

## VOYS—From Pa. I

code clerk at the Soviet Embassy to Australia, transmitted to Moscow some of Kislytsin's

secret messages. Mrs. Petrov also obtained asylum in Australia.

The Petrov disclosures are likely to be extremely embarrassing for the Foreign Office and the Government here. Both have maintained they did not know the whereabouts of Burgess and MacLean after the two men crossed the English Channel and entered France four years ago.

The Foreign Office also has professed ignorance of whereabouts of Melinda MacLean, American-born wife of MacLean. She and her children disappeared from Switzerland in September, 1953, after they had been allowed to leave this country.

Petrov's account confirmed

that she fled to join her husband in the Soviet Union.

Petrov's disclosures imply that the Soviet Union, for many years, had access to secrets of the British Foreign Office, including secrets entrusted to this country by the United States and other Allies.

They lend substance to demands made in the United States that Washington should withhold from Britain secret matters until the Government here eliminated enormous holes declared to exist in its security system.

A Foreign Office spokesman today confirmed some of Petrov's statements.

Asked whether Petrov was correct in saying that Burgess and MacLean had been long-time Soviet agents, the spokes-

man said: "We believe this to be true."

Asked about the statement that they fled because they had learned they were being investigated, the spokesman said: "It is true that MacLean was under active investigation by the security authorities. Burgess' suitability for continued foreign service employment was under investigation and he had already been withdrawn from Washington."

Petrov, who was head of the Soviet secret service in Australia, said in his account that Kislytsin, who had been working under him, burst into his office on Sept. 17, 1953, waving a newspaper and shouting: "It's come off at last, just as we planned it!"

Kislytsin was referring to the

disappearance of Mrs. MacLean from Switzerland.

Kislytsin told Petrov he was assigned to the Soviet Embassy at London in 1945 as a code clerk from the Soviet secret police and for three years was in close touch with Burgess and MacLean through an intermediary. He did not meet either of them.

Petrov quoted him saying: "I personally handled all the material that Burgess supplied. I received briefcases full of Foreign Office documents. They were photographed at the Embassy and quickly returned to Burgess. The photographs were sent by courier, in the diplomatic bag, to Moscow."

From London Kislytsin went,

in 1948, to Moscow, where he was put in charge of a special section of "an amazing library of foreign intelligence called the top secret archives."

According to Petrov's account, "it was crammed full of secret documents of the British Foreign Office. There was so much that a great deal had not

even been translated and distributed to the (Soviet) ministries interested."

86

RECEIVED 9-18-55 C. B. Mac Donald

RECEIVED 9-18-55

PER 100-100000

*jug*

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

## Two Diplomats Were Agents

# MP's Demand Probe of Soviet Spy Case

LONDON, Sept. 19 (UP)—Disclosure that missing diplomats Guy Burgess and Donald MacLean were suspected Soviet spies touched off demands for a parliamentary investigation into why they were allowed to disappear behind the Iron Curtain.

The Foreign Office announced in an official statement Burgess and MacLean, who disappeared four years ago and are believed to have gone behind the Iron Curtain, were suspected of being Soviet agents at the time.

The statement said there was insufficient evidence to warrant their arrest and the government has no


A Foreign office spokesman said MacLean "was under active investigation" at the time and Burgess' suitability "for continuous foreign service" also was being investigated.

Asked whether it was true the men were tipped off that they were under investigation and had asked their Soviet contact for refuge in the Soviet, the spokesman said, "We believe that to be so."

### STEAMER

Both men boarded an English Channel steamer at Southampton on May 25, 1951, and got off at St. Malo, France, the following day. Then they vanished.

MacLean was head of the American affairs section of the Foreign Office. Burgess was former second secretary at the British Embassy in Washington.



Burgess

MacLean

power to stop them from leaving the country. Their disappearance began one of the biggest mysteries of the Cold War. The mystery deepened when MacLean's Chicago-born wife and their three children also disappeared.

### DEMANDS

Informed sources said both Conservative and Labor members of Parliament were expected to use the statement to press demands for a full inquiry into why the diplomats were allowed to leave the country.

Wash. Post and Times Herald \_\_\_\_\_  
Wash. News \_\_\_\_\_  
Wash. Star \_\_\_\_\_  
N. Y. Herald Tribune \_\_\_\_\_  
N. Y. Mirror \_\_\_\_\_  
Daily Worker \_\_\_\_\_  
The Worker \_\_\_\_\_  
New Leader \_\_\_\_\_

Date SEP 19 1955

SEP 19 1955

*87*

# Missing Diplomats Spied For Russians 20 Years

LONDON, Sept. 19 (AP).—A Russian who deserted to the West says Britain's two missing diplomats—Donald MacLean and Guy Burgess—served as spies for the Kremlin all the time they worked in the Foreign Office.

A British Foreign Office spokesman said later the Foreign Office now believes this to be true.

Vladimir Petrov, formerly the top Soviet agent in Australia, told the story in an article in Sunday newspaper. The people.

Burgess and MacLean were recruited by the Communists 20 years ago while students at Cambridge, he said, and neither knew of the other's spy activities until a few weeks before they disappeared together 4½ years ago.

## Fled Behind Iron Curtain

MacLean was head of the American department in the Foreign Office at the time he vanished. Burgess was on leave from his post as second secretary of the British Embassy in Washington.

Demands in parliament for more light on the mystery have brought only the official admission from the Foreign Office that it can be "assumed" the young diplomats fled behind the Iron Curtain.

Adding to the mystery was the disappearance of MacLean's American-born wife, Melinda, and their three children two years later. They slipped away after going to Switzerland and presumably went to join him.

Petrov said MacLean, now 42, and Burgess, 44, appealed to the Russians for asylum after discovering they were being investigated by British security agents.

## Filled Many Documents

Petrov said another Kremlin agent who worked in the Soviet Embassy in London told him that in 1945 Burgess brought him "briefcases full of Foreign Office documents." They were photographed and quickly turned back.

The British Foreign Office has said it did not discover any important documents missing after Burgess and MacLean vanished.

Even though Burgess and MacLean became close friends after leaving Cambridge, Petrov said, "the most astonishing fact . . . is that the two men . . . did not know of each other's spying activities . . . until they were almost ready for their flight to Moscow."

Questioned about the article, a Foreign Office spokesman conceded that the two were under investigation before they skipped, but said, "We had no powers to stop them from leaving the country." He said the Foreign Office now believes the two were long-time Soviet spies.

## Regularly Supplied Secrets

Petrov wrote:

"I can now disclose beyond all doubt that these two men regularly supplied the Kremlin with all the information they could lay their hands on as trusted servants of the Foreign Office."

Petrov said a Russian secret agent named Kislytsin, who had been in close touch with the diplomats in London, told him:

"I was posted to our embassy in London in 1945. My job was that of cipher clerk to the M. V. D. (secret police). I personally handled all the material that Burgess supplied."

"I received brief cases full of Foreign Office documents. They were photographed at the embassy and quickly returned to Burgess. The photographs were quickly sent by courier in the diplomatic bag to Moscow."

"But there were many times when urgent information from the documents had to reach Moscow quickly. In those cases I used to transcribe the information into code and cable it direct to headquarters."

## Heads Secret Archives

Petrov gave no details of MacLean's spy activities. He did, however, say that when Kislytsin returned to Moscow he was put in charge of "an amazing library of foreign intelligence called top secret archives" and added:

"By a remarkable coincidence this section turned out to be a collection of the material supplied by Burgess and MacLean."

In Moscow, western newsmen long have suspected that Burgess and MacLean might be in the city. But all attempts to unearth them have failed.

No official Russian source has ever admitted knowing anything about them.

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Wash. Post and Times Herald \_\_\_\_\_  
Wash. News \_\_\_\_\_  
Wash. Star \_\_\_\_\_  
N. Y. Herald Tribune \_\_\_\_\_  
N. Y. Mirror \_\_\_\_\_  
Daily Worker \_\_\_\_\_  
The Worker \_\_\_\_\_  
New Leader \_\_\_\_\_

Date SEP 19 1955

DELIVER COPY SENT C.B. Mac Donald

BY LETTER

1955

3-1-18 1955

88

## TIME FOR ALL THE FACTS

Once again down the chilly Palladian corridors of the Foreign Office there flit two ghosts—not Palmerston, not Edward Grey, not Curzon, but the lithe, youthful, profoundly agitated and profoundly agitating figures of Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess. There must be many a harassed official to-day murmuring, "Oh! that these two phantoms would rest."

But alas they are not phantoms. Mr. Petrov (who, let us ruefully concede, must be causing his ex-side some embarrassment and worry too) has compelled the Foreign Office to admit, in public and with every show of extreme reluctance, a few facts about the vanished diplomatists.

## Valuable

Maclean and Burgess were long-term Soviet agents, recruited in all probability during their undergraduate days in Cambridge.

Maclean, a permanent and established member of the Foreign Service, rose rapidly through a series of responsible and key posts until he was head of the American Department of the Foreign Office. Not only did he have access to any number of confidential and secret documents; he also understood and appreciated to the full the temper and the technique of government in Britain, and he had great knowledge and experience of Anglo-American co-operation and of N.A.T.O.

It is difficult to imagine, from the Soviet point of view, a more valuable source of information. He was under suspicion for a short time—a very short time but a crucial time—before he fled.

## Speculation

Burgess was never a permanent Foreign Office official; he was a temporary wartime recruit; but he did rise to be, for some time, private secretary to the then Minister of State, Mr. Hector McNeil. He was about to be discharged from the service, not for security reasons, and was—there is a bite of irony here—about to join the staff of a great London newspaper.

All these facts have been widely discussed for years past. Under the compulsion of Mr. Petrov's disclosures the Foreign Office has begun to open up about them a little.

It is now essential that the opening-up process continue, and that it be as full and as candid as possible. Above all some explanation, however painful, must be given of the failure to act swiftly and decisively when it was realised that Maclean was a security suspect. One able and very dangerous man got away; so did his Sancho Panza. Why?

The Foreign Office must strive to answer honourably and truthfully. Otherwise a torrent of speculation will continue, certainly not to the country's benefit; and the men's tragic, innocent and ill-used families and friends will endure a renewed bout of cruel, needless publicity.

RE: DONALD DUART MacLEAN, et al  
ESPIONAGE - R (Bufile 100-374183)

THE EVENING NEWS  
SEPTEMBER 19, 1955  
LONDON, ENGLAND

OFFICE OF THE LEGATE ATTACHE  
AMERICAN EMBASSY  
LONDON, ENGLAND.

NOT RECORDED  
126 OCT 11 1955

89



# MISSING DIPLOMATS MYSTERY

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. Boardman  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Winterrowd  
Mr. Casper  
Mr. Callahan  
Mr. Conrad  
Mr. DeLoach  
Mr. Evans  
Mr. Gale  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Sullivan  
Mr. Tavel  
Mr. Trotter  
Mr. Tele. Room  
Mr. Holmes  
Miss Gandy  
BRANIGAN  
*[Signature]*

NOT RECORDED  
126 OCT 11 1955

RECEIVED BY C.B. Mac Donald  
BY LETTER OF 10/11/55  
PER 10417/101 JWG

RE: DONALD DUART MACLEAN, et al  
ESPIONAGE - R (Bufile 100-374183)

THE PEOPLE  
SEPTEMBER 18, 1955  
LONDON, ENGLAND

5 OCT 12 1955

OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ATTACHE  
AMERICAN EMBASSY  
LONDON, ENGLAND.

# SOLVED

90

# Top Russian agent reveals: Burgess and Maclean begged for refuge

● Today 'The People' lays before the world the complete solution to the mystery of the missing British diplomats who disappeared into the unknown four years ago.

The answer to the most baffling riddle of our times comes from inside the MVD. Russia's secret service network — from Vladimir Petrov, the top Soviet agent who has broken with Moscow and found refuge in Australia.

As head of the Soviet spy ring in the Australian capital, Canberra, he came into possession of all the incredible details of the conspiracy organised in Moscow to spirit away Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess.

Last week the Australian Royal Commission's report on Soviet spying in the Commonwealth was published. It was based almost exclusively on Petrov's revelations and those of his wife Evdokia.

The report was not concerned with the case of the missing diplomats. Neither Petrov nor his wife gave public evidence on the fate of Burgess and Maclean.

Only now is their dramatic testimony disclosed—for exclusive publication in Britain through 'The People.'

● In the most fantastic spy document ever compiled Vladimir Petrov today reveals that—


Burgess and Maclean were recruited as spies 20 YEARS AGO;

They supplied Moscow with secret documents of the British Foreign Office ON A SCALE HITHERTO UN-SUSPECTED;

When British Intelligence agents began to investigate their activities THEY BEGGED FOR REFUGE IN MOSCOW.



Mrs. Evdokia Petrov . . . she told her husband about secret cables.



● On the left: Guy Burgess; on the right: Donald Maclean. They are traitors who gave vital information to the Russians, says Petrov.

# 'Both joined us as spies when they were still students'

THE DATE WAS SEPTEMBER 17, 1953. INTO MY OFFICE AT CANBERRA BURST SECRET AGENT KISLYTSIN, ONE OF THE BEST OPERATORS IN THE AUSTRALIAN BRANCH OF THE MVD, OF WHICH I WAS CHIEF.

"It's come off at last, just as we planned it," he shouted, waving a newspaper.

He showed me the huge front page headlines. They reported the disappearance from Switzerland of Mrs. Melinda Maclean and her three children.

She had gone, so the newspaper guessed, to join her husband, Donald Maclean, behind the Iron Curtain.

No wonder Kislytsin was exultant. This was the final coup in the most daring spy operation in history—the spirited away of two high-ranking officials of the British Foreign Office, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess.



**By VLADIMIR PETROV**

42



## Leading part

It was a triumph for the entire world-wide spy network run from the Kremlin. Dozens of the most cunning agents of the secret service had taken part in it. And Kisiytsin himself had played a leading rôle in it when he was an MVD officer in London and later in Moscow.

It was through him, indeed, that I was able to discover the truth about a mystery that has kept the world guessing for four years.

Even though I was head of an important MVD branch and held the high rank of lieutenant-colonel in the service, I should never have been let into the Burgess and Maclean secrets.

As in other secret services, no one group of the MVD is allowed to know anything beyond its own special sphere of duty. So I had no right to question Kisiytsin about his work in the Burgess and Maclean affair.

But no sooner did he hear that Mrs. Maclean had disappeared than he sought to get in touch with the MVD men in Moscow with whom he had planned her secret journey

before he joined me in Australia.

And to secure permission to send coded cables to Moscow he had to explain to me, his chief, all about his work in the missing diplomats operation.

I gave him permission. My wife Evdokia was our cypher clerk. She coded the cabled messages he sent and the replies he received.

As a result I learned almost every startling detail of the Burgess and Maclean story. From the secret cabled messages and from Kisiytsin himself I was able to build up an astonishing picture of the gigantic coup.

And now I can lay before the world the full solution to the mystery of the missing diplomats.

First of all, let me destroy some of the myths that have gathered round this case.

It is not yet fully accepted, outside the Iron Curtain, that Burgess and Maclean were traitors to their country and gave secret information to Moscow.

## Soviet spies

*I can now disclose that beyond all doubt these two men regularly supplied the Kremlin with all the information they could lay their hands on as trusted servants of the Foreign Office.*

Certain public men in Britain have consoled themselves with the idea that the two diplomats were Soviet spies for only a short time and could not have

passed over to Russia any secrets of first-class importance.

*In fact, both these men were long-term Soviet agents. They were recruited for intelligence work while they were still students at Cambridge 20 years ago.*

*And the final myth that I can*

*explode is the fiction that Burgess and Maclean only crossed the Iron Curtain because they were disillusioned with life in "capitalist" Britain and yearned for the Russian Utopia.*

*In fact, the reason for their flight was simple and urgent—they discovered that they were under investigation by the British security services. And they pleaded for asylum.*

## Ardent Reds

The story of the missing diplomats begins at Cambridge University, where these two young men, quite independently, became interested in left wing politics. Their interest was noted by the British branch of the Soviet spy organisation working from the Russian embassy as "diplomats"—as we did in Australia.

Before very long both men were heart and soul on the Communist side in the world-wide battle of ideas.

Skilful work by British contacts, acting for our spy network in London, soon convinced them that it was their duty to

**Continued on Page 5**

# MORE SECRETS

—of the Burgess —of the Soviet  
and Maclean spy ring  
conspiracy from inside

# NEXT WEEK

93



# 'Burgess told everything'

do anything that would give aid and comfort to Communism.

They were then, even if they did not know it themselves, already members of the Russian intelligence service.

Indeed, the most astonishing fact about the whole extraordinary affair is that the two men, though they became close friends after their Cambridge days, did not know of each other's spying activities.

It was not until they were almost ready for their flight to Moscow that they learned they were both linked in highly secret MVD work.

## Spies already

The scale of their activities can be gathered from what Kislitsin told me of the three years in which he was in close touch with them.

"I was posted to our Embassy in London in 1945," he informed me. "My job was that of cypher clerk to the MVD. I personally handled all the material that Burgess supplied.

"I received brief-cases full of Foreign Office documents. They were photographed at the Embassy and quickly returned to Burgess. The photographs were

## VLADIMIR PETROV'S SECRETS

Continued from page 1

sent by courier in the diplomatic bag to Moscow.

"But there were many times when urgent information from the documents had to reach Moscow quickly. In those cases I used to transcribe the information into code and cable it direct to headquarters."

It was typical of the way the MVD worked that while he was in London, Kislitsin never saw either Burgess or Maclean. But he knew the Soviet official who was in regular contact with Burgess.

"He used to come back to the Embassy, after his meetings with Burgess, with his clothes spattered with mud," Kislitsin told me. "I gathered that their rendezvous was out in the country."

In 1948 Kislitsin was recalled to Moscow. He spent a year on an intelligence training course in which he specialised in English. Then he was appointed

to the Directorate of the Committee of Information, a body that controls the sifting of intelligence brought in by the secret service.

He was put in charge of the special section of an amazing library of foreign intelligence called the Top Secret Archives. By a remarkable coincidence, this section turned out to be a collection of the material supplied by Burgess and Maclean.

## MVD crisis

It was crammed full of secret documents of the British Foreign Office. There was so much of it that a great deal had not even been translated and distributed to the Ministries interested. Kislitsin had his work cut out even to sort it.

When he had done so, he was frequently called upon to show particular files of documents to high-ranking officials of various Soviet Ministries.

Steadily the documents poured in for another two years. But in 1951 came a crisis in MVD headquarters.

Urgent messages were received from London that Burgess and Maclean had reported to their Soviet contact that they were under investigation by British Intelligence. They begged for refuge in Moscow.

**NEXT WEEK:** Vladimir Petrov reveals how the escape was carried out. And he gives a close-up picture of how Burgess and Maclean live and work in Moscow today.

94

100-374183-A

SECTION 5

Mr. ...
Mr. ...
Mr. ...
Mr. ...
Mr. ...
Mr. ...
Mr. ...
Mr. ...
Mr. ...
Mr. ...
Mr. ...
Mr. ...
Tele. Room
Mr. ...
Miss Gandy

BRANCHAN

ROACH

# Who Was The Third Man?

## New Riddle Of The Burgess-Maclean Affair

By OUR DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT

FROM the welter of words written and spoken on the Burgess and Maclean affair this week-end, there emerges this vital question: WHO WAS THE THIRD MAN? Was he found and sacked or is he still in the Foreign Office?

The Third Man stands revealed in the fascinating pages of the White Paper on the Disappearance of Two Former Foreign Office Officials. This makes it clear that, following a leakage of information to the Soviet years before, the field of suspicion was narrowed by mid-April 1951 to two or three persons.

Maclean was Suspect Number One, just a week or two before he vanished. Burgess went too. Who was the Third Man and where is he to-day?

This is and will remain the dominant question until the re-assembly of Parliament provides the opportunity for the thorough probe which Members of all parties are planning.

To say that politicians are alarmed, worried and dismayed at the White Paper is to put it mildly. It is not only the admissions but the omissions which are causing concern.

For instance, it is observed, practically nothing has been revealed about the spying activities of Burgess.

1 31 64

DELETED COPY  
C. B. Mac Donald  
B. J. T. JUN 22 1976  
PER FOIA  
jung

6-67

96

RE: MacLEAN CASE  
(Bufile 100-374183)

NEWS OF THE WORLD  
SEPTEMBER 25, 1955  
LONDON, ENGLAND

2 OCT 12 1955

NOT RECORDED  
126 OCT 12 1955

## Will Government Reveal More?

The White Paper, in fact, tells very little more than was already known to most people and there is a feeling among Members I spoke to yesterday that if Parliament pushes hard enough, the Government will be forced to disclose a great deal more. Unless, of course they insist on the ground of security upon treating the matter as an issue of confidence.

The idea that has prevailed over the years that "No one was to blame" is blown sky-high by the White Paper." was how one M.P. put it to me.

Of course, due attention is being paid to the statement that no one is appointed to or continues to occupy any Foreign Office post involving highly secret information "unless he or she is fit to be entrusted with the secrets to which the post gives access."

But, it is contended, surely Burgess and Maclean were subjected to certain security safeguards when they were appointed and during their terms of office—until finally the finger of suspicion pointed directly to them.

What lessons were learned from this sad affair and have they been applied—that will be the keynote of the speeches from all quarters when the Government set the Great Debate in motion.

## The Prime Minister May Speak

Mr. Harold Macmillan as Foreign Secretary will presumably take up the cudgels on behalf of the Foreign Office, though no one would be surprised if the Prime Minister decides to take the burden on his own shoulders. The more so because he himself served as Foreign Secretary from 1951-1955, and he will no doubt feel he must be the principal spokesman on this tremendous issue.

Mr. Herbert Morrison, who was Foreign Secretary at the time Burgess and Maclean vanished, is also certain to make an important contribution to the discussion.

Meanwhile Members of Parliament and members of the public are searching through the White Paper to put some of their pet theories to the test, particularly in the matter of how Burgess and Maclean got away.

It is officially admitted that Maclean must have become aware he was under investigation.

Is that where the Third Man came into it? Did he learn Maclean was to be interrogated and get messages to the two men to flee the country within a few precious hours? For Burgess was on leave and he had to be told, too.

## Tragedy Of The Lost Week-End

How many people in Government or Foreign Office circles could possibly have known Mr. Morrison had sanctioned the questioning of Maclean by the security authorities?

Did someone, either accidentally or intentionally, tip off the Third Man?

Why was the men's disappearance on the Friday evening not

discovered by the Foreign Office until the following Monday? Because Maclean had taken the Saturday off, as he could do by arrangement.

And, though it seems like a film story, obviously the Third Man would appear to have known or guessed that Maclean was not being shadowed outside London—that the search of his home had been delayed.

Thus Friday, May 25, to Monday, May 28, became the Foreign Office's "lost week-end." They lost their man. They lost two days in alerting officials abroad to intercept the run-aways before they could reach safety and security behind the Iron Curtain.

## But Did They Escape By Air?

True, Maclean's wife was expecting a baby. But M.P.s will want to know who decided not to bother Maclean at home on his day off, though he was suspect and though the Foreign Secretary had ordered his interrogation.

But there are those who wonder whether in fact Burgess and Maclean got out of the country by boat as the White Paper suggests. They ask—did they escape by air?

Information given to the Australian Government by Vladimir Petrov, former Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Canberra, after he had sought political refuge suggests they went by air.

Which is the more likely? Let's look at the boat story.

Two men raced up the gang-

plank of the s.s. Felsiae at Southampton with tickets for St. Malo shortly before midnight on Friday, May 25, 1951. They had only minutes to spare.

A dock watchman hollered about the car they left on the quay. "Back on Monday," came the shouted answer as the boat cast off. The car was subsequently identified as the one in which Maclean and Burgess left Maclean's home.

## The Theory Of The Decoys

But is that proof that it was Maclean and Burgess who boarded the boat? Would two men, both anxious to get out of the country undetected, have created such a hullabaloo? Or was it done deliberately?

Again at St. Malo when the Felsiae berthed the two men made a commotion about having missed the train to Paris and in apparent consternation took a taxi to Rennes. And they left suitcases and clothing belonging to Burgess and Maclean on the boat.

If these two men were conspirators and spies they acted like the merest amateurs. Yet it is now known that for 20 years both had been trained for conspiracy and espionage and had operated so cleverly all the time that not even their closest friends became aware of their duplicity.

Many now believe that the Third Man employed decoys to go by boat and that Burgess and Maclean went in fact by air.

There seems little doubt that the pair left Maclean's home in a car at 7.50 p.m. on May 25, 1951. May they not have changed cars and gone to an airport while their original car was driven to Southampton?

M.P.s will certainly want to be assured that security regulations have been so tightened that it is impossible to-day for any person to leave Britain by air without documents, passport or tickets and perhaps return in the same way without anyone being the wiser.

97







Mr. Boardman	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

BRANCH  
10/28/55  
10/28/55

## WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

**T**HAT White Paper on Burgess and Maclean contains remarkably few lessons for Scotland Yard on How To Track Down Criminals. The rawest police recruit could hardly hope to win his spurs by such hit-or-miss (especially miss) methods.

We won't recount the details here. No "Penny Dreadful" of your youth contained a more fascinating story, though our recollection is that those stories didn't end quite the way of this Foreign Affair.

Most remarkable revelation of all, among a host of astounding disclosures, is that a search of Maclean's country house was delayed because Mrs. Maclean was expecting a baby and would, it was presumed, go away. Maclean got a tip that he was under suspicion, took a week-end off, and skipped it—for ever!

The phrases trip out of the White Paper rather as we expected. The coda is no surprise:

"Espionage is carried out in secret. Counter-espionage equally depends for its success upon the maximum secrecy of its methods. Nor is it desirable at any moment to let the other side know how much has been discovered or guess at what means have been used to discover it. Nor should they be allowed to know all the steps that have been taken to improve security. These considerations still apply and must be the basic criterion for judging what should or should not be published."

Few quarrel with the contention that it's silly to let the other side know everything you know. But surely nobody—outside the Foreign Office, maybe—rates the Russians as being all that dumb! We all realise that they engineered the spiriting-away and carried it out with typical ruthless efficiency.

RE: MacLEAN CASE  
(Bufile 100-374183)

NEWS OF THE WORLD  
SEPTEMBER 25, 1955  
LONDON, ENGLAND

RECEIVED  
OCT 22 1955

C. B. Mac Donnell  
jug  
100

### COULD IT HAPPEN AGAIN?

And where do we go from here? It's certain that Parliament will return from holiday to a first-class crisis. The public will want to know, through their elected representatives, whether they have heard all that can be told—real security, of course, permitting—and whether the same sort of thing could happen to-morrow.

Many Members will doubtless claim they have been misled by Parliamentary replies over the intervening years and all will want to know more about the "searching inquiries" now made into the "antecedents and associates of all those occupying or applying for positions in the Foreign Office involving highly secret information."

Remember, the total number of Foreign and Imperial Service personnel is well over 8,000.

No one would tolerate McCarthyism here. But the Burgess and Maclean affair gave the American Senator lots of ammunition when he was conducting his witch-hunt over there. And when the Americans read our White Paper, there'll be more than a few of them who'll say "I told you so. Joe McCarthy was right."

To return to our own theme at the head of this column — Scotland Yard would catch about one criminal in a hundred if they adopted these gentlemanly kid-glove methods of Getting Their Man.



Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	<i>L</i>
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Felt	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

BRANIGAN

# MACLEAN

## MORE SECRETS

## FROM PETROV

What the White Paper  
did not tell you


RE: MacLEAN CASE  
(Bufile 100-374183)

THE PEOPLE  
SEPTEMBER 25, 1955  
LONDON, ENGLAND

NOT RECORDED  
125 OCT 12 1955

DELETED COPY SENT C.B. Mac Donald  
BY LETTER JUN 22 1976  
SEP 1976 *sjwg*

102



Petrov has  
put the  
Foreign  
Office in  
panic.

**N**O newspaper has staggered the world on the scale 'The People' did last Sunday. Our publication of the facts concerning the missing British diplomats, Maclean and Burgess, by Vladimir Petrov, the former Russian agent, has had amazing repercussions. It forced the Government to publish a White Paper.

**B**UT the document did not tell ALL the facts, and today we publish new disclosures from Petrov—who ran out on the Russians in Australia—that will add to the outcry. For Petrov reveals that after Maclean and Burgess escaped, the Foreign Office were fooled by Mrs. Maclean as well.

# They were fooled by Mrs. Maclean

By VLADIMIR PETROV

103

**T**ODAY I can disclose the most astounding secret of the entire Maclean and Burgess affair—the part played in it by that remarkable woman Mrs. Melinda Maclean.

This wife and mother, who earned widespread sympathy when her husband, the Soviet spy Donald Maclean, fled to Moscow, was herself, I am now sure, guilty of a staggering piece of duplicity.

She fooled the Secret Service chiefs of Britain, and then those of France and Switzerland, in a series of cunning manoeuvres that few master spies can match.

It was my comrade Kisiytsin who placed me in possession of the Burgess and Maclean secrets. He was my assistant in Canberra, the Australian capital, where I was chief of the M.V.D., the Soviet spy network.

From 1945 to 1948 Kisiytsin was stationed in London, where he was in personal touch with the two diplomats. Afterwards he worked at M.V.D. headquarters in Moscow in the department handling the Maclean and Burgess operation.

The truth of the disclosures he made to me have now been confirmed by the British Foreign Office.

Since I broke with Moscow and was given refuge in Australia last year I have studied the published documents in the case of the missing diplomats.

Fitting together all that Kisiytsin told me with these publicly known facts, I can now complete my dossier on Burgess, Maclean—and Mrs. Melinda Maclean.

### **Urgent conference in Moscow**

As I disclosed last week, Maclean and Burgess spied for Russia over a period of many years before the suspicions of the British Security Services were aroused.

Then came catastrophe. The two men discovered that they were under investigation. Terrified, they reported to their Soviet contact in London.

At once, Kisiytsin revealed to me, the full resources of the M.V.D. were mobilised to snatch them from danger.

In Moscow an urgent conference of top M.V.D. agents was called. Chief of those present was Colonel Raina, head of the First Directorate, which is responsible for intelligence work in Britain and America.

His deputy, Gorsky, since dismissed from his post, was there. So was Kisiytsin himself. All



**SHE LIED  
AND THEY  
LET HER  
GO TOO!**

Foreign Office information for transmission by code to Moscow.

In the Soviet capital he later had charge of the secret library, consisting entirely of documents supplied by the two diplomats.

Kisiytsin was never allowed to meet the two men whose highly valuable information went through his hands.

Only on their arrival in Moscow did he greet Maclean and Burgess for the first time. And Kisiytsin was given the job of looking after the precious pair.

He became, indeed, their welfare supervisor. He saw them installed in a comfortable house on the outskirts of Moscow. He signed the cheques for all their food, clothing and personal necessities.

And he prepared plans for exploiting their diplomatic knowledge and skill in the service of the Kremlin.

### **'Supplied with the best'**

Obviously, Burgess and Maclean would best be used as advisers to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially on questions affecting Russia's relations with Britain and America. And that was the job which Kisiytsin arranged for them.

They were engaged in it when Kisiytsin left Moscow to join me in Australia. They are, no doubt, doing it now.

Kisiytsin reported to me that he had left Burgess and Maclean in excellent health, leading a most comfortable existence and supplied with the best of everything.

Life for the two renowned spies was idyllic—but for one thing. They missed their families.

Maclean especially was no doubt concerned about his wife and three children, one of whom was born only a few weeks after his flight across the Iron Curtain.

He had sent Melinda affection-

three men were well known to me personally.

The conference quickly decided that Burgess and Maclean were agents of such value, that at all costs they must be saved from arrest and brought to sanctuary in Russia.

How to stage the escape itself was a much tougher problem. Plan after plan was discussed, only to be rejected.

Everyone at the conference was obsessed with the perils of whisking away from London two spy suspects holding important Foreign Office posts.

At last the route Maclean and Burgess are now known to have taken from London to Paris was plotted. In Paris M.V.D. agents took complete charge. (A Soviet or Czech plane—Kisiytsin was not sure which—flew them to Prague.)

The joy and relief with which the M.V.D. chiefs received them in Moscow can well be imagined.

Though he had been in intimate contact with them for years, the rules of the spy game had prevented Kisiytsin from actually meeting Maclean and Burgess.

As cypher clerk to the London branch of the Soviet spy network Kisiytsin had handled large quantities of secret For-

101



ate notes and placed money to her account in a Swiss bank.

And so the M.V.D. had started to plan the final operation in the missing diplomats affair—the spiriting away of Mrs. Maclean and her children.

It was even more daring than the coup by which Burgess and Maclean themselves were snatched from under the noses of the British Security services.

Kiselytsin was in it from the beginning, though he was not in Moscow to see its final outcome. By this time he had joined me in Australia.

But when he read the reports in Australian newspapers of Mrs. Maclean's disappearance he recognised some of the details of the escape plan to which he had devoted so much of his skilled attention.

And the most breathtaking feature of the scheme was the part assigned to that attractive, enigmatic, American-born mother and wife of a top Soviet spy, Mrs. Melinda Maclean.

### He told her his plans

I am now convinced, though conclusive evidence is lacking, that she knew all about her husband's plan to flee.

At any rate, she began to play a willing and highly astute part in her own successful disappearance very soon after Donald Maclean passed behind the Iron Curtain.

When her husband vanished on May 25, 1951, the birth of her baby Melinda was only a month ahead. Yet on the morning after Donald's disappearance she was reported cheerful.

"Mr. Maclean isn't here," she is said to have told her housekeeper with the utmost calm.

In private she was, of course, closely interrogated by men of the British security services. She told them she knew nothing.

She so firmly convinced the British authorities of her entire ignorance of her husband's secret life as a spy and runaway that the Foreign Office made no objection when she took her children on holiday to France only three months after Donald Maclean's flight.

Yet it now seems certain that in France she made contact with an M.V.D. agent and finally agreed to take part in the plot that led to her own flight across the Curtain to Moscow.

For Kiselytsin made it clear to me that the M.V.D. was seeking an opportunity to contact her

immediately after her husband's go-away.

It was even intended that an official of the Soviet Embassy should approach her in London or at her house in Kent! But the M.V.D. chiefs decided it would be too risky.

She must be contacted in a spot where British security agents could be evaded.

On her Riviera holiday, agents of the French security service kept the Maclean family under constant watch in the villa they occupied. Yet Mrs. Maclean managed to slip away for two whole days.

This may have been the occasion for her fateful rendezvous with the M.V.D.

But the eyes of the Western counter-spy agents were still upon her. It was too soon for flight. She returned with her children to England.

There she at once began to play a game of incredible duplicity.

### She spoke of 'divorce'

She unburdened herself to her friends about her broken home. Tragically she spoke of the "façade" of her marriage. She announced her intention of divorcing Donald.

This was a sheer blind to throw British security off the scent. I have no doubt that her story of a forthcoming divorce was part of a "cover" plan in which she was co-operating with the M.V.D.

In July, 1952, Mrs. Maclean announced that she was leaving Britain to live in Switzerland with her children.

The vigilance of British security had by now completely relaxed. "Surely," they must have argued, "a woman who has finished with her husband will make no move to rejoin him."

The Swiss Intelligence organisation did, however, maintain some sort of surveillance over



105



# MRS. MACLEAN WAS IN THE PLOT

**Petrov  
on the  
woman  
who  
lied**



Mrs. Maclean's new home in Geneva.

She clearly fooled the Swiss agents, too. For Kislytsin reported to me that in Geneva a M.V.D. representative arranged with Mrs. Maclean the final details of her journey to Moscow.

On Friday, September 11, 1952, two years and four months after her husband's disappearance, Mrs. Maclean drove off with her children in her black Chevrolet car, ostensibly on a visit to friends.

Their movements were traced to the Austrian border. There the trail ended.

Mrs. Melinda Maclean had triumphed over the security services of three countries. The part she had played as an abandoned wife, disillusioned in her traitor husband, was crowned with success.

Now she is living with her husband in Moscow as he secretly continues with his work for the Soviet Foreign Ministry

alongside his fellow spy Guy Burgess.

Burgess and Maclean were undoubtedly prize "catches" for the M.V.D. But it is certain that the Soviet spy network has recruited informers of greater or lesser usefulness in every country with which Moscow maintains diplomatic relations.

These time-honoured diplomatic contacts between States are vital for the working of the Russian secret service. Almost invariably the head of the Soviet spy ring in any country is to be found safely installed in the Soviet Embassy itself.

That was the pattern in Australia when I headed the M.V.D. organisation. It was the same when I was stationed in Sweden from 1943 to 1947. And the pattern is duplicated in every capital of the world.

Each head of an M.V.D.

## SHE GOT OUT TOO!

ABOVE is the block of buildings in which Mrs. Donald Maclean lived in Geneva. And in the picture on the right she is seen at London Airport with her son, as she walks out to join the plane which brought her on the first leg of her escape. No wonder she smiles!

★

branch is known as a "Resident." He holds military rank in the M.V.D. that corresponds with the importance of the country in which he works.

106

When I was sent to Australia, then beginning to assume great importance politically as a Pacific power and militarily as the centre of secret rocket experiments, I held the rank of Lieut.-Col. of State Security. Later I was promoted full Colonel.

But my rank and the nature of my work were kept secret from everybody in our Canberra Embassy save the Ambassador himself. M.V.D. headquarters in Moscow appointed me and my assistants. We were responsible to the M.V.D., not to the Foreign Ministry.

All the same, we spies had real jobs in the Embassy. I was Third Secretary and Consul. My wife Evdokia, who held the rank of Captain in the M.V.D., and acted as my cypher clerk, was Embassy accountant.

There were two reasons for this arrangement. It kept our colleagues in ignorance of our real function. And it gave us, as diplomats, immunity from arrest by the Australian counter-spy organisation should we be unmasked.

### Their agent was safe

If I were caught in espionage work the Australian Government could only ask Moscow to withdraw me from Canberra. Moscow would have to comply, but their agent would be safe.

And, more important still, the M.V.D. could send out another "diplomat"—in the guise of a new Counsellor or Press Attaché or Second Secretary—and the spy ring would carry on.

Besides, by doing a real diplomatic job, the Soviet spy has many opportunities for worming

out the secrets of the country to which he is accredited.

As Consul in Australia it was my duty to look after the interests of Soviet citizens all over the country. That meant travelling and meeting people who might be enlisted to supply secret information.

The approach to prospective informers is the crucial point of a Soviet agent's work. One false move and he frightens off his contact or exposes himself as a spy.

Moscow's standing instruction to all its agents abroad is never to approach a possible source of information without asking permission from headquarters. Even when permission is given, the agent proceeds with the utmost caution.

There is first a period of "study," to discover the suitability of the contact. It has sometimes taken me weeks to complete even this preliminary stage.

I had to weigh up how sympathetic my contact was to the Soviet system. Could he be useful to us? Did he have access to Government information? Did he have any weaknesses on which we could play to enlist him in our cause?

Knowledge of a contact's income is important, for we might be able to tempt him with money. His religious beliefs, any associations with women, especially outside marriage, whether he drank—all these were included in my "study" of a victim.

I reported to Moscow the results of my inquiries. Then, if they agreed that I had a likely recruit in tow, I was allowed to go ahead and delicately probe for the secret information he possessed.

Some contacts did not know they were divulging anything of importance. They were our unwitting helpers. Others became

conscious agents—and sometimes received payment.

Messages from M.V.D. headquarters were sent to us in the diplomatic bag. I knew which letters to pick out because the envelopes bore the initial letters of three Russian words meaning "Office of Weights and Measures."

The messages inside were on undeveloped film wrapped in light-proof paper.

I developed and printed the films myself, then passed them to my wife to be decoded. I burned the negatives. One print of each message was kept in my safe. After 12 months, the print was destroyed.

### Afraid of discovery

Moscow was morbidly afraid of our secret documents—some of them with names and addresses of informants—being discovered by the Australian Security Service.

At one stage they asked me to find a hiding place for them outside the Embassy. I chose a spot underneath a bridge on a road outside Canberra. But Moscow told me it was unsuitable. They refused to approve of two other suggested hiding places.

Before I could propose a fourth, the crisis that brought about my breach with the M.V.D. had come to a head. When I was given refuge in Australia and diplomatic relations were broken between Moscow and Canberra, my spy-ring collapsed.

But let no one imagine that a smashed Soviet spy network cannot be rebuilt. I saw the way this was done in Sweden.

### WORLD COPYRIGHT RESERVED

Next week Petrov reports on his spying assignment in Sweden—an investigation into the private life of his own ambassador!

101

# 'I blame the diplomats'

**T**HE revelations about Maclean and Burgess in our columns a week ago resulted in general attacks on our Whitehall "diplomats" that were more unrestrained than any launched against any Government department during my half-century in politics.

"People shouldn't blame our civil servants," pleaded Lord John Hope, a raw junior Minister. "Blame us Ministers!"

Fancy the Government putting up an office-boy to answer the Press!

The plain truth is that our entire "diplomatic" system needs overhauling—the Foreign Office, our Embassies and the consular service.

## A warning in 1941

**A**S long ago as May, 1941, I wrote in my column: "Sooner or later—and the sooner the better—we must reform the Foreign Office."

In proof of that, I quoted Somerset Maugham, the distinguished novelist, who had escaped from France on a coal-burner.

After a tribute to Churchill

**says HANNEN  
SWAFFER**

for the resolute spirit with which he had imbued the nation, Maugham declared:

"The only persons who seemed to me unchanged were the officials of the Foreign Office."

"I met them sometimes at dinner and I was amazed to hear the casual, ironical way in which they spoke of the situation."

"You would have thought the war was a game of chess; if your opponent made a move that endangered your queen, you parried it, of course, but had to admire his nimble strategy; and if, in the end, he beat you—well, after all, it was only a game, a very interesting one, and, next time, perhaps you would beat him."

Our diplomats, added Maugham, "led lives so shut off from ordinary human interests that they are incapable of taking serious things seriously."

He saw them having long lunches at the Dorchester, discussing Ming china or Waterford glass. Meanwhile the world was crashing!

Even this terrible criticism,

uttered in an hour of crisis, did no good.

The old school tie was pulled a little tighter; that was all.

## So we lost the peace

**S**O it was that, after the war, we lost the peace.

In Rome, our diplomats palled up again with their pre-war friends, the nobles and the wealthy ones, who owned the best polo ponies and had the best booze. The views of the workers were never heard.

(Incidentally, it was from our Embassy in Rome that two chests of secret documents were stolen.)

## Wanted: the names

**W**HO was the Whitehall diplomat who advised Ernest Bevin, new to the game, to back the Arab League? Because of that stupidity, we lost Israel.

Who was the Whitehall diplomat who persuaded Bevin to cold-shoulder Tito—until the Labour M.P.s whom I had accompanied to Yugoslavia were proved, by events, to be right?

## The cocktail set

**A**LMOST all over the world our Embassies wasted small fortunes every year on cocktail parties, inviting only "the best people."

Well, because of the Foreign Office's blunders and evasions and lies over the Maclean and Burgess scandal, even our boasted Security Service is suspected. It let two spies escape, right under its nose.

I do not wonder that our nation is aroused to anger.

108



# Why they fear 'The People'

*At last a newspaper has rung the bell. There have been countless (costly) stories of Mr. Maclean and Mr. Burgess, of the Foreign Office, since they vanished four years ago. Now the tale told in "The People" as from Mr. Petrov in Australia is admitted by the Foreign Office to be in certain essentials true.*

**T**HOSE are not my words. They are a quotation from a leading article in the "The Times" last Monday while the world was still reeling from the disclosures we printed the day before about the missing diplomats.

It was a graceful compliment from that august journal and it is gratefully received. Not merely because it is pleasant for the staff of a newspaper to have its enterprise so openly acclaimed, but because these words may put an end to the insidious campaign to discredit what is called "the popular Press."

For years the public has been fed with the story that they should take no notice of newspapers like "The People." We have been brushed aside as "sensational-seeking harlots, concerned only with catch-penny stunts."

**I**F we uncover a grave official injustice we are called "scandal sheets" and accused of distortion.

If we reveal aspects of life that show the existence of social problems we are accused of "muck-raking."

There is a good reason for this. In all walks of life there is a hard core of men with power who fear the popular Press.

For we are not satisfied to accept official statements. We dig under the surface.

We find out the facts—and we print them.

Worse still, we call a spade a spade and, since we see it as our duty to write for ordinary men and women who often refer to that implement as an adjectival shovel, we sometimes use those very words for it.

So officialdom has tried to gang up on us. It has "explained away" our disclosures about what is really going on in public life with airy-fairy statements.

And lately it has adopted the more sinister tactics of defaming the popular Press as "irresponsible" and "degrading."

Since it has been "The People" that has upset them most with its crusades, this newspaper has been the target of much of this denigration.

But the conspiracy has failed. Time and again we have succeeded in exposing and ending evils despite their clucks and jeers.

When Duncan Webb brought to light the ghastly vice ring in London run by the Messina brothers, they sneered and called his articles "pornography."

But the police were forced to act, and two of the Gang were gaoled while the other three fled the country.

★

**T**HIS newspaper faces life as it is, and forces others to follow suit. Muck-raking? Is it "muck-raking" to let young people read what actually happened to a girl who ran away from home to take a lorry ride into a life of shame?

109



Is it "sensationalism" for a newspaper to print the addresses of premises that are being used by "call" girls, since the police claimed to know nothing of the existence of such things?

These are matters of grave concern to the fabric of our national life. You won't find them mentioned in the "respectable" newspapers. They are not supposed to happen!

Well, "The People" takes people as they are. It has no time for humbugs or for cowards. And this time it has got both factions on the run with its Petrov disclosures.

This time even the stuffy boys of the Foreign Office have had to admit that the big black type they hate so much—"so much nicer, don't you think, if they said it quietly like the *"Daily Telegraph"*?"—is true.

I promise them that they are going to hate our big black type a lot more in the coming months.

Unless, like "The Times" and our own vast army of loyal readers, they have the sense to accept it and to realise that, in our columns at least, the unvarnished truth is always going to be printed.

*Man o' the People*

Mr. Boardman	.....
Mr. Nichols	.....
Mr. Belmont	.....
Mr. DeLoach	.....
Mr. Mohr	.....
Mr. Casper	.....
Mr. Callahan	.....
Mr. Conrad	.....
Mr. Felt	.....
Mr. Gale	.....
Mr. Rosen	.....
Mr. Sullivan	.....
Mr. Tavel	.....
Mr. Trotter	.....
Tele. Room	.....
Mr. Holloman	.....
Miss Gandy	.....
BRANIGAN	

ROACH

# Security men saw Burgess slip through net

Empire News Reporter  
TWO security men watched Guy Burgess slip through the net enclosing him and escape to the Iron Curtain—and they were powerless to do anything about it.

I am able to make this extraordinary revelation following the White Paper publication, which admits that surveillance of the two Foreign Office renegades was limited by "kid glove" procedure.

On the last day before Burgess "went on leave" he was followed by two security men who were detailed to watch him in London. They saw him arrive at the Foreign Office at his usual time and go to his room.

There he packed a suitcase and left just before lunch. The two officers hid behind a curtain in another room overlooking the Foreign Office quadrangle and waited.

## Too late

They saw Burgess walk swiftly down the Foreign Office steps in the quadrangle, pause, look round quickly and furtively, and

then place his suit-case down and begin to walk slowly round the quadrangle.

He was apparently waiting for somebody.

Burgess suddenly appeared to come to a decision. He picked up his case and walked rapidly away.

The two security officers ran down into the quadrangle—but they'd lost him.

## Ulster watch

Subsequent inquiries showed he got into a taxi in Whitehall and drove to the West End. He never returned to the Foreign Office, nor was he seen again by security shadows.

Now I understand that security men from M.I.5 may be stationed permanently in Northern Ireland as part of the Government's plans to prevent any leakage through Ulster of top-level docu-

mentary secrets to countries behind the Iron Curtain.

It is realised that Eastern refugees who had come to Elre might easily cloak new MVD activities—particularly when it was found that such refugees made very frequent visits north of the border.

This step will be the latest in a series which have been taken throughout British diplomatic centres to guard against espionage "infiltration."

Since the shake-up in security measures there have been several Official Secrets Act prosecutions, including one outside London, where evidence was submitted by what was obviously a very large and comprehensive "shadowing" team.

In addition, Scotland Yard now runs an elaborate phone-tapping service. Although the evidence is not admissible in court, it provides much valuable information to assist shadowing teams and other investigators.

RE: MacLEAN CASE  
(Bufile 100-374183)  
EMPIRE NEWS  
SEPTEMBER 25, 1955  
LONDON, ENGLAND

RECEIVED COPY SENT C.B. Mac  
Donald  
BY LETTER JUN 22 1976  
FEB 3 1980  
jug 111

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Boardman	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

BRANIGAN

# AMERICAN FEARS ON BRITISH SECURITY

## Burgess and Maclean Case Likely to Harden Attitude to Atomic Secrets

By **NICHOLAS CARROLL**,  
*The Sunday Times Diplomatic Correspondent*

THE Government's belated admissions in the case of Burgess and Maclean have once again brought to the fore the question of exchanges between Britain and the United States of highly secret information about nuclear weapons. The main effect of the White Paper, issued on Friday, is likely to be the hardening of the present position, of which Sir Winston Churchill complained so bitterly when Prime Minister, under which there is still no disclosure of information on the design or manufacture of such weapons.

American distrust of British security, which underlay the ending of wartime exchanges of atomic weapon secrets, has been the most costly and frustrating of the many recurrent Anglo-American issues. It has led to much unnecessary duplication of research and experiment, to the crippling of liaison within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and to the embarrassment of officials of both countries at every level of military co-operation.

Before the White Paper's appearance, the main question in the minds of diplomats whose countries have the closest alliance with Britain was: "What have the Government done to ensure that there are no more traitors left in its employ?"

### Secret Methods

On this point, the Government have been enigmatic. There has been "a more extensive security check" than was previously the practice; "searching inquiries have been made into the antecedents and associates of all those occupying or applying for positions in the Foreign Office involving highly secret information."

But what Britain's principal allies wanted to know—and chief among them the United States—was whether the "more extensive security check" had resulted in any dismissals or rearrangements of staff. This is precisely what they are not told, on the ground that counter-espionage, like espionage, depends for its success on the maximum secrecy of its methods.

Many State Department officials, themselves so long under the shadow of McCarthyite "witch-hunting," had a feeling that something of the sort must be needed in Whitehall.

Some of them, indeed, claim to have among their friends Foreign Office

officials who, though known to have worked closely with Maclean, remain uninterrogated to this day. But they evidently overlook the restraining influence of the laws of libel and slander here, which are liable to make "witch-hunting" an extremely costly sport.

A major weakness in the Government's case, on which there has been most comment in London, concerns the statement that highly secret documents were withheld from Maclean once he came under suspicion. The obvious inference is that he must previously have seen highly secret documents.

### Ingenuous Claim

Yet earlier in the White Paper it is ingeniously claimed that Maclean's former Department, the North American Department, "does not deal with the major problems of Anglo-American relations"—a contention that State Department officials could only deride. Nor have the evasive references to the failure to trace a possible "Third Man"—the man who may have given Maclean the tip to escape—encouraged transatlantic confidence.

Foreign diplomats in London generally seem to feel that Foreign Office prestige has taken a bad knock, and the suspicion has been widely voiced — though indignantly rebutted by Foreign Office members, who are profoundly embarrassed by the whole affair—that Maclean must have had some powerful "protection" behind the scenes to have been handled with such kid gloves.

[World-Copyright]

RE: MacLEAN CASE  
(Bufile 100-374183)

THE SUNDAY TIMES  
SEPTEMBER 25, 1955  
LONDON, ENGLAND

5374  
112  
EX-9  
RECEIVED  
SEP 22 1955  
C.B.  
Maclean  
jwg

# M.P.s Prepare Commons Attack

By CHARLES E. GAYTON,

*The Sunday Times Political Correspondent*

THE Government is in for a difficult time over the Burgess-Maclean affair when Parliament re-assembles next month. The prevailing opinion in all parties is that the White Paper is less frank than it ought to be.

It is felt that there are gaps in the official record of events which must be filled in: that even Parliament was misled at times when it sought information on the matter; and that it must be satisfied by the Government that the system of security against espionage is now much more efficient.

This is a formidable attack, which will undoubtedly be pressed. The Government will give time for full Parliamentary debate. It could not do less. But its apparent openness now, under pressure, more than four years after the disappearance of the two men, is not regarded as a virtue.

## Further Inquiry

There may be a demand for a further inquiry by a Parliamentary body, so that blame for failures in the security system can be impartially apportioned, and weaknesses fully exposed and corrected.

The opportunity for attack by the Opposition, which many Socialists intend to exploit as far as possible, is restricted

by the fact that many important incidents in the affair took place when the Socialists were in power.

The feeling among Ministers is that the best defence is frankness to the fullest possible extent, with firm assurances that the security system has been tightened up, and a suitable degree of contriteness, in which, after all, some Socialist ex-Ministers must share.

## BRITAIN'S NEED OF ATOM-PLANE FORCE

### Long-range Bombers

Lord De L'Isle and Dudley, V.C., the Air Minister, said at Bristol yesterday that Britain must build up an effective long-range bomber force with a nuclear potential. Britain's freedom, he said, has rested under the shadow of air power, principally but not entirely the air power exercised by the United States.

"We must always recognise what we and Europe have owed to the men who created that great force, which has thus shielded us for close on ten years. We must hope and pray that one day the world will become sane enough to recognise the futility of war in the modern world. But to ban the bomb in the present condition of the world would not make war impossible; indeed it would make it far more likely."

113



Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

BRANIGAN  
*[Handwritten signature]*

# SOVIET ESPIONAGE

By ALEXANDER FOOTE  
*Author of 'Handbook for Spies'*

HAVING been for nine years a Soviet agent—against Germany but never against Britain—I daresay that I approach the case of Burgess and Maclean from a rather special point of view. Ever since their disappearance in 1951 there have been questions in my mind which have not been answered by the White Paper issued on Friday. Let me, at the outset, make it quite clear that I have no special knowledge of this case; my familiarity with Soviet espionage ceased in 1947, when I arrived in Berlin from Moscow and defected to the West.



*David Moore*

*Alexander Foote, whose career is briefly explained in Table Talk on the opposite page.*

The question which I continue to ask myself about Burgess and Maclean is this: How did they persuade the Soviet authorities to depart from normal practice and arrange their removal to the Soviet Union?

To grasp the point of this question, the reader should understand how the Soviet espionage system works and the functions of its component categories. There are three of these. At the head of the espionage network in a particular country—he usually lives just outside the country he is working against—is the Resident Director; he is the only operator in possession of the codes and is in full charge of communications. Incidentally, it is the transmitting of material—actual documents, or photographs of documents—that makes up ninety per cent. of the task of espionage.

RE: MacLEAN CASE  
 (Bufile 100-374183)

THE OBSERVER  
 SEPTEMBER 25, 1955  
 LONDON, ENGLAND

## Fetch and Carry

Below the Resident Director come the "couriers" and "postboxes" (persons in whose homes documents can be deposited for collection by couriers), and the radio telegraphists. All these are, as a rule, made officers of the Red Army, whatever their rank or sex. They are in a sense mechanics; their role is to fetch and carry material between the Resident Director and his "sources."

The "sources" are nearly always nationals of the country in question, sympathetic to the Soviet Union. They must occupy positions which give them direct contact with information of potential value to Moscow. Maclean and Burgess were "sources."

Now the point to bear in mind about a "source" is that he is of use only if he retains access to important information. Note that a "source" is not a trained agent, like the Resident Director, or, to a lesser extent, the couriers. He is useful only in

NOT RECORDED  
 128 OCT 12 1955

DELETED COPY SENT C.B. Mac  
 Donald  
 5-11-55 11 22 210  
*[Handwritten signature]*

114

own country. There is no point in removing a discovered "source" to Moscow, unless it is known that he is about to be brought to trial, with the risk that further undiscovered "sources" will be given away.

"Sources," who are often unstable personalities, tend to suffer from anxiety. From time to time they develop "out-station" nerves, and bombard Moscow with requests to be given asylum. Part of the Resident Director's job is to soothe them down, keep them on the job. A promise is, of course, made to all "sources" that, if they ever are detected, they and their families will be saved and taken to Moscow—but only when detection is certain and would lead to a public scandal. In cases where evacuation would be the cause of the scandal, as it was with Burgess and Maclean, evacuation would not normally be carried out.

It should be added that the business of arranging an evacuation is complex and requires several weeks of preparation. Many agents have to be diverted into arranging it; false passports have to be made, and every detail carefully organised. The cost of maintaining useless evacuees in Moscow is also unwelcome. In short, however hard he may beg to be removed to the Soviet Union the "source" will be left in his own country unless there is some extraordinary reason for removing him.

Now, it appears from the White Paper that Burgess and Maclean were not in danger of arrest. True, the White Paper says that Maclean was going to be interviewed on suspicion, and this evidently became

known to him. But—and we must look at this through the eyes of the men in Moscow who had to decide whether to evacuate him—it was not by any means certain that this inquiry would result in a public scandal. On the evidence of the White Paper, Maclean was in danger, at worst, of being called upon to resign. In that event the British public would have heard nothing of what lay behind the case.

Of course, if the British authorities could have produced concrete evidence that Maclean had been communicating secret information, they could have prosecuted him; and probably have had him imprisoned. But, according to the White Paper, no such evidence existed at the time, and this is the fact which would normally weigh most with the Soviet espionage authorities.

If Burgess and Maclean were not in the situation which normally warrants evacuation, why did the Soviet authorities take this extraordinary step?

## Husband and Wife

As it is clear that the evacuation of these men was fully prepared, and as the only danger that seems to have confronted them was that of questioning, it seems likely that the Russians feared they might have incriminated others if they broke down under questioning. Both men were admittedly unstable characters, liable to breakdowns. (Once the Russians had evacuated Maclean they were bound, in my opinion, to go on to evacuate his wife: to have taken the husband and left his wife would have had a damaging effect on Soviet "sources" all over the world.)

This supposition need not mean that the Russians have, or had, a super-spy in the middle of the British Government machine. They might have been mistaken—the battle of Kharkov was lost by the Russians because one of their best "sources" in Nazi Germany had become the dupe of a "double" agent. What seems at least certain is that Moscow not only knew Maclean was going to be questioned—itself remarkable enough—but also thought that he and Burgess might incriminate others or another more important than two expendable "sources" such as themselves.

THE story of Burgess and Maclean is one of the most fascinating of our time. Part of its interest is that Maclean was in many ways a "golden boy" of our community—Liberal family background, "progressive" views, combined with an aristocratic demeanour. Alger Hiss was fascinating to America because he seemed the perfect specimen of a "New Dealer"; he was both attacked and defended so hotly because of this. Maclean and Burgess are to-day being denounced either as Public School products or as Left-wing intellec-

tuals. Yet Dr. Klaus Fuchs, the specially colourless *émigré*, was probably a far more valuable Soviet agent than Maclean or Burgess. How he escaped detection for so long provoked far less demand for inquiries. It seems to be the social, rather than the security, significance of such cases that excites.

There can be no doubt that something has been seriously wrong with our security services. They need thorough investigation. It would not, however, be a sound idea to hold that investigation in public or in the spirit of an indignation meeting.

## Fun and Confusion

THAT much of the Press is not sincerely concerned about security is evident enough: one of the papers that most fervently proclaims its patriotic worries yesterday gave its guess of who was head of our "Intelligence department" in 1949—clearly an intended deliberate breach of security. Even the papers that respect security most scrupulously have some odd ideas on the subject. "If there was suspicion of espionage in his [Burgess's] case, the evidence should be in the White Paper," states *The Times*: is that the place for such evidence? The fact that Maclean was allowed to get out of the country shocks the *Manchester Guardian*; but would that paper approve legislation empowering a secret police to detain people without clear evidence of guilt?

The public has every right to know that an inquiry by impartial and implacable men is being made. Parliament should, we believe, press for such a commission. But its findings should remain secret; and if its members are satisfied, that should be enough. Otherwise security must become increasingly breached. To increase parliamentary or ministerial watchfulness of our officials, and public understanding of enemy methods, is a duty: to try to break into our own official secrets is a highly irresponsible form of entertainment.

115

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. Boardman  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Hendon  
Mr. Jones  
Mr. Mumford  
Mr. Quinn  
Mr. Nease  
Mr. Gandy

# **BURGESS AND MACLEAN**

## **Story Foreign Office**

### **has NOT told**

By C. F. MELVILLE

Sunday Dispatch Diplomatic Correspondent

**CAN** tell today that part of the Burgess and Maclean story which the Foreign Office are still keeping secret—the part which was **NOT** put into the Government White Paper.

The White Paper does not explain why the disappearance of the diplomats on **FRIDAY** was unknown to the Foreign Office till **MONDAY AFTERNOON**—**NOT** Monday morning as stated in the White Paper.

Maclean had asked for Saturday morning (May 26) off. It was given to him.

The security services either did not know this or did not suspect that there was anything fishy about his request.

On Monday morning he was missing from his desk as head of the American Department.

But not one person who knew that his loyalty was under suspicion had an inkling that he was absent.

**WHY?**

**Wife ill**

Other members of the American Department—none of whom had been warned of the investigation then going on—simply thought he had stayed at home because his wife, who was expecting a baby, was unwell.

So they did not report Maclean's absence to his superiors.

It was only when Mrs. Maclean telephoned later in the day to say her husband had been missing since Friday that higher officials learned what had happened.

## **As we said in 1953**

*A cutting from the Sunday Dispatch of December 6, 1953:*

### **WHY NOT AN INQUIRY?**

THE Sunday Dispatch suggests that the widespread criticisms of Britain's Secret Services could be answered and confidence restored if there were a complete inquiry into the efficiency of our Services.

NOT RECORDED  
26 OCT 12 1955

RE: MacLEAN CASE  
(Bufile 100-374183)

SUNDAY DISPATCH  
SEPTEMBER 25, 1955  
LONDON, ENGLAND

RECEIVED

SEP 22 1955

RECEIVED

C. B. Mac  
Dawson

jug

116



Thus all-important hours were lost before the authorities knew that Burgess and Maclean had disappeared.

By the time the British and international police machinery could be set in motion they were well on their way to (or perhaps already in) Red territory.

Those few hours of grace, added to the three days, may well have made all the difference to the fugitives.

The reason none of the men or women in close touch with Maclean had been told that he was under suspicion was that it was felt "improper" to inform them while the inquiries were incomplete.

(Burgess was not going to the Foreign Office daily because he had been suspended for "improper behaviour" and no check was kept on his movements).

## **Plain Dutch**

*THE London correspondent of the Dutch newspaper De Volkskrant wrote yesterday:*

**The British White Paper on Burgess and Maclean revealed only two things—the impotence of the British Secret Service and the gullibility of the Foreign Office.**

117



Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

**How Maclean was warned  
that M.I.5 were on his trail**

# WE KNOW THE THIRD MAN

But he will never be  
charged with treachery

**Why so lax  
a watch?  
MPs will ask**

RE: MacLEAN CASE  
(Bufile 100-374183)

Sunday Chronicle Reporter

SUNDAY CHRONICLE  
SEPTEMBER 25, 1955  
LONDON, ENGLAND

NOT RECORDED  
126 OCT 12 1955

118

**THE "Third Man" who tipped off Donald Maclean that M.I.5 were shadowing him has been traced.**

Secret Service men and officers of Scotland Yard's Special Branch are certain that they know him.

*But it is unlikely he will ever be charged with any offence under the Official Secrets Act. There is no evidence that either his intention or his act was disloyalty to the Crown.*

The investigators are convinced that when he became aware that Maclean was being watched, he concluded that the only possible explanation was Maclean's "careless talk" during drinking bouts.

His only motive was to warn Maclean to "watch his step."

### **Few knew**

He believed that Maclean had been given his last chance when he was carpeted after his indiscretions and drunkenness in Cairo, and that the Diplomatic Corps career of a young man of exceptional ability and promise was about to end with a demand for his resignation.

The fact that Maclean was being watched was known to only a handful of senior permanent officials of the Foreign Office—and to the M.I.5 officers detailed to trail him. This limited the number of those who—as the White Paper on the Maclean-Burgess affair revealed—were under suspicion as having "alerted" Maclean.

These men were soon cleared of any deliberate action in warning Maclean that the counter-espionage net was closing on him on the eve of his hurried exit from Britain in May, 1951.

But the investigators were convinced that either there had been "careless talk" by one or more in the know, or that a friend or acquaintance of Maclean's had spotted the man detailed to shadow him.

Weeks of inquiry proved this to be correct.

Maclean's getaway across the Channel via the Southampton-St. Malo boat was an accident.

### **Good intention**

His well-intentioned informant was, like Maclean, a Cambridge man. He was genuinely concerned that Maclean, son of a former Cabinet Minister—Sir Donald Maclean—was betraying not his country but his tradition, was being false to his heritage.

And so, almost at the exact moment that Mr. Herbert Morrison, then Foreign Secretary, was sanctioning a proposal that Maclean should be interrogated as a suspected spy, this well-intentioned "friend" was speaking as man-to-man to Maclean, then a counsellor in the senior branch of the Foreign Office.

That "friendly chat" sent Maclean scurrying to his Communist agent contact in London. The Russian contact—Burgess.

### **No one knew**

Maclean's meeting with the Russian agent was in the week ending Saturday, May 26, 1951. On the Friday Mr. Morrison put his signature to the document sanctioning the Maclean questioning.

By midnight, Maclean and Burgess were out of Britain. The White Paper admits that the authorities knew nothing about it till the Monday morning "because Maclean had asked for the Saturday morning off." And in any case, the watch on Maclean was not maintained when he was out of London.

When Parliament reassembles M.P.s will demand an explanation of the fix watch kept on Maclean by the Foreign Office security organisation since the beginning of May, 1951, when the field of suspects supplying secret information to Soviet agents having been "narrowed to two or three persons, Maclean came to be regarded as the principal suspect."

119

Mr. Boardman	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____
BRANIGAN	

ROACH

113 Mac Donald  
JUN 22 1976

FOR TOMORROW

## No witch hunt

Of course the purpose of Mr. Macmillan's throwing himself to the pack now howling for blood is entirely laudable. He hopes to draw them off and prevent a mistaken assault on the Foreign Service.

For there is a very real danger that the natural anger fired by the affair may degenerate into a witch hunt.

Already certain politicians are revealing themselves in their pronouncements as very able fledgling McCarthies. They must be given no encouragement.

Let this fraternity once slip the leash and they may do far more damage to the Foreign Service than Burgess and Maclean.

And how much damage, in fact, have the treacherous pair done? Not as much, I feel, as is generally believed.

Military plans are vital—in peace or war—and their revelation to another power may be a major disaster. But I think the vast secrecy over diplomatic plans is greatly overdone.

## Little to fear

If you are pursuing an essentially honest Foreign Policy—which Britain is doing—then you have little to fear from disclosure of your plans.

And, indeed, since any plans that Russia may get hold of will only serve to convince her, presumably, of our honest intentions, it may be that the leakage has done less harm than good.

## Too Leftish

And although I must say, it never crossed my mind that he was a traitor to his country, I wouldn't have said he was a suitable person to be private secretary to a Minister.

He was too much in the political swim himself with too many Leftish contacts.

That is why I find the modest silence of Mr. Hector McNeill a little extraordinary. For Burgess was, in fact, his private secretary. And Mr. McNeill apparently noticed nothing wrong.

Mr. Morrison's restraint on the subject is equally remarkable. In view of the fact that he was Foreign Secretary at the time.

★


This is what makes the unflinching self-immolation of Mr. Macmillan and Lord John Hope just a little absurd. Useless for them to shoulder nobly the cross of responsibility for the affair.

It is with the Labour Government of the time that the real responsibility lies.

Mr. Dalton tells us in his memoirs that one of the first things he did on becoming Under Secretary at the Foreign Office in 1929 was to call for a list of all Roman Catholics working there—to see if his dark suspicions were true!

I feel he could profitably have transferred at least an equal suspicion to Communists in '45-50—and urged those suspicions on his colleagues. Perhaps he still feared the Pope more than he feared Stalin.

LORD  
HAILSHAM



# Odd types around the F.O.

ADMIT to a personal interest in the Burgess-Maclean debate now running at fever pitch.

I knew Burgess during the war. He had been seconded to the B.B.C. as a producer. He was charming, amiable and highly intelligent. He had a habit of flattery.

I suspected that his flattery was not entirely disinterested in my case, although what its ulterior object was I could not have said then.

It may be that he was trying to extract secrets from me since it is very doubtful that I knew any, I fear he wasted his time and talents.

RE: MacLEAN CASE  
(Bufile 100-374183)

SUNDAY GRAPHIC  
SEPTEMBER 25, 1955  
LONDON, ENGLAND

2 OCT 11 1955

120



# The Man on the Spot

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Boardman	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
BRANIGAN	_____



Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan . . . grim-faced at London Airport.

RE: MacLEAN CASE  
(Bufile 100-374183)

SUNDAY EXPRESS  
SEPTEMBER 25, 1955  
LONDON, ENGLAND

DELETED COPY SENT C.B. Mac Donald

BY LFT JUN 22 1955

PH

NOT RECORDED  
126 OCT 12 1955

71 OCT 12 1955

121

## **Macmillan dodges the questions on Maclean and Burgess**

**T**HE Foreign Secretary, Mr. Harold Macmillan, dodged all questions about the Maclean and Burgess affair when he left London Airport for New York last night.

Had he seen the newspaper reactions to the White-paper on the missing diplomats? "I have read only one paper," said Mr. Macmillan.

Did he expect the Americans to be interested in the Foreign Office explanation? "I shouldn't think so."

Mr. Macmillan, who was in a black jacket, striped trousers, and wearing an Old Etonian tie, agreed to speak in a television broadcast ... *providing he was not questioned.*

For three and a half minutes he talked about his trip to the United Nations. When he had finished he pulled his tie straight, and strode to the aircraft.

### **M.P.s' anger grows**

There will be no dodging the questions when Mr. Macmillan returns. He will face the hottest reception of his career in the Commons.

The anger of M.P.s is mounting in all parties.

They are determined to probe every aspect of the affair as soon as Parliament reassembles.

Questions Mr. Macmillan will be asked are:—

**IF** you know the name of the "third man" who tipped off Maclean that he was being watched, why don't you name him?

**IF** he has been punished or sacked, why not tell us?

**IF** you don't know who the tip-off man was, what are you going to do about finding out?

**WHO** were the officials responsible for appointing Burgess and Maclean to their last posts?

### **Spy list offered**

*The Sunday Express Foreign Editor writes:—*  
The White-paper suggests that it was only in 1949 that a security report revealed leakages to Russia from the Foreign Office.

But I can reveal that, in 1943, a Soviet official warned the British Foreign Office of a widespread net of Soviet agents in Whitehall.

And he offered in return for British citizenship and £10,000 in gold to come to London bringing with him a list of all Soviet spies in Britain.

Since it has been admitted that Maclean and Burgess were long-term agents, it is clear that the list offered would have contained their names.

A special courier was sent to a rendezvous to accept the terms. But the deal never came off. Such was the delay in Whitehall that the Soviet official lost his nerve. His nervousness was noted by the Russian Security Service and he was whisked away to Russia.

**MARGINAL NOTE** from Paris. The newspaper *Le Monde* comments about the White-paper: "No other document could give such an impression that the British are infants in the art of counter-espionage, and that in the country of Sherlock Holmes the services of security ignore the simplest rules of a police inquiry."

122

## Share of the guilt

**T**HE Foreign Office deserves every bit of the drubbing it is now receiving over the Burgess-Maclean scandal.

But it should not stand alone in the dock.

Why exonerate the do-gooders who helped to prolong the conspiracy of silence? Why charge the bureaucrats and let the bumbler go?

Don't let's forget the self-appointed arbiters of "good taste" in the newspapers. Always, always remember the champions of Melinda Maclean. For their example carries a fearful warning to all who love liberty.

Fourteen months after the diplomats disappeared—the Sunday Observer printed a virulent attack on newspapers which, it complained, had been invading Mrs. Maclean's privacy at her home in Surrey.

And the worst offender, it seems, was the Daily Express, whose crime had been to ask Mrs. Maclean about her coming move to Switzerland and then print what she said.

**A**t once the army of do-gooders moved in.

Headed by a distinguished Liberal, Lady Violet Bonham Carter, they flooded the Press with letters in defence of Mrs. Maclean.

Declared Lady Violet: "The duty of a free Press is to protect the freedom of the individual citizen from both persecution and misrepresentation."

Note that last astonishing word. Just where, in fact, did the misrepresentation lie?

Mrs. Maclean at this time was still representing herself as a completely innocent party. Does anybody question that she was living a lie? Is it not now plain that she had connived at her husband's treason and was planning to quit the West herself?

But the intervention of the do-gooders was effective.

There can be no doubt that it strengthened the Foreign Office in its determination to say and do nothing. No doubt either that it helped to avert a full-scale probe into the security arrangements of the Foreign Service—with what resulting damage to the national interest it is impossible to calculate.

**N**o responsible newspaper wants to intrude on private grief. But in the atmosphere of public anxiety created by the Foreign Office's silence it was not only proper for the newspapers to watch Melinda Maclean.

In the absence of adequate official security checks—spectacularly shown up later by her easy flit from Switzerland—it was their duty to do so.

For the government of a democracy will go slothful and rot if the newspapers fail to maintain perpetual vigilance.

The folly of the do-gooders was that they were ready to let national security be stifled by polite manners.

If such well-meaning idealists had their way, democracy and freedom would be done to death by their earnest, sincere, and deadly soft scruples.



## CURRENT EVENTS

by

**John Gordon**

**T**HE Foreign Office, faced with the disclosure of some (but only some) of its long hidden Burgess-Maclean secrets, pours a bucket of whitewash over itself. Will it get away with that performance? I hope not. I think the safety of the nation justifies the most searching investigation into the Foreign Office, the Security department, and the Secret Service. Even if such an investigation uncovers—as I think it would—some secrets as devastating as a Hiroshima bomb.

**L**ET us leave Maclean for the moment and turn to Burgess, the more evil and dangerous man of the two. He was not only a man of moral ill-repute, but a man with a sinister political background, known to have disclosed secrets.

**WHAT HAPPENED** when the Foreign Office received a strong report against him? He was merely "reprimanded," and given a post at Washington where he could dabble in secrets again. Who was responsible for that folly?

**A**T Washington Burgess continues the same behaviour. He not only misbehaves but he is again what the Foreign Office describes as "careless" about secret papers.

The ambassador sends him home. The Foreign Office sends him on holiday while it makes up its mind whether to sack him or not.

**I THINK** we are entitled to ask—did some people throw a mantle of protection round this singularly favoured young man? Who were they?

**I**t is known now that Burgess was in touch with Russians not only here but in the United States. Yet that fact is either never discovered or, if discovered, is never produced against him. What a remarkable security system, isn't it? Further, at Washington, Burgess learns that his old friend Maclean is about to be caught for handing secrets to the Russians. Who leaked that vital information to Burgess? Undoubtedly someone in the British Embassy. Oughtn't we to know who he is, and what has happened to him, if anything.

Burgess comes home and "tips off" Maclean. He prepares for their flight. Buys the travel tickets. And by odd coincidence they leave the country on the very day that the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Herbert Morrison, authorises the interrogation of Maclean.

**DID BURGESS** have another "tip off" from within the Foreign Office that it was time to run? It looks like it.

**N**OW to the most remarkable happening of all. Why wasn't Burgess with his

known bad record put under close surveillance after his return from the United States?

Had he been watched as a man with his history should have been, his association with Maclean, who was then being quietly investigated, would have been discovered. That would certainly have dropped the net over Maclean. Burgess's Foreign Office contacts would also have come under observation and suspicion which might have thrown a light on several mysteries.

His buying of the travel tickets would have indicated that flight was imminent. The trap would have been closed on both of them. There would have been no escape.

**B**ut for some inexplicable reason no watch was put on him by M.I.5, the department responsible. I suggest that the head of M.I.5, then Sir Percy Sillitoe, should be asked to explain that mystery.

**I**F Sir Percy Sillitoe knew the facts, then clearly he was guilty of extraordinary ineptitude in failing to order the shadowing of Burgess.



**I**f, on the other hand, the information did not reach him, I think it is reasonable to ask why not, and who failed to let him have it.

**BURGESS IN FACT**, was such a lucky young man that we need some better assurance than we have yet had that his astonishingly lengthy immunity and final escape were not due to the protection of friends with political administrative or security power.

**A**nd I think we are also entitled to ask the Foreign Office: "Are you stone-cold certain that you haven't any more at home like him?"


Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_  
 BRANIGAN  
*[Signature]*

# WHY



... was he given a chance to vanish?

... was he able to go on spying?



# ?

... did 3 years pass before arrest?

... was he captured too late?

... were Red relatives ignored?

... was she left free to flee?

## IN THIS FORTHRIGHT ARTICLE EMANUEL SHINWELL

*RECEIVED BY C.B. Mac Donald*  
*11 OCT 22 1955*  
*gins*

RE: MacLEAN CASE  
 (Bufile 100-374183)

SUNDAY DISPATCH  
 SEPTEMBER 25, 1955  
 LONDON, ENGLAND

NOT RECORDED  
 126 OCT 12 1955

74 OCT 12 1955

125

**S**TORIES of espionage have always intrigued me.

The slinky and alluring female spy; the suave diplomat whom nobody would suspect; the apparently innocent dealer in antiques; a dash of murder and romance, with the culprits ultimately unmasked—most of us are familiar with those exciting complications.

But the Burgess-Maclean affair leaves me completely baffled. "Truth," indeed, "is stranger than fiction."

The most exasperating feature of the affair is the evasive attitude of the Foreign Office, and now, when it pleases the superior people in that exclusive department to come off their perch, the casual nature of their disclosures.

## Fantastic

**I** SHOULD have thought that public disquiet about security arrangements in the Foreign Office would have induced the Foreign Secretary to make a considered statement at once. Not so; it was left to a very junior Minister, Lord John Hope, to make a public explanation of this most mysterious affair.

## AND WHAT A FANTASTIC EXPLANATION IT WAS.

It is now admitted that both those unsavoury characters were under suspicion while engaged in the service. Then, why were they permitted to continue in

*former Minister of Defence  
and Secretary for War  
demands an inquiry into*

# Our Secret Service Slip-ups

their nefarious operations—though, so we are informed, "they were not allowed access to 'Top Secret' documents?"

Worse still, when this precious pair of rascals realised that the axe was about to fall they vanished right under our security men's noses.

Both the Foreign Office and Lord John Hope must surely underrate the intelligence of the British public if they expect us to believe that a high-ranking official in that department, even when

under suspicion, could not find ways and means of examining secret documents.

I certainly refuse to believe it. I have seen enough of Government departments to know that restricted and "Top Secret" papers are in constant transit between officials and Ministers.

I must confess that as Secretary for War and

Minister of Defence I was never made acquainted with the operations of the Secret Service. Nor, to my knowledge, was any other Minister.

The Prime Minister alone accepts full responsibility for M.I.5. The position of the Foreign Secretary is uncertain; no doubt in due course we shall be enlightened on this score.

Apart from an occasional talk with the head of M.I.5 on some matter of minor importance, and the perusal of telegrams containing

information on diplomatic affairs and military intelligence, I was kept completely in the dark.

I don't complain about this: it is far better to restrict secret information to a few.

**BUT HOW MANY OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE STAFF ARE IN THE KNOW?**

126





The security service must surely be regarded as almost our first line of defence. Espionage undertaken by some foreign country, disclosing secrets about diplomacy or defence plans, may prove in the long run more disastrous than a shortage of manpower or lack of modern weapons.

*I have always assumed that our security men were the most keen and intelligent in the world. No doubt they are, but when the treasonable pair were discovered why were they allowed to escape from this country?*

Really both the Foreign Office and M.I.5 must not side-step this question. Otherwise they will have a lot more to answer for.

It isn't as if this was an isolated case. Since the last war at least seven vital people have slipped through the Secret Service net.

Two of them—Nunn May and Klaus Fuchs—were captured, but only after they had sold secrets to a foreign country. Fuchs was a known Communist, yet he was

recommended for British naturalisation by reputable citizens. Will the Foreign Office now disclose their names?

Nunn May passed atomic secrets to the Russians.

It is known that he was in contact with a military attaché of the Soviet Embassy in Canada in 1943, yet it was not until 1946 that he was arrested.

What of Bruno Pontecorvo? This elusive customer, after three security checks, in 1948 became a British citizen. He worked in our atomic stations though the authorities knew of his family Communist connections. He moved to Helsinki in 1951 and, of course, then found refuge in Russia.

Have the British public such short memories that they have already forgotten those gentry, or the story of Janossy who vanished to Dublin in 1950, and then to Budapest. There were others, I have no doubt.

Strangest of all is the fantastic tale of Mrs. Maclean, for whom much sympathy was aroused in certain quarters after her husband had vanished.

## An inquiry

**S**HE went to live in Switzerland, where, though apparently without funds, she managed to keep up appearances as befits the wife of a Foreign Office official.

It is clear that this supposedly innocent person was far better informed about her erring husband's doings than was thought at the time.

*Did it not occur to our security men that she might have been detained and interrogated as a material witness. Or did somebody in high places intercede for her?*

A thorough investigation into our security service and its liaison with the Foreign Office and other Government departments can no longer be delayed.

The argument that our security methods should

never be disclosed will not hold water. The fact is that our security is at stake.

The disclosure that Burgess and Maclean were tipped off by a British official in Washington—even if it is no more than a rumour—is bound to cause further disquiet.

Mr. Herbert Morrison's suggestion that a few senior Privy Councillors from each party should be selected to undertake an inquiry should be rejected. Ex-Cabinet Ministers are as likely to be involved as the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office or the head of M.I.5.

## Vital gap

**N**ETHER partisan opinions nor the standing of political personalities should exclude the most penetrating examination. We must have an independent body to tackle this job.

**I SHOULD SELECT A BODY MADE UP OF SOME BUSINESS MEN OF HIGH STANDING, TWO EMINENT JUDGES, TWO PROMINENT TRADE UNION LEADERS, TOGETHER WITH A REPRESENTATION FROM THE UNIVERSITIES.**

All active and retired politicians must be barred.

I have no desire to see this country emulating the United States. Television interrogation of suspects is nauseating.

But even if occasionally some innocent person is subjected to examination I should not regard that as too high a price to pay if the gaps in our security could be sealed.

Security is vital; we owe it to ourselves, to Ministers, who carry the principal responsibility, to vast numbers in the Civil Service, and to our Allies in the Western Hemisphere.

The Government must act—and at once.

121

# ALASTAIR FORBES SURVEYS THE WORLD POLITICAL SCENE

"Don't drop Guy, won't you," was the plaintive request from my host as I made my way to my car, after a party which was the first occasion upon which I had come across Burgess since his return, more or less in disgrace, from Washington.

"Don't be silly," I replied, with what I thought to be quite commendable wit for the early hours of the morning. "I dropped him ages ago."

To be honest, it was boredom rather than disapproval that caused me to abandon him that night. A good talker when ordinarily tight, which, like Maclean, he ordinarily was, he became a "crasher" when his public drinking followed the Muscovite pattern of his not so very private thinking.

## Sparrows and spies

SO the last time I laid eyes upon him he was doing an imitation, not less passable for being anticipatory, of Krushchev's garrulous and convivial farewell to Tito.

However, since this has been very much Burgess and Maclean memorial week and their now officially disclosed activities have successfully competed in the public prints not only with the fascinating discovery of Telemachus' bathroom in King Nestor's palace at Mycenae, but even with the more modest hospitality of the living high-born in Venice, we must return to the wanderings of these two lost black sheep and search for the identity of the shepherds responsible for letting them go.

As we quoted at the time to a harassed Foreign Office official:

"When sorrows come, they come not single spies,  
"But in battalions."

It was the fault of the Foreign Office to appear to have filed away the Burgess-Maclean affair under the classification "sorrows" instead of that of "spies." In what appeared to be a spirit of civilised toleration not previously extended even to brilliant ambassadors who had had the misfortune to be involved in contested divorce suits, Whitehall cast a protective veil of secrecy over what it appeared to dismiss as the exploits of young officials whom Hollywood psychiatrists might have called "two crazy mixed-up kids."

No thought was given to legitimate public concern about

what two crazy mixed-up kids were doing in the Civil Service in the first place.

Of course, the Foreign Office is ruled by the Treasury and in that hotbed of eccentricities Burgess and Maclean might have passed as almost stuffily respectable in their orthodoxy.

But as Lord John Hope and his chief, Mr. Macmillan, last week reminded us this was not the sort of matter to be adjudicated upon by permanent officials, however senior.

It was a problem for Ministerial decision and in this case the Minister was Herbert Morrison.

Perhaps Mr. Macmillan and Lord John Hope had this in mind when they sought to narrow the blame down to Ministerial shoulders. Certainly the cheekiest trick of the week has been the report that the Socialists, and of all Socialists, Mr. Morrison as their spokesman, propose to demand a full-scale investigation into the workings of the national security system. Such an investigation should start its work by investigating Mr. Morrison's part in it all.

## No apology

THREE days after the two agents, knowing themselves to be "burnt," as the saying in the profession goes, successfully sought from their foreign masters the asylum that is so rarely able to be granted to persons in their predicament.

I speculated in this space about their fate in as frank a manner as an indulgent lawyer would allow me. Though, in fact, the article was actionable, I feared no action.

I challenged the colleagues and superiors of the two missing diplomats to put their hands on their hearts and say that they had never had grounds for suspecting them of the activities of which they are now officially accused.

The challenge was not taken up. But Mr. Morrison's question about my article in the Commons, went out of his way to reject its now proven assumption.

Mr. Morrison, of course, really has been co-operating, over and above the call of duty, with Britain's bungling counter-espionage service, which was anxious, no doubt, to persuade Moscow that Burgess and Maclean were double agents. And the long delay that elapsed before the Kremlin began to exploit the two men's knowledge of British and American psychology might have been thought to have brought success to this operation.

tions, and no apology from him has ever been forthcoming.

It was evident, I said then, that our security arrangements were in the hands of Watson rather than Holmes. One would like to be reassured that the necessary reforms had been carried out.

It is some time since anyone was kind enough to take a look at my "dossier," but what I have learnt of it in the past, coupled with the odd visit to Room No. Whatever-it-is at the War Office, has not encouraged me to believe that our security officials have much clue as to how the other half live. Even when they happen to connect the right curriculum vitae with the name on their books.

## Plausible charm

FEW newspapers have given more space to the official revelations concerning Burgess and Maclean than the *Daily Telegraph*, and the fact is greatly to the credit of that journal's integrity. For to the just-published account of its history, by Lord Burnham, entitled "Peterborough Court," there is a missing chapter.

The latter might have been entitled "Peterborough Caught," for on the eve of his discovery that he was going to have to say good-bye not only to the Foreign Office but to England, Guy Burgess, working his plausible charm on the "old boy" and Old Etonian levels, had landed himself the promise of a job as an assistant leader-writer on Britain's leading Tory newspaper.

It may be said that so long as a leader-writer gives satisfaction it doesn't matter a rap what his opinions may be.

What we have to discover is how long the security services had remained in the same state of extraordinary innocence as the Editor-in-Chief of the *Telegraph* or his deputy hirer and firer. For a newspaper not to understand the times it is living in is one thing, for a counter-espionage agent to be equally unperceptive is another and far more expensive and dangerous a fault.

Sir Winston Churchill used to make some books "must reading" for his colleagues and subordinates, among them, it is said, those of Schwarzschild and Koestler. Evidently his distribution list was too restricted. The generals in M.I.6 have not understood their Koestler nor

got to grips with such studies as Aron's "Opium of the intellectuals," nor even browsed sufficiently into such eye-openers as the autobiography of the belatedly wide-awake Stephen Spender. They are totally unqualified for their jobs in this day and age.

There are too many Peter Pans knocking around Britain and indeed the rest of Europe who cannot, or will not, grow up out of adolescence when politics were simple and allegiance to something called anti-Fascism the easy and natural thing.

There are too many sentimental Liberals, as Maclean's own brother, who simply cannot understand what leads some of their fellow men to a kind of "death with happiness" in the Communist party.

There are too many people, like Mrs. Maclean, who believe that the only people in the world who want peace are those who signed the Stockholm peace appeal or its organisers.

Russians have been quick to exploit the energies of those whose mental development was arrested in the Spanish Civil War. Maclean and Burgess required spiritual and physical intoxication as well as *Boys' Own Paper* excitement; they got all three in the service of Russia.

They believed and still believe that, as Krushchev said again last week Communism is bound, under Russian direction, to overcome the rest of the world. And, looking around the world last week, who could say they are wrong?

## Paradox unnoticed

THE paradox that in the America of so-called "monopoly capitalism" the proletariat have a control of their employment and destiny as well as a contentment and high standard of living undreamt of in Moscow or Peking passes unnoticed in the world, while America's European allies, having rejected supra-nationalism and true brotherhood—even, it seems in the sphere of counter-espionage co-operation—drift into suicidal selfishness and shortsightedness that must allow them sooner or later, with all who depend on them, to pass one by one, or even two at a time, under Communist domination.

Maclean may yet be head of the Foreign Office of a sort in London, and Burgess his official spokesman.



Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Boardman	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Evans	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

BRANAGAN  
9/10/55

# THE SQUALID TRUTH



GUY BURGESS



DONALD MACLEAN

RE: MacLEAN CASE  
(Bufile 100-374183)

SUNDAY PICTORIAL  
SEPTEMBER 25, 1955  
LONDON, ENGLAND

DELETED COPY SENT C.B.  
BY LIT JUN 22 1976 miss Donald  
PER FOIA REQUEST /w/g

NOT RECORDED  
126 OCT 12 1955

100-374183-129

5-111  
129

**THE** wretched, squalid truth about Burgess and Maclean is that they were sex perverts.

### **'Protected' Men**

They were protected during much of their careers by men who knew or ought to have known about their homosexual tendencies.

There has for years existed inside the Foreign Office service a chain or clique of perverted men.

### **Danger to Britain**

Whatever the current medical or social view, the danger of such men in public service is obvious.

Homosexuals—men who indulge in "unnatural" love for one another—are known to be bad security risks.

They are easily won over as traitors. Foreign agents seek them out as spies.

### **The Key**

When the U.S. State Department in Washington purged its staff of bad security risks, 600 of those fired or forced to resign were sexual perverts.

This sordid secret of homosexuality—which is one of the keys to the whole scandal of the Missing Diplomats—is ignored by the Government White Paper.

### **End It!**

The "Pictorial" prints the news today—with an authoritative statement by a Tory M.P.—because it is urgently necessary that this hoodwinking of the public should cease.

134



# Who is hiding the man who tipped off these sex perverts?



Captain HENRY KERBY, M.P.

**CAPTAIN** Henry Kerby, forty-year-old ex-diplomat and Tory M.P. for Arundel and Shoreham, told the Sunday Pictorial yesterday:

"The interest of the remarkable White Paper is NOT in what it reveals—but in what it still CONCEALS.

"The apologists, busily white-washing unnamed bureaucrats, are still hoodwinking the public.

## **Third Man**

"Plenty of people in the Foreign Office and diplomatic circles must know the identity of the man who tipped off the diplomats that they were suspect."

Captain Kerby asks: "Can it be that this man must have

131

## SAYS CAPT. HENRY KERBY, M.P.

known of the 'brotherhood' of perverted men?

"There have been other cases of flagrant homosexuality in the British Foreign Service which have been covered up."

### **'Notorious'**

Captain Kerby maintains that Burgess and Maclean were "known as drunks and sex perverts for years."

He said: "It is not as if their homosexual activities were known only to a handful of people."

"They were notorious perverts. They were known as such in London, Cairo and Washington."

"Why, in answer to a question in the House, did the Minister of State, Mr. Anthony Nutting, refuse to admit or deny that these men

were homosexuals? I believe he could not deny the fact."

"I have reason to believe that there are still many people of this ilk today in the Foreign Service."

"Why does the White Paper make no mention of their sex perversion?"

"It is one of the keys to the Burgess-Maclean scandal that these men were notorious perverts."

"The British people are still denied the names of those Foreign Office officials who shielded both traitors during their service."

### **'Tell Public'**

"We are denied the names of those responsible for appointing them to their last and vital posts."

"Why? Their names should be made public in Parliament."

"I hope that the White

Paper will be debated fully in Parliament, and that the searching light of a Public Inquiry (under a High Court judge) will be thrown on it."

"We must probe the full and concealed ramifications of the Burgess and Maclean scandal."

### **Tradition**

"Thus alone can we at least try to ensure that something similar does not happen again."

"On present form—with evasions and non-accountable anonymity—it CAN and WILL."

"The archaic tradition of Ministers manfully shouldering responsibility and shielding Civil Servants at the Foreign Office is ABSURD and DANGEROUS."

132

# F.O. FLOPS

## Spies are not the only trouble, says this M.P.



BUNGLING over the Maclean and Burgess case is only a symptom of what is wrong at our Foreign Office, says

**GEORGE BROWN,  
P.C., M.P.**

This former Minister today gives first-hand evidence of his discoveries.

**If I were the Foreign Secretary, there is something that would worry me far more than spies and security leaks.**

**It is this: The sheer incompetence of the Foreign Service.**

So often it has flopped by putting the wrong man in the wrong place at the wrong time.

This is the jet age. The era of moving damn fast.

It is a period of vast political changes, with new States being formed all over Africa, Asia and the Middle East—and the race to win their support.

If we relied on our diplomats to see us through, we would not even reach the starting gate in most places.

I have travelled many times since 1945 in Europe, Africa and the American Continent.

I have seen their appalling ineffectiveness again and again.

Of course there are good ones.

### **SMUGNESS**

**B**UT when they are they stand out like the Eddystone lighthouse and almost invariably they are not traditional Foreign Service entrants.

I well remember my first experience of the rest at Washington in 1946. He was one of the top men there, a man who afterwards became an Ambassador elsewhere in an important capital.

I asked him how he explained the new Labour Britain to the Americans.

His reply was that he could not. He hadn't even been home to see it!

I can still see his smug look as he said:

"I have been in Moscow. They're all interested in that so I have two speeches, one hard and one soft, and I give 'em whatever seems to suit."

He polished his monocle with accustomed elegance and put it back again.

### **ADVISER**

**I**NTO my mind comes the British Financial Adviser to one of the fabulously rich old sheiks. A terrific battle for

133



in the mind's eye as the general pattern — cynical, long-haired young gentlemen toddling from one cocktail party to another, never meeting ordinary people, and proclaiming a belief in nothing at all.

Perhaps the worst example was in Argentina, where I went this year.

It was obvious even then that changes were coming. It was also only too obvious that the Germans were grabbing tremendous trade there.

Could I get the Embassy staff to talk about it and discuss what we might do? Could I hell.

The Ambassador, one of the better ones, was new there.

There was also a good Labour Adviser, who was not out of the Foreign Office mould.

But, with the exception of these two, most of the rest in this key area seemed to be out of this world.

## LEVITY

MY final picture of the Argentine British diplomatic staff will always be a wonderful Alice-in-Wonderland dinner.

Many of the Embassy staff were there with their ladies, just to meet us.

Every attempt I made to discuss Argentina and British prospects there was met with levity and cynicism.

To counter it, they trotted out every stale joke ever heard about the Labour Government.

Incidentally, the Socialists had already been out of office three years.

From quips about groundnuts to jokes about the Coal Board and even about the amount of milk for expectant mothers in 1947—we had the lot.

## THE SORT OF THING THAT HAPPENS IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE

WHO is sitting in Donald Maclean's chair now?

The present Head of our American Department at the Foreign Office is a diplomat who has never been to the United States!

He is a top-ranking authority on Eastern affairs. He has studied conditions intimately in Bagdad and Beirut—but not in Brooklyn.

influence in this area was going on between us and the Americans.

This man was in a key position.

He was ex-Indian Army—knowing “absolutely nothing,” in his own words, about financial policy, economics or politics!

How did he get there?

## CYNICS

“O H,” he told me, “the Crown Agents advertised it and I was on a list of retired soldiers and so they saw me and I got it.”

But nothing remains so clear

## DISORDER

THE final curtain was pretty fine disorder, as I lost my temper and displayed how unsuitable I would be for appointment to the cynical, ineffectual, prattling body we call our diplomatic service.

Spies? Of course we have to take them seriously.

But the trouble in the Foreign Office goes much deeper than that.

134



## Text of Britain's Report on Inquiry in Maclean-B

Following is the text of a British Government report, made available by the British Information Services yesterday, on the Mucanu-Burgess case:

On the evening of Friday, May 25, 1951, Mr. Donald Duarte Maclean, a Counselor in the Senior Branch of the Foreign Service and at that time head of the American Department in the Foreign Office, and Mr. Guy Francis de Morny Burgess, Second Secretary in the Junior Branch of the Foreign Service, left the United Kingdom from Southampton on the boat for St. Malo. The circumstances of their departure from England, for which they had not sought sanction, were such as to make it obvious that they had deliberately fled the country. Both officers were suspended from duty on June 1, 1951, and their appointment in the Foreign Office was terminated on June 1, 1952, with effect from June 1, 1951.

Maclean was the son of a former Cabinet Minister, Sir Donald Maclean. He was born in 1913 and was educated at Gresham's School, Holt and Trinity College, Cambridge, where he had a distinguished academic record. He successfully competed for the diplomatic service in 1935 and was posted in the first instance to the Foreign Office. He served subsequently in Paris, at Washington and in Cairo. He was an officer of exceptional ability and was promoted to the rank of Counselor at the early age of 35. He was married to an American lady and had two young sons. A third child was born shortly after his disappearance.

## Nuclear Had Breakdown

In May, 1950, while serving at Her Majesty's Embassy, Cairo, Midean was guilty of serious misconduct and suffered a period of breakdown which was attributed to overwork and excessive drinking. Until the breakdown took place his work had remained eminently satisfactory and there was no sound whatsoever for doubting his loyalty. After recuperation and leave at home he was assessed medically fit, and in October, 1950, was appointed to be head of the American Department of the Foreign Office which, since it does not deal with the major problems of Anglo-American relations, appeared to be within his capacity.

Mr. Brown  
Mr. Green  
Mr. Smith  
Mr. Taylor  
Mr. Wilson  
Mr. Young  
Mr. Zane  
Mr. Adams  
Mr. Baker  
Mr. Carter  
Mr. Evans  
Mr. Foster  
Mr. Gibson  
Mr. Hall  
Mr. Hill  
Mr. Jones  
Mr. King  
Mr. Lee  
Mr. Miller  
Mr. Moore  
Mr. Parker  
Mr. Quinn  
Mr. Reed  
Mr. Scott  
Mr. Stewart  
Mr. Thomas  
Mr. Turner  
Mr. Vance  
Mr. Webb  
Mr. White  
Mr. Wright  
Mr. Young  
Mr. Zane

BRANGAN

120 033

## COLLENS 2002 Pp. 8

N. Y. *Press*

DATED 9/25/55

FORWARDED BY ~~C~~ 1. DIVISION

page 5

Salt City Editor  
 Donald Stuart McKean  
 et al Espionage  
 Bufile 100-374183

21

5-10-68

DEFENDANT: C. B. Moore Donald

JUN 22 1976

**MILITARY SERVICE**

105

201 13 10 14 22

**INVOICE**

71 OCT 12 1955

135

Since Maclean's disappearance a close examination of his background has revealed that during his student days at Cambridge from 1931 to 1934 he had expressed Communist sympathies, but there was no evidence that he had ever been a member of the Communist party and indeed on leaving the university he had outwardly renounced his earlier Communist views.

Burgess was born in 1911 and was educated at the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, at Eton and at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he had a brilliant academic record. After leaving Cambridge in 1935 he worked for a short time in London as a journalist and joined the B. B. C. in 1936, where he remained until January, 1939. From 1939 until 1941 he was employed in one of the war propaganda organizations. He rejoined the B. B. C. in January, 1941, and remained there until 1944, when he applied for and obtained a post as a temporary press officer in the News Department of the Foreign Office.

He was not recruited into the Foreign Service through the open competitive examination but in 1947 took the opportunity open to temporary employees to present himself for establishment. He appeared before a Civil Service Commission Board and was recommended for a junior branch of the Foreign Service. His establishment took effect from Jan. 1, 1947. He worked for a time in the office of the then Minister of State, Mr. Hector McNeil, and in the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office. In August, 1950, he was transferred to Washington as a Second Secretary.

Early in 1950 the security authorities informed the Foreign Office that in late 1949 while on holiday abroad Burgess had been guilty of indiscreet talk about secret matters of which he had official knowledge. For this he was severely reprimanded. Apart from this lapse his service in the Foreign Office up to the time of his appointment to Washington was satisfactory and there seemed good reason to hope that he would make a useful career.

136

#### Burgess Drove Recklessly

In Washington, however, his work and behavior gave rise to complaint. The Ambassador reported that his work had been unsatisfactory in that he lacked thoroughness and balance in routine matters, that he had come to the unfavorable notice of the Department of State because of his reckless driving and that he had had to be reprimanded for carelessness in leaving confidential papers unattended. The Ambassador requested that Burgess be removed from Washington and this was approved. He was recalled to London in early May, 1951, and was asked to resign from the Foreign Service. Consideration was being given to the steps that would be taken in the event of his refusing to do so. It was at this point that he disappeared.

Investigations into Burgess' past have since shown that he like Maclean, went through a period of Communist leanings while at Cambridge and that he too on leaving the university outwardly renounced his views. No trace can be found in his subsequent career of direct participation in the activities of left-wing organizations; indeed he was known after leaving Cambridge to have had some contact with organizations such as the Anglo-German Club.

#### Relations With Each Other

The question has been asked whether the association of these two officers with each other did not give rise to suspicion. The fact is that, although we have since learned that Maclean and Burgess were acquainted during the undergraduate days at Cambridge, they gave no evidence during the course of the career in the Foreign Service of any association other than would be



normal between two colleagues. When Burgess was appointed to the Foreign Office, Maclean was in Washington and at the time Burgess himself was appointed to Washington, Maclean was back in the United Kingdom awaiting assignment to the American Department of the Foreign Office. It is now clear that they were in communication with each other after the return of Burgess from Washington in 1951 and they may have been in such communication earlier. Their relations were, however, never such as to cause remark.

In January, 1949, the security authorities received a report that certain Foreign Office information had leaked to the Soviet authorities some years earlier. The report amounted to a little more than a hint and it was at the time impossible to attribute the leak to any particular individual. Highly secret but widespread and protracted enquiries were begun by the security authorities and the field of suspicion had been narrowed by mid-April, 1951, to two or three persons. By the beginning of May, Maclean had come to be regarded as the principal suspect. There was, however, even at that time, no legally admissible evidence to support a prosecution under the Official Secrets Acts. Arrangements were made to ensure that information of exceptional secrecy and importance should not come into his hands.

In the meantime the security authorities arranged to investigate his activities and contacts in order to increase their background knowledge and if possible to obtain information which could be used as evidence in a prosecution. On May 25 the then Secretary of State, Mr. Herbert Morrison, sanctioned a proposal that the security authorities should question Maclean. In reaching this decision it had to be borne in mind that such questioning might produce no confession or voluntary statement from Maclean sufficient to support a prosecution, but might serve only to alert him and to reveal the nature and the extent of the suspicion against him.



**MISSING MACLEANS:** Donald Maclean with his wife and two of their three children, Donald, Jr., and Fergus. The British have termed Maclean a Soviet spy and believe he is in Moscow. Mrs. Maclean and her children were last seen on their way from Geneva to the Soviet zone of Austria. Photo was taken before Maclean's disappearance in 1951.

In that event he would have been free to make ~~arrange-~~  
~~ments to~~ leave the country and the authorities would have had no legal power to stop him. Everything therefore depended on the interview and the security authorities were anxious to be as fully prepared as was humanly possible. They were also anxious that Maclean's house at Tatsfield, Kent, should be searched and this was an additional reason for delaying the proposed interview until mid-June when Mrs. Maclean, who was then pregnant, was expected to be away from home.

#### Planned to Search House

It is now clear that in spite of the precautions taken by the authorities, Maclean must have become aware, at some time before his disappearance, that he was under investigation. One explanation may be that he observed that he was no longer receiving certain types of secret papers. It is also possible that he detected that he was under observation. Or he may have been warned. Searching inquiries involving individual interrogations were made into this last possibility. Insufficient evidence was obtainable to form a definite conclusion or to warrant prosecution.

Maclean's absence did not become known to the authorities until the morning of Monday, May 28. The Foreign Office is regularly open for normal business on Saturday mornings, but officers can, from time to time, obtain leave to take a weekend off. In accordance with this practice Maclean applied for and obtained leave to be absent on the morning of Saturday, May 28. His absence therefore caused no remark until the following Monday morning when he failed to appear at the Foreign Office. Burgess was on leave and under no obligation to report his movements.

#### Both Traced to France

Immediately the flight was ~~known~~ all possible action was taken in the United Kingdom, and the French and other continental security authorities were asked to trace the whereabouts of the fugitives and if possible to intercept them. All British Consulates in Western Europe were alerted and special efforts were made to discover whether the fugitives had crossed the French frontiers on May 26 or 27. As a result of these and other enquiries it was established that Maclean and Burgess together left Tatsfield by car for Southampton in the late evening of Friday, May 25, arrived at Southampton at midnight, caught the S. S. Falaise for St. Malo and disembarked at that port at 11.45 the following morning, leaving suitcases and some of their clothing on board. They were not seen on the train from St. Malo to Paris and it has been reported that two men, believed to be Maclean and Burgess, took a taxi to Rennes and there got the 1:18 P. M. train to Paris. Nothing more was seen of them.

Since the disappearance various communications have been received from them by members of their families. On June 7, 1951, telegrams ostensibly from Maclean were received by his mother, Lady Maclean, and his wife, Mrs. Melinda Maclean, who were both at that time in the United Kingdom. The telegram to Lady Maclean was a short personal message, signed by a nick-name known only within the immediate family circle. It merely stated that all was well. That addressed to Mrs. Maclean was similar, expressing regret for the unexpected departure and was signed "Donald."

Both telegrams were dispatched in Paris on the evening of June 6. Their receipt was at once reported to the security authorities, but it was impossible to identify the person or persons who had handed them in. The original telegraph forms showed, however, that the messages had been written in a hand which was clearly not Maclean's. The character of the handwriting, and some misspelling, suggested that both telegrams had been written by a foreigner.

On June 7, 1951, a telegram was received in London by Mrs. Bassett, Burgess' mother. It contained a short and affectionate personal message, together with a statement that th

1410



sender, was embarking on a long Mediterranean holiday and was ostensibly from Burgess himself. The telegram had been handed in at a post office in Rome earlier on the day of its receipt. As with the telegram from Paris to Maclean's family, there was no possibility of identifying the person who had handed it in. The handwriting had the appearance of being foreign and was certainly not that of Burgess.

#### Two £1,000 Drafts in Mail

According to information given to the Foreign Office in confidence by Mrs. Dunbar, Maclean's mother-in-law, who was then living with her daughter at Tatsfield, she received on Aug. 3, 1951, two registered letters posted in St. Gallen, Switzerland, on Aug. 1. One contained a draft on the Swiss Bank Corporation, London, for the sum of £1,000 payable to Mrs. Dunbar; the other a draft payable to Mrs. Dunbar for the same sum, drawn by the Union Bank of Switzerland on the Midland Bank, 122 Old Broad Street, London. Both drafts were stated to have been submitted by order of a Mr. Robert Becker, whose address was given as the Hotel Central, Zurich. Exhaustive enquiries in collaboration with the Swiss authorities have not led to the identification of Mr. Becker and it is probable that the name given was false.

Shortly after the receipt of these bank drafts Mrs. Maclean received a letter in her husband's handwriting. It had been posted in Reigate, Surrey, on Aug. 3, 1951, and was of an affectionate, personal nature as from husband to wife. It gave no clue as to Maclean's whereabouts or the reason for his disappearance but it explained that the bank drafts, which for convenience had been sent to Mrs. Dunbar, were intended for Mrs. Maclean.

141

Lady Maclean received a further letter from her son on Aug. 15, 1951. There is no doubt that it was in ~~his own~~ handwriting. It had been posted at Herne Hill on Aug. 11.

Mrs. Bassett, the mother of Burgess, received a letter in Burgess' handwriting on Dec. 22, 1953. The letter was personal and gave no information as to Burgess' whereabouts. It was simply dated "November" and had been posted in South East London on Dec. 21. The last message received from either of the two men was a further letter from Burgess to his mother which was delivered in London on Dec. 25, 1954. This letter was also personal and disclosed nothing of Burgess' whereabouts. It too was simply dated "November." It had been posted in Poplar E. 14 on Dec. 23.

#### **Mrs. Maclean's Disappearance**

On Sept. 11, 1953, Mrs. Maclean, who was living in Geneva, left there by car with her three children. She had told her mother who was staying with her that she had unexpectedly come across an acquaintance who she and her husband had previously known in Cairo, and that he had invited her and the children to spend the week-end with him at Territet, near Montreaux. She stated that she would return to Geneva on Sept. 13 in time for the two elder children to attend school the following day. By Sept. 14 her mother, alarmed at her failure to return, reported the matter to Her Majesty's Consul General in Geneva and also by telephone to London.

Security officers were at once dispatched to Geneva where they placed themselves at the disposal of the Swiss police who were already making intensive inquiries. On the afternoon of Sept. 16 Mrs. Maclean's car was found in a garage in Lausanne. She had left it on the afternoon of the 11th saying she would return for it in a week. The garage hand who reported this added that Mrs. Maclean had then proceeded with her children to the Lausanne railway station.

On the same day, Sept. 16, Mrs. Dunbar reported to the Geneva police the receipt of a telegram purporting to come

148

from her daughter. The telegram explained that Mrs. Maclean had been delayed "owing to unforeseen circumstances" and asked Mrs. Dunbar to inform the school authorities that the two elder children would be returning in a week. Mrs. Maclean's youngest child was referred to in this telegram by a name known only to Mrs. Maclean, her mother and other intimates. The telegram had been handed in at a post office in Territet at 10:58 o'clock that morning by a woman whose description did not agree with that of Mrs. Maclean. The handwriting on the telegram form was not Mrs. Maclean's and it showed foreign characteristics similar to those in the telegrams received in 1951 by Lady Maclean, Mrs. Maclean and Mrs. Bassett.

From information subsequently received from witnesses in Switzerland and Austria it seems clear that the arrangements for Mrs. Maclean's departure from Geneva had been carefully planned and that she proceeded by train from Lausanne on the evening of Sept. 11, passing the Swiss-Austrian frontier that night and arriving at Schwarzach St. Veit in the American Zone of Austria at approximately 9:15 on the morning of Sept. 12. The independent evidence of a porter at Schwarzach St. Veit and of witnesses travelling on the train, has established she left the train at this point. Further evidence believed to be reliable shows that she was met at the

143



station by an unknown man driving a car bearing Austrian number plates. The further movements of this car have not been traced. It is probable that it took Mrs. Maclean and the children from Schwarzach St. Veit to neighboring territory in Russian occupation whence she proceeded on her journey to join her husband.

There was no question of preventing Mrs. Maclean from leaving the United Kingdom to go to live in Switzerland. Although she was under no obligation to report her movements she had been regularly in touch with the security authorities and had informed them that she wished to make her home in Switzerland. She gave two good reasons, firstly, that she wished to avoid the personal embarrassment to which she had been subjected by the press in the United Kingdom and, secondly, that she wished to educate her children in the International School in Geneva.

It will be remembered that Mrs. Maclean was an American citizen and in view of the publicity caused by her husband's flight it was only natural that she should wish to bring up her children in new surroundings. Before she left for Geneva the security authorities made arrangements with her whereby she was to keep in touch with the British authorities in Berne and Geneva in case she should receive any further news from her husband or require advice or assistance. Mrs. Maclean was a free agent. The authorities had no legal means of detaining her in the United Kingdom. Any form of surveillance abroad would have been unwarranted.

144

In view of the suspicions held against Maclean and of the conspiratorial manner of his flight, it was assumed, though it could not be proved, that his destination and that of his companion must have been the Soviet Union or some other territory behind the Iron Curtain. Now Vladimir Petrov, the former Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Canberra, who sought political asylum on April 3, 1954, has provided confirmation of this. Petrov himself was not directly concerned in the case and his information was obtained from conversation with one of his colleagues in the Soviet service in Australia.

#### Recruited at College

Petrov states that both Maclean and Burgess were recruited as spies for the Soviet Government while students at the university, with the intention that they should carry out their espionage tasks in the Foreign Office and that in 1951, by means unknown to him, one or other of the two men became aware that their activities were under investigation. This was reported by them to the Soviet intelligence service, who then organized their escape and removal to the Soviet Union. Petrov has the impression that the escape route included Czechoslovakia and that it involved an airplane flight into that country. Upon their arrival in Russia, Maclean and Burgess lived near Moscow. They were used as advisers to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Soviet agencies. Petrov adds that one of the men (Maclean) has since been joined by his wife.

Two points call for comment: first, how Maclean and Burgess remained in the Foreign Service for so long and second, why they were able to get away.

When these two men were given their appointments nothing was on record about either to show that he was unsuitable for the Public Service. It is true that their subsequent personal behavior was unsatisfac-

145

tory and this led to action in each case. As already stated Maclean was recalled from Cairo in 1950 and was not re-employed until he was declared medically fit. Burgess was recalled from Washington in 1951 and was asked to resign. It was only shortly before Maclean disappeared that serious suspicion of his reliability was aroused and active enquiries were set on foot.

The second question is how Maclean and Burgess made good their escape from this country when the security authorities were on their track. The watch on Maclean was made difficult by the need to ensure that he did not become aware that he was under observation. This watch was primarily aimed at collecting, if possible, further information and not at preventing an escape. In imposing it, a calculated risk had to be taken that he might become aware of it and might take flight.

It was inadvisable to increase this risk by extending the surveillance to his home in an isolated part of the country and he was therefore watched in London only. Both men were free to go abroad at any time. In some countries no doubt Maclean would have been arrested first and questioned afterwards. In this country no arrest can be made without adequate evidence. At the time there was insufficient evidence. It was for these reasons necessary for the security authorities to embark upon the difficult and delicate investigation of Maclean, taking into full account the risk that he would be alerted. In the event he was alerted and fled the country together with Burgess.

146



#### Security Checks Increased

As a result of this case, in July, 1951, the then Secretary of State, Mr. Herbert Morrison, set up a Committee of Inquiry to consider the Security checks applied to members of the Foreign Service; the existing regulations and practices of the Foreign Service in regard to any matters having a bearing on security and to report whether any alterations were called for. The Committee reported in November, 1951. It recommended among other things, a more extensive security check on Foreign Service officers than had until then been the practice. This was immediately put into effect and since 1952 searching inquiries had been made into the antecedents and associates of all those occupying or applying for positions in the Foreign Office involving highly secret information. The purpose of these inquiries is to ensure that no one is appointed to or continues to occupy any such post unless he or she is fit to be entrusted with the secrets to which the post gives access. The Foreign Secretary of the day approved the action required.

A great deal of criticism has been directed towards the reticence of ministerial replies on these matters; an attitude which it was alleged would not have been changed had it not been for the Petrov revelations. Espionage is carried out in secret. Counter-espionage equally depends for its success upon the maximum secrecy of its methods. Nor is it desirable at any moment to let the other side know how much has been discovered or guess at what means have been used to discover it. Nor should they be allowed to know all the steps that have been taken to improve security. These considerations still apply and must be the basic criterion for judging what should or should not be published.

147

# Briton Fears Effect of Spy Case on U. S.

LONDON, Sept. 24 (AP)—A member of Parliament expressed fear today the "Foreign Office scandal" of Britain's "run-away spies" might lead to a "resurgence of McCarthyism in America."

The British press lashed out at an official Government report on the escape of Donald MacLean and Guy Burgess behind the Iron Curtain May 25, 1951. It demanded a full-scale investigation to find the man who tipped them off.

Donald Wade, a Liberal member of Parliament, told a party political meeting this afternoon:

"I hope it will not encourage a resurgence of McCarthyism in America. I hope it will not make cooperation between this country and America more difficult."

## Public Disturbed

Wade, one of the four Liberals in Commons who generally support the Conservative Government's foreign policy, pleaded against making the case a party political issue.

He said, however, "the general public is very disturbed and it is right that we should examine it (the White Paper) to see that those employed in the Foreign Office are fit to be entrusted with the secrets to which the post gives access."

The White Paper released last night was the first Government statement on the four-year-old case. It added little to disclosures made last week.

The Eden Government said MacLean fled the country with his associate Burgess just hours after security men received the go-ahead to question him.

It also hinted that a mystery figure with access to high Government secrets may have tipped off the two men.

Mr. Tolson ☒  
Mr. Boardman ☒  
Mr. Nichols ☒  
Mr. Belmont ☒  
Mr. Harbo ☒  
Mr. Mohr ☒  
Mr. Parsons ☒  
Mr. Rosen ☒  
Mr. Tamm ☒  
Mr. Sizoo ☒  
Mr. Winterrowd ☒  
Tele. Room ☒  
Mr. Holloman ☒  
Miss Gandy ☒

BRANIGAN

## Press Comments Still

Press comment was still on the report.

"It is an insulting document ... an insult to any reasonable man's intelligence," the imperialist Daily Express declared. "Who were the men in the key posts at the time? Have they been brought to account? Are they still carrying on in the same positions of trust?"

The mass circulation Laborite Daily Mirror called the report "an indictment of the slapp-happiest bunch of incompetents who ever graced a Government department."

The conservative tabloid Daily Sketch asked: "Is there a super spy still tapping secrets at the Foreign Office?"

The dignified, independent Times said the report "is too late and too little" and joined in calling for "full honest scrutiny before the forum of Parliament."

Wash. Post and Times Herald /A5  
Wash. News \_\_\_\_\_  
Wash. Star \_\_\_\_\_  
N. Y. Herald Tribune \_\_\_\_\_  
N. Y. Mirror \_\_\_\_\_  
Daily Worker \_\_\_\_\_  
The Worker \_\_\_\_\_  
New Leader \_\_\_\_\_

Date SEP 24 1955

NOT RECORDED  
25 OCT 13 1955

DELETED COPY SENT BY LETTER JUN 28 1978  
FEB 1968  
C.B. Mac Donnell  
148

U-20

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Boardman	✓
Mr. Nichols	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Harbo	✓
Mr. Mohr	✓
Mr. Parsons	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Tamm	✓
Mr. Sizoo	✓
Mr. Winterrowd	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Mr. Holloman	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

BRADIGAN

(DIPLOMATS)

LONDON--A CONSERVATIVE M.P. SAID HE WILL DEMAND A PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATION OF THE "SCANDALOUS" ESCAPE OF GUY BURGESS AND DONALD MACLEAN, WHO HE SAID "WERE KNOWN AS DRUNKS AND PERVERTS FOR YEARS" BEFORE THEY FLED BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN.

CAPT. HENRY KERBY CHARGED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN EVADING AN ANSWER TO HIS QUESTIONS ABOUT THE TWO MEN.

"IT IS NOT AS IF THEIR HOMOSEXUAL ACTIVITIES WERE KNOWN ONLY TO A HANDFUL OF PEOPLE..." KERBY SAID. "MACLEAN AND BURGESS WERE KNOWN AS DRUNKS AND SEX PERVERTS FOR YEARS. I INTEND TO PRESS IN PARLIAMENT... FOR A FULL SCALE PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE SCANDALOUS CASE."

9/25--N220P

NOT RECORDED  
126 OCT 12 1955

DELIVERED OCT 11 1955 C.B. MacDonald  
BY LETTER JUN 22 1976  
PER FOIA REQUEST  
Juz

12 OCT 12 1955

149



Mr. Tolson ☒  
Mr. Boardman ☒  
Mr. Nichols ☒  
Mr. Belmont ☒  
Mr. Harbo ☒  
Mr. Mohr ☒  
Mr. Parsons ☒  
Mr. Rosen ☒  
Mr. Tamm ☒  
Mr. Sizoo ☒  
Mr. Winterrowd ☒  
Tele. Room ☒  
Mr. Holloman ☒  
Miss Gandy ☒

RECEIVED (C) Mac Donald  
OCT 12 1955  
J. Edgar Hoover

(MACLEAN-BURGESS)

THE CHILLING CLOAK AND DAGGER STORY OF BRITISH TRAITORS DONALD MACLEAN AND GUY BURGESS SERVED AT LEAST ONE GOOD PURPOSE, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS SAID. IT FORCED AMERICAN AND BRITISH INTELLIGENCE TO SWIFTLY PLUG SECURITY GAPS USED SO SHAMELESSLY BY THE TWO SPIES FOR SOVIET RUSSIA BEFORE THEY VANISHED ON MAY 25, 1951.

THE MEASURES TAKEN HAVE NEVER BEEN FULLY DISCLOSED BUT IT IS KNOWN THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AND THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION LOST NO TIME GOING INTO ACTION.

FOR THEIR PART, THE BRITISH ORDERED MORE EXTENSIVE SECURITY SCREENINGS FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THEIR FOREIGN SERVICE CORPS AND, PRESUMABLY, INVOKED TIGHTER SECURITY PRECAUTIONS GENERALLY.

AMERICAN OFFICIALS WERE NOT SURPRISED BY THE MACLEAN-BURGESS WHITE PAPER WHICH THE BRITISH RELEASED FRIDAY. THEY HAD KNOWN ITS CONTENTS FOR MANY MONTHS AND HAD LONG SINCE SET UP TIGHTER PRECAUTIONS. BUT NONE WOULD COMMENT FOR PUBLICATION.

THE MACLEAN-BURGESS AFFAIR JUMPED BACK INTO THE LIMELIGHT SUDDENLY WHEN VLADIMIR PETROV, FORMER TOP AGENT OF THE RUSSIAN SECRET POLICE (MVD) IN AUSTRALIA, WROTE WHAT PURPORTED TO BE THE TRUE STORY OF THE MACLEAN-BURGESS DEFECTION. PETROV HIMSELF DEFECTED IN APRIL, 1954, AND EXPOSED SOME OF THE WORLDWIDE MACHINATIONS OF THE SOVIET ESPIONAGE SYSTEM.

PETROV CONFIRMED WHAT AMERICAN OFFICIALS HAD ~~NOT RECORDED~~ HAD REMAINED GRIMLY SILENT ABOUT -- THAT MACLEAN, WHEN HE HEADED THE CHANCERY OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY HERE IN 1944-48, HAD EASY ACCESS TO U.S. SECRETS AND HAD A PASS TO THE PRIVILEGED SANCTUM OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION.

BURGESS LATER SERVED HERE AS SECOND SECRETARY OF THE EMBASSY. HE ALSO WAS PRIVY TO SOME SECRETS, MAINLY INVOLVING KOREAN POLICY. BUT HE DID NOT SHARE MACLEAN'S STATURE IN HIGH-LEVEL ECHELONS.

PETROV TOLD HIS STORY IN A COPYRIGHTED DISPATCH IN THE CURRENT ISSUE OF U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT AND IN A LONDON NEWSPAPER. THE BRITISH HOUSE OF COMMONS WAS IMMEDIATELY THROWN INTO TURMOIL WITH DEMANDS THE GOVERNMENT EXPLAIN WHY MACLEAN AND BURGESS WERE ALLOWED TO FLEE BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN WHEN THEY WERE UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR TREASON. THE WHITE PAPER WAS ISSUED FRIDAY AS A RESULT.

IT HINTED THAT BRITISH SECURITY MEASURES HAD BEEN SO LAX THAT THE MERE FACT THAT MACLEAN'S WIFE WAS PREGNANT HAD DELAYED HIS ARREST. IT ALSO BROUGHT OUT THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN A "THIRD" PERSON IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE CORPS WHO KNEW OF THE MACLEAN-BURGESS INQUIRY AND TIPPED THEM OFF IN TIME FOR THEM TO FLEE.

AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE APPARENTLY WAS ENTIRELY IGNORANT OF THE MACLEAN-BURGESS OPERATIONS HERE, ELSE THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN A SWIFT CLAMPDOWN. THEY COULD NOT HAVE ARRESTED EITHER OFFICIAL BECAUSE OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY. BUT THEY COULD HAVE BRANDED THEM PERSONA NON GRATA AND DEMANDED THEIR INSTANT RECALL, WITH ARREST SURE TO FOLLOW.

THIS RULE HAS BEEN FOLLOWED RIGIDLY WHEN DIPLOMATS OF RUSSIAN SATELLITES HERE HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED OFF THE SECURITY RESERVATION.

9/24--PA1147A

58 OCT 12 1955 WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE

150

Mr. Boardman  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Parsons  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tamm  
Mr. Sizoo  
Mr. Winterrowd  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Holloman  
Miss Gandy

BRANCO

HOACH

**The FOREIGN OFFICE and the SPIES**

# Questions they're still dodging

IT has taken the Foreign Office exactly four years and four months to give their version of the mystery of the Missing Diplomats, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess, who fled from England on May 25, 1951. It takes the form of today's White Paper which confirms what anyone who had carefully studied the extraordinary history of these two young men had long suspected—that they were "long-term Soviet agents."

But, like so many official documents of this kind, it is curiously obscure on many of the vitally important points in what will probably always be known as the "Burgess and Maclean Case." For example:

## GEOFFREY HOARE

who has detailed knowledge of the Maclean - Burgess affair, comments on the White Paper's findings.

RE: MacLEAN CASE  
(Bufile 100-374183)

NEWS CHRONICLE  
SEPTEMBER 24, 1955  
LONDON, ENGLAND

DELETED  
BY 117  
JUN 23

C. B. Mac Donald

jug 151

710-1183  
710-1183

## How long had they been passing Britain's secrets to Soviet Russia?

PETROV declares they were signed up by Soviet intelligence services while still at Cambridge. It is true that both were then ardent Communists. But so were thousands of other liberal-minded young men who turned to Communism in the dark days of the mid-thirties simply because they considered it the best way of fighting Fascism.

When Hitler was defeated, most of them forgot all about Communism. Why should Russian agents have selected just these two from all the other university Communists who have since become irreproachable citizens — and patriots? And what use could they have been before they had even decided what their career would be?

No. I think Donald Maclean was approached much later, when he was First Secretary to the British Embassy at Washington, around 1946, when he was in a position to provide valuable information and was sufficiently opposed to British and American policy to believe that he was helping the cause of world peace by doing so.

## How was it that he was not suspected earlier?

ONE of the most disturbing aspects of this dreadful affair is that Donald Maclean was allowed such a long run. In his drunken moments he was by no means careful, either in speech or action, and often declared that he was a Soviet agent. Did none of his friends or colleagues at least suspect that he was betraying his trust? If they did, why

did they not report him to their superiors? If they did report him, why was no action taken?

## How thorough were the investigations?

A SENIOR official of M.I.5 told me just before the News Chronicle serialised my book\* last year that his service had been warning the Foreign Office about Maclean "for some time" before his flight. He did not say what the warning was about. It could simply have been of Maclean's behaviour, which was entirely unsuitable for a senior Foreign Service official.

But if the suspicion was by then of something far graver, how was it that he was able to evade M.I.5's net? He was conspicuously tall and easy to keep under observation if, for example, he was meeting his Russian contact in a pub or a bar to hand over Foreign Office documents.

Even when the game was up and he had flown, both Melinda, his American-born wife, and her mother, Mrs. Dunbar, told me that the investigators who hurried down to Beaconshaw, his house at Tatsfield, when he was reported missing, did not trouble to examine the mass of papers he left behind. Yet by then it must have been apparent that he was a spy.

## How much did Melinda know?

THERE is now a suggestion that Melinda, who followed Donald into exile with her three children 27 months later,

\* *The Missing Macleans*, published by Cassell and Co., Ltd., at 12s. 6d. net.

knew all the time that her husband was a Soviet agent, and was indeed a Communist herself.

If that is true, and without definite hard evidence I cannot believe that it is, then she was a superb actress. I knew Melinda well.

Although it is evident that sometime between Donald's disappearance and her flight from Geneva she had been told what he was doing—and for inexplicable reasons of her own had accepted the position and agreed to go to him—I am still sure she was the simple, rather frivolous girl with no political interests, whatever she appeared. It was not only to me that she gave this impression, but to many others of her friends—including girl friends who might have had a more critical approach.

## What was Burgess's role?

THE White Paper specifically mentions Donald Maclean as "the principal suspect" in a leakage of information to the Russians. It states that Burgess's behaviour was unsatisfactory, but there is no suggestion that he was in any way implicated in passing information.

It is also stressed that there is no evidence of any abnormal or suspicious contact between the two men so that were one suspected the other would automatically come under suspicion.

Were they in fact the team they have all along been supposed as they fled together? Or were they acting separately as Soviet agents, and only brought together by the necessity of getting them both out of England at the same time? It is an important point.

150



# FAILURE ALL THE WAY

THE White Paper on Burgess and Maclean is an admission of failure. The Foreign Office failed to pay early or adequate heed to the extraordinary behaviour of these two men, holding offices of high responsibility in the Foreign Service. The Intelligence Service failed in the elementary task of keeping them under surveillance.

At the moment when suspicion should have been keenest, Maclean was given week-end leave! The fact that he and Burgess had flown the country was not discovered for three days. And the excuse for leaving Maclean unguarded is that he would have been difficult to "shadow" in the country.

This would be laughable were the whole thing not so serious.

These were grave enough blunders. Almost as big a mistake was the decision to keep the story under lock and key for four years. Everything in the White Paper—apart from references to the later departure of Mrs. Maclean to join her husband—could have been made public in 1951.

The result of this incomprehensible delay is that the whole Foreign Office has suffered. Hundreds of loyal and devoted civil servants have now been tainted by scandal. The prestige of the entire department has been dealt a shattering blow.

## Responsibility

MEANWHILE, the question of responsibility remains. For Mr. Harold Macmillan to say "Blame me" is nonsense—and, whatever the rule-book says, he knows it to be nonsense. Nor can all the fault be laid at the doorstep of Mr. Herbert Morrison, who was Foreign Secretary in 1951, and who probably signed a hundred other State papers on the day he approved Maclean's investigation.

The full story has yet to be told. No one would be foolish enough to demand that our counter-espionage methods be made public. But we have a right to know who was directly responsible for this disastrous failure to protect vital secrets, and whether he still remains in a position of trust.

The solution of the Burgess and Maclean mystery has been revealed reluctantly—and a little at a time. The White Paper all but completes the series of admissions. But public opinion will not be satisfied with anything less than the whole truth.

That is why an early House of Commons debate on the White Paper is essential. The people demand it.

doubt, someone is gravely responsible. For, leaving aside for the moment Maclean's treachery, his behaviour for some years had been such that he was not fitted to hold the honourable position of a senior member of the British Foreign Service.

And somebody was covering him.

## Is this the end of the story?

CERTAINLY not. More, much more, is likely to be heard of Donald Maclean. The Soviet Government have matched the British Government in their bland denials for the past four years of any knowledge of the Missing Diplomats.

But now that one of their own renegades has blown the gaff, further denials will be futile.

And so I suggest they will soon make public use of a man who has clearly become one of their well-paid servants—and they will put Donald Maclean on the air "in the interests of East-West friendship."

## Where does the responsibility lie?

IF the whole unhappy story of the Missing Diplomats was not so desperately serious, the valiant efforts of the present Foreign Secretary, Mr. Harold Macmillan, and of Lord John Hope, to offer themselves as hostages would be merely funny.

Mr. Macmillan has made a noble offer to "take the blame," although at the time Maclean was not only spying but also bringing discredit on the Foreign Service by his disorderly behaviour, the Minister was a somewhat obscure M.P. with no official position. Let there be no

153

Mr. Boardman  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Parsons  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tamm  
Mr. Winterrowd  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Holloman  
Miss Gandy

BRANIGAN

ROACH

## THE SPIES

The Government's White Paper on the disappearance of Maclean and Burgess does not really add much to the story as the diligence of the newspapers have built it up over the last four years. In the story of the flight the unsolved problem that remains is: Who "tipped" them off or, as the Government puts it, "alerted them"? Did they just sense that the security service was on their track or did someone tell them? Burgess had already been asked to resign (the date of this is not given). Maclean was about to be closely investigated and his house searched. On May 25 the then Foreign Secretary, Mr Herbert Morrison, sanctioned a proposal that the security authorities should question Maclean. On the evening of that day Maclean and Burgess fled the country. Who, if anybody, warned him? The White Paper says on this that "after searching interrogations 'insufficient evidence was obtainable to form a definite conclusion or to warrant prosecution.' But has the Foreign Office no suspicions? And have there been any staff changes in the Foreign Office to make assurance doubly sure? Has anyone been got off on suspicion? The other point on which there has been criticism, largely in America, is that it should not have been possible for Maclean and Burgess to get away so easily. The White Paper, with America in mind, says rather caustically:

In some countries, no doubt, Maclean would have been arrested first and questioned afterwards. In this country no arrest can be made without adequate evidence.

True enough, but it is also evident that the watch on Maclean was not very close. It was confined to London. Once out of London, he could do as he pleased, even to getting out of the country. The security authorities were not acting with any urgency, for they were going to delay the proposed interview with Maclean until mid-June—three weeks after the decision to interrogate him was taken. This was putting touching trust in the inadequacy of the Foreign Office grapevine.

The impression most people will form on studying the White Paper is that the security authorities did not take a very serious view of either Burgess or Maclean. They were perhaps right prima facie about Burgess, an unreliable type who had not apparently been in any closely confidential relation. (Although that is not to say that he might not have gone to great lengths to steal documents from the British Embassy at Washington when he was there.) They were not, it would seem, moved by any great sense of urgency about Maclean. There is a curious phrase in the account of Maclean. He began as an officer of "exceptional quality"; he misbehaved and had a breakdown in Cairo. When he came back, pronounced as medically fit, he was made head of the American Department of the Foreign Office. This, says the White Paper, "since it does not deal with the major problems of Anglo-American relations, appeared to be within his capacity." Here was an able person given a responsible position in the Foreign Office. Yet it is now pretended that it was not a really important position, and was therefore

DECLASSIFIED BY C.B.  
BY ORDER JUN 22 1971

June

NOT RECORDED  
126 OCT 12 1955

154

RE: MACLEAN CASE  
(Bufile 100-374183)

THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN  
SEPTEMBER 24, 1955  
LONDON, ENGLAND

52 OCT 12 1955

"within his capacity." There is something of hindsight in this apologia. Some hindsight also comes into the account of Mrs Maclean in Switzerland. Would it not be fairly true to say that British security was deceived? It thought that Mrs Maclean could not be sympathetic towards a husband who had not treated her over well; and besides, she was an American. At any rate, there was no watch on her. Call it "old school tie" or what you will, there was great reluctance to believe the worst of these two.

For this most people who look at the evidence calmly will not be disposed to be highly censorious of the Foreign Office. It was natural enough that his colleagues should be loth to suspect one of themselves, a man of great personal attraction, bearing an honoured name. He had his defects

of character, but he seemed to be overcoming them. What we do not get from the White Paper is any hint of the evidence on which the security inquiry was based. It was investigating a leakage that took place "some years" before 1949; this might have been only a casual indiscretion. Clearly security had not the remotest idea that in the archives of Moscow was a whole Maclean-Burgess sub-department under the busy Kislytsin. On the general question of the treachery of Maclean and Burgess there is not much new to say. That they had

Communist leanings at Cambridge in the early thirties means little. Those were the days of the Popular Front, of Spain, of the Left Book Club. Communism was an epidemic disease and with most of its sufferers—and from all appearances with Maclean and Burgess—it quickly passed. We shall never know why, like Alger Hiss, these two men developed the strange ~~kink that led~~ them in the late forties to feed documents to the Russians. We do not, for instance, know when this spying is supposed to have begun; we shall probably find that it was during the war when the Grand Alliance was in being and everybody was prepared to think so well of our Eastern ally. This is not a case of a generation being on trial, but of two clever but rather unbalanced persons going wrong. The new security checks adopted by the Foreign Office in 1951 are all very well in their way, but if a really clever man wants to be a spy a check on his antecedents and associates is not necessarily a sure means of discovery. (What, for instance, of Burgess, who played about with the Anglo-German Club?) No doubt there is much to be said in censure of the rather wild life in which Burgess and Maclean sometimes indulged. It should be a warning to others in the Foreign Service. But we must remember too that Alger Hiss was impeccably well-conducted. There is no clear moral to be drawn except that the Foreign Office must look anxiously to its standards of efficiency, conduct, and alertness. It will take it a long time to recover from the effects of this terrible exposure, and the Government will do well not to ride off in any complacency.



## AN INEXPLICABLE EXPLANATION

APART from officially confirming what was already known about the BURGESS and MACLEAN affair, the Government White Paper is only remarkable for its total failure to come to grips with the real questions in the public mind. Since last Sunday, the overriding question has not been how these two renegades escaped detection, as Mr. PETROV made it known that the security authorities were already on their trail at the time of their escape. Nor was there any real complaint that their departure had not been prevented. What the public wanted to know was not why they had been allowed to escape, but why the Government for four years kept Parliament and the public so completely in the dark about a matter of burning concern.

The White Paper's explanation is wholly unconvincing—even as whitewash. It suggests that to have told the public that MACLEAN's treason was known in advance would have provided "the other side" with valuable information. But since the White Paper also states that MACLEAN fled because he suspected that the game was up, clearly the Russians must also have known that the British authorities knew of the espionage before the spies fled. MACLEAN's collaborator who tipped him off must also have known. So why on earth should the British public have been kept in the dark? The only possible explanation is that successive governments feared criticism for having allowed the two spies to escape.

RE: MACLEAN CASE  
(Bufile 100-374183)

DAILY TELEGRAPH  
SEPTEMBER 24, 1955  
LONDON, ENGLAND

Another question which the White Paper fails to answer is why, with their questionable personal records, these two officials were for so long retained in the Service, and, in the case of MACLEAN, consistently promoted. The White Paper refers to MACLEAN's "serious misconduct" in Cairo in May, 1950, but adds that in October he was "passed medically fit" and appointed to be head of the American Department. It is really intolerable for the Foreign Office to ask us to assume that this promotion requires no further comment. MACLEAN's conduct in Cairo was notorious. If his promotion was routine, it was bad routine. If it was exceptional, the public deserves to be told why the exception was made.

The next question on which the White Paper sheds too little light is that of the effectiveness of our security system in general. After all the Pontecorvo defection, which was supposed to have shown the authorities the red light, occurred only eight months before the MACLEAN and BURGESS affair. Yet even inquiries into "antecedents and associates" were not initiated until six months after it. The problem is entirely different since the cold war started. Before, treason was a matter of corruption, or grievance, or mental instability. To-day the Marxist faith has proved capable of subverting men otherwise of upright character and balanced mind. How are they to be detected in time to save the country from them, and them from themselves?

Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Boardman	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

BRANIGAN

ROACH

LETTER COM  
BY LETTER JUN 22 1956  
PER 1014 1956

Not by a McCARTHY witch-hunt. McCarthyism's methods gained their momentum from Administration efforts to sidetrack legitimate public fears about the dangers of subversion in government. If President TRUMAN had not attempted to cover up the Hiss scandal, the McCARTHY reaction might well have been kept within bounds. Similarly, to withhold information risks arousing here the very atmosphere of suspicion and distrust in which McCarthyism flourishes. What is required is an examination of the problem by a small Committee selected from those who had long experience of security systems during the war. They should examine not only the mechanism of our security system, but also how to avoid defeating the true purposes of an indispensable measure of secrecy by over-prolonged and over-exhaustive taciturnity towards the public; and their report should, of course, be rendered only to the Prime Minister. The public will be content to judge not by its terms but by its results. They cannot be content with the results of the present system as disclosed by the White Paper.

NOT RECORDED  
OCT 12 1955

156



Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Boardman	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Sizoo	_____
Mr. Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____
BRANCH	_____

ROACH

# MACLEAN: The LOST WEEK-END

He vanished the  
day Security  
was told to  
question him

RE: MacLEAN CASE  
(Bufile 100-374183)

DAILY EXPRESS  
SEPTEMBER 24, 1955  
LONDON, ENGLAND

DELETED COPY SENT  
BY LETTER NOV 23 1955  
FOR INFO REVD...

C.B. Mac Donald

NOT RECORDED  
126 OCT 11 1955

2 OCT 12 1955

157



## TWO-YEAR SEARCH

Express Political Correspondent DEREK MARKS

**S**ECURITY men were on the trail of Maclean and Burgess for more than two years before they fled behind the Iron Curtain. Then, just as the authorities were ready to pounce, there came an astonishing "lost week-end" in which the security men did nothing and the diplomats made their getaway.

This is revealed in the Foreign Office White-paper—"Report concerning the disappearance of two former Foreign Office officials"—published last night.

It is disclosed that in January 1949 "the security authorities received a report that certain Foreign Office information had leaked to the Soviet authorities some years earlier."

Highly secret investigations were begun. By mid-April 1951 the field of suspects had been narrowed "to two or three persons."

*Then "by the beginning of May Maclean had come to be regarded as the principal suspect."*

*But Burgess was still not linked with Maclean.*

At this point a decision was taken to see that top-secret documents did not reach Maclean's desk.

The security men started to probe Maclean's activities and contacts to gather evidence that could justify a prosecution.

### FRIDAY TO MONDAY

To speed this process, on Friday, May 25, 1951, Mr. Herbert Morrison, then Foreign Secretary, authorised the security men to interrogate Maclean.

But Maclean had made his own plans. He arranged to take the day off on Saturday, May 26. Late on the Friday night, together with Guy Burgess, he sailed from Southampton for St. Malo.

In one amazing sentence the White-paper sums up the activities of the security men:—

158

"Maclean's absence did not become known to the authorities until the morning of Monday, May 28."

Why not? The White-paper gives an explanation. The security men were banking everything on breaking down Maclean by interrogation. But they did not want to warn him that he was under suspicion. In addition they wanted to search his house at Tatsfield, in Surrey. To do this they were prepared to wait until the middle of June 1951 when Mrs. Melinda Maclean would be in a nursing home having her baby.

### THE THIRD MAN

It was decided to risk Maclean running away. He was watched in London only.

The White-paper tacitly admits the existence of the "Third Man"—the man who gave the tip-off.

"Maclean," it says, "may have been warned—searching inquiries involving individual interrogations were made into this possibility. Insufficient evidence was obtainable to form a definite conclusion or to warrant prosecution."

What of Guy Burgess? The White-paper discloses that early in 1950 he was severely reprimanded for indiscreet talk about Foreign Office matters while on holiday abroad in 1949.

At the embassy in Washington he was reprimanded again for leaving confidential papers unattended.

As a result of his general conduct the Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, asked for Burgess to be removed.

He was recalled to London early in May 1951 and was asked to resign from the Foreign Service.

The White-paper makes this cryptic comment: "Consideration was being given to the steps that would be taken in the event of his refusing to do so. It was at this point that he disappeared."

### NEW CHECK

What has the Foreign Office done to tighten up security since?

The White-paper discloses that in July 1951 Mr. Herbert Morrison set up a committee to look into the security checks made on Foreign Office men.

The committee reported in November—by which time Sir Anthony Eden was back in office—and since 1952 searching inquiries have been made into the antecedents and associates of all those occupying or applying for positions involving highly secret information.

### WHAT NOW?

## All-party M.P.s to seek a full inquiry

THE Government, it is understood, will find time for a debate on the White-paper soon after Parliament reassembles on October 25.

Though senior members of both Government and Opposition are involved, M.P.s are

expected to insist that the case be probed as thoroughly and impartially as the much less important incident of Crichton Down.

Crichton Down—which involved land-grabbing—led to the resignation of the Minister of Agriculture and the transfer of an official.

## No panic, says McNeil

FIRST question on the B.B.C.'s "Any Questions?" programme last night was: Who carries most responsibility for Maclean and Burgess having been in touch with a foreign Power?

Panel member Mr. Hector McNeil, M.P.—he is mentioned in the White-paper—said: "We must have a post-mortem, but please, no hysteria."

"The Minister must be responsible. But the thing now

is what we do to make sure this will never happen again."

Lieut.-Colonel Marcus Lipton, Socialist M.P., who has asked many questions about Maclean and Burgess, said yesterday: "There are two kinds of intelligence: the intelligence of the average citizens and the intelligence of the Foreign Office. The White-paper is an insult to both."

Mr. Herbert Morrison last night declined to comment on the White-paper.

159

The Daily Express and  
the Foreign Office

# HAVE THEY EVER HEARD OF THE TELEPHONE?

WITH the publication of the Foreign Office's own account of the Maclean-Burgess mystery a number of questions asked by the Daily Express since 1951 still wait for a satisfactory answer.

**Q** Why did the Foreign Office seek to deny the report by Chief Crime Reporter Percy Hoskins in April last year that Vladimir Petrov—the Soviet agent who gave himself up in Australia—had provided information about Maclean and Burgess?

**A** The White-paper confirms that Petrov told the security men a very great deal.

But the Foreign Office says that accurate information was not received in Whitehall until several days after it was received by the Daily Express.

None of the information received from Petrov was cabled to London—it all came by diplomatic bag to save expense.

## That money

THEN there is the mystery of the two drafts for £1,000 that Maclean sent to his mother-in-law, Mrs. Dunbar. The White-paper says that these were received on August 3, 1951.

It is stated also that on August 5, 1951 Mrs. Maclean received a letter from her husband telling her that the money was intended for her. That letter was posted in Reigate, Surrey.

The fact that Mrs. Maclean had received money from her husband was disclosed first by the Daily Express in 1952.

This newspaper was bitterly attacked for the disclosure which, it was asserted, was quite untrue.

**Q** Why did the Foreign Office, knowing the truth and closely questioned on the point, say nothing?

**A** It was "information given to the Foreign Office in confidence by Mrs. Dunbar."

## That secret

THROUGHOUT the years since Maclean and Burgess vanished the Foreign Office has stressed that the men did not have access to vital information.

Yet now it is formally admitted that Maclean might have guessed that he was being investigated because it was arranged that "information of exceptional secrecy and importance should not come into his hands."

**Q** Why was there this persistent campaign to write down the importance of the two spies?

**A** No official answer. Just: "Espionage is carried out in secret. Counter-espionage equally depends for its success upon the maximum secrecy of its methods."

EXPRESS CHIEF CRIME REPORTER PERCY HOSKINS STUDIES  
WHITE-PAPER ON MACLEAN AND BURGESS AND ASKS—

# IS THIS THE WAY TO RUN SECURITY?

**B** BRITAIN'S Intelligence Service, which each year costs the taxpayer £5,000,000, cannot fail to come in for a certain amount of criticism when the Maclean-Burgess affair is debated in Parliament.

Examine first the admission that it was in January 1949 when it was first discovered that certain Foreign Office information had been reaching the Soviet authorities over a period of years.

The news of this leakage would have first reached M.I.6, the Intelligence department controlling our own agents

abroad, then directed by General Sir Stewart Menzies. M.I.6 would in turn report the matter to M.I.5, the internal security machine of which Sir Percy Sillitoe was then the head.

The immediate move by both organisations would be to screen the people having access to documents containing that particular information—and after all they could not have been many.

The White-paper goes on: "The field of suspicion had been narrowed down by mid-April 1951 to two or three persons."

More than two years to track

down a leakage of such importance.

Having made the decision to interview Maclean and to search his home the reasoning of the authorities is difficult to understand.

They decided to postpone the whole matter until mid-June solely because Mrs. Maclean, who was then expecting a baby, would be away from home.

Any further risk to the nation by a continuance of leakages seemed to have been a secondary consideration.

Was Maclean's house ever searched? The White-paper does

not record this interesting point. And finally there came the extraordinary case of the "lost week-end."

And remember: Nunn May had shocked us with his betrayal of atomic secrets in 1946. Pontecorvo had done his disappearing act. Fuchs had delivered another devastating body blow to our security departments in 1950. We were still in the middle of a cold war.

Yet in November 1951 a Foreign Office committee was just recommending a more extensive security check on its own staff.



Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. E.A. Tamm	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____
BRANIGAN	_____

**THE CASE OF MACLEAN  
AND BURGESS: FULL TEXT.**

**May I take  
Saturday off?  
said Maclean  
and vanished...**

NOT RECORDED  
126 OCT 11 1955

RE: DONALD DUART MacLEAN, et al  
ESPIONAGE - R (Bufile 100-374183)

DAILY EXPRESS  
SEPTEMBER 24, 1955  
LONDON, ENGLAND

DELETED COPY  
BY LETTER JUN 22 1976  
PER FOIA REQUEST

C.B. Mac Donnell

53 OCT 12 1955

jug 161

# OPINION

## WHO ARE THE GUILTY MEN?

IT is an insulting document that the Foreign Office publishes in the case of Maclean and Burgess. An insult to any reasonable man's intelligence.

Far from restoring confidence in the security organisation of the Foreign Office, it will have the opposite effect.

For here, for the first time, is the admission that the authorities were aware two years and three months before the disappearance that secrets were being stolen.

The White-paper relates how suspicions were gradually narrowed to two or three people. Then the mistake was made of keeping from Maclean documents which he would normally receive.

### To catch a spy...

ANY schoolboy would know that if you want to catch a spy you do not sound an alarm beforehand. But that was only the beginning of the bungling.

Mr. Morrison, Foreign Secretary at the time, gave the signal for Maclean to be questioned on Friday, May 25, 1951. That was the very day on which Maclean and Burgess left this country.

Maclean had asked earlier for the following Saturday morning off. Did not Security know about that? It should have been elementary to keep a check on the movements of this suspected man.

Nothing of the sort was done. It was not even known that he was missing until he failed to show up on the following Monday.

### Hushing it up

JUDGED by this account, the security authorities did not appear to treat this matter very seriously at all. How else can such negligence be explained?

And afterwards, what was the attitude of the Foreign Office? Mr. Anthony Nutting, Minister of State, brushed aside a demand for action. His airy answer was: "I am not prepared to lend myself to a witch-hunt."

But it appears that this arrogant young Minister was quite prepared to lend himself to the suppression of information. For, from then on, the object of the Foreign Office was to hush up the whole affair.

### The old excuse

THE Foreign Office consistently did its best to discount facts published in the Daily Express. In other quarters the Express was attacked and denigrated for its disclosures.

Now the Express revelations—the payment of money to Mrs. Maclean, the long association of the two diplomats with Communism, the information given by Petrov to the authorities—are all confirmed.

Yet still the Foreign Office keeps silent on many important aspects of the case. The White-paper explains that security considerations "still apply."

### Answer these questions

THAT excuse will not satisfy public opinion that all the necessary action has been taken to overhaul the security set-up in the country. Nor will the statement by Mr. Macmillan that as Foreign Secretary he is responsible for any failure, and should take the full blame.

Ministers must depend on the advice and actions of their experts. Who were the men in the key posts at the time? Have they been brought to account? Are they still carrying on in the same positions of trust?

These are questions affecting not only the nation's internal security but her vital affairs with other countries. They must be answered.

The bungling revealed in the White-paper, the facts it omits, reinforce the demand for the immediate recall of Parliament.

162

On the evening of Friday, May 25, 1951, Mr. Donald Duart Maclean, a counsellor in the senior branch of the Foreign Service and at that time head of the American Department in the Foreign Office, and Mr. Guy Francis de Money Burgess, a second secretary in the junior branch of the Foreign Service, left the United Kingdom from Southampton on the boat for St. Malo.

The circumstances of their departure from England, for which they had not sought sanction, were such as to make it obvious that they had deliberately fled the country.

Both officers were suspended from duty on June 1, 1951, and their appointments in the Foreign Office were terminated on June 1, 1952, with effect from June 1, 1951.

2 Maclean was the son of a former Cabinet Minister, Sir Donald Maclean. He was born in 1913 and was educated at Gresham's School, Holt, and Trinity College, Cambridge, where he had a distinguished academic record.

He successfully competed for the Diplomatic Service in 1935 and was posted in the first instance to the Foreign Office.

He served subsequently in Paris, at Washington, and in Cairo. He was an officer of exceptional ability and was promoted to the rank of counsellor at the early age of 33.

He was married to an American lady, and had two young sons. A third child was born shortly after his disappearance.

## Overwork

3 In May 1950 while serving in His Majesty's Embassy, Cairo, Maclean was guilty of serious misconduct and suffered a form of breakdown which was attributed to overwork and excessive drinking.

Until the breakdown took place his work had remained eminently satisfactory and there was no ground whatsoever for doubting his loyalty.

After recuperation and leave at home, he was passed medically fit, and in October 1950 was appointed to be head of the American Department of the Foreign Office which, since it does not deal with the major problems of Anglo-American relations, appeared to be within his capacity.

4 Since Maclean's disappearance a close examination of his background has revealed that during his student days at Cambridge from 1931 to 1934 he had expressed Communist sympathies, but there was no evidence that he had ever been a member of the Communist Party, and indeed on leaving the university he had outwardly renounced his earlier Communist views.

## 2,000,000 PEOPLE

How many people are under security watch? The Daily Express understands that details of about 2,000,000 PEOPLE in whom the security authorities might one day be "interested" are stored in the basement registry at M.I.5 headquarters "somewhere in London."

## AND A FEW GIRLS

IS one of the main dangers in our security system simply in this?—

I understand that the responsibility for ensuring that all new material gathered by the outside agents is filed in the correct dossiers is in the hands of a few underpaid girls.

If an M.I.5 investigator wants to know whether there is any information on file about a foreign-born scientist or a doubtful diplomat, these girls search.

The critical mistake of failing to find a dossier has happened often enough for a special phrase to be in use to describe it.

When a girl reports "nothing on record" when in fact there is a dossier out of place through care-

lessness in the green steel filing cabinets, she is said to have "missed a trace."

A "missed trace" might easily mean missing a spy as dangerous as Donald Maclean or Klaus Fuchs.

Who then are these highly important girls and how are they recruited?

They are mostly teen-age debutantes, the daughters of Society and Service families.

The argument in support of this set-up is that it is cheap, for few of the girls take on the jobs with a career in mind. And, more importantly, it keeps out Communist girls who might destroy valuable records.

It is a somewhat tarnished theory.

Chapman Pincher

143



## 'Brilliant'

Burgess was born in 1911 and was educated at the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, at Eton, and at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he had a brilliant academic record.

After leaving Cambridge in 1935 he worked for a short time in London as a journalist and joined the B.E.C. in 1936, where he remained until January 1939.

From 1939 until 1941 he was employed in one of the war propaganda organisations. He rejoined the B.E.C. in January 1941 and remained there until 1944 when he applied for, and obtained, a post as a temporary Press officer in the News Department of the Foreign Office.

He was not recruited into the Foreign Service through the open competitive examination, but in 1947 took the opportunity open to temporary employees to present himself for establishment.

He appeared before a Civil Service Commission board and was recommended for the junior branch of the Foreign Service. His establishment took effect from January 1, 1947.

He worked for a time in the office of the then Minister of State, Mr. Hector McNeill, and in the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office. In August 1950 he was transferred

to Washington as a second secretary.

6 Early in 1950 the security authorities informed the Foreign Office that in late 1949 while on holiday abroad Burgess had been guilty of indiscreet talk about secret matters of which he had official knowledge. For this he was severely reprimanded.

Apart from this lapse his service in the Foreign Office up to the time of his appointment to Washington was satisfactory and there seemed good reason to hope that he would make a useful career.

7 In Washington, however, his work and behaviour gave rise to complaint.

The ambassador reported that his work had been unsatisfactory in that he lacked thoroughness and balance in routine matters, that he had come to the unfavourable notice of the Department of State because of his

reckless driving, and that he had had to be reprimanded for carelessness in leaving confidential papers unattended.

The ambassador requested that Burgess be removed from Washington, and this was approved.

## Recalled

He was recalled to London in early May 1951, and was asked to resign from the Foreign Service.

Consideration was being given to the steps that would be taken in the event of his refusing to do so. It was at this point that he disappeared.

8 Investigations into Burgess's past have since shown that he, like Maclean, went through a period of Communist leanings while at Cambridge, and that the top on leaving the university outwardly renounced his views. No trace can be found in his

**MACLEAN'S HOME**  
IT WAS AT TATSFIELD—  
"INADVISABLE TO KEEP  
WATCH HERE," SAYS  
REPORT.

subsequent career of direct participation in the activities of Left-wing organisations. Indeed he was known after leaving Cambridge to have had some contact with organisations such as the Anglo-German Club.

9 The question has been asked whether the association of these two officers with each other did not give rise to suspicion.

The fact is that although we have since learned that Maclean and Burgess were acquainted during their undergraduate days at Cambridge, they gave no evidence during the course of their career in the Foreign Service of any association other than would be normal between two colleagues.

## A leak

When Burgess was appointed to the Foreign Office Maclean was in Washington, and at the time Burgess himself was appointed to Washington Maclean was back in the United Kingdom awaiting assignment to the American Department of the Foreign Office.

It is now clear that they were in communication with each other after the return of Burgess from Washington in 1951, and they may have been in such communication earlier. Their relations were, however, never such as to cause remark.

10 In January 1949 the security authorities received a report that certain Foreign Office information had leaked to the Soviet authorities some years earlier.

The report amounted to little more than a hint and it was at the time impossible to attribute the leak to any particular individual.

Highly secret but widespread and protracted inquiries were begun by the security authorities and the field of suspicion had been narrowed by mid-April 1951 to two or three persons.

By the beginning of May Maclean had come to be regarded as the principal suspect.

There was, however, even at that time, no legally admissible evidence to support a prosecution under the Official Secrets Acts.

## Questions

Arrangements were made to ensure that information of exceptional secrecy and importance should not come into his hands. In the meantime the security authorities arranged to investigate his activities and contacts in order to increase their background knowledge and, if possible, to obtain information which could be used as evidence in a prosecution.

On May 25, the then Secretary of State, Mr. Herbert Morrison, sanctioned a proposal that the security authorities should question Maclean.

In reaching this decision it had to be borne in mind that such questioning might produce no confession or voluntary statement from Maclean sufficient to support a prosecution, but might serve only to alert him and to reveal the nature and the extent of the suspicion against him.

In that event he would have been free to make arrangements to leave the country and the authorities would have had no legal power to stop him.

Everything therefore depended on the interview and the security authorities were anxious to be as fully prepared as was humanly possible.

They were also anxious that Maclean's house at Tatfield,

1601





Kent\*, should be searched and this was an additional reason for delaying the proposed interview until mid-June when Mrs. Maclean, who was then pregnant, was expected to be away from home.

11 It is now clear that in spite of the precautions taken by the authorities Maclean must have become aware, at some time before his disappearance, that he was under investigation.

One explanation may be that he observed that he was no longer receiving certain types of secret papers. It is also possible that he detected that he was under observation. Or he may have been warned.

Searching inquiries involving individual interrogations were made into this last possibility. Insufficient evidence was obtainable to form a definite conclusion or to warrant prosecution.

## Leave

12 Maclean's absence did not become known to the authorities until the morning of Monday, May 28.

The Foreign Office is regularly open for normal business on Saturday mornings but officers can from time to time obtain leave to take a week-end off.

In accordance with this practice Maclean applied for and obtained leave to be absent on the morning of Saturday May 26.

His absence therefore caused no remark until the following Monday morning when he failed to appear at the Foreign Office.

Burgess was on leave and under no obligation to report his movements.

13 Immediately the flight was known all possible action was taken in the United Kingdom, and the French and other Continental security authorities were asked to trace the whereabouts of the fugitives and if possible to intercept them.

All British consulates in Western Europe were alerted and special efforts were made to discover whether the fugitives had crossed the French frontiers on May 26 or 27.

As a result of these and other inquiries it was established that Maclean and Burgess together left Tatsfield by car for Southampton in the late evening of Friday, May 25, arrived at Southampton at midnight, caught the s.s. Palaise for St. Malo, and disembarked at that port at 11.45 the following morning, leaving suitcases and some of their clothing on board.

## Telegrams

They were not seen on the train from St. Malo to Paris, and it has been reported that two men, believed to be Maclean and Burgess, took a taxi to

Rennes and there got the 1.18 p.m. train to Paris. Nothing more was seen of them.

14 Since the disappearance various communications have been received from them by members of their families.

On June 7, 1951, telegrams ostensibly from Maclean were received by his mother, Lady Maclean, and his wife, Mrs. Melinda Maclean, who were both at that time in the United Kingdom.

The telegram to Lady Maclean was a short personal message, signed by a nickname known only within the immediate family circle. It merely stated that all was well.

That addressed to Mrs.



MRS. MELINDA MACLEAN  
HER HUSBAND SENT 'REGRETS'  
FOR HURRIED DEPARTURE

Maclean was similar, expressing regret for the unexpected departure, and was signed "Donald."

Both telegrams were despatched in Paris on the evening of June 6. Their receipt was at once reported to the security authorities, but it was impossible to identify the person or persons who had handed them in.

## Not his

The original telegram forms showed, however, that the messages had been written in a hand which was clearly not Maclean's. The character of the handwriting, and some misspelling, suggested that both telegrams had been written by a foreigner.

15 On June 7, 1951, a telegram was received in London by Mrs. Bassett, Burgess's mother.

It contained a short and affectionate personal message together with a statement that the sender was embarking on a long Mediterranean holiday, and was ostensibly from Burgess himself.

The telegram had been handed in at a post office in Rome earlier on the day of its receipt.

As with the telegrams from Paris to Maclean's family, there was no possibility of identifying the person who had handed it in. The handwriting had the

165

## OF THE OFFICIAL WHITE-PAPER REPORT

# '...Both men were

Continued from Page Four

appearance of being foreign, and was certainly not that of Burgess.

16 According to information given to the Foreign Office in confidence by Mrs. Dunbar, Maclean's mother-in-law, who was then living with her daughter at Tatsfield, she received on August 3, 1951, two registered letters posted in St. Gallen, Switzerland, on August 1.

One contained a draft on the Swiss Bank Corporation, London, for the sum of £1,000 payable to Mrs. Dunbar; the other, a draft payable to Mrs. Dunbar for the same sum, drawn by the Union Bank of Switzerland on the Midland Bank, 122, Old Broad-street, London.

Both drafts were stated to have been remitted by order of a Mr. Robert Becker, whose address was given as the Hotel Central, Zurich.

Exhaustive inquiries in collaboration with the Swiss authorities have not led to the identification of Mr. Becker and it is probable that the name given was false.

# free to go

# abroad'

### A letter

17 Shortly after the receipt of these bank drafts Mrs. Maclean received a letter in her husband's handwriting.

It had been posted in Reigate, Surrey, on August 5, 1951, and was of an affectionate, personal nature as from husband to wife.

It gave no clue as to Maclean's whereabouts or the reason for his disappearance, but it explained that the bank drafts, which for convenience had been sent to Mrs. Dunbar, were intended for Mrs. Maclean.

18 Lady Maclean received a further letter from her son on August 15, 1951. There is no doubt that it was in his own handwriting. It had been posted at Herne Hill [in South-East London] on August 11.

19 Mrs. Bassett, the mother of Burgess, received a letter in Burgess's handwriting on December 22, 1953.

The letter was personal and gave no information as to Burgess's whereabouts. It was simply dated "November," and had been posted in South-East London on December 21.



DONALD DUART MACLEAN  
HE WAS 'FREE TO GO ABROAD  
AT ANY TIME'

166



## The last

The last message received from either of the two men was a further letter from Burgess to his mother which was delivered in London on December 23, 1954.

This letter was also personal and disclosed nothing of Burgess's whereabouts. It too was simply dated "November." It had been posted in Poplar, E.14, on December 23.

20 On September 11, 1953, Mrs. Maclean, who was living in Geneva, left there by car with her three children.

She had told her mother, who was staying with her, that she had unexpectedly come across

an acquaintance whom she and her husband had previously known in Cairo and that he had invited her and the children to spend the week-end with him at Territet, near Montreux.

She stated that she would return to Geneva on September 13, in time for the two elder children to attend school the following day.

By September 14 her mother, alarmed at her failure to return, reported the matter to her Majesty's consul-general in Geneva and also by telephone to London.

Security officers were at once de-patched to Geneva where they placed themselves at the disposal of the Swiss police who were already making intensive inquiries.

On the afternoon of September 15 Mrs. Maclean's car was found in a garage in Lausanne.

She had left it on the afternoon of the 11th saying she would return for it in a week. The garage hand who reported this added that Mrs. Maclean had then proceeded with her children to the Lausanne railway station.

On the same day, September 15, Mrs. Dunbar reported to the Geneva police the receipt of a telegram purporting to come from her daughter.

The telegram explained that Mrs. Maclean had been delayed

"owing to unforeseen circumstances" and asked Mrs. Dunbar to inform the school authorities that the two elder children would be returning in a week.

Mrs. Maclean's youngest child was referred to in this telegram by a name known only to Mrs. Maclean, her mother, and other intimates.

The telegram had been handed in at the post office in Territet at 10.58 that morning by a woman whose description did not agree with that of Mrs. Maclean.

The hand-writing on the telegram form was not Mrs. Maclean's and showed foreign characteristics similar to those in the telegrams received in 1951 by Lady Maclean, Mrs. Maclean, and Mrs. Bassett.

## Planned

21 From information subsequently received from witnesses in Switzerland and Austria it seems clear that the arrangements for Mrs. Maclean's departure from Geneva had been carefully planned, and that she proceeded by train from Lausanne on the evening of September 11, passing the Swiss-Austrian frontier that night, and arriving at Schwarzsach St. Veit in the American zone of Austria at approximately 9.15 on the morning of September 12.

The independent evidence of a porter at Schwarzsach St. Veit, and of witnesses travelling on the train, has established that she left the train at this point.

Further evidence, believed to be reliable, shows that she was met at the station by an unknown man driving a car bearing Austrian number plates.

The further movements of this car have not been traced. It is probable that it took Mrs. Maclean and the children from Schwarzsach St. Veit to neighbouring territory in Russian occupation, whence she proceeded on her journey to join her husband.

## In touch

22 There was no question of preventing Mrs. Maclean from leaving the United Kingdom to go to live in Switzerland.

Although she was under no obligation to report her movements, she had been regularly in touch with the security authorities, and had informed



MRS. DUNBAR  
SHE RECEIVED MONEY INTENDED  
FOR HER DAUGHTER

them that she wished to make her home in Switzerland.

She gave two good reasons: firstly that she wished to avoid the personal embarrassment to which she had been subjected by the Press in the United Kingdom, and secondly that she wished to educate her children in the International School in Geneva.

It will be remembered that Mrs. Maclean was an American citizen, and in view of the publicity caused by her husband's flight it was only natural that she should wish to bring up her children in new surroundings.

## Free agent

Before she left for Geneva the security authorities made arrangements with her whereby she was to keep in touch with the British authorities in Bern and Geneva in case she should receive any further news from her husband or require advice or assistance.

Mrs. Maclean was a free agent. The authorities had no legal means of detaining her in the United Kingdom. Any form of surveillance abroad would have been unwarranted.

23 In view of the suspicious mood against Maclean and of the conspiratorial manner of his flight it was assumed, though it could not be proved, that his destination and that of his companion must have been the Soviet Union or some other territory behind the Iron Curtain.

167

Now Vladimir Petrov, the former third secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Canberra, who sought political asylum on April 3, 1954, has provided confirmation of this.

Petrov himself was not directly concerned in the case and his information was obtained from conversation with one of his colleagues in Soviet service in Australia.

Petrov states that both Maclean and Burgess were recruited as spies for the Soviet Government while students at the university, with the intention that they should carry out their espionage tasks in the Foreign Office, and that in 1951 by means unknown to him, one or other of the two men became aware that their activities were under investigation.

## Escape

This was reported by them to the Soviet Intelligence service, who then organised their escape and removal to the Soviet Union.

Petrov has the impression that the escape route included Czechoslovakia and that it involved an airplane flight into that country.

Upon their arrival in Russia, Maclean and Burgess lived near Moscow. They were used as advisers to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Soviet agencies.

Petrov adds that one of the

men (Maclean) has since been joined by his wife.

Two points call for comment: First, how Maclean and Burgess remained in the Foreign Service for so long, and second, why they were able to get away.

When these two men were given their appointments nothing was on record about either to show that he was unsuitable for the public service.

It is true that their subsequent personal behaviour was unsatisfactory, and this led to action in each case.

As already stated, Maclean was recalled from Cairo in 1950 and was not re-employed until he was declared medically fit.

Burgess was recalled from Washington in 1951 and was asked to resign.

It was only shortly before Maclean disappeared that serious suspicion of his reliability was aroused and active inquiries were set on foot.

The second question is how Maclean and Burgess made good their escape from this country when the security authorities were on their track.

The watch on Maclean was made difficult by the need to ensure that he did not become aware that he was under observation.

## Risk

This watch was primarily aimed at collecting, if possible, further information, and not at preventing an escape.

In imposing it a calculated risk had to be taken that he might become aware of it and might take flight.

It was inadvisable to increase this risk by extending the surveillance to his home in an isolated part of the country and he was therefore watched in London only.

Both men were free to go abroad at any time.

In some countries, no doubt, Maclean would have been arrested first and questioned afterwards. In this country no arrest can be made without adequate evidence. At the time there was insufficient evidence.

It was for these reasons necessary for the security authorities to embark upon the difficult and delicate investigation of Maclean, taking into full account the risk that he would be alerted.

In the event he was alerted and fled the country together with Burgess.

As a result of this case in July 1951 the then Secretary of State, Mr. Herbert Morrison, set up a committee of inquiry to consider the security checks applied to members of the Foreign Service, the existing regulations and practices of the Foreign Service in regard to any matters having a bearing on security, and to report whether any alterations were called for. The committee reported in November 1951.

## Check

It recommended, among other things, a more extensive security check on Foreign Service officers than had until then been the practice.

This was immediately put into effect and since 1952 searching inquiries have been made into the antecedents and associates of all those occupying or applying for positions in the Foreign Office involving highly secret information.

The purpose of these inquiries is to ensure that no one is appointed to or continues to occupy any such post unless he or she is fit to be entrusted with the secrets to which the post gives access.

The Foreign Secretary of the day approved the action required.

## Criterion

A great deal of criticism has been directed towards the reticence of ministerial replies on these matters, an attitude which it was alleged would not have been changed had it not been for the Petrov revelations.

Espionage is carried out in secret. Counter-espionage equally depends for its success upon the maximum secrecy of its methods.

Nor is it desirable at any moment to let the other side know how much has been discovered or guess at what means have been used to discover it. Nor should they be allowed to know all the steps that have been taken to improve security.

These considerations still apply and must be the basic criterion for judging what should or should not be published.

168



Mr. Boardman	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Sizoo	_____
Mr. Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

**Maclean White Paper reveals  
amazing suspicion of leak  
after top-level decision**

BOACH  
CE Mac Donnell  
10/11/55  
Jung

# IS THERE A SUPER SPY

***—still  
tapping  
secrets  
of the  
Foreign  
Office?***

RE: MacLEAN CASE  
(Bufile 100-374183)

DAILY SKETCH  
SEPTEMBER 24, 1955  
LONDON, ENGLAND

NOT RECORDED  
108 OCT 11 1955

164

5-11-55

10 OCT 11 1955

## **IS THERE STILL A SUPER SPY INSIDE THE FOREIGN OFFICE?**

This astonishing new line of inquiry is sparked off by one paragraph in last night's White Paper on the Burgess and Maclean affair.

This paragraph makes an amazing disclosure. The two men disappeared on the **EVENING OF FRIDAY, MAY 25, 1951.**

During the **DAY OF FRIDAY, MAY 25,** Mr. Herbert Morrison, then Foreign Secretary, had secretly sanctioned a proposal that the security authorities should question Maclean.

What happened that afternoon?

The Foreign Secretary's decision would normally be known to only two or three people at the top of the Foreign Office and the Intelligence Service.

**DID SOMEBODY WARN MACLEAN?**

**IF SOMEBODY DID, WHO WAS THAT SOMEBODY?**

Was he some unauthorised outsider able to tap high secrets swiftly? Or was he a secret agent actually inside the Foreign Office or Security, who managed to learn top level decisions soon after they were made?

**If he was, IS HE STILL THERE?**

For the report makes it quite clear that nobody was ever caught.

This is what the White Paper says:

"It is now clear that Maclean must have become aware that he was under investigation. One explanation may be that he observed that he was no longer receiving certain types of secret papers.

"It is also possible that he detected that he was under observation.

**"OR HE MAY HAVE BEEN WARNED."**

**"Searching inquiries involving individ-**

17

# MACLEAN CRISIS FLARING AFTER NEW DISCLOSURE

➔ From Page 1

dual interrogations were made into this last possibility.

*"Insufficient evidence was obtainable to form a definite conclusion or to warrant prosecution."*

The White Paper makes no further reference to this sensational point. The Biggest Question of ALL remains unanswered.

But (says Daily Sketch political correspondent Guy Eden) M.P.s will want an answer to it when the House reassembles next month.

Sir Anthony Eden saw Mr. Harold Macmillan, Foreign Secretary, just before the White Paper was published last night. It was decided to offer a debate in the Commons if the Socialists ask for it.

## **MPs DEMAND DEBATE**


It is almost certain that Mr. Attlee will do so—but if he does not, M.P.s on the Government side will press for a debate.

M.P.s of all parties expressed the view last night that a searching inquiry into the working of the Foreign Office and its handling of secrets is imperative.

But the Cabinet will refuse a Parliamentary inquiry, and Sir Anthony is prepared to make the matter one of confidence in the Government, threatening resignation if the Commons insist on one.

What else does the White Paper tell us?

It discloses that Mr. Morrison, immediately after the disappearance, set up a Committee of Inquiry to look into the Foreign Office security checks as applied to members of the staff, and into the security regulations.



Miscellaneous No. 17 (1955)

## **Report** concerning the disappearance of two former Foreign Office Officials

London, September 1955

*Facsimile of part of the White Paper. The title is wrong. Maclean and Burgess were not former officials when they disappeared.*

171