

ALL ARE SCREENED

As a result, since 1952, searching inquiries have been made into the antecedents and associates of all those occupying or applying for positions in the Foreign Office involving highly secret information.

"The purpose of these inquiries is to ensure that no one is appointed to or continues to occupy any such post unless he or she is fit to be entrusted with the secrets to which the post gives access."

It is revealed that as long ago as January, 1949, the security authorities knew that Foreign Office information had leaked to the Soviet authorities **SOME YEARS EARLIER.**

"Highly secret but widespread and protracted inquiries were begun by the security authorities, and the field of suspicion had been narrowed by mid-April, 1951, to two or three persons."

THE CHIEF SUSPECT

By the beginning of May, Maclean had come to be regarded as the chief suspect.

That was two and a half years after the investigations began.

Even then no action was taken except to ensure that "documents of exceptional secrecy did not come into his hands."

Meantime security "arranged to investigate his activities and contacts in order to increase their background knowledge and if possible to obtain information which could be used as evidence in a prosecution."

After the decision to question Maclean security "were also anxious that Maclean's house at Tatsfield, Kent, should be searched and this was an additional reason for delaying the proposed interview until mid-June when Mrs. Maclean who was then pregnant was expected to be away from home."

That brings us to the fateful Friday. At this point the Foreign Office week-end plays a part in this fantastic story:

"Maclean's absence did not become known to the authorities until the morning of Monday, May 28. The Foreign Office is regularly open for normal business on Satur-

day mornings but officers can from time to time obtain leave to take a week-end off.

"In accordance with this practice Maclean obtained leave to be absent on Saturday, May 26. His absence therefore caused no remark until the following Monday."

THE VANISHING ACT

The story of the flight we know. There is a lot more familiar to the student of the greatest vanishing act of modern times—the telegrams to the relatives, the money from Switzerland, the letters posted in London, and the disappearance of Mrs. Maclean.

The report admits that she told security she intended to go to live in Switzerland, and says there was no question of preventing her:

"Mrs. Maclean was a free agent. The authorities had no legal means of detaining her in this country."

To that is added the really astonishing statement:

"ANY FORM OF SURVEILLANCE ABROAD WOULD HAVE BEEN UNWARRANTED."

Then the White Paper deals with two questions that this newspaper and millions of people in the country have asked for years and are still asking. We fear they will not be much wiser now.

Why did Maclean and Burgess remain in the Foreign Office for so long?

Why were they able to get away?

When the two men were appointed "there was nothing on record to show that either was unsuitable for the public service. It is true that their subsequent personal behaviour was unsatisfactory."

UNSATISFACTORY!

Take a look at the record as set out in the White Paper:

MACLEAN: In May, 1950, while serving in the Embassy in Cairo he was guilty of "serious misconduct and suffered a form of breakdown which was attributed to overwork and excessive drinking. . . . After recuperation at home, he was passed medically fit and in October, 1950, was appointed Head of the American Department of the Foreign Office.

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THE AMERICAN REPORT

BURGESS: In 1949 while on holiday abroad he was guilty of "indiscreet talk about secret matters of which he had official knowledge." For this he was severely reprimanded. Yet the following year he was sent to Washington as a Second Secretary at the Embassy.

Out there, the Ambassador put in a report on him that made even the Foreign Office think about firing him.

His work was unsatisfactory, he lacked thoroughness and balance, the U.S. State Department looked unfavourably on his reckless driving, and he had had to be reprimanded for "carelessness in leaving confidential papers unattended."

At the Ambassador's request he was removed from Washington.

Then the Foreign Office really got down to work: "He was recalled to London in early May, 1951, and was asked to resign from the Foreign Office."

Consideration was being given to the steps that would be taken in the event of his refusing to do so. It was at this point that he disappeared.

So in view of this record, how could the two men have stayed so long in this highly secret service?

This is the White Paper answer that is no answer at all:

"Action was taken in each case. It was only shortly before Maclean disappeared that serious suspicion of his reliability was aroused and active inquiries set on foot."

And how could they have escaped when the security sleuths were on their track?

"The watch on Maclean was made difficult by the need to ensure that he did not become aware that he was under observation."

"It was inadvisable to increase this risk by extending the surveillance to his home in an isolated part of the country and he was therefore watched in London only."

"Both men were free to go abroad at any time . . . In this country no arrest can be made without adequate evidence."

NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE

"At the time there was insufficient evidence. It was for these reasons necessary for security to embark upon the difficult and delicate investigation of Maclean, taking into full account the risk that he would be alerted. In the event he was alerted."

That is the end of this sorry tale except for a whitewash for the "reticence" of Ministerial replies about the two men.

This is attributed to the necessity for secrecy in espionage and counter-espionage.

That is the whitewash cover laid on to protect the men who were guilty of supplying successive Ministers with incomplete information about these traitors, to be passed on to the House of Commons and the public.

IT IS A PATHETIC DOCUMENT. A RECORD OF FALTERING INDECISION.

It might almost have been designed to demonstrate to the world that we are children in the art of spying, and babies in arms at the job of catching our own traitors.

But above all it leaves hanging in the air, as menacing as that Thing which hung down from the roof of the Abbey in the Quaternass Experiment, the possibility of the existence still of a master spy able to tap the decisions of our most secret services.

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
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Mr. Holloman	

to show the name
of the
FL

SPIES AT 11th HOUR

*Dash for Channel
boat on day Morrison
ordered questioning
of Donald Maclean*

126 OCT 11 1955

RE: MacLEAN CASE
(Bufile 100-374183)

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LONDON, ENGLAND

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WARNING BY THIRD MAN?

By RONALD CAMP

DONALD MACLEAN fled to Russia on the very day—almost to the hour—that Mr. Herbert Morrison gave the order to close the security net around him. He and Burgess slipped completely unnoticed out of England.

This startling admission is made in the White Paper published last night. It points to the near-certainty that a third Communist agent gave Burgess and Maclean the escape signal as soon as Mr. Morrison decided to swoop on them.

NO WATCH OUTSIDE LONDON

Yet, although both had been under suspicion as Red spies for over a month—

Maclean was not being watched outside London;

He was granted week-end leave beginning the day Mr. Morrison gave his order;

Full questioning and a search of Maclean's home at Tatsfield, Surrey, were delayed until Mrs. Maclean, who was expecting a baby, left the house.

Maclean and Burgess fled late on the night of Friday, May 25, 1951. No one in authority knew until Monday morning, when Maclean failed to appear at the Foreign Office. They had two clear days' start.

WHO WARNED THEM TO QUIT?

They left the riddle of the Third Man. Two years' security inquiries into leakage of secrets to Russia had "narrowed the field of suspicion to two or three persons," says the White Paper.

MACLEAN



'Principal suspect'

Mrs MACLEAN



'Press embarrassment'

BURGESS

Maclean was one; Burgess another. Who warned them the game was up? The White Paper declares:

Searching inquiries involving individual interrogations were made. . . . Insufficient evidence was obtainable to form a definite conclusion, or to warrant prosecution.

Nowhere does the report say no evidence was found—simply that “insufficient evidence was obtainable.” So the Third Man keeps his secret.

Maclean, head of the American Department of the Foreign Office, had become Suspect No. 1. Yet he was watched only when in London, the White Paper explains, because it was thought too risky to keep his country home under observation.

MORE EVIDENCE WAS NEEDED

Security authorities considered it essential that Maclean's suspicions should not be aroused.

Watch on him was “primarily aimed at collecting, if possible, further information and not at preventing an escape. In imposing it a calculated risk had to be taken that he might become aware of it and might take flight. . . .

“It was only shortly before Maclean disappeared that serious suspicion of his reliability was aroused and active inquiries were set on foot.”

The 4,000-word White Paper gives this picture of:

THE MEN.—Maclean, 42, son of a former Cabinet Minister. Sir Donald Maclean, and Guy Burgess, 44, both showed Communist leanings during brilliant careers at Cambridge.

Both renounced their views. But both ran into trouble in their diplomatic careers — Maclean in Cairo, where he was guilty of serious misconduct and excessive drinking, and Burgess, who “talked indiscreetly,” in Washington.

MONTH'S WAIT

THE NET.—Finally the security chiefs were ready to pounce.

But they wanted to be fully prepared to trap Maclean when they questioned him. So the interview and the search at Tatsfield were postponed until mid-June, when Mrs. Melinda Maclean would be away from home for the birth of her baby.

THE ESCAPE.—Maclean and Burgess drove to Southampton, caught the Palace to St. Malo and a taxi to Rennes—and the trail petered out in a train to Paris.

THE LETTERS.—Several have reached members of their families. And two £1,800 drafts were sent to Mrs. Maclean through her mother, Mrs. Dunbar.



‘Indiscreet talk’

HOUSE THEY COULD NOT WATCH



The Macleans' home at Tatsfield, Surrey. Daily Mail reporter Laurence Wilkinson, who went there yesterday, reports:

The new tenants of Beacon Shaw are two families who did not know Donald Maclean or his American wife, Melinda.

Mr. Edward Leslie, a surveyor, occupies one half of the

mansion. His wife said: “The Macleans could not have chosen a better place if they wanted seclusion. Trees and shrubbery surround the house, and the only person who could have kept an eye on things without being noticed was the village constable.”

“Even he would have become the subject of comment and speculation if he had made more than his regular call.”

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MRS. MACLEAN. -- Why was she allowed to vanish from Geneva with her three children on September 11, 1953—or even to go from Britain to Geneva?

FREE AGENT

She complained of "embarrassment" caused by the Press in Britain, and said she wished to educate her children in Geneva.

"There was no question of preventing her from leaving the United Kingdom," says the White Paper. "Mrs. Maclean [an American citizen] was a free agent."

"The authorities had no legal means of detaining her in the United Kingdom. Any form of surveillance abroad would have been unwarranted."

THE OFFICIAL SILENCE.

Counter-espionage depends for its success upon the maximum secrecy of its methods, the White Paper concludes. "Nor is it desirable at any moment to let the other side know how much has been discovered."

"These considerations still apply, and must be the basic criterion for judging what should or should not be published."

Socialists to ask for inquiry

By GEOFFREY WAKEFORD

SOcialist leaders have decided to press for an inquiry into present Foreign Office workings—despite the fact that the "stables" left by the Attlee Government were cleaned up by Sir Anthony Eden.

The Government are expected to refuse even a private inquiry. If so the Opposition may be forced to table a censure motion in a matter on which they are on unsure ground.

Mr. Herbert Morrison, their Deputy Leader, was pressing for a probe last night after the sensational disclosures of the Burgess-Maclean White Paper.

Leakages had been suspected two years before Mr. Morrison became Foreign Secretary. After the horses had bolted he ordered a secret inquiry into security checks.

On the basis of its findings, Sir Anthony, his successor, personally supervised a shake-up of

which the beneficial effects are felt today.

Mr. Morrison is therefore demanding another probe. He said last night that this did not necessarily mean an inquiry into the Secret Service, but into the workings of the Foreign Office itself.

With it he coupled the suggestion that it should take into account the "heavy load" borne by the Foreign Secretary.

Shortly before the White Paper was issued last night the Government made it known that they are ready for a showdown in the Commons when Parliament returns on October 25. This is undoubtedly a challenge.

A debate is made inevitable by a remark by Mr. Hector McNeill, who was Minister of State under the late Mr. Ernest Bevin up to 15 months before Burgess and Maclean fled.

During the B.B.C. "Any Questions?" programme last night Mr. McNeill said of the two spies: "Mark you, I don't know what facilities these people had. They do not seem, from what we know, to have been very effective spies, although we must see there are no more of them."

STORY THE WHITE PAPER DOES NOT TELL *Inefficiency* *Carelessness* *Lack of urgency*

By WALTER FARR

AN inside story of the Burgess and Maclean scandal—the story which has not been told in the White Paper—was given me last night by an authority who was in close touch with the case from the beginning.

He made these allegations:

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'Amateur'

The authority told me: "It is clear that when the Communist menace deepened after the war the system of checking up on Communist activity in Britain and the Western world was outdated and incompetent."

"Although there have been improvements since then it is fair to say that from the beginning many of the vital decisions regarding Burgess and Maclean were amateurish and quite ineffective."

"The White Paper itself gives two glaring examples of what may be called the amateur approach. It admits that secret documents may have been withheld from Maclean in such a way that he may have realised he was under suspicion and thus had time to make his getaway."

"This in itself is an extraordinary admission. It should be coupled with the statements showing the extent to which Maclean, though under suspicion, was watched."

"There are also the statements which show that Burgess may have had a chance to tip off his Communist contacts that he was under suspicion in time for those contacts to warn Moscow that the British Services were about to swoop."

"Perhaps even more remarkable is the light thrown on various liaison methods by what happened when Petrov, the former Soviet secret agent, revealed during the official inquiry in Australia what he knew of the Burgess and Maclean affair."

"It now seems clear that the importance of Petrov's statements was not immediately understood. The reports sent back to London—the H.Q. of the Maclean and Burgess inquiries—appear to have been skimpy."

"There also appear to have

1. That several of the men concerned in London and foreign capitals with efforts to check up on and trap Burgess and Maclean displayed gross inefficiency, lack of judgment, lack of a sense of urgency, and, in some cases, carelessness.

2. There was inadequate liaison at high level between groups of officials conducting inquiries in different capitals.

Wrongly assessed

3. There was inadequate or ineffective liaison between British organisations concerned with chasing Burgess and Maclean and the organisations of other countries, particularly in Europe.

4. On two occasions—when the case first came to the attention of the public in 1951 and in recent weeks—men in key positions wrongly assessed the significance of facts bearing on the scandal.

In one case—perhaps one of many—it appears that important facts were not passed on to a British departmental chief, responsible for policy decisions.

5. At an important stage in the inquiries the policy of "hushing up" the facts appears to have been followed not so much to help to expose the Communist network as to shield persons holding responsible positions.

6. The power and ingenuity of the Communist spy organisation in Britain and other countries in the West have been gravely underestimated.

INEFFICIENCY . . . CARELESSNESS

Continued from Page 1

been long delays due, I gather, to a decision that to hash the information to London by the quickest possible means was judged to be too expensive.

"One source of information says at first, after Petrov had spoken, the facts he had given were sent by 'slow telegram'."

"Newspapers published the information apparently long before it came through official channels to the men actively concerned with Burgess and Maclean inquiries."

Exactly how this happened is not yet clear. It warrants thorough investigation.

Why, it should be asked, was

not a full account of Petrov's revelations sent to London regardless of expense? One defence given to this is that the Petrov material did not call for 'immediate action' and that therefore it could be delayed.

Final cards

"There is no doubt the full information got to London eventually and to the right people. But in this sort of game when it comes to getting vital information concerning spy networks minutes can count."

"The point made by the White Paper that the authorities could not act against Maclean and Burgess and prevent them leaving

the country without proof of wrongdoing may be valid.

"But it is astounding to anyone familiar with the case that there does not appear to have been sufficient liaison between Britain and the Continent to ensure that Burgess and Maclean were shadowed and finally trapped as they headed eastwards."

"One may wonder now how Russia will play the final cards in this affair. For there is no doubt she holds them. She can at any time produce Burgess and Maclean and public statements from them."

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ALARMING WHITE PAPER

THE White Paper on MACLEAN and BURGESS is alarming. Alarming for its admissions. Alarming for its omissions.

Perhaps the most disturbing fact of all is that MACLEAN and BURGESS fled to France—unhampered—only a few hours after the then Foreign Secretary, Mr. HERBERT MORRISON, had authorised the security authorities to question MACLEAN.

The White Paper says that he may have been warned. It would be stretching coincidence too far to suggest that he was not. And the person who warned him must have been in a high place.

Yet, says the White Paper, although searching inquiries were made, "insufficient evidence was obtainable to form a definite conclusion or to warrant prosecution." Is there a guilty man still in a position of authority?

Suspicion

MORE than two years before the spies escaped the Foreign Office were warned that information had leaked to Russia. It was not until only a few weeks before they fled that MACLEAN was marked down as the principal suspect.

No doubt the inquiries were delicate, but surely they should have been speeded up—even if this meant that some toes had to be trampled on.

And why, when MACLEAN had applied for Saturday leave on the very day—Friday, May 25, 1951—the Foreign Secretary decided he should be interrogated, was he allowed to leave the country without being questioned about his destination?

The White Paper says that there was not sufficient evidence to justify his arrest. But why was there not a watch set upon all ports as from that vital Friday morning, so that he could have been asked the simple questions: "Where are you going, and why?"

Sensation

THE old attitude which damned Press stories about the disappearance of MACLEAN and BURGESS as sensational is still apparent in the White Paper.

In a reference to MRS. MACLEAN it says that she gave "two good reasons" for wishing to move her family to Switzerland. We quote: "Firstly that she wished to avoid the personal embarrassment to which she had been subjected by the Press..."

But she was a vital link in the case. The Press realised this, though the authorities did not treat her as such since they raised no objection to her going abroad. Her reasons were "good reasons."

It almost looks as if MACLEAN and BURGESS had come from a charmed circle. As students they were both known Communists, but the Foreign Office didn't know that, when they employed them. They did not bother to ask.

Suppression

AND, after MACLEAN had been "guilty of serious misconduct" in Cairo in May 1950, he was promoted to be head of the American Department! Who was pushing him?

Early in 1950 the Foreign Office was told that BURGESS had been "guilty of indiscreet talk about secret matters." But he was not asked to resign until more than a year later. Who was protecting him?

Considerations of secrecy still apply in this case, says the White Paper, "and must be the basic criterion for judging what should or should not be published."

Well, the White Paper has certainly not revealed all the secrets. The Russians know all about MACLEAN and BURGESS. So who is benefiting from the secrecy now?

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SECTION 6

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Washington Scene . . . By George Dixon

Hello, Home Folks!

I INSISTED we come home from Europe before my bride could meet Capt. Townsend, because I will not have her name linked with that of a commoner. Moreover, if the unmanly incident at Chigwell could be taken as an augury, there were omens that the old country might be plunging into a rather unethical type of crime wave.



Dixon

The police of Chigwell, a metropolitan area in Essex, have a rugby team. On a recent Saturday, which dawned in a normally damp and law-abiding manner, the Chigwell Bobbies took on the London Welsh for a rugged go at rugby. But, during the game, an unsportsmanlike thief raided the police team's dressing room and made off with the wallets of nine constables.

The purloined purses contained not only a total of better than 50 quid in cash, but the official warrants cards which authorize the players, while not engaged at scrum, to search subjects of Her Majesty and make arrests.

Fifty quid averages out to more than 5 pounds per con-

stable, which is a sizable sum for a Bobby to be packing, but particularly when he intends to doff his uniform pants and leave them lying around a dressing room. However, nothing developed from this although there were mutterings in Labor Party circles that questions should be asked in the House.

The victims also found themselves in a rather unusual quandary, because, without their warrants cards, they could not legally search each other. And to their further embitterment they lost the match to the London Welsh—who suffered no pilferage of cash or cards—21 to 3.

When we left Europe, the unspeakable crime had not yet been solved, but Scotland Yard said the CID was making inquiries.

I UNEARTHED one reassuring piece of information abroad. Since the Maclean-Burgess revelation, the British Foreign Office security officers have been right on their toes.

They had reason to suspect that a certain division might be infiltrated by enemy agents so they sacked the whole force. But British fair play prevailed. They gave the discharged employee three months' notice and let them continue on the

job until the three months were up.

They probably feared it might be too severe a shock to a spy's nervous system if his spying was stopped too abruptly.

I AM GLAD I came back because I found I had been getting out of touch with the living issues in the U. S. A. This was brought home to me forcibly by Federal Communications Commissioner Edward M. Webster.

The 66-year-old Commissioner is a former Coast Guard commodore and not at all a jocular type. He is a native of the District of Columbia, which means he probably never had much to laugh about.

Nevertheless he regaled a gathering with this story:

A man comes home late on the night of his wife's birthday empty-handed. She demands: "Where's my birthday present?" and he says: "It's outside—come and look!"

She goes outside and there, at the curb, is a brand-new 1956 car of a certain costly make. "It's yours!" he says.

He expects her face to light up, but instead she scowls.

"What happened?" she rasps.

"Were you so dumb you flunked the \$64,000 question?"

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Date OCT 23

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WASHINGTON REPORT

BY FULTON LEWIS, JR.

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WASHINGTON, OCT. 30 -- There is general agreement among American military leaders that when the Chinese Communists threw their military forces into the Korean War in November, 1950, they knew the United States would not retaliate against China itself.

The question long has been, how did the Red Chinese leaders know that the misnamed United Nations forces in Korea -- misnamed, because they were virtually all American -- would not return the compliment by attacking Red bases in Manchuria or in China proper, as any reasonable desire for victory would seem to have dictated?

Espionage always has seemed the only logical answer; but that has left a corollary question -- the identity of the agent or agents who picked up the information and transmitted it to the Communists.

There is a growing suspicion around Washington now that the answer may have been found, in the persons of the two deserter British diplomatic corps Communists, Donald MacLean and Guy Burgess.

The British government's White Paper on the MacLean-Burgess case says that in May, 1950, while serving in Cairo, MacLean suffered a breakdown, which was attributed to "overwork and excessive drinking," and was recalled to England for treatment. Pronounced cured, he was placed in charge of the American department of the Foreign Office in October, 1950, just one month before the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.

The White Paper specifies that this post "NOT RECORDED" not deal with the major problems of Anglo-American relations, appeared to be within his capacity." However, diplomats familiar with British Foreign Office procedure say that while the job would not involve policy decisions, it does serve as a sort of funnel through which flow all British diplomatic messages between London and the Embassy in Washington.

In early 1950, the White Paper says, security authorities informed the Foreign Office that Burgess, then working in the Foreign Office headquarters in London, had been talking indiscreetly about official secrets and he was reprimanded; this was said to be the first black mark on his record.

(MORE)

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In August, 1950, Burgess was assigned to Washington as a second secretary and his conduct there was so bad -- drinking, reckless driving and leaving confidential papers in odd places -- that he was sent home in May, 1951, and requested to resign.

It was at this point -- on May 25, 1951 -- that MacLean and Burgess disappeared, starting their trek behind the Iron Curtain. It now is known they left so precipitously because they were tipped off by a security officer, who apparently knew nothing of their Communist proclivities, that they were under investigation.

It was in mid-November, 1950, after the Chinese had sent a few "volunteers" into Korea in what apparently was a tentative feeling out of what the reaction would be, that Gen. Douglas MacArthur asked permission to bomb Yalu River bridges to keep out further Chinese.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt the permission should be granted but the State Department, then governed by the nicey-nice Truman-Acheson postures, insisted on first seeking permission from the 13 other governments which had token forces in Korea. One of them was Britain. Permission to bomb the bridges was rejected, and on Nov. 25 Chinese armies moved into Korea in force.

In November, 1950, the month of decision, Burgess was in the British Embassy in Washington and MacLean was sitting on the London end of the British diplomatic communications line to Washington. It seems most unlikely that one or both would not have known, almost as soon as it was reached, of the decision to prohibit MacArthur from bombing the Yalu bridges or carrying any attack into Manchuria or China.

Vladimir Petrov, the defected Soviet secret police official who has talked freely to Australian officials, has furnished compelling evidence that MacLean and Burgess had been turning over secret documents and information to Soviet agents for many years prior to their escape.

This could be the long-sought answer.

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Mr. Boardman	
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Miss Gandy	

GUY BURGESS

A KIND OF FOLLY

THE Burgess-Maclean White Paper has served only to confirm the impression that the Foreign Office and the security authorities between them have made egregious asses of themselves. (Only the *Daily Worker* dissents: it feels this is an elaborately staged stunt to sabotage Geneva.) The unanimity with which all shades of opinion have damned the culprits is remarkable: but there is no agreement on what should be done to stop them disgracing themselves again. The reason is that two issues which ought to have been kept separate have been confused—largely because of Maclean's social background: security on the one hand; and on the other, the future of the Foreign Office as an institution.

The real trouble, as the White Paper makes clear, was not the disloyalty of Burgess and Maclean, but their superiors' inability to recognise that both men were utterly unstable and irresponsible. Neither of them could have survived in his job, let alone been promoted, but for the protection that being 'one of the boys,' so to speak, afforded them. The Foreign Office's loyalty to its staff at its best is admirable: it creates a far better spirit than is found in, say, the State Department, where the law of the jungle operates. But at its blindest, loyalty can become dangerous: not simply because it allows men like Burgess and Maclean to flourish, but also because it creates extraordinary hostility outside, reflected in the savagery with which the newspapers have been attacking the Foreign Office.

The newspapers, however, have tended to concentrate on a campaign for the tightening of security regulations—better screening—more efficient smelling-out of witches. Such a policy is foredoomed to failure. Communism is a virus that cannot be detected by any security microscope: screening will only tend to exclude those who have avowed themselves Communists—not, now, the most dangerous strain. But even if a case could be made for a more efficient security system—(it must be agreed that the country's record in this respect is pitiful) the question remains: What do we want to secure? Are we not in danger of forgetting that we have little left worth being secretive about?

RE: MacLEAN CASE
(Bufile 100-374183)

SPECTATOR (No. 6640)
SEPTEMBER 30, 1955
LONDON, ENGLAND

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To take a topical instance, it was years before the security authorities could be persuaded to allow a film of *The Dam Busters* to show (as the book had not been allowed to show) how the dams were attacked; and the director was forbidden to show how the bomb was actually launched from the aircraft. This information had been given to the Russians at the time, and was common gossip in RAF messes subsequently; the general principle of the bomb release, too, could be guessed by anybody with a knowledge of ballistics, on seeing the film. Yet this information is still on the secret list. The reason is simple: the security authorities depend for their livelihood on having a good supply of information to keep secure. They do not want to make themselves redundant by admitting that the whole paraphernalia is a farce.

But it is. Security now exists, in the main, for two purposes. Primarily it is designed to appease US public opinion. As the admirable leading article in Wednesday's *Manchester Guardian* shows, this is largely time wasted. If Americans want to believe that Burgess and Maclean were responsible for China's decision to attack in Korea, they will—like Mr. David Lawrence, of the *US News and World Report*—continue to believe it, even to inventing facts and ignoring dates to their own taste. The other is to act as a national patent office, to ensure that new ideas are not scooped up too quickly by foreign rivals—a commercial as well as a military transaction. The point is that the day of security as a mystique is over. To worry about it to the extent of witch-hunting is not merely illiberal; it is downright silly.

As many journalists and editors have good reason for knowing, Lady Violet Bonham Carter is a tenacious controversialist, and mere self-interest would make me withdraw from what I wrote last week if I thought her letter to the Editor of the *Spectator* this week were justified. I have three points to make in reply. (i) I never suggested that she had used her influence to affect official decisions in the interests of Burgess and Maclean. I was talking about the subtle influence which is exercised by members of what I call the 'Establishment' in creating an attitude of mind to the whole question of the disappearance of Burgess and Maclean. No doubt they did it for the best possible reasons—we all, I hope, would stand by our friends—but there can be little doubt that, because they knew so many of the right people, a great deal

of pressure was brought to bear in 1951 and 1952 to discount the more sensational stories about Burgess and Maclean. (ii) Lady Violet says that all she did was to write a letter to *The Times* about the 'hounding' of Mrs. Maclean and her family and relations. Is she quite sure that she never sought to bring pressure to bear on the *Express* newspapers on precisely this question? Is she quite sure that it was not due to any intervention on her part that the attitude of the *Daily Express* became a matter, not just of editorial concern, but of managerial and perhaps even proprietorial concern? (iii) As I believe the Editor of the *Spectator* makes clear in a footnote to Lady Violet's letter, neither he nor I approve of the 'hounding' of the family or relations of 'malefactors (proved or suspect).' But the point is that at no time did Mrs. Maclean show any inclination to cut herself off from the press. Never did she complain to any individual journalist. She normally said what she had to say 'off the record.' On one occasion when she did say something 'on the record' to a number of journalists, she telephoned to Fleet Street to deny what she had said even before the story itself had reached Fleet Street. This does not seem to be the behaviour of an innocent woman 'hounded' by the press. It suggests rather that she was being guided by men extremely skilled in handling the press.

Counter-Espionage

By Dr. MICHAEL BIALOGUSKI

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Sizoo	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

THERE has probably never been a political system that made espionage so difficult as the Communist regime in Russia. Without domestic privacy, without freedom of movement, without political freedom, and with draconian punishments for treason, actual or suspected, it must be almost impossible for an agent to obtain in Russia, and to transmit, secret information of the Soviet Government's intentions, plans, and preparations. This fact alone makes counter-espionage more important to-day than espionage proper—it is the more promising as well as the more essential of the two.

The other reason why counter-espionage has to-day a new significance concerns the peculiar nature of Communism. Because of the appeal that Communism still has for many Western intellectuals, Soviet espionage can call on the services of a few well-placed individuals in all Western countries who believe that they are serving the ultimate interests of their own fellow-countrymen by treasonably supplying information to the Soviet Government's agents. It is these "sources" which give Soviet espionage a unique advantage over the intelligence services of other Governments. We can judge of their value when we consider the knowledge available to those few sources who have become known to us—Fuchs, Nunn-May, Pontecorvo, Dr. John, Burgess and Maclean.

THE OBSERVER
SUNDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1955
LONDON, ENGLAND

OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ATTACHE
AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON, ENGLAND

DONALD MACLEAN
Guy Burgess

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C.B. Mac Donald

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Political Religions

Our opportunity lies in discovering either these "sources" or those agents in our midst to whom they transmit their information, and in using these discoveries for our own ends. This is the task of counter-espionage. Having gained some experience in this field in the course of bringing about the defection of Petrov, I would like to submit some general thoughts on the matter.

The tradition of our intelligence services was shaped before the days of ideological politics. These political religions have brought into espionage work a morally and intellectually higher type of person than was previously engaged in such work. To-day, the Communists find available to them scientists and Government officials of top quality who are willing to engage in espionage because of sympathy for the Communist faith.

These men can be detected and countered only by people of equally high intellectual quality, and, in particular, by those who appreciate the nature of the political faith that sustains the Soviet "source" or

agent. Both those who direct intelligence work and those who carry it out must be men of a high order of ability and of political understanding. And they must respect one another—men of the necessary high calibre will not be obtained unless the task is recognised as being more significant than the work of the old-fashioned "spy" of pre-ideological days.

What kind of "expertise" is needed for counter-espionage work? The essential is a knowledge of Marxism and, if direct contact with Soviet personnel is involved, a knowledge of the Russian language and way of thinking. Reading and understanding Marxist literature is a labour, and learning to speak Russian fluently is difficult, which no doubt explains why not every counter-intelligence officer has this knowledge—but it is the essential starting point of operations aimed either at Communist "sources" or at Soviet personnel.

Full Moral Backing

How suitable scientists and other intellectuals are to be induced to devote their time to counter-espionage work is no easy question. But what is quite sure is that the kind of men who have the necessary imaginative gifts for success in this field will be individualists, and the work itself will call for individual initiative. Unless these men are handled with a proper appreciation of their work, good results cannot be expected—and we should in all modesty admit how few defections have been achieved and how late we have been in detecting important sources.

Not only does the agent need full moral backing and intellectual understanding. The loss he suffers through pursuing his devious course can be very great. It can cost him friends, and the chance of building up any career of his own.

The Australian Intelligence Security Organisation (A.I.S.O.), which I served, was patterned on M.I.5, and Sir Percy Sillitoe visited Australia specially to advise on its formation. In my experience of the Petrov defection—which, without boasting, one must point out was one of the very few Soviet defections that have been achieved by our positive effort—serious defects in our service greatly added to the difficulties of the work. There was a lack of expert knowledge of Soviet ways of thought among the staff officers, and a lack of understanding of the true difficulties confronting the agent.

We need people—staff officers and agents—who can understand

the enemy agents in our midst and match them in intellect, education, resourcefulness and enthusiasm. If we fail to attract and train genuine experts of this calibre, there is hardly any justification in maintaining a counter-espionage service as a separate entity—a special branch of the police can do the ordinary job of watching suspects. I hope that whatever official inquiry is made into our counter-espionage service as a result of the Burgess and Maclean affair will not look only for disloyalty: it should also look for "inexpertise."

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THE Government is confronted by two separate issues in debating the disappearance of Burgess and Maclean. We hope it will not, in its embarrassment, allow them to become confused. One issue concerns the staffing of the Foreign Office; the other concerns the state of our counter-espionage service.

We have a right to know why men of unstable character were allowed to hold responsible posts in the Foreign Office. There should be no secrecy about how their appointments were made or why their misdemeanours did not lead them into trouble earlier. The Foreign Office should not be shy of admitting that it tried to deal humanely with Maclean's breakdown, or unwilling to confess why it accepted into its midst a brilliant but erratic outsider recommended by a junior Labour Minister. The precise nature of the Foreign Office's mistakes should be fully and openly disclosed, so that the House may judge whether everything possible has been done to make a repetition of such mistakes unlikely.

To detect that these men were foreign agents was not the task of the Foreign Office but of our counter-espionage service. The inefficiency of this service, and the apparent possibility that it was penetrated by Soviet sympathisers or agents, is a separate issue. We have an absolute right to demand evidence that a severe, thorough and disinterested investigation of M.I.5 is being made.

—it was clear that this service needed drastic reform when Fuchs virtually gave himself up, as we argued at the time. But Parliament has no right to expect this inquiry to be made in public. That would defeat the ends of security: we must be content if a sufficiently high-powered reformatory commission is appointed.

Character Assassination

MEANWHILE, the parliamentary debating of these issues has been opened with an example of McCarthyism which shows how little the dangers of this political vice have yet been understood. Colonel Marcus Lipton, M.P., using the privilege that allows Members to say what they like in the House without risk of a libel action, named Mr. Harold Philby, formerly First Secretary at the British Embassy in Washington, as a man who had, he believed, carried on "dubious third-man activities."

Mr. Philby may or may not be guilty of this grave charge. Whether he is, can be established only by some form of official or judicial inquiry. If Colonel Lipton had merely demanded such an inquiry so that he could offer evidence against a person unnamed, he would have performed a valuable public service. The Government could hardly have refused to hear his evidence.

Instead, Colonel Lipton went on to use the method of public allegation in a privileged place, where his victim has no right of reply. That is the essence of McCarthyism. Its danger is not that the charges are necessarily untrue in every case, but that it wantonly damages reputations and spreads fear because the charges are made in a manner which evades the safeguards of judicial procedure.

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- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Belmont _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Mohr _____
- Mr. Parsons _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tamm _____
- Mr. Sizoo _____
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- Mr. Holloman _____
- Miss Gandy _____

Probers Turn To Fugitives

By the Associated Press

The activities of the fugitive British diplomats Guy Burgess and Donald MacLean have been brought under investigation by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

Chairman Eastland, Democrat of Mississippi, said in disclosing this that one point of inquiry is whether they could have tipped off Red China that its home bases would be immune from attack even if Chinese Communist troops were thrown into the Korean war.

"We want to find out, if we can, if they had that knowledge," he said in an interview.

Held Key Posts

Burgess, at the time, was second secretary of the British Embassy here while MacLean was in charge of the American desk in the British Foreign Office in London.

They mysteriously disappeared behind the Iron Curtain in the spring of 1951 and the British Foreign Office recently said it believed they were Soviet agents. They are reported to be in Moscow now.

Senator Eastland wrote a letter September 22 asking Secretary of State Dulles about the two men's "relations to the State Department, and the basic activity in connection therewith." He said he has not yet received a reply from Mr. Dulles.

In addition to the question of whether MacLean and Burgess might have given the Chinese Communists a big assist in the Korean war, the subcommittee is expected to try to find out what information they had access to and what contacts they had in this country.

Tipped Scales in War

The Chinese Communists entered the Korean war in force in late November 1950 as the United Nations troops under Gen. Douglas MacArthur were advancing close to the Manchurian border and appeared to be on the verge of victory.

Gen. James A. Van Fleet,

former commander of the United States 8th Army in Korea, testified at a subcommittee hearing last year and in response to questions about the surprise entry of the Chinese Communists into the war said:

"My own conviction is that there must have been information to the enemy that we would not attack his home bases."

Buckley

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June

John P. ...

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126 DEC 2 1955

- Wash. Post and Times Herald _____
- Wash. News _____
- Wash. Star C-8
- N. Y. Herald Tribune _____
- N. Y. Mirror _____

Date: 9-30-55

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Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. Boardman ✓
Mr. Nichols ✓
Mr. Belmont ✓
Mr. Harbo ✓
Mr. Mohr ✓
Mr. Parsons ✓
Mr. Rosen ✓
Mr. Tamm ✓
Mr. Sizoo ✓
Mr. Winterrowd ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Mr. Holloman ✓
Miss Gandy ✓

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BY LET. JUN 22 1976
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BRANIGAN

(MACLEAN -BURGESS)
THE UNITED STATES IS RECEIVING INFORMATION FROM BRITAIN ON THE LATEST PHASES OF THE MYSTERIOUS MACLEAN-BURGESS SPY CASE. IT WAS DISCLOSED THIS AND OTHER INFORMATION IS GOING INTO A MOUNTING FILE EXPECTED SOME DAY TO SHOW HOW SUCCESSFUL THE SPIES WERE IN GETTING INFORMATION ON THE UNITED STATES OF VALUE TO RUSSIA.
THE STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENTS, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, FBI, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, AND OTHER EXECUTIVE AGENCIES ARE REPORTED KEENLY INTERESTED -- AND ACTIVE -- IN CONTINUING INVESTIGATIVE ASPECTS OF THE CASE THAT HAS SHOCKED ALLIED SECURITY PERSONNEL AND STATESMEN. SENATE INVESTIGATORS ALSO ARE MOVING IN ON THE CASE.
BRITISH DIPLOMATS DONALD MACLEAN AND GUY BURGESS, BOTH OF WHOM HAD SERVED IN THE BRITISH EMBASSY HERE, SLIPPED BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN IN MAY, 1951, WHEN BRITISH AGENTS WERE TIGHTENING THE NET ON THEIR SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITIES. THEY ARE NOW REPORTED WORKING FOR THE RUSSIANS IN MOSCOW.
WHILE IN WASHINGTON IN THE POSTWAR YEARS, MACLEAN HAD ACCESS TO THE ATOMIC ENERGY HEADQUARTERS HERE. HE WAS CHIEF OF THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE'S AMERICAN SECTION WHEN HE SLIPPED AWAY IN 1951. BURGESS, REGARDED BY INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS AS A LESSER FIGURE, WAS A SECOND SECRETARY AT THE EMBASSY FOR A SHORT TIME.
THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN HAVE BEEN CONSULTING SECRETLY ON THE CASE EVER SINCE SUSPICIONS FIRST WERE RAISED. BUT THE LIAISON IS EXPECTED TO BECOME MORE ACTIVE NOW THAT CHAIRMAN JAMES O. EASTLAND (D-MISS.) OF THE SENATE INTERNAL SUBCOMMITTEE IS PUTTING THE HEAT ON SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES FOR DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE CASE.
BASIC DOCUMENTS SOUGHT VERY RECENTLY BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT INCLUDE COPIES OF THE BRITISH "WHITE PAPER", AND A TEXT OF LAST TUESDAY'S PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSION OF WHO TIPPED OFF THE TWO SPIES THAT THEY WERE UNDER INVESTIGATION.

10/29--RH317P

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WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE

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Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. Boardman _____
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 Mr. Belmont _____
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ADD 1 MACLEAN - BURGESS

FURTHER AND MORE DETAILED INQUIRIES WILL BE DISPATCHED TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY AS SOON AS PARLIAMENT CONCLUDES ITS DEBATE ON THE CASE. THERE HAD BEEN SOME QUESTION IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT ABOUT THE DIPLOMATIC PROPRIETY OF SUCH INQUIRIES, BUT SIGNS NOW ARE THAT THE BRITISH WILL BE HEARING MORE FROM THIS GOVERNMENT SOON.

EASTLAND HAS THROWN THE STATE DEPARTMENT INTO A TIZZY WITH HIS LONG AND INVOLVED LIST OF QUESTIONS. A FULL REPLY MAY REQUIRE WEEKS OF INTENSIVE CHECKING. A "BE PATIENT" REPLY MAY BE HANDED THE SENATOR IN THE MEANTIME.

EASTLAND HAS RECALLED TESTIMONY A YEAR AGO BY GEN. JAMES A. VAN FLEET THAT THE CHINESE REDS MUST HAVE HAD SOME ASSURANCE THAT AMERICAN FORCES WOULD NOT CROSS INTO MANCHURIA, DURING THE KOREAN WAR, IF RED CHINA STRUCK INTO KOREA. THE SENATOR WANTS TO KNOW WHETHER MACLEAN WAS GUILTY OF ANY SUCH LEAK.

THERE IS MUCH DOUBT IN DIPLOMATIC QUARTERS ABOUT HOW MUCH MACLEAN KNEW ABOUT ALLIED STRATEGY IN KOREA WHEN THE CHINESE REDS STRUCK IN OCTOBER-NOVEMBER, 1950. OFFICIALS DOUBT THAT THE UNITED STATES OR ITS ALLIES THEMSELVES -- IN THAT CONFUSING AND TRAGIC PERIOD -- KNEW WHAT THEY WOULD DO.

INITIAL CHECKS SHOW THAT MACLEAN WAS ASSIGNED TO THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE NOV. 6, 1950. HE WAS IN A HOSPITAL PRIOR TO THAT TIME SUFFERING FROM A NERVOUS BREAKDOWN. HIS LAST ASSIGNMENT HAD BEEN IN CAIRO.

ON NOV. 6, 1950, GEN. DOUGLAS MACARTHUR REPORTED TO THE UNITED NATIONS THAT HIS FORCES IN KOREA HAD MET "A NEW FOE" -- THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS. HIS REPORT SHOWED THAT A REGIMENT OF TROOPS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST 42ND ARMY HAD CROSSED THE YALU RIVER ON OCT. 16.

10/29--RH325P



The Two Spies ... And a Third Man

By Max Lerner

On the first day of the new Parliament session, on Tuesday, Eden was asked to agree to a Parliamentary investigation of the whole MacLean-Burgess case.

When he refused, the Labor member, Col. Marcus Lipton, asked whether he wished "to cover up at all costs the dubious third-man activities of Mr. Harold Philby?"

This now brings into the open the name of the "third man" who presumably (perhaps innocently and blunderingly) warned Burgess and MacLean that they were under the suspicion of MI-5, which is the British counter-espionage section. Their flight followed.

I disagree strongly with those who treat the latest excitement about the two British spies and the "third man" as an effort to whip up British hysteria on the American model. The British, let us remember, don't whip up easily, and this time they have a whopper of a spy mystery on their hands. The Russian spy system is both real and earnest, as witness David Dallin's new and massive volume on the subject, "Soviet Espionage," which I hope to discuss in another column.

True, some of the eager-beavers say silly things, like Sen. Eastland's theory that the Chinese Reds launched their attack across the Yalu because Donald MacLean (then at the British Embassy in Washington) presumably told his Russian contacts to tell their Chinese allies that America wouldn't extend the war to China as a result. How would Eastland know? Not even Vladimir Petrov, the Soviet Intelligence man who defected to the democratic side in Australia, would have more than the wildest guess on that one.

But Petrov's evidence does now clear up any lingering doubt as to whether MacLean and Burgess were Soviet agents. They were. The two men vanished from England in May, 1951. In 1953 Mrs. MacLean and her three children also vanished. Petrov defected in 1954. He has told how, when the news of Mrs. MacLean's disappearance broke, an MVD agent called Kislytzin boasted to him that it had happened "just as we planned it."

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Mr. Tamm
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BRUNNEN

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Spafford

CLIPPING FROM THE

N.Y. TIMES

DATED OCT 20 1955

FORWARDED BY N. Y. DIVISION

page 40

NIGHT EXTRA EDITION

DONALD MC LEAN: et al

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The question that interests me most is that of motive and personality: How a cause like Russia's revolutionary tyranny could not only have caught two men like MacLean and Burgess in its net but kept them enmeshed there. For my own pictures of the spies I have drawn mainly on two accounts.

One is "The Missing MacLeans," by Geoffrey Hoare (Viking, 1955). The other is a couple of articles on the two men that appeared in The Reporter in December, 1952, by the English critic, Cyril Connolly, written with his usual dash and brilliance.

Both men had evidently joined the Communist movement while at Cambridge, in the years before there were any Russian purges, when young British aristocrats in search of intellectual excitement and a new father-symbol found them in communism. MacLean was a shy, ingrown but attractive youngster; Burgess talked politics incessantly, and used to warn everyone about the future when the proletariat would be in control and heads would roll.

Both were unstable boys, both drank heavily and later became uncontrollable drunks. Burgess seemed pretty openly a homosexual. MacLean was sexually ambivalent, and later married a charming American girl, Melinda Marling, who bore him two sons and was pregnant with a third child when he disappeared. Both Burgess and MacLean—for what the fact may be worth—had fathers who died before they were out of their teens, a crucial age when a boy needs a strong father-model on whom to fashion himself.

Both entered the Foreign Service, both had ability at their jobs, both got into scrapes over their drunkenness and violence. Both boasted, when drunk, that they were Communist agents—a fact that might have given the vaunted British Intelligence some pause.

Both were deeply sick men who led confused, turbulent, and wretchedly unhappy lives, however they might look outwardly.

One day in May, 1951, the British Foreign Office people finally decided to arrest MacLean if they could get real evidence on him. It was this decision that presumably led Philby to give his "ip-off": He, too, seems to have been a brilliant and confused young Englishman whose politics were toward the left but whose father was a pro-Arab Fascist.

Recently both the missing men have been seen in Moscow, and it is a good guess that they have proved useful to the Russians in launching their recent policy of the New Friendliness.

What can we say about these men except that every country produces, among its abler young people, some who are the heirs of the ages, but prove to be sick and twisted people in search of a cause that will heal their inner insecurity and violence, and give them the dream of being bigger in stature than they are.

Sometimes they are sexually unbalanced, but that is not the core of it. The core is that the ideas that give the rest of us sustenance leave them empty.

Tightening the security net won't help much either. Remember that the Russians have a ruthless security system, yet Petrov defected to our side. The problem is not our outer apparatus of security: it is their inner insecurity. The only thing that can nourish our young people is the strong meat and drink of belief.

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Mr. Tolson	_____
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BURGESS-MACLEAN CASE CALL FOR MORE DETAILS

Tory woman MP asks for 'less ambiguous terms'

Dame Irene Ward (Tory, Tynemouth) has tabled a motion on the Foreign Service for debate on an early day. It reads:

"That this House is of the opinion that full Parliamentary support is due to the Foreign Service in the difficulties it has faced through the behaviour of Burgess and Maclean;

"That the Foreign Secretary should state what powers are vested in his office as Secretary of State and those of other Ministers to appoint to confidential positions members of the service and what is the usual procedure followed;

"That information should be given as to what authority exists and in whom the power

is vested to disregard adverse reports from MI5 and MI6.

"That in any debate in the House of Commons the Prime Minister should make clear the powers that the Foreign Service has to advise on the suitability of new entrants into the service and what machinery exists for ensuring that departmental views are not disregarded by holders of Ministerial appointments without adequate independent consideration at a high level;

"That, in view of the general anxiety caused by the Burgess-Maclean incident, a full factual account should be made available as to what part, if any, holders of Parliamentary office played in the fortunes of these men as members of the Foreign Service; and,

"That, in view of the con-

fidence the country has in the Foreign Service, it would welcome a clear unequivocal statement couched in less ambiguous terms than that of the White Paper."

Free Sub-A

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NOV 15 1955

RE: MACLEAN CASE
(Bufile 100-374183)

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EVENING STANDARD
OCTOBER 28, 1955
LONDON, ENGLAND

OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ATTACHE
AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON, ENGLAND.

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Britain's 'Third Man'

The identification, by a member of Parliament, of Harold Philby as the "third man" in the Maclean-Burgess spy case sheds little new light on this mysterious affair.

Philby formerly was in charge of security at the British Embassy here. His particular job was to see to it that embassy personnel protected the secrecy of official documents.

According to London reports, Philby unwittingly pulled the trigger on the spy case. Donald Maclean, then head of the American department of the British Foreign Office, was under surveillance as a spy for the Russians. Guy Burgess, an all-around bad actor, had been recalled to London from his post as second secretary at the Washington embassy and forced to resign from the diplomatic service. But this was for misconduct. Although evidently a spy, he was not suspect on that ground. Philby, who did not know that Maclean was a spy, is supposed to have warned Burgess that his conduct was under scrutiny. Whether Maclean also was warned is not known. But both men in any event fled from London in 1951, and are believed to be working for the Russians in Moscow. Philby resigned from the government service four months after the escape of Maclean and Burgess.

The thing that sticks in the craw in this business, and which ostensibly touched off the row in Commons which resulted in the naming of Philby, is the attitude of the British government. There is considerable evidence that British counter-intelligence bungled the job prior to the escape of Maclean and Burgess. There is a great deal of evidence that the British government has tried to cover up much of the scandal. It is this latter aspect which has provoked most of the criticism in London.

Prime Minister Eden now says that the matter will be called up for debate in Commons at an early date. Since there is no other way to establish the facts and allay unwarranted suspicions, the sooner this is done the better it will be.

Mr. Tolson ☒
Mr. Boardman ☒
Mr. Nichols ☒
Mr. Belmont ☒
Mr. Harbo ☒
Mr. Mohr ☒
Mr. Parsons ☒
Mr. Rosen ☒
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Miss Gandy ☒

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N. Y. Mirror
Daily Worker
The Worker
New Leader

Date OCT 27 1955

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BRADY

S. G. Payne

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MORE MACLEAN SECRETS OUT MAKINS ran inquiry, found nothing PHILBY NAMED AS THIRD MAN

RE: MacLEAN CASE
(Bufile 100-374183)

DAILY EXPRESS
OCTOBER 26, 1955
LONDON, ENGLAND

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NOV 16 1955 OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ATTACHE
AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON, ENGLAND

Express Political Correspondent

SIR ROGER MAKINS, who is now ambassador in Washington, watched, checked **AND CLEARED** Donald Maclean at the Foreign Office just before the diplomat vanished, it was disclosed last night.

And in the House of Commons Colonel Marcus Lipton named Mr. Harold Philby, a former Foreign Office official, as a "Third Man" in the Maclean-Burgess case.

The vital fact about Sir Roger Makins was not included in last month's White-paper.

It came out in the House of Lords yesterday when the Marquis of Reading, Minister of State, Foreign Office, said about Maclean:—

“A very experienced Under-Secretary who supervised the department was watching him with special closeness towards the end of the time before his disappearance just to see whether there was anything which indicated that Mr. Maclean was not performing his duties satisfactorily at that moment, and he came to the conclusion that there was nothing to which exception could be taken.”

That Under-Secretary, the Foreign Office said later, was Sir Roger Makins.

Maclean and Burgess vanished in May 1951. Sir Roger became Washington ambassador in January 1953.

Why then?

The case of the diplomats was brought up in the Lords yesterday by Lord Eilton.

He wanted to know why, in view of facts disclosed in the White-paper, the Government had told the House in October 1952 that—

“Mr. Maclean performed his official duties satisfactorily up to the date of his disappearance.”

AND

“We knew Mr. Maclean's background, we knew his distinguished career in the Foreign Office up to that time, and there was no reason to entertain any suspicion of him.”

THIS IS SIR ROGER



SIR ROGER MAKINS, 51-year-old British Ambassador to Washington, can overlook most men. He is 6ft. 4in. tall. He got the post at Washington—plum of the British diplomatic service—with a salary of £4,500 and responsibility for another £30,000. He had been there before. His first Foreign Office assignment overseas was as Second Secretary at Washington in 1944. Since then he has been widely

regarded as a foreign affairs expert and has represented Britain on many United Nations committees.

He is a barrister with a public school accent (Winchester), who can also speak Broadway slang (he is a Damon Runyon fan).

Sir Roger has six children—two sons and four daughters—and an American wife whom he met during his first assignment in the U.S.

'Accurate'

Lord Reading said that the original question was directed solely to Maclean's suitability to be appointed head of the Foreign Office's American Department in October 1950—when he was in fact not under suspicion as a spy.

The reply was therefore "completely accurate."

"I was explaining the circumstances in which he had been given a further trial in a fresh appointment," said Lord Reading.

"In support of that decision I cited the fact that he had performed his official duties—clearly meaning his new official duties as head of the American Department—satisfactorily up to the date of his disappearance. And so he did."

Lord Eton said that no one would suspect Lord Reading of deliberately misleading the House, but he felt "a bit puzzled" by this reply.

'Satisfied'

"The public," he said drily, "is bound to ask itself whether there may not be other officials who are performing their official duties in a similarly satisfactory manner."

Lord Reading: "I knew at the time I made the answer—of course I did, for there is no question of the department holding anything back from me—that Mr. Maclean had been under observation. It was not relevant to the question asked."

"I was satisfied that it was not in the public interest to disclose more. I am still satisfied."

IN WASHINGTON a British spokesman said that Sir Roger Makins "considers that any clarification or amplification of Lord Reading's statement must be sought from the Foreign Office."

GUY WAS NO THIEF, SAYS HIS MOTHER

Express Staff Reporter

THE mother of Guy Burgess, now wife of Lieutenant Colonel Jack Bassett, talked last night in her Mayfair flat about her son.

As she tip-tapped a cigarette she said: "I am still his mother, and I am as fond of him now as I ever was. I have not changed and I would like to tell him so. I think these allegations are all lies."

"They are saying he was sacked from Dartmouth Naval College because he was a thief. It just isn't true."

Guy's stepfather put in: "They have called him a spy. They have called him a traitor."

ONLY HE—

"Now they call him a thief. None of it is true." He waved his hands in anger—"His mother and I don't know. You certainly don't know. The Prime Minister himself doesn't know. Nobody knows except Guy himself."

In the expensive Bassett flat there was silence.

Mrs. Bassett sighed, then said: "I would like Guy to know how I feel about him. It is impossible to get letters to him, but every day after the postman has been, I go to the letter-box, to see if Guy has written."

[Burgess wrote to his mother at Christmas 1954, and again at Christmas last year. "I could not have had a nicer Christmas present," said his mother.]

Taut with grief she spoke about the Dartmouth incident. "I know he wasn't a thief," she said.

DELIGHTED

She put out thin, veined hands.

In them was a letter from the captain of the college. It said:—

"Dear Mrs. Burgess, I am satisfied that Guy's eyesight must be a great disappointment. If he does not take to the idea of engineering or paymaster, I can only think you would be wise to send him back to Eton."

"Actually, it is better for him to be boarded out now than say in three or four years' time, when he will be more definitely committed to the Navy."

[Guy Burgess went to Dartmouth from Eton in January 1925. He was then 13. He stayed at Dartmouth eight terms, and left in July 1927 to go back to Eton.]

At Eton, his master, Mr. F. W. Dobbs, wrote to him saying: "I am most awfully sorry to hear of the way your career in the Navy has been made impossible by your eyesight. I shall be delighted to have you back again."

EDEN REFUSES NEW
PROBE: M.P. ASKS—

Are you covering



● Mr. Harold Philby, wounded in the Spanish Civil War.

Philby?

Express Staff Reporter

THE name of Mr. Harold Philby was mentioned in the Commons yesterday by Lieut.-Colonel Marcus Lipton (Soc., Brixton) as a "Third Man" in the Maclean-Burgess affair.

Colonel Lipton had asked Sir Anthony Eden whether the Government would appoint a select committee to investigate the disappearance of Burgess and Maclean and the efficiency of security in general.

"No, Sir" was the only answer.

Colonel Lipton then asked: "Have you made up your mind to cover up at all costs the dubious 'Third Man' activity of Mr. Harold Philby, who was first secretary of the Washington Embassy a while ago?"

"And are you determined to stifle all discussion on the very grave matters which were evaded in the wretched White-paper?"

Sir Anthony, with a shocked air, said: "Your question, asked for a select committee, and my answer remains 'No, Sir'."

THIS IS MR. PHILBY He resigned

MR. HAROLD A. R. PHILBY, O.B.E., is the son of Mr. H. St. John Philby, famed as an explorer in Arabia. Career:—1936: Became a Times reporter. 1938: While reporting the Spanish Civil War he was wounded at Teruel, was awarded the Military Merit Cross by General Franco.

1946: Joined Foreign Service.

1947: Posted to Istanbul.

October 1949: To Washington.

For a while the Philby family lived in the same house as Guy Burgess, then a second secretary. Mr. Philby, it is believed, was the Washington embassy's senior official of a counter-espionage organisation.

June 1951 (soon after Maclean-Burgess disappeared):

Returned to Britain.

September 1951: Resigned from Foreign Service.

Mr. Philby now lives with Mr.

Philby in a five bed-roomed house near Croyborough, Sussex.

There are five children. Their toys—a bicycle, a wheelbarrow, some lead soldiers—littered the porch last night.

Mrs. Philby, in tweed skirt and black twin-set, answered the door with a smile.

"My husband is staying in town," she said. "I am not sure exactly where he is. He won't be back here tonight. The answer to all other questions is 'No comment.'"

NEXT—A DEBATE

Eden: 'I'll be glad'

MR. ALFRED ROBENS (Soc., Blyth), an ex-Minister, also questioned the Prime Minister in the Commons yesterday.

He asked: "Have you made any investigation why briefs supplied by the Foreign Office officials to Ministers answering questions in this House have been so much at variance with the facts of the case?"

Sir Anthony said that this could be raised in a debate.

The Government, he said, desires an early debate on the wider issues which Colonel Lipton raised—"and I personally as Prime Minister will be glad to take part in it."

This seemed to be an answer to a report that the Government wants to put off a debate until Mr. Macmillan, the Foreign Secretary, returns from abroad next month.

One suggestion last night: Mr. Burnaby Drayson (Tory, Skipton) is asking the Premier if there could be a secret session!

WIFE: I'M NOT SURE WHERE HE IS



● Mrs. Philby at the door of her Sussex home last night.

The Daily Express is the guardian of public liberties, and it has a duty to perform in enlightening the people.

OPINION

ALL THE FACTS, PLEASE

SIR ANTHONY EDEN says that he is in favour of a debate on the Burgess-Maclean affair and that he is willing to take part in it himself. That is an excellent decision.

Let the debate be held as soon as possible. For it is more and more plain that the Government has still to tell the full story.

Certainly it was not told in the White-paper. Lord Reading has now revealed that before Maclean disappeared he was under observation at the Foreign Office by a senior Under-Secretary. Why was there no mention of this in the White-paper?

Clear up these points

ON the day Maclean fled he had asked for the morning off. This was an unusual event.

Why did not the Under-Secretary detailed to watch him inform the security authorities about it? Especially as the decision had by then been taken to bring Maclean in for questioning.

Nor is that the only new point that emerges. The name of Harold Philby, a former First Secretary at the Washington Embassy, is raised in the Commons. This man's part in the mystery, if any, must now be cleared up.

If doubts survive...

AS for Lord Reading's explanation of an earlier reply of his, it is open to the charge of evasion.

He says that when he declared there was no cause to suspect Maclean, he meant at the time Maclean was appointed. But Maclean already had a serious adverse personal record. Lord Reading omits altogether to explain why he was given a "further trial"—especially in such an important post as Head of the American Department.

Lord Reading has no responsibility for the appointment. All the more reason for frankness. Until that is forthcoming the Government must blame itself if doubts survive about British security.

SUPPORT THIS ALLY

WARM and enthusiastic is the welcome given to President Lopes of Portugal.

His state visit affirms old ties. They should be strengthened still further by a declaration of British support for the courageous stand Portugal is taking in Goa.

Before President Lopes returns to Lisbon let Britain assure him of the firmest backing against Nehru's greedy and unjust desire to seize that Portuguese land.

201

Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

M.P. NAMES "THIRD MAN" IN BURGESS-MACLEAN CASE

No Select Committee but Early Debate

Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, said in the House of Commons yesterday that he would not appoint a Select Committee to investigate the disappearance of the two diplomats, Burgess and Maclean, and the efficiency of the Civil Service security arrangements in general. The Government's view was that it was desirable to have an early debate on this subject, and one in which he, as Prime Minister, would be glad to take part.

Lieutenant-Colonel M. Lipton (Lab. Brixton), who had asked whether a Select Committee would be appointed, then asked: "Have you made up your mind to cover up at all costs the dubious third man activities of Mr Harold Philby, who was First Secretary of the Washington Embassy a little while ago? Are you determined to stifle all discussion of the grave matters evaded in the wretched White Paper, which was an insult to the intelligence of the country?"

Sir Anthony: I said "No" to the question which asked for a Select Committee. My answer remains "No." So far as the wider issues raised in the supplementary question are concerned, the Government take the view that it is desirable to have a debate, an early debate, on this subject and one in which I, as Prime Minister, shall be glad to take part.

Mr A. Robens (Lab. Blyth): Have you made any investigation of the reason why briefs supplied by Foreign Office officials to Ministers answering questions in this House have been so much at variance with the facts of the case?

Sir Anthony: That seems one of the matters which might well be raised in this debate.

Explanation Sought

Lord Elton asked in the House of Lords for an explanation of the Government's statements in reply to a question on October 28, 1952, that "Mr Maclean performed his official duties satisfactorily up to the date of his disappearance," and that "we knew Mr Maclean's background, his distinguished career in the Foreign Office up to that time, and there was no reason to entertain any suspicion of him."

Lord Reading, Minister of State to the Foreign Office, replied: "The question to which I was replying was directed solely and specifically to Mr Maclean's suitability to be appointed head of the American Department of the Foreign Office. That appointment was made in October, 1950, which was, therefore, the material date so far as the question was concerned. At that time Mr Maclean was under no suspicion of being either a Communist or a Russian spy."

"Mr Maclean did not disappear until May, 1951. I said in my reply: 'It is now known that on more than one occasion before his disappearance Mr Maclean made remarks suggesting that he was a Communist or sympathetic to communism,' and then I added these very important words, 'this was not known at the time of his appointment.' That statement and also the further statement quoted in the present question, that 'we knew Mr Maclean's background, we knew his distinguished career in the Foreign Office up to that time and there was no reason to entertain any suspicion of him' both have direct and exclusive reference to the point of time in October, 1950, when he was appointed to the American Department, and both are completely accurate."

"The statement that 'Mr Maclean performed his official duties satisfactorily up to the date of his disappearance' must be read in the proper context of his suitability for appointment as head of the American Department, the point of the question with which I was dealing. I was explaining the circumstances in which he had been given a further trial in a fresh appointment and, in support of that decision, I cited the fact that he had performed his official duties—clearly meaning his new official duties as head of the American Department—satisfactorily up to the date of his disappearance. And so he did."

Lord Elton said he could not help being

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RE: MacLEAN CASE
(Bufile 100-374183)

THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
OCTOBER 26, 1955
LONDON, ENGLAND

OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ATTACHE
AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON, ENGLAND

BY LETTER JUN 22 1976

PER FOIA REQUEST

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"a bit puzzled" by the reply. "If Lord Reading maintains that it is strictly accurate to say that Mr Maclean performed his official duties satisfactorily up to the date of his disappearance—we know now that he was under grave suspicion and was being watched as a suspected spy apart from his other record—the public, which does not understand these niceties, is bound to ask whether there may not be other officials who are performing their official duties in a similarly satisfactory manner."

Lord Reading said that when, in his original statement, he said Maclean had discharged his official duties satisfactorily that it referred, in the context, to his appointment as head of the American Department and the duties he had been called upon to carry out. "In fact, a very experienced under-secretary who supervised the department was watching him with special closeness towards the end of the time before his disappearance, just to see whether there was anything which indicated that Mr Maclean was not performing his duties satisfactorily at that moment, and he came to the conclusion that there was nothing to which exception could be taken."

Lord Jowitt, Leader of the Opposition peers: If it was known at the time that this man was under suspicion at the date of his disappearance, would it not have been better to say so unless public interest demanded that it should be kept quiet?

Lord Reading: I knew at the time I made the answer—of course I did, there is no question of the department holding anything back from me at any time—that Mr Maclean had been under investigation. It was not relevant to the question asked. I was satisfied at the time, while investigations were still proceeding, that it was not in the public interest to disclose more than I actually disclosed. I am still satisfied that is the case.

Lord Vansittart asked if it was now realised that "some of us who have given our lives to this great service are profoundly sad at heart that it has been sullied by the retention of a notorious drunk after his exploits in Cairo were known, and how hotly I repudiate the aspersions that in some quarters have been thrown on the service as a whole"?

Lord Astor asked if there would be an opportunity of debating the White Paper.

Lord Reading said if the House wanted a debate the Government was perfectly prepared to have one.

Briton Names Ex-Aide Here As Spy Link

Laborite MP Ties
Philby to Escape of
Burgess, Maclean

By Seymour Topping

LONDON, Oct. 25 (AP)—A Laborite member of Parliament today named a former British diplomat in Washington as the third man whose last-minute warning gave Soviet spies Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean time to escape behind the Iron Curtain.

Lt. Col. Marcus Lipton started an uproar in the House of Commons by charging that Harold Philby, then First Secretary of the Washington Embassy, gave the tip-off just as a security net was closing in on the two Foreign Office diplomats.

(The New York Daily News Service named Philby as the third man of the spy case in a story printed Sunday by The Washington Post and Times Herald.)

Burgess and Maclean disappeared May 12, 1951, after British intelligence learned they had been long-time espionage agents for Russia. Both had access to key Western secrets. Maclean was head of the Foreign Office's American Department.

Government sources said Philby served in Washington between 1949 and 1951 and was friendly with Burgess who once was an associate on the Embassy staff. Philby, recalled to London after Burgess and Maclean fled, resigned Sept. 18, 1951.

Philby, son of a distinguished British explorer, Harry Philby, is a free lance journalist now living near London. Mrs. Philby said her husband was not home and there would be

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Mr. Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

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N. Y. Mirror _____
Daily Worker _____
The Worker _____
New Leader _____

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Ex-Diplomat Here Named Spies' Tipster

PHILBY—From Page 1

no immediate comment on Lipton's charges.

Lipton hurled his accusation after Prime Minister Anthony Eden turned down his demand for an investigation of the Burgess-Maclean affair and the government's new security regulations.

Lipton leaped to his feet and angrily shouted:

"Have you made up your mind to cover up at all costs

the dubious activities of Mr. Harold Philby, who was First Secretary of the Washington Embassy until a little while ago?

"Are you determined to stifle all discussion of the very grave matters which you evaded in the wretched White Paper which was an insult to the intelligence of the country?"

Amid general uproar, Eden replied:

"My answer remains no. So far as the wider issues raised

are concerned, the government themselves take the view that it is desirable to have a debate, an early debate, on this subject and one which personally I as Prime Minister will be glad to take part."

Eden's promise of a debate appeared aimed at quieting demands in British newspapers and by Laborites for a complete expose of the Burgess-Maclean case. A white paper—an official government statement issued last September—only spurred the demand.

Pressed for information on Philby's career, a Foreign Office spokesman said:

"In view of the fact that Mr. Philby is being connected with

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Associated Press

HAROLD PHILBY
named as "third man"

the Burgess-Maclean case, the Foreign Office is refusing to supply further information on him or, in fact, on any other aspect of the Burgess-Maclean case pending debate in the House of Commons.

(In Washington, diplomatic informants said Philby was a security officer at the British Embassy here. Philby's responsibilities, they said, were to make sure all Embassy personnel maintained secrecy of vital information and papers.) In the House of Lords also there were demands for a full debate and an explanation of why British intelligence slipped

up in the Burgess-MacLean case.

Lord Reading, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, denied reports that British intelligence had reason to suspect Maclean when he was appointed head of the American Department in October, 1950.

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 New Leader _____

Date 10-21-55
 Page 11

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Date OCT 26 1955

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PHILBY—From Page 1

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Associated Press

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Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. Boardman ✓
Mr. Nichols ✓
Mr. Belmont ✓
Mr. Harbo ✓
Mr. Mohr ✓
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Mr. Holloman ✓
Miss Gandy ✓

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BY LETT JUN 22 1976

PER FOIA REQUEST

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ADD SPIES, LONDON (1048A)
PUBLISHED REPORTS TWO DAYS AGO SAID THAT INTELLIGENCE IDENTIFIED
PHILBY AS THE MAN WHO TIPPED OFF GUY BURGESS AND DONALD MACLEAN, THAT
THEY WERE UNDER SUSPICION AS COMMUNIST AGENTS. THEY ARE NOW BELIEVED
TO BE BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN.
THE FOREIGN OFFICE REFUSED TO CONFIRM OR DENY THAT PHILBY HAD
BEEN CONNECTED WITH THE BURGESS-MACLEAN CASE.
LABOR M.P. MARCUS LIPTON ASKED PRIME MINISTER EDEN IN COMMONS
TODAY WHETHER HE HAS "MADE UP HIS MIND TO COVER UP AT ALL COSTS THE
DUBIOUS ACTIVITIES OF MR. HAROLD PHILBY... AND IS HE DETERMINED TO STIFLE
ALL DISCUSSION ON THE VERY GRAVE MATTERS EVADED IN THE WRETCHED WHITE
PAPER, WHICH IS AN INSULT TO THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE COUNTRY."
LIPTON NAMED PHILBY AS THE MYSTERIOUS "THIRD MAN" AFTER EDEN HAD
REPLIED, "NO, SIR," TO AN EARLIER QUESTION FROM THE LABOR MEMBER. IN
THAT QUESTION HE ASKED WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT PLANNED TO APPOINT A
SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGED FOREIGN OFFICE BUMBLING IN THE
BURGESS-MACLEAN CASE.
RISING TO ANSWER LIPTON'S SECOND QUESTION, EDEN SAID:
"MY ANSWER REMAINS NO. AS FAR AS THE WIDER ISSUES RAISED IN THE
SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTION ARE CONCERNED, THE GOVERNMENT TAKES THE VIEW
THAT IT IS DESIRABLE TO HAVE AN EARLY DEBATE ON THIS SUBJECT IN
WHICH I PERSONALLY, AS PRIME MINISTER, WILL BE GLAD TO TAKE PART."
LABORITE ALFRED ROBENS CHIPPED IN TO ASK EDEN WHY BRIEFS SUPPLIED TO
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TWO DIPLOMATS HAD BEEN "SO MUCH AT VARIANCE WITH THE FACTS."
"THAT IS ONE OF THE MATTERS WHICH MIGHT WELL BE RAISED IN THIS CASE."
EDEN SAID.

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WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE

Mr. Tolson ✓
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Mr. Nichols ✓
Mr. Belmont ✓
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Tele. Room ✓
Mr. Holloman ✓
Miss Gandy ✓

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G.I.R.-2

(SPIES)
LONDON--A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT CLAIMED ON THE FLOOR OF COMMONS
TODAY THAT HAROLD PHILBY, FORMER FIRST SECRETARY OF THE BRITISH
EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, ENGAGED IN "DUBIOUS THIRD MAN ACTIVITIES" IN
THE BURGESS-MACLEAN SPY CASE.
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BURGESS WAS

A THIEF

Expelled from Dartmouth
Royal Naval College

By VINCENT MULCHRONE

GUY BURGESS was expelled from the
Royal Naval College at Dartmouth
when he was 14 for stealing from a fellow
cadet.

It was the cadet Burgess
stole from—now a doctor
with a famous London hos-
pital—who made this dis-
closure yesterday.

"I bring this matter to
light," he said, "because it
seems to expose a weak link in
the Foreign Office's security
arrangements.

"How can a man sacked from
an officers' training college for
such an offence get into the
Foreign Service?"

"Burgess and I went to Dart-
mouth in 1924 and were to-
gether in the St. Vincent term.

"I remember him as a clever
chap and very artistic. He was
also very good at sport. But it
sticks in my memory that he was
very shifty-eyed.

Open locker

"We were in our fifth term, late
in 1925, when the theft came. I
had missed drawing instruments.

"One day I was passing Bur-
gess's locker. It was half open
and inside I saw my belongings.

"I reported the matter to a
petty officer and I was inter-
viewed by a Lieut. Cavendish,
who was in charge.

"He told me to keep quiet about
it. Burgess's locker was emptied.
He was sacked, and within a few
hours he had left the college.

"I thought all this would come
out in the White Paper on Bur-
gess and Maclean, but it simply
said Burgess had been educated
at Dartmouth.

But I knew...

"I gave all the facts to a mem-
ber of Parliament. He treated it
as a bit of amusing information.

"We never saw Burgess again
at Dartmouth, but the story went
around that he had left because
of poor eyesight. I said nothing,
though I knew differently."

An official of the Royal Naval
College at Dartmouth said yester-
day: "Our records show that
Burgess was withdrawn from the
college by the Admiralty because
of poor eyesight."

How third man was named

By Daily Mail Reporter

MR. NORMAN DODDS, M.P.,
toured London in a
chauffeur-driven car while he
was told about the "third man"
who tipped off Burgess and
Maclean.

That night, with a 1,000-word
signed statement before him,
Mr. Dodds wrote to the Foreign
Secretary, Mr. Macmillan,
asking him to name the man.

At his home yesterday Mr.
Dodds said: "I have evidence
from a most reliable source,
which the Foreign Secretary

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RE: MacLEAN CASE

(File 100-374183)

DAILY MAIL

OCTOBER 25, 1955

LONDON, ENGLAND

OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ATTACHE

AMERICAN EMBASSY

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BURGESS

Continued from Page 1

must either refute or admit is correct.

"If it is true then the Foreign Office will have to explain why this man has been protected."

Mr. Dodds, who sits as a Socialist for Erith and Crayford, told this story of how he met his mysterious informant:

"A man telephoned me at my home at Dartford early in the morning. He said: 'We want you to name the third man from the floor of the House of Commons.'"

"I was hesitant about seeing him, but his chauffeur was waiting at London Bridge Station when my train arrived. He asked me to meet his employer in the waiting car."

"The informant and myself sat in the back seat while the chauffeur drove around. I am not easily persuaded to take up matters of this kind, but the informant had all the evidence."

Of good family

"His facts had come from an excellent source. He handed me a signed statement, which detailed how Burgess and Maclean had been tipped off."

"He said I could use his name in any inquiries I had to make. He is a man from a very substantial family who might be a big loser if he was proved wrong."

"If there is some very good reason why the third man has been protected, I shall go no further. But if the Foreign Secretary's reply does not satisfy me, then I shall disclose to the House all that I know."

Ex-Diplomat to U.S. Accused in Spy Case

Tip to Burgess And Maclean Is Laid to Philby

LONDON, Oct. 25 (AP).—A labor member of Parliament today accused a former member of the British Embassy staff in Washington of tipping off spies Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean that they were under investigation.

Lt. Col. Marcus Lipton named Harold Philby, former first sec-

"Third Man" in Spy Case Lived Here for Two Years. Page A-4

retary of the Embassy in Washington, as being the "third man" in the case.

Burgess and Maclean, high-ranking British Foreign Office officials, disappeared in May, 1951, and are presumed behind the Iron Curtain. A recent government white paper accused them of spying for the Kremlin for many years.

Shortly after Parliament reconvened from its two-month summer recess, Col. Lipton tangled with Prime Minister Eden on the Red spy case.

Demand Rejected

Sir Anthony rejected a demand by the Laborite for the appointment of a special Parliamentary committee to investigate the case. The Prime Minister added:

"The government themselves take the view that it is desirable to have a debate on this subject, in which I personally, as Prime Minister, shall be glad to take part."

Burgess and Maclean disappeared while Herbert Morrison was Foreign Secretary in the old Labor government. The case extended through Sir Anthony's tenure as Foreign Secretary under former Prime Minister Churchill and also runs into the tenure of Harold Macmillan, the present Foreign Secretary.

The white paper had hinted vaguely at a third man in the case. After Sir Anthony had spoken Col. Lipton carried out a threat he had made a few days ago to name the person he said warned Burgess and Maclean.

House Is Startled

The Laborite startled the House by addressing this remark to Sir Anthony:

"Have you made up your mind to cover up at all costs the dubious third-man activities of Mr Harold Philby, who was first sec-

See PARLIAMENT, Page A-12

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Boardman _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Parsons _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tamm _____
Mr. Sizoo _____
Mr. Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Holloman _____
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Wash. Star _____
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N. Y. Mirror _____
Daily Worker _____
The Worker _____
New Leader _____

Date OCT 25 1955

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ued From First Page
retary of the Washington em-
bassy a little while ago?

"Are you determined to stifle
all discussion of the very grave
matters you have evaded in the
wretched white paper which was
an insult to the intelligence of
the country?"

It could not be determined im-
mediately whether Mr. Philby
still holds a government post.
Col. Lipton and another Laborite,
Norman Dodds, claimed Satur-
day that Mr. Philby still "is liv-
ing in freedom and comfort."

Up in House of Lords

The Burgess-Maclean case also
flared up today in the House of
Lords. There the Marquess of
Reading, Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs, was questioned
closely about a statement he had
made on the case on October
28, 1952.

Lord Reading had said that
when Maclean was appointed
head of the American depart-
ment of the Foreign Office in
October, 1939, he was under no
suspicion of being a Russian spy
and was discharging his diplo-
matic duties satisfactorily.

The white paper in recount-
ing Maclean's career pointed out
that for some time before his
disappearance he had been drink-
ing excessively and had gotten
involved in scrapes while serv-
ing in overseas posts.

The Foreign Office said Mr.
Philby joined the service as a
temporary officer with the act-
ing rank of first secretary on
September 7, 1946. He resigned
September 19, 1951. His last
post was in Washington and he
had served in Ankara.

Foreign Office records do not
show whether he held any other
Government appointment after
his resignation from the For-
eign service. During World War
II he was a correspondent for
the London Times.

Mr. Philby is believed living
just outside London. He could
not be reached immediately for
comment.

A Foreign Office spokesman
said: "In view of the fact that
Mr. Philby is being connected
with the Burgess-Maclean case,
the Foreign Office is refusing to
supply further information on
him or, in fact, on any other
suspect of the Burgess-Maclean
case pending debate in the
House of Commons."

Under the British system, ma-
jor statements involving policy
or administrative responsibility
are first announced by a minis-
ter in the House of Commons.

There the minister can be sub-
jected to questioning by the op-
position. The minister person-
ally and the cabinet jointly are
responsible for the answers.

Questioning of Sir Anthony on
the reported romance of Princess

Even heavier cannoning is
likely tomorrow when C. J. Bellor
of the Exchequer R. A. Juller
presents a supplementary budget
designed to cut short Britain's
spending spree with a heavy dose
of austerity.

The opposition Labor Party,
aroused by rumors of sharp cuts
in government subsidies which
are supposed to aid the poor
was primed and ready for an all-
out attack.

Sir Anthony faced his greatest
testing time since he succeeded
Winston Churchill last April as
the leader of the conservative
government.

Townsend Sees Princess

Besides the Burgess-Maclean
case, he was expected to be asked
if the government plans any step
to dispel the mystery of Prin-
cess Margaret's romance with
RAF Group Capt. Peter Town-
send.

Capt. Townsend called on the
Princess at Clarence House to-
day, two hours after she and
other members of the royal fami-
ly had welcomed Portuguese
President Craveiro Lopes to
Britain.

Shortly before Capt. Townsend
arrived, Queen Mother Elizabeth
left to carry out an engagement
at a big dairy show.

Col. Lipton has said he wanted
to know whether the govern-
ment intends to seek repeal of
the royal marriage act of 1772.
The act interposes a number of
time-consuming obstacles to the
marriage of the Princess, third
in line to the throne, to Capt.
Townsend, handsome divorced
commoner.

Any statement by Sir Anthony
that repeal of the act was in the
works would be taken by most
people that Margaret has made
up her mind to become Capt.
Townsend's bride despite the ob-
jections of the Church of Eng-
land.

Pressure increased for the gov-
ernment to issue some statement
that would end the gossip and
rumors.

The pro-Conservative Daily
Sketch declared the "welter of
tittle tattle and speculation all
over the world about Princess
Margaret has now grown to such
extent it threatens the dignity
of the crown."

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Mr. Tolson ☒
 Mr. Boardman ☒
 Mr. Nichols ☒
 Mr. Belmont ☒
 Mr. Harbo ☐
 Mr. Mohr ☐
 Mr. Parsons ☐
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 Miss Gandy ☐

file with

Today in Washington

Red China's Korea Attack Laid to Betrayal by Spies

By DAVID LAWRENCE

WASHINGTON, Oct. 29.—Were the 33,500 American boys who were killed in Korea, and the more than 103,000 who were wounded, betrayed by Communist spies operating in the British foreign office or the British Embassy in Washington?

That is the big question now being posed as a result of the disclosures that Donald MacLean and Guy Burgess were Communist agents and that a third person—a British intelligence officer who lived with Burgess in Washington—was the man who tipped off the other two and enabled them to escape behind the iron curtain.



Lawrence

Burgess was an official in the British Embassy here. MacLean also served in the embassy for a time and, though his record was bad, he was nevertheless permitted to take charge of the "American desk" in the British foreign office in November 1950 under the Socialist labor government.

In that very month, the Red Chinese first sent a few units of troops across the Manchurian border into Korea and General MacArthur promptly asked for permission to bomb the bridges across the Yalu and keep out any further forces. But, although the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for immediate authority to send MacArthur such orders, the State Department felt obligated to consult the other thirteen governments which had troops in Korea—and one of these was the British.

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Chinese Got Information

The request was made by the American Secretary of State on November 13, but the word came back that the allies rejected it. This was highly secret information, but evidently the Red Chinese learned that there was no great danger in their intervention—no danger of an attack on their bases in the rear—and they went ahead on November 25 with a full-scale intervention that turned the tide of the Korean War.

What did the State Department tell the other governments? How much of this information passed through the hands of MacLean in the British foreign office? What did he do with it? Senator Eastland, chairman of the Senate subcommittee on internal security, has asked several questions about this in a letter to Secretary Dulles.

Vladimir Petrov, the Soviet official who defected in Australia, has established that MacLean and Burgess were for years supplying documents from the British foreign office to the Soviet government.

This became known only a few weeks ago and has revived interest in the statements made by various American military men who have suspected that somebody had betrayed them in Korea.

Report to Senate

The Senate subcommittee on internal security, in its formal report last January, said:

"The senior military commanders in the Korean war theater who appeared before the internal security subcommittee of the Senate committee on the judiciary believe that possible subversion, wishful thinking, European orientation and allied pressure denied them victory. . . .

"The senior military commanders in the Korean war theater . . . supplied some clues to possible subversion in government departments, but were unable to make specific charges."

Most important, however, is the statement of military doctrine which came from one after another of the military commanders concerning enemy behavior at the time of the Red Chinese intervention.

Gen. Mark Clark, Gen. Stratemeyer, Gen. MacArthur, Gen. Almond and Gen. Van Fleet have all indicated by their testimony that the Red Chinese must have known they would run no risks by intervening in Korea. Here is the colloquy at the Senate hearing with Gen. Van Fleet, Commander U. S.

Eighth Army from April, 1951 to February, 1953:

"Q. Do you believe that the Chinese Communists would have crossed the Yalu without assurance that our military action would be limited?

"A. No. He (the enemy) would not have entered Korea if he did not feel safe from attack in North China and Manchuria."

MacArthur's Letter

Here is an extract from a letter to Sen. Byrd, of Virginia, Democrat, written by Gen. MacArthur on April 19, 1953:

"By one process or another it was conjectured by, or conveyed to, the Red Chinese that even though they entered the fray in large force it would be under the sanctuary of being relieved from any destructive action of our military forces within their own area."

Here is what Gen. Almond, commander of the 10th U. S. Army Corps from September, 1950, to July, 1951, said to the Senate committee:

"The things as they happened looked very strange insofar as the assurance with which the enemy appeared to operate. I think it would have been a very hazardous thing for the Chinese to enter North Korea in the abundant numbers in which they did if they had thought their bases of rice or ammunition or any other base would be subject to attack."

Who gave the Red Chinese that assurance? Maclean was in a position to do so because he knew almost everything the American commanders would do, for he handled messages on these subjects as they passed to and from London.

Whether the information went direct to the Soviets in Moscow and then from Moscow to Peiping, or whether it went by way of some other intermediate capital is irrelevant. The circumstantial evidence points to the fact that the Soviet government had two Communist agents inside the British government at a time when it was vital to know what the American military commanders would be permitted to do if the Chinese Communist armies intervened in Korea.

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'Third Man' in Spy Case Lived Here for 2 Years

Harold Philby, accused in the British House of Commons today as a "third man" in the Burgess-MacLean spy case, was a first secretary of the British Embassy in Washington from October, 1949, until the summer of 1951. He was then recalled to London and there resigned from the British Foreign Service.

It is evident that his name came up early during the British investigation of the disappearance of Guy Burgess and Donald MacLean in May, 1951.

Both Mr. Burgess and Mr. Philby were stationed at the British Embassy here simultaneously. Mr. Philby and his family were living at 4100 Nebraska avenue N.W., according to State Department records. The same records show that Mr. Burgess, who was here without any family, moved in with the Philbys.

After Mr. Burgess returned to London and then fled behind the Iron Curtain, British investigators presumably questioned Mr. Philby. It was believed that his recall from London and subsequent resignation from the Foreign Service might have had connection with the Burgess-MacLean case.

Presumably, however, British authorities do not have evidence warranting any criminal prosecution of Mr. Philby.

Mr. Philby is said to have been engaged in the export-import business with Spain after his departure from the Foreign Service. He is now reported to be living in England.

Mr. Philby once served as a correspondent for the London



HAROLD PHILBY
Pictured in 1937 as correspondent wounded in Spanish civil war.—AP Wirephoto.

Times, covering the Franco side in the Spanish civil war. One person who knew him at that time described Mr. Philby as being a strong supporter of the anti-Communist Generalissimo Franco.

If it is true that Mr. Philby tipped off Mr. Burgess that he was under investigation, the most charitable interpretation would be that Mr. Philby thought that Mr. Burgess was being investigated for too much drinking. Mr. Burgess, however, got in touch with a Soviet agent who arranged for both Mr. Burgess and Mr. MacLean to flee before they could be arrested for spying for the Soviet Union.

Mr. Tolson ☒
Mr. Boardman ☒
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Who Tipped U. S. Hand in Korea?

British Spy Disclosures Support Suspensions of Our Top Military

Were the 33,500 American boys who were killed in Korea, and the more than 103,000 who were wounded, betrayed by Communist spies operating in the British Foreign Office or the British Embassy in Washington?

That is the big question now being posed as a result of the disclosures that Donald MacLean and Guy Burgess were Communist agents and that a third person—a British intelligence officer who lived with Burgess in Washington—was the man who tipped off the other two and enabled them to escape behind the Iron Curtain.

Burgess was an official in the British Embassy here. MacLean also served in the Embassy for a time and, though his record was bad, he was nevertheless permitted to take charge of the "American desk" in the British Foreign Office in November, 1950, under the Socialist Labor government.

In that very month, the Red Chinese first sent a few units of troops across the Manchurian border into Korea and Gen. MacArthur promptly asked for permission to bomb the bridges across the Yalu and keep out any further forces. But, although the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for immediate authority to send MacArthur such orders, the State Department felt obligated to consult the other 13 governments which had troops in Korea—and one of these was the British. The request was made by the American Secretary of State on November 13, but the word came back that the allies rejected it. This was highly secret information, but evidently the Red Chinese learned that there was no great danger in their intervention—no danger of an attack on their bases in the rear—and they went ahead on November 25 with a full-scale intervention that turned the tide of the Korean war.

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C. B. MacDaniel

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Mr. Holloman
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BRANLEY

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John S. ...

MACLEAN: CLUES TO THE TIP-OFF MAN

By CHAPMAN PINCHER

SECURITY authorities are now satisfied that the Third Man—the man who warned Burgess and Maclean to get out of Britain—was himself a Communist agent, not just a friend of the diplomats.

They think that he may still hold an important position in the Government service.

Since M.I.5 set out to identify their Third Man they have established two vital points:—

1 In the early afternoon of May 25, 1951, a few hours before the two men disappeared, only a few top officials in the Foreign Office and M.I.5—probably fewer than 10 men—knew that Maclean was to be interrogated as a spy suspect.

So one of these few must have warned the diplomats.

2 Whoever passed the warning clearly knew that Burgess too was a spy working with Maclean. And that was not suspected by the security authorities at that time. It could have been known only to someone who was also in the spy network.

Suddenly—

This belief follows from the behaviour of the two men on the day they disappeared.

M.I.5 men believe that at lunch-time on May 25 Maclean had no suspicion that Foreign Office permission had been given to them to interrogate him. He was expecting to have a quiet week-end at home at Tatsfield, Surrey.

It was Burgess who learned suddenly that Maclean was in danger. Yet Burgess's name had never been mentioned during the security discussions about Maclean. He was never suspected of being a spy.

At 2 p.m. that day, while Maclean was still lunching with friends in London, Burgess was hiring the car in which the two travelled to Southampton. He took the car to Tatsfield and the two men left to catch the 10 o'clock boat to St. Malo.

RE: MacLEAN CASE
(Bufile 100-374183)

DAILY EXPRESS
OCTOBER 25, 1955
LONDON ENGLAND

NOV 15 1955

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2 The case of Burgess and Maclean. The suggestion is put forward that in the absence of the Foreign Secretary in Geneva the debate on the missing diplomats should be postponed.

The Government should reject such advice. The debate should be held urgently and the Prime Minister should face the storm himself. Who could be better qualified than Sir Anthony Eden, with his distinguished record at the Foreign Office?

Anglo-American understanding on security has too long been clouded by this issue. It is vital that, on the eve of Geneva, there should be no more hedging.

OCT 24 1955

Mr. H.
Mr. M.
Mr. P.
Mr. R.
Mr. T.
Mr. S.
Mr. W.
Tele. R.
Mr. H.
Miss G.

N. Y. DAILY NEWS

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CAPITOL STUFF

By JOHN O'DONNELL

Washington, Oct. 23.—When THE NEWS revealed exclusively yesterday the name of the "third man"—Harold A. E. Philby—in the London-Washington operations of the Moscow spy plot, a sleeping memory stirred in the mind of this reporter.

Philby? Philby? Sure we've known that man. But where? Here he was now, ex-London newspaperman, onetime big shot in the British Embassy here, now named as the man who gave the warning signal to British foreign officer Guy Burgess that he was being investigated. Burgess took this to mean that the part he and Donald Maclean had played as official members of the British Embassy here who had turned Moscow spies and were handing over American defense secrets to Kremlin agents had been discovered.

Suddenly the uneasily sleeping memory woke up and the picture came back—and Philby. It was the first Armistice Day celebrated during World War II—19 years ago—when six American correspondents, thanks to the pressure of our then ambassador to Britain, Joseph P. Kennedy, had received credentials from Britain's War Office to accompany Viscount Gort's ill-fated troops to France.

That November day was cold and wet. The ceremonies were held where so many Canadians had given their lives in World War I at Vimy Ridge. Three of us Americans entered the Ford coupe assigned to us at Arras headquarters—Webb Miller of the UP, Edward Angly of the Herald-Tribune and this reporter. Then the conducting officer, a World War I captain of the 10th Hussars, came up and said: "Can we crowd in one more? Gentlemen, this is a fellow journalist, Philby of the London Times."



Joseph P. Kennedy
Persuaded British War Office

A Youthful Correspondent

Representing the Times of London didn't impress such veteran foreign correspondents as Miller and Angly, but I took a serious look. I had always wondered what type of big correspondents the Thunderer picked for top assignments. I rather surprised at his youth. The bigger surprise came a later and another surprise about two days later.

All were in uniform—American correspondents had agreed cover the assignment wearing the uniform of a British captain with the proviso that in the event of capture we had an idea brassard as foreign correspondent and in the pockets of our uniforms were American identification cards. Then came the solemn march of the military ceremony. All came to attention. The last was sounded and every American reporter stood at attention held the salute as he would have done at home on Armistice before the tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

Philby was on my left and from the corner of my eye I saw he was moving about. Just to be helpful, I muttered out of corner of my mouth "I think we should be at attention." Nothing happened. Don't think he even dropped his cigaret. Well, it none of my business what a London Times reporter does but I n some crack to Miller on the way back to the Ford and our London Times colleague overheard and made some observation to the effect "I don't go for all this military rot."

Later at dinner, away from Philby, I remarked that it damned peculiar that the British Intelligence which had been meticulous about the ancestry of every American correspondent manding and getting the birthplaces of their four grandpares should be sloppy about getting a report on the attitude of their men, particularly after a wave of pacifism had swept Oxford Cambridge Universities, with undergraduates taking a pledge to bear arms even in defense of their country.

His Father Under Investigation

Several days later, at the officers mess in Arras, a few words from Philby over the dinner table gave a tip-off on why he was so. He was mad because, as he announced boldly, the British government was persecuting his father, a distinguished Arabian explorer as a security risk.

This reporter most certainly knew nothing about Philby's father at that time but the next day when I was in the War Office was so seriously worried about the father's patriotism it might not be a bad idea for them to check up on the angry before giving him the run of the battlefield.

But we figured that this was a British headache. Philby was representative of the all-powerful and influential London Times; this was a good time for Britain's American guests at their bat front to keep their mouths shut.

Later came reports about Philby's father being interned Britain for security reasons because of his activities in the uncertain Middle East and, as an added charge, because of his filiation with the anti-Semitic totalitarian party then headed London by Sir Oswald Mosley.

But all this, during the early days of the war, certainly did arouse official suspicion about the London Times correspondent. remained in uniform at the front, was a correspondent on the Communist side during the Spanish civil war, later moved to a trust post in the British War Office and thence to a job as undersecretary officer (this must be a dour joke now). Later he became one of the first secretaries of the British Embassy here when a nation's most precious secrets were being passed to the Soviet Embassy by Burgess and Maclean.

Now it's interesting and important, in the naming of you Philby as the third man, to note the hidden operations of his father the 70-year-old distinguished Arabian scholar, St. John Philby.

After his wartime difficulties with London were over, Philby father returned to Saudi Arabia and for years was a close advisor of the late King Ibn Saud.

Capitol Staff.

NY Daily News Oct. 24
by John O'Donnell.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

The third man in the Burgess-MacLean spy plot is a character named Harold Philby, whom I knew as a war correspondent 16 years ago. At the time, after being duly cleared, a group of American correspondents had obtained permission to accompany the British expeditionary corps to France. Philby was among the British newspapermen, already noticeable for his violent remarks about the British military. Later I learned that his reactions were due to the "persecution" of his father by the government. His father, St. John Philby, a distinguished Arabian explorer, was later interned for his activity in the Middle East and his membership in Sir Oswald Mosley's party. In spite of all this Harold Philby finished the war as an undercover officer in the British War Office and later became one of the first secretaries in the British Embassy in Washington. His father became, after the war, the close friend and adviser of Ibn Saud of Arabia.

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C. R. Mac Donald
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Mr. Mohr	_____
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Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Sizoo	_____
Mr. Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

The Third Man

NEW YORK NAMES ALLEGED BURGESS-MACLEAN LINK

From RICHARD GREENOUGH: New York, Sunday

THE mysterious "third man" who is alleged to have tipped off Burgess and Maclean, enabling them to escape the closing British counter intelligence network just in time, is named in the New York "Sunday News" today.

In a copyright story from London, the paper states that the man will be named in the House of Commons, when Parliament meets on Tuesday, at the request of Mr. Norman Dodds, M.P.

"If necessary I will stand up in the House of Commons and name him," the paper quotes Mr. Dodds as saying.

The man was appointed to an important post in a British Embassy in 1949.

"This seeming wonder boy's rapid rise to such a post is best explained by his real job," the Sunday News says.

"He was in fact an intelligence agent working for hush-hush M.I.6, a branch of the British Secret Service. The Embassy assignment was only cover for his spying activities."

'Unwitting dupe'

Although, according to the Sunday News, the Foreign Office was "dead sure" that the man "triggered" Burgess's and Maclean's escape on May 25, 1951, "his only punishment was being fired."

"One reason why he was sacked without a fanfare is that detectives believed he was the unwitting dupe of Russian spies and that he did not even know they were traitors."

Supporting this theory was the White Paper admission that Burgess and Maclean "might have been warned," but that searching inquiries into this had not produced enough evidence for prosecution.

The Sunday News goes on to say that when Burgess got the "third man's" message he immediately made a rendezvous with his Soviet agent contact, "who was also Maclean's go-between with the ring," told him the game was up, and demanded that the Soviets line up an escape.

The paper records details of the escape, pointing out one alleged new fact, that Burgess and Maclean at St. Malo purposely avoided going to the railway station, fearing it might be watched by British agents. "It was," the newspaper says.

RE: MacLEAN CASE-
(Bufile 100-374183)

DAILY MAIL
OCTOBER 24, 1955
LONDON, ENGLAND

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100-374183-A
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126 NOV 15 1955

Handwritten notes and stamps

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PERIODICALS

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NOV 15 1955

MP: I told the Ministry

By Daily Mail Reporter

MR. DODDS, M.P. for Erith and Crayford, Kent, denied at Dartford last night that he had given the name of the "Third Man" to any newspaper.

"But I have given the Foreign Secretary the name of a man I believe to be the Third Man," he said.

"I have given the suspected man's name to the Foreign Secretary in a private letter, and asked him what action has been taken. If the reply is unsatisfactory I shall not hesitate to name the man on the floor of the House."

"I understand the Foreign Office knows who he is. I understand, too, that this man was useful to them on some other occasion, and that there is some sort of gentleman's agreement that if he sits tight they will save him."

At her London home the man's mother said: "My son knows all about this thing, but he is unable to speak just now. That is the Foreign Office way."

M.I. RIDDLE OF GUY BURGESS

Did he work for War Office too?

NEWS CHRONICLE REPORTER

A NEW mystery concerning the missing diplomat developed last night.

Records suggest that Guy Burgess, who fled with Donald Maclean to Russia in May, 1951, was at the outbreak of war employed on military intelligence for the War Office.

His file at the B.B.C. bears this entry dated January 11, 1939: Resigned. To undertake M.I. activities for the War Office.

Asked about this last night a War Office official said he would have to consult higher authority. He made a telephone call, talked for some minutes and then replied: "We have no information for you."

His B.B.C. file

The new riddle followed yesterday's claim by Mr. Maurice Webb, a former Minister of Food, in The People, that Burgess joined the Foreign Office after being sacked by the B.B.C. because of Communist associations reported by Mr. Webb.

That was in 1944. Said Mr. Webb: "I knew then that Guy Burgess was a Moscow agent." Four years later he found him personal assistant to the late Mr. Hector McNeil, then Minister of State in the Labour Government. He warned McNeil.

Wrote Mr. Webb: "I could do no more. Indeed, when I found Burgess was still kept in a high position at the Foreign Office I began to doubt my own judgment. I considered that he was, in fact, being used for counter-espionage purposes."

Resigned for M.I.

The B.B.C. last night could not confirm that Burgess had been sacked because of Mr. Webb's information. On his record card is the entry: "June, 1944—resigned to join Foreign Office." The word "resigned" is underlined.

Other details from his file are these:

October, 1936: Joined B.B.C. for training.

January 1, 1937: Appointed assistant to talks department at Bristol.

January 11, 1939: Resigned to undertake M.I. activities for the War Office.

January 20, 1941: Rejoined B.B.C. as assistant to talks dept.

Ian Trethowan adds: The new mystery about Burgess will strengthen the desire among some M.P.s for further investigations.

Mr. Macmillan, the present Foreign Secretary, will be asked to give two main assurances: (1) that civil servants responsible for the worst blunders have been moved (and not upwards), and (2) that there is now no risk of a repetition.

Mr. Alison
Mr. Roarman
Mr. N. N.
Mr. B. B.
Mr. H. H.
Mr. M. M.
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sisco
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Tele. Room
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RE: MacLEAN CASE

(Bufile 100-374183)

NEWS CHRONICLE

OCTOBER 11, 1955

LONDON, ENGLAND

NOV 15 1955

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Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

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When What Why?



PARLIAMENT reassembles tomorrow.

And one of the first problems to be discussed will be the disappearance of Burgess and Maclean, the diplomats who vanished four and a half years ago.

Ever since the two men vanished on May 25, 1951, the Daily Express has been asking questions.

Percy Hoskins, Daily Express Chief Crime Reporter, who broke the news that Vladimir Petrov, the Russian refugee, had revealed the story of the Burgess and Maclean vanishing act, is asking more questions today.

Those questions M.P.s will ask Parliament, he says, are mild.

Now he wants to know:—

DID someone override an adverse report by the security authorities when the question of the appointment of Burgess as personal assistant to the Minister of State was raised?

DO Ministerial minutes on appointment exist?

WILL they be produced?

WHY, when the leakage of information to the Soviet Government was discovered, did it take two years and three months to trace its source? The number of people with access to such information must surely have been few.

HOW many people knew on May 25, 1951 (the day of the disappearance), that Mr. Herbert Morrison (then Foreign Secretary) had that afternoon decided to have Maclean questioned?

WHERE are those people now?

ARE any still in Government employ?

IS it true that someone suspected of being the man who warned Burgess of his danger was later "permitted to resign"?

ON whose authority was the decision taken to postpone both the interrogation of Maclean and the search of his home?

WAS the house ever searched?

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BY LETTER JUN 22 1976

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126 NOV 15 1955

RE: MacLENN CASE
(Bufile 100-374183)

DAILY EXPRESS
OCTOBER 24, 1955
LONDON, ENGLAND

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WHEN was Maclean's intention of taking the day off on May 28 communicated to the security authorities? IS it a fact there was a lapse of three vital days before they were notified?

WAS there a lack of co-ordination between M.I.5 and M.I.6, the two security departments involved?

IS there any justification for the American suggestion that their activities affected the course of the Korean War? The M.P.s' questions will include these:-

WHY did the secret and widespread inquiries begun by the security authorities in January 1949 (as stated in last month's White - paper) include no inquiry into the background of Maclean before he joined the Foreign Service in 1935?—By Lieut.-Colonel J. K. Cordaux (Tory, Nottingham Central).

WHY was information concerning the subversive activities and disappearance of Burgess and Maclean given to the Press by an anonymous Foreign Office spokesman, rather than by the

Foreign Secretary himself to the House of Commons?—By Mr. William Taylor (Tory-Nat.-Liberal, Bradford North).

WHY was the Foreign Office unaware of the common knowledge that Guy Burgess had Communist leanings before he entered the Foreign Service.—By Dame Irene Ward (Tory, Tunemouth).

WHAT security checks were imposed by the Foreign Office after Burgess and Maclean left the country?—By Mr. Emanuel Shinwell (Socialist, Easington, Co. Durham), former Defence Minister.

WILL the Foreign Secretary set up a royal commission to inquire into the engagement and retention of Maclean and Burgess in the Foreign Office service?—By Major H.R. Spence (Tory, Aberdeen West).

WILL the Prime Minister set up a Select Committee to investigate the circumstances of the disappearance of Burgess and Maclean and the efficiency of the Civil Service Security?—By Lieut.-Colonel Marcus Lipton (Socialist, Brixton).

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Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
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Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Sizoo	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

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AT LAST THE OFFICIAL LIPS ARE UNSEALED The Most Amazing Story Ever Told by the Foreign Office

DONALD MACLEAN
Guy Burgess

DELETED COPY SENT C.B. Mac Donald
BY LETTER JUN 22 1976
PER FOIA REQUEST *jung*

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RE: MACLEAN CASE (C1 3)
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DAILY MAIL
SEPTEMBER 24, 1955
LONDON, ENGLAND
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WHO WOULD HAVE GUESSED?

It is summertime in England. A typically British family enjoys a typically British holiday. "What passer-by would ever have dreamed that the "charming couple," and their children would soon be the centre of a story unsurpassed in fiction for its elements of mystery and shock? Yes, there they were, taking the sun-bath the shadowy fell—Donald Maclean, Melinda Maclean, and their boys.

FULL TEXT OF YESTERDAY'S WHITE PAPER

ON the evening of Friday, May 25, 1951, Mr. Donald Duart Maclean, a Counsellor in the senior branch of the Foreign Service and at that time head of the American Department in the Foreign Office, and Mr. Guy Francis de Moncy Burgess, a Second Secretary in the junior branch of the Foreign Service, left the United Kingdom from Southampton on the boat for St. Malo.

The circumstances of their departure from England, for which they had not sought sanction, were such as to make it obvious that they had deliberately fled the country.

Suspended

BOTH officers were suspended from duty on June 1, 1951, and their appointments in the Foreign Office were terminated on June 1, 1952 with effect from June 1, 1951.

Maclean was the son of a former Cabinet Minister, Sir Donald Maclean. He was born in 1913 and was educated at Gresham's School, Holt, and Trinity College, Cambridge, where he had a distinguished academic record.

He successfully competed for the Diplomatic Service in 1935 and was posted in the first instance to the Foreign Office. He served subsequently in Paris, at Washington, and in Cairo.

He was an officer of exceptional ability and was promoted to the rank of Counsellor at the early age of 35. He was married to an American lady and had two young sons. A third child was born shortly after his disappearance.

In May 1950 while serving at His Majesty's Embassy, Cairo, Maclean was guilty of serious misconduct and suffered a form of breakdown which was attributed to overwork and excessive drinking.

Breakdown

UNTIL the breakdown took place, his work had remained eminently satisfactory and there was no ground whatsoever for doubting his loyalty.

After recuperation and leave at home he was passed medically fit, and in October 1950 was appointed to be Head of the American Department of the Foreign Office, which, since it does not deal with the major problems of Anglo-American relations, appeared to be within his capacity.

Since Maclean's disappearance a close examination of his background has revealed that during his student days at Cambridge from 1931 to 1934 he had expressed Communist sympathies, but there was no evidence that he had ever been a member of the Communist Party and indeed on leaving the University he had outwardly repudiated his earlier Communist views.

Burgess was born in 1911 and was educated at the Royal

Naval College, Dartmouth, at Exon, and at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he had a brilliant academic record.

After leaving Cambridge in 1935 he worked for a short time in London as a journalist and joined the B.B.C. in 1936, where he remained until January 1939. From 1939 until 1941 he was employed in one of the war propaganda organisations.

He rejoined the B.B.C. in January 1941 and remained there until 1944, when he applied for and obtained a post as a temporary Press officer in the News Department of the Foreign Office.

He was not recruited into the Foreign Service through the open competitive examination, but in 1947 took the opportunity open to temporary employees to present himself for establishment.

Transferred

HE appeared before a Civil Service Commission Board and was recommended for the junior branch of the Foreign Service. His establishment took effect from January 1, 1947.

He worked for a time in the office of the then Minister of State, Mr. Hector McNeill, and in the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office. In August 1950 he was transferred to Washington as a Second Secretary.

Early in 1950 the security authorities informed the Foreign Office that in late 1949 while on holiday abroad Burgess had been guilty of indiscreet talk about secret matters of which he had official knowledge. For this he was severely reprimanded.

Apart from this lapse, his service in the Foreign Office up to the time of his appointment to Washington was satisfactory and there seemed good reason to hope that he would make a useful career.

In Washington, however, his work and behaviour gave rise to complaint. The Ambassador reported that his work had been unsatisfactory in that he lacked thoroughness and balance in routine matters, that he had come to the unfavourable notice of the Department of State because of his reckless driving and that he had had to be reprimanded for carelessness in leaving confidential papers unattended.

Disappeared

THE Ambassador requested that Burgess be removed from Washington and this was approved. He was recalled to London in early May 1951 and was asked to resign from the Foreign Service. Consideration was being given to the steps that would be taken in the event of his refusing to do so. It was at this point that he disappeared.

Investigations into Burgess's past have since shown that he, like Maclean, went through a period of Communist leanings while at Cambridge, and that he, too, on leaving the University outwardly renounced his views.

No trace can be found in his subsequent career of direct participation in the activities of Left-Wing organisations; indeed he was known after leaving Cambridge to have had some contact with organisations such as the Anglo-German Club.

The question has been asked whether the association of these two officers with each other did not give rise to suspicion.

The fact is that although we have since learned that Maclean and Burgess were acquainted during their under-

graduate days at Cambridge, they gave no evidence during the course of their career in the Foreign Service of any association other than would be normal between two colleagues.

When Burgess was appointed to the Foreign Office Maclean was in Washington and at the time Burgess himself was appointed to Washington Maclean was back in the United Kingdom awaiting assignment to the American Department of the Foreign Office.

Leakage

It is now clear that they were in communication with each other after the return of Burgess from Washington in 1951 and they may have been in such communication earlier. Their relations were, however, never such as to cause remark.

In January 1949 the security authorities received a report that certain Foreign Office information had leaked to the Soviet authorities some years earlier.

The report amounted to little more than a hint, and it was at the time impossible to attribute the leak to any particular individual.

Highly secret but widespread and protracted enquiries were begun by the security authorities, and the field of suspicion had been narrowed by mid-April 1951 to two or three persons.

By the beginning of May Maclean had come to be regarded as the principal suspect. There was, however, even at that time, no legally admissible evidence to support a prosecution under the Official Secrets Act. Arrangements were made to ensure that information of exceptional secrecy and im-

portance should not come into his hands.

In the meantime the security authorities arranged to investigate his activities and contacts in order to increase their background knowledge, and if possible to obtain information which could be used as evidence in a prosecution.

On May 25 the then Secretary of State, Mr. Herbert Morrison, sanctioned a proposal that the security authorities should

In reaching this decision it had to be borne in mind that such questioning might produce no confession or voluntary statement from Maclean sufficient to support a prosecution but might serve only to alert him and to reveal the nature and the extent of the suspicion against him.

In that event he would have been free to make arrangements to leave the country, and the authorities would have had no legal power to stop him. Everything, therefore, depended on the interview, and the security authorities were anxious to be as fully prepared as was humanly possible.

Searched

They were also anxious that Maclean's house at Tatsfield, Kent, should be searched, and this was an additional reason for delaying the proposed interview until mid-June when Mrs. Maclean, who was then pregnant, was expected to be away from home.

It is now clear that in spite of the precautions taken by the authorities Maclean must have become aware, at some time before his disappearance, that he was under investigation.

One explanation may be that

he observed that he was no longer receiving certain types of secret papers. It is also possible that he detected that he was under observation, or he may have been warned.

Searching enquiries involving individual interrogations were made into this last possibility. Insufficient evidence was obtainable to form a definite conclusion or to warrant prosecution.

Maclean's absence did not become known to the authorities until the morning of Monday, May 28. The Foreign Office is regularly open for normal business on Saturday mornings, but officers can from time to time obtain leave to take a week-end off.

Absent

In accordance with this practice Maclean applied for, and obtained, leave to be absent on the morning of Saturday, May 28.

His absence, therefore, caused no remark until the following Monday morning, when he failed to appear at the Foreign Office. Burgess was on leave and under no obligation to report his movements.

Immediately the flight was known all possible action was taken in the United Kingdom, and the French and other Continental security authorities were asked to trace the whereabouts of the fugitives and if possible to intercept them.

All British Consulates in Western Europe were alerted and special efforts were made to discover whether the fugitives had crossed the French frontiers on May 28 or 27.

As a result of these and other enquiries it was established that Maclean and Burgess together left Tatsfield by car for Southampton in the late evening of Friday, May 25, arrived at Southampton at midnight, caught the s.s. Falaise for St. Malo, and disembarked at that port at 11.45 the following morning, leaving suitcases and some of their clothing on board.

Unnoticed

They were not seen on the train from St. Malo to Paris, and it has been reported that two men, believed to be Maclean and Burgess, took a taxi to Rennes and there, got the 1.18 p.m. train to Paris. Nothing more was seen of them.

Since the disappearance various communications have been received from them by members of their families. On June 7, 1951, telegrams ostensibly from Maclean were received by his mother, Lady Maclean, and his wife, Mrs. Melinda Maclean, who were both at that time in the United Kingdom.

The telegram to Lady Maclean was a short, personal message, signed by a nickname known only within the immediate family circle. It merely stated that all was well. That addressed to Mrs. Maclean was similar, expressing regret for the unexpected departure and was signed "Donald".


Both telegrams were despatched in Paris on the evening of June 6. Their receipt was at once reported to the security authorities, but it was impossible to identify the person or persons who had handed them in.

The original telegraph forms showed, however, that the messages had been written in a hand which was clearly not Maclean's. The character of the handwriting, and some misspelling, suggested that both telegrams had been written by a foreigner.

On June 7, 1951, a telegram was received in London by Mrs.



ALL THE FACTS



Bassett, Burgess's mother, contained a short and affectionate personal message, together with a statement that the sender was embarking on a long Mediterranean holiday, and was ostensibly from Burgess himself.

The telegram had been handed in at a post office in Rome earlier on the day of its receipt. As with the telegrams from Paris to Maclean's family, there was no possibility of identifying the person who had handed it in.

The handwriting had the appearance of being foreign, and was certainly not that of Burgess.

According to information given to the Foreign Office in confidence by Mrs. Dunbar, Maclean's mother-in-law, who was then living with her daughter at Tatesfield, she received on August 3, 1951, two registered letters posted in St. Gallen, Switzerland, on August 1.

One contained a draft on the Swiss Bank Corporation, London, for the sum of £1,000 payable to Mrs. Dunbar; the other, a draft payable to Mrs. Dunbar for the same sum, drawn by the Union Bank of Switzerland on the Midland Bank, 122, Old Broad-street, London.

Both drafts were stated to have been remitted by order of a Mr. Robert Becker, whose address was given as the Hotel Central, Zurich.

Exhaustive inquiries in collaboration with the Swiss authorities have not led to the identification of Mr. Becker and it is probable that the name given was false.

Letter

SHORTLY after the receipt of these bank drafts Mrs. Maclean received a letter in her husband's hand-writing. It had been posted in Reigate, Surrey, on August 5, 1951, and was of an affectionate, personal nature as from husband to wife.

It gave no clue as to Maclean's whereabouts or the reason for his disappearance but it explained that the bank drafts, which for convenience had been sent to Mrs. Dunbar, were intended for Mrs. Maclean.

Lady Maclean received a further letter from her son on August 15, 1951. There is no doubt that it was in his own hand-writing. It had been posted at Horne Hill on August 11.

Mrs. Bassett, the mother of Burgess, received a letter in Burgess's hand-writing on December 22, 1953. The letter was personal and gave no information as to Burgess's whereabouts. It was simply dated "November" and had been posted in South-East London on December 21.

The last message received from either of the two men was

a further letter from Burgess to his mother which was delivered in London on December 23, 1954.

This letter was also personal and disclosed nothing of Burgess's whereabouts. It too was simply dated "November." It had been posted in Poplar, E.14, on December 23.

On September 11, 1953, Mrs. Maclean, who was living in Geneva, left there by car with her three children.

She had told her mother, who was staying with her, that she had unexpectedly come across an acquaintance whom she and her husband had previously known in Cairo and that he had invited her and the children to spend the week-end with him at Territet, near Montreux.

Alarmed

SHE stated that she would return to Geneva on September 13 in time for the two elder children to attend school the following day. By September 14 her mother, alarmed at her failure to return, reported the matter to Her Majesty's Consul-General in Geneva and also by telephone to London.

Security officers were at once despatched to Geneva where they placed themselves at the disposal of the Swiss police who were already making intensive inquiries.

On the afternoon of September 16 Mrs. Maclean's car was found in a garage in Lausanne. She had left it on the afternoon of the 11th saying she would return for it in a week. The garage hand who reported this added that Mrs. Maclean had then proceeded with her children to the Lausanne railway station.

On the same day, September 16, Mrs. Dunbar reported to the Geneva police the receipt of a telegram purporting to come from her daughter. The telegram explained that Mrs. Maclean had been delayed "owing to unforeseen circumstances" and asked Mrs. Dunbar to inform the school authorities that the two elder children would be returning in a week.

Nickname

MRS. Maclean's youngest child was referred to in this telegram by a name known only to Mrs. Maclean, her mother, and other intimates. The telegram had been handed in at the Post Office in Territet at 10.58 that morning by a woman whose description did not agree with that of Mrs. Maclean. The hand-writing on the telegram form was not Mrs. Maclean's and it showed foreign characteristics similar to those

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... IT ALL BEGAN IN '51

SEARCHING INQUIRIES

Continued from Page 4

in the telegrams received in 1951 by Lady Maclean, Mrs. Maclean, and Mrs. Bassett.

From information subsequently received from witnesses in Switzerland and Austria, it seems clear that the arrangements for Mrs. Maclean's departure from Geneva had been carefully planned, and that she proceeded by train from Lausanne on the evening of September 11, passing the Swiss-Austrian frontier that night, and arriving at Schwarzach St. Veit in the American Zone of Austria at approximately 9.15 on the morning of September 12.

The independent evidence of a porter at Schwarzach St. Veit and of witnesses travelling on the train has established that she left the train at this point. Further evidence, believed to be reliable, shows that she was met at the station by an unknown man driving a car bearing Austrian number-plates.

Untraced

THE further movements of this car have not been traced. It is probable that it took Mrs. Maclean and the children from Schwarzach St. Veit to neighbouring territory in Russian occupation, whence she proceeded on her journey to join her husband.

There was no question of preventing Mrs. Maclean from leaving the United Kingdom to go to live in Switzerland. Although she was under no obligation to report her movements, she had been regularly in touch with the security authorities, and had informed them that she wished to make her home in Switzerland.

She gave two good reasons firstly that she wished to avoid the personal embarrassment to which she had been subjected by the Press in the United Kingdom, and, secondly, that she wished to educate her children in the International School in Geneva.

It will be remembered that Mrs. Maclean was an American citizen and in view of the publicity caused by her husband's flight it was only natural that she should wish to bring up her children in new surroundings.

Unrestricted

BEFORE she left for Geneva the security authorities made arrangements with her whereby she was to keep in touch with the British authorities in Bern and Geneva in case she should receive any further news from her husband or require advice or assistance.

Mrs. Maclean was a free agent. The authorities had no legal means of detaining her in the United Kingdom. Any form of surveillance abroad would have been unwarranted.

In view of the suspicions held against Maclean and of the con-

spiratorial manner of his flight it was assumed though it could not be proved, that his destination and that of his companion must have been the Soviet Union or some other territory behind the Iron Curtain.

Now Vladimir Petrov, the former Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Canberra, who sought political asylum on April 3, 1954, has provided confirmation of this. Petrov himself was not directly concerned in the case and his information was obtained from conversation with one of his colleagues in Soviet service in Australia.

Petrov states that both Maclean and Burgess were recruited as spies for the Soviet Government while students at the University, with the intention that they should carry out their espionage tasks in the Foreign Office, and that in 1951, by means unknown to him, one or other of the two men became aware that their activities were under investigation.

This was reported by them to the Soviet Intelligence Service, who then organised their escape and removal to the Soviet Union. Petrov has the impression that the escape route included Czechoslovakia and that it involved an aeroplane flight into that country.

Upon their arrival in Russia, Maclean and Burgess lived near Moscow. They were used as advisers to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Soviet agencies. Petrov adds that one of the men (Maclean) has since been joined by his wife.

How? Why?

TWO points call for comment: First, how Maclean and Burgess remained in the Foreign Service for so long and second, why they were able to get away.

When these two men were given their appointments nothing was on record about either to show that he was unsuitable for the public service. It is true that their subsequent personal behaviour was unsatisfactory, and this led to action in each case.

As already stated Maclean was recalled from Cairo in 1950 and was not re-employed until he was declared medically fit. Burgess was recalled from Washington in 1951 and was asked to resign.

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It was only shortly before Maclean disappeared that serious suspicion of his reliability was aroused and active inquiries were set on foot.

The second question is how Maclean and Burgess made good their escape from this country when the security authorities were on their track. The watch on Maclean was made difficult by the need to ensure that he did not become aware that he was under observation.

This watch was primarily aimed at collecting, if possible, further information, and not at preventing an escape. In imposing it a calculated risk had to be taken that he might become aware of it and

might take flight. It was inadvisable to increase this risk by extending the surveillance to his home in an isolated part of the country, and he was therefore watched in London alone.

Both men were free to go abroad at any time. In some countries no doubt Maclean would have been arrested first and questioned afterwards.

In this country no arrest can be made without adequate evidence. At the time there was insufficient evidence.

It was for these reasons necessary for the security authorities to embark upon the difficult and delicate investigation of Maclean, taking into full account the risk that he would be alerted.

Inquiry

IN the event he was alerted and fled the country together with Burgess.

As a result of this case, in July 1951 the then Secretary of State, Mr. Herbert Morrison, set up a Committee of enquiry to consider the security checks applied to members of the Foreign Service; the existing regulations and practices of the Foreign Service in regard to any matters having a bearing on security; and to report whether any alterations were called for.

The Committee reported in November 1951. It recommended, among other things, a more extensive security check of Foreign Service officers than had until then been the practice.

This was immediately put into effect and since 1952 searching enquiries have been made into the antecedents and associates of all those occupying or applying for positions in the Foreign Office involving highly secret information.

The purpose of these enquiries is to ensure that no one is appointed to or continues to occupy any such post unless he or she is fit to be entrusted with the secrets to which the post gives access. The Foreign Secretary of the day approved the action required.

Criticism

A GREAT deal of criticism has been directed towards the reticence of Ministerial replies on these matters; an attitude which it was alleged would not have been changed had it not been for the Petrov revelations.

Espionage is carried out in secret. Counter-espionage equally depends for its success upon the maximum secrecy of its methods.

Nor is it desirable at any moment to let the other side know how much has been discovered or guess at what means have been used to discover it. Nor should they be allowed to know all the steps that have been taken to improve security.

These considerations still apply and must be the basic criterion for judging what should or should not be published.

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Burgess Tipster Worked Here

'Third Man' in Spy Case To Be Named in Commons

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LONDON, Oct. 22—The mysterious "third man," whose secret warning enabled Soviet spies Donald MacLean and Guy Burgess to escape a counterintelligence net and flee behind the Iron Curtain, will be named in Parliament after it meets Tuesday.

Norman Dodds, a Labor member, today demanded that Foreign Minister Harold Macmillan unmask the tipster.

"If necessary," Dodds declared, "I will stand up in the House of Commons and name him."

Identity of this mysterious "Mr. X" has thus far been hidden by the Foreign Office.

The New York News was informed today, however, that the man Dodds will denounce is Harold A. R. Philby, 38.

Philby was made First Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington in October, 1949, when he was only 32 and had been in the British Foreign Service a mere two years. His rapid rise to such an important post is best explained by his real job.

Philby was, in fact, an intelligence agent working for the hush-hush MI-6, a branch of the British Secret Service. His Embassy assignment was only a cover for his spying activities.

Although the Foreign Office is dead sure Philby triggered the May 25, 1951, flight of Burgess and MacLean, his only punishment was being fired.

One reason he was sacked without fanfare is that detectives believe he was the Russian spies' unwitting dupe, that he did not even know they were traitors.

In a white paper on the case, the Foreign Office admitted that MacLean "might have been warned." This official report issued last month said "searching inquiries involving individual interrogations were made into this possibility."

But, it added, there was not enough evidence for prosecution.

Highly classified Secret Service reports said, however, that Philby got the word to Burgess. See BURGESS, Page A-8, Col. 1.

Mr. Tolson _____
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Mr. Sizoo _____
Mr. Winterrowd _____
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Mr. Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

BURNHAM

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Wash. News _____
Wash. Star _____
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Daily Worker _____
The Worker _____
New Leader _____

Date OCT 23 1955

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BURGESS—From P. 1

Spy Case Mr. 'X' To Be Revealed

his intimate friend, to "watch your step." Philby evidently believed that Burgess' superiors were upset by his scandalous sex behavior and drinking.

But to Burgess, it was hint enough that his Red spy game was up. Then he and MacLean slipped away.

Lived With Burgess

Philby, who holds the coveted Order of the British Empire, had been very close to Burgess in Washington. Burgess lived with Philby in his rented house there.

The two often entertained Alan MacLean, Donald's younger brother, when he visited the Capital. The younger MacLean also was in the Foreign Service and then was private secretary to Sir Gladwyn Jebb, British Ambassador to the United Nations at the time.

Burgess' conduct in Washington was notorious. A known homosexual, he drank to excess. He was stopped three times in one day for speeding.

He was a cynic and a braggart, and his cocktail-party libes at British Commonwealth policies shocked his colleagues.

Weeks before his disappearance, Burgess was bluntly ordered home and told to resign.

Knowing Burgess' habits, Philby was not surprised when his superiors instructed him to make a list of the disgraced diplomat's close friends and associates.

He assumed the Foreign Office was piling up evidence of his friend's homosexual activities to bolster the demand for his resignation.

What Philby did not know was that, in mid-April, 1951, the Secret Service launched an all-out investigation of a spy ring in the Foreign Office and suspicion pointed to Burgess and MacLean.

The white paper, incidentally, admitted that this probe was started two years after authorities got a tip from a Russian in the London Soviet Embassy about these Foreign Office leaks.

Philby, who suffered a head wound in 1938 while covering the Spanish Civil War for a London newspaper, could not warn Burgess himself.

But he could—and apparently did—tell Alan MacLean to get the message to his friend through Alan's brother Donald.

Rendezvous With Red

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They knew each other only by reputation, and neither knew—then—that the other was in the Kremlin's service.

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Burgess evidently told the Russian he was suspected and that the game was up. He demanded that the Soviets line up an escape route to a Red asylum for him.

The go-between realized that MacLean's role in the operation also must be suspected. He warned MacLean, set up the flight and put the two in contact.

MacLean was indeed under suspicion, along with three others he was, however, allowed to continue his normal routine in hopes he would lead intelligence agents to other spies.

MacLean's country home where he lived with his American-born wife, Melinda, and their two sons, was not shadowed for fear he would notice and realize he was suspected.

This policy paid off—except that the quarry escaped.

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Story of Flight

Then, warned, MacLean and Burgess fled. Using a false name, Burgess rented a drive-yourself auto and called at MacLean's luxurious home for his colleague. Not even members of their families were told they were leaving.

They abandoned the auto on a Southampton dock and took a cross-channel ship to St. Malo, France. All they carried with them—two small suitcases—they left on the steamer, the Falaise.

Once in France, they gave the railroad station a wide berth, fearing it would be watched by British agents. It was.

Instead, they hired a taxi to take them to Rennes. They paid off the driver and evidently caught an express to Paris.

In Paris the trail went cold. It was assumed they reported to the Soviet Embassy there to be flown secretly to Russia.

Vladimir Petrov, a Russian spy who went over to the West in Australia, said a talkative Soviet agent indicated to him that they flew by Czech or Russian plane to Prague, then to Moscow.

Petrov also said they were luxuriously housed in the Russian capital, where their trains were carefully picked for every secret they might know.

Wash. Post and Times Herald A-1 & A-8

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Tipster Sought In Traitor Case

LONDON, Oct. 22 (AP).—A Laborite legislator challenged Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan tonight to name a "third man" who is said to have tipped off traitors Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess of a counterintelligence check, enabling them to flee behind the Iron Curtain.

Mr. Macmillan must name the man, "or I will do it myself," said Norman Dodds, outspoken rank-and-file socialist in the House of Commons.

Mr. Dodds said the man's name is common knowledge in government circles and "it would be iniquitous if he were to remain hidden and absolved from public judgment."

The government disclosed in its official report that the runaway diplomats, Burgess and Maclean, skipped the country in May, 1951, within hours of the time security men were ordered to question them.

Although the report did not say so specifically, it hinted that a shadowy "third man" in the government circles had warned the two and enabled them to escape the net.

"The Foreign Secretary is well aware, I am sure, that this third man is still living in freedom and comfort in this country," Mr. Dodds said.

Some reports have spoken of a former diplomat in Britain's Washington Embassy, where both Maclean and Burgess had worked, as being responsible for the tip-off.

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Burgess Tipster Worked Here

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Believed Unwitting Dupe

One reason he was sacked without fanfare is that detectives believe he was the Russian spies' unwitting dupe, that he did not even know they were traitors.

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Brady

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page 10

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Spy Case Mr. 'X' To Be Revealed

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Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

**He was a Red agent when
Foreign Office took him on!**

W. J. By
S. Page

BURGESS: ANOTHER BOMBSHELL

RE: MacLEAN CASE
(Bufile 100-374183)

THE PEOPLE
OCTOBER 23, 1955
LONDON, ENGLAND

71 NOV 15 1955

100-374183-A
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Ex-Minister says: 'His chief ignored my warning'



His story demands an explanation

THE amazing statements made here by Mr. Maurice Webb, the former Food Minister, demand answers to these questions:

- Why was Burgess appointed to the Foreign Office after he had been fired by the B.B.C. because of his Communist activities?
- Why was he then promoted to become Personal Assistant to the late Hector McNeil, then the Government's Minister of State?
- Why were Maurice Webb's warnings to McNeil about Burgess ignored?

GUY BURGESS, ONE OF THE TWO MISSING BRITISH DIPLOMATS NOW IN RUSSIA, WAS SACKED BY THE B.B.C. BECAUSE OF HIS COMMUNIST ASSOCIATIONS.

Yet he soon afterwards entered the Foreign Office and actually got himself promoted to become Personal Assistant to the late Mr. Hector McNeil, then serving as Minister of State in the Labour Government.

These disclosures—made exclusively in "The People" today—show the utter lack of real security precautions in the Foreign Office at that time.

The facts are so appalling that they will add further to the row that will take place in Parliament on the Burgess and Maclean debate.

It is Mr. Maurice Webb, former Minister in the Labour Government and ex-M.P. for Bradford, who has provided "The People" with this information.

As he is no longer an M.P., Mr. Webb feels that Parliament should have the facts put before them—to support the case many M.P.s are making that a full and searching inquiry should be started into the whole business of Burgess and Maclean.

Here is Mr. Webb's full dossier of his association with Burgess and the astonishing sequel.

MAURICE WEBB'S REPORT

I FIRST knew that Guy Burgess was a Moscow agent as long ago as 1944.

At that time, I was doing a fair amount of broadcasting work for the B.B.C., mostly on the Overseas Service. Burgess was then a B.B.C. producer and he was detailed to supervise my talks.

He showed little interest in my work but, whenever the subject of Communism cropped up, I noticed certain reactions and mannerisms to make me suspicious.

He frequently gave me brilliant little lectures on the theme of "Who believes all this Parliamentary poppycock?"

He was a great cadger of small change and an enthusiast for "a quick drink."

One night after a broadcast he suggested that if I "had some cash" we should have one of the "quick drinks" together. We went to a public-house near Oxford Circus.

As we were talking, a man entered at the far corner of the saloon—a man dressed in a shaggy overcoat.

The Burgess face changed instantly. From the usual bland cynic he became tense and anxious.

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Then he said: "Oh, there's one of our chaps" and hurried over to him. A few seconds later he came back and said he would have to leave at once. I followed him and his friend to the door and watched them go into the Tube station at Oxford Circus because I was more than interested.

Although Burgess could not have suspected it, I knew his friend. I knew him to be one of Britain's most militant Communists.

I first met the man in the gabardine overcoat at the so-called "People's Convention," staged by the Communists in 1940 for the purpose of "ending the war."

The watcher

I went there as an observer, and it was the man in the gabardine raincoat who stood in a dark corner by the door, watching everyone who entered.

So when, at that public house in London four years later, I saw that this man was a friend of Guy Burgess and had caused him to hurry away in a state of anxiety, I knew for certain that Burgess was a Communist agent.

I was uncertain what to do since, as a journalist, I was anxious to respect the code of our profession which is never to act as an informant to authority.

Yet I was aware that I had responsibilities as a citizen, too. So I decided to await developments.

They came quickly. Burgess

Burgess bombshell for MPs

Continued from Page 1

began to make frequent calls on me at the House of Commons.

He pressed me for introductions to all kinds of important people. Most of all, he tried to get me to supply him with private reports on War conferences that were passed on to certain journalists.

B.B.C. informed

Finally, I acted. I gave information to the B.B.C. Soon afterwards Burgess left the service.

It was my impression that he was sacked and I was relieved to hear it.

But the story does not end there.

Four years later I arranged a Sunday meeting in my Bradford constituency at which my co-speaker was to be the late Hector McNeil, then Minister of State in the Labour Government.

McNeil met me at an hotel

and his first words were: "Can I get some cigarettes for my Personal Assistant?"

I got them and went out with McNeil to his car. And there, sitting in the back, was Guy Burgess.

Immediately I turned to McNeil and said: "Why didn't you consult me before taking him on?" Burgess sat without speaking, and my question was unanswered.

Later, when we were back in London, I sounded McNeil. From his answers to my questions I gathered he had not the slightest idea that Burgess was a Communist agent.

I could do no more. Indeed, when I found that Burgess was still kept in a high position at the Foreign Office, I began to doubt my own judgment.

I considered that Burgess was in fact being used for counter-espionage purposes—that he had been planted in his post by the Foreign Office because of his knowledge of Communist activities.

At the time of his transfer, too, Russia was our ally in the war, and so I felt sure there was little need for alarm, even if my theory were wrong.

But when Burgess fled with Maclean I realised the amazing truth for the first time.

This Communist agent had fooled everyone at the Foreign Office—including the Government.

More astounding still, he had managed to get himself a job in our most vital department of state—after he had been fired by the B.B.C. because of his suspect activities.

To my mind, M.P.s must demand an explanation for all this from those responsible.

They must ask why the Foreign Office was not told by the B.B.C. what they knew about Burgess.

Staggering conduct

They must find out whether Burgess offered references to the Foreign Office when he was appointed—and if so, why he had no references from the B.B.C.

Or if he did, who at the B.B.C. could have recommended his employment in the Foreign Office?

To my mind Burgess was not the sort of man clever enough to cover up his political leanings. That apart, his personal conduct was such as to make him a dubious person to employ in a high diplomatic post.

In proof of that let me tell what finally happened at the Bradford meeting.

Before catching the train to London that night, Burgess went into the Queen's Hotel, ordered more cigarettes and six bottles of beer. Then he said:

"Charge these up to Mr. Webb, your local M.P."

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
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Political Commentary

By HENRY FAIRLIE

THOSE who—like that admirable Cassandra of democracy, Mr. Christopher Hollis—claim that Parliament nowadays does very little that is useful should reflect on what would have happened this week if the House of Commons had been sitting. On Monday either the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary would have had to answer a private-notice question about the Maclean-Burgess affair. Their answers would almost certainly have been unsatisfactory, and some Member would have moved the adjournment of the House on a definite matter of urgent public importance. The Speaker would have had no alternative but to accept the motion—clearly the Foreign Office's admission that Maclean and Burgess were Soviet agents is both a 'definite' matter and one of 'urgent public importance,' and it would have been raised at the earliest possible moment (another qualification which has to be fulfilled if the adjournment of the House is to be moved). He would then have asked if forty Members were prepared to support the motion for the adjournment, and there can be no doubt that forty members would have risen in their places. Consequently, at 7.30 that evening the House would have interrupted its normal proceedings and debated the remarkable statement which the Foreign Office had made to the press the day before. The result might have been as important as the result of the adjournment debate on the Savidge case in 1929, which led to an inquiry into police powers.

The Government has escaped this sort of immediate, searching inquiry, which can be conducted *only* by the House of Commons, and which the House does, in fact, conduct very

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7th Sept

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6-1 Burgess

RE: MacLEAN CASE
(File 100-374183)
SPECTATOR (No. 6639)
SEPTEMBER 23, 1955
LONDON, ENGLAND

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C.B. Mac Donald

58 NOV 16 1955

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effectively. It has now all the time that it could ask to prepare its positions. But I do not think that, when Parliament re-assembles, it will be allowed to fog the issue. I am not in a position this week—since this column has to be written before the White Paper is published—to comment on the details of the scandal. But one aspect of it seems to me to deserve immediate comment. I have several times suggested that what I call the 'Establishment' in this country is today more powerful than ever before. By the 'Establishment' I do not mean only the centres of official power—though they are certainly part of it—but rather the whole matrix of official and social relations within which power is exercised. The exercise of power in Britain (more specifically, in England) cannot be understood unless it is recognised that it is exercised socially. Anyone who has at any point been close to the exercise of power will know what I mean when I say that the 'Establishment' can be seen at work in the activities of, not only the Prime Minister, the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Earl Marshal, but of such lesser mortals as the chairman of the Arts Council, the Director-General of the BBC, and even the editor of *The Times Literary Supplement*, not to mention divinities like Lady Violet Bonham Carter.

Somewhere near the heart of the pattern of social relationships which so powerfully controls the exercise of power in this country is the Foreign Office. By its traditions and its methods of recruitment the Foreign Office makes it inevitable that the members of the Foreign Service will be men (and the Foreign Service is one of the bastions of masculine English society) who, to use a phrase which has been used a lot in the past few days, 'know all the right people.' At the time of the disappearance of Maclean and Burgess, 'the right people'

moved into action. Lady Violet Bonham Carter was the most active and the most open. A study of her activities during the past twenty years would reveal how power in this country can still be exercised by someone who has, politically, been stripped of it. But Lady Violet Bonham Carter was not alone. No one whose job it was to be interested in the Burgess-Maclean affair from the very beginning will forget the subtle but powerful pressures which were brought to bear by those who belonged to the same stratum as the two missing men. From those who were expecting Maclean to dinner on the very night on which he disappeared, to those who just happened to have been charmed by his very remarkable father, the representatives of the 'Establishment' moved in, and how effectively they worked may be traced in the columns of the more respectable newspapers at the time, especially of *The Times* and of the *Observer*.

I heard recently a story which illuminates many of the ways in which the 'Establishment' now works. Mr. Maurice Edelman, the Labour Member of Parliament, was asked some time ago by an American magazine to write an article about Princess Margaret which could be published to celebrate her twenty-fifth birthday. (That Labour Members of Parliament should be assumed to know about the Royal Family seems to me to be an amusing comment on contemporary British society in itself.) Mr. Edelman wrote his article, which contained a sentence which was in no way disrespectful but which might be construed as a criticism of Princess Margaret. Then, being Mr. Edelman, he submitted his article to the Lady-in-Waiting of Princess Margaret. The next that he heard about it was when he was called to Mr. Attlee's room in the House of Commons. There, in front of Mr. Attlee, was the offending article.

Mr. Attlee told Mr. Edelman that he might have expected many other members of the Labour Party to write such an article, but not him, and he requested that it should not be published. Mr. Edelman's article has not appeared. Many things are interesting about this story—not least the delightful picture of Mr. Attlee in his most headmasterly mood ('I had hoped, Edelman, to make you a prefect, but now, well, you know . . .')—but the more one considers it, the more one realises that the events which occurred did not depend on any formal relationships, but on subtle social relationships. That was the 'Establishment' at work.

BURGESS-MACLEAN INTELLIGENCE

Q. WHO TAKES THE BLAME?—*Evening News.*

A. ' . . . those in authority—the Ministers.'—*The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.*

' . . . the British Foreign Office—crammed with intellectuals.'—*Daily Mirror.*

' . . . gross levity.'—*Manchester Guardian.*

' . . . the right social background and the right old school tie.'—*Daily Herald.*

' . . . disingenuous reticence.'—*The Times.*

' . . . witches in the Foreign Office. Let's have a hunt.'—*Daily Sketch.*

Mr. Boardman
 Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Belmont
 Mr. Harbo
 Mr. Mohr
 Mr. Parsons
 Mr. Rosen
 Mr. Tamm
 Mr. Sizoo
 Mr. Winterrowd
 Tele. Room
 Mr. Holloman
 Miss Gandy

BRANCH 36
file 5 B...

How they could have trapped Donald Maclean



by RANDOLPH CHURCHILL



100-774183-1
 NOT RECORDED
 126 NOV 14 1955

RE: MacLEAN CASE
 (Bufile 100-374183)

EVENING STANDARD
 OCTOBER 21, 1955
 LONDON, ENGLAND

MACLEAN
 A deception
 would have
 done the
 trick.

303 247
 1 NOV 15 1955

DELETED COPY SENT C.B. MacDonald
 BY LETTER JUN 22 1976
 PER FOIA R. *jug*

245

PARLIAMENT meets again next week and on "an early day" the Government will have to find time for a debate on the White Paper published last month "concerning the disappearance of two former Foreign Office officials."

Seldom has a Government report received so universally hostile a reception from the Press, and it is to be expected that Parliament will have many searching questions to put to the Foreign Secretary. It may be useful to subject the report to some preliminary scrutiny.

Sharing blame

Before doing so it is right to emphasise that this is no party or personal matter. The conduct of the Foreign Office under three successive Foreign Secretaries will be under examination, and it will be for Parliament to weigh how the blame for successive acts of folly and neglect are to be divided between the periods of office of Mr. Herbert Morrison,

Sir Anthony Eden and Mr. Harold Macmillan.

One of the charges which will be brought against all three Foreign Secretaries will be the lack of candour they showed from the outset in May 1951, when the two diplomats fled the country, down to the present day. This last is the only charge that can be brought against Mr. Macmillan.

Over a period of four years a series of Foreign Office spokesmen have attested to Parliament and the Press that they had no information that cast any light upon the events or motives which might have led to the flight of the two men.

It was only when Petrov defected from the Soviet Union and wrote some articles that the Foreign Office condescended to admit part of what they knew. (It should be remarked in passing

that Petrov's testimony is only hearsay and would not be admissible in a court of law.)

But if Petrov's story justified the publication of the White Paper, why had not the Foreign Office acted earlier? Had no Foreign Office official talked to Petrov before he decided, more than a year after his defection, to sell his memoirs to the Press?

This, even in the light of the White Paper, seems inconceivable.

Now the White Paper explains that the repeated denials of any information being in the possession

of the Government were not true; and the White Paper itself is open to severe attack on the grounds of lack of candour.

Moreover it is not only the Foreign Office which is under fire. M.I.5, the counter-espionage organisation, is also convicted of gross negligence from the account given in the White Paper. This is the most disquietening aspect of the whole affair and it is to this that Parliament should direct its coldest scrutiny.

Postponed

Even when Mr. Morrison had agreed, on May 25, 1951, that Maclean should be questioned, the security authorities decided to take no immediate action as they wished to wait till Mrs. Maclean had left her house to have a baby before they searched it for incriminating evidence.

Are M.I.5 really incapable of searching anything except an empty house? Would it have been beyond their wit to have induced one of the Maclean servants to have quit their employment and to have introduced their own agent into the house?

This would not only have achieved the object of the search but would have provided that surveillance at his country home which the White Paper professes could not have been undertaken without arousing Maclean's suspicions.

Another point of crucial importance in this connection. If there is danger of surveillance arousing a suspect's apprehensions and if it is thought that by withholding top secret matter from him he may be prompted to flee, it is surely an elementary maxim of counter-espionage that the suspect's apprehensions be deliberately aroused at a moment when he, his friends and his haunts are all under the closest observation? If the suspect is guilty, he may well give himself away completely.

Misleading

To this the White Paper's answer is that there was no means of stopping Maclean from leaving the country. This is the most flagrantly misleading statement

in the whole of the White Paper. The Home Office still reserves to itself the right to refuse a passport to any British subject without giving any reason for its action. A passport can also be confiscated without any explanation. It is disingenuous of the Government to affect the contrary.

Surely the way the hand should have been played was something like this. As there was no proof of Maclean's treason it was necessary that he should be trapped into betraying himself. A subtle, calculated deception should have been practised upon him at a time when he was closely watched.

If he had attempted, as in fact he did, to leave the country he would have found that all the ports had been warned; and his passport would have been taken from him at Southampton.

ulates in Eastern Europe labour under severe handicaps, but it seems strange that they were not informed of the departure of the two men.

The failure to alert the Consulates in Eastern Europe is the more remarkable in the light of paragraph 23 which states: "In view of the suspicions held against Maclean and of the conspiratorial manner of his flight, it was assumed, though it could not be proved, that his destination and that of his companion must have been the Soviet or some other territory behind the Iron Curtain."

Gossip

True enough, why not then inform our Embassies and Consulates which lie behind it?

In the foregoing I have carefully confined my remarks to matters which arise directly from the White Paper. There are other matters of which I, and many others, have sure knowledge which could easily be raised, and probably will be raised.

There is a further mass of matter based on gossip and surmise which is discussed by hundreds of people but the publication of which might possibly be to the public detriment and to the injury of innocent individuals. These may none the less be raised in Parliament.

Truth now

Such possibilities would never have arisen if successive Governments had not, from vain and foolish motives, deliberately misled both Parliament and the nation. The longer this process is continued the bigger the price in forfeiture of public esteem that both the Government and the Foreign Office will have to pay.

Surely it is time to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

WORLD COPYRIGHT RESERVED

A case

Even if his subsequent interrogation had not yielded sufficient results to procure a conviction for espionage there would have been a sufficiently strong *prima facie* case of disloyalty against him to warrant his dismissal from the service and a refusal thereafter to furnish him with a passport.

A counter espionage system which openly admits that it cannot search an occupied house and has not the wit to play a trick of this kind upon a suspected spy has surely forfeited the confidence of Parliament and of the public.

Any one can make a mistake, or a series of mistakes. But to plead such ineptitude in defence, as the Foreign Office, presumably on the advice of M.I.5 does, is an affront to the intelligence of Parliament and the nation.

Paragraph 13 states "Immediately the flight was known all possible action was taken in the United Kingdom. . . All British Consulates in Western Europe were alerted." Why only Western Europe? Admittedly our Con-

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W. J. [unclear]

MACLEAN AFFAIR: NEW SECRETS OUT

He started Ribbentrop pact

..... From GORDON YOUNG

Burgess and Maclean . . . names synonymous with espionage. Who was the man behind them ; whose idea was it to infiltrate British intellectuals with Red agents ? These, and similar questions, are answered in this interview with a man who claims to know the intimate background of the astonishing BURGESS AND MACLEAN AFFAIR. . .

..... METZ

FROM a highly nervous man in a brown tweed suit who spent part of the last war in Pentonville Prison I heard today a most remarkable story of the whole background of the Burgess and Maclean affair.

The "man from Pentonville" even claimed to give the name of the secret agent who first recruited the two British diplomats for the Soviet Intelligence Service. Before my informant would meet me I had to give a solemn promise that I would not reveal his identity, and our meeting in a back room of a busy street was arranged after a series of complicated telephone calls in which code names were used.

For this man claims that he is still trusted by the Intelligence Service of an Iron Curtain country for which he has worked for years and that he still has many relatives in Soviet-controlled territory.

"Mr. Pentonville" produced to me papers which identified him as, in fact, a person who has occupied a highly responsible position in foreign Communist official circles. To me his story sounds largely convincing but judge for yourselves, for this is what he said :

DONALD MACLEAN

DELETED COPY SENT C.B. Mac Donald
BY LETTER JUN 22 1976
PER FOIA REQUEST

RE: MacLEAN CASE
(Bufile 100-374183)
6 NOV 1 1955

DAILY MAIL
OCTOBER 20, 1955
LONDON, ENGLAND

OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ATTACHE
AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON, ENGLAND.

100-374183-A
NOT RECORDED
138 OCT 21 1955

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In the early days of the last war I was one of a group of Communists who were interned by the British Government, first in Pentonville and later on the Isle of Man.

"In that same group was the man who claimed to have been the Red agent who originally contacted not only Burgess and Maclean but a number of other British people whom I could name if I wanted to and won them over as secret agents for the Soviet Government."

FIRST IDEA

The first idea of "infiltrating" the ranks of British intellectuals and finding recruits there to act as Communist agents originated, said Mr. Pentonville, with the then Soviet Foreign Minister, Litvinov, and his group of cosmopolitan Jewish intellectuals.

But Litvinov was strongly opposed in this idea. Zhdanov, Stalin's one-time deputy, the conventional Communist doctrinaire who believed all Western intellectuals were corrupt and completely untrustworthy, especially in matters of espionage.

This clash of opinions inside the Kremlin itself, said Mr. Pentonville, created many difficulties at different times for the man in charge of the British end of the Red Intelligence Enterprise.

DANGEROUS

It was this man who shared imprisonment with Mr. Pentonville in Britain in 1940.

"His name," said Mr. Pentonville, "was Ludwig Freund, a Sudeten-German of Jewish origin, who was born in 1904 in Reichenberg. He was at one time editor of the German-language Communist weekly *Die Rote Fahne* in Prague."

"Freund was a brilliant—and dangerous—young man. As an ardent young Communist he had first studied commercial law in Berlin and in 1926 and 1927 economics at London University. He spoke almost perfect English."

"After being briefed on his mission by an agent of Litvinov in Germany, Freund went back to Britain in the early thirties, ostensibly to attend lectures at both Oxford and Cambridge Universities, but actually to

"It was while visiting Cambridge that he contacted Burgess and Maclean and the others, and it was he who arranged their necessary intelligence contacts for them, both in London and also in Paris when Maclean went to work at the Embassy there."

At this stage said Mr. Pentonville, Burgess and Maclean were never asked to supply any information of a military nature, but their help was sought to keep the Kremlin informed on the political and economical problems of the British Government.

DYNAMITE

In particular there were five special subjects on which they reported to Moscow in the years just before the war. These were:

1. "Moves inside the British Government to come to terms with Hitler."

2. "The alleged intentions of British 'reactionaries' to encourage Hitler's ideas of expansion towards the Ukraine."

3. "Pacifist tendencies" inside the Socialist and Liberal parties."

4. "Internal divisions between members of the British Commonwealth."

5. "The spread of anti-Americanism among members of the British Civil Services and in British public opinion."

Said Mr. Pentonville: "All these ideas were dynamite at the time, of course, and Maclean and Burgess, and the other members of prominent British families who were recruited by Freund did a great deal by their reports to confirm the suspicions of the Kremlin that Britain was preparing to make a secret deal with the Nazis and did not seriously intend to fight Hitler."

"And it was this belief in Moscow that largely influenced the Kremlin to sign the fatal pact with Ribbentrop in August, 1939."

Burgess and Maclean and the other members of Freund's network, said my informant, never received any real training in espionage work, were never subjected to Communist Party discipline, and thus became accustomed to act as pure amateurs.

A CHANGE

But with the start of the war in 1939 there came a fundamental change in the activities of Burgess and Maclean. More positive, factual news was wanted by Moscow.

The war-time official positions held by the two diplomats greatly increased their usefulness, and now for the first time Moscow allotted to them financial payments.

Freund was ordered by the Kremlin to "seek asylum" in Britain along with Karl Krelbich, a former director of the Comintern's British section in Moscow.

Both men were released from internment after Russia's entry into the war, and it was easy for Burgess to maintain contact with them.

At one period during the war, said my informant, he was a frequent visitor to the headquarters of the Czechoslovak Government at 62, Prince's Gate London, S.W.7, and at the same time he kept in touch with the Poles, Yugoslavs, and Rumanians in war-time London.

Said Mr. Pentonville: "We knew at that time that Burgess was spying on behalf of the Kremlin on such men as Mikolajczyk, of Poland, Benes, of Czechoslovakia, King Peter of Yugoslavia, and Dr. Titea, of Rumania, and other illustrious émigrés in London."

"We often wondered why British Security Services allowed Burgess to continue to work for the Soviets so openly and most of us thought that he must be a 'double agent' working also for the British Intelligence."

"Even so, it seemed to many of the responsible people of the Central European and Eastern Governments that Burgess was a big security risk for even then he gave the impression of being a homosexual, a depraved and utterly unreliable man."

Mr. Pentonville then added



DONALD MACLEAN : Five subjects for Moscow.

one extraordinary allegation: "Did you know," he said, "that even while Freund and Kreibich were interned in Pentonville and the Isle of Man, Burgess was able to maintain contact with them and exchange secret messages?"

As the war proceeded, said my informant, Burgess and Maclean won favour in Moscow with their reports on "delays" in establishing the Second Front and "divergencies" between the United States and Britain. But their privileged position in Moscow's eyes won them a good deal of jealousy from the Soviet's professional spies.

Thus, when Maclean made his first big mistake it was instantly reported to Moscow. This mis-

take happened one day when Maclean had been drinking.

During conversation with the man who was at that time acting as his "contact man," a Hungarian Communist spy, Maclean revealed that he had taken his wife, Melinda, into his confidence and that she was helping him in his work.

It was strictly against the rules to involve relatives in espionage work without direct permission from Moscow.

In this case, said Mr. Pentonville, the Kremlin took no action against Maclean, but from that moment it kept vigilant check on Mrs. Maclean's activities.

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Mr. Mohr	_____
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Miss Gandy	_____

BRANIGAN 3

U.S. freeze over Maclean

By CHAPMAN PINCHER
INTERCHANGE of
secrets between
Britain and U.S. is in
peril.

Cause, it was disclosed
last night, is the Foreign
Office admission that
Donald Maclean and Guy
Burgess were spies for the
Russians.

The admission has particu-
larly impaired the Govern-
ment's chances of borrowing
the U.S. Pacific proving
ground for the test of the first
British hydrogen bomb,
devised by Sir William Penney.

U.S. security chiefs have
previously ruled against granting
this facility.

But the flare-up of the
Maclean-Burgess scandal last
month renewed doubts about
the efficiency of British security
methods.

The Government is having great
difficulty in finding a site for the
test because radioactive dust
from the explosion falls out over
a wide area. To equip a test site
would cost millions of pounds.

There has also been increased
reluctance on the part of U.S.
service chiefs to pass information
about guided weapons to the
British Services Mission in
Washington.

Under a new agreement
scientists of both nations were to
collaborate on new guided
weapons.

And a special arrangement to
interchange "Atomic Intelli-
gence"—information about what
Communist countries are doing in
research—is not working satis-
factorily. This failure too is
attributed in part to the admis-
sions about Burgess and Maclean.

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g/c

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BY LETTER JUN 22 1976
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100-374183-14
NOT RECORDED
126 NOV 1 1955

RE: MacLEAN CASE
(Bufile 100-374183)

DAILY EXPRESS
OCTOBER 18, 1955
LONDON, ENGLAND

OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ATTACHE
AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON, ENGLAND
52 NOV 2 1955

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May Name Aid Of 2 Turncoats

LONDON, Oct. 15 AP.—A Laborite member of Parliament said Sunday he intends to identify publicly the person said to have warned missing diplomats Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess that they were suspected of Communist activities. Norman Dodds said that if Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan does not order the arrest of the man he will reveal the name in the House of Commons.

The man is believed to have been an employee of the British Embassy at Washington at the time when Burgess and Maclean disappeared in May, 1951. They are believed to be now in the Soviet Union.

Lord Elton, a Laborite peer, announced today that he plans to ask the government why it said once that Maclean per-

formed his duties "satisfactorily." A government White Paper said last month that Maclean was known to have been drinking heavily during the years while he was supplying classified information to Soviet agents.

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Wash. Post and Times Herald _____
Wash. News _____
Wash. Star _____
N. Y. Herald Tribune 10
N. Y. Mirror _____
Daily Worker _____
The Worker _____
New Leader _____

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[Handwritten signature]

DID MACLEAN TELL KOREA SECRETS?

WASHINGTON, Saturday.
MR. DULLES, U.S. Secretary of State, was asked today if he knew whether Communist China received secret information from British sources during the Korean war.
The question was in a letter from Senator James Eastland, chairman of the Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee.
He asked if the British diplomats Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean had assured the Communists that U.S. forces would not strike beyond the Yalu River into Manchuria.
The senator said that General James Van Fleet, former 8th Army Commander, had hinted that the Chinese might have received assurances through "some embassy source in Peking."

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100-374123-A
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RE: MacLEAN CASE
(Bufile 100-374183)

SUNDAY EXPRESS

OCTOBER 16, 1955
LONDON, ENGLAND

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Mr. Tolson _____
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G. I. R. - 1

British 'Leaks' to Reds Queried

By Warren Rogers Jr.
 Associated Press

Senate investigators asked Secretary of State John Foster Dulles yesterday if he had any information on whether British sources leaked secret information to Communist China during the Korean war.

Dulles was asked whether British Embassy sources in Peking might have assured Red China that United States forces would not strike beyond the Yalu River into Manchuria.

The inquiry came in a letter from Chairman James O. Eastland (D-Miss.) of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

Eastland asked 15 specific questions, most of them involving British diplomats Guy Burgess and Donald MacLean who disappeared in May, 1951, from

their Foreign Office jobs. They since have been reported behind the Iron Curtain, most recently in Russia.

Eastland's letter followed up a general inquiry he sent Dulles Sept. 22 with reference to MacLean and Burgess. The State Department reply, also couched in general terms, apparently did not satisfy Eastland.

In his new letter, he said testimony given before his Subcommittee last year by Gen. James A. Van Fleet (Ret.), former 8th Army commander in Korea, "indicates that some assurance was given the Chinese Communists that American forces would not cross the Yalu River in event of the Chinese Communist armies invading Korea, and that these assurances may have come through some Embassy sources in Peking."

The Senator asked the department if it had any information that MacLean or others may have given the Reds such assurances.

Eastland asked whether the State Department knew the whereabouts of MacLean and Burgess and "whether or not they are presently being used by the Soviet Foreign Office as advisers on Anglo-American relations and policy."

MacLean was head of the American division of the British Foreign Office. Burgess had been second secretary of the British Embassy in Washington in 1950. Before that he was in the Foreign Office's Far East section.

Eastland asked what, if any, action the State Department took when it learned of the pair's mysterious disappearance in 1951. He also asked whether there were any de-

velopments affecting United States security which could be traced to Burgess and MacLean. The Senator also called for

Wash. Post and Times Herald 10/16/53
 Wash. News _____
 Wash. Star _____
 N. Y. Herald Tribune _____
 N. Y. Mirror _____
 Daily Worker _____
 The Worker _____
 New Leader _____

Date 10/16/53

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Mr. Tolson	_____
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Mr. Belmont	_____
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Mr. Mohr	_____
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Miss Gandy	_____

BRAND *by*

ful
Boyle

New spy sensation

M.P. says: I can name the third man

EMPIRE NEWS-REPORTER

PROSECUTE the third man who tipped off Burgess and Maclean to escape to Russia, a Socialist M.P. is asking the Foreign Minister—"or I will name him in the Commons."

Mr. Norman Dodds (Dartford) told me this yesterday: "I have asked Mr. Macmillan to set the law in action to decide on the third man's guilt."

"It would be iniquitous if he were to remain hidden and absolved from public judgment."

RE: MacLEAN CASE
(Bufile 100-374183)

EMPIRE NEWS
OCTOBER 16, 1955
LONDON, ENGLAND

66 NOV 1 1955

"Out of courtesy I ask the Minister privately first to reveal publicly what I know. But if he hesitates to do this it is my duty in the interests of public security to tell the House the name of this man."

COUNTERSPY

In his letter to Mr. Macmillan, Mr. Dodds reveals he has information of the efforts of Britain's Secret Service departments to track down leakage of information from the Foreign Office.

Information that the leakages were taking place are now known to have come to M.I.5 from a Russian counterspy working in a Russian Embassy in Europe.

Said Mr. Dodds: "I have been told that Burgess and the third man became great friends but Maclean never met him."

"When investigations started in London on Burgess and Maclean, M.I.5 asked for a list of Burgess's closest friends. The third man was able to send word to Burgess and Maclean telling them the game was up."

Donald Maclean was watched by a particular branch of military intelligence but he was watched only in London and not at his home at Tatsfield. The authorities did not want Maclean to know he was under investigation because they hoped he would lead them to other sources, which in fact he did.

SUSPICION

"As early as 1949 M.I.5 knew of this leakage through the Russian counterspy. This meant that various organisations had to be investigated. This took much time and it was not until April, 1951, that suspicion concentrated on Burgess, Maclean, the third man and a man at the Foreign Office who later was cleared."

"The Foreign Office again did not inform M.I.5 of the disappearance of Burgess and Maclean until the Tuesday following the Friday night on which they disappeared, May 25, 1951."

"The international police were then alerted but, as everyone now knows, it was too late."

"The Foreign Secretary is well aware, I am sure, that the third man is still living in freedom and comfort in this country."

100-374183-A

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138.00. 04 1955

BY LETTER JUN 22 1976

FBI FOIA REQUEST

C.B. Mac Donald

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Mr. Tolson	
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Mr. Holloman	
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MRS. MACLEAN AND THE PRESS

OUR political columnist kicked over a hornet's nest in the *Spectator* of September 23 when he ventured his opinion that there was a connection between the long official silence over the Burgess-Maclean scandal and the far-reaching power and influence of what he termed the 'Establishment.' The controversy which followed has been a lively one, but, like most ferocious altercations, it has succeeded in obscuring the real issues. The time has come to clear the air.

It is a fact that there was a remarkably long official silence over the affair and that the hand of the Foreign Office was not forced until Mr. Petrov's disclosures were published in the *People*. The subsequent White Paper with its lame evasions was not calculated to allay suspicion that something had been far wrong in high places. In placing responsibility for the general softness of opinion concerning the affair on the 'Establishment' Mr. Fairlie explained that by the term he meant '[not] only the centres of official power—though they are certainly part of it—but rather the whole matrix of official and social relations within which power is exercised.' This was not to say that 'the right people' (the phrase which Mr. Fairlie quoted as the popular term for the 'Establishment') would condone treacherous activity on the part of those beside whom they might find themselves at dinner any evening. What Mr. Fairlie suggested was that 'the right people' might automatically, and for the purest of motives, come to the aid of that 'Establishment' which they constituted. Mr. Fairlie's comment was on the 'Establishment' itself, not on such members of it who might, very properly, be loyal to institutions almost entirely controlled and staffed by people from 'the same stratum.' Mr. Fairlie named Lady Violet Bonham Carter as a prominent member of the 'Establishment.' Lady Violet took Mr. Fairlie's

500-371123-17

John Smith

100-371123-17
NOT RECORDED
126 NOV 15 1955

Guy Burgess

RE: MacLEAN CASE
(Bufile 100-374183)

SPECTATOR (No. 6642)
OCTOBER 11, 1955
LONDON, ENGLAND

DELETED COPY SENT C.B. MacDonald
BY LETTER JUN 22 1976
PER FOIA REQUEST

58 NOV 16 1955

C.B. MacDonald
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general argument to mean that she used such influence as she possessed to provide a 'cloak for treachery.' It is difficult to see how such a meaning could conceivably be drawn from Mr. Fairlie's words, since on any view he was writing about the period after Maclean and Burgess had disappeared, by which time a 'cloak for treachery' was an impossibility. Of course it is unnecessary to insist that neither the *Spectator* nor our columnist nor anyone else imagines that Lady Violet did or ever would do anything remotely dishonourable. No suggestion of this sort was made, nor was it suggested that the *Observer* or any other newspaper had attempted to influence official decisions in this case. Mr. Fairlie's general suggestion was, to repeat, that many of the people of influence who constituted, in his terminology, the 'Establishment' determined through their connection and attitude what most people were to think about the Burgess and Maclean affair, including the subsequent actions of Mrs. Maclean.

Lady Violet, then, was singled out as one of those people. The *Observer* was instanced as one of the newspapers which followed the same line. What did in fact happen? Lady Violet wrote a letter to *The Times* complaining that a newspaper had invented an interview with Mrs. Maclean (and the following day Mr. Randolph Churchill wrote to *The Times* naming that newspaper as the *Daily Express*). Drawing attention to what she described as 'a flagrant violation of what may still, I hope, be called the ethics of journalism,' Lady Violet complained that: '... a national newspaper published what purported to be an interview on the previous night with the wife of Donald Maclean, which in fact never took place. Mrs. Maclean has signed a declaration in which she stated that at no time on the preceding day did she give such an interview. ... This declaration Mrs. Maclean is prepared to confirm on oath.' That is, Lady Violet plainly chose to believe Mrs. Maclean's denial of the interview rather than the account of the reporter who had conducted it. The Editor of the *Daily Express*, replying in his own newspaper, said that 'I have a full account of the telephone conversation between Mrs. Maclean and the *Express* reporter. I have complete faith in the reporter's integrity.' But why did Lady Violet single out the *Daily Express*? On the same morning as the publication of the *Express*'s interview—July 16, 1952—there was a brief message by a diplomatic correspondent in the *Daily Telegraph* quoting Mrs. Maclean as saying that she was thinking of going to live in France or Switzerland for the sake of greater privacy for the children.

'I have had no word of my husband,' she concluded, 'since he disappeared.' The *Observer*, by this time active against the *Daily Express*, said that the *Daily Telegraph*'s report had 'kept fairly close to the content of the statement issued by the family through the Press Association, and it is chiefly for this reason that no protest was made to the *Daily Telegraph* by the Maclean family, although there were grounds for it.' To this condescending explanation the *Daily Telegraph* replied on the following day:

'The allegations are therefore that:

(1) Mrs. Maclean did not speak to the *Daily Telegraph*.

(2) That the words attributed to her were invented by re-writing a statement made through the Press Association.

'Both these allegations are totally untrue ... an experienced and reliable member of the staff rang up Mrs. Maclean, from whom he obtained the statement already quoted.'

When the Editor of the *Observer*, Mr. David Astor, wrote to the *Telegraph* to remind it that Mrs. Maclean denied all knowledge of the interview, the *Telegraph* replied that the journalist's telephone call was not only recorded by the newspaper's switchboard but was also confirmed by the GPO. It did not add, though this in fact was the case, that the conversa-