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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/10/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security number [redacted] telephone numbers [redacted] and [redacted] was interviewed on June 2, 2004, at [redacted] place of employment at the United States Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] stopped working [redacted] at USAMRIID in June of 2001. [redacted] is currently employed [redacted]. While employed [redacted] worked for [redacted] worked in [redacted] from [redacted] indicated that room [redacted] of Building [redacted] was [redacted] room [redacted] was the [redacted] and from [redacted] room [redacted] was another room used by [redacted] noted that no anthrax studies were conducted in room [redacted]. The hood lines numbered one (1) and two (2), which were utilized for the aerosol exposures, were located in room [redacted]. The rooms were always locked when not being utilized. The rooms were locked with push button coded doors. FNU [redacted] was responsible for increasing the security measures in the facility.

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[redacted] received [redacted] in [redacted] in [redacted] from the University of [redacted] completed [redacted] in [redacted] at [redacted] College.

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[redacted] assumed that the anthrax material [redacted] was working with [redacted] had come from BRUCE IVINS. [redacted] noted that IVINS was the secondary Principal Investigator (PI) whenever he provided material for a study. The material provided by IVINS was heat shocked in Room [redacted] of Building 1412. IVINS brought the material for the aerosol challenges to Building 1412 in a stainless steel container. The steel container had an autoclavable bag inside containing a double bagged bottle of the anthrax solution. [redacted] never saw the spores being prepared for the aerosol challenges.

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[redacted] stated that ten (10) milliliters of material were need for an aerosol challenge. [redacted] were given one (1)

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Investigation on 06/3/2004 at Frederick, MD

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-835

Date dictated N/A

SSA [redacted]
by SA [redacted]
[redacted] 041553.wpd

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 06/2/2004, Page 2

extra tube of material in case necessary. The extra tube was autoclaved at the end of the day. _____

_____ The material that remained in the nebulizer was always autoclaved. The aerosol challenges were run for ten (10) minutes. The entire process to setup the challenge and complete it would take approximately twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) minutes. _____ noted that there were always a lot of people present for the aerosol challenges. For each anthrax aerosol challenge there were always _____ present. _____ recalled that IVINS, _____ were involved in conducting the aerosol challenges. b6 b7C

_____ said that the hood lines were not decontaminated between days of aerosol exposures. The all glass impinger (AGI) liquid was passed out to the PI for post-challenge plating. _____

_____ The AGIs were passed out through the pass box in the hood. _____

_____ At the end of the day, all material from the aerosol challenges was autoclaved. _____ the cleaning process after an aerosol challenge as taking one (1) to two (2) hours. It took ninety (90) minutes to run the autoclave in the hood lines.

The material collected in the AGI was kept for at least one (1) day for post-challenge plating purposes. _____ noted that it was the responsibility of IVINS to dispose of the post-challenge material. _____ b6 b7C

_____ does not recall post-challenge plates or material being left lying around any of the rooms in Building 1412. _____

_____ stated that _____ IVINS would do all of the post-challenge work following an aerosol challenge. The media for the aerosol work was kept in the refrigerator in room _____. The media included _____ b6 b7C b2 b7F

_____ The water used during the anthrax aerosol challenges was provided by IVINS. _____ was used in the aerosol challenges of toxins, however,

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 06/2/2004, Page 3 b6
b7C

was not used for anthrax. [REDACTED] is unaware of anything else being added to the material being aerosolized.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Antifoam or the antifoam dilution was never used on anthrax aerosol challenges. If antifoam was used in a challenge, it would be noted in the exposure logs. The antifoam was kept in a cabinet in room [REDACTED]. The antifoam dilution was prepared as needed and was not kept as a stock item. If the dilution was placed into the hood, it would have been autoclaved out of the hood. The dilution would not have been prepared for an anthrax aerosol challenge. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] never saw any bottle of olive oil in Building 1412. [REDACTED] does not know if there was olive oil in other parts of Building 1412. [REDACTED] noted that [REDACTED] did not know the combinations for the doors other than the rooms which he used. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] also had access to the lab [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] received [REDACTED] training in the aerosol challenge [REDACTED] from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] will attempt to locate the [REDACTED] and will provide it to the interviewing agents at a future date.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/2/2004, Page 4 b6
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[redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] did know who [redacted] was. [redacted] recalled
[redacted]
[redacted] noted that [redacted] b6
[redacted] b7C
[redacted] b2
[redacted] b7E

[redacted] did the aerosol
challenges for [redacted] in room [redacted] of Building [redacted] worked
with [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] recalled that sometimes [redacted]
[redacted] would be present during [redacted] challenges.

[redacted] never saw [redacted] in [redacted] of Building [redacted] b6
[redacted] recalled seeing [redacted] in rooms [redacted] b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] had no knowledge of the work that [redacted] conducted in
[redacted] never socialized with [redacted]
[redacted] was always forward with [redacted] regarding information
on the work [redacted] was doing.

[redacted] never saw where [redacted] parked [redacted] vehicle. [redacted] b6
speculated that [redacted] parked near Building [redacted] because [redacted] office b7C
was in that building. [redacted] said that there were parking spots in the
back of Building [redacted] The parking spaces in the back of Building [redacted]
were for [redacted] never saw any
personally owned vehicles parked in the parking spaces behind Building
[redacted]

[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 06/2/2004, Page 5

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is not aware of [REDACTED] ever visiting Building [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] never used the walk-in cooler [REDACTED] of Building 1412. [REDACTED] said that some media was kept in the [REDACTED] floor walk in cooler. [REDACTED] never saw [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED] floor [REDACTED] said that the freezer [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED] was used to keep serum samples.

[REDACTED] recalled scientists from Russia visiting and touring through the hot side of Building 1412. [REDACTED] never saw any other visitors on the hot side of the building. The Russians were never present for any aerosol challenges. [REDACTED] never signed for any foreign visitors at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] is unaware of anyone showing any unusual interest in anthrax or anthrax challenges.

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[REDACTED] did not handle any of the anthrax letters at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] did handle the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] noted that nothing [REDACTED] handled tested positive for anthrax.

[REDACTED] agreed to provide any information [REDACTED] could locate to help in determining [REDACTED] whereabouts during the mailing periods.

[REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] would not object from taking a polygraph relative to the AMERITHRAX investigation.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/30/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social
security number [redacted] home address [redacted]
[redacted] home telephone number [redacted]
[redacted] work telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]
place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick,
Maryland. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing
agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the
following information:

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[redacted] has a [redacted] degree in [redacted]
[redacted] to USAMRIID in [redacted]
[redacted] currently works in [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] was first assigned to [redacted] and
remained there until [redacted] supervisor was [redacted] For
most of this time, [redacted]

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[redacted] rarely worked with specimens, but
occasionally [redacted] plated samples. [redacted]

[redacted] has never performed any spore preparations; he
has mostly plated samples. [redacted]

[redacted] never participated in any
aerosol challenges, [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

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[redacted] did not conduct a great deal of work on live Ba.

[redacted]
[redacted] During this time, [redacted] spent a lot of time in the
[redacted] suites. [redacted]

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Investigation on 06/30/2004 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936, 279A-BA-C101392 - 1545 Date dictated N/A

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by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 06/30/2004, Page 2

In approximately _____

_____ worked in the same general area.

_____ did not work with live samples. _____ occasionally worked in the _____ suites at USAMRIID.

Approximately _____

_____ worked in Building 1425, and _____ supervisor was _____.
Much of _____ work during this time involved _____

_____ has also worked with live Ba as part of _____ work on the _____

_____ works primarily with _____ although _____ has also worked with spores. _____ stores these samples in _____ and _____ receives the samples in 1-milliliter vials containing 10^9 colony forming units per milliliter (cfu/ml). These samples are stored in a -70-degree freezer in Building _____ Suite _____

_____ advised that _____ has not been inside a _____ suite for approximately _____ years.

_____ thinks that _____ has provided _____ to employees within _____ work group, but has never distributed _____

_____ had never used a lyophilizer, although _____ had seen one in _____

_____ had never personally dried Ba and had never seen dried Ba Ames. _____

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 06/30/2004, Page 4

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Since _____ main function regarding _____
_____ could not recall whether Sterilite boxes were used
to store any supplies _____ had never seen nor
purchased pre-stamped envelopes like the ones used in the mailings.

_____ could not recall any direct work _____ conducted with
the anthrax-laced letters in this case, _____

_____ was not familiar with the standard operating
procedures (SOPs) for decontamination of Class II and Class III
biosafety cabinets in _____ work areas. _____

During _____ was working at
USAMRIID, although _____ had no _____ calendar or other way of
assisting with a possible determination of _____ whereabouts during
this period. _____ did recall that _____ and many others had been
placed on a heightened work schedule after _____

_____ had never been introduced to _____
although _____ pictures looked "vaguely familiar." _____
_____ did wonder why the person who
mailed the letters did not try to kill more people.

_____ provided the names of several individuals who
displayed questionable behavior or raised _____ suspicion. One was a
_____ advised that _____
_____ would know this individual's real name. _____
_____ left USAMRIID approximately _____ years before the
anthrax mailings.

_____ believed _____ possessed the knowledge, ability, and access
required to perpetuate the attacks.

_____ was another individual whom _____ believed
may have been capable of mailing the anthrax-laced letters.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/30/2004, Page 5

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[redacted]

[redacted] speculated that it would have been very easy for [redacted] to keep part of the sample for [redacted].

Finally, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] had never been a member of the [redacted]. Moreover, [redacted] had never hosted any foreign visiting scientists.

It should be noted that [redacted]

[redacted]

I-108 [redacted] 02-307 [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Date of transcription 04/09/2004

On April 08, 2004 [redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security Account Number [redacted] of [redacted] telephone number [redacted] was contacted at [redacted] place of employment, [redacted] located at [redacted] was advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the purpose for the interview. [redacted] was interviewed using a list of questions provided by SA [redacted]

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[redacted] provided a three(3) page vitae which details [redacted] academic achievements and employment history. A copy of that is attached to and made a part of this document.

This FD-302 will be written with response to specifically enumerated questions. If the answer to that question was negative that will be noted.

1) [redacted] worked at USAMRIID during [redacted]

[redacted] advised that during this time [redacted] had no contact with any Bacillus anthracis Ba materials.

[redacted] advised that during this period [redacted] worked for several investigators including: [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] worked as a [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] said that it was during this time that [redacted] did some work associated with Ba. [redacted] advised that [redacted]

Investigation on 04/08/04 at [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-22936 - USAMRIID - 839

Date dictated 04/09/04

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b7Cby SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 04/08/04, Page 2

In [redacted] was promoted to the position of [redacted] said [redacted] supervisors during this period were [redacted]

2) [redacted] said the only Ba component [redacted] worked with was used during the [redacted]

3) [redacted] advised [redacted] never worked with either spores or vegetative cells.

4) [redacted] advised [redacted] never worked with any modified G sporulation media.

5) [redacted] advised [redacted] worked with neither culture techniques.

6) [redacted] advised [redacted] never did any work with drying of Ba.

7) [redacted] advised that [redacted] received that material from [redacted] work with Bruce Ivins. [redacted] advised that [redacted] did not know if materials provided were from the Ames strain or any other strain.

8) [redacted] said that [redacted] had no specific knowledge about [redacted] co-workers that may have expertise with weaponization techniques, spore production or lyophilizing. [redacted] said [redacted] did recall the names of several people that may have been working on those items while [redacted] was there. [redacted] said [redacted] recalls [redacted]

[redacted] who worked on spore production, [redacted] [redacted] Bruce Ivins, who was know as an expert on Ba.

9) [redacted] advised [redacted] was not aware of any [redacted] suites that had problems with bacterial contamination.

10) [redacted] was provided with the floor plans which were denoted as [redacted]

The first [redacted] is the four(4) pages of material which starts with [redacted] This reflects [redacted] In that package [redacted] marked page one with "back entrance" on the right side of the page and

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 04/08/04, Page 3

drew a box around a series of [REDACTED] suites which [REDACTED] indicted were marked as [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] was working there. On page three, [REDACTED] noted that room [REDACTED] was the clinical lab area [REDACTED]. On page four, [REDACTED] noted that [REDACTED] room [REDACTED] which contained an electron-microscope.

The [REDACTED] is a three(3) document that starts with [REDACTED]. This reflects [REDACTED]. In that package [REDACTED] noted the autoclave area of the basement on page one [REDACTED]. On page two, which is the [REDACTED] floor of the building [REDACTED] noted a number of areas. Noted as "1" is the [REDACTED] "2" is the air lock, "3-5" are various labs, "6" is the entrance to the animal rooms located in the portion of the building, "7" denotes the area where Bruce Ivins conducted his work and "8" is another lab room. On page three, identified as the [REDACTED] floor of the building, [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] had been in the following area: "1" and "2" [REDACTED] "3" main work lab, "4" supplemental lab, "5" employee break room, "6" an animal room [REDACTED] "7" cold storage used to store reagents and "8" [REDACTED] lab.

The marked floor plans are attached to and made a part of this document.

11) [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] had access to both the hot areas of building 1412 and the walk-in cooler that is numbered as room [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] advised that a number of people had access to that cooler and that the cooler itself had no security system. [REDACTED] specifically recalled [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] as having been in the cooler. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] and the folks from the lab across the hall also had access to that cooler.

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] said that many workers kept their stocks in the cooler and it was not unusual for one worker to borrow the stock from another in the cooler without needing to ask permission. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] recalled seeing cultures labeled "anthrax" on plates and in petri dishes also stored in the cooler. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] also recalled seeing a reagent stored there. [REDACTED] believes it was labeled [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 04/08/04, Page 4

12) _____ said _____ was not aware of any "piggy-back" entrances into the hot area of the lab. _____ said _____ did recall visits to the lab during _____

_____ said that during the _____ FNU LNU conducted a quality assurance inspection in regards to the _____. In the _____ a number of folks from _____ also visited in connection with the Ba program.

13) _____ advised that someone could take items from the hot area by secreting them and carrying them through the airlock. _____ said it also may be possible to place an item in the passbox from the hot side and then retrieve it on the cold side. _____ said it may also be possible to remove items by sending them to the autoclave in the basement and then retrieving them prior of operation of it. _____ said he did not know if the autoclave had to function in order to open the exit door after putting an item into it.

14) _____ was not aware of anyone who would use a Select Agent for an improper purpose.

15) _____ was not aware of anyone with the access and ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents and expressed hostile attitudes toward political organizations, the media or others.

16) _____ advised that _____ was not surprised _____ was a person of interest in this investigation. _____ said that _____

17) _____ was not aware of people at the lab who were lax in handling of dangerous items or expressed an inappropriate interest in harmful agents.

18) _____ was not aware of anyone with an inappropriate interest in biological or chemical agents.

19) _____ advised _____ has no knowledge or interest in drying Ba and sending it through the mail.

20) _____ advised _____ was not aware of anyone who had an interest in being able to get around forensic techniques.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 04/08/04

, Page 5

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21) [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] does not have nor was [REDACTED] aware of anyone with personal or professional association with any area of New Jersey.

22) [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] did not travel to New Jersey during September or October of 2001, nor is [REDACTED] aware of any associates doing so. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

23) [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] was aware of SOPs for decontamination of biosafety work cabinets. [REDACTED] advised that typically the decontamination was conducted by putting items to be sterilized in the air locks and then placing boiling pans of formaldehyde in the air locks.

24) [REDACTED] advised that while [REDACTED] was at USAMRIID the virology labs were decontaminated on a regular basis. [REDACTED] said that at least once a month they would have "decon days", usually on a Friday.

25) [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] has smelled bacterial decontamination agents in the [REDACTED] suites.

26) [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] never used sterilite boxes for storage.

27) [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] was not aware of an unauthorized or unrecorded Ba work being conducted.

28) [REDACTED] advised that all of [REDACTED] lab work was recorded in books that were left at USAMRIID.

29) [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] never purchased any pre-stamped envelopes.

30) [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] never used the vending machines at Frederick to purchase pre-stamped envelopes.

31) [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] never personally handled any of the anthrax letters.

32) [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] has not done any analytical work on the evidence in this case.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 04/08/04

, Page 6

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Questions regarding [REDACTED]

- 1) [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] knew [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- 2) [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] recalled seeing [REDACTED] in a number
of places in building [REDACTED] including: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- 3) [REDACTED] did not know when [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- 4) [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] never let [REDACTED] "piggy-back"
into an area.
- 5) [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] never observed [REDACTED] moving
equipment or removing it from the building.
- 6) [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] believed [REDACTED] worked in the
[REDACTED]
but could not state specifically what [REDACTED] did.
- 7) [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] saw [REDACTED] working [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] but did not know specifically what [REDACTED] was working on.
- 8) [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] did not know if [REDACTED] ever
removed or borrowed equipment from USAMRIID and never observed [REDACTED]
attempt to obtain discarded equipment.
- 9) [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] observed [REDACTED] both near the
cooler, room [REDACTED] and on the hot side of [REDACTED]
- 10) [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] never asked [REDACTED] for any
isolates, equipment or access to other USAMRIID locations.
- 11) [REDACTED] advised that other than in room [REDACTED]
may have stored samples in [REDACTED] lab.
- 12) [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] was not aware of any samples [REDACTED]
may have brought to the lab.
- 13) [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] never discussed [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 04/08/04, Page 7

14) [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] never discussed [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]15) [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] never made any references to
killing people.16) [REDACTED] said [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]17) [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] never discussed
[REDACTED] the possibility of mailing
anthrax.18) [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] never mentioned [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]19) [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] was not aware if [REDACTED] had any
connections to Princetown, New Jersey.20) [REDACTED] said [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]21) [REDACTED] said [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]22) [REDACTED] said [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]23) [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] has no knowledge of [REDACTED]
activities [REDACTED]24) [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]25) [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] has not had any contact with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]26) [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] has no further information
regarding this investigation.

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Continuation of FD-302 of

[REDACTED]

, On 04/08/04

, Page 8

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[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] never hosted any foreign scientists at
USAMRIID nor was [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/13/2004

2
[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security number [redacted] was interviewed on May 10, 2004, at [redacted] place of employment at the United States Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] has worked at Fort Detrick since [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] stated that [redacted] had conducted aerosol challenges as part of [redacted] work [redacted] and that [redacted] had conducted Anthrax aerosol challenges.

[redacted] said that [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] said that [redacted] has seen a glass bottle of Italian olive oil in one of the aerosol rooms at USAMRIID, however, could not recall exactly where. [redacted]

Investigation on 05/10/2004 at Frederick, MD

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 842

Date dictated N/A

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b7Cby SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

041344.wpd

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/10/2004, Page 2

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[REDACTED] regarding what other materials to add to the aerosol process.

[REDACTED] guessed that oil could be placed onto the o-rings to help them slide on and off of the piping.

[REDACTED] The water [REDACTED] utilized during the aerosol process was only commercially purchased. [REDACTED] is not aware of where the water was purchased from.

[REDACTED] said that BRUCE IVINS did most of the post-challenge plating following Anthrax aerosol challenges [REDACTED] was involved in. [REDACTED] recalled some post-challenge material being taken back to Building [REDACTED] for work. [REDACTED] is unaware of what the colony counts from the post-challenge plating are. [REDACTED] does not know how much material is plated in the post-challenge plating process. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] stated that after the colony counts were completed on the post-challenge plates, if there was growth on the plates, the practice is to autoclave the plates in the hood line prior to disposal by whomever was reading them. After the plates are autoclaved, they are taken to the basement and autoclaved again. The bags taken to the basement only have the room number, initials of who was disposing of it, and the date. [REDACTED] has noticed material left in the hood line, but always with a note explaining what the material was and who left it. [REDACTED] never saw plating of material remaining from the nebulizer done at USAMRIID.

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[REDACTED] has never seen the material from a nebulizer poured back into the stock of material.

[REDACTED] was aware of what strains of anthrax [REDACTED] was working with [REDACTED] is not aware of what stock the material came from or who had made it.

[REDACTED] recalled that rooms [REDACTED] contained the aerosol equipment and the small autoclaves. [REDACTED] believed that rooms [REDACTED] had lab space. [REDACTED] never noticed anyone extra

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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b7CContinuation of FD-302 of _____, On 05/10/2004, Page 3

or anyone who did not need to be present in rooms _____ during the aerosol challenges.

_____ supposed that if an individual wanted to remove material from the hot side of Building _____ that they could use the airlock or passbox systems. _____ noted that individuals from _____ would use this process to remove items from the hot side of the building.

_____ was shown a picture of a circular plexiglass disc with a rubber edge for identification purposes. _____ was unaware of any equipment that the disc might have come from. _____ said that the disc possibly could have come from the ports on the "8-ball". The "8-ball" is the old cloud room that has been memorialized across the road from where Building _____ was at Fort Detrick.

_____ knew _____ from passing in the hallway. _____ had taken the equipment from the penthouse of Building _____ to take from USAMRIID. _____ recalled _____

_____ is not aware of any activity that _____ had in _____ never saw _____ in the rooms where aerosol challenges were conducted. _____ noted that when _____ started working in _____ had already left USAMRIID. _____ never saw what car _____ drove or where _____ parked at USAMRIID. _____ said that _____ may have seen _____ in the basement of Building _____ once. _____ never saw _____ on the hot side of Building _____

_____ never saw a pre-stamped envelope at USAMRIID.

_____ conducts _____ at USAMRIID. Initially

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/10/2004, Page 4

[REDACTED] recalled researchers from Johns Hopkins using sterilight boxes at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] stated that there are still units in the containment areas of USAMRIID. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] would know who exactly was using the boxes.

[REDACTED] remembered signing for two foreign visitors from [REDACTED] (not positive on last name). [REDACTED] never saw any visitors in "hot" areas at USAMRIID.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/13/2004

On 05/07/2004, [redacted] date of birth: [redacted]
[redacted] social security number: [redacted] home address: [redacted]
[redacted] Cell: [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] residence. After being
advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose
of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information.

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[redacted] was employed at USAMRIID [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] while at USAMRIID was assigned to [redacted]
[redacted] and worked on various studies in the Bio-
Safety Level [redacted] Suites involving anthrax, [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted]

BRUCE IVINS provided all the cultures, and the AMES strain was used
as well as other strains. The vials of B. anthracis were stored
in the aerosol containment hood until they were used and then
destroyed. [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] has never used the modified G sporulation media.

[redacted] has never used any culture techniques.

Investigation on 05/07/2004 at [redacted]b6
b7CFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - BASDate dictated 05/13/2004by [redacted] Postal Inspector
[redacted] Postal Inspector

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/07/2004, Page 2

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[REDACTED] has never dried B. anthracis or used a lyophilizer. [REDACTED] does not know of any persons who had expertise in weaponization techniques, spore production or lyophilizing.

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[REDACTED] advised that in [REDACTED] area had a problem with contamination from Anthrax. The incident caused a big uproar in the Bacteriology Division and that [REDACTED] remembers coming into work and noticing the area roped off and hearing reports of a contamination spill.

[REDACTED] routinely worked in building [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] also worked in [REDACTED] and in [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] has used the hot area of building 1412 and the walk-in cooler room [REDACTED] advised that the cooler was used by the researchers and BRUCE IVINS to store media and live viruses when not being used in the hot suites. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] also said that the room was never locked and that various researchers used the area to store samples and was unaware of any AMES Ba samples being left behind in the room.

[REDACTED] advised that people did "piggy-back" in and out of the hot areas at USAMRIID but it was due to the fact that most people did not realize that it happened due to the badge access devices not working correctly. [REDACTED] also said that people would forget their badges and were let into an area by a co-worker.

[REDACTED] advised that visiting scientists were taken into the hot areas at USAMRIID but were always escorted and all select agents were removed from the area before the visit. [REDACTED] said the biggest group to tour the hot areas were groups from Russia.

[REDACTED] said that it would be very easy for someone to remove select agents from the hot areas that they could do this by putting a vial into a pocket or just holding it in their hand. [REDACTED] said that the select agents used were super concentrated and that the person removing an agent would be putting themselves into a position of infecting themselves.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 05/07/2004 , Page 3

[REDACTED] is unaware of anyone who wanted access or the knowledge to make bioweapons or of anyone with the access or the ability to create them.

[REDACTED] is unaware of any persons with the access and ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents, or who expressed hostile attitudes toward any political organization or the media.

[REDACTED] has never worked with anyone in [REDACTED] that was lax in handling dangerous items or inappropriately interested in agents that could be turned into harmful agents. [REDACTED] advised that people in [REDACTED] would limit the number of people that they would work.

[REDACTED] has never heard of any rumors of anyone interested in obtaining anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents or the means to produce them.

[REDACTED] could not say how [REDACTED] would go about preparing dried Ba and sending it through the mail. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] has only seen it in liquid form and that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is unaware of anyone who expressed a special interest in being able to get around forensic techniques.

[REDACTED] does not have any relatives or professional association with Trenton, New Jersey, Princeton or any other area of New Jersey.

[REDACTED] did not travel to New Jersey in September or October 2001 and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that there are SOP's for decontamination of Class II and Class III biosafety cabinets and suites. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/07/2004, Page 4

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] advised that it was rare to leave vials of Ba under the hood-line for any period of time after being used for the aerosol challenges but that it did happen one or two times due to being busy with other work and the lack of supervision. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has smelled bleach in the virology suites but not in [REDACTED] areas.

[REDACTED] has never used any plastic storage containers, such as sterilite boxes for storage of research materials and has never seen any at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] is unaware of any work being conducted with Ba or its simulants which was unofficial or not recorded.

[REDACTED] did not keep any lab notebooks however [REDACTED] did advise [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has never purchased pre-stamped envelopes like the ones used in the mailings for [REDACTED] or for anyone else. [REDACTED] has also never used the vending machines in Frederick to purchase pre-stamped envelopes.

[REDACTED] did not handle nay of the anthrax-laced letters or envelopes.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/07/2004, Page 5

[REDACTED] has not done any of the analytical work on the evidence in this case.

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[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] has never seen any empty olive oil bottles in the hot areas at USAMRIID and said that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not know [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not know [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has never [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] could not provide investigators with any other information in regards to [REDACTED] or in reference to the anthrax mailings.

[REDACTED] did not host any foreign visitors.

[REDACTED] was not [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/03/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security Number [redacted] was interviewed by Special Agents [redacted] [redacted] at [redacted] place of employment at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Ft Detrick, Maryland, [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

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[redacted] utilized Ames stock from BRUCE IVINS. [redacted] is pretty sure that IVINS received that Ames stock from Dugway Proving Ground as part of the [redacted]

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The notes obtained by SA [redacted] indicated that the

The stock of *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) used for the aerosolization studies are diluted to the appropriate concentrations using [redacted]

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Investigation on 6/2/2004 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID; 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/A

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b7C

by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]


1548

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID; 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 6/2/2004, Page 2

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] If the autoclave is in use, the bagged materials are left under the hood until the autoclave is ready for another load. The materials from the studies are either in the autoclave or under the hood; it never leaves the hot suite without being autoclaved. Only animal carcasses are taken out of the hot suite without autoclaving. Protocol maintains that the carcasses be transported to the animal room in the basement of Building 1412 to be autoclaved. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Everyone [REDACTED] knows the rules and procedures. For example, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The Agent Registry sheet [REDACTED] was given to the FBI during a prior interview. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This vial was left-over from previous researchers and was from BRUCE IVINS' collection. That vial has since been collected by the FBI, specifically by Special Agent [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] agreed to give the FBI copies of [REDACTED] research notes from [REDACTED] notebook located in the hot suite. [REDACTED] will either scan or fax the pages to the cold side and will also look for other notebooks maintained by [REDACTED] agreed to contact SA [REDACTED] once the copies are ready.

[REDACTED] gave the Agents a copy of an excel spreadsheet listing [REDACTED] This list has been sent to the corresponding 1A file.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/03/2004—b6
b7C

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]
social security number [redacted] was interviewed on June 2,
2004, at [redacted] place of employment at the United States Army
Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). After
being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the
purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following
information:

[redacted] stated that [redacted] was involved with [redacted]
challenges of anthrax Ames [redacted]

During the time [redacted] was involved in the aerosol challenges, [redacted]
never noticed anyone present for the challenges that did not have a
purpose or reason to be there. [redacted] did not always
know what strain of anthrax was being handled during the aerosol
challenges.

[redacted] was educated as a [redacted] As part of [redacted]
education [redacted] was educated in some aerosol topics, [redacted]

[redacted] never worked with [redacted]

[redacted] does not recall any Primary Investigator (PI) ever
wanting the material remaining in the nebulizer following an aerosol
challenge returned to them.

[redacted] recalled rare occasions of [redacted]

[redacted] only autoclaved material by using the autoclave in
the hood lines. [redacted] autoclaved everything in the hood line.

Investigation on 06/2/2004 at Frederick, MD

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File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-848

Date dictated N/A

SA [redacted]
by SA [redacted]

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 06/3/2004, Page 2

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[REDACTED] never witnessed or conducted the post-challenge plating following an aerosol challenge. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] recalled sometimes the material collected in the all glass impinger (AGI) was turned over to [REDACTED] immediately following a challenge and sometimes the AGI material was turned over once several challenges had been completed.

[REDACTED] The material that was turned over to [REDACTED] was kept in the first floor refrigerator in Building 1412. The material was kept for long amounts of time in the first floor refrigerator. [REDACTED] is not aware of how the post-challenge material, including the post-challenge plates, were disposed of.

[REDACTED] always labeled the tubes taken from the hood line containing the post-challenge material with unique identifiers.

[REDACTED] was aware of one occasion in which antifoam was utilized in an aerosol challenge of anthrax. The occurrence took place during one entire day of aerosol challenges being conducted for BRUCE IVINS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] could not recall the date on which this event occurred. [REDACTED] stated that the use of antifoam was not standard procedure for anthrax aerosol challenges.

[REDACTED] does not recall which strain of anthrax was used during this challenge. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that antifoam was never added to the nebulizer during an anthrax aerosol challenge. Antifoam was added to the nebulizer as part of the aerosol process for other pathogens.

[REDACTED] is not aware of any substitute for antifoam in the aerosol process. [REDACTED] does not recall who taught [REDACTED] how to use the antifoam as part of the aerosol process. [REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 06/3/2004, Page 3

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[REDACTED]
it is possible that if antifoam was utilized in an aerosol challenge that it would not have been noted in the logs. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] never introduced olive oil to the aerosol challenge process. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had never heard of using olive oil as an alternative to antifoam.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] noted the high level of turnover [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] in the department. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] told the interviewing agents that they should talk to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] does not recall anyone showing any unusual interest in the aerosol process.

[REDACTED] provided the interviewing agents with two (2) documents. The first document contains [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The document, labeled FY01
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The second document given to agents contains a break down of the first document by [REDACTED] The list indicates that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 07/07/2004

To: Washington Field/

Attn: SA [REDACTED]

Squad Amerithrax 3

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From: [REDACTED]

Squad 5/ [REDACTED]

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

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Approved By: [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

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Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-LEAD-601 (Pending)
279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-85 (Pending)

Title: AMERITHRAX
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: [REDACTED] interviewed in [REDACTED]

Reference: 279A-WF-222936-LEAD Serial 563
279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID Serial 758

Enclosure(s): (1) FD-302 of [REDACTED] dated 7/7/04. (2) 1A envelope containing interview notes and notated USAMRIID floor plans.

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Details: The purpose of this communication is to provide a cover for the enclosed FD-302 and associated documentation. Close lead.

In summary, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] can testify concerning the work environment and standard operating procedures, but [REDACTED] has no knowledge of any potentially illegal activity. [REDACTED]

Descriptive Data:

Reference

Name -

Last: [REDACTED]

7/16/04

To: Washington Field From:
Re: 279A-WF-222936-LEAD, 07/07/2004

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First:
Middle:
Race:
Sex:
DOB:
SSN:
Address(es) -
House #:
Street Name:
Street Suffix:
City:
State:
Postal Code:
Phone #:
Phone #:
Phone #:



cell)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/28/2004

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[redacted] date of birth [redacted] was interviewed on June 22, 2004, at [redacted] place of employment at the United States Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] stated that everyone involved in an aerosol challenge in Building [redacted] signed a log sheet.

[redacted] said that [redacted]
[redacted] was not an unusual request.

[redacted] never saw [redacted] present for an anthrax aerosol challenge. [redacted]

[redacted] would dispose of challenge material in the autoclave in rooms [redacted] in Building [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] recalled that post-challenge material was stored in the first floor cooler in Building 1412. This included the AGIs utilized in the aerosol challenges.

[redacted] believed that [redacted] probably used antifoam on anthrax aerosol challenges, however, [redacted] could not recall a specific instance. [redacted] was taught the aerosol process and proper uses for antifoam by [redacted]

Investigation on 06/22/2004 at Frederick, MD

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 853

Date dictated N/A

by PI [redacted]
SA [redacted]
[redacted] 041801.wpdb6
b7C

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 06/22/2004, Page 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had heard that olive oil could be used in the aerosol process, however, [REDACTED] never used it. [REDACTED] believed that there might have been a small glass bottle of olive oil in the cabinet in room [REDACTED] of Building 1412. [REDACTED] could not recall the brand of oil.

All trash made in Building [REDACTED] would be autoclaved in the basement.

[REDACTED] BRUCE IVINS determined which stocks would be used on each challenge.

[REDACTED] was shown a copy of the aerosol exposure data forms [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] does not recall ever adding antifoam to the nebulizer for anthrax challenges.

[REDACTED] is not aware of how long the post-challenge material is maintained following an anthrax challenge. [REDACTED] stated that the post-challenge plates were kept for weeks. [REDACTED] recalled that IVINS would do the colony count for the post-challenge plates by hand. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A copy of the aerosol exposure log sheet will be maintained in the 1A containing the notes of this interview.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 860

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

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On 06/03/2004, Special Agent (SA) [redacted] collected twenty-five (25) *Bacillus anthracis* Ames spore samples from Dr. BRUCE E. IVINS in Suite [redacted] of the Bacteriology Division of The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. In an FD-302 dated 06/08/2004, SA [redacted] described the collected samples in tabular format. Sample number six (6), further described as "Ames spores 2433 CDC 7738", which consisted of nine (9) milliliters of a liquid suspension, was a sample from IVINS that had previously been stored in building [redacted] of USAMRIID. The sample had been submitted to the FBI Ames Repository by [redacted] of USAMRIID as submission FBIR047 on 04/07/2004.

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File: [redacted] 21101.wpd [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 07/22/2004

On July 22, 2004, [redacted] were interviewed at their place of employment at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] stated that [redacted]

[redacted] informed Special Agent [redacted] that the owner of the [redacted]

[redacted] The original stock of the Ames strain was provided by BRUCE IVINS on April 22, 2002 from the [redacted] stock.

[redacted] stated that [redacted] was available to answer any other questions relating to [redacted] phone number at USAMRIID is [redacted]

Investigation on 7/22/04 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -879

Date dictated N/A

by

SA [redacted]

048058.WPD

Back Of Page

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SSA

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/14/2004

To: Washington Field

Attn: IIC [redacted]
SSA [redacted]
SSA [redacted]
SA [redacted]
USPI [redacted]

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

From: Washington Field

AMX-3

Contact: SA [redacted]

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b7C

Approved By: [redacted]

b6
b7C

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID✓ (Pending)-882

Title: AMERITHRAX
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: To summarize information obtained from five archived laboratory notebooks which pertained to activities and experiments conducted by [redacted] Dr. Bruce Ivins [redacted] at the United States Army Medical Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland.

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Details: In June 2004, five laboratory notebooks from [redacted] [redacted] Dr. Bruce Ivins [redacted] at USAMRIID were reviewed. Entries in these notebooks were made by [redacted] Ivins, and various other individuals, both known and unknown. The information contained herein was obtained from the notebooks.

Numbers are assigned by the USAMRIID library to all laboratory notebooks issued to Principal Investigators. The notebooks can be turned in to the library for archival when completed. Notebooks may also be retained by individual researchers or in biological containment suites within USAMRIID. Because several notebooks were used concurrently, this information is not presented in absolute chronological order.

Non-Ames research is presented only if protocols might prove pertinent or if Ames was probably used as a control.

Notebook # [redacted]

Notebook [redacted] issued on October 7, 1980 and entitled [redacted] contained information on isolation and purification of polysaccharides from *Bacillus subtilis*, sonification of *Bacillus*

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[redacted] 6809a

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T6: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 07/14/2004

anthracis (Ba) Sterne, a protocol for the challenge of anthrax polysaccharides, anthrax polysaccharide protein assays, and other similar information. Entries were made by [redacted] and an unknown individual.

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On page 1, dated October 1, 1980, an unnamed growth media recipe was provided for isolation and purification of polysaccharides from *Bacillus* sp., requiring [redacted]

b7F

On page 10, written January 19, 1981, an experimental protocol by [redacted] was listed. This protocol was entitled "Challenge of 'anthrax polysaccharide - Sterne strain' vaccinated guinea pigs with virulent *B. anthracis*, Vollum 1B." The objective of this protocol was to determine whether vaccination of guinea pigs with polysaccharide derived from the attenuated *B. anthracis*, Sterne strain would protect the animals against challenge with the virulent Vollum 1B strain of *B. anthracis*. No results were immediately provided.

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An April 27, 1981 entry on page 15 provided a recipe for "G" medium in which Sterne could be sporulated: [redacted]

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A recipe for "R" medium was listed on page 17 and dated April 28, 1981. Page 27, written by an unknown individual but initialed and dated by [redacted] revealed that on July 15, 1981, [redacted] set up and ran an ELISA test with the [redacted] strain of anthrax spores.

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On page 32, spore coat protein studies were conducted using the following medium: [redacted]

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Another unknown individual's handwriting was displayed on pages 42-44, and involved developing an ELISA test for the PA

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 07/14/2004

component of the anthrax toxin (unknown strain). No date was listed for this test.

~~Notebook #~~ [redacted]

Notebook [redacted] issued January 5, 1981 and entitled "Legionnaires' Disease", contained information on Legionnaire's Disease, fermenter runs with *Bacillus anthracis* Sterne, work with an anthrax vaccine, and other related information. Entries were made by Bruce Ivins.

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Page 24, dated February 4, 1981, described a medium preparation of anthrax toxin (unspecified strain), which was a modification of the "Haines, Klein, and Lincoln" preparation from the "Journal of Bacteriology", 89: 74-83.

"Run #1 - Sterne Supe" was listed on page 28 and dated February 12, 1981. "Run #2", with some changes to that experimental procedure, was listed on page 40 and dated March 5, 1981. Ivins also ran tests attempting to purify the Ba toxin or any of its components.

On page 48, dated March 19, 1981, Ivins wrote that [redacted] has given me some PA" and that [redacted] has given me some anthrax vaccine (adsorbed onto aluminum hydroxide)." The strain used for the vaccine is unknown, but the Ba was of an "avirulent, nonencapsulated strain".

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Page 64, on April 16, 1981, lists a protocol involving inoculating Ba Sterne from a 24-hour blood plate.

~~Notebook #~~ [redacted]

Notebook [redacted] issued April 29, 1981 and entitled "Rapid Detection of Infectious Diseases", contained information about R medium composition, optimum toxin production conditions, the [redacted] anthrax strain, comparison of media for growth and toxin production, non-toxicity of spores after heat passaging, and other related information. Entries were made by Bruce Ivins.

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Page 1, dated May 11, 1981, was entitled [redacted] defined medium for *B. anthracis*." On the next page, three liters of the [redacted] medium were made, dispensed into flasks, and incubated. On page 4, Ivins detailed a procedure in which he grew five liters of Ba (strain unknown) to give to [redacted] However, no rats died after being injected with this medium; Ivins speculated that he harvested the Ba too early in the growth phase of the organism. On page 18, one liter of

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 07/14/2004

the [] medium was again inoculated, and the supernant from this solution was saved and given to []

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Page 21 lists the [] Ivins medium recipe. On page 25, dated July 1, 1981, Ivins received [] from [] and inoculated it into [] medium. After performing an experiment on it, Ivins concluded that all the V-770-NPI-R strains at USAMRIID produce lethal anthrax toxin.

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On page 40, written August 21, 1981, Ivins compared toxin production by [] in [] medium with slight shaking versus no shaking. He found, on page 41, that not as much growth was found with stationary cultures as with gently shaken cultures. Furthermore, Ivins determined that, for maximum toxin production in the [] medium, the inoculum blood plate must be incubated in an atmosphere containing carbon dioxide [] had been used in the past). On the same page, Ivins also found that, according to "Bergey's Manual of Determinative Bacteriology", the maximum growth temperature of Ba was []

On page 43, dated August 28, 1981, Ivins noted that there appeared to be differences with respect to growth of several avirulent and virulent strains of *B. anthracis*. He inoculated the Sterne, Vollum 1B, Ames, Colorado, and Texas strains into [] medium and [] medium. On the next page, Ivins determined that, when inoculating from a plate, evidently the best growth and toxin production in R medium comes when a fresh (vegetative cells, not spores) blood plate incubated in an atmosphere containing carbon dioxide is used.

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Page 60, dated October 3, 1981, detailed Ivins' observations that:

1. []
2. Incubation for [] at [] carbon dioxide is better for the [] inoculum than incubation for only []
3. The R medium is a better medium for toxin production than the [] medium.
4. Toxin was bound to the heterologous protein (BSA) on the polypropylene centrifuge tube.

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Ivins also wanted to demonstrate that carbon dioxide promotes toxin production when inoculum plates are incubated in carbon dioxide. Additionally, he wanted to determine the best times for incubation of the plates. After conducting an

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experiment to test this, Ivins found that [] hours was too long an incubation time for the blood plate. He believed it was apparent, at least for Sterne and [] that carbon dioxide in the atmosphere was necessary. In the future, Ivins wanted to try raising the percentage of carbon dioxide to see whether the change increased toxin production.

b7F

On page 63, dated October 18, 1981, Ivins wrote that he and Perry Mikesell were running tests to determine whether heat passaging with the Sterne, [] and Vollum 1B strains caused the cells to lose a plasmid that encodes toxin antigen or a toxin regulatory protein. On page 72, Ivins speculated that the heat-passaged strains lost a plasmid which:

- a. encodes for one or more of the toxin antigens
- b. encodes for a direct genetic positive regulatory element
- c. encodes for a protease or a protease control element (protease is responsible for cleaving large molecule(s) into smaller molecules which can escape the cell. The large molecule(s) may not be able to be easily secreted. Two or all three of the antigens may be derived from a single protein of large molecular weight).

Ivins noted that he may wish to look for protease activities in the supernants and cytosols of the parent or heat-passaged strains; he also may wish to look for large molecular weight (greater than 100,000) anthrax antigens in the cytosols of the passaged strains.

Notebook []

Notebook [] issue date January 25, 1983 and entitled [] contained information on the anthrax toxin EF component, tables of various experiment results, an experiment on spore coat protein, the [] aerosol challenge test, and a PCA test. Entries were made by [] and an unknown individual. There was no table of contents.

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On page 8, written March 29, 1983, [] conducted an experiment to determine whether aeration had the beneficial effect of increasing the EF component of the anthrax toxin (unknown strain). Results of this experiment were not listed.

Page 9, and most of the subsequent pages, contained tables of test results of various experiments. Limited

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information was listed on the pages, which restricted deciphering of the tests conducted.

Page 27, continued from page 38 of Notebook [] listed an experimental protocol for spore coat protein studies. The protocol was entitled "Protective efficacy of experimental anthrax vaccine against anthrax aerosol challenge". Its objective was to evaluate the efficacy of spore coat protein to protect guinea pigs against challenge with aerosols of anthrax spores. The strains used were [] and Vollum 1B.

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On page 29, dated May 11, 1983, an unknown individual listed the survival response to an aerosol challenge known as the [] test. This test used the Vollum 1B strain.

b6
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On page 30, dated July 1, 1983, [] attempted to determine the relationship between protocatechuic acid (PCA) and the anthrax toxin, Sterne strain. No results of this experiment were provided.

Notebook []:

Notebook [] issued August 30, 1996 and entitled [] contained information on shipments of Ba from Dugway Proving Grounds, Dugway, Utah to USAMRIID, quality control sheets for these shipments, Ivins' laboratory procedures upon receipt of the Dugway shipments, and a draft of the standard operating procedure (SOP) used by Dugway to prepare the Ba Ames spores. Also contained in the notebook was correspondence, experimental results, and protocols for a serological evaluation of anthrax-naïve human plasma and phlebotomy protocols. Numerous individuals contributed to this notebook. There was no table of contents.

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One entry listed Ba shipped to USAMRIID from Dugway for sterilization by irradiation. This occurred on thirteen different occasions between March 31, 1994 and May 14, 1996.

On April 21, 1997, [] of Dugway shipped the first two lots (4/12/97 and 4/14/97) of Ba Ames spore preparations. The total volume was approximately [] of paste and liquid with a total of approximately [] spores. These spores were received in good condition on April 24, 1997 by Bruce Ivins. Ivins [] transferred them into three 500-ml centrifuge bottles with a total of about 420 ml of sterile water for injection. On April 28, 1997, 600 ml []

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[] to each of eight polypropylene

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centrifuge bottles; these were stored at 2-8 degrees Celsius.

b7F

[REDACTED]

On May 1, 1997, Ivins sent an e-mail to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] saying that he had just purified the spores from Dugway on [REDACTED] Ivins wrote, "They look good, separate (not clumped), virtually no bacilli or other debris. The final preparation is [REDACTED] unclumped, refractile spores." The ultimate viability was determined to be about [REDACTED]

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In a memorandum dated June 9, 1997, [REDACTED] described lots 3, 4, and 5 (lot numbers 4/22/97, 4/25/97, and 5/19/97, respectively) of Ba Ames spore preparations. The total volume was approximately [REDACTED] of paste and liquid with a total of approximately [REDACTED] spores. Ivins received this shipment on June 25, 1997. During Ivins' processing of the spore preparations, he added [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] each of 8 sterile polypropylene centrifuge bottles; the bottles were stored at 2-8 degrees Celsius. Ultimately, Ivins was left with 250 ml at [REDACTED]

In a memorandum dated July 8, 1997, [REDACTED] described sending two lots, numbered 5/22/97 and 6/28/97, to Ivins. Ivins received this shipment on July 10, 1997. During his processing of the spore preparations, Ivins added [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] each of 4 sterile polypropylene centrifuge bottles; these bottles were stored at 2-8 degrees Celsius. Ultimately, Ivins was left with 170 ml of [REDACTED]

In a memorandum dated July 23, 1997, [REDACTED] described sending two lots, numbered 6/11/97 and 6/17/97, to Ivins. Ivins received this shipment on July 24, 1997. During his processing of the spore preparations, Ivins added [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] each of 8 sterile polypropylene centrifuge bottles; these bottles were stored at 2-8 degrees Celsius. Ultimately, Ivins was left with 240 ml [REDACTED]

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In a memorandum dated August 6, 1997, [] described sending two lots, numbered 7/21/97 and 8/2/97, to Ivins. Ivins received this shipment on August 7, 1997. During his processing of the spore preparations, Ivins added []

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[] each of 8 sterile polypropylene centrifuge bottles; these bottles were stored at 2-8 degrees Celsius. Ultimately, Ivins was left with 140 ml []

In a memorandum dated September 3, 1997, [] described sending one lot, numbered 8/4/97, to Ivins. Ivins received this shipment on September 4, 1997. During his processing of the spore preparations, Ivins added []

[] each of 8 sterile polypropylene centrifuge bottles; these bottles were stored at 2-8 degrees Celsius. Ultimately, Ivins was left with 100 ml []

In a memorandum dated September 23, 1997, [] described sending two lots, numbered 9/9/97 and 9/15/97, to Ivins. Ivins received this shipment on September 25, 1997. During his processing of the spore preparations, Ivins added []

[] each of 16 sterile polypropylene centrifuge bottles; these bottles were stored at 2-8 degrees Celsius. Ultimately, Ivins determined that the spores were too "dirty", with too much debris. These spores would not be added to the GLP Ames spore batch.

Quality control sheets for batch numbers 4/12/97, 4/14/97, 4/22/97, 4/25/97, 5/19/97, 5/22/97, 6/28/97, 7/11/97, 7/17/97, 7/21/97, 8/2/97, 8/4/97, 9/9/97, and 9/15/97 were sent from [] to Ivins on October 30, 1997. In addition, scanning electron microscope photographs from lots 4/12/97 and 5/19/97 were included.

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Ivins sent an e-mail to []

[] on October 9, 1997. The e-mail regarded the GLP Ames spores received from Dugway. Ivins advised that the preparation would be known as [] and consisted of [] Ames spores, greater than [] of which is in individual, refractile spores. Less than [] of the material is clumped spores, non-refractile spores, vegetative cells, or other debris.

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[] Ivins also conveyed that he, [] would run tests on the preparation and []

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would take pictures of the results. On October 22, 1997, Ivins wrote another e-mail to all the above individuals except [redacted] In this e-mail, he discussed dispensing the spores into various aliquots, and revealed that the concentration was about [redacted]
[redacted]

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Another notebook entry was entitled "Scope of Work - *Bacillus anthracis* Ames Spores". A letter was sent from [redacted] and detailed the terms of the agreement involving USAMRIID shipping 4 vials of Ba spores to Dugway. Dugway would then grow a total of approximately 10 batches of spores, which would be sent as individual shipments to USAMRIID. The USAMRIID points of contact were designated as Bruce Ivins (technical) and [redacted] (administrative), while the Dugway points of contact were [redacted] (administrative) and [redacted] (technical). A standard operating procedure (SOP) containing the details of how the spores were produced, equipment used, materials, and quality control procedures used was to be provided within one month after Dugway's last shipment to USAMRIID. In addition, batch records for each spore preparation produced would contain the following quality control results: the percentage of spores and vegetative cells, a test for the viability of spores after heat-shocking of a test sample, electron microscopy photographs of spore preparations, photographs of colony morphology, photographs of spore stains, and phage sensitivity. In addition, 10 colonies from each batch would be tested on halo agar. The supplier, lot number of media components used, media sterility test results, and the results of purity testing of the spore preparations would also be provided. Purity testing was to be conducted prior to heat shocking. Each batch, including all photographs and results, was to include a batch number at the time of the shipment. The batch records were to be sent within two weeks of each shipment.

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Also contained within the notebook was a Dugway procedure for anthrax spore preparation in bench top fermentors. This standard operating procedure (SOP) draft outlined the culture and processing methods used for preparation of Ba spores in less than 10 liter quantities. Such preparations were for use as challenge material in testing bio-defense material. The preparations could also be used for other applications such as antigen for the production of antiserum or for use as coating antigen in antibody capture enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISAs).


On February 12, 1998, [redacted] e-mailed [redacted] to request that Dugway send a letter stating that the draft SOP

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entitled "Procedure for anthrax spore preparation in bench top fermentors" was in fact the final procedure used for the spore preparations sent to USAMRIID from Dugway. However, no such letter from [] was found in the notebook.

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One of the steps in the above SOP under "Materials and Methods" required adding []



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Numerous pages within the notebook contained correspondence, experimental results, and protocols for a serological evaluation of anthrax-naive human plasma and phlebotomy protocols. Also in the notebook was a "MTT Cytotoxicity Assay for [] Samples", dated 7/2/96. These samples did not appear to include Ba.

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A report, dated February 18, 1997, was entitled "Affinity-Purified Human IgG Anti-PA", and was written by LTC [] of USAMRIID's Diagnostic Systems Division.

Reference Material Receipt Record (RMR) 1012, dated December 6, 1996 and written by [] described "Affinity Purified Anthrax Human IgG".

A report entitled "Methods in Immunohematology" was written by [] Director of the Blood Bank Reference Laboratory and Associate Professor of Immunohematology at the University of Michigan Medical School, Ann Arbor, Michigan. This report described plasma recalcification and the treatment of collected blood, plasma, and serum.

A special report for [] was written on January 22, 1997 by BMDS, Radio Frequency Technologies. This report referenced quality control validation procedures for BMDS equipment and devices, and summarized the various tests and quality control steps applied to the IPTT transponder.

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On January 3, 1997, [redacted]
[redacted] sent [redacted] a letter concerning
[redacted] This letter involved
the study, number [redacted] performed for USAMRIID from August 16,
1996 to December 12, 1996.

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A fifth laboratory notebook that was written or co-written by Bruce Ivins and once archived by the USAMRIID library, had been destroyed and so its contents could not be examined. The USAMRIID library advised that they contained no other laboratory notebooks from Ivins which the FBI had not already perused.

♦♦

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/08/2004

On 01/07/2004, [redacted] date of birth: [redacted] social security number: [redacted] home address: [redacted] home phone number: [redacted] work phone number: [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information.

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[redacted] is employed as a [redacted] of USAMRIID specializing in [redacted] has a [redacted] from the University of [redacted] and a [redacted] in [redacted] College [redacted] current work involves work in [redacted] current work involves [redacted] [redacted] does no direct work with *Bacillus anthracis* (*B. anthracis*).

[redacted] worked with *B. anthracis* [redacted] when working for [redacted]

[redacted] worked with living *B. anthracis* for [redacted]

[redacted] has never used the modified G sporulation media.

[redacted] has never sent *B. anthracis* or done any research outside of USAMRIID.

Investigation on 01/07/2004 at USAMRIID, Fort Detrick, MD

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File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated 1/08/2004

by [redacted] Postal Inspector
[redacted] Postal Inspector

A. [redacted] INTERVIEW

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 01/07/2004, Page 2

[REDACTED] work involved the use of small amounts of a single colony.

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[REDACTED] has never used dried *B. anthracis* or used a lyophilizer to dry it. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] provided the following names of people who may have expertise in weaponization techniques, spore production, and lyophilizing of Ba; BRUCE IVINS [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] could not identify any areas of USAMRIID which had problems with bacterial contamination. [REDACTED] did recall that swabs were taken after samples of the *B. anthracis* evidence was brought into USAMRIID and that one or two spores were found.

[REDACTED] identified suite area [REDACTED] as the area [REDACTED] routinely used. [REDACTED] has worked in room [REDACTED] rooms [REDACTED] and rooms [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] has used the walk-in cooler in room [REDACTED] and stated that it is a large walk-in type unit and is used by everyone including temporary researchers. [REDACTED] also stated that many items have been left behind in it by temporary researchers after they were finished with their research. [REDACTED] stated that during [REDACTED] the cooler was cleaned out and old research projects destroyed.

[REDACTED] stated that the cooler is used by a large number of different researchers in various departments and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] has seen unknown researchers in the cooler but said that it was normal. [REDACTED] also stated that it is a constant battle to clean out the cooler lockers with old stuff left in them.

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[REDACTED] knew "piggy-backing" happened and that [REDACTED] let people [REDACTED] knew enter into areas behind [REDACTED] also stated that [REDACTED] has

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 01/07/2004 , Page 3

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never observed any unknown persons in areas that they were not supposed to be in.

Visiting scientists were taken into hot areas, but it was difficult due to the fact that they had to go through safety training and instruction first before being allowed into the areas.

[REDACTED] has never known anyone to attempt to remove any items covertly. [REDACTED] stated that all items set for destruction are double bagged and tagged. [REDACTED] stated that if someone wanted to remove an item covertly that it would be an easy task, but [REDACTED] has never seen or heard of anything being removed.

[REDACTED] did not know anyone who may want to make a Select Agent for use in some improper fashion.

[REDACTED] does not know of anyone hostile toward any political organization, media or others.

[REDACTED] does not know or suspect anyone who might be involved in the mailing of the anthrax-laced letters. [REDACTED] does not know of anyone to have an interest in gaining access to anthrax or any other chemical agents or means to produce them without a special reason.

[REDACTED] stated "No", "two part question" when asked if [REDACTED] knew of anyone being lax in the handling of dangerous items. [REDACTED] then stated that people who have been lax have been disciplined and removed. [REDACTED] stated that only one person came to mind. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] is unaware of anyone who expressed a special interest in being able to get around forensic techniques.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 01/07/2004, Page 4

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[redacted] does not have any association with Trenton, or Princeton, New Jersey.

[redacted] has never been to New Jersey and does not like to travel.

[redacted] stated that [redacted] was at work during the mailings in 2001.

There are SOP's for decontamination of Class II and III biosafety areas, and paraformaldehyde is used as well as bleach due to the fact that most of the equipment is stainless steel.

There is an autoclave in the basement for using glutaraldehyde to clean and decontaminate paper and was last used in the late 1980's for destruction of lab notebooks.

[redacted] has never smelled any decontamination agents in the [redacted]

Plastic containers are used for sharps, pads and are of the red plastic type, small containers used in the hood areas. Various sizes are used to autoclave items and cultures but no large size containers are used.

[redacted] is unaware of any work being conducted with Ba or its simulants for any unofficial work.

[redacted] work was recorded in lab notebooks and is stored in the library at USAMRIID and under the control of [redacted]. There is a total of [redacted]

[redacted] has never purchased pre-stamped envelopes like the ones used in the mailings.

[redacted] has never used any of the vending machines in Frederick to purchase pre-stamped envelopes.

[redacted] has never handled any of the anthrax-laced letters or envelopes.

[redacted] did not do any of the analytical work on the evidence for this case.

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 01/07/2004, Page 5 b6
b7C

_____ did not know _____

_____ only recalls seeing _____ in the hot suite
building and only by face in _____

_____ never saw _____ at USAMRIID after _____

_____ is unaware of anytime that _____ let _____ piggy-back
into building areas.

_____ did not know what _____ was working on at USAMRIID
due to the fact that _____ was working in the _____

_____ was unaware of ever seeing _____ working with or
using a lyophilizer. Other people use the equipment, and it is an
open area used twenty-four hours a day.

_____ did not know of _____ removing any equipment.

_____ did not recall ever seeing _____ by the walk-in
cooler, room _____

_____ never talked to _____ while _____ was at
USAMRIID.

_____ said that _____ would have to store _____ samples in

_____ did not know of any research samples that _____

_____ never talked with _____ in reference to

_____ has never _____

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Continuation of FD-302 of

[Redacted]

, On 01/07/2004, Page 6

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b7C

Investigators may want to talk to the following
individuals in reference to the case,:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] did not host any foreign visitors.

[Redacted] was not

[Redacted]

The investigation of [Redacted] is still in progress as of
August 9, 2004.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 07/30/2004

On July 23, 2004, [redacted] residing at [redacted]
[redacted] telephone [redacted] was
interviewed by Special Agents [redacted] After being
advised of the nature of the interview and the identity of the
Agents [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] attended [redacted] schooling in [redacted]
the [redacted] where [redacted] was schooled in [redacted]

[redacted] is currently employed at [redacted]

[redacted] stated that [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] was [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] further expounded on this
through the interview and stated that [redacted] was never involved in the
growth of Ba or other infected samples, was not familiar with
specific contracts or projects. [redacted] stated that the Ba and
other infectious samples were located in various storage areas.
[redacted] stated that [redacted] did not feel these storage areas had
appropriate security. [redacted] stated that [redacted] would routinely see
individuals "piggyback" into the storage areas. In addition [redacted]
stated that [redacted] saw visitors all the time and some appeared to be
unescorted.

Investigation on 7/23/2004 at Fairport, New York

File # 279A-WF-222936-LEAD-888 Date dictated 7/30/2004

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by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-LEAD

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 7/23/2004, Page 2

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b7C

[redacted] stated that [redacted] was familiar with the "Hot Suites" in the buildings specifically [redacted] [redacted] was not familiar with the walk-in cooler in room [redacted] and was not familiar with what was stored there.

[redacted] stated that [redacted] was familiar with the names of Bruce Ivins from paperwork at USAMRIID [redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C

The scientist that [redacted] recalled working with [redacted]
[redacted] (phonetic), there were other scientist which [redacted]
could not recall by name.

[redacted] stated that [redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] stated that if individuals wanted to remove selected agents from the "Hot Suites" it may be possible. Scientist would routinely leave the selected agent out with a note to the Team members on what needed to be done with them. These samples were not signed out and it appeared that they did not have a good accounting for them.

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b7C

[redacted] stated that [redacted] never used the modified G sporulation media and was unsure what this technique is.

[redacted] did not have knowledge of the culture techniques used, the drying of Ba, types of lyophilizer used, strains of Ba characterized, where strains of Ba originated or manufactured, or the types of strains to include the Ames strain.

[redacted] was not familiar with individuals who had expertise in weaponization techniques, spore production and lyophilizing. [redacted] stated that [redacted] was not aware of anyone who would want to weaponize the materials at USAMRIID or anyone who may want to make a Select Agent for use in some improper fashion.

[redacted] was not aware of any person with access and ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents who expressed a hostile attitude toward any political organization, the media or others.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 7/23/2004 , Page 3

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[REDACTED] was not aware of any individual who [REDACTED] could consider to be a suspect of possibly being associated with the mailings of anthrax letters. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was not involved in the mailing of anthrax letters.

[REDACTED] was not aware of anyone who was lax in handling dangerous items or inappropriately interested in agents that could be turned into harmful agents.

[REDACTED] was unaware of any individual at USAMRIID who was rumored to be interested in gaining access to anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents or the means to produce them without a specific need or responsibility to do so.

[REDACTED] was not familiar with the process of drying Ba and sending it through the mail.

[REDACTED] was not familiar with anyone who expressed a special interest in being able to get around forensic techniques.

[REDACTED] does not have any personal or professional association related to Trenton, New Jersey or other areas of NJ.

[REDACTED] did not travel and was not aware of others traveling to NJ in September or October 2001. [REDACTED] had been

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b7C

[REDACTED] stated that the Standard Operating Procedures for decontamination of Class II and Class III was to spray bleach, discard hazardous materials in the appropriate trash bags, sharps in the appropriate sharps container. [REDACTED] stated that there were also filters however was not familiar with them.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had friends in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] never used plastic storage containers, such as sterilite boxes, for storage of materials at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] was not aware of any work being conducted with Ba or its stimulants which was unofficial or not recorded.

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b7c

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 7/23/2004, Page 4

[REDACTED] stated that all of [REDACTED] work was recorded in lab notebooks [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not purchase pre-stamped envelopes.

[REDACTED] did not purchase pre-stamped envelopes in vending machines.

[REDACTED] did not personally handle any of the anthrax laced letters or envelopes.

[REDACTED] did not do any analytical work on the evidence in this case.

[REDACTED] was familiar with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] never heard [REDACTED] discuss [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] never heard [REDACTED] make references to killing people, political issues, scenarios involving anthrax, avoiding forensic detection, books or reading materials.

[REDACTED] was not aware of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was not aware of whom [REDACTED] associated with or if [REDACTED] had connections in NJ or Princeton.

According to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] never let [REDACTED] "piggyback" into any area with [REDACTED] never saw [REDACTED] remove equipment from USAMRIID or an undetectable area, never saw [REDACTED] perform any scientific work.

[REDACTED] was not aware of where [REDACTED] stored samples and material, not aware of any samples or material which [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not host foreign visiting scientist during [REDACTED] employment at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] did see foreign visiting scientist while [REDACTED] was employed there.

[REDACTED] was not [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 7/23/2004, Page 5

[redacted] stated that [redacted] was not aware of any additional information which may be helpful to this investigation.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

No Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheet(s).

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