-1-

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/01/2004	b6 b7C
, born, Social	
Security Account Number driver's license number currently residing at home phone	
currently employed at phone number Extension employed	
as a voluntarily agreed to be interviewed	
at theField Office. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview,provided the following information:	
in graduated from University in with a worked at USAMRIID from	
of to of as a worked on	
From to because	7
as a In	] _
began working for Section as an	J
In began working for	
as a specialization is At USAMRIID, worked with Bacillus anthracis (Ba) cultures for	
2. At USAMRIID, worked with	b6 b7
3. worked with employee on named worked with live cultures of Ba stored at -70 degrees and grew Ba on blood auger plates. did no spore work and worked with the Ames strain of Ba. had both a freezer and an incubator in suite, so never distributed Ba to any other sources, and no one else used their cultures.	
Investigation on 2/26/04 at	b6 b7C
File # 279A-WF-222936-6001 - 15AMKID-703 Date dictated 2/26/04  SA  by SA	· 
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279A-WF-222936

b6 b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of	, <sub>On</sub> 2/26/04 , <sub>Page</sub> 2
4 has never u	used modified G sporulation media.
5. worked most	cly with multi-colony cultures.
6. did not wor	rk with the drying of Ba.
characterized, where they originat	now if the strains were ted, or where they were amiliar with Bruce Ivins or
expertise in weaponization techniq	nat when was at USAMRIID,
9. is unaware have problems with bacterial contavirology suite.	b6
determined that	rovided floor plans, Building b7C worked in Building
11. N/A	
out of the hot areas in 1412.	are of any piggybacking in and be never saw it, nor did know by not aware of visiting scientists
13. said it wou agents from the hot areas by either waistband of your scrubs. Neither searched upon exiting the area.	
14. said wa might make a select agent for use	as unaware of anyone who said they in some improper fashion.
and the ability to create dangerou	are of any persons with the access us biological agents who expressed tical organizations, the media, or
16 is not awa a suspect or associated with the m	are of anyone believes to be mailings of the anthrax letters.

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279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of	
17. did not work with anyone whom considered lax in handling dangerous items.	
18. was not aware of anyone at USAMRIID who was rumored to be interested in gaining access to anthrax or other biological or chemical agents.	
19. said would sporalate and liafolize or mill a Ba sample than mail it.	
is not aware of anyone who expressed a special interest in being able to get around forensic techniques.	
21. has no personal or professional association with New Jersey.	
22. Neither nor associates traveled to  New Jersey in September or October of 2001. was in during that time period.	
23 did not see any SOPs for decontamination of Class II and Class III biosafety cabinets while at USAMRIID.	
24. was not aware of any fumigation in the verology areas.	
25. N/A	
said that had frequently used plastic storage containers, but that did not purchase them, nor does know who did. never noticed any of storage boxes missing.	
27. is not aware of any work that was conducted with Ba unofficially.	
work was recorded in three-ring binders, not lab books assumes those binders are still somewhere at USAMRIID.	
never purchased pre-stamped envelopes.	
30. did not use the vending machines in Frederick to purchase pre-stamped envelopes.	

## 279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of		, On 2/26/04 , Page 4	
anthrax-l	31. did not personally ha	andle any of the	
evidence	32. did not do any analyt	cical work on the	
media cov	1. did not know erage about	prior to the	
comments areas wit			
anthrax l	26. had no additional infetter mailings.	Formation regarding the	
	FOREIGN VISITING SCIENTIS	STS	
visiting	1. never had any dealings scientists.	s with any foreign	
	2-13 N/A		
	1. was not an member.		
	2-11 N/A		
provide r		ditional information to ated no.	

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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#### FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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	Date of transcription $02/20/2004$	_
	3-1	
social security number	date of birth telephone number	b6
	2004 at place of employment at	b7C
was incerviewed on repluary 20, 2	2004 at     prace or emproyment at	
<u> </u>	After being advised of the	
identities of the interviewing ag		
	following information:	b6
<u> </u>	<b>3</b>	b7C
is		. I
received his in	at University.	$\sim$
dissertation was on		
working on	work included	
and serogo	l challenges administered in	
	es Army Medical Research Institute	
of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)		
	USAMRIID were	
	ere approved by	
		1. 6
		b6 b7C
		270
	, ,	
worked with		
and at USA		
performed the aerosol challenges		b6
for believes that	t left when	b7C
The reteri	nary caretakers were	
	now works at and	
WiiO	now works at and	
4		
	primary investigator working with	
l, was the other		
, was the other would assist	with	
		b6
would assist		b6 b7C
would assist	with	
would assist stigation on 02/20/04 at	with	
would assist stigation on 02/20/04 at	with	
would assist stigation on 02/20/04 at	with	

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Rev. 10-6-95)		•	
279A-WF-	222936-USAMRIID		
on of FD-302 of		, On	/04 ,Page2
were run (3) week	on a random schedule, but	alled that aerosol usually every two	
		t USAMRIID was con	
Building		fice space in Buil	ding   or
		racin tipuliting on Da	
anthraci	n members of BRUCE IVINS' g s (B.a.).		CIIIUS
Tyvex su	its were required for entry	v into Room VINS' group would	gomo in after
	eft. He knew that they wer	re there from the m	
	samples, and bottles left a that the bottles used by I		oorly labeled
	tilde one bottleb upod by 1	TVIND STOUP WOLC P	ocity rabeted
	did not recall whether	Ames was one of th	e strains.
	grew and stored	live bacteria in r	room of
Building	at USAMRIID.		
Durraria			
Durraring			
	ator and freezer that	used were in r	The only
refriger		used were in r	om
refriger Blood co	unts were done in room wo		coom
refriger	unts were done in room wo	with fro	coom chemistry and

2

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

b6 b7C

tion of FD-302 of			,On 02/18/04	, Page3
the free	ezer during that peri		aware of what els	e was ın
was cont them dor	acted to have bo		at USAMRIID. In d, however, ne	ver had
	did not k	enow who	was have never inter	prior to acted.
USAMRIII locked v	the suite doors woul	ld grant acces c doors that s pen. Rooms	<u>hould h</u> ave b <u>een</u> c	at losed and ere coded
	USAMRIID. where	4	in room of Bu alk-in cooler on nd consumable mat	
departm	did not went at USAMRIID.	work with anyo	ne from the	
pathoge	is not aw	ware of any we	aponization proce	dures for
Building	never saw 1412 at USAMRIID.	w a lyophilize	er or freeze dryer	in
access	is unawar to pathogenic materia		who attempted to guson or need.	ain
past.		it is a routin	plates from patien ne and common acti nst to freeze bact	vity.
in alva	has used erol and glucose.	a fermentor t	o grow vaccine ca	indidates

ation of FD-302 of		, <sub>On</sub> 02/18/04	, Page4
	is aware that there is and owever, is not aware if t facility.	has the	strain of r strains
	does not know any memb	er of the	
USAMRII at USAM			
anthrax	is unaware of anyone w mailings of 2001.	rho could have don	e the
mailing	n the internet or through	rior to the Anthra call if had rea	x d the
	recalled	i going into USAMR	IID's
	noted that has never done any	v work that was cl	assified
as Secr			
that si weaponi source		SAMRIID. I no one had any USAMRIID was not states that Anthrax is	noted the not a
needed	cal pathogen to use for an attack s for an effective attack, however, erm storage. Anthrax is a good cho	it is a good choi	ce for
distrik people 11, 200	oution is going to be via powder. who perpetrated the anthrax mailing attacks. recalled the	believes ags died in the Se report of a cutar	that the eptember neous
exposu	re to anthrax and MOHAMMAD ATTA's a would not have thought that send		

\* FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

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Continuation of FD-302 of		,On 02/18/04	, Page
pathogen. [ incidents of ran out incident at	be so effective since it believes that to fanthrax if the people of material to use. It the Israeli Embassy when the that a possible motifier increased research for	there would have been stresponsible had not eine in the second of the second recalled the 199 are a petri dish was followation for the attacks	ubsequent ther died 6 or 1997 und.
remove the	noted that wo static charge from the p	ould use Bounce fabric	softner to
American is		e that the material was	from an
floor and w	the refrigerators that where the refrigerator in A copy markings will be maintage	of the floor plan with ined in the 1A section	b6 b7C
rire arong	with the notes of this :	TIICET ATEM.	

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DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/dk/cls

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#### FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription	01/29/2004	_,_
	1 ,	b6 b7C
1. Justilia Cominal Comminant	date of home address	270
birth Social Security Number home telephor		•
was interviewed at place of employ		
Building   United States Army Medical Research Ins		
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Ft. Detrick, MD, work		
number After being advised of the ide	entities of	b6
the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview	ew,	b7C
provided the following information:		
is currently the		
at USAMRIID. has a	from	
	USAMRIID	
from		<b>μ</b>
· .		•
has done no personal work with Bac	in the	
anthracis (Ba); however Division at USAMRIID who work with Ba.	III CHE	
DIVIBION &C ODENALID WHO WOLK WICH Da.		
has not had any projects that deal	<u>lt wit</u> h Ba and	
has never used the modified G sporulation media.	stated	
that no drying of Ba work is conducted at USAMRIID.		
danalista a pro prima Titting		
identified Dr. BRUCE IVINS, as persons who have some expertise in weaponing	and	
techniques, spore production and lyophilizing of Ba.	Zacion	
comiques, spore production and syspherizing of sa.		
recalled one incident after 09/11		
bacterial contamination occurred in the hallway of US	AMRIID which	
was the only incident that could recall outside of		
containment suites. Other incidents occur within the suites on occasion, which are understandable because		
containment suites are assumed to be contaminated.	ciie	
Configuration of the apparatus to be configurated.		b6
identified buildings and	and	b7C
containment suites as areas routinely used by	has	
used the hot areas of building however, has	not used room	
·		
		b6
	<del></del>	b7C
Investigation on 01/22/2004 at Ft. Detrick, MD		
707 /479	\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\	
File # 279-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated 01/29	7/2004	
by Postal Inspector; Postal Ins	spector	
	•	
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279-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

doesn't know anyone who uses room and doesn't know what is stored there.  Stated people did "piggy-back" in and out of the hot areas of USAMRIID and stated visiting scientists were taker into the hot areas of USAMRIID by researchers.  stated there are many, many ways someone could remove Select Agents from the hot areas of USAMRIID covertly. said it would not be a difficult task. said hypothetically, someone could procure culture plates through the pass box or shower room, could take impure cultures, or a person could auto-innoculate themselves and place a culture under their fingernails, in their nose and etc. did not know anyone who said they would use or make Select Agents improperly. knew of no one whom believed to be associated with the mailings of the anthrax letters.  advised that there were who worked with on occasion who were lax in handling dangerous items (no names recalled) but they were dealt with in-house by retraining. knew of no one who was rumored to be interested in gaining access to anthrax or any other dangerous agents.  advised if was to prepare Ba to send through the mail it definitely wouldn't be done in the institute.  said the drying of the Ba would be the hardest part of the process. First, one would need to build themselves a lab, grow the cultures, get a lyophilizer or drying equipment such as a spray dryer to make it aerosolize and add compounds to refine the powder advised the person would have to have a fairly reasonable	doesn't know anyone who uses room and doesn't know what is stored there.    stated people did "piggy-back" in and out of the hot areas of USAMRIID and stated visiting scientists were taken into the hot areas of USAMRIID by researchers.    stated there are many, many ways someone could remove Select Agents from the hot areas of USAMRIID covertly.   said it would not be a difficult task.		
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the mail it definitely wouldn't be done in the institute.  said the drying of the Ba would be the hardest part of the process. First, one would need to build themselves a lab, growthe cultures, get a lyophilizer or drying equipment such as a spray dryer to make it aerosolize and add compounds to refine the powder advised the person would have to have a fairly reasonable biological background and experience. In the lab, one would have to drape everything in plastic and use a HEPA filter as well as internal pressure of the lab so that the neighbors wouldn't get sick.  doesn't know anyone who would construct such a	the mail it definitely wouldn't be done in the institute.    said the drying of the Ba would be the hardest part of the process. First, one would need to build themselves a lab, grow the cultures, get a lyophilizer or drying equipment such as a spray dryer to make it aerosolize and add compounds to refine the powder.    advised the person would have to have a fairly reasonable biological background and experience. In the lab, one would have to drape everything in plastic and use a HEPA filter as well as internal pressure of the lab so that the neighbors wouldn't get sick.   doesn't know anyone who would construct such a lab.    is not aware of anyone who expressed a special interest in having the ability to get around forensic techniques.   stated the only dealings   has had with the state of New   stated the stated th	worked with on occasion who (no names recalled) but the retraining. knew interested in gaining access	were lax in handling dangerous items y were dealt with in-house by of no one who was rumored to be
	interest in having the ability to get around forensic techniques.  stated the only dealings has had with the state of New	advised the mail it definitely would said the drying of the process. First, one wor the cultures, get a lyophild dryer to make it aerosolize advised the person biological background and end drape everything in plastic internal pressure of the lansick. doesn't known	dn't be done in the institute.  f the Ba would be the hardest part of uld need to build themselves a lab, growizer or drying equipment such as a spray and add compounds to refine the powder nowuld have to have a fairly reasonable experience. In the lab, one would have to and use a HEPA filter as well as boothat the neighbors wouldn't get

# 279-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of		on <u>01/22/200</u>	4 , Page3	— b6
location. [ traveled to	sated net New Jersey in Sept	ither nor any of asso tember or October of 2001.	ciates	' b7C
couldn't re online. chemicals i suites are	nd biosafe ecall them, but state said has in the virology suit deconned monthly was nyde. Suite was advised fa	here are SOP's for decontamiety cabinets; advited they can be can be retried smelled bacterial decontamites. stated air-lith either paraformaldehydes deconned in 2001 for renovacilities engineering would	sed	b6 b7C
the storing	such as sterilite be said small plastic b <u>g of</u> samples in free	has never used plastic stor boxes for storage of mat boxes are used by some resea ezers but none the size of a ced any missing containers a	erials. archers for a sterilite	b6 · b7C
and was not <u>keep offi</u> ci	Ba in division notebooks; some of recorded in lab notes but not all	data is captured electr	work is conically esearchers	•
envelopes l else.	advised like those in the an	has never purchased pre-st	amped or anyone	
technicians	stated s (names unknown) we	Dr. B <u>ruce Ivins a</u> ere present when	and two	b6 b7C
other than never ran		has no knowledge of s MRIID and has no personal kn	said nowledge of	b6 b7C

279-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

b6 b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of
stated has never hosted foreign visiting scientists and has never been a member of the
said has a small problem with submitting to a polygraph examination. stated the polygraph is being
used opposite of what it is intended. advised asking questions relating to what a person did when they were 15 years old
has no significance to the case at hand. stated wouldn't mind taking the polygraph but has problems on how it is being administered at this time

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/dk/cls

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#### FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04	:/08/2004	,, 0
, date of birt , social security number employed at the Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (U interviewed on After being advised of the the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, the following information:	United State SAMRIID), was	b
antifoam was used when aerosol	challenges	
		]
•		J
igation on 04/07/2004 at Frederick, Maryland	b€ b7	
SSA Date dictated SSA SA		
.wpd		
document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to		

Continuation of FD-302 of
said that the same AGIs have been used for at least the past ten (10) years. Recently the AGIs have been modified to use a screw top instead of a push on top.
The material that was collected in the AGI would be maintained for several days or longer following a challenge.
Small amounts of the antifoam were aliquoted into tubes. In previous years, larger tubes were used which caused excess waste.
noted that Anthrax spores are very resilient.
is unaware of any antifoam stock ever reported missing.  said that would assume that knew the process of using antifoam as part of the aerosol challenges.
in the past olive oil was used for aerosol challenges. The olive oil was used for challenges involving toxin proteins. Olive oil has not been used during challenges for ten (10) years.  has not seen a bottle of olive oil at USAMRIID since the early 1990's.
stated that there is no difference in the post challenge assays if olive oil or antifoam are used during the aerosol challenge.

Continuation	1 of FD-302 of						, On <u>04/</u>	07/2004	, Page	3	b6 b7C b7F
Г	depended					x used i e concen			challe	nae	1
Ĺ											]
,											1
							4				
	utilized IVINS war personal material	in the nted to larger than the	aerosol do the p said t at the a	challe plating that IV amount	nges at of the INS woul plated	materia ld plate	D. Al of he o.1 of for e	stat is chal r 0.2 m	ed that lenges l of	BRUCE	, b6   b7C
	present :	ir an	y logs : andling	studie indicat	ed that			halleng	he PI,		]

Continuation of	of FD-302 of			, On <u>04/07/20</u>	04, Page4
	said that challenge	s related to		round for any of the	he aerosol
	placed in		saw the post chall lave bags for disp		they had been
	IVINS wou anthrax a	ld have a co erosol prepa Operating Pr	there are unof or anthrax aerosol py of the procedur ration.	re, as well as a protection there are	rotocol for general
	systems. electroni over the however, replaceme and glove intention	ave been upd As an examp c instead of past several other modifi nts. Upgrad mainte replacement of historic	that the systems ated with newer, a le manual. Some of years have been a cations have involves made to the equance logs were made. The maintenance al documentation.	the flow meters the modifications based on system ma wed complete comp ipment were not n intained for filt te logs were not k The hood lines p	r based are now to the units intenance, onent oted in a log. ers, tubing, ept with the resent in the
	presentat in Decemb	ebsite, inte ion given at er of 2003.	ional Institute of rviewing agents shan aerosol workshan The presentation aerosol challenge	nould be able to l nop. The presenta should have photo	ocate a tion was given
· [	going to study is involving	mice at the	AMRIID. Loo Ba Ames around M	May 1, 2004. The de the <i>Ba</i> Ames for derosol challenge d. The PI for the	an primate is PI for the the challenge. of Ba Ames study is
	Aerosol C	ndividual wo	sheets were the p	were utilized in volved to hold the	nning the the challenge, animal.

Continuation of FD-302 of		,On <u>04/07/2004</u> ,Page <u>5</u>
however, challeng	not many people were hands-on es.	with administering the
	identified	as a former aerosol technician.
	s or other documentation for Ba would require	the protocol number of the
material using th nebulize material sterile	e old nebulizers and that none rs would have been re-mixed bac that was collected in the AGI	iod would have been aerosolized of the remaining material in the ck into any anthrax stock. The
labeled print ou purchase	Lo <u>g Books. One</u> of books is lab	a brown a brown a brown a provided a copy of an
is based should b	on an older unofficial procedu e able to provide a copy of the	the SOP ure developed with IVINS. IVINS e older procedure.
	The two (2) log books, the SC books collected, the antifoam pw notes will be maintained in a	product information, and the b70
the agen future A	During this interview, ts may want to obtain Ames samp mes aerosol challenge and may w	advised by SSA that ples from various stages of a want to secure them in the

Continuation of FD-302 of	, On <u>04/07/2004</u> , Page <u>6</u>
aerosol challenge laboratory at rassist when needed.  in the future to produce spore produce	room temperature. willing to told that may be asked reparations and use the challenge
equipment as it was setup in the	late 1990's for some challenge runs
without animal exposures.    SSA   told	such plans would be cleared
with	is asked to assist