official of the Federal Police of Argentina (FPA), Department of Federal Security (Intelligence Division), provided the following information: (U)

Recently the Argentine Army Intelligence Service (SIE) circulated information to all Argentine security units indicating that information had been obtained from captured Montonero documents indicating that the Montoneros were working on plans to set up roadblocks posing as military and police personnel. The Montoneros were planning to attempt to identify military and police personnel passing through the roadblocks and assassinate them on the spot. (U)

On 7/16/76, an official of the Buenos Aires Provincial Police Intelligence Service provided the following information: (U)

Recently the ERP set up a roadblock on the Panamerican Highway at Kilometer 46 under the pretext of being plainclothes Buenos Aires Provincial Police officers. Approximately 50 motorists were stopped and a monetary contribution to the ERP was demanded from each motorist. The motorists caught in the roadblock were given a receipt for their donation to the ERP and a large red ERP star was affixed to their windshield before they were allowed to leave the roadblock area. One unfortunate motorist proceeded directly to a Buenos Aires Provincial Police Sub-station and was assassinated by Buenos Aires Provincial Police guards outside of the Police Sub-station, who upon viewing the ERP star on the motorists's windshield, opened fire believing that an ERP attack against the Sub-station was about to commence. (U)

With regard to Montonero plans to set up roadblocks to facilitate the assassination of military and police personnel, the FPA and the Argentine military have been utilizing extensive helicopter patrols throughout the Federal Capital and Buenos Aires Province, in order to detect any fraudulent roadblocks or checkpoints. To date, none have been detected. (U)

1 - PGL/R
1 - SY
1 - DAO
5 - Buenos Aires (1 - 109-103)(109-38)
(1 - 105-767)(1-80Marcote)
(1 - 80-DeBaldrich)
RWS:jn (10)

SECRET

Classified by 5931
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified indef

(U)

(S) (U)

TERRORIST UTILIZATION OF ROADBLOCKS POSING AS SECURITY FORCES

The FPA source noted that should the Montoneros put their plan into operation, their roadblocks would more than likely be established during the evening hours in order to avoid the possibility of helicopter detection and to minimize the opportunity of close examination of uniforms and presumed police and military vehicles utilized in the roadblock. This conclusion was arrived at since military and police personnel have expert knowledge of the correct uniforms of their services and also would easily be able to recognize a fictitious military or police vehicle, or one that was brought from another district to the location of the roadblock, should the Montoneros steal a vehicle. The FPA source noted that generally speaking, combined police and military units manned roadblocks in the Federal Capital and the areas of Buenos Aires Province close to the Federal Capital. In most instances the source noted that plainly marked Federal Police or Provincial Police cruisers are present in the immediate vicinity of the roadblock, as well as military vehicles. Thus the source noted that a roadblock manned by individuals in uniform of either the police or military without the presence of a vehicle from either the military or police forces would be highly suspicious. Additionally, should combinations of uniforms be used, i.e. part of the individuals in street uniforms with others in combat dress, this should be viewed with suspicion. (S) (U)

The Buenos Aires Provincial Police source noted that his service conducted no roadblocks or checkpoints by police officers in civilian attire. Additionally, although unmarked police cruisers may be placed at a roadblock or checkpoint, there almost always is a marked cruiser on the scene. The source noted that any roadblock in Buenos Aires Province manned by individuals in civilian clothes with unmarked vehicles should be viewed with considerable suspicion and avoided if possible. (S) (U)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-10-2017 BY: F54M93K42

7/16/76

CODE

SECRET

CABLE URGENT (PRIORITY)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. 173-16

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)

SECRET

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA. (S)(U)

ON JULY 15, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS A RANKING OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA), DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY (INTELLITENCE DIVISION), PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SEVERAL RECENTLY DETAINED MONTONERO GUERRILLA MEMBERS INDICATES THAT THE MONTONEROS ARE PLANNING TO INITIATE LARGE SCALE ATTACKS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSASSINATION S AGAINST SENIOR MILITARY AND POLICE OFFICIALS HAVING INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES. THE MONTONEROS PLAN TO INITIATE THE ASSASSINATION CAMPAIGN ON JULY 20, 1976, AND AT THE PRESENT TIME ARE MOVING MEMBERS INTO THE FEDERAL CAPITAL OF BUENOS AIRES IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THE ASSASSINATION ~~REAM~~ OPERATION. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR CARLOS VICENTE MARCOTE, ACTING DIRECTOR, FPA, DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY. (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY. (S) (U)

Classified by: DPIAGO
Declassify on: OADR 0/3189
284394

1 - 105-767 (S) (U)
RWS:jn
(3)

SECRET

105-767-76

CLASSIFIED BY: 39063 (10-27-75) SPEAG/CAL
REASON: 1.5 (B) (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (5) X (6)
Approved 90-037 Argentina Project
NTL Bhuiyan

5/23/01

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 1-10-76 page 1 only
SPEAG/CAL/DR

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FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

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Objetivos de la subversión

Las organizaciones declaradas ilegales habían establecido desde hace un año objetivos comunes, métodos de acción paralelos y estaban dispuestas a hacer público dicho acuerdo en breve plazo, según documentos incautados por las fuerzas del orden en recientes operativos. Fuentes castrenses señalan la identidad de miras de las dos organizaciones, sobre la base de un "partido único marxista-leninista" y de lo que llamaban un "único Ejército Popular", todo para la conquista del poder.

Las dos organizaciones extremistas declaradas fuera de la ley tenían establecidos estrechos vínculos y actuaban de conjunto —contrariamente a lo estimado en círculos políticos— según han podido establecer los responsables de las fuerzas combinadas de seguridad después de la serie de operativos coronados por el éxito de las últimas semanas.

Durante esas acciones antisubversivas se incautaron importantes y numerosos documentos sobre la actividad de las organizaciones ilegales, que indican una total identidad de miras y propósitos entre las conducciones respectivas.

Como se sabe, la acción de las fuerzas del orden culminó esta semana con la muerte de **Mario Roberto Santucho** —máximo dirigente de la organización proscripta en 1973— así como de sus principales lugartenientes.

Uno de los documentos obtenidos por las autoridades, con el carácter de boletín interno del Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores, sintetiza el estado de las relaciones entre esa agrupación y el grupo desprendido del peronismo y puesto fuera de la ley en 1975. Señala que dichas relaciones se iniciaron en forma regular hace exactamente un año, acordándose llevar adelante la "guerra revolucionaria", sobre la base de "un único partido marxista-leninista" y también un "único ejército popular". Más aún, se habían puesto de acuerdo para suscribir un documento político, destacando su recíproco reconocimiento.

Los acuerdos se basan sobre la admisión de que la lucha armada era el medio apto para conquistar el poder, la oposición al liberalismo, una actitud antinorteamericana y el establecimiento del llamado "socialismo nacional".

Estas comprobaciones sobre la acción de las organizaciones subversivas realizadas por las Fuerzas Armadas, pone punto final a una serie de especulaciones que se hicieron en medios políticos sobre las relaciones que mantenían entre sí las agrupaciones extremistas.

Es evidente que los grupos subversivos desprendidos del peronismo trataron de mantener durante cierto tiempo una apariencia doctrinaria que no las separase totalmente de los medios populares. Este no era el caso de la otra organización subversiva de extrema izquierda, que siempre actuó con una radicalización inicial que la privó de todo tipo de influencia en la población.

Como se sabe, la organización proscripta en 1975 comenzó a formarse entre 1966 y 1970, sobre la base de siete agrupaciones de tendencia izquierdista del peronismo y "cristiana progresista", inspirada por el marxismo y el proceso de la revolución cubana.

El 12 de octubre de 1973 la mencionada organización se fusionó con las denominadas FAR (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias), de elementos de extrema izquierda, algunos de los cuales habían recibido instrucción militar así como adoctrinamiento político en el exterior.

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P. 2

CLARIN

BUENOS AIRES

7/24/76

Date:
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title:

Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office: 105-767 - 77
☐ Being Investigated

SEARCHED ..... INDEXED .....
SERIALIZED ..... FILED .....
JUL 26 1976
LEGAL ATTACHE
BUENOS AIRES

SECRET

RSO GEORGE BECKETT 8/9/76

LEGATT ROBERT W. SCHERRER

Classified by DDIA/BSC
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

MONTONEROS

Attached is the original handwritten report provided by your guard during the evening of 8/6/76, together with a translation of this report. In addition to the information contained in the attached report your guard advised as follows orally in the Spanish language: (S) (U)

In connection with his official position with the Argentine Air Force, in the office of a ranking Argentine Air Force intelligence officer, he ascertained that the Montoneros intended to carry out the action described in the attached report. He ascertained this information from Montonero documents which he had seen within the past 72 hours. (S) (U)

He voiced considerable concern for his fellow Brown Security guards, especially those in mobile patrol cars who would be obvious targets for Montonero action. He indicated that since he joined Brown Security over two years ago, shift changes have been routinely conducted at the same location and at the same time for over two years. He identified this location as the YPF (former ESSO) Service Station located at the corner of General Pacheco and Santa Fe in Martinez. He indicated that according to his information, the shooting incident which took place at this service station on 8/2/76 was an attempt by terrorists to attack Brown Security Patrol cars or personnel during the shift change. (S) (U)

It should be noted that according to Dr. MARCELO CASTRO, the two individuals killed during the 8/2/76 shootout at the YPF station were not terrorists but innocent civilians who panicked during a routine check by the FPA and were gunned down in their automobile near the service station. According to Dr. CASTRO, the two victims were unarmed and had no connection (S) (U)

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1 - Addressee
2 - Bue [(105-767)] (S) (U)
(1 - 109-103)

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(3)

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Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on Indefinite

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[105-767-78] (S) (U)

RE: MONTONEROS

with any terrorist organization. Dr. CASTRO indicated that one of the FPA officers conducting a vehicle and identity checks allowed a round to escape from his weapon, thus causing a reaction from his companions who believed the two individuals who were subsequently killed had fired upon the FPA officers. (U)

Attachments (2)

NCL 8 ...39

[8/7/76] (S)(U)

According to information provided by a reliable source, the ERP-Montoneros, due to the loss of weapons and backup equipment, have decided to conduct attacks against the security forces, as well as the security forces of the different Embassies who use portable radio equipment and weapons. S (U)

The probable target areas will be Olivos, Martinez, Vicente Lopez, Acassuso and Becar, inasmuch as most of the diplomatic corps reside in those areas. S (U)

It is felt that attacks against individuals will bring about friction between the government and the diplomatic community. The extremist groups have been instructed to kill the selected individual and to take radio equipment and weapons, trying to avoid confrontation with the police and the armed forces. S (U)

The Montoneros have decided to send persons posing as salesmen to the residences, ostensibly to sell articles for the home and thus gain entrance to the residence to achieve their aims. S (U)

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ON 10-22-95
Appeal # 90-0371

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284394

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CONFIDENTIAL

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA THE ACTING DCM

9/20/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

MONTONEROS

On 9/20/76, HERB LESHINSKY, Chrysler South America Managing Director, provided the following information: (S) (U)

At approximately 5:00 A. M. on 9/20/76, a group of armed individuals traveling in a pickup truck stopped in front of the Chrysler Fevre-Argentina administrative offices in San Justo, Buenos Aires Province, and fired upon the building with automatic weapons. According to LESHINSKY, the conference room window was riddled with bullets, with one of the bullets penetrating into LESHINSKY's office, where it imbedded itself in the ceiling. (S) (U)

The MONTONERO guerrilla organization left a communique at the scene claiming credit for the attack. Chrysler Fevre security guards recovered an unexpended cartridge pertaining to an FAL weapon which apparently was one of the weapons utilized in the attack. (S) (U)

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Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

Copies:
1 - Addressee
1 - POL
1 - POL-R
1 - Economic Counsellor
1 - SY
2 - Bue [(105-767)] (S) (U)
(1 - 109-103)
RWS:gjk
(7)

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ON 10-27-95
Appeal 90-0371
ARGENTINA project

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NOV 3

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(S) (U)
[105-767-79]

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THE AMBASSADOR 9/21/76
VIA ACTING DCM WILLIAMS BEAL

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

SECRET

MONTONEROS

Reference my memo dated 9/20/76.

Subsequent to the transcription of referenced memo, HERB LESHINSKY, Chrysler South America Managing Director, visited the Embassy and made available the attached Montonero flyer, which had been left near the scene of the shooting of the Chrysler-Febre Argentina Administrative Offices in San Justo, Buenos Aires Province. (S)

LESHINSKY provided the following additional information: (S)

With the recent assassination of a Chrysler supervisory employee by the Montonero organization, many Chrysler executives have expressed their concern for their safety and the wellbeing of their families, since apparently the Montoneros have instituted a campaign against Chrysler. LESHINSKY noted that recently the manufacturing and engineering manager had tendered his resignation. Additionally the Public Relations Director has also resigned. An administrative officer who had been moved to Sao Paulo, Brazil, because of apparent surveillance activity against him, is also giving consideration to resigning. LESHINSKY voiced his concern that the Montoneros were succeeding in their objectives of of causing fear among the Chrysler Febre Argentina executive corps and disrupting Chrysler Fevre Argentina operations. (S)

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ON 10-27-95 5/23/01
Appeal # 90-0321
Argentina Project

Attachment

1 - Addressee (Enc. 1)
1 - POL (Attachment)
1 - POL/R (Attachment)
1 - Econ Counselor (Attachment)
1 - SY (Attachment)
2 - Buenos Aires
(1 - 105-767) (S)(U)
(1 - 109-103)

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Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
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RWS:jn
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[105-767 BO] (S)

4°CAMPAÑA NACIONAL DEL EJERCITO MONTONERO

oficial 1° Carlos Caride

Por la dignidad del PUEBLO y la grandeza de la PATRIA



SIN JUSTICIA SOCIAL
NO HABRA PAZ PARA NADIE

EJERCITO MONTONERO

Secciòn Pacho Sanandrea-Alejandro Veiga

DECLASSIFIED BY SP6AG/CAL
ON 11-27-95
Appeal # 96-0371

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DATE 09-19-2017 BY: C32W35B91

CONTROL: 6078
SEP 76 1245

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM	CLASSIFICATION
Amembassy BUENOS AIRES	~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ASEC
SUBJECT: Contents of Equipment and Materials Found in Montonero Intelligence Headquarters
ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC

CONFIDENTIAL BUENOS AIRES 6078

1. Contact of RSO having access to the results of Military operations, furnished the following:

A) During week of Sept. 6, 1976, GOA Army and police elements raided an intelligence and logistic HQ, Montoneros Northern Column. Found in this HQ were the following:

a) Advanced technological instruments and machinery used in forging all kinds of documents and credentials, both military and civil.

b) Identity cards similar to those extended by police forces (Federal and Buenos Aires Provincial), Federal Capital and Provincial drivers licenses, various credentials for important official positions, etc.

c) Documents and credentials covering vehicle ownership, permits to enter the Buenos Aires downtown area, etc.

AMB
DCM
SY
CHRON
MLGRP
DAO
POL
POL/R
LEGATT
ECOM

105-767-8

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
RSO:GSBeckett:mek	9-16-76	148/175	AMB:RCHill

CLEARANCES:
A/DCM:WBeal

NOV 3 1989

INDEXED
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LEGAL ATTACHE
BUENOS AIRES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 163
(Formerly FS-413)
January 1975
Dept. of State

50153-101

d) Intelligence Services credentials (SIDE, SIE, SII, SIG, ETC.)

e) Seals and copies of signatures of high-level military and civil officials authorized to sign above-mentioned documents and credentials.

f) Marriage licenses, birth certificates, passports, etc., in blank and ready to be filled out.

g) Files and an index with thousands of cards containing names of MONTONEROS, their sympathizers and collaborators (especially the persons who lend their identities), etc.

h) Index cards, especially coded, containing photographs and titles of some of their leaders.

B) Police and Military Intelligence officials consider the results of the raid to be significant and believe the raided location was the intelligence and logistics support HQ for the Montonero movement. They consider the raid to be an extensive setback for the Montonero movement and are currently analyzing all materials for the purpose of obtaining information for future raids.

2. Source also advised that between January and the end of August, fourteen business executives, Argentine nationals, were kidnapped. In addition, he advised that from Jan. thru Aug. security forces killed 415 extremists and that an additional 751 political assassinations took place. This

means 1166 persons lost their lives in some respect connected with the terrorist problem in Argentina. Within the 751 political assassinations, 14 executives of major companies were assassinated. Management personnel from Bendix, Swift, Chrysler and Fiat were among those killed.

HILL

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

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(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

P. 6

EL CLARIN

BUENOS AIRES

10/3/76

Date:
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title:

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☐ Being Investigated

105-767-82

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NOV 8 1989

SEARCHED INDEXED
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OCT 1976
LEGAL ATTACHE—BUENOS AIRES

El operativo de Floresta

Otro rudo golpe fue asestado a la subversión; al perecer cinco de sus dirigentes nacionales y ser capturados otros cuatro, en el procedimiento efectuado el miércoles pasado en Villa Luro. Se conocen amplios detalles sobre el desarrollo de este operativo de las fuerzas conjuntas. En los últimos meses se registra otra serie de descalabros para el extremismo, que alcanzó a las dos organizaciones declaradas ilegales en nuestro país.

A sesenta días de la muerte de Mario Roberto Santucho y su lugarteniente, Benito José Urteaga, las fuerzas conjuntas de seguridad asestaron otro rudo golpe, esta vez a la organización declarada ilegal en 1975, que abatieron a cinco dirigentes nacionales de su rama política.

En el enfrentamiento que se produjo el miércoles pasado, en la finca de Corro y Yerbal, de Floresta, perecieron Alberto José Molinas Beliizzi, secretario político a nivel nacional; Juan Carlos Coronel, responsable de la agitación sindical y fabril; Isaac Salume, encargado de la acción en medios estudiantiles; María Victoria Walsh, dirigente del departamento de prensa del frente sindical, e Ignacio José Bertrán, miembro del secretariado político nacional. Otros cuatro subversivos fueron detenidos.

♦ La casa

Según informaciones que se fueron recogiendo, la casa donde se ocultaban los extremistas, de una sola planta y con una amplia terraza, se encontraba en venta, pero su dueño la alquiló en julio por una renta mensual de 55.000 pesos.

Llegó entonces a residir en la finca una mujer de unos 60 años, con tres hijos varones —según dijo— a los que se unieron luego dos mujeres, que se decían hermanas de los anteriores.

El procedimiento se inició a las 8.30 cuando vehículos policiales procedieron a tomar posiciones en torno de la manzana y a cortar el tránsito a varias cuadras a la redonda. Luego avanzó desde el noroeste una columna del Ejército, compuesta por tres carriers artillados y dos camiones.

♦ Tiroteo de gran intensidad

Luego de que efectivos del Ejército se unieron al cerco, un vehículo policial llegó frente a la casa, desde donde se ordenó a los subversivos que se entregaran, dirigiéndose a ellos por medio de megáfonos. La respuesta fue una serie de disparos contra los efectivos de seguridad, iniciándose así un tiroteo de gran intensidad.

Los disparos de toda clase de armas se prolongaron desde las 9 a las 9.45 y, cinco minutos después de este primer intercambio, dos extremistas huyeron por los techos, tras arrojar dos granadas de mano. El tiroteo se reanudó y uno de los prófugos fue localizado en un galpón de una casa de la calle Bermúdez 172, donde fue abatido tras 15 minutos de tiroteo. El otro murió al llegar a las vías del ferrocarril.

A las 10.5, llegaron dos helicópteros artillados de la Policía Federal, y uno del Ejército, mientras que los efectivos terrestres comenzaban a disparar con bazucas contra la casa.

♦ Detenidos

Los extremistas no siguieron respondiendo al fuego y minutos más tarde se vio salir de la finca con los brazos en alto, a un hombre identificado como el esposo de una de las hijas de la dueña de casa. Luego lo siguió ésta y otros dos hombres. Los detenidos, bajo fuerte custodia, fueron llevados a un vehículo estacionado en Cervantes, entre Yerbal y Rivadavia.

Los medios oficiales asignan asimismo gran importancia a los documentos hallados, donde había listas de miembros desertores de la organización, de contribuyentes a través de extorsiones, etcétera.

♦ Otros hechos

Este exitoso operativo, que fue la culminación de pacientes investigaciones, que detectaron el lugar de reunión de la conducción subversiva, viene a sumarse a otra serie de duros golpes asestados a la guerrilla en los últimos meses. Estos son los principales:

—El 1º de julio, 45 extremistas fueron detenidos en el noroeste y otros cinco abatidos al intentar un ataque en Campo de Mayo.

—Otros 12 elementos subversivos resultaron muertos al día siguiente en el enfrentamiento ocurrido en Boulogne.

—El 10 se descubre el archivo central de la organización declarada ilegal en 1973, en la calle Ecuador de la localidad de San Andrés.

—El 12, mueren 12 extremistas en distintos puntos del país y se descubre en Córdoba la más importante de las imprentas clandestinas, instalada con gran despliegue técnico y a un costo millonario.

—Sorprendido en Villa Martelli, caen Mario Roberto Santucho y su lugarteniente José Benito Urteaga, así como Domingo Mena, líderes de la organización declarada ilegal en primer término.

—En los días sucesivos se hallan nuevas imprentas clandestinas y el 15 de agosto, en Rosario y Córdoba, se hallan importantes

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DATE 04-10-2017 BY: F54M93K42

10/4/76

SECRET

TELETYPE URGENT

6-1-01 39063 E/W BCE/sam 10-27-95
CLASSIFIED BY: SP6AG/CAL
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (1)
APPEAL #90-0371
argentina project

p 04 Z OCT 76

FM BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103) (P)

TO DIRECTOR (109-12-201) PRIORITY -04

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-96 page 1, 2 only
SP6AG/CAL/DK 10-4-96

BT

Classified by DPIAB 30
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; [ARGENTINE 284394
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.] (S) (U)

ON OCTOBER 2, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS AN OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

ARGENTINE PRESIDENT LT. GENERAL JOSE RAFAEL VIDELA ATTENDED A CEREMONY AT CAMPO DE MAYO? A LARGE ARGENTINE ARMY INSTALLATION LOCATED IN BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE, THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 2, 1976. A SMALL REVIEWING STAND HAD BEEN SET UP AT CAMPO DE MAYO TO ACCOMMODATE PRESIDENT VIDELA AND OTHER ATTENDING ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY OFFICIALS. APPROXIMATELY FIVE MINUTES AFTER PRESIDENT VIDELA AND HIS ENTOURAGE DEPARTED THE REVIEWING STAND, A MEDIUM SIZE BOMB EXPLODED? CAUSING PART OF THE REVIEWING STAND TO COLLAPSE AND INJURING A NEWSPAPER REPORTER? AN ARGENTINE (S) (U)

4 - Bue (109-2) (109-103)
[(105-767 Montoneros) [(80-173 Capt. Lucero)] (S) (U) [105-767-83] (S) (U)
RWS:gjk (S)(U)
(4)

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ARMY NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER AND AN ARGENTINE ARMY COMMISSIONED OFFICER. INVESTIGATION ESTABLISHED THAT THE BOMB WAS MADE UP OF LESS THAN FOUR OUNCES OF PROTYL AND IT HAD BEEN DETONATED BY A CLOCK-LIKE TIMING DEVICE. DURING THE LATE AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 2, 1976, THE AAIS DETAINED AN INDIVIDUAL WHO WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE BUENOS AIRES MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT WHO HAD TAKEN PART IN THE INSTALLATION OF THE REVIEWING STAND AT CAMPO DE MAYO AND WHO ADMITTED HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE PLACEMENT OF THE BOMB. THE ATTEMPT AGAINST PRESIDENT VIDELA'S LIFE WAS CARRIED OUT BY THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS 2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE.

SOURCE IS MAJOR JUAN LUCERO, AAIS. (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY. (S) (U)

BT

SECRET

NOV 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-10-2017 BY F54M93K42 ADG

RESERVADO

Buenos Aires, 29 de Setiembre de 1976

ASUNTO: O.P.B.C. Box 1313-Oakland -California - EEUU 94609

Un dirigente terrorista perteneciente a la organización subversiva Montoneros, escribe una carta a la dirección mencionada arriba, solicitándole que insista ante diversas entidades norteamericanas (no las menciona) y personalidades del mismo País (aclara si es posible DEMOCRATA) para que se intensifiquen presiones para lograr la libertad de presos terroristas en Argentina.-

También menciona el remitente que es imprescindible que "ustedes desde EEUU deben conseguirnos asilo político en la Embajada de ese país en Buenos Aires, a través de las manijas que puedan tener allí...".-

En la carta se hace mención a que la persona actualmente radicada en EEUU logró su propósito en base a "presiones de entidades internacionales de solidaridad cuando se ausentó del país".-

La carta está dirigida a una tal RAQUEL, desconociéndose todo otro dato de la destinataria.-

Solicito -si es posible- obtener datos de los ciudadanos argentinos que residan en la dirección mencionada a la cabeza de esta nota.-

105-767-84

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
OCT 6 1976
LEGAL ATTACHE - BUENOS AIRES

Furnished by Major Lucero 10/5/76. Rux

SIE XEROX
NOV 3 1989

RESERVADO

Rux

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-10-2017 BY: F54M93K42

SECRET

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA THE DCM

10/6/76

ROBERT W. SCHERRER, LEGAL ATTACHE

CLASSIFIED BY: SP6Ag/CAL
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (1)
#90-0371 argentina project

Classified by: DDIA
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

MONTONEROS

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7/10/86 PBC 1.2
SP6Ag/CAL/DK 10-4-94

On 10/5/76, a ranking official of one of the Argentine intelligence services provided the following information: (S) (U)

On 9/28/76, Argentine security forces raided an apartment in Villa Luro in the Federal Capital of Buenos Aires which was occupied by high ranking leaders of the Argentine terrorist organization, the Montoneros. Several Montonero leaders were killed and others captured. A volume of important Montonero correspondence was recovered from the apartment. One document recovered was a copy of the letter directed to "OPBC", Post Office box 1313, Oakland, California, 94609. This letter had been written by Montonero leader Jose Molinas Beluzzi and was directed to an individual within the "OPBC" named Raquel. (S) (U)

The letter requests that the "OPBC" institute various pressure tactics in the United States and to contact members of the Democratic Party in order to intensify pressure to force the Argentine Government to liberate terrorist prisoners in Argentina. Additionally, Molinas requested that "you in the United States should arrange for political asylum for us in the American Embassy in Buenos Aires by means of the pressure you can apply there" (in the United States). Additionally, Molinas commented that Raquel could further assist the Montonero cause by means of "pressure upon international organizations of solidarity when you travel outside the country" (United States). (S) (U)

According to an evaluation made the the source's service of the above described letter, the Montonero terrorist organization is seeking assistance from OPBC in the United States and abroad. The source's service is considerably concerned at the inference that Montonero terrorists may attempt to claim political asylum in the Embassy of the United States in Buenos Aires. (S) (U)

Copies: 1 - Addressee
1 - POL
1 - POL-R
1 - SY
1 - DAO
2 - Bue

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(S) (U)

SECRET
Classified By 5931
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on Indefinite

105-767-85

(U) (1 - 80-173 Lucero)
RWS:
(7)

SECRET

RE: MONTONEROS

The foregoing information should not be discussed with any foreign officials, including those of the Argentine Government. (A)(4)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-10-2017 BY: F54M93K42

10/6/76

CODE

SECRET

CABLE PRIORITY 6/1/01 39063 EIWBCE/SEM

CLASSIFIED BY: SP6Ag/CAL
REASON: 1.5 (C) (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (1) (6)

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P 061400Z OCT 76

FM BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103) argentina project 10-27-95

TO DIRECTOR (109-12-201) PRIORITY 214-06 (S)(U)

BT

Classified by
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89 284394

S E C R E T

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA. (S)(U)

ON OCTOBER 5, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS A RANKING OFFICIAL WITH THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1976, ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES RAIDED AN APARTMENT IN VILLA LURO IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL OF BUENOS AIRES, WHICH WAS OCCUPIED BY HIGH RANKING LEADERS OF THE MARXIST ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, THE MONTONEROS. SEVERAL MONTONERO LEADERS WERE KILLED AND OTHERS CAPTURED. A VOLUME OF IMPORTANT MONTONERO CORRESPONDENCE WAS RECOVERED FROM THE APARTMENT. ONE DOCUMENT RECOVERED WAS A COPY OF THE LETTER DIRECTED TO "OPBC," POST OFFICE BOX 1313, OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA, 94609. THIS LETTER HAD BEEN WRITTEN BY MONTONERO LEADER JOSE MOLINAS BELUZZI AND WAS DIRECTED TO AN INDIVIDUAL WITHIN THE "OPBC" NAMED RAQUEL. (S) (U)

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC) DATE: 2-10-96 page 1, 2, 3 only SP6Ag/CAL/DR 10-16-96 Appeal 90-0071

(S)(U)
1 - 105-767 (MONTONEROS) 1 - 105-1346 (S)(U) SECRET
1 - 80-LUCERO NOV 3 1989 (S)
(U)

RWS:jn (5)

(U) (S)

86

SECRET

THE LETTER REQUESTS THAT THE "OPBC" INSTITUTE VARIOUS PRESSURE TACTICS IN THE UNITED STATES AND TO CONTACT MEMBERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN ORDER TO INTENSIFY PRESSURE TO FORCE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO LIBERATE TERRORIST PRISONERS IN ARGENTINA. ADDITIONALLY, MOLINAS REQUESTED THAT "YOU IN THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ARRANGE FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM FOR US IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES BY MEANS OF THE PRESSURE YOU CAN APPLY THERE" (IN THE UNITED STATES). ADDITIONALLY, MOLINAS COMMENTED THAT RAQUEL COULD FURTHER ASSIST THE MONTONERO CAUSE BY MEANS OF "PRESSURE UPON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF SOLIDARITY WHEN YOU TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY" (UNITED STATES). (S) (U)

ACCORDING TO AN EMMA EVALUATION MADE BY THE AAIS OF THE ABOVE DESCRIBED LETTER THE MONTONERO XXXXXXX TERRORIST ORGANIZATION IS SEEKING ASSISTANCE FROM OPBC IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD. THE AAIS IS CONSIDERABLY CONCERNED AT THE INFERENCE THAT MONTONERO TERRORISTS MAY ATTEMPT TO CLAIM POLITICAL ASYLUM IN THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES IN BUENOS AIRES. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-1 AND 2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE (2 CR 3 LF) (S) (U)

SOURCE IS MAJOR JUAN LUCERO, AAIS. (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY. (S) (U)

COPY OF INSTANT COMMUNICATION SHOULD BE PLACED IN BUFILE 105-302269. (S) (U)

THE AAIS REQUESTS FBI ASSISTANCE IN IDENTIFYING THE ORGANIZATION "OPBC," POST OFFICE BOX 1313, OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA. (S) (U)

ADDITIONALLY, THE AAIS REQUEST THAT LIMITED INVESTIGATION BE CONDUCTED TO ASCERTAIN THE IDENTITIES OF INDIVIDUALS CONNECTED WITH OPBC WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO RAQUEL (LNU), AND ANY INDIVIDUALS IDENTIFIED AS ARGENTINE CITIZENS. THE FPA NOTE THAT THE MONTONERO TERRORIST ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR KIDNAPPINGS, MURDERS, BOMBINGS, ARSON AND EXTORTION, IN ARGENTINA, INCLUDING THE KIDNAPPING AND MURDER OF U. S. CONSULAR AGENT JOHN EGAN IN CORDOBA, ARGENTINA, DURING ~~xxxx~~ 1975. (S) (U)

BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO INSTRUCT THE SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE TO INSTITUTE APPROPRIATE INVESTIGATION. (S) (U)

BT

SECRET

NOV 3 1989

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-10-2017 BY F54M93K42

10/18/76

TELETYPE URGENT

SECRET

P18 Z OCT 76

FM BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103) (P) (S)(U)

TO DIRECTOR (109-12-201) PRIORITY

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED BY: Splaag/cag
REASON: 1.5
DECLASSIFY ON: X (1)

6/1/01 390632/1W7 32ELSAM 10-2745

Classified by: ORIA SCG
Declassify on: OADR 9/13/89
284394

Appeal #90-0371 Argentina Project

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA. (S)(U)

OCTOBER 17, 1976 WAS THE ANNIVERSARY OF PERONIST LOYALTY DAY WHICH MARKED THE RELEASE OF FORMER ARGENTINE PRESIDENT JUAN DOMINGO PERON FROM MILITARY CUSTODY ON OCTOBER 17, 1943, ALLOWING HIM TO BE SUBSEQUENTLY ELECTED PRESIDENT OF ARGENTINA. OCTOBER 17TH IS TRADITIONALLY CELEBRATED BY PERONISTS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS THROUGHOUT ARGENTINA. (S)(U)

ON OCTOBER 17, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS AN OFFICIAL WITH THE STATE SECRETARIAT FOR INFORMATION (SIDE), AN ARGENTINE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S)(U)

AT APPROXIMATELY 12:05 A.M. OCTOBER 17, 1976, A POWERFUL (S)(U)

5 - Bue (109-2) (S)(U)
(1 - 109-103) (S)(U)
(1 - 105-767 Montoneros)
(1 - 80-84 Dr. Poiré)
(1 - 80-217 Carlos Vicente Marcotte) (S)(U)

RWS:gjk (5)

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XEROX
NOV 13 1989
SECRET

105-767-87 (S)(U)

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 2-10-94 Appeal #90-0371 Argentina Project

SECRET

PAGE TWO BUE 109-2 109-103 CONFIDENTIAL

BOMB MADE UP OF APPROXIMATELY FOUR KILOS OF TNT, WAS DETONATED BY AN AUTOMATIC TIMING DEVICE NEAR A RECREATION ROOM IN THE "CIRCULO MILITAR" (MILITARY CIRCLE), AN EXCLUSIVE CLUB FOR ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES OFFICERS IN DOWN TOWN BUENOS AIRES. AT THE TIME OF THE DETONATION, APPROXIMATELY 114 PERSONS, INCLUDING MILITARY OFFICERS AND THEIR FAMILIES, WERE VIEWING A FILM. FORTY-NINE INDIVIDUALS WERE INJURED AS A RESULT OF THE BOMBING, 19 BEING HOSPITALIZED. AMONG THE INJURED, WERE MANY WOMEN AND CHILDREN. TWO WOMEN LOST THEIR SIGHT DUE TO EXTENSIVE INJURIES RECEIVED. SHORTLY AFTER THE DETONATION, THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION TOOK CREDIT FOR THE BOMBING. (X) (U)

ON OCTOBER 17, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS AN OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA), DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY (INTELLIGENCE DIVISION), PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (X) (U)

DURING THE LATE EVENING HOURS OF OCTOBER 17, 1976, NUMEROUS BOMB ATTACKS WERE CARRIED OUT THROUGHOUT THE CITY OF BUENOS AIRES BY UNIDENTIFIED TERRORISTS. THE PRINCIPAL TARGETS OF THESE BOMB ATTACKS WERE PARKED AUTOMOBILES? AND BUSES, INCLUDING A COLOR TELEVISION TRANSMISSION TRUCK. A VEHICLE BELONGING TO THE U. S. (X) (U)

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

EMBASSY, BUENOS AIRES, BEARING DIPLOMATIC LICENSE TAGS, WAS ATTACKED BY AN INCENDIARY BOMB THROWN FROM A PASSING AUTOMOBILE. THE U. S. EMBASSY VEHICLE WAS BEING DRIVEN BY A CHAUFFEUR WHO WAS UNHURT. MODERATE DAMAGE WAS CAUSED TO THE EMBASSY VEHICLE AS A RESULT OF THE BOMBING. NO TERRORIST GROUP HAS TAKEN CREDIT FOR THE AFOREMENTIONED ATTACK AGAINST THE U. S. EMBASSY VEHICLE. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE:

THE EMBASSY VEHICLE WHICH WAS ATTACKED ON OCTOBER 17, 1976, BELONGED TO THE DEFENSE ATTACHE'S OFFICE OF THE EMBASSY. THE CHAUFFEUR WHO WAS DRIVING THE VEHICLE ADVISED HE DID NOT DETECT ANY SURVEILLANCE AND BELIEVES THAT HE WAS THE VICTIM OF A RANDOM ATTACK CARRIED OUT BY TERRORISTS. (S)(U)

LEGAT PERSONNEL CONTINUE TO TAKE STRINGENT SECURITY PRECAUTIONS. (S)(U)

SOURCES ARE DR. ARTURO H. POIRE, SIDE and ~~EARSE~~ CARLOS VICENTE MARCOTTE. (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY. (S)(U)

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA THE DCM

11/1/76

ROBERT W. SCHERRER, LEGAL ATTACHE

Classified by: [illegible] 10/3/89
Declassify on: OADR 284394

MONTONEROS

On 11/1/76, I was contacted by HERB LESHINSKY, Chrysler, South America Manager-Director, who provided the following information: (S) (U)

On Saturday, 10/30/76, the wives of sixteen Chrysler executives and managers received a letter from captioned organization threatening their respective husbands with death if they did not cease exploiting workers and collaborating with the Military Government. It was explained to the recipient wives that the only manner in which their husbands' lives would be spared would be for them to cease their repressive activities and collaborate with the workers at Chrysler. (S) (U)

The letters were individually typed and not machine copied as others that had been received by Chrsyler executives in the past. The transmittal envelope contained each executive's exact address and even included their current telephone number. An error was made in the case of LESHINSKY, since he is unmarried and the letter was directed to the non-existent Mrs. LESHINSKY. (S) (U)

In order to guarantee the authenticity of the letter, the Montoneros referred to a machinegunning of the Chrysler Fevre Argentina administrative offices in San Justo, Buenos Aires Province on 9/20/76. Information concerning this incident is contained in my memorandum dated 9/20/76. (S) (U)

Copies: 1 - Addressee
1 - POL
1 - POL-R
1 - Economic Counsellor
1 - SY
2 - Bue [105-767] (S) (U)

(1 - 109-103) C O N F I D E N T I A L
RWS:gjk
(7)

Classified by 5931
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on Indefinite

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NOV 3 1989

39063 E/W BCE 5909

DECLASSIFIED BY Splag [illegible] [10-5-99 7-88]
ON 10-27-95 6-1-01
Appeal # 96-0371 Argentina Project

(S) (U)

11/3/76

SECRET

TELETYPE

P 03 Z NOV 76

FM BUENOS AIRES (109-2) [(109-103)] (S)(U) (S)(U)

TO DIRECTOR (109-12-201) PRIORITY [(?)-03]

Classified by [illegible]
Declassify on: OADR 0/3/89
284394

BT

E F T O

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; [ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.] (S)(U)

ON NOVEMBER 3, 1976, HERB LESHINSKY, CHRYSLER FEVRE, ARGENTINA MANAGING DIRECTOR, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S)(U)

DECLASSIFIED BY .....
ON .....

AT 7:30 A.M., NOVEMBER 3, 1976, THREE TERRORISTS CONNECTED WITH THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION ASSASSINATED CHRYSLER FEVRE ARGENTINA'S LABORATORY MANAGER, CARLOS ROBERTO SOUTO, OUTSIDE OF HIS RESIDENCE in CASTELLAR, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE. CHRYSLER FEVRE ARGENTINA IS THE ARGENTINE SUBSIDIARY OF THE CHRYSLER CORPORATION IN DETROIT, MICHIGAN. (S)(U)

DECLASSIFIED BY 39063 EIW BC Elsam
ON 10-22-95
Appeal # 90-0371 argentina Project

ADMINISTRATIVE.

FOREGOING INFORMATION IS EXCLUSIVE AND WILL BE COORDINATED LOCALLY. (S)(U)

NOV 3 1989

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BT

1 - Bue 109-2
1 - 109-103 [1 - 105-767] (S)(U) Montoneros) RWS:gjk (3)

SECRET

(S)(U)

[105-7[illegible]-89]

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THE AMBASSADOR
VIA RCH

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W [redacted]

MONTONEROS

Reference my memo 11/1/76 under the above caption.

On 11/3/76, I was again contacted by HERB LESHINSKY, Chrysler South America Managing Director, who provided the following information: (S)(U)

During the late afternoon and evening of 11/2/76, various telephone calls were received at the residences of the 16 Chrysler executives and managers to whom the Montonero letter described in referenced memo had been directed. The callers identified themselves as Montoneros and indicated the purpose of their calls was to confirm receipt of the Montonero written communication. (S)(U)

During the evening of 11/2/76, twelve of the sixteen executives and Chrysler managers to whom the earlier Montonero communication had been directed, received packages through the Argentine postal service at their residences. The son of one of the Chrysler executives opened one of the packages and discovered that it contained a small coffin. (S)(U)

At 7:30 A.M., Chrysler Laboratory Manager, CARLOS ROBERTO SOUTO, was assassinated by Montoneros as he left his residence enroute to the Chrysler Plant in San Justo. SOUTO was a 41-year-old Argentine citizen, who was married with three children. According to information provided by SOUTO's wife, as her husband was backing his automobile out (S)(U)

1 - Addressee
1 - POL
1 - POL/R
1 - ECONOMIC COUNSELOR
1 - SY
3 - Buenos Aires
(1 - 109-2)
(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 105-767)
BWS:jn (8)

NOV 3 1976

(S)(U)

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105-767-98 (S)(U)

DECLASSIFIED BY [redacted] ON [redacted]

SECRET

MONTONEROS

of the family residence in Castellar, Buenos Aires Province, two male individuals with stocking masks, armed with what was believed to be an Ithaca riot gun and a sub-machine gun, riddled her husband's car. Mrs. SOUTO ran out of her residence pleading with her husband's attackers to leave him alone. The attackers pointed their weapons at Mrs. SOUTO and she beat a hasty retreat back into her residence. She observed her husband's car veering and crashing into a neighbor's fence. The two armed individuals then went to the car, opened the driver's door and fired at her husband at point blank range. Mrs. SOUTO observed a third terrorist, who was in position down the street from the SOUTO residence. This terrorist was a female and also had her face covered with a stocking mask. After her husband had been assassinated, a Dodge 1500 red sedan entered the block at high speed and picked up the three terrorists.

SECRET

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DATE 04-10-2017 BY: F54M93K42

CONFIDENTIAL

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA A/DCM

11/4/76

ROBERT W. SCHERRER

SECRET

MONTONEROS

(S) (U)

On 11/3 and 11/4/76, various office contacts within the Intelligence Division of the Federal Police of Argentina (FPA) and other Argentine intelligence agencies reported that Sunday, 11/7/76, will be the "Día de los Montoneros" and that it is anticipated that captioned organization would carry out various disruptive activities; specifically, bombings throughout the Federal Capital and Greater Buenos Aires. (S)

6/1/01 39063 E/WBCE/Sam

CLASSIFIED BY: SP6AG/CAL
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (1)
Appeal #90-0321
Argentina Project

Classified by: [illegible]
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-96 page 1 only
SP6AG/CAL/DK 10-16-96

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1 - DAO
1 - HILGROUP
1 - SY
3 - Bue [(105-767)] (S)(U)
[(1 - 80-84)]
[(1 - 80-205)]
RWS:gjk
(9)

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105-767-91
(S)(U)

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CHARGE MAXWELL CHAPLIN 11/17/76

LEGATT ROBERT W. SCHERRER

SECRET

MONTONEROS

On 11/16/76, MALCOLM WATSON, Acting Chrysler Director for Argentina, advised that on 11/15/76 captioned organization communicated telephonically with the wives of several Chrysler executives, who had previously received individual written communications from the Montoneros. Several of the telephone calls indicated that future letter would be received from the Montoneros, while some hinted at possible action against the recipients' husbands next week. Telephone calls were received at the respective Chrysler executives' residences during the early morning hours after the executive in question had departed for work. (S)(U)

Chrysler is providing an escort service to take select executives to work in the morning and to accompany them to their residences from the Chrysler Plant in the evening. (S)(U)

39063 E/W BCE/Sam

DECLASSIFIED BY SPAG/CAL
ON 10-27-95 6/1/01
Appeal #90-0371
Argentina Project

Classified by DOIAGJC
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

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1 - Addressee
1 - POL/R
1 - SY
1 - ECON COUNSELOR
2 - Buenos Aires
(1 - 109-103) [1 - 105-767] (S)(U)
RWS:jn (6)

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SECRET

NOV 26 1976

(S)(U) 24

[105-767-92]

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DATE 04-10-2017 BY: F54M93K42

SECRET

SECRET

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA THE DCM

12/10/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

THE MONTONEROS

On 12/10/76, a source, who is connected with one of the Argentine Intelligence Services, provided the following information: (S) (U)

The recent shootout between Argentine security forces in Buenos Aires Province, which resulted in the alleged death of Montonero guerrilla leader, NORMA ARROSTITO, was a contrived operation. ARROSTITO was located in the general area in which the alleged shootout took place, and was captured by Argentine security forces after she had taken a potion of potassium cyanide. An andidote was immediately given to ARROSTITO and she survived the attempt at suicide. (S) (U)

ARROSTITO is presently in the hands of Argentine security forces undergoing interrogation. (S) (U)

The foregoing information should not be discussed with any foreign officials, including those of the Argentine Government. (S) (U)

1 - Addressee
1 - POL/R
1 - DAO
1 - SY
2 - Buenos Aires (105-767)
(1 - 80-POIRE)
RWS:jn(8)

(S) (U)

CLASSIFIED BY: 37063 DLW/BCE/SAM
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (1)
Appeal #90-0371 argentina passed

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 10-16-96 page 1 only
SPAG/CAC/DK #90-0371 10-16-96

CLASSIFIED BY 5931
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY: 5B(2)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON: IMDET

Classified by DPHG JC
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

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NOV 3 1989

XEROX

(S) (U)

[105-767-93]

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DATE 04-10-2017 BY F54M93K42 ADC

b1 per CIA

b1 per CIA

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NNNN

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THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

1/26/77

SECRET

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

(U)
(S) MONTONERO THREATS AND ATTACKS
AGAINST GOODYEAR ARGENTINA

On 1/26/77, FRED ADEN, Director, Goodyear Argentina, advised that during the evening of 1/25/77, the residence of the Goodyear Plant Manager was fired upon and a bomb attack carried out by the Montonero guerrilla organization. (S) (U)

ADEN advised that Goodyear has been receiving numerous telephone calls and receiving Montonero leaflets indicating that the Montoneros were aware of the residences of all Goodyear executives, and that action would be carried out against them. (S) (U)

ADEN requested my assistance in obtaining automatic weapons for use by Goodyear guards. I told ADEN that the Embassy was not in a position to provide assistance in the acquisition of automatic weapons but suggested that ADEN contact an Argentine Army Intelligence Service representative, who is known to the Legal Attache. (S) (U)

The foregoing is submitted for your information.

1 - Addressee
1 - POL/R
1 - SY

2 - Buenos Aires (U)
(1 - 109-103)
[(1) - 105-767)] (S)

RWS:jn
(5)

DECLASSIFIED BY 39063 E/W BCE/Sar
SP6AG/CAC
ON 10-27-95 6-1-01
Appeal 90-0371
argentina project

Classified by SP1AG
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
2/84394

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(U) (S)
[105-767-95]

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VIA DCM

SECRET 3/3/77

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

MONTONERO THREATS AGAINST U. S. COMPANIES IN BUENOS AIRES

On 3/2/77, CARLOS R. NOVO, General Manager, Wyeth Laboratories; CARLOS A. SALVAGNI, General Manager, Upjohn Laboratories; and RUBEN L. BILA, General Manager, American Cynamid Laboratories, all Buenos Aires, visited the Embassy and spoke with the Legat and RSO DAVID TANNER.

The purpose of the above mentioned individuals' visit was to advise the Embassy of receipt by Lederle Laboratories and Abbot Laboratories on 2/4 and 2/16/77 respectively, of a communique from the Ejercito Montonero, in which the Montoneros indicate that in 1977 they will continue their attacks against companies, who submit their workers to deprivations, etc. The Montonero communique advises the recipients that they and all executive personnel should leave Argentina as soon as possible in order to save their lives and avoid danger to their families. Both communiques were signed by the "Ejercito Montonero Zona Sur." Mr. BILA advised that the above described communiques had been shown to the Buenos Aires Provincial Police Intelligence Service, and that the Buenos Aires Provincial Police Intelligence Service advised that the communiques were authentic, noting that the Montoneros during the past three weeks had commenced to call themselves "Ejercito Montonero." Legat and RSO TANNER provided copies of State Department brochure on countering terrorism and advised the above mentioned individuals that the Embassy would appreciate receiving any additional information concerning Montonero threats against them. Above individuals were informed by the Legat and RSO that the Montonero communiques should not be taken lightly as similar communiques had been received by the Chrysler Corporation following which assasinations were carried out against Chrysler executives.

1 - Addressee
1 - POL
1 - POL/R
1 - ECON COUNSELOR
1 - SY
2 - Buenos Aires (1 - 105-767)
(1 - 109-103)

Attachment
RWS:jn (7)

Classified by
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284394

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ON 10-22-95 6/1/01
Appeal #90-0371
Argentina Project

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MONTONERO THREATS AGAINST U. S. COMPANIES IN BUENOS AIRES

The above individuals voiced their concern that the drug industury had apparently been singled out by the Montoneros for special attention. Legat and RSO pointed out that this might be possible, inasmuch as the drug industry in Argentina is made up of a number of U. S.-affiliated companies.

Attached for each recipient is a copy of the 2/14/77 Montonero communique directed to Abbot Laboratories.

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DATE 04-10-2017 BY F54M93K42 ADC

EJERCITO MONTONERO

BUENOS AIRES, 14 de Febrero de 1977.-

Señor
Gerente de
LABORATORIOS ABBOT ARGENTINA S/A.
Fcio. Verela (BS/AS.)

Señor:

El pueblo argentino está padeciendo uno de los momentos más difíciles de su historia. Sumido en la miseria, cargado de privaciones que llegan al hambre, y como si esto fuera poco, si protesta o se organiza en las fábricas para defender sus derechos, es encarcelado, secuestrado, torturado o fusilado por los gendarmes de los monopolios, hoy apoderados del Estado.

Las patronales monopólicas (como vuestra Empresa) son las directas responsables de los sufrimientos de nuestro pueblo; por supuesto apoyadas por la Junta militar gorila que las defiende a sangre y fuego.

La clase trabajadora conducida por el Movimiento Montonero, les ha demostrado una y mil veces con medidas de todo tipo, la firme voluntad de no rendirse al poder económico y militar de sus empresas. Nuestro pueblo ha empezado hace tiempo el largo y penoso camino hacia su liberación. Este camino desemboca irreversiblemente en la destrucción de sus enemigos. Ud. está entre ellos.

Le anticipamos que con el año que comienza continuaremos atacando cada vez con mayor contundencia, en todos los frentes de lucha, con medidas de acción directa, sabotaje a la producción, ataques a vuestros domicilios y ejecución de vuestros ejecutivos y alcahuetes. Por lo tanto USTED Y TODO EL PERSONAL PATRON DE SU EMPRESA DEBERAN ABANDONAR EL PAIS A CORTO PLAZO A FIN DE PRESERVAR SUS VIDAS y evitando riesgos y zozobra a sus familias.

XEROX NOV 8 1977

Sin otro motivo, esperamos que en última instancia prive en Ud. el buen criterio y cumpla con lo expresado; caso contrario nos veremos.-

PATRIA O MUERTE

VENCEREMOS!!!

EJERCITO MONTONERO

Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

STATE

IBUTION

XXXXX
AXXXXX
E.O.11652:N/A
TAGS: PINS,AR
SUBJECT: CATHOLIC CHURCH DENIES KNOWLEDGE OF MONTONERO CEASE FIRE CALL

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BUENOS AIRES 1681

Reports (such as that in La Paz radio broadcast published in FBIS Feb.18) that Montoneros have asked the Argentine Catholic Church to mediate a cease fire with the Argentine govt have been denied by Church sources here. The Papal Nuncio's office and Argentine Episcopate deny any knowledge of a letter allegedly sent to Church officials by the Montoneros calling for an end to the armed struggle. The letter reportedly proposes a number of conditions for the end of guerrilla warfare, including free elections, release of all citizens under arrest without reason, basic human treatment of prisoners of war, return of unions to workers and just distribution of national income. FornMinister Guzzetti told Ambassador on Feb. 28 that he had no knowledge of the alleged letter or truce call from the Montoneros and that, at any rate,

105-967-97

D BY	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY
OL:YThayer:mp	3-2-77	121	POL:A/Counselor:AGFreeman

NCES:
POL/R (in draft)

AMB:RCHill
DCM:MChaplin

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the govt would never consent to the preconditions. Comment: Guerrilla groups are reportedly trying to forge an alliance with the Church to oppose the military govt and its allegedly repressive policies, and letter, if indeed it was authored by Montoneros, may have been one effort in that direction, although Church denies any knowledge of it. Others, including press sources, discredit communication as a Montonero propaganda effort.

HILL

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THE AMBASSADOR
VIA THE DCM

3/23/77

ROBERT W. SCHERRER, LEGAL ATTACHE

SECRET

MONTONEROS

On 3/23/77, GUILLERMO NAVARRO, Director of Security, American Oil Company of Argentina, advised that during the past week the attached MONTONERO sticker had been placed on elevators at the American Oil Company of Argentina offices in Buenos Aires located at Maipú #938. It is noted that the MONTONERO sticker contains an adhesive backing making it extremely easy to affix to any smooth surface. (S) (U)

The foregoing is provided for information.

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Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

DECLASSIFIED BY Sp6Ag/CAL
ON 10-22-95
Appeal #90-0371

Attachment (1)
Copies:
1 - Addressee
1 - POL
1 - POL-R
1 - SY
1 - Bue [105-767] (S) (U)
RWS:gjk
Rwt (5)

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[105-767-98] (S) (U)

EL PLAN DE LOS YANKIS ES EL PLAN DE LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS

MONTONEROS

NOV 3 1989

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DATE 04-10-2017 BY F54M33K42 ADC

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

● ROUTINE

IN 208445

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

[redacted] Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 58 (5), (2). Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIR DB-315/02584-77 b3 per CIA

DIST 7 MARCH 1977

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-[redacted]

b1 per CIA

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

[redacted]

[redacted] DAT 3/29/77 INSTRUCTING
FOR INFORMATION
FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR MONTONERO INFILTRATORS OF THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES

[redacted]

1. A MONTONERO DOCUMENT [redacted] PROVIDES INSTRUCTIONS FOR MONTONERO INFILTRATORS OF THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES. INFILTRATORS ARE TO MAINTAIN WEEKLY OR BIWEEKLY MEETINGS WITH APPROPRIATE MONTONERO LEADERS TO REPORT ON THEIR ACTIVITIES AND TO RECEIVE GUIDANCE. DURING THESE MEETINGS THE

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LEGAL ATTACHE—BUENOS AIRES

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INFILTRATORS ARE TO BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THEIR PROGRESS IN DETERMINING INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE FOLLOWING: (1) FOREIGN INSTRUCTORS WHO MAY BE PRESENT WITHING THE ARMED FORCES; (2) MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES WHO MAINTAIN RELATIONS WITH RIGHTIST GROUPS; (3) OPERATIONAL DATA, PARTICULARLY INFORMATION ON COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES, AS WELL AS INFORMATION CONCERNING COORDINATION BETWEEN SECURITY UNITS OF THE THREE SERVICES, CONTENT OF COURSE INSTRUCTION, ETC.; (4) PERSONAL INFORMATION ON MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES WITH WHOM THE INFILTRATORS COME IN CONTACT, SUCH AS THEIR POLITICAL ORIENTATION, HOME ADDRESSES AND PHONE NUMBER; AND PHOTOGRAPHS, PARTICULARLY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL INVOLVED WITH INTELLIGENCE. SOLDIERS WILL BE PERIODICALLY SENT MONTONERO LITERATURE, AND INFILTRATORS ARE TO OBSERVE THEIR REACTION WHICH WILL SERVE AS A BASIS FOR FURTHER HOSTILE OPERATIONS OR RECRUITMENT ATTEMPTS.

2. WHILE ON DUTY THE INFILTRATORS ARE TO ENGAGE IN MINOR ACTS OF SABOTAGE, SUCH AS PLACING SAND OR SUGAR IN THE GAS TANKS OF MILITARY VEHICLES, PRODUCING SHORT CIRCUITS IN ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS, PUTTING SAND IN EMERGENCY GENERATORS, PLACING OLD BATTERIES IN COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, DEFLATING TIRES ON VEHICLES, STEALING PIECES OF ARMAMENT, DESTROYING GUN SIGHTS AND PUTT[redacted] SAND IN WEAPONS' MAGAZINES.

3. THE PRIORITY TARGET AREAS WITHIN THE MILITARY OF INFILTRATION ARE THE FOLLOWING: ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS; FIRST, SECOND, THIRD AND FIFTH CORPS HEADQUARTERS; MILITARY DISTRICTS; HEADQUARTERS OF THE MILITARY FACTORIES; SUPERIOR WAR SCHOOL; SAN MARTING GRENADIER CAVALRY REGIMENT; NAVY MECHANICAL SCHOOL; HEADQUARTERS OF THE MILITARY INSTITUTES; CAVALRY SCHOOL; INFANTRY SCHOOL; ENGINEERING SCHOOL; COMMUNICATIONS SCHOOL; ARTILLERY SCHOOL; AND "SARGENTO CABRAL" NOC SCHOOL.

4. THOSE MONTONEROS SELECTED TO JOIN THE ARMED FORCES AS INFILTRATORS ARE TO HAVE NO KNOWN HISTORY OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY, NOR ANY RELATIVES PRESENTLY UNDER DETENTION. AMONG THEIR MILITARY COLLEAGUES THEY ARE TO ASSUME AN APOLITICAL STANCE AND TO ACT CONFUSED OVER POLITICAL ASPECTS. IF IT SEEMS NECESSARY TO SHOW ANY POLITICAL TENDENCY, AROUND A MEMBER OF THE UPPER CLASS INFILTRATORS ARE TO TALK AGAINST PERONISM AND WITH A MEMBER OF THE WORKING CLASS ACT PRO-PERONIST. THE INFILTRATORS SHOULD BE FRIENDLY WITH THEIR SUPERIORS AND ENGAGE THEM IN CONVERSATIONS ABOUT THEIR FAMILIES. IN MILITARY COURSES COVERING SUBVERSION, INFILTRATORS SHOULD SEEM INDIFFERENT, AND THEY SHOULD DEMONSTRATE IGNORANCE IN THE USE OF WEAPONS. THEY SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE, HOWEVER, OF THE MILITARY

INSTRUCTION WHICH IS GIVEN. WHEN PARTICIPATING IN MILITARY SECURITY OPERATIONS, INFILTRATORS SHOULD DO WHAT THEY CAN TO STALL AN OPERATION, AND IF A FIRE FIGHT TAKES PLACE, THEY SHOULD SHOOT HIGH. WHEN GOING TO MEETINGS WITH MONTONERO CONTACTS, INFILTRATORS SHOULD PRACTICE STRICT COUNTERSURVEILLANCE, AND THEY SHOULD NEVER WEAR THEIR MILITARY UNIFORMS IN THE THE PRESENCE OF MONTONEROS.

[redacted] b1 per CIA

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED [redacted] b3 per CIA

[redacted]

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THE AMBASSADOR
VIA THE DCM

4/11/77

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERER

CLASSIFIED BY Sfla89/ICA 39063 sl/w DCE/SCM
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (1)
Appeal # 90-037 Argentine Project

Classified by DDIA 80 (1)
Declassify on: OADR 10/5/89
584394

MONTONEROS

On 4/11/77 an office contact who is connected with the Argentine Air Force Intelligence Service (AAIS), provided the following information: (S) (U)

Investigation by the AAIS established that the target of the bomb placed in the Condor Building last week was Argentine Air Force Brigadier General (Retired) Palazuelo. Brigadier Palazuelo had previously been the victim of two unsuccessful attempts against his life; one involving the placing of a bomb in his personal automobile and the othor an attack against his residence. The AAIS ascertained that Brigadier Palazuelo's own daughter was responsible for placing the bomb in her father's office in the Condor Building. Investigation established that the daughter, accompanied by another female who was subsequently identified as a Montonero, arrived at the Brigadier's office approximately one hour before the bomb detonated. The Brigadier was not in his office at the time and his daughter left a package which contained the bomb, consisting of six kilos of ~~trotyl~~ explosives. Brigadier Palazuelo's daughter is currently a fugitive and is being urgently sought by security forces. (S) (U)

During the past week the AAIS positively identified a Montonero among Air Force conscripts assigned to Ezeiza International Airport. The conscript's clandestine Montonero activities included reporting on arrivals and departures of military air craft from Ezeiza, as well as the movements of Argentine Government officials to and from Ezeiza. On 4/7/77, the conscript was taken into custody. (S) (U)

The foregoing information should not be discussed with any foreign officials, including those of the Argentine Government. (S) (U)

Copies: 1 - Addressee
1 - POL-R
1 - DAO
1 - SY
2 - Bue (105-767 Classified by 5931
(1 - 80-84 Dr. Poire) Exempt from General Declassification
RWS:gjk (S) (U) Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on Indefinite

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(6)

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105-767-99

(S) (U)

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THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

4/19/77

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LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

(U) ATTEMPTED MONTONERO BOMB ATTACK AGAINST BRIGADIER GENERAL (R) JUAN CARLOS DURET, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PLANNING

On 4/18/77, an office contact who is connected with one of the Argentine military intelligence agencies provided the following information: (U)

On 4/16/77, the son of Army Brigadier General (R) JUAN CARLOS DURET, the Secretary of State for Planning, Ministry of Planning, was married at a Roman Catholic Church in the Federal Capital. (U)

During the religious ceremony the Federal Police of Argentina (FPA) Bomb Squad was summoned to the church to investigate a suspicious package discovered on the sidewalk just outside the church. Examination of the package by the FPA Bomb Squad disclosed it contained a stuffed "Donald Duck" doll-like figure. The FPA Bomb Squad placed the package inside their bomb disposal truck and detonated the package with a blasting cap. The outwardly harmless-appearing "Donald Duck" contained a lethal bomb. (U)

An anonymous telephone call was received at the Church after the wedding from the Montoneros, who claimed responsibility for the bomb. (U)

It is noted that General DURET was recently promoted from Colonel to General. General DURET is a prominent (U)

Copies: 1 - POL-R
1 - DAO
1 - SY

4 - Buc (105-767) Montoneros (U)
(1 - 80-216 Gen. Duret)
(1 - 109-103 Argentine Terrorist Activity)
(1 - 80-84 Dr. Poiré) (U)

RWS:gjk
(8)

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CLASSIFIED BY: SP6 RWS/sam
REASON: 1.5 (d)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (1) Agent #90-0371 Agent
3002 2nd Ave

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-84 Exempt 1, 2 mult.
SP6 RWS/CAL/gjk

101

RE: (U) (S) ATTEMPTED MONTONERO BOMB ATTACK AGAINST BRIGADIER GENERAL (R) JUAN CARLOS DURET, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PLANNING

figure at the Ministry of Planning. Fortunately, there were no injuries as a result of the above incident. It is noted that numerous young children attended the wedding with their parents and were inside the Church when the package containing the "Donald Duck" bomb was discovered and detonated. Obviously, should one of the young children attending the wedding have discovered the package containing the "Donald Duck" bomb and attempted to open same a great tragedy would have occured. It is believed that the bomb was placed after the wedding had started in order that it would be discovered and detonated when those attending the wedding inside the Church adjourned outside to the sidewalk and, as customary, milled about in groups. Thus, if the bomb had been detonated at this point, a great many persons would have been killed and injured. (S) (U)

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DATE 04-10-2017 BY: F54M93K42

SECRET

[105-312844] (U)

DIRECTOR, FBI 4/26/77
ATTENTION: SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION
FBI LABORATORY, TECHNICAL ANALYSIS SECTION, EXPLOSIVES UNIT
LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES [(105-767) (P)] (U)

MONTONEROS
[IS-ARGENTINA] (U)

Enclosed for the Bureau are three copies of an instruction sheet, as translated from the Spanish language, which was distributed to members of captioned organization, an Argentine terrorist group. The Spanish language version of the enclosure dated 3/4/77 was urgently distributed by the Montoneros due to a number of recent incidents, wherein Montonero members placing bombs in Buenos Aires accidentally detonated the bomb while it was being placed, resulting in the known deaths of at least four Montoneros. (U)

The Spanish language version of the enclosure [was provided by Comisario Inspector AGUSTIN ITALO MARTINI, Chief of the Bomb Squad, Federal Police of Argentina (FPA).] (U) The material is unclassified and may be disseminated provided the Montoneros are not identified [and the FPA is not named as the source.] (U)

The enclosure is submitted since it may be of interest to the Scientific and Technical Services Division.

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-96 PAGE 1 ONLY
SP6Ag/CAL/DR 10-17-96

3 - Bureau (Enc. 3)
(1 - Foreign Liaison Unit)
1 - Buenos Aires
RWS:gjk
(4)

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Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

CLASSIFIED BY: SP6Ag/CAL
REASON: 1.5 (B) (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X(5) X(6)
Appeal #90-0371

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[105-767-102]
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SECRET

March 4, 1977

SECRET

TRANSLATION FROM SPANISH

CLASSIFIED BY: SP6AG/CAC MARCH 4, 1977
REASON: X 1.5 (B) (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (5) (6)
Appeal 90-0371

Secretariat of Regional Logistics
~~Instruction~~ Instruction Booklet

1. Introduction:

One should first be familiar with this lesson before handling any of the elements that have been handed out or in dealing with any of the members of the group affected by the operation. The group leader or the operational detachment is responsible for the costs that might occur (deterioration of arms or accidents) as a result of not being familiar with this instruction.

2. Basics of the functioning of the delayed destructive container: The main components are ~~three~~ 1) the container itself and 2) the delay device (in this case electronic). UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD THE DELAY DEVICE BE CONNECTED TO THE CONTAINER BEFORE THE CONTAINER IS SITUATED IN ITS FINAL DESTINATION IN THE OBJECTIVE.

a. ~~The~~ The container itself: Consists of a solid chassis (shell) that has the explosive mixture (aluminized ~~powder~~ powder) inside. Beginning the combustion, the mixture produces a high compression which is resisted by the outside shell; finally the outside shell gives way, producing the explosion. The initiation of the combustion comes about due to a small flashbulb inside the container (within the powder mixture) that is connected to a male plug. BECAUSE THE MIXTURE IS RELATIVELY UNSTABLE, AVOID EXPOSING THE ~~XNEX~~ CONTAINER TO ~~XX~~ FIRE OR EXCESSIVE HEAT, HUMIDITY OR BOUNCING AROUND.

b. Electronic Delay Device: Consists of an electronic ~~circuito~~ circuit ~~capaz~~ capable of sending the necessary electronic impulse to light the flashbulb after a determined amount of time following it s connection. It requires a delicate handling of the delay device in its storing as well as in its transport to avoid its deterioration (carry it and store it in a box). The delay device contains the following elements: battery box containing four batteries which should be placed with the ~~negati~~ negative end against the springs; an electronic circuit; an on-off switch (which turns to on toward the red mark) which should be kept off; a female plug and a small bulb.

Use: The delay device has a control and security mechanism which permits testing the device as many times as necessary (don't waste the batteries). YOU MUST TEST THE DEVICE WITHOUT BEING CONNECTED TO THE CONTAINER OR YOU WILL HAVE AN EXPLOSION (and you won't be able to test it again).

1. Test: Turn the switch to on and wait for the delay time (about ten minutes) to light the small bulb (if the container was connected, instead of lighting the small bulb, the flashbulb inside the contaier would light causing the explosion. If the delay functions, turn off the switch.

2. Operational handling: At the ~~location~~ placement of the container, turn the switch on. If the small bulb doesn't ~~ligth~~ light, turn it off. Plug in the ~~male~~ male plug to the femal plug of the delay device and turn the switch on again. If when one turns on the switch the small bulb lights, don't plug in the container or there will be ~~an~~ an explosion.

3. Observation: As ~~we~~ we have said, upon ~~activating~~ activating the circuit, the delay time is being counted down. If for some reason one needs to postpone momentarily the operation, turn the switch to off and the time will automatically go back to zero beginning again when the switch is turned back on.

This armament that is provided has been entirely fabricated and is rigorously controlled by S/L/R. If you find imperfection in the fabrication, return the elements with the appropriate report. You should retain the instruction sheet and the logistics officer of each group may reproduce it in order to give copies when necessary.

At the time of situating the explosive container, avoid having the metal shell of the container come in contact with the circuit.

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

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

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(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

P. 8

THE GUARDIAN

LONDON

3/13/77

Date:
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title:
105-767 - 104

Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office:

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NOV 3 1989

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Argentina Project

MAY 26 1977

Rwk

Christopher Roper finds Argentina's best-known guerrillas in good heart despite recent setbacks

Don't cry for us, say the Montoneros

MARIO EDUARDO FIRMENICH, leader of the Montoneros, does not give the impression of being the desperate chief of an almost vanquished guerrilla band — the image of his organisation that the Argentine military junta seeks to project.

But then, he is not. As secretary-general of the Montonero Party, Senor Firmenich leads the only cohesive political force in Argentina to emerge with mass support from the break-up of the once powerful Peronist movement.

Relaxing in a well-furnished office, not far from the centre of Buenos Aires, we talked for several hours about the political situation and what he sees as the increasing desperation of the military in the face of the rising tide of popular resistance.

"The great mistake made by President Jorge Videla and his fellow generals, says Senor Firmenich, has been to see the struggle with the Montoneros essentially as a military affair. "In fact," claims Senor Firmenich, "the problem is political.

"Our politics are rooted in the people, and in order to destroy us the armed forces are waging war on the people. The degree of repression completely contradicts their admitted need to secure a measure of popular support."

In previous conversations with Montonero leaders in Buenos Aires, a year or more ago, I had been surprised by the contrast between their calm confidence and the heavy losses which the security forces claimed to be inflicting on their organisation.

Once again I needed some convincing that they were not on the brink of defeat. Since early December hardly a day has gone by without new lists of Montonero casualties appearing in the newspapers.

These have included two former deputies, who represented the Montonero position in Congress after the March 1973 elections, and Norma Arrostito, a member of the original group which kidnapped and killed a former President, General Pedro Aramburu, in June 1970, the first public operation of Montoneros.

Senor Firmenich assured me that these casualties did not spell the end of the effectiveness of the organisation. "The armed forces are waging war against the people. Our position, as leaders of popular struggles in factories, in the cities and in the countryside means that we inevitably face heavy casualties. But it is worth remembering that many of our comrades they claim to kill in battle are in fact taken from detention and massacred in cold blood. This is well documented."

Most of the success scored by the military, Senor Firmenish says, has been the result of information obtained under torture. "The generals admit they are employing the methods developed by the French in Algeria.

Our casualties will probably continue at the present level throughout this year."

The Montoneros fully accept that they are engaged in a war, with the attendant risk of being killed in battle. They feel there should be supervision by the International Red Cross to prevent the murder and torture of prisoners.

I asked Senor Firmenich, whether the present level of casualties was not an impossibly heavy price to pay. Could the leaders they were losing be replaced?

"You cannot think mechanically in terms of replacing a dead comrade by recruiting a new member of the organisation," he replied. "This is essentially a political struggle.

"It could be that 10,000 workers might go on strike as a result of the death of one of our comrades. In such a case, the blood would not have been shed in vain. Military action is just one aspect of our struggle, and is always intimately linked to the day-to-day struggles of the people."

In fact, he told me, the Montoneros organisation is still growing, and is capable of responding politically and militarily to the changing situation. "When I hear people talk about our extermination, I wonder what they are thinking of. Our situation is a hundred [illegible] when we really were in bad shape. It's a thousand times better than in 1970, when we were reduced at one point to 20 people holed up in two flats."

From September 1972 to March 1973, Senor Firmenich recalls, the Montoneros played a leading part in the political mobilisations, which led up to the election of President Hector Campora and the restoration of civilian rule on 25 May 1973.

"Fundamentally, this was because our analysis of the situation was correct, and the people recognised the part we had played in defeating the military dictatorship." Argentina had lived under military rule since June 1966, but a combination of farmed resistance and popular insurrections forced the soldiers to call elections in 1973.

We discussed the importance of that period, the experience gained, and its relevance to the present situation. There are many parallels between the economic and social policies of the present Videla Government and those applied in 1967. The Montoneros argue that these policies will be no more successful now than then.

Senor Firmenich is convinced that the military will be forced to call elections sooner or later. "It's their only way out." He assured me that the Montonero Party was ready to enter the electoral fray. "Of course," he says, "they will attempt to exclude us from the elections. That, too, is tradition in Argentina."

In the view of the Montoneros, [illegible] no longer an effective political option for the Argentine working class. The Montoneros have always argued that as well as being a political movement and an ideology, Peronism provided the Argentine working class with a political identity. Following the death of Peron himself in 1974, and the shambles created by his widow, Isabel Peron, this identity no longer satisfied the millions of Argentines who had so often voted their hero into the presidency.

If the political strategy of the Montoneros is well-founded, says Senor Firmenich, "the people — or Peronism in general — will become Montonero. Being a Montonero represents continuity with having been a Peronist."

This is the crux of the matter. But it is virtually impossible to verify, under present conditions, whether this transmutation of the Peronist movement is actually taking place. For years, before Peron's return to Argentina in 1972 after 17 years in exile, non-Peronists argued that the old man had lost his drawing power and no longer enjoyed support.

But in 1973, he proved the critics wrong. First his personal representative, Senor Campora, was elected with 50 per cent of the popular vote, and then six months later, Peron himself was returned with 60 per cent.

Empirical data is lacking because almost all forms of free expression are prohibited. It is more than one's life is worth to express public support for Montoneros.

Football is one of the few areas of popular expression left and people are taking full advantage of this, mixing applause for their teams with almost untranslatable abuse of the military. On one recent Sunday, a team from Cordoba was playing in Rosario, bringing together fans from the second and third largest cities in the country. A Cordoba supporter expressed his [illegible] with the behaviour of the Rosarians by plunging a home made dagger into the back of a nearby policeman.

The police, in retaliation, began shooting into the crowd. At this point, the whole stadium began to chant, not "Peron, Peron," as in the old days, but "Montoneros . . . Montoneros . . . Montoneros."

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6/1/77

ROBERT W. SCHERRER, LEGAL ATTACHE

(4)
(S) MONTONERO THREAT AGAINST BRANIFF

Attached is the original of an alleged Montonero letter and transmittal envelope directed to the Braniff Legal Counsel at Ezeiza International Airport. The attachments were made available by JUAN HARRY MARPLES, Braniff Regional Vice President for Argentina and Uruguay. (S) (4)

The above information was furnished by MARPLES to HARRY PIZER, Braniff Security, Dallas, Texas. (S) (4)

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COUNTRY Argentina

DOI March 1970 - Early April 1977

History of the Montoneros from March 1970 to Early April 1977

[illegible]

[illegible] by [illegible] use [illegible] and classified [illegible] of early April 1977.

Following is a history of the Montoneros from March 1970 to early April 1977. The report has been divided as follows:

Phase One: March 1970 when the Montoneros were formed to the Spring of 1973 when the peronists win the elections and President Hector Campora takes over the government.

Phase Two: March 1973 when Campora assumes the presidency to 6 September 1974 when the Montoneros declare war on the government and voluntarily go underground.

Phase Three: 6 September 1974 to 8 September 1975 when the government outlaws the Montoneros.

Phase Four: 8 September 1975 to early April 1977.

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The Montoneros were formed in March 1970 as a predominantly peronist-oriented organization which included leftist peronists, radical catholics, leftist nationalists and marxists. The original membership was drawn from all classes, but the majority consisted mainly of students and professionals plus a limited number of workers. The Montoneros took their name from groups of irregulars who fought in the Argentine wars of independence and in the civil war and subsequent against dictators during the period from 1820-1852.

Philosophically, the Montoneros embraced the traditional peronist beliefs in social justice, economic development free of foreign influence, a just distribution of wealth within a national socialist system, and political independence. The ideology of the Montoneros gradually tilted more to the left, and in 1973 one of their leaders described the Montonero ideology as a combination of marxism, nationalism and peronism which, he said, was adapted to the objective conditions existing in Argentina. He stated that their strategy was the development of a "popular war", led by the Montoneros, and that the ultimate struggle in Argentina would be between the people and the revolutionary vanguard on one side and the forces of repression and imperialism on the other.

During the first three years of their existence, the Montoneros functioned as a classic underground urban guerrilla terrorist group, dedicated to overthrowing the military government and to restoring Juan P e r o n to power, if necessary by force of arms. Their first terrorist act was the kidnapping on 29 May 1970 and subsequent assassination of former President Pedro E. A r a m b u r u. Indications are strong that Peron did not disapprove of the action. After the murder of Aramburu, the Montoneros undertook a series of political assassinations, bank robberies, attacks on various military and police installations, and occupation of small towns. Unlike the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), the Montoneros did not seem to single out foreigners or foreign firms as targets, although they did kidnap the director of Phillips of Argentina in September 1972 and possibly conducted other kidnappings. The Montoneros took the war directly to their main enemy, the military government.

The Montoneros also mounted joint operations with other Argentine terrorist groups, the most spectacular being a massive break from Rawson Prison in August 1972. Although Montonero leader, Fernando V a c a / N a r v a j a, was among the group that hijacked an airliner to Chile and escaped, most of the others involved were killed by the military in the "Trelew Massacre", which has become a cause celebre for Argentine terrorist groups.

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During their first three years underground, the Montoneros continued to expand their political base as well as conduct terrorist acts. The Montoneros reportedly spent much of 1971 forming support groups in the Catholic youth movement and establishing influence in the parochial schools, universities and Catholic lay organizations. The Montoneros also became involved with "third world priests", a loose-knit organization of radical priests, a few of whom believed in violent revolution to change the social order in Argentina.

During this time, the supreme body of the Montonero movement was the National Command under which a number of provincial commands had been established. A member of the National Command was assigned to each provincial command to give it political guidance. The provincial commands were made up of several basic recruiting units and basic combat units responsible for propaganda activities as well as armed operations. These units were divided into cells.

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The Montoneros began to enter their second phase during the Spring of 1973. In March 1973, the orthodox Peronist Party asked all terrorist groups in Argentina to stop their activities during the presidential elections. While the ERP refused, the Montoneros agreed.

After the election of Hector C a m p o r a as President on the Peronist ticket in March 1973, the Montoneros scaled down their terrorist activity and began to emerge and operate quite openly in Argentine politics. They concentrated on becoming the rallying point for ultra-leftist peronists, particularly among the peronist youth. The Montoneros increasingly shied away from political violence, although they may have been responsible for the assassination of Jose Ignacio R u c c i, a well known labor leader, on 25 September 1973.

Following Juan Peron's assumption to the presidency in October 1973, the Montoneros officially announced that they were merging with the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) led by Roberto Q u i e t o. The new group would be under the joint leadership of Quieto and Mario F i r m e n i c h, the leader of the radical peronist faction of the Montoneros and would use the Montonero name. The group pledged to follow Peron and to undertake revolutionary development without violence. A splinter group of the Montoneros, known as the "Savino Navarro Column", rejected the merger and continued to advocate the creation of a socialist state through armed struggle. It is believed, however, that this column later rejoined the Montoneros. The FAR had made its initial appearance in Argentina in mid-July 1970. It was first created to support Ernesto "Che" G u e v a r a in Bolivia, and most of its founders were trained in Cuba. Its membership was largely drawn from the lower and middle classes and students. The FAR's ideology was marxist-leninist, and the leadership supported "Che" Guevara's theory of the guerrilla front. The FAR had engaged in widespread terrorist activities, including the kidnapping of foreign businessmen.

During the Fall of 1973, Peron continued to attempt to persuade the Montoneros to give up violence and to keep them as a part of the peronist movement. As of September 1973, Peron reportedly planned to offer Firmenich and Quieto positions in the government, representing the Montoneros, in exchange for their cooperation. The positions would reportedly have been low-level ones and would have had little influence upon the decision-making powers of the government. The kid-glove treatment of the Montoneros continued. When both Quieto and Firmenich were arrested in separate incidents in February 1974 for carrying false documents and illegally possessing weapons, they were quickly released by the courts for lack of evidence.

It soon became clear to the Montoneros, however, that President Peron was not going to take Argentina to the left as they desired. In mid-October 1973 a delegation of Montonero leaders met with the Army Chief of Staff and asked the army for weapons to protect themselves from extremist elements in the trade unions and also to improve their power position so that the "fascist" ring around President Peron could be broken. The army refused. In the Winter and Spring of 1974, the

Montoneros realized they could not achieve their aims openly. They decided they would have to confront the Peronist government and even President Peron himself. A minority faction in the Montoneros wanted to work toward the creation of a mass movement which would unite groups with similar philosophies and ideologies and to avoid confrontation and separation from the peronist movement at all costs. The majority prevailed.

The confrontation with Peron came to a head during the 1974 May Day celebration of National Unity when the Montoneros shouted anti-government slogans during Peron's speech, causing Peron to lose his temper and denounce the hecklers as "stupid, immature hirelings of foreign money". The Montoneros left the meeting en masse. A group of moderate Montoneros who were still members of the Catholic Church denounced the walkout and claimed that the Montoneros were being misled by the FAR.

The death on 1 July 1974 of Juan Peron and the assumption to the presidency of Peron's vice president and widow, Maria Estela (Isabel) M a r t i n e z de Peron, made the Montoneros' confrontation with the government easier. They started a propaganda campaign in order to pressure the government to proscribe their organization. This failed, although the government banned the publication of the Montonero magazine "La Causa Peronista", and the Montoneros were forced to take the final step themselves when on 6 September 1974 they declared war on the government of Mrs. Peron and went underground, announcing they would undertake an anti-government campaign.

By early September 1974, the Montoneros had, according to a Montonero leader, 15,000 members throughout the country, 2,500 of whom could be considered armed combatants. In the Buenos Aires area alone, the leader said there were 8,000 members, 1,500 of whom could be considered armed combatants. He estimated that the Montoneros could probably mobilize some 200,000 supporters throughout the country, and between 50 and 60 thousand for demonstrations in the Buenos Aires area. The Argentine [redacted] estimated at that time that there were 11,000 Montoneros, of whom 10 or 15 percent were armed and dangerous. The Argentine [redacted] believed the Montoneros were divided into two factions, a violent-line group which represented 60 percent of the membership, including all of the FAR, and a moderate faction. [redacted] the violent faction controlled all of the weapons and six million dollars in funds. As of 1974 the leaders of the violent-line faction were, for the most part, former leaders of the FAR and were more marxist than peronist. It was considered at that time that a notable exception was Mario Firmenich, who adopted a more moderate public image but who, [redacted] was just as much a proponent of violence as the FAR. They actually considered Firmenich more dangerous than the other Montonero leaders because of the sizeable following he enjoyed from both factions and because of his skills as a political manipulator.

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In what could be considered "phase three" of the Montoneros, that is from their decision on 6 September 1974 to declare war on the government and go underground, to their being outlawed by the government on 8 September 1975, the Montoneros carried out a number of significant terrorist acts, some of which were the following:

19 September 1974 - The Montoneros kidnap two prominent businessmen, Juan and Jorge B o r n of the Bunge and Born Company. Jorge was released in June 1975 after his brother agreed to pay an amount believed to range between 30-60 million dollars and 320,000 new pesos in merchandise distributed to the poor.

1 November 1974 - The Montoneros assassinate by a remote-controlled bomb Federal Police Chief Alberto V i l l a r and his wife while they were aboard a yacht.

26 February 1975 - The Montoneros kidnap John Patrick E g a n, Honorary Consul for the United States in Cordoba. When the Argentine government failed to negotiate and produce four alleged prisoners demanded by the abductors, Egan was killed and his body found 28 February 1975.

25-26 July 1975 - The Montoneros are responsible for numerous bombings and other incidents within the greater Buenos Aires area to commemorate the 26 July death of Eva P e r o n.

28 July 1975 - The Montoneros assault the "Halcon" weapons facility in Banfield taking over 600 guns, including 105 submachine guns.

Period around 22 August 1975, which is the anniversary of the "Trelew Massacre". The Montoneros are responsible for various incidents, including the explosion on a navy ship in the Federal Capital causing serious damage.

The objectives of the Montoneros by now were to provoke through terrorist activities a military coup d'etat followed by a polarization of the political forces. The Montoneros reasoned that following a coup d'etat with time the rightist sector would be dominated by the military with the support of some civilians, and the leftist sector would consist of a coalition of most of the leftist groups dominated by the Montoneros. The Montoneros calculated that under such a situation the rightist forces would be in a definite minority with many sectors sympathetic to the rightist side remaining uninvolved out of disinterest or fear. With the advantage of numbers, the Montoneros would then be in a position to press for elections and, through a leftist coalition led by the "Authentic Peronist Party", the Montoneros' political party front, take control of the country via the electoral process.

To better organize its military campaign, by mid-1975 the Montoneros decided to devote about a three-month period to intensive militant operations, to be followed by some six months of planning, selecting specific targets and assigning teams against them, training cadre and acquiring weapons and materiel. Militant activities were to continue

during this latter phase, but on a lower level. The large-scale terrorist activity during the 25-26 July 1975 period marked the beginning of what the Montoneros called their "First Military Campaign" which was to run through October 1975. The primary targets during this campaign were to be the paramilitary forces of the Argentine government since the Montoneros did not yet consider themselves prepared for direct confrontation with the Argentine army. The Montoneros would retaliate, however, whenever the Armed Forces became involved in repressive measures against the Montoneros.

Up until about the time they were outlawed on 8 September 1975 the Montoneros had been able to operate with virtual impunity. As the Montoneros had been an instrumental factor in bringing about the return to power of Juan Peron, and as they considered themselves representative of peronism, there was a political problem for the government in turning against them, despite the Montoneros' militant offensive against the government of Mrs. Peron. Consequently, as a result of their virtual free rein to operate, the Montoneros continued to gain recruits and sympathizers. In September 1975 [redacted] the Montoneros had grown considerably during the previous few months, acquiring a large number of new members from among workers who were disgruntled over the worsening economic situation in Argentina. While [redacted] did not state the precise number of recruits, he indicated the number might be around 2,000. b1 per CIA

During this period, in addition to acquiring actual recruits within labor, the Montoneros also managed to achieve influence among the work force of several important industries, such as within automobile plants. While the Montoneros never managed to control unions, they did succeed in dominating the internal labor commissions of many factories and being selected as labor delegates. These Montoneros rarely revealed their true affiliation to their worker colleagues, passing themselves off merely as peronists or, when pressed, as members of the "Authentic Peronist Party". They devoted their efforts in trying to bring about higher wages and greater social benefits for the workers and for the most part did not attempt to organize the workers politically. It was not difficult for the Montoneros to enter a plant's work force as they were usually well qualified. Many companies hired their workers and technicians based on examinations, and consequently, the Montoneros, most of whom had had some university education, were usually able to pass the tests easily and be hired legitimately. For example, the Montoneros would have their members who were engineering students take the tests given by automobile companies.

Within the student sector, the Montoneros were also acquiring recruits and influence. The Montonero student front at the secondary level (high school) was the "Union of Secondary Students" (UES), and at the university level the "Peronist University Youth" (JUP). The primary objective of the UES was the continuous formation within secondary schools, and particularly technical schools, of "base groups", which generally consisted of four people, one being the group leader. The UES rarely assembled to agitate en masse for student causes. Efforts

to promote the objectives of the UES were normally carried out quietly through individual contact.

Within the university sector, the JUP became more vocal then the UES, utilizing its organizational strength and the experience and capability of its members to champion causes or pressure for actions. To help achieve its objectives, the JUP resorted to public rallies, propaganda, and pressure on professors. The JUP's activities were directed both at national political matters, as well as strictly student aspects. For example, with respect to the latter, problems such as inadequate student dining rooms, professor absenteeism, lack of vacancy in a particular course and difficulties with enrollment all became the concern of the JUP in an effort to win student recruits and sympathizers. Individuals represented within the JUP were elected by students from individual university departments. Within each department there were "student centers" which were politically oriented student groups competing with one another to obtain student representation within various university organizations, including the JUP. The Montoneros infiltrated both openly and clandestinely "student centers" in almost all university departments throughout the country. The Montonero-dominated "student centers" obtained adherents both through ideological appeal, as well as through services, such as providing textbooks at low cost, course aids and employment opportunities.

The JUP had a national leadership consisting of two representatives from Buenos Aires, one from the Littoral, one from La Plata and one from Cordoba. The JUP leadership would meet alone every fifteen days and with the national leadership of the Montoneros every month. While both the JUP and the UES became influential throughout the country, within the Federal Capital area the JUP was particularly strong within the National University of Buenos Aires, notably in the departments of Medicine, Architecture and Urbanism, Exact Sciences, Pharmacy and Biochemistry, Philosophy and Letters, Economic Science, and Law and Social Sciences. At the secondary level, the UES became strong in the Federal Capital area within the Buenos Aires National College, Carlos Pellegrini National College and Sarmiento National College.

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What might be considered "phase four" of the Montoneros, that is 8 September 1975 when the Montoneros were outlawed until the present, has been marked by a continuation of terrorist incidents by the Montoneros against the Argentine military, police, and business sector, and, in response, an all-out anti-subversive effort by the military and civilian security forces, particularly after the military took over in a coup d'etat 24 March 1976. By September 1975 the Montoneros were anticipating more serious confrontations with the Armed Forces to begin about the end of 1976-early 1977. In order to attack armored vehicles, the Montoneros were reportedly preparing anti-tank and anti-armored vehicle devices, such as Viet Cong-type mines and anti-tank grenades. They also planned to use a Spanish-type 51 mm mortar. On 5 October 1975 the Montoneros took the initiative in the largest attack to date against a military garrison. In a three-stage simultaneous assault, the Montoneros (1) attacked the 29th Regiment Army Base in Formosa, were met with heavy resistance and consequently suffered a number of casualties; (2) took control of the Pacu Airport in Formosa and (3) skyjacked an Aerolineas Argentinas domestic flight which was diverted to Pacu Airport to pick up survivors of the attack against the 29th Regiment. The crew was forced to fly to an isolated landing area where the Montoneros deboarded and escaped.

Toward the end of 1975 the military and civilian security services were beginning to take a harder position against the Montoneros, and on 28 December 1975 Argentine security officials picked up Roberto Quieto on a beach in the Buenos Aires suburb of Martinez, and this time he was not released. Quieto told the authorities that the Montoneros as of December 1975 had between 7,000-10,000 active members and about 300,000 supporters. He said that he and Firmenich were still the top leaders of the Montoneros, and that the third-ranking leader was Alberto Jose M o l i n a s Menuzzi, National Chief of Propaganda. Molinas was subsequently killed 29 September 1976 in a confrontation with security forces. At the time of his death, Molinas was identified [redacted] as being number six in the Montonero hierarchy.

Quieto identified the Montoneros' largest and most important arms cache located in a warehouse in the Buenos Aires suburb of Villa Ballester, and said this was also where the Montoneros had held the Born brothers. Based on Quieto's information, security officials raided the warehouse and confiscated 150 "Halcon" submachine guns made in Argentina, new automatic shotguns of Italian manufacture, five "Colt" heavy machineguns, approximately 100 hand guns, including some U.S. models, "FAL" rifles, hand grenades, three million rounds of small arms ammunition, one thousand barrels for a type of submachine gun under manufacture by the Montoneros, a large quantity of equipment for cleaning and maintaining small arms, Montonero uniforms and a detailed field manual providing instruction for small arms handling, explosives and guerrilla tactics. [redacted] this raid constituted the largest amount of subversive weapons and munitions confiscated by the government thus far.

b1 per CIA

Quieto also stated that the Montoneros maintained a Swiss bank account containing 150 million dollars, with another 50 million dollars distributed throughout Argentina. In August 1975 an Argentine revolutionary [redacted] had reported that most of the funds used by the Montoneros to carry out their operations were obtained through kidnappings and robberies. He said that some of the monies thus obtained were invested locally and abroad and used to purchase shares in major Argentine companies to insure continuing income. Other income was provided through the purchase and sale of real estate. Such transactions were handled by legal members of the Montoneros, that is, those members who had not been identified as Montoneros by the authorities. A less significant source of funds came from Montonero members themselves. Those who were legally employed were required to contribute a percentage of their income to the organization with the percentage varying according to the individual's financial circumstances. b1 per CIA

In addition to Firmenich, himself and Molinas, Quieto identified the following as other leaders of the Montoneros as of December 1975:

Alberto Miguel C a m p s, Chief of Logistics at the National level.

Ricardo Rene H a i d a r, Chief of Foreign Affairs with responsibility for maintaining foreign connections. At the time of Quieto's capture, Haidar was residing in Rome, Italy. In February 1977, however, Haidar was picked up by the authorities in Buenos Aires.

Juan Julio R o q u e, alias "Matero", Chief of the Buenos Aires Region, which included the Federal Capital and Buenos Aires Province.

Francisco Reynaldo U r o n d o, Chief of Propaganda for the Buenos Aires Region.

Ignacio V e l e z C a r r e r a s, Chief of Cordoba Province.

Hernan Agosto O s o r i o, Chief of the Southern Region.

Maria Antonia B e r g e r, Chief of the combat unit for the Southern Zone.

Fernando Vaca Narvaja, Chief of the "Cuyo" Region, which included the Provinces of San Juan, Mendoza and San Luis.

Esther Norma A r r o s t i t o, Chief of the combat unit for the Northern Region who had participated in the operation against former President Aramburu. Arrostito was picked up by the security forces 2 December 1976 and reportedly later killed.

Jorge Omar L e w i n g e r, Chief of the Western Region. Lewinger has since been reportedly captured.

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In the action 29 September 1976, which led to the death of Molinas, Army G-2 also reported the death of the following, all of whom, according to G-2, were members of the Montoneros' National Political Secretariat as of September 1976:

Jose Carlos C o r o n e l, alias "Julian", head of the Montonero front of factory workers

Ismael S a l a m e, alias "El Turco" Montonero head of agitation and activities at the student level.

Maria Victoria W a l s h, alias "Hilda", head of the press section of the labor front.

Ignacio B e r t r a n.

Montoneros who, in addition to Arrostito and Firmenich, had participated in the operation against former President Aramburu were Carlos Raul C a p u a n o Martinez, who was killed 18 August 1972; Carlos Gustavo R a m u s, who was killed 7 September 1970; and Fernando Luis A b a l Medina, who was killed 7 September 1970.

In a captured document entitled "Annual Plan of the Montoneros from February 1976 through February 1977" the Montoneros express their intent to engage in the "First Military Campaign" of this period during March and April 1976 with the objective of trying to "annihilate" the police forces and carry out actions against business executives. According to the document, subsequent military campaigns were to depend on the outcome of the March-April offensive. Other [redacted] b1 per CIA documents refer to the Montoneros "Fourth Military Campaign" which took place between early August 1976 to mid-October 1976 with the principal assassination targets continuing to be the "repressive forces" and business executives. In addition to killing, the Montoneros also engaged in harassment operations against their targets, which involved such actions as threatening phone calls and letters; threatening packages, some actually with bombs, some without; explosive devices in gifts of flowers, etc. The overall objective of the harassment campaign was to provoke fear and confusion among the targetted sectors with little cost to the Montoneros.

Following are some of the significant actions during 1976 against the military and police which are attributed to the Montoneros:

15 March 1976 - The Montoneros are responsible for the detonation of a powerful bomb which had been placed in a car parked next to Army Headquarters in an assassination attempt against General Jorge V i d e l a, Commander of the Army.

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18 June 1976 - Federal Police Chief Brigadier General Cesareo Angel C a r d o s a was killed by a bomb placed under the mattress of his bed by Ana Maria G o n z a l e z, a member of the Montoneros.

2 July 1976 - The Montoneros are responsible for the powerful bomb explosion in the dining room of Federal Police Security (Intelligence) headquarters which caused the death and injury of numerous people.

2 October 1976 - The Montoneros are believed to be responsible for a bomb which exploded under the reviewing stand at Campo de Mayo, resulting in several wounded. President Videla had been seated in the stands a few minutes beforehand but was not hurt.

17 October 1976 - The Montoneros are believed to be responsible for the powerful bomb explosion in the Military Club in the Federal Capital in which numerous people were injured.

15 December 1976 - The Montoneros are responsible for the explosion of a powerful bomb at the cinema of the Defense Ministry's Planning Department in downtown Buenos Aires which killed at least fourteen people and injured another thirty.

With respect specifically to the business sector, in a document dated August 1976 the Montoneros claim that they sent 2,000 threatening letters to business executives warning that they would be judged by the "revolutionary tribunal" if they collaborated with the government. In their campaign of intimidating and killing business executives, which was directed particularly against multinational companies, the Montoneros hoped to discourage international investment and promote the continuation of economic chaos, a situation which the Montoneros consider to be advantageous to their ultimate objective of taking control of the country.

The "Fourth Military Campaign" was also to focus on acts of sabotage against large industries, primarily those which had allegedly been dismissing or suspending workers without paying wages. The automobile and textile industries were singled out as particular targets. The Montoneros reasoned that sabotage operations presented an especially effective way to strike blows at the enemy and could be carried out by an insider in a clandestine manner with a minimum of risk; politically, sabotage operations helped provide public proof that there still existed a viable and potent opposition movement; and militarily, sabotage operations forced the enemy to disperse their troops and thus weaken their position. The Montoneros directed that sabotage acts were to be carried out with primarily three objectives in mind: (1) Destroying goods produced, such as stock on hand; (2) slowing down overall production; and (3) causing serious damage to the final stages of production, including retail aspects. Sabotage operations at beginning stages were to be avoided as they caused too many people at later stages of production to be put out of work.

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On 17 August 1976 the Montoneros held a press conference of foreign correspondents in which the Montonero representatives present informed the correspondents that in the foreseeable future the Montoneros would be concentrating on propaganda/psychological action operations with less attention directed at military activities. The Montoneros assured that the organization was in no hurry to achieve power and would work behind the scenes to gradually strengthen its support. They stated that as a result of the "plan of hunger" of Jose M a r t i n e z de H o z, Minister of Economy, conditions were such that propaganda/psychological action operations were tactically the appropriate course for the Montoneros to pursue and not great military operations.

As defined by numerous confiscated documents, "propaganda/psychological action operations" were in fact the type of operations which the Montoneros had already been carrying out through most of 1976, i.e., isolated assassinations, bombings, sabotage and harassment, with a concurrent effort, particularly in the propaganda area, to strengthen opposition to the government both in Argentina and abroad. With respect to the Armed Forces specifically, in addition to trying to kill various officers and provoke fear within the ranks, the Montoneros sought to denigrate the Armed Forces command in an attempt to exacerbate disunity within the services and to bring about the isolation of the military government from the rest of the population. The Montoneros recognized that their ultimate victory would depend less on their carrying out military offensive operations than on their promoting disruptive actions designed to thwart the success of the government. The Montoneros calculated that through growing opposition to the government and disunity within the ranks the Armed Forces governing process would eventually collapse on its own, at which time the military would be compelled to permit elections, thus allowing the Montoneros to gain power legally as the vanguard of a leftist front and the main element in the formation of a socialist state. Mario Firmenich stated in a press conference 30 June 1974 that as of that time he envisioned that a ten-year program would be necessary before Argentina could achieve a socialist government.

In accord with the Montoneros' political objectives, under the military government, the Montoneros have been trying to form a broad-based opposition "national resistance movement" which eventually would be expanded into a more politically organized "national liberation front". The Montoneros also founded the clandestine "Montonero Party" on 17 October 1976, the anniversary of peronist "Loyalty Day", with the Secretary General of the party being Mario Firmenich, who was to continue to function as head of the Montoneros. The party was to be the channel for the political expression of the Montoneros' concept of peronism, as well as the focal point for the creation of the "national liberation front". While the "Montonero Party" and eventually the "national liberation front" were to represent the political elements of the Montoneros, the "Montonero Army" and the militias were to serve as the Montoneros' militant element. What previously had been known as "peronist resistance" came to be known

as "Montonero resistance". The Montonero document announcing the creation of the "Montonero Party" was signed by Firmenich, "Mendizabal", who is probably Horacio M e n d i z a b a l, and "Vaca Narvaja", who is probably Fernando Vaca Narvaja. By August 1976, the Montoneros had begun to distribute on a biweekly basis a pamphlet entitled "Resistencia Montonera", and were also continuing to put out regularly their official publication "El Montonero".

The effort of the Montoneros to extend their influence also embraced the religious sector, as revealed by a [redacted] Montonero document believed to have been written August or September 1976. As of the writing of the document, the Montoneros had already begun efforts to organize the following three groups directed at expanding Montonero influence within the religious sector: (1) Social Christian Movement (SCM). The SCM was to be primarily a political entity to integrate sectors of the Popular Christian Party and the Revolutionary Christian Party. At the time the document was written, the SCM had about 42 affiliates, some of whom, according to the document, were first and second echelon members of the latter two parties. (2) Movement for the Unity of Christians. This Movement was to be comprised primarily of clergymen and was to be directed at attempting to sever the relatively close relationship then existent between the government and the Church hierarchy. (3) Christians for Liberation (CPL). The CPL, contrary to the other two groups, consisted mainly of Montoneros. The CPL had been established within the Greater Buenos Aires area, and it was the intent of the Montoneros to promote the CPL nationally as part of the broad-based opposition "national resistance movement".

b1 per CIA

Another [redacted] document revealed the effort of the Montoneros as of July 1976 to promote the formation of "Neighborhood Resistance Centers". The purpose of the Centers was to help organize, coordinate and lead the resistance movement within poorer residential areas, including encouraging the poor to become participants in acts of terrorism. In the past, Montonero subversive operations had been conceived and carried out by highly trained specialized groups acting independently of the people. However, by mid-1976 the Montoneros were encouraging the people to plan and implement their own operations, such as killings, with whatever weapons might be available to them; setting fires, bombings, causing streets to be blocked, and isolating wealthy neighborhoods through acts of sabotage, leaving them without water, electricity, gas, etc.

Within labor, following the coup d'etat and the suspension by the government of traditional labor activity, the Montoneros attempted to organize the General Labor Confederation/Resistance (CGT/R) as a clandestine labor organization parallel to the legal, but suspended, General Labor Confederation (CGT). According to a press release of the CGT/R sent to foreign news correspondents in Argentina, the CGT/R held its first plenum 14 August 1976 at a secret site in Buenos Aires Province in which representatives of unions throughout the country were in attendance. During the session, officers of the CGT/R were elected with metal worker Arturo G a r i n, which might be an alias, being named as the CGT/R chief.

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Throughout 1976 the Montoneros continued to hold discussions with the ERP regarding the possibility of unification of the two organizations in an attempt to strengthen opposition against the government. Such talks had been going on since at least 13 February 1974 when Mario Firmenich, Mario Roberto S a n t u c h o, Commander of the ERP, and others met in Mendoza Province to discuss the unification issue at that time. In a subsequent press conference, Firmenich acknowledged that the two organizations had been holding talks but said that no profound agreement yet existed. Firmenich stated that in the opinion of the Montoneros the ERP's basic error was in trying to copy the model of the Vietnam situation, particularly in believing that the enemy could be clearly defined, that weapons represented the principal strength, and that the focus should be in the rural areas. In addition, the Montoneros believed that the ERP's blind adherence to marxist theories had caused the ERP to become strapped by dogma and to commit political errors which resulted in the ERP becoming separated from the Argentine people. The Montoneros also considered the ERP to be overly concerned with military aspects to the exclusion of political developments.

Firmenich admitted that the Montoneros had also made mistakes, noting that originally the Montoneros believed that the armed struggle in Argentina should be modelled after the "Che" Guevara experience and that the Montonero effort should therefore be concentrated in the rural areas. Firmenich said that the Montoneros later realized that this was unrealistic, that while the rural sector should not be abandoned, the emphasis should be on urban guerrilla warfare because the masses of workers were in the cities, not in the mountains.

The ERP, in turn, accused the Montoneros of being opportunists without a definable ideology. The ERP claimed that the Montoneros were not true revolutionaries because they did not follow any approved revolutionary doctrine and because, at least under President Campora and President Juan Peron, they were willing to operate within the Argentine political system.

Despite their failure to achieve unification, some contact and cooperation continued between the two groups. During a raid by the security forces in early 1975 a Montonero document [redacted] stating that meetings would be held throughout 1975 by the Montoneros national leadership with the Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT), the political element of the ERP. With respect to joint operations, on 18 August 1975, the Montoneros and the ERP together stole an Army truck loaded with submachine guns and other weapons. A communique [redacted] claimed that the two organizations joined forces in this operation to retaliate the recent killing, presumably by rightist forces, of the Mariano P u j a d a s family in Cordoba. The communique also stated that the Montoneros and the ERP would continue with assassinations, particularly directed at Argentine military and security personnel.

b1 per CIA

In September 1975 a Montonero leader commented that coordination between the Montoneros and the ERP had improved and that a permanent coordinating council had been established, although there was still no central leadership over both groups. He stated that an example of Montonero/ERP cooperation was the coordinated assault in Cordoba on 21 August 1975 in which the ERP attacked a police station while the Montoneros attacked an Army communications center. In September 1975 the Army [redacted] received information that the Montoneros would be sending about eighty men to Tucuman Province to assist the ERP in urban terrorist activities. b1 per CIA

Upon questioning after his detention 28 December 1975, Roberto Quieto told the authorities that ties between the Montoneros and the ERP were minor. Quieto claimed that the ERP had distributed propaganda portraying a stronger relationship between the two organizations than was actually the case in order to build the ERP's image, lure recruits from the Montoneros and confuse the authorities.

The prospect of unification also suffered a setback after the unsuccessful attempt by the ERP on 23 December 1975 to seize the "Domingo Viejobueno Arsenal Battalion" at Monte Chingolo in Buenos Aires Province in which over fifty ERP participants were killed. While the Montoneros reportedly provided assistance to the operation in a support capacity, they were highly critical of the ERP for the failure of the operation and consequently reassessed the desirability of unifying with a group which, in the opinion of the Montoneros, had bungled so disastrously. In addition, the Montoneros were reluctant to become too closely associated with an organization which had a purely marxist orientation, considering that they could function more effectively under the peronist banner. Unification talks also suffered a setback with the death on 19 July 1976 of Mario Roberto Santucho and numerous other actions against the ERP by the security forces.

The Montoneros and the ERP nonetheless continued with their loose cooperative arrangement, and as of July 1976, being in financial straits, the ERP had borrowed at least U.S.$600,000 from the Montoneros.

By mid-1976 both the Montoneros and the ERP were promoting an international propaganda campaign against the Argentine government, and in this regard each organization was represented within the "Argentine Center of Information and Solidarity" (CAIS), headquartered in Paris, France. As of August 1976, however, CAIS was having internal problems which was affecting its propaganda output. These problems largely concerned infighting between Rodolfo M a t t a r o l l o, alias "Raul N a v a s", a militant of the ERP; and Luis C e r r u t i C o s t a, a Montonero who was head of the CAIS foreign relations section. Part of the difficulty was allegedly due to an effort by the Montoneros to assume authority over subversive matters in Argentina. As of mid-1976 the CAIS reportedly had a direct relationship with the "Latin American Students Section" (AELA) in Germany, the "Antifascist Committee Against Repression in Argentina" (CAFRA) in Rome, which has the support of the Italian Communist Party; the "Argentine Anti-

Imperialist Socialist Movement" (MASA) in the United States, "C.O.S.A." (sic) in London, "Casa del Pueblo Argentino" in Mexico, Amnesty International", the "Russell Tribunal II", the "Peace Association" in the U.S., and the "International Commission of Jurists", a subsidiary of the communist-front "World Peace Council".

In November 1975 it had been reported that left-wing Montoneros were a dominant element within the "Casa del Pueblo Argentino" in Mexico City and that Mexico City was being used as a type of support base for the ERP and the Montoneros. In this regard, the "Casa del Pueblo Argentina" was providing documents, housing, travel funds and other assistance.

In June 1976 Envar E l K a d r e, representing the Montoneros, attended a meeting in Lisbon, Portugal of the "Revolutionary Coordinating Junta" (JCR), a coordinating body consisting of the ERP, the Uruguayan National Liberation Movement/Tuparmaros, the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left and the Bolivian Army of National Liberation. The purpose of the meeting was to advise the group that the Montoneros, while not actually joining the JCR, would participate in an observer/advisor status, as well as provide the JCR with financial assistance on a monthly basis.

Despite their efforts to expand their influence and impede the efforts of the government, by late March 1976 the Montoneros privately conceded that despite the recent assumption of the military government they had already been dealt significant blows by actions of the security forces, particularly in the interior and most notably in Cordoba, Mendoza, the Northeast and the Littoral. The Montoneros considered it inevitable that as the interior continued to come under the control of security elements, the government would channel more of its resources into offensive actions against the Montoneros in the Federal Capital and Buenos Aires Province. As the rear guard of the Montoneros in the Buenos Aires area was regarded as weak and in no condition to successfully combat the Armed Forces offensive, the "tactical command" of the Montoneros ordered the implementation of "operation chameleon" calling for a large number of Montoneros to go into hiding. To help allow these Montoneros to live clandestinely, the "tactical command" directed that beginning 30 April 1976 an intensive effort was to be initiated to obtain legitimate documentation and identifying data of citizens who were not Montoneros. The Montoneros would then alter the documentation as necessary for use by the clandestine Montoneros or make false documents from the personal data acquired. Parallel with the defensive "chameleon operation", the Montoneros would continue to engage in offensive militant operations, both for the purpose of trying to stop the advance of the military, as well as to re-enforce the image of the Montoneros.

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As a result of the capture of Roberto Quieto, whom the Montoneros condemned as a traitor for allowing himself to be picked up and for revealing information to the authorities, and because of other actions against the Montoneros by the security forces, the Montoneros reappraised their situation and consequently instituted organizational changes beginning about May 1976.

When the Montoneros were first formed, they were a relatively small group consisting of cadre units which operated for the most part independently. As the membership expanded, it became apparent that a more centralized and structured organization was necessary to respond to reality. In May 1973 steps were taken to gradually consolidate the cadre units into a more cohesive body. The cadre chiefs became the overall national leaders, a number which eventually was reduced to three men, Firmenich, Quieto and possibly, at least at some point, Molinas. With time, a superstructure evolved which resulted in both a large bureaucracy with a period of demilitarization. The demilitarization brought about an absence of military training and led to low-level operations. The bureaucracy became unwieldy and Montonero members began acting on their own, carrying out activities at will without authorization or supervision. A further problem was that the national leaders became inaccessible. The decisions of the national leaders were not to be questioned, nor were they interested in suggestions. The primary focus of attention of the national leadership was in the Federal Capital area, and as a consequence the national leaders lacked knowledge of the different Montonero regions. The national leadership failed to produce a consistent and broad policy which encompassed the entire organization, resulting in contradictions between the Federal Capital area and the regional districts. In sum, the organizational structure which evolved lacked an effective channel to discuss and resolve problems.

In early 1976 the Montonero "national council" recommended the following to help correct the situation which had developed: (1) Greater democratization of the organization to allow for more effective communication between elements and the opportunity for members at all levels to express views and criticisms; (2) Better military training with at least one operation a year involving a large Montonero troop contingent; (3) Greater knowledge about and interest in members of the organization at all levels to help avert possible security problems. This latter point referred to the Quieto situation in which Quieto had apparently been denounced to the authorities by his wife who was angered over Quieto's affair with the Montonero "Ana"; (4) The assignment of a security officer to each regional district to be alert to potential problems from the membership which could affect the security of the organization; (5) Insistence that all members continually carry a weapon to be used either to try to resist capture or to kill oneself if capture appeared certain; a cyanide capsule was also to be carried to commit suicide.

Around May 1976 it was decided to refer to the "Commander" of the Montoneros as the "Secretary General" and to divide responsibility of the "tactical" (military) and "strategic" (political) functions, which hitherto had been combined. The "tactical" aspects would be controlled by a "national secretariat" operating from the Federal Capital. "Strategic" aspects would be more regionally oriented. "Regional elements", as such, were to be replaced by "columns" or "zones" led by a secretary general. The "columns" or "zones" would have more of a vertical command structure than did the "regional elements".

In sum, during this period the new Montonero organizational structure included the following: "National leadership (conduccion nacional), consisting of a secretary general plus three "area chiefs"; (2) secretariat, consisting of the secretary general and the national secretaries responsible for military, political, organizational, propaganda and indoctrination matters, and international aspects; (3) "columns" or "zones", each led by a secretary general, plus four sub-secretaries in charge of military, political, organizational, and propaganda and indoctrination matters.

The military sub-secretary for the Federal Capital would have responsibility for three departments: The department of production involving the manufacture of armaments; the department of services which was to be responsible for logistical supports, medical facilities, caches and documentation; and the department of information responsible for maintaining intelligence files on personalities of interest and other potential targets, such as aspects of the country's infrastructure, etc.

Within the Federal Capital the political sub-secretary would be in charge of four departments: Student, labor, press and propaganda, and the "national liberation front".

Within the Federal Capital the organizational sub-secretary would be in charge of five departments: Personnel, prisoners, finances, communications and technical assistance.

The propaganda and indoctrination sub-secretary within the Federal Capital would be in charge of preparing, publishing, and distributing propaganda.

The national secretary in charge of international aspects headed four departments: Latin America, Investigation and Information, Special Logistics, and Relations with Europe, Africa and the Soviet Bloc. A document dated 1975 outlining the "work plan" of the Montoneros for 1975 stated that the International Section of the Montoneros would maintain periodic contact with the embassies of Cuba, friendly Arab states, such as Syria, Iraq and Algeria; and other communist states, the selection, according to the document, to be made at a later date. The "work plan" also noted that preparations would be made to send a mission to Western Europe

to disseminate propaganda relating to repression in Argentina and to obtain the support of "social democratic groups" in that area.

The Montoneros new organizational structure also called for armed operations to be carried out by "combat groups", consisting of some twenty people divided into units of four directed by a unified command. In addition, the Montoneros began to institute an operational system of roving patrols for the purpose of carrying out terrorist acts on the basis of targets of opportunity. The main feature of the members of a given patrol would be that they all knew the area in which they were operating extremely well. The patrol system differed from past operating techniques, in which the Montoneros carefully planned an operation well in advance and then selected individuals who would comprise a "commando unit" to implement the operation, basing the selection on various factors which did not necessarily include knowledge of the operating locale.

By late 1976 and early 1977, as a result of countersubversive actions, the Montoneros had lost numerous members and supporters and had been dealt severe blows to their logistical and organizational structure.

Within the labor area, the Montoneros suffered a setback as a result of actions by the security forces which began as early as January 1976. At that time, the security forces, having information that the subversives had infiltrated labor commissions at the factory floor level, picked up several Montonero labor penetrations. The Montoneros then pulled out many of their labor penetrations still remaining and helped them go into hiding. The result was a decline in the influence which the Montoneros had hitherto been able to acquire within the labor sector. To further hinder the developments of subversive infiltration within labor, after the military took over the government in March 1976, the Army 601st Intelligence Battalion gradually became involved in an effort to infiltrate the work force of as many companies as possible to acquire information firsthand on the labor situation and to identify subversives among workers. As of January 1977, the Army 601st had infiltrated about one hundred companies.

The Montoneros, however, still attempted to extend their influence within the labor area to try to utilize the workers as a base of support. By early 1977 the Montoneros were anticipating, because of the deteriorating economic situation, a massive confrontation between government forces and labor before the end of July 1977, a situation which the Montoneros hoped to exploit. In preparation for this possibility, the Montoneros planned to begin as of 1 January 1977 an intense effort to infiltrate as many factories as possible, engage in a widespread recruitment effort, create small combat units among factory workers and bring about Montonero control of internal labor commissions. The goal of the Montoneros was to have the support of at least thirty percent of workers in each factory. The Montoneros intended to give priority attention in their infiltration/recruitment

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effort to the textile and metallurgical unions. The Montoneros also hoped to reorganize the CGT/R to make it more effective.

[redacted] despite their ambitious goals within labor, the Montoneros are faced with trying to gain the support of workers who in general continue to be responsive to traditional peronist labor leaders, and these leaders, in turn, are not disposed towards sharing their power positions with the Montoneros. While the Montoneros, through the CGT/R or some other vehicle, might eventually be able to utilize labor discontent as a power base, this would probably be a gradual occurrence over a long period and not a situation which could evolve immediately. b1 per CIA

With respect to the Montoneros' logistical apparatus, various actions carried out by the countersubversive forces against the Montoneros in November 1976 represented, according to the Army [redacted] the greatest blow ever dealt to the logistical infrastructure of a subversive organization in Argentina. As a result of raids against Montonero weapons factories and supply centers, the authorities confiscated almost all of the G-70 "Energa" grenades made by the Montoneros and almost all of the 16-33-MP grenade launchers. In addition, about one-fourth of the hand grenades under production were seized, as were the prototypes for 60 mm mortars. These actions were carried out in Chaco, Corrientes, Santa Fe and Villa Dominico in Buenos Aires Province.

By early 1977 a Montonero document revealed that the Montoneros were no longer in a position to provide small arms to their militias who must acquire their own. However, fabrication of grenades was continuing with priority being given to the manufacture of SFM-5 grenades and launchers. The Montoneros hoped to have the SFM-5 grenades ready for use by April 1977. The Montoneros also expected to have 1,000-2,000 G-40 grenades by the end of April 1977.

With respect to the Montoneros' finances, the Montonero national military secretary listed in a document the financial expenditures in the Federal Capital for August, September and October 1976 as being, respectively, the peso equivalent of US$127,500.00, US$233,250 and US$70,450. Roughly 42 percent of these totals was for the purchase of vehicles, safehouses and other property, 38 percent for logistical and miscellaneous items and 20 percent was invested. The Army [redacted] assessed that while the Montoneros had suffered losses in membership and in their logistical apparatus, at least as of August, September and October 1976 there did not seem to be a problem of funds.

This situation changed, however, in February 1977 when Argentine naval officers captured in Buenos Aires Ricardo Rene Haidar, the Montonero National Secretary for Finances. Haidar provided detailed information on the Montoneros' financial structure, including the location of the Montoneros' principal financial reserves in bank accounts in Spain and Switzerland, to which Haidar had direct access

using his alias "Pablo V e n t u r a". Based on Haidar's information and assistance, the security forces were able to withdraw 14 million U.S. dollars from a bank account in Madrid, Spain and 50 million U.S. dollars, plus stock certificates, from a bank in Geneva, Switzerland. Haidar told the authorities that most of the Montonero operations had been financed primarily by interest earned on these two European accounts. Within Argentina, Haidar led the authorities to 17 million dollars hidden in a safesite in Cordoba and to four million dollars hidden in Mendoza. As a result of these operations involving Haidar, as of February 1977 the financial reserves of the Montoneros had been virtually elminated.

Within the student sector, soon after the coup d'etat the countersubversive campaign moved against both secondary and university levels. In early May 1976, President Videla remarked privately that the government had made significant progress in identifying subversive indoctrination activities at the secondary school level. Videla noted that the previous government had done a good job of keeping down such activity in the universities but had not focused on this problem at the secondary school level. He said that what the present military government was discovering was the extent of infiltration by subversives in secondary schools, which in some cases involved professors and directors of schools.

With respect to membership losses, in September 1976 [redacted] the number of Montonero militants at that time may have been about 7,000. [redacted] b1 per CIA as of February 1977 the number of militants may not have been more than 1,000, and he judged that the Montonero leadership had been reduced by perhaps as much as eighty percent. [redacted] the figure of militants as of January 1977 at about 2,000. Both the leadership and rank and file had dispersed, and as of March 1977 Mario Firmenich was said to be in France.

Despite setbacks, per a Montonero document entitled "National Plan from January through April 1977" signed by Rodolfo G a l l m b e r t i, National Military Secretary, the Montoneros intended to continue with terrorist operations in 1977, the principal terrorist targets in order of priority being as follows:

(1) Executives of monopolisitic companies and members of the oligarchy who have taken actions detrimental to the workers. The primary objective of the terrorist campaign against these individuals is to force them out of fear to leave Argentina. If they wish to remain in the country and stay alive they must agree to provide the wages and benefits to workers stipulated by the CGT/R. For the most part, the targets are to be executives who do not have bodyguards or who are otherwise easy to get at.

(2) Members of the Armed Forces and other security services. In general, emphasis is to be placed on actions against the Armed Forces rather than the police. Killing of individual police officers

is to be primarily for the purpose of acquiring a weapon. The Montoneros also consider it important to continue with their propaganda/psychological action campaign aimed at intensifying disunity within the military by working to exacerbate the differences within the Armed Forces over the policies the government should pursue. Propaganda in this regard is to continue to stress that the military hierarchy favors the imperialists and the oligarchy at the expense of the workers and the national interests. The Montoneros also hope to develop a greater social consciousness among the lower ranks of the military and incite them to challenge the decisions taken by their superiors.

(3) Argentine government officials, both military and civilian. Selected high-level officials will be threatened with death unless they resign. Lesser officials will be urged to promote policies which benefit the lower and middle classes.

While the Montoneros continued to collect and maintain information on the U.S. Mission in Argentina, the fact that U.S. officials were not listed by the Montoneros as priority targets may relate to a meeting held in Rosario in early September 1976 attended by Mario Firmenich, Molinas and "Pablo Ventura", the alias, as later revealed, of Ricardo Rene Haidar. During this meeting the leaders said they considered that the human rights issue, particularly within the U.S., was working to the advantage of the Montoneros. Consequently, in the interest of maintaining this advantage the Montonero leaders decided that for the present they would not direct terrorist actions against foreign diplomatic missions or their personnel in Argentina, as such actions would tend to weaken the Montoneros' position in the human rights context. The Montonero leaders noted that the human rights issue was generating sympathy and support for the Montoneros and other leftist groups in Argentina, and the attacks being made against the Argentine government were ultimately to the benefit of the Argentine leftist radical sector.

In the face of increased countersubversive actions, by early 1977 the Montoneros had brought about further organizational changes. The position of Montonero secretary of organization had been abolished, and the Montonero structure was becoming increasingly decentralized with action concentrated at the zone level. The policy of the Montoneros was no longer to exist as an elite and tight entity, in effect separate from society, but to become diffused and its members absorbed among the masses where they could exert influence at the grass roots level, particularly among the workers. In this way, the Montoneros hoped to take advantage of the growing conflict between labor and the government to try and become the vanguard of the opposition force. The Montoneros intended to spread their people throughout the country, both to promote the resistance of the government nationwide, as well as to avoid a concentration of Montoneros at any one place, a situation which would make them particularly vulnerable to the security forces. Specific political and military actions within a zone were to be decided by the zone leader without

the need for higher approval. Such actions, however, were to include targets and be implemented in accord with the general guidelines set forth in the Montonero "Military Instruction Manual". This manual was to have been completed by January 1977 and beginning February 1977 four-day courses were to be given by platoon leaders to militants based on the contents of the manual. Every month a two-day meeting was to be held of various zone chiefs with appropriate national representatives to evaluate problems and successes of the previous month, make plans for the upcoming month and discuss political matters. Operations against any target were to entail a low risk for the Montoneros involved and were to be implemented with as few militants as possible. Those Montoneros carrying out an action were to be familiar with the operating locale and plans were to be made for an easy and rapid getaway, possibly by using bicycles or motorcycles in congested areas rather than cars. The Montoneros acknowledged that their communications procedures were extremely vulnerable as the security forces were aware of most of them, and consequently from January through April 1977 a special effort was to be made to improve communications.

Despite the plans and efforts of the Montoneros to maintain their viability and fulfill their objectives, as of early 1977 President Videla was making public statements stressing the determination of the government to continue its fight against subversion until it was destroyed. Some government and security officials privately calculated that the subversives would be defeated by the end of 1977, while others estimated that the struggle would be prolonged until the end of 1978. The Montoneros, however, are optimistic, believing that despite this period of confrontation time is on their side, and that ultimately the leftist forces will prevail and a socialist state in Argentina, dominated by the Montoneros, will be established.

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REPORT CLASS ~~S E C R E T~~--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED [redacted] b3 per CIA

[redacted]

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

[redacted] b1 per CIA

SUBJECT: GOAL OF THE "PERONIST-MONTONERO MOVEMENT" TO OBTAIN INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AS A LEGAL POLITICAL FORCE FOR THE ARGENTINE RESISTANCE

105-[redacted]-107

[redacted] b1 per CIA

DISTRIBUTION
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1. IN APRIL 1977 THE SECURITY FORCES CONFISCATED A MONTONERO DOCUMENT WHICH DISCUSSES THE "PERONIST-MONTONERO MOVEMENT" (MPM). [redacted] b1 per CIA

[redacted]

[redacted] THE DOCUMENT STATES THAT THE MPM WILL ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AS A LEGAL POLITICAL FORCE REPRESENTING THE ARGENTINE RESISTANCE. SUCH RECOGNITION WILL BE SOUGHT SPECIFICALLY FROM SOCIALIST COUNTRIES; THE VATICAN; THE PALESTINE LIBERATION

ORGANIZATION; VARIOUS EUROPEAN POLITICAL PARTIES, SUCH AS THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, SOCIALIST PARTIES AND COMMUNIST PARTIES; PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL FORCES OF LATIN AMERICA; AND "YANKEE DEMOCRATS". THE MPM WILL FOCUS LARGELY ON POLITICAL MATTERS AND WILL ATTEMPT TO IMPLEMENT INITIAL OBJECTIVES IN THE TRANSITION OF THE REVOLUTION TO SOCIALISM.

2. MOST OF THE TOP OFFICIALS OF THE MONTONEROS HAVE LEFT ARGENTINA [redacted] FOR AN INDEFINITE TIME PERIOD. THEY WILL NONETHELESS LEAD THE MONTONEROS INDIRECTLY FROM ABROAD, AND ON A ROTATING BASIS EACH OFFICIAL WILL RETURN PERIODICALLY TO ARGENTINA TO MANAGE MONTONERO ACTIVITY DIRECTLY. THE MONTONERO ARMY IN ARGENTINA WILL CONTINUE TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR IMPLEMENTING MILITARY OBJECTIVES. THE MAJORITY OF MILITARY OPERATIONS WILL BE CARRIED OUT BY MONTONERO ARMY UNITS OF 3-4 PEOPLE WHO WILL FUNCTION FOR THE MOST PART INDEPENDENTLY WITHOUT THE NEED TO REPORT OR COORDINATE THEIR ACTIVITY.

3. THE DOCUMENT ADMITS THAT THE MONTONEROS HAVE SUFFERED NUMEROUS LOSSES FROM COUNTERSUBVERSIVE ACTIONS, AND STATES THAT SOME 90 PER CENT OF THE ACTIVISTS IN FACTORIES HAVE BEEN OUSTED FROM THEIR JOBS. NONETHELESS, THE MONTONEROS CLAIM TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO KEEP THE SECURITY FORCES FROM CLOSING IN COMPLETELY, AND THE MONTONEROS NOW CONSIDER THAT THEY ARE MAKING HEADWAY IN TURNING THE SITUATION AROUND.

~~S E C R E T~~

b1 per CIA

[redacted]

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED [redacted]

b3 per CIA

[redacted]

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DATE 04-10-2017 BY F54M93K42 ADG

b1 per CIA

XE

NOV 3 19

b1 per CIA

b1 per CIA

CHARGE MAXWELL CHAPLIN 7/29/77

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

SECRET

ALLEGED MONTONERO ABDUCTION OF WALTER BROWN, BANCO COMERCIO ARGENTINA (CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA)

On 7/29/77, THOMAS SWIFT, Security Officer, Chase Manhattan Bank, New York City, who has been in Argentina during the past month in connection with the reestablishment of Chase Manhattan Bank control over the Banco Comercio Argentina, advised that during the week of 7/25/77, WALTER BROWN, a Chase Manhattan Bank, medium level official from New York City, was returning to the Sheraton Hotel from the Pulpo Restaurant located on Reconquista in the Federal Capital. SWIFT advised that BROWN claimed he was returning to the Sheraton Hotel via Florida, where he turned on to Plaza San Martin, and proceeded to the hotel. SWIFT stated that BROWN claimed he was approached by three male individuals driving a four-door sedan at the intersection of Alem and San Martin. The individuals invited BROWN into the automobile creating the impression that they were police. BROWN claimed he was requested to produce identification and he displayed his U. S. passport to the individuals. BROWN claimed he was questioned as to the purpose of his being in Buenos Aires, and he explained to them that he was an employee of the Chase Manhattan Bank on TDY in Buenos Aires. It is noted that BROWN is a negro, who is fluent in the Spanish language. BROWN claimed that the individual in the passenger's seat produced a silver-colored hand gun and informed BROWN that he and his companions were Montonero terrorists. BROWN claimed he was driven out of the Federal Capital into Buenos Aires Province, where he was released after being robbed of his money and valuables. BROWN was allowed to retain his U. S. passport. BROWN borrowed money from a service station operator and returned to the Sheraton Hotel where he immediately contacted SWIFT.

DECLASSIFIED BY 38063 E/W BEE/SOM ON 10-22-85 Appeal # 90-0377 Argentina Project

1 - Addressee
CCs: POL
POL/R
CONGEN
ECON COUNSELOR
SY

2 - Buenos Aires
(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 105-767)

RWS:jn
(8)

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SECRET

Classified by
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394

NOV 3 1989

CONFIDENTIAL

[105-767-109]

(U) (S) ALLEGED [illegible] ABDUCTION
OF WALTER BROWN, BANCO [illegible]
ARGENTINA ([illegible] MANHATTAN [illegible],
BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA)

SWIFT advised that at the time of his abduction, BROWN was dressed in a highly conspicuous fashion, i. e. an African-style shirt, beads and [illegible] prominent rings. SWIFT [illegible] of being [illegible]. After [illegible] arrived at the [illegible] by members of one of the [illegible] the area of [illegible]. SWIFT [illegible] the most direct route to return to the [illegible] Restaurant would be to proceed [illegible] Florida. SWIFT noted [illegible] he would have passed through the redlight district near [illegible] Mayo and Tres Sargentos. SWIFT offered his conjecture that BROWN probably did walk down [illegible] and was encountered in the redlight district by the three individuals driving the four-door sedan. (S) (U)

SWIFT advised that BROWN will depart Buenos Aires during the week of 8/1/77. SWIFT also advised that the above incident was not reported to the authorities based on SWIFT's belief that Argentine security forces were responsible. (S) (U)

SWIFT requested that his and BROWN's identity not be disclosed. SWIFT also requested that the Chase Manhattan and the Banco Comercio Argentina not be named in connection with the above episode. (S) (U)

Classified by [illegible] indefinite.

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

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DATE 04-10-2017 BY F54M93K42 ADC

Descubren un refugio montonero en Roma

ROMA, 29 (ANSA). — Fue descubierto en un suburbio de Roma un refugio que probablemente pertenece al grupo guerrillero argentino montoneros.

El descubrimiento fue hecho cuando el portero de un edificio llamó a la policía para denunciar que la puerta de un departamento estaba entornada. El hombre pensaba que habían entrado ladrones, como es común en esta época del año en Italia.

Los agentes registraron el departamento y encontraron pistolas y documentos falsos. Del asunto fue informada inmediatamente la oficina política de la policía italiana, la que luego de haber examinado algunos volantes en los que se loaba al grupo de los montoneros, informó a su vez al Servicio de Informaciones de Defensa y al Servicio de Seguridad. La policía encontró además de los volantes tres pistolas cargadas —una Walther P 38, una Browning calibre 9 y una Beretta calibre 7,65— que resultaron robadas, así como decenas de documentos, muchos de los cuales con las mismas fotografías.

Cuando se realizaba el allanamiento llegó a la casa la ciudadana argentina, María Fleming, de 23 años, con sus dos hijos. La mujer declaró que era una refugiada política, que estaba en Italia desde hacía 15 días y que su marido vive en Bélgica. La mujer fue detenida y sucesivamente liberada. A la policía declaró que las llaves de la casa se las había dado una amiga, de la que no trascendió el nombre. Esta noche la Sra. Fleming pidió formalmente pedido de asilo político en Italia.

Mientras tanto se averiguó que el departamento fue alquilado originalmente a una pareja argentina apellidada Mischler que hace tres meses partió con destino desconocido, aunque el contraespionaje piensa que se hallan en Francia y que desde allí coordinan la actividad de algunos movimientos terroristas en Europa.

Al departamento fue a vivir luego una segunda pareja cuyo nombre no fue revelado, pero que la policía ya conocería y a la que estaría buscando ya que a través de ellos podrá descubrirse a los grupos que utilizaron esta base romana.

Del asunto fue informada la embajada argentina en Roma que se mantiene en contacto permanente con el servicio de seguridad italiano.

Los montoneros tendrían una amplia red de conexiones internacionales, especialmente en el resto de América Latina y sobre todo en el Uruguay. En Europa tienen al parecer bases en Francia.

P. 3

LA NACION

BUENOS AIRES

7/30/77

Date:
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title:

Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office: 105-767 -110

☐ Being Investigated

XEROX
NOV 3 1989

AUG 2 - 1977

FBI-BUENOS

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : FILE 105-767 (C) (S) SECRET DATE: 8/31/77

FROM : LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES

SUBJECT: MONTONEROS

Captioned matter was opened and assigned to report information of interest to the Bureau which was developed through office contacts. These contacts were impressed with the FBI's continuing interest in the above subject matter and they advised they would remain alert for any such information. (S) (U)

A review of instant file disclosed that no current information of interest to the Bureau had been reported by office contacts. (S) (U)

Accordingly, this case is being closed administratively at this time subject to reopening to report any information of interest to the FBI that office contacts might provide in captioned subject at a latter date. (S) (U)

RWS:jn
(1)

DECLASSIFIED BY Sp2 Ag/CAC
ON 10-27-95
Appeal #90-0377

Classified by [illegible]
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89

284394

CHECK FOR DESTRUCTION
Mo. 8 Yr 80

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105-767-111

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED (S) (U)

AUG 31 1977

FBI-BUENOS AIRES

XEROX
NOV 3 1989

SECRET

5010-110

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 09-19-2017 BY: C32W33B91

A-125

SECRET

Department of State

E.O.11652: GDS
TAGS: ASEC, PINS, PINT, SHUM, AR

Amembassy BUENOS AIRES September 27, 1977

Estimate of Current Montonero Strength and National and International Activity

RSO met with senior member of the Argentine intelligence community. Source stated that presently the military war against the subversives is rapidly coming to an end and that by next year the terrorist activities should be limited to action on the labor, student and religious fronts. Source stated that several days ago they had discovered what they believed to be the last of the jamming stations used recently by the Montoneros to interfere with national broadcasts. The station broadcasted under the title "Liberated Argentina."

HARGE
DL/R
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Source stated that Montonero activities throughout the country have decreased with the exception of Rosario. The increase in Rosario is due to the transfer of units from Santa Fe to that city. Source stated that the movement in total is in disarray and the units are continually moving from one area to another to avoid discovery by security services. Although this has inhibited government action against them, it has also made it very difficult for the terrorists to take any consolidated action against government targets. Source stated that at present the Montonero combative strength nationwide is considered to be about 750. This figure is based on an analysis made at the beginning of this month. During the month there have been additional losses which would have to be subtracted from that estimate.

105-767-1/2
XEROX
NOV 3 1989
SEP 28 1977
FBI-BUENOS AIRES

SECRET

RSO:RJKelly:mek 9-23-77 313/314 CHARGE:MChaplin BA-9 4-12-76

Source stated that there have been numerous defections from the Montoneros. First, by terrorists who have fled the country, either upon direction of a higher authority or on their own initiative. Second, persons who have stepped out of combat (gone to the margin) and third, persons who have surrendered to the government. In the past several months there have been approximately 40 such surrenders. This represents an estimated 5-6 percent of the existing Montonero combat strength. Source stated that a recent survey was conducted of the persons who had surrendered to determine why they had not surrendered earlier. The general consensus was that they were unaware of the procedures for surrendering and they did not believe the government would give them good treatment. Source stated the government's policy is to provide good treatment for any terrorists that surrender and to give them one-third of what would be the normal sentence. Source stated that the security services have not made clear to the terrorists the procedures for surrendering and the assurances of good treatment. Source hoped to see an increase in the number of Montoneros who turn themselves in in the future.

Source stated that the Montonero supreme command has been in Europe, with headquarters in Rome, for quite some time but now even the second level leadership has been recalled from Argentina and consequently there is very little leadership or direction to the present Montonero activities. The National Conduction had attempted to infiltrate leadership back into the country every 40 days to provide temporary direction. However, the past three leaders were captured within seven days of their arrival in Argentina and subsequently they have stopped infiltrating leadership back into Argentina for periodic visits. Source stated that the Montonero leadership in Europe has established contacts with Al Fatah and affiliated Arab organizations. Recently, Firmenich and Vaca Narvaja met with the head of Al Fatah and other Arab organizations. Source stated the purpose of these meetings and discussions is not known at this time.

Source stated that although the main terrorist organizations are being systematically eliminated, there still are numerous small groups of various political ideologies that have remained active up to the present. These organizations will be better dealt with when the main groups have been eliminated. Two days ago in Mar del Plata, a new organization was identi-

fied as the Communist-Marxist-Leninist Party. This element, although small, was discovered to have a people's prison, communications equipment and sophisticated weapons, including the INGRAHAM line of submachineguns. Source stated they also had long-barrelled weapons that apparently have come from the U.S. Source stated this group has no relationship to the legal Communist Party of Argentina which has not been involved in any terrorist activities. Source stated that some of these small groups have been receiving financial support from outside the country. The intelligence services believe, but do not have definitive proof, that the Cuban Embassy has been providing financial support for the Fidelist-based movements and that other groups have received some limited support from the Fourth International, based in Paris. Source stated that the Montoneros and the ERP had financed their own operations through kidnappings, bank robberies, extortions and other such activities and had not received financial assistance from abroad.

CHAPLIN

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SECRET

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

12/7/77

ROBERT W. SCHERRER, LEGAL ATTACHE

(U)
(S) ALLEGED BAADER-MEINHOF GANG RESPONSIBILITY
FOR ARSON AT MERCEDES-BENZ PLANT IN BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE

On 12/2/77, EDUARDO "TED" BEACH, Chrysler Argentina, contacted me on another matter and during the course of the conversation he mentioned there are strong rumors circulating among executives in the automotive industry in Buenos Aires indicating that the day following the fire at the Mercedes-Benz facility in Buenos Aires Province last week, some form of communication was received at Mercedes-Benz Headquarters in Germany by the Baader-Meinhof gang claiming joint responsibility for the fire with the Montoneros. (S) (U)

According to BEACH, the recent Mercedes-Benz fire was not accidental but deliberate arson. (S) (U)

1 - Addressee

1 - POL/R
1 - ECON COUNSELOR
1 - SECURITY
1 - DAO

2 - Buenos Aires
(1 - 109-103) (S) (U)
[(1 - 105-767)] (Montoneros)

RWS:jn
(7)

Classified by: [illegible]
Declassify on: OADR 10/3/89
284394
390632/WCE/Sam

DECLASSIFIED BY SP6 Ag/Col
ON 11-22-95 6-1-01
Appeal #90-0371
Argentina Project

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OTHERWISE

SECRET

XEROX
NOV 8 1989

[105-767-114] (S) (U)

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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 09-19-2017 BY: C32W33B91

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TR	XMB
NAVY	OSD
CIA	

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Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files.

FILE DESIGNATION

HANDLING INDICATOR: CONFIDENTIAL

NO.: A-151

TO : Department of State
E.O.11652 GDS
TAGS: ASEC, PINS, PINT, SHUM, AR

FROM : Amembassy BUENOS AIRES DATE: December 6, 1977

SUBJECT : Montonero Operational Plan for Greater Buenos Aires: July-September 1977

REF :

This report is a review of a Montonero document titled "Montonero Party Zonal Bulletin, Federal Capital". It was produced some time late in June 1977 and captured by Security Service personnel in mid-September 1977. The bulletin consisted of 59 pages and is represented as the official medium of the Montonero Party. It is dedicated to the memory of Montoneros who were killed in action. The document itself is poorly printed and may have been run off on a mimeograph machine. On both of the covers are oval badges, roughly drawn. In the center of the badges are a spear and a machinegun. Across the badge is the large letter "M", standing for Montonero. There are also two 8-pointed stars on each side of the badge. The badge bears the motto: "Montoneros, we will defeat". The bulletin covers five basic topics, an editorial, a plan for the Montonero Party in the zone, a plan for the political secretariat in the zone, a plan for the military secretariat in the zone and a plan for the press and propaganda secretariat in the zone. This report provides a summary of each of the five sections followed by comments on the contents of each section and an evaluation.

Section I: Editorial

105-767-115

This section identifies the bulletin as being the main instrument for organizing Montonero forces and efforts in the Federal Capital. It issues new orders and promulgates a new policy for all Montonero elements 105-767 109-103

FORM 10-64 DS-323

CONFIDENTIAL

For Department Use Only

Drafting Date:	Phone No.:	Contents and Classification Approved by:
11-30-77	313/314	AMB:RCastro

RSO:RKelly:mek

WHallman POL/R:DSmock DCM:MChaplin

BA-17
4-12-76

operating in this zone and reflects that the bulletin is directed at Montonero groups and agencies, of which the secretariat is most easily reached, and that special issues of the bulletin will be published to cover particular needs. The bulletin qualifies the limitations on its first issue by stating it will not be able to provide information concerning activities of the previous months because the previous secretariat for the zone had been destroyed. This first editorial section is signed by Felipe Larroque, Capital Federal zone general secretary.

POST COMMENTS:
The most important aspect of the editorial is the development of a zonal policy concentrating total activities at developing greater influence with the masses. It admits to the destruction of the previous secretariat and corroborates our information from other sources that there has been substantial criticism by the rank and file of the leadership. It attempts to provide the rank and file with a feeling of greater participation in the policy and directions of the movement.

Section II: Trimestral Plan for Montonero Party

This section reflects the trimestral (quarterly) plan for the Montonero Party in the Federal Capital zone. It includes general operations and specific activities from July to September 1977 and exhorts members to build up the political conduction of the Montonero Peronist Movement. It accepts their weakened position due to the large number of casualties and betrayals they have suffered over the past months and states the general secretariat of the zone has been rebuilt and a plan of action in the next months has been established. The core of the plan is to develop a political policy that will influence the masses. It states that the Montonero Peronist Movement will be the center of growing popular resistance to the existing government and lists it as the only political movement in the country that provides an option for the masses against the military government.

It provides that "the central aim of the quarterly plan will be the progressive concentration of the effort of the whole party behind some political aim, without any distinction to the different secretariats, since each one of them must carry out the same policy through different means."

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4-12-76

It acknowledges that the Montoneros lack an accurate knowledge of the conditions of the workers in the main labor unions and factories and confesses that participation of the Montonero Party in union conflicts was in some cases insignificant and in other cases nonexistent. It exhorts the Montonero groups to agitate and promote propaganda in the most combative unions, particularly power workers, telephone workers, port workers, mechanics, metallurgical workers and to consider all other political fronts as secondary. The bulletin assumes workers' resistance to the present government will increase as a result of frozen salaries and dismissal of a number of workers from various companies. This will lead to the progressive isolation of the military government which will then have to face the opposition of all national forces.

The bulletin analyzes the situation in the government as follows. The government has not succeeded in annihilating the Montonero Party in spite of concerted efforts. The short war strategy has failed. The government cannot solve the present economic crisis and is politically isolated within the country and internationally isolated outside the country. The bulletin expresses the conviction that the government anti-terrorist offensive is coming to a halt and, therefore, it is time for the Montonero Party to go on the counter-offensive.

It identifies the main task for the political secretariat as making the Montonero Peronist Movement known on all fronts and encouraging the development of the CGT-R, (General Confederation of Labor - Resistance). It lists the following immediate objectives: infiltrate and develop accurate knowledge of the unions, their problems, state of morale and conflicts with the government. The general objectives are to promote movements to return labor union control to labor officials and to remove state interventions; to restore higher level of salaries; to eliminate Martinez de Hoz' economic policies and to achieve a broad based labor union unity against the government. It presses for the creation of solidarity agencies, i.e. Commission of Tenants in the Resistance; creation of resistance centers in the student fronts or through the use of Peronist University Youth.

The major objective of the military secretariat is to initiate attacks against executives and the oligarchy. Sixty percent of the military efforts will be directed at these objectives. The remaining 40% will be directed against

the repressive forces. For each military operation, at least two propaganda operations should follow. The main targets are executives of the power supply companies, telephone, port, railroad, mechanical and metallurgical companies and executives of foreign monopolistic companies. The Montonero platoons are directed to establish operational areas close to unions or factories in order to establish regular connections with the workers, gain operative information and relate more closely to local problems.

The bulletin encourages the platoons to operate with "complete autonomy," select targets properly, propagandize their activities after attacks and rebuild their logistics and intelligence services. It identifies the basic Montonero Army units as the platoon, composed of 4-5 persons, and the sub-platoon, a new unit of two persons, and explains that the Montonero Party exists when it has centralized direction and a single policy, even when there is no interrelation between various platoons, agencies and groups. It exhorts the members to remain close to the masses and not seek to become close to the organizational structure of the Party and insists that all internal functionings of the Party be kept to a minimum, owing to the offensive of the security forces.

The central aim of the press and propaganda secretariat is to develop conditions suitable for the Montonero Party, its agencies and the Montonero Peronist Movement. For this purpose, it will combine centralized production of some literature with simple printing techniques down to the agency and platoon level. The general tendency is for decentralization of production and guaranteeing proper distribution.

POST COMMENTS:
The central design of the zonal bulletin is to develop a political, military and propaganda strategy that will gain the support of the masses. They hope to utilize unions and other groups to their own ends, taking advantage of the weak and in some cases the absence of leadership in the labor unions. In the recent past, the Montonero movement has been elitist and failed to develop sufficient linkage between themselves and the general population. This is borne out by their admission of insufficient knowledge concerning labor and union activities in the Federal Capital. It is also apparent that the Montoneros recognize that they have been defeated in the military aspects of their campaign.

BA-17
4-12-76

Consequently, it is necessary to reorganize their structure, to bolster the morale of their remaining companions, diminish their sensation of defeat and overcome their lack of confidence in final victory.

Section III: Trimestral Plan for the Political Secretariat of the Capital Zone

This plan is headed by a dedication to the memory of the Montonero, Juan Carlos Chioccarello, who was the political secretary of the Federal Capital. It identifies the main aims of the political secretariat as developing the Montonero Peronist Movement in the Federal Capital and developing the CGT-R. The Montonero members are directed to focus their efforts towards political integration with the masses through propaganda. It directs that leaflets be distributed in factories and signed by groups affiliated with labor unions as well as by the Montonero Peronist Movement. The fundamental aim of these activities is to develop Montonero Peronist Movement delegates who will be affiliated with political groups or labor unions. The delegates will be the conduit for issuing orders, instructions or propaganda from the Montonero Peronist Movement to the various agencies or political or labor unions they become affiliated with.

The principle role of the CGT-R will be to help unify the fight of workers against the government at a national level and to resist any laws controlling labor. It directs the fight of the workers be legal as long as possible and to force the government to grant as many concessions as it can. The CGT-R is to encourage the creation of legal or illegal agencies in each factory, develop broad based support and interface between factories and labor districts and report any conflicts that develop in factories or unions and how they may be used to advantage. The bulletin reaffirms the targets of para-military action as the oligarchy, monopolistic companies, state companies in conflicts, labor unions or factories in conflicts, as well as the forces of repression. It forbids indiscriminate targeting, attacks against public places and means of transportation. It states that these tactics are necessary in order not to alienate the masses.

In the field of labor, it directs close attention to the power companies, LUZ and FUERZA (Light and Power), telephone, port and railroad workers. It directs propaganda attacks on Martinez de Hoz' economic policies, calls for unity of labor unions to face the dictatorship and propagandizes for the Montonero Peronist Movement as well as the CGT-R. It

also directs the Montonero Peronist Movement to seek unity with any group that offers resistance to the dictatorship, to become companions of and create commissions of solidarity with groups of relatives of persons who have been killed, jailed or have disappeared.

In the student field, the Peronist University Youth are directed to foster a broad alliance of agitation directed at the cessation of state intervention in the universities, changes in the university law, participation of students in the governing of the university, establishment of student centers, resignation of military men from the Ministry of Education and student support for workers in conflict. It establishes that the main purpose of UES (Secondary Students Union) is to operate in technical and industrial schools in opposition to the compulsory draft. It admits that at the present time the Montonero Peronist Movement does not have an active group in the colleges or universities.

POST COMMENTS:
Of significant interest is the lack of organizational structure in the Montonero Peronist Movement. Previous plans of the Montonero Party have been highly structured and have reflected an extremely bureaucratic organization. The present failure to portray an organization with various delineations of responsibility reflect the weakened state of the Montonero movement. Their admission that they do not have a group presently operating in the universities reflects a major change from 1975-1976 when the universities were a main source of the Montonero recruiting.

Section IV: Plan for the Military Secretariat - Federal Capital Zone

The bulletin describes the Montoneros present military situation as poor. It states that since March 1977 their military structure has been reduced in its ability to carry on combat; is presently involved mostly in defensive activities and is largely paralyzed in regard to offensive operations. The zone relies on five platoons with a great deal of operational experience, good chiefs and companions. The main factors of this deterioration result from the failure of the existing organizations to adjust to the development of the war and the realities of the situation. It states that the only way out of this crisis is for better and more economical use of its members, including dispersal of staff and resettling of units and platoons in places of political priority.

It describes a task of the Montonero Army over the coming months as the development of autonomy in the platoons, development of political clearness concerning their aims and policies, and initiative in following these aims. It admonishes them to count on minimal material support in money and weapons, and orders platoons to try to develop logistic and intelligence centers of their own. It restructures the zonal general staff and states that the casualty of leadership in the Federal Capital zone has weakened and paralyzed their forces. It calls for redefinition at each level of the roles of each superior and warns against a tendency toward overlapping, bureaucratic controls. It nominates a military secretariat, a chief of combat section, chief of logistic section and a chief of information unit. It designates the chiefs of two existing platoons to take over supervision of combat groups.

It points out that military logistics is the most disorganized sector in the Montonero Army and directs that a logistics policy be developed that is compatible with the needs of the combat platoons. It requests from the logistic section three services: (1) workshops for the manufacture/repair of weapons and the development of explosives that can be made by the platoons in small shops, (2) a distribution section to ensure that the platoons are adequately provided the necessities for operation, and (3) a health section that can provide urgent services for each platoon.

The bulletin directs the further development of an intelligence unit in the Federal Capital sector. The main intelligence effort is to be directed at bosses, business executives and the armed forces. Fundamentally, the information must be geared to the needs of the combat structures. The idea of an intelligence unit with independent and strategic aims is to be disregarded and instead the intelligence gathering must have a direct correlation with the needs of the combative units.

The bulletin calls for dispersal of military elements into the southwestern territory of the Federal Capital zone to engage in work in the factory area and for a small number of the combat forces to settle in lower class districts with the aim of establishing attack bases near areas where the enemy has a center of operations. Each combat platoon is to be assigned as a priority, a labor union or factory upon which it will focus all its political, combat and

propaganda efforts. The location/settlement of each platoon will be maintained in strictest secrecy and will not be shared with other platoons. The favored weapon for attacking the enemy will be the G70 or G40 grenades, when possible. The most important targets are business executives or factory bosses. Each combat platoon will try to carry out two attacking operations per month, following the above priorities. These operations will be followed by propaganda actions, aimed at the worker or labor sectors or any other defined areas.

POST COMMENTS:
Of interest is the assertion that the Capital zone has only five experienced combat platoons. This leads to the conclusion that the losses they have suffered are extremely serious, particularly so since the past year many groups and cells from other areas of the country have been gravitating into the general Buenos Aires area. However, this information should not be misconstrued to indicate that the five experienced combat cells are the sole remnants of the Montonero military secretariat in the Capital. Their recent activity reflects a considerable number of terrorists still operating in the Capital area. The prohibition against any coordination between the platoons is apparently a defensive measure designed to prevent infiltration and exploitation of information from captured terrorists. It demonstrates the weakness of their organization and reinforces the military/police opinion that they are not capable of any concerted efforts against hard targets. They must maximize their limited numbers by attacking soft, relatively unprotected targets. Attacks against business executives, particularly those whose companies are engaged in wage or labor disputes, may generate support for the Montoneros from labor union members and workers who feel disfranchised due to the government's present economic policy. The information that the logistics and intelligence services have been destroyed indicates that military efforts will have to be directed against targets that can be hit with a minimum of operational intelligence.

Section V: Trimestral Plan for the Press and Propaganda Secretariat - Federal Capital Zone

This plan is dedicated to the memory of companion Julio Roque, former secretary of the press and propaganda section, as well as José Koncurat. The bulletin states the principle function of the press secretariat is to develop propaganda

for the Montonero Peronist Movement and to advertise the CGT-R and to make known propaganda and orders for labor resistance. Its internal aims are to develop a central apparatus of graphic infrastructure, known as the DIG (Graphic Infrastructure Department) and a distribution department, known as the DEC (Correspondence, Assessment and Distribution Department).

Among the priorities listed are the printing of 100,000 leaflets to be distributed in unions where there is a climate for political action and the printing of 12,000 copies of "EVITA MONTONERO", the Montonero monthly magazine. All new instruments of the resistance are to be printed in the same quantity as EVITA MONTONERO and in a centralized manner. The political secretariat will produce the CGT-R Sheet with orders and information for labor resistance. This information will be developed by the political secretariat and passed on to the DEC. The bulletin states the role of the press and propaganda secretariat is not the throwing of propaganda parcels but distributing necessary materials to meet political objectives in the zone.

This section also deals with the military training of the press and propaganda secretariat. This training consists of tactics for security and defenses of safe houses and their premises, basic military training in weapons, and in urban operation tactics. It states that all press and propaganda members must know how to drive cars, have a driver's license and by the end of the three-month period must be able to manufacture a bomb and must have set off a bomb in a group action. They must also have obtained two sets of false documents to protect their identity. It states that the press and propaganda secretariat must become closely related to the masses and to mass action. The members must become directly involved with the people and the unions and that for large-scale propaganda activity they must have close and constant touch with the people.

POST COMMENTS:
The main efforts of the Montoneros are twofold. One, to develop propaganda that will effectively identify with the workers and gain their support; two, to redevelop means of printing and distributing Montonero propaganda. The direct admission that "their function is not to throw parcels but to distribute necessary propaganda" reflects a weakness in analyzing their target audience and a weakness in delivering their propaganda message. At one time the propaganda and

press secretariat of the Montoneros was an extremely active force. It now is faced with an extremely difficult situation. In order to achieve its objective of focusing propaganda efforts on union, factory and economic problems and gaining support of the populace, it will require centralized policy and direction. It will be very difficult to decentralize these efforts and still insure control over their product.

The last pages of the bulletin deal with the main topics of political and propaganda effort and call for the following:

1. Dismissal of Economy Minister Martinez de Hoz and a change of economic policy in favor of national interests and the population.
2. Reinstatement of the constitutional rights and guarantees.
3. Restoration without any exception of political parties.
4. Setting free of all political prisoners and the elimination of concentration camps, and publication of a list of kidnapped persons indicating their location and condition.
5. Immediate freeing of former President Hector J. Cámpora, former Santa Cruz governor Dr. Jorge Cepernic, former Mendoza governor Alberto Baca, former Education Minister Jorge Taiana, labor union leaders Alberto Piccinini, Mario Aguirre, Arturo Garín, Jorge di Pascuale, Oscar Smith and the former dean of Buenos Aires University, Ernesto Villanueva, and the president of the First National Congress of the Authentic Peronist Party, Dr. Antonio Lombardich.
6. Immediate elimination of repressive operations in violation of human rights as well as the prosecution of those responsible for torture and murder.
7. Restoration of the CGT, all labor unions under State supervision and restoration of all suppressed labor legislation.
8. Summons to general election to appoint national, provincial and municipal authorities.

The overriding theme attached to all political and propaganda efforts is that in the consciousness of the masses being a Peronist and being a Montonero is the same thing.

EVALUATION:

The Montonero operational plan for greater Buenos Aires was given to the RSO by a senior member of the Federal Security Service who has provided information and analysis in the past concerning Montonero activities. There is little doubt as to the authenticity of the document. The plan represents a strategy for survival of the Montonero Party in Argentina. It reflects a mode of operation that the terrorists have been forced to adopt due to heavy losses in combatants, personnel, leadership and logistics. The Montonero organizational structure has been destroyed and the only means of survival is massive decentralization of operations and independent action by small, almost completely self-contained platoons. This will insure the survival of some combatants and will make the government's task of eliminating all vestiges of leftist terrorism almost impossible.

The tactic of attempting to develop strong links with labor unions and dissatisfied workers is well founded. At present, the most common objection to the military government rests with its economic policy concerning wages, prices and job security. This is the area where the terrorists are most likely to attract the support of financially disadvantaged workers. However, the security services are extremely sensitive to any possible linkage between unions, workers and terrorist organizations, and there is no indication that labor will embrace the terrorists in a misguided attempt to improve their lot. The post feels that the change in terrorist tactics will have no major effect on the long term stability of the government.

Ramon de Castro

CASTRO

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 09-19-2017 BY: C32W33B91

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: January 13, 1978

PLACE: A Restaurant in Buenos Aires

PARTICIPANTS: John Corr and a Contact at Cronista Comercial

SUBJECT: Current Events and the Kidnapping of Rafael Perrotta, former editor-owner of Cronista Comercial

The contact (name available on request) said that Perrotta had been kidnapped eight months ago by a Montonero cell seeking to recover Montonero funds that had been funnelled to Perrotta in return for, among other things, the use of the newspaper's files on corporations and companies in Argentina. The contact said that Santucho and Firmenich had both been seen in the past in the Cronista building.

The contact said that a second Montonero cell asked for a ransom following the kidnapping. The family paid part of the ransom, said the contact, without seeking proof that Perrotta was still alive.

The contact added that Perrotta had sent abroad funds that he had received in the sale of his newspaper sometime before the kidnapping and may have done the same with Montenero funds. There was no doubt in the contact's mind that Perrotta had been killed by the Montoneros.

cc:
PAO
POL
POL/R
LEGATT

XEROX
NOV 3 1989

105-767-116
INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
JAN 17 1978
FBI-BUENOS AIRES

IO:JCorr:vp

CONFIDENTIAL

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-10-2017 BY F54M93K42 ADG

A J [redacted]

DIST: 16 MAY 1978

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

b3 per CIA

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
REPORT CLASS SECRET--WNINTEL-[redacted]
COUNTRY: PANAMA/ARGENTINA
SUBJECT: ARGENTINE MONTONEROS' PLANS TO ASK U.S. PRESIDENT TO INTERCEDE BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA [redacted]

[redacted]

[illegible]IEGA WAS TOLD THAT THE MONTONEROS WOULD BE TRAVELLING UNDER [illegible] ALIAS, MARCELO GUILLERMO V[illegible] WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY [illegible] BODYGUARD NAMED GUILLERMO G O N Z A L E Z: [redacted]

[redacted]

b1 per CIA

[illegible] AND IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS HORACIO M[illegible], [illegible] OF OPERATIONS OF THE MONTONEROS. [redacted] SAID THAT [redacted] THE MONTONEROS WISHED TO DEMONSTRATE A PEACE SETTLEMENT. ACCORDING TO MENDIZABAL THE MONTONEROS UNDERSTAND THAT PRESIDENT VIDELA IS ON THE WAY OUT AND NOW THEY WANT [redacted] TO DELIVER A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES [redacted] ASKING HIM TO USE HIS GOOD OFFICES WITH THE NEW ARGENTINE JUNTA TO OPEN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE MONTONEROS. [redacted]
COMMENT: ON 2 MAY 1978 THE ARGENTINE GOVERNING JUNTA ANNOUNCED THAT GENERAL VIDELA WOULD REMAIN AS PRESIDENT FOR A TERM ENDING MARCH 1981, BUT ON 1 AUGUST 1978 HE WILL RESIGN AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY AND AS ARMY REPRESENTATIVE ON THE JUNTA.

105-767-117

Throwing in the towel

NOV 3 1982

JUN 2 1978
FBI-BUENOS AIRES

RWS

5. [redacted], MENDIZABAL SAID HE WILL NOTIFY MARIO F I F M E N I C H, ANOTHER MONTONERO LEADER, WHO WILL PREPARE THE LETTER AND SEND IT TO [redacted] FOR DELIVERY. MENDIZABAL PLANS TO REMAIN [redacted] UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 21 MAY 1978.

b1 per CIA

[redacted]

REPORT CLASS SECRET-WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-[redacted]

b3 per CIA

[redacted]

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-10-2017 BY: F54M93K42

10/18/79

LEGAL ATTACHE CALVIN C. CLEGG

MONTONEROS

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

SECRET
5/16/01 [illegible] 3406 3EW/BCE
CLASSIFIED BY [illegible]
C,d
Argentina Proje

On 10/18/79, [an office contact who is connected with one of the Argentine intelligence services,] provided the following information: (S) (U)

Argentine intelligence has confirmed that individuals, comprising two Montonero Commando Units of 15 operatives each, entered Argentina in April, 1979. The operatives are believed to have entered Argentina at the Brazilian and Uruguayan borders, where they crossed individually through utilization of false documents. For reason of security, the two groups are organized to operate totally autonomous of each other, the only control between the two being located outside of Argentina. Each group, or Commando Unit, is made up of members, who have one field of specialization, i.e. administration, bomb technology, support, propaganda, false documents, etc. The individuals within the Commando Units represent 30 of approximately 250 Argentines, who have received specialized training in guerrilla warfare by the PLO in Libya. Although the presence of two Commando Units has been verified, Argentine intelligence fears the presence of other undetected units within the country. (S) (U)

Investigation of the bombing of the residence of WALTER KLEIN, Sub-Secretary to Ministry of Economy, was verified to have been executed by one of the existing Commando Units. The principal motive behind the bombing appears to have been to create an aura of terror within the Argentine Government and demonstrate to the public the Government's inability to effectively combat the terrorist movement. Further, the bombing serves to announce the renewed presence of an active and organized movement against the Argentine administration. The Commando Unit participating in the KLEIN bombing had ample opportunity to assassinate members of the KLEIN family. Argentine authorities believe KLEIN was an alternate target, the principal target being Minister MARTINEZ DE HOZ, who as a target afforded a higher risk to the Commandos. (S) (U)

Investigation was able to verify that the pick-up truck utilized during the attack was legally purchased from a private (S) (U)

1 - Addressee
CC: POL
POL/R
SY
DAO
2 - Buenos Aires
CCC:jn (1 - 105-767)(1 - 109-103)
(7)

Furnished by Dr. Arturo Frio, SIDE, 10-18-79 (S) (U)

NOV 3 1989

Classified and Extended by 6410
Reason for Extension FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 (1)
DRD 10/18/99

105-767-118

seller for 13 million pesos in cash two weeks before the bombing incident. Of major concern to Argentine authorities is the high degree of sophistication shown by the terrorists, the brazen manner in which the bombing was carried out, and the fact that the terrorists are known to have been in Argentina since April, 1979. The fear prevails that the KLEIN bombing is the beginning of several future attacks against prominent Argentine officials. This fear is partially supported by recent Government of Argentina statistics showing a sudden upsurge in the number of vehicles stolen, as well as military weapons and explosives. (S) (U)

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-10-2017 BY F54N93K42 ADG

(Mount Clipping In Space Below)

Involved in recent attacks

Terrorists named

Bahia Blanca

THE supposed indentity of some of terrorists involved in the recent attacks against members of the economic team was revealed here yesterday.

The Montoneros terrorists organization has set up special armed groups which operate in the federal capital, responding only to the Montoneros secretary-general, Mario Firmenich, and which were trained by the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the daily La Nueva Provincia said in a front-page story here.

The newspaper reports that the federal capital area is "occupied and controlled by the TEI (Special Infantry Troops) which depend exclusively and directly from the secretary-general of the movement, Mario Eduardo Firmenich, commander of the Montoneros, who had delegated his leadership to international military secretary Horacio Mendizabal ("Hernan"), who was killed in a shootout in our country, until recently".

The military leader of the Montoneros in the country is Raul Clemente Yaguer now, the newspaper reports.

The Special Infantry Troops are "exclusively in charge of carrying out armed operations in the country" and their number of members "is absolutely variable and practically unknown, although at a guess they would be of no less than 25 persons".

The report says that the extremists are "automatically" replaced every 30 or 40 days, or after each terrorist attack, and that the TEI troops were responsible for the recent attacks on Economic Planning Secretary Guillermo Walter Klein and on Treasury Secretary Juan Alemann.

"It could be assured that Montoneros delinquent Lewinger took part in the first of these attacks and that the man in charge of the Montoneros in the country at the moment, Yaguer, and another subversive called "Pardo" took part in the second attack", La Nueva Provincia says. (NA)

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

P. 9

BUENOS AIRES HERALD

BUENOS AIRES 11/15/79

Date:
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title: MONTONEROS

105-767 - 119

Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office:

☐ Being Investigated

NOV 3 1989

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DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-10-2017 BY: F54M93K42

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P 04 Z FEB 80

FM BUENOS AIRES (185-14)

TO DIRECTOR PRIORITY 0 -04

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

THREAT AGAINST ALEJANDRO ORFILA, SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, WASHINGTON, D.C., AND JORGE E. CARNICERO, 3949 52ND STREET, WASHINGTON, D.C.; PFO - THREAT - SUBVERSIVE; OO: WFO

RE BUREAU TELS JANUARY 31, 1980, AND FEBRUARY 1, 1980.

THE FOLLOWING COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "CONFIDENTIAL" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

[INFORMATION IN REBUTELS HAS BEEN DISSEMINATED TO A RELIABLE AND WELL-PLACED LEGAT CONTACT WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA (GOA) INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS CONCERNING THE PROCUREMENT OF PHOTOGRAPHS AND PHYSICAL DESCRIPTIONS OF PRINCIPAL MONTONERO LEADERS. LEGAT HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO OBTAIN DESCRIPTIONS OF THE TWO UNKNOWN TERRORISTS IN ORDER THAT APPROPRIATE PHOTOGRAPHS CAN BE SELECTED FOR COMPARISON PURPOSES.] THIS REQUEST RESULTS FROM (S) UP

1 - 185-14
1 - 105-767

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105-767-120

FACT THAT THE NUMBER OF KNOWN MONTONERO LEADERS AND PRINCIPALS IS CONSIDERABLE.

ARGENTINE INTELLIGENCE AND LOGICAL AGENCIES WITHIN AMERICAN EMBASSY (AMEMB), BUENOS AIRES HAVE BEEN REQUESTED TO APPRISE LEGAT OF ANY INFORMATION DEVELOPED INDICATING OPERATIONS WITHIN THE US TO FURTHER MONTONERO OBJECTIVES. TO DATE NO POSITIVE RESPONSE OBTAINED.

AS MATTER OF BACKGROUND RE RECENT MONTOMERO ACTIVITY, THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION NOT PREVIOUSLY REPORTED TO FBIHQ WAS CONFIDENTIALLY FURNISHED IN MEMORANDUM FORM TO US AMBASSADOR AND APPROPRIATE SECTIONS WITHIN AMEMB:

"ON OCTOBER 18, 1979, AN OFFICE CONTACT WHO IS CONNECTED WITH ONE OF THE ARGENTINE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (U)

" ARGENTINE INTELLIGENCE HAS CONFIRMED THAT INDIVIDUALS COMPRISING TWO MONTONERO COMMANDO UNITS OF 15 OPERATIVES EACH, ENTERED ARGENTINA IN APRIL, 1979. THE OPERATIVES ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE ENTERED ARGENTINA AT THE BRAZILIAN AND URUGUAYAN BORDERS, WHERE THEY CROSSED INDIVIDUALLY THROUGH UTILIZATION OF FALSE DOCUMENTS. FOR REASON OF SECURITY, THE TWO GROUPS ARE ORGANIZED (U)

TO OPERATE TOTALLY AUTONOMOUS OF EACH OTHER, THE ONLY CONTROL BETWEEN THE TWO BEING LOCATED OUTSIDE OF ARGENTINA. EACH GROUP, OR COMMANDO UNIT, IS MADE UP OF MEMBERS WHO HAVE ONE FIELD OF SPECIALIZATION, I.E., ADMINISTRATION, BOMB TECHNOLOGY, SUPPORT, PROPAGANDA, FALSE DOCUMENTS, ETC. THE INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE COMMANDO UNITS REPRESENT 30 OF APPROXIMATELY 250 ARGENTINES WHO HAVE RECEIVED SPECIALIZED TRAINING IN GUERRILLA WARFARE BY THE PLO IN LIBYA. ALTHOUGH THE PRESENCE OF TWO COMMANDO UNITS HAS BEEN VERIFIED, ARGENTINE INTELLIGENCE FEARS THE PRESENCE OF OTHER UNDETECTED UNITS WITHIN THE COUNTRY. (S) (U)

"INVESTIGATION OF THE BOMBING OF THE RESIDENCE OF WALTER KLEIN, SUB-SECRETARY TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, WAS VERIFIED TO HAVE BEEN EXECUTED BY ONE OF THE EXISTING COMMANDO UNITS. THE PRINCIPAL MOTIVE BEHIND THE BOMBING APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN TO CREATE AN AURA OF TERROR WITHIN THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND DEMONSTRATE TO THE PUBLIC THE GOVERNMENT'S INABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY COMBAT THE TERRORIST MOVEMENT. FURTHER, THE BOMBING SERVES TO ANNOUNCE THE RENEWED PRESENCE OF AN ACTIVE AND ORGANIZED MOVEMENT AGAINST THE ARGENTINE ADMINISTRATION. THE COMMANDO UNIT PARTICIPATING IN THE KLEIN BOMBING HAD AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO ASSASSINATE MEMBERS OF THE (S)

~~SECRET~~

KLEIN FAMILY. ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES BELIEVE KLEIN WAS AN ALTERNATE TARGET, THE PRINCIPAL TARGET BEING MINISTER MARTINEZ DE HOZ, WHO AS A TARGET AFFORDED A HIGHER RISK TO THE COMMANDOS.(S) (U)

"INVESTIGATION WAS ABLE TO VERIFY THAT THE PICKUP TRUCK UTILIZED DURING THE ATTACK WAS LEGALLY PURCHASED FROM A PRIVATE SELLER FOR 13 MILLION PESOS IN CASH TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE BOMBING INCIDENT. OF MAJOR CONCERN TO ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES IS THE HIGH DEGREE OF SOPHISTICATION SHOWN BY THE TERRORISTS, THE BRAZEN MANNER IN WHICH THE BOMBING WAS CARRIED OUT, AND THE FACT THAT THE TERRORISTS ARE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN IN ARGENTINA SINCE APRIL, 1979. THE FEAR PREVAILS THAT THE KLEIN BOMBING IS THE BEGINNING OF SEVERAL FUTURE ATTACKS AGAINST PROMINENT ARGENTINE OFFICIALS. THIS FEAR IS PARTIALLY SUPPORTED BY RECENT GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA STATISTICS SHOWING A SUDDEN UPSURGE IN THE NUMBER OF VEHICLES STOLEN, AS WELL AS MILITARY WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES."(S) (U)

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT SINCE THE ATTACK ON WALTER KLEIN, SUPRA, TWO OTHER MAJOR ATTACKS HAVE BEEN MADE AGAINST GOA TARGETS, BOTH INVOLVED WITH ECONOMIC PROGRAMS IN ARGENTINA.(S) (U)

LEGAT MAKES THE FOLLOWING TWO OBSERVATIONS FROM INFORMATION CONTAINED IN RETELS WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT BE OF SIGNIFICANCE.

~~SECRET~~

PAGE FIVE C O N F I D E N T I A L BUE 185-14

1. FBI SOURCE OF REFERENCED INFORMATION ADVISED THAT THE TERRORISTS CLAIMED TO HAVE ENTERED US ILLEGALLY FROM BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA. WHILE ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THAT UNIDENTIFIED TERRORISTS MAY BE OF MONTONERO ORIGIN, IT APPEARS INCONSISTENT THAT MONTONEROS SUCCESSFULLY INFILTRATED BACK INTO ARGENTINE WOULD RISK THEIR COVER AND PLACEMENT TO PERPETRATE A TERRORIST ATTACK IN THE US. IF MONTONEROS ARE INVOLVED AS CLAIMED BY CARNICERO, IT WOULD BE EASIER TO UTILIZE NUMEROUS KNOWN MONTONERO ELEMENTS OUTSIDE ARGENTINA WHO HAVE YET TO INFILTRATE INTO ARGENTINA. (S) (U)

2. IT WOULD BE ENTIRELY LOGICAL TO SELECT CARNICERO AS A TARGET UNSYMPATHETIC TO THE NEEDS OF POOR AND OPPRESSED OF ARGENTINA. ON THE OTHER HAND, JORGE ORFILA HAS SERVED AS SOMEWHAT OF A THORN IN THE SIDE OF CURRENT GOA AND WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HIGHLY CRITICIZED ACT OF SENDING AN OAS COMMISSION TO ARGENTINA TO INVESTIGATE HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ATTRIBUTED TO PRESENT ADMINISTRATION. THUS, ORFILA FROM OUTWARD IMPRESSIONS WOULD NOT BE A LOGICAL TARGET FOR THE MONTONEROS BUT WOULD CONCEIVABLY BE A TARGET OF THE ARGENTINE MILITARY STRUCTURE. IT IS FURTHER NOTED THAT ANY ATTACK AGAINST ORFILA AND/OR CARNICERO, WHETHER CARRIED OUT ~~OR NOT~~ BY MONTONEROS OR OTHERS, WOULD ADD (S) (U)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-10-2017 BY: F54M93K42

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THE HEAVY-HANDED POLICIES AGAINST SUSPECTED SUBVERSIVES IN ARGENTINA AND LEND SUPPORT TO GOA AGAINST CONTINUING INTERNATIONAL REPROACH IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS. (X) (U)

SUMMARIZING, ALTHOUGH REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT ANY ATTACK AGAINST JORGE ORFILA WOULD IN ALL LIKELIHOOD BE PLANNED BY THE MONTONERO ORGANIZATION, ONE CANNOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF ARGENTINE MILITARY COMPLICITY UNTIL MORE KNOWLEDGE IS DEVELOPED.

ADMINISTRATIVE

BUREAU REQUESTED TO FORWARD FOREGOING TO WFO WITH REQUEST TO FURNISH LEGAT, IF POSSIBLE, ANY PHYSICAL DESCRIPTIONS OF TWO TERRORIST ELEMENTS REFERRED TO HEREIN IN ORDER TO ASSIST ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES IN SELECTION OF PHOTOGRAPHS. (X) (U)

~~C&E BY 6410, REASON 2, DRD FEBRUARY 4, 2000.~~

BT

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

WEIGHT TO THE HEAVY-HANDED POLICIES AGAINST SUSPECTED SUBVERSIVES IN ARGENTINA AND LEND SUPPORT TO GOA AGAINST CONTINUING INTERNATIONAL REPROACH IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

ADMINISTRATIVE (S) (U)

BUREAU REQUESTED TO FORWARD FOREGOING TO WFO WITH REQUEST TO FURNISH LEGAT, IF POSSIBLE, ANY PHYSICAL DESCRIPTIONS OF TWO TERRORIST ELEMENTS REFERRED TO HEREIN IN ORDER TO ASSIST ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES IN SELECTION OF PHOTOGRAPHS. (S) (U)

~~C&E BY 6410, REASON 2, DRD FEBRUARY 4, 2000.~~

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SECRET

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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-10-2017 BY: F54M93K42

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
ATTENTION: SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION
FBI LABORATORY, TECHNICAL ANALYSIS SECTION, EXPLOSIVES UNIT

DATE: 4/26/77

SECRET

FROM : LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (105-767) (P)

SUBJECT: MONTONEROS
IS-ARGENTINA

Enclosed for the Bureau are three copies of an instruction sheet, as translated from the Spanish language, which was distributed to members of captioned organization, an Argentine terrorist group. The Spanish language version of the enclosure dated 3/4/77 was urgently distributed by the Montoneros due to a number of recent incidents, wherein Montonero members placing bombs in Buenos Aires accidentally detonated the bomb while it was being placed, resulting in the known deaths of at least four Montoneros.

The Spanish language version of the enclosure was provided by Comisario Inspector AGUSTIN ITALO MARTINI, Chief of the Bomb Squad, Federal Police of Argentina (FPA). The material is unclassified and may be disseminated provided the Montoneros are not identified and the FPA is not named as the source.

The enclosure is submitted since it may be of interest to the Scientific and Technical Services Division.

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-96 page 1 only

3 - Bureau (Enc. 3)
(1 - Foreign Liaison Unit)
1 - Buenos Aires
RWS:gjk
(4)

ENCLOSURE

REC- 117

105 312844

20 MAY 3 1977

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Classified by: SP6 Ag/CAU/BK
Declassify on: OADR
#284394 9/1/87

CLASSIFIED BY: SP6 Ag/CAU/BK
REASON: 1.5 (B) (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (5) (6)
90-0571

JUN 7 19

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

SECRET

Classified by Sp8Bty/Bury
Declassify on: OADR
#284,394

DECLASSIFIED BY Sp6 Ag/CA/Dx
ON 10-1-96
Appeal 90-0371

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED [redacted] this envelope
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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

ENCLOSURE

R60

SECRET

[105 - 312844] (S)(U)

March 4, 1977

TRANSLATION FROM SPANISH

Secretariat of Regional Logistics DECLASSIFIED BY SP6 Ag /CAL/DK MARCH 4, 1977
Instruction Booklet ON 10-1-96 #90-0371

1. Introduction:

One should first be familiar with this lesson before handling any of the elements that have been handed out or in dealing with any of the members of the group affected by the operation. The group leader or the operational detachment is responsible for the costs that might occur (deterioration of arms or accidents) as a result of not being familiar with this instruction.

2. Basics of the functioning of the delayed destructive container: The main components are 1) the container itself and 2) the delay device (in this case electronic). UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD THE DELAY DEVICE BE CONNECTED TO THE CONTAINER BEFORE THE CONTAINER IS SITUATED IN ITS FINAL DESTINATION IN THE OBJECTIVE.

a. The container itself: Consists of a solid chassis (shell) that has the explosive mixture (aluminized powder) inside. Beginning the combustion, the mixture produces a high compression which is resisted by the outside shell; finally the outside shell gives way, producing the explosion. The initiation of the combustion comes about due to a small flashbulb inside the container (within the powder mixture) that is connected to a male plug. BECAUSE THE MIXTURE IS RELATIVELY UNSTABLE, AVOID EXPOSING THE CONTAINER TO FIRE OR EXCESSIVE HEAT, HUMIDITY OR BOUNCING AROUND.

b. Electronic Delay Device: Consists of an electronic circuit capable of sending the necessary electronic impulse to light the flashbulb after a determined amount of time following it s connection. It requires a delicate handling of the delay device in its storing as well as in its transport to avoid its deterioration (carry it and store it in a box). The delay device contains the following elements: battery box containing four batteries which should be placed with the negative end against the springs; an electronic circuit; an on-off switch (which turns to on toward the red mark) which should be kept off; a female plug and a small bulb.

Use: The delay device has a control and security mechanism which permits testing the device as many times as necessary (don't waste the batteries). YOU MUST TEST THE DEVICE WITHOUT BEING CONNECTED TO THE CONTAINER OR YOU WILL HAVE AN EXPLOSION (and you won't be able to test it again).

1. Test: Turn the switch to on and wait for the delay time (about ten minutes) to light the small bulb (if the container was connected, instead of lighting the small bulb, the flashbulb inside the contaier would light causing the explosion. If the delay functions, turn off the switch.

2. Operational handling: At the placement of the container, turn the switch on. If the small bulb doesn't light, turn it off. Plug in the male plug to the female plug of the delay device and turn the switch on again.
If when one turns on the switch the small bulb lights, don't plug in the container or there will be an explosion.

3. Observation: As we have said, upon activating the circuit, the delay time is being counted down. If for some reason one needs to postpone momentarily the operation, turn the switch to off and the time will automatically go back to zero beginning again when the switch is turned back on.

This armament that is provided has been entirely fabricated and is rigorously controlled by S/L/R. If you find imperfection in the fabrication, return the elements with the appropriate report. You should retain the instruction sheet and the logistics officer of each group may reproduce it in order to give copies when necessary.

At the time of situating the explosive container, avoid having the metal shell of the container come in contact with the circuit.

SP6 Ag/Burg

9/1/87 4.004.394

DUPE to page 5

March 4 1977

DECLASSIFIED BY SP6 AG/CAD/DK
ON 10-1-96

TRANSLATION FROM SPANISH #90-0371

Secretariat of Regional Logistics
Instruction Booklet

MARCH 4, 1977

1. Introduction:

One should first be familiar with this lesson before handling any of the elements that have been handed out or in dealing with any of the members of the group affected by the operation. The group leader or the operational detachment is responsible for the costs that might occur (deterioration of arms or accidents) as a result of not being familiar with this instruction.

2. Basics of the functioning of the delayed destructive container: The main components are 1) the container itself and 2) the delay device (in this case electronic). UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD THE DELAY DEVICE BE CONNECTED TO THE CONTAINER BEFORE THE CONTAINER IS SITUATED IN ITS FINAL DESTINATION IN THE OBJECTIVE.

a. The container itself: Consists of a solid chassis (shell) that has the explosive mixture (aluminized powder) inside. Beginning the combustion, the mixture produces a high compression which is resisted by the outside shell; finally the outside shell gives way, producing the explosion. The initiation of the combustion comes about due to a small flashbulb inside the container (within the powder mixture) that is connected to a male plug. BECAUSE THE MIXTURE IS RELATIVELY UNSTABLE, AVOID EXPOSING THE CONTAINER TO FIRE OR EXCESSIVE HEAT, HUMIDITY OR BOUNCING AROUND.

b. Electronic Delay Device: Consists of an electronic circuit capable of sending the necessary electronic impulse to light the flashbulb after a determined amount of time following it s connection. It requires a delicate handling of the delay device in its storing as well as in its transport to avoid its deterioration (carry it and store it in a box). The delay device contains the following elements: battery box containing four batteries which should be placed with the negative end against the springs; an electronic circuit; an on-off switch (which turns to on toward the red mark) which should be kept off; a female plug and a small bulb.

Use: The delay device has a control and security mechanism which permits testing the device as many times as necessary (don't waste the batteries). YOU MUST TEST THE DEVICE WITHOUT BEING CONNECTED TO THE CONTAINER OR YOU WILL HAVE AN EXPLOSION (and you won't be able to test it again).

1. Test: Turn the switch to on and wait for the delay time (about ten seconds) to light the small bulb (if the container has a flashbulb). If, instead of lighting the small bulb, the flashbulb inside the container would light causing the explosion. If the delay functions, turn off the switch.

2. Operational handling: At the placement of the container, turn the switch on. If the small bulb doesn't light, turn it off. Plug in the male plug to the female plug of the delay device and turn the switch on again. If when one turns on the switch the small bulb lights, don't plug in the container or there will be an explosion.

3. Observation: As we have said, upon activating the circuit, the delay time is being counted down. If for some reason one needs to position momentarily the operation, turn the switch to off and the time will automatically go back to zero beginning again when the switch is turned back on.

This armament that is provided has been entirely fabricated and is rigorously controlled by S/L/R. If you find imperfection in the fabrication, return the elements with the appropriate report. You should retain the instruction sheet and the logistics officer of each group may reproduce it in order to give copies when necessary.

At the time of situating the explosive container, avoid having the metal shell of the container come in contact with the circuit.

9/16/7 A-234,304

DUPE to page 5

March 4, 1977

TRANSLATION FROM SPANISH

Secretariat of Regional Logistics
Instruction Booklet

March 4, 1977
DECLASSIFIED BY SPC AG/CAC/DX
ON 10-1-96
#90-0371

1. Introduction:

One should first be familiar with this lesson before handling any of the elements that have been handed out or in dealing with any of the members of the group affected by the operation. The group leader or the operational detachment is responsible for the costs that might occur (deterioration of arms or accidents) as a result of not being familiar with this instruction.

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A. The container itself: Consists of a solid chassis (shell) that has the explosive mixture (aluminized powder) inside. Beginning the combustion, the mixture produces a high compression which is resisted by the outside shell; finally the outside shell gives way, producing the explosion. The initiation of the combustion comes about due to a small flashbulb inside the container (within the [illegible]) that is connected to a male plug. BECAUSE THE MIXTURE IS RELATIVELY UNSTABLE, AVOID EXPOSING THE CONTAINER TO FIRE OR EXCESSIVE HEAT, HUMIDITY OR BOUNCING AROUND.

b. Electronic Delay Device: Consists of an electronic circuit capable of sending the necessary electronic impulse to light the flashbulb after a determined amount of time following it s connection. It requires a delicate handling of the delay device in its storing as well as in its transport to avoid its deterioration (carry it and store it in a box). The delay device contains the following elements: battery box containing four batteries which should be placed with the negative end against the springs; an electronic circuit; an on-off switch (which turns to on toward the red mark) which should be kept off; a female plug and a small bulb.

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1. Test: Turn the switch to on and wait for the delay time (about ten minutes) to light the small bulb (if the container was connected, instead of lighting the small bulb, the flashbulb inside the contaier would light causing the explosion. If the delay functions, turn off the switch.

2. Operational handling: At the ~~location~~ placement of the container, turn the switch on. If the small bulb doesn't light, turn it off. Plug in the male plug to the femal plug of the delay device and turn the switch on again.
If when one turns on the switch the small bulb lights, don't plug in the container or there will be an explosion.

3. Observation: As we have said, upon activating the circuit, the delay time is being counted down. If for some reason one needs to postpone momentarily the operation, turn the switch to off and the time will automatically go back to zero beginning again when the switch is turned back on.

This armament that is provided has been entirely fabricated and is rigorously controlled by S/L/R. If you find imperfection in the fabrication, return the elements with the appropriate report. You should retain the instruction sheet and the logistics officer of each group may reproduce it in order to give copies when necessary.

At the time of situating the explosive container, avoid having the metal shell of the container come in contact with the circuit.

(S)

#284,394

SECRET [redacted] b3 per CIA

[redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SEE REVERSE FOR CLASSIFICATION ACTION

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION : Intelligence Division

SUBJECT : Forwarding of English Language Document [redacted] from the "Montoneros," an Argentine Terrorist Group b1 per CIA

REFERENCE : [redacted] b3 per CIA

1. Reference is made to [redacted] b1 per CIA documents [redacted] the home of an official of the "Montoneros," an Argentine terrorist group, regarding the Central Intelligence Agency [redacted] the text of a Xerox copy of two separate sections of a typed letter, in English, which was among the [redacted] documents. Attached is the Xerox copy of that letter.

2. From all indications, the attached document was written by some unknown party in the United States who is collecting information on CIA personnel assigned abroad and passing this information to persons having connections with the Montoneros.

3. It is requested that your Bureau forward any significant findings pertinent to this Agency's mission that may develop as a result of your review of the document. b1 per CIA

[redacted]

REC-70 105-312844-2

[redacted] b3 per CIA

ST 109

7 JUL 27 1977

SECRET

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42
FBI INFORMATION ONLY

b3 per CIA

I am sorry about the delay over the names and addresses which I promised for you so long ago. I wanted to have them checked by [redacted] and by the Centre for National Security Studies in Washington. The Centre is a group of people, many of whom have left the various US organisations, and who are working for reform - some of them are not exactly revolutionary, but they have files and material on US espionage and related topics.

1

I have had the names we found checked by [redacted] but not yet by the CNSS. They seem to be on holiday. But I spoke on the phone to them before I left [redacted] and they promised that they would try to work on them this week for me. So I may be able to confirm more when I get back to the office next week.

b1 per CIA

[redacted]

[redacted]

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42
FBI INFORMATION ONLY

ENCLOSURE

105-312844-2 (8) (U)

[redacted]

b3 per CIA

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

[redacted]

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

[redacted]
George V. Lauder

Attachment, as stated

[redacted]

[redacted]

b3 per CIA

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-07-2017 BY F54M93K42 ADG

1 - Laboratory Division
1 - Mr. V. H. Nasca

~~SECRET~~

BY COURIER

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

CLASSIFIED BY: SP6AG/CAL
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (1)
10-23-95 90-0371

2ND del to CIA via courier 7/19/77 PJC

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY COMMITTEE (DOC) DATE: 9-10-96 pgs 1, 2 only

Date: July 15, 1977

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency (S) (U)

[redacted]

b3 per CIA

From: Director, FBI

Subject: FORWARDING OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE DOCUMENT CONFISCATED FROM THE "MONTONEROS," AN ARGENTINE TERRORIST GROUP (S) (S) 9/1/87 [redacted]

Classified by Multiple Source
Declassify on: OADR

Reference is made to your communication dated June 30, 1977, with enclosure, in the captioned matter, your reference [redacted]

You requested that this Bureau forward any significant findings pertinent to your Agency's mission that may be developed as a result of our review of the enclosure, which were portions of a typewritten letter. ~~S-1~~ (U) (S)

The submitted portions of the typewritten letter were compared with material of a similar nature, including material contained in the Anonymous Letter File, without effecting an identification. ~~S-1~~ (S) (S) (U)

A review of the initial portion of the letter relative to possible authorship identification revealed that there is a strong possibility that the author of the message is a native of a Spanish-speaking country, this supposition (S) ~~S-1~~ (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ST-136

REC-70 [05-312844-3] (X)

SEE NOTE, PAGE 3

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. VHN:emc
Dep. AD Inv. (5)
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Fin. & Pers ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Legal Cou ____
Plan. & In ____
Rec. Mgt. ____
S. & T. Se ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SSM/mn

b3 per CIA

[redacted]

Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

JUL 27 1977

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

55 AUG 12 1977

GPO c43—16—53790-1

[redacted] b3 per CIA

Director
Central Intelligence Agency] (S) (U)

being based on certain peculiarities in sentence structure that are characteristic of the Spanish language. Moreover, the use of such words as "Centre," "on holiday" and "organisation" indicates that the author probably learned English from a British instructor. In this regard, it should also be noted that the author seems well educated. ~~(S)~~ (U)

It is hoped that the foregoing findings and observations will be of assistance to your Agency.

[redacted] b3 per CIA

b3 per CIA

[redacted]

Director
Central Intelligence Agency [redacted] (U)

NOTE:

CIA by referenced letter furnished a copy of the document mentioned in the caption and commented that from all indications it was written by some unknown party in the United States who was collecting information on CIA personnel assigned abroad and passing this information to persons having connections with the Montoneros. ~~S-E~~ (S) (U)

The document was furnished to [redacted] Laboratory Division, for review, and the above information concerning the document was furnished by the Laboratory Division.

APPROVED:

Director
Asst. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.
Asst. Dir.
Asst. Dir.
Asst. Dir.
Asst. Dir.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

b3 per CIA

[redacted]

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-07-2017 BY: F54M93K42
FBI INFORMATION ONLY

NDNVV EIA7Z9IQA975

[redacted]

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UN

9 OCT 81 02 08 z Ma

b3 per CIA

R 232324Z OCT 81

FM CIA

FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION

Exec AD-Adm.
Exec. AD-Inv.
Exec. AD-LES
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs.
Crim. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Rec. Mgmt.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Off. of Cong.
& Public Affs.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

[redacted]

BT

~~SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~WNINTEL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2

CIA 060977

[redacted]

105-312844-

NOV 3 1981

59 JAN 7 1982

[redacted]

DIST: 28 OCT 81

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b3 per CIA

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL [redacted]

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA [redacted]

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENTS OF THE CURRENT ACTIVITIES AND CAPABILITIES OF THE MONTONEROS, AN ARGENTINE TERRORIST GROUP

b1 per CIA

[redacted]

SUMMARY: [redacted]

[redacted] THE MONTONEROS, AN ARGENTINE TERRORIST GROUP, HAVE NOT CARRIED OUT ANY VIOLENT ACTS IN ARGENTINA DURING 1981, ALTHOUGH THEY RETAIN A WIDE RANGE OF CAPABILITIES, INCLUDING THE ABILITY TO CARRY OUT A SELECTED TERRORIST ACT. [redacted] A WELL-ORGANIZED MONTONERO STRUCTURE WITH 15 SELF-SUFFICIENT UNITS

b3 per CIA

CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT ACTIONS THAT RANGE FROM DISTRIBUTING PROPAGANDA TO CARRYING OUT AN ASSASSINATION; [redacted]

b1 per CIA

[redacted] THERE ARE ABOUT 300 MONTONEROS WORLDWIDE, INCLUDING UP TO 60 IN ARGENTINA. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b3 per CIA

b1 per CIA

[redacted]

b3 per CIA

b1 per CIA

[redacted]



b1 per CIA

b3 per CIA

b1 per CIA



[redacted]

b1 per CIA

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[redacted]

R 282324Z OCT 81

FM CIA

[redacted]

b3 per CIA

BT

~~S E C R E T~~ [redacted] WNINTEL FINAL SECTION OF 2

CIA 060977

[redacted]

b3 per CIA

DIST: 28 OCT 81

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

[redacted]

b1 per CIA

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b3 per CIA

b1 per CIA

[redacted]

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED [redacted]

b3 per CIA

[redacted]

[redacted]

BT

12