

(Rev. 10-01-1999)

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/05/2001

To: Washington Field

Attn: SA [REDACTED]

b6  
b7c

From: Baltimore

Squad 11

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936 (Pending)

Title: AMERITHRAX  
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: To advise of interviews conducted at USAMRIID.

Reference: 279A-WF-222936 Serial 373

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### Details:

In referenced EC, Washington Field requested that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] be interviewed in reference to the captioned case. Washington Field later provided a list of forty-two individuals to be interviewed at the US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). These individuals had published, or contributed to, research on anthrax. SA [REDACTED] reviewed the names to verify employment at USAMRIID and involvement in anthrax research. SA [REDACTED], SA [REDACTED], and SSA [REDACTED] conducted the majority of the interviews of individuals still at USAMRIID. The results of that review follow.

Name:

Status:

[REDACTED]
------------

Interviewed 12/03/2001
No longer at USAMRIID
No longer at USAMRIID (possibly [REDACTED])
[REDACTED]
Interviewed 12/04/2001
No access to hot suites
Interviewed 12/04/2001
Not at USAMRIID
No access to hot suites
No access to hot suites
No access to hot suites
No access to hot suites
[REDACTED]
Interviewed 12/03/2001

12/11/01

[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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To: Washington Field From: Baltimore  
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 12/05/2001

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

interview pending

Interviewed 11/09/2001

Interviewed 12/03/2001

Interviewed 11/29/2001

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

interview

pending

No access to hot suites

Interviewed 12/03/2001

[REDACTED]

interview pending

Bruce Ivins

Interviewed by SA [REDACTED]

No access to hot suites

No access to hot suites

No access to hot suites

Interviewed 12/03/2001

No access to hot suites

Not at USAMRIID

Interviewed 12/03/2001

No access to hot suites

No access to hot suites

Interviewed by [REDACTED]

Interviewed 12/04/2001

No longer at USAMRRID [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

No access to hot suites

Interviewed by SA [REDACTED]

Interviewed 12/03/2001

Interviewed 12/03/2001

No longer at USAMRIID

Not at USAMRIID

Interviewed

No longer at USAMRIID

[REDACTED]

In addition, SA [REDACTED] reviewed abstracts from [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Conference, held in June, 2001,  
in [REDACTED] From those abstracts, SA [REDACTED] located the  
following individuals who had published research and were currently  
assigned to USAMRIID:

Name:

Status:

[REDACTED]

Interviewed 12/03/2001

Interviewed 12/03/2001

Interviewed 12/04/2001

Interviewed 12/03/2001

Interviewed 12/03/2001

Interviewed 12/04/2001

Interviewed 12/03/2001

Interviewed 12/03/2001

To: Washington Field From: Baltimore  
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SA [ ] also met with [ ]  
[ ] at USAMRIID, and discussed current or former employees who  
could potentially pose a threat. Information provided by [ ]  
[ ] and gleaned from interviews conducted at USAMRIID,  
resulted in a list of [ ] current or former employees who  
left under questionable circumstances, were dismissed, or seemed  
potentially unstable to USAMRIID staff. To the extent possible,  
spelling of names and further identifying information was obtained  
from [ ], of the USAMRIID [ ]

[ ] FD-302's include further information on circumstances  
surrounding these individuals. [ ] advised that more  
detailed information in personnel records would probably require a  
subpoena, to be coordinated with the [ ] Office. The [ ]  
individuals were:

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Name: SSN: DOB: Remarks:

--

To: Washington Field From: Baltimore  
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 12/05/2001

FD-302's of interviews conducted at USAMRIID will be forwarded when completed. Baltimore will continue attempts to contact individuals not yet interviewed, as well as complete interviews in referenced lead at other facilities. The investigation continues.

To: Washington Field From: Baltimore  
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 12/05/2001

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1:

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

Read and clear.

♦♦

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12-09-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg

b7E

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 12/07/2001

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: Anthrax Working Group

SSA [redacted]  
SSA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]  
SSA [redacted]

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SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

From: Washington Field  
Squad C-4  
Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936 (Pending)  
279A-MM-98504 (Pending)  
279A-NY-280436 (Pending)  
279C-NK-C105753 (Pending)

Title: AMERITHRAX,  
MAJOR CASE #184

Synopsis: To set lead to interview former US bioweapons scientists

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Administrative: Receiving Offices are requested to provide WFO with preliminary results of interview by fax at [redacted] In response, refer to WFO AMERITHRAX lead number 231.

Details: On 12/7/01, The [redacted] provided WFO with the names of several individuals who were intimately involved with the [redacted]. These individuals have extensive knowledge of the procedures involved in aerosolizing anthrax, and should be interviewed along the lines of the interviews previously conducted at the Tier One labs. There is no indication any of these individuals are suspects. They are only being interviewed to obtain their insight into the probable technical capacity of the subject in this case and to identify any former employees or co-workers who they recall as disaffected or suspicious.

- 1161

12/10/01  
[redacted]

X: Anthrax  
[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 12/07/2001

Given the large number of interviews within the state of Maryland, [redacted] is advised to contact WFO if additional assistance will be required.

**LEAD(s) :**

**Set Lead 1:**

[redacted]

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AT [redacted]

Conduct a comprehensive interview of [redacted]  
[redacted],  
telephone numbers [redacted] (h) and [redacted] (w), concerning  
[redacted] knowledge of anthrax and any insights [redacted] may have into potential  
suspects.

**Set Lead 2:**

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

Conduct a comprehensive interview of [redacted]  
[redacted] telephone number [redacted]  
[redacted] concerning [redacted] knowledge of anthrax and any insights [redacted] may  
have into potential suspects.

**Set Lead 3:**

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

Conduct a comprehensive interview of [redacted]  
[redacted] telephone numbers [redacted] (h) and  
[redacted] (w), concerning [redacted] knowledge of anthrax and any insights  
[redacted] may have into potential suspects.

**Set Lead 4:**

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 12/07/2001

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Conduct comprehensive interviews of the following individuals concerning their knowledge of anthrax and any insights they may have into potential suspects:

[Redacted]

Bruce Ivins, USAMRIID Bacteriology Division, [Redacted] Porter St,  
Ft. Detrick, MD 21702, [Redacted] (h) [Redacted] (w)

[Redacted]

Set Lead 5:

[Redacted]

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AT

[Redacted]

Conduct a comprehensive interview of [Redacted]  
[Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] (w), concerning  
[Redacted] knowledge of anthrax and any insights [Redacted] may have into potential  
suspects.



To: Counterterrorism From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 12/07/2001

Set Lead 6:

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[redacted]

AT [redacted]

Conduct a comprehensive interview of [redacted]

[redacted] telephone number [redacted] (h) and [redacted] (w), concerning [redacted] knowledge of anthrax and any insights [redacted] may have into potential suspects.

Set Lead 7:

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

Conduct a comprehensive interview of [redacted]

[redacted] telephone number [redacted] (w), concerning [redacted] knowledge of anthrax and any insights [redacted] may have into potential suspects.

Set Lead 8:

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

Conduct a comprehensive interview of [redacted]

[redacted] telephone number [redacted] (h) and [redacted] (w), concerning [redacted] knowledge of anthrax and any insights [redacted] may have into potential suspects.

Set Lead 9:

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

Conduct a comprehensive interview of [redacted]

[redacted] telephone number [redacted] (h) and [redacted] (w), concerning [redacted] knowledge of anthrax and any insights [redacted] may have into potential suspects.

To: Counterterrorism From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 12/07/2001

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Set Lead 10:

[redacted]

AT

[redacted]

Conduct a comprehensive interview of [redacted]  
[redacted] telephone number [redacted] (h),  
concerning [redacted] knowledge of anthrax and any insights [redacted] may have into  
potential suspects.

Set Lead 11:

[redacted]

AT

[redacted]

Conduct a comprehensive interview of [redacted]  
[redacted] telephone number [redacted] (w),  
concerning [redacted] knowledge of anthrax and any insights [redacted] may have into  
potential suspects.

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(Rev. 10-01-1999)

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 02/03/2002

To: Washington Field

Attn: SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]  
Anthrax Task Force

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From: New Orleans

Contact: SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936 (Pending) <sup>2466</sup>

Title: AMERITHRAX;  
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: To provide results of captioned investigation/interviews conducted at NIH and USAMRIID by New Orleans Division SAs [redacted] and [redacted] while TDY to the WFO and BA Divisions from 1/15-27/02.

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Administrative: Per telephonic request of ADIC Van Harp, WFO to SAC Kenneth W. Kaiser, New Orleans Division on 1/14/02 New Orleans SAs [redacted] and [redacted] traveled TDY to WFO on 1/15/02 and met with WFO SAs [redacted] and [redacted] re captioned matter. SAs [redacted] and [redacted] then traveled to NIH in Bethesda, Md. and USAMRIID at Fort Detrick, in Frederick, Md. to conduct investigation/interviews.

Enclosures: Enclosed for WFO are the following:

- The original and two copies of FD-302s reflecting interviews of the following individuals:

AT USAMRIID

- 1) [redacted] on 1/22/02
- 2) [redacted] on 1/23/02
- 3) [redacted] on 1/24/02
- 4) [redacted] on 1/24/02
- 5) [redacted] on 1/23/02
- 6) [redacted] on 1/22/02
- 7) [redacted] on 1/22/02
- 8) [redacted] on 1/22/02
- 9) [redacted] on 1/22/02
- 10) [redacted] on 1/23/02

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302s  
only

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To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: 279A-WF-222936 (Pending) 02/03/2002

- 11) [redacted] on 1/22/02
- 12) [redacted] on 1/22/02
- 13) [redacted] on 1/22/02
- 14) BRUCE IVINS on 1/23/02
- 15) [redacted] on 1/25/02
- 16) [redacted] on 1/25/02
- 17) [redacted] on 1/25/02
- 18) [redacted] on 1/25/02
- 19) [redacted] ON 1/25/02

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AT NIH

- 1) [redacted] on 1/17/02
- 2) [redacted] on 1/17/02
- 3) [redacted] on 1/17/02
- 4) [redacted] on 1/16/02
- 5) [redacted] on 1/18/02

-24 FD-340s containing the original interview notes from the above noted individuals

-An FD-340 containing a hand drawn schematic prepared by Bruce Ivins received from [redacted]

-An FD-340 containing two color digital photographs of Bacillus anthracis cultures showing locations of distribution from USAMRIID and a business card of Bruce Ivins from same

-An FD-340 containing documents provided by [redacted]

-An FD-340 containing documents provided by [redacted]

(TOTAL-52 ENCLOSURES less the copies of the 302s)

Details: Investigation/interviews conducted at NIH and USAMRIID were conducted by New Orleans Division SAs [redacted] and [redacted] The USAMRIID interviews were coordinated at the direction of BA Division SA [redacted]

To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: 279A-WF-222936 (Pending) 02/03/2002

LEAD (s):

Set Lead 1: (Adm)

WASHINGTON FIELD

READ AND CLEAR

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DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg  
ON 12-22-2008

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 03/04/2002

To: Washington Field

Attn: SA [REDACTED]  
SA [REDACTED]  
AMERITHRAX Task Force

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From: New Orleans

Contact: SA [REDACTED]  
SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

set

Case ID #: (U) 279A-WF-222936 (Pending) - 3030

Title: (U) AMERITHRAX  
MAJOR CASE 184

b7D

Synopsis: (U) To provide results of investigation conducted by New Orleans Division agents [REDACTED] in response to a lead set forth by the Washington Field Office (WFO) for interviews of scientists and other personnel [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(U)

~~(S)~~

~~Classified By: G-3  
Reason : 1.5(c)  
Declassify On: X1~~

Reference: (U) 279A-WF-222936, Serial 2706

(U)

Enclosures: ~~(S)~~ Enclosed for WFO are the following documents:

1. Freezer Log Book (inventory) of bacterial archive at [REDACTED]
2. Computer screen printout showing that [REDACTED] still maintains the original vial of Bacillus

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To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 03/04/2002

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- anthracis (hereinafter B. anthracis) obtained from USAMRIID in July 1998,
3. A copy of the application [redacted] prepared in order to obtain the B. anthracis strains from USAMRIID, dated 6/4/1998,
  4. Three lists of [redacted] personnel with access to the Bacteriology Bio-safety Level III (hereinafter BL III) suite from approx. 1997 to present,
  5. Log book sign-in sheets for access to BL III from January 26, 1998 to February 7, 2002,
  6. Four pages containing contact information for individuals at [redacted] and [redacted] and [redacted] employee [redacted]
  7. One page containing contact information for the contractor, [redacted] involved in sequencing B. anthracis plasmids for [redacted]
  8. Original letter and envelope addressed to [redacted]  
[redacted]
  9. Copy of an article showing the reference for one of [redacted] publications
  10. Copy of an advertisement provided by [redacted] for a portable grinding system,
  11. [redacted] travel summary for [redacted] from 1995 to present showing only [redacted]-funded travel,
  12. List of publications by [redacted]
  13. List of publications by [redacted]
  14. Curriculum Vitae prepared by [redacted] on 2/12/2002,
  15. [redacted] report on incidents of anthrax threats and suspicious substances/packages including two data tables
  16. Two photocopied sheets of Business cards for [redacted] and [redacted] personnel.
  17. 3 photographs of [redacted] at [redacted]  
[redacted] on 2/22/02.

Details: (U) New Orleans Division Special Agents (SAs) [redacted]  
[redacted] and [redacted] conducted interviews in [redacted]  
[redacted] at the request of WFO to determine the presence and

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To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 03/04/2002

handling of B. anthracis in [ ] and to obtain other intelligence information in support of the investigation of anthrax-laced letters sent in the United States. All intelligence collection activities in [ ] were coordinated with [ ] investigator [ ] was present for all interviews. SA [ ] Legal Attache's Office, [ ] coordinated the effort with [ ] and was kept informed of all activities and issues while the SAs were in [ ]

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(U) Upon arrival in [ ] on February 19, 2002, SAs [ ] and [ ] were met by [ ] investigators [ ] and [ ] was advised that the purpose of the visit was to collect intelligence regarding scientific work on B. anthracis in [ ] to support the investigation of current and future incidents in the United States involving anthrax. [ ] immediately introduced the SAs to [ ]

[ ] representatives, [ ] and [ ], who had previously requested they be present for the interviews at [ ]

The SAs clarified that there was no interest in [ ] [ ] and that the interviews would be primarily scientifically oriented. [ ] and [ ] did not provide any information to the agents or request any exchange. They did not appear at [ ] for the interviews.

(U) (S) [ ] told SAs [ ] and [ ] about a recent complaint regarding a [ ]

[ ] at [ ] reported that [ ] about how to get [ ] interviewed [ ] and determined that [ ]

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To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 03/04/2002

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(U) ~~(S)~~ On February 20, 2002 [ ] officials met with SAs [ ] and [ ] and Investigator [ ] (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the agents"). Access to [ ] was obtained through [ ] and [ ]. The agents were met by [ ] who coordinated the visit within [ ] and were immediately joined by [ ]. [ ] [ ] [ ] After the agents assured the group the interviews did not involve overall [ ] and other potentially classified information, [ ] said [ ] did not need to be present and left the room. A round-table discussion was suggested, but the

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To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 03/04/2002

agents requested interviews of individuals for documentation purposes. Prior to initiating the individual interviews [ ] and [ ] met with the agents.

(U) During the [ ] group discussion with [ ] and [ ] the following information was reported to the agents:

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(U) (S) [ ] employee [ ] was on travel and not available for interview. [ ] specializes in [ ] and is apparently very knowledgeable about [ ] [ ] It was suggested the agents contact [ ] at a later date.

(U) (S) [ ] said they wanted to "get the [ ] thing out of the way" before the scientific interviews began. The agents had not previously mentioned [ ] was described as a [ ] scientist from [ ] until [ ] who was rather unproductive. They claimed [ ] had no access to B. anthracis for [ ] years and no access to other Level III organisms. [ ] said [ ] has never heard of any work on B. anthracis conducted by [ ] and [ ] would have to have maintained a B. anthracis career publication list at [ ] [ ] [ ] access to the Level III area pre-dates the receipt of the Ames strain of B. anthracis at [ ] [ ] would have had access to the simulants, but [ ] could not access the hot suites even if [ ] had obtained B. anthracis elsewhere. The hot suites were re-opened in 1997 after having been shut down for renovation.

(U) (S) [ ] primary work at [ ] involved the [ ] [ ] was reportedly very sloppy and inattentive in [ ] work, but pleasant and accomodating in manner. [ ] appears to have expected others to do [ ] work for [ ] said people would work with [ ] until [ ] "burned" them, then they would not work with [ ] again. [ ] was [ ] immediate supervisor from [ ] until [ ] traveled [ ] primarily to [ ] also went to [ ] at least once for [ ] related work. [ ] maintained a record of [ ] travel which they agreed to provide. The record listed only travel funded by

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To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 03/04/2002

[ ] so none of [ ] personal travel or travel paid for by the United Nations or anyone else was included.

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(U) [ ] and [ ] claimed [ ]

They said [ ]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [ ] claims to conduct no dry or powdered work with B. anthracis and claims to have no milling capabilities at the facility. They do use Bacillus globigii (hereinafter B. globigii) as their standard simulant for B. anthracis and have used it for the last 5 to 6 years. The dry, powdered form of B. globigii used at [ ] is obtained from Dugway Proving Ground and is the 1960's version. Work with the powdered form of B. globigii is a standard part of the program at [ ] and there are annual summer projects with it. A simulation of the [ ] involving a release caused by a military school cadet showed that a student at the Bachelor of Science degree level could have caused the incident. [ ] conducted the [ ] exercise in 1998 or 1999.

(U) ~~(S)~~ No electron microscopy has been conducted at [ ] since 1991. Scanning electron microscopy was used on metals, but transmission electron microscopy has not been used and is not being used at present. [ ] had no way to accurately figure the particle size variation in the aerosolization studies. They have not examined any of the spore preparations (their own wet spore preps or the Dugway dry powder) with electron microscopy.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ The only Ames strain of B. anthracis at [ ] was obtained from the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). [ ] will supply samples from their archive to the FBI for analysis if the FBI identifies exactly which samples they want following discussions with the [ ] scientists.

(U) [ ] has no competitor [ ] related to chemical and biological defense. They provide forensic and technical support to [ ] and are currently completing a new forensic laboratory for terrorism response purposes. The [ ] facility has two divisions which have hot suites. [ ] believes the Bacteriology Division cannot access the hot suite in the Virology Division and vice versa, but [ ] suggested the agents verify this with someone else.

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To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 03/04/2002

(U) [ ] and [ ] agreed on a profile of the person who sent the anthrax-laced letters in the US as a person directly involved in weapons work who had access to more B. anthracis than they used in the letters (access to more than 15 grams). They said the person could have used an old sample from a stockpile and questioned whether or not someone could have simply kept a sample from years ago. They did not believe the perpetrator realized the impact that would occur by using the mail system. They would suggest the agents focus on the weaponization route rather than on scientifically tracing the strains of B. anthracis around the world. They referred to the American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) having allegedly supplied the Middle East with B. anthracis and the vaccine strain found in the trunk of a car in Las Vegas. Later the same day, [ ] asked SAs [ ] and [ ] if they could verify whether or not a Texas company had provided a large amount of B. anthracis to the Middle East in the past. The agents did not know and advised they would check into it for [ ]

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(U) ~~(S)~~ [ ] employees were part of the investigation team put together by the Center for Disease Control (CDC) to go to the Brentwood mail facility. [ ] and [ ] assisted at the Brentwood facility.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ [ ] and [ ] did not believe [ ] would have the expertise to prepare the anthrax letters. [ ] was not vaccinated and had no access to B. anthracis at [ ]. [ ] seemed very disinterested in work at [ ] on a daily basis. The name of [ ] was given to the agents as a person with whom [ ]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [ ]  
Current employee [ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]

They currently have 84 applicants for a current job search which was advertised to younger people at universities. [ ] never approached [ ] or [ ] to ask them to hire someone at [ ]. Someone like [ ]

[ ] would probably not pass the security clearances because [ ] would not have let the background investigation be conducted. After

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To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 03/04/2002

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checking their records, [ ] and [ ] said they have no record of an applicant named [ ] but that if [ ] had applied by E-mail, there would be no record of it after rejection.

(U) ~~(S)~~ After [ ] left the room, [ ] and [ ] said that [ ]

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[ ] It was suggested the agents talk to [ ] employee. [ ] had started in the [ ]

[ ] Contact information was provided. [ ] did not know of any other individuals who might be helpful in discussions of the weaponization of B. anthracis.

(U) ~~(S)~~ [ ] and [ ] said [ ] and that none of them have BL III facilities. [ ] even work with avirulent forms of dangerous organisms including avirulent B. anthracis (even the vaccine strain) must be handled only in a BL III facility. Their regulations are more strict than the CDC regulations [ ] works on the identification of threat agents and has [ ] They do conduct work with B. anthracis, but they may not possess the Ames strain. [ ] would maintain the collection of B. anthracis [ ] The new Director of that facility is [ ] Contact information for both was provided. [ ] is aware of no other [ ] facilities which might maintain B. anthracis. [ ] is [ ]

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To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 03/04/2002

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for one remaining [ ] person who holds either a [ ] of [ ] or [ ] degree.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Since [ ] came to [ ] there have been [ ] military employees who have knowledge about (but no practical experience with) B. anthracis. [ ]

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[ ] These individuals might be good to talk to on theoretical terms about the anthrax-laced letters.

(U) During an interview of [ ] on February 20, 2002 the following information was provided:

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(U) ~~(S)~~ [ ] has worked at [ ] since [ ] in [ ] Prior to that, [ ] was at the University of [ ] and at school in [ ] primarily works on [ ] [ ] has been involved in [ ] work since [ ] and is on the team for [ ] supplies scientific advisors for the team, and [ ] [ ]

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(U) ~~(S)~~ [ ] has conducted work on [ ] [ ]

[ ] has also worked with virulent Ames. [ ] obtained a variety of strains from USAMRIID because of a publication on vaccine-resistant strains. Eleven strains were imported from USAMRIID, and the Ames strain was one of them. [ ] has not used Ames in their animal work, but instead use volium (US weaponized).

(U) ~~(S)~~ One study conducted by [ ] in [ ] was only prepared as a [ ] internal report. A California company named Biolog manufactured a micro-titre plate with 96 different substrates on it. It gives a biological fingerprint of how an

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~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 03/04/2002

organism uses the various substrates. Based on the study, four groupings of anthrax were identified.

(U) ~~(S)~~ In a couple of the studies at [ ] the Ames was passaged, but only a few times. The Ames is stored on protect beads made by a [ ]. The beads are ceramic and have a cryoprotectant on them. Each time Ames is needed for a project, one of the beads is removed and used. [ ] is not aware of any other dissemination of Ames from [ ]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[ ] On the inventory, Ames is listed many times, but the multiple listings are for numerous protect beads made with the original USAMRIID Ames. The dilutions listed on the inventory are of vollum.

(U) ~~(S)~~ [ ] recently talked with [ ] of [ ] while in [ ] and understands that Ames is endemic in Texas. [ ] believes Ames originally came from Texas. In the work conducted at [ ], Ames is grown on agar plates, but [ ] does not have experience with [ ] is a [ ] at [ ] who might have knowledge about any differences in [ ] of Ames at [ ]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [ ] has not worked with spore preparations very much. [ ] is a [ ] who collected B. anthracis from [ ] for his [ ] came to [ ] does not know anyone who has the expertise to prepare the anthrax letters. [ ] knows of no dry or powdered work except for Dugway's B. globigii. [ ] provided a copy of an advertisement for a bench-top grinder which [ ] thought might be the type of equipment used to prepare the letters.

b6  
b7C

(U) ~~(S)~~ Just prior to September 11, [ ] a study to determine how easy it would be for someone to grow the B. anthracis Ames strain at home outside a laboratory. They used old recipes and media formulations and bought all of the supplies at a grocery store. The Ames grew very well. [ ]

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To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 03/04/2002

pointed out that they only grew it to the sporulation stage (no drying, powderizing or milling) and that it would take far more effort, expertise, and equipment to get from that stage to the stage of the material in the letters. [ ] did not know of any former employees or outside associates who would have the expertise or demeanor to send the anthrax letters. [ ] thought [ ] work with [ ] would be the best investigative route to take. [ ] is not aware of any insecticide companies or other businesses in the area which might utilize the technology for producing the dry, powdered version from an industrial standpoint.

b6  
b7C

(U)

~~(S)~~ When an incident involving a letter containing a powder occurred [ ] it was realized there were no guidelines for handling the event and no real risk assessment. [ ]

[ ] The Dugway powder was used

b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U)

~~(S)~~ [ ] said the only people authorized to enter the BL III lab are immunized. They wear respiratory protection (PAPRs) in the BL III lab because of the presence of Brucella. The access to the suite is with a swipe card, and there is an access log maintained for entry. Approximately 12

b6  
b7C

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To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 03/04/2002

people have access to the B. anthracis. [ ] also has the vaccine strain of B. anthracis and an avirulent [ ]  
In order to import or transfer samples, [ ] must have a permit

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[ ] is the [ ] for [ ] Dr. Bruce Ivins was the point of contact at USAMRIID for the eleven strains obtained in 1998. [ ] received one shipment from USAMRIID, and that was the first time [ ] obtained the Ames strain.

b6  
b7C

(U) During an interview of [ ] on February 20, 2002 the following information was provided:

(U) (S) [ ] has worked at [ ] since [ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ] is focused on B. anthracis [ ]  
[ ]  
[ ] the  
primers which are specific to the [ ]  
were developed through a contractor [ ]  
[ ] has a huge archive, but has no Level III organisms. The highest level they maintain is the one for the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). [ ]  
[ ]  
[ ] has been developing the anthrax assay and designed the primers against the two virulence plasmids and a chromosomal gene target of anthrax. [ ] patented the target site. A lot of different B. anthracis strains were sent from [ ] and have been sequenced.

b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U) (S) [ ] said the most virulent strains of B. anthracis have both plasmids. [ ] does not know how successful it would be to try to transfer the plasmids into a non-pathogenic Bacillus sp. in order to make it produce the anthrax toxins. The plasmid which produces the toxin has to be present for it to be virulent. They can reduce virulence by removing the capsule plasmid because the capsule protects the organism from the host it infects. [ ]  
[ ] if the chromosomal gene target does not show up, the organism is either a manipulated strain of Bacillus,

b6  
b7C

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To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 03/04/2002

or there is too small an amount of B. anthracis to detect the signal.

(U)

~~(S)~~

[redacted]  
[redacted] USAMRIID's B. anthracis strains were used to design the primers. The [redacted] contractors came to [redacted] to conduct some of the work. [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U)

~~(S)~~

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U)

~~(S)~~

[redacted] thinks the anthrax letters were a very sophisticated dissemination, and [redacted] does not know of anyone with the capability of preparing the letters. [redacted] began working with anthrax [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted] There is no way that anyone at [redacted] could have grown anything from the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 03/04/2002

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
to protect their intellectual property and will probably not publish the B. anthracis work in the public domain.

(U) (S) [redacted] believes the Animal Disease Research [redacted] would have virulent B. anthracis. There was an anthrax outbreak in [redacted] in 2000. Last spring, USAMRIID approached [redacted] and wanted to do some work to test their assays in the field. A permit was obtained to [redacted] In July 2001 [redacted] and USAMRIID scientists [redacted]

[redacted] Another anthrax outbreak occurred while they were on site. Historically, there had not been two successive outbreaks like that. Clinical samples were [redacted] Split samples were [redacted] Half of the samples went to [redacted] and half to USAMRIID (duplicates). [redacted]

[redacted] has not distributed those samples to anyone else. Anthrax was detected in some of the soil and tissue samples using a portable lab brought by USAMRIID. [redacted]

[redacted] The samples actually belong to [redacted] When the research is complete, [redacted] will have to send the samples to [redacted] is over the archive for the World Health Organization (WHO). The anthrax outbreak stopped in [redacted]

(U) (S) [redacted] thinks approximately [redacted] people have access to the B. anthracis at [redacted] Access is granted by Security, and the existing security measures have always been in place at [redacted] (not just since September 2001). [redacted] knows of no one whom [redacted] considers a security or safety risk. [redacted]

[redacted] It would be almost impossible to sneak into the BL III suite. Someone would have to get past the front desk, then pass the Level 2 and Level 3 swipe card points to reach the suite. [redacted] does not know of anyone who has come down with anthrax or symptoms of anthrax. Theoretically, it would be possible to "piggy-back" into the hot suite with someone who had access. It would also be possible to take something out of the hot suite. [redacted] work in the hot suite all of the time.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 03/04/2002

(U) ~~(S)~~ [ ] has never worked on any of the substrains of B. anthracis and has never received any samples [ ] knew to have originated in Texas. b6 b7C

(U) [ ] provided the following information during an interview on February 20, 2002: b6 b7C b7D

(U) ~~(S)~~ [ ] advised that [ ] from [ ] had contacted [ ] on January 8, 2002, and had asked if [ ] was at [ ] mentioned [ ] and said [ ] name had come up in [ ] interview with [ ] then briefed [ ]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [ ] worked at [ ] from [ ] as a [ ] in the [ ] section. [ ]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [ ] [ ]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 03/04/2002

b6  
b7C

(U) ~~(S)~~ [ ] described a conversation [ ] had with [ ] either the day after September 11, 2001, or later during that same week. [ ] mentioned to [ ] how tragic the events in the US were. [ ]

(U) ~~(S)~~ According to [ ] employee [ ] also had a similar discussion with [ ] on a different day.

b6  
b7C  
b7D

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~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 03/04/2002

b6  
b7C

(U) [ ] was interviewed on February 20 and 21, 2002 and provided the following information:

(U)

~~(S)~~

DOB [ ]

address [ ]

telephone number [ ]

Driver's License Number [ ]

The topic of [ ]

project

at the [ ]

was [ ]

From [ ]

to [ ]

(U)

~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 03/04/2002

b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] believes the Ames strain was originally found in 1948 in a cow carcass in Iowa. Now the Texas isolate from 1981 appears to have been mislabeled. The Texas issue is a big break and may narrow down the sources of the material used in the letters. Whoever prepared the letters definitely got it from a laboratory. There are actually a couple of genotypes sitting in the soil in Texas, and that is too big a coincidence. Isolating it from the soil is too complex. [redacted] procedure may differentiate between the 1948 Ames from Iowa and the 1981 Texas sample. [redacted] [redacted] has very few anthrax experts. [redacted] were affiliated with Level II agencies and did have anthrax in their inventories. The isolation work is all done by technicians. [redacted] and the technicians carried out the work.

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] does not know if Ames is in the collection [redacted] but it is definitely at [redacted]

(U) [redacted] was interviewed on February 21, 2002 and provided the following information:

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] has been employed at [redacted] for [redacted] years where [redacted] work involves [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 03/04/2002

and [ ] has worked with the Ames strain in [ ] research on Anthrax. [ ] maintains rigorous logs regarding the BL III suite access and the inventory access. [ ] was not aware of the origin of the sample of Ames maintained at [ ] was previously at [ ]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[ ] also received [ ] degree in [ ] from there. [ ] has never been approached by anyone suspicious trying to get any samples of the [ ] inventory. [ ] is not aware of any dry or powdered work being conducted at [ ] with the Ames strain or with anything other than B. globigii. No such equipment to accomplish drying or milling is at [ ] In [ ] estimation the subject of the anthrax-laced letters would be one who had access to B. anthracis and who works in a much freer environment than that at [ ] A [ ] conducts an annual review of all work conducted at [ ] which includes an inventory check to ensure no offensive work is being conducted. [ ] believes investigators are overly focused on defense facilities, whereas [ ] thinks the focus should be more on Veterinary facilities. [ ]

[ ] is aware of [ ] work with [ ] [ ] believes it will be unlikely to scientifically track the signature of the culprit as it could have been anyone with access to the Ames strain.

(U) ~~(S)~~ [ ] advised [ ] stayed in contact with [ ]

[ ] has never had any cause for concern or suspicions about [ ] and did not see [ ] as a fanatic. [ ] advised that [ ] primarily worked with [ ] and [ ] had no knowledge of [ ] ever working with B. anthracis.

(U) [ ] was interviewed on February 21, 2002 and provided the following information:

(U) ~~(S)~~ [ ] telephone number [ ] is a [ ] has

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 03/04/2002

b6  
b7C  
b7D

been at [ ] for [ ] years working in [ ] and [ ]. The Ames strain of *B. anthracis* is part of the [ ] inventory, however, it has never been worked with in the dry or powdered form. [ ]

[ ] provided a list of individuals who have had access to the BL III suites and copies of Entry/Exit log sheets to the BL III lab from January 26, 1998 thru February 7, 2002.

[ ] duties as [ ] include the [ ]

[ ] has no reason to believe anyone has been in the BL III suite who should not have been there. A small changing room is the first area one comes to before entering the lab, and two people trying to go in this area together would not go unnoticed. The -70 degree celcius freezer in the BL III suite which contains the inventory is only accessed by those [ ] employees who work in the lab. The freezer has a combination lock on it to which [ ] does not have access. The BL III lab equipment is serviced once per year during which time the freezer is kept locked and cannot be accessed by anyone. Anyone shipping samples from [ ]

(U) [ ] was interviewed on February 21, 2002 and provided the following:

(U) [ ] telephone number [ ] is a [ ] and has been at [ ] for [ ] years who works for [ ] with *B. anthracis* and [ ]. In [ ] a test to use a chemical decontaminate [ ] on the Ames strain of *B. anthracis* was not successful at [ ]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 03/04/2002

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U)

~~(S)~~

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7F

(U)

~~(S)~~ On February 25, 2002 the agents met with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U)

~~(S)~~

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: New Orleans  
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 03/04/2002

LEAD (s):

Set Lead 1: (Adm)

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]  
From: [redacted]  
Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2002 9:01 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: access to BL-3

Hi [redacted]

As discussed yesterday, here are the people who could enter BL-3 suite 1:

[redacted] current or former frequent users of BL-3:

[redacted]

[redacted] personnel with current or former access to BL-3 suite 1, but with infrequent or no entry:


[redacted]


Contractors/visitors/post-docs with current or former access to BL-3 suite 1:

[redacted]

from [redacted]  
2/21/02  
[redacted]

**Personnel with access to the BioLevel III (bateriology suite)**  
(~1997 to present)



 Personnel



b6  
b7C  
b7D

**Contractors:**



from   
2/21/02  


# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments
2/26/98		1430	1530		
2/27/98		1335	1520		
2/28/98		1325	—		
2/29/98		1130	—		
3/1/98		1250	1440		
3/2/98		1328	—		
3/3/98		1330	1600		
3/4/98		1305	1430		
3/5/98		1300	—		
3/6/98		1345	1440		
19 Feb 98		9:07	1307		
"		13:51	14:52		
20 Feb 98		14:57	15:00		
2 March 1998		11:10	13:17		
"		—	—		
9 March 1998		9:55	13:09		
10 Mar		1725/1345			
11 Mar. 1998		10:40	10:45		
11 Mar 98		338	16:23		
12 Mar 98		300	1403		
13 Mar		8:20 PM	0941		
14 Mar		715	1000		
15 Mar		0900	0938		
16 Mar		01:55	14:27		

Rec'd 2/21/02  
from [signature]

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments
17 Mar		1345	1422		
19 Mar 98		10:40	14:41		
20 Mar		0911			
21 Mar		10:55	12:50		
22 Mar		0928	1006		
23 Mar 98		0933	12:47		
24 Mar 98		0758	0758		
25 Mar 98		12:52	15:26		
26 Mar 98		14:32	16:06		
31 Mar 98		12:25	16:03		
2 April 98		13:25	16:10		
7 April 98		11:07	13:15		
8 April 98		12:42	15:10		
11 April		2:15	4:15		
"		1035	1222		
14 April		10:45	13:16		
15 April		1037	1205		
15 April		12:35	16:25		
16 April					
16 April		10:39	1226		
16 April		12:50	16:25		
17 April		12:38	1346		
18 April		0815	0950		
19 April		0830	0915		

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments
20 April 98		9:02	9:03		
"		9:04	11:40		
"		11:52	11:52		
21 April 98		14:27	16:15		
22 April		10:33	12:00		
"		13:47	16:01		
24 April		8:30	19:21		
25 April		8:00	13:20		
26 April		09:10	09:45		
27 April		14:24	16:06		
28 April		10:38	11:39		
29 April 98		8:45	11:21		
30 April		10:41	12:19		
1 May 98		9:41	12:56		
4 May 98		10:48	12:12		
6 May 98		13:17	13:42		
8 May 98		8:37	9:14		
11 May 98		16:15	16:15		
12 May 98		9:27	10:33		
13 May 98		9:30			
"		9:35			
15 May 98		15:20	16:15		
"		15:35	16:10		
23.7.98		←			



# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comment
23 July 98		14:40	16:20		
24 July 98		9:28	12:40		
28 July 98		13:30	15:55		
29 July 98		10:47	11:51		
Aug 1		9:08	12:45		
Aug 5		10:50	12:25		
6		13:00	14:40		
7		08:33			
7		10:45	12:41		
10		9:21			
10		11:17	12:38		
10		8:10	14:15		
11		10:57	12:31		
12		9:19			
12		13:00	14:38		
13		03:05	11:00	11:20	11:41
13		13:01	14:38		
14		8:27			
14		10:41	14:02		
17		03:30			
17		11:50	13:30		
17		15:43			
18		11:20			
18		12:57	14:10		

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

1998

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
Aug 19		1324	1503		
20		0827			
20		0415	1243		
21		0744			
24		0500	1234		
24		1346			
25		0825	0839/1031		
25		1552	1326		
25		1315			
26		0848			
26		1042	1136		
26		1140	1425		
27		1045	1146		
27		1342			
28		1040	1121		
28		1322	1338		
29		0844	0849 0950		
31		0942	1258		
31		1330	1550		
"		1355	1538		
1 Sept		1256			
11		1305	1455		
2 Sept		1105	1355		
2		1115	1330		

# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

### Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

1998

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
Sept 3		11:07			
Sept 3		11:05	14:45		
Sept 4		9:20	10:00		
4 Sept.		12:51	1:55		
4 Sept.		13:43			
5 Sept.		7:24	8:55		
6 Sept.		7:50	9:10		
7 Sept.		7:30	8:32		
8 Sept.		10:55	12:02		
9 Sept.		13:15	13:54		
10 Sept.		11:22			
11 Sept.		11:15	13:10		
12 Sept.		08:13	08:51		
14 Sept.		08:26			
14 Sept.		10:55	12:14		
15 Sept/98		12:00	14:48		
16 Sept		13:00	14:00		
" "		15:15			
17		08:55	09:03 / 12:41		
17		10:41	11:42		
18 Sept		11:00	13:40		
21		12:12	13:30		
21		13:35	14:50		
21		13:45	14:23		

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

1998

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
Sept. 23		10:40	11:15		
Sept. 24		13:23	13:55		
Sept 25		0935			
11		1040	1322		
26		1347	1420		
27		0925	0935		
28 Sept.		12:10			
29		1300			
29		11:03			
30		14:40	16:30		
Oct 1		1130	1205		
2		1009			
2		11:50			
3		0820	0930		
4		0830	0915		
5		0829			
5		11:35	15:05		
6		0940/1040			
6		10:50	15:10		
6		1100	1223		
7		10:30	12:20		
7		11:32	15:55		
7		13:20	15:20		
7		1439			

# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

### Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

1998

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
Oct 8		1007			
11		1350	1450		
Oct 9		8:55	11:55		
"		1120			
Oct 10		0925	1040		
11		1055	1130		
"		1135			
12		0940			
12		0955	1035		
Oct 13		11:15	14:01		
14 Oct		15:00	16:38		
15 Oct		14:00	16:35		
16 Oct		11:50			
17		1122			
17		1138	1215		
18		0938	1025		
18		1136			
19		13:05	14:45		
20 Oct		10:55	15:55		
20 Oct		11:15	15:05		
21 Oct		9:10	11:00		
22 Oct		10:45	13:30		
11		12:30	16:25		
23 Oct		11:45	14:45		

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
7/24		09:00	10:20		
in		09:50	10:35		
26 Oct		12:30	16:15		
27 Oct		14:50	15:45		
28 Oct		14:15	14:45		
29 Oct		7:30	10:50		
"		14:00	18:30		
30 Oct		7:30	1:31:27		
"		14:00	17:30		
31 Oct 98		8:00	13:26		
"		14:00	18:06		
1 Nov 98		11:55	15:13		
2 Nov		09:47			
3 Nov		12:43	17:17		
4 Nov		11:15	16:16		
"		11:35			
"		13:39	15:19		
"		13:51	14:50		
invs		8:35	13:50		
"		9:17	14:13		
"		10:25	11:45		
"		14:55	18:00		
4		15:40	16:10		
10-6		9pm	12:55		
10		1:19/150			
15			11:35		

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
11/12		13:24	15:38		
12		09:40			
12		12:50			
12		13:20	15:00		
16 Nov 98		13:24			
Nov. 16-98		13:35	16h40		
Nov. 16-98		13:45	15h45		
Nov. 16-98		13:55	15h30		
Nov. 16-98		15:10	18:30		
Nov 17-98		10 AM	16:35		
17 Nov 98		11:45	16:54		
18 Nov 98		8:30	12:05		
"		9:15	12:30		
"		14:14	17:28		
"		14:25	17:10		
19 Nov 98		8:25	12:30		
"		10:35	16:25		
19 Nov		13:00	16h00		
"		13:05	1645		
"		14:05	17:00		
20 Nov		7:55	11:05		
20 Nov		1:00	15:30		
"		13h10	15h15		

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
20 Nov.		13h15	15h05		
21/22		09:20 <sup>9:20</sup>	09:35 <sup>10:30</sup>		
23 Nov.		9:10	12:00		
23 Nov.		9h15	11h30		
"		10h05	11h45		
23 Nov.		15:00	15:50		
24 Nov		9:30	11:55		
24 Nov		9:40	11:45		
24 Nov.		9h45	12h00		
"		13:45	16:00		
25 Nov		9:30	13:45		
"		14:00	16:25		
26 Nov		9:20	15:35		
"		9:30	13:40		
27 Nov		9:40	11:15		
27 Nov		13:40	14:30		
28		0830	0915		
29		0919	0940		
30		1055	1240		
1 Dec 08		10:55	16:20		
2		1300	1355		
3		1050	1140		
4		0830	1117		
5		14:10	16:25		



# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
12/10		08:10	14:10		
12/11		10:00	10:15		
11 Dec 98		11:23	13:10		
12 Dec		09:37	10:57		
14 Dec.		12:10	14:30		
15 Dec.		8:25	16:30		
16 Dec		9:50	10:55		
19 Dec 98		9:10	11:10		
21 Dec 98		8:10	10:22		
21		11:11	13:57		
21		14:30	15:30		
22 Dec 98		13:52	15:52		
23 Dec 98		8:25	11:10		
24 Dec 98		8:30	10:47		
4 Jan 99		8:40	16:15		
6 Jan 99		11:40	15:40		
7 Jan 99		9:40	12:55		
8 Jan 99		9:10	11:41		
11 Jan 99		11:30	14:05		
12 Jan 99		10:AM	15:50		
13 Jan 99		13:55	16:15		
15 Jan 99		10:15	15:24		
15 Jan 99		14:40	16:40		
16 Jan 99		8:30	16:40		

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
19 Jan 99		11:11	14:28		
m20		1038			
25 Jan 99		9 AM	11: AM		
25 Jan 99		13:30	16:20		
25 Jan 99		11:30	Ø		
m		11:30	15:15		
26 Jan 99		11:45			
27 Jan 99		14:50	15:50		
28 Jan 99		15:50	17:00		
29 Jan 99		13:40	14:30		
30		0845	0925		
31		1500	1530		
1 Feb 99		11:10			
2		1315	1515		
3		0831/1500			
3		1032	1110		
4		0915	0955		
5		0817	911		
5		1039			
6		0840	1010		
7		0910	1120		
8		10:45	16:00		
9		13:10	15:30		
9		14:10	16:20		
10		11:20			

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
Feb 10/99		14:20	16:30		
Feb 11/99		8:35	10:30		
Feb 11		15:05	16:15		
Feb 12		8:40	13:10		
12					
12		11:50	15:00		
12		<del>15:20</del>			
13		13:00	7:30 <sup>4</sup>		
13		13:10	14:38		
16		9:20	11:52		
17		0842			
"		038	1233		
"		1430			
22 Feb 99		9:10	14:30		
"		9:19	11:00		
"		12:00			
"		13:30	15:55		
23 Feb 99		9:35			
23 Feb 99		9:50	14:20		
24 Feb 99		14:20	16:30		
"		1445	1558		
25		0941			
26		8:15	12:07		
26		13:18	14:30		

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
1 March 99		9:36	11:20		
11		9:50			
1		12:25			
2		08:19			
2		08:22	09:50		
4		09:23			
4 March 99		11:45	15:00		
5 March 99		12:05	14:25		
7 March 99		8:00	8:00		
7 March 99		11:55	16:21		
8 March 99		12:30	15:40		
9 March 99		11:10	16:55		
11		12:17	12:17		
11		15:03	16:20		
10 March 99		7:50	11:45		
11		2:00 PM	14:50		
10 March 99		14:44	17:10		
11 March 99		09:10	09:57		
11 March		9:25	16:05		
11 March 99		12:12	16:20		
11		12:57			
12 March		8:05	10:45		
12 March 99		9:50	12:20		
12 March		14:45			

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
MAR 13		09:50	09:35		
14		09:05	10:10		
15 Mar 99		10:24	13:30		
15		13:57			
16 Mar 99		14:17	15:50		
17 Mar		08:55	09:50		
17 Mar		13:06	16:00		
18 Mar		7:30	13:00		
18 Mar		08:00			
		08:35	10:30		
		10:17/10:18			
18 Mar		13:47	14:15		
u		18:55	23:15		
14 Mar		8:20	15:00		
15 Mar		10:00	11:50		
19 Mar		16:00	23:40		
19 Mar		08:55			
u		09:25	10:10		
21		08:18			
11		08:42	09:30		
Mar 22		9:20	10:00		
11		12:50	13:5		
11		13:25	15:25		
Mar 23		11:30	15:30		

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
Mar 23		13:04			
"		13:10	14:58		
24 March		8:35	16:10		
24 Mar		10 AM	16:30		
"		14:30	(4x)		
25 Mar		8 AM	14:45		
"		16:50			
"		11:03	13:12		
26 Mar		11:45	2:30		
27 Mar		28:55/29:03/29:12			
28		13:07	15:42		
29		10:06	11:41		
30 Mar 99		13:20	16:15		
31 Mar 99		7:35	12:00		
31 Mar 99		9 AM	22:40		
31 Mar 99		14:20	17:25		
31 Mar 99		19:30	22:26		
1 April 99		19:22	12:45		
1 Apr 99		9:30	12:10		
		15:36			
6 Apr. 99		12:35	16:10		
"		13:15	14:35		
7 Apr 99		8:15	15:50		
"		11:15			

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
4/2/99		08:35			
4/11		5:5			
9		8:37	11:50		
9 April 99		8:35			
"		10:40			
10 April		9:50	10:15		
10 April		9:40	10:40		
10 April		9:45	15:00		
12 Apr		8:45	15:45		
12 April		8:50	16:35		
13 April		7:30	11:50		
"		8:35	12:05		
13 Apr		8:15	12:00		
13 April		12:45	16:00		
"		3:15			
"		8:35	15:30		
14 Apr.		7:20	12:00		
14 Apr		8:45	23:55		
14 Apr		9:20	10:50		
14 Apr.		3:00	19:20		
14 April		15:00	16:30		
14 Apr.		4:35	23:37		
15 April		8:45	10:10		
		12:30	16:00		
9:00		13:00	16:15		
"		13:10	16:35		
14 Apr		9:16			

DATE	NAME	Time IN	OUT	Protocol#	Backlog
Apr 16		9 AM	<del>12:55</del>		
"		9:05	12:45		
"		9:10	<del>15:30</del>		
April 16		14:00	17:00		
"		14:05	16:45		
April 17		8:00	10:15		
April 18		7:30	11:15		
April 19		<del>7:50</del>	11:25		
April 19		8:00	11:10		
"		13:00	16:55		
"		13:10	16:45		
April 20		17:40			
"		7:50			
"		8:40			



# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
19		1322	1335	1536	
20		140	16:30		
		750	13:00		
		840	16:20		
		310	1402		
21		8:40	13:20		
21 April		7:45	11:45		
		100	1253		
21 April		12:15	16:00		
"		4:00	16:10		
22 April		8:00	11:15		
"		8:05	13:00		
22		1230	1337		
23 April		8:55	10:55		
23 April		9:05	11:10		
"		10:25	14:55		
23 April		1136	1234		
24		0915			
24		0920	1017		
25		0915	1025		
26		1015	16:05		
26		1110	1713		

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
26		13:15	15:48		
27		8:20	13:40		
1		9:07	15:26		
11		12:57	15:57		
28		7:55	13:35		
18		8:15 11:10			
28		13:38	14:34		
28		15:05	17:00		
29/4/04		10:10	14:25		
29		10:45	13:55		
29		13:04	15:00		
30		8:10	9:30		
30		11:15	14:35		
30		11:05	14:15		
may 03		10:50	12:10		
6 May 04		13:10	15:45		
7 May 04		11:00	14:00		
11 May 04		9:35	10:35		
14 May		12:05	12:50		
17 May 04		12:00	17:42		
17 MAY					
22 June		13:47	16:52		
22 June		14:15	16:21		

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
22 June 99		11:37	17:00		
10 Aug 99					
10 Aug 99		13:30	16:30		
10 Aug 99		14:15	16:10		
11 Aug 99		12:00	16:55		
12 Aug 99		11 AM	16:30		
13 Aug 99		11:15	13:10		
16 Aug 99		9:10	—		
16 Aug 99		10:45	14:35		
16 Aug 99		11:40	14:40		
16 Aug		15:18			
17 Aug 99		8:15	13:55		
17 Aug 99		12:00	16:30		
17 Aug		14:40	19:30		
20 Aug		11 AM	17:00		
18 Aug		12:55	17:40		
19 Aug		0815			
19 Aug 99		12:40	16:30		
19 Aug 99		13:40	16:05		
20 Aug 99		10:25	14:00		
20 Aug 99		11:00	12:30		
23 Aug		1130			
23 Aug 99		13:07	16:30		
11		1330	1530		

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
Aug 24/99		011	1230		
25		0917			
25		100	1348		
25		2:30	16:24		
26		7:25	16:35		
26		018/1022	1323		
27		054	1235		
		402			
31		019			
1 Sept.		1:05	13:00		
"		028			
"		110 <sup>(x2)</sup>	1218		
"		14:40	16:30		
2 Sept.		2:30	13:40		
2 Sept.		8 AM	14:00		
2 Sept.		14:40	22:32		
"		14:45	22:50		
2 Sept		10 AM	14:35		
"		1142			
9 Sept		7:55	11:55		
13 Sept		7:45	15:10		
18 Sept		7:15	17:00		
"		0945			
7		1015	1306		
"		13:26	16:30		
22 Sept		11:45	21:00		

b6  
b7C  
b7D

DATE	NAME	Time in	Time out	Project	Backup
Sept 07/99	[redacted]	8:35	16:30	[redacted]	[redacted]
"	[redacted]	11:30			
Sept 10/99	[redacted]	8:50	12:50		
Sept 14/99	[redacted]	7:30	8:55		
Sept 14	[redacted]	10:25	15:35		
16 Sept 99	[redacted]	12:25	15:00	[redacted]	
17 Sept. 99	[redacted]	10:13	15:00		
20 Sept. 99	[redacted]	11:00	14:12	[redacted]	
21 "	[redacted]	0850			
21 Sept. 99	[redacted]	12:00		[redacted]	
22 Sept 99	[redacted]	13:00		[redacted]	14:50
23 Sept. 99	[redacted]	13:30		[redacted]	

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself, eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
Sept 23		1330	16:10		
24 Sept		15:05	15:00		
27		0920	1012		
27		015	1149		
28		1029			
28		035	1352		
24		8:30	10:50		
27		1338			
		1313	1600		
24		14:05	16:26		
30		1018	1109		
05-10		14:00 13:20	17:00		
5/10/99		13:50	16:25		
11		13:55	16:35		
11		14:10	16:20		
06-10-99		9:15	15:45		
06-10-99		9:20	14:35		
07-10-99		9:35	15h05		
11		9h45	14h50		
07-10-99		9:55	15:30		
08-10-99		9:45	13:10		
11		8h55	16h30		
08-10-99		9:00	16:00		
09-10-99		8:20	11:45		

## Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

## Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
09-10-99		8h25	11h30		
10-10-99		8h25	11h00		
10-10-99		8:30	11:45		
11-10-99		8:15	15:25		
11-10-99		8:25	15h00		
11-10-99		8:35	15:35		
12-10-99		8:35	2:45		
"		8:45	3h05		
12-10-99		8h50	2h55		
12/10/99		11:15			
13-10-99		8:40	16:00		
"		8:50	15:20		
"		9h00	15h35		
"		12:15	14:33		
14-10-99		8:40	14:25		
14-10-99		8h50	14h05		
"		8h55	14:35		
"		11:12	13:30		
15-10-99		10:15	12:15		
"		10h25	11h55		
16/10/99		7:35	10:22		
17/10/99		9:20	10:20		
18/10/99		9:05	12:05		
14/10/99		8:50	12:40		

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
20/10/99		12:30	16:15		
21/10/99		8:40	10:40		
22/10/99		11:00	12:20		
24/10/99		9:00	10:20		
25/10/99		10:30	12:15		
29/10/99		12:30	14:20		
1/11/99		10:15	12:45		
2/11/99		10:00	16:25		
3/11/99		8:30	17:15		
"		18:30	23:45		
4/11/99		9:50	16:20		
5/11/99		7:30	10:30		
"		13:00	13:00		
7/11/99		8:00	9:15		
Nov 8		10:45			
"		12:20	14:37		
9		0845 x2			
9		10:05	12:00		
10		12:50			
10		13:05	15:15		
12 Nov 99		9:15	13:20		
15 Nov 99		10:00	16:20		
"					
16 Nov 99		7:40	15:10		

b6  
b7C  
b7D





# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
16 Nov		1240	1403		
17 Nov 94		7:20	16:25		
18 Nov 94		9:20	15:42		
Pln Dr		1012	1140		
22 Nov		12:15	15:30		
23 Nov		9:15	15:30		
11		9h25	15h40		
11		9h40	15h00		
11		11:10	16:20		
24 Nov		9h15	16:30		
24 Nov		9:25	16:50		
24		9h35	16h20		
25 Nov		9:20	15:35		
11		9h30	14h45		
11		9h40	15h02		
26 Nov		9:00	15:00		
11		9:10	15:15		
11		9h15	15h30		
27 Nov		9:00	12:00		
28 Nov		8:40	12:25		
28-11		8:50	12:15		
29-11		9:20	15:35		
11		9h35	15h10		
11		9h45	15h25		

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
30-11-99		8h53	13h22		
"		9h00	13h50		
"		9:10	13:40		
01-12-99		8h45	14h35		
"		8h55	14h52		
01-12-99		10:05	15:30		
02-12-99		8h10	15:03		
"		8h20	15h20		
02-12-99		8:45	15:30		
03-12-99		8:45	15:00		
03-12-99		8h55	14h50		
03-12-99		10:15	14:45		
Dec 3		13:17	13:47		
04-12-99		9h00	11h00		
05-12-99		9h25	11h25		
06-12-99		11h00	15h20		
"		11h10	15h40		
Dec 7/99		8:37	10:24		
"		9:45	13h35		
"		9h55	14h00		
Dec 8/99		9:15	11h35		
"		9:25	11h42		
Dec 9		13:22	15:20		
		14:50	14:52		



# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
3/4/2000					
4 Jan 99		8:30	15:40		
5 Jan		035	1216		
6 Jan		010	1208		
10 Jan 00		12:41	14:45		
10		1258			
11 Jan 00		9:21	15:10		
11		0945	1315		
11		1320	1425	15	
12		502	1624		
21 Jan 00		12:35	15:00		
26 Jan 00		9:10	13:35		
2 Feb 00		9:55	12:47		
2 Feb 00		11:46	16:25		
4 Feb 00		9:10	12:37		
7 Feb		1030			
Feb 7		10:42	15:05		
		1355	1547		
Feb 9/2000		12:00	15:23		
Feb 8		1420			
9		957	1124		
Feb 9/2000		10:10	11:47		

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
17 Feb 2000		16:20	16:21		
16 Feb		10:12			
17 Feb 2000		13:58	16:27		
18 Feb 2000		9:00	11:20		
24 Feb 2000		12:45	14:35		
1 March 2000		8:22	10:06		
1		09:03	09:17		
		09:22	10:24		
1 March		10:56	10:56		
1		11:02 16:57	11:12		
1		13:40	15:16		
2 March		8:50	9:05		
2 March		11:45	12:55		
1		11:51	13:30		
2 MARCH		11:50	N/A		
3 March 2000		9:40	13:50		
3 March 2000		9:45	1:35		
4 March 2000		15:40	16:20		
5 March		0945	1045		
March 100		12:56	1:40		
11		1725			
7 Mar 2000		4:25	13:50		
1		9:40	13:20		
11					

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
8 March 2000		9:00	9:13		
"		9:35	9:40		
"		9:40	9:50		
"		9:40	9:50		
9 March 2000		9:10 <del>9:35</del>	11:00		
9 March 2000		9:00	10:30		
10 March 2000		8:25	9:17		
11 March 2000		14:30	15:10		
12 March 2000		11:05	11:45		
13 March 2000		13:30	15:34		
14 March 2000		10:05	14:50		
"		10:15	2:15		
"		15:50	15:51		
"		16:20	16:21		
15 March 2000		9:40	12:12		
"		9:50	12:00		
16 March 2000		9:10	13:10		
"		9:15	12:38		
"		13:55	17:07		
"		14:00	16:26		
17 March 2000		9:03	14:28		
"		9:05	10:50		
"		9:20	13:45		
20/3/00		11:40	15:30		

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
20-03-00		12:05	15:15		
21-3-00		9:15	13:40		
21-3-00		10:15	13:10		
21-03-200		12:10	15:50		
21/03/00		12h20	15h35		
22/03/00		9:00	14h15		
22/03/00		9:05	14h.40		
23/3/00		9h00	14h00		
23-03-200		9:05	14:10		
23-03-200		10:30	11:45		
"		10:40	16:12		
24-3-00		9h10	10h40		
"		9:45	14:45		
25-03-00		9:15	10:50		
26-3-00		9h35	11h00		
27-03-00		8:30	13:25		
27-3-00		8h40	13h10		
28-3-00		9h05	15h05		
28-03-00		9:00	15:25		
28-3-00		9:35	11:00		
29-3-00		8h45	14h45		
29-03-00		9:00	15:00		
29.03.00		9:45	12:35		
		11:22	11:40		
			11:40		

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
30-Mar-00		09:30	12:07		
30-03-00		10:00	13:05		
30-03-00		10:05	13:40		
31-Mar-00		09:12	11:17		
31-03-00		09:20	10:56		
31-3-00		10:10	<del>12:50</del>		
31-03-2000		10:15	13:05		
03-04-00		09:15	12:00		
03-04-00		09:25	11:20		
04-04-00		10:10	10:13		
04-04-00		10:19	11:06		
05-04-00		12:50	13:55		
06-04-00		09:50	11:45		
06-04-00		10:05	11:30		
7 Apr 2000		10:40	11:55		
11-Apr-2000		12:30	16:42		
10 APR-2000		12:42	16:30		
10 Apr 2000		16:04	17:00		
11-Apr-2000		08:20	09:15		
11-Apr-2000		08:35	09:30		
11		10:40	15:00		
11		12:45	15:20		
12 Apr		14:00	16:30		
13 Apr		09:00	17:50		



# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
13 Apr 00		9:30	11:50		
13 Apr 00		9:40	12:20		
13 Apr 00		13:20	15:35		
13 Apr 00		13:30	15:55		
14 Apr 00		0900	15:40		
14 Apr 00		1:20	3:30		
15 Apr 2000		15:15	16:45		
16 Apr 2000		7:10	8:40		
17 Apr 2000		9:05	14:17		
17 Apr 2000		09:13	12:20		
"		10:05	12:43		
"		13:27	16:16		
18 Apr 00		9:20	11:35		
18 Apr 00		9:30	11:20		
19 Apr		0928			
"		0935	1206		
"		0935	1140		
20 Apr		0935	1400		
20 Apr		1400	1540		
21 Apr 2000		10:40	11:20		
25 Apr 00		12:58	15:20		
25 Apr 00		13:05	15:40		
26 Apr 00		10:00	11:55		
26 Apr 00		13:54	15:46		

**Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.**

[illegible]

# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

### Suite 1

BL-3 operators

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
5 July 2000		3:20	15:00		
6 July 00		9:35	10:40		
10/7/00		14:17	15:12		
11/7/00		9:00	11:33		
11/7/00		9:10	12:13		
11/7/00		09:57	11:58		
11/7/00		13:00	16:07		
11/7/00		13:11	15:55		
12/7/00		9:08	10:02		
"		1:35	/		
13/7/00		13:12	14:00		
14/07/00		12:04	13:34		
14/07/00		13:15	15:14		
17/7/00		13:53	15:05		
"		15:20	15:21		
18/7/00		8:40	11:30		
"		6:45	12:00		
18/7/00		08:51	11:45		
18/7/00		9:30	12:30		
18/7/00		12:55	16:32		
"		13:05	16:15		
"		13:20	16:20		
19/7/00		8:48	12:00		
19/7/00		08:55	12:18		

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
19/07/00		13:10	16:25		
19/07/00		13:25	16:07		
20/07/00		8:50	12:00		
20/07/00		08:56	12:13		
"		14:05	15:57		
21/07/00		10:17	11:02		
24/07/00		9:45	12:15		
"		10:00	12:30		
25/07/00		9:15	10:05		
27/07/00		9:00	11:34		
27/07/00		09:11	11:19		
28/7/00		9:14	15:05		
28/7/00		09:46	N/A		
31/7/00		9:36	13:52		
31/07/00		10:40	13:25		
01/08/00		11:05	13:05		
5		13:30	13:45		
02/08/00		08:20	11:00		
"		4:40	11:18		
"		10:10	14:37		
3/8/00		13:10	16:24		
3/08/00		13:30	16:35		
4/08/00		8:55	10:42		
		9:00	N/A		
4/8/00		10:55	14:45		
08/08/00		13:20	13:50		

# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

### Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
30/08/00		9:05	11:45		
31/08/00		7:25	N/A		
"		13:55	15:28		
01/09/00		9:03	10:00		
5/9/00		13:47	15:30		
6/9/00		7:50	17:13		
6/9/00		9:03	12:30		
6/9/00		13:08	16:15		
29 Sept 00		10:00	14:34		
7/9/00		10:50	15:45		
11 Sept 00		9:46	16:11		
11 Sept 00		13:50			
13 Sept 2000		9:50	16:20		
15 Sept 2000		10:05	13:17		
16 Sept 2000		9:45	11:10		
19 Sept 2000		0914	N/A		
20 Sept 2000		12:26	16:05		
21 Sept 2000		9:00	15:02		
26 Sept 00		13:20	14:10		
27 Sept 2000		8:43	9:42		
11		9:45	12:32		
27 Sept 2000		0950	12:10		
29 Sept 00		945	1100		
29 Sept 00		13:25	13:35		

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
9 Aug 2008		9:15	13:13		
09/08/08		9:30	14:12		
10/08/08		12:45	15:38		
16/8/00		10:35	12:28		
16/08/08		11:33	16:24		
16/08/08		8:15	15:55		
16/08/08		3:26	16:07		
17/08/08		1:16	11:16		
18/08/08		9:55	12:55		
21/08/08		13:10	14:14		
u		13:30	13:52		
22/08/08		08:30	11:21		
+		8:50	11:42		
23/8/00		8:13	9:08		
23/08/08		12:13	13:42		
24/08/08		08:12	12:06		
24/08/08		08:27	12:31		
24/08/08		13:15	14:15		
25/08/08		15:07	16:15		
u		15:20	16:26		
26/08/08		8:40	12:10		
27/08/08		08:50	11:50		
27/08/08		13:20	15:15		
30/8/08		8:47	4:05 <sup>12</sup>		

# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

### Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
02/04/00		8:35	9:35		
03-Oct-00		0822	1037		
03/01/00		840	1120		
03 Oct 00		1054	Ø		
" "		1055	Ø		
4 Oct 00		10:00	12:38		
4 Oct 00		10:05	12:50		
04/11/00		13:25	16:10		
04/11/00		14:08	16:30		
04/11/00		14:25/1429			
5 Oct 00		0821	12:20		
05 Oct 00		14:11	/		
05 Oct 00		8:40	11:07		
06 Oct 00		9:13	11:50		
06 Oct 00		13:52	14:58		
11 Oct		08:30	12:30		
11 Oct		0845	12:10		
04/11/00		9:15	10:50		
" 11		14:05	15:10		
04/12/00		9:45	10:47		
Friday the 13 <sup>th</sup> Oct/2000		9:40	10:55		
Oct 13 <sup>th</sup>		12:20	14:30		
Oct 16		9:11	10:07		
Oct 16		13:52	14:55		

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
17 Oct 00		13:30	14:14		
18 Oct 00		08:16	08:18		
18 Oct 00		10:15	10:17		
"		10:30	13:48		
18 Oct 00		10:40	13:32		
19 Oct 00		9:45	14:03		
19 Oct 00		9:55	12:30		
19 Oct 00		12:50			
20 Oct 2000		9:30	12:30		
20 Oct 00		13:10	13:46		
23/10/00		9:03	11:50		
"		9:21	11:27		
23/10/00		10:19	-		
24/10/00		13:30	14:45		
25/10/00		8:17	11:45		
25/10/00		08:32	11:50		
25/10/00		13:02	16:05		
25/10/00		13:15	16:25		
26/10/00		10:05	14:50		
27/10/00		10:31	12:20		
28/10/00		15:04	15:45		
31/10/00		08:35	11:13		
1/11/00		9:46	10:49		
02/11/00		9:30	10:35		



# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Notel A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
10/11/2008		1350 <del>0150</del>	1450		
07/11/2008		0821	0821		
7/11/00		9:00	14:30		
07-11-00		11:45	16:45		
07/11/00		1440	15:05		
08-11-00		9:15	14:30		
4/11/00		13:11	17:00		
09-11-00		9:40	15:45		
4/11/00		10:10	14:35		
10/11/00		10:00	15:05		
10-11-00		10:10	15:25		
11-11-00		8:45	10:00		
13-11-00		9:20	2:45		
13-11-00		9:30	14h35		
14-11-00		10:04	11:20		
14-11-00		10:30	13:45		
14-11-00		10h40	14h00		
15-11-00		10:00	12:00		
15-11-00		0901	0905		
16-11-00		9h50	10h40		
16/11/00		14:17	16:10		
16/11/00		15h45	16h00		
16/11/00		16:27	16:27		
17/11/00		9h25	12h10		

# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

### Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
17/11/00		13:05	13:55		
17/11/00		14h05	15h05		
18-11-00		9:45	11:30		
19-11-00		10h15	12h10		
20-11-00		09:47	10:22		
20-11-00		9:15	15h45		
20-11-00		9:25	15:30		
20-11-00		9:35	15:10		
20-11-00		16:35	16:36		
21-11-00		9h00	14h10		
21-11-00		9:10	14:15		
21-11-00		1:15	14:30		
21/11/00		14:30	15:30		
22/11/00		9:15	11h30		
22/11/00		9h30	11h20		
22 Nov 2000		14:45	15:51		
23/11/00		9h05	13h40		
23/11/00		9h10	13:15		
24/11/00		9h20	14:00		
25/11/00		10h00	12h20		
26/11/00		10h05	12h20		
27/11/00		09:25	09:17		
27-11-00		8h40	14h35		
27/11/00		8h45	14h55		
27 Nov 2000		13:00	16:22		
28/11/00		9h10	14h30		
28-11-00		9h15	14h41		
		16:35	15:50		

DATE 12-23-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg

b6 .  
b7C  
b7D

[illegible]

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
24 Nov 2000		10:40	13:30		
"		10:50	—		
26/11/00		0838	0840		
30/11/00		09:05	12h40		
30/11/00		09h15	12h30		
01/12/00		09h30	11h00		
1/12/00		13:00	13:36		
1/12/00		12:40	13:45		
"		13:05			
4/12/00		1422	1518		
5/12/00		0722	0724		
5/12/00		13:30	13:32		
6/12/00		0833	0906		
8/12/00		09:30	10:45		
08/12/00		10:50	N/A		
11/12/00		1322	1411		
13 Dec 2000		10:42	12:46		
13/12/00		1332	1551		
14/12/00		0835	1050		
14/12/00		1125	1130		
15/12/00		9:15	10:05		
18/12/00		1505	1550		
14/12/00		10:20	14:41		
19/12		1516	—		

# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

### Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
20 Dec 2000		9:00	12:12		
21 Dec 2000		9:45	13:14		
22 Dec		9:15	10:15		
24 Dec 2000		8:00	9:40		
27 Dec 2000		9:20	10:50		
29 Dec 00		11:15	11:05		
31 Dec 2000		8:05	9:13		
2 Dec 2000		13:00	17:02		
3 Jan		9:15	-		
3 Jan 2001		9:50	16:22		
4 Jan 2001		11:00	16:08		
Jan 4		11:20	-		
Jan 5		10:20	11:05		
Jan 5/01		10:07	14:15		
Jan 5/01		12:08	16:30		
Jan 9/01		9:16	15:35		
Jan 9/01		13:45	16:00		
Jan 12/01		9:25	11:22		
Jan 15/01		8:20	14:33		
15 Jan 01		0851	1251		
15 Jan 01		1337	1535		
16 Jan 01		8:20	14:42		
16 Jan 00		0905	1407		
17 Jan 01		853	1415		

# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

### Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
17 Jan 01		0912	1423		
18 Jan 01		850	1140		
18 Jan 01		0910	1219		
"		12:00	1417		
19 Jan 01		915	1015		
22 Jan 01		930	1220		
23 Jan 01		1335	1557		
24 Jan 01		8:50	13:36		
25 Jan 01		8:20	12:25		
26 Jan 01		0839	12:05		
26 Jan 01		855	1210		
26 Jan 01		9:15	13:53		
29 Jan 01		13:13	1410		
31 Jan 01		0852	0854		
24 Jan 01		1300	1600		
1 Feb 01		900	950		
2 Feb 01		843	940		
2 Feb 01		1300	1355		
5 Feb 01		1306	1452		
7 Feb 01		1246	1450		
9 Feb 01		840	1035		
Feb 01		9:00	11:35		
Feb 01					
Feb 12		9:00	11:05		

# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

### Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
7/12		9:15	11:55		
Feb. 12		8	8		
Feb 14		8:30	10:27		
Feb 16		8:45	10:28		
Feb 16		9:05	11:35		
Feb 19		8:42	10:02		
19 Feb		11:44	11:45		
21 Feb		8:50	11:20		
22 Feb		0840	0841		
22 Feb		0850	0351		
23 Feb		8:15			
23 Feb		8:30	10:05		
23 Feb		9:20	10:25		
26 Feb		8:25	9:27		
27 Feb 2008		10:06	12:05		
1 March 2008		11:14	13:10		
2 Mar 08		8:35	9:40		
1		8:50	11:35		
2 March 2008		9:10	11:50		
9 March 2008		11:13	12:40		
5 Mar 08		14:15	—		
6 Mar		13:25	16:55		
7 Mar		9:07	11:55		
7 Mar 2008		13:00	14:56		
7 Mar		14:25	17:00		

# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

### Suite 1

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
7 Mar 01					
<del>2:57</del>		0:57			
7 Mar 01		7:15	17:16		
8 Mar		0:30	11:30		
8 March 01		3:33	16:30		
9 Mar 01		6:25	12:15		
"		8:45	15:00		
9 March 01		2:55	16:15		
12 March 01		8:30	11:45		
12 Mar 01		9:30	15:43		
12 March 01		2:47	14:12		
13 March 01		9:30	14:10		
14 March 01		8:45	10:30		
14 March 01		12:15	16:25		
14 March 01		1:40	0		
15 March 01		0809	0810		
15 Mar 01		13:38	16:14		
<del>16 March 01</del>		<del>09:05</del>			
16 Mar 01		10:57	12:55		
16 Mar		11:10 <sup>21</sup>			
19 Mar		3:30	15:15		
20 Mar 01		11:10	16:15		
"			16:25		
21 March 01		4:03	13:52		
23 March 01		9:45	11:00		
25 March 01		11:30	12:15		
27 March 01		12:40	13:46		



# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

### Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
24 March 2001		8:06	12:00		
25 March 2001		08:58	12:12		
"		13:20	16:33		
"		3:44	16:12		
29/03/01		8:45	13:31		
29/3/01		09:30	13:50		
30/3/1		9:06	15:45		
March 30		9:25	15:30		
Mar 30		9:45	-		
March 31		14:35	15:25		
11 Apr 01		9:10	9:45		
2 Apr 01		9:25	15:55		
5 Apr 01		8:50	12:30		
6 Apr 01		13:05	14:50		
7 Apr 01		8:45	9:30		
9 Apr 01		8:57	11:25		
April 9 '01		9:55	12:43		
"		11:53	14:12		
Apr 10		7:25	10:50		
Apr 10		12:05	17:00		
"		12:25	16:30		
10 Apr 2001		13:20	15:30		
11 Apr 2001		07:18	07:19		
11 Apr 2001		07:25	9:50		

# Level III Biocontainment Entry/Exit Log Sheet Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
Apr 11/01		1:55	18:50		
"		2:20	16:52		
Apr 12		8:15	11:05		
"		2:27	18:35		
"		13:15	14:24		
14 Apr 2001		8:05	9:00		
17 Apr 01		9:07	13:30		
"		10:20	12:20		
"		3:30	16:45		
"		1:00	1:20		
18 Apr 01		8:45	12:30		
"		9:05	12:05		
18 Apr 01		13:30	14:56		
19 Apr 01		8:30	12:20		
20 Apr 01		9:28	10:46		
20 Apr 01		13:00	15:05		
"		13:15	14:55		
22 Apr 01		9:00	9:40		
23 Apr 01		9:05	11:10		
Apr 23 01		10:05	15:52		
24 Apr 01		8:17	11:25		
"		9:05	12:20		
"		10:55	13:40		
"		13:50	16:00		

# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

### Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
Apr. 26 <sup>th</sup>		10:35	11:45		
"		10:47	12:02		
"		14:25	15:57		
Apr. 27 <sup>th</sup>		9:54	11:30		
30 Apr. 2001		8:14	11:20		
"		8:40	9:30		
"		8:50	10:30		
"		12:30	13:55		
"		12:55	15:15		
"		14:00	15:30		
May 1 <sup>st</sup> 01		13:10	14:15		
May 2/01		8:35	12:32		
"		9:30	14:15		
3 May 01		9:20	10:50		
"		13:20	15:10		
"		13:32	15:46		
4 May 01		8:30	/		
"		9:20	11:30		
"		9:30	11:18		
7 May		9:15	10:05		
10 May 01		9:15	9:45		
14 May 01		8:45	9:15		
14 May 01					
16 Aug 01					

## Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

## Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
20 Aug 01		10:20	11:20		
21 Aug 01		N/A	N/A		
22 Aug 01		11:11	12:01		
23 Aug 01		15:18	—		
27 Aug		15:30	16:10		
30 Aug		13:57	15:23		
4 Sept.		14:20	15:11		
11		14:50			
6 Sept 01		9:33	11:17		
Sept 7 <sup>th</sup>		9:50	12:25		
Saturday 8 Sept.		9:30	10:10		
9 Sept		9:10	9:50		
Sept. 10 <sup>th</sup>		9:08	14:55		
Sept. 11		9:45	10:20		
11		13:00	N/A		
12 Sept.		9:30	16:45		
Sept. 13		9:55	11:45		
11		13:35	N/A		
11		13:50	15:20		
Sept 14		8:13	—		
Sept. 14 <sup>th</sup>		9:00	10:15		
Sept 17 <sup>th</sup>		9:48	10:21		
Sept 17		13:17	1600		
Sept. 18		9:16	11:40		
11					

# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

### Suite 1

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12-23-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/l

Note: A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
19 Sept. 01		10:20	12:59		
Sept. 20		8:10	N/A		
"		8:55	14:30		
"		1:45	/		
Sept 21 <sup>st</sup>		8:45	10:30		
Sept 21		11:15	12:42		
"		11:45	13:16		
"		11:45	13:05		
22 Sept.		7:35	9:00		
23 Sept.		14:40	15:55		
		1450	1541		
Sept 24		9:32	14:52		
Sept 24		10:55	13:13		
24 Sept		1111	1252		
Sept 24		~145	-		
Sept. 25		9:20	N/A		
"		13:15	14:25		
"		14:55	N/A		
26 Sept.		8:40	16:30		
26 Sept		0936	1125		
Sept 27 <sup>th</sup>		8:55	14:30		
Sept 28 <sup>th</sup>		10:05	11:30		
"		14:27	/		
28 1/2		10:45	13:15		

# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

### Suite 1

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12-23-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lst

Note: A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself, eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
1 Oct 01		11:00	12:17		
2 Oct 01		9:20	12:20		
11		15:30	N/A		
3 Oct 01		8:56	13:27		
3 Oct 01		9:35	-		
4 Oct 01		8:40	10:10		
Mon 9 Oct 01		8:50	10:10		
10 Oct 01		8:50	14:30		
10 Oct 01		2:55	15:40		
11		13:20	14:20		
12 Oct 01		13:05	14:22		
Oct 15 <sup>th</sup>		10:50	13:10		
16 Oct 01		15:27	16:09		
17 Oct 01		14:44	16:32		
Oct 18 <sup>th</sup>		15:25	15:05		
Oct 19		10:10	11:15		
Oct 19		9:15	11:40		
20 Oct 01		8:42	9:20		
22 Oct 01		11:13	13:05		
22 Oct 01		11:27	12:20		
Oct 23 <sup>rd</sup>		10:12	11:28		
11		13:40	N/A		
24 Oct 01		8:56	14:13		
11		9:15	11:15		
11		10:20			

b6  
b7C  
b7D

# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-23-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg

### Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note: A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
Oct 24 <sup>th</sup>		13:20	16:15		
Oct 25 <sup>th</sup>		8:32	15:30		
"		9:25			
"		13:30	15:50		
26 Oct 08		9:50	14:25		
"		10:12	13:32		
29 Oct 08		10:17	17:22		
"		10:35	13:17		
30 Oct 08		8:50	<del>10:50</del>		
Oct 30 <sup>th</sup>		10:23	16:55		
"		10:59	16:25		
Oct 31		8:55			
"		10h00	12h30		
"		10h00	12h50		
"		10:45	16:05		
"		11:08	13:18		
"		13:20	14:35		
Nov 2		9:10	10:25		
"		9h30	12h15		
"		9h35	12h30		
"		10:33	12:50		
Nov 2		10:55	N/A		
Nov 3		8:10	4:55		
Nov 3		9:30	11:00		

# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

### Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-23-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
5 Nov 01		8:44	9:50		
5 Nov 01		10:20	14:35		
11		0h30	15h00		
11		0h45	15h05		
11		15:50			
10 Nov 01		9h30	15h25		
10 Nov 01		9h40	15h03		
6 Nov 01		10h00	14h45		
6 Nov 01		10h15	14h30		
7 Nov 01		9:36	15:20		
7 Nov		10:05	11:15		
7 Nov		10:30	13:30		
7 Nov		10:45	12:45		
7 Nov		13:30	16:15		
11		14:40	15:47		
8 Nov		8h:35	12h30		
8 Nov		8h45	12h00		
8 Nov		8h50	11:30		
11		8h55	11h50		
11		1346	15:38		
9 Nov		9h15	13h55		
9 Nov		9h30	13h20		
9 Nov		9h35	13h40		
9 Nov		10:46	13:00		



ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-23-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg

# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

### Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note: A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
Nov 10, 01		8h10	11:35		
11 Nov 01		5:50	6:35		
11 Nov 01		6h40	9h55		
12 Nov 01		12h20	16h00		
12 Nov 01		12h30	15h50		
13 Nov 01		8h00	16h35		
13 Nov 01		8h10	16h20		
13 Nov 01		8h20	16h50		
13 Nov 01		13:05	15:15		
14 Nov 01		8h05	16h55		
14 Nov 01		8h10	16h35		
14 Nov 01		8h15	16h00		
14 Nov 01		10:54	11:52		
14 Nov 01		12:11	13:49		
15 Nov 01		8h30	16:15		
15 Nov 01		8h40	16h30		
15 Nov 01		8h50	16h00		
15 Nov 01		9:52	12:17		
16 Nov 01		8h00	16:30		
16 Nov 01		8h10	14h40		
16 Nov 01		8h15	16h00		
"		10:50	11:50		
17 Nov 01		7:00	7:55		
17 Nov 01		8:10	10:30		

# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

### Suite 1

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-23-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
17 nov		8h05	10h35		
18 Nov 01		7:55	9:30		
19 nov 01		8:15	16h00		
19 nov 01		8:10	16h15		
19 Nov 01		13:20	16:34		
20 nov 01		9h45	15h50		
20 nov 01		9h50	15h40		
20 Nov 01		1314	1505		
20 Nov 01		14:03	16:54		
21 nov 01		10h20	12h25		
21 nov 01		10h25	12h15		
21 Nov 01		1054	1637		
21 Nov 01		14:55	17:00		
22 Nov 01		9:03	15:00		
22 Nov 01		9:53	15:19		
22 Nov 01		1300	1535		
22 Nov 01		1313	1615		
Nov 23		11:55	14:25		
Nov 23		12:35	13:45		
Nov 23		12h45	14h00		
24 Nov 01		7:35	8:40		
25 Nov 01		6:40	7:55		
Nov 27		8:40	N/A		
Nov 27		8:51	4:51		

# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

### Suite 1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
Nov 27/0		10:15	17:03		
Nov 27/0		1302	15:15		
Nov 28/0		842	15:21		
"		9:14	1326		
Nov 29/0		950	16:59		
Nov 29/0		1245	16:40		
Nov 30/0		9:35	15:17		
"		10:20	15:30		
"		11:05	14:20		
1 Dec 01		7:45	8:50		
2 Dec 01		8:05	9:10		
3 Dec 01		11:03	15:38		
Dec 3 <sup>rd</sup> 01		13:25	N/A		
Dec 4		8:40			
Dec 4/01		10:09	15:21		
"		10:41	1255		
Dec 5/0		9:05	11:43		
Dec 5/0		10:00	15:38		
"		11:45	N/A		
"		13:10	16:25		
Dec 7/0		11:15	12:15		
8 Dec 01		8:20	9:20		
11 Dec 01		8:35	14:20		
11 Dec 01		9:00	15:45		

# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

### Suite 1

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-23-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg

b6

b7C

b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
Dec 11/01		9:52	16:20		
Dec 11		12:45	—		
Dec 12/01		7:25	9:27		
"		8:00			
Dec 12/01		8:51	12:20		
Dec 13/01		8:35	14:28		
"		10:15	15:41		
"		13:15	16:00		
Dec 14/01		9:24	13:57		
"		9:50	15:25		
"		10:15	13:24		
"		12:00	12:01		
Dec 15/01		8:45	9:40		
Dec 17/01		10:28	16:03		
Dec 17/01		12:55	15:01		
Dec 18/01		08:30	16:05		
Dec 18/01		9:17	13:55		
Dec 18/01		10:02	15:20		
Dec 19/01		7:27	11:43		
Dec 19/01		9:12	11:46		
"		10:40	12:09		
Dec 20/01		7:44	11:44		
Dec 21/01		11:00	N/A		
Dec 21/01		11:46	14:42		
"		12:40	14:06		

# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

### Suite 1

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-23-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
22 Dec 01		7:55	8:40		
26 Dec 01		8:20	11:40		
29 Dec 01		15:30	16:10		
2 Jan 01		9:15	12:52		
"		15:30	16:30		
3 Jan 01		11:55	13:30		
"		11:35	N/A		
"		15:20	16:25		
Jan 4		9:54	12:15		
Jan 5		10:30	11:50		
Jan 6		10:20	12:10		
Jan 7/02		13:30	15:23		
Jan 8/02		8:37	—		
4 Jan 02		10:26	14:21		
12 Jan 02		9:20	10:40		
14 Jan 02		15:15	15:55		
15 Jan 02		8:38	12:53		
15 Jan 02		15:40	16:30		
16 Jan 02		8:48	11:50		
16 Jan 02		9:56	13:40		
16 Jan 02		12:04	16:30		
17 Jan 02		9:53	11:28		
18 Jan 02		9:15	10:40		
20 Jan 02		13:15	14:05		

# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

### Suite 1

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-23-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note: A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself, eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
Jan 21/08		9:39	14:48		
il		12:00	15:12		
Jan 22/08		8:52	12:43		
Jan 22/08		10:07	12:03		
Jan 23/08		8:30	13:35		
Jan 23/08		9:35	15:08		
"		12:50	16:55		
Jan 24/08		10:55	13:14		
Jan 24/08		11:59	12:01		
Jan 25/08		13:00	15:30		
Jan 25/08		7:40	N/A		
Jan 26/08		9:20	10:10		
Jan 28/08		14:20	16:45		
Jan 28/08		14:25	17:20		
Jan 28/08		14:38	17:38		
Jan 28/08		14:38	17:08		
Jan 28/08		8:05	—		
Jan 29/08		9:00	16:24		
Jan 29/08		9:10	14:10		
Jan 29/08		10:15	15:55		
Jan 29/08		11:45	15:00		
Jan 30/08		8:46	16:54		
Jan 30/08		10:05	15:03		
Jan 30/08		11:25	16:24		

# Level III Biocontainment

## Entry/Exit Log Sheet

### Suite 1

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-23-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Note! A protocol # of 0 (zero) indicates the door was opened without entry to containment itself. eg. To check or replace supplies in the clean areas.

Date	Name	Time In	Time Out	Protocol #	Comments/Backup Person
JAN 30		13:20	14:00		
Jan 31		8:48	—		
Jan 31		9:09	18:09		
Jan 31		12:15	17:02		
Jan 31		13:10	16:40		
JAN 31		19:42	17:47		
Feb 01		9:25	18:04		
Feb 01		9:55	16:05		
Feb 01		11:46	15:00		
"		13:20			
FEB 01		14:15	17:41		
FEB 02		12:00	13:15		
Feb 4		10:04	15:02		
Feb 4		11:41	13:55		
Feb 4		13:00	13:35		
Feb 5		8:37	—		
Feb 5		12:15	11:35		
Feb 5		13:23	14:18		
Feb 6		10:25	12:15		
Feb 02		13:58	14:48		
Feb 02		14:15	15:07		
7 Feb 01		10:30	11:20		
7 Feb 01		14:20	16:10		
7 Feb 02		14:20	15:35		

## Incidence of anthrax, and environmental detection of *Bacillus anthracis* in the UK

P.C.B. TURNBULL<sup>1</sup>, JANE E. BOWEN<sup>1</sup>, J.S. GILLGAN<sup>2</sup> and N.J. BARRETT<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Anthrax Section, Centre for Applied Microbiology and Research, Porton Down, Salisbury, Wiltshire SP4 0JG, UK; <sup>2</sup>Notifiable Diseases Section, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food, Government Buildings, Tolworth, Surrey KT6 7NF, UK; <sup>3</sup>PHLS Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre, 61 Colindale Avenue, London NW9 5EQ, UK

Notifications of human cases of anthrax remain exceedingly rare while small but troublesome outbreaks continue to occur in livestock. The last confirmed human incident was a case of cutaneous anthrax in a casual labourer in London in August 1995<sup>1</sup>. The source of the infection was not established. The confirmed human case prior to that was a case of cutaneous anthrax in a worker in a woollen mill in Scotland in October 1991<sup>4</sup>. The case notified in 1992 remained unconfirmed.

Figures 1 and 2 and Table 1 are updated versions of those presented at the last International Workshop on Anthrax<sup>5</sup>. Perhaps most noteworthy among the livestock incidents was the outbreak in an intensive pig-rearing unit in 1989<sup>6,9</sup> which led to the study reported elsewhere in these proceedings<sup>4</sup>.

hazards posed. Furthermore, as with the outbreak in pigs, interest from the media frequently raises public anxiety.

The finding of anthrax spores in environmental specimens similarly results in considerable public and official concern. Some perspective can be gained from Table 2, which summarises an analysis of 1342 environmental samples from 95 sites examined in the 8-year period, October 1987 to August 1995. In all, 43 (3.2 %) samples from 14 (15 %) sites yielded virulent *Bacillus anthracis*. Spore numbers exceeded an estimated 100 cfu/g in 13 of the positive samples, but 9 of these were from a single troublesome carcass burial site<sup>3</sup>. In the majority of samples, numbers were clearly very low and, in our view, represented no hazard to site workers taking sensible hygienic precautions. Risks for subsequent users of the site are also regarded as vanishingly small in these instances, but consideration is obviously given to either removal of the contamination or the most suitable subsequent use of such sites, for example, car parks. An attempt at providing guidance on assessing risks associated with environments known to be, or suspected of being contaminated with anthrax spores has been made elsewhere<sup>6</sup>.

The isolation from environmental sites of avirulent *B. anthracis* that have lost one or both plasmids continues to be of interest since our formal report on this<sup>7</sup>. A dilemma exists over whether to report these to clients; while of no hazard in themselves, it is presumed they represent virulent parents and, as seen in Table 2, they are periodically isolated together with virulent counterparts. A molecular explanation of the point at which they lose their plasmid(s) in the germination, multiplication and sporulation cycle is looked forward to.




Figure 1. Human anthrax. Notifications under Factories Acts and Public Health Act United Kingdom 1900-1994




Figure 2. Reported cases of animal anthrax in Britain 1888-1994 (CVO reports [MAFF])

Although only 19 deaths were confirmed as cases of anthrax, the outbreak created husbandry problems which resulted in the ultimate slaughter and incineration of all 4492 animals on the farm.

The less anthrax is seen, the more emotive its occasional appearances become. Recent outbreaks in livestock have resulted in official obstacles to the disposal of the wastes reflecting concern which is out of proportion to the real

Table 1. Reported cases of human and animal anthrax in Britain 1989-95

Year	Human Notifications*	Animal		
		Incidents	Deaths	
			Animals	Number <sup>†</sup>
1989	1	3	Cattle	3
		1	Pigs	19
1990	3	5	Cattle	6
1991	1	2	Cattle	2
1992	1	2	Cattle	2
1993	0	2	Cattle	5
1994	0	3	Cattle	5
1995	1	1	Cattle	1
		1	Ferrets	2

\*No deaths reported

<sup>†</sup>Confirmed cases and not including animals which were treated and lived

Sources: Human: notifications and reports to OPCS, SHHD and HSE.  
Animal: CVO reports (MAFF).

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Table 2. Environmental specimens examined in the Anthrax Section, CAMR, during the period, October 1987 to August 1995<sup>1</sup>.

Type of site	Number of sites				Number of samples			
	Total	Number			Total	Number		
		V	AV	V + AV		V	AV	V+AV
Bone processing	17	1	1	3	228	6	8	2
soil					183	4	0	2
dust								
bone chips/charcoal					12	1	0	0
bonemeal					22	1	2	0
Tanneries	18	1	1	0	107	*2	0	0
Building materials	18	2	0	2	497	10	39	3
("horsehair plaster")								
Burial sites	13	1	0	1	133	*16	*2	0
Abattoirs	7	0	1	0	80	0	4	0
Laboratory/hospital	6	2	0	0	45	2	0	0
Sewage treatment works	5	1	1	0	193	2	2	0
Other (fellmongers, Government Disinfection Station, manure etc)	6	0	0	0	40	0	0	0
Not known	6	0	0	0	19	0	0	0
TOTALS	96	8	4	6	1342	38	55	5

<sup>1</sup>Modified from Table 1 in Turnbull (1996)<sup>4</sup>; reproduced by kind permission of the Editor and Publisher of *Land Contamination and Reclamation*

\*From one site. V, virulent; A, avirulent (cap)

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## Anthrax in Russia

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Anthrax has been a serious problem for veterinary and public health in the former USSR. Even in the beginning of the twentieth century on the territory of the former USSR about 40-60 thousand anthrax cases were registered in animals and 10-20 thousand cases in humans annually. The case fatality rate was 25%.

According to the official data, an average of 1200 cases of livestock anthrax were reported between 1971 and 1980 annually; the annual number of cases had fluctuated from 2750 cases in 1971 to 553 in 1980. An average of 440 cases of anthrax in human beings were registered annually; the annual number of cases had fluctuated from 658 in 1971 to 292 in 1980. The level of morbidity per 100,000 in animals averaged 0.36 and, in humans 0.17.

During the following decade, the level of morbidity in animals as well as in humans decreased; between 1981 and 1990 an average of 453 cases of anthrax of livestock had been registered annually; the annual number of cases had fluctuated from 1177 in 1981 to 181 in 1985. An average of 230 cases of anthrax in humans had been observed annually from 268 in

1983 to 176 in 1989. The average levels of morbidity per 100,000 were 0.16 in animals and 0.8 in humans.

The level of anthrax morbidity was usually highest in Kazakhstan and the republics of Central Asia. For example in 1986-1990, about 50% of all registered cases in the former USSR were in Tadjikistan and 12% in Kazakhstan. The total number of cases just in Kazakhstan, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Aserbaijan constituted 85% of all cases in the USSR. Russia accounted for only 11% of all cases, 50% of which were registered in the territory of North Caucasus.

During these years, the incidence rate per 100,000 population in Tadjikistan was 17-fold higher than in the USSR on average, in Turkmenistan, 5-fold and in Kazakhstan, 3- to 5-fold.

According to the official data an average of 94 cases of anthrax in humans were registered annually in Russia between 1971 and 1980. The annual number of cases had fluctuated from a peak of 151 in 1972 to a minimum of 46 in 1973. The level of morbidity per 100,000 population was 0.06 an average and fluctuated from 0.11 to 0.04.


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
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00	0.1-2	4.0	N/A
0101	0.5-20	10-30	60-120

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
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