

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

On 02/05/2007, [REDACTED]
SSAN [REDACTED] DOB [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] telephone numbers [REDACTED] and
[REDACTED] was interviewed at [REDACTED] place of employment, the
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
(USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the
identity of the interviewing agents, [REDACTED] reviewed and signed
a Non-Disclosure Agreement, and indicated to interviewing agents
that [REDACTED] understood the Agreement. [REDACTED] then provided the
following information:

[redacted] was employed at USAMRIID in 2001 at the time of the anthrax attacks. [redacted] recalled that [redacted] might have been

[redacted] does not recall traveling anywhere at that time because [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936-3 Date dictated 02/08/2007
by SA [redacted]
PI [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-[]

b6
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [], On 02/05/2007, Page 2

In 2001, [] had cellular telephone service with [] cannot recall the telephone number, as it has changed since [] switched [] service to []. Telephone calls from [] residence should reflect calls from [] to [] in September and October, 2001.

[] home computer is new since 2001. []

[] has had one personal email account since [] with [] but claims [] does not keep any old email. [] has had the same email address since [] also regularly deleted email from [] USAMRIID desktop computer.

[] does not maintain any records, regularly shredding them to avoid identity theft.

279A-WF-222936-[redacted]

b6
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 02/05/2007, Page 3

USAMRIID had a good command climate in 2001. [redacted] stated the command is still good, but there is some adjustment dealing with different styles of management. [redacted]

[redacted] noted that the company command is rotational, and the commander changes approximately every two years.

Before 9/11 and the anthrax attacks, [redacted] described the environment at USAMRIID as much easier because there was not as much security in place. [redacted] security measures added since 9/11 include cameras in the suites and hallways, x-ray and random checks of bags, and the guards now carry weapons. [redacted] added that they can no longer take any paper out of the hot suites, they have to sign off on the air locks and passbox, and a fingerprint reader in addition to a PIN are required for entry to the suites. [redacted] more scrutiny on employees, noting that background checks must be complete before a person can enter the suites. Prior to the 2001 attacks, [redacted] believed that the background checks only need to have been initiated, and not necessarily complete, for someone to gain access to the suites.

[redacted] described the Personal Reliability Program (PRP) as a new addition since the events of 2001 and something where "they are checking up on you." As part of the PRP, employees' finances and family are scrutinized and any problems can keep someone out of the suites.

[redacted] is not aware of any other persons who have been denied access to the suites under the PRP. Outside of the program, there are no incidents or behavior that stood out to [redacted] after 9/11 and the anthrax attacks.

[redacted] described [redacted] colleagues generally as being in shock after the anthrax letters were discovered. [redacted] work with anthrax daily, and [redacted] was shocked that someone would commit this kind of act.

Interviewing agents advised [redacted] that it was now known to investigators that the material used in the 2001

279A-WF-222936-[]

b6
b7c

Continuation of FD-302 of [] , On 02/05/2007 , Page 4

attacks came from USAMRIID. [] stressed that USAMRIID does not produce weapons to harm anyone, only to design countermeasures. The letters were contrary to what they work for at USAMRIID. According to [] , it never occurred to [] that the anthrax came from USAMRIID.

[] added that the anthrax in the letters was in powder form, and not everyone knows how to create such a powder. [] believes only a few people know how to make a powder, but could not provide any names. [] does not know about anyone working with dry *B. anthracis* or any simulants such as *B. thuringiensis* or *B. globigii*. [] emphasized that in [] understanding, it was too dangerous to work with powders.

[] theorized that the anthrax used in the attacks could have been produced at USAMRIID, but sent to another person or facility, and that they were responsible for the mailings. [] stated that USAMRIID "had people from all over" referring to scientists who visit the facility. [] further explained that what the scientists do is very common, adding to [] theory that someone outside of USAMRIID was responsible for the 2001 attacks. [] stated that the fact that the powder was identified as Ames did not change the atmosphere at USAMRIID.

Some investigative work with the powder used in the 2001 attacks was done by []

[]

[] described several incidents where [] had become alarmed at what [] perceived as careless or reckless procedures used by other researchers. []

[]

[]

279A-WF-222936-[redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 02/05/2007, Page 5

[redacted]

A lyophilizer is located in the [redacted] area, taking up space. [redacted] stated that [redacted] does not know who would have used it or how to use it [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] was asked to review a copy of a [redacted] Attachment, which included [redacted] [redacted] but did not recognize the document. Although [redacted] could not recall receiving any instructions on how to prepare the slants, [redacted] stated that any time a sample was to be taken from any liquid solution, [redacted] would "vortex" the solution, and the sample should be taken right after "vortexing." This was to ensure the sample reflected the appropriate spore concentration and would capture any mutations or differences within the spores. [redacted] also stated that this type of procedure was very basic and common knowledge in [redacted] field, and that [redacted] did not need to be instructed to utilize this procedure.

b3
b6
b7C

[redacted] repeatedly commented on the changes at USAMRIID that had been brought about by the anthrax attacks and the subsequent FBI investigation. [redacted] stated that the staff at USAMRIID knew it would change their way of life. Most people have passion and respect for their work at USAMRIID, and [redacted] blames the investigation for holding up and interrupting that work.

According to [redacted] the military command is the primary source for guidance and information regarding the ongoing investigation and USAMRIID's role in it. [redacted] holds "town hall" meetings every so often to brief the personnel and ensure everyone has an opportunity to ask questions to the leadership regarding ongoing issues and events. Additionally, it allows the leadership an opportunity to tell personnel what is expected from them.

b6
b7C

Outside of the briefings from [redacted] will sometimes "hear stuff" [redacted] but could not elaborate on the kinds of information [redacted] hears. [redacted] described the post-attack rumors as things such as they would

279A-WF-222936-[]

Continuation of FD-302 of [] , On 02/05/2007 , Page 6

lose their jobs because USAMRIID would be shut down. Other vague references provided by [] were to the job, that they could not work or do their jobs because of the attacks and subsequent investigation. [] described USAMRIID as changing fast after the attacks.

[] denied hearing any rumors about the investigation itself, except that the case will never be solved. [] stated [] is "waiting for an apology" when the case is solved and the mailer is someone not affiliated with USAMRIID. [] reiterated [] expectation of an apology several times over the course of the interview.

[] was not aware of any problems with vaccine development and stated no one was under any pressure to develop a new vaccine. [] pointed out that USAMRIID does not actually produce the vaccines and believes problems with the old anthrax vaccine resulted from the production process. [] believes there are too many outside factors to place any blame on the vaccine itself, so none of the researchers feel any responsibility for problems associated with the vaccine. BRUCE IVINS may have felt more strongly about problems with the vaccine because "that's how he is." [] described IVINS as a "unique individual" who is very passionate about his work.

IVINS was further described by [] as 'strange but fun-loving. IVINS writes music and sings all the time, and tries to dance. IVINS is "really cheap." [] is not aware of any care package IVINS prepared []

[] was shown a memorandum authored by [] dated September 27, 2002. The memorandum is an accounting of BRUCE IVINS entering the [] hot suite without an escort on September 27, 2002. The memorandum states that IVINS claimed [] did not show up on time and that IVINS had entered the suite to see if [] had already entered. The memorandum also stated that IVINS stayed in the suite alone for 15 minutes, which IVINS explained as waiting for []

[] did state that IVINS is dedicated to his work and may have

279A-WF-222936 [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 02/05/2007, Page 7

entered to take readings of time sensitive spore preps. [REDACTED] explained that before 9/11, personnel could enter the hot suites unescorted, but after 9/11 and prior to the installation of cameras in the hot suites, personnel were required to use the "buddy system" when entering the suites.

[REDACTED] Division was described generally by [REDACTED] as a close, social group. [REDACTED] denied that there was any division among employees along the lines of job title, race, gender, or any other personally identifying characteristics. [REDACTED] Division employees regularly socialize with each other or participate together in outside interests such as sports teams. [REDACTED] stated that any occasion to "eat, drink, and be merry" would bring members of the Division together. Approximately two to three times a year, [REDACTED] was part of a group that would get together to go out drinking. The group included [REDACTED] and IVINS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] denied any knowledge of "Thirsty Thursdays" or other regular gathering of [REDACTED] Division employees.

[REDACTED] could only recall one person who had problems getting along with others in the Division, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] could not provide any specific information about [REDACTED] issues at USAMRIID, but stated [REDACTED] worked in Building [REDACTED] was very unhappy, although [REDACTED] does not know why, recalling only that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] denied that [REDACTED] had problems with anyone in the Division, although [REDACTED] admitted seeing [REDACTED] get mad "a couple of times." [REDACTED] witnessed [REDACTED] cursing and saw [REDACTED] kick a desk one time, but never saw or heard of [REDACTED] physically or verbally assaulting anyone. [REDACTED] claimed everyone else in the Division gets along. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] does not know of any nicknames used in reference to any [REDACTED] Division employees. [REDACTED] thought the name "King Badger" sounded like a name [REDACTED] IVINS used in

279A-WF-222936-[]

b6
b7c

Continuation of FD-302 of [] , On 02/05/2007 , Page 8

reference to someone else, but claimed [] had never heard the name. [] does not know of anyone referred to as []

[]

[]

[] stated that [] and IVINS knew each other outside of USAMRIID. []

[]

No one [] interacts with has exhibited any differences in behavior. Additionally, no one to [] knowledge has been drinking excessively or exhibited any other habits that are out of the ordinary. [] again stated that the staff is frustrated by the procedural and security changes that have been implemented since 9/11 and the anthrax attacks.

[] claimed it was not unusual for employees to work late at night or over the weekend. The work that might require such hours could include preparing for a big challenge to start on Monday morning, so the preparation would begin on Friday and require someone to come in over the weekend so everything would be ready on Monday morning. In [] experience, weekend work usually only takes about one hour. Occasionally, someone may get called in if a freezer alarm goes off. [] observed that in the past there had been construction in the building and the freezer alarms went off frequently. Historically, [] only has to work one or two weekends a year.

[] was asked to review a set of charts which depicted [] Division employees' access to the [] hot suites on September 12, 2001 through October 8, 2001. [] did not review each page, but was asked generally about the late evening and weekend hours worked by IVINS. [] did not observe anything unusual about IVINS's hours, but [] could not offer an explanation as to what kind of work would have

279A-WF-222936-[]

Continuation of FD-302 of [] , On 02/05/2007 , Page 9

required him to spend more than an hour at a time in the hot suites. [] reiterated that it was [] experience that such off hours work only took [] one hour to complete.

In [] opinion, IVINS, [] and [] would have the knowledge required to commit the anthrax attacks or would know where to get the necessary material. [] denied the possibility of being involved because [] had no additional comments regarding [] never worked with [] but stated, however, [] is very "knowledgeable." And although [] claimed [] was someone who had the knowledge to commit the anthrax attacks or obtain the necessary material, [] later stated [] was not sure if [] worked with anthrax, but thought [] did. [] and others joke about what [] According to [] does not have any issues with anyone.

In response to questions about additional specific individuals, [] had the following comments:

[] had a good work ethic. [] worked for IVINS when [] was at USAMRIID.

[] is a "gossiper," [] stated there are certain things you don't tell [] is aware [] had problems with IVINS and [] but does not know what those problems were. []

[] came to the [] Division from [] and was described by [] as a good person. []

[] was referred to as [] who also described [] as a good person. [] was unsure if [] worked with anthrax.

[] never worked with [] but thought [] used to have a lab in [] used to work for []

[] never worked with [] although [] described [] as pushy and referred to [] as []

279A-WF-222936-[redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 02/05/2007, Page 10

[redacted] is very nice and worked in the Division.

[redacted] never worked with [redacted] whom [redacted] referred to as "one of the ancients." [redacted] perceived that [redacted] had a lot of clout at USAMRIID. [redacted]

[redacted] does not recall ever seeing [redacted] in the lab, and believes [redacted] works in [redacted] in [redacted]

[redacted] did not know the name [redacted]

[redacted] was not aware of anyone who kept track of Members of Congress or the issues before Congress. [redacted] was asked to review a document containing a list of Congressmen, separated by party affiliation, and listing the Congressmen's positions on issues related to anthrax vaccine development. [redacted] denied ever seeing the list or anything similar, and did not know of anyone who would keep such a list.

According to [redacted], no one has had to respond to a request made under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and [redacted] is not aware of any FOIA requests made of USAMRIID.

Computers at USAMRIID are switched out every three years, including those computers in the hot suites. There is one computer in the office shared by hot suite users that [redacted] believes one person should hold the hand receipt for. [redacted] does not know who currently holds the receipt for that shared computer, but it could be anyone. [redacted] is also aware of computers in [redacted] offices. [redacted] believes all computers were recently swapped out. When computers are swapped out, it is [redacted] understanding that they are decontaminated when removed and the hard drive is destroyed before the old computer is turned in to the warehouse. USAMRIID's computer services (BIMD, commonly referred to as the Help Desk) asks the hand receipt holder what should be migrated over to the new computer before the old one is destroyed.

All documents reviewed by [redacted] and the original Non-Disclosure Agreement signed by [redacted] are enclosed in a 1A with the notes of this interview.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/17/2004

b6
b7C

To: Washington Field

Attn: SA [REDACTED]

From: Washington Field

AMX 3

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-~~PO1~~ (Pending) - ~~224~~

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

- / 8

Synopsis: Report results of investigation regarding [REDACTED]

Details: [REDACTED] date of birth [REDACTED] social security account number [REDACTED] is employed at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). In the course of [REDACTED] employment with USAMRIID, [REDACTED] has had access to, knowledge of, and experience working with *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.).

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] position at USAMRIID is [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED] Division, a position which [REDACTED] has held since [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was not certain where the *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) Ames used by [REDACTED] was obtained from, however [REDACTED] thought [REDACTED] probably obtained the sample from BRUCE IVINS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] never handled or worked with the Daschle, Leahy, Brokaw, or New York Post letters or envelopes. [REDACTED] was aware that [REDACTED] research group performed some analysis on the evidentiary material contained in the letters, and thought that [REDACTED] may have worked on some of the Leahy letter material.

wpd

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-POI, 06/17/2004

b6
b7c

A review of [] financial records was unremarkable and revealed no connections to New Jersey.

[] [] advised that [] does not know []

A time-line of [] activities for the likely time periods of the mailing of the anthrax-laced letters from Princeton, New Jersey was compiled using USAMRIID security key card access records, telephone call records, credit card use, and statements made by []. The time-line focused on any six hour period for which [] would be unaccounted, with the premise that it takes six hours to drive round trip from Frederick, Maryland to Princeton, New Jersey.

Time-line First Mailing (5:00 pm, 09/17/2001 through 8:00 pm, 09/18/2001)

A review of USAMRIID security key card access records for [] indicated the following: [] entered Building [] at [] and exited at [] on [] and [] entered Building [] at [] and exited at [] on []

A review of [] financial records for [] through [] provided no further information about [] whereabouts on these dates.

Records for the telephone number at the residence [] indicated the following: []

[] advised that [] was at work at USAMRIID on [] and []

Time-line Second Mailing (3:00pm, 10/06/2001 through 11:00 am, 10/09/2001)

A review of USAMRIID security key card access records for [] indicated the following: [] entered Building [] at [] and exited at [] on [] There are no key card access records for [] on [] or []

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-POI, 06/17/2004

b6
b7c

A review of [redacted] financial records for [redacted] through [redacted] provided no further information about [redacted] whereabouts on these dates.

Records for the telephone number at the residence [redacted] indicated the following: [redacted]

[redacted] had no recollection or record of [redacted] activities for the time frame in question. [redacted] advised that [redacted] may [redacted]

[redacted] was interviewed by investigators on [redacted] and [redacted] and was cooperative with investigators on both occasions.

[redacted] was given a polygraph examination on [redacted] which targeted any knowledge of, or involvement in, the anthrax mailings. The report of the polygraph examiner stated that there was no deception indicated by [redacted] during the polygraph examination. A discreet handwriting exemplar was submitted for [redacted] with negative results.

Investigation has revealed no direct, testimonial, or circumstantial evidence which indicates that [redacted] was involved in the preparation or mailing of the anthrax-laced letters.

Based upon the above, the investigation regarding [redacted] is considered complete. Unless information is obtained to suggest that [redacted] was involved in the mailing of the anthrax-laced letters, no further investigation of [redacted] is intended.

♦♦

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6
b7cDate of transcription 06/05/2006

On June 2, 2006, [redacted]
[redacted] date of birth [redacted] home address of [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place
of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick,
Maryland, telephone [redacted]. After being advised of the
identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted]
provided the following information:

[redacted] confirmed that [redacted] has been employed at USAMRIID
since [redacted] working for [redacted] in the [redacted] Division as
a [redacted] and
[redacted] research involved
Bacillus anthracis (Ba). [redacted] primarily works with [redacted]
[redacted]. As in prior interviews,
[redacted] could not recall the specific types of Ba strains [redacted] worked
with and indicated that [redacted]

[redacted] Most of [redacted] research is conducted
in the [redacted] suites, rooms [redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted] reiterated that [redacted] has worked for [redacted] during
[redacted] entire employment at USAMRIID. [redacted]

[redacted] and indicated that [redacted] got
along fine with [redacted] has not maintained contact with
[redacted] after [redacted] left USAMRIID. [redacted] recalled that [redacted]
[redacted] BRUCE IVINS had some kind of personal connection between each
other outside of work and thought it might have something to do
with their Catholicism beliefs. [redacted] advised that [redacted]
IVINS's relationship was not romantic and that [redacted] was not aware of
any romantic relationships existing between co-workers at USAMRIID.
The Principal Investigators (PIs) [redacted] was most familiar with were

Investigation on June 2, 2006 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 23

Date dictated _____

by PI
SA

FILE NAME: [redacted] 302

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

b6
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On June 2, 2006, Page 2

[REDACTED], BRUCE IVINS, [REDACTED] They were all part of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] described the working relationships with [REDACTED] co-workers as very positive and enjoyable. [REDACTED] enjoyed [REDACTED] job and had a lot of fun with [REDACTED] co-workers. [REDACTED] explained that IVINS, at times, was a prankster and enjoyed playing an occasional joke on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not have anything negative to say about any of [REDACTED] co-workers and reiterated that it has been a pleasure working at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] went on to explain that security measures in Building [REDACTED] at USAMRIID have increased significantly since 2001.

b6
b7C
b7F

[REDACTED] described the autoclave process as one in which materials needing be autoclaved are left in the autoclave to be autoclaved at the end of the day or autoclaved by the individual depositing them before going home that same day.

b6
b7C

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 07/23/2007

On April 13, 2007, [redacted]
SSAN [redacted], DOB [redacted]
[redacted] telephone number [redacted] and
[redacted] was interviewed at Fort Detrick, Maryland. After
being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the
nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following
information:

b6
b7C

[redacted] had recently received a [redacted] to appear
before a [redacted] with regard to this investigation.
Interviewing agents explained the [redacted] process and what
would be required of [redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

In preparation [redacted]
[redacted] was asked to locate any email or other documents
which would account for [redacted] whereabouts during September and
October 2001. [redacted]

[redacted] When investigators told [redacted] not
to become overly stressed about finding documentation from 2001,
[redacted] replied, "Don't worry - I'm not."

[redacted] claimed there were no social divisions within
the [redacted] Division, and reminded investigators [redacted] had
stated this previously. [redacted] then acknowledged that "there
may be" but [redacted] doesn't "divide" or "group" [redacted]

[redacted] Safety is [redacted]
only issue with people, and [redacted] has not seen other people treat
anyone differently.

b6
b7C

[redacted] stated because they work at a military
installation with a majority of civilians, the military people
feel like the minority. [redacted] believes it should be reaffirmed
to the civilian employees that this is a military installation.
It is the mission of USAMRIID to conduct research for the war
fighter, but the military's first mission is to be combat ready,
while the civilian employees are more focused on their research
proposals. Civilians don't understand the combat ready mission
and complain about the training the military must attend. [redacted]

Investigation on 04/13/2007 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936 [redacted] 31 Date dictated April 13, 2007by SA [redacted]
PI [redacted]

AL07008A.302

279A-WF-222936-[redacted]

b6
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 04/13/2007, Page 2

[redacted]

Civilian technicians are paid more than those employed by the Army, so it is not uncommon for technicians to quit the Army then come back to USAMRIID as a contract employee. According to [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] claimed [redacted] could not comment on any divisions between groups within the [redacted] Division, stating everyone works together. Despite repeated questions, [redacted] maintained [redacted] was not aware of anyone who had problems with other people in the Division. When asked specifically about [redacted] then remembered that [redacted] had problems with several people and did not get along with [redacted]. [redacted] was not allowed in the hot suites and was not allowed to work with any hazardous materials. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] does not remember any of the researchers being upset about their funding prior to 9/11, and stated the Division members work together to fund their salaries and keep everyone employed. There are always ongoing concerns that money will be taken from one Division to fund another, as in the aftermath of 9/11 when funding was moved from other Divisions to fund the [redacted]

[redacted]

When asked about the current funding process through the [redacted] [redacted] stated [redacted] thinks it is fair, although [redacted] hears the "normal" complaints. [redacted] has never observed anyone to "act out" because they did not get the funding they required.

According to [redacted] Division employees felt like outcasts after 9/11, partly because of the results of IVINS swabbing and finding anthrax contamination in the

279A-WF-222936-[redacted]

b6
b7c

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 04/13/2007, Page 3

Division. [redacted] was aware that IVINS did not normally conduct such swabbings, and as a result of IVINS's actions and the results, an AR15-6 investigation was initiated by the Army.

[redacted]

With regard to other contamination incidents, [redacted] also recalled a water leak in 1999 inside a hot suite and a seal on the door broke.

[redacted] described "drastic changes" at USAMRIID after 9/11, but mentioned only the addition of armed guards as an example. [redacted] claimed these changes caused Division personnel to look for other jobs.

[redacted] complained about the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), which requires participation from anyone who works in a hot suite to disclose personal information that may affect their safety and the safety of those working in the suites. [redacted]

[redacted] believes the PRP is too personal. [redacted]

[redacted] mentioned [redacted] as another person who may have had issues with the PRP.

Although [redacted] repeatedly denied being aware of any rumors or talk of the ongoing investigation into the 2001 anthrax attacks, when asked specifically about [redacted] [redacted] responded [redacted] "heard a rumor [redacted] would be the number one prime suspect." There also "may have been a rumor" that [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] was not aware of any issues between [redacted] and IVINS. [redacted] advised that [redacted] could probably expound on any situation between [redacted] and IVINS. [redacted] is also not aware of any problems between [redacted] and [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-[]

Continuation of FD-302 of [] , On 04/13/2007 , Page 4

[] vaguely remembers [] and claimed [] did not affect [] "in any way, form, or fashion" so [] did not mean anything to []

[] was asked if there was anything about [] that someone could point to that would imply [] was involved in the 2001 anthrax attacks. []

[] some see [] as a little strict. [] believes this is because [] demands everything is done safely, and will not tolerate cutting corners. According to [] knows everything and is good, fair, and honest. [] sees [] as the best investigator at USAMRIID. [] further described [] as politically correct, diplomatic, a team player, and tactful.

[] never heard anything about [] being romantically involved with anyone at USAMRIID.

[] described [] as dedicated, but found it funny that people are afraid of [] although [] stated people have respect for the work done in [] lab.

[] grows anthrax and works in Building [] [] described [] as a good person, "but you know [] present." [] is very opinionated and has a very strong will. [] thinks [] gets along with everyone, and has observed []

[] did not know anything about a letter sent by [] to IVINS from New Jersey. [] considers [] a prankster, but not as much so as IVINS.

279A-WF-222936-[redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 04/13/2007, Page 5

b6
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] described IVINS as a frugal, church-going person, and a strict Catholic. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] IVINS often discussed the Right to Life movement and [redacted] involvement. [redacted] recalled IVINS discussing what types of things to give up for Lent and recalled a bumper sticker. The concept of viability was discussed. [redacted] does not know how active the IVINS's are in the Right to Life movement, but knows IVINS's position is that life begins at conception.

According to [redacted] IVINS drinks while he is out socially, but does not drink at home. IVINS is a "lightweight," gets very hyper, and is a high energy person. IVINS has made his own foot fungus powder and used lab equipment for drinking water. [redacted]

[redacted]
IVINS could have taken early retirement, but continues to work at USAMRIID.

[redacted] could not provide any additional information on [redacted] or [redacted]

The 2001 annual anthrax conference was held in Maryland. According to [redacted] the conference is in Toronto this year. [redacted] claims nothing unusual ever happens at these conferences, but they all "just go out and have a good time."

Although [redacted] insisted [redacted] did not pay any attention to gossip and rumors, and did not know anything bad about any colleagues, [redacted] mentioned [redacted] has heard stories about other people at USAMRIID being involved with each other and mentioned several incidents, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

279A-WF-222936-[redacted]

b6
b7c

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 04/13/2007, Page -6-

-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-

[redacted]

[redacted] commented that [redacted] was the only person [redacted] had known at USAMRIID who had real issues that caused problems. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] was asked who at USAMRIID besides the Principal Investigators (PIs) would have the ability to create the material used in the Anthrax attacks. [redacted] said that [redacted] [redacted] could have the ability to create the spores used in the anthrax attacks because of years of experience [redacted] at USAMRIID.