

tion had also been heard by other members of the newspaper's staff. When Mrs. Maclean wrote the following day to say that 'to the best of my recollection' she had spoken to no one of the *Daily Telegraph*, the newspaper reiterated the fact that both its own switchboard and the GPO confirmed that the call had been made. On August 3 the *Observer* published letters from Lady Maclean and Lady Violet Bonham Carter praising it for its attitude, and on October 22 Mrs. Melinda Maclean told the Swiss authorities that she would like to make Geneva her permanent home. What happened thereafter is common knowledge.

There can be no doubt in the minds of all except those determined to maintain unsupported attitudes that reporters of both the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Daily Express* did in fact conduct telephone interviews with Mrs. Maclean. Naturally we do not criticise Lady Violet and Mr. David Astor for choosing to believe Mrs. Maclean's word rather than that of a reporter. At that time Mrs. Maclean had the sympathy of most people; she seemed pathetic and honest; the great majority of liberal opinion tended to be on her side and on the side of Lady Violet who seemed to be a courageous attempt to uphold the principles of the press. We should be the last to suggest that Lady Violet's advocacy in a good cause would be in any way determined by the social position of the people she was seeking to help; but it is unlikely that she would have taken up this particular case if Maclean had been in a different social position for the reason that she might not have known about it. Of course she is not to be blamed for her efforts. On the contrary, when it is remembered that Maclean's father had been an old Liberal colleague of her father's, and that she had served on the board which selected Maclean for the Foreign Office, then it is perfectly understandable that she would have believed the false words of Mrs. Maclean.

But things look different today. Who now can doubt that Mrs. Maclean was a Communist, and that she was a Communist during the time that elapsed between the flight of her husband and Burgess and the departure of herself and her children behind the Iron Curtain? Journalists who had reason to suspect that at the time and who acted on their suspicion in the best traditions of a free and unfettered press cannot now be condemned for lack of good taste. In her cunning campaign which fooled many people, Mrs. Maclean must have had two objectives: to rejoin her husband and to discredit this country as much as possible. As Miss Rebecca West pointed out in three brilliant articles in the *Daily Express* last week, the mode of departure of both Maclean and his wife was such as to create the maximum interest and publicity and to make the British security service and the Foreign Office look as incompetent as possible. (This aim Mr. and Mrs. Maclean realised only too well.) Mrs. Maclean needed some excuse to get to Switzerland. What better excuse than that she was being hounded out by the unscrupulous and hard-hearted gutter press? Her lies naturally ensured that the press should be interested in her; she thus provided herself with an excuse to leave the country, and at the same time ensured that the greater part of liberal opinion would be on her side. She successfully duped Lady Violet Bonham Carter, Mr. David Astor and others. Where the press is free it is inevitable that some sections of it should be over-zealous in their methods. The fact that there was so much greater fuss over the alleged mistreatment of Mrs. Maclean would seem to tell in favour of Mr. Fairlie. But that is a matter of opinion, and here Mr. Fairlie can fight his own battles. What we are concerned to do now is to point out that Lady Violet Bonham Carter and Mr. David Astor were misled by Mrs. Maclean; and that in denying the authenticity of the interviews they were wrong. Would they not now do better to admit it?

LONDON, Sept. 30—Inquiry into the organization of the Foreign Office by a small committee of privy councillors was suggested tonight by Herbert Morrison.

The proposal by the deputy leader of the Labor party, who was Foreign Secretary when the diplomats Guy Francis de Moncy Burgess and Donald Quarrie Maclean fled to the Soviet Union, was accompanied by a vigorous defense of the competence and conscientiousness of the Foreign Office.

Mr. Morrison's speech at Lewisham tonight guarantees, however, that despite the hopes of many politicians in both major parties, the Burgess-Maclean case is not going to be quietly buried.

A politician of long experience remarked that the "British people and especially their newspapers, believe they have suffered at the hands of civil servants for years and now that they see a chance to get some of their own back they are going to take it."

Something of this attitude was reflected in the remark of the political commentator who said that Foreign Office officials were men who "know all the right people" and in his suggestion that this protected them in moments of crisis.

The attacks on the civil service that arose a year ago during the Crichton Down affair, when a ministry was forced to return to a retired naval officer some disputed requisitioned land, is indication of the temper of the people, it is said.

It is not the fact that Burgess and MacLean are known to have spied for the Soviet Union that will be at the issue but suggestions they were protected by the Foreign Office and the efficiency or lack of it in security services.

The Economist says it hopes "more parry and thrust in Parliament about the security aspects of affair" will not be necessary. But it may be that the only way this can be avoided will be through early adoption of suggestions like Mr. Morrison's.

The former Foreign Secretary emphasized immense burden that rests upon anyone in that role prevents her giving adequate time to personnel.

There should be a "suitable form of inquiry" into the work of the Foreign Secretary and the general organization of the Foreign Office, Mr. Morrison said. Since he does not regard situation as involving partisan politics, Mr. Morrison said, he thinks a "very small committee of privy councillors" drawn from both parties would be best body to undertake his inquiry.

Senators Look Into Case
WASHINGTON, Sept. 30 (AP)—The activities of the fugitive British diplomats Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean have been brought under investigation by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

BRITAIN WON'T LET SPY INQUIRY DIE

Morrison Asks Investigation of Burgess-Maclean Case—U. S. Senators Study It

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Boardman
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Belmont
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Parsons
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tamm
- Mr. Sizoo
- Mr. Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Holloman
- Miss Gandy

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126 OCT 11 1955

COPIED COPY SENT *C.B. Mac Donald*
LETTER JUN 22 1978
PER FOIA REQUEST *Jug*

Chairman James O. Eastland, Democrat of Mississippi, said in disclosing this that one point of inquiry was whether they could have tipped off Communist China that its home bases would be immune from attack even if Chinese Communist troops were thrown into the Korean war.

ond secretary of the British passy here while Maclean was in charge of the American section in the British Foreign Office in London.

"We want to find out, if we can, if they had that knowledge," he said in an interview.

They mysteriously disappeared behind the Iron Curtain in spring of 1951 and the Foreign Office recently believed they were Soviet spies. They are reported to be in Moscow now.

OCT 1 1955
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A Deadly Leak From Our Allies

Loose Security in U. N. Countries May Have Made Possible Tip That Cost 140,000 U. S. Casualties

DANIEL DUART MACLEAN

The evidence of loose security among the governments allied with the United States during the Korean war points now suspiciously to the grave possibility that American lives indeed were sacrificed in that conflict by the transmission of important military information to the enemy.

Gen. Van Fleet, 8th Army commander, and Gen. Willoughby, who was in charge of the intelligence operations of the Far Eastern command, and in fact, Gen. MacArthur himself now say that the Communist Chinese must have known that they would not be bombed or their planes pursued if they attacked United Nations forces in Korea.

The testimony of Dean Acheson, who was Secretary of State during the fateful period when American military strategy was being developed in consultation with the allies, did not seem as significant when given as it is today in view of the revelations of a spy ring in Paris and the treachery of MacLean and Burgess in the British Foreign Office disclosed since 1951.

For the story told on June 1, 1951, by Mr. Acheson—who, of course, had no suspicion of any looseness in the security situation among our allies—appears in the light of what has happened since to show how difficult, if not impossible, was the role of the United States, as military agent of the United Nations, in Korea.

Senator Russell, Democrat, of Georgia, who was chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee at the time of the MacArthur hearings, asked Mr. Acheson about "the details of the so-called hot pursuit finding by the members of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff where they recommended that our planes be permitted to pursue the planes of the Communist aggressors over the Manchurian border." Here is what Mr. Acheson said in reply:

"Some days prior to the 13th of November, 1950, there were discussions between the Department of Defense and the Department of State, as the result of which the Department of State transmitted to our embassies in certain countries the message, by air, that

an early date we might permit United States aircraft to defend themselves in the airspace over the Yalu River, to the extent of permitting hot pursuit of enemy aircraft up to two or three minutes flying time over enemy territory . . .

"Those telegrams resulted in our embassies taking up with the governments of those countries, this question. We did not ask them to get any expression of views, but informed them that they might, in a short time, have to ask these governments about this matter."

"They discussed the question with those governments, and in all cases they got strongly negative responses from the governments, saying they thought it was dangerous, and not desirable . . .

"Shortly after that some of these governments in their turn came to our embassies and again stated that if we were thinking about this, they wanted to register their view that it was unwise and undesirable. I transmitted the views of these governments to the Secretary of Defense in a letter, one letter dated November 23, 1950, and in another letter which I believe was dated November 24, 1950.

"After considering these responses, it was determined between the Department of State and the Department of Defense that it was not desirable to go further with this suggestion."

Senator Bridges asked: "What was the date when the Chinese Communists came in?"

"They actually attacked, I believe," said Mr. Acheson, "on the 26th of November. They had been known to be in Korea, I think, since perhaps the 24th of October. Certainly in the early days of November, we began to get reports from the commander in chief, Far East, that units were in North Korea."

So it appears that the decision to attack on a large scale was made after our allies in the U. N. told the United States emphatically that our forces could not reconnoiter by air to see what the Chinese Communist troops were doing, and could not fight back by air to bomb the supply lines in Manchuria from which the Communist Chinese troops were being supported.

The importance from a security standpoint of the military decisions of those autumn days of 1950 is emphasized in the following passage from the same testimony:

"Chairman Russell: You stated you took it up with six countries. I will not ask which they were. But I had understood there were some 13 nations who had contributed troops to the United Nations forces in Korea. Why was it confined to six nations rather than to consult with all of them?"

"Secretary Acheson: I have tried to refresh my memory on that and I do not know. The six countries which were picked out were prominent and representative, and I think it was probably a view of not spreading the security too widely . . .

"Chairman Russell: In other words, it had a highly secret security rating at that time?"

"Secretary Acheson: Yes, sir; this would be a military operation which you would not wish to inform the enemy about."

But Gen. MacArthur, Gen. Van Fleet and Gen. Willoughby insist that the enemy did learn somehow, presumably from an embassy source abroad, and shaped its policy—a general attack—because it knew the United Nations forces would not use airpower as a military weapon to make a proper and normal military defense of the area.

The result? More than 140,000 American casualties. And still the Europeans and not a few Americans continue to pooh-pooh the espionage menace and talk about the insignificant number of enrolled Communists in this country. It took only one Klaus Fuchs to transmit the facts about the atomic bomb. It doubtless took only one spy in the French or British Foreign Office to tell the Communists they were safe in risking their big army on the Korean peninsula, with the long supply line into Manchuria immune from attack. What a tragic way to conduct a war! And what a warning to America that her sons may face in the next war operation, big or little, the same hazards of treachery among our allies because they are not as security conscious as they should be.

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- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. Boardman _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Belmont _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Mohr _____
- Mr. Parsons _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tamm _____
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Mr. Tolson	
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S. J. [Signature]

GUY BURGESS

The discussion of the attitude of certain popular newspapers to the Burgess-Maclean flight continues in the correspondence columns of this journal. I wish only to comment on the idea of the 'Establishment' which Lady Violet Bonham Carter regards as 'a fiction,' Mr. Randolph Churchill as a bee in my bonnet and Mr. David Astor as a libellous 'smear.' I would ask Lady Violet Bonham Carter and Mr. David Astor to read what I have written during the past two weeks more carefully than they seem to have done. At no point did I attribute to them, or to other members of the 'Establishment,' either improper motives—indeed I went out of my way last week to suggest that their motives were not only proper but such as all of us might have responded to—or the more specific motive of wishing to protect actual or presumed traitors. I merely suggested that, as always in this country, there is a nexus of official and social relations which enables certain people to exercise more influence than other people can. I find nothing sinister in this. I believe that it is desirable that something like the 'Establishment' should exist, because it prevents even worse influences from operating. But I merely wished to make the point that the tentacles of the 'Establishment' seem to me—and not only to me—to stretch farther today than ever before. Because of this, Lady Violet Bonham

F. S. [Signature]

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RE: MacLEAN CASE
(Bufile 100-374183)

SPECTATOR (No. 6641)
OCTOBER 7, 1955
LONDON, ENGLAND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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C. B. MacDonald

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Carter, by simple and natural means, helped to create the feeling that it was wrong to inquire too closely into the whole affair, and especially to question Mrs. Maclean. It has turned out that she (not the popular press) was wrong.

The spread of the 'Establishment's' influence is due partly to the increase in the number of official and semi-official bodies—I regard the patronage exerted by bodies such as the Arts Council, the BBC, the British Council and so on with extreme suspicion, especially because it is becoming increasingly difficult for young writers and artists to cock a snook at them—and partly to the *apparent* diminution in the *formal* powers of the 'Establishment' which has made people less suspicious of the *actual* power and influence which its members exercise. It is Mr. Randolph Churchill's letter which interests me. (Mr. Connell, if he wishes to understand the genius of the 'Establishment,' need go no farther than read the cry of pain which was uttered in a leading article on the Burgess-Maclean affair in a contemporary two weeks ago.) Mr. Churchill spends most of his time conducting assaults on the 'Establishment.' The

reason why, in this specific case, he has rallied to the 'Establishment's' side would, I think, provide a clue to its nature. (In any case, I never suggested that Lady Violet Bonham Carter had had any contact with Lord Beaverbrook, or that any pressure she brought to bear was successful.) But another clue was provided by Mr. Sparrow, the Warden of All Souls', in his letter which was published last week. As Sir Robert Boothby has pointed out this week, that letter confirmed most of what I said. All Souls' is one of the centres of the 'Establishment.' All that is needed now is a piece of homely piety from Mr. A. L. Rowse and the circus will be complete.

There is, however, one factual answer I would like to give to Mr. Sparrow. I was careful to say in my piece two weeks ago that it is the *traditions* as well as the methods of recruitment of the Foreign Office which determine its character. I have not his faith in the present methods of recruitment. But even if I had, I would still answer that it is what happens to the young men once they get inside the Foreign Service which is important.

In London—

BRITISH OFFICIALS CRITICIZED IN BURGESS-MACLEAN CASE

A leading British newspaper, speaking its mind on the case of Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess, finds plenty to criticize.

The Times of London assails lax security checks on the two master spies and finds discrepancies and evasions in the British Government's White Paper.

It credits the disclosures of Vladimir Petrov—published first in this country by U.S. News

& World Report—with forcing the Foreign Office to issue the White Paper.

But suppose the Red agents had been American Government employees. Would they have escaped with this nation's secrets? A U.S. Justice Department official believes that they would have been trapped.

On these pages you get important views from both sides of the Atlantic.

Following is full text of an editorial from "The Times" of London, Sept. 24, 1955, commenting on the White Paper issued by the British Government on the spying activities of Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess:

"Two points call for comment," says the White Paper on Maclean and Burgess. That is typical of its primness and defensiveness. There are not two but a dozen points that call for comment, and the White Paper throws little new light upon them.

Appearing as it does, scandalously late, four and a quarter years after the two men fled the country, the White Paper might have been expected to give many details hitherto unknown. It does, indeed, mention that Burgess had, just before his flight, been specifically asked to resign from the Foreign Office because of reckless and careless conduct while posted in the United States. It also discloses that on May 25, 1951, the very day of the two men's disappearance, the Foreign Secretary at that time (Mr. Morrison) agreed that Maclean should be questioned by the security authorities because of suspicions that he had previously passed Foreign Office information over to the Soviet authorities.

For some unaccountable reason these facts were not made known until now. For the rest, the Paper does little more than confirm a good part of the information already known through the Press, and especially through the disclosures by Mr. Petrov [Vladimir Petrov, Soviet espionage agent who defected] in Australia. There is very little doubt that, but for the knowledge that Mr. Petrov was going to make his evidence public, the Foreign Office and the security authorities would not have decided to publish a White Paper at all even now.

Throughout the past four and a quarter years the pattern has been almost invariably the same. A Press report has been followed by a reluctant and often tendentious admission in the House or at the Foreign Office. Official statements were made which are now seen to have been misleading.

No doubt the spokesmen themselves were put up with the proper information which is usual on foreign affairs. Even so, it is hard to square the suggestion a year ago that Petrov's evidence was simply based on hearsay, and was "to be treated with some reserve," with the White Paper's admission that Petrov has "provided confirmation" of part of the story. An even stronger discrepancy exists between the White Paper's evidence that Maclean was being watched on suspicion of passing information and Lord Reading's statement to the [House of] Lords on October 28, 1954: "Mr. Maclean," said Lord Reading, "performed his official duties satisfactorily up to the date of his disappearance."

The White Paper defends what it coyly calls the "reticence of Ministerial replies" on the grounds that it is not desirable at any moment to let the other side know how much has been discovered or guess at the means used to discover it. An excellent principle, but how does it apply in this case? The Foreign Office needed no elaborate means to "discover" that it had asked Burgess to resign or that it was close watching Maclean; and the Russians already knew—otherwise they would not have helped the two men to escape. The result of "reticence" was the opposite of that intended. Instead of becoming bored with the affair, the public scent a mystery and wondered uneasily how much was being hidden.

The White Paper does little to remove doubts about the security authorities' handling of the matter. It says that, on suspicions fastened on Maclean, they took a calculated risk that he became aware of their watch and made tracks abroad. Events showed that they calculated wrongly; he did escape. But it is more extraordinary to read that, although gravely suspecting him, they decided not to keep a watch on his home in Kent.

More extraordinary still, on the very day that authority was given to question him, he was allowed to go from London (where he was watched) on leave to Kent (where he was not watched). And, according to the White Paper,

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ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL SAYS:

U.S. Security System Would Have Caught British Spies

Following are extracts from the testimony of William F. Tompkins, Assistant Attorney General handling the internal security program, before the Senate Subcommittee on Government Employees' Security Program on Sept. 27, 1955:

Mr. Tompkins: . . . Now, just remember this, when you are talking about prosecutions and trying to bring prosecutions into the scope of employe security, I think you are confusing the issue.

If you will recall, Maclean and Burgess in the British White Paper could not be prosecuted. There was no violation of law that they could be prosecuted. Yet, as you and I know, they certainly stole the British Government blind. So that in every loyalty case, we can't prosecute but there are instances where there is perjury or false statements and I tell you, I think there is probably roughly about 10 or 15 cases of that type.

However, just remember this in prosecutions also, you have a question of whether you want to disclose informants; you have a question of possibly where the statute of limitations has run on some of these cases and you have a question of evidence that sometimes is not admissible so that you just can't consider it, very frankly, in a vacuum.

Paul E. Hadlick [of the Subcommittee legal staff]: No security program would really catch a Burgess or Maclean or Benedict Arnold?

Mr. Tompkins: Well, Mr. Hadlick, let me say this—

Mr. Hadlick: You can't try a man for his thoughts.

Mr. Tompkins (continuing): as to Burgess and Maclean, in both instances, there was prior derogatory information, isn't that correct?

Mr. Hadlick: I believe you are right but nothing was done about it.

Mr. Tompkins: Nothing was done in Great Britain, but if you are relating Burgess and Maclean and derogatory information I say I believe that, under our program, that would have been gotten.

Mr. Hadlick: Did we ask them to remove the gentlemen from this country as part of this—

Mr. Tompkins: I honestly don't know that, that would be a State Department question.

Senator Carlson [Senator Frank Carlson (Rep.), of Kansas, a member of the Subcommittee]: Mr. Chairman, just this point—did I understand you to state that under executive order 10450 you have located some individuals that might be regarded as security risks?

Mr. Tompkins: Oh, yes, sir.

Senator Carlson: And some have been convicted?

Mr. Tompkins: There have been some convictions.

Senator Carlson: I believe you said 10 or 15?

Mr. Tompkins: I think I have a note here on that.

Senator Carlson: I don't care for an accurate statement. The statement has been made around here that there have been no convictions and I think the record should be clarified on that.

Mr. Tompkins: Well, Senator, that is what I already tried to explain. You can't consider prosecutions and the security program as one big bundle and that is where I gave the Maclean and Burgess example. You might have a man who is unfit for Government service and you might have a man who is a member of 9 or 10 Communist fronts but he can't be prosecuted, but you have got to get him out of the Government, sir.

flight that same evening, May 25, "did not become known to the authorities until the morning of Monday, May 28." They had cut themselves off from all means of knowing.

Another point, less serious but no less bewildering, is that the White Paper says that the two men left the country "when the security authorities were on their track." Was Burgess, then, also being watched? There is nothing else in the White Paper to suggest it. The evidence produced is simply that he had been asked to resign after the Ambassador in Washington had reported on his personal behaviour. The authorities cannot have it both ways. If there was suspicion of espionage in his case the evidence should be in the White Paper. If the authorities had no such suspicions, they evidently had been caught napping.

The mystery is deepened by the Foreign Office statement last weekend that it was now believed that both men were "long-term agents" for the Soviet Union. Petrov has said so, and his testimony is accepted, but on British evidence the part of Burgess has not been brought to light.

Equally unsatisfactory is the way in which the White

Paper deals with the manner in which the two men were kept for so long in the Foreign Service. All questions of spying apart, their personal behaviour at times should have raised far stronger and earlier questionings about their suitability for responsible work. Stories of their drinking bouts were common talk in London. Were they the men to be trusted with State secrets? Did the authorities go on to ask what was the root cause of the evident strains which the men were under?

It is good to be reminded in the White Paper that, since the disappearance of the two men, security in the Foreign Service has been tightened and that more searching inquiries are now made into the characters and antecedents of candidates and members. The whole affair calls for full, honest scrutiny before the forum of Parliament; and there must be no disposition, as there has been on earlier occasions, to score party points. The record of the Foreign Service is second to none for steadfastness, hard work, and loyalty, but the House [of Commons] will have searching and important questions to ask.

- Mr. Boardman _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Belmont _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Mohr _____
- Mr. Parsons _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tamm _____
- Mr. Sizoo _____
- Mr. Winterrowd _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Mr. Holloman _____
- Miss Gandy _____

MACLEAN: M.P.s GET ORDERS

DONALD MACLEAN

Boach
Boach
Boach

Vote of confidence on White-paper

Express Political Correspondent DEREK MARKS

SIR ANTHONY EDEN intends to make the Commons vote on the Maclean-Burgess White-paper one of confidence in the Government.

This decision—which reflects the extreme sensitivity of senior Ministers on the issue—will be bitterly contested by a number of Tory M.P.s.

For it means that Tory back-benchers will receive a three-line whip demanding support for the Government.

RE: MacLEAN CASE
(Bufile 100-374183)

DAILY EXPRESS
OCTOBER 6, 1955
LONDON, ENGLAND

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BY LETTER JUN 22 1976
BY REQUEST *just*

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At the same time it is believed that the Government intends to refuse any further inquiry.

Although the Tories were in opposition in May 1951 when Maclean and Burgess vanished, it was the decision of Tory Ministers after the October election that kept details of the case hushed up.

For most of the time Sir Anthony Eden himself was in charge of the Foreign Office.

But Tory M.P.s who are anxious for the affair to be probed believe it should be discussed on a non-party basis.

They are hoping that the Government will be persuaded to change its mind and set up an impartial inquiry.

Two points which interest M.P.s:—

(1) *Who warned Maclean and Burgess they were under suspicion?*

(2) *Who was responsible for the secrecy that hid the case?*

It is certain that there will be demands for a full investigation from some Socialist back-benchers.

But their official leaders are expected to be as reluctant as the Government to support such an idea.

- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Belmont _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Mohr _____
- Mr. Parsons _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tamm _____
- Mr. Sizoo _____
- Mr. Winterrowd _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Mr. Holloman _____
- Miss Gandy _____

CASSANDRA

THE MISSING DOCUMENTS

ALL the most "responsible," which often means the most "fixed," newspapers in this country insist that no good can come of a detailed investigation into the Burgess and Maclean affair.



CASSANDRA SAYS:
*"Hush is hush.
 Ask no questions.
 Hear no lies. Shut your trap."*

They say that the inviolable point about Military Intelligence is that no questions should be asked no matter what the circumstances, and that nobody should be questioned.

Hush is hush. Ask no questions. Hear no lies. Shut your trap.

Thus within our famous British counsels, long used to dealing with the espionage of the outside world, there can be no public discussion about the real facts concerning the escape of vital documents which in their aggregate may mean war or peace.

The B.M. affair is excluded from democratic scrutiny except for a rather rigged foray in the House of Commons.

Donald Maclean

Boyle

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 PER FOIA REQUEST *John Smith*

RE: MacLEAN CASE
 (Bufile 100-374183)

DAILY MIRROR
 OCTOBER 6, 1955
 LONDON, ENGLAND

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The guardians of the national security of Great Britain are immune from the ordinary critical gaze that in the case of any common defaulter will send him to gaol for three months for non-payment of his rates.

Messrs Burgess and Maclean have escaped and nothing much more will happen to their reputations in England other than a Parliamentary drubbing. The officials who are responsible for letting these blackguards slip through the net will be chided but not brought to book.

In the meantime, while all this soft soap is being applied another remarkable but somewhat unnoticed leak has taken place in Cairo.

Colonel Nasser has produced for public gaze some very remarkable secret documents which might well have come from the top drawer of the Burgess and Maclean conspiracy.

These papers are almost certainly genuine.

They have been photographed by the Egyptian Government and have been reproduced in the Cairo Press. Nasser challenges the British Ambassador to look on them and deny their authenticity.

They are a secret appraisal by the Military Intelligence Department of the War Office in Whitehall as to

whether Egypt will attack Israel or whether Israel will attack Egypt.

The considered opinion expressed in these stolen papers is that Egypt will do its best to avoid war while Israel has been toying with the idea of seizing the Gaza strip no matter the consequences and has only been deterred by the threat of an attack from her rear.

The inmost secrets of the War Council are now apparently known to Colonel Nasser and his friends who have been taunting the British Ambassador in Cairo with their information gained from skillfully fished documents.

This spectacular leak may well have come from agents in Cyprus who have a common hatred with the Egyptians against the British.

It is at this crucial state of our military affairs in the Middle East that there are now at the Staff College at Camberley some of the highest ranking officers of the Egyptian Army studying our combined strategy. Good idea?

The Big Tip

THE Foreign Office has just published an indignant statement about the bribery that was attempted for the oil prospecting rights over territory near the Oman Peninsula in the Persian Gulf.

The bribe offered by King Saud of Saudi Arabia to Sheikh Zaid was a squalid little tip of about £30,000,000. This bauble was hotly refused by the Sheikh who reported his bribers to the British. The Foreign Office held him up as a paragon of virtue.

But note this. The backers behind the unsuccessful bribers were A.R.A.M.C.O., the vast Arabian-American Oil Company, who own most of this part of the oil-bearing world. They were involved up to the hilt in this disreputable deal.

Address all complaints not to the shifty King Saud but to his Wall Street backers in the United States.

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. Boardman _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Belmont _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Mohr _____
- Mr. Parsons _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tamm _____
- Mr. Sizoo _____
- Mr. Winterrowd _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Mr. Holloman _____
- Miss Gandy _____



I CALL IT THE SHOUTED

WHISPER

AND REMEMBER THIS—
**Mrs. Maclean's flight was to nudge
 the world in the ribs and remind it of
 the inefficiency of the British**
By REBECCA WEST

5 O'Brien

File Sub A

*(1) 7-1
2-1*

*DONALD MACLEAN
 Guy Burgess*

DELETED COPY SENT *c.B. Mac Donald*
 BY LETTER JUN 22 1970
 PER FOIA REQUEST *jug*

100-374183-A
 NOT RECORDED
 138 DEC 1 1955

RE: **MACLEAN CASE**
 (B file 100-374183)
 DAILY EXPRESS
 OCTOBER 5, 1955
 LONDON, ENGLAND

52 DEC 5 1955
326

269

IT is said that Burgess and Maclean were warned by a certain man that British security had detected them as Soviet agents.

His name has been kept a secret. At a rough guess it would have been just possible last week to house all the people who knew it in the Albert Hall, but since then the number has increased.

This man has not been prosecuted, possibly for the good reason that it was impossible to get legal proof of a warning given by word of mouth, particularly if there were a go-between.

Be that as it may, this man is the centre of a spreading and degrading spot of doubt.

Suspicion

LET us call him A. B. He belonged to an organisation in which a number of people known to Burgess and Maclean were employed. Let us suppose that an ordinary Londoner is acquainted with three of these people, C. D., E. F., and G. H. He knows that C. D. is a homosexual, that E. F. joined the Communist Party at the University and left it some years later, and that G. H. is a decent soul, and knew the diplomats because his parents knew theirs.

The scandal will darken and fuse the Londoner's knowledge of these men. Inevitably he will suspect all these three men of Communism of which none is guilty, and of homosexuality, of which only one is guilty. Inevitably also he will smear the organisation to which they belong with a big, black smear, bigger and blacker than it deserves.

This is a natural consequence of Communist activity. Once a secret society establishes itself

within an open society there is no end to the hideous distrust it must cause.

Let us suppose that this ugly situation has been deliberately exploited and titivated to be even uglier than it need be. Then the British Government's policy of denial in the Burgess and Maclean case becomes explicable.

Calumny

THE policy of silence becomes comprehensible if it be supposed that first Mr. Attlee and then Sir Winston Churchill found that to tell the truth about Burgess and Maclean would be to let a torrent of mud wash over England and drown the innocent as well as the guilty in a sea of gross calumny.

Burgess and Maclean would in any case have left a bad story behind them. The oddly incompetent security work was bound to poison public confidence.

(Again we must reflect on the ineptitude of the White-paper. Surely no sane person would seriously state that it was impossible for the police to watch an isolated house in the country, unless he was a house agent trying to sell a castle on the Yorkshire moors to an exceptionally trusting foreign criminal.)

A trail

BAD as this story was, it was the duty of Burgess and Maclean to do everything they could to make that story worse.

They were under an obligation to lay a bogus trail behind them which would divert suspicion from the Communists who had really been their aides and throw it on innocent people; and these Communists, and all others, had to join in the game of misleading the authorities.

Maclean would not be as good at this as Burgess, who

would bring to it energy, imagination, and zest. And he knew where the body was buried. He knew where many bodies were buried.

He knew all that there is to be known about the homosexual world: a world of vulnerable people who, unless they were of the highest courage, could be compelled to give undeserved certificates of characters and bolster up doubtful stories.

He also knew other people useful at such a time. For example, in the late thirties he had been instructed by the Communist Party to infiltrate the British Fascist parties. It is said that at one Nuremberg rally he stood beside Hitler as he took the salute. Very few Englishmen had been attracted to the Nazi cause, but Burgess would know them all. They too would be vulnerable.

He must also have known a great deal about the British Communist Party, open and underground. He must have known a number of people who had left the party. Many of these ex-Communists would also be vulnerable, and all were fair game to attack and involve.

Distortions

THE inquiry into the Burgess and Maclean affair has therefore been met by an organised opposition, which has stuck at nothing to conceal the truth. The Communists who were left behind have defended themselves by lying testimony, carefully based on distortions of accurate information, and therefore hard to controvert.

What has happened has left its mark on the landscape. There are men who are believed to be enemies of this country by those who have worked with them in war and in peace. During this inquiry they have not convinced the authorities of their innocence, for they do not fill the posts that were theirs at the beginning of this inquiry. But

*Rebecca...
Lynn... C-13*

they are not in prison. It seems to many that they can have kept out of it only by the hardest of lying.

Embarrassment

ON the other hand, it is well known that one of the wisest of living Englishmen, a man of fine brain and generous heart, has been gravely embarrassed because of kindness he had shown to one of the diplomats.

It is not unnatural that first Mr. Attlee and then Sir Winston Churchill should have decided to keep the knowledge of this explosive matter in as small a circle as possible.

There was great reason for this attitude, for the Soviet authorities played the diplomats out of England with a noise as loud as bagpipes.

Their exit was planned to land them on the front page. Had Burgess and Maclean paused in their flight and posted in France letters to the Foreign Office, giving their resignation, and to their families, explaining that they were going on a holiday, not one line suggesting that they were Soviet agents could have been printed in any newspaper.

The sole purpose of the

Soviet plan was to tell the world that the British Foreign Office had two traitors on its staff; and Mrs. Maclean's humbugging flight from Switzerland two years later can have had no purpose except to nudge the world in the ribs and ask if it had forgotten Burgess and Maclean and the inefficiency of the British.

Nobody has yet explained why Mrs. Maclean should not have left a note for her mother, openly driven her family down to the railway station, and take tickets to Austria like any other traveller. Nobody could or would have stopped her. And it all happened at the exact moment when a discussion between America and Great Britain on the sharing of atomic secrets was taking a critical turn.

A spanner

WHATEVER the documents the diplomats may have passed, they could hardly have done greater service to the Soviet cause than their disappearance. The scandal it created threw a spanner into the works of the capitalist world. It is an attempt to disrupt the machinery of the

British State and to break up the unity of the West.

It aims at undermining the trust of the British people in their defences, their Civil Service, their Government. It also seeks to kill America's confidence in Britain as an ally.

If Mr. Attlee and Sir Winston tried to limit the scope of this sabotage by carrying on behind closed doors an investigation bound to be so difficult and so sordid, they are not to be blamed.

The truth

BUT that policy has been carried out with unnecessary untruthfulness; and even if it had been carried out ably it would sooner or later have to be abandoned. The Soviet Union is going to drag it out from time to time, and corroborative evidence, such as Petrov's, will keep on working its way to the surface. Now that there has been time to sift and balance the evidence of the security organisations it is the hour to tell the truth.

For if the truth cannot be told, it means that an open society cannot defend itself against a secret society. But let us not consider that gloomy prospect, for, while it is right to feel disgust and alarm over the Burgess and Maclean affair, those who give way to panic are behaving just as the Soviet Union desires.

THE END

THIS IS THE LAST OF THREE ARTICLES GIVING A PERSONAL VERDICT ON THE BURGESS AND MACLEAN CASE: WORLD COPYRIGHT RESERVED.

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. Boardman _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Belmont _____
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- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tamm _____
- Mr. Sizoo _____
- Mr. Winterrowd _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Mr. Holloman _____
- Miss Gandy _____

13
REACH
B

HOW THEY GOT AWAY WITH IT

BURGESS & MACLEAN: A PERSONAL VERDICT

We all know the Customs dodger who says 'Look, my pocket's full of watches...'



by
Rebecca West
SECOND OF 3 ARTICLES

DELETED COPY SENT C.B. Mac Donald
BY LETTER JUN 22 1976
PER FOIA REQUEST

Gale Sub A
5-10P

Donna
OCT 18 1955 611.22
RE MacLEAN CASE
(Bufile 100-374183)

100-374183-A
NOT RECORDED
126 DEC 15 1955

DAILY EXPRESS
OCTOBER 4, 1955
LONDON, ENGLAND

188
DEC 16 1955

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It was so difficult for the security organisations investigating the Burgess and Maclean case to feel sure that their protectors were Communists, since so many of them were nothing of the kind.

Some were simply kind-hearted people moved by the sight of two young men throwing away great natural advantages.

Others were conventional sheep following a particularly drab convention of the day.

Nothing is so rare as a drunkard who is not a bore.

Pretence

MR. EVELYN WAUGH is a novelist of enormous talent, but he and his imitators have injected our society with tedium and squalor by the pretence that the drunken wastrel is amusing, and that not to be amused by him is dowdy.

Others of their defenders were homosexuals drawn to them by their homosexuality.

These are complications which the two men cannot have planned; but that the two men were capable of planning complications on their own behalf can be seen by an examination of the work they did for Communism.

Maclean cannot have made a large contribution here. He seems to have gone on year in year out passing to his Soviet contacts documents to be copied; and the copies, Petrov now tells us, are now piled up in a room in Moscow.

We cannot know definitely how much harm Maclean did, or Burgess either. But Burgess wore his Communism with a difference. The life of a Communist propagandist was meat and drink to his love of mischief, and he was here, there, and

everywhere at his work of fire-raising.

Let us take three typical examples where he served the Communist Party, and kept well within the law.

THE CASE OF X.Y., LECTURER

Just before the war the head of a provincial university made some broadcasts at the B.B.C. and was put in charge of the agreeable and intelligent

young Mr. Burgess, who was then working there.

During the proceedings Mr. Burgess put to the professor the idea that it would be a good thing to have a course of lectures given at his university, and gave an ecstatic recommendation that X.Y. should deliver them; and later produced friends who were also ecstatic about X.Y., who therefore gave the lectures. X.Y. was a very nasty person, who had just then seen that war was inevitable

and had therefore broken off a long flirtation with the Nazis and become a fellow traveller. Everybody who came within the orbit of Burgess at that time was addressed on the subject of X.Y.'s virtues.

THE CASE OF MIHALOVITCH

In 1941 Yugoslavia came into the war on the side of the Allies against Hitler's Germany. The Com-

mander-in-Chief of the Yugoslav Army was a gallant soldier named Drazha Mihailovitch.

After 18 months or so Burgess and an unsavoury group of friends began to run round London spreading the news that Mihailovitch was a Fascist and undeserving of Allied support.

The charge was a lie. Mihailovitch was no Fascist, and long before the war had sought out members of the Yugoslav Peasant Parties to plan resistance to Hitler. But Burgess and his friends were nimble and industrious, and did much to poison public opinion.

THE CASE OF

THE FRENCH FAKE

When France was liberated, Burgess, still at the B.B.C., induced a friend of his who spoke good French and was well known in France, to go over with him to Paris on the grounds that the French radio station wanted her to broadcast.

It was highly inconvenient for her to go, but her sense of duty persuaded her to go on what was a fruitless journey. For nobody at the French radio station had ever heard of her, and Burgess disappeared.

When he came back he told his friends of exciting meetings with members of the French Communist Party, and how they were going to take the country

over and establish a stable Government.

Actually there was an attempt at civil war which cost the lives of many Frenchmen. He had faked an official journey to cover a Communist errand.

Though half London saw Burgess performing such services to the Communist Party as these, they did not believe that Burgess was a Communist agent, for the simple reason that he told them he was.

He practised to perfection the old technique of the muggler, who, as he approaches the Customs, slaps his stomach and shouts, "This is a pillow and it's stuffed with watches," and is telling the truth, but gets a weary smile from the Customs officer, and permission to pass.

Burgess proclaimed his party work so often and so loudly and in such unsuitable company that nobody could believe that he was speaking the truth.

Scandal

ALL this means that the Burgess and Maclean affair had its own distinctive feature, not to be found in any previous case of espionage.

When a Soviet spy is arrested the Communist Party gives him or her instructions what to do: whether to fight, like the courageous Rosenbergs, or to submit quietly and get the case over without scandal. Here the party evidently gave instructions to create as thorough a scandal as possible.

Burgess was a cynic, he was not for martyrdom, and would not have enjoyed playing the role of an innocent man. Innocence was not his wear. But he would not have accepted happily the luck of the game when it went against him.

A plan

DETECTION would hurt his vanity. Imprisonment would have been torture to his mercurial temperament, and exile a great inconvenience to one who was living so happily in London. He would certainly have wanted to get his own back at society.

He was witty, imaginative, unscrupulous. It would not have been beyond his power to devise a plan whereby if he had to pay for his treacheries, a storm of scandal would break over England.

The fantastic policy of denial adopted by the British Government, and the emphasis of its White-paper, are explicable only if we suppose that it has had to suppress such a storm.

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. Boardman _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Belmont _____
 Mr. Harbo _____
 Mr. Mohr _____
 Mr. Parsons _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tamm _____
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 Tele. Room _____
 Mr. Holloman _____
 Miss Gandy _____

BRADY
 BOGGS
 51

WHY THEY

DID IT by Rebecca West

An analysis on the human subtleties of treason

AFTER the millions of words written on Maclean and Burgess, now comes the assessment of someone who knew them both, and someone who saw them with eyes experienced in reporting and analysing all the elements of treason.

Rebecca West goes beyond the facts of the White-paper to probe and dissect the human aspects of this most bizarre and complex case in the whole history of espionage. First—as people—what were they like?...

DONALD
 RE: MacLEAN CASE
 (Bufile 100-374183)

DAILY EXPRESS
 OCTOBER 14 1955
 LONDON, ENGLAND

196
 71 DEC 16 1955

DELETED COPY SENT C.E. Mac Donald
 BY LETTER JUN 22, 1976
 PER FOIA REQUEST *July*

File Sub A

100-374183-14

NOT RECORDED
 126 DEC 15 1955

274

THE Burgess and Maclean White-paper recalls the definition of a net as a number of holes tied together with string. It is a number of holes tied together with words.

One has to admit that it makes a considerable advance in frankness, for it tells no lies.

It is not completely honest. For it says that Maclean "may have been warned" that he was under investigation, when it is quite certain that he was so warned. But it drops the pretence that the Government did not know Burgess and Maclean to be Soviet agents.

Iceberg

OTHERWISE it is empty to the point of impudence, and far past that. It is written with that pointless discourtesy, as it were of an imbecile iceberg, for which the Foreign Office is too well noted.

But of course there are many essential things that it could not say, for official language is geared to record facts, which are so small a part of reality.

And before one blames the White-paper for what it has chosen not to say, one may consider what it could not say. It could not tell us what Burgess and Maclean were really like.

To begin with, they were not typical upper-class Englishmen. One had only to look at them to know that there was something strange about them. They had parted from the herd, and it seemed likely that the herd was right in any little dispute it had with them. Yet both men were attractive.

Grubby

GUY BURGESS was the more positive personality of the two. He had a charm which was hard to account for as he was small and stocky, incorrigibly grubby, and often drunk.

He was at once obviously well bred and obviously

squalid. It could be seen that he belonged to the world of the favoured, who have wealth and respect by right of birth; but it was sure that in his time he had wakened up in some very queer rooms.

He had many friends, and some of them tried to give their liking for him a rational explanation by saying that he was very kind, and no doubt he was. But his charm was of a more exciting and more troubling kind than can be accounted for by good nature.

Even when he was nearing 40 there was an engaging boyishness about him. But there are boys and boys. Burgess recalled a special sort of boy.

Brooding

SOMETIMES, in a home for children who are unhappily not like other children, there is a small boy who always catches the visitor's eye. The brooding darkness of the child's face lights up with such an enchanting smile. His response to strangers is so quick and gay, he has such a quaint turn of phrase.

Surely, the visitor says, there cannot be anything very much wrong with this delightful little boy.

Well, yes, there is. Unfortunately happens that wherever he goes fires break out. By constant watching it has been established that the only toy he cares for is a box of matches. The only game he really enjoys is arson.

He likes stealing out to set light to houses and barns and hayricks, and afterwards is silent while the grown-ups fuss and wonder, watching the flames that roar and spread.

Delight

THAT was Burgess's distinguishing mark: the flashing smile of the fire-raiser, full of secret delight in mischief and destruction.

Because he was so obviously a problem child, and when he was not smiling had the unhappy, appealing look of a problem child, affectionate and benevolent people felt a desire to help and protect him.

At the same time other

BURGESS

The flashing smile of the fire-raiser... his favourite toy a box of matches

MACLEAN

Feverish gaiety that could so easily run up the scale towards hysteria...

people who were mischievous and destructive looked to him to give them what they too secretly wanted.

There is a little of this in all of us; and many people who were on the whole stable and sensible had an amused feeling that Guy Burgess was always likely to do something unpredictable and outrageous, and were on his side.

Shimmer

IF Guy Burgess was a perpetual child, Donald Maclean was a perpetual adolescent.

He was lanky like a lad who has outgrown his strength, and he had kept the brilliant, unspotted colour of eye and skin that is faded in most adults.

He was attractively gay,

but his gaiety had the feverish quality of over-excited 18. It might easily run up the scale to hysteria.

He was a charming person to sit next to at dinner, but afterwards doubts crossed one's mind. Could he really be the age that he was said to be, or responsible enough for the post he occupied?

This shimmering, unstable effect was the mark of the tragedy he had brought on himself. For Maclean was obviously frank by nature. When he met a stranger his handshake was warm, he gave a welcoming smile, he asked personal questions, made personal confidences.

It is impossible to imagine a character less suited to bear the obligation of secrecy which is imposed on conspirators.

It is significant that he was on the most affectionate terms with certain members

they overcame certain weaknesses.

Thereby they showed themselves idiots. The Foreign Office is not a psychiatric clinic for problem children and adolescents. But these people were not Communists.

Idiocy

THERE was another complication. Both men were homosexuals. Other homosexuals had come to their aid. This was deplorable.

But it made it still more difficult for the Security organisations to look at the dossiers of Maclean and Burgess and say, either in private or in this White-paper: "Yes, both of them were Communists, and therefore So-and-So and So-and-So, who helped them, must be Communists too."

Of course Britain has dealt idiotically with this matter. But it must be realised that there is no country in the world that would not have been baffled by the smoke-screen which hangs round Burgess and Maclean, created by their peculiar personalities.

Suspicion

BUT their lot was to do a special harm over and beyond this.

The usefulness of Burgess and Maclean to the Soviet Union increased when they stopped working for it as spies and left England.

Their disappearance raised the stench of suspicion which makes old friends look at each other doubtfully, causes the British people to feel contempt for their Government, and invites a breach between the British and American peoples.

There lies the greater importance of the two diplomats. They both belong to that dangerous class, the attractive delinquent.



THE AUTHOR

of his family, and that these relatives were astonished, with an astonishment certainly genuine, when it was first put to them after his departure that he had been a Soviet agent.

Throughout 20 years he had kept up between them and himself an unbroken barrier of deceit.

This must have been a tormenting strain on him, no matter how he argued away the moral aspect, simply because he was not made that way. It goes far to explain his recurrent periods of nervous collapse and drunkenness.

Torture

LET us not forget that. He was probably self-tortured. Communism injured him also.

A problem adolescent appeals to the kind hearted as strongly as a problem child; and again many affectionate and benevolent men and women concerned themselves with this man who, even in his late thirties, looked like an undergraduate and acted like an undergraduate who cannot handle his new liberty, and will be all right when he has learned how to drink.

Taint

IT should be realised that, because Burgess and Maclean had these special characteristics, the investigation of their case could not possibly lead to the identification of the pro-Communist influence in Britain, for which many people had hoped.

Certainly Burgess ought never to have got into the Foreign Office, and certainly neither he nor Maclean should have been allowed to remain there; and certainly they owed their exceptional good fortune to the influence of powerful people.

But most of their protectors were utterly untainted by Communism, and were actuated by nothing more sinister than the desire to help two men whom they liked, who seemed to them to have the makings of good public servants.


three-hour battle with rocks and tear gas that left 40 injured. In Paris, the Métro ran fitfully—sometimes with no fares collected—and striking bus drivers let the air out of nonstriking drivers' tires. Gas and electric meters walked out. Half the nation's trains were tied up by a one-day "warning" strike of engineers who wanted a 15 per cent raise, not the 5 per cent the government offered. As the strikes spread, the government rushed home again some of the riot police it had just finished rushing to Algeria.

SOVIET UNION:

Change of Heart?

From the Pharaohs of Egypt to the dictators of today, men have enslaved men out of cruelty, greed, or expediency. Slaves built the great wall of China and propelled the galleys of Caesar's legions. In modern times, they built the massive steel and concrete fortifications of Hitler's Europe. But nowhere in history has human slavery been exploited to such a vast and terrifying degree as in Soviet Russia. Literally hundreds of slave-labor camps scar the Soviet landscape—great clusters of wooden barracks surrounded by barbed wire and guarded by lookout towers bristling with guns. One infamous installation—Yorkuta—is a complex of more than 50 camps, which once contained about 500,000 inmates. Estimates of the total slave-labor force in Russia range from 6 to 12 million.

From the relatively few who have found freedom and escape, the outside world has pieced together a picture of unequalled brutality and degradation. Men and even some women sentenced to 25 years or more of hard labor in the mines and forests, and on roads, canals,



Paris: Red-sponsored traffic jam

and other "communal" projects; twelve- to fourteen-hour workdays in temperatures reaching 70 degrees below zero, food barely sufficient to sustain life, and death by starvation or exhaustion for those unable to meet work "norms."

Although slave labor in Russia got its start under the czars, it became a way of life under the Communists. Stalin used the system to get rid of millions of political enemies. During the second world war, nationality groups that could not be trusted were deported en masse to Si-

... And Another Skeleton Rattles

leading diplomats in assessing Maclean. So effective was the smoke screen that two years after the disappearance, men in some of the highest government positions were convinced Burgess and Maclean had met their deaths on a homosexual binge.

Finger Man The first confirmation that the men were spies came more than a year ago from Vladimir Petrov, the MVD agent who defected in Australia. He told investigators Burgess and Maclean were in Moscow, and named the Soviet agent—one F.V. Kislytsin—who engineered their escape (Newsweek, May 31, 1954). It was publication of Petrov's memoirs in a London newspaper, The People, that helped touch off the current storm.

Kislytsin, then stationed at the Soviet

Embassy in Australia, rejected British inducements to defect—including a six-figure sum.

The Burgess-Maclean affair is not the only skeleton in Foreign Office closets. Late in 1952 the American Embassy in London learned of a case involving two Queen's Messengers escorting the British diplomatic pouch from Moscow to London. East of Berlin, the Soviet pilot landed at a small provincial airport—because of "engine trouble." One messenger tried to persuade the other to leave the plane for a drink at the airport canteen. The second dutifully refused, and the bag arrived safely in London. But it was later found that the first man was a Soviet agent who had instructions to open the pouch and photograph its contents during the other's absence.

INTERNATION

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INTERNATIONAL

marshal, Algerian-born Alphonse-Henri Juin, 66, hero of two world wars, and now NATO land commander in Europe. Others included Defense Minister Gen. Pierre Koenig, and Gen. Jean Lecomte, Koenig's chief of staff.

Earl last August, they "assigned" Gen. Raymond Duval, then military commander of Morocco, to "get" the newly appointed resident-general, Gilbert Grandval, a civilian and avowed advocate of compromise. Duval was killed in a plane crash in Morocco last August. But he already had done much to obstruct the government's reforms.

Sitting Tight: With Grandval out and Gen. Boyer de Latour, a career military man, installed in his place, the generals turned to another key element in Faure's program—the departure of the antinationalist Sultan Mohammed ben Moulay Arafa and substitution of a regency council. Gen. Pierre de Benouville, a right-wing deputy, was dispatched to Rabat to urge the Sultan to sit tight. Benouville was followed by former Air Minister Pierre Montel, chairman of the parliamentary defense committee. He flew to Morocco ostensibly to inspect the military situation, but quickly turned to politicking in support of ben Arafa. Last week, Faure ordered cancellation of his military transportation.

The generals turned next to the proposed regency council. Negotiations had deadlocked over selection of the third and last regent. Faure proposed Gen. Si Kettani ben Hamon, only Moroccan general in the French Army, now serving in Germany. He literally begged him to take the job. But the Premier had overlooked one important factor: Kettani's top superior is Marshal Juin. Kettani turned down the post.

The generals' biggest coup came last



Jun: Morocco for Frenchmen

Wednesday in Paris. After three days of consultation with the Cabinet (and Juin), Resident-General de Latour returned to Morocco not with new instructions but with authority to make his own decisions. De Latour so far has shown no desire to buck the die-hard generals, in fact has urged Faure to go slow on reforms.

As the Moroccan morass deepened, fresh disorders swept both Morocco and Algeria. The Paris newspaper *Le Figaro* cried: "What absurdity! What aberration! What folly!"

ISRAEL:

Gusher

From Hulciqat, a low, barren hill barely 6 miles from the Egyptian-held Gaza strip, a black gusher shot 40 feet into the sky. Israel had struck oil.

The well, brought in last week by the Lapidot-Israel Petroleum Co., Ltd. (33 per cent American-owned), had been started by the British-owned Iraq Petroleum Co. and abandoned when the Arab-Israeli war broke out in 1947. Oil men believed they had found a major field. For Israel, the discovery held the promise of easing a yearly burden of \$3 million in petroleum imports, and of getting the huge Haifa refinery, now crippled by the Arab boycott, back to full production. It also made the Israelis more adamant than ever against any border revisions as the price of a peace settlement with their Arab neighbors.

FRANCE:

Strike Fever

"If we succeed in maintaining the present rhythm of progression, the standard of living will double in ten years," Premier Edgar Faure told France last week. It should have been a boast; instead, it was an appeal. Even as he spoke, Faure's goal of "expansion and stability" was threatened by nationwide demands for more wage hikes that could bring only more inflation.

Already 200,000 Frenchmen were on full- or part-time strike, mostly shipyard construction, and metal workers, and mostly members of the Communist-controlled General Confederation of Labor. In Nantes, strikers and police staged

Those Defecting Diplomats: A Tizzy in Britain..

The case of the missing diplomats was as much of a shocker to Britons in 1951 as the Hiss case was to Americans. Last week, four years of doubt about Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess exploded in a burst of public indignation that forced the government to break its long silence with a eight-page White Paper. For the first time official London conceded both men were Soviet spies.

But the White Paper's attempts to justify the handling of the case raised fresh doubts and fears. It suggested, for example, that Maclean and Burgess fled because Maclean had been tipped off he was under suspicion. But it dodged the question of whether a "third man" was still at work in the Foreign Office.

"An insult to any reasonable man's intelligence," said Lord Beaverbrook's Lon-



Eden: Why the uproar?

don Daily Express of the White Paper explanation of how Maclean and Burgess had been allowed to rise to sensitive positions—and then escape. Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden, who had been Foreign Secretary through 43 months of silence about the scandal, braced for full-scale debate after Parliament convenes in October.

NEWSWEEK's Edward Weintal, long personally acquainted with the Maclean case, sends this background:

The Foreign Office never had a doubt Maclean was spying. But it tried to conceal the true reason for the man's disappearance because of (1) an unwritten law in Britain's services which protects those who belong and (2) the errors of judgment of some of Britain's

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BRIDGEMAN
ROACH

Wait till we say so'

Burgess: This man must not tell

By IAN COLVIN

THE man who was Britain's security officer in Washington at the time Burgess and Maclean disappeared has been advised that no official approval can be given at present for him to write his story.

"I have therefore come to the conclusion that it would be improper for me to say anything," he told me last night.

The security man is Mr. Harold A. R. Philby, son of the famous Arabian explorer. He joined the Foreign Office after the war with the rank of First Secretary and was posted to Washington.

Philby joined the British Embassy there after Donald Maclean had left, but was there in 1950 when Guy Burgess was Second Secretary.

In same house

A man of wide experience he got an O.B.E. from the Foreign Office for wartime services—Philby was previously foreign correspondent for a London newspaper and reported on the Spanish civil war.

He was in a position to observe Guy Burgess fairly closely in Washington. For a time Burgess lived in the same house as the Philby family.

After the disappearance of Maclean and Burgess, Philby was recalled to London.

Soon after returning to Britain, Mr. Philby resigned. There was a financial settlement.

At his rambling house in a secluded part of Sussex I asked Philby whether he could get official permission to make further revelations on the mystery of Maclean and Burgess before the parliamentary debate.

Most improper

"I cannot restrain you from printing what facts you may know," he replied. "But I can not add anything without Foreign Office permission, and I think it would be most improper for me to comment at this stage."

I understand that clearance for Philby would be a joint decision of the security chiefs of Britain and the Foreign Office. The view of high officials is that an incomplete version of the story might give a false impression.

Philby, father of five children, is at present a free-lance journalist.

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RE: MacLEAN CASE
(Buff 100-374183)

SUNDAY EXPRESS
OCTOBER 2, 1955
LONDON, ENGLAND

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U.S. Asks British Who Shielded Spies

N. Y. Journal-American and Chicago Daily News Foreign Service
LONDON, Oct. 1.—The American Embassy here has asked the British Foreign Office what steps have been taken to apprehend the official who four years ago tipped off Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess that the security net was closing in about them.

The British have advised the embassy that the official's identity is known but that nothing will be done about him.

The explanation is that when he warned Maclean that he was being watched he believed that the investigation was concerned only with the young diplomat's drinking, free-talking and homosexuality.

The official, it is stated, was

unaware Maclean was under suspicion as a Soviet agent.

INQUIRY DEMANDED.

This explanation, however, has failed to satisfy many in Parliament, who are only now beginning to add up the costs to the West of harboring two expert spies for so many years.

Capt. Henry Kerby, 40-year-old Tory MP and a former diplomat, claims Maclean and Burgess were known as homosexuals to many in the department in London, Cairo and Washington.

GOVERNMENT WORRIED.

Only the series of articles by Vladimir Petrov, the Soviet agent who took refuge in Australia, forced the British Foreign Office to disclose many of the facts at this time.

One of the chief Government worries is over the effects in Washington.

The United States already is refusing to exchange certain atomic information because of allegedly loose British security.

Now that it is known that Maclean and Burgess shipped photostats of thousands of documents to Russia, the British fear that the United States will become even more conscious so far as Britain is concerned.

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Rebecca West Probes Case of Treason Twins



There is no more bizarre case in the annals of espionage than the disappearance in 1951 of British diplomats Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess. Both served in the U. S. Maclean had access to Anglo-American atomic secrets. And both were part of an international Soviet conspiracy. Both fled to Russia, the British Government now admits, and Maclean's American-born wife and three children later joined him there.

What were these men really like? How could these scions of well-established families spy for Russia? To tell the full, behind-the-scenes story, as only she can, International News Service selected world-famous British author Rebecca West (photo left), whose book "The Meaning of Treason" won acclaim for brilliant reporting. This is the first of three articles.

By REBECCA WEST

(World Copyright 1955; by International News Service)

LONDON, Oct. 1

BECAUSE Burgess and Maclean had special characteristics unusual in Englishmen of their station, investigation of their case by British intelligence could not possibly lead to the identification of the pro-Communist influence in Britain, for which many people had hoped.

But British security comes badly out of the Burgess-Maclean business, and there is no use trying to find excuses for it.

Certainly Burgess never ought to have got into the Foreign Office, and certainly neither he nor MacLean should have been allowed to remain there; and certainly they owed their exceptional good fortune to the

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GUY BURGESS



DONALD MACLEAN

Burgess and Maclean were among the most important of Soviet agents, and it is the strangest feature of their destiny that they rose to the supreme height of their importance when they stopped working and ran away.

Gave Atomic Data To Soviet Union

Certainly Donald Maclean passed Foreign Office documents to the Soviet Union year in and year out, and among them the papers concerning atomic energy which he prepared for the combined committee when he was head of the American department.

Burgess, too, did what he could, although he was not so favorably situated, being of far lower rank than Maclean.

But Burgess was more mobile and he hopped about London and Washington as busily as a bird picking up worms, and he was clever enough not to waste his time.

But their lot was to do a special harm over and beyond this.

The usefulness of Burgess and Maclean to the Soviet Union increased when they

Rebecca West Probes Inside Case of the Treason Twins

By REBECCA WEST

Continued from First Page.

influence of powerful people.

But most of their protectors were utterly untainted by communism, were actuated by nothing more sinister than a desire to help two likeable men who seemed to them to have the makings of good public servants if they overcame certain weaknesses.

Thereby they showed themselves idiots. The British Foreign Office is not a psychiatric clinic for problem children and adolescents. But they were not Communists.

There was another complication. Both men were homosexuals. Other homosexuals came to their aid when they were threatened. This was deplorable. But it made it still more difficult for the security organizations to look at the dossiers of Burgess and Maclean and say, either in private or in the British government's recently published "white paper":

"Yes, both of them were Communists, and therefore so-and-so and so-and-so, who helped them, must be Communists, too."

The White Paper Not Entirely Honest

In fact, the White Paper on the Burgess and Maclean case recalls the definition of a net as a number of holes tied together with string. It is a number of holes tied together with words.

It makes a considerable advance in frankness, for it tells no lies. True, it is not completely honest, for it says that Maclean "may have been warned" that he was under investigation. It is quite certain that he was so warned.

But it drops the pretense that the British government did not know Burgess and Maclean to be Soviet agents. Otherwise, however, it is empty to the point of impudence and far past that.

Yet there are many essential things it could not say, for official language is geared to recorded facts, which are so small a part of reality. And before one condemns the White Paper for what it chose not to say, one may consider what it could not say.

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stopped working for it and left England.

Then their disappearance raised the stench of suspicion which makes old friends look at each other doubtfully, causes the British people to feel contempt for their government, and makes a breach between the British and American peoples.

There lies the greater importance of the two diplomats. They both belong to that dangerous class, the attractive delinquent.

Both Strange, Yet Attractive

Neither could the White Paper tell us what Burgess and Maclean were really like. I have met both men. To begin with, they were not typical upperclass Englishmen.

One had only to look at them to know that there was something strange about them. They had parted from the herd, and it seemed likely that the herd was right in any little dispute it had with them. Yet both men were attractive.

Guy Burgess was the more positive personality of the two. He had a charm which was hard to account for, as he was small and stocky, incorrigibly grubby, and often drunk.

He was at once obviously well bred and obviously squalid. It could be seen he belonged to the world of the favored, who have wealth and respect by right of birth; but it was sure that in his time he awakened in some very queer rooms.

He had many friends, and some of them tried to give their liking for him a rational explanation by saying that he was very kind, and no doubt he was. But his charm was of a more exciting, more troubling kind that can be accounted for by good nature.

Even when he was nearing 40 there was an engaging boyishness about him. But there are boys and boys. Burgess recalled a special sort of boy.

Secret Delight In Making Mischief

Sometimes in a home for children who are unhappily not like other children there is a small boy who always catches the visitor's eye.

The brooding darkness of the child's face lights up with such an enchanting smile. His response to strangers is so quick and gay, he has such a quaint turn of phrase. Surely the visitor says, there cannot be anything very much wrong with this delightful little boy?

Well, yes, there is. It unfortunately happens that wherever he goes fires break out. By constant watching it has been established that the only toy he cares for is a box of matches. The only game he really enjoys is arson. He likes stealing out to set a light to houses, barns, hayricks, and afterwards is silent while grownups fuss and wonder, watching the flames that roar and spread.

That was Burgess' distinguishing mark: The flashing smile of a fire-raiser, full of secret delight in mischief and destruction. Because he was so obviously a problem child, and when he was not smiling had the unhappy, appealing look of a problem child, affectionate and benevolent, people felt a desire to help and protect him.

At the same time other people who were mischievous and destructive looked to him to give them what they, too, se-

cretly wanted. There is a little of this in all of us; and many people who were on the whole stable and sensible had an amused feeling that Guy Burgess was always likely to do something unpredictable and outrageous, and were on his side.

Had a Shimmering, Unstable Personality

If Guy Burgess was a perpetual child, Donald Maclean was a perpetual adolescent. He was lanky like a lad who has outgrown his strength and he had kept the brilliant, unspotted color of eye and skin that is faded in most adults.

He was attractively gay, but his gaiety had the feverish quality of an overexcited 18. It might easily run up the scale to hysteria.

He was a charming person to sit next to at dinner, but afterwards doubts crossed one's mind. Could he really be the age that he was said to be or responsible enough for the post he occupied?

This shimmering, unstable effect was the mark of tragedy he had brought on himself. For Maclean was obviously frank by nature. When he met a stranger his handshake was warm, he gave a welcoming smile, he asked personal questions, made personal confidences.

It is impossible to imagine a character less suited to bear the obligation of secrecy which is imposed on conspirators.

It is significant he was on most affectionate terms with certain members of his family and that these relatives were astonished, with an astonishment certainly genuine, when it was first put to them after his departure that he had been a Soviet agent.

Barrier of Deceit Lasted 20 Years

Throughout 20 years he had kept up between them and himself an unbroken barrier of deceit. This must have been a tormenting strain on him, no matter how he argued away the moral aspect, simply because he was not made that way. It goes far to explain his recurrent periods of nervous collapse and drunkenness.

A problem adolescent appeals to the kindhearted as strongly as a problem child, and again many affectionate and benevolent men and women concerned themselves with this man who even in his late 30s looked like a college boy and acted like a college boy who cannot handle his new liberty, and will be a fine man when he has learned how to carry his liquor.

Britain has not dealt cleverly with this matter. But there is no country in the world that would not have been baffled by the smoke-screen which hangs around Burgess and Maclean, created by their peculiar personalities.

(Tomorrow: Burgess and Maclean at work for the Kremlin.)

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FBI Sifts New Data In British Spy Case

By WILLIAM L. UMSTEAD

WASHINGTON, Oct. 1 (INS). —The FBI today was disclosed to be investigating fresh information on Britain's Burgess-Maclean spy case, including possible "contacts" within the U. S. Government.

Informed sources revealed the FBI was investigating the case months before the two diplomats disappeared behind the Iron Curtain in June, 1951.

The FBI refused comment on the reports. Officials pointed out the missing men were under diplomatic immunity while stationed in Washington and that the State Department has jurisdiction in such matters.

Chairman Eastland (D-Miss.) said the Senate Internal Security subcommittee has asked Secretary of State Dulles for further information about contacts of the pair while in Washington. Committee aides said U. S. atomic and Korean war secrets appear to be involved.

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We Too Lax or Too Tough on Security Risks?

Just at a time when there has been a flood of propaganda to the effect that we have been too tough in the execution of our security laws, there is evidence that Great Britain was much too lax in the same field. Britain's inner sanctum was penetrated by enemy agents. What the agents were able to tell the Russians hurt the United States too.

The reason the Soviet spies were able to penetrate the British Foreign Office was that Britain's security set-up is inadequate. In the United States we have suffered because of the same complaint.

The British suspected Donald MacLean and Guy Burgess were security risks, but they couldn't do anything about it. The authorities could not even gather enough evidence to arrest them.

We have suffered because of the same thing. However, we seem to have done more about it than the British.

If this condition had been recognized at the time we undertook with Great Britain to split the atom and manufacture the first atom bomb, most likely we might have been able to screen out such individuals as Dr. Klaus Fuchs, the German-born British subject who came over here to help on the project and who turned out to be a Communist spy. The British knew he had a Communist background but apparently decided it was meaningless.

Fuchs has been called the most deadly spy of all time because he managed to sneak out of this country the secret of making the atom bomb. The United States was at a great disadvantage in diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union because of the successful atomic espionage. Soviet scientists knew the atomic secrets, but we did not know they knew them. We supposed that we were at least five years ahead of the Soviet Union in the atomic field.

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"Montana Standard"
Butte, Montana
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It is now revealed by a former top Soviet agent in Australia, Vladimir Petrov, that the two British agents—MacLean and Burgess—probably assisted in the atomic espionage. They escaped to Moscow when it appeared certain they were about to be exposed. They were assisted by the Soviet Union in their escape.

It has not been disclosed what sort of information the two British agents transmitted to the Soviet Union, but the volume must have been great because the Soviet foreign office set up a special bureau to process it.

It is known that the Soviets were able to get a large volume of material through a similar espionage setup in the United States which was disclosed in the case of Alger Hiss. Both MacLean and Burgess had direct connections with United States high level information. MacLean occupied the American desk in the British Foreign Office until May, 1951. Burgess was second secretary in the British embassy in Washington. During his stay there he carried a 24-hour pass to the Atomic Energy Commission.

Supposedly during all this time the two men were under suspicion but British officials could do nothing about it.

A similar situation existed in this country in the case of the late Harry Dexter White, an official in the Treasury Department who acted in many instances for the Secretary of Treasury.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation sent letter after letter to the White House as well as to other responsible officials pointing out that White was under strong suspicion as a Communist agent. But White kept on getting promotions.

But we have tightened our security setup since then. The action was forced by congressional investigations which exposed scores of government employes who refused to testify about their Communist affiliations on the grounds that anything they might say would be self-incriminating (Fifth Amendment).

The rule was laid down that no government employe who took the Fifth Amendment was entitled to remain on his job.

There have been a few instances in which our security measures misfired. But the common opinion among Americans is that more Communists have escaped than have been caught. The great danger is that we

have a tendency to be too lenient—as the British have been—and not too tough in the execution of our security laws.

Probers Turn To Fugitives

By the Associated Press

The activities of the fugitive British diplomats Guy Burgess and Donald MacLean have been brought under investigation by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

Chairman Eastland, Democrat of Mississippi, said in disclosing this that one point of inquiry is whether they could have tipped off Red China that its home bases would be immune from attack even if Chinese Communist troops were thrown into the Korean war.

"We want to find out, if we can, if they had that knowledge," he said in an interview.

Held Key Posts

Burgess, at the time, was second secretary of the British Embassy here while MacLean was in charge of the American desk in the British Foreign Office in London.

They mysteriously disappeared behind the Iron Curtain in the spring of 1951 and the British Foreign Office recently said it believed they were Soviet agents. They are reported to be in Moscow now.

Senator Eastland wrote a letter September 22 asking Secretary of State Dulles about the two men's "relations to the State Department, and the basic activity in connection therewith." He said he has not yet received a reply from Mr. Dulles.

In addition to the question of whether MacLean and Burgess might have given the Chinese Communists a big assist in the Korean war, the subcommittee is expected to try to find out what information they had access to and what contacts they had in this country.

Tipped Scales in War

The Chinese Communists entered the Korean war in force in late November 1950 as the United Nations troops under Gen. Douglas MacArthur were advancing close to the Manchurian border and appeared to be on the verge of victory.

Gen. James A. Van Fleet

former commander of the United States 8th Army in Korea, testified at a subcommittee hearing last year and in response to questions about the surprise entry of the Chinese Communists into the war said: "My own conviction is that there must have been information to the enemy that we would not attack his home bases."

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'Third Man' Music All That's Needed Now

Who Was the Mastermind in MacLean-Burgess Case?

By MILTON BERLINER (See Editorial on next page)

A little "Third Man" music is all the MacLean-Burgess spy case needs now.

The famous case of the two missing British diplomats—both of whom served here in Washington—has been given everything from a pooh-pooh to a British white paper.

Now, with a little theme-song, it would seem to be ready for the movie thriller treatment, too, for today, the big unanswered question is:

- Who masterminded Guy Burgess and Donald Duarf MacLean?--
- Who helped them transmit government secrets to Russia and then helped them skip from England, right from under the noses of the British counter-espionage agents (who had been alerted) and then helped forge the various messages to which either Burgess's or MacLean's name were signed?
- Who masterminded the quiet fade-out behind the Iron Curtain of the American wife and three children of Donald MacLean? This happened at Geneva, more than three years after her husband and his co-conspirator had vanished.

BEGINNING

The whole story, which—to put not too much lemon in the tea—has the British government a bit upset, began when MacLean and Burgess were students together at Trinity College in Cambridge, England. Both had brilliant academic records. Both showed some communist leanings while there. Both seemed to have renounced them when they left.

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Mr. MacLean is the son of a former cabinet minister, Sir Donald MacLean. Young MacLean joined the diplomatic service in 1935. He served in Paris, Washington and Cairo, rising swiftly to the rank of counsellor in 1938 at 35. He was here in Washington during the World War II period.

"In May, 1950," said the recent British government white paper on the case, "while serving at Her Majesty's embassy at Cairo, Mr. MacLean was guilty of serious misconduct and suffered a form of breakdown which was attributed to overwork and excessive drinking.

"Until the breakdown, his work had remained eminently satisfactory and there was no ground whatsoever for doubting his loyalty. After recuperation and leave at home he was passed medically fit, and in October, 1950, was appointed head of the American department of the Foreign Office which, since it does not deal with the major problems of Anglo-American relations, appeared to be within his capacity."

(The opposition is likely to make sharp point of this when the House of Commons debates the case next month.

INQUIRY

(Also, Capt. Henry Kerby, Conservative member of Parliament, has demanded a full scale public inquiry into the case. He said both men were "known as drunks and sex perverts for years" to a great many persons. He also claimed the Foreign Office was deliberately covering up sordid details.)

Guy Francis de Moncy Burgess, who became a second secretary in Washington in 1950, was much better known here than his partner in espionage. This was because of the number of times he was arrested or reckless driving.

Mr. Burgess came to Washington with a black mark against him. Early in 1950, British security officers informed the Foreign Office that in late 1949 while on a holiday abroad Mr. Burgess had talked indiscreetly about secrets that he had official knowledge of.

"For this he was severely reprimanded," said the British white paper, adding that "apart from this lapse his service up to the time of his appointment to Washington was satisfactory."

But his work here proved unsatisfactory. Again, he drew a reprimand. This time for leaving confidential papers unattended.

In May, 1951, he was recalled to London and asked to resign, on the promise of being booted out if he didn't.

"It was at this point," said the British government, "that he (and MacLean) disappeared."

That was Friday, May 25, 1951.

Did a "third man" help their getaway?

Just 16 months before that, British authorities had received reports of a security leak.

WHITE PAPER

The white paper takes up the story from there:

"In January 1949, the security authorities received a report that certain Foreign Office information had leaked to the Soviet authorities some years earlier. The report amounted to little more than a hint and it was at the time impossible to attribute the leak to any particular individual.

"Highly secret but widespread and protracted inquiries were begun. . . . The field of suspicion had been narrowed by mid-April 1951 to two or three persons. By the beginning of May, MacLean (was) principal suspect. Even at that time, there was no legally admissible evidence.

"Arrangements were made to ensure that information of exceptional secrecy and importance should not come into his hands. Meantime, security authorities arranged to investigate his activities and contacts to obtain information which could be used as evidence. . . .

"On May 25 the then Secretary of State, Herbert Morrison, sanctioned a proposal that the security authorities should question MacLean. Such questioning might produce no confession or voluntary statement sufficient to support a prosecution, but might serve only to alert him. . . .

"In that event he would have been free to make arrangements to leave the country and the authorities would have had no legal power to stop him. Everything therefore depended on the interview. The security authorities were anxious to be as fully prepared as was humanly possible.

"They were also anxious that MacLean's house at Tatsfield, Kent, should be searched. This was an additional reason for delaying the proposed interview until mid-June when Mrs. MacLean, who was then pregnant, was expected to be away from home.

"It is now clear that in spite of the precautions taken by the authorities, MacLean must have become aware that he was under investigation. One explanation may be that he observed that he was no longer receiving certain types of secret papers."

"It is also possible that he detected that he was under observation. Or he may have been warned.

"Searching enquiries involving individual interrogations were made into this last possibility. Insufficient evidence was obtainable to form a definite conclusion or to warrant prosecution."

Did a "Third Man" warn them?

On May 28, 1951, Mr. MacLean failed to show up for work. The British authorities went into action.

They found that Messrs. MacLean and Burgess had left Tatsfield by car for Southampton in the late evening of Friday, May 25, had arrived at Southampton at midnight, caught the S. S. Falaise for St. Malo and disembarked there at 11:45 the next morning, leaving suitcases and some clothing on board.

TRACED

The manhunters traced the pair to Paris. There they lost sight of them. They turned their attention to Mr. MacLean's family and Mr. Burgess' mother in England for possible contacts with the missing men.

On June 7, 1951, telegrams sent from Paris were received by MacLean's mother and his wife, Melinda. The first was signed with an affectionate nickname known only to the family. All was well, it said.

The other, expressing regret at the sudden departure was signed "Donald."

Here the "third man" theme enters the picture again.

• The original telegraphic forms suggested, by handwriting and misspellings, that the telegrams had been written by a foreigner.

• Similarly, a telegram received from Rome by Burgess' mother on the same day, "had the appearance of being foreign and was certainly not that of Burgess," the white paper said. This one, short and affectionate said Burgess was leaving for a long Mediterranean holiday.

INFORMATION

The white paper continues:

"Accordingly to information given to the Foreign Office in confidence by Mrs. Dunbar, Mr. MacLean's mother-in-law, who was then living with her daughter at Tatsfield, she received on Aug. 3, 1951, two registered letters posted in St. Gallen, Switzerland, on Aug. 1. One contained a draft on the Swiss Bank Corp., London, for the sum of £1000 payable to Mrs. Dunbar; the other, a draft payable to Mrs. Dunbar for the same sum, drawn by the Union Bank of Switzerland on the Midland Bank in London.

"Both drafts remitted by a Robert Becker, whose address was

(Continued on Page 59)

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Who Was Mastermind

(Continued From Page 37)

given as the Hotel Central, Zurich. Swiss authorities could not identify Mr. Becker. Probably the name was false.

"Shortly after the receipt of these bank drafts Mrs. MacLean received a letter in her husband's handwriting. It had been posted in Reigate, Surrey on Aug. 5, 1951, and was of an affectionate, personal nature as from husband to wife. It gave no clue as to Mr. MacLean's whereabouts or the reason for his disappearance but it explained that the bank drafts, which for convenience had been sent to Mrs. Dunbar, were intended for Mrs. MacLean.

"Lady MacLean received a further letter from her son on Aug. 15, 1951. There is no doubt that it was in his own handwriting. It had been posted at Herne Hill on Aug. 11 . . .

"On Sept. 11, 1953, Mrs. MacLean, who was living in Geneva, left there by car with her three children. She had told her mother, who was staying with her, that she had unexpectedly come across an acquaintance who she and her husband had previously known in Cairo, and that he had invited her and the children to spend the week-end with him at Territet, near Montreux. She stated that she would return to Geneva on Sept. 13 in time for the two elder children to attend school the following day.

"By Sept. 14 her mother, alarmed at her failure to return, reported the matter to Her Majesty's Consul General in Geneva and also by telephone to London.

"Security officers were at once dispatched to Geneva. Swiss police were already making intensive inquiries. On Sept. 16 Mrs. MacLean's car was found in a garage in Lausanne. She had left it on the afternoon of the 11th, saying she would return for it in a week.

"The garage hand who reported this added that Mrs. MacLean had taken her children to Lausanne's railway station. On the same day, Sept. 16, Mrs. Dunbar reported to Geneva police the receipt of a telegram purporting to come from her

daughter. The telegram explained that Mrs. MacLean had been delayed 'owing to unforeseen circumstances' and asked Mrs. Dunbar to inform the school authorities that the two elder children would be returning in a week.

"Mrs. MacLean's youngest child was referred to in this telegram by a name known only to Mrs. MacLean, her mother and other intimates.

"The telegram had been handed in at a post office in Territet at 10:58 that morning by a woman whose description did NOT agree with that of Mrs. MacLean.

• The handwriting on the telegram form was not Mrs. MacLean's and it showed foreign characteristics similar to those in the telegrams received in 1951 by Lady MacLean, Mrs. MacLean and Mrs. Bassett.

"From witnesses in Switzerland and Austria, it seems clear that the arrangements for Mrs. MacLean's departure from Geneva had been carefully planned. She went by train from Lausanne, passing the Swiss-Austrian frontier and arriving at Schwarzach St. Veit in the American Zone of Austria at approximately 9:15 on the morning of Sept. 12.

"A porter at Schwarzach St. Veit and witnesses traveling on the train established she left the train at this point. Further evidence shows that she was met at the station by an

unknown man driving a car bearing Austrian number plates. This car was never traced. Probably it took Mrs. MacLean and the children from Schwarvach St. Veit to neighboring territory in Russian occupation, on her journey to join her husband."

The MacLeans and Burgess had vanished and with plenty of help.

However, their real whereabouts was only a matter of suspicion until Vladimir Petrov, former Third Secretary of the Russian embassy in Australia, escaped to freedom on April 3, 1954.

Said the white paper:

"Petrov states that both Messrs. MacLean and Burgess were recruited as spies for the Soviet government while students, with the intention that they should carry out their espionage tasks in the Foreign Office, and that in 1951, by means unknown to him, one or other of the two men be-

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came aware that their activities were under investigation.

"This was reported by them to the Soviet Intelligence Service who then organized their escape and removal to the Soviet Union. Petrov has the impression that the escape route included Czechoslovakia and that it involved an airplane flight into that country. Upon their arrival in Russia Messrs. MacLean and Burgess lived near Moscow. They were used as advisers to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Soviet agencies."

Mr. Petrov also said that Mr. MacLean has since been joined by his wife.

Did the same third man see the whole adventure thru? And what is he up to now?



GUY BURGESS



• DONALD MacLEAN

206 52
JUN 22 1952

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

4

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Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Evans	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

BAUMGARDNER

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V.

for

Security Justified.

The individuals and organizations promoting the destruction of the security system in America have been given a bitter pill to swallow.

Newspapers, politicians and private citizens in Britain who have derided the efforts of the United States to protect this country from infiltration by subversives now are eating crow.

The incident which is so unfortunate from the view of the American left-wingers and the British critics of this country's security measures is the publication of the true story of the disappearance of Donald MacLean and Guy Burgess, the British foreign office officials, who skipped behind the iron curtain in 1951.

The most comprehensive account of the story of the two diplomats to be published in America is found in a copyrighted article in David Lawrence's magazine, U. S. News & World Report. The article is written by Vladimir Petrov, former MVD agent in Australia, who defected to the West in 1954. It was reviewed by Mr. Lawrence in his column on this page a few days ago.

Broadly speaking, the story of the fleeing diplomats makes the point that free nations in today's world must be ever vigilant to prevent infiltration of their governments by subversives and espionage agents reporting to Moscow.

JACKSON CITIZEN PATRIOT
 JACKSON, MICHIGAN
 923-55
 HOME EDITION
 Page 6 - Col 1-2
 EDITOR:
 CARL H. SAUNDERS

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There are also details in the story which have a special bearing on current arguments in America over "dredging up old left-wing connections" and "guilt by association."

Petrov, who is in a position to know, reports that Burgess and MacLean both were members of left-wing groups at Cambridge university.

Geoffrey Hoare, in his book, "The Missing MacLeans," reports that MacLean made no secret of his disgust with "the spinelessness of the western democracies" and that at

one point he considered giving up his planned career to go to work in Russia.

A routine security check, such as is conducted in this country, would have revealed this facet of MacLean's life. Whether the British government made this check or accepted the idea that college associations of the young diplomat were not important, never has been explained.

It follows that if the government had looked into MacLean's past and become a bit suspicious of his ideological leanings, great masses of American and British secrets might not have been shipped to Russia.

Another intriguing angle of the mystery of the missing diplomats involves Mrs. MacLean, who disappeared behind the iron curtain to join her husband in September of 1953.

The British government seemingly accepted at face value what Petrov calls Mrs. MacLean's "cover story."

She gave the appearance of being distraught and mystified after her husband faded from sight, and handed British government agents communications purporting to be from MacLean. She spoke to friends of her intention to divorce the missing husband.

Mrs. MacLean apparently was not kept under strict surveillance by the British government. She was permitted to travel freely, even to Geneva from which point she started her flight to join her husband. "Guilt by association" apparently is an unthinkable theory from the British point of view. But read what Petrov writes:

"My belief is that MacLean told his wife of his destination before he left, but I cannot be sure of this. At any rate, she participated fully at a later stage in (her) escape plan."

And so the one person who might have held the key to a great mystery was permitted to slip through the fingers of the British security system—if it deserves that name.

The case of Burgess and MacLean proves—as did the Hiss incident and others of its type in America—that eternal vigilance is essential to national security in this era of a great ideological struggle. The difficulties of keeping a nation's guard up without treading on individual rights and liberties, are frightful, indeed.

But the dangers in lax security must be admitted in the light of events which show clearly the damage that can result from following the advice from the left.

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. Boardman _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Belmont _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Mohr _____
- Mr. Parsons _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tamm _____
- Mr. Sizoo _____
- Mr. Winterrowd _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Mr. Holloman _____
- Miss Gandy _____

BRITAIN'S SPIES

BRITAIN'S missing diplomats—the MacLean-Burgess case—have given our British friends a major communist spy problem. Milton Berliner's roundup of the fascinating case makes good reading on Page 37 today and points up why it is still a headache on both sides of the Atlantic.

The White Paper issued by the government still leaves many questions unanswered. It also leaves the government—both the present Conservative and former Labor governments—open to grave suspicion of bungling and underestimating the seriousness of this case.

The most damaging new evidence contributed by the White Paper is disclosure that on the very day one of the diplomats was to be questioned by security officers, after months of dilly-dallying, the two men disappeared.

This poses the probability that someone in a very high position in the British Government or security administration tipped off the men to flee.

The serious problem for the British Government now is—is the person who tipped off the diplomats to scam still operating?

Not only should that question worry Britishers; it also should temper future criticism in Britain of the American security program.

Soviet espionage is international. It is time the free world accepted this unpleasant fact. It is also time the free world recognized that the weakest part of its military alliance is the failure to work together to combat espionage. In the end, defense against espionage may be more important than defense against armed aggression.

DONALD MACLEAN

BRANNIGAN

file
W.M.N.

Patricia
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- Wash. Post and Times Herald _____
- Wash. News _____
- Wash. Star _____
- N. Y. Herald Tribune _____
- N. Y. Mirror _____
- Daily Worker _____
- The Worker _____
- New Leader _____

Date SEP 28 1955

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- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Belmont _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Mohr _____
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- Mr. Rosen _____
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- Mr. Sizoo _____
- Mr. Winterrowd _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Mr. Holloman _____
- Miss Gandy _____

Wanted: A 'Lynskey Tribunal' on the Foreign Office



BRADY
ROACH

THANKS to gross mishandling under three successive Foreign Secretaries, there is now only one way to clear up the Burgess and Maclean affair—a full and impartial investigation.

But who is to do it? A Royal Commission is too slow-moving. A Parliamentary Select Committee would be too political, in view of the fact that nearly a dozen members of the Lords and Commons, who served at the Foreign Office, are interested parties.

What we need, I am sure, is another "Lynskey Tribunal."

Some people, perhaps, have forgotten Sydney Stanley and the guileless Socialist Minister, John Belcher, who fell into his clutches.

As soon as the first rumours of Ministerial corruption came to the ears of Mr. Attlee, he took action. Three eminent lawyers, headed by Mr. Justice Lynskey, were instructed by Parliament to institute a full and public investigation.

The Tribunal was given access to the confidential files of Government Departments, and it was empowered to summon witnesses and to take their evidence on oath.

It did its job impartially and ruthlessly, leaving nothing unprobed.

When it was all over, the British people were relieved to know that there was far less fire behind the evil-smelling smoke than had been feared.



Since this formidable apparatus of judicial investigation was successfully employed to clear up the relatively trivial Stanley affair, I cannot see how Sir Anthony Eden can hesitate to invoke it now that he is faced with an infinitely graver crisis of public confidence.

Today the good name of the British Foreign Office is at stake and public faith in both the candour and the competence of its senior officials has been shaken.

Mr. Macmillan's White Paper, which presumably was intended to allay public anxiety, has had exactly the opposite effect.

It has strengthened the suspicion that vital facts are being concealed in order to protect highly placed persons.

Instead of frankly admitting its errors and putting them right directly, Burgess and Maclean disappeared, the

Foreign Office has spent four years stifling Press investigation and Parliamentary questions.

Indeed, the White Paper itself makes it clear that many of the answers which Ministers were briefed to give in Parliament were deliberate suppressions of the truth—and some of them were actual lies.

The damage done by Burgess and Maclean is a thing of the past. What needs investigation is the state of affairs in the Foreign Office which made it possible.

I realise, of course, that, if the full truth is to be uncovered, the politicians and officials concerned must be able to speak freely; and this means that much of the evidence would have to be heard in secret.

Nevertheless, I am sure that, when the Tribunal's report and recommendations were published, they would achieve two vital objectives. First, they would reassure the public and kill the danger of the kind of hysteria which Senator McCarthy exploited in the States.

Secondly, they would enable the Government to take the action required inside the Foreign Office in order to restore its good name.

by RICHARD CROSSMAN, M.P.

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DONALD
RE: MacLEAN CASE
(Bufile 100-374183)
OCT 9 15
DAILY MIRROR
SEPTEMBER 27, 1955
LONDON, ENGLAND
OCT 12 1955
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Mr. Boardman _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Belmont _____
 Mr. Harbo _____
 Mr. Mohr _____
 Mr. Parsons _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tamm _____
 Mr. Sizoo _____
 Mr. Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Mr. Holloman _____
 Miss Gandy _____

BRANCH
 NORTH
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EXPRESS CHIEF CRIME REPORTER PERCY HOSKINS PONDERES ON THE MACLEAN WHITE-PAPER RIDDLE AND SAYS:

If I were an M.P. I would ask these questions

If I were an M.P. taking part in next month's parliamentary debate on Burgess and Maclean I would seek enlightenment on eight points.

1. I cannot believe it was sheer coincidence Maclean fled on the day Foreign Secretary Mr. Herbert Morrison decided he should be interrogated. So...
1. To how many people was Mr. Morrison's decision made known? How many of these persons are still in the employ of the Foreign Office?
2. Having taken the decision to question Maclean and search his home, what person in authority decided to delay this action?
3. Does the Foreign Secretary know or suspect the identity of the Third Man—the man who warned Maclean that he was in danger?
4. If so, is he still a member of the Foreign Office staff, or is he serving with any other Government department?
5. Was there a lack of co-ordination between the security departments involved? Did someone in authority "sit

upon" information which should have been passed on for immediate action elsewhere?

5. Why was the observation on Maclean carried out by M.I.5 operatives inexperienced in such operations instead of being entrusted to the specially-trained Scotland Yard Special Branch men?

[In asking this question I have in mind the case of William Martin Marshall, the Foreign Office cypher clerk jailed for five years in July 1952 for passing secret information to a Soviet Embassy official. For

days Special Branch men kept these two under observation as they met in King George's Park, Wandsworth, and pounced at the moment definite evidence was established.]

WHO FAILED?

6. Was Maclean's intention of taking the day off on May 26 ever communicated to the security authorities? Did someone fail to appreciate a man suspected of betraying his country might, in that interval, meet someone assisting in the betrayal?

7. Was Burgess ever under observation? The White-paper does not mention that he was. It simply records: "Burgess was on leave and under no obligation to report his movements."

If he was under observation, how did it escape notice that he had taken possession of a self-drive car on the day of the disappearance?

8. What instructions have been issued to sea and airport authorities should these men ever attempt to return?

CHAPMAN PINCHER OFFERS AN EXPLANATION

Eden forced Foreign Office to talk

PRESSURE from Sir Anthony Eden forced the Foreign Office to break its four-year silence on Burgess and Maclean, it was revealed last night.

The decision to make certain admissions was taken only after

the Cabinet had discussed the matter at meetings spread over the previous month.

Australian security authorities had warned the Foreign Office that Vladimir Petrov, the former Russian spy, was going to disclose damaging facts about

Burgess and Maclean in a Sydney newspaper.

After studying these facts the Premier, who had continued the policy of silence on the missing diplomats while he was Foreign Secretary, urged that some of Petrov's allegations should be admitted.

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DONALD

RE: MACLEAN CASE (Bufile 100-374183) IS 52 BH 22

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Mr. Tolson	_____
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Mr. Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

BRADLEY
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HOW SAFE IS BRITAIN? *The Daily Mail*

Special Investigation into the Security Defences of the Nation, today takes a two-part look at the men and the methods behind the administration of the Foreign Service

**Talent Is Ruined
by the Foreign
Office 'System'**

Those diplomatic strutters should start learning how to walk with the people.

NO single organisation has been portrayed more variously or inaccurately than the Foreign Office. It has been said to consist of aristocrats, intellectuals, old-school-tie men, "long-haired" men, and snobs.

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DAVID
RE: MacLEAN CASE
(Bufile 100-374183)

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126 OCT 12 1955

DAILY MAIL
SEPTEMBER 27, 1955
LONDON, ENGLAND

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INDICE
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Some commentators, working themselves up into a legitimate rage over the Maclean and Burgess affair, have tried to combine all these insulting words in a single spate of abuse; but the accusations are so mixed, and the general picture so incoherent, that the public is merely left, feeling that something is wrong with the Foreign Office and nobody knows what.

Nor is this surprising. No one without first-hand experience really knows what our diplomats are like, because nine-tenths of their work is done abroad, out of sight of the public and of newspapers.

What is the Foreign Office? It is a Department of State, like any other, consisting of permanent officials. Its staff are recruited by examination and interview over a period of days.

No preference

AS in the rest of the Civil Service, the successful candidates come mostly from the middle class, with a sprinkling and no more of the working class and the aristocracy.

So far, so good, we may say. No preference for the old school tie, and the best man for the job.

Mr. X, educated perhaps at Manchester Grammar School and a pretty bright boy, is a typical example. He joined up full of youthful enthusiasm and a desire to bring the peoples of the world together. His first disillusionment will be to learn that his mission is not, as he thought, to foreign peoples but to the Governments—which means to officials.

This will surprise him but he will be even more surprised on going abroad and learning that he is expected to spend his social life with his co-diplomats from other countries.

Finally, he will learn to his chagrin that his enthusiasm is vulgar and that the correct

by
**ARTHUR
GORE**

attitude for a British diplomat, particularly dealing with foreigners is one of aloof disdain. He will learn that his protocol must be perfect but that his manners are of little account.

Now, unless Mr. X is a man of an exceptional character, he will find himself quickly falling into the way of life thus laid down for him.

His work during the day will be full and absorbing—and, make no mistake British diplomats work pretty hard like all senior Civil Servants. His nights will be delightful. On Monday there will be cocktails with the Turks, on Tuesday a gay dinner with the Finns, on Wednesday a *bal masque*, perhaps, by the Venezuelans—the Latin-Americans have lots of money, little to do, and give the best parties.

Ample allowances

MOREOVER, his allowances being ample as befits a British representative abroad, he will be able to give back as good as he gets. He will be living, in short, as he could never live at home.

Who will blame him, then, if he becomes a very spoilt and apeing his superiors, a very rude young man, or his wife enjoying hugely a social position which she could never have

aspired to in Manchester, and for developing the most ludicrous airs and graces?

Life will be very sweet for Mr. and Mrs. X. Before them, unless he or she makes a first-class bloomer, lies possibly an ambassadorship and—almost inevitably—the K.C.M.G., and even if he does slip a little there is always a cosy consul-generalship.

True, he may not belong to the innermost Foreign Office cabal, those dozen or so prominent who never seem to get a bad post (Sir Gladwyn Jebb and Lord Hood, for example, have never made the acquaintance of Bogota), but as long as they both obey orders—and Mr. X must play her part, too, as an Embassy hostess—the prospects are relatively golden.

Relatively, because before them lies always the spectre of a possible spell in London and the certainty of a dim and underpaid retirement.

Assume that Mr. X manages to become Counsellor in Paris: there he will receive allowances of £4,500 a year in addition to an untaxed salary of £2,500. Put him back in the Foreign Office as head of the American Department—Maclean's post—and he not only loses his allowances but has to pay U.K. income tax on his salary.

Lost friends

IN addition he will find that he has lost his British friends. Friendship depends on regular association: and life moves on.

Moreover, they will be faced with reminders of what lies ahead. It will not comfort them to find their former chief, Sir A. B., cooking his own supper in his three-roomed Kensington flat.

Envy Mr. X—pity him! Envy him for his gorgeous present and pity him for his lustreless future. Pity him, too, for the graceless, self-satisfied little monkey which the system is so busily turning him into. He starts all right—indeed, he might be your son; and if he has an old school tie it is the Foreign Office tie, not that of Eton. "Long-haired" he most certainly is not.

And don't blame the Foreign Secretary. He has to make the best of what he finds, and basically what he finds is good material in terms of loyalty and brains at least.

Blame the sorry succession of permanent under-secretaries who have been content to let their young men, our young men, strut across the world represented by all but their "opposite numbers" and their co-diplomats.

Determined chief

IT wants one keen and determined chief, a second—Sir Lyra Crowe, to put things to rights.

He would tell his staff to go out among the foreign peoples and discover what they and not what the officials or the other diplomats are thinking. He would warn them that in future, the plum posts would go to those who do things and do them with gusto, not to those who sit and obey orders scrupulously but without imagination.

Above all, he would remind them that foreigners judge Britain by the behaviour of her official representatives, and proclaim that henceforth arrogance and offensiveness will simply not be tolerated.

He will not be loved for his reforms. But no unpopularity would be too great if it meant making out of our foreign service the great and respected institution that it once was and, for the past 20 years, has ceased to be.

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Boardman	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

**THIS IS THE DANGER OF
'INSIDE' SECURITY MEN**

**Would You Report on
Your Own Boss?**

"Nothing could be worse than to do anything which would undermine the confidence of our people in the Foreign Service."

*The Foreign Secretary,
Mr. Harold Macmillan.*

THE bill for Britain's Foreign Service this year is some £20,000,000. Rightly it is a proud service. Rightly it is accounted something to have "a job in the Foreign Office."

This year 230 young men and women, all university graduates with honours degrees (others need not apply), sought entry to "A Branch." Only 14 were successful, 12 young men and two young women. They alone survived the two-day written examination followed by the close scrutiny of a 21-day personal "vetting" by members of the selection board.

For life

AFTER surviving that the 14 have had to be "screened" by security officers of the Foreign Office personnel branch with inquiries, intensified since the Burgess-Maclean affair, into

their families, background, habits, private lives.

Those hurdles behind them they now have jobs for life, a period of grooming with service at home and abroad, and before them the prospect of jobs worth between £2,000 and £3,000 a year, £5,000 a year, much more if they reach ambassadorial rank.

The Foreign Service still eyes its "A" members beneficently, always errs to overlook private misdemeanours and indiscretions. It is still the tradition of the Service to "protect" its members, to let nothing escape that would "undermine the confidence of our people."

Rare 'axe'

WHAT happens to anyone in the Service who misbehaves? A reprimand, a transfer? Never, or very rarely the "axe." Yet almost everyone in the Service, from the upper strata "A Branch" career men to clerks and typists, cannot help in a foreign post coming into possession of confidential information.

Some facts about procedure, office routine, passage of documents are known to everyone. It is common knowledge in any Embassy or Legation who is "Five," "Six" (MI5 and MI6) and who is "Security." Anyone liable to be "got at" could furnish an enemy agent with valuable clues.

The Foreign Office has its own security men, resident (in the larger Embassies) or visiting. Some check physical security, safes, the guard on codes, classification, and circulation of documents disposal of notes and waste.

Personnel branch has its own security men, checking on the behaviour and private lives of employees, inspecting the personal dossier which accompanies every officer through his or her career. But these officers are career men too. They are in line for promotion, and it is expected much that they should report adversely upon, say, a superior who may in the near future have considerable influence on their own promotion. This is something which should be changed without delay.

Liberalised

DURING the war the Service was liberalised to mould the component branches into one large whole. The change opened the top diplomatic posts to men who previously had been limited to say, consular rank. Grammar school boys who had won through to university and honours degrees got their chance. This year among the 14 successful "A Branch" candidates three were grammar school boys; three in 14, that is about the annual ratio. The rest were from public schools.

People in the Service say the changes have not been as radical as would appear from this. The right family background still counts. There is still a "golden road" in the Service.

In other parts of Whitehall Civil Servants discuss cynically

what they call the Foreign Office "Protection Society." Inside the Foreign Service there are people who say it is too "protective" and that that is its major failing. It is "protected" from public opinion, is aloof, remote.

Typical of this was the decision made when Burgess and Maclean fled the country to be as uncommunicative as possible: typical Foreign Office attitude now on that decision is the comment: "It was a calculated risk."

What was the risk? Telling the people of Britain, the risk of being frank? Nothing could have been more calculated to undermine public confidence.

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Mr. Tolson	_____
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Mr. Mohr	_____
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BURGESS AND MACLEAN

'COST US KOREA'

WASHINGTON, Monday.
A M E R I C A would have won the Korean war but for Burgess and Maclean says a U.S. magazine to-day.

"The two men helped trigger the invasion by armies of Communist China at the moment of defeat for the Soviet North Koreans," says the magazine, U.S. News and World Report.

VITAL PIECE

"At the crucial moment when Communist leaders in Peking either had to write off Korea or enter the fight, they needed one vital piece of intelligence.

"If China threw its armies into the war, would the U.S. use its full military

power to strike back or accept the chance of defeat by fighting only in Korea?"

It was intelligence that could be discovered for an enemy only by people at the heart of the diplomatic machinery in Britain and the U.S., says the article.

"Private cables on high decisions were flowing into the Foreign Office in London."

"In charge of the American desk sat Donald Maclean, says the magazine. He got the job on November 6, 1950, just 18 days before the Chinese armies attacked.

"Papers containing 'exceptionally secret' information passed through

his hands, the Foreign Office admitted."

General Douglas MacArthur United Nations commander in Korea, received orders on September 26, 1950, to use his air forces only in tactical attacks.

BORDER ORDER

The next day the general got orders that his forces, ground and air, "would not cross the Soviet or Manchurian borders under any circumstances."

The magazine claims that when Maclean took over his job in November, the big secrets that the Chinese Communists needed to know were in the Foreign Office files.

Burgess, in Washington, knew the same secrets, says the report. "Evi-

dence is strong that the two men confirmed the big decision for the Communists.

"The Chinese were so sure of themselves that they did not bother even to black out rail and highway bridges over the Yalu river. Supplies poured in from Manchuria."

The war which followed was the first America failed to win since 1812, says the magazine.

ANOTHER WAR

"If the war had ended late in 1950, after the North Koreans were defeated, America would have come out of it with 31,000 casualties, including 5,300 dead.

"As it was, with another war to fight against the

Chinese Communists, U.S. casualties mounted to 142,000, with 33,600 dead.

"In money, the war cost America at least \$5,357,343,000."

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RE: MacLEAN CASE
 (Bufile 100-374183)

DAILY SKETCH
 SEPTEMBER 27, 1955
 LONDON, ENGLAND

58 OCT 12 1955

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 BY LETTER JUN 22 1976
 PER FOIA REQUEST

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Was Maclean given away by embassy code spy?

PAINFUL CONTRAST, SAYS U.S.

THIS is what the Americans are saying about the Burgess and Maclean affair:

New York Herald Tribune: The evil skill employed in recruiting two brilliant young university students for Soviet espionage, fostering their advance through the British Foreign Service and aiding them to vanish as soon as their usefulness to the spy system was impaired, stands in painful contrast to the methods used to protect the security of the Foreign Office and to track down the missing men.

The old rules no longer apply: Burgess and Maclean were not the underprivileged mercenaries who made up the bulk of former secret agents, nor were they foreign nationals.

Well educated Englishmen of good families, with the talent to make fine careers in honest patriotic service, their offence was of the kind that constitutes the peculiar evil of our times.

McCarthy lesson
Boston Post: When our State Department was undergoing fumigation for termite infestation, many of the solid, substantial British journals were practically oozing with virtue as they deplored McCarthyism and the witch hunts. Now there is a great uproar in Britain.
 It seems good for the sake of deflating British self-esteem that the British people finally are learning what Senators McCarthy, Jenner and others were talking about, at in the usual way, it is too little and too late.

DONALD Maclean

RE: MacLEAN CASE
 (Bufile 100-374183)
 NEWS CHRONICLE
 SEPTEMBER 26, 1955
 LONDON, ENGLAND

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OTTAWA, Sunday.
It may have been Igor Gouzenko, former cipher clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, who first threw suspicion on the missing diplomats Burgess and Maclean.
Gouzenko's disclosures after he sought Canadian asylum in 1946 led to the found-up of a Russian atom-spy ring which included the British

scientist Dr. Nunn May. But not until last year was it learned that Gouzenko had told the authorities in Ottawa that he knew of an important spy in a Western capital.
Thirty-four words of his later testimony before U.S. Senators McCarran and Jenner were censored by the Canadian Government in April, 1954, for "international propriety."

The deleted words contained a cover name and the name of the organization in which the spy worked.
Because of his earlier reference to the British, it was believed in Ottawa today that Gouzenko, now living in hiding in Canada, had disclosed the presence of at least one Communist spy, and possibly two, in London.—B.U.P.

303

EDEN MAY DEMAND VOTE ON ESPIONAGE CHECKS

By DOUGLAS BROWN

LEADERS on both front benches in the Commons will come under heavy pressure from their back-benchers during the next four weeks to change their present attitude to the Burgess-Maclean affair.

Many M.P.s are in the mood to insist on sweeping investigations, followed by a report to reassure the public. The Government has resolved to take the line that all necessary action has already been taken.

BURGESS POOR SPY SAYS M.P.

Hector McNeill, M.P., Minister of State during the Labour Government, was asked on ITV last night what he thought of Burgess and Maclean. He said he did not know Maclean but he had no suspicion of Burgess when Burgess was working for him.

Was Burgess a good spy then? Mr. McNeill answered: "Method was not a part of his nature at all. He was not systematic or discreet. I should not imagine it was likely that he was a dependable spy of a high rank."

Opposition leaders propose to concentrate their criticism on Foreign Office recruitment and administration. Two things may save the front benches from the embarrassment of defeat:

1.—The Government will make the issue one of confidence in Sir Anthony Eden—who was Foreign Secretary during most of the period since the two diplomats fled—and the Cabinet.

2.—Labour will be influenced by the argument that there is a danger of "hysteria" about security which could create a climate for McCarthyism in Britain.

Third man

Both sides of the House are involved in responsibility for what has happened. The personal behaviour of the two spies, the security inquiries about them and their disappearance occurred while the Labour government was in power.

Most of the parliamentary replies now criticised as inadequate or misleading were given by Conservative Ministers.

It is probable that Labour will table a motion on the idea of an inquiry into Foreign Office matters. Back-benchers are likely to want a second inquiry—into the security organisations and their methods.

In particular, there will be a strong demand for information about the "third man" who may have tipped Burgess and Maclean that they were in danger.


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How Safe is Britain?



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TIME FOR A REFIT?

by Illingworth.

RE: MacLEAN CASE
(Bufile 100-3741183)

DAILY MAIL
SEPTEMBER 26, 1955
LONDON, ENGLAND

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Lack of Liaison is the Weak Link in Our Security Defences

"The watch on Maclean was made difficult by the need to ensure that he did not become aware that he was under observation."

Extract from the Foreign Office White Paper.

THAT statement in an official document of explanation must rank as the classic of naivete in the annals of espionage and counter-espionage.

In the sorry record of the Burgess-Maclean affair it projects disturbingly the criticisms made by people in the know that there are serious imperfections in Britain's security network. The major criticisms: That the structure of the security network is too compartmentalised; and that co-ordination between the different forces is weak.

The White Paper speaks of the difficulties of observation. "Shadowing" is not simple. In a city such as London it requires at least 12 men to mount a continuous 24-hour watch on one suspect.

It would not be reasonable to expect any one branch of security to have available a pool of trained "shadowers" large enough to meet such emergencies except in exceptional circumstances. But if there were closer liaison between the security forces, closer integration, such difficulties would not arise.

It is a major criticism that Scotland Yard is not kept properly advised, insufficient use is made of its highly expert Special Branch. Experienced police officers say it is incredible that in the Burgess-Maclean bungle swift warning was not passed to Scotland Yard, or the Immigration Service that the two men might flee the country. Such warning is routine in crime detection.

It is not difficult for outward-bound travellers to be delayed—a Customs search for suspected contraband—long enough for other authorities to be consulted.

The protective network exists. Men in the know say its efficiency is regularly impaired because there is lack of co-ordination. That lack of co-ordination, with its dangers, still exists.

**The First Report in an
Important New
DAILY MAIL
Investigation**

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The structure of Britain's protective network is complex. The outer and visible guard, though it too has under-cover men, is the Immigration Service on watch at harbours and airports. The Ministry of Supply, responsible for a large amount of secret work, has a headquarters security force, and subsidiary forces guarding developments in aircraft, weapons, guided missiles, and radar.

The new Atomic Energy Authority has its own security guard.

Behind these bastions there is an inner citadel of security, popularly known as M.I. (for Military Intelligence).

The force

WITHIN this citadel is a force split into many sections each of which deals with a particular aspect of security. Official references to this secret organisation are rare indeed, but when it has been mentioned—a few times during the post-war spy trials—it has always been referred to as the British Intelligence Service.

B.I.S. works under-cover. People talk of M.I.5 and M.I.6 and other symbols, sometimes, in whispers, of S.I.S. (Secret Intelligence Service), the spear-head force. These designations are never used officially.

The identities of the chiefs of any of the executives are never revealed. They are men, and women, of mystery. Their lives are ruled by the rigorous Official Secrets Act—to the grave. The executives are answerable to Cabinet superiors—no one else.

The Foreign Office is not connected with the inner citadel, but every British Embassy or Legation is concerned with much information that is highly confidential, and while it has its own safety and under-cover officers, the security of some of the information handled must be the concern of the B.I.S.

Scotland Yard's Special Branch stands aside. It acts as a sort of handmaid to be called upon when police action is required to detain suspects for questioning, to make arrests. But not before.

How is Britain served by this complex, and highly expensive, network? The failures that have come to light since the war have been disquieting. There has been a tightening-up, especially since the notorious Fuchs case. But it is said, co-ordination is still poor. Too rigidly each security force operates as a self-contained entity.

Security checks, "screenings," are closer. Among Foreign Office employees more care is being taken to inquire into antecedents, affiliations, political leanings. Since "screening" was intensified it is notable that numbers of people who were employed by the Atomic Energy Authority have moved to other employment.

The contrast

BY contrast there is a disquieting example of laxity within the Ministry of Supply, where a package of photographs of an aircraft still on the secret list was sent by the Ministry through the ordinary post in an envelope marked "Most Secret."

Leakages still occur. Now, more often than not, they occur at the top. Business heads who forget security in their eagerness to sell their products are a source of anxiety. A number whose names are well known to the public have been warned. It is through such leaks that foreign publications have given details of British industrial developments when here in Britain those developments were still on the secret list.

Security men still complain that the punishment of people in positions of trust who breach security is ineffective. Too often their lapse is "covered up." They may be reprimanded, but they are rarely disciplined.

Above all, no one has yet found the answer to the security problem of this generation—that of political defection. Entrapped by an alien ideology a

man betrays his country. He does it by conviction, and unless the defection is alarming, treacherous, suffers little public opprobrium. In the British tradition of freedom of thought and speech toleration is often stretched far beyond the limits of national security, the safety and well-being of 50,000,000 people.

The danger

A MAN has a right to his convictions, but he has not the right to permit those convictions to endanger his fellow-citizens. This is accepted, but it is put into practice erratically. People with vivid streaks of weakness in their characters are still tolerated, and shielded, in positions of trust.

While this goes on, until there is closer co-ordination between the different security forces, Britain cannot feel safe.

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What can they charge Maclean with?

By PERCY HOSKINS

If Maclean and Burgess returned to Britain tomorrow, could they be charged?

The Foreign Office has branded them as long-term Soviet agents.

All the circumstances support that.

But a criminal charge in a court of law?

If the Crown legal authorities were satisfied with the evidence placed before them by the security forces, a charge could be formulated—as in the case of the atom spies Nurn May and Fuchs—under the Official Secrets Act.

Section Two of the Act says that the fact that a person has been in communication with, or has attempted to communicate with, a foreign agent, either within or without the United Kingdom, is evidence that he has for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interest of the State, obtained or attempted to obtain information calculated or intended to be useful to an enemy.

The penalty could be 14 years jail. In time of war the charge would be treason. Penalty: death.

BUT in this case much of the information has been collected through undercover methods. And it is circumstantial.

The only supporting evidence comes from Petrov, the Soviet agent who deserted in Australia. And that is simply second-hand hearsay.

CONFESION

The White-paper published on Saturday stressed the necessity of obtaining an admission from Maclean.

It said that in reaching a decision to interview him on May 25, 1951, "it had to be borne in mind that such questioning might produce no confession or voluntary statement sufficient to support a prosecution, but might serve only to alert him."

The White-paper also said: "Both men were free to go abroad at any time. In some countries, no doubt, Maclean would have been arrested first and questioned afterwards. In this country no arrest can be made without adequate evidence. At the time there was insufficient evidence."

Does that mean that evidence has been collected since that time?

Or does it mean that Maclean and Burgess could return tomorrow and go scot-free?

Was M.I.5 overawed?

By CHAPMAN PINCHER

TWO big questions about the Maclean-Burgess case are expected to be put to the Government when Parliament reassembles next month.

DID M.I.5 chiefs put off the interrogation of Maclean until it was too late because they were overawed by the fact that he was the son of a former Minister? (Liberal Sir Donald Maclean was a onetime Education Minister.)

WAS it the difficulty of believing that a man with such social connections could be a traitor which led M.I.5 to ignore the possibility that he might flee from the country?

THE REASONS

Three points to be considered:—
 1. M.I.5 interrogated Fuchs and induced him to confess on much flimsier evidence than had been collected against Maclean.

2. Even after M.I.5 chiefs felt confident enough to secure Foreign Office permission to interrogate Maclean, they delayed still further. They decided that they needed more evidence before questioning such an influential suspect.

3. Maclean's obvious susceptibility to blackmail through his drunkenness and association with people of dubious character would have been enough to sanction interrogation in the case of a less well placed official.

RE: MacLEAN CASE
 (Bufile 100-374183)

DAILY EXPRESS
 SEPTEMBER 26, 1955
 LONDON, ENGLAND

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 FROM NY HERALD
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M. Ps Demand Probe On Escape of Red Spies

By William J. Humphreys
 From the Herald Tribune Bureau
 Copyright, 1955, N. Y. Herald Tribune Inc.
 LONDON, Sept. 25.—With the press spurring Britons to a new sense of awareness about defects in their security system, several members of Parliament today launched demands for the most searching kind of investigation into the men and methods responsible for the escape in May, 1951, of Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess, British Foreign Office officials who were Soviet spies.

sity personalities with the task of bringing the British security agencies under a strong light. Col. Marcus Lipton, Labor M. P., said that a permanent Parliamentary committee "should rip the veil of mystery" shrouding the Maclean-Burgess case. Capt. Henry Karby, Conservative M. P., expressed hopes that after Parliament reconvenes on Oct. 25 "the searching light of a public inquiry under a high court judge" will be empowered to "probe the full and concealed ramifications of the Burgess and Maclean scandal." The "Sunday Times" said the suspicion is being widely voiced that the two men might have had protection behind them.

Emanuel Shinwell, former Laborite Defense Minister, recommended entrusting a special committee of business leaders, two outstanding judges, two trade union leaders and univer-

File 5 pages

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- Wash. News _____
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SECTION 7

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Sordid Story of Burgess & MacLean

Guy Burgess and Donald MacLean now have filled in the missing chapters of their squalid past and boastfully announced intentions to continue on the path of treason.

The diplomat-traitors finally emerged from five years of mystery in Moscow. They are as arrogant as ever. Whether their personal lives—highlighted in the past by drunken brawls and homosexuality—remain as sordid is a problem for their Soviet masters.

The unanswered question is how the British foreign office tolerated these two young men when they themselves never hid their pro-Soviet views, and when their personal behavior in London, Paris, Cairo and Washington was a public scandal.

The post-mortem on this case already has reverberated in many capitals—especially in Washington. Only last week Gen. MacArthur again suggested that the Communists in Korea probably got their information of his military plans and even of higher American policy decisions through Burgess, then serving in the British Embassy in Washington, and MacLean, head of the American desk in the foreign office in London.

Treason is a crime that revolts honorable men everywhere. Americans will sympathize with Britishers who believe such despicable characters should hang from a gallows.

These two are beyond the reach of

British law, unfortunately. There is, however, a punishment Britain with our help can give them—deny them success in their efforts to divide and weaken the West.

This sudden surfacing of Burgess and MacLean has a major objective—to stir up old British-American difficulties . . . to keep us agitated about the past while Communism moves into the future.

Burgess and MacLean already have contributed to British-American disagreements. Are the British and Americans to let them continue to do so? Are we to reward them with more successes?

The past cannot be forgotten and should not. It is filled with lessons. But only the Communist conspiracy will profit if recriminations are permitted to poison the future.

About the only way the West can contribute to ultimate punishment of Burgess and MacLean is to prove them wrong. If the Western alliance does not fall apart—

If it gets stronger—and if the Burgess-MacLean projects to divide and weaken the West fail, the Kremlin is likely to tire of these men and find them useless.

When the Kremlin is through with a man the punishment is usually quick and ruthless. Speed the day when the Kremlin rewards these men with a knock on the door at midnight.

File 5 Part 1, 2

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SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.
February 13, 1956
Page 11, Col. 6

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Burgess and Maclean, the British traitors, crawled out from the Kremlin woodwork to prove that they still are in the Foreign Service—U. S. S. R.

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Petrov Calls Maclean and Burgess Liars

CANBERRA, Australia, Feb. 12 (AP)—The former Soviet spy in Australia said today that Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean lied when they asserted they never were Soviet agents.

Vladimir Petrov, who deserted his spy job in April, 1954, and turned over the Australian authorities a pile of secret Soviet documents on espionage operations, issued a statement through the Australian Security Service.

He challenged a statement by Burgess and Maclean, the turn-coat British diplomats who revealed their presence in Moscow yesterday for the first time since their mysterious disappearance in 1951.

In their statement, the run-aways admitted being Communists since their youth, but denied they ever had been spies, as is now charged by the British Foreign Office.

"Burgess and Maclean worked for the MGB (Soviet Ministry of State Security) and gave much secret information," said Petrov. "For these reasons the MGB arranged for Burgess and Maclean to travel secretly to the Soviet Union when British security authorities discovered that they were Soviet agents."

It was Petrov's first public statement, except for publication of a book, since a royal commission investigated his defection to Australian authorities. He previously had charged Burgess and Maclean with delivering secrets to Russia.

In an article in the London Sunday newspaper, The People, last September, Petrov said another Kremlin agent named Kislytsin told him Burgess had delivered to the Soviet Embassy in London "briefcases full of Foreign Office documents."

He said he was told the documents were photographed by the Embassy and quickly returned to Burgess, and the information forwarded to Moscow by pouch. In some instances, he said, the information was urgent so it was sent to Moscow by secret code.

Petrov wrote that Kislytsin later was sent to Moscow and put in charge of "an amazing library of foreign intelligence" and "by a remarkable coincidence this section turned out to be a collection of the material supplied by Burgess and Maclean."

In his statement today, Petrov said he felt sure Burgess

and Maclean made their statement in Moscow "under the direction of Soviet authorities and that the statements had been issued for propaganda purposes."

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Date FEB 13 1956

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Reds Wooing Britain With 2 Turncoats?

Moscow, Feb. 12 (Reuters).
 Communist Party Chief Nikita Khrushchev probably gave the order for the dramatic reappearance of missing British diplomats Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean yesterday, diplomats here said today.

They feel the decision was taken to remove an outstanding issue between Russia and Britain, clearing the way for Khrushchev's coming visit to Britain in April with Premier Nikolai Bulganin.

It was also felt that their statement, handed to two British and two Soviet reporters, might have been intended to impress the Russian people by suggesting there were doubts even in the British Foreign Office about United States policy.

Khrushchev Denial Recalled

Whatever the reason, it must have been compelling, for Khrushchev said only two weeks ago in an interview with London's News of the World he did not know where Burgess and Maclean were.

The Burgess-Maclean statement was published in all Soviet papers today with no comment.

Burgess, 44, and Maclean, 42, tonight were still mystery men. There is no clue as to where they went after they walked away in the Moscow fog yesterday.

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 125 FEB 28 1956

- Wash. Post and Times Herald _____
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Date FEB 13 1956

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CAPITOL STUFF

By JOHN O'DONNELL

Washington, Feb. 12.—This current installment of the great Burgess-Maclean spy serial, as contributed by the Kremlin authors, has left this constant reader chewing his finger down to the second knuckle and wondering where the next chapters are going to be printed and who will be the authors.

Almost five years ago, Guy Burgess, the screwball Britisher assigned to Britain's embassy here in a post where he was privy to our nation's military and top policy secrets, and his friend Donald Maclean, head of the American Department in the London Foreign Office, vanished behind the Iron Curtain. Both were Communist sympathizers and haters of the "Anglo-American" attitude toward Communism and "the senselessness and danger of the American policy in the Far East and in Europe."

But why have the big boys in the Kremlin after years of silence decided at this particular time to parade Burgess and Maclean at a Moscow press conference? We suggest a couple of answers. These are mere suggestions because this reporter trails along with Winston Churchill's famous May, 1939, observation in the House of Commons: that the thinking of the bosses in the Kremlin "is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma."

First, we note that the date of the flight from London of Burgess and Maclean in the spring of '51 was shortly after the decision of Harry Truman to remove abruptly Gen. MacArthur from his Far East command.

The current volume of Truman's biography and Gen. MacArthur's blistering retort pivots on the unanswered question: who tipped off the Chinese Reds that they could enter the Korean war with the vital advance knowledge that the U. S. State Department and the White House under Truman would hamstring MacArthur by giving the Red army their "place of sanctuary" north of the Yalu and prohibit him from bombing their bases and supply lines?

MacArthur's views on this, which mention specifically Burgess and Maclean, reached Moscow 48 hours before a decision was made to bring the two British defectors out of their long concealment.



Red Boss Khrushchev
Said he was in the dark

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- N. Y. Daily News 4
- Daily Worker _____
- The Worker _____
- New Leader _____

Date FEB 13 1956

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315

MacArthur Recalls Information Leak

"What may well have triggered my removal was my recommendation that a treason trial be initiated to break up a spy ring responsible for the purloining of my top secret reports to Washington," MacArthur wrote in retort to Truman.

"My campaign plans including those of the 8th Army were transmitted daily to Washington. Gen. Walker complained constantly to me that the enemy was receiving prior information of his (Walker's) movements. Then suddenly one of my dispatches concerning the order of battle was published in a Washington paper within a few hours of its receipt. I insisted that those responsible be prosecuted. . . . But the case was never processed and I was shortly relieved of my command.

"It was not until the recent exposure of the British spies, Burgess and Maclean, that the true facts began to unfold."

What was this phase of the anti-American spy plot which Truman cautiously skips over in his historical (?) recital?

Well, the general fills in the gaps:

"These men (Burgess and Maclean) with access to secret files were undoubtedly links in the chain to our enemy in Korea through Peiping by way of Moscow. I believe that my demand that this situation be exposed, coming after the Alger Hiss and the Harry Dexter White scandals, caused the deepest resentment and that it probably was branded a move to embarrass the administration."

Red Leader Boasted of Advance Dope

On top of this is the published report in direct quotes from the commander in chief of the Red China armies which entered Korea: he boasted that he had definite advance information that MacArthur's hands would be tied by the diplomats in the White House, State Department and the UN, "Otherwise I would not have dared risk almost certain destruction by crossing the Yalu in force. No competent commander would have been such a fool."

As MacArthur significantly observes, "The Maclean-Burgess defection has shown how he could have known."

But these important bits of American history still do not explain why the Kremlin decided at this time to parade their British spies.

One guess is that more details on the Burgess-Maclean spy activities against the United States will be forthcoming next week before the Senate Internal Security subcommittee. At that session, former Lt. Col. Yuri Rastvorov of the MVD, who quit his top Communist post in Tokyo to gain American freedom, will go into the Red penetration of the British Foreign Office so far as it has imperiled the United States. He will bear down heavily on the importance of the Burgess-Maclean network in Washington and London.

Another speculation is that the Kremlin is firing both barrels of the Burgess-Maclean spy gun as a propaganda blast—one aimed at impressing Red China and Asia with the Soviet charge against the "war-mongering capitalistic Anglo-Americans," the other the political security of Eden's Conservative government in Britain. Ever since Eden invited Khrushchev and Bulganin for an official visit this spring, the British Foreign Office has been trying to find some diplomatic excuse for canceling the invitation. If the invitation is canceled now, the Kremlin can pound the propaganda drums that here is more evidence that the Colonial-minded British don't want to live happily with the peace-loving Soviets. If London doesn't cancel the invitation, the Kremlin can say here is evidence that the British government is too weak to resent a direct insult.

The "Missing Diplomats" Reappear

One of the strangest cases in the tangle of treason and espionage that communism has visited on the world has taken a new twist. The "missing diplomats"—Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess—have put in a formal appearance at Moscow to "explain" their disappearance from Britain. The explanation clarifies nothing, except to confirm the generally accepted fact that the two are working for the Russians. It even adds some additional mystery to the puzzle.

Why did the Kremlin decide, at this moment, to unvell the long hidden pair? There are several possible reasons. For one thing, the revelations of Vladimir Petrov, who defected from the Soviet Embassy in Canberra and provided the first public clue to the activities of Burgess and Maclean, stirred up a good deal of bitterness in Britain. The Foreign Office was led to provide its own information on the case and the realization that two rather obvious security risks had been allowed to retain posts of considerable importance in the British foreign service and had subsequently vanished without a trace, subjected the government to some pointed criticism. It has been suggested that the Russian government would like to reduce the temperature of public opinion on this score before high Communist officials pay their scheduled visit to London.

It is also possible that the Russians were impelled to produce Burgess and Maclean by a current controversy in the United States. General MacArthur has

charged that the Red Chinese attacked United Nations forces in Korea because they knew that there would be no retribution on Chinese territory. In his recent article in "Life" magazine, the general, referring to Burgess and Maclean, wrote: "These men with access to secret files were undoubtedly links in the chain of our enemy in Korea through Peiping by way of Moscow."

At any rate, whether British or American public opinion—or both—was the Red target, the Russians have produced the missing diplomats to assert: "We neither of us have ever been Soviet agents." As to that, the free world will take the evidence of Vladimir Petrov and the British Foreign Office against the self-serving statement of two men who have done nothing to merit confidence and much to destroy it. It may be a minor point, but the odd phraseology of the statement attributed to Burgess and Maclean, ("already a few months previously," for example) is much closer to that of Moscow than Cambridge. In fact, it reads precisely like a translation of one of Premier Bulganin's effusions.

Perhaps this is because the published text was originally a Russian document, signed by the two Englishmen and turned into an approximation of English for export; perhaps they wrote it and the Russians processed it later. But whatever they have to say must be taken as just another product of the Soviet propaganda mill.

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- Gandy

MR. BRANIGAN

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- The Worker _____
- New Leader _____

Date FEB 13 1956

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The Kremlin's Kept Men

A queer pair of British traitors has been trotted out in Soviet Russia, where everyone knew they were, but where Soviet officials blandly insisted they were not.

These are the diplomats Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, who disappeared in May of 1951, at which time Burgess had just been sent home in disgrace from the British Embassy in Washington, where he was Second Secretary and Maclean (who had previously served in Washington) was head of the American Department of the British Foreign Office.



Burgess Maclean

Communists since their college days at Cambridge, they fled Britain to work for "greater mutual understanding between the Soviet Union and the West," according to their statement, and because they were disturbed by "the senselessness and danger of American policy in the Far East and Europe."

Maclean also knew he was being investigated as a traitor and spy, and Burgess had learned he was going to be fired.

Burgess was a lush, an admitted homosexual. Maclean became a problem drinker, and when in his cups, which was often, exhibited homosexual tendencies.

Why did the Soviet officials decide to unveil them at this particular time?

Obviously for propagandist reasons: To color the Kremlin's phony "peace offensive"; to sow suspicion between the U. S. and Britain; to influence British opinion prior to the April visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to London—these are among the speculative motives.

But the importance of Maclean and Burgess is not their exhibition now as the kept men of Soviet policy.

It lies in what they were—part of a pattern of conspiracy which produced the Canadian spy ring and the theft of the atomic secrets; which produced Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White; which operated worldwide—and still operates—to undercut the policies of the free world and advance communism by any means.

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MR. BRANIGAN

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Date FEB 13 1956

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TOP CLIPPING
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It puts into sharper focus the charge of General Douglas MacArthur, in his rebuttal of ex-President Truman, that a spy ring was successful in purloining his top secret reports to Washington, including Korean war campaign plans, and passing them on to the enemy. MacArthur says significantly:

"It was not until the recent exposure of the British spies, Burgess and Maclean, that the true facts began to unfold. These men with access to secret files were undoubtedly links in the chain to our enemy in Korea through Peiping by way of Moscow...

"I myself have long been convinced that Red China's decision to commit its forces to the Korean peninsula was predicated upon assurances previously given through Moscow that such intervention would not precipitate retaliation against its attack bases."

MacArthur urged that the ring be exposed and treason trials instituted. Nothing was done. Red China emerged as the dominant power of the Far East. U. S. prestige suffered a blow.

The derisive laughter of Burgess and Maclean from their Moscow sanctuary is in answer to those who minimize the continuing Communist conspiracy, and who shriek the sneering cry of "witch hunt!" at all efforts to expose the menace.

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- Mr. Belmont _____
- Mr. Mason _____
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- Mr. Parsons _____
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- Mr. Nease _____
- Mr. Winterrowd _____
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- Mr. Holloman _____
- Miss Gandy _____

MR. BRANGAN

(SPIES)

LONDON--FOREIGN SECRETARY SELWYN LLOYD SAID TODAY THAT THE REAPPEARANCE IN MOSCOW OF TURNCOAT BRITISH DIPLOMATS GUY BURGESS AND DONALD MACLEAN "SHOWS HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS OF MUTUAL TRUST" WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

LLOYD MADE HIS OBSERVATION WHILE DELIVERING A STATEMENT TO COMMONS ON THE STRANGE CASE OF THE TWO FORMER DIPLOMATS WHO DISAPPEARED IN MAY, 1951, AND POPPED UP UNEXPECTEDLY IN MOSCOW LAST SATURDAY. LLOYD TOLD PARLIAMENT THAT WHILE THE SOVIETS "PROFESS SO MUCH TO DESIRE" MUTUAL TRUST, THEY HAD REPEATEDLY GREETED BRITISH QUESTIONS ABOUT THE TWO MEN WITH A "CONSISTENT LACK OF CANDOR." THE FOREIGN SECRETARY ANGRILY TOLD COMMONS HE PLACED "NO CREDENCE" IN THE WORDS OF BURGESS OR MACLEAN, WHO DENIED IN THEIR REAPPEARANCE PRESS CONFERENCE SATURDAY THAT THEY HAD BEEN COMMUNIST SPIES. LLOYD SAID THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES PROBABLY PERMITTED THE TWO TURNCOATS TO COME OUT OF HIDING IN AN EFFORT TO "CREATE DISTRUST AND DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTS." "IF THIS IS THE EXPLANATION, THEY WILL NOT SUCCEED," HE SAID.

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C.B. Mac Donald
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WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Boardman _____
Mr. Belmont _____
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ADD SPIES, LONDON

HE SAID MOSCOW ALSO MIGHT HAVE PRODUCED BURGESS AND MACLEAN NOW SO THAT SOVIET PREMIER NIKOLAI BULGANIN AND COMMUNIST PARTY BOSS NIKITA S. KHRUSCHE COULD "AVOID AWKWARD QUESTIONS" WHEN THEY VISIT BRITAIN.

OF THE BURGESS-MCLEAN STATEMENT DENYING THAT THEY HAD BEEN COMMUNIST SPIES WHILE EMPLOYED BY THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE, LLOYD SAID "NO CREDENCE CAN BE PLACED ON THEIR WORDS."

"SUSPICION FOR KNOWN LEAKAGE TO THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES WAS NARROWED DOWN TO MACLEAN BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE," LLOYD SAID.

"NO SUSPICION WAS ATTACHED TO BURGESS BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE, BUT STRONG SUSPICION FELL UPON HIM WHEN HE DEPARTED AND THIS WAS CONFIRMED BY MR. (VLADIMIR) PETROV (SOVIET DIPLOMAT WHO SOUGHT ASYLUM IN AUSTRALIA)."

PRIME MINISTER SIR ANTHONY EDEN ADDED TO LLOYD'S STATEMENT BY SAYING THAT THE COMMITTEE OF PRIVY COUNCILLORS AUTHORIZED TO INVESTIGATE SECURITY MEASURES IN THE LIGHT OF THE BURGESS-MACLEAN DEFECTION NOW HAD MADE ITS REPORT.

"I HAVE GIVEN IT CAREFUL STUDY," EDEN SAID. "WE ARE NOW ENGAGED IN CONSIDERING THE STEPS TO BE TAKEN TO GIVE EFFECT TO IT. I WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO MAKE A STATEMENT IN DUE COURSE."

LLOYD REPLIED IN COMMONS TO A QUESTION POSED BY SOCIALIST HERBERT MORRISON, WHO WAS FOREIGN SECRETARY IN 1951 WHEN BURGESS AND MACLEAN FLED BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN.

LLOYD SAID THE TURNCOAT'S REAPPEARANCE "BRINGS INTO CLEAR RELIEF THE CONSISTENT LACK OF CANDOR OF THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES IN THEIR STATEMENTS ABOUT THESE TWO MEN."

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ADD SPIES, LONDON

"AS RECENTLY AS JAN. 12 WHEN MR. HAROLD WILSON (A SOCIALIST M.P.) SAW KHRUSHCHEV, HE PUT SOME QUESTIONS TO HIM. KHRUSHCHEV IS REPORTED TO HAVE REPLIED: 'ARE THEY IN OUR COUNTRY THEN? I HAVE NOT HEARD ANYTHING OF THEM FROM ANY SOVIET OFFICIALS, NOR HAVE I EVER MET THEM.'"

"THE HOUSE MUST FORM ITS OWN OPINION ABOUT THE TRUTH OF THESE STATEMENTS."

"THIS KIND OF CONDUCT SHOWS HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS OF MUTUAL TRUST WHICH THE SOVIET UNION PROFESSES SO MUCH TO DESIRE."

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MR. BRANIGAN

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Maclean: Lloyd To Make Statement

NOT RECORDED
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Eden Decision After Whitehall Talk

"Star" Political Correspondent

SIR ANTHONY EDEN HELD TALKS WITH THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, MR SELWYN LLOYD, TODAY ABOUT THE MOSCOW STATEMENT BY THE FORMER FOREIGN OFFICE MEN DONALD MACLEAN AND GUY BURGESS.

The Prime Minister also had consultations with Whitehall experts on Russian policy.

RE: MacLEAN CASE
 (Enfile 100-374183)

THE STAR
 FEBRUARY 13, 1956
 LONDON, ENGLAND

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 BY LETTER JUN 23, 1979
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52 FEB 24 1956

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He decided that Mr Selwyn Lloyd would make a statement in the Commons later this afternoon.

The statement is in reply to a private notice question by Mr Herbert Morrison, who was Foreign Secretary when Maclean and Burgess disappeared from London in 1951.

Mr Morrison is asking the Government whether they have any further comment to make on Maclean and Burgess or on the statement which the two men issued in Moscow on Saturday.

Many MPs on both sides of the House were eagerly awaiting an opportunity this afternoon to put questions to the Foreign Secretary after his statement.

Envoy's Telegram

Meanwhile, Sir William Hayter, British Ambassador in Moscow, reported by telegram to the Foreign Office on the re-appearance of Maclean and Burgess.

This telegram was considered by Mr Selwyn Lloyd and his experts at the Foreign Office. They also studied the statement which Maclean and Burgess made.

The Government believe the two men were "put on show" purely for Soviet propaganda reasons.

Their Usefulness

Ministers are therefore anxious to avoid creating the impression that they attach great importance to this new development in the four-and-a-half-years-old mystery of the missing diplomats.

It has long been accepted that they were working behind the Iron Curtain.

Whitehall opinion is the usefulness of Maclean and Burgess to the Soviet Government has been much exaggerated.

One theory is that it was necessary for them temporarily to be brought out of their shadowy existence to avoid embarrassing questions for Marshal Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev when they visit London in the Spring.

Cabinet Called

Until now the Russians have repeatedly denied any knowledge of the whereabouts of the two Britons.

Sir Anthony Eden has called a Cabinet meeting for this evening.

This will be held after he has reported to MPs on his talks with President Eisenhower and Canadian Premier St Laurent.

The Cabinet, who will probably meet again tomorrow, are now ready to give final approval to the annual Government policy statement on Defence. This will be published at the end of the week.

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SORDID STORY

GUY BURGESS and Donald MacLean now have filled in the missing chapters of their squalid past and boastfully announced intentions to continue on the path of treason.

The diplomat-traitors finally emerged from five years of mystery in Moscow. They are as arrogant as ever. Whether their personal lives—highlighted in the past by drunken brawls and homosexuality—remain as sordid is a problem for their Soviet masters.

The unanswered question is how the British Foreign Office tolerated these two young men when they themselves never hid their pro-Soviet views, and when their personal behavior in London, Paris, Cairo and Washington was a public scandal.

The post-mortem on this case already has reverberated in many capitals—especially here in Washington. Only last week Gen. MacArthur again suggested that the communists in Korea probably got their information of his military plans and even of higher American policy decisions thru Mr. Burgess, then serving in the British Embassy in Washington, and Mr. MacLean, head of the American desk in the Foreign Office in London.

Treason is a crime that revolts honorable men everywhere. Americans will sympathize with Britishers who believe such despicable characters should hang from a gallows.

These two are beyond the reach of British law, unfortunately. There is, however, a punishment Britain with our help can give them—deny them success in their efforts to divide and weaken the West.

This sudden surfacing of Messrs. Burgess and MacLean has a major objective—to stir up old British-American difficulties to keep us agitated about the past while communism moves into the future.

Messrs. Burgess and MacLean already have contributed to British-American disagreements. Are the British and Americans to let them continue to do so? Are we to reward them with more successes?

The past cannot be forgotten and should not. It is filled with lessons. But only the communist conspiracy will profit if recriminations are permitted to poison the future.

About the only way the West can contribute to ultimate punishment of Messrs. Burgess and MacLean is to prove them wrong. If the Western alliance does not fall apart—if it gets stronger—and if the Burgess-MacLean projects to divide and weaken the West fail, the Kremlin is likely to tire of these men and find them useless.

When the Kremlin is thru with a man the punishment is usually quick and ruthless. Speed the day when the Kremlin rewards these men with a knock on the door at midnight.

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M.R. BRANIGAN

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p. 5 - P. 10

- Wash. Post and Times Herald _____
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ADD SPIES, LONDON
 THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ALSO BRANDED BURGESS A LAIR AS WELL AS A
 TURNCOAT. THE FOREIGN OFFICE ANNOUNCED THAT HE NEVER WAS A MEMBER
 OF BRITAIN'S MI-5 COUNTER-ESPIONAGE ORGANIZATION AS HE CLAIMED
 IN A MOSCOW STATEMENT SATURDAY.
 THE FOREIGN OFFICE DECLARED THROUGH A SPOKESMAN:
 "BURGESS WAS NEVER A MEMBER OF THE MI-5 ORGANIZATION."
 "THE ONLY CONNECTION GUY BURGESS HAD WITH MI-5 WAS THAT WHEN WORKING
 FOR THE BBC HE HAD FROM TIME TO TIME REPORTED TO MI-5 INFORMATION ABOUT
 GERMANY RECEIVED BY HIM FROM A CONTRACT."
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White-Plumed Traitors

The Kremlin, after having repeatedly denied any knowledge of their whereabouts has at last lifted the curtain on the dismal figures of Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean. The act confirms what has been long suspected—namely, that these two former officials of the British Foreign Office have been in Russia ever since their electrifying disappearance from England almost five years ago. And in the meantime, as traitors with marked psychopathic tendencies, they undoubtedly have been rendering good service to the Soviets in the propaganda and other fields.

Of course, this is not the way Burgess and Maclean measure themselves. In their own opinion, as set forth in their statement at Saturday's "press conference" in Moscow, they are on the side of the angels. Although they were Communists as far back as their student days at Cambridge, they say they neither are nor have been Soviet spies. On the contrary, they are upright, honorable and patriotic gentlemen dedicated to the cause of peace, and they have defected merely because the Kremlin's policy is "right" and because they are ever so anxious to promote mutual understanding between East and West. That, they claim, is what explains their flight from England. Both of them—especially Maclean—were privy at one time to some pretty important Anglo-American secrets (including probably a few bearing upon the Korean war), but if they betrayed any of them, they did so only for the noble purpose of serving the noble objectives of the USSR. In short, they have been sort of like white-plumed knights fighting in shining armor for a better and happier world against a "small but powerful" group of evil warmongers in Britain and the United States—especially the United States, whose Far Eastern and European policies are compounded of nothing but "senselessness and danger."

Traitors have never been kinder to themselves than have these two shabby characters. From reading their statement, one would hardly suppose that Burgess and Maclean—although said to be gifted with superior minds—have neurotic twists that have led them not only to treason but to the depths of personal moral squalor. Yet, although they abundantly deserve the world's contempt, the Kremlin can be counted upon to continue making good use of them. That in itself is a rather instructive commentary on the Soviet way of doing things.

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MR. BRANNIGAN

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Cold War Weapons

'Lost' Diplomats Seen Used by Soviet To Sever Ties of Britain and U. S.

Reuters
 LONDON, Feb. 12—Russia's presentation of Burgess and Maclean yesterday was staged to drive a wedge between the United States and Britain and to try to prove that the West is perpetuating the cold war, highly placed British officials said tonight.
 At the same time, both Conservative and Labor Party members of Parliament announced a campaign to try to make the Foreign Office reveal more details about the ex-diplomats, Donald Maclean and Guy Bur-

gess, who vanished behind the Iron Curtain in 1951.
 The highly placed officials here said that in its timing of the ex-diplomats' reappearance the Kremlin had two main objectives:
 1. To sow discord between London and Washington.
 2. To woo both Communist bloc and neutral nations to the belief that it is the West which is the aggressor in the cold war.
 Many diplomatic observers here also felt that the Burgess-

Maclean statement aimed to take pressure off Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin and Communist Party Chief Nikita Khrushchev when they visit Britain in April. Reporters undoubtedly would have fired questions at them about the missing diplomats.
 [The United Press reported from London that some Britons speculated that Burgess and Maclean may have used their skill and knowledge of Anglo-American policy to ghost-write
 See DIPLOMATS, Pg. 6, Col. 1

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'Lost' Diplomats Seen Used to Disrupt Allies

DIPLOMATS—Fr. Pg. 1

the recent Bulganin letters to President Eisenhower.

[Both Maclean and Burgess are trained diplomats. Maclean particularly is well-equipped to advise the Russians. The London Sunday Times noted that "the most striking example was (Marshal Premier Nikolai) Bulganin's letter to President Eisenhower on disarmament last summer. The last two Bulganin letters to President Eisenhower (on friendship treaties) ... were also thought to bear the Maclean imprint."]

The political pressure on the Foreign office will begin Monday in the House of Commons, when at least three MPs will fire pointed questions at Government Ministers.

Laborite Col. Marcus Lipton said he thought the Burgess-Maclean statement made a Government White Paper on the case last September, look

"even a bigger insult to intelligence than I thought it at the time."

Conservative Capt. Henry Kerby declared, "I hope that in view of their statement the Foreign Office will at long last give the British people the full and unvarnished truth about this grim and unsavoury scandal."

Reuters correspondent Sidney Weiland reported from Moscow that diplomats there believe Khrushchev gave the order for the dramatic reappearance of Burgess and Maclean.

They feel that the Burgess-Maclean statement, handed to Weiland, another British correspondent and two Soviet reporters yesterday, might have been intended to impress the Russian people by suggesting that there were doubts and apprehensions even in the British Foreign Office about United States policy.

The statement was published

in all Soviet papers today with no comment.

Burgess and Maclean tonight were still mystery men. There is no clue as to where they went after they left the correspondents yesterday and walked away in the Moscow fog, Weiland said.

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MACLEAN LINKED TO LEAK OF U.S. SECRETS IN CAIRO ✓

By Don Cook in the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE, datelined London, Feb. 13.

Bragg

Cook reports that in Cairo three months ago he was told the story of the discovery of a "Cairo letter" that was related to the case of the disappearing British diplomats, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess. The letter was found in a book by a visitor in the British Embassy library. It was addressed to Maclean, appeared to be in some sort of code, was signed by an American who might have been an employee of the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and in general gave MI5, to whom it was handed, the general impression that Maclean had an American contact and that the two were using the British embassy library as a communications drop - a favorite device of espionage.

One odd aspect of the case, reports Cook, was that the American girl whose apartment Maclean wrecked in a drunken brawl that led to his recall to London was an employee of the American Embassy's library. He and a companion made a shambles of the place and the next morning, the U.S. Ambassador called on the British ambassador and declared Maclean to be persona non grata to the American Embassy. The British Ambassador was so shocked that he ordered Maclean aboard the next plane for London, not even giving the diplomat permission to enter his office and collect his mail and belongings.

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Patterson

Thus, in the haste with which he was despatched from Cairo, Maclean may have been forced to leave behind even conspiratorial mail.

Cook concludes that the affair at least gives the lie to Moscow that neither Burgess nor Maclean had acted as Communist agents. But he does not know to what extent the letter has been examined or even if intelligence agents have been able to discover the identity of the person who wrote the letter.

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Britain Hits Red Deceit On Burgess and Maclean

LONDON, Feb. 13 (AP).—Britain accused the Russians today of deceit in hiding Guy Burgess and Donald D. Maclean for almost five years.

Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd declared that any attempts to use the renegade British diplomats now to drive a wedge between Britain and the United States will fail.

Mr. Lloyd rose in the House of Commons to single out Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov and Communist Party Boss Nikita S. Khrushchev by name. He accused them of "lack of candor" in shrugging off British attempts—as late as a month ago—to trace Burgess and Maclean.

Mr. Lloyd conceded the Russians may try to use for propaganda purposes a statement issued by the two at a five-minute news conference in Moscow Saturday, but added sharply:

"No credence can be placed in their words."

The Foreign Secretary said that if the Soviet leaders are trying to "drive a wedge between the United States and Britain... when it will fail."

Churchill in House

Just before the Burgess-Maclean case came up, Sir Winston Churchill entered the chamber in one of his rare visits since retiring as Prime Minister.

Prime Minister Eden went over to whisper to him.

Burgess and Maclean, who vanished in May, 1951, came out of hiding in Moscow Saturday and denounced British and American foreign policy in a prepared, typewritten statement.

The Foreign Minister identified the 42-year-old Maclean, who was head of the American

Department of the British Foreign Office, as the suspected Soviet spy before he fled.

Mr. Lloyd explained that no suspicion had been aroused about the 44-year-old Burgess.

Moscow correspondents reported Burgess seemed to be the more dominant of the two when the runaway diplomats showed up at the restricted news conference in a Moscow hotel on Saturday.

Petrov Accuses Pair

In Canberra, Vladimir Petrov, former Soviet spy chief in Australia, declared yesterday Burgess and Maclean lied when they asserted they never were Soviet agents.

Mr. Petrov, who deserted his spy job in April, 1954, and turned over to Australian authorities a huge pile of secret Soviet documents on espionage operations, issued his statement through the Australian Security Service.

"Burgess and Maclean worked for the MGB (Soviet Ministry of State Security) and gave much secret information," said Mr. Petrov flatly. "For these reasons the MGB arranged for Burgess and Maclean to travel secretly to the Soviet Union when British security authorities discovered that they were Soviet agents."

Brazigan

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Page 10

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BY LETTER JUN 22 1976

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Cold War Weapons

'Lost' Diplomats Seen Used by Soviet To Sever Ties of Britain and U. S.

Reuters
 LONDON, Feb. 12—Russia's presentation of Burgess and Maclean yesterday was staged to drive a wedge between the United States and Britain and to try to prove that the West is perpetuating the cold war, highly placed British officials said tonight.

At the same time, both Conservative and Labor Party members of Parliament announced a campaign to try to make the Foreign Office reveal more details about the ex-diplomats, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess,

who vanished behind the Iron Curtain in 1951.

The highly placed officials here said that in its timing of the ex-diplomats' reappearance the Kremlin had two main objectives:

1. To sow discord between London and Washington.

2. To woo both Communist bloc and neutral nations to the belief that it is the West which is the aggressor in the cold war.

Many diplomatic observers here also felt that the Burgess-

Maclean statement aimed to take pressure off Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin and Communist Party Chief Nikita Khrushchev when they visit Britain in April. Reporters undoubtedly would have fired questions at them about the missing diplomats.

[The United Press reported from London that some Britons speculated that Burgess and Maclean may have used their skill and knowledge of Anglo-American policy to ghost-write See DIPLOMATS, Pg. 6, Col.

'Lost' Diplomats Seen Used to Disrupt Allies

DIPLOMATS—Fr. Pg. 1

the recent Bulganin letters to President Eisenhower.

[Both Maclean and Burgess are trained diplomats. Maclean particularly is well-equipped to advise the Russians. The London Sunday Times noted that "the most striking example was (Marshal Premier Nikolai) Bulganin's letter to President Eisenhower on disarmament last summer. The last two Bulganin letters to President Eisenhower (on friendship treaties) ... were also thought to bear the Maclean imprint.")

The political pressure on the Foreign office will begin Monday in the House of Commons, when at least three MPs will fire pointed questions at Government Ministers.

Laborite Col. Marcus Lipton said he thought the Burgess-Maclean statement made a Government White Paper on the case, last September, look

"even a bigger insult to intelligence than I thought it at the time."

Conservative Capt. Henry Kerby declared, "I hope that in view of their statement the Foreign Office will at long last give the British people the full and unvarnished truth about this grim and unsavoury scandal."

Reuters correspondent Sidney Weiland reported from Moscow that diplomats there believe Khrushchev gave the order for the dramatic reappearance of Burgess and Maclean.

They feel that the Burgess-Maclean statement, handed to Weiland, another British correspondent and two Soviet reporters yesterday, might have been intended to impress the Russian people by suggesting that there were doubts and apprehensions even in the British Foreign Office about United States policy.

The statement was published

in all Soviet papers today with no comment.

Burgess and Maclean tonight were still mystery men. There is no clue as to where they went after they left the correspondents yesterday and walked away in the Moscow fog, Weiland said.

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 126 FEB 16 1956

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- Wash. News _____
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- The Worker _____
- New Leader _____

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Petrov Calls Maclean and Burgess Liars

CANBERRA, Australia, Feb. 12 (AP)—The former Soviet spy in Australia said today that Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean lied when they asserted they never were Soviet agents.

Vladimir Petrov, who deserted his spy job in April, 1954, and turned over the Australian authorities a pile of secret Soviet documents on espionage operations, issued a statement through the Australian Security Service.

He challenged a statement by Burgess and Maclean, the turncoat British diplomats who revealed their presence in Moscow yesterday for the first time since their mysterious disappearance in 1951.

In their statement, the runaways admitted being Communists since their youth, but denied they ever had been spies, as is now charged by the British Foreign Office.

"Burgess and Maclean worked for the MGB (Soviet Ministry of State Security) and gave much secret information," said Petrov. "For these reasons the MGB arranged for Burgess and Maclean to travel secretly to the Soviet Union when British security authorities discovered that they were Soviet agents."

It was Petrov's first public statement, except for publication of a book, since a royal commission investigated his defection to Australian authorities. He previously had charged Burgess and Maclean with delivering secrets to Russia.

In an article in the London Sunday newspaper, The People, last September, Petrov said another Kremlin agent named Kislytsin told him Burgess had delivered to the Soviet Embassy in London "briefcases full of Foreign Office documents."

He said he was told the documents were photographed by the Embassy and quickly returned to Burgess, and the information forwarded to Moscow by pouch. In some instances, he said, the information was urgent so it was sent to Moscow by secret code.

Petrov wrote that Kislytsin later was sent to Moscow and put in charge of "an amazing library of foreign intelligence" and "by a remarkable coincidence this section turned out to be a collection of the material supplied by Burgess and Maclean."

In his statement today, Petrov said he felt sure Burgess

and Maclean made their statement in Moscow "under the direction of Soviet authorities" and that the statements had been issued for propagand purposes.

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- Wash. News _____
- Wash. Star _____
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Text of Statement Issued By Burgess and Maclean

LONDON, Feb. 11 (AP)—Text of a statement issued in Moscow today by missing British diplomats Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, as broadcast by Moscow Radio:

It seems to us doubts and speculation as to our present whereabouts and our former activity may represent a small but significant factor which has hitherto been used and may again be used by opponents of Anglo-Soviet understanding.

In view of these considerations we thought it better to publish this statement.

We arrived in the Soviet Union in order to make our contribution to a policy aimed at achieving greater mutual understanding between the Soviet Union and the West, having become convinced on a basis of official information which was at our disposal of the fact that neither the British, nor still more the American policy at that time was seriously pursuing the object.

The position which we occupied gave us every reason to think such mutual understanding absolutely necessary if we wish to preserve peace.

We had every reason for coming to the conclusion that such mutual understanding was the object of Soviet policy.

Feared for Future

We had every possibility to know the plans of a small but powerful group of men who opposed the achievement of such mutual understanding and for this reason we had every grounds to fear these plans.

When we were in Cambridge we were both Communists. We ceased our political activities, not because we were to any extent not in agreement with Marxist analysis of the situation which we still observe at the present moment, but because as has now become clear to us, we wrongly presumed that being in the service of the state we could more than anywhere else put into practice our ideals.

Wrongful interpretation of our actions—the need to cease political activities when entering the service of the state—apparently led to the statement of the Foreign Office that the Foreign Office presumes that we had become Soviet agents in Cambridge.

The Foreign Office can, of course, presume anything it wishes. But what matters to us is that we, not the Foreign Office, are competent in this question.

We neither of us have ever been Soviet agents.

Up to that moment the paths of our lives were alike.

Later the career of each of us followed a different course. For this reason it will be better to describe them separately.

As regards Maclean, he was in the official diplomatic service in London and Paris, Washington and Cairo from 1935 to 1951, thus being part of the machine which, with the exception of the war period, was pursuing a policy unacceptable not only to Maclean, but also to many others.

He was by no means the only one in the Foreign Office to express before the war his negative attitude toward Britain's foreign policy, particularly as regards Abyssinia (Ethiopia), the civil war in Spain and the Munich events.

However, after the war he found himself more and more alone.

It was becoming increasingly difficult to find anyone to think of something else than the Communist menace, to understand the senselessness and danger of American policy in the Far East and Europe.

To remain further in the diplomatic service was becoming impossible. In May, 1951, there were clear signs that whatever plans he may have been making for his future, the Foreign Office and the Security organs had their own intentions as regards him.

The telephones both in his office and at his home were being used as microphones for listening in. Counterespionage agents followed him wherever he went, and one of his colleagues was sent to him for provocative purposes.

Decided to Leave

For this reason, Maclean decided to go to the Soviet Union in order to contribute from there, to the best of his ability, to the achievements of mutual understanding between East and West.

The difficulty of leaving the country while under police surveillance was solved by a meeting with Burgess who had just returned to London from Washington, where he was occupying a post in the British Embassy

The latter not only agreed to organize everything necessary for departure, but he himself also took the decision to leave Britain.

This journey was too dangerous for Mrs. Maclean, who was expecting a baby.

She arrived with her children in the Soviet Union in 1953.

As regards Burgess, having decided to leave Cambridge, he joined the BBC. Later, he was offered other posts. Having agreed to this, he worked at first in one of the departments of the British Secret Service,

and later in the Foreign Office. During all this time, he sympathized with Soviet policy.

At the same time, he was increasingly alarmed by the post-war character of Anglo-American policy.

No Effort for Peace

The greatest anxiety was caused by the fact that at first no modus vivendi was reached between East and West and later on no attempts were made to reach it.

Neither when he was working in the BBC, when he was a Foreign Office official, nor when he was connected with the Secret Service or counter espionage—M. I. 5—did he make a secret with his friends or colleagues of his views or of the fact that he had been a Communist.

His views at the time he held the aforementioned posts clearly refute the assertion that he was a Soviet agent.

This explanation of the views of Burgess is necessary to understand the circumstances which arose a week or so after his return to London from Washington in 1951.

He visited Maclean as the American department of the Foreign Office.

During this meeting they discovered that their knowledge and appreciation of the political situation and the danger of war were identical.

Further Events

The further course of events was determined by the following circumstances.

Burgess, who already a few months previously had started looking for other work, intending to leave the diplomatic service, was faced with the fact that the Foreign Office, somewhat later and independently of Burgess' decision, had decided not to employ him any longer in the diplomatic service.

There can be no doubt that no agent would have left the Foreign Office on his own initiative.

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Boardman
- Mr. Belmont
- Mr. Mason
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Parsons
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tamm
- Mr. Sizoo
- Mr. Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Holloman
- Miss Gandy

However, at the decisive moment Burgess had doubts as to whether he wished or could do work for which he was striving, without acting against his own conscience.

For this reason, when Maclean told Burgess that he himself had decided no longer to work for the Foreign Office and its policy, and also proposed that both of them should go to the USSR, it was not difficult for Burgess to agree to this.

Only there, it seemed to them, was a possibility to put into practice in one form or another the convictions which they had always held.

Our life in the Soviet Union has convinced us that we took at that time the correct decision.

We are handing out this statement for publication in the press. (Signed) Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess.

JUL 1951

- Wash. Post and Times Herald
- Wash. News
- Wash. Star
- N. Y. Herald Tribune
- N. Y. Mirror
- N. Y. Daily News
- Daily Worker
- The Worker
- New Leader

Date FEB 12 1956

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
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DONALD MACLEAN



GUY BURGESS

... break their silence

In the meeting with two British and two Russian reporters in a hotel room, they dodged questions on what they are doing now.

Asked if they were working for the Russian Foreign Ministry, the 44-year-old Burgess replied:

"It is not that I refuse to answer that question. You would not find me outside the Foreign Ministry. We do not wish to say where we are working."

They said that they had been in Russia since their disappearance from England in May, 1951, and now are living in Moscow. Maclean said that his American-born wife, Melinda, formerly of Chicago, and three children who vanished from Switzerland in September, 1953, are with him in Moscow.

Maclean, son of the late Sir Donald Maclean, a British Liberal Party leader, was head of the American Department at the Foreign Office before his disappearance.

Burgess, a bachelor, was second secretary at the British Embassy in Washington.

Both appeared in good health. They were dressed in heavy Russian coats with fur collars and Russian felt hats.

They were waiting outside a hotel room at the appointed time of their meeting with me, as Reuters chief correspondent in Moscow, and Richard Hughes, of the London Sunday Times.

We had been summoned by a telephone call from Tass, the official Russian news agency, to be at the room. Tass re- See MACLEAN, Page A9, Col. 1

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- Mr. Boardman _____
- Mr. Belmont _____
- Mr. Mason _____
- Mr. Mohr _____
- Mr. Parsons _____
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- Mr. Winterrowd _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Mr. Holloman _____
- Miss Gandy _____

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2 Renegades See Newsmen In Moscow

Burgess, Maclean Deny They Were Communist Agents

By Sidney Weiland

MOSCOW, Feb. 11—Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, British diplomats who vanished five years ago, reappeared here today for five minutes to issue a statement denying they were Communist agents and blasted American policy as a threat to peace.

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- Wash. News _____
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- The Worker _____
- New Leader _____

Date FEB 12 1956

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BY LETTER JUN 22 1976
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68 FEB 21 1956

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Burgess and Maclean Tell of Flight East

used to say that the purpose of the call was to discuss the case which Burgess carried. On arrival they had produced the copies of the statement from a brown leather dispatch case which Burgess carried. They said they had asked Tass to arrange a meeting "because we wanted to make a statement."

Both wore neat, pin-striped suits, apparently of English make.

They smoked a cheap brand of Russian cigarets and declined English cigarets offered to them.

They broke off the interview after 5 minutes by standing up at the table at which they sat and shaking hands with the newsmen.

Outside the hotel, they paused for a moment before crossing Gorky street, Moscow's main thoroughfare, and chatted with me as I asked whether they had any message to send to relatives.

Burgess, who seemed as confident as Maclean was ill at ease, replied:

"I would like to send a message to my mother. I think of her constantly and I hope to write to her as soon as I can."

Maclean, asked if he also had a message, answered: "I will be communicating myself."

Then, they set off on foot through the fog covering Moscow in the direction of a building occupied by the Soviet Government Central Administration.

[Following is the text of the Burgess-Maclean statement, as transmitted by Associated Press and as broadcast by Moscow Radio:]

"It seems to us doubts and speculation as to our present whereabouts and our former activity may represent a small but significant factor which has hitherto been used and may again be used by opponents of Anglo-Soviet understanding.

"In view of these considerations, we thought it better to publish this statement.

"We arrived in the Soviet Union in order to make our contribution to a policy aimed at achieving greater mutual understanding between the Soviet Union and the West, having become convinced on the basis of official information which was at our disposal of the fact that neither the British, nor still more, the American policy at that time was seriously pursuing this object.

"The position which we occupied gave us every reason to think such a mutual understanding, absolutely necessary if we wish to preserve peace."

Endorsed Red Policy

"We had every reason for coming to the conclusion that such mutual understanding was the object of Soviet policy.

"We had every possibility to know the plans of a small but powerful group of men who opposed the achievement of such a mutual understanding and for this reason we had every grounds to fear these plans.

"When we were in Cambridge, we were both Communists—we ceased our political activities, not because we were to any extent not in agreement with Marxist analysis of the situation which we still observe at the present moment, but because as has now become clear to us, we wrongly presumed that being in the service of the state, we could more than anywhere else put into practice our ideals.

"Wrongful interpretation of our actions—the need to cease political activities when entering the service of the state—apparently led to the statement of the Foreign Office that the Foreign Office presumes that we had become Soviet agents in Cambridge.

"The Foreign Office can, of course, presume anything it wishes. But what matters is that we, not the Foreign office, are competent in this question.

"We, neither of us have ever been Soviet agents.

"Up to that moment the paths of our lives were alike.

"Later, the career of each of us followed a different course. For this reason it will be better to describe them separately.

"As regards Maclean, I was in the official diplomatic service in London and Paris, Washington and Cairo from 1935 to 1951, thus being part of the machine which, with the exception of the war period, was pursuing a policy unacceptable not only to Maclean but also to many others."

"He was by no means the only one in the Foreign Office to express before the war his negative attitude toward Britain's foreign policy, particularly as regards Abyssinia (Ethiopia), the civil war in Spain and the Munich events.

"However, after the war he found himself more and more alone.

"It was becoming increasingly difficult to find anyone to think of something else than the Communist menace, to understand the senselessness and danger of American policy in the Far East and Europe.

"To remain further in the diplomatic service was becoming impossible. In May, 1951, there were clear signs that whatever plans he may have been making for his future, the Foreign Office and the security organs had their own intentions in regard to him.

"The telephones both in his office and at his home, were being used as microphones for listening in. Counterespionage agents followed him wherever he went, and one of his colleagues was sent to him for provocative purposes.

"For this reason, Maclean decided to go to the Soviet Union in order to contribute from there, to the best of his ability, to the achievements of mutual understanding between East and West.

Meeting With Burgess

"The difficulty of leaving the country while under police surveillance was solved by a meeting with Burgess who had just returned to London from Washington, where he was occupying a post in the British Embassy.

"The latter not only agreed to organize everything necessary for departure, but he himself also took the decision to leave Britain.

"This journey was too dangerous for Mrs. Maclean, who was expecting a baby.

"She arrived with her children in the Soviet Union in 1953.

"As regards Burgess, having decided to leave Cambridge, he joined the BBC. Later, he was offered other posts. Having agreed to this, he worked at first in one of the departments of the British secret service, and later in the Foreign Office. During all this time, he sympathized with Soviet policy.

postwar character of Anglo-American policy.

"The greatest anxiety was caused by the fact that at first no modus vivendi was reached between East and West and later no attempts were made to reach it.

"Neither when he was working in the BBC, when he was a Foreign Office official, nor when he was connected with the secret service or counter espionage—M.I. 5—did he make a secret with his friends or colleagues of his views, or of the fact that he had been a Communist.

Spy Charge Reported

"His views at the time he held the aforementioned posts clearly refute the assertion that he was a Soviet agent.

"This explanation of the views of Burgess is necessary to understand the circumstances which arose a week or so after his return to London from Washington in 1951.

"He visited Maclean as the head of the American Department of the Foreign Office.

"During this meeting they discovered that their knowledge and appreciation of the political situation and the danger of war were identical.

"The further course of events was determined by the following circumstances:

"Burgess, who already a few months previously had started looking for other work, intending to leave the diplomatic service, was faced with the fact that the Foreign Office, somewhat later and independently of Burgess' decision, had decided not to employ him any longer in the diplomatic service.

"There can be no doubt that no agent would have left the Foreign Office on his own initiative.

"However, at the decisive moment, Burgess had doubts as to whether he wished or could do work for which he was striving, without acting against his own conscience.

"For this reason, when Maclean told Burgess that he himself had decided no longer to work for the Foreign Office and its policy, and also proposed that both of them should go to the U. S. S. R., it was not difficult for Burgess to agree to this.

"Only there, it seemed to them, was there a possibility to put into practice in one form or another the convictions which they had always held.

"Our life in the Soviet Union has convinced us that we took at that time the correct decision.

"We are handing out this statement for publication in the press.

(Signed) Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess."

FEB 12 1956

Wash. Post and Times Herald Pages 1&9

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Mr. Boardman	_____
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BURGESS & MACLEAN APPEAR IN MOSCOW

MR. BRADIGAN

See Sub A

C. B. Mac Donald

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BY LETTER JUNE 22 1956
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The Sunday Times is the Only Paper
Represented at Disclosure

1,000-WORD STATEMENT TELLS: WHY
WE CAME TO SOVIET UNION

GUY BURGESS and Donald Maclean, the two British diplomats who disappeared from England in May, 1951, revealed themselves in Moscow yesterday. It was the first definite news of them since their disappearance. They handed to an audience of four a 1,000-word joint statement, but refused to answer questions.

RE: MACLEAN CASE
(Puffie 100-374183)

SE-15, 100-374183 - 1

THE SUNDAY TIMES
FEBRUARY 12, 1956
LONDON, ENGLAND

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126 FEB 24 1956

63 FEB 29 1956

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The only representative of any newspaper in the world invited to the disclosure meeting was Richard Hughes, The Sunday Times representative in Moscow. The others present were Reuter's Moscow correspondent and two Soviet correspondents.

In their statement, they said that they had been in Russia since leaving Britain and were living in Moscow, Maclean with his wife and children—who vanished from Switzerland in 1953. Neither would say whether he was working for the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

Burgess the Dominant Partner

By RICHARD HUGHES,
Representative of The Sunday Times in Moscow

MOSCOW, Saturday.

TONIGHT, in Room 101 of the Hotel National, overlooking Red Square and the Kremlin, I met and talked with Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess, the missing British diplomats.

They handed me a copy of a statement which they said they wished to make to the Press in full. The only other persons present were the representatives of Reuters, of the Communist Party newspaper "Pravda" and the official Soviet news agency Tass.

The interview lasted about five minutes. Burgess and Maclean said that they had been in the Soviet Union ever since they left Britain and that they lived in Moscow. Maclean added that his American wife Melinda and his two children, who disappeared from Switzerland in 1953, were with him.

I arrived late and reluctant at Room 101, which is on the first floor of the hotel. I had been summoned by a strange voice speaking poor English when I was packing to return to London on Monday. I had thought that it was merely an invitation to have a farewell drink with the hotel manager.

I entered the room, where normally television is shown to guests, and found five men seated around a white-clothed table surrounded by late Victorian bric-a-brac, golden clocks and antimacassars, under an ornate chandelier.

I looked around mystified. A tall man in a blue suit and red bow tie stood up. "I am Donald Maclean," he said. "I am Guy Burgess," said a shorter man in a blue suit and blue-and-white striped tie. "Gentlemen," I said, "this is the end of the long trail."

They laughed and sat down to face me and Sydney Welland, the Reuter representative, and two Russians representing Tass and "Pravda."

MACLEAN CONTENT TO SIT BACK

There was some cautious sparring and forced laughter around the table, while Burgess, who seemed to me to be undoubtedly the spokesman for the couple, opened a handsome leather briefcase and produced exactly four meticulously typed and carefully signed copies of a three-page document of 1,000 words headed "Statement by G. Burgess and D. Maclean."

In response to our questions, Burgess, who was affable and smiling, insisted that they could say nothing and wished to say nothing that was not included in the text of the statement.

To obvious questions about the children, Maclean replied that everything was explained in the statement. To questions about whether they were employed in Moscow as advisers to the Soviet Foreign Office Burgess, who, I cannot emphasise too strongly, was the relaxed spokesman for both the diplomats, replied easily: "You won't find me by sitting outside the Foreign Office." He added: "The fact is I don't want to have correspondents trying to follow me around."

Maclean seemed content to sit back, puff a cigarette and listen to Burgess talk.

"You Aren't Playing Fair"

A statement was made by one journalist present: "You aren't playing fair with us in not giving us an opportunity to read the statement and then ask questions before you leave."

Burgess laughed. "Now don't try to tell me that," he said, with a side glance at Maclean, who joined in the laugh. "I have given out too many statements to the Press in my time not to know what I have given you fellows. We just don't intend to add to our statement."

I was itching to leave when it was clear that Burgess had no intention of adding to the statement—I repeat that, looking back in retrospect as I frantically type this message, my main impression of a rushed, improbable meeting is the complete dominance by Burgess of the interview. He was the one who carried the statements. He was the one who handed them out as soon as I, the last arrival, had seated myself at the table. He was the one who replied to questions. He was the one who quipped, jested and invited Maclean, leaning back on his left

smoking, to support him by a smile or a brisk affirmative.

Burgess said, without any explanation: "We also give our statement to *The Sunday Times*."

I rushed out of the room with the other three journalists. The Russians were impassive and unhurried, and seemed to be surveying the Reuter man and myself amusedly.

I ran along the high, carpeted corridor to my room, nearly knocked down two stout elderly delegates to next week's Party Congress and picked up typewriter paper and carbon.

There was a knock at the door. I flung it open. An amiable hotel maid, with an accent in her hand, said in broken English, "You have not yet paid the laundry bill, Gospodin" (a Russian honorific).

I paid and rushed to the cable office up snow-covered Gorky Street.

Two interesting points—maybe not important—leap to the eye when studying the joint statement. The heading reads: "Statement by G. Burgess and D. Maclean"—the christian names are not given in the heading—and Burgess's name again appears before Maclean's in the opening of the statement.

On the other hand the signatures in neat blue ink transpose the order—Maclean's appears above Burgess's.

When I rushed back after the meeting to the stairway with the typewriter after an absence of one and a half minutes, I found the door of Room 101 closed but the lights still burning.

"Have the gentlemen left?" I asked the administrator sitting blissfully unconscious outside the doors.

"Yes," she replied, serenely. "They left immediately."

Downstairs I met the hotel manager. "Have those two visiting gentlemen gone?" I asked again.

"Yes, Mr. Hoojls," he replied urbanely. "They left in a black limousine. Very nice gentlemen. I do not remember having seen them before. Are they friends of yours, Mr. Hoojls?"

Reason for Disclosure

It is interesting to speculate why this moment has been selected for the dramatic appearance of Burgess and Maclean after nearly five years in hiding.

Only two weeks ago, Mr. Khrushchev told interviewers that he did not know where either man was. It may well be that the impending visit to London by Mr. Khrushchev and Marshal Bulganin was the main reason. Certainly, had the statement not been made, both Soviet leaders would have been constantly questioned on the mystery at English Press interviews.

An obvious reply to the question why Soviet authorities had hitherto denied all knowledge of the whereabouts of the two men would be that Russia, in granting them sanctuary, chose to respect their wish that nothing be said about their presence or activities in Moscow.

The announcement finally ends the world-wide speculation and surmise, at least about the location of the pair and whether they are alive. They are certainly very much alive. They look assured and happy, but I cannot say whether either has aged or acquired more grey hairs. Burgess looks greyer and Maclean older than they did in photographs I have seen, but they both undoubtedly appear well and relaxed.

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MOTHER'S HOPE OF BURGESS LETTER

"Might Even See Him"

Mrs. J. Bassett, mother of Guy Burgess, said last night at her London home: "Now I may get letters and I may be able to write. I might even be able to see my son again." Mrs. Bassett is now married to Lieut-Colonel J. Bassett.

Later she said: "I should certainly go to Moscow later to see my son if there was any possibility of doing so. I cannot go now because I am unwell."

Mrs. Bassett added that she would write immediately if she "knew where to write to." No doubt, she said, her son would give an address.

Bulganin notes had Maclean touch.
See Page 7.

The Missing Diplomats

DONALD DUART MACLEAN, who is 42, was educated at Gresham's School and Trinity College, Cambridge. He joined the Diplomatic Service in 1935.

GUY FRANCIS BURGESS, 44, was educated at the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, at Eton and at Trinity College, Cambridge. He entered the Foreign Service in January, 1947.

Other important dates in their careers were:

May, 1950: Maclean was guilty of serious misconduct while serving at the Embassy at Cairo. Suffered a form of breakdown due to overwork and excessive drinking.

Aug., 1950: Burgess transferred to Washington.

Oct., 1950: After leave at home and recuperation Maclean appointed Head of American Department, Foreign Office.

Early May, 1951: Burgess recalled to London after a request by Ambassador for his removal for carelessness with confidential papers. Around this time, Maclean was regarded as principal suspect after inquiries into leakage of information.

May 25, 1951: Mr. Morrison, then Foreign Secretary, sanctioned proposal to question Maclean.

May 28, 1951: It became known that Burgess and Maclean had fled the country on May 25.

Mr. Boardman
 Mr. Belmont
 Mr. Clegg
 Mr. Glavin
 Mr. Ladd
 Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Rosen
 Mr. Tracy
 Mr. Harbo
 Mr. Mohr
 Mr. Winterrowd
 Tele. Room
 Mr. Holloman
 Miss Gandy

STATEMENT IN FULL

The following is the full statement by Burgess and Maclean handed out in Moscow yesterday:

GUY BURGESS and Donald Maclean, former members of the British Foreign Office, wish to make the following statement: It seems to us that doubts as to our whereabouts and speculation about our past actions may be a small but contributory factor that has been and may again be exploited by the opponents of Anglo-Soviet understanding.

Accordingly we have thought it best to issue the following statement:

We both of us came to the Soviet Union to work for the aim of better understanding between the Soviet Union and the West, having both of us become convinced from official knowledge in our possession that neither the British nor, still more, the American Government was at that time seriously working for this aim.

We had in the positions we occupied every reason to believe that such an understanding was essential if peace was to be safe. We had every reason to conclude that such an understanding was the aim of Soviet policy.

We had had every opportunity to know, and grounds for fearing, the plans and outlook of the few but powerful people who opposed this understanding.

Not Soviet Agents

It was probably our action in necessarily giving up political activities by entering the public service that, falsely analysed, led the Foreign Office to say through its spokesman it "believed" we had been Soviet agents at Cambridge.

The Foreign Office can, of course, "believe" anything it wishes. The important point, however, is that on this question we know, and it does not.

We neither of us have ever been Communist agents. So far the ground was common for us both. Details of our subsequent careers were completely different and had, therefore, better be dealt with separately.

As regards Maclean, he worked in London and in Paris, Washington and Cairo as a regular member of the Foreign Service from 1935 to 1951 and, as such, was part of the machine which, with the exception of the war period, carried out a policy unacceptable not only to him but to many others.

BY NO MEANS THE ONLY ONE

He was by no means alone inside the Foreign Service in objecting to British foreign policy before the war, particularly as regards Abyssinia, the Spanish Civil War and Munich. But he was increasingly isolated in doing so after the war.

It became more and more difficult to find anyone willing to think or speak of anything but the "menace of Communism" or to understand the folly and danger of American policy in the Far East and Europe.

Further work in the Foreign Service was becoming impossible. In May, 1951, there were clear signs that, whatever future course he might work out for himself, the Foreign Office and security authorities had plans of their own.

'Microphones in Home'

His telephones in his office and private house were used as microphones. Plain clothes policemen followed him wherever he went and one of his colleagues was put to act as provocateur.

Maclean, therefore, decided to come

to the Soviet Union to do whatever he could to further understanding between East and West from there.

The difficulty of leaving the country while being tailed by the police was solved by a meeting with Burgess shortly after the latter's return from the Washington Embassy to London. The latter not only agreed to make arrangements for the journey but to come too.

The risks of such a journey would have been too great for Mrs. Maclean, who was shortly expecting a child.

SYMPATHISED WITH SOVIET POLICY

As regards Burgess, when he decided to leave Cambridge, he joined the B.B.C. Subsequently, positions were offered to him which he accepted, first in a department of the Secret Service and secondly in the Foreign Office.

Throughout, he sympathised with Soviet policy and became increasingly alarmed by the post-war trend of Anglo-American policy. Most alarming of all was its failure first to reach, and later even to seek to reach, a modus vivendi between East and West.

Neither in the B.B.C. nor in the Foreign Office, nor during the period that he was associated with the Secret Service and also M.I.6 itself, did he make any secret from his friends or colleagues either of his views or the fact that he had been a Communist.

In Agreement

His attitude in these positions was completely incompatible with the allegation that he was a Soviet agent.

This statement of Burgess's position is necessary to understand the situation which arose a week or so after his return to London from Washington in 1951. He went to see Maclean as Head of the American Department of the Foreign Office. They found that their information and opinions about the political situation and the danger of war were in agreement.

What now happened was determined by the following facts. Burgess, who some months previously had himself initiated arrangements to obtain a new job with a view to leaving the Foreign Office, was faced with the fact that the Foreign Office had independently and subsequently decided that they would no longer employ him.

DOUBTS WHEN THE BREAK CAME

However, when the break came, Burgess was doubtful whether he wanted or could conscientiously do the new job he had been arranging.

Therefore, when Maclean told Burgess that he himself had decided that he could no longer work for the Foreign Office and its policies and suggested that they should both go to the U.S.S.R., Burgess had no difficulty in agreeing. There alone there appeared to both to be some chance of putting into practice in some form the convictions they had always held.

As the result of living in the U.S.S.R. we both of us are convinced that we were right in doing what we did.

We are handing this statement to the Press.

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Mr. President
Mr. Secretary
Mr. Speaker
Mr. Chief Justice
Mr. Vice President
Mr. Attorney General
Mr. Secretary of State
Mr. Secretary of Defense
Mr. Secretary of the Interior
Mr. Secretary of the Treasury
Mr. Secretary of the Army
Mr. Secretary of the Navy
Mr. Secretary of the Air Force
Mr. Secretary of the State
Mr. Secretary of the Defense
Mr. Secretary of the Interior
Mr. Secretary of the Treasury
Mr. Secretary of the Army
Mr. Secretary of the Navy
Mr. Secretary of the Air Force

Maclean Touch in Soviet Note

By **NICHOLAS CARROLL**,
The Sunday Times Diplomatic Correspondent

MANY former Foreign Office colleagues in London of Burgess and Maclean have never wavered in their belief that both men were somewhere behind the Iron Curtain, despite the many formal denials by Soviet officials.

Two weeks ago Mr. Khrushchev himself snapped back a sharp denial when a Western journalist suggested that Maclean was in Russia.

A second theory that has gained wide acceptance in the Foreign Office was that the greatly improved drafting of Soviet Notes, letters from Russian leaders, and Soviet announcements on important occasions during recent years, bore the stamp of Maclean's work.

It was thought significant that within a few months of Maclean's disappearance there was a noticeable moderation in the abusive language of Soviet Notes to the West. At the time, this was put down to a change in Soviet diplomatic tactics, but as the quality of the drafting continued to improve former friends thought they detected the accomplished hand of Maclean.

Striking Example

The most striking example was Marshal Bulganin's letter to President Eisenhower on disarmament last summer. The last two Bulganin letters to President Eisenhower coinciding with Sir Anthony Eden's visit to Washington,

and offering a 20-year treaty of friendship, were also thought to bear the Maclean imprint.

Within half an hour of the first news from Moscow about the Burgess-Maclean interview, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, telephoned the News Department of the Foreign Office. A spokesman afterwards described the news as "an interesting development."

NO SURPRISE IN WASHINGTON

WASHINGTON, Saturday.

The news of the reappearance in Moscow of Burgess and Maclean caused no surprise here, as all speculation in the last five years tended to reflect the feeling that the two men had fled to the Soviet Union. The State Department refused official comment on their reappearance.—Reuter.

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