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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/05/2007

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[redacted] Date of Birth [redacted] social
security number of [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of
employment, [redacted]

[redacted] by United States Postal Inspectors (PI)

[redacted]
[redacted] was advised of the identity of the
interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview. [redacted]
provided the following information:

[redacted]
[redacted] was
questioned about the period of the 2001 mailings and if [redacted] could
recall any travel by [redacted] during the period. [redacted] stated
that [redacted] could not remember any unusual travel by [redacted]
indicated that [redacted] and [redacted] notify each other of any business
or pleasure trips. [redacted]

1/2 [redacted]

[redacted] was asked if [redacted] had cellular phones
during the 2001 time frame. [redacted] did not recall if they had
cellular phones during the time frame but indicated [redacted]
were not big cellular phone people.

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] 07095.302

Investigation on 4/05/2007 at [redacted] MD

File # 279A-WF-222936-[redacted]-6 Date dictated 4/05/2007

by [redacted]

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[] stated that [] parents live in []
[] and that [] talks with them on the telephone.

[] was asked if there were unflattering issues that
might be developed in looking at [] []
stated that there were no issues.

[] stated that [] interaction with []
[] was limited to []
[] could not remember all attendees, but
remembered that [] and
BRUCE IVINS had attended in the past.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/01/2008

[redacted] Date of Birth: [redacted], Social Security Account Number: [redacted] office telephone number: [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), [redacted] Porter St., Frederick Maryland. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview [redacted] provided the following information:

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During [redacted] was being renovated and the researchers who typically work in [redacted] were sharing laboratory space in [redacted] an incident that occurred [redacted] A two liter flask being used to grow *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) leaked and had a "drip line" of dried media/Ba on the outside of the flask. [redacted] believed that only one flask had leaked, but there was a possibility that two flasks leaked. [redacted] wiped off the flask with a paper towel and threw it into the trash. In addition to the flask an autopipette was contaminated, likely by the glove of [redacted] or [redacted] As a result of this incident environmental sampling was conducted on [redacted]

(124)
[redacted]

SA [redacted] reviewed the results of the sampling with [redacted] and inquired as to why many of the environmental samples from room [redacted] came up as having greater than 200 colonies of Ba. [redacted] indicated that if a plate from a swab had colonies that were too numerous to count (TNTC), it was enumerated at greater than 200. [redacted] indicated that [redacted] was "spore central" and many research groups would grow spores in this laboratory because it had all of the required equipment. At that time, some of the people that used [redacted] to make spores were; [redacted] BRUCE IVINS, and [redacted]

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During the sampling [redacted] took swabs of areas that [redacted] believed, based on [redacted] experience, would be susceptible to contamination and in this way enriched the sampling results. [redacted] "fully expected" the ice machine to be an area that would be contaminated, since ice is a part of the spore production process. [redacted] reiterated that [redacted] was targeting specific areas to sample because [redacted] was trying to find contamination. [redacted] noted that the areas of [redacted]

Investigation on 02/01/2008 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-[redacted]-13Date dictated 02/01/2008b6
b7Cby SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

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contamination were decontaminated using a bleach solution, and the areas were then re-surveyed. [] stated that the decontamination would have been the responsibility of the workers in each laboratory. [] didn't recall if there was additional or a follow-up sampling of [] [] didn't believe that the contamination of [] during this sampling was any worse than in had been during previous occasions when environmental sampling was conducted; however, as a result weekly sampling was initiated and is still ongoing.

While it was possible for the contamination in [] to be a result of the anthrax letters, [] felt it was more likely the result of sloppy work, especially the floor below the hood. [] was warned repeatedly not to place flasks used to culture *Ba* on the floor.

Subsequent to the B3 events and sampling, BRUCE IVINS performed unauthorized environmental sampling and identified *Bacillus anthracis* outside the confines of the containment suites. This finding initiated a USAMRIID-wide environmental sampling, and an Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation was initiated. [] indicated that [] was responsible for conducting their own environmental sampling.

[] opined that the contamination by the cold-side of the B3 passbox was a result of a droplet on the outside of the packaging in which the Daschle letter was contained.

[] believed that when IVINS sampled around the outside of the B3 passbox, the wall bumper on the right side was the area where a significant number of spores were found. [] rationalized the location of the contamination as being consistent with a right-handed person, holding the Daschle package in their right hand, and opening the passbox latches with their left hand, which would place the Daschle package in proximity to the location where the contamination was found.

A common belief among individuals in [] was that this contamination was from the Daschle letter, when it was brought into B3 for analysis. []

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Continuation of FD-302 of [] , On 02/01/2008 , Page 3

[] felt that the positive nasal swab for [] probably came from the shaker and not a contaminated surface, as they are less likely to cause a positive exposure, due to dried media being "sticky." [] did not recall if the colonies from the nasal swabs had been tested for erythromycin resistance, but believed that [] would know. [] didn't believe anyone was in "grave" danger as a result of the contamination found in [] and the other areas of the B3 hot suite. The results of the sampling were likely e-mailed to those who worked in the B3 suite and believed that the areas with positive swabs would have been cleaned up by those who worked in them. [] would have conducted the sampling in [] even though the results are reported with the expanded sampling conducted []

[] did not describe the powders behavior to be easily aerosolizable and floating all over the place like a few others who worked with the letter powders.

After the first gulf war, Anthrax work at USAMRIID began to decline and glanders and plague research became a higher priority. However, in the late 90's research on a new Protective Antigen (PA) anthrax vaccine became revitalized because of negative press surrounding the existing AVA vaccine.

[] was asked if [] was running out of a batch of spores that was being used for a series of studies, what would [] use as a source for a new batch. [] responded that [] would likely use a seed stock and not the current batch that was being used in the series of studies. [] also indicated that it was [] opinion that a bridging study would only be necessary if different batches of spores were to be used within the same animal species.

Regarding the morphological variants found in the Ba from the anthrax letters, [] believed that it may have been

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discussed with personnel within the [] Division after the discovery was made. It would be common for this type of discussion and it wasn't indicated that it was something that should not be discussed. [] believed that [] had a conversation with [] before a [] e-mail from [] which included photographs of the morphological variants in the evidence.

[] contacted the interviewing agents [] stating that [] could not find any e-mails regarding [] sampling results having been e-mailed to others in []. In addition, [] could not find any documentation regarding discussions of the morphological variants prior to the [] e-mail from []. However, [] did indicate that after the [] time frame, people were discouraged from openly discussing the forensic samples.

A copy of the materials shown to [] during the interview as well as a copy of the e-mail sent to SA [] will be placed in the 1A with the original interview notes.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/06/2007

On January 29, 2007, [redacted] DOB [redacted]
[redacted] SSAN [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the U.S.
Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
(USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the
identity of the interviewing agents, [redacted] reviewed and signed
a Non-Disclosure Agreement, and indicated to interviewing agents
that [redacted] understood the Agreement. [redacted] then provided the
following information:

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At the request of interviewing agents prior to this
interview, [redacted] reviewed [redacted] calendar and data stored on [redacted]
work and personal computers from September and October 2001, in
order to assist in the reconstruction of a time line of [redacted]
activities during that time frame [redacted]
[redacted] provided printouts from [redacted] USAMRIID computer hard drive
showing e-mail information and the last modified dates of
documents [redacted] worked on during the same time frame [redacted]
[redacted] provided photographs of [redacted] computer
screen showing similar information, [redacted]
[redacted] also provided a photocopy of [redacted] calendar
for [redacted]

[redacted] was shown printouts of several e-mails from the
USAMRIID computer servers purported to be written by [redacted] in
September and October 2001, and asked if the date and time stamp
on the e-mails accurately reflect the date and time [redacted] actually
sent the e-mails. [redacted] could not recall exactly when the e-
mails were written, [redacted]

[redacted] had no reason to believe the date and time stamp
on the e-mails was not accurate.

[redacted] was then shown data from USAMRIID's key card
access records indicating the dates and times [redacted] accessed
[redacted] and various components within the building and

113-1,
9-15-17
[redacted]

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PI [redacted]

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asked if [] could explain why there is no record of [] in the building when the e-mails were sent. [] admitted that prior to the anthrax mailings in 2001, there was "piggybacking" into and out of the building, where one or more people would pass through the door without using their key card, following someone in front of them who had. [] stressed that although piggybacking into and out of the building was common, there was no piggybacking into or out of the hot suites. All of the documents provided by [] along with the e-mails and key card access records referenced above are contained in 1A 7144.

[]

[] has no connections to New Jersey, []

[]

[]

According to [] did not have remote access to USAMRIID's computer system, and typically carried work to and from [] home via floppy disks. [] was able to access some websites from home, but could not access the network. [] was aware that some USAMRIID employees requested laptops or remote access, usually those in a TDY status, as well as Division Chiefs, or others who just insisted on having that capability.

[] routinely archived all of [] computer files and old e-mails as records, however, USAMRIID's computer services changed servers and now Macintosh computer users, such

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as [redacted] cannot access their archived files. [redacted] offered to advise agents should [redacted] re-gain access to the information archived in [redacted] e-mail.

[redacted] recalled attending a party at [redacted] and remembers the following people were also in attendance: [redacted]
BRUCE IVINS, [redacted]

[redacted] did not specifically recall anyone at [redacted] party talking about ROBERT STEVENS, who had died [redacted] of inhalation anthrax. The Centers for Disease Control's (CDC) explanations as reported in the media of how STEVENS contracted anthrax was not plausible, according to [redacted] [redacted] remembers the CDC's comments being discussed among some co-workers, but does not recall specific comments made by anyone.

[redacted]
[redacted]

When asked about colleagues who had caused problems for others or with research projects, [redacted] provided information on the following individuals:

[redacted] was a [redacted] for a number of years at USAMRIID, and [redacted] described [redacted] as an arrogant bully.

[redacted]

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[redacted] [redacted] could run a fermentor, and [redacted] knew purification better than most researchers, but [redacted] did not believe [redacted] could make spores, and [redacted] found it hard to believe [redacted] was capable of mailing anthrax. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] recalled another person with personnel problems, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

When asked about the level of expertise of fellow researchers at USAMRIID, [redacted] claimed none of the researchers in [redacted] had expertise drying anthrax spores - they only

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made liquid preparations. According to [] they were told after the 2001 anthrax attacks that Dugway had dried spores (Dugway is fully identified at U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, in Utah). [] heard [] had worked with "irradiated" dried material after the mailings, but suggested [] would be better able to address the question of [] work. [] recalled hearing that approximately in 1984 researchers (possibly [] used lyophilized plaque because there was less apparent damage to cell walls. [] suggested there may have been discussions about powders, [] [] impression since arriving at USAMRIID is that work with powdered *Bacillus anthracis* is considered offensive research, and there is no offensive work done at that facility. USAMRIID's research is generally limited to vaccine work, done with small liquid quantities of anthrax.

[] described [] as having an "air of mystery," [] was arrogant [] [] was suspicious of [] because they originally denied that the anthrax letters were taken into B3. The chain of custody could not be located, but SA [] had told [] observed the transfer. In addition to SA [] [] also personally observed the letters in the suite. [] inferred that [] group passed the letters to BRUCE IVINS and believed it was a cover-up by the [] and let [] "hang" for it. Because no one was allowed in the [] that group had to do their own swabs.

Interviewing agents showed [] a copy of an e-mail dated [] with the subject line [] (all information identifying who provided the e-mail was previously redacted). [] was asked if [] was aware of the source of the information in the e-mail, which implied [] had produced a spore powder matching the material in the attack letters, []

[]

[] was aware that [] had looked at some material for the FBI and had heard []

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"spouting off" about the FBI samples. [] only suspicion of [] and [] is limited to the letters being taken into B3.

[] was asked to review a 29-page typed document titled [] which obviously describes [] and explains how [] could have been involved in the anthrax mailings. [] had never seen the document, and was not aware of any person or group who claimed to be the [] or otherwise affiliated with such.

After USAMRIID received the anthrax attack letters in 2001, [] thought [] went to IVINS out of concern for the way [] handled the letters. IVINS swabbed the area in December 2001, and saw anthrax. [] believes IVINS just wanted to make sure the area was safe and clean, and did not intend to make waves, so he just cleaned the problem areas and did not confirm his findings ("he did not gamma phage it"). IVINS was concerned for [] because [] did not have a reputation for being very safe and portrayed a very cavalier attitude.

With regard to possible contamination incidents, [] recalled [] and [] had culture leak from a flask and did not realize it, causing a trail of contamination everywhere they took the flask. []

In [] opinion, [] is a "gossip" and everything [] said had to be taken with a grain of salt. [] IVINS, [] did not like [] although their relationship seems to have improved []

[] suspects [] and IVINS use [] as a source of gossip, adding IVINS likes to gossip. [] opined IVINS and [] did not have confidence in [] ability to work alone in the suites.

[] now works for IVINS, and may have overlapped [] time there with [] The Division values [] gets along with everyone and deals well with IVINS's "idiosyncracies".

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When [] IVINS and [] were the two lead investigators in anthrax research. [] described IVINS as bright. IVINS "loves this place" (referring to USAMRIID) and used to love his work. USAMRIID was IVINS's "refuge" for many years and he enjoyed the work and interaction with others. USAMRIID provided IVINS a social life and he has made many friendships through his work that are important to him. [] has the impression IVINS is very close to his children, but not his wife. IVINS is very talkative, but tends to "make waves" even though [] does not believe that is his intent, and [] suggested IVINS does not always recognize or appreciate how others might perceive his words or actions. For example, when IVINS volunteered with the Red Cross to assist the FBI search of ponds in the Frederick area, he did not realize how that would appear to the FBI and did not understand why he colleagues suggested he not volunteer for that particular Red Cross exercise.

IVINS worked on a vaccine project with Bioport, []

[] USAMRIID advised Bioport on issues of spore preparation, immunizations, and animal modeling. [] thought IVINS, [] and [] traveled back and forth to Bioport to address the "scientific problems" and that USAMRIID's role was primarily supportive, as directed by the General.

IVINS may have lost some of his stature, which according to [] happens when a researcher loses funding. When USAMRIID's funding was turned over to [] in 2002 or 2003, the Division lost a lot of "hard money" and now everyone's budget is carried by "soft program money," which is less appealing. [] and [] moved on to [] research, but IVINS stayed with anthrax. Because IVINS has no funded research plan of his own, he is dependant on the other researchers and "at [] mercy" for funding. [] though [] kept some "ear-marked funds" under [] control for [] projects, but the rest of the Division had to re-allocate their funding to cover the costs (such as salaries) for remaining projects. Only half of the proposals are funded by [] which forces the remaining proposals to find funding from other projects. [] believed there will be a reduction in force (RIF) as early as 2008.

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[] commented that IVINS loves his work and USAMRIID, but the bad press regarding the anthrax investigation has clouded all of their reputations. IVINS in particular has received a lot of attention, but there is "not a fiber of [] being" that believes IVINS was involved in the mailings. IVINS confided [] he was told he was a suspect, and he told [] about some of the questions he has been asked in the investigation []

[] stated [] found it personally offensive - not just the questions but the way the interview was conducted and the way IVINS was treated.

[] was asked to review a typed document titled "Fall of 2001 - Bruce Ivins" which had been provided previously to investigators by IVINS. [] described the document as a project review-type of submission. [] was asked which items on the document would have required IVINS to spend time in a laboratory. [] placed a check mark by two items ("Notebooks 3716 and 4383" and "Papers and computer files") indicating these tasks required lab time; "no" beside two items ("Notebook 4240" and "Notebook 4241 - Receipt of 30 vials") indicating these tasks did not require lab time; and "maybe" beside "Notebook 4241 (and computer files and other papers)" indicating [] was unsure if this task required lab time. [] did not know about the remaining two items, "Notebook 4240 - Immunization" and "Meetings". [] noted that "GLP" stands for "Good Lab Practices." [] further explained some of the items on the document, stating animals must be checked several times. The animal caretaker would check the animals at least once, then the Principal Investigator (IVINS) or their technician would follow-up. The document suggested to [] that IVINS's work at that time involved a passive immunization mice study that would have required "hands-on" by IVINS. [] also inferred IVINS was conducting a study of efficacy in rabbits and may have made a trip to Covance, which would not have been unusual. The two items [] indicated did not require lab time were items that required only cold side access to the suites.

When asked about other individuals [] has worked with at USAMRIID, [] provided the following information:

[] described [] as extremely dedicated and thorough, with a real eye for detail. []

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[redacted]

[redacted] and IVINS react to each other "like oil and water."

[redacted] described [redacted] as a "high level technician" with a [redacted] degree. IVINS gave [redacted] a lot of freedom and credit working with [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] added that the work environment changed after the anthrax attacks.

[redacted]

[redacted] There are some people [redacted] never trusted to be in the lab, and other people [redacted] only trusted when someone responsible was watching them.

According to [redacted] [redacted] is "one of the greatest resources [they] have." [redacted] has the most operational knowledge of USAMRIID and how the facility works. [redacted] is often "saddled" with [redacted] techs and post docs and does not get credit for the work [redacted] does. [redacted] along with [redacted] [redacted] are the only irreplaceable employees at USAMRIID. [redacted] appears to get along with and works well with everyone and is great in the lab. [redacted] stated [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] knows [redacted] from [redacted] work on [redacted] had an interest in [redacted] work. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] and [redacted] did not interact outside of USAMRIID. [redacted] was aware of [redacted] particle size work with [redacted] and knew [redacted] had done some preliminary work with [redacted] and [redacted] commented that

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various people at USAMRIID worked with anthrax in addition to [] would have gone to IVINS or [] with any anthrax-related questions. [] was not aware of any discussions between [] otherwise within the [] Division about working with dry agents, although [] recalled hearing something about the [] funding aerosol studies at USAMRIID with viral agents, but not dry agents.

[] was then shown a series of charts reflecting key card access to the [] hot suites for September 12 - October 8, 2001. Each page reflects a different date and shows all of the individuals who entered the hot suites for some period of time on that date. The time in the suites is depicted as a bar chart reflecting the time the employee entered and exited the suites. [] was specifically asked if anything on the charts stood out to [] as an unusual day or time to be in the suites, or if the length of time depicted appeared unusual. [] chose to go through each page and explained what the data on each page represented to [] [] did not observe any unusual activity or suite access for any dates. [] specific remarks follow, listed by date:

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IVINS's early morning entry in the suite may represent IVINS using the shower in the suites. According to [] many employees used the showers in the suites rather than showering at home. [] also noted many people who exercised in the morning often then showered in the suites before starting work. IVINS's access later in the day did not appear unusual to [] because he was preceded first by [] then by [] and [] and they were probably working on something that IVINS then checked after them.

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Other people who accessed the suite on this date included: []

[] [] noted [] usually started the work, and [] would come in after [] to finish the work. This pattern is depicted by [] and [] suite access on this date. [] also commented that [] was a [] so it was not unusual for [] to spend a lot of time in the suites. [] thought very highly of []

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stating [] was very bright and hard working and "on the up and up."

September 13, 2001:

[] noted IVINS's only access on this date was for a short period of time, very early in the morning. This prompted [] to add that [] thought IVINS might have insomnia. Also accessing the suites were []

[] observed that [] were both in the suites long enough to check animals or start cultures.

September 14, 2001:

Again [] were in the suite before IVINS. [] commented, with regard to IVINS's access from 9:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m., that IVINS "always worked a weird schedule" and added he often used the internet computer inside the hot suites. [] reiterated this was not unusual activity for IVINS "for as long as [] had known him." Also accessing the suites on this date were, among others, []

September 15, 2001:

[] was in during the morning with [] IVINS was in late in the evening on this Saturday, and [] admitted the time was unusual to [] but stressed again that IVINS worked odd hours. [] speculated the work was probably animal-related.

September 16, 2001:

[] was in during the morning. [] rotated their weekend shifts, so [] would not be observed accessing the suites every weekend. IVINS was in the suites after 7:00 p.m. on this Sunday, until 10:00 p.m. [] knew IVINS attended church on Sundays and often did things with his children. If he needed to come in on the weekend, late in the evening was probably the best time for him.

September 17, 2001:

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[] commented that [] access was consistent with someone who was just using the shower. [] was probably setting up an aerosol challenge for []

September 18, 2001:

[] did not know why [] accessed the suites, but thought [] had something to do with [] [] did not remember seeing [] in the suites. [] also noted [] worked for [] and [] worked for [] [] commented that [] hours in the suites on this date was "classic []

September 20, 2001:

[] pointed out [] access was again consistent with someone using the showers after a noon-time workout.

September 22, 2001:

[] was identified as [] [] was also in the suites on this Saturday, however, [] pointed out it was not unusual for [] to work on the weekends. For [] work []

September 23, 2001:

[] again accessed the suites in [] capacity as [] IVINS was in the suites between approximately 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. on this Sunday afternoon, but again [] stated this was not unusual for IVINS.

September 25, 2001:

[] did not recognize the names [] or [] IVINS accessed the suites only after approximately 7:30 p.m., but [] did not find this unusual, adding IVINS would sometimes take leave during the day for personal business, such as to go to a doctor's appointment or attend one of his children's events, then would make up the time in the evenings.

September 26, 2001:

[] and observed IVINS's group must have had a

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project going on because [] IVINS, and []
were in the suites at the same time. []

[] was a
tech.

September 27, 2001:

[] and [] were not in the suites very often,
although they were observed in the suites together on
this date.

September 28, 2001:

[] did not find IVINS's hours unusual, stating
IVINS was always on his own schedule. IVINS was never
unhappy to see someone else come into the suites while
he was working and obviously loved the company because
he is very social. [] added [] surprised
that the records did not reflect more people going into
the suites late in the evenings and on weekends.

September 29, 2001:

[]
IVINS was in the suites after approximately 8:30 p.m.
on this Saturday, but [] did not find this unusual
because [] was also in the suites earlier in the
day, between approximately 2:30 p.m. and 3:30 p.m.

September 30, 2001:

[] and IVINS were the only people to access
the suites on this Sunday, but the pattern was similar
to the day before. It was noted IVINS did not access
the suites until 11:00 p.m., however [] had again
been in the suites earlier in the day.

October 1, 2001:

Everyone was in the suites at some point over most of
the day, preparing to shutdown []. IVINS was observed
entering the suites again after 10:00 p.m. for a short
period of time, but [] did not find that activity
unusual. [] noted [] was a []
[] worked for [] and
noted [] was usually never in the suites,
commenting they "probably had to drag [] in." []
could not explain why [] accessed the suites

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on this day (in [] opinion, [] was "clueless" in [] dealings with people).

October 5, 2001:

[] noted [] which may account for [] access to the suites on October 2, 2001.

October 6, 2001:

[] [] was also observed in the suites on this Saturday, which was part of a long holiday weekend.

October 7, 2001:

IVINS and [] were observed in the suites this Sunday afternoon for short periods at different times.

October 8, 2001:

[] were the only people who accessed the suites on this holiday.

With regard to the investigation into the 2001 anthrax attacks, in [] opinion, other people at USAMRIID talked freely about the investigation, and did not see anything wrong with this behavior. [] always suggested that people not discuss the investigation with each other, but it is impossible to stop. For example, when SA [] is observed at USAMRIID, it is assumed something is happening with the investigation, and people start talking. It was also widely known a search had been conducted at USAMRIID the past November (November 2006), even though the Commander ordered everyone to stop discussing what may or not have transpired. [] thought that early on in the investigation USAMRIID people were "badly abused" by the investigation, believing they had no choice but to submit to polygraph exams and answer questions. [] said some people had very negative experiences in their interviews by the FBI and went so far as to state they felt threatened by investigative activities. [] made an attempt to counsel USAMRIID employees, and asked for everything to go through [] office before it was provided to the FBI, but [] did not think [] had order was made clear or enforced. According to [] they are hearing less and less about what is happening with the investigation.

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[redacted] is one person [redacted] described as having a "hard time keeping [redacted] mouth shut." [redacted] thinks [redacted] actions hurt morale, which in turn does not help their work environment. [redacted] told [redacted] to stop talking about the investigation with colleagues, particularly about any evidentiary material. [redacted] was aware of the November 2006 search and stopped talking openly about it only after being directed to do so by the Commander and the [redacted]

[redacted] mentioned [redacted] others regularly socialize at happy hour on "Thirsty Thursdays." [redacted] is not easy to deal with and often challenges authority, threatens to quit, and likes to "push [redacted] weight around."

[redacted] was aware some time in the last two years that [redacted] had postmarked a letter to IVINS from New Jersey as a joke. The envelope was clearly reflective of the 2001 attack envelopes, and [redacted] thought IVINS "sort of" thought it was funny. [redacted] explained that many researchers, such as [redacted] have developed a "black humor."

[redacted] was asked to review two documents regarding USAMRIID's required submission of *Bacillus anthracis* samples to the FBI. The first document, titled [redacted] Attachment," required production of samples of all cultures and subcultures of the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* according to an attached protocol. The referenced protocol, titled [redacted]

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[redacted] was the second document reviewed by [redacted] [redacted] recalled another set of documents circulated at USAMRIID that [redacted] thought came from the FBI. Those instructions were ambiguous and [redacted] thought some recipients might have picked a single colony for submission. [redacted] served as the intermediary between the researchers and the FBI and was probably the recipient of the [redacted] attachment. [redacted] everyone in the [redacted] Division received the submission instructions, although there were a limited number of people who had Ames. [redacted]

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[redacted] deleted items from the list that did not specifically state "Ames", [redacted] pointed out, some of those may have actually been Ames. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Because everyone was paranoid, they worked off of [redacted] list to prepare their own lists of items for submission.

[redacted] was asked to review a document which lists various member of Congress and summarizes their respective positions on biological defense issues. The document is not titled, however the word "republicans" appears at the top of the first page; republicans, democrats, and independents are all included in the document. [redacted] was not familiar with the document and stated [redacted] was not high enough on the "food chain" to hear about anything that would be categorized by political party and specific elected officials. [redacted] speculated it may be vaccine-related, as there had been some publicity regarding the Department of Defense (DOD) experimenting with vaccines on the troops, and that the squalene in the vaccine had caused adverse reactions and illness. [redacted] pointed out that this was "old news." [redacted] also suggested this information could have been used in a "white paper" on DOD policy or collected to determine how the vaccine was perceived. [redacted] was aware of what [redacted] described as a White House sub-committee on the stock piling of therapeutic medications and also recalled a "human use committee." Possible committee members included some researchers, Division Chiefs, and [redacted] or [redacted] [redacted] was aware some Congressional money is earmarked for anthrax research and added [redacted] is the [redacted]

[redacted] recalled information requests filed under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) regarding vaccine work, and AVA in particular, in early 2000. [redacted] does not recall any journalist in particular as filing the FOIA requests, but thought [redacted] and IVINS got "the worst of it", and IVINS in particular because of his work with squalene (referring to accusations that there was squalene in AVA).

[redacted] was shown a three-page typed list of questions that appeared to be about various people in the [redacted]

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Division. [redacted] thought the questions were part of a "get to know you" game from a Division holiday party several years earlier. [redacted] wrote down what [redacted] thought were the answers on the copy [redacted] was provided, stating some of [redacted] responses were [redacted] "best guess." [redacted] could not answer the question [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] was not aware of any kind of e-mail "filter" which alerted supervisory personnel to e-mails in which they were referenced. There was some speculation that Information Services was reading or screening e-mails, but [redacted] did not know anything about it.

There have been a number of computers in [redacted] over the years. [redacted] was not aware when or why any particular computers were removed or exchanged, but stated the number of computers has varied from time to time. [redacted] thought [redacted] and [redacted] computers were still in the suite.

All of the documents reviewed by [redacted] and the signed Non-Disclosure Agreement are contained in 1A 7145 with the original notes of this interview.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/20/2008

[redacted] date of birth: [redacted] social security account number: [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the US ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID), [redacted] Porter Street, Frederick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] was reminded by the interviewing agents that the AMERITHRAX Task Force is investigating a continuing criminal investigation and that any information discussed during the interview was sensitive and should not be disseminated to other individuals. [redacted] indicated that [redacted] understood and agreed.

[redacted]

USAMRIID conducts performance ratings starting in June of each calendar year and the process can take a couple of months. In [redacted] was BRUCE IVINS rater. In late summer and early fall of each calendar year the steering committees convene to determine the objectives for each program.

[redacted] wasn't as close to IVINS as [redacted] however, [redacted] would have conversations with him on a regular basis. [redacted] opined that they may have talked about personal things but can't recall any specific things happening or any unusual behavior/moods by IVINS in the months leading up to and following September 11, 2001. [redacted]

Investigation on 06/19/2008 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-[redacted]-16 Date dictated 09/20/2008by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

SSA



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SSA 302

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[] so [] couldn't recall IVINS' behavior during this time-frame.

[] described IVINS interest in the AMERITHRAX investigation as his interest in any gossip or other significant news events and wouldn't categorize it as unusual. IVINS is a "busy body" and like to stick his nose into everything he could.

[] indicated that the morphological variants discovered in the evidentiary anthrax powders was talked about freely around the institute out of scientific interest. It wasn't until Special Agents [] demonstrated interest in these variants and asked [] to keep the information and discussions about this phenomenon to [] At this point []

When asked how [] would feel if it was determined that the person who mailed the anthrax letters worked at USAMRIID, [] replied "I'm not convinced" and "I don't believe that it's true" that the mailer worked at USAMRIID. [] also indicated that the FBI has done "tremendous damage to the institute by innuendo." While individuals at USAMRIID had the capabilities to produce the quantity and purity of the spores used in the anthrax mailings, [] opined that no one at USAMRIID had the knowledge or skills to produce dried spores. [] never heard anyone at USAMRIID talk about drying spores. The only circumstance [] remembers about dried anthrax spores occurred after the command had made statements to the media that USAMRIID has never had dried spores and it was found out that [] had made some killed dried spores []

[] recalled that the subpoena requesting [] [] There was a meeting to discuss the details of the subpoena and how to prepare the samples for submission soon after the subpoena was received by USAMRIID. The meeting was most likely attended by all Principal Investigators (PI), or a representative for the PI of each laboratory. [] could not recall specifics or time-frames surrounding the subpoena. [] opined that it was known at USAMRIID that the purpose of setting up the FBI Ames strain Repository (FBIR) was being set-up in order to compare the genetic profile of the mailed anthrax to the samples being collected by the FBI and placed into the FBIR. During a meeting in March of 2002 it was discussed that the

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preparation of samples for the FBIR should be a swipe from a plate, as opposed to a single colony pick, which would provide a representative sample. [redacted] one could observe a plate and determine that if the significant majority of the colonies on the plate had one phenotype then picking a single colony which looked like the majority of the colonies would be representative. In the absence of a provided protocol [redacted] opined that a typical microbiologist would prepare the slants for the FBIR in a way that they typically prepared slants and from scientist to scientist they may do this differently.

It was know around the [redacted] Division [redacted] that [redacted] collection of Ba, as well as other organisms, looked different phenotypically than others in [redacted] because [redacted] took swipes from plates when [redacted] prepared cultures.

On September 11, 2001, [redacted] remembers [redacted] a plane hit a building in New York City. [redacted]

[redacted] the [redacted] Chief coming into the room and pulling some of the individuals out to start preparing USAMRIID for handling any contingencies which might arise as a result of the attacks. USAMRIID was locked down, and if one didn't get off base soon after the attacks they were stuck on base for awhile. After the 9/11 attacks, [redacted] doesn't recall any specific communication as to the possibility of a biological weapons event, however, [redacted] indicated that [redacted] wouldn't be surprised if [redacted] made such a statement since the mission of [redacted] was to detect the presence of biological agents on a battlefield. It wouldn't phase [redacted] to hear such a statement, since the objective of USAMRIID was to be able to detect and mitigate the use of a biological agent in a combat scenario. [redacted] recalls a communication to the effect that everyone should back-up their data and take it home so that in the event USAMRIID was hit then the data would not be lost.

[redacted] was asked about the late hours that IVINS spent in the laboratory prior to each of the windows of opportunity for mailing the anthrax letters. [redacted] indicated that it wasn't unusual for IVINS to spend time in the hot suite doing work in the evening hours. [redacted]

[redacted] knew this primarily because IVINS himself told [redacted] that he would work in the evening hours and that sometimes [redacted] would

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receive e-mails from IVINS at nighttime hours. [] suggested that it was often necessary to check animals in the evenings and this is a possible explanation for IVINS' working late these evenings. [] indicated that to check animals in the suite would take approximately one hour and that for the time IVINS was in the suite over an hour he may have been doing other experiments or just surfing the internet. It was common for people to surf the internet in the hot suite. Interviewers pointed out that IVINS' hot suite access for the first eight months of 2001 and after October 2001, IVINS had very limited night time hot suite access, [] replied that a lot of people had trouble sleeping after 9/11 and maybe this is why IVINS had night time hot suite hours for this limited time period.

[] indicated that many people at USAMRIID were pulled into help [] after 9/11 to help handle the significant influx of environmental samples collected from various locations. Because of this [] opined that anyone working at USAMRIID during this time could have been described as a basket case. [] opined that IVINS likely cleaned out the B3 walk-in refrigerator to make space for all the samples that were coming into USAMRIID after 9/11 and not for any nefarious reason.

When asked why IVINS would suggest to someone at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) that ROBERT STEVENS may have contracted inhalational anthrax from an animal carcass up stream of where STEVENS may have take a drink, after it may have been discussed around USAMRIID that there might be a potential for a biological weapons (BW) attack, [] suggested that this scenario was believed to be unlikely. [] suggested that there would be no obvious reason to target a media outlet with a BW attack and therefore, it was more likely that STEVENS may have obtained anthrax from a hobby such as weaving or so exposure to animal wool or hair.

In 2001 anyone who worked with Ba at USAMRIID would know what Ames strain of Ba was, as this was the standard that was used at USAMRIID since [] determined that it was highly virulent compared to the Vollum 1B strain which was the standard prior to [] determination.

[] recalled a Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) request circa 1999 [] (ph) asking for all data on animal and human studies of the anthrax vaccine using an adjuvant that had squalene as a component. [] was also interested in the use

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of squalene as an adjuvant in the anthrax and it's potential role in Gulf War Syndrome. [redacted] was familiar with the name [redacted] but [redacted] could not recall why it was familiar. Everyone who had to spend time searching their paperwork in order to respond to the FOIA request was irritated at spending the time doing so, especially IVINS and [redacted]. According to [redacted] squalene was never a part of the human anthrax vaccine, but was a component in a Ribi adjuvant which was used in experimental vaccines. The theory that squalene was responsible for Gulf War Syndrome was subsequently disproved.

[redacted] has made a lot of jokes about the anthrax investigation, however, as some grew tired of the jokes because they believed that they were in poor taste, [redacted] IVINS told [redacted] that he put the poster on [redacted] door that said something to the effect of "FBI Rat." [redacted] [redacted] believed that IVINS put the sign up out of jealousy because he was no longer involved in the anthrax investigation [redacted]

IVINS would talk about politics around the office and [redacted] would describe IVINS' political stance as being right wing when [redacted] first came to USAMRIID but he became progressively more liberal as the years went on. IVINS would be described as middle of the road in the 2001 time-frame. IVINS was staunchly anti-abortion [redacted] but [redacted] believed his stance tempered a bit over the years. IVINS flip-flopped his stance on the death penalty. [redacted] had no recollection of IVINS' feelings toward New Yorkers, and didn't think he had any negative feelings for any group other than sororities. [redacted] believed that IVINS was treated badly by a sorority girl while he was younger and this is the reason that he disliked sororities. [redacted] believed that [redacted] learned of IVINS' dislike for sororities in [redacted]

It was common for people to take magazines into the hot suite so one could read while they had down time when waiting for experiments to finish. [redacted] recalls primarily news type magazines and didn't recall any tabloid like magazines. It was more convenient to stay in the hot suite and wait for experiments to finish than constantly shower in and out of the hot suites. [redacted] doesn't remember seeing the American Family Association (AFA) Journal in the hot suite.

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Regarding IVINS' sampling of the office he shared with [] in late 2001, [] opined that IVINS didn't report the results of his sampling to anyone because he felt that [] was "teflon" and no actions would be taken if the findings were reported to his superiors. In fact IVINS believed that he himself might be reprimanded. [] indicated that because so few colonies were found in this sampling that there was little safety threat to anyone and it was not to surprising that spores may have been found in the office since IVINS' lab worked primarily with Ba and years of working with Ba may have carried a few spores into the office. It was believed that [] was above reprimand [] [] opined that IVINS may have conducted the sampling in order to try and get something to hold over [] head and not out of concern for the safety of others. IVINS may have conducted the sampling in order to confirm the complaint by [] that [] handling of the anthrax letters was sloppy.

[] opined that IVINS couldn't have mailed the anthrax letters because he isn't organized enough, didn't have the attention to detail, isn't focused enough, and if he did mail the letters he couldn't keep from telling someone. When asked why IVINS would point the finger at [] and [] [] indicated that they were the "evil empire." When asked why IVINS would point the finger at [] [] indicated that nobody liked [] When asked why IVINS would point the finger at [] [] indicated that he might have done this as retribution for [] jokingly pointing the finger at IVINS. When asked why IVINS would point the finger at [] or [] [] indicated that he might have done this because he was under duress by investigators. After being told that investigators were not present when IVINS fingered [] and [] opined that it may have been retribution for them stopping communications with him.

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