

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 02/23/2006

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] social security number [redacted] employed at the United
States Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID),
was interviewed on February 22, 2006. After being advised of the
identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the
interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] was asked about an aerosol exposure performed on
[redacted] could not explain why there was no aerosol
exposure sheet for that particular exposure. It is possible that
either the aerosol exposure sheet was never taken out of the suite,
or that it was accidentally filed in another binder.

BRUCE IVINS would commonly provide *Bacillus anthracis*
(Ba) spores for use in aerosol challenges. [redacted] believes that when
IVINS would prepare Ba spores for a challenge, he would bring over
enough material for a specific aerosol exposure or set of exposures
and that the bulk of Ba spores would be stored in the [redacted]
[redacted] suites in building [redacted]

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[redacted] was aware that a large batch of Ba Ames strain
spores were produced at Dugway Proving Grounds (DPG) for use in
anthrax vaccine research and development. [redacted] indicated that, for
the purposes of [redacted] Ames spores were Ames
spores. It did not matter to them if they were produced at DPG or
USAMRIID. [redacted] would not know where the Ba Ames spores being used
in a given aerosol exposure were produced. [redacted] does not know at
what time point IVINS switched from using Ba Ames spores produced
at USAMRIID to Ba Ames spores produced at DPG.

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[redacted] was shown four (4) copies of photographs of a one
(1) liter flask labeled, "Oct97, GLP Ames Spores, Left 160ml-4/21,
7737 RMR 1029," by SA [redacted] does not recall ever
seeing the flask in Building 1412. The copies of the photographs
are maintained in the corresponding 1A envelope.

[redacted] 1,362

Investigation on 02/22/2006 at Frederick, Maryland

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File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1502 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

SSA

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 03/03/2006

On March 3, 2006, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] [redacted] social security number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Materiel Development Activity (USAMMDA), Building [redacted] Fort Detrick, Maryland, work telephone number [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] has [redacted] degree in [redacted] and began employment at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] was vaccinated against *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) in [redacted]

[redacted] originally did not recall [redacted]. The interviewing agents then showed [redacted] a spreadsheet, which [redacted] recognized as an [redacted]

[redacted] A copy of the [redacted] shown to [redacted] is maintained in the 1A section of the file. [redacted]

303

Investigation on 03/03/2006 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-1505 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]

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[redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of

[redacted]

, On 03/03/2006, Page 2

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[redacted]

[redacted] briefly left the interview to search [redacted] computer for any RMR-related files. [redacted] returned with 15 pages of RMR data. However, all data was taken directly from the same [redacted] information shown to [redacted] by the interviewing agents.

[redacted]

[redacted] USAMRIID office was located in Building [redacted]

[redacted]

To the best of [redacted] recollection, [redacted] never entered any hot suites.

[redacted] initially believed [redacted] physically counted the samples and verified their location. The interviewing agents then showed [redacted] a copy of USAMRIID floor plans for Building [redacted]. A copy of the floor plans shown to [redacted] is maintained in the 1A section of the file. The interviewing agents discreetly showed [redacted] RMR 1029 on the spreadsheet, listed as stored in Building [redacted] Room [redacted]. [redacted] remarked that Room [redacted] was part of the Bacteriology Section and that, to the best of [redacted] recollection, [redacted] had never been into any Bacteriology rooms. It is possible [redacted] went into Room [redacted] to verify the location of RMR 1029, but the custodian of RMR 1029, BRUCE IVINS, would most likely have told [redacted] the location of RMR 1029. [redacted] would have taken IVINS' word and probably would not double check IVINS' truthfulness.

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[redacted] believed [redacted] stored [redacted] samples in the [redacted] laboratories, one of which was in Building [redacted] Room [redacted]

[redacted] advised the interviewing agents that [redacted] would search [redacted] computer for additional files of RMR-related information

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of

, On 03/03/2006

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and would recontact the interviewing agents if were successful at finding additional files.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 03/06/2006

To: Washington Field

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DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

From: Washington Field
Washington Field AMX-3
Contact: [redacted]

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Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

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Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending)-1507

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: Report results of the investigation regarding locations the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) was stored, at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Building 1412 and Building 1425, Fort Detrick, Maryland.

Details: As part of the investigation into [redacted]

[redacted] investigators interviewed persons known to have had Ames in their possession during that time. Individuals were chosen if the Ames in their possession matched genotypic and phenotypic characteristics of those of the Ba found in the anthrax-laced letters. References made to the "hot side" refer to a [redacted] containment area in the building where infectious microorganisms were being handled and contained, and where special protective equipment was required to reduce the risk of exposure. The "cold side" refers to the remaining areas of Building [redacted] including areas where there is little or no risk of exposure to infectious materials, as well as some BSL-3 laboratories. The locations of concern in Building [redacted] were: room [redacted] (hot side), suite [redacted] (cold side), room [redacted] (hot side), room [redacted] (hot side), [redacted] (hot side). The locations of concern in Building [redacted] were: suites [redacted] suite [redacted] suite [redacted] suite [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]

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Information was collected from the following eight persons via interview and/or review of FD-302's from prior interviews: [redacted] (USAMRIID), [redacted] (USAMRIID)

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/28/2006

[redacted] USAMRIID), ~~Bruce E. Ivins~~ (USAMRIID),
and [redacted] USAMRIID).

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[redacted] recalled having seen [redacted] in room [redacted]
the walk-in cooler. [redacted] could not provide information about
materials in [redacted] but mentioned that [redacted]

[redacted] recalled that stocks of agents were kept in [redacted]
but could not provide specific information regarding Ames.
[redacted] also noted that Ames was not stored in the hallways of
Building 1425¹.

[redacted] recalled there being a freezer containing Ames in
the hallway of Building [redacted] next to [redacted]
[redacted] stated Ames was there for many years prior to
1999 and up to the present, including samples belonging to
[redacted] did not store any samples in room [redacted] the walk-in
cooler. [redacted] stated Building [redacted] rooms [redacted] contained
only the Pasteur strain; the only Ames used there was from the
mailings. [redacted] stated Ba was stored in [redacted] prior to 2001, used
by [redacted] and the Diagnostic Services Division, who
performed DNA extractions².

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[redacted] stated Ames from Ivins' laboratory was not
stored in room [redacted] the walk-in cooler. [redacted] stated that there
were no freezers or refrigerators that contained Ames in the
hallways of Building 1425³.

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[redacted] stated room [redacted] was used as a pre- and post-
exposure animal room for aerosol challenges. [redacted] did not store
any material in room [redacted] the walk-in cooler, although [redacted]
leftover material from aerosol challenges may have been stored
there. [redacted] noted that [redacted] stored Ba in a freezer in the hot
hallway of Building [redacted]

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[redacted] could not provide specific information
regarding Ames storage in room [redacted] the walk-in cooler, but
believed [redacted] may have stored Ba there. [redacted] did
perform Ba sprays in Building [redacted] Suite [redacted] while Building
1412 was down for renovations (possibly up until late 1999)⁵.

[redacted] did not store Ames in Building 1412, room [redacted]
[redacted] could not provide any information about Ames actually
being stored in any of the other locations in question⁷.

Information from Ivins was gathered from a review of
FD-302's from prior interviews. Ivins did not recall being in
room [redacted] the walk-in cooler. No other information was available
regarding the storage of Ames for the locations in question⁸.

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/28/2006

Information from [redacted] was gathered from a review of FD-302's from prior interviews. In general, [redacted] could not identify the rooms [redacted] worked in with Ames while in Building [redacted] did not recall being in room [redacted] the walk-in cooler; [redacted] did not know where the Ames [redacted] used came from. [redacted] never worked in a BSL-4 suite, and would therefore not have used Building 1425, suite [redacted]

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The attached chart provides a summary of the above information, gathered from interviews and review of FD-302's. Attached hereto and considered part of this document is the above mentioned chart.

1. FD-302 of [redacted] (Oct.17,2005) - POI Serial 1483
2. FD-302 of [redacted] (Oct.17,2005) - USAMRIID Serial 1426
3. FD-302 of [redacted] (Oct.19,2005) - USAMRIID Serial 1425
4. FD-302 of [redacted] (Jan.3,2006) - USAMRIID Serial 1490
5. FD-302 of [redacted] (Jan.12,2006) - USAMRIID Serial 1479
6. Review of [redacted] current FD-302's
7. FD-302 of [redacted] (Nov.7,2005) - USAMRIID Serial 1433
8. Review of Bruce Ivins current FD-302's

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Investigators known to have Positive Samples and Storage Locations

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	1412					1425				
	Room	Room		Hot hallways	Suite	AR	Suite	Suite	Suite	Hallways
	No info	No info	Just plates	No info	No info	No info; [redacted]	Stocks of agents kept; no info on Ames	No info	No info	None stored in hallways
	No info	No info	Did not store any samples there	Freezer with Ames next to [redacted] Ames there for many years prior to 1999 and up to present; samples from [redacted]	No info	Pasteur only agent used there; only Ba was from mailings	Ba stored there prior to 2001; DNA extractions done by DSD; Ba from [redacted]	---	No info	---
	No info	No info	No Ames from Ivins' laboratory	No info	No info	No info	No info	No info	No info	There were no fridges or freezers that stored Ames in hallways
	Used as a pre- and post-exposure animal room for aerosol challenges	No info	[redacted] did not store anything here; may have been leftover material from aerosol challenges stored here	[redacted] stored Ba in a freezer in the hallway	No info	No info	No info	No info	No info	No info
	No info	No info	No specific info; if Ba stored there, probably [redacted]	No info	No info	No info	No info	Performed Ba sprays there while [redacted] was down for renovations (possibly until late 1999)	No info	No info
	---	---	Does not recall being in here	---	---	---	---	---	No	---

	Nothing Stored	No info								
Ivins ⁸	---	---	No	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

Revised 02/22/06

This chart is a summary of the information gathered from the FD-302's.

No info: person not able to provide an account of what was stored in the location.

--- no information to be found; nothing reported about the location.

1. 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1483
2. 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1426
3. 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1425
4. 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1490
5. 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1479
6. Review of prior FD-302's
7. 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1433
8. Review of prior FD-302's

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 03/07/2006

On March 7, 2006, [redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] social security number [redacted] home address of [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]
[redacted] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), [redacted] Porter Street,
Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [redacted]. After being advised
of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview,
[redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] confirmed that [redacted] has been employed at USAMRIID
since [redacted] in the [redacted] Division [redacted]
[redacted] suites [redacted], in Building [redacted] with [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
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[redacted]
[redacted] The room contained several pieces of equipment including
a hood, shakers, and incubators. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The fermentor was used in work with attenuated strains
of *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba). [redacted] advised that there was a freezer
in suites [redacted] and that there were several -70 degree freezers in
the hallways which everyone had access to. [redacted] also was aware of

Investigation on 03/07/2006 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-1525 Date dictated _____

by PI [redacted]
PI [redacted]

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[redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 03/07/2006 , Page 2

[REDACTED]

In 2001, [REDACTED] did not keep an inventory of organisms [REDACTED] [REDACTED] maintained approximately a dozen spore preps and 30 to 40 seed vials. In discussing the walk-in coolers, [REDACTED] described them, particularly during the renovation of suites [REDACTED] as very cluttered and that employees stored a variety of dead animals, plates, test tubes, centrifuge rotors, and flasks there.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] recalled obtaining Ames from a couple of vials which co-worker [REDACTED] had maintained in a box in the freezer. [REDACTED] also recalled obtaining a few milliliters of Ames from IVINS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] explained that nobody goes into someone else's spore stock without their consent. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was shown a photocopy of a version of the Reference Material Receipt (RMR) pertaining to USAMRIID Part Number 1029, described as highly purified *Bacillus anthracis* Ames spores, dated October 22, 1997. [REDACTED] indicated that [REDACTED] was not familiar with the term 1029 or Dugway Spores. [REDACTED] obtained the document simply because [REDACTED] had earlier observed [REDACTED] maintain a similar document in [REDACTED] notebook. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The RMR receipt copy shown to [REDACTED] is maintained in the 1A section of the file.

[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 03/07/2006, Page 3

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] recalled that IVINS maintained a supply of Ames in a walk-in cooler in suites [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED] and that this was common knowledge. [REDACTED] was shown a copy of the floor plans for - suites [REDACTED] Building [REDACTED] indicated on the floor plan that in [REDACTED] identified the following areas and labeled the floor plans as: cold rooms [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The USAMRIID floor plan copy shown to [REDACTED] is maintained in the 1A section of the file.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The bigger autoclave was primarily used by the veterinarians and the smaller autoclave used by the researchers. Usually it would take anywhere from 1.5 to 2.0 hours to complete the autoclave process. [REDACTED] explained that the common practice adhered to by employees using the autoclaves was to place materials in the autoclave and only when it was full was it turned on. Since there was no set policy that was followed, [REDACTED] explained that materials were often left together on the floor (from various employees) by the autoclave waiting for it to be full before it was run.

During a brief tour of the [REDACTED] cold side of Building [REDACTED] pointed to some flasks on the floor by an autoclave and indicated that some of the flasks [REDACTED] awaiting to be autoclaved. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] acknowledged that it would be wrong for a researcher to remove material from the autoclave or autoclave area that did not belong to them.

[REDACTED] was given an opportunity to review four photocopies of one flask, from different angles, which was labeled "RMR 1029 GLP Ames Spores Oct 97". After viewing the photocopies, [REDACTED] could not recall seeing or handling the flask but acknowledged that the handwriting depicted on the photocopy appeared to be that of IVINS.

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Continuation of FD-302 of , On 03/07/2006, Page 4

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The above photocopies shown to are maintained in the 1A section of the file.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 03/29/2006

To: Washington Field

Attn: AMX-3

Inspection

Attn: IIC [redacted] (no encl.)

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Counterterrorism

Attn: WMDOU, SSA [redacted] (no encl.)

From: Washington Field

AMX-3

Contact: [redacted]

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Approved By: [redacted]

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b7C

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending)-1529

Title: AMERITHRAX;
Major Case 184;
OO:WF

Synopsis: A summary of the results of two initiatives, each whose goal was to determine how correctly and consistently keycard access badges were used by employees who were involved in aerosol challenges in Building 1412 of the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland.

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Enclosure(s): 1) Six (6) page copy of keycard data titled "September 16, 1998 Aerosol Challenge," 2) Six (6) page copy of keycard data titled "September 14, 1999 Aerosol Challenge," 3) Three (3) page copy of keycard data titled "October 15, 1999 Aerosol Challenge."

[redacted]
② ④
⑤ ⑥
[redacted]

Details: Efforts were made to obtain a general idea of whether keycard access badges were used correctly and consistently by employees who were involved in aerosol challenge work in Building [redacted] at USAMRIID. Two separate initiatives were conducted to this end, each described below:

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
1. Examination of the use of the five main access points to and from the containment area of Building [redacted] for the days of and days after three aerosol challenges.

Aerosol challenges were conducted within a Bio-safety Level 3 containment area in Building [redacted] Proper entrance into

[redacted] 040306-ec.wpd

[redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 03/29/2006



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For the purposes of the initiative, each of the five access points was assigned a number as it is labeled above. For an individual who entered and exited the containment area of Building 1412 using all the required access badge readers, the keycard access records would typically follow the order 1), 2), 3), 4) and 5), with other keycard entries possibly appearing between 1) and 2), 3) and 4), and 4) and 5).

Keycard access records were examined for 9/16/1998, 9/14/1999, 10/15/1999, and the days after each of these three dates. The abovementioned dates were chosen because they were possibly the first three times RMR 1029 was used in aerosol challenges at USAMRIID. The days after each were included because post-challenge work, such as the culturing of *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) from the all-glass impingers, was most likely done then.

For 9/16/1998 and 9/17/1998, the keycard access records of the following individuals were examined due to their mention as being involved in the challenge, either through aerosol data sheets or in interviews: [REDACTED] BRUCE IVINS, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] The keycard records of [REDACTED] were also examined for these dates, in order to compare [REDACTED] access to that of individuals that were known to be in the containment area of Building 1412.

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For 9/14/1999 and 9/15/1999, the keycard access records of the following individuals were examined due to their mention as being involved in the challenge, either through aerosol data sheets or in interviews: [REDACTED] BRUCE IVINS, [REDACTED] The keycard records of [REDACTED] were also examined for these dates, in order to compare [REDACTED] access to that of individuals that were known to be in the containment area of Building 1412.

For 10/15/1999 and 10/16/1999, the keycard access records of the following individuals were examined due to their

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 03/29/2006

mention as being involved in the challenge, either through aerosol data sheets or in interviews: [REDACTED]

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BRUCE IVINS, [REDACTED] No keycard access records for [REDACTED] exist for these dates.

The keycard access data for the abovementioned dates and individuals are enclosed with this communication. Data are presented in a spreadsheet, with relevant access points labeled by number on the right-hand side of the page. Also included are the highest total numbers of access points recorded at one time (out of five) for each date and each individual whose records were examined. This number demonstrates how many of the five relevant access points were used in the correct order for entry into the containment area on the given date. For several individuals, there are also extraneous entries into (1) and exits from (5) Building 1412.

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For all of the days when access points were recorded for employees who used the containment area to work with aerosol challenges, at least three of the five access points were recorded together. There was therefore always some indication that the employee used the change room or keypad to enter the containment area. In approximately 50% of the cases, one or two of the access points were missing (i.e. 3 of 5, or 4 of 5 points recorded). For the other approximately 50% of the cases, all five access points were used correctly (i.e. 5 of 5 points recorded). Never on a day when an employee was assigned to work in the containment area was he/she shown only to have entered and exited the building on that day (i.e. 2 of 5 points recorded). Of the dates examined, [REDACTED] keycard access records include relevant access points on only one date, 9/14/1999. On this date, only two of the access points are recorded, 1) and 5). In this respect, [REDACTED] records are inconsistent with those of the employees who were known to have used the containment areas on those dates. [REDACTED] records show no relevant access points on 9/16/1998. Through the analysis described above, it is therefore found to be unlikely that [REDACTED] used the containment area of Building 1412 on 9/16/1998 or 9/14/1999.

2. Examination of the use of the three main access points into and out of the containment area of Building 1412, for aerosol challenges between 9/14/1999 and 8/14/2001.

For each aerosol challenge that occurred between 9/14/1999 and 8/14/2001 and is listed on the spreadsheet entitled "Aerosol Data Sheets, Anthrax Protocols, 12/1996 through 8/2001," the keycard access records for each Principal Investigator (PI) and aerosol technician (tech) listed were analyzed.

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
 Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 03/29/2006

The three keycard access points of concern were: 1) Entry into the male or female change room via badge swipe [redacted], 2) Entry into the containment area via keypad code [redacted] (KEYPAD"), 3) Exit from the male or female change room via badge swipe [redacted]. These access points are referred to on the below chart as 1) IN, 2) KEY and 3) OUT.

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The following chart describes each employee's keycard access records for each date they were listed as having been involved with an aerosol challenge using Ba. Data in the fourth column are recorded as follows: "Yes" indicates all three relevant access points were recorded in the proper order (IN, KEY and OUT), "None" indicates none of the relevant access points were recorded, and any anomalies or missing access points are mentioned.

Use of the Keycard System in Building 1412, Rooms [redacted] and [redacted] by Principal Investigators and Aerosol Technicians During Aerosol Challenges Between 9/14/1999 and 8/14/2001

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Exposure#	Date	PI/Techs	IN/OUT/KEY consistently?
[redacted]	9/14/99	[redacted]	Yes IN/KEY but no OUT
	10/15/99		Yes Yes
	4/5/00		None One extra IN, all else okay
	4/7/00		None Yes Yes
	4/10/00		None Yes Yes
	7/17/00		None Yes KEY/OUT but no IN
	7/18/00		None None (was in on 7/17/00) Yes IN/KEY but no OUT

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
 Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 03/29/2006

	12/5/00		Extra OUT between IN and KEY Yes Yes
		B. Ivins	Yes
	12/7/00		IN/KEY but no OUT Yes Extra OUT or KEY/OUT but no IN IN/OUT but no KEY None Yes
		B. Ivins	Yes
12/11/00		IN/KEY but no OUT Yes Yes Yes Yes KEY but no IN or OUT	
	B. Ivins	None Yes Yes IN/KEY but no OUT Yes Yes Yes Yes None	
12/13/00		None Yes	
4/10/01		None Yes Yes Yes Yes	
	B. Ivins	Yes Yes IN/KEY but no OUT Yes	

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
 Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 03/29/2006

	4/12/01		None Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
		B. Ivins	Yes Yes Yes
	6/26/01		Yes Yes IN with no OUT; no KEY KEY/OUT but no IN Extra OUTs
	7/10/01		None Yes Yes IN and OUT with no KEY Yes Yes OUT but no IN or KEY Yes Yes
		B. Ivins	None Yes Yes Extra IN; OUT between IN and KEY Yes Yes IN/KEY but no OUT Yes
	7/11/01		None Yes Yes IN and OUT with no KEY (twice) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
		B. Ivins	Yes Extra OUT between IN and KEY IN and OUT with no KEY Yes
	7/12/01		None Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
		B. Ivins	Yes Extra OUT between IN and KEY IN and OUT with no KEY Yes
	8/14/01		Yes Extra OUT between IN and KEY IN and OUT with no KEY Yes

b6
b7C

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 03/29/2006

Anomalies indicate that the employee may have piggybacked through a missing access point with another individual, or the system might not have read a keycard swipe or keypad code properly. "IN and OUT with no KEY" is most likely an anomaly if there is a significant time lapse (i.e. several minutes) between IN and OUT.

The amount of anomalies evident on the spreadsheet imply that there were most likely instances of piggybacking and/or system faults through use of the change rooms into the containment area of Building 1412 on these dates. [REDACTED] stated during an interview that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the lack of KEY access points for [REDACTED] entered the containment area through one of the abovementioned means. Additional review and interviews could be done to determine how many of the above individuals may have piggybacked or experienced keycard system faults when entering and exiting the containment area. Individuals whose keycard records show anomalies or no access points at all could be further investigated, and a study could be done of the history of failures of the keycard access system.

b6
b7c

The initiatives described above demonstrate a significant difference between expected keycard access data for employees using the containment area of Building 1412, and the actual data for employees during several Ba aerosol challenges between 9/1998 and 8/2001. The records of these employees often did not include at least one access point that is required for entering or exiting the containment area. The initiatives therefore have demonstrated that it is likely employees involved in aerosol challenges have piggybacked and/or experienced system failures when using keycard access badges and keycard access codes. All records in one initiative did show at least some indication of the use of a change room, however; it is therefore unlikely that an individual who worked in the containment area during an aerosol challenge would have access records that show no access at all to one of the change rooms.

◆◆

September 16, 1998 Aerosol Challenge

b2
b6
b7C

9/16/98 13:41:04 Access Granted Normal		0 of 5	
9/16/98 13:56:02 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 14:14:28 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 14:14:50 Access Granted In			
9/16/98 14:18:25 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 14:18:27 Access Granted Out			
9/16/98 14:19:13 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 14:20:12 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 14:20:36 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 14:27:53 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 14:27:56 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 14:29:33 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 15:21:02 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 16:29:38 Access Granted Normal			
9/17/98 7:20:26 Access Granted Normal			
9/17/98 7:22:54 Access Granted Normal			
9/17/98 7:23:17 Access Granted In			
9/17/98 7:23:33 Access Granted Out			
9/17/98 7:24:14 Access Granted Normal			
9/17/98 8:47:50 Access Granted Normal			
9/17/98 8:49:39 Access Granted Normal	1		
9/17/98 8:50:04 Access Granted In	2		
9/17/98 10:04:01 Access Granted Out	4		
9/17/98 10:06:25 Access Granted Out			
9/17/98 10:08:27 Access Granted Normal	5		
9/17/98 10:09:47 Access Granted Normal			
9/17/98 11:32:11 Access Granted Normal			
9/17/98 12:17:52 Access Granted Normal			
9/17/98 13:38:33 Access Granted Normal			
9/17/98 13:43:34 Access Granted Normal			
9/17/98 14:14:16 Access Granted Normal			
9/17/98 14:16:01 Access Granted Normal	1		
9/17/98 15:15:34 Access Granted Normal	5		
9/17/98 15:17:18 Access Granted Normal			
9/17/98 16:33:54 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 8:47:30 Access Granted Normal		0 of 5	
9/16/98 8:48:12 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 8:49:14 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 8:49:25 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 9:06:41 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 9:09:34 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 9:10:05 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 9:17:53 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 9:22:10 Access Granted In			
9/16/98 9:25:01 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 12:18:55 Access Granted Out			
9/16/98 12:19:17 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 12:20:27 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 13:07:58 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 14:36:54 Access Granted Normal			
9/16/98 15:03:33 Access Granted Normal			

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

September 16, 1998 Aerosol Challenge

9/16/98	8:40:05	Access Granted	Out	[REDACTED]	IVINS, BRUCE E.			b2	
9/16/98	8:42:28	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.	3		b6	
9/16/98	13:21:01	Access Granted	Out		IVINS, BRUCE E.	4		b7C	
9/16/98	13:21:10	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.	5			
9/16/98	13:22:50	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.				
9/16/98	13:23:59	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.				
9/16/98	14:20:32	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.				
9/16/98	15:16:45	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.				
9/16/98	16:45:06	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.				
9/16/98	20:07:01	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.				
9/17/98	6:40:56	Access Granted	Normal	[REDACTED]	IVINS, BRUCE E.		3 of 5		
9/17/98	6:41:07	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.				
9/17/98	6:41:26	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.				
9/17/98	6:42:36	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.				
9/17/98	8:50:00	Access Granted	In		IVINS, BRUCE E.	2			
9/17/98	8:54:22	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.	3			
9/17/98	10:06:54	Access Granted	Out		IVINS, BRUCE E.	4			
9/17/98	10:09:07	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.				
9/17/98	11:09:06	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.				
9/17/98	11:19:04	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.				
9/17/98	11:19:26	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.				
9/17/98	11:20:23	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.				
9/17/98	13:59:38	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.				
9/17/98	14:24:42	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.				
9/17/98	14:26:10	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.				
9/17/98	16:39:38	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.				
9/16/98	8:14:49	Access Granted	Normal		[REDACTED]			4 of 5	
9/16/98	8:15:01	Access Granted	Normal						
9/16/98	8:22:36	Access Granted	Normal						
9/16/98	8:24:52	Access Granted	In						
9/16/98	8:28:07	Access Granted	Out						
9/16/98	8:28:28	Access Granted	In			2			
9/16/98	13:33:45	Access Granted	Out			4			
9/16/98	13:34:03	Access Granted	Normal			5			
9/16/98	13:35:09	Access Granted	Normal						
9/16/98	13:36:12	Access Granted	Normal						
9/16/98	13:37:14	Access Granted	Normal						
9/16/98	13:55:33	Access Granted	Normal						
9/16/98	13:55:42	Access Granted	Normal						
9/16/98	13:56:14	Access Granted	Normal						
9/16/98	14:45:26	Access Granted	Normal						
9/16/98	14:47:11	Access Granted	Normal						
9/16/98	15:06:47	Access Granted	Normal						
9/16/98	15:07:42	Access Granted	Normal						
9/16/98	15:14:24	Access Granted	Normal						
9/16/98	15:26:22	Access Granted	Normal						
9/16/98	16:03:26	Access Granted	Normal						
9/16/98	16:04:06	Access Granted	Normal						
9/16/98	16:06:18	Access Granted	Normal			1			
9/16/98	16:07:45	Access Granted	In			2			
9/16/98	16:28:38	Access Granted	Out			4			

September 16, 1998 Aerosol Challenge

9/16/98	16:28:56	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	16:30:35	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	16:31:32	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	16:32:33	Access Granted	In
9/16/98	16:33:33	Access Granted	Out
9/16/98	16:35:14	Access Granted	In
9/16/98	16:35:54	Access Granted	Out
9/16/98	16:37:19	Access Denied	In
9/16/98	16:38:37	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	16:40:08	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	16:41:00	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	17:56:44	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	17:58:18	Access Granted	In
9/16/98	17:58:51	Access Granted	Out
9/16/98	18:04:46	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	23:54:33	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	23:55:22	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	23:57:00	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	23:57:17	Access Granted	In
<hr/>			
9/17/98	0:20:17	Access Granted	Out
9/17/98	0:20:43	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	0:22:28	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	0:23:03	Access Granted	Normal
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9/17/98	8:58:12	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	8:58:27	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	10:08:50	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	11:57:49	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	12:08:17	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	12:08:59	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	12:09:38	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	12:11:11	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	12:11:29	Access Granted	In
9/17/98	12:32:15	Access Granted	Out
9/17/98	12:32:40	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	12:35:36	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	12:36:28	Access Granted	In
9/17/98	12:38:17	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	12:59:19	Access Granted	Out
9/17/98	12:59:48	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	13:03:47	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	13:19:35	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	14:26:54	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	16:39:23	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	16:42:28	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	16:57:33	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	17:34:52	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	18:23:14	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	18:24:08	Access Granted	Normal
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9/16/98	7:56:35	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	7:57:48	Access Granted	In
9/16/98	8:01:12	Access Granted	Normal

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b7c

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September 16, 1998 Aerosol Challenge

9/16/98	8:11:13	Access Granted	Out
9/16/98	8:12:07	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	8:13:20	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	8:13:32	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	8:14:11	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	8:14:18	Access Granted	In
9/16/98	8:16:57	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	13:40:13	Access Granted	Out
9/16/98	13:45:28	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	13:48:59	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	14:20:40	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	14:21:42	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	14:23:44	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	14:24:22	Access Granted	In
9/16/98	14:24:52	Access Granted	Out
9/16/98	14:25:23	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	14:27:08	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	16:50:38	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	16:51:12	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	16:52:00	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	16:52:26	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	16:53:48	Access Granted	Normal
9/16/98	16:53:58	Access Granted	In
9/16/98	16:56:56	Access Granted	Out
9/16/98	16:57:03	Access Granted	Normal
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9/17/98	8:15:55	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	8:18:38	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	8:18:46	Access Granted	In
9/17/98	8:23:08	Access Granted	Out
9/17/98	8:23:14	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	8:26:33	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	8:57:49	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	8:58:27	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	9:05:56	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	9:08:43	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	9:16:00	Access Granted	In
9/17/98	9:16:58	Access Granted	Out
9/17/98	9:17:37	Access Granted	Out
9/17/98	9:17:43	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	9:21:13	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	9:24:12	Access Granted	Out
9/17/98	9:26:06	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	9:26:19	Access Granted	In
9/17/98	9:31:05	Access Granted	Out
9/17/98	9:33:25	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	10:06:04	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	11:28:45	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	11:39:36	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	11:46:58	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	11:47:55	Access Granted	Normal
9/17/98	11:48:09	Access Granted	In

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4 of 5
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b2
b6
b7C

September 14, 1999 Aerosol Challenge

9/14/1999	7:31:48	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	7:32:19	Access Granted	In
9/14/1999	7:36:17	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	14:05:16	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	14:06:31	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	16:51:50	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	16:52:16	Access Granted	Normal
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9/15/1999	7:14:17	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	7:16:59	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	7:17:45	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	7:18:01	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	7:35:02	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	7:35:14	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	7:35:43	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	8:48:11	Access Granted	In
9/15/1999	8:50:20	Access Granted	Out
9/15/1999	8:50:39	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	8:50:50	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	9:01:32	Access Granted	Out
9/15/1999	9:20:14	Access Granted	In
9/15/1999	9:21:05	Access Granted	Out
9/15/1999	9:27:09	Access Granted	In
9/15/1999	9:27:25	Access Granted	Out
9/15/1999	9:58:05	Access Granted	In
9/15/1999	9:58:59	Access Granted	Out
9/15/1999	12:07:16	Access Granted	In
9/15/1999	12:07:35	Access Granted	Out
9/15/1999	14:03:38	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	14:03:51	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	14:04:37	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	14:07:27	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	15:25:27	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	15:27:24	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	16:56:02	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	16:56:23	Access Granted	Normal
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9/14/1999	7:18:59	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	7:33:24	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	7:33:55	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	8:58:32	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	8:59:39	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	9:14:43	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	9:15:36	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	9:18:08	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	9:19:32	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	9:19:55	Access Granted	In
9/14/1999	9:21:51	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	13:55:06	Access Granted	Out
9/14/1999	13:56:10	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	14:03:21	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	14:03:49	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	14:48:00	Access Granted	Normal

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b2
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b7c

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September 14, 1999 Aerosol Challenge

9/15/1999	7:25:00	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.		
9/15/1999	7:26:03	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.		
9/15/1999	7:40:11	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.		
9/15/1999	8:21:19	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.		
9/15/1999	8:25:27	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.	5	
9/15/1999	8:26:28	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.	1	
9/15/1999	8:34:54	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.	3	
9/15/1999	15:46:38	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.	5	
9/15/1999	15:48:29	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.		
9/15/1999	15:53:57	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.		b2
9/15/1999	15:54:02	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.		b6
9/15/1999	15:54:32	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.		b7C
9/15/1999	17:06:18	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.		
9/15/1999	17:07:21	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.		
9/15/1999	17:14:20	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.		
9/15/1999	20:40:02	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.		
9/15/1999	21:27:01	Access Granted	Normal	IVINS, BRUCE E.			
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9/14/1999	7:12:32	Access Granted	Normal			5 of 5	
9/14/1999	7:13:08	Access Granted	Normal				
9/14/1999	7:15:33	Access Granted	Normal			1	
9/14/1999	7:18:35	Access Granted	In			2	
9/14/1999	7:21:25	Access Granted	Normal			3	
9/14/1999	14:32:51	Access Granted	Out			4	
9/14/1999	14:32:51	Access Granted	Normal			5	
9/14/1999	14:35:06	Access Granted	Normal				
9/14/1999	14:36:37	Access Granted	Normal				
9/14/1999	15:40:02	Access Granted	Normal				
9/14/1999	15:48:17	Access Granted	In				
9/14/1999	15:48:27	Access Granted	Out				
9/14/1999	16:01:12	Access Granted	Normal				
9/14/1999	16:03:22	Access Granted	Normal				
9/14/1999	16:03:59	Access Granted	In				
9/14/1999	16:05:13	Access Granted	Normal				
9/14/1999	17:31:34	Access Granted	Out				
9/14/1999	17:33:13	Access Granted	Normal				
9/14/1999	17:39:28	Access Granted	Normal				
9/14/1999	18:26:32	Access Granted	Normal				
9/14/1999	18:28:20	Access Granted	Normal		1		
9/14/1999	18:29:45	Access Granted	In		2		
9/14/1999	18:31:58	Access Granted	Normal		3		
9/14/1999	22:21:41	Access Granted	Out		4		
9/14/1999	22:23:32	Access Granted	Normal				
9/14/1999	22:24:10	Access Granted	Normal				
9/14/1999	22:27:31	Access Granted	Normal				
9/14/1999	22:29:21	Access Granted	Normal				
9/14/1999	22:30:10	Access Granted	Normal				
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9/15/1999	7:01:53	Access Granted	Normal			5 of 5	
9/15/1999	7:02:29	Access Granted	Normal				
9/15/1999	7:23:28	Access Granted	Normal				
9/15/1999	7:24:28	Access Granted	Normal				
9/15/1999	7:26:43	Access Granted	Normal		1		

September 14, 1999 Aerosol Challenge

9/15/1999	7:27:00	Access Granted	In
9/15/1999	7:28:27	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	19:31:47	Access Granted	Out
9/15/1999	19:32:18	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	19:33:20	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	19:33:50	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	19:41:58	Access Granted	In
9/15/1999	19:42:55	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	22:45:49	Access Granted	Out
9/15/1999	22:53:24	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	22:56:34	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	22:57:46	Access Granted	Normal
<hr/>			
9/14/1999	7:48:09	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	7:52:30	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	14:01:26	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	14:01:36	Access Granted	Out
9/14/1999	14:30:58	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	14:31:23	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	14:32:01	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	14:58:20	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	14:59:07	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	14:59:25	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	15:04:13	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	15:05:01	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	15:11:01	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	15:16:41	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	15:16:58	Access Granted	In
9/14/1999	15:18:09	Access Granted	Out
9/14/1999	15:21:15	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	15:21:57	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	16:41:04	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	16:41:34	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	16:41:40	Access Granted	In
9/14/1999	16:42:21	Access Granted	Out
9/14/1999	16:43:00	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	16:48:20	Access Granted	Normal
9/14/1999	16:50:22	Access Granted	Normal
<hr/>			
9/15/1999	7:54:14	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	7:54:26	Access Granted	Out
9/15/1999	8:11:02	Access Granted	In
9/15/1999	8:11:15	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	8:32:04	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	8:33:35	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	8:33:46	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	8:33:51	Access Granted	In
9/15/1999	8:34:06	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	8:35:31	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	8:36:39	Access Granted	Out
9/15/1999	8:36:45	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	8:36:57	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	8:40:54	Access Granted	Normal

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1 3 of 5
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3 of 5


5

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September 14, 1999 Aerosol Challenge

9/15/1999	8:41:57	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	8:42:36	Access Granted	Out
9/15/1999	8:58:53	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	9:01:02	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	9:15:35	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	9:23:30	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	9:27:15	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	10:04:11	Access Granted	In
9/15/1999	10:32:51	Access Granted	In
9/15/1999	10:33:20	Access Granted	Out
9/15/1999	11:15:46	Access Granted	In
9/15/1999	11:16:12	Access Granted	Out
9/15/1999	11:56:34	Access Granted	In
9/15/1999	11:57:35	Access Granted	Out
9/15/1999	13:27:49	Access Granted	In
9/15/1999	13:29:56	Access Granted	Out
9/15/1999	13:34:46	Access Granted	In
9/15/1999	13:34:56	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	13:37:42	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	13:42:13	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	13:43:37	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	13:43:52	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	13:44:04	Access Granted	In
9/15/1999	13:47:07	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	15:49:37	Access Granted	Out
9/15/1999	15:49:44	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	15:50:28	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	15:51:53	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	15:59:58	Access Granted	Normal
9/15/1999	16:19:30	Access Granted	Normal



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October 15, 1999 Aerosol Challenge

10/15/1999	7:11:22	Access Granted	Normal		1	5 of 5
10/15/1999	7:11:43	Access Granted	In		2	
10/15/1999	7:14:02	Access Granted	Normal		3	
10/15/1999	11:19:34	Access Granted	Out		4	b2
10/15/1999	11:21:55	Access Granted	Normal		5	b6
10/15/1999	11:38:30	Access Granted	Normal			b7C
10/15/1999	12:26:55	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	13:15:19	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	13:16:03	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	13:31:18	Access Granted	Normal		1	
10/15/1999	13:31:35	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	14:38:11	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	14:38:11	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	14:38:44	Access Granted	Normal		5	
10/15/1999	14:40:38	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	14:41:06	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	16:31:24	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	16:31:47	Access Granted	Normal			
						5 of 5
10/15/1999	7:12:34	Access Granted	Normal		1	
10/15/1999	8:48:47	Access Granted	Normal		2	
10/15/1999	8:49:56	Access Granted	In		3	
10/15/1999	8:52:04	Access Granted	Normal		4	
10/15/1999	10:52:24	Access Granted	Out		5	
10/15/1999	10:53:48	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	10:55:13	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	11:31:31	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	11:32:01	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	16:08:08	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	16:08:32	Access Granted	In			
10/15/1999	16:09:18	Access Granted	Out			
10/15/1999	16:12:43	Access Granted	Normal			
						5 of 5
10/15/1999	5:16:42	Access Granted	Normal			IVINS, BRUCE E.
10/15/1999	5:21:27	Access Granted	Normal			IVINS, BRUCE E.
10/15/1999	5:23:06	Access Granted	Normal		1	IVINS, BRUCE E.
10/15/1999	5:23:26	Access Granted	In		2	IVINS, BRUCE E.
10/15/1999	5:27:36	Access Granted	Normal		3	IVINS, BRUCE E.
10/15/1999	6:57:49	Access Granted	Out		4	IVINS, BRUCE E.
10/15/1999	6:58:00	Access Granted	Normal		5	IVINS, BRUCE E.
10/15/1999	6:59:45	Access Granted	Normal			IVINS, BRUCE E.
10/15/1999	7:16:14	Access Granted	Normal			IVINS, BRUCE E.
10/15/1999	7:40:57	Access Granted	Normal			IVINS, BRUCE E.
10/15/1999	7:42:14	Access Granted	Normal			IVINS, BRUCE E.
10/15/1999	7:44:33	Access Granted	Normal			IVINS, BRUCE E.
10/15/1999	7:45:15	Access Granted	Normal			IVINS, BRUCE E.
10/15/1999	8:47:02	Access Granted	Normal			IVINS, BRUCE E.
10/15/1999	8:48:31	Access Granted	In		2	IVINS, BRUCE E.
10/15/1999	8:51:55	Access Granted	Normal		3	IVINS, BRUCE E.
10/15/1999	11:03:03	Access Granted	Out		4	IVINS, BRUCE E.
10/15/1999	11:03:12	Access Granted	Normal		5	IVINS, BRUCE E.
10/15/1999	11:05:15	Access Granted	Normal			IVINS, BRUCE E.
10/15/1999	13:20:46	Access Granted	Normal			IVINS, BRUCE E.

October 15, 1999 Aerosol Challenge

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10/15/1999	13:31:41	Access Granted	Normal	[REDACTED]	IVINS, BRUCE E.	
10/15/1999	14:17:40	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.	
10/15/1999	14:18:05	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.	
10/15/1999	17:43:32	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.	
10/15/1999	17:43:57	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.	
10/15/1999	17:48:24	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.	
10/15/1999	17:48:36	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.	
10/16/1999	9:11:41	Access Granted	Normal		IVINS, BRUCE E.	5 of 5
10/16/1999	9:39:43	Access Granted	Normal	IVINS, BRUCE E.		
10/16/1999	9:44:28	Access Granted	Normal	IVINS, BRUCE E.		
10/16/1999	9:50:12	Access Granted	Normal	IVINS, BRUCE E.		
10/16/1999	9:51:39	Access Granted	Normal	IVINS, BRUCE E.	1	
10/16/1999	9:52:04	Access Granted	In	IVINS, BRUCE E.	2	
10/16/1999	9:56:40	Access Granted	Normal	IVINS, BRUCE E.	3	
10/16/1999	10:15:13	Access Granted	Out	IVINS, BRUCE E.	4	
10/16/1999	10:15:23	Access Granted	Normal	IVINS, BRUCE E.	5	
10/16/1999	10:16:54	Access Granted	Normal	IVINS, BRUCE E.		
10/16/1999	10:19:45	Access Granted	Normal	IVINS, BRUCE E.		
10/15/1999	7:28:49	Access Granted	Normal	[REDACTED]		5 of 5
10/15/1999	7:29:06	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	7:34:28	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	7:35:00	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	7:36:28	Access Granted	Normal			1
10/15/1999	7:36:44	Access Granted	In			2
10/15/1999	7:38:53	Access Granted	Normal			3
10/15/1999	11:01:32	Access Granted	Out			4
10/15/1999	11:02:25	Access Granted	Normal			5
10/15/1999	11:04:46	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	11:05:52	Access Granted	In			
10/15/1999	11:09:09	Access Granted	Out			
10/15/1999	11:11:04	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	11:44:44	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	11:45:20	Access Granted	In			
10/15/1999	11:47:11	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	12:16:10	Access Granted	Out			
10/15/1999	12:16:44	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	12:18:32	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	12:20:30	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	14:14:32	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	14:49:00	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	15:04:15	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	15:13:05	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	16:42:18	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	17:32:28	Access Granted	Normal			
10/16/1999	13:05:21	Access Granted	Normal			
10/16/1999	13:06:18	Access Granted	Normal			
10/16/1999	13:07:06	Access Granted	In			
10/16/1999	13:09:04	Access Granted	Normal			
10/16/1999	13:38:57	Access Granted	Out			
10/16/1999	14:16:44	Access Granted	Normal			
10/16/1999	14:18:04	Access Granted	Normal			

October 15, 1999 Aerosol Challenge

10/15/1999	7:47:45	Access Granted	Normal		1	4 of 5
10/15/1999	7:48:06	Access Granted	In		2	
10/15/1999	7:50:22	Access Granted	Normal		3	
10/15/1999	11:20:37	Access Granted	Normal		5	
10/15/1999	11:21:42	Access Granted	Normal		1	
10/15/1999	11:21:59	Access Granted	Normal			b2
10/15/1999	11:25:10	Access Granted	In			b6
10/15/1999	11:25:22	Access Granted	Normal			b7C
10/15/1999	11:30:57	Access Granted	Normal		5	
10/15/1999	11:31:46	Access Granted	Normal		1	
10/15/1999	11:32:01	Access Granted	In		2	
10/15/1999	11:33:26	Access Granted	Out		4	
10/15/1999	11:33:35	Access Granted	Normal		5	
10/15/1999	11:34:25	Access Granted	Normal		1	
10/15/1999	11:35:24	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	11:37:58	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	11:45:09	Access Granted	Normal		5	
10/15/1999	11:47:31	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	11:47:48	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	11:47:54	Access Granted	In			
10/15/1999	11:49:40	Access Granted	Out			
10/15/1999	11:51:05	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	13:13:15	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	13:24:48	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	13:26:17	Access Granted	Normal		1	
10/15/1999	13:26:25	Access Granted	In		2	
10/15/1999	13:28:46	Access Granted	Out		4	
10/15/1999	13:31:25	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	13:31:37	Access Granted	Out			
10/15/1999	14:47:17	Access Granted	Normal			
10/15/1999	14:49:20	Access Granted	Normal		5	
10/15/1999	14:50:25	Access Granted	In		2	
10/15/1999	14:55:55	Access Granted	Out		4	
10/15/1999	14:56:26	Access Granted	In		2	
10/15/1999	15:01:41	Access Granted	Out		4	
10/15/1999	15:06:33	Access Granted	Normal		5	

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 03/22/2006

On March 20, 2006, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security number [redacted] home address of [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), [redacted] Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] confirmed that [redacted] has been employed in the [redacted] Division at USAMRIID since [redacted] [redacted] is more commonly referred to as [redacted] [redacted] has never met [redacted] but recalled one occasion having a telephone conversation with [redacted]

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[redacted] has not worked directly with [redacted] or BRUCE [redacted] IVINS in the past. [redacted]

[redacted] has only worked with liquid materials. There has not been any dry or offensive work performed at USAMRIID since 1972. [redacted] does not know anyone who does dry work. [redacted] thought that Aberdeen Proving Grounds may be involved in dry work. [redacted] did not observe any unusual activity at USAMRIID. [redacted] recalled IVINS telling [redacted] an individual could obtain a usable stock of *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) from 8 liter flasks. It was common knowledge at USAMRIID that Ba Ames was stored in the [redacted] suites of Building 1425. The cold rooms in these areas were not locked. Anyone could obtain materials from the walk-in coolers; use of the coolers was based on the "honor system". The suites did not have walk-in freezers. Freezers were kept out in the hallways. Current handling procedures involving select agents have been significantly modified in that the use of select agents must now be documented and individual accountability maintained in a database.

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Investigation on March 20, 2006 Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-552

Date dictated _____

by PI [redacted]

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On March 20, 2006 Page 2

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[REDACTED] volunteered [REDACTED] thoughts concerning the anthrax powder contained in the mailings and explained that investigators should be focusing on the chemistry of the anthrax. [REDACTED] explained that spores normally tend to stick to each other but with the anthrax powder, the spores had to have been separated. In order to accomplish this, a positive or negative charge had to be introduced, a hyperphobic or polar molecule, like a dry detergent, and then milled during growth. The material must be charged and polar. [REDACTED] believes that the use of a mass spectrometer would aid in identifying the chemical make-up of the anthrax. [REDACTED] indicated, that if asked, [REDACTED] would volunteer [REDACTED] assistance in [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] explained that room [REDACTED] housed a 100-liter fermentor known as "Big Bertha". [REDACTED] there were two separate 100-liter fermentors known as "Big Bertha" in Building [REDACTED] USAMRIID originally obtained these fermentors around 1980-1985. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The 100-liter fermentors, [REDACTED] were never used for anthrax growth. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] could best provide a historical perspective of the fermentors. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] explained that fermentors were primarily used back in the 1980's but their use drastically declined due to the advent of molecular cloning. [REDACTED] advised that a bioreactor is similar to a fermentor and that it is possible to grow *Ba* using a bioreactor.

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[REDACTED] was given an opportunity to review a document titled [REDACTED] Annual Inventory Check and Corrections: 8 Nov 2005. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] "Big Bertha" is the 100-liter fermentor identified as stock number [REDACTED] on the inventory sheet and believes the fermentor was purchased in 1983. [REDACTED] two Braun Biotech fermentors, stock numbers [REDACTED] (20 liter

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On March 20, 2006, Page 3

fermentor) and [redacted] (30-liter fermentor) as two fermentors [redacted] also identified a New Brunswick, Bio Flow III, 3-liter fermentor, stock # [redacted] as having been moved from suite [redacted]. During further review of the inventory sheet, [redacted]

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[redacted] Inventory sheet shown to [redacted] is maintained in the 1A section of the file.

During significant segments of the interview, [redacted] asserted that the Anthrax investigation was not focused in the right direction; that the investigative spotlight should be much broader and that investigative efforts should focus more on the human/financial motivational aspects of the crime as opposed to the scientific angle. [redacted] suggested that investigative efforts should be more focused on a company called Bioport and not USAMRIID.

[redacted] indicated that the investigation has greatly interfered with USAMRIID's work and that a closer scrutiny of Bioport would reveal that Bioport is the one entity that has financially benefitted the most from the anthrax mailings. USAMRIID has not benefitted from the anthrax mailings but in retrospect has suffered. [redacted] explained that since the anthrax mailings and the subsequent investigation at USAMRIID, funding has significantly been cut, projects have fallen behind schedule, and the implementation of control and accountability measures has been restrictive and time consuming.

[redacted] explained that it currently takes approximately 12 years and \$800 million dollars to develop a new biological product and that the anthrax mailings, in [redacted] opinion, have caused a two year delay.

According to [redacted] prior to the anthrax mailings, Bioport's anthrax vaccine program had been cited for 14 violations by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), also known as 483 violations, resulting in Bioport having to stop production and sale of the vaccine. During this same time period, USAMRIID had already been working on a new anthrax vaccine which was ready for clinical testing. USAMRIID was directed to go to Bioport and attempt to resolve the deficiencies that existed with the old anthrax vaccine program. USAMRIID employees BRUCE IVINS, [redacted] [redacted] were tasked with this effort. Bioport needed to improve its employee training program, update their facilities, and validate their efficacy models. Ultimately, as a result of the anthrax mailings, Bioport's anthrax vaccine was re-licensed. [redacted] asserted that Bioport was ultimately successful in delaying the development and sale of the new USAMRIID anthrax vaccine while

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On March 20, 2006, Page 4

prolonging the sale of their old anthrax vaccine. [REDACTED] further claimed that there was an FDA board member who was affiliated with Bioport. [REDACTED] was unable to elaborate on this.

[REDACTED] volunteered that, in 2000, a connection existed between Dynport Vaccine Corporation (DVC) and Bioport. [REDACTED] explained that USAMRIID's competitor, DERA, a British government agency, and Bioport are affiliated. [REDACTED] explained that former USAMRIID employee [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] would have more insight into this theory.

In attempts to provide further assistance with the investigation, [REDACTED] opined that the facility in Boca Raton, Florida that is believed to have received a mailing containing anthrax may also house offices for the CRC Press which publishes critical reviews in science and chemistry. Bioport's vaccine program may have been negatively impacted by this company.

On or about March 21, 2006, [REDACTED] provided Inspector [REDACTED] an e-mail which contained the following attachments: 1)

[REDACTED] These documents will be maintained in the 1A section of the file.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 04/12/2006

To: Washington Field

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DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

From: Washington Field

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AMX-3

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

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Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID ✓ (Pending)-1536

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184



Synopsis: To document the completion of leads generated by the review of [redacted]

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[redacted] from the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland.

Enclosure(s): Enclosed for Washington Field are copies of the leads addressed in this communication, generated by the electronic mail review.

Details: [redacted]

[redacted] from the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. These records were reviewed by Amerithrax investigators and deemed worthy of further review. [redacted]

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[redacted] but writer located and reviewed the following notebooks by [redacted]

Notebook Number	Relevant Pages Found
1151	A few pages; [redacted] lyophilized anthrax (likely all Sterne strain) in 1978.
1214	No

email

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b7C



To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 04/12/2006

1282	No
1381	No
1399	No
1400	No
1435	No
1455	No
1523	No
1527	No
1582	No
1587	No
1807	No

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b7C

[redacted] written on August 17, 2000 by Bruce Ivins, revealed that Ivins deemed it necessary to review [redacted] notebooks in hopes of gaining information on Vollum 1B, lot 189 spores. To that end, the following notebooks by [redacted] which were all that remained at USAMRIID, were reviewed by writer:

<u>Notebook Number</u>	<u>Relevant Pages Found</u>
195	No
441	No
447	No
454	No
461	No
471	No
473	No

[redacted]
One notebook, #3869, was not reviewed as it was currently in a containment suite. Notebook #3793 was missing for a time, [redacted] but was found on December 16, 1997, [redacted] and later reviewed by writer. Pages from #3793 were copied pertaining to a visit by [redacted] foreign visiting scientists on October 17 and

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 04/12/2006

October 18, 1995. Notebook #1767 was also listed by [redacted] as missing; it is unclear whether #1767 was ever located but writer did not locate this notebook during the notebook review.

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


<u>Notebook Number</u>	<u>Pages Copied</u>
1946	No
1947	No
1948	No
1970	No
1971	No
1972	Some; [redacted] received Ames from Ivins
3064	No
3065	One page; mentioned new name of [redacted]
3066	No
3184	No
3185	No
3263	No
3264	No
3265	One page; mentioned new name of [redacted]
3343	No
3344	No
3345	No
3413	No
3414	No
3415	No

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 04/12/2006

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3417	No
3418	No



<u>Notebook Number</u>	<u>Related to Anthrax</u>
3675	No
3710	No
3776	No
3856	No
3954	No
4026	No
4027	No
3772	No
3944	No
4151	No
4279	Yes
4285	Yes

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 05/08/2006

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] social security account number [redacted] residing at [redacted]
[redacted] telephone [redacted]
was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] telephone [redacted] e-mail address [redacted]

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After being advised of the identity of the
interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the
following information:

[redacted]

[redacted] From
[redacted] was employed as a [redacted] at
the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases (USAMRIID). [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] employed at
USAMRIID. [redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 05/04/2006 at [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-LEAD-1386

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-1544

Date dictated 05/08/2006

by SA [redacted]

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 05/04/2006 , Page 2

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While employed at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] never observed any unknown or unauthorized person working in suites B3 and B4 in building 1425. Regarding operation of the autoclave, one particular individual was not responsible for running the machine. Instead, each scientist and technician was responsible for autoclaving his or her own waste, and those individuals were responsible for legibly marking the material autoclaved. [REDACTED] noted that the animal caretakers who entered the suites daily to care for the animals being used for experimentation were responsible for autoclaving all of the animal waste and bedding materials from the animal cages.

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It was general knowledge that wet spore preps of the Ames strain of bacillus anthracis (BA) were made in suites B3 and B4. The walk-in cooler which was located in the common hall that internally connected suites B3 and B4 was a "busy" place, as it was used by almost everyone with a laboratory in suites B3 and B4.

[REDACTED] used the walk-in cooler regularly. There were no sign-in procedures for the cooler. The following types of things were maintained in the cooler: reagent media, sterile media, sterile plates, buffers, inoculated plates from ongoing research, boxes of samples, and tins containing a variety of things such as organic reagents. It was not uncommon to find that when you placed your research material in the cooler, another researcher might move them to a different location in the cooler.

Although [REDACTED] is familiar with BA biology, [REDACTED] did not conduct research regarding BA, and never worked with BA. [REDACTED] noted that on one occasion [REDACTED] a wet prep of BA spores being conducted by Bruce Ivins, but [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] for the BA vaccine. [REDACTED]



279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 05/04/2006, Page 3 b6 b7C

is not familiar with Ames "1029" BA, but has heard of "Dugway spores". [redacted] noted that it was commonly known that Dugway made spores, and [redacted] recalled that post 9/11, there was discussion related to Dugway spores regarding the creation of a standardized spore prep for use in the challenge studies being conducted for vaccine testing. Regarding distribution of samples within the labs in the suites, the principal investigator for each lab set up his or her own policies and procedures regarding how they distributed samples. If a spore prep were to leave suites B3 or B4, then the USAMRIID safety office worked with the investigator to document the move and ensure all safety requirements were met.

If dry work was being conducted in any lab in suites B3 and B4, [redacted] believes other employees would have noticed, as this would have been unusual. [redacted] does not believe that a lyophilizer was maintained in suite B3 or B4, but noted they did contain several speed vacs which were used for low volume drying procedures.

b6 b7C

[redacted] noted that [redacted] during [redacted] employment at USAMRIID. However, [redacted] could not recall every person who worked there. [redacted] recalled having contact with the following individuals: [redacted] and another individual whose name [redacted] can't recall;

[redacted] Bruce Ivins (primary investigator); [redacted]

[redacted] does not recall any of the individuals [redacted] worked with making unusual observations about other coworkers.

The working relationship among all coworkers was good, and [redacted] never noted any specific conflicts or tensions, with one exception. [redacted]

[redacted] was having some kind of conflict with the [redacted] but [redacted] could not recall what the conflict was about. [redacted] does not know [redacted]

[redacted] does not recall ever coming across a [redacted] but does believe a [redacted] by the name of [redacted] may have worked for

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 05/04/2006 , Page 4

[REDACTED] at some point. [REDACTED] noted that some of the soldiers had access to suites [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] working as assistants to various investigators. Suite access depended on the primary investigators for the different labs located in the suites.

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] noted the 150-liter fermenter located in suites [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was not used frequently. There was generally little need to produce anything on such a large scale, and the process of using the fermenter was very messy due to the parts and supplies required for operation. The only individuals [REDACTED] could recall specifically who used the fermenter were [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] could not specifically identify the biological agents used in the fermenter, but speculated that recombinant BA preps made with an avirulent strain of BA, non spore forming, were likely used. A virulent, spore forming strain of BA would not be used in the fermenter because it would be a safety issue. Due to the size of the fermenter, and the mess it created in the room where it was located, it would be impossible to ensure complete decontamination after use with a spore-former. The fermenter was not portable, and was located in a room dedicated specifically for the fermenter. In order to remove the fermenter, a wall would have to be removed. Approximately one year after 9/11, there was a discussion about loaning it to a private company. The fermenter was going to be removed and transported to the company for their own use, and in exchange the company would use it to produce large amounts of some recombinant proteins for USAMRIID's use in vaccine work. However, this transaction never occurred [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is not familiar with the protocols for bacteria grown in a fermenter, as fermentation biology is not [REDACTED] area of expertise. [REDACTED] is not aware of any spores from any bacteria being grown in the fermenter. [REDACTED] is unaware of any individuals who showed a special interest in the fermenter, discussed using it for producing the Ames strain of BA, or expressed an interest in borrowing the fermenter. [REDACTED] assumes that there were equipment logs and records pertaining to the use and maintenance of the fermenter, but [REDACTED] can not verify this.

Regarding the production process for the Ames strain of BA, [REDACTED] noted it was renograffin purified, which is part of a

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Continuation of FD-302 of

, On 05/04/2006

, Page

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b7c

wet prep purification process. is not familiar with renocal purification. Regarding destruction of "lots" of BA, noted that you would archive a small part of a lot, and then destroy the rest by autoclave. does not know if any Ames scheduled for disposal was recycled to be used for ad-hoc studies. could not elaborate on the rules that were in place for the access, storage, and dissemination of Ames, and noted that these rules/procedures were controlled by the individual investigator in the lab who dealt with the bacteria. noted that Bruce Ivins was always very good with documentation, and was responsible regarding distribution of samples.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 04/27/2006

On April 25, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security number [redacted] home address of [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), [redacted] Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C

[redacted] confirmed that [redacted] has been employed in the [redacted] at USAMRIID since [redacted] working in [redacted] indicated that [redacted] and that a majority of [redacted] research involves the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] reiterated that most of [redacted] research pertains to the Ames strain of Ba. [redacted]

[redacted] at USAMRIID, the Federal Bureau of Investigation obtained samples from all of the Ba spore stocks contained in said freezer. [redacted] believes that [redacted] obtained the Ba Ames from either BRUCE IVINS, [redacted] grows small batches of vegetative cells from the original stock and believes that growing spores continuously from the original stock keeps the spores [redacted]

b6
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Investigation on April 26, 2006 Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-5A7

Date dictated _____

by SA [redacted]


b6
b7C

FILE: 302- [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On April 26, 2006, Page 2



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b7E

Ba spore growth in flasks with Leighton-Doi media and using the hot water bath/shaker apparatus typically occurred over a [redacted] duration. [redacted] recalled occasional instances where, after starting the procedure on Friday, [redacted] returned on Monday to find the Ba vegetative cells had not exhausted their Leighton-Doi media nutrients and therefore had not undergone sporulation, or were in various stages of sporulation (i.e. a mix of vegetative cells, cells under going sporulation, and spores). [redacted] also noted on other occasions vegetative cell growth was too rampant. In situations like this, the Ba spores that were formed were of poor quality and "clumpy". [redacted] advised the ratio of Ba vegetative cells to media volume was directly proportional to spore quality: too much Ba vegetative cells within a defined media volume results in poor Ba spore quality. [redacted] advised it was standard procedure to allow the Ba vegetative cells to exhaust their nutritive supply in order to induce sporulation.

b6
b7C

[redacted] indicated that [redacted] research does not involve dry Ba. The spores [redacted] were never dried. [redacted] advised to [redacted] knowledge there was no "dry work" conducted at USAMRIID, rather it was well known that Battelle was involved in "dry work". Typically



[redacted] indicated the aerosol challenges [redacted] pertain only to the use of wet or liquid spore preps. [redacted] recalled an experiment in [redacted] that [redacted] was involved in that used [redacted]



[redacted] are more susceptible to Ba infection, and this is advantageous in studying certain aspects of

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On April 26, 2006, Page 3

b6
b7C

anthrax pathogenesis. This is the only instance [redacted] could recall that [redacted] was familiar with in which [redacted] was used.

[redacted] recalled [redacted]
[redacted] could not recall which strain of Ba was used in this particular study at the [redacted]
[redacted] opined the only country [redacted] was knowledgeable of having the Ames strain of Ba was the United Kingdom.

As an aside note, [redacted] recalled that [redacted] lyophilized a sample of irradiated Ames strain of Ba on the cold side of [redacted] recalled that the Ames was "dead." [redacted] further advised the lyophilized sample was used in antigen production. [redacted] opined these antigens were unique to the spore coat of the Ames Strain of Ba. [redacted] could not recall any additional information.

[redacted] has never met [redacted]
[redacted] has heard various stories from coworkers pertaining to [redacted] stories that describe [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/18/2006

On May 9, 2006 [redacted] date of birth [redacted]
social security number [redacted] work telephone number [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the United States
Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Building
[redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing
agents, [redacted] provided the following information.

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[redacted] started [redacted] employment at USAMRIID in [redacted]
[redacted] suites. [redacted] stated [redacted] was only in the suites once or twice a
month [redacted] Employees generally know that *Bacillus anthracis*
is kept in freezers in the [redacted] suites. Approximately [redacted]

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[redacted] assisted BRUCE IVINS on [redacted] with
an aerosol challenge in Building 1412. [redacted]

[redacted] described IVINS as a good guy and
jokester. [redacted] as part of [redacted] initial
training at USAMRIID. [redacted] was described as very thorough.
[redacted] has had only positive interactions with [redacted] IVINS.

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[redacted] is not familiar with [redacted]
[redacted] Due to [redacted] limited amount of
time in the [redacted] could not provide further
information about unusual lab activities or observations about
coworkers.

[redacted] is familiar with the term "Dugway Spores" but has
no further knowledge about them. [redacted] was shown pictures of a
flask known as Reference Material Receipt 1029 (RMR 1029). [redacted]
could not recall seeing this particular flask, but in general, has
seen many little flasks in the refrigerators and throughout the
labs in Building 1425.

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[redacted] is not familiar with any dry work at USAMRIID.
[redacted] has only worked with liquid spore preps from the All-Glass
Impingers (AGIs).

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Attached to and considered part of this document are
photocopies of four different angles of the flask RMR 1029.

Investigation on 05/09/06 at Frederick, MD

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-(SS)

Date dictated

by PI [redacted]
PI [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] 0503.wpd

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS


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
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
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5/9/06







FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 5/01/2006

On May 1, 2006, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security Account Number (SSAN) [redacted] was telephonically interviewed via work phone number of [redacted] [redacted] is currently employed [redacted]

b6
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[redacted]

[redacted] confirmed that prior to working at [redacted] was employed as a [redacted] at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), at Fort Detrick, Maryland. [redacted] worked at USAMRIID from [redacted] [redacted] worked in the [redacted] [redacted] Most of [redacted] research at USAMRIID was conducted in Building [redacted] in the [redacted] suites, mostly [redacted] suites. [redacted] could not recall the exact room number. [redacted] also remembered sharing lab space in [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] also recalled working with a lab technician named [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] BRUCE IVINS are friends. [redacted] indicated that IVINS's [redacted] and that [redacted] [redacted] explained that [redacted] did not work directly with IVINS on any research [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] described IVINS as very lively, intelligent, and someone who likes to joke around a lot. [redacted]

[redacted] did not work directly with [redacted] on any projects [redacted]

Investigation on 05/01/2006 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-1555 Date dictated _____

by PI [redacted]

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b7C

FILENAME = [redacted] 302

[redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/01/2006, Page 2 b6
b7C

[REDACTED] was not familiar with any employees or soldiers at USAMRIID named [REDACTED] did not know former USAMRIID employee [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] confirmed that, while at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] did some research work with *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) and believes it was the Ames strain but was not one hundred percent sure. [REDACTED] confirmed working with Ba spore preps, which [REDACTED] always obtained from [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] obtained the Ba from a freezer located in the [REDACTED] "hot suites" and that [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] has previously provided a more accurate and detailed account of [REDACTED] research work at USAMRIID to investigators. [REDACTED] advised that once [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] advised that this was the general standard practice at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] explained that [REDACTED] did not conduct any research utilizing a fermentor nor was [REDACTED] involved in any research pertaining to aerosol challenges or dry work. [REDACTED] was not aware of any dry work being conducted at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] was unaware of any plans in the future to conduct dry work at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] advised that weaponizing Ba would be a big undertaking and a lot of effort. [REDACTED] did not know how someone would go about doing that and [REDACTED] would not know what type of equipment would be needed to aerosolize Ba other than it would involve more than just a freeze dryer. [REDACTED] did not use a lyophilizer while at USAMRIID but on a rare occasion or two, [REDACTED] saw the lyophilizer being used for protein studies.

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[REDACTED] explained that while at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] did on occasion use an autoclave or place materials in an autoclave for someone else to autoclave at the end of the day. [REDACTED] recalled that there were two "Pasteur" autoclaves located in the hot suites and that it would take approximately one hour to complete an autoclave cycle. [REDACTED] advised that when working with cultures [REDACTED] also would add bleach to the cultures prior to having the cultures autoclaved. Employees could not leave cultures out in the suites at the end of the day. [REDACTED] was not aware of any special or additional security measures that were in place when working with Ames Ba. [REDACTED] was very picky about the quality of spores [REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of , On 05/01/2006, Page 3

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maintained the Ba spores in a freezer. explained that petri dishes could be left out in the labs for a couple of days but the dishes would be taped with para film. Streaked plates would be kept in a refrigerator.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 5/03/2006b6
b7c

On May 3, 2006, [redacted]
[redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security
Account Number (SSAN) [redacted] was
telephonically interviewed. This Inspector had left messages
earlier in the week at [redacted] residence and on this date [redacted]
returned the phone call. [redacted] was immediately informed that an
in-person thorough interview needed to be conducted with [redacted] but
that some minimal preliminary information was desired from [redacted] over
the telephone.

[redacted] confirmed that [redacted] is currently [redacted]
[redacted] indicated that [redacted] is extremely
busy and that [redacted] is going to be [redacted]
[redacted] advised that [redacted] will also be away [redacted]

[redacted] confirmed that from [redacted]
[redacted] at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). [redacted] worked in the [redacted]
[redacted] characterized [redacted] work
responsibilities as that of a "worker bee". [redacted] advised that [redacted] has
not been a [redacted] confirmed that [redacted] did
work with *Bacillus anthracis* in the "hot suites" while at USAMRIID. (Y)

[redacted] acknowledged knowing BRUCE IVINS, but never working
directly with him. [redacted] indicated that on occasion [redacted] would run into
IVINS while having a cup of coffee and remembered IVINS having a
good sense of humor. [redacted]

[redacted] was re-informed that a more thorough and in-depth
face-to-face interview with [redacted] would be needed at a later date.

Investigation on 05/03/2006 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1556 Date dictated _____

by PI [redacted]

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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FILENAME: [redacted] 302

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 05/18/2006

On May 9, 2006 [redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] social security number [redacted] home telephone
number [redacted] work telephone number [redacted] was
interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army
Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Building [redacted]
[redacted] After being advised of the identity of the
interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted]
provided the following information.

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b7C

[redacted] resides at [redacted]
[redacted] graduated with a [redacted] Degree
in [redacted] from the University [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] After submitting [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]
(123)
[redacted]

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assisted on a project involved with non-virulent *Bacillus anthracis*
[redacted] From this research, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Most of the work [redacted]
conducted was on the [redacted] of Building [redacted] in Suite [redacted]
[redacted] also worked on the [redacted] of Building [redacted] in Suite [redacted]
[redacted] did not conduct research in Building [redacted] and did not have
access to that building. [redacted] stated the animal work was conducted
in Building [redacted] where the pathologist would do necropsies, and
[redacted] would work with the All Glass Impingers (AGIs).
[redacted] has no experience in this type of work. The microbiology
work included plating and blood culture work, and would be done in
Building [redacted] recalled doing copious amounts
of [redacted]

Investigation on 05/09/2006 at Fort Detrick, MD

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-1559 Date dictated _____

by PI [redacted]

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[redacted] b506.wpd

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 05/09/2006, Page 2

[redacted] attended the University of [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] stated security at USAMRIID is now tighter than [redacted]

[redacted] knows BRUCE IVINS and they have worked in the
hotsuite at the same time together. [redacted] described IVINS as a
strange guy. [redacted] elaborated that IVINS's quirkiness likely comes
from a hard childhood and not having many friends. [redacted]
impression is that IVINS "lacks social graces" and is inept when
interacting with people. [redacted] further stated [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] does not know [redacted] and has never seen [redacted]

Although they have never collaborated on any projects,
[redacted] knows [redacted] socially. Interactions included a [redacted]

[redacted] is not familiar with [redacted]
[redacted] does not recall working with any foreign [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 05/09/2006, Page 3

scientists. [] stated that none of [] coworkers expressed any anti-American sentiment, nor did they try to circumvent any security procedures.

[] is not aware of any dry work having been or currently being conducted at USAMRIID. [] stated that [] certainly would not have been privy to such a conversation and that [] was only familiar with wet spore preps. The first time [] heard of work with dry *Bacillus anthracis* was in an article [] read about U.S. ARMY DUGWAY PROVING GROUND from the media. When questioned about other labs, [] mentioned that it was rumored that ~~BATTELLE CORPORATION~~ messes up animal studies and was not considered to do good work. [] knows ~~BIOPORT CORPORATION~~ has Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed (AVA), but [] has no personal interaction with them and has not heard any negative comments. [] best theory pertaining to the anthrax mailings of 2001 is that a terrorist could have been involved but [] has no basis for that conclusion.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 04/25/2006

On 24 April 2006, [redacted] Date of birth, [redacted]
[redacted] Social Security Account Number, [redacted] home
telephone number, [redacted] cellular telephone number, [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed. The interview took place at [redacted]
[redacted] After being advised of the identities of the
interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted]
provided the following information:

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b7C

Education and Work Experience

[redacted] is currently employed by [redacted]
[redacted] working as a [redacted]

[redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] is currently assigned as the [redacted]

[redacted]

In [redacted] received a [redacted] degree


[redacted]

From [redacted] worked at [redacted]
[redacted] started as a [redacted]
[redacted] and held various positions at the [redacted]
culminating in [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] never worked with Bacillus anthracis (Ba) at the [redacted]
[redacted] because the Lab was not equipped to handle Ba. Part of
the research [redacted] conducted at the [redacted] involved
the creation of a [redacted]

[redacted]



Investigation on 04/24/2006 at [redacted]

USAMRIID-1563 284

File # 279A-WF-222936-LEAD- [redacted] Date dictated 04/25/2006

SA [redacted]
by SA [redacted]

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SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
APR 27 2006	
FBI	

117 pl.302.wpd

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BACK PAGE

279A-WF-222936-LEAD

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 04/24/2006, Page 2

b6
b7c

In [REDACTED] at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, [REDACTED]

Work Environment and Colleagues

[REDACTED] has never dried or lyophilized Ba. [REDACTED] has used a fermenter extensively but never with Ba. [REDACTED] has used a fermenter with [REDACTED] knows many people who have knowledge of weaponization techniques, spore production and lyophilizing. This list of people would be very large, as most everyone in the field of Microbiology that [REDACTED] knows or works with, would have some degree of such knowledge.

[REDACTED] did describe one individual with weaponization knowledge as a little strange. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

USAMRIID Questions

[REDACTED] visited USAMRIID only one time for a [REDACTED] period in [REDACTED]. In connection with [REDACTED] research on the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] conducted viability tests on live cultures of both the Ames and Vollum strains of Ba. [REDACTED] was escorted at all times while at USAMRIID and was never left alone. [REDACTED] was supervised by Bruce Ivins, but does not remember the names of any of the other staff at USAMRIID. No one at USAMRIID struck [REDACTED] as a possible perpetrator of the anthrax mailings. [REDACTED] described Ivins as "a typical geeky scientist, who probably spends most of his time in the lab." [REDACTED] said that in the Microbiology community, such scientists are referred to as "SCIF dwellers."

[REDACTED] has never received any biological samples from USAMRIID. [REDACTED] only recalls working in two labs at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] does not

279A-WF-222936-LEAD

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 04/24/2006, Page 3 b6 b7c

recall ever entering or looking into a walk-in cooler in either lab.

[REDACTED] informed that [REDACTED] has a copy of a report summarizing [REDACTED] work at USAMRIID on [REDACTED] computer and would supply it to the FBI at a later date, once [REDACTED] locates it.

Questionable Behavior

[REDACTED] opined that the only way it would be possible to remove select agents from a USAMRIID lab's hot area, would be to secret the agent inside your body. [REDACTED] added that this would be difficult to do, as there are always at least two people inside a hot area and the people would be in close proximity. A person would not be able to hand carry a select agent out of a hot area, because a person exiting must remove all clothing and go through a wash down process. The only other means to exit the lab, would subject any items being removed, to either an autoclave or an ultra violate cleansing process.

[REDACTED] does not know of anyone who exhibited any behavior that would indicate that they would steal pathogens or toxins and use them inappropriately.

Travel

[REDACTED] has never been to Trenton or Princeton, New Jersey, nor has [REDACTED] been to Costa Rica.

Miscellaneous

[REDACTED] does not know anyone who did any unofficial or unrecorded work with Ba or its simulants. [REDACTED] has never seen or used pre-stamped envelopes, like the ones utilized in the Ba mailings.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] does not have any knowledge of [REDACTED] and has never met [REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 07/05/2006

[redacted] (Social Security Account Number (SSAN): [redacted] Date of Birth (DOB): [redacted] was interviewed, as pre-arranged, at [redacted] residence (address: [redacted] on the afternoon of June 28, 2006. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Postal Inspector and Special Agent (SA), and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] was provided a Non-Disclosure Agreement Form for review. [redacted] verbally agreed to items listed therein; however, refused to sign. (WFO NOTE: maintained in the FD-340 portion of this communication is the above mentioned Non-Disclosure Agreement Form [redacted] verbally agreed to.)

[redacted] is a [redacted] At present, [redacted] has [redacted]

[redacted] advised [redacted] had not recalled any additional information since [redacted] last interview circa 2003. (WFO NOTE: [redacted] was provided with a printout from [redacted] for review, which is maintained in the FD-340 portion of this communication.)

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[redacted] advised [redacted] could not recall [redacted] ever calling [redacted] at home from [redacted] United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) work telephone on the afternoon of [redacted] affirmed the information on the provided printout was accurate, and that during [redacted] resided at [redacted] and [redacted] residential telephone number (#) was [redacted]

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[redacted] opined as [redacted] and [redacted] was apparently at home [redacted] opined given the relative short duration of the call, [redacted] and the time frame, [redacted] may have called [redacted] pertaining to a research project at USAMRIID. [redacted] was knowledgeable of [redacted]

1248

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Investigation on 06/28/2006 at [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-1578 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted] Postal [redacted]

[redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of

[redacted]

, On 06/28/2006

, Page 2

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[redacted]

[redacted] opined the telephone conversation may have pertained to [redacted] effort to [redacted]

[redacted] advised it was not uncommon for co-workers at USAMRIID to contact [redacted] home; however, [redacted] reiterated [redacted] could not recall [redacted] ever contacting [redacted] telephonically.

[redacted] advised [redacted] previous statements pertaining to the relationship between [redacted] USAMRIID co-worker, [redacted] were correct as [redacted] did not have a personal relationship with [redacted] advised [redacted]

[redacted] Furthermore, at that time [redacted] at USAMRIID and [redacted] kept [redacted] political and social opinions to [redacted]

[redacted] advised as a [redacted] interacted with [redacted]

[redacted] indicated, as in [redacted] prior interview, [redacted] could not recall the specific laboratories within USAMRIID building [redacted] accessed, other than to add they were [redacted] laboratories.

[redacted]

[redacted] only interaction with [redacted] was [redacted]

[redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 06/28/2006, Page 3 b6 b7C

_____ could not recall any specific work related conversations with _____ however, reiterated the substance of such conversations would be restricted to topics such as scheduling a time to _____. Although _____ recalled a conversation at USAMRIID with _____ in which _____

_____ could not recall any additional specifics. _____ opined this type of behavior by _____ was typical for _____ and consistent with _____

_____ advised _____ never inquired about _____

As an aside, _____ noted _____ did not

_____ advised _____ had no recollection of _____ ever talking to anyone from the _____ Division at USAMRIID. _____ further advised it was not uncommon for _____ Division personnel to collaborate with individuals from the Bacteriology Division, and even if _____ observed _____ talking to someone from the Bacteriology Division, _____ would not have thought of it to be a strange or unusual occurrence.

_____ advised as a _____ was aware that the _____ Division suites contained the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*; however, the exact location(s) within their suites was not known. _____ opined that if an individual was involved in the anthrax related aerosol challenges, then an individual would have the opportunity to learn the location(s) of the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* within the _____ Division suites and/or the post-challenge material.

_____ conducted _____ and reiterated _____ never worked with the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*. Prior to _____ departure from USAMRIID, _____ worked with BRUCE IVINS _____ applying _____ to *Bacillus anthracis* vaccine research.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 06/28/2006, Page 4

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_____ thought IVINS was strange, but not in a bad way. _____ further described IVINS as a strange duck.

_____ thought IVINS was supportive of _____ even though _____

_____ had nothing derogatory to say about _____ recalled _____

_____ recalled IVINS wanted _____ to _____ recalled that for _____ to go outside of _____

_____ opined it was not the case of _____ demonstrating an intent to hinder an investigation, rather in _____ mind _____ probably did not want to spend _____ time and effort with FBI or in other words, non-scientific, issues.

_____ was typical of the civilian scientific community at USAMRIID. Military scientists were generally aware of and concerned with security issues, whereas, the civilian scientists were not concerned with security issues, nor safety issues. In particular, _____ indicated civilian scientists, _____ are lax in how they report hazardous material incidents. _____

_____ spoke fondly of _____ former USAMRIID co-worker, _____ considered _____ and a source of information pertaining to current events at USAMRIID.

_____ recalled additional details pertaining to foreign visitors at USAMRIID; however, _____ was not familiar with _____

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 06/28/2006, Page 5

_____ recalled the name of _____

_____ advised _____ did not know if that visit ever occurred; however, _____ would query _____.

_____ recalled _____ was the USAMRIID point of contact (POC) for an individual identified on USAMRIID records as _____ opined USAMRIID records were referring to _____

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b7D

_____ did not have access to the hot suites at USAMRIID, rather presented research pertaining to _____ in the USAMRIID conference room. _____ indicated _____ would check further to see if _____ could definitively identify _____ and/or _____ (WFO NOTE: maintained in the FD-340 associated with this communication are Internet computer printouts, provided by _____ pertaining to _____)

_____ could not recall the name of a foreign visiting scientist from _____ who _____ had previously reported had been photocopying too much information while at USAMRIID. _____ did not recognize the name _____ reiterated that the _____ scientist _____ was remembering did not have access to the hot suites at USAMRIID.

_____ opined although _____ had collaborated with numerous foreign scientists, and was the USAMRIID POC for numerous foreign visitors, it was unlikely that _____ indifference, or lack of cooperation, in assisting the FBI in providing personal identifiers which would fully identify the same was the result of _____

_____ rather, it was likely that such an attitude was endemic to most civilian scientists at USAMRIID. _____ opined _____ had a personal and professional responsibility to provide the FBI with all pertinent personal identifiers.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/28/2006, Page 6 b6 b7C

[redacted] advised [redacted] would check [redacted] archived email surrounding the [redacted] time frame of the [redacted] telephone call to [redacted] home residence and provide any results to the interviewing Postal Inspector or SA.

Through investigation and interview [redacted] is further described as:

LAST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
FIRST NAME:
SEX:
RACE:
SSAN:
DOB:
HOME ADDRESS:

HOME TELEPHONE:
PREVIOUS HOME ADDRESS:

PREVIOUS HOME TELEPHONE:

[Redacted area]

Through investigation [redacted] is further described as:

LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
SEX:
AFFILIATION #1:

AFFILIATION #2:

MISCELLANEOUS:

[Redacted area]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 08/30/2006

On August 28, 2006, [redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] Social Security Account Number [redacted] cellular
telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of
employment, [redacted]

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[redacted]
[redacted] work telephone number [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] After being advised of the
identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted]
provided the following information:

[redacted] confirmed that [redacted] was employed with the United
States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
(USAMRIID) from [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted] described [redacted] as someone who is [redacted]

[redacted]

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Investigation on 08/28/2006 at Fort Detrick, MD

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-159A

Date dictated 08/30/2006

by PI
SA

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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FILENAME: [redacted]-302

[redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 08/28/2006, Page 2 b6 b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that shortly after the above described incident, [REDACTED] expounded that it was [REDACTED] belief [REDACTED] that career government employees at USAMRIID are not as motivated to complete tasks and/or research projects in as timely a fashion as non-career contract employees for fear of having the funding for their projects eliminated. [REDACTED] last spoke to [REDACTED]. Other than that, [REDACTED] has not had any other communication with [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] advised that on several occasions [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] confirmed that [REDACTED] knew who [REDACTED] was and what [REDACTED] looked like. [REDACTED] advised during the interview and during a brief follow-up telephone conversation, that [REDACTED] recalled seeing [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] advised that the only other USAMRIID employee that may have spent more time with [REDACTED] during his tenure at USAMRIID [REDACTED] explained that [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] was asked specifically to elaborate on [REDACTED] use of [REDACTED] and its use regarding the growth of Ba. [REDACTED] explained that [REDACTED] worked only with the [REDACTED] strain of Ba and that they grew the Ba in [REDACTED] indicated that the inoculation period for the growth of Ba encompassed approximately eight hours and that one of [REDACTED] primary work functions during the Ba related research was to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] explained that Ba was harvested in a [REDACTED].


279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 08/28/2006, Page 3

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When asked about USAMRIID scientist BRUCE IVINS, _____ responded that IVINS was a nice individual, but was not organized and described him as "goofy." _____ recalled an incident involving IVINS that took place several years ago at USAMRIID whereby IVINS became frantic about the possibility that a shipment of *Ba* from Dugway Proving Grounds had been mis-sent via Federal Express to the _____ offices in Washington, D.C. IVINS was extremely alarmed and vocal throughout USAMRIID because he had heard on the news that a package containing anthrax had been sent to _____ in Washington, D.C., and was concerned that this package was the same *Ba* that he was anticipating from Dugway. _____ advised the incident turned out to be a hoax mailing which contained a petri dish of a non-harmful substance. IVINS did receive his parcel of *Ba* as anticipated without incident. _____ indicated that because of this incident and the hysteria created by IVINS, the hierarchy at USAMRIID ultimately changed the way in which biological agents are shipped to and from USAMRIID.

_____ insinuated that security at USAMRIID, particularly prior to September 11, 2001, was extremely lax. _____ described an incident _____



questioned or without the coolers being searched. _____ insinuated that _____ was always amazed at the level of security that existed when entering USAMRIID compared to the lack of security demonstrated when leaving.

_____ advised that USAMRIID employee _____ worked a lot with _____ and would possibly know _____ better than most employees.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 08/28/2006, Page 4

As far as someone at USAMRIID having a possible motive for the anthrax letter mailings, _____ advised that the only employee _____ could think of was _____ based this belief because of the nature in which _____

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/07/2006

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social
security number [redacted] home address [redacted]
[redacted] home telephone [redacted] was
interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID),
Building [redacted] Room [redacted] Fort Detrick, Maryland, work phone number
[redacted] After being advised of the identity of the
interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided
the following information:

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In [redacted] began employment at USAMRIID in the
[redacted] began working
in the hot suites after completing [redacted] immunizations approximately
[redacted] worked with [redacted] lab
located in Building [redacted] The research exclusively involved the
study of [redacted] recalled
that Suite [redacted] had
access to Suite [redacted] for approximately [redacted]
[redacted] could not recall the room number of [redacted] lab in Suite [redacted]
[redacted] did recall that [redacted] lab was located [redacted]
[redacted] further recalled that a walk-in refrigerator
[redacted] Petri plates, bottled
growth media and test tubes were stored in the walk-in
refrigerator. [redacted] stored bottled growth media there. [redacted]
did not maintain cultures in the walk-in refrigerator. [redacted] is
not aware of any material that was associated with Building [redacted]
being stored in this walk-in refrigerator. [redacted] was aware that
the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* is located in Suite [redacted] but [redacted]
does not know the exact location. BRUCE IVINS [redacted]
were responsible for distributing the Ames strain of *Bacillus*
anthracis to researchers. [redacted] personally never handled *Bacillus*
anthracis. [redacted] recalled observing a fermentor through a window
in Suite [redacted] that was assigned to [redacted] The fermentor was to
be utilized to grow *Escherichia coli* for a large scale protein
purification project. [redacted] is not certain if the fermentor was
actually placed into service. [redacted] does not work with any
lyophilizers or freeze dryers and is uncertain as to their location
at USAMRIID. [redacted] does not recall noticing anyone that did not
belong inside the hot suites. [redacted] has no knowledge of anyone
who might have been involved in the mailings of the anthrax tainted
letters.

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Investigation on 09/07/2006 at Frederick, Maryland

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File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-595

Date dictated n/a

by [redacted] Postal Inspector [redacted]

[redacted] .wpd

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 09/07/2006, Page 2

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[redacted] has [redacted] and has worked with [redacted] in developing aerosolization projects involving [redacted] is not aware of any research involving the aerosolization of dry material. [redacted] has since left USAMRIID for a position at [redacted] left due to the politics and paperwork associated with USAMRIID. [redacted] has assumed [redacted] [redacted] primarily works at [redacted] desk. An [redacted] is unsure of [redacted] name, is responsible for scheduling the aerosolization studies.

[redacted] has observed the following individuals working in Suites B3 and B4 of Building 1425:

BRUCE IVINS

[redacted] has left USAMRIID) [redacted] [redacted]
 [redacted] (has left USAMRIID) [redacted] [redacted]

[redacted] currently conducts research in Suite [redacted] of Building [redacted] has observed the following individuals in this location:

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
 [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/06/2006

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field Office
Amerithrax #3
Contact: SA [redacted]

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Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

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Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending) -1597

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: To memorialize the work performed on the electronic evidence collected on Bruce Edwards Ivins in relation to Major Case 184.

Enclosure(s): One CD containing all files that were "bookmarked" during the review process.

Details: During the course of the Amerithrax investigation, Bruce Edwards Ivins consented to having his home computer, two United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) workstations, various loose media items and his USAMRIID user directory copied for review by Amerithrax investigators.

(K)
[redacted]

The abovementioned items were imaged by Washington Field Computer Analysis Response Team (CART) members. The imaged drives were given 1B numbers and were maintained as evidentiary items. The imaged drives were loaded onto a workstation maintained in the Amerithrax workspace located in the Northern Virginia Resident Agency. Once loaded onto the workstation, the images were loaded into the software program [redacted] scanned the imaged drives and categorized each file based on its type (i.e. email, document, spreadsheet, database, etc.). The files were then reviewed by the writer of this communication. Files that were deemed pertinent to the Amerithrax investigation were "bookmarked." Writer then exported all files that were bookmarked to a CD for review by other Amerithrax investigators.

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[redacted] 06250 b.wpd

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[redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field Office
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 09/06/2006

Each image reviewed had numerous bookmarks that separated each pertinent file into a specific case related category (i.e. Ames, Anthrax, Bioport, etc.). Below is a listing of each bookmark category, a brief description of each category and the number of files bookmarked for each image:

Ivins' Home Computer

[redacted] - represents files written by or written about Ivins' [redacted] Four files bookmarked.

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[redacted] - represents files written by or written about Ivins' [redacted] Two files bookmarked.

Anthrax - files discussing anthrax in a general sense. 61 files bookmarked.

Blindfolded - files associated with blindfolding, kidnapping or other similar interests. 147 files bookmarked but numerous files were not bookmarked because they were repetitive in nature.

Contacts - individuals listed in Ivins' "Contact List." Seven files bookmarked.

Followup - files that represent items that need to be investigated further. 2 files bookmarked.

[redacted] - items written by or written about [redacted] 17 files bookmarked.

Follow Up Items - Same as Followup listed above. 38 files bookmarked.

Google Searches - Google searches performed by Ivins of a curious nature. Need to be investigated further. 19 files bookmarked.

Health - file where Ivins discusses his health. One file bookmarked.

[redacted] - file discussing [redacted]. One file bookmarked.

KKG - files associated with the Kappa Kappa Gamma (KKG) sorority. Nine files bookmarked.

Kingbadger - file about Ivins' screen name kingbadger. One file bookmarked.

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field Office
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 09/06/2006

[redacted] - files discussing [redacted] Two files
bookmarked.

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Phoenix - file where Ivins posts to an internet bulletin board about fraternities/sororities using the screen name Phoenix. One file bookmarked.

Abortion - files mentioning abortion. Two files bookmarked.

Docsnivi54 - file where Ivins uses the screen name docsnivi54. One file bookmarked.

Loose Media Recovered in Ivins' USAMRIID Office

3 plates - file where three plates are shown in a photograph. One file bookmarked.

Accomplishments - files where Ivins [redacted] discuss their scientific accomplishments in relationship to USAMRIID. These appear to be done on an annual basis. 15 files bookmarked.

Amerithrax - files associated with the Amerithrax investigation. Two files bookmarked.

Ames - files mentioning or discussing the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis (Ba). Six files bookmarked.

Anthrax - files discussing anthrax in a general sense. 18 files bookmarked.

Bioport - files discussing Bioport. Two files bookmarked.

Bruce's Swabbing - file discussing Ivins' unauthorized environmental swabbing at USAMRIID. One file bookmarked.

Dugway - files discussing Dugway in general or the contract where USAMRIID paid Dugway to produce Ames spores. 79 files bookmarked.

FVS - short for Foreign Visiting Scientists, these are files discussing foreign scientists at USAMRIID. Two files bookmarked.

Follow Up Items - Same as Followup listed above. 28 files bookmarked.

[redacted] - files discussing [redacted] Seven files
bookmarked.

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field Office
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 09/06/2006

Papers - represents published papers written by Ivins. 19 files bookmarked.

Patent - files discussing issues surrounding Ivins' patents. Two files bookmarked.

Procedures - represents Standard Operating Procedures, or protocols, used at USAMRIID in experiments. 16 files bookmarked.

Recipes - written recipes used to grow bacillus spores. Eight files bookmarked.

Ivins' USAMRIID User Directory

1029 - files referencing RMR 1029. Eight files bookmarked.

1412 - files referencing Building 1412 at USAMRIID, Fort Detrick, Maryland.

AMI - short for American Media Incorporated. Three files bookmarked.

Abortion - files mentioning abortion. Two files bookmarked.

Accomplishments - file where Ivins discussed his scientific accomplishments in relationship to USAMRIID. These appear to be done on an annual basis. One file bookmarked.

Address Book - files from Ivins' address book. Two files bookmarked.

Ames - files mentioning or discussing the Ames strain of Ba. 97 files bookmarked.

Anthrax Conference - in 2001, USAMRIID sponsored an Anthrax conference that was held in Annapolis, Maryland. Files discuss this conference. Two files bookmarked.

Battelle - files that reference Battelle Corporation. Two files bookmarked.

[redacted] - newspaper article discussing the search of [redacted] homes. One file bookmarked.

Bioport - files discussing BioPort Corporation. Four files bookmarked.

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field Office
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 09/06/2006

Kappa - files associated with the Kappa Kappa Gamma (KKG) sorority. Three files bookmarked.

[redacted] - files discussing [redacted]
[redacted] 11 files bookmarked.

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[redacted] - files discussing [redacted]
[redacted] Three files bookmarked.

[redacted] Review - Items bookmarked that were scientific in nature to be reviewed by SA [redacted] Amerithrax #2. 75 files bookmarked.

[redacted] - files discussing [redacted] Three files bookmarked.

Mailing Reference - files that discuss the anthrax mailings. Two files bookmarked.

Mikesell - Files referencing Perry Mikesell, a former scientist at Battelle who is now deceased. One file bookmarked.

Misc. - miscellaneous items pertinent to the Amerithrax investigation. 21 files bookmarked.

Patent - files discussing issues surrounding Ivins' patents. 32 files bookmarked.

Pictures - Anthrax - pictures of anthrax. 24 files bookmarked.

Potency Team - files associated with Ivins' membership on the anthrax vaccine potency team. 33 files bookmarked.

SOPs - represents Standard Operating Procedures, or protocols, used at USAMRIID in experiments. 27 files bookmarked.

Timeline - files to be used to timeline Ivins' whereabouts during the mailing window. Four files bookmarked.

Vollum 1B 189 - files discussing Vollum 1B 189. Seven files bookmarked.

[redacted] - files discussing [redacted]
[redacted] Four files bookmarked.

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field Office
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 09/06/2006

[redacted] - files referencing [redacted]
Two files bookmarked.

b6
b7c

FBI - files mentioning the FBI or employees of the FBI. 37 files bookmarked.

Ivins' Office Workstation

Ames - files mentioning or discussing the Ames strain of Ba. Four files bookmarked.

Anthrax - files discussing anthrax in a general sense. Six files bookmarked.

B3 - files discussing USAMRIID laboratory B3 within Building 1425.

Blindfold - file discussing blindfolding. One file bookmarked.

Bruce's Swabbing - file discussing Ivins' unauthorized environmental swabbing at USAMRIID. Two files bookmarked.

Contacts - individuals listed in Ivins' "Contact List." 23 files bookmarked.

FBI - files mentioning the FBI or employees of the FBI. 22 files bookmarked.

Follow Up - files that represent items that need to be investigated further. 45 files bookmarked.

[redacted] - picture of [redacted]
One file bookmarked.

Lyophilize - files referencing lyophilization. Two files bookmarked.

[redacted] - files discussing [redacted] One file bookmarked.

Misc - miscellaneous items pertinent to the Amerithrax investigation. 2 files bookmarked.

SOPs - represents Standard Operating Procedures, or protocols, used at USAMRIID in experiments. One file bookmarked.

Kappa - files associated with the Kappa Kappa Gamma (KKG) sorority. One file bookmarked.

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field Office
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 09/06/2006

B5 Workstation - used by several individuals including Ivins

Follow Up - file that represents items that need to be investigated further. One file bookmarked.

Summary

Each of the abovementioned bookmarks and files can be found in the generated report located in the enclosed CD.

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FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 279A-WF-222936

Field Office Acquiring Evidence _____

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received _____

From _____
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By _____

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

Title:


ENCLOSURE
TO EC

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of

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ENCLOSURE TO EC



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
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Twins Digital Evidence Review
1 of 1

Original

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/07/2006

To: Washington Field

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From: Washington Field
AMX-3

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

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Contact: PI [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

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Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending)-1598

Title: AMERITHRAX
Major Case 184

Synopsis: To provide a periodic update regarding identification and tracking of fermentors in place at the United States Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) prior to the anthrax mailings, obtained from collected documentation and reviews of FD-302's.

[redacted]

Details: One fermentor was located and positively identified as having been in place at USAMRIID, in Building [redacted] around the time of the anthrax mailings. Additional fermentors have been identified with an undetermined final disposition date. Available Property Accounting Online Maintenance Records were collected from [redacted] at USAMRIID, and [redacted] at USAMRIID.

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Maintenance record information includes the hand receipt holder code, the stock and model number, and various service dates. The equipment is also identified by an internal USAMRIID code called the MMCN number.

150-Liter Fermentor: Room [redacted]

The TF-150 New Brunswick fermentor, MMCN Number [redacted] Stock Number [redacted] was known as Big Bertha. [redacted]

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[redacted] Throughout various interviews this large or bulky fermentor has been described with volumes varying from 100-Liters to 300-Liters by the interviewees best recollection. It was installed into [redacted] after the removal of the wall because it was too large to fit through the doorway. The fermentor was not portable.¹ [redacted] recalled that there were two of these fermentors in Building [redacted] They were both acquired between 1980 and 1985.² As arranged by [redacted] the

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fermentor located in [redacted]

[redacted] On a contract basis, [redacted] supports the research of laboratories by providing expertise in cell culture, protein expression, and protein purification as well as growing cells. The contract describes the relationship between the two entities as, "Temporary housing and maintenance of USAMRIID fermentors in exchange for unfettered use by a contractor plus scheduled runs for USAMRIID."³ A copy of a photograph from [redacted] USAMRIID Horizon newspaper article shows Big Bertha and the two BioStat Braun Biotech fermentors at their current off-base location.

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[redacted] stated the fermentor was used fairly infrequently due to its large size.⁴ It has had various operators to include: [redacted] material used *C. Botulinum* between 1991-1993;⁵ [redacted] material used *E.Coli*, *B. Subtilis*, and *delta-Sterne* between 1991-1997;⁶ [redacted] material used FV-1 antigen; [redacted] material used Sterne strain of *Ba*; [redacted] material used water.

During [redacted] employment individuals recalled that [redacted] used the fermentor in Room [redacted] for attenuated strains of anthrax; protective antigen (PA), lethal factor (LF), and edema factor (EF) studies. [redacted] and has fermented *B. subtilis*.

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[redacted] described a second fermentor as being Big Bertha's twin. It was housed in the B4 suites and was transferred to the [redacted]

[redacted] It is surmised that after the destruction of the GMP facility at USAMRIID this fermentor was relocated and therefore not in place during the anthrax mailings.

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[redacted] who was identified as using Big Bertha and its twin, originally obtained these fermentors from the Salk Institute for use with *C. botulinum* in direct support of vaccine production with a deadline from the Pentagon in support of Operation Desert Storm. Around that time frame, the fermentors were both located at USAMRIID in Building [redacted] in Biological Production Lab 1 [redacted] and [redacted] now known as rooms [redacted] and [redacted] respectively.⁸

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75-Liter Fermentor: Room [redacted]

This fermentor, no MMCN Number, no Stock Number, described only as being glass-lined was housed in [redacted] during the 1980's. [redacted] a 75-liter fermentor located in Room [redacted] of Suite [redacted] to grow colonies of attenuated *delta-Sterne* strain *Bacillus anthracis*.⁹ Other operators

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include: [redacted] Big Bertha replaced the older 75-Liter fermentor, therefore it is surmised that the 75-Liter fermentor would not have been in place during the time of the anthrax mailings. Final disposition records for this fermentor were unavailable.

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20-Liter Fermentor: [redacted]

The Biostat Braun Biotech fermentor, MMCN Number [redacted] Stock Number 664001C060025, was located in [redacted] Operators included [redacted] and [redacted] This fermentor was relocated to KBI in 2005

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30-Liter Fermentor: [redacted]

The Biostat Braun Biotech fermentor, MMCN Number [redacted] Stock Number 664001C060026, was located in [redacted] No operator information available. This fermentor was relocated to [redacted] in 2005.

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[redacted] indicated that the newer fermentors were the Braun Biotech fermentors and that the New Brunswick fermentors likely predate 2001.¹²

20-Liter Fermentor: Room [redacted]

The New Brunswick fermentor, no MMCN Number, no Stock Number was located in [redacted]. Operators included: [redacted] and [redacted] recalled that, in 2000, [redacted] run a New Brunswick 20-liter fermentor which involved a vaccine study pertaining to the growth of *delta-Ames* or *delta-Sterne*.¹³

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Final disposition records for this fermentor were unavailable.

5-Liter & 20-Liter: Fermentor

This fermentor, no MMCN Number, no Stock Number was used for pilot runs and was possibly located in [redacted] Operators included: [redacted] material used rPA for anthrax vaccine in the 1990's. "In the 1990s, [redacted] under the direction of [redacted] were tasked to produce a recombinant version of PA (rPA)..."¹⁴ Final disposition records for these fermentors were unavailable.

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5 Liter Fermentor: Room [redacted]

The Bio Flow III New Brunswick fermentor, MMCN Number [redacted] Stock Number [redacted] was located in [redacted]. The Property Accounting System Online Maintenance Record run [redacted] b6 date 05067 lists the [redacted] Operat b7C included: [redacted] material used delta-Sterne. This fermentor b2 as lent to [redacted] by Bruce Ivins.¹⁵ It was used for pilot b7F fermentation runs. It is possible that the 5-Liter fermentor mentioned above used for pilot fermentation runs and this fermentor are one and the same. This fermentor was relocated to [redacted]

FBI Agent [redacted] was contacted about the theory of a feasible working volume for a fermentation run. He stated the minimum volume would have to come from the manual of operations for a particular fermentor but theorized that a fermentor would have to be at least 75% full to operate as designed. In a 250-L fermentor this would be approximately 188-L. The culture used to inoculate this would be 19-L, if using 10% inoculum.

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With regard to making a determination to examine the fermentors more closely via environmental sampling the writer believes that the 150-L fermentor "Big Bertha" would have been difficult to operate innocuously and discreetly due to its large size. The fermentors that were relocated to [redacted] (to include Big Bertha) were probably deconned before leaving USAMRIID, although no official documentation could be retrieved. At this time, no official record of *Ba* Ames having been fermented was located and the usage time frames, materials used, and protocols for the smaller fermentors have not been fully determined. Additional review of documents from the Automated Logistics Requisitioning System (ALORES) from [redacted] [redacted] at USAMRIID is being compiled and reviewed for identification information for the above mentioned fermentors.

Attached to and considered part of this documents is the B3/B4 Fermentor Chart.

The investigation is continuing.

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- 1.(U) FD-302 of [redacted] - Sub USAMRIID Serial 1544
- 2.(U) FD-302 of [redacted] - Sub USAMRIID Serial 1532
- 3.(U) Collected item 1A 6787 [redacted] Nov 05.xls, [redacted] Annual Inventory Check and Correction, Property Accounting System Sub Hand Receipt, Solicitation/Contract/Order for Commercial Items and Statement of Work from [redacted]
- 4.(U) FD-302 of [redacted] - Sub USAMRIID Serial 1544
- 5.(U) FD-302 of [redacted] - Sub POI Serial 4330
- 6.(U) FD-302 of [redacted] - Sub POI Serial 1501
- 7.(U) FD-302 of [redacted] - Sub USAMRIID Serial [redacted]
- 8.(U) USAMRIID Horizon Article [redacted]
- 9.(U) FD-302 of [redacted] - Sub POI Serial 1501
- 10.(U) Collected item 1A 6787 [redacted] Inventory Nov 05.xls, [redacted] Annual Inventory Check and Correction, Property Accounting System Sub Hand Receipt, Solicitation/Contract/Order for Commercial Items and Statement of Work from [redacted]
- 11.(U) Collected item 1A 6787 [redacted] Inventory Nov 05.xls, [redacted] Annual Inventory Check and Correction, Property Accounting System Sub Hand Receipt, Solicitation/Contract/Order for Commercial Items and Statement of Work from [redacted]
- 12.(U) FD-302 of [redacted] - Sub USAMRIID Serial 1532
- 13.(U) FD-302 of [redacted] - Sub USAMRIID Serial 1532
- 14.(U) USAMRIID Horizon Article [redacted]
- 15.(U) FD-302 of [redacted] - Sub POI Serial 1501

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Fermentors										
MMCN ¹	Common Name ^{1,2}	Type ^{1,2,4}	Approximate ^{1,5,6} Volume	Stock ^{1,3} Number	Previous ^{1,3,5,6,7,8} Location	Current ^{1,2} Location	Purchase ³ Date	Operator ^{3,6,7}	Approximate ^{3,4,5,6,7} Timeframe Used	Material Used ^{1,7}
D4992	1. Big Bertha*	TF-150 New Brunswick	150-L				2003 1980-1985			Water
							2003 1980-1985		1991-1997	E.coli, B.Subtilis, Delta-Sterne
							2003 1980-1985		1992-1996	Bacillus anthracis (PA)
							2003 1980-1985			PV-1 antigen
							2003 1980-1985			Sterne Strain
							2003 1980-1985		1991-1993	C. Botulinum
	2. Big Bertha's twin*		150-L				1980-1985		1991-1993	Pentavalent Botulinum Toxioid
							1980-1985		1991-1993	Pentavalent Botulinum Toxioid
F4368	3. Fermentor	Biostat Braun Biotech	20-L				2005 n/a		2003	n/a
F4369	4. Fermentor	Biostat Braun Biotech	30-L				2005 n/a		2003	n/a
D5661	5. Fermentor*	Bio Flow III New Brunswick	3-L				n/a		1990-1994	
	6. Fermentor	New Brunswick	20-L				n/a		2000	delta-Sterne or delta-Ames
	7. Fermentor	(Glass-lined)	75-L	n/a			n/a		1980s	delta-Sterne
							n/a			
	8. Fermentor		5-L/20-L				n/a		1990s	rPA for anthrax vaccine, pilot

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* Per [redacted] Braun Biotech fermentors are newer and New Brunswick brand fermentors probably predated 2001.

All cells with a slash mark (no information) have no supporting statements, documents, or indicators at this time.

1. (U) Collected from IA 6787 [redacted] Inventory Nov 05.xls [redacted] Annual Inventory Check and Correction, Property Accounting System Sub Hand Receipt, Solicitation/Contract/Order for Commercial Items and Statement of Work from [redacted]
2. (U) FD-302 of [redacted] Sub USANRIID Serial 1532
3. (U) USANRIID Horizon Article [redacted]
4. (U) FD-302 of [redacted] Sub [redacted]
5. (U) FD-302 of [redacted] - Sub USANRIID Serial [redacted]
6. (U) FD-302 of [redacted] Sub [redacted]
7. (U) FD-302 of [redacted] Sub [redacted]
8. (U) Property Accounting System Sub Hand Receipt 05087

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Date of transcription 09/15/2006

On September 5, 2006, [redacted] date
of birth [redacted] Social Security Account Number [redacted]
was interviewed at [redacted] was recently

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[redacted] After being
advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the
interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] advised that [redacted]

[redacted] to the United
States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
(USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick, Maryland.

X2 X3 X4 X5

The [redacted] at USAMRIID, [redacted] worked as a [redacted]

[redacted] first worked for [redacted]
[redacted] assisted in
research pertaining to [redacted]
[redacted] assisted with the [redacted] also
assisted with the [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] was immunized against all agents
upon [redacted] arrival to USAMRIID. During this time period [redacted] never
went into a hot suite, nor did [redacted] work with *Bacillus anthracis*
(Ba). [redacted] also recalled working with [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] did not recall working with any foreign scientist;
however, [redacted] does recall seeing two scientists at USAMRIID whom [redacted]
believed were from [redacted] known only to [redacted] as [redacted]

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Investigation on 09/05/2006 at Fort Detrick, MD

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-1599 Date dictated n/a

by SA [redacted]

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and _____ reiterated that during _____ at USAMRIID _____ did not have access to any of the hot suites.

Beginning on or around _____ for approximately _____ _____ advised that USAMRIID underwent a significant re-organization resulting in _____ being transferred to a new division called the _____. This division was later transformed in _____ and recalled specifically working on _____. During this time period, _____ worked only on the cold side of Building _____. _____ conducted research pertaining to _____. _____ research was done in lab rooms _____.

_____ advised that during this time period or thereabouts, the _____ replaced the _____ began working for _____ in Building _____. After viewing a floor plan of Building _____ acknowledged that _____ primarily worked in rooms _____. _____ advised that most of _____ work involved _____ research pertaining to _____ and _____. On a regular basis _____ analyzed _____ and recalled on one or two occasions conducting _____ in the hot side of Building _____. _____ also recalled working with _____ in the hot side of Building _____ for approximately _____.

(WFO NOTE: maintained in the FD-340 associated with this communication are USAMRIID floor plans which were provided to _____ for review.)

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In ongoing attempts to chronologically detail _____ work assignments at USAMRIID, _____ advised that around _____ began working for _____ in Building _____ who at that time was the _____. _____ assisted with the aerosolizing of the challenge material and the ensuing animal challenges. _____ worked with many biological agents, including Ba. _____ also did some work for Dr. BRUCE IVINS and recalled that the _____ working for _____ back then were _____. _____ described _____ role with the animal challenges as that of _____.

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_____ was asked to expound on the nature of _____ interaction with Ba during _____ work at USAMRIID. _____ advised that

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_____ but was not certain if _____ did or not. _____ recalled having to _____
 _____ did not know where the Ba came from or where at USAMRIID Ba was stored but recalled that _____ brought the material over from Building 1425. _____ advised that part of _____ work responsibilities included the

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_____ advised that employees from other sections of USAMRIID would often come over to observe the animal challenges. _____ reiterated that there were a lot of people in and out of Building _____. After viewing the floor plans of Building _____ identified room _____ as the lab _____ worked in. Room _____ was the predominant room used for aerosol challenges. _____ reiterated that _____ did not know where the Ba was stored and _____ was never responsible for retrieving the Ba material used for the animal challenges. _____ indicated that _____ would not know how to grow Ba or any other biological agents.

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_____ was advised that a review of USAMRIID key card access records pertaining to buildings _____ and _____ indicated that on _____ had accessed various locations within both buildings at unusual and awkward times of the evening and early morning. When asked to recall and attempt to explain the irregular work hours on this date, _____ struggled to provide an answer. Initially _____ could not explain why _____ would have been in the buildings between _____ or what type of work or project _____ may have been working on. After considerable thought and prodding, _____ opined that during the time period immediately surrounding the terrorists attacks on September 11, 2001, USAMRIID officials, in response to the terrorists attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., and rumors associating the anthrax laced letter mailings with USAMRIID, _____


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The initiative was called the _____

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_____ could not justify in _____ own mind what would have caused _____ to work the unusually awkward hours on _____. _____ also intimated that around the time period of _____ had been extremely busy and working many late nights trying to finish a paper so that it could be published as well as having to attend college classes in the evenings. _____ did not recall having any involvement with research in the hot suites of the Bacteriology Division during the above mentioned time period.

In continued attempts to account for _____ presence in Buildings 1425 and 1412 at the times and date mentioned above, _____ explained that _____ had no reason for being in any _____ suites and that _____ could only recall having accessed a _____ suite maybe one time in _____. _____ indicated that most of _____ time at USAMRIID was spent in _____ suites.

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_____ advised that at some point in _____

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_____ was not aware of any dry work being conducted at USAMRIID regarding *Ba* or any other biological agents. _____ advised that _____ was involved in aerosolizing agents for USAMRIID. _____ advised that _____ had attended some meetings at USAMRIID whereby discussions took place pertaining to a dry aerosolizer but that _____ was not aware of any actual dry work being conducted. _____ also recalled _____ talking about drying and/or aerosolizing material but that it was just talk and that the talk eventually subsided. This subject matter was discussed for a

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 09/15/2006, Page 5 b6 b7C

short period of time at several of the [redacted] meetings. [redacted] was not aware of the existence of any plans which involved drying or transforming liquid Ba into a dry powder form.

[redacted] opinions of the following co-workers are as follows:

1) BRUCE IVINS: Did not know very well, but thought he was very serious about his work and thought he walked with a slight limp.

2) [redacted]

3) [redacted]

4) [redacted]

5) [redacted]

6) [redacted]

7) [redacted] Did not know or offer any opinion of [redacted]

In closing, [redacted] advised that [redacted] never removed any select agents from hot suites while at USAMRIID. [redacted] provided interviewing agents with [redacted] bank account and visa credit card account information in attempts to further account for [redacted] whereabouts during the time period of the anthrax mailings. [redacted] was asked to submit to a polygraph examination on this date and agreed to do so.

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