




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOIPA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

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
5	Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.				
×	Deleted under exemption(s) <u>67C, D</u> with no segregable material available for release to you.				
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

USA, Washington, D. C. Attn: AUSA FREDERICK G. SHITHSON

JAMES J. RTAN 12/30/60

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MEMBERS OF UNITED STATES


AUSA FREDERICK G. SMITHSON advised that from review of sase that the language used in the letter and the thoughts expressed are not such as to amount to any threat but merely the expressions of a sharp tongued spinster.

DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

EXTORTION :

On December 23, 1960, Assistant United States Attorney FREDERICK G. SMITHSON advised that from a review of the reports submitted in this matter that the language used in the letter written by to the United States Supreme Court and the thoughts expressed are not such as to Supreme Court and the stated the letter was merely the amount to any threat. He stated the letter was merely the expressions of a sharp-tongued spinster.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D. C. This Washington Field Office (9-Mew) Daw April 4, 1962 11 Unsub; A. (Anonymous commusication addressed "U. S. Supreme Court, John Edger Houver, Dire 1 Washington 25, D. C.," postmarked Clarksdale, Mississippi, 3/19/62) EXTORTION TEL Puise Ma. 3-3-0785 II Examination resourced by Wanhington Field Office La: No. A1:501 3/82/62 Relarance: Document - Fingerprint Examination requested: - <u>-</u> -B-merae: You will be separately advised reparately the result of the latest fingerprist examination and the disposition of specim Q1 and Q2. нĒ. 39730 10 APR 8 1957 LE Lab reported of 1 5011 + Enclosure (Lab report) Distance attaction 192: 1 - A. A. J.



Result of examination:

Spotiment Q1 and Q3 were searched through the appropriate sections of the Anonymous Letter File without identifying them with any of the writings therein,

Photographs of specimens Q1 and Q2 have been re

9-2923

Recorded 3/39/87 FETTRES EDBENT TO STAT UNITED STATES DESIGNATION OF DU TILL Laboratory Work Sheet BO LAR FILS . Re: Unesb; (As enymous sometalcation Ε. 🖡 addressed "D. S. Sepreme Court, Laur D-330785 1K Vashington 25, D. C., " postnarked Clarksdale, Mississiggi, 3/10/68) RETORTION FR6, TIS Examination requested by: Aireel 3/22/62 Examination requested: Document - Fingerprint Dure received: Result of Examination: 3/13/62 Exemination by: Seminal in 1 = PS 67C LEISVIL return 61462 7 614 6 1-3-6 -2. E Specimens submitted for exertination C1 Envelope pestmarked "CLARENDALE MISS. MAR 18 1948 6 PH" bearing handerittes address "U. S. Supremo Court Shoot of p per bearing typewriting headed "AN OFER LETTER 22 TO ALL COMPUTIETS AND TRAITORS EVERYWEIZE!" which also Contains handwriting beginning "Pass this on to all the" AND A CONSIST AND 14 J 1 1 . . 5 82 1999 31-4-2-Sal d. C.

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This on te all the furthy to FIII AN OPEN LETTER TO ALL CONPERTIONS AND You are caught in your own trap. Yes, you are victim to your own The events unfolding before un today evil conspiracy and devices. A are part of the living God's plan to destroy the world and the bestike who have corrupted it. Read Isliah 46, werses 10 and 11; Revelation 17, weres 17. the entire book of Revelation and you will 10904 how close you are to Don't believe me, but you had total destruction --- BODY and BOULIII better believe the Word of the Living God. Repent of your sins; seek ye the Lord; save your soul before the door closes forever!!!. F your Kick buddies Stalen Franklin Roosevelt Lenin, mary, sam Rayburn could call from when they are, they would say - "NEPENT COMRADES -- There is a HELL If you DARE take = God and prayer out of our schools, You LOSE! Every fines chall bou

april End will be Deck. take God - and prayer for take God - and prayer for our schools. This is God's world!

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9-39730-1

si ... ne B FEL Transport the four way I ype in plain sear or code Via AIRTEL Priority or Measure of Maxime? TUI DIRECTOR, FBI ATTENTIONS TBI LABORATERS SaC, WFG (9-hew) (C) FROME UKSUBI (Anonimous communication addressed "U. S. Supreze Court, Washington 25, J. C.;* Postmarked Clarksdale, MississIppl, 3/19/62) 390785 (00:1F0) In connection with captioned matter there are enclosed for the Bureau six copies of a letterhead memorations quoting an anonymous communication received in the Marshal's Office, U. S. Supreme Court, Washington, D. C., on 3/21/02, and setting out opinion of AUSA JOHN C. CONLIFF, who expressed the opinion that prosecution of the letter-writer would not be warranted. Also enclosed herewith to the Bureau, encased in a cellophant envelope is the anonymous undated communication and envelope bearing a four cent canceled stamp addressed * U. S. Supreme Court, Washington 25, D. C.," postmarked Clarksdale, Mississippi, 6:00 p.m., 3/19/62. 23 This letter was made available to S 3/21/62 1-51 Marshal, U. S. Supreme Court. stated he is the only person to handle instant letter and He that it was not examined ar read by any of the Suprame Court He stated he does not desire the return of this letter. ENCLOSURE (REC- 69 (Encd 1) (Info) 55 kik 27 LER A Real Providence

It is requested that the letter and envelope be processed for latent fingerprints and any prints developed should be setained for pussible future reference. It is requested also that the letter be searched through the Anonymous Communications File for possible identification. In the event no identification is effected, it is suggested that appropriate specimens from the ascorney communication be included in the Anonymous Communications File for possible

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Is substance the letter refers to hitle verses and states from reading the book of Revelation "you will Kkow how close you are to total destruction --- Bill 4nd Soulfite The concluding seatences is the letter are as follower "April 3rd will be BOOMS DAT for you, if you care follows: "April 2rd will be BOOMS DAY for you, if you lard take the and prayer from our schools. This is God's world:" A copy of this communication, as well as a copy of the Momphis Office in view of the fact instant abonyments communication was bailed from Ciertsdale, Missionippi. As prosecution has been declined, no investigation letter to the office of the Main Bady will be cleased with a letter to the office of the Main Bady will be cleased with a

letter to the office of the M.S. Attorney; iscorporating the opinion of Assistant . A Storney Couldry.

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BECEINED



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF ENVIRENCESON

In Reply, Plane Refer to File No.

MASHINE NO 25 E.C.

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Narsha!

Abonymous Communication Addressed "U. S. Supreme Court, Washington 25, D. C.," Postmarked Clarksdale, Mississippi, March 19, 1962

On March 21, 1962,

United States Supreme Court, Washington, D. C., made available an anonymous letter which was received in his office on March 21, 1962. The letter was contained in an envelope postmarked Clarksdale, Mississippi, March 19, 1962, addressed #U. S. Supreme Court, Washington 25, D. C." The anonymous letter, quoted below, appears to be mimeographed, added to which are sentences in handwriting and hand printing, with certain words written or printed with red crayoni

*AN OPEN LETTER TO ALL CONNUNISTS AND TRAITORS EVERTWHERE

"You are caught in your own trap. Yes, you are victim to your own evil conspiracy and devices. The events unfolding before us today are part of the living God's plan to destroy the world and the heathen who have corrupted it.

"Read Isaiah 40, verses 10 and 11; Revelation 17, verse 17. Read the entire book of Revelation and you will KNOW how close you are to total destruction --- BOBY and SCULIII Don't believe me, but you had better believe the Word of the Living God.

"Repeat of your sins; seek ye the Lord; save your soul before the door closes forever!!!* je i se se se 1412 145 The following section of the letter is in handwriting nd hand printing): 🚲

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"If your Red buddies Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt, Lemin, Marx, Sam Rayburn etc could Abonymous Communication Addressed #U. S. Supreme Court, Washington 25, D. C., * Postmarked D. Clarksdale, Mississippi, March 19, 1962

> call from where they are, they would say -*REPEAT COMRADES -- there is a HELL.* If you DARE take God and prayer out of our schools, YOU LOSE! Every knee shall bow to GOD! Remember this! April 3rd will be DOOMS DAY for you, if you dare take God and prayer from our schools. This is God's world!*

The words "includes Catholics" are written in pen and ink as marginal words with an arrow pointing to the printed word "TRATTORS." At the top of the communication, handwritten in pen and ink, except the name "KENMEDYS" which is printed in red crayon, is the sentence "Pass this on to all the filthy KENKEDYS."

The date April 3rd, referred to in the communication, eccording to the United States Supreme Court in the case to be heard in the United States Supreme Court in the case entitled "Steven I. Engel, Et Al, Petitioners vs. William J. Vitale, Et Al, Case Number 468 Appellate." This case has come to the United States Supreme Court from the Court of Appeals of New York as a result of a petition for Writ of Certiorari filed in the United States Supreme Court on October 3, 1961. Petitioners state therein they are opposed to daily prayer in public schools, Nassau County, New York, and that the practice of saying one specific religious prayer violates the first and 14th amendments of the Constitution.

The facts in this case were presented on March 22, 1962, to Assistant United States Attorney John C. Conliff. Mr. Conliff stated that while some of the remarks are scurrilous, the letter does not contain any direct threat against the Justices of the United States Supreme Court. He stated further that in the absence of direct threats in the letter, prosecution would not be warranted. Anonymous Communication Addressed #U. S. Supreme Court, Washington 25, D. C., # Postmarked Clarksdale, Mississippi, March 19, 1972

In view of the opinion of the Assistant United States Attorney Conliff, no investigation concerning this matter is being made.

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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBL. It is the property of the FBL and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

2 2 6

H. S. Bureau of Inbestigation

Department of Justice

900 Ezra Thompson Building, Salt Lake City,Utah December 21, 1933.

Director, Division of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.


Dear Sir:

I have been informed that the U.S. Supreme court has recently handed down addression in the case of the 5. Funk -vs- U.S. treating of the competency of a wife to testify for her husband. I have not had an opportunity to read the decision, but refer the Division to the case so that it can arrange to have a study made of the decision to see if it is of any value to the field. It is no understanding that the gist of the decision is that a wife can testify for a husband. The decision does not touch upon the competency of a husband or wife to testify against each other.

I en also informed that the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of Gregorio Chavez and Jose Marie Chavez, -vs-U.S., 242, V.S. 470-491, has handed down a decision which treats offindian country, which defines what constitutes Indian territory. I have not had an opportunity to read this decision but refer it to the Division for study for any value it may have to the field on a subject matter which has always been more or less complex.

JOHN A. DOWD. pecial Agent in C REJORDES DIVISION 赴 INDEXED 27 1933 DEC J.D:J U. S. Bir 19,44 FILE

Very truly yours,





SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

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No. 162.—October Term, 1933.

The United States of America, Appellant, US. Gregorio Chavez and Jose Maria Chavez.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States For the District of New Mexico.

[December 11, 1933.]

Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

By indictment in the federal district court for New Mexico Gregorio Chavez and Jose Maria Chavez, described as "non-Indians", were charged with the larceny, on January 3, 1932, "at and within the limits of the Pueblo of Isleta, the same being Indian Country, in the State and district of New Mexico," of certain live-stock belonging to designated Indians of that Pueblo. By a demurrer the defendants challenged the indictment as not stating an offense against the United States, and in support of the challenge asserted (1) that the Pueblo of Isleta is not Indian country within the meaning of the statutes whereon the indictment is founded, and (2) that, even if the Pueblo be Indian country, larceny committed therein by one who is not an Indian is not within those statutes. The court sustained the demurrer, dismissed the indictment and gave a certificate declaring in effect that the judgment was put entirely on the ground that when the statutes underlying the indictment are properly construed-and particularly when construed in the light of the act enabling New Mexico to become a State-they do not make larceny within the Pueblo of Isleta by one not an Indian, even of property belonging to an Indian, an offense against the United States, but leave the same to be dealt with exclusively by and under the laws of the State.

The case is here on appeal by the United States under the criminal appeals law.¹

¹Act of March 2, 1907, c. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246; U. S. C., § 682, Title 18, and § 345, Title 28; Acts January 31, 1928, c. 14, 45 Stat. 54, and April 26, 1928, c. 440, 45 Stat. 466.

62-30367-1

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By §§ 451 and 466, Title 18, U. S. C.,² larceny committed in any place "under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States" is made an offense against the United States, the punishment described varying according to the value of the property stolen; and by § 217, Title 25, U. S. C.,^a the general laws of the United States relating to the punishment of crimes committed in any place within its exclusive jurisdiction are extended, with exceptions not material here, to "the Indian country". These are the statutes on which the present indictment is founded.

By the enabling act of June 20, 1910,⁴ and two subsequent joint resolutions,⁶ Congress provided for the admission of New Mexico into the Union as a State "on an equal footing with the original States". Compliance with stated conditions was made a prerequisite to the admission, and these conditions were complied with. The admission became effective through a proclamation of the President on January 6, 1912.⁶ One of the conditions related to Indians and Indian lands and to the respective relations thereto of the United States and the State. The provisions embodying this condition are copied in an appended note.⁴

¹Formerly § 5356 Rev. Stat. and §§ 272 and 287 Criminal Code, Act March 4, 1909, c. 321, 35 Stat. 1088.

*Formerly § 25, Act June 30, 1834, c. 161, 4 Stat. 729, and § 2145, Rev. Stat. 4C. 310, 36 Stat. 557.

*February 16, 1911, 36 Stat. 1454; August 21, 1911, 37 Stat. 39. *37 Stat. 1723.

"Section 2 of the enabling act prescribed that the convention called to form a constitution for the proposed State should provide by ordinance made a part of the constitution-

"First. That... the sale, barter, or giving of intoxicating liquors to Indians and the introduction of liquors into Indian country, which term shall also include all lands now owned or occupied by the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico, are forever prohibited.

"Second. That the people inhabiting said proposed State do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title . . . to all lands lying within said boundaries owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes the right or title to which shall have been acquired through or from the United States or any prior sovereignty, and that until the title of such Indian or Indian tribes shall have been axtinguished the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States; . . . but nothing herein . . . shall preclude the said State from taxing, as other lands and other property are taxed, any lands and other property outside of an Indian reservation owned or held by The lands of the Pueblo of Isleta, like those of other pueblos of New Mexico, are held and occupied by the people of the pueblo in communal ownership under a grant which was made during the Spanish sovereignty, was recognized during the Mexican dominion and has since been confirmed by the United States.

The people of these pueblos, although sedentary rather than nomadic, and disposed to peace and industry, are Indians in race, customs and domestic government. Always living in separate communities, adhering to primitive modes of life, largely influenced by superstition and fetichism, and chiefly governed according to crude customs inherited from their ancestors, they are essentially a simple, uninformed and dependent people, easily yietimized and ill-prepared to cope with the superior intelligence and cunning of others. By a uniform course of action, beginning as early as 1854 and continued up to the present time, the legislative and executive branches of the Government have regarded and treated them as dependent Indian communities requiring and entitled to its aid and protection, like other Indian tribes.¹⁴

In 1904 the territorial court, finding no congressional emactment expressly declaring these people in a state of tutelage or assuming direct control of their property, held their lands taxable like the lands of others.⁴ But Congress quickly forbade such taxation by providing:⁹


any Indian, save and except such lands as have been granted or acquired as aforesaid or as may be granted or confirmed to any Indian or Indians under any Act of Congress, but . . . all such lands shall be except from taration by said State so long and to such extent as Congress has prescribed or may hereafter prescribe.


"Eighth. That whenever hereafter any of the lands contained within Indian reservations or allotiments in said proposed State shall be allotted, sold, reserved, or otherwise disposed of, they shall be subject for a period of twenty-five years after such allotiment, sale, reservation, or other disposal to all the laws of the United States prohibiting the introduction of liquor into the Indian country; and the terms 'Indian' and 'Indian country' shall include the Poeblo Indians of New Merice and the lands now owned or escupied by them."

⁷a See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U. B. 28, and United States v. Candelaria, 271 U. S. 432, where the matters bearing on the history, characteristics, status and past treatment of the Pueblo Indians of New Maxico are extensively stated and reviewed.

*Territory v. Delinquent Taxpayers, 12 New Mexico 139. *Act March 3, 1905, c. 1479, 33 Stat. 1048, 1069.







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United States vs. Chavez et al.

"That the lands now held by the various villages or pueblos of Pueblo Indians, or by individual members thereof, within Pueblo reservations or lands, in the Territory of New Mexico, and all personal property furnished said Indians by the United States, or used in cultivating said lands, and any cattle and sheep now possessed or that may hereafter be acquired by said Indians shall be free and exempt from taxation of any sort whatsoever, including taxes heretofore levied, if any, until Congress shall otherwise provide."

In 1907 the territorial court, for a like reason, held that the Pueblo Indians were not wards of the Government in the sense of the legislation forbidding the sale of intoxicating liquor to Indians and its introduction into the Indian country.¹⁰ But that decision was soon followed by the declaration, in the enabling act of 1910, that "the terms 'Indian' and 'Indian country' shall include the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico and the lands now owned or occupied by them". And in 1924 Congress, in taking measures to protect these Indians in their land titles, expressly asserted for the United States the status and powers belonging to it "as guardian of said Pueblo Indians."¹¹

In United States v. Sandoval, 231 U. S. 28, this Court, after full examination of the subject, held that the status of the Indians of the several pueblos in New Mexico is that of dependent Indian tribes under the guardianship of the United States and that by reason of this status they and their lands are subject to the legislation of Congress enacted for the protection of tribal Indians and their property. We there said (pp. 45, 46):

"Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, but long continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a State.

"Of course, it is not meant by this that Congress may bring a community or body of people within the range of this power by arbitrarily calling them an Indian tribe, but only that in respect of distinctly Indian communities the questions whether, to what extent, and for what time they shall be recognized and dealt with as dependent tribes requiring the guardianship and protection of

¹⁰United States v. Mares, 14 New Mexico 1. ¹¹Act June 7, 1924, c. 331, 43 Stat. 636.

United States vs. Chavez et al.

the United States are to be determined by Congress and not by the courts."


We then pointed out that neither their citizenship, if they are citizens, nor their communal ownership of the full title in fee simple is an obstacle to the exercise of such guardianship over them and their property. We also there disapproved and declined to follow the decision in the early case of United States v. Josepk, 94 U. S. 614, relating to these Indians, because it was based upon reported data which in the mean time had been found to be at variance with recognized sources of information and with the long continued action of the legislative and executive departments.


In United States v. Candelaria, 271 U. S. A32, we were called upon to determine whether the people of a pueblo in New Mexico were a "tribe of Indians" within the meaning of § 2116 of the Revised Statues, declaring that no purchase of lands "from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians" shall be of any validity unleas made with specified safeguards; and the conclusion to which we came, and the reasons for it, are shown in the following excerpt from the opinion (pp. 441, 442):

"This provision was originally adopted in 1834, c. 161, sec. 12, 4 Stat. 730, and, with others 'regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes,' was extended over 'the Indian tribes' of New Mexico in 1851, c. 14, sec. 7, 9 Stat. 587.

"While there is no express reference in the provision to Pueblo Indians, we think it must be taken as including them. They are plainly within its spirit and, in our opinion, fairly within its words, 'any tribe of Indians.' Although sedentary, industrious and disposed to peace, they are Indians in race, customs and domestic government, always have lived in isolated communities, and are a simple, uninformed people, ill-prepared to cope with the intelligence and greed of other races. It therefore is difficult to believe that Congress in 1851 was not intending to protect them, but only the nomadic and savage Indians then living in New Mexico. A more reasonable view is that the term 'Indian tribe' was used in the acts of 1834 and 1851 if the sense of 'a body of Indians of the same or a similar race, united in a community under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular though sometimes ill-defined territory.' Montoya v. United States, 180 U. S. 261, 266. In that sense the term easily includes Pueblo Indiana."

Section 217 now being considered, like the section considered in that case, was originally a part of the act of 1834. One speaks of "Indian country" and the other of an "Indian nation or tribe





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United States vs. Chavez et al.

of Indians". The act as a whole makes it apparent that the term "Indian country" was intended to include any unceded lands owned or occupied by an Indian nation or tribe of Indians, and the term continues to have that meaning, save in instances where the context shows that a different meaning is intended.¹² Nothing in any of the statutes now being considered requires that it be given a different meaning in this instance.

It follows from what has been said that the people of the Pueblo of Isleta are Indian wards of the United States; that the lands owned and occupied by them under their ancient grant are Indian country in the sense of § 217; that the United States, in virtue of its guardianship, has full power to punish crimes committed within the limits of the pueblo lands by or against the Indians or against their property—even though, where the offense is against an Indian or his property, the offender be not an Indian¹³—and that the statutes in question, rightly construed, include the offense charged in the indictment.

There is nothing in the enabling act which makes against the views here expressed. True, it declares, in keeping with the constitutional rule, that the State shall be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States. But the principle of equality is not disturbed by a legitimate exertion by the United States of its constitutional power in respect of its Indian wards and their property.¹⁴

As the District Court's judgment rested upon a mistaken construction of the statutes the judgment cannot stand.

Judgment reversed.


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
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
Clerk, Supreme Court, U. S.

¹²Clairmont v. United States, 225 U. S. 551, 557, et scq.; Donnely v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 268; United States v. Pelican, 232 U. S. 442, 447, et seq.; United States v. Ramsey, 271 U. S. 467, 470, et seq.

¹⁸Donnely v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 271-272; United States v. Pelican, 232 U. S. 442, 448, 451; United States v. Ramsey, 271 U. S. 467, 469. ¹⁴United States v. Sandoval, 231 U. S. 28, 49.







SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

No. 394.-October Term, 1933.

John S. Funk, Petitioner,

The United States of America.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

[December 11, 1933.]

Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.

The sole inquiry to be made in this case is whether in a federal court the wife of the defendant on trial for a criminal offense is a competent witness in his behalf. Her competency to testify against him is pot involved.

The petitioner was twice tried and convicted in a federal distriet court upon an indictment for conspiracy to violate the prohibition law. His conviction on the first trial was reversed by the circuit court of appeals upon a ground not material here. 46 F. (2) 417. Upon the second trial, as upon the first, defendant called his wife to testify in his behalf. At both trials she was excluded upon the ground of incompetency. The circuit court of appeals sustained this ruling upon the first appeal, and also upon the appeal which followed the second trial. 66 F. (2d) 70. We granted certiorari, limited to the question as to what law is applicable to the determination of the competency of the wife of the petitioner as a witness.

Both the petitioner and the government, in presenting the case here, put their chief reliance on prior decisions of this court. The government relies on United States v. Reid, 12 How. 361; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263; Hendrix v. United States, 219 U. S. 79; and Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U. S. 189. Petitioner contends that these cases, if not directly contrary to the decisions in Benson v. United States, 146 U. S. 325, and Rosen v. United States, 245 U. S. 467, are so in principle. We shall first briefly review these cases, with the exception of the Hendrix case and the Jin Fuey Moy case, which we leave for consideration until a later point in this opinion.

62-30311-1

In the Reid case, two persons had been jointly indicted for a murder committed upon the high seas. They were tried separately, and it was held that one of them was not a competent witness in behalf of the other who was first tried. The trial was had in Virginia; and by a statute of that state passed in 1849, if applicable in a federal court, the evidence would have been competent. Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 declares that the laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States otherwise provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply; but the court said that this referred only to civil cases and did not apply in the trial of criminal offenses against the United States. It was conceded that there was no act of Congress prescribing in express words the rule by which the federal courts would be governed in the admission of testimony in criminal cases. "But," the court said (p. 363), "we think it may be found with sufficient certainty, not indeed in direct terms, but by necessary implication, in the acts of 1789 and 1790, establishing the courts of the United States, and providing for the punishment of certain offences."


The court pointed out that the Judiciary Act regulated certain proceedings to be had prior to impaneling the jury, but contained no express provision concerning the mode of conducting the trial after the jury was sworn, and prescribed no rule in respect of the testimony to be taken. Obviously however, it was said, some certain and established rule upon the subject was necessary to enable the courts to administer the criminal jurisprudence of the United States, and Congress must have intended to refer them to some known and established rule "which was supposed to be so familiar and well understood in the trial by jury that legislation upon the subject would be deemed superfluous. This is necessarily to be implied from what these acts of Congress omit, as well as from what they contain." (p. 365.) The court concluded that this could not be the common law as it existed at the time of the emigration of the colonists, or the rule which then prevailed in Eng. land, and [therefore] the only known rule which could be supposed to have been in the mind of Congress was that which was in force in the respective states when the federal courts were established by the Judiciary Act of 1789. Applying this rule, it was decided that the witness was incompetent.

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In the Logan case it was held that the competency of a witness to testify in a federal court sitting in one state, was not affected by his conviction and sentence for felony in another state; and that the competency of another witness was not affected by his conviction of felony in a Texas state court, where the witness had since been pardoned. The indictment was for an offense committed in Texas and there tried. The decision was based not upon any statute of the United States, but upon the ground that the subject "is governed by the common law, which, as has been seen, was the law of Texas . . . at the time of the admission of Texas into the Union as a State." (p. 303.)

We next consider the two cases upon which petitioner relies. In the Benson case two persons were jointly indicted for murder. On motion of the government there was a severance, and Benson was first tried. His codefendant was called as a witness on behalf of the government. The Reid case had been cited as practically decisive of the question. But the court, after pointing out what it conceived to be distinguishing features in that case, said (p. 335), "We do not feel ourselves, therefore, precluded by that case from examining this question in the light of general authority and sound reason." The alleged incompetency of the codefendant was rested upon two reasons, first, that he was interested, and second, that he was a party to the record, the basis for the exclusion at common law being fear of perjury. "Nor," the court said, "were those named the only grounds of exclusion from the witness stand; conviction of crime, want of religious belief, and other matters were held sufficient. Indeed, the theory of the common law was to admit to the witness stand only those presumably honest, appreciating the sanctity of an oath, unaffected as a party by the result, and free from any of the temptations of interest. The courts were afraid to trust the intelligence of jurors. But the last fifty years have wrought a great change in these respects, and to-day the tendency is to enlarge the domain of competency and to submit to the jury for their consideration as to the credibility of the witness those matters which heretofore were ruled sufficient to justify his exclusion. This change has been wrought partially by legislation and partially by judicial construction." Attention then is called to the fact that Congress in 1864 had enacted that no witness should be excluded from testi-





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fying in any civil action, with certain exceptions, because he was a party to or interested in the issue tried; and that in 1878 (c. 37, 20 Stat. 30) Congress made the defendant in any criminal case a competent witness at his own request. The opinion then continues (p. 337):

"Legislation of similar import prevails in most of the States. The spirit of this legislation has controlled the decisions of the courts, and steadily, one by one, the merely technical barriers which excluded witnesses from the stand have been removed, till now it is generally, though perhaps not universally, true that no one is excluded therefrom unless the lips of the originally adverse party are closed by death, or unless some one of those peculiarly confidential relations, like that of husband and wife, forbids the breaking of silence.

". . . If interest and being party to the record do not exclude a defendant on trial from the witness stand, upon what reasoning can a codefendant, not on trial, be adjudged incompetent!"

That case was decided December 5, 1892. Twenty-five years later this court had before it for consideration the case of *Rosen* v. United States, supra. Rosen had been tried and convicted in a federal district court for conspiracy. A person jointly indicted with Rosen, who had been convicted upon his plea of guilty, was called as a witness by the government and allowed to testify over Rosen's objection. This court sustained the competency of the witness. After saying that while the decision in the *Reid* case had not been specifically overruled, its authority was seriously shaken by the decisions in both the *Logan* and *Benson* cases, the court proceeded to dispose of the question, as it had been disposed of in the *Benson* case, "in the light of general authority and sound reason."

"In the almost twenty [twenty-five] years," the court said, "which have elapsed since the decision of the Benson Case, the disposition of courts and of legislative bodies to remove disabilities from witnesses has continued, as that decision shows it had been going forward before, under dominance of the conviction of our time that the truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of all persons of competent understanding who may seem to have knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury or by the court, rather than by rejecting witnesses as incompetent, with the result that this principle has come to be widely, almost universally, accepted in this country and in Great Britain.


"Since the decision in the Benson Case we have significant


evidence of the trend of congressional opinion upon this subject in the removal of the disability of witnesses convicted of perjury, Rev. Stats., § 5392, by the enactment of the Federal Criminal Code in 1909 with this provision omitted and § 5392 repealed. This is significant, because the disability to testify, of persons convicted of perjury, survived in some jurisdictions much longer than many of the other common-law disabilities, for the reason that the offense concerns directly the giving of testimony in a court of justice, and conviction of it was accepted as showing a greater disregard for the truth than it was thought should be implied from a conviction of other crime.

"Satisfied as we are that the legislation and the very great weight of judicial authority which have developed in support of this modern rule, especially as applied to the competency of witnesses convicted of crime, proceed upon sound principle, we conclude that the dead hand of the common-law rule of 1789 should no longer be applied to such cases as we have here, and that the ruling of the lower courts on this first claim of error should be approved."

It is well to pause at this point to state a little more concisely what was held in these cases. It will be noted, in the first place, that the decision in the Reid case was not based upon any express statutory provision. The court found from what the congressional legislation omitted to say, as well as from what it actually said, that in establishing the federal courts in 1789 some definite rule in respect of the testimony to be taken in criminal cases must have been in the mind of Congress; and the rule which the court thought was in the mind of that body was that of the common law as it existed in the thirteen original states in 1789. The Logan case in part rejected that view and held that the controlling rule was that of the common law in force at the time of the admission of the state in which the particular trial was had. Taking the two cases together, it is plain enough that the ultimate doctrine announced is that in the taking of testimony in criminal cases, the federal courts are bound by the rules of the common law as they existed at a definitely specified time in the respective states, unless Congress has otherwise provided.

With the conclusion that the controlling rule is that of the common law, the *Benson* case and the *Rosen* case do not conflict; but both cases reject the notion, which the two earlier ones seem to accept, that the courts, in the face of greatly changed conditions, are still chained to the ancient formulae and are powerless to declare and enforce modifications deemed to have been wrought in





the common law itself by force of these changed conditions. Thus, as we have seen, the court in the *Benson* case pointed to the tendency during the preceding years to enlarge the domain of competency, significantly saying that the changes had been wrought not only by legislation but also "partially by judicial construction"; and that it was the *spirit* (not the *letter* be it observed) of this legislation which had controlled the decisions of the courts and steadily removed the merely technical barriers in respect of incompetency, until generally no one was excluded from giving testimony, except under certain peculiar conditions which are set forth. It seems difficult to escape the conclusion that the speeific ground upon which the court there rested its determination as to the competency of a codefendant was that, since the defendant had been rendered competent, the competency of the codefendant followed as a natural consequence.

This view of the matter is made more positive by the decision in the *Rosen* case. The question of the testimonial competency of a person jointly indicted with the defendant was disposed of, as the question had been in the *Benson* case, "in the light of general authority and sound reason." The conclusion which the court reached was based not upon any definite act of legislation, but upon the trend of congressional opinion and of legislation (that is to say of legislation generally), and upon the great weight of judicial authority which, since the earlier decisions, had developed in support of a more modern rule. In both cases the court necessarily proceeded upon the theory that the resultant modification which these important considerations had wrought in the rules of the old common law was within the power of the courts to declare and make operative.

That the present case falls within the principles of the *Benson* and *Rosen* cases, and especially of the latter, we think does not reasonably admit of doubt.

The rules of the common law which disqualified as witnesses persons having an interest long since in the main have been abolished both in England and in this country; and what was once regarded as a sufficient ground for excluding the testimony of such persons altogether has come to be uniformly and more sensibly regarded as affecting the credit of the witness only. Whatever was the danger that an interested witness would not speak


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the truth—and the danger never was as great as claimed—its effect has been minimized almost to the vanishing point by the test of cross-examination, the increased intelligence of jurors, and perhaps other circumstances. The modern rule which has removed the disqualification from persons accused of crime gradually came into force after the middle of the last century, and is today universally accepted. The exclusion of the husband or wife is said by this court to be based upon his or her interest in the event. Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, supra. And whether by this is meant a practical interest in the result of the prosecution or merely a sentimental interest because of the marital relationship, makes little difference. In either case, a refusal to permit the wife upon the ground of interest to testify in behalf of her husband, while permitting him, who has the greater interest, to testify for himself, presents a manifest incongruity.

Nor can the exclusion of the wife's testimony, in the face of the broad and liberal extension of the rules in respect of the competency of witnesses generally, be any longer justified, if it ever was justified, on any ground of public policy. It has been said that to admit such testimony is against public policy because it would endanger the harmony and confidence of marital relations, and, moreover, would subject the witness to the temptation to commit perjury. Modern legislation, in making either spouse competent to testify in behalf of the other in criminal cases, has definitely rejected these notions, and in the light of such legislation and of modern thought they seem to be altogether fanciful. The public policy of one generation may not, under changed conditions, be the public policy of another. *Pation v. United States*, 281 U. S. 276, 306.

The fundamental basis upon which all rules of evidence must rest--if they are to rest upon reason--is their adaptation to the successful development of the truth. And since experience is of all teachers the most dependable, and since experience also is a continuous process, it follows that a rule of evidence at one time thought necessary to the ascertainment of truth should yield to the experience of a succeeding generation whenever that experience has clearly demonstrated the fallacy or unwisdom of the old rule.

It may be said that the court should continue to enforce the old rule, however contrary to modern experience and thought, and





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however opposed, in principle, to the general current of legislation and of judicial opinion, it may have become, leaving to Congress the responsibility of changing it. Of course, Congress has that power; but if Congress fail to act, as it has failed in respeet of the matter now under review, and the court be called upon to decide the question, 13 it not the duty of the court, if it possess the power, to decide it in accordance with present day standards of wisdom and justice rather than in accordance with some outworn and antiquated rule of the past? That this court has the power to do so is necessarily implicit in the opinions delivered in deciding the Benson and Rosen cases. And that implication, we think, rests upon substantial ground. The rule of the common law which denies the competency of one spouse to testify in behalf of the other in a criminal prosecution has not been modified by congressional legislation; nor has Congress directed the federal courts to follow state law upon that subject, as it has in respect of some other subjects. That this court and the other federal courts, in this situation and by right of their own powers, may decline to enforce the ancient rule of the common law under conditions as they now exist we think is not fairly open to doubt.

In Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 530, this court, after suggesting that it was better not to go too far back into antiquity for the best securities of our liberties, said:

"It is more consonant to the true philosophy of our historical legal institutions to say that the spirit of personal liberty and individual right, which they embodied, was preserved and developed by a progressive growth and wise adaptation to new circumstances and situations of the forms and processes found fit to give, from time to time, new expression and greater effect to modern ideas of self-government.

"This flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation is the peculiar boast and excellence of the common law.

".... and as it was the characteristic principle of the common law to draw its inspiration from every fountain of justice, we are not to assume that the sources of its supply have been exhausted. On the contrary, we should expect that the new and various experiences of our own situation and system will mould and shape it into new and not less useful forms."

Compare Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 385-387.

To concede this capacity for growth and change in the common law by drawing "its inspiration from every fountain of justice," and at the same time to say that the courts of this country are forever bound to perpetuate such of its rules as, by every reasonable test, are found to be neither wise nor just, because we have once adopted them as suited to our situation and institutions at a particular time, is to deny to the common law in the place of its adoption a "flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation" which was "the peculiar boast and excellence" of the system in the place of its origin.

The final question to which we are thus brought is not that of the power of the federal courts to amend or repeal any given rule or principle of the common law, for they neither have nor claim that power, but it is the question of the power of these courts, in the complete absence of congressional legislation on the subject, to declare and effectuate, upon common law principles, what is the present rule upon a given subject in the light of fundamentally altered conditions, without regard to what has previously been declared and practiced. It has been said so often as to have become axiomatic that the common law is not immutable but flexible, and by its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions. In *Ketelsen* v. *Stilz*, 184 Ind. 702, the supreme court of that state, after pointing out that the common law of England was based upon usages, customs and institutions of the English people as declared from time to time by the courts, said (p. 707):

"The rules so deduced from this system, however, were continually changing and expanding with the progress of society in the application of this system to more diversified circumstances and under more advanced periods. The common law by its own principles adapted itself to varying conditions and modified its own rules so as to serve the ends of justice as prompted by a course of reasoning which was guided by these generally accepted truths. One of its oldest maxims was that where the reason of a rule ceased, the rule also ceased, and it logically followed that when it occurred to the courts that a particular rule had never been founded upon reason, and that no reason existed in support thereof, that rule likewise ceased, and perhaps another sprang up in its place which was based upon reason and justice as then conceived. No rule of the common law could survive the reason on which it was founded. It needed no statute to change it but abrogated itself."





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That court then refers to the settled doctrine that an adoption of the common law in general terms does not require, without regard to local circumstances, an unqualified application of all its rules; that the rules, as declared by the English courts at one period or another, have been controlling in this country only so far as they were suited to and in harmony with the genius, spirit and objects of American institutions; and that the rules of the common law considered proper in the eighteenth century are not necessarily so considered in the twentieth. "Since courts have had an existence in America," that court said (p. 708), "they have never hesitated to take upon themselves the responsibility of saying what are the proper rules of the common law."

And the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in *Hanriot* v. Sherwood, 82 Va. 1, 15, after pointing to the fact that the common law of England is the law of that commonwealth except so far as it has been altered by statute, or so far as its principles are inapplicable to the state of the country, and that the rules of the common law had undergone modification in the courts of England, notes with obvious approval that "the rules of evidence have been in the courts of this country undergoing such modification and changes, according to the circumstances of the country and the manner and genius of the people."

The supreme court of Connecticut, in Beardsley v. City of Hartford, 50 Conn. 529, 541-542, after quoting the maxim of the common law, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lez, said:

"This means that no law can survive the reasons on which it is founded. It needs no statute to change it; it abrogates itself. If the reasons on which a law rests are overborne by opposing reasons, which in the progress of society gain a controlling force, the old law, though still good as an abstract principle, and good in its application to some circumstances, must cease to apply as a controlling principle to the new circumstances."

The same thought is expressed in People v. Randolph, 2 Park. Cr. Rep. (N. Y.) 174, 177:

"Its rules [the rules of the common law] are modified upon its own principles and not in violation of them. Those rules being founded in reason, one of its oldest maxims is, that where the reason of the rule ceases the rule also ceases."


It was in virtue of this maxim of the common law that the supreme court of Nevada, in *Reno Smelting Works* v. Stevenson, 20 Nev. 269, in a well reasoned opinion, held that the common law doctrine of riparian rights was unsuited to conditions prevailing in the arid land states and territories of the west, and therefore was without force in Nevada; and that, in respect of the use of water, the applicable rule was based upon the doctrine of prior appropriation for a beneficial use.


In Illinois it was held at an early day that the rule of the common law which required an owner of cattle to keep them upon his own land was not in force in that state, notwithstanding its adoption of the common law of England, being unsuited to conditions there in view of the extensive areas of land which had been left open and unfenced and devoted to grazing purposes. Seeley v. Peters, 5 Gil. (111.) 130.


Numerous additional state decisions to the same effect might be cited; but it seems unnecessary to pursue the matter at greater length.


It results from the foregoing that the decision of the court below, in holding the wife incompetent, is erroneous. But that decision was based primarily upon *Hendrix v. United States* and *Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, supra,* and in fairness to the lower court it should be said that its decision was fully supported by those cases.

In the Hendrix case the opinion does not discuss the point; it simply recites the assignment of error to the effect that the wife of Hendrix had not been allowed to testify in his behalf, and dismisses the matter by the laconic statement, "The ruling was not error." In the Jin Fuey Moy case it was conceded at the bar that the wife was not a competent witness for all purposes, but it was contended that her testimony was admissible in that instance because she was offered not in behalf of her husband, that is not to prove his innocence, but simply to contradict the testimony of government witnesses who had testified to certain matters as having transpired in her presence. The court held the distinction to be without substance, as clearly it was, and thereupon disposed of the question by saving that the rule which excludes a wife from testifying for her husband is based upon her interest in the event and applies without regard to the kind of testimony she might give. The point does not seem to have been considered by the lower court to which the writ of error was addressed (253









Fed. 213); nor, as plainly appears, was the real point as it is here involved presented in this court. The matter was disposed of as one "hardly requiring mention." Evidently the point most in the mind of the court was the distinction relied upon, and not the basic rule which was not contested. Both the *Hendrix* and *Jin Fuey Moy* cases are out of harmony with the *Rosen* and *Benson* cases and with the views which we have here expressed. In respect of the question here under review, both are now overruled.

Judgment reversed.

Mr. Justice CARDOZO concurs in the result.

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS and Mr. Justice BUTLER are of opinion that the judgment of the court below is right and should be affirmed.

A true copy.

 $\mathbf{Test}:$

Clerk, Supreme Court, U. S.

WN EDGAR HOO

TFB:GAJ

Bivision of Investigation

H. S. Bepartment of Instice

Mashington, D. C. January 9, 1934.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NATHAN

Reference is made to the sttached letter from Special Agent in Charge Bowd of Salt Lake City, relative to two recent decisions in the United States Supreme Court, i.e., the cases of John S. Funk v. United States, treating of the competency of a wife to testify for her husband, and of Gregorio Chavez and Jose Maria Chavez v. United States, holding that the Pueblo of Isleta in the State of New Mexico is Indian country.

I have secured copies of the referred to decisions and find that the case of John S. Fank v. United States holds that previous cases relating that a wife is not a competent writness to testify in behalf of hardhusband are overruled and a wife hereafter may testify for her husband in a criminal case in which he is charged with an offense under the laws of the United States. She, however, cannot be compelled to testify against her husband.

The other case, i.e., Gregorio Chavez and Jose Maria Chavez v. United States, merely holds that the Pueblo Indians are Indian tribes within the intent of the statutes prohibiting certain acts committed within the "Indian country", and accordingly that these acts are punishable in the Federal courts rather than in the State courts.

Respectfully,

T. F. Baughman.

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
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Sit-Doun Strike Illegal, Supreme Court Declares; NLRB Loses Three Tests

Josili -

Justices Black and Reed Dissent; Orders to Rehire Workers Dissolved

By CLESLY MANLY Objector Tribuno Press Service The United States Supreme Court yesterday dealt the National Labor Relations Board three smashing blows in the most farreaching series of Wagner act rulings since the law itself was upheld in April, 1937.

In an opinion by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the court delivered its first condemnation of the sitdown strike and set aside an order of the board requiring the Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation, of North Chicago, to reinstate with back pay 92 C.I.O. union members who participated in the seizure of the company's plants in February, 1937.

'High-Handed Proceeding'

The court denounced the sitdown strike as "a high-handed proceeding without shadow of legal right." Such conduct on the part of the strikers, the court held, was ample cause for their discharge.

"To justify such conduct because of the existence of a labor dispute or of an unfair labo, practice," said the court, "would be to put a premium on resort to force instead of legal remedies and to subvert the principles of law and order which lie at the foundations of society."

After thus repudiating the labor board's condonation of violence, the court ratused to raview a criminal case growing out of the C.I.O. sitdown strike in the Fansteel plants.

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\$7 to Go to Jail

Thirty-seven of the 92 strikers whom the labor board ordered reinstated were convicted of contempt of court in delying an injunction to evacuate the plants and sentenced to jail terms ranging from 10 to 180 days. Their last legal resort having been exhausted, they now must serve the sentences.

In the other two Wagner act cases, the court held that there was no evidence to sustain the board's finding that the Columbian Enameling and Stamping Company, of Terre Haute, Ind., and the Sands Manufacturing Company, of Cleveland, Ohio, refused to bargain collectively with their employes.

It upheld decisions setting aside the board's orders to reinstate discharged employes with back Day.

Five Straight Losses

Including these decisions, the labor board has lost five major cases in a row at the prese. term of the Supreme Court. In the Consolidated Edison Company case (New York) the Court con-

(Continued on Page 2, Col. 2)

the board's attempt to abrogate an American Federation of Labor contract for the purpose of installing & C. I. O. union. In refusing to review the Peninsular and Occidental Steamship Company case (Florida) the Court thwarted efforts of the labor board to reinstate, with back pay, C. I. O. seamen who engaged in mutinous sitdown strikes.

Black, Reed Dissent

The Supreme Court divided five to two in each of the three Labor Board cases decided yesterday. Neither Justice Louis D. Brandeis, Neither Justice Louis D. Branchor Whether the nait ment, who who retired two weeks ago, nor ers of America, Local No. 1, or the Justice Felix Frankfurter, who ers of America, Local No. 1, or the function of the banch a month C.I.O. union, represents a majorago took part in the consideration ity of the employes is a question or decision of the cases Justices which the board must determine or decision of the cases. Justices Hugo L. Black and Stanley F. Reed, both Roosevelt appointees, dissented in all three cases, hold-ing in effect that the majority opinions nullified the purposes of the Wagner act.

In the Fansteel case, the Supreme Court upheld the labor board's order in so far as it required the company to cease and desist from interfering with the right of its employes to organize and bargain collectively.

Partially Upheld

It upheld that part of the the enameing company the board's order requiring the com-fused to bargain collectively. Justice Owen J. Roberts, hand the majority opinion in from the Jare Metal Workers of ing down the majority opinion in America, Local No. 1, which was the Sands case, held that there formed after the C.I.O. sitdown was not a "scintilia" of evidence

The court, however, did not up Society of America.

hold the board's order in so far as demned as arbitrary and unlawful it required the company to bargain the hourd's attempt to shrought collectively with Lodge 66 of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers, the CLO. union. ۰.

Election Ordered

"In view of the change in the situation by reason of the valid

discharge of the 'sitdown' strikers and the filling of positions with new men, we see no basis for a

conclusion that after the resumption of work Lodge 66 was the choice of a majority of respondent's employes for the purpose of collective bargaining," said the said the opinion by Chief Justice Hughes. Whether the Rare Metal Work-

by means of an election, the court held.

But the court found that the company violated the Wagner act by refusing to bargain collectively with the C.I.O. union prior to the sitdown strike, which began on February 17, 1937.

Other Cases

In the Columbian case, Justice Stone, delivering the majority finding, said that the court could not find substantial evidence to sustain the board's finding that

strike. The opinion held that there to show that the company's unwas evidence to support the fair labor practices precipitated board's contention that the com- trouble at its plant. On the conthis union, in violation of the had dealt "freely and candidly" Wagner Act.



STANDARD FORM MR. 64



TO . Mr. Tolson

TROM I L. B. Nichols

SUBJECT :

LENERAL

DATE: December 14, 1953

Jim Donovan of United Press called to request the reason as to why twenty-one Bureau Agents would seek admission to the Supreme Court today. They have had two or three inquiries from clients as to the significance of this. I told Donovan that there was no significance; that they were Agents who were eligible to seek admission to the Supreme Court and that since admissions are moved only at periodic intervals, this obviously was an accumulation.

I think it might be well to watch this in the future and seek to discourage such large groups as this seeking admission.

RECORDED 784 cc - Mr. Glavin مه ملتممه LBN:ptm umbered ection & FEBENAL BUY 17 C 221953

• •	DL SCTOR OF PUBLIC INF(ORMATI-N	Mr. Mr. Mr.
	OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY	GENERAL	Mr.
• • • •	Official indicated below by cl	heck mark / /	Mr.
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			Mr.
Attorney General .	•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	MEMORA	й'n
Deputy Attorney G	eneral		
Solicitor General			
Executive Assistar	t to the Attorney General	D M-	
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Transcription Se		(R.L. Stern) }
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- 44

mi TWENTY-ONE SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE FBI WERE ADMITTED TODAY TO PRAC ORF THE SUPREME COURT. BEFORF THE THE AGENTS, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE BAR OF THE HIGHEST COURTS IN 13 TATES AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, WERE PRESENTED BY ACTING FOLICITOR GENERAL ROBERT L. STERN. 12/14--EG1225P let 2/16/53 67-0-8459 ENCLOSUES

December 16, 1953

RECEIVED

DIRECTOR

Mr. Robert LAStern Acting Solicitor General United States Department of Justice E Washington 25, D. C. Cop NERAL-5 SEPT. OF JUSTICE Dear Mr. Sternt ເທ I did mant to send you this personal 00 PM 153 note of thanks for presenting twenty-one of our Special Agents to the United States Supreme Court en December 14, 1953. All of them appreciate as much as I do your taking time to present them for practice before RECEIVED 4 this court. പ് Sincerely yours, 5 J. Edgar Hoover ſŊ 17412-04 DEC 1/2 1953 460 MEQORDED-86 67 AOTE : NAda CITE : Ada CITE : A رژ. **Бе**н. Nu s Address and salutation per reading room. 1.1 DEC 📈 1953 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INTESTIMATION 87 DEC 23 1953 670

Tol Ladd

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ce Mul. mandum . UNITE **FATES GOVERNMENT** JE AUGERFGEFEE Mr. Ladd DATE: December 11, 1953 O GENERAL Mr. Roser THOM SUBJECT : MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION CONCERNING GROUP OF SPECIAL AGENTS DESIRING ADMISSION TO PRACTICE BEFORE THE U. S. SUPREME COURT You were advised on December 2, 1953, that a group of Special Agents (approximately 20) were in the process of obtaining the necessary papers for admission to practice before the U. S. Supreme Court. The agents were desirous of having the Acting Solicitor General, Robert L. Stern, as their sponsor and to have him move for their admission to the U.S. Supreme Court. To culminate this, it was recommended that Special Agent informally contact the secretary of the Acting Solicitor General to determine his desires on sponsoring the agents. On Tuesday, December 8, 1953, Special Agent contacted in the absence of also being a secretary of Mr. Stern, and she advised she would be glad to ask Mr. Stern whether he would bill so honor the agents by acting as their sponsor. On Thursday, December 10, 1953. Advised Mr. Stern would be glad to sponsor the agents and set Monday, December 14, 1953, at 11:30 A.M., as the date and time he would sponsor the group. 61-0-8463 **RECOMMENDATION:** Searched You will be None. This is for your information. advised of the names of the Special Agents who are admitted and sufficient copies of this memorandum advising you of their admission will be made for each Special Agent's personnel file. FEDERAL BUREAU OF CHEETMATH 11 53 VI ... RECORDED. 2 ersonnel fi 2 O'JAN

The following is a list of Special Agents who are to be admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court on December 14, 1953:

NAME

STATE ADMITTED TO PRACTISE

Georgia

Missouri District of Columbia District of Columbia New York Office) North Carolina North Carolina (Washington Field Office) New York Missouri (Washington Field Office) Washington Nebraska Rhode Island Missouri District of Columbia New York Indiana (Washington Field Office) Florida (Washington Field Office) Ohio Ohio (Washington Field Office) Arizona Idaho Wisconsin

Unless otherwise indicated the above Special Agents are all assigned to the Bureau.

67-0-846

STANDARD FORM NO. 84

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ro Ö

DATE: December 11, 19

FROM :

SUBJECT:

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION CONCERNING GROUP OF SPECIAL AGENTS DESIRING ADMISSION TO PRACTICE BEFORE THE U. S. SUPREME COURT

LENERAL

A group of twenty-one Special Agents will be admitted to practice before the U.S. Supreme Court on Monday, December 14, 1953, on or about 11:30 A.M. Acting Solicitor General, Robert L. Stern, has kindly consented to act as this group's sponsor and move for its admission.

The Special Agents being admitted have indicated a desire, if at all possible, to have a group picture taken with the Director. If such can be arranged in the already busy schedule of Mr. Hoover, the group will be greatly honored and most appreciative. The ceremonies at the U.S. Supreme Court will be concluded about 1:30 P.M., and the Agents involved should be available any time after 2:00 P.M., on Monday, December 14, 1953.

RECOMMENDATION:

Mr. Ladd

Mr. Roser

That it be determined whether or not Mr. Hoover's schedule will permit him to have his picture taken with the group.

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11 DEC 20 1953

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Mr. J. Edgar Heever, Chief Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D. C. Internal Samily-Guilar

Dear Sir:

ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATION

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Am inclosing clipping which appeared in the Evening Sun of Baltimore about two days ago.


The "Henry Nerdin", signer of first letter is quite active. Within two weeks or so following the Un-American Activities hearing in Baltimore in the spring, he wrote a letter of unmitigated castigation for the Committee, its power to interfere with personal activities of citizens and indicated very clearly that he thought groups should have the right to meet, criticize our Constitution and, if according to their personal ideas there should be a new form of Government they should have the uninterrupted pleasure of conspiring to bring such into being by hook or crock. Search of files of the Sun-paper office will prove my assertion regarding the above. The moment I saw his name to the later letter I recalled the incident following the hearings. It rung the Bell.

It being obvious that Bethlehem Steel at Sparrows Point, place of employment for many in the Essex area, is a hot-bed of Communists, it is not too far-fetched to assume that he is active in same place.

I am quite sure that my son was the most American student in the high school here, having been theroughly indectrinated by me, a Virginian of generations going back before Revolutionary War. He often reported to me thought-to-be subtle little injections for indectrination-by some instructors. During an interview between part of faculty and me an accusation was diracted that he was radical. I, in no uncertain terms, gave them to understand that he was a true product of old dyed-inthe-weel Americaniam, a replica of me and my family; that no antipathy was to be directed at him but that they should battle, / De you not think it lamentable that our Senate has been subordinated to a body having no Power to enact Laws, that they are new being affrented by the dirty Gangster arregance; that they have the pleasure of constantly calling "Uncle" uncle " (meaning Supreme Court) and, that the thousands of hoodlums and Antis in this country may chuckle with assurance that our Congress is no longer the ruling Body of this Nation?

70 SEP 3 1957

Hest Mincerely



importance than the new age, .

To me it seems that one body of men, the S Court of the United Sta recognizes the disconten prevails over a large par globe as something fund: It would seem that they stand that we cannot this change by remaki democracy into a dicta even a dictatorship of c ity. Evidently they also nize the fact, if no one el: that the law, at least in th cannot forever live in a tower.

I see in the court's decisions a belief that (is a useless thing unless i all of the people, and people includes not or sheeplike conformists, E minority of nonconfe who are in the nature of always a thorn in sor side.

I do not see how this cratic government can another century if every is challenged either fri outside or from within i body, it gives up its den piece by piece. I think t court understands this o well, and for this underst. it deserves the sincere the every living soul in the I States.

Essex, July 31. 14124 Teaching Commun

In Schools

TO THE EDITOR OF THE E SUN-Sir: In the July 24 F Florence D. Watkins stat agree that the 'nature of munism' should be taug our schools, but it should presented to the students its awfulness, including its murders, slave labor, its ism and immorality and i fiscation of property and 1 It should not be presen just a different political nomical or social system good points and bad point I fail to see the conr between mass murders, labor, immorality, etc. communism any more can see the connection b lynchings, race riots, pre

immorality and democra seems to me the form universal expréssions of baser emotions. The latt products of his intelligenhould be allowed to st fall as such. In this age o painting our enemies or as villains is becoming t takes a peculiar kind of to believe it any more.

L for one, enthusia support the teaching o parative economic syste our public schools. The lingly haive and emotio ture of American at toward communism is ev that greater emphasis field is long overdue. A l understanding of conten political ideologies is a and necessary product democratic educational

It is a truism that v what we do not unde Credulous, fearful thinki communism, is the threat to the democrat DAVID PAR

power, which in itself is a revolution, there is a sociological revolution taking place over this of life. wide world that may in the end prove itself to be of far more | Baltimore, July 31. 100-0-31668

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that previous decisions are to

be followed whenever possible

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will write of these times as


another revolutionary age. Axide from the fact that we have entered the time of nuclear


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Contral Research Sace

DAVID LAWRENCE

Blow Against Commun

Five Justices' Decision Lauded In Freedom of Speech Case

It seems incredible that, with a "cold war" going on and with billions of dollars being spent by the Soviet government to 'infiltrate every democratic country in was trying to punish him for the world, there should be in "beliefs." Congressional issued by four members of efforts to get information on the Supreme Court of the United States Chiel Justice Warren, Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan—an opinion which appears to brush aside the Communist - menace.

Fortunately, five other members of the court-Justices Stewart, Clark, Frankfurter, Harlan and Whittaker-see the Communist menace in its realistic form. By their latest decision, they make it clear that the empty claim to protection of "free, speech" will not save suspected Communists in the Unitedi States from investigation by an authorized congressional committee.

The four dissenting justices insist that witnesses, when asked by a congressional committee whether they are Communists, need not even take the Fifth Amendment but can refuse to answer on the ground that their rights of free speech under the First Amendment are being transgressed.

The argument solemnly -proclaimed by the four dissenting justices is that no agency of the Federal Government, be it legislative, executive or judicial, may "harass or punish people for their beliefs, or for their speech about, or public crititism of, laws and public of-Licials."

This doctrine would make It possible for any citizen to decline to tell an investigating committee about rackets, monopolies, payols, or any irregularities in human be-havior on which it might be desirable to pass remedial

62 MAR 9 1961,

laws. The witness could merely claim that the congressional committee was "harassing" him for his criticisms of the committee and which to base regulatory laws could thus be frustrated.

In the latest opinion-the case of Frank Wilkinson, who refused to give even his place of residence to the House Committee on Un-American Activities - the majority of the justices repeated a statement from a previous decision which said:

"To suggest that because the Communist Party may also sponsor peaceable political reforms the constitutional issues before us should now be judged as if that party were just an ordinary political party from the standpoint of national security, is to ask this court to blind itself to world affairs which have determined the whole course of our national policy since the close of World War П."

What the majority of the court says is supposed to be "the law of the land," but it is being scorned-in the companion case of Carl Braden-by Justice Black, with Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas agreeing. In this dissenting opinion these words of defiance are issued:

"The founders of this Nation were not then willing to trust the definition of First Amendment freedoms to Congress or this court, nor am I now."

But to accept the idea that Congress cannot investigate or that the Supreme Court cannot rule on the case of a man who may be serving or helping a hostile government -an enemy - is to deprive the Nation of any power of self-preservation. The pur-

pose of these congressional investigations is to expose the espionage and subversive activities of the whole Communist apparatus in the United States. Loyal American citizens are expected to co-operate with their own Government in all its branches. The Communists have stolen atomic secrets. They have at times infil-trated the departments in Washington. The Supreme Court in the past has taken the view that it isn't a "right of free speech" falsely to cry "Fire!" in a crowded theater. Nor does the "free speech" clause of the Constitution give anyone immunity from an investigation to determine whether he belongs to a party that is financed by, instigated by, and often directed by a foreign government which is seeking to damage the United States and possibly to bring on a war.

Justice Black argues that editors and newsmen who have criticized a congressional committee now could be brought before that same committee and punished for refusing to answer questions. But whenever there is basis for suspecting that a news-f paperman is paid by or working for an enemy government. he shouldn't be able to claim immunity under the First Amendment, either.

The House Committee on Un-American Activities is under attack these days by so-called "liberals" who will be encouraged now by the dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court to carry on their campaign to curtail, if not abolish, the work of the House committee and also of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. But the defenders of America's safety against the Communist enemy will find an irrefutable argument in the two opinions rendered this week by Justices Stewart, Clark, Frankfurter, Harlan and and Whittaker. " 6 (Copyright 1961)

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Times Herald
The Washington Daily News
The Evening Star
New York Hefald Tribune
New York Journal-American
New York Mirror
New York Daily News
New York Post
The New York Times
The Worker
The New Leader
The Wall Street Journal
Date
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OT RECORDED

17 MAR 6 1961

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memorandum

TO

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Onn

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Mr. DeLoach

A. Rosen K-FROM

SUBJECT: STATE OF ILLINOIS VS. WILLIAM-ALLEN

ΓE:	March 3	•	Xon
		De Loach	· · ·
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SA Section of the States Supreme Court in an eight to nothing decision written by Mr. Justice Black ruled that a man can lose his right to remain in court if his conduct is such that it disrupts the court.

DA'

The ruling was handed down in a State of Illinois case involving William Allen, who had been convicted for armed robbery and sentenced to ten to thirty years. During his trial, Allen was abusive toward the judge and was warned that his conduct would result in his being removed from the court. Wil he persisted, he was removed but allowed back if he would behave himself. When he continued his abuse, he was removed from the courtroom during his trial.

He filed a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Cour alleging he had been denied his right to remain in the courtroom during his trial. The United States District Court denied his writ, and the United States 7th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. The case was then remanded to the United States Supreme Court.

This morning the United States Supreme Court, as mentioned above by an eight to nothing decision ruled that <u>a</u>man can lose his right to remain in court during his trial if his conduct is such that it disrupts the court.

REC-2663-0-26873 ACTION: This is for information. 10 APR 6 1970 **RJG:**jny (9) 51 APR 1013/0 32 1

OFTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 102 EDITION 05A FFMR (41 EFR) 101-11.5 UNITED STATES GO FRNMENT Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

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
DATE: 10/2/70

: SAC, WFO (52-11670) (C)

subject: UNSUB; Theft of Victor Calculator SN 234-6-157, From Administrative Offices Of U.S. Supreme Court, 2/70 TGP (OO:WFO)

> Re WFO airtel to Baltimore, 6/17/70 (IO) WFO let to Baltimore, 8/19/70 (IO) BA let to WFO, 8/26/70 (IO) BA airtel to WFO, 8/31/70 (IO)

ADMINISTRATIVE DATA:




WFO 52-11670

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On March 11, 1970, a check with the Victor Corporation revealed Victor Adding machine 234-6-157 was sold to the United States Office, Administrative Division, United States Courts, WDC, on June 3, 1965. It was assigned to the Legal Aid Division, WDC.

On April 23, 1970, Legal Aid Division, WDC, advised that the Victor Calculator machine 234-6-157 was stolen sometime in February, 1970. He stated he was not able to put a specific date of loss since the office was in the process of moving from one building to another, but did know that this machine was one of several stolen in February, 1970.



WFO 52-11670

Washington, D.C., advised captioned machine purchased under purchase order 28288, dated June 7, 1965, and is valued at \$500. Captioned machine, according to would not have been sold by his branch since it is still considered a fairly new machine.

A lead was set forth to interview at his home, however, the Baltimore Division advised that as of August 26, 1970, was

On September 28, 1970, Attorney, Attorney, telephonically requested SA to come to his office and recover a Victor Calculator, SN 234-6-157, which his client, had brought to his office to be returned to the FBI. The machine was examined and found to be identical with the stolen Government machine. Was furnished a receipt for the machine.

On the same date, the facts of this case were discussed with AUSA JAMES FLANIGAN, WDC. Mr. FLANIGAN advised that since Legal Aid could not put a definite date of loss on the machine, and since it could not be proven that knew it to be stolen Government Property, he would decrine prosecution in this matter. Openan Confirmed.

On October 2, 1970, the machine was returned to Legal Aid Division of the U.S. Courts, WDC.

Bureau is requested to credit WFO with recover value of \$500 for the captioned machine.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-78) FBI ¢*. TRANSMIT VIA: **PRECEDENCE:** CLASSIFICATION: Immediate Teletype TOP SECRET **Facsimile** Priority SECRET Airtel K CONFIDENTIAL □ Routine UNCLAS E F T O UNCLAS Date 1/14/83 TO: DIRECTOR, FBI 11 FROM: ADIC, NEW YORK (9A-8833) (C) (M-9) INSUR, THERE AGAINST UNITED STATES SUBJECT: SUPREME COURT EXTORTION (OO:NEW YORK) Re WFO teletype to New York dated 6/23/82 and WFO airtel to NY dated 12/20/82. For information of the Bureau and WFO, all logical investigation has been conducted in an effort to develop the identity of UNSUB with negative results. Furthermore the results of the latent fingerprint examination was also negative. Due to the above facts this matter has been closed within the New York office. Armed and dangerous. DE-127: 9-0-26 23 .11 17 133 D-Bureau 2-Washington Field 1-New X6zk. 1. 1983 らつく Approved Transmitted . (Number) (Time) U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFF 12 10

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FD-36 (R	lev. 8-26-92)	EDI		I	
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			Date3/8/85		
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1	ANONYMOUS MENACING	G LETTER			
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	Enclosed	for the Bureau a	are three copies of an	1 envelope	
ł	on February 19, 19	985. Enclosed for	he United States Supre r New York are the ori	e Court	
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1	the enclosed lott	JRT POLICE DEPART	MENT (USSCPD), advised t the Supreme Court or	i that	
	February 19. 1985	and was opened so	ome time that week.	1	
		and was opened s	ome cime that week.	and the second se	
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	upper case letter:	s and the envelop	e bears a postmark whi	ch reads,	
	Western Nassua GMI	F, NY, 115, February	ary 15, 1985. The let	ter is /	
	August of 1960 Ty	, 1985 and begins was attacked at th	, "Ladies and Gentleme he parade grounds of H	en: In	
	by three blacks an	nd I was never pa	id for the ugly and pa		
	injuries sustained	d " The letter	goes on to state that	the	
	writer lost his jo	ob with one of the	e city agencies of the	e Aty	
	of New York and re	eceived no compens	sation, and further th	at he	
	Bank Executives of	i in 1976. The level of the second subface the second subface and the second second second second second second	tter concludes with, ' oved to me that you su	Jewish	
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of the Supreme Court Justices are not routinely given out, there have been many articles in various magazines about all of the justices and these articles usually include home addresses. advised that all of the Justices will be alerted to note any unusual activity or persons around their residences. added that he could not recall receiving any similar letters at the Supreme Court in recent months.

Inasmuch as no threats are made in the enclosed letter, any laboratory analysis is left to the disgression of the office of origin, and the above is provided for information and indexing.

FEBRUARY 15, 1985

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

and the second second

IN AUGUST OF 1960 I WAS ATTACKED AT THE PARADE GROUNDS OF FORT DIX BY THREE BLACKS AND I WAS NEVER PAID FOR THE UGLY AND PERMANENT INJURIES SUSTAINED.

IN 1966 I LOST MY JOB AT ONE OF THE CITY AGENCIES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY <u>NO</u> ASSISTANCE <u>EVER</u> IN THE FORM OF WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, PENSION OR FOOD STAMPS.

IN 1976 I WAS SENT TO PRISON AS THE RESULT OF YOUR SICK AND UNDYING LOVE FOR NELSON ROCKEFELLER.

JEWISH BANK EXECUTIVES CRIED WHEN THEY PROVED TO ME THAT YOU SUCCEEDED IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY TO RUIN MY LIFE. HOWEVER, I HAVE YET TO FIGURE OUT WHY THEY GAVE ME YOUR HOME ADDRESSES.

SEE YOU AT THE BANK

ENCLOSURE


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
_ 1 Mr. Tolson Mr. Baughmu Federal Bureau of Infres. 2. on r. Clorg Mr. Coffey H. S. Bepartment of Justice Mr. Dawsey .. Washington Field Office, Room 4244, Mr. Egan Washington, D.C. Mr. Forworth Mr. Glavin October 9, 1936. Mr. Harbo Mr. Joseph avers (1) Mr. Lester AND CONFIDENTI ir. Nichols . . Mr. Quinn Director, Mr. Schilder .. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr. Tamm Washington, D.C. Mr. Tracy DECI Mise Gendy ... BY Dear Sir: 67C On October 9, 1936 shal for the Supreme Court of the United States appeared at the Washington Field Office with the following information: Marshal stated that 09-17-じだい Marshal stated he did not wish to duly alarm the Chief Justice without first making some inquiries to substantiate or disprove the information thus received, and proceeded to interview who informed him as follows: COPIES DESTROYED 29 RECORDED 2 83 007 15 1964 FEDERAL BURLAU OF LEVESTIGATION ð à.IJ. meno INDEXED OCT 9 1936 P. M. Ce Keen Sat 10/11/36 OCT 15 1936 ON




Sussith

J. M. KEITH, Special Agent in Charge.

JMK:MBL





John Edgar Hoover, Director.

EAT:RP October 10, 1936 62-46210 🔁 🗤 🗤 ۰, FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE ATTORNET OFRERAL. ENORANDUM NR. JOSEPH KRENAN ND CONFIDENT your information I am attaching hereto which I have today addressed IOTADAUE 1 to the Atterney Canera I relative 670 Very truly yours, John Edgar Hoover Director. Mr. Nathan Mr. Tolson Mr. Baughman Inclosure #663483 Mr. Clogs RE-JORDED \mathcal{Z} 0 Mr. Colley . .. Mr. Dawsey -DUREAU OF HAVESTIGATION FEBERAL Mr. Egan Mr. Paperorth 13 1935 -P. M. Mr. Clark Ser. Durfe ... STICE GOMMUNICATIONS SECTION Mr. Joean MAILED Mr. Levia FILE Mr. Michals OCT 1 2 1936 Mr. Quilly Start in 18 F Mr. Tal. I. FLEESL CLARE AND A 10 Trace . K. E. Section of a M an Gandy -----. ī

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER



10:50 A.M. 2:35 P.M. Hederal Bureau of Investigation U. S. Department of Instice

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Washington, B. C. October 13, 1936

MEMORANDUM FOR MR.

RE: Complaint relating to receipt of advance information from Supreme Court.

While Supervisor was discussing another case with Mr. McGuire, an attorney in the Department, Mr. McGuire stated that there had been referred to him a personal and confidential memorandum sent to the Attorney General by the Bureau relating to information furnished by the Marshal's Office concerning the receipt of advance information from the Supreme Court. Mr. McGuire stated the Department would desire an investigation but would like to know whether the Supreme Court has been informed of this information, and if not the Department would do so.

I am informed that discussed the above subject matter with you and he was advised to contact Mr. McGuire and inform him that the Bureau would like to have a memorandum from the Department outlining just what action should be taken. Mr. McGuire was contacted by Supervisor and was informed that what the Department desired to know is whether the Supreme Court had been advised by or anyone else of the information that advance notice was being received from the court as to their decisions. He was informed that so far as the Bureau is aware, the court has not been informed and, at least, the Bureau has not done so. Mr. McGuire stated that the Department was inclined to the view that the complainant in this case should have immediately gone to the Supreme Court and advised it of the information received, and also brought the same to the attention of the Bureau, but at any rate Mr. Keenan will desire an immediate investigation by the Bureau. Mr. McGuire was informed that the Bureau would like to have a memorandum from the Department setting forth just what is desired, and that no action will be taken until the receipt of such memorandum. McGuire said that the Department would write a letter to the court and advise the members of the substance of the complaint and would send a memorandum to the Bureau requesting an investigation. He stated that these communications would leave the Department in the immediate future

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BEXCONSULE Respecti INIMEXED OCT 14 1936 P. M. P. E. Foxworth. TAMAN

Mr. Nathan .. JOSEPH B. KEENAN Mr. Toleon Mr. Baughme Mr. Clegg Department of Justice Pawser Mr. Erse Washington Mr. Fexworth Mr. Glavir Mr. Joseph October 12 Mr. Lester ... 19 36 Mr. Nichels ... ir. Quinn Mr. Schüder .. PERSONAL Mr. Femm 뚪 AND CONI Mr. Tracy Mass Gandy MEMORANDUM FOR MR. J. EDGAR HOOVE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION . . This will acknowledge the receipt of your memorandum of October 10, 1936; attaching therewith a copy of the memorandum which you under that date, addressed to the Attorney General, relative to This is a matter of extreme importance and one that should be immediately investigated for the purpose of obtaining all the facts. Needless to say, the investigation should be conducted with your usual tact and good judgment. The Chief Justice has been advised of this reference. . Keenan. the Attorney General. The Assistant to 62-462 RECORDED Ł **VESTIGATION** INDEXED OCT 17 1936 λ. Н. OCT 2 6 1935 OTICE 1 **Ս**. Տ Ի 7 LE

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			Mr. ferverth
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			Mr. Harbo
	October	15,1936.	Mr. Jeseph
•			Mr. Kleinkauf
			Mr. Lester
	Time5:30 pm		Mr. Nichols
t			Mr. Quinn
r.	Name Miss Be	rard tele.	Mr. Schilder
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JOHN EDGAR HOOVE

Federal Bureau of Investigation

U. S. Department of Justice Washington, D. C.

October 15, 1936

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

RE: Alleged Irregularity on part of Employee of Supreme four

Mr. McGuire in the Department called and advised that he has recontacted the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and informed him that this matter was being referred to the Bureau for investigation and that the direction of the investigation would hereafter be in your hands. Chief Justice Hughes requested that the Agent who is going to conduct this investigation contact him at his home, 2223 R Street, tomorrow morning at 9:30 A. M., in order that the Chief Justice can indicate his views in the situation.

The case is not particularly involved and should not require more than two days to complete. I believe that it would be well, however, for two men to jointly conduct all interviews in the case, and recommend that Agents and A. Rosen of the Field Office be designated for this assignment. If you approve this selection, they will be instructed to contact the Chief Justice at his residence tomorrow morning and will be furnished with the basic facts in the situation meanwhile.

Respectfully.

E. A. Tamm.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN 18 UNCLASSIFIED DATE 61

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Mr. Nathan ...

Mr. Tolson

Mr. Baughme

Mr. Clegg Mr. Coffey ...

Mr. Dawsey . Mr. Egan

Mr. Foxworth

Mr. Glavin ...


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
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
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Mr. Nethen Mr. Tolson Mr. Ecorhman Personal and Washington Field Office, Room 4244, Confidential Washington, D. C. October 24, 1936. MELIORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR 1576 Re: mieged Attempt to Sell advance Opinions of the U. S. Supreme DECLA Court copy of was exhibited to chief Justice Hugnes, and he requested that he be allowed to retain the 0 copy, which was permitted. The Chief Justice, upon reading the memorandum was visibly moved and stated that it was a most serious and extraordinary development, inasmuch as B has been a trusted employee of the U. S. Supreme Court since 1897. Due to the developments in this case, Agents and Rosen will hereafter contact the Chief Justice at his home, 2223 R St., N. W., D. and will not appear at any time in the future in the Supreme Court Building. The Chief Justice requested the unlisted telephone number of the Washington Field Office, and in addition thereto requested that the contents of the aforementioned conversation between Agent not be given to the Department of Justice. He was informed that the contents of this conversation are known only to the Director of this Bureau and the three Agents working on the case. 676 E 41.2.40 62-STIGATION RECORDED NOV 19,1926 Μ., 1. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COPIES DESTROYED 83 OCT 15 1964 FILE



JOHN EDGAR HOOVER

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Federal Bureau of Investigation

H. S. Department of Justice

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Mr. Nathan Mr. Tolson

Mr. Baughm Mr. Clegg...

Mr. Coffey .. Mr. Dawsey

Mr. Egan

Mr. Nichols Mr. Quinn Mr. Guinn Mr. Tamm Mr. Tamm

Miss Gandy.

Mr. Foxworth Mr. Glavin Mr. Harbo Mr. Joseph Mr. Lester

Washington, B. C. October 16, 1936

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Pursuant to your instructions, Agents Rosen and were authorized to see Chief Justice Hughes at 4:30 P.M. today in connection with the case involving certain irregularities on the part of an employee of the Supreme Court. A memorandum will be prepared tonight on the developments to date, and information will be transmitted to you daily relative to the progress name


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
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JOHN EDGAR HOOVER



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Federal Bureau of Investigation

Mr. Naths

Mr. Toiso: Mr. Baugh

Mr. Clegg

Mr. Coffey

Mr. Dawae

Mr. Égan., Mr. Forwo

Mr. Glavin

Mr. Harbo Mr. Joseph Mr. Lester Mr. Nichols Sir. Quinn Mr. Schiller

M. S. Department of Justice Masifington, A. C. October 15, 1936.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Some days ago, United States Marshal and of the Supreme Court of the United States called at the Washington Field Office and advised Mr. Keith concerning alleged irregularities on the part of a clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States. who endeavored to perfect some arrangement with

could presumably make money on his advance information concerning decisions handed down by the Supreme Court. The substance of this information was furnished to the Attorney General in a personal and confidential memorandum, with the request that the Bureau be advised if an investigation was authorized, it being noted that the Justices of the Supreme Court did not know of this occurrence. The Attorney General evidently referred the matter to Mr. Keenan, who in turn referred it to the Criminal Division, and Mr. McGuire of the Criminal Division called me about one o'clock today to advise that pursuant to a request from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to discuss this matter with someone who was familiar with the facts, he, McGuire, had gone to the Supreme Court this morning and laid the facts before Chief Justice Hughes, pointing out that he knew the facts only secondarily.

McGuire said that upon his return to his own office, he found a note of a call from Chief Justice Hughes expressing a desire to discuss the matter further with someone intimately acquainted with the details. McGuire said he had informed the Chief Justice that he, McGuire, would instruct the Special Agent who had initiated the investigation of this matter to report to the Supreme Court at 4:30 this afternoon to discuss the matter further with the Chief Justice.

I informed McGuire that the Bureau had not initiated any investigation into this matter since we were awaiting Departmental instructions; that consequently, there was no Agent available who was intimately in possession of all the facts. I told McGuire that it would appear the logical thing to have done in the beginning would be to have called upon the Director of the Bureau, or someone designated by him, to present the facts to the Chief Justice, and that since McGuire had already presented the facts to the Chief Justice and since the Bureau did not have authority to conduct any investigation, there would not appear to be anyone in the Bureau who could carry out McGuire's so-called "instructions" in this matter; that since he, McGuire,

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Memo for the Director

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
had handled the matter thus far, he might notify the secretary to Justice Hughes that the Department had no information other than that which he had previously been furnished.

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The impression I obtained from talking with McGuire is that he had "big timed" himself to the Chief Justice this morning, and had announced what he would instruct the Director of the Bureau to do. Consequently, I believe that until the Bureau receives some written authorization from the Department to conduct this investigation, we should let McGuire get himself out of the situation into which he has placed himself.

Respectfully E. A. TAMM




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ED EAU OF INVESTIGATION 3 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE	Cie.
Record of Telephone Call of Visitor. Oct. 15 1936.	Mr. Joseph
Time12:03	Mr. Kisimkaul Mr. Lester Mr. Hichols
Name Mr. McGuire in Mr. Keenan's	B Mr. Quinn Mr. Schilder
Office tele.	HT. TOALY
Referred to	Miss Gandy

Details:

Stated he had been unable to get in touch with Mr. Tamm and he would like to speak with the Director. When informed the Director was out he stated that what he wanted to ask the Director wa to have him send the Agent who is investigating f matter at the Supreme Court, up to see the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court at 4:30 PM this efternoon. Mr.McGuire stated that he had been up to see the Chief Justice and the latter stated he desired to see the Agent who is working on thems and who is familiar with the facts, this afternoo at 4:30. Mr. McGuire stated that arrangements for the appointment could be made thru Mr. Hogue, Lev Clerk to the Chief Justice, at National 5321, but that Mr.McGuire would like to have Mr. Tamm call when Mr.Tamm returned. This message was left wit Mr.Smith in Mr. Tamm's office. cek

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Memo for Director

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October 17, 1936

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
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
The Chief Justice has been fully advised as to the progress of the investigation to date. The Chief Justice suggested the possibility that a microphone might be concealed in the conference rooms of the Supreme Court, and requested that before the investigation is completed, the Agents make a thorough search of the conference rooms.


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Respectfully,

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In talking with Agent Rosen yesterday afternoon, Chief Justice Hughes informed him that he did not wish the arrangements to reach a point where there would be an actual delivery of one of the advance opinions of the Supreme Court.

- 2 -

Respectfully

E. A. Tenn.

OHN EDGAR HOOVER

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Federal Bureau of Investigation

U. S. Pepartment of Justice Mashington, D. C.

October 16, 1936

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Pursuant to your instructions, Special Agents and A. Rosen interviewed Chief Justice Charles Evans, Hughes at his restdence, 2223 R Street, N.W., at 9:30 this morning with reference to the alleged leak in the Supreme Court whereby advance notice of the opinions to be handed down would be furnished by the second an employee in the Supreme Court Building, to members of

The Chief Justice furnished no additional information other than that possessed at the present time by the Bureau, but indicated that he desired two points in particular to be stressed in the investigation, first, if, in fact, the Lade any overtures to the advance information of Supreme Court decisions, and second, that inasmuch as the was not in a position from his employment to secure this information, who, if any, person or persons were acting in collusion with him, the second person being in a position to secure advance copies of the decisions to be handed down.

The Chief Justice requested that the two Agents keep him informed from day to day of the progress of the investigation, and he indicated that he was quite concerned about the matter as it reflected upon the integrity of the Court and its employees. He particularly desired to be informed this day at 4:30 P.M. of the results of the investigation to date. The Chief Justice further informed the Agents that

had also spoken to Marshal and of the Supreme Court relative to this matter, and the conclusion drawn was to the effect that the final in his capacity in the conclusion drawn was to the effect that the final in his capacity in the court of the supreme Court Building, could not be in a position to obtain any information concerning the opinions to be rendered by the Court; that the only possibility for obtaining such information would arise through collusion with some other employee of the Supreme Court. Due to the rules of recording all visits to any part of

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Mr. Nathan ... Mr. Tolson ...!

Mr. Baughman


Mr. Clegg

Mr. Coffey

Mr. Clavin Mr. Harbo

Mr. Joseph Mr. Lester Mr. Nichols Mr. Quinn Mr. Schuldes

Mr. Temp



Memo for Director

and

October 16, 1936

the Supreme Court Building by persons employed in the building or outsiders, it is the opinion of the same and the Chief Justice that no one could have obtained information in advance of the decisions of the Court. Unless otherwise instructed, Agents will orally report to the Chief Justice each day as to the progress of the investigation.


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
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from Agents Rosen

Respectfully,

Tamm





Memo. for the Director

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October 23, 1936.

The Chief Justice will be interviewed today at 4:30 P.M. by Agents and Rosen, and the matter presented to him in its entirety for his decision.


Respectfully, S. A. TAMM.


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THE MACKAY RADIO AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY TRANSMITS AND DELIVERS THE WITHIN MESSAGE SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING TERMS AND CONDITIONS

To guard against mistakes or delays, the sender of a messare should order it REPEATED; that is, telegraphed back to the originating office for comparison. For this, one-half the hunrepeated message rate is charged in addition. Unless otherwise indicated on its face, THIS IS AN UNREPEATED MESSAGE AND PAID FOR AS SUCH, in consideration whereof it is agreed between the scader of the message and this Company as follows:

1. The Company shall not be liable for mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery, or for non-delivery, of any message received for transmission at the UNREPEATED-MESSAGE rate, whether caused by the negligence of its servants or otherwise, beyond the sum of FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS; nor for mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery, or for non-delivery, of any message received for transmission at the REPEATED-MESSAGE rate, beyond the sum of FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS; nor for mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery, or for non-delivery, of any message received for transmission at the SPECIALLY VALUED MESSAGE rate, beyond the sum at which such message shall be valued, in writing type of sender thereof when tendered for transmission and for which payment is made or agreed to be made of the share of the rate of the valuation shall exceed five thousand charge equal to one-tenth of one per cent of the short that a transmission in the working of its lines, or for errors in clober or obscure messages.

2. The Company is hereby made the agent of the sender wis the liability, to forward this message over the lines

of any other Company when necessary to reach is institutiation. 5 3. Messages will be delivered free within one ball million that many soffice in towns of 5.000 population or less, and within one mile of such office in other cities of toking reyond these limits the Company does not undertake to make delivery, but will, without liability, at the sender's request, as his agent and at his expense, endeavor to contract for him for such delivery at a reasonable price.

4. No responsibility attaches to this Company concerning messages until the same are accepted at one of its fransmitting offices; and it a message is sent to fuck office by one of the Company's messengers, he acts for that purpose as the agent of me sender.

5. The Company shall be liable for damages or statutory penalties in any case where the claim is not presented in writing whiln stary days after the message is filed with the Company for transmission.


6. It is agreed that product and correct transmission and delivery of this message shall be presumed in any ac-


W W.NO EMPLOYEE OF THIS COMPANY IS AUTHORIZED TO VARY THE FOREGOING.

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
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


Ô Person and Confide tial Washington Field Office, Room 4244, Washington, D. C. October 19, 1936 FICATION DECLAS T_{TT} ΒY Gandy MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR Re Attempting to Sell Advance Opinions of the U. S. Supreme Court 3 In a conversation with Special Agents hnđ RECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-12114 - P. A. Rosen on Saturday afternoon, Chief Justice Hughes indicated to the Agents that he desired that an effort be made to ascertain the identity of some acquaintances of the source, having in mind that one of his acquaintances might be the person with whom he is acting in collusion in an attempt to secure advance opinions of the United States Supreme Court. REOCRDFD & INDEXED Respectful ί. 6t ful 1 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 1400000-000 E. A. Temm **JCT 28** 1936 A. M. U. S. DEPARTON IT OF J 19710E OCT 29 1936 670 THE


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


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Federal Bureau of Investigation

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Washington, B. C.

October 30, 1936.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Re: Alleged Attempt to Sell Advance Opiniona of the Supreme Court of the United States.

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FEDERAL BUREAT OF INVESTIGATION

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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October 30, 1936.

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Respectfully,

A. TAMM. E.

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Federal Bureau of Inbestigation H. S. Department of Instice

> Washington, D. C. October 28, 1936.

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
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Re: Arreged Attempt to Sell Advance Oppinions of the Supreme Court

Investigation is being continued and arrangements will be made this evening to contact and have arrangements (Agent (Agent)) interview and relative to the delivery of an opinion in either the A. and P. Chain Store case or the <u>lowa Chain</u> Store Tax case. Both of these cases will be decided upon by the Supreme Court and opinions delivered during the next convening of the Court, which will take place on November 9, 1936.

Arrangements have also been made to have Chief Justice Hughes place identifying marks on the copies of the opinion in the above-named cases which will be delivered to the Justices. It is contemplated that a test run will be made and that the is able to deliver opinions in advance of the opinion day, will obtain one of the copies which have been circulated among the Justices.



Respectfully,

K. A. Tamm.


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


Mr. Nethen Mr. Tolson. JOHN EDGAR HOOVER Mr. Baughman DIRECTOR Mr. Clerr **Federal Bureau of Investigation** Nr. Ceffer EAT: CDW Mr. Daw United States Department of Justice Mr. Forwarth Washington, D. C. Mr. Glavin Mr. Harbo November 6, 1936. Mr. Joseph Mr. Lester Mr. Nichols Mr. Culna Time - 3:40 P.M. tte, Coküder. Mr. Talam Mr. Trees Mine Gandy MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR With reference to the Supreme Court matter, Mr. Hottel failed to show up for an telephoned me and said that Subject at the Washington appointment which he had with Agent Hotel at three o'clock this afternoon. They are going to try to get in touch with him tonight. Respectfully, E. A. TAMM 62 1100 NOV 10 1976 Ċ, 1000 11.1 Y LLEON

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER

ENGLOSURE ATTACHED

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November 4, 1936.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NATHAN

Re: Taking of photographs by $\int_{\mathcal{D}} \mathcal{D} \zeta$ Special Agents and Rosen.

On October 29, 1936 the Laboratory furnished Special Agents and Rosen of the Washington Field office Leica/cameras for use in photographing suspects in a confidential investigation.

Your attention is called to the excellent results obtained by Agent with the aid of telephoto lens equipment and a Leica camera furnished by the Laboratory. The attached photographs which depict the subjects in question were taken without their knowledge at distances ranging from fifty to one hundred and fifty feet.

At the same time motion pictures were also taken by of the Laboratory depicting these same subjects in conversation with each other.

Respectfully. Coffey

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Mr. Nethan

Mr. Tolson

Mr. Baughman ...

Mr. Clegg Mr. Coffey

Mr. Dawsey Mr. Egan

Mr. Perworth Mr. Glavin Mr. Barbo

Mr. Joseph Mr. Lester Mr. Nichols Mr. Quinn Mr. Schilder

Mr. Tracy .

Miss Gandy

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
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
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
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Office of the Attorney General Washington, D.C.

October 13, 1936.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOOVER.

I have your memorandum of October 10, with reference

I note also that you have sent a copy of the memorandum to Mr. Keenan.

I would suggest that you confer personally with Mr. Keenan and determine upon a course of action. Your memorandum does not clearly indicate whether or not the Chief Justice has yet been advised by Marshall and the developments referred to. It rather strikes me there it would be best for Mr. to submit the matter to the Chief Justice and that thereafter the F.B.I. should follow a course approved by the Chief Justice.

If you and Mr. Keenan take this view, I would be glad if you would proceed along the lines suggested.

> H.S.C. ▲.G.

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MENORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

PERSONAL AND CHIFIDENTIAL

The Tollowing Information has been received from Marshal for the Supreme Court of the United States.

Marshal advised that before reporting this matter to the Court, he bilieved it desirable to make some inquiries to substantiate or disprove the information obtained and, accordingly, he interviewed

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October 10, 1936

Marshel advises that he talked with who furnished in substance the same facts as and

Marshal

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
stated that through inquiries conducted of

Marshal , upon reaching this point in his inquiries, decided that the matter was one requiring the attention of this Bureau and, accordingly, he has submitted the facts to the Bureau. I would appreciate being advised whether you desire the Bureau to initiate investigation into this situation.

I am transmitting a copy of this memorandum to Mr. Keenan for his information.

Respectfully,

Jihn Edgar Hoover, Director.



() Federal Bureau of Investigation Caller United States Department of Instice Washington Field Division, Rm. 4244, M -Washington, D. C. Mr. Glevin November 13, 1936. Mr. Harbo Mr. Jos coli Mr. Lester . Mr. Nichols Mr. Quinn Mr. Schilder . Mr. Tamm ... Mr. Tracy MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR. Mise Gendy... RE ALLEGED ATTEMPT TO SELL OPINIONS OF đ U. S. OSUPREME COURT IN ADVANCE. 1311 Pursuant to previous arrangements, at the Mayflower Hotel at 3 p.m. met (Agent) this date, having previously been prepared to receive an opinion who stated on Thursday, November of the Supreme Court from 12, 1936, that he had something to deliver to At this stated meeting, is unable 's impression that It wa was informed to obtain any opinions of the Supreme Court, and is able to get an opinion, that until such time as by no further negotiations or meetings would be had relative to this matter. ı. ctfully Res Temm E. AR: JGM 46240 - 23 DECORI ISD TNDE / 101 17 1938

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigat 💷

United States Department of Instice

EAT:TMF

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Washington, B. C.

November 19, 1936

Mr. Ciere

Mr. Coffey . Mr. Dawsey

Mr. Barro

E. Jo eut

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

With reference to the case involving the alleged lead in the supreme Court. you are advised that Agents Rosen and the supreme court is last evening a signed statement in which he admits his participation in this entire project in his efforts to sell advanced copies of Supreme Court decisions.

has been interviewed and a signed statement taken from him outlining in detail his part in the affair.

Since the interrogation of him is the next step. Since the interrogation of the investigation of him is the next step. leak getting out concerning the investigation the facts will be discussed this afternoon with the Chief Justice, by the investigating Agents to ascertain whether he will permit going further into the investigation.

Respectful

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JOHN EDGAR HOOVER

ueral Bureau of Investigation United States Department of Instic. Washington, D. C. November 20, 1936

EAT:RP

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Agents Rosen and the interviewed mentioned in my memorandum of yesterday, mentioned in my memorandum of yesterday, leged obtaining of advance copies of Supreme Court decisions. A signed statement was obtained from the which, together with other facts developed, indicates that he regarded this whole matter as something of a hoax or a practical joke being played by or on someone. The statement sets forth that it would be virtually impossible for any person under the setup in the Supreme Court to obtain advance copies of decisions, and the Bureau's investigation substantiates this condition.

The Chief Justice has been furnished with the facts orally in this matter and copies of the signed statements have been displayed to him. He expressed himself as highly pleased with both the results of the investigation and the manner in which it was conducted, and requested the investigating Agents to personally convey to you his commendation for the handling of this matter.

A complete report on the entire investigation will be prepared which will take several days to get out, and I will also have prepared a personal and confidential letter for your signature to the Chief Justice furnishing him with the general facts disclosed by the investigation.

Respec

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EECORDED & INDEXED.

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Fovember 27, 1956.

Nonorable Charles Evans Highes, Ohisf Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 2223 R Street, N. M., 🖉 👘 Washington, D. C. Marker and the second second

My dear Mr. Chief Justice:

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With reference to the investigation which was conducted of an amployee in the U. S. Supreme Court Building, who, it is alleged, was endeavoring to dispose of, for a monstary consideration, opinions of the Court in advance of their being delivered, it has been determined that the was not only unable to produce an opinion. but that such an eventuality is highly improbable.


I have been informed by the Special Agents who were engaged a in this investigation that a meeting took place on October 22, 1936, between and an Agent of this Bureau, who represented himself to h

on the t a second meating between Mesers, night of October 29, 1936 ____ named in the Supreme Court Building, as his associate. In addition thereto, an appointment was made by the to deliver to the second an opinion at 5 p.m. an opinion at 5 y.m. on Hovember 5th in the Lobby of the Washington Hotel. This appointment was - kept, but ment alled to make the expected delivery. However, he stated that if he could secure an opinion during the interim, he would meet failed to keep this appointment. the following day.

The final meeting coourred in the lobby of the Mayflower confessed his inability Hogel on November 13, 1935, at which time

The final meeting co out model on November 13, 1938, at which is not perform his part of the agreement. Destrict 15 confront both to coppies of 15 confront both to E^3 D^{10} both Messre. In and expressent. E^3 D^{10} D^2 D^2 D

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOIPA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

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