



Course Overview

Overall Training Objective:

Provide an instructional foundation on the DIOG and then apply the knowledge gained by using hypothetical examples and scenarios. Upon completing this course of instruction you should have a firm grasp of the concepts and principles underpinning the DIOG.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



Course Overview

Participation Standards:

Questions are welcome; however, if your question is about a specific set of facts that may divert the training objective, please direct your question to one of the Training team members at a break for a response.

During the scenario exercises, participants will be called upon to provide their response to particular facts or circumstances. Each Unit/Section should select a representative to speak for the Unit/Section and rotate that responsibility among the group. The scenarios are meant to prompt discussion, but the presenters must keep the scenario moving forward. Please understand that everyone may not be able to voice their perspective in the group setting. Keep in mind there may be several avenues to reach the same justified conclusion. You may use your handouts and training aids to inform your decision.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO




Course Overview

Course Completion:

- •You must complete the entire mandatory 16.5 hours of training. You must score an 80% or higher to pass. You will be notified of your score via e-mail. If you do not pass the first time, you will be permitted to take the test again.
- •Please annotate on the attendance sheet your presence at the training if you pre-registered. If you did not pre-register, please print your name, division, and the items requested on the attendance roster.
- After the course is complete, you will be receiving a survey e-mail containing questions that will test your knowledge and understanding of the material presented. The test is open book.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO




Teaching Point: Removes discrepancies, sets uniform rules for criminal, national security, and foreign intelligence collection cases. Each program will have a program-specific policy guide (PG)



- Reduces reporting requirements, particularly in the national security area
- Recognizes Special Events and Domain Management as part of the FBI's mission
- Recognizes the FBI's obligation to provide investigative assistance and joint operational support to other agencies, including the U.S. intelligence community
- Creates a new category outside of predicated investigations named "Assessments"

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



Teaching Point:

FBIHQ Division Program Policy Implementation Guides (PG):

- •Cannot be less restrictive than the DIOG
- •Must comply with the policy contained in the DIOG
- •Requests for program policy deviations from the DIOG must be reviewed by the OGC <u>and</u> approved by the Deputy Director



1. Scope and Purpose	10. Sensitive Investigative Matter
General Authorities and Principles	11. Investigative Methods
3. Core Values, Roles and Responsibilities	12. Assistance to Other Agencies
Privacy and Civil Liberties, and Least Intrusive Methods	13. Extraterritorial Provisions
5. Assessments	14. Retention and Sharing of Information
6. Preliminary Investigations	15. Intelligence Analysis and Planning
7. Full Investigations	16. Undisclosed Participation
8. Enterprise Investigations	17. Otherwise Illegal Activity
9. Foreign Intelligence	Appendices



- DIOG applies to all investigative and intelligence collection activities conducted by the FBI
 - within the United States
 - in the United States territories
 - outside the territories of all countries
- DIOG does <u>not</u> apply to investigative and intelligence collection activities of the FBI <u>in</u> foreign countries
 - governed by AGGs for Extraterritorial FBI
 Operations (national security and criminal)



DIOG Section 1: Scope & Purpose

- The primary purpose of the AGG-DOM and the DIOG is to standardize policy so that criminal, national security and foreign intelligence investigative activities are performed in a legal and consistent manner
- The DIOG replaces numerous FBI manuals, electronic communications, letterhead memoranda and other policy documents. The DIOG is located on the Corporate policy Office (CPO) Policy and Guidance Library web site
- The changes implemented by the DIOG better equip you to protect the people of the United States against crime and threats to the national security
- The DIOG stresses the importance of oversight and self-regulation to ensure compliance

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



- The AGG-Dom replaces six guidelines:
 - The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes,
 Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations (May 30, 2002)
 - The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (October 31, 2003) *
 - The Attorney General's Supplemental Guidelines for Collection, Retention, and Dissemination of Foreign Intelligence (November 29, 2006)




DIOG Section 2: General Authorities & Principles

• The AGG-Dom also replaces:

- The Attorney General Procedure for Reporting and Use of Information Concerning Violations of Law and Authorization for Participation in Otherwise Illegal Activity in FBI Foreign Intelligence, Counterintelligence or International Terrorism Intelligence Investigations (August 8, 1988) *
- The Attorney General's Guidelines for Reporting on Civil Disorders and Demonstrations Involving a Federal Interest (April 5, 1976)
- The Attorney General's Procedures for Lawful, Warrantless Monitoring of Verbal Communications (May 30, 2002) (only portion applicable to FBI)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

DIOG Section 2:



Note: Regarding Extraterritorial FBI's Operations, the AGG-Dom did not repeal or supersede certain portions of the prior guidelines (marked * in prior slides). These national security extraterritorial portions continue to remain in effect pending the approval of new Attorney General's Guidelines for Extraterritorial FBI Operations for both national security and criminal investigations.

Additionally, the classified Attorney General Guidelines for Extraterritorial FBI Operations and Criminal Investigations (1993) continue to remain in effect pending approval of the new guidelines.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



Comparison of Prior and New Attorney General Guidelines

General Comparison

Prior AGG

Investigative Guidelines and Compliance Rules

- The six guidelines governing investigative and intelligence gathering replaced/superseded by the new AGG:

 - The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations; The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection
 The Attorney General's Supplemental Guidelines for Collection, Retention, and Dissemination of Foreign Intelligence
 The Attorney General's Supplemental Guidelines for Collection, Retention, and Dissemination of Foreign Intelligence
 The Attorney General Procedure for Reporting and Use of Information Concerning Violations of Law and Authorization for Participation in Otherwise Illegal Activity in FBI Foreign Intelligence, Counterintelligence or International Terrorist Intelligence Investigations
 The Attorney General's Guidelines for Reporting on Civil Disorders and Demonstrations Involving a Federal Interest
 The Attorney General's Procedures for Lawful, Warrantless Monitoring of Verbal
 Communications (superseded, as to the FBI)
- Numerous and different guidelines used for compliance
- Different rules for national security and criminal investigations

New AGG

Investigative Guidelines and Compliance Rules

- The Attorney General's Guidelines (AGG) for Domestic FBI Operations govern all FBI investigative and intelligence gathering activities conducted in the United States or outside the territories of all other countries replaces five guidelines and supersedes one
- One standardized guideline used for compliance
- One set of rules for national security and criminal investigations

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



Comparison of Prior and New Attorney General Guidelines

Assessments

Prior AGG (Threat Assessments)

Authorized Methods

- Obtain publicty available Information
 Access and examine FBI/DOJ records, and obtain
 Information from any FBI/DOJ personnel
 Check other federal, state, and local records
 Use online services and resources
 Interview previously established Human Sources (not
 including new tasking of such sources)
 Interview or request Information from members of the
 public and private entitles (other than pretext interviews
 or requests)
 Accept voluntarily information

New AGG (Assessments)

Authorized Methods

- Obtain publicly available information
- Obtain publicly available information.

 Access and examine FBI and other DOJ records, and obtain information from any FBI or DOJ personnel.

 Access and examine records maintained by, and request information from, other federal, state, local, tribal, or foreign government or agencies.

 Use online services and resources.
- Use and recruit human sources in conformity with AG Guidelines Regarding the Use of FBI Confidential Human Sources
- Interview or request information from members of the public and private entities
 Accept information voluntarily provided by governmental or private entitles
- Engage in observation or surveillance not requiring a court order

Reporting Regulréments

None

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Reporting Requirements



Preliminary Investigations

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Prior AGG

Authorized Methods

- All Threat Assessment techniques Interviews (including pretext) of subject and others Recruitment of new human sources & tasking of existing sources
- sources of the stand of the sta

- Polygraph examinations
- Polygraph examinations
 National Security Letters
 Accessing stored wire/electronic communications
 Pen registers/Trap & Trace
 Obtain business records
 Grand Jury subpoenas

Reporting Regulrements

- Field notification of Instation to FBIHQ (10 Days) FBIHQ notification to DQJ-Qt of Initiation (10 Days) FBIHQ notify DAG if initiation is disapproved

<u> Partin de la companya de la compan</u>

New AGG

Authorized Methods

- All Assessment Methods

 Mail covers

 Physical searches of personal or real property where a warrant or court order is not legally required because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy

 Consensual monitoring of communications (including consensual computer monitoring)

 Closed circuit TV, direction finders, and monitoring devices
 Polygraph examinations

 Undercover operations

 Compulsory process as authorized by law; Federal Grand Jury and other subpoenas and National Security Letters

 Accessing store were and electronic communications and transactional records

 Use of pen registers and trap and trace devices

Reporting Requirements

- Only if sensitive investigative matter Notify FBIHQ and DOJ/U.S. Attorney Notify NSD if sensitive matter is a national security threat (NLT 30 Days) FBIHQ notify the DAG if initiation is disapproved based on insufficient predication for national security matters

b2 b7E



Full Investigations

Prior AGG

Authorized Methods

All Threat Assessment techniques All preliminary investigation techniques Electronic Surveillance Physical searches and Mail openings .

Reporting Requirements

Field notification of initiation to FBIHQ (10 Days) FBIHQ notification to DOJ-OI of initiation (10 Days) FBIHQ notify DAG if initiation is disapproved Annual summary submitted to DOJ-OI

New AGG

Authorized Methods

- All Assessment Methods
 All Preliminary Investigation Methods
 Electronic Surveillance
 Foreign Intelligence collection under Title VII of FISA
 Physical searches and Mail openings

Reporting Requirements

- Notify FBIHQ and DOJ/U.S. Attorney sensitive investigative matter Notify NSD if sensitive matter is a national security threat (NLT 30 Days) FBIHQ notification to DOJ-NSD (NLT 30 Days) only if:

 - Initiation on U.S. person relating to a national security threat
 Initiation based on foreign intelligence requirement
- FBIHQ notify the DAG if initiation is disapproved based on insufficient predication for national security matters

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



The FBI is authorized to:

- Conduct investigations and collect evidence (criminal and national security) and collect foreign intelligence (AGG-Dom, Part II)
- Provide investigative assistance to federal, state, local, tribal, and foreign agencies (AGG-Dom, Part III) and (DIOG Section 12)
- Collect information necessary for and conduct intelligence analysis & planning (AGG-Dom, Part II & IV) and (DIOG Section 15)
- Retain and share information (AGG-Dom, Part VI) and (DIOG Section 14)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



The word "Assessment" has two distinct meanings:

- The AGG-Dom authorizes as an investigative activity an "assessment" which requires an authorized purpose and objective as discussed in DIOG Section
- The U.S. intelligence community uses the word "assessment" to describe written intelligence products as discussed in DIOG Section 15.7.B.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



- The FBI is an intelligence agency as well as a law enforcement agency
- The FBI is authorized to engage in intelligence analysis and planning, using all lawful sources of information:
 - development of overviews and analysis
 - research and analysis to produce reports and assessments
 - operate intelligence systems that facilitate and support investigations through ongoing compilation and analysis of data and information



- The FBI is the "lead federal agency" in the following areas:
 - Federal Crimes of Terrorism (listed in DIOG Section 2.4.C)
 - Other non-Terrorism federal crimes (listed in DIOG Section 2.4.D)
 - Counterintelligence and Espionage (listed in DIOG Section 2.4.F)
 - Criminal Investigations (some listed in DIOG Section 2.4.G; see also CID PGs)



Departures from the AGG – Dom:

In Advance: FBI Director, Deputy Director, or EAD (NSB or Criminal Cyber Response and Services Branch) must approve with notice to the General Counsel.

In Emergency: Approving authority who authorizes the departure must give notice as soon thereafter as practical to Director, Deputy Director or EAD with notice to General Counsel – OGC must keep records of all departures to advise DOJ, as required.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



Departures from the DIOG:

<u>In Advance</u>: Appropriate substantive AD or DAD must approve with notice to the General Counsel or appropriate Deputy General Counsel (DGC).

In Emergency: Approving authority who authorizes the departure must give notice as soon thereafter as practical; SAC or HQ Section Chief must provide written notice to appropriate substantive AD and the General Counsel.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



The AGG-Dom and DIOG apply to all FBI domestic investigations and operations conducted by "FBI employees" – defined as:

- · applicable support personnel
- intelligence analysts
- special agents
- task force officers (TFO)
- detailees
- FBI contractors
- confidential human sources (CHS)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



FBIHQ Division Program Policy Implementation Guides (PG):

- · Cannot be less restrictive than the DIOG
- Must comply with the policy contained in the DIOG
 - requests for program policy deviations from the DIOG must be reviewed by the OGC <u>and</u> approved by the Deputy Director

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



DIOG Section 2: General Authorities & Principles

Authorities of an FBI Special Agent:

- 1. Investigate violations of the laws, including the criminal drug laws, of the United States (21 U.S.C. § 871; 28 U.S.C. §§ 533, 534 and 535; 28 C.F.R. § 0.85)
- 2. Collect evidence in cases in which the United States is or may be a party in interest (28 C.F.R. § 0.85 [a]) as redelegated through exercise of the authority contained in 28 C.F.R. § 0.138 to direct personnel in the FBI
- 3. Make arrests (18 U.S.C. §§ 3052 and 3062)
- 4. Serve and execute arrest warrants and seize property under warrant; issue and/or serve administrative subpoenas; serve subpoenas issued by other proper authority; and make civil investigative demands (18 U.S.C. §§ 3052, 3107; 21 U.S.C. § 876; 15 U.S.C. § 1312)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



Authorities of an FBI Special Agent (cont.):

- 5. Carry firearms (18 U.S.C. § 3052)
- Administer oaths to witnesses attending to testify or depose in the course of investigations of frauds on or attempts to defraud the United States or irregularities or misconduct of employees or agents of the United States (5 U.S.C. § 303)
- 7. Seize property subject to seizure under the criminal and civil forfeiture laws of the United States (e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 and 982)
- 8. Perform other duties imposed by law


LINCLASSIFIED/JEOUT



The AGG-Dom did not limit other authorized FBI activities, such as:

- Conducting background checks and inquires concerning applicants and employees under federal personnel security programs
- Maintenance and operation of national criminal records systems and preparation of national crime statistics
- Forensic assistance and administration functions of the FBI Laboratory

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



The FBI's Core Values are:


- Rigorous obedience to the U.S. Constitution
- · Respect for the dignity of all those we protect
- Compassion
- Fairness
- Uncompromising personal integrity and institutional integrity
- Accountability by accepting responsibility for our actions and decisions and their consequences
- Leadership, by example, both personal and professional

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

29


Teaching Points: DIOG Section 3.1:

- 1. Core values must be fully understood, practice, shared, vigorously defended and preserved.
- 2. By observing core values FBI will achieve a high level of excellence in performing both our national security and criminal missions.
- 3. Information for reporting violations is available from the Office of Integrity and Compliance (OIC).



Teaching Point: DIOG Section 3.1:

- 1. DIOG compliance applies to all FBI employees, task force officers, contractor's etc.
- 2. May not disregard the law, rule, etc. for sake of expediency.
- 3. Information for reporting.



Teaching Point: DD, through the CPO, will review the Program Guides (PGs) for all divisions to ensure compliance with DIOG standards.



DIOG Section 3: Special Agent, Intelligence Analyst, Task Force Officer, FBI Contractor, and Others - Roles and Responsibilities

DIOG Section 3.3:

- Comply with AGG-Dom and DIOG standards for initiation, conducting, and closing investigative activity; collection activity; or use of an investigative method
- Obtain training on DIOG standards relevant to their position and perform activities consistent with those standards
- Ensure all investigative activity complies with all laws and policy
- Identify victims, offer FBI assistance, and furnish information to the FBI Victim Specialist

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

22

Teaching Point:

- Laws/policy include the Constitution, federal law, Executive Orders,
 Presidential Directives, AGG-Dom, other AGGs, Treaties, MOAs/MOUs, DIOG
 and other policy. When in doubt consult their Supervisor, the CDC or OGC.
- 2. Victims include those who have suffered direct physical, emotional, or financial harm as a result of the commission of federal crimes.




DIOG Section 3: Special Agent, Intelligence Analyst, Task Force Officer, FBI Contractor, and Others - Roles and Responsibilities

(Continued – DIOG Section 3.3)

- Ensure civil liberties and privacy are protected throughout the assessment or investigative process
- Conduct no investigative activity solely on the basis of activities protected by the 1st Amendment or solely on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin or religion of the subject
- Report non-compliance to the proper authority

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



DIOG Section 3.4.A – Supervisor Defined:

 Field Office or FBIHQ personnel, including: SIA, SSA, SSRA, UC, ASAC, ASC, SAC, DAD, AD, ADIC, and EAD


UNCLASSIFIED//FOUC



DIOG Section 3.4.B - Supervisor Responsibilities:

- Determine whether the DIOG standards are satisfied for initiating, approving, conducting and closing an investigative activity, collection activity, or investigative method
- Ensure all investigative activity complies with all laws and policy
- Obtain training on DIOG standards relevant to their position and <u>conform</u> their decisions to those standards
- Ensure civil liberties and privacy are protected throughout the assessment or investigative process

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



Continued DIOG Section 3.4.B - Supervisor Responsibilities:


- If encountering a practice that does not comply with the law, rules, or regulations, the supervisor must:
 - 1. report that compliance concern to the proper authority
 - 2. take action to maintain compliance, when necessary
- Ensure no retaliation or adverse action is taken against persons who raise compliance concerns

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOUO

36


Teaching Points:

- 1. Should report non-compliance to immediate Supervisor and/or OIC.
- 2. OIC non-retaliation policy located in the CPO policy and guidance library.




Teaching Points: Question – Can SSA or SIA <u>delegate</u>? No, but an appropriately designated Acting or Relief Supervisor can <u>assume</u> the responsibilities in the absence of the SSA.


DIOG 3.4 C



Teaching Points: ACS Investigative Case management Case Review report.




Teaching Points: DIOG Section 5 details file review requirements.



Teaching Points: Probationary Agent File reviews conducted at least every 60 days, recommend 30 days

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO






DIOG Section 3: CDC's Role and Responsibilities

CDC's Role and Responsibilities:

- Must review all Assessments, Preliminary Investigations (PI) and Full Investigations (FI) that involve a "Sensitive Investigative Matter" (SIM)
- 2. Must review particular investigative methods as mandated by DIOG Section 5 and 11
- 3. Requirements imposed on the CDC may be performed by an Associate Division Counsel, Legal Advisor, or designated Acting CDC. All delegations must be in writing and retained appropriately.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO




CDC Determinations:

The primary purpose of the CDC's review is to ensure the legality of the actions proposed. In this context, the review includes a determination that the:

- Investigative activity is not legally objectionable (can be overruled by OGC)
 - Activity is not based solely on the exercise of 1st Amendment rights or on the race, ethnicity, national origin or religion of the subject
- The investigation is founded upon an "authorized purpose" (Assessments) or have adequate factual predication (Preliminary and Full)
- Advise as to the "wisdom" of the proposed action

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



Continued: CDC Determinations

The CDC's determination is based on facts known at the time of the review and recommendation.

The CDC may require additional reviews or provide guidance as to monitoring the results of investigative activity to ensure that the authorized purpose and/or factual predication remain intact after additional facts are developed.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO




DIOG Section 3: OGC Roles and Responsibilities

OGC Role: In coordination with the DOJ NSD, the OGC is responsible for conducting regular reviews of all aspects of FBI national security and foreign intelligence activities.

The primary purpose of the OGC's review is to ensure the legality of the actions proposed. These reviews, conducted in the field offices and in HQ Units, broadly examine such activities for compliance with the AGG-Dom and other requirements. In this context, the review includes a determination that the:

- Investigative activity is not legally objectionable (Activity is not based solely on the exercise of 1st Amendment rights or on the race, ethnicity, national origin or religion of the subject)
- The investigation is founded upon an "authorized purpose" (Assessments) or have adequate factual predication (Preliminary and Full) and meets the standards in the DIOG
- · Advise as to the "wisdom" of the proposed action


UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



Continued: OGC Determinations

- The OGC's determination above is based on facts known at the time of the review and recommendation.
- The OGC may require additional reviews or provide guidance as to monitoring the results of investigative activity to ensure that the authorized purpose and/or factual predication remain in tact after facts are developed

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



<u>CPO = Corporate Policy Office</u>: Oversight and Implementation of the DIOG; Report compliance risks to OIC (DIOG Section 3.7)

OIC = Office of Integrity and Compliance: Identify compliance risk areas, adequacy of policy and training programs, monitor DIOG compliance (DIOG Section 3.8)

DCO = Division Compliance Officer: One identified in each Field Office to assist the OIC to identify potential non-compliance risk areas and report them to proper authority and OIC (DIOG Section 3.10)

<u>PM = Program Manager</u>: HQ entity that identifies, prioritizes, and analyzes compliance risks and takes appropriate corrective action (DIOG Section 3.9)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



- Responsibility to protect the American public, not only from crime and terrorism, but also from incursions into their constitutional rights; accordingly, all investigative activities must fully adhere to the Constitution and the principles of civil liberty and privacy.
- Provisions of the AGG-Dom, other AG guidelines, and oversight from DOJ components, are designed to ensure FBI's activities are lawful, appropriate, and ethical, as well as effective in protecting civil liberties and privacy.
- DOJ and FBI's Inspection Division, Office of Integrity and Compliance, the OGC, other Bureau components, and you share responsibility for ensuring the FBI meets these goals.

48

Teaching Point:

The FBI is a very important agency with dedicated, highly professional, greatly disciplined Government servants. These words, uttered in in 1975 by then Attorney General Levi, are just as true today – if not more so – than they were 34 years ago. But when these words were spoken, it was in the context of Senate hearings on the intelligence function of the FBI and the substantial concerns expressed by a parade of witnesses that for the purpose of protecting the national security and preventing violence, the Bureau was engaging in activities that "tread[] on forbidden ground."

Fashioning investigative activities that navigate between Constitutional requirements and the imperatives of protecting the nation is often a difficult balancing act and one of the hardest issues that an agent or analyst can face is whether and under what circumstances a particular investigative activity is appropriate. The rewards when we find the right balance often go unnoticed by the general public, but the criticism when we don't can be heard far and wide.

The Attorney General Guidelines for Domestic Activities and the implementing Domestic Investigations Operations Guide are built on a history of attempting to fashion the proper balance between investigating crimes and collecting intelligence while protecting the civil liberties of our people. You are sitting here today because it is your job to help educate your colleagues on how to strike the right balance.



- No investigation or assessment can be commenced based solely on race, ethnicity, national origin, religion of the subject or the exercise of First Amendment rights.
- Corollary to this AGG requirement is the Privacy Act, which states that each agency that maintains a system of records shall "maintain no record describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity. 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(7).

49

Teaching Point:

The first two conditions in the Privacy Act are fairly simply and not typical. If Congress says we can collect and maintain records about how an individual exercises First Amendment rights or if the subject of the record consents, there's no problem – and any resultant records would not be based solely on First Amendment activities.

The purpose of (e)(7) of the Privacy Act, as articulated in the limited legislative history that we have, is to prevent the "collection of protected information not immediately needed, about law-abiding Americans, on the off-chance that Government or the particular agency might possibly have to deal with them in the future." The Act does not define an "authorized law enforcement activity," but the courts have been generous in finding a law enforcement purpose for FBI activities.



- The test is whether the collection of information is relevant to a law enforcement activity.
- · Consider the following cases:
 - Patterson v. FBI, 893 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1990).
 - Bassiouni v. FBI, 436 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2006).

Teaching Point:

Cases interpreting this section of the Privacy Act have approved:

1. The first cases involved the FBI's maintenance of records describing a 6th grader's letters, written as part of a school project, to a large number of foreign embassies. The return address on the letters was his father's business and the resultant records not only examined the company, but also the 6th grader. The court found that maintenance of records about the 6th grader was relevant to a law enforcement activity. Interestingly, the investigation in this case was undertaken pursuant to the then existing AG Guidelines.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO


2. In the second case, we argued that the plaintiff's records were relevant to current FBI "investigative interests" because the investigation of terrorism is a top FBI priority and the records concerned the plaintiff's contacts with, and activities concerning, the Middle East. The court agreed. We also argued that we needed to keep the records for contextual reasons, if we received new information about the plaintiff, and also to evaluate the credibility and veracity of FBI sources. The court found all these reasons for maintenance of the records persuasive and consistent with an authorized law enforcement activity.




- The AGG-Dom says that any activity undertaken pursuant to the Guidelines is an authorized law enforcement activity for purposes of the Privacy Act.
- Is this enough?

stan mas silastan tampisas tampisas tampisas tampisas sa tahi tampan sa tampa sa tampa sa tampa sa tampisas tampisa tampisas tampisas tampisas tampisas tampisas tampisas tampi

Teaching Point:					



Questions continue on next slide



b2 b7E

Teaching Point:

These are difficult issues, but it is important to understand not only what is permissible, but how to document what action is taken.



FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS:

Individuals or groups who communicate with each other or with members of the public in any form in pursuit of social or political causes—such as opposing war or foreign policy, protesting government actions, promoting certain religious beliefs, championing particular local, national, or international causes, or a change in government through non-criminal means, and actively recruit others to join their causes—have a fundamental constitutional right to do so. An assessment may not be initiated based solely on the exercise of these First Amendment rights. If, however, a group exercising its First Amendment rights also threatens or advocates violence or destruction of property, an assessment would be appropriate

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS (cont.):

- No investigative activity, including assessments, may be taken solely on the basis of activities that are protected by the First Amendment or on the race, ethnicity, national origin or religion of the subject.
- If an assessment or predicated investigation touches on or is partially motivated by First Amendment activities, race, ethnicity, national origin or religion, it is particularly important to identify and document the basis for the assessment with clarity

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



DIOG Section 4: Privacy and Civil Liberties, and Least Intrusive Methods

All activities must be consistent with the Attorney General's 2003 Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies (forbids the use of racial profiling and requires activities involving the investigation or prevention of threats to the national security to comply with the Constitution and laws of the United States)

The DIOG stresses several points in each section:

- No investigation or assessment can be commenced based solely on race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, or exercise of First Amendment rights
- The FBI must use the least intrusive method that is feasible under the circumstances
- In connection with Foreign Intelligence collection, agents must operate openly and consensually with U.S. Persons, to the extent practicable
- All investigative activities must have an "authorized purpose"

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



DIOG Guidance on use of Race or Ethnicity

As to individuals:

- 1. Permits the consideration of ethnic and racial identity information based on specific reporting;
- 2. The race or ethnicity of suspected members, associates, or supporters of an ethnic-based gang or criminal enterprise may be collected when gathering information about or investigating the organization; or
- 3. Ethnicity may be considered in evaluating whether a subject is—
 or is not—a possible associate of a criminal or terrorist group that
 is known to be comprised of members of the same ethnic
 grouping—as long as it is not the dominant factor for
 focusing on a particular person

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO




DIOG Guidance on use of Race or Ethnicity

As to a community:

- 1. Collecting and analyzing demographics if these locations will reasonably aid the analysis of potential threats and vulnerabilities, and, overall, assist domain awareness
- 2. Geo-Mapping ethnic/racial demographics if properly collected
- 3. General ethnic/racial behavior <u>cannot</u> be collected, <u>unless</u> it bears a rational relationship to a valid investigative or analytical need
- 4. Specific and relevant ethnic behavior
- 5. Exploitive ethnic behavior by criminal or terrorist groups

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



Teaching Point: There is a component of efficiency in being "effective".

In some instances, a more intrusive method, i.e. use of a CHS, may be more operationally sound and effective for resolving an outstanding investigative need, than a less intrusive method such as acquiring financial records or business records. The totality of the circumstances surrounding the investigative activity plays an important role in considering the use of the least intrusive alternative for obtaining intelligence or evidence. It is a balancing test.



By emphasizing the use of less intrusive means, employees will be able to balance:

Our need for evidence/intelligence vs.

Mitigating potential negative impact on the privacy and civil liberties of people/public

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO





DIOG Section 4: Privacy and Civil Liberties, and Least Intrusive Methods

Primary factor in determining "intrusiveness":

- The degree of procedural protection that the law and the AGG-DOM provide for the use of the particular method.
 - Examples of <u>"more intrusive"</u> methods: Search Warrants, wiretaps, UCOs
 - Examples of "less intrusive" methods: checks of government databases, state or local criminal record checks, commercial databases, interviews

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



DIOG Section 4: Privacy and Civil Liberties, and Least Intrusive Methods

Items to consider when determining the relative intrusiveness of an investigative method:

- Is method permitted prior to the initiation of an assessment?
- Is the method relevant to the assessment or investigation?
- Will the information collected or obtained likely further the investigative objective?
- · What alternatives exist for gathering the same information?
- · Are those alternatives relatively less intrusive?
- What time span is involved in using the investigative method (days, weeks, months)?
- What confidence level is associated with the information gathered using the investigative method?
- · Will the method resolve a pending investigative issue quickly?


UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



Factors to Determine "Intrusiveness":

- 1. Nature of the information sought
- 2. Scope of the information sought
- 3. Scope of the use of the investigative method
- 4. Source of the information sought
- 5. Risk of public exposure

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO





Investigative Methods/Approvals Chart

		shortzed Method and DIOG Reference*		royal Levels for Assessments and Predicated Inv		
textorized memora signologi (talesaich.		21/4/1244 Wearen and 21/4/12/12/12/4	Assessments Predicated		Foreign intelligence	
ı١	5.9A	Obtain publicly available Information	None Required	None Required	None Required.	
1		Tasking a UCE to attend a religious service	Not Permitted	SSA Approval	SSA Approval	
1		Physical surveillance of a person or group	1		-	
١	- 1	(Consult the DIOG for handheld photo and video surveillance with no reasonable expectation of privacy)	DIOG for requirements	None Required	None Required	
١				ASAC Approval	ASAC Approval	
l			ASAC Approval	ASAC Approval	ASAC Approval	
,	59C	Access and examine FBI and other Department of Justice (DOJ) records, and obtain information from any FBI or other DOJ personnel	None Required	None Required	None Required	
•	5.9D	Access and examine records maintained by, and request information from, other federal, state, local, or tribal, or foreign governmental entries or agencies	None (Unless such approval is required by MOU or other agreements)	None (Unless such approval is required by MOU or other agreements)	None (Unless such approval is required by MOX or other agreements)	
5		Use online services and resources (whether nonprofit or commercial)	None Required	Nona Required	None Required	
3		interview or request information from members of the public and private entries	None Required except for contact with- represented persons, members of U.S. Congress, or their staffs, White House personnel, or other substantive division requirements	None Required except for contact with represented persons, members of U.S. Congress, or their staffs, White House personnel, or other substantive division requirements	None Required except for contact with represented persons, members of U.S. Congress, or their staffs, White House personne or other substantive division requirements	
•		Accept information voluntarily provided by governmental or private entities	None Required	None Required	None Required	
1	5.9H	Use and recruit human sources	None Required (utilize	None Required (utilize Delta)	None Required (utiliza Delta)	
1		Tasking a CHS to attend a religious service	SAC Approval	SSA Approval	SSA Approval	
I		Federal Grand Jury subpoenas for telephone or electronic mail subscriber information	US Attorney Office Approval (Type 1 and 2 Assessments Only)	US Attorney Office Approval	Not Permitted	
1	5.9C	Pattern Based Data Mining	SORC	SORC	SORC	

b2 b7E

Teaching	Points

- Obtain Publicly Available Information: Supervisory approval is not required for use of this method, except as to Information gathered at a religious service. Notwithstanding any other policy, tasking a CHS or UCE to attend a religious service, whether open to the public or not, during an assessment requires SAC
- approvaEngage in observation or surveillance not requiring a court order. Use of mechanical devices operated by a user (e.g., binoculars; hand-held cameras; radiation, chemical or biological detectors) is authorized in physical surveillance provided the device is not used to collect information in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy (e.g., equipment such as a parabolic microphone or other listening device that would intercept a private

surveillance begins as stated in the plan at the indiaton of surveillance. Requires SSA or SIA approval, SSA or SIA authorized to approve physical surveillance requests in TBI employee cannot submit multiple requests for one time approval. No limitation on use of fixed or moving physical surveillance. For predicated investigations: no limitation

- ASAC can delegate anomyal to SSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriately filed.

 ASAC can delegate anomyal to SSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriately filed.

 ASAC can delegate approval to SSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriately filed.

 ASAC can delegate approval to SSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriately filed.

 ASAC can delegate approval to SSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriately filed.

 ASAC can delegate approval to SSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriately filed.

 ASAC can delegate approval to SSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriately filed.

 ASAC can delegate approval to SSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriately filed.

 ASAC can delegate approval to SSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriately filed.

 ASAC can delegate approval to SSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriately filed.

 ASAC can delegate approval to sSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriately filed.

 ASAC can delegate approval to FSI or approval to SSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriately filed.

 ASAC can delegate approval to FSI or approval to SSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriately filed.

 ASAC can delegate approval to FSI or approval to SSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriately filed.

 ASAC can delegate approval to SSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriately filed.

 ASAC can delegate approval to SSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriately filed.

 ASAC can delegate approval to SSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriately filed.

 ASAC can delegate approval to SSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriately filed.

 ASAC can delegate approval to SSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriately filed.

 ASAC can delegate approval to SSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriately filed.

 ASAC can delegate approval to SSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriately filed.

 ASAC can delegate approval to SSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriately filed.

 ASAC can delegate approval to SSA or SIA. Must be in writing and appropriatel

predicated investigation.

In normal course of interview, FBI should divulge employee's affiliation with FBI and true purpose of interview. If person being interviewed expresses desire not to provide information, FBI employee may not state or imply in any way that the interviewe is compelled to provide information or that adverse consequences may follow. If interviewee indicates he or she wishes to consult an attorney, the interview must immediately stop.

Custodial Interviewa: Miranda warnings are required to be given prior to custodial interviews if the subject is significantly restricted in his/her freedom of action to a degree normally associated with arrest. See FBI Legal Handbook for Special Agents.

- Interviews that require supervisory approval:

 (i) contact with represented persons requires CDC review.

 (ii) Contact with represented persons requires CDC review.

 (iii) Members of U.S. Congress and Staff. Generally, FBI employees may take information received just as they would from other sources, and they may act upon it accordingly. However, pror CDC review, SAC and appropriate FBIHQ AD approval and prior notice to the AD Office of Congressional Affairs are required if FBI employee seeks to establish a formal relationship or interview a member of Congress or Congressional staff in connection with a foreign counterintelligence and/or public corruption matter.
- (iii) White House Personnel: CDC review and SAC approval is required before initiating contact with White House personnel. CDC review, SAC approval and appropriate FBIHQ Section Chief approval must be obtained prior to conducting an interview of a member of the White House.

- Accept Information Voluntarily Provided By Governmental or Private Entitles: Voluntarily provided information includes, but is not limited to: oral as well as documentary evidence and physical evidence such as: a computer hard drive or other electronic media that contains information, apper documents containing information, or physical objects (e.g., handgon or necrotics).

 FBI employee may not request in nor hornwings by accept information where disclosure would be prohibited by feedant law (e.g., communications records).
- Access and Examine Records Maintained by, and Request information From, Other Federal, State, Local, Tribal, or Foreign Governmental Entities or Agencies: When requesting information using this authority, care must be taken to ensure the entity concerned understands that it is not compelled to provide such information or create a new record.
- Grand Jury Subpoenas for Telephone or Electronic Mall Subscriber Information: Used only during a type 1 or 2 assessment

.b2

b7E

		Investig	ative Me	thods/Appro	vals Chart
	***	Authorized Method and DIXOG Statemence*		pproval Layers for Assessments and Predicated Im	estigetions
11	113	Mad covers	Assessments:	Predicated	Foreign Intelligence
12	113	Physical searches of personal or real property where a warrant or court order is not legally required because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy (e.g.	Not Parmand		
13	11 6	Consensual monitoring of communications, including consensual computer monitoring	Not Permitted	CDC or OGC Review	CDC or OGC Review SSA Approval
14	115	Consensual monitoring of communications, including consensual computer monitoring, with a sensitive monitoring drawnstance	Not Permitted	CDC or OGC Review, SAC Approval, DOJ Criminal or DOJ NSO Approval-	COG or OGC Review, SAC Approval, DOJ. Criminal or DOJ NSD Approval
15	116	Use of closed-circuit television, direction finders, and other monitoring devices	Not Permitted		
16	11.7	Polygraph examinations	Not Permitted	SSA Approvel	SSA Approval
17	118	Undercover operations, Group II		CDC Review, BAC or ASAC with delegated authority; Netional Security cases also require NSD unit UACB	COC Review, SAC or ASAC with delegated authority, NSB-Unit/UACB Approval
18	118	Undercover operations, Group I	Not Permitted	CDC review, SAC, and AD and CUORC or UCRC (EAD/DD certain cases) Approval	CDC review, SAC and AD and UCRC (EAD/DO certain cases) Approval
19	119	Compulsory process as authorized by law; Federal Grand Jury and trial subpoenss		US Attorney's Office Approval	
į		Administrative Subpoenss, Drugs	Not Permitted	SAC, ASAC, SSRA, of Drug Squad SSA	Not Permitted
20	11.9 Administrative Subpoenas. Sexual Explodation Administrative Subpoenas. Healthcare Fraud	Administrative Subpoenes, Sexual Explodation			
			U.S. Attorney's Office Approval		
21		Valent Committee	4148	Field Office, CDC Review, ADIC or SAC Approval.	Not Permitted
''	11,8	National Security Letters	Not Permitted	HQ: NSLB Review, DD or EAD-NSB or AD & DADe CT/CD/O/D or GC or Deputy GC-HSLB Approval	Not Permitted
22	11 10	Accessing stored wire and electronic communications and transactional records	Not Permitted	Statula/Court Order, Consult DIOG	Not Permitted
23	11,11	Use of pen registers and trap and trace devices	Not Permitted	FISA Court or District Court Order	Only Averable for Non-USPER by FISA Court order
24	11,12	Electronic surveillence	Not Permitted		
25	11,13	Physical searches, where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, including meil openings			
26	11,14	Acquisition of foreign intelligence information in conformity with Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence		FISA Court Order	FISA Court order

b2 b7E

Teaching Points:

1. Mail Covers: The DIOG currently states that for national security mail covers, "after being approved by the SSA, the Field Office must transmit the mail cover letter request by EC, with the draft letter as an attachment, to the National Security Law Branch (NSLB) for legal review and concurrence. Upon review and concurrence, the NSLB must transmit the letter request for signature to the EAD, National Security Branch, or, in his or her absence, to the Director.

_	O
۷.,	Consensual Monitoring:
- 1	Field Office must ensure that the individual who
•	approves OIA is so authorized. For example, if the SAC has delegated authority to approve OIA for consensual monitoring to the SSA, upon CDC review, the SSA can approve the consensual monitoring and OIA. If OIA authority was not delegated to SSA, appropriate supervisory authority must expressly approve OIA.
3.	Administrative Subpoenas: Within the FBI, the authority to issue administrative subpoenas is limited to those positions holding the delegated authority from the Attorney General; that authority may not be redelegated.
•	Throa Tunas of Administrative Culmonnes Authorized: (i) drug program investigations: (ii) shild

Three Types of Administrative Subpoenas Authorized: (i) drug program investigations; (ii) child sexual exploitation and abuse investigations; (iii) health care fraud investigations.

4. **National Security Letters:** Authority to sign NSLs has been delegated to the Deputy Director, EAD and Assistant EAD for NSB; ADs and all DADs for CT/CD/Cyber; General Counsel; DGC for NSLB; ADICs in NY, DC and LA; and all SACs. Every NSL must be reviewed and approved by a CDC or NSLB attorney.

ee