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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 01-06-2009 BY 65179 dmh /baw

Date of transcription 02/07/2007

On 02/01/2007, [redacted] SSAN [redacted]
[redacted] telephone number [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the U.S. Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID),
Fort Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of
the interviewing agents, [redacted] reviewed and signed a Non-
Disclosure Agreement, and indicated to interviewing agents that
[redacted] understood the Agreement. [redacted] then provided the
following information:

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[redacted] recalled generally the investigative activities
taking place at USAMRIID in late 2001, but was unable to assist
investigators in establishing [redacted] whereabouts in September and
October, 2001. [redacted] could not recall what [redacted] was doing
during that time frame and did not have any records available
that would demonstrate [redacted] activities.

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Investigation on 02/01/2007 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-[redacted]-3 Date dictated 02/06/2007by SA [redacted]
PI [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [] , On 02/01/2007 , Page 2

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]
[Redacted] Computers at USAMRIID
are switched out every three years, [Redacted]

[Redacted] Investigators suggested the computer's hard drive could be mirrored in [Redacted] office rather than removing the computer, but [Redacted] had observed how long that process took with other researcher's computers, and [Redacted] was too busy to have that kind of interruption. [Redacted] again suggested investigators take [Redacted] to examine later, as long as the computer was returned.

After indicating that [Redacted]
[Redacted] voluntarily signed a Consent to Search form indicating [Redacted] consent to a full search of the computer and also signed an FD-597 Receipt for Property. [Redacted] was provided with copies of both documents and instructed to notify [Redacted] that [Redacted] had turned the computer over to the agents. SA [Redacted] took custody of the computer and transported it to the Northern Virginia Resident Agency in Tysons Corner, Virginia for analysis (collection of the computer is documented in an FD-302 at 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID Serial 1672, and the signed Consent to Search and FD-597 are contained in 1A 7155).

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With regard to the computers in the hot suites, [Redacted] stated their computer services had recently changed out all of the operating systems. Computers are changed out/upgraded every three years. [Redacted] was not sure how many computers were switched out, but believed it was all computers in the hot suite.

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It is [] opinion that the 2001 anthrax attacks were perpetrated by a foreign person or government, and the investigation should focus on one group or country. [] has no feeling at all that anyone at USAMRIID was involved. [] could not think of any motive why someone at USAMRIID would have mailed the anthrax letters.

According to [] there was one particular group that did not like the biological defense work done at USAMRIID and other facilities and who thought there was no real threat of the offensive use of biological agents such as anthrax. [] thought the group was called the Committee of Responsible Physicians and its most vocal member was [] Group members would show up at anthrax conferences and publicly disputed the perception that biological weapons, specifically anthrax, present any real threat. [] noted that the group, and [] "disappeared" after 9/11 and the 2001 anthrax attacks.

[] thought the anthrax letters contained several grams of dry anthrax, which would require a large amount of liquid spores. [] does not know how to dry liquid spores to a powder. [] assumes a lyophilizer would have been used, but does not know how it would have been done safely. [] suggested it had to be done in a biosafety hood, but [] still does not know how to get the lyophilized spores into a fine powder. [] stated DUGWAY had the capability, but that no such capability existed at USAMRIID (DUGWAY is fully identified as U.S. ARMY DUGWAY PROVING GROUND, in Utah). [] stressed that all of USAMRIID's spore preparations are wet. [] is aware of a lyophilizer in [] a non-containment [] area.

[] does not know who at USAMRIID has experience with a lyophilizer, but thought [] knew how to use the equipment. [] does not recall ever seeing the lyophilizer in use, but may have seen it used to dry down a reagent like a chemical. [] speculated that it could be used to provide a plasmid vector by drying down on a disk to send someone.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [] , On 02/01/2007 , Page 4

[] thought it might take a few hours to dry down a wet anthrax spore preparation, depending on the volume of material. [] believed someone could observe a lyophilizer in use and know how to use it without additional training.

[] described [] as a good worker, and [] had no reason to think anything negative of [] worked in [] so [] did not have much interaction with [] but [] believed [] provided good technical support. [] commented the only thing [] heard about [] was "gossipy things" such as that [] handled material without gloves on. [] could provide no other specific examples of "gossipy things."

[] was asked to read an email with a subject line "Hot news!" which suggests [] made a powder similar to the powder used in the 2001 attacks [] is believed by investigators to be [] stated [] had not seen that email and had never heard the information contained in the email.

[] did not have much to do with [] who [] believed took the lead on working with the FBI and primarily handled the anthrax letters. It was [] understanding that [] maintains a collection of all biological agents because they do forensic assays for comparison. [] was involved with [] work with the FBI.

[] was not well liked at USAMRIID. [] described [] as abrasive with poor people skills, stating [] did not have "warm fuzzy interaction" with people. [] however, had no reason to believe [] would do anything bad. [] was asked to review a lengthy document which suggests [] had some involvement in the mailings. [] had not previously seen the document but thought it may describe someone in the [] Division.

The staff at USAMRIID did not receive any blame or pressure from Army managers for the problems associated with the vaccine administered to troops during the first Gulf War. According to [] there was no pressure to develop a new vaccine after complaints about the anthrax vaccine became public in the 1990s. [] identified this vaccine as AVA and reiterated there was no concern at USAMRIID over the vaccine, which had been developed in the "early years," possibly around 1980. []

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BRUCE IVINS but did not work on the newer recombinant PA (rPA) gene.

[] was not aware of any instance where members of the media contacted researchers or other USAMRIID employees about problems with the anthrax vaccine. [] was not aware of any problems researchers had with the media prior to the attacks. [] was contacted by then [] reporter [] after the anthrax attacks, but before USAMRIID was "targeted" by the media and in the investigation. Public Affairs Officer [] would have handled all media requests.

Prior to the anthrax attacks, [] did not observe anything unusual about [] colleagues' behavior, however they appeared nervous and anxious in the days following the attacks. [] was not aware of any of [] co-workers having alcohol or drug related problems, [] does not know what [] colleagues are like away from USAMRIID. [] was also not aware of any co-workers with behavioral or financial problems.

[] did not have any problems with anyone in 2001, and recalled the following individuals as working in the [] Division in 2001: [] BRUCE IVINS (a good person with who [] did not have much interaction), [] (a "solid worker") [] [] (had been at USAMRIID "since time began"), []

[] described the atmosphere in the [] Division as "convivial," but stated there are no jokes involving anything personal.

[] was, in [] opinion, "okay" although [] was "kind of abrasive." [] did not have much interaction with [] and found [] "pleasant enough." [] tech was [] LNU, who now works at [] (writer's note: [] tech has been previously identified as [] heard mention of a "tussle" [] had with IVINS, and had also heard about [] "loud talk," but could not provide any information on either situation. [] left USAMRIID for a job at a []

[] suggested [] may have also been frustrated with []

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Continuation of FD-302 of [], On 02/01/2007, Page 6

"regulatory stuff" and the slow administrative processes at USAMRIID. [] volunteered that [] and [] did not like each other.

[] has not worked directly with IVINS since the [] According to [] IVINS has good technical skills; he does not do a lot of cloning, but does "solid" vaccine testing. IVINS is down to earth and unassuming; overall a "very solid person." [] further described IVINS as a good-hearted person who would do anything for you, and summed up [] comments regarding IVINS as "He's just Bruce."

[] is the "Institute's memory." [] thought [] had been a tech at USAMRIID for [] years or more and also described [] as a solid individual. According to [] is the "pillar of this place" in that [] knows where to find everything and understands the "nuts and bolts" of how USAMRIID functions. [] lamented that when [] retires, a lot of institutional memory will be gone with [] [] was further described as a nice [] who was easy to get along with, and who did not have problems with anyone.

[] is also a [] has not done any direct research with [] but gets along with [] well. [] could not think of anything negative about []

[] was advised by interviewing agents it was now known to investigators that the material used in the 2001 attacks came from USAMRIID. [] immediately stated that if it came from USAMRIID, it was sent somewhere else, and therefore someone outside of USAMRIID mailed the anthrax letters. [] was informed that was not the case, that the material used came from USAMRIID, and that the mailer was someone who worked at USAMRIID or had worked at USAMRIID in the past. [] was visibly disturbed by this information, and apologized for sounding like a broken record but stressed that [] really believes [] colleagues are all very good people. [] was reminded of the terms on the Non-Disclosure Agreement [] signed at the beginning of the interview.

[] reiterated that everyone in the [] Division gets along very well, [] [] stated that they all "hang together" and

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described this as very unique for any Division at USAMRIID, and that made it bearable to work there.

was asked to review a set of charts which depicted Division employees' access to the hot suites on September 12, 2001 through October 8, 2001.

was asked about the type of work being done in the suites during that time and whether or not that was consistent with what observed in the charts. did not know exactly what others were working on, stating that a person's time in the hot suites could have been to inoculate or harvest spores. Animals are required to be checked two or three times a day, depending on what stage in the process they were at, which could also explain some hot suite activities.

observed that on October 1, 2001, where an unusual amount of activity appeared to be taking place in the hot suites the Division was probably preparing for a scheduled decontamination of or , or it was a "big cleaning day."

was asked about IVINS's time in the suites as compared to other researchers. According to IVINS may have been starting a culture if he was making a spore preparation. With regard to IVINS's late night and weekend entries into the suites, suggested he was setting up his work in the evenings then inoculate into a larger volume.

IVINS did a lot of work for other researchers, and did not find his time in the suites to be unusual. pointed out that their work requires them to work around the organisms, not around the clock, elaborating that animals and other living things have their own start and stop time that does not fit within the work day. IVINS was helping a lot of people at the time and growing a lot of spores for other researchers and may have been working on a starter prep or sub-culture, but could not be more specific because does not know what was working on. also stated IVINS was more active in his research and carrying a more hectic schedule in 2001, and that he has more help now than he did at that time.

who worked with IVINS, did not get along when they were working together. stated that a lot of people did not like and described as very "gossipy." stated on the other hand, was well liked and considered very skilled.

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[] now works at [] observed that [] seemed to really enjoy [] work.

[] currently works for IVINS. [] described [] as a very skilled animal tech, and [] was always called upon by others to help with the animals.

[] considers [] a very good scientist and someone who "really knows anthrax." [] is a [] with a keen intelligence, is very productive, and well liked. []

[] have all worked for [] with [] having worked for [] for [] years.

[] has been at USAMRIID [] and was at USAMRIID during the "white coat" days, when researchers all wore white laboratory coats. []

[] described [] as a "very good anthrax person" who is very skilled and careful. [] pointed out that [] skills and care in the lab is reflected in []

[] works with [] at USAMRIID and has not been there as long as [] observed [] to be a "very together person" who doesn't go "off the cuff." [] does not get "riled up" and is a very steady person. [] has a lot of respect for what [] does.

[] works for [] is very careful with regards to safety in the lab and is very careful in handling organisms. [] observed that []

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 02/01/2007, Page 9

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] was asked to review a copy of a [redacted] Attachment, which included [redacted]. This page looked vaguely familiar to [redacted], but thinks [redacted] may have seen a longer document with more specific instruction regarding how to prepare the slants for transport and removal from the suites.

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USAMRIID researchers maintain their spore stocks as frozen or in a liquid suspension. Frozen stock is kept on dry ice while working with it, and to prepare samples from frozen stock requires using a loop to scrape off the desired amount and transfer to nutrient medium. For liquid preparations, the spores may have settled to the bottom, so it is common practice to re-suspend the spores to ensure a uniform sample is obtained. [redacted] explained this simply as mixing up the liquid preparation before taking a sample. [redacted] commented that if a sample were taken from the top of the liquid without re-suspending the spores, it would not have the right concentration of spores. [redacted] thought the only time a sample could be taken from the top of the liquid would be if the liquid had just been made, and the spores had not had time to settle to the bottom. [redacted] added that it would be obvious if the spores had settled or had been re-suspended -- one could tell by simply looking at the liquid. If the spores had settled, the liquid would appear to have white/gray pellets at the bottom, where as if the spores were suspended, the liquid would look like water.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [] , On 02/01/2007 , Page 10

[] stated several times that it is common practice to resuspend spores before taking any sample, either for the FBI samples or research, because failing to do so would alter the spore concentration. According to [] no one who regularly works with liquid preparations would need to receive specific instructions to resuspend the spores, because it is always done.

[]

According to [] there is not a lot of talk about the investigation of the 2001 anthrax attacks. IVINS still mentions the investigation occasionally because he has been harassed by investigators. IVINS feels like he's been highlighted "quite a bit." IVINS talks about the investigation with []. When asked what IVINS and [] talk about, [] described it as "jokey stuff" but could not elaborate or give a specific example. [] insisted the investigation was not an active topic of conversation but believes IVINS feels pressure from being under the spotlight. [] commented that IVINS and [] are very frustrated at the case not being solved and because it seems to come back to them all the time. [] thought maybe [] talks to IVINS and [] about the investigation.

[] further described IVINS as being heavily involved in his church and added he is a very dedicated Red Cross volunteer. [] stated IVINS spends a lot of time in his lab in the other building, but did not elaborate. IVINS socializes with [] and is generally very sociable. IVINS will bring in jars of candy to share with everyone and will leave the candy by the coffee machine. IVINS likes to do things for other people.

[] was also asked to read an email from November, 1994, which appears to be several emails or web postings run together. The email first purports to be from a veterinary medicine student seeking information on anthrax, then makes references to the "black angel of death" and "Mr. Clean." [] did not recognize this email, and does not know of anyone at USAMRIID referred to as the angel of death or Mr. Clean.

[] was not aware of anyone who keeps track of Members of Congress or the issues before Congress. [] was asked to review a document containing a list of Congressmen,

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Continuation of FD-302 of [] , On 02/01/2007 , Page 11 b6
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separated by party affiliation, and listing the Congressmen's positions on issues related to anthrax vaccine development. [] denied ever having seen the list or anything similar, and did not know of anyone who would keep such a list.

All documents reviewed by [] and the original Non-Disclosure Agreement signed by [] are enclosed in a 1A with the notes of this interview.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/12/2007

On 02/21/2007, [REDACTED]

SSAN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] telephone number [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was interviewed at [REDACTED] place of employment, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

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[REDACTED] BRUCE IVINS was producing anthrax spores for himself and other principal investigators since 2001. [REDACTED] recalled these spores were used in vaccine and antibiotics studies. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] in 2001 IVINS was involved in projects designed to improve the effectiveness of vaccines. These projects focused on factors such as the use of adjuvants, the timing of doses, the number of doses, etc. His work involved interaction with the companies that produced adjuvants. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was unaware of any anthrax spore production work performed by IVINS that was not for another Principal Investigator, another laboratory, or a project of his own. [REDACTED] is unaware of any spore production work that did not result in publication. However, [REDACTED] noted that there are occasions where observations made in a lab do not result in publication but can be presented or referenced elsewhere. [REDACTED]

Copies of [REDACTED]

and the notes of this interview were filed in a 1A envelope.

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Investigation on 2/21/2007 at Frederick, MDFile # 279A-WF-222936- [REDACTED] 32Date dictated 4/12/2007by PI
SA [REDACTED]b6
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/24/2002

To: Washington Field

Attn: AMERITHRAX Task Force

From: Washington Field

AMERITHRAX 1

Contact: IRS [redacted]

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Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

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Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936 [redacted] (Pending) 637

Title: AMERITHRAX

Major Case 184

OO: Washington Field

Synopsis: Report results of data queries on [redacted]
[redacted], an employee of the United States Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), who
has access to virulent Bacillus anthrax (Ba).

Administrative: Analysis completed at the Pocatello Information
Technology Center (PITC) by the AMERITHRAX [redacted] Team.

Details: The [redacted] was requested to
obtain information on [redacted] an employee of USAMRIID.
The following are the results of these queries:

Databases Searched:

Positive

Public Source [redacted]

Automated Case Support (ACS) [redacted]

NCIC


AMERITHRAX Major Case Database

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Negative

Internet [redacted]

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S: /Amerithrax /upload / [redacted] EC

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936- 06/24/2002

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PENTTBOMB Major Case Database
IntelPlus
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN)

Biographical information:

Name:

Sex:

DOB:

Height:

Weight:

SSAN:

Driver's license:

Address:

Owner:

Sale date:

Sale amount:

Loan amount:

Loan type:

Vehicles:

Possible telephone
number:

Education:

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936- 06/24/2002

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ACS:

is referenced in the following serials:

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279A-WF-222936, serial dated was included on a list of USAMRIID employees to be (or were) interviewed;

279A-WF-222936, serial dated was on a list of persons to be interviewed;

279A-WF-222936, serial dated was mentioned in an interview of Bruce Edwards Ivins;

279A-WF-222936, serial dated was mentioned in an interview of

279A-WF-222936, serial dated was mentioned in an interview of

279A-WF-222936-302, serial dated was mentioned in an interview of

Interview:

279A-WF-222936-302, serial dated interview of described position at USAMRIID and tasks; replied negatively when asked about the anthrax letters;

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279A-WF-222936-302, serial dated was mentioned in an interview of

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279A-WF-222936- serial dated but should be dated was mentioned in a summary concerning Bruce E. Ivins (supra);

279A-WF-222936-302, serial dated was mentioned in an interview of

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279A-WF-222936-302, serial dated was mentioned in an interview of

279A-WF-222936-302, serial dated was mentioned in an interview of

279A-WF-222936-302, serial dated was mentioned in an interview of

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-[redacted] 06/24/2002

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Interview:

279A-WF-222936-302, serial [redacted] dated [redacted]
interview of [redacted]
[redacted]

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AMERITHRAX Major Case Database:

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] received a vaccination booster [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] attended the University of [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] position is described as [redacted] in the
[redacted] at USAMRIID.

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DATE 01-06-2009 BY 65179 dmh /baw

Date of transcription 01/24/2006

On January 24, 2006, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] [redacted] social security number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), work telephone number [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] has worked with *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) since [redacted] and has always worked in [redacted] no longer produces Ba spores for aerosol challenges. [redacted] last made Ba spore preparations in approximately [redacted]. These preparations ranged from 250 milliliters for small animal challenges to one liter of spores for large animal challenges. The largest spore preparation [redacted] ever made for an aerosol challenge was eight flasks of spores, each containing 250 milliliters. [redacted]

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[redacted] containment suite work is conducted in Suite [redacted], which is also where [redacted] samples are located.

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[redacted] received Ba Ames from BRUCE IVINS [redacted]

Investigation on 01/24/2006 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 25

Date dictated N/A

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SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 01/24/2006, Page 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was then shown six photographs of a vial upon which was handwritten [REDACTED]. This vial was found during the FBI's July 2004 search of USAMRIID. A copy of the photographs shown to [REDACTED] was sent to the 1A section of the file. Upon viewing these photographs, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] shares [REDACTED] laboratory space with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] did not know of any dried Ba work conducted at USAMRIID, and advised that "no one knows how to make" dried Ba.

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FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

No Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheet(s).

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 1
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