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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/25/2004

On January 23, 2004, [redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] Social Security Account Number [redacted] was
interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the UNITED STATES ARMY
MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID), Fort
Detrick, Frederick, Maryland, work telephone [redacted] by
Special Agent [redacted] and Postal Inspector [redacted]
[redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the
investigators and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the
following information:

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In [redacted] earned a [redacted]
degree from [redacted] COLLEGE in [redacted]
[redacted] majored in [redacted]

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[redacted]. At USAMRIID, [redacted] participated in [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

257
[redacted]

[redacted] worked as a [redacted] in the [redacted]
Division. [redacted] completed a [redacted]
[redacted] in [redacted] at [redacted] in [redacted]

[redacted] has held that position to date.

[redacted]

Investigation on 01/23/2004 at Frederick, Maryland

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File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated 1360

by SA Postal Inspector

[redacted]

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A letter and a sample arrived from Ames, Iowa, in response to canvass for B.a. isolates. The sample was not catalogued with a name, thus labeled it "Ames". recalled that the sample arrived as a slant

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] worked with B.a. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] collaborated with BRUCE IVINS, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] on vaccine challenge
studies. All of the collaborative work involving virulent organisms
were conducted [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

During the [REDACTED] estimated that [REDACTED] made spore
preparations a total of [REDACTED] times. Fifty milliliter suspensions
of spores were generated and used in lethal dose (LD₅₀) and vaccine
challenge studies [REDACTED] generated B.a. spore preparations for
each isolate used in the vaccine challenge project. Spores were
grown on Sheep's Blood Agar (SBA) plates, harvested and washed with
water. Phenol was added to the spores for storage [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] recalled that [Redacted] also generated *B.a.* spores in the [Redacted] for a project aimed at [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] provided the following description of [Redacted] culturing technique: A small amount of original starting material

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] conducted research with virulent *B.a.* in Suite [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] samples were stored in the walk-in

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] worked in the hot suites [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IVINS stepped in and assisted with [REDACTED] research projects. IVINS helped predominantly with vaccine challenges using virulent organisms. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not recall ever requesting [REDACTED] samples be inventoried or destroyed. IVINS [REDACTED] would know if any of [REDACTED] spore preparations remained. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] indicated that [REDACTED] must have shared B.a. with other USAMRIID scientists; however, [REDACTED] could not identify specific incidents or individuals. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] it was not unusual for strains to be shared among USAMRIID researchers. IVINS and [REDACTED] both worked with the Ames strain of B.a. [REDACTED] did not recall ever sending Ames outside of USAMRIID, either domestically or internationally. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had no recollection of foreign shipments of B.a.

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

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[The USAMRIID Form 11-R shown to [REDACTED] was placed in a 1A envelope and submitted to the file.]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not know why [REDACTED] wanted the materials. [REDACTED] was not aware of the specifics of [REDACTED] work. [REDACTED] did not contact [REDACTED] directly to request the materials. [REDACTED] first met [REDACTED] while [REDACTED] was visiting USAMRIID. [REDACTED] did not recall when this initial meeting occurred. [REDACTED] saw [REDACTED] several times over the years at scientific conferences, but characterized their interactions as infrequent. [REDACTED] saw [REDACTED] approximately [REDACTED] at a [REDACTED] conference. The last time they talked, [REDACTED] was working with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not recall sending B.a. to any [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] reiterated that [REDACTED] did not send Ames to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] did not recall receiving requests for Ames from other countries or foreign scientists.

[REDACTED] provided the following information regarding USAMRIID scientists. PERRY MIKESELL conducted genetic studies of the B.a. plasmids. He compared the DNA extracted from the cells of different B.a. isolates. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] may have conducted studies with Ames.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

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and was not aware of anyone at USAMRIID who lyophilized virulent spores. [REDACTED] was 'taken back' when [REDACTED] first learned that DUGWAY PROVING GROUNDS (DPG) was making dry B.a. materials. It was [REDACTED] understanding that the dry material was used to develop detection systems and to enhance defense preparedness against a biological weapon (BW) attack. The dry material generated by DPG was very different from the wet aerosols produced at USAMRIID.

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[REDACTED] did not host foreign scientists or visitors at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] did not invite Foreign Nationals to work at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] worked with [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED] could not recall the name of the individual, but stated that [REDACTED] was from [REDACTED] and studied [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] recalled seeing a case of small, plastic freezer boxes in Suite [REDACTED]. Plastic containers with rectangular fitted lids were used in [REDACTED] a 'cold' suite, to store vials of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] did not recall the use of large, plastic containers by [REDACTED] researchers. [REDACTED] did not pay much attention to storage containers.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED], was located in New Jersey, but [REDACTED] had never visited [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] did not recall ever meeting [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] did not know of [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] never had any discussions and they did not associate. [REDACTED] observed an individual, dressed in all black, using the photocopy machine at the front of USAMRIID's Building 1425. [REDACTED] did not recall when this observation occurred. [REDACTED] thought that the person [REDACTED] observed [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was working at USAMRIID when [REDACTED] first arrived. [REDACTED] did not attend any of [REDACTED] presentations, nor did [REDACTED] participate in scientific discussions with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] has not been involved in one-on-one or group discussions with [REDACTED] regarding [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] may have attended some of the early meetings reviewing [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] research using [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] most often uses a plain envelope and affixes a stamp for mailing. [REDACTED] has purchased pre-franked envelopes from the post office in Frederick, MD. [REDACTED] has never purchased pre-franked envelopes from a vending machine. [REDACTED] may have pre-franked envelopes in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] declined to submit to a voluntary polygraph. [REDACTED] informed the interviewing Agent and Postal Inspector that [REDACTED] had researched the proper use of the polygraph on the Internet and concluded that the FBI's use of the polygraph as a general screening tool was not appropriate.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had no involvement in the anthrax mailings. [REDACTED] was totally shocked when the attacks occurred. [REDACTED] was angry when the FBI's investigation started at USAMRIID. According to [REDACTED] the investigation implied that the researchers at USAMRIID were not professional. [REDACTED] could not identify any individual with whom [REDACTED] has worked that [REDACTED] would consider a possible perpetrator of the anthrax mailings. [REDACTED] did not handle the evidentiary letters or powders. [REDACTED] did not conduct any analyses using the evidentiary material.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/29/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security Number [redacted] home address [redacted] home telephone number [redacted] employer [redacted] work address [redacted] work telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] received a [redacted] Degree in [redacted] with minors in [redacted] from [redacted] in 1993. In [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] to the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick on [redacted] was first assigned to work in the [redacted] Division as a [redacted]. It should be noted that [redacted] immediate supervisor was [redacted] worked in the [redacted] and was responsible for [redacted]
[redacted]

At the beginning of the interview, [redacted] provided a copy of [redacted] Curriculum Vitae (CV). In order to more clearly describe [redacted] duties while working in the [redacted] the following is an excerpt from [redacted] CV regarding [redacted] duties from [redacted] until [redacted]
[redacted]

While working in the [redacted] worked in building [redacted] and spent most of his time in [redacted] suites. [redacted] also had access to several [redacted] and [redacted] suites including: [redacted]
[redacted]

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b7CInvestigation on 1/29/04 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID ⁵⁰⁷ 279A-BA-C101392 ¹³⁶¹ Date dictated 1/29/04by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] began working at USAMRIID as [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] immediate supervisor was [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] worked in building [REDACTED] and the hot and cold
side of building [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was responsible for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] has used room [REDACTED] the walk in cooler located on
the [REDACTED] floor hot side of building [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] used room [REDACTED]
to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] research. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
both stored items in room [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that everyone had a
specific area within the cooler to store things. [REDACTED] did not
know what everyone else kept in room [REDACTED].

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[REDACTED] met [REDACTED] sometime in [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had office space on the cold
side of building [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] worked with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] contact with [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 1/29/04, Page 3

was limited. [redacted] never saw [redacted] in room [redacted]. [redacted] is sure that [redacted] saw [redacted] in room [redacted] in building [redacted] and may have seen [redacted] on the [redacted] floor hot side of building [redacted]. [redacted] thinks that [redacted] worked with [redacted]. [redacted] never discussed [redacted] work with [redacted]. [redacted] never saw [redacted] in a social setting. [redacted] never discussed [redacted] personal life, [redacted] New Jersey, problems with the government or Ba with [redacted]. [redacted] never saw [redacted] with a lyophilizer and [redacted] never discussed collecting or taking lab equipment from USAMRIID. [redacted] did not realize that [redacted] had left USAMRIID until much later. [redacted] remembers that [redacted] told [redacted] and [redacted] that [redacted].

[redacted]

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[redacted] was shown an envelope consistent with the ones used in the anthrax mailings of 2001. [redacted] advised that [redacted] has never seen or used an envelope like the one [redacted] was shown.

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[redacted] has used Styrofoam containers as well as small plastic containers slightly larger than a shoe box to transport items in the laboratory. [redacted] has never seen or used a sterilite type box at USAMRIID.

[redacted] does not have personal or professional associates in New Jersey, and [redacted] has never traveled to New Jersey. [redacted] was working for [redacted] in 2001 and does not recall taking any trips in September or October 2001. [redacted] advised that [redacted].

[redacted]

[redacted] feels that it would have been easy for someone to remove a select agent from a hot suite. Someone could shower out with something, put it through a passbox, dunk it out or put it through an airlock or UV box.

When asked about whether or not individuals piggyback into change rooms [redacted] replied "Oh God yeah." [redacted] has never seen someone piggyback into a hot suite.

[redacted] does not specifically know anyone who has a grudge against USAMRIID or the Government. [redacted] does not know anyone who tried to or was willing to misuse a select agent. [redacted] does not suspect anyone of being involved with the mailing

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 1/29/04, Page 4

of Ba in 2001. [REDACTED] advised that occasionally people left because of a Reduction in Force (RIF) and stated that one woman used to picket the front gate of USAMRIID because of an RIF.

[REDACTED] was not impressed with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] felt that they were not safe and their labs were dirty. [REDACTED] recalls seeing plates just sitting out in one of laboratories used by [REDACTED]. There were various laboratory technicians assigned to [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] was unable to pinpoint which technicians were sloppy.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] described various decontamination procedures used by [REDACTED] in building [REDACTED] at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] advised that

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Ba research is conducted in BSL-2 and BSL-3 suites. [REDACTED] believes that the following investigators have worked with Ba: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] BRUCE IVINS, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] does not know [REDACTED].

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Continuation of FD-302 of , On 1/29/04, Page 5

Attached hereto and considered part of this document is
the CV provided by .

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/09/2004

[redacted] born,
[redacted] Social Security Number [redacted] assigned to
[redacted] was interviewed by [redacted]
[redacted] of the FBI. After being advised of the identity of the
interviewing agent and purpose of the interview [redacted] provided the
following information:

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[redacted]
[redacted] United States Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). [redacted]
USAMRIID from [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] at USAMRIID was as a [redacted]

[redacted]

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Investigation on 2/02/2004

at [redacted]

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b7CFile # 279A-WF-222936 SUB LEAD AND SUB USAMRIID Date dictated 2/05/2004

by [redacted]

This document contains [redacted]
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;

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Continuation of FD-302 of

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] didn't work on any projects nor was [REDACTED] aware of any projects involving *Bacillus anthracis*.

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[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] has never used the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has never used any type of culture technique, either single colony or multiple colony techniques.

[REDACTED] has no experience, nor has [REDACTED] ever worked on any projects involving the drying of *Bacillus anthracis*.

[REDACTED] has never fully characterized a string of anthrax and has no information about where it would have originated, or if it was the Ames strain, or if it came from Bruce Ivins or [REDACTED]

When asked if [REDACTED] could identify any persons who had expertise in weaponization techniques, spore production or lyophilizing, [REDACTED] responded that [REDACTED] has been working at USAMRIID for some time and had worked at USAMRIID when the facility developed biological weapons. [REDACTED] was further described as [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] would probably know how to weaponize anthrax and how to conduct spore production. When asked about [REDACTED] [REDACTED] could not say that [REDACTED] was aware if [REDACTED] had expertise in weaponization techniques, spore production or lyophilizing. [REDACTED] had heard that [REDACTED] but had only met [REDACTED] once with no significant contact/conversation during that meeting. [REDACTED] had heard a lot of talk regarding [REDACTED]. People at USAMRIID, in general, liked [REDACTED] thought [REDACTED] was cordial, and [REDACTED] was nice to work with. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] possibly had more contact with [REDACTED] because [REDACTED]

When asked if [REDACTED] could identify areas of USAMRIID which had problems with bacterial contamination (specifically [REDACTED] suites), [REDACTED] had heard that they had done random testing in Building [REDACTED] and allegedly found loose anthrax spores in the hallway but [REDACTED] was not sure which hallway. [REDACTED] attempted to point

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

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out on one of the provided schematics of the buildings where [REDACTED] thought they found the spores.

When asked if [REDACTED] could identify the areas where [REDACTED] routinely worked, [REDACTED] pointed out places on the building schematics where [REDACTED] generally worked during his time at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] was asked if [REDACTED] had ever used the hot areas of Building [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED] and that [REDACTED] had never visited the hot areas. [REDACTED] does not know where room [REDACTED] was and [REDACTED] never needed to go there.

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When asked if people piggy-backed in and out of hot areas at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] assumed that the answer would be yes because people routinely piggy-backed going in and out of most rooms at USAMRIID. Piggy-backing occurred routinely in areas being worked in. [REDACTED] figured that if people piggy-backed in non hot zone areas [REDACTED] figured they wouldn't change their habits while going in and out of the hot zones.

[REDACTED] was asked how someone could remove select agents from hot areas covertly and if [REDACTED] could identify anyone who might have talked about removing select agents or who might try to remove a select agent out of a hot area. [REDACTED] opinion was that [REDACTED] felt that, overall, security was lacking at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] had never visited hot areas and [REDACTED] does not remember if anyone talked or joked about it. [REDACTED] felt security was a joke and that a lot of faith was placed in the trust-worthiness of the employees and [REDACTED] felt that anyone could walk out with anything if they really wanted to. There were no x-ray devices to screen ingoing or outgoing people or baggage. Once a person is assigned to USAMRIID they receive a computer controlled access card. The access cards were not color-coded according to access level. Often, access cards were lost, borrowed or shared by workers when they need to go in and out of areas when they didn't have their card with them. For example, [REDACTED] heard people offer to lend their access cards when they needed to go out to their car or go to a snack machine. [REDACTED] believed that personnel did not take security measures very serious at USAMRIID. However, [REDACTED] was not aware of any theft or attempts to steal select agents from the hot areas.

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[REDACTED] was not aware of anyone who said they might make a select agent for use in improper fashion.

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[REDACTED] was not aware of any persons with access or ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents or expressed hostile attitudes towards any political organizations, the media or others.

When [REDACTED] was asked if there were persons [REDACTED] believed to be or suspect possibly associated with the mailings of the anthrax letters [REDACTED] could not provide a specific name, but [REDACTED] said that if [REDACTED] was to suspect someone of the mailing, for absolutely no reason that [REDACTED] could justify [REDACTED] would say [REDACTED] would pick [REDACTED] identified [REDACTED] because [REDACTED] has been working at USAMRIID [REDACTED] and during the time they were making biological weapons for the US government. [REDACTED] believes that [REDACTED] misses [REDACTED] glory days when [REDACTED] was creating weapons and that is why [REDACTED] is "a very bitter and pissed off old [REDACTED]". However, [REDACTED] is thought of very highly at USAMRIID and [REDACTED] stated there is a lot of "ass-kissing" of [REDACTED] in that regard. [REDACTED] heard, via rumor mill, that [REDACTED] is paid approximately [REDACTED] per hour for [REDACTED] expertise as [REDACTED] for USAMRIID. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] did not spend anytime with [REDACTED] therefore, [REDACTED] does not come to mind as someone who might have sent the anthrax letters. [REDACTED] mentioned there were [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] remembered who might have the expertise to do something like the anthrax mailings. [REDACTED] provided the name [REDACTED] (phonetic spelling) as someone who might have the expertise to do something like the anthrax mailings. [REDACTED] is allegedly a [REDACTED] who was [REDACTED] food chain, but [REDACTED] had only seen [REDACTED] once before and never had any direct contact with [REDACTED]. All other speakers that [REDACTED] was aware of were all from within USAMRIID and they were all either doctors, military officers, or both.

[REDACTED] is not aware of any people with whom [REDACTED] worked with who were lax in handling dangerous items or inappropriately interested in agents that could be turned into harmful agents. [REDACTED] was impressed with the professionalism exhibited by everyone [REDACTED] worked with.

[REDACTED] was not aware of anyone being involved or interested in gaining access to anthrax or other biological chemical agents nor having the means to produce them without a specific need or responsibility to do so.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

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When asked how [REDACTED] would go about preparing dry *Bacillus anthracis* and sending to through the mail, [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] probably kill [REDACTED] in the process therefore [REDACTED] wouldn't even try.

[REDACTED] was asked if [REDACTED] was aware of anyone who expressed special interest in being able to get around forensic techniques and [REDACTED] was not able to provide a name of anyone [REDACTED] thought would fit this description. Neither [REDACTED] nor any of [REDACTED] associates had any personal or professional association with Trenton, New Jersey, Princeton or other areas of New Jersey.

[REDACTED] did not travel nor is [REDACTED] aware of any of [REDACTED] associates' travel to New Jersey in September or October 2001.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] did not work in an area that had level [REDACTED] or level [REDACTED] bio safety cabinets, therefore, [REDACTED] was unaware of any special standard operational procedures for decontamination of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] bio safety cabinets.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had been used in [REDACTED] work area in the [REDACTED] lab

[REDACTED] has never smelled bacterial decontamination agents in the [REDACTED] suite because [REDACTED] has never visited the [REDACTED] suite.

When asked if [REDACTED] had ever used plastic storage containers such as sterilite boxes for storage of [REDACTED] material at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] answer was negative.

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When asked if [REDACTED] was aware of anyone who worked with *Bacillus anthracis* or simulants [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] stated that all of [REDACTED] work was recorded in lab notebooks and those notebooks can be found in the [REDACTED] lab file cabinets.

[REDACTED] had never purchased any pre-stamped envelopes nor did [REDACTED] ever use any vending machines in order to purchase pre-stamped envelopes.

[REDACTED] has never personally handled any of the anthrax laced letters or envelopes nor has [REDACTED] conducted any analytical work on the evidence pertaining to this case.

[REDACTED] knew who [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] but only from working at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] a [REDACTED] there, but [REDACTED] was unaware of how [REDACTED] was paid, if [REDACTED] was a [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] [REDACTED] recalled seeing [REDACTED] at USAMRIID at the rear entrance of Building [REDACTED] where [REDACTED] escorted [REDACTED] from the rear of Building [REDACTED] to the front of Building [REDACTED] at the time of this visit [REDACTED] had a visitor's badge and was escorted to the conference room on the front side of building [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was allowed to technically piggy-back with [REDACTED] because [REDACTED] did not have an access badge in the building, which was why [REDACTED] was escorted from the back of the building to the conference room. With the exception of the one time [REDACTED] escorted [REDACTED], [REDACTED] never saw [REDACTED] inside USAMRIID after [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] never saw [REDACTED] taking any equipment out of USAMRIID or moving equipment to a place where [REDACTED] could use it unobserved.

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[REDACTED] never observed [REDACTED] work at USAMRIID and [REDACTED] never showed any interest in the anthrax in front of [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] only knew that [REDACTED] was a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] never saw [REDACTED] working with bacterial cultures or lyophilizers.

[REDACTED] is unaware if [REDACTED] ever removed or borrowed any equipment from USAMRIID or if [REDACTED] ever tried to taint discarded lab equipment.

[REDACTED] never saw [REDACTED] walk near or go into the walk-in cooler, room [REDACTED] on the hot side of Building [REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936 SUB LEAD AND SUB USAMRIID

b6
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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02022004 , Page 9

[REDACTED] never asked [REDACTED] for any isolates, equipment or access to any USAMRIID locations.

[REDACTED] does not know where [REDACTED] may have stored samples or materials.

The one day [REDACTED] was escorted by [REDACTED] at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] may have brought [REDACTED] for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] never discussed [REDACTED]'s experiences in [REDACTED] with [REDACTED].

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] never talked about [REDACTED] decisions with [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] in front of [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] never made any references to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] never complained about political issues or any issue in front of [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] did not have any conversations with [REDACTED] in which [REDACTED] mentioned scenarios involving bio-weapons or how to create them or any ideas about mailing anthrax.

[REDACTED] never mentioned ways to avoid forensic detection in bio-weapons cases to [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] is unaware of [REDACTED] having any connections in New Jersey or at Princeton.

[REDACTED] never recommended any books to [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] is unaware if [REDACTED] ever visited the Gambrill Parkrode area.

[REDACTED] is unaware with whom [REDACTED] socialized or spent time with at work nor could [REDACTED] identify any of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is unaware of any of [REDACTED] activities after [REDACTED] left USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] never attended any [REDACTED] however, people that [REDACTED] knows [REDACTED] were impressed. [REDACTED] provided the names [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] as having attended [REDACTED] at USAMRIID.

279A-WF-222936 SUB LEAD AND SUB USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02022004 , Page 10

Since [REDACTED] no one has made any comments to [REDACTED] about [REDACTED] or about giving [REDACTED] access to certain areas or to anthrax.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] doesn't specifically remember any conversations that [REDACTED] ever had with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] is unaware of any political issues or funding issues that [REDACTED] was involved with. [REDACTED] handled all the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is unaware if [REDACTED] ever discussed forensic countermeasures to bio-terrorism scenarios.

[REDACTED] is not sure if [REDACTED] When [REDACTED] escorted [REDACTED] [REDACTED] observed items in [REDACTED] bag that may have been [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] never discussed the use of lyophilizer to make powdered anthrax.

[REDACTED] never showed to [REDACTED] any materials such as

[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936 SUB LEAD AND SUB USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 02022004, Page 11

[redacted] said that [redacted] did not spend much time at
USAMRIID [redacted] while [redacted] was assigned to USAMRIID [redacted]
[redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] never discussed with [redacted]
[redacted]

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/03/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social
Security Number [redacted] home address [redacted]
[redacted] home telephone number [redacted]

[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]
place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the
interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided
the following information:

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b7C

[redacted] earned a [redacted] Degree in [redacted]
in [redacted] and a [redacted]

[redacted] worked at the United States Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) from [redacted]
until [redacted] [redacted] was assigned to the [redacted] Division
and was [redacted] [redacted] had various
[redacted] duties and [redacted]
[redacted] provided [redacted]
[redacted] was also involved
with [redacted]

Prior to [redacted] USAMRIID, [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted] worked in building [redacted] and [redacted] at USAMRIID
[redacted] was been involved with studies involving [redacted]
[redacted] spent most of [redacted] time on the hot side of
building [redacted] and one of the [redacted]
division laboratories.

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[redacted] was involved with a *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) study
that was headed by BRUCE IVINS. This study took place in suite [redacted]
in building [redacted] only had [redacted] duties and was [redacted]

Investigation on 1/30/04

at [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID ⁵³² 279A-BA-C101392Date dictated ¹³⁸⁶ 2/3/04b6
b7C

by SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 1/30/04, Page 2

responsible for _____ on the hot side of building _____. In this case, _____ would perform _____. Requested items would be taken to the _____. This was an _____. _____ was not involved with culturing, growing or harvesting the Ba used in this study. _____ was not involved with any aerosol challenges during this study. _____ thinks that IVINS used blood agar plates to grow his Ba. _____ does not know what strain of Ba IVINS used during his study.

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_____ also assisted _____ and _____ with a _____ study. This was an aerosol study.

_____ advised that the Ames strain of Ba was used frequently at USAMRIID.

_____ described three ways that carcasses/tissue were moved from various laboratories to the necropsy room or to another laboratory:

1) A carcass would be placed in formalin for three weeks and then taken to the Pathology Division. Requested samples would be taken from the carcass and sent to the appropriate division. The rest of the carcass would be placed in a freezer or autoclaved.

2) Unfixed tissue samples would be removed from the laboratory and sent to the Bacteriology or Virology Division.

3) Tissue would be fixed in gluteraldehyde and sent for electron microscopy.

Anytime a carcass or tissue sample left a laboratory, it would be bagged, decontaminated, bagged again and passed out of the laboratory.

_____ advised that room _____ the walk-in-cooler on the hot side of building _____ was used to store animal carcasses.

_____ has never met or talked to _____. _____ heard rumors that _____ was special operations and _____ worked for various government agencies. _____ did not hear any rumors about _____ work habits or personal life.

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_____ has never seen or used a sterilite box at USAMRIID.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 1/30/04, Page 3

[REDACTED] was shown an envelope consistent with the ones used in the anthrax mailings in 2001. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] has never seen or used an envelope like the one [REDACTED] was shown.

[REDACTED] does not have any professional associates in New Jersey. [REDACTED] attended a meeting in Newark, New Jersey sometime prior to September 11, 2001 and [REDACTED] years ago, [REDACTED] visited the New Jersey shore.

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[REDACTED]

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/06/2004

On February 03, 2004, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security Account Number [redacted] home address [redacted] home telephone [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the [redacted] work telephone [redacted] by Special Agents [redacted] Springfield Division, and [redacted] Washington Field Office. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] provided a copy of [redacted] which detailed [redacted] educational and professional experiences. [redacted] obtained a [redacted] in [redacted] and a [redacted] in [redacted] degrees were conferred by [redacted] earned a [redacted] in [redacted] from the [redacted] in [redacted] worked at the UNITED STATES ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland, from [redacted] to [redacted] and held the position of [redacted] from [redacted] made handwritten notations on [redacted] indicating that [redacted] work at USAMRIID was related to anthrax from [redacted] and to [redacted] is currently a [redacted] in the Division of [redacted] at the [redacted] has held the position since [redacted]

15

As [redacted] at USAMRIID, [redacted] spent [redacted] years

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b7CInvestigation on 02/03/04 at [redacted]b6
b7CFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-538

Date dictated _____

by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/03/04

, Page 2

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] worked in [REDACTED] in USAMRIID's [REDACTED] (believed to be Building [REDACTED]) from [REDACTED] worked in [REDACTED] in Building [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] Laboratory space was shared by researchers and was assigned based on project type.

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[REDACTED] received [REDACTED] B.a. stocks from the [REDACTED] at USAMRIID. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] did not recall ever working with B.a. Ames. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] used sporulation media to generate spores for permanent storage of bacterial stocks. [REDACTED] did not recall the specific type of sporulation media used. [REDACTED] stocks were maintained in a refrigerator in [REDACTED] For germination of bacteria from a seed stock, [REDACTED] would streak a plate and select a colony following the incubation period. [REDACTED] was too busy with his own research projects to produce B.a. materials for other scientists.

[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/03/04

, Page 3

Aside from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not transfer any of [REDACTED] samples when [REDACTED] left USAMRIID for the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] contacted [REDACTED] via email approximately two years ago regarding [REDACTED] materials remaining at USAMRIID. The items were inventoried and [REDACTED] confirmed that they were remnants of [REDACTED] research. [REDACTED] believed that the materials located by [REDACTED] were destroyed.

[REDACTED] did not ship B.a. domestically or internationally. Following the publication of the *Cell* paper in 1983, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] followed all USAMRIID protocols and obtained the appropriate administrative approvals for the transfer.

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] on a [REDACTED] article titled [REDACTED] " Volume [REDACTED] pages [REDACTED] The paper reported determination of the nucleotide sequence of the PA gene from B.a. and the 5' and 3' flanking sequences. The paper was published after [REDACTED] had left USAMRIID. [REDACTED] did not participate in the hands-on research aspects of the sequencing project. [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] contribution as that of an [REDACTED]

BRUCE IVINS developed a halo test to detect recombinant *E. coli* using immunological reagents for PA which were provided by [REDACTED] IVINS [REDACTED] used [REDACTED] in a study aimed at transferring [REDACTED] into *Bacillus subtilis*. [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] working at USAMRIID with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had very little collaborative interaction with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Any proposed studies discussed among the three remained at the 'talking stage' and never developed into functioning research projects. [REDACTED] did not receive B.a. materials from [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] continued to collaborate on [REDACTED] projects with USAMRIID scientists, including [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Most of the work was related to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] replacement at USAMRIID and continues to work there.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 02/03/04, Page 4

[REDACTED] remained in contact with [REDACTED] who is still employed at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] also collaborated with [REDACTED]

The Ames strain was sent to USAMRIID in 1980 or 1981.

[REDACTED] knowledge of the Ames strain was derived from two sources: scientific discussions with [REDACTED] and media reports on the CABLE NEWS NETWORK (CNN). [REDACTED] worked with PA, B.a. plasmids and virulent B.a. strains, such as Ames and [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] characterized their interaction as 'intellectual collaboration', as they often discussed scientific topics. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] met at USAMRIID and they had a good relationship. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] did not socialize outside of USAMRIID.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/03/04

, Page 5

[REDACTED] never hosted foreign scientists, but [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was
introduced to [REDACTED]

a scientist from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] never lyophilized B.a. and was not aware of any lyophilized B.a. material at USAMRIID. According to [REDACTED] there was no reason to dry B.a. for storage, as bacterial spores were sufficiently stable for long-term storage.

[REDACTED] has never met [REDACTED] and their terms of employment at USAMRIID did not overlap. [REDACTED] knowledge of [REDACTED] derived from [REDACTED] was aware that [REDACTED] was from [REDACTED] had no relatives or associates in NEW JERSEY. [REDACTED] recalled traveling to NEW JERSEY [REDACTED] to attend [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] described the perimeter security at Fort Detrick as topnotch. [REDACTED] stated that samples could be taken from [REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/03/04 , Page 6

USAMRIID if a person was intent on doing so; however, [REDACTED] knew of no one who removed Select Agents covertly. [REDACTED] was not aware of any persons with access and ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents who expressed hostile attitudes toward any political organizations, the media, or others. There were no persons [REDACTED] believed to be or suspected of possibly being associated with the mailings of the anthrax letters. [REDACTED] was not aware of anyone with whom [REDACTED] worked who was lax in handling dangerous items.

[REDACTED] followed the anthrax investigation through media reports and publications. [REDACTED] referred to the isotopic analysis of the Ames powder and a report that the spores were determined, within the limits of detection, to be approximately two years old. [REDACTED] indicated that the interpretation of the data was critical. The results actually indicated to [REDACTED] that the growth media used to produce the spores was approximately two years old. [REDACTED] suggested two possible interpretations: the stock of Ames from which the spores derived was two years old, or the stock predated the mailings by many years, but the spores were produced using media that was two years old.

[REDACTED] discussed the anthrax mailings with [REDACTED] during a [REDACTED]. Two possible motives were proposed. The anthrax attack may have been perpetrated by someone trying to send a message. The highly purified nature of the spores [REDACTED] that at least one of the persons involved in producing the material possessed very specialized skills and knowledge. [REDACTED] surmised from media reports that the reagents added to weaponize the spores were not ones used in the US. It was also suggested that a foreign country, such as China, perpetrated to attack to test the defense and response capabilities of the US. [REDACTED] was skeptical of this proposal, as such an act would be very risky for any country to take.

[REDACTED] was in [REDACTED] during the days surrounding the mailings of the anthrax letters. As documentation of [REDACTED] whereabouts [REDACTED] provided a handwritten telephone log, an employment leave record, and dated email messages encompassing the dates of September [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] also provided a document detailing the minutes of a [REDACTED] meeting at [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] indicated that [REDACTED] could also verify [REDACTED] whereabouts during the dates surrounding the anthrax mailings.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/03/04

, Page 7

A copy of [REDACTED] "Division of Environmental Health and Safety, Academic Personnel Record of Vacations, Holidays and Leaves, [REDACTED]" suggested that [REDACTED] worked [REDACTED] usual schedule [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of 2001, as [REDACTED] was not noted for those days. [REDACTED] used this document to personally track [REDACTED] usage of leave throughout the year. [REDACTED] handwritten, office telephone log for the number [REDACTED] noted that [REDACTED] made and received a total of four calls on September [REDACTED]. Three calls were noted as received or made on [REDACTED]

A copy of an email message, dated [REDACTED] indicated that

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was asked to voluntarily submit to a polygraph examination regarding the mailing of the anthrax letters. [REDACTED] indicated that [REDACTED] would think about the request and contact the Agents within a few days with [REDACTED] decision.

The following items, received from [REDACTED] have been placed in a 1A envelope (FD-340):

- (1)
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)

[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of

[Redacted]

, On 02/03/04

, Page 8

(5)

(6)

[Redacted]

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/17/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security Number [redacted] 2, residing at [redacted] phone number [redacted] was interviewed by Special Agent [redacted] and Postal Inspector [redacted] at [redacted] place of employment at Ft. Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

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[redacted] earned [redacted] degree in [redacted] from [redacted] College [redacted] started working at Ft. Detrick in the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in [redacted] as a [redacted]. From [redacted] until [redacted] only had access to the [redacted] in building [redacted]. In [redacted] started to receive [redacted] vaccinations [redacted] was vaccinated, [redacted] and began working in building [redacted]. Specifically, [redacted] worked in the [redacted] suites as well as the [redacted]. The only time [redacted] works in any area other than [redacted] Division is [redacted]

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[redacted] has never work with *Bacillus anthracis* but does [redacted] has been involved in vaccine challenges performed by [redacted] Dr. BRUCE IVINS. [redacted]

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[redacted] has no knowledge of any foreign visiting scientists at USAMRIID.

[redacted] never knew [redacted]

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b7E
b6
b7C

Investigation on 02/11/2004 at Frederick, Maryland

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b7C

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID; 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/A

SA [redacted]
by PI [redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/27/2004

To: Washington Field

Attn: Amerithrax 3
SA [redacted]

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b7C

From: [redacted]

Squad CT-2

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

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b7C

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-5880 (Pending) -USAMRIID-561

Lead-457

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: To report results of lead set for [redacted] Division to interview [redacted]

Enclosure(s): Enclosed for Washington Field are one (1) copy and one (1) original FD-302 for the interview of [redacted] and one (1) FD-540 envelope containing the original notes of the interview and floor plans of USAMRIID used in the interview.

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Details: On 1/26/2004, [redacted] Division interviewed [redacted] [redacted], at [redacted] place of employment, [redacted] provided detailed information regarding [redacted] employment and education history [redacted]

From [redacted] through [redacted] worked at USAMRIID, [redacted] Division, building [redacted]

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[redacted] received the non-virulent Bacillus Anthracis samples from Doctor Bruce Ivins. The samples were retrieved from [redacted]

[redacted] did not [redacted] know the location of the freezer used to store the Bacillus Anthracis samples. [redacted] did not grow Bacillus Anthracis samples at USAMRIID

[redacted] did not conduct research inside of building 1412. [redacted] did not go into the hot areas of building 1412.

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To: Washington Field From: [REDACTED]
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 01/27/2004

[REDACTED] did not know who [REDACTED] was [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was not a member of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Please refer to the enclosed FD-302 for further details of
the interview.

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b7C

To: Washington Field From:
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 01/27/2004

b6
b7C

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

Read and Clear

♦♦

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/27/2004

[redacted] born [redacted]
[redacted] social security account number [redacted]
[redacted] home
[redacted] telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of
employment, [redacted]
[redacted] After
being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the
purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following
information:

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Since [redacted] has [redacted]

[redacted]
at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Disease (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. From [redacted] to [redacted]

[redacted] received a [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] worked in Building [redacted] Division. [redacted]

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[redacted] Starting in [redacted] for approximately [redacted]
[redacted] conducted research on Non-Virulent forms of Bacillus
Anthraxis. [redacted]

b6
b7CInvestigation on 1/26/2004 at [redacted]b6
b7CFile # 279A-WF-222936-5884 - USAMRIID-562 Date dictated 1/27/2004by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 1/26/2004, Page 2

_____ conducted the
Bacillus Anthracis research under the direction of _____

While at USAMRIID, _____ was assigned _____

_____ stored
the Bacillus Anthracis samples in a freezer. _____
_____ was not familiar with the
number of personnel with access to the freezer. _____
_____ worked under
_____ IVINS' department would grow
the Bacillus Anthracis samples. _____ did not assist with the
growing of Bacillus Anthracis samples. _____

_____ Upon completion of each laboratory work
day, _____ destroyed all Bacillus Anthracis samples utilizing
the autoclave. _____ could not identify other researchers at
USAMRIID utilizing Bacillus Anthracis.

_____ could not identify the strain of Bacillus
Anthracis _____ used for research. _____

_____ did not use modified G
Sporulation media and was unfamiliar with the media. _____

_____ utilized single colony culture techniques. After
receiving the Bacillus Anthracis samples, _____ would add
antibiotics diluted in a liquid at a specific concentration. The
culture would be monitored for growth or reaction to the
antibiotics. Different types and quantities of antibiotics were
mixed and added to the Bacillus Anthracis cultures. Typically,
the samples were completed in a four to six hour time period.
After the test results were recorded, all samples were destroyed
the same day by autoclave.

_____ has not participated or used drying techniques
for Bacillus Anthracis or any other organism. _____ has not utilized

279A-WF-222936

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b7CContinuation of FD-302 of _____, On 1/26/2004, Page 3

a lyophilizer. _____ has no experience or training in laboratory drying techniques. _____ was unable to provide names of anyone with experience using a lyophilizer or drying techniques. _____ was not familiar with the location of stored samples of dried Bacillus Anthracis.

_____ was unclear if the Bacillus Anthracis _____ used for research was fully characterized. _____ believes the Bacillus Anthracis was most likely fully characterized, since it was identified as a _____. _____ unfamiliar with the origins of the Bacillus Anthracis used in her _____. The samples were provided to _____ by Bruce Ivins.

_____ was familiar with one person, _____, with expertise in _____. _____ learned of _____ by reading research materials and books on the subject.

_____ had no first hand knowledge of bacterial contamination at USAMRIID. However, _____ read in a research paper of one incident of bacterial contamination at USAMRIID. The paper indicated a visiting scientist died at USAMRIID as a result of exposure to _____.

_____ worked in building _____ at USAMRIID. _____ was assigned office _____ in the staff area adjacent to the _____. _____ conducted _____ research in laboratory space within the _____ Division. _____ could not recall the room numbers of the laboratories. _____ utilized both level II and level III laboratory space within the _____ Division.

_____ did not conduct research inside of building _____. _____ would go to building _____ only to _____. _____ has not been in the hot areas of building _____. _____ has not been in the walk-in cooler, room _____ of building _____. _____ does not know what is stored in room _____. _____ was not aware of anyone "piggy-backing" into hot areas at USAMRIID. _____ was unable to provide information on visiting scientists inside the hot areas, since _____ had not been in the hot areas.

_____ was unaware of anyone removing select agents from the hot zone. If someone wanted to remove select agents from the hot zone, _____ identified three possible methods to remove the agents from the hot zone. First, someone could pass the select agent through the "Pass Box". The "Pass Box" is utilized to pass

279A-WF-222936

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 1/26/2004, Page 4

laboratory notebooks from the hot zone to the clean zone. The notebook inside the hot zone is placed inside the box. The box door is closed and UV lights inside the box are turned on. After the UV treatment, the notebook is removed from the box on the clean side. Second, someone could carry the select agent through the decontamination shower. After showering, the individual could hide the select agent material in their street cloths before exiting the decontamination area. Third, an individual could place the select agent inside the autoclave from the hot zone. A person could place a select agent inside the autoclave, but not turn it on. Once through the decontamination shower, the person could open the autoclave on the clean side and remove the select agent.

[REDACTED] was unaware of anyone indicating they might make a select agent for use in some improper fashion. [REDACTED] was unaware of anyone with access and the ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents, which expressed hostile attitudes toward any political organization, the media or others. [REDACTED] was not aware of any persons believed to be or suspected of possibly being associated with the mailings of anthrax letters. [REDACTED] could not identify anyone [REDACTED] has worked with that was lax in handling dangerous items or inappropriately interested in agents that could be turned into harmful agents.

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[REDACTED] was not aware of anyone at USAMRIID interested in gaining access to anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents. [REDACTED] has no ideas on how to prepare dried Bacillus Anthracis and send it through the mail. [REDACTED] is unaware of anyone which expressed a special interest in being able to get around forensic techniques. [REDACTED] has no ties or associates with ties to the Trenton, New Jersey or other areas of New Jersey. [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] at the time of the anthrax mailings. [REDACTED] has no knowledge of anyone traveling to New Jersey during September or October of 2001.

The [REDACTED] laboratory maintained basic standard operating procedures (SOP) for decontamination of laboratory work areas. The SOP for basic decontamination of Level II and III laboratories were similar. The SOP directed workers to use a ten percent bleach solution to clean surfaces. Also, workers were directed to turn on UV light sources on the room ceiling and inside the hoods.

[REDACTED] indicated paraformaldehyde or glutaraldehyde fumigation were not used in [REDACTED] area at USAMRIID. However [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 1/26/2004, Page 5

observed on several occasions small areas sealed off inside building 1425. The sealed off areas were marked with warning signs indicating fumigation was taking place. Typically, the fumigation of laboratory areas was conducted on Fridays. [REDACTED] was not sure if the virology areas were ever fumigated, as [REDACTED] did not go into the virology area.

[REDACTED] utilized glass or metal containers at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] does not recall using or observing plastic storage containers, such as sterilite boxes, at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] was not aware of any unofficial or off the record research conducted at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] recorded all of [REDACTED] research in laboratory notebooks. [REDACTED] turned in all completed notebooks into the laboratory librarian.

[REDACTED] has not purchased or used pre-stamped envelopes like the ones used in the anthrax mailings. [REDACTED] has no knowledge of pre-stamped envelopes being available or for sale at USAMRIID. However, the pre-stamped envelopes may have been sold at the U.S. Post Office on the grounds of USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] did not handle any of the anthrax-laced letters sent to USAMRIID. [REDACTED] has not conducted analytical work on the evidence in the anthrax investigation.

[REDACTED] did not know who [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] does not recall observing [REDACTED] at USAMRIID or elsewhere. [REDACTED] indicated [REDACTED] was not a member of the [REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/26/2003b6
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On 02/27/2004, [redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] social security number [redacted] home address [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of
employment, [redacted]

After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and
the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following
information:

[redacted] provided the following overview of [redacted]
educational and career experience:

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

SERIALIZED	[redacted]	LED	[redacted]
MAR 08 2004			
[redacted]			

Investigation on 02/27/2004 at [redacted]File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-WF-222936-LEAD Date dictated n/aby SA [redacted] and SA [redacted]

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, On 02/27/2004 , Page 2

If never interviewed:

1. Obtain details on education, specializations, nature of work at each laboratory of employment; details on work with biological organisms (particularly *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba)).

Answer: Covered above. has never worked with any virulent form of Ba. has worked with the Sterns(vaccine) strain of Ba during the normal course of immunization duties.

2. Determine whether any work with Ba was on the living organism or only with components such as toxin, DNA, etc.

Answer: has never worked with any virulent strain of anthrax, only the vaccine strain used for immunizing USAMRIID employees.

3. Obtain details on all projects involving Ba including identification of contracts, subcontractors, lab assistants, whether the work involved spores or just vegetative cells, strains used, specifically how the Ba was grown, storage technique and all storage locations, distribution to any other researchers.

Answer: Although has never worked on any science driven projects involving Ba agreed to identify Division coworkers:

4. Have you ever used the modified G sporulation media? When, on what organism and strain, where was it stored?

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, On 02/27/2004, Page 3

Answer: [] has never worked with any form of anthrax created using modified G sporulation media.

5. What type of culture technique did you use? Was it single colony or multiple colony culture technique? If you used both, what time-frames did you use each?

Answer: [] has never cultured any form of Ba.

6. Identify any work involving the drying of Ba. Was a lyophilizer used? What was the specific technique? Are any samples of dried Ba still maintained? Were high resolution images collected?

Answer: [] has never dried any form of Ba and has never used a lyophilizer.

7. Were the strains used fully characterized? Where did they originate, and where have they been disseminated? If the strain was Ames, did it come from Bruce Ivins or []

Answer: [] has never worked with any form of virulent anthrax (characterized or uncharacterized).

8. Identify any persons who have expertise in weaponization techniques, spore production, lyophilizing. Is there anyone else we should talk to about the above issues?

Answer: [] does not know of any individuals with the above listed expertise.

9. Identify any areas of USAMRIID which had problems with bacterial contamination, particularly [] suites.

Answer: [] never heard about any issues of bacterial cross contamination in any area of USAMRIID but did note that in 1999, [] a USAMRIID employee, had an accidental needle stick and may have been exposed to a virulent strain of anthrax. []

[]

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Continuation of FD-302 of

, On 02/27/2004 , Page 4

10. Identify the areas routinely used by the employee (use floor plans).

Answer: [] spent almost all of [] time while at USAMRIID in Building [] rooms [] remembers going into Building []

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11. Determine if the person used the hot areas of building [] Was the walk-in cooler, room [] used? Who was observed using the walk-in cooler? Do you know what was stored there?

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Answer: [] did not conduct work in the hot areas of building [] was unaware of the existence of a walk-in cooler in room []

12. Did people "piggy-back" in and out of the hot areas at USAMRIID? Were visiting scientists taken into the hot areas by USAMRIID researchers?

Answer: [] stated that [] cannot remember ever witnessing anyone "piggybacking" into the BL3 area at USAMRIID, but did remember individuals "piggybacking" in the general access doors of Building 1425.

13. How could someone remove Select Agents from the hot areas covertly? Identify any individuals who attempted this.

Answer: [] believes the person would need to conceal the sample of select agent in clothing in order to make it out of the BL3 area. After leaving the BL3 area [] did not know how the person would remove the sample from the building.

14. Are you aware of anyone who said they might make a Select Agent for use in some improper fashion?

Answer: [] could not identify anyone who said they might make a select agent for subversive reasons. [] did recall the FBI arresting several

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Continuation of FD-302 of

[Redacted]

, On 02/27/2004 , Page 5

veterinary technicians in 1998 for manufacturing drugs using USAMRIID equipment and raw materials.

15. Are you aware of any persons with the access and ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents who expressed hostile attitudes toward any political organization, the media, or others?

Answer: No

16. Are there any persons you believe to be or suspect of possibly being associated with the mailings of the anthrax letters? Who and why?

Answer: No

17. Are there any people with whom you have worked who were lax in handling dangerous items or inappropriately interested in agents that could be turned into harmful agents?

Answer: No

18. Was there anyone at USAMRIID who was rumored to be interested in gaining access to anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents or the means to produce them without a specific need or responsibility to do so?

Answer: No

19. How would you go about preparing dried Ba and sending it through the mail?

Answer: [Redacted] had no idea of how someone would prepare dried Ba and send it through the mail.

20. Are you aware of anyone who expressed a special interest in being able to get around forensic techniques?

Answer: No

21. Do you or any of your associates have any personal or professional association with Trenton, New Jersey, Princeton or other areas of New Jersey?

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/27/2004, Page 6

Answer: No

22. Did you or any of your associates travel to New Jersey in September or October 2001? Do you recall where you were during that time period?

Answer: No. [REDACTED] does not believe [REDACTED] has ever been in NJ. [REDACTED] remembers driving to [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] but does not recall traveling through New Jersey.

23. Are there SOPs for decontamination of Class II and Class III biosafety cabinets in your work areas? What are they?

Answer: [REDACTED] remembers an SOP that had been established for decontamination of the [REDACTED] suites after a "hot" individual had been recovered and moved to USAMRIID by the [REDACTED] never used this SOP and stated that it was only to be instituted if a "hot" person was quarantined and removed from the [REDACTED] suites.

24. Has paraformaldehyde or glutaraldehyde fumigation been employed in the [REDACTED] areas? When?

Answer: [REDACTED] has no knowledge of this process.

25. Have you ever smelled bacterial decontamination agents in the [REDACTED] suites?

Answer: [REDACTED] has never smelled bleach, a common bacterial decontamination chemical, at USAMRIID but does remember a distinct decontamination smell routinely coming from a specific area where lab study monkeys were being disposed of in an incinerator. [REDACTED] also remembers the smell coming from the labs where the monkey related research had taken place and were subsequently being cleaned and decontaminated. [REDACTED] stated the smell reminded [REDACTED] of, "fresh green beans in summer time".

26. Have you ever used plastic storage containers, such as sterilite boxes, for storage of your materials at USAMRIID? If so, how, where and when were they

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purchased? By whom? Did you ever notice any such storage boxes missing?

Answer: [] remembers using thick clear plastic boxes that were approximately 8" X 12" X 6". [] remembers that the boxes had metal safety locks with rubber gaskets that created an air tight seal.

27. Are you aware of any work being conducted with Ba or its simulants which was unofficial or not recorded?

Answer: No

28. Was all of your work recorded in lab notebooks? Where are they stored?

Answer: [] stated that before the mid 1990s all of the USAMRIID immunization records were exhaustively documented by employees in lab books. After the mid 1990s USAMRIID switched to and now uses a computerized immunization record keeping system that now tracks all immunization records.

29. Did you ever purchase pre-stamped envelopes like the ones used in the mailings for your own use or for anyone else? If so, did you ever give them to anyone else? Where were the envelopes stored?

Answer: No

30. Did you ever use any of the vending machines in Frederick to purchase pre-stamped envelopes? If so, which machine and when?

Answer: No

31. Did you personally handle any of the anthrax-laced letters or envelopes? If so, when, what rooms, who else was present?

Answer: No

32. Did you do any analytical work on the evidence in this case? Get details.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/27/2004 , Page 8

Answer: No

Questions regarding [REDACTED]

1. Did you know who [REDACTED] was prior to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Answer: Yes

2. Do you recall ever seeing [REDACTED] in USAMRIID? If so, what parts of which building did you see [REDACTED] in?

Answer: [REDACTED] would routinely see [REDACTED] when [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] work area (previously identified) for immunization against a variety of select agents. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] would routinely run into immunization compliance problems due to the fact that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] remembers [REDACTED] ranting and raving specifically about [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] non compliance issues. [REDACTED] stated that once an employee became non compliant [REDACTED] immediate supervisor was notified.

[REDACTED] fell so far behind that [REDACTED] department had [REDACTED] access into the [REDACTED] suites turned off during the [REDACTED]
Soon after [REDACTED] access badge was turned off, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Once [REDACTED] was compliant, [REDACTED] access was turned back on. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] remembers [REDACTED] being immunized against [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

3. Do you recall seeing [REDACTED] inside USAMRIID after [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] If so, was [REDACTED] escorted? What kind of badge was [REDACTED] wearing and using? When did you see [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Where did [REDACTED] go inside USAMRIID?

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

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Answer: [REDACTED] left USAMRIID in [REDACTED] and has no knowledge of [REDACTED] activities after that date.

4. Did you ever let [REDACTED] "piggy-back" into any areas with you? What areas and when?

Answer: No

5. Did you ever see [REDACTED] taking any equipment to a place where [REDACTED] could use it unobserved?

Answer: No

6. What did [REDACTED] work with at USAMRIID?

Answer: [REDACTED] was not sure exactly what [REDACTED] did at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] knows that [REDACTED] was a [REDACTED] and did a lot of socializing. [REDACTED] always remembers seeing [REDACTED] in the hallways with a cup of coffee in [REDACTED] hand talking to other people.

7. Did you ever see [REDACTED] working with bacterial cultures or lyophilizers?

Answer: No

8. Did [REDACTED] ever remove or borrow any equipment from USAMRIID? Did [REDACTED] ever try to obtain discarded lab equipment?

Answer: [REDACTED] was not aware of any equipment related issues surrounding [REDACTED]

9. Did you ever see [REDACTED] near the walk-in cooler, room [REDACTED] in the hot side of [REDACTED]

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Answer: [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was only in building [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] occasions to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not specifically remember any walk in cooler in building [REDACTED]

10. Did [REDACTED] ever ask you for any isolates, equipment, or access to any USAMRIID locations?

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Answer: No

11. Do you know where [] stored samples and materials?

Answer: No

12. Are you aware of any samples [] may have brought with [] from prior research or employment? What were they?

Answer: No

13. Did [] ever discuss [] experiences in [] Details?

Answer: Not that [] remembers. [] was aware that []

14. Did [] talk about [] discussions with [] or [] Details?

Answer: [] does not know who [] or [] are and has never heard of either person.

15. Did [] make any references to killing people?

Answer: No

16. Do you recall [] complaining about any political issues or other issues, particularly involving senators or media personnel?

Answer: No

17. Were there any conversations in which [] mentioned scenarios involving bioweapons and how to create them? Did [] ever mention the idea of mailing anthrax?

Answer: No

18. Did [] ever mention ways to avoid forensic detection in bioweapons cases?

Answer: No

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/27/2004 , Page 11

19. Do you know if [REDACTED] had any connections in New Jersey?
At Princeton?

Answer: No

20. Did [REDACTED] ever recommend any books to you as good books
to read? What were they? Do you still have them?

Answer: No

21. Do you know if [REDACTED] ever visited the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] area?

Answer: [REDACTED] has never heard of [REDACTED]
and did not know the location of [REDACTED]

22. Do you know with whom [REDACTED] socialized or spent time
with at work? Can you identify any of [REDACTED]

Answer: [REDACTED] remembers [REDACTED] spending time with
[REDACTED] while at USAMRIID. [REDACTED]
does not know who [REDACTED] socialized with outside work
but remembers that [REDACTED] who
was also employed at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] thinks [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

23. What, if anything, do you know about [REDACTED] activities
after [REDACTED] left USAMRIID?

Answer: [REDACTED] has no idea of what [REDACTED] was doing
after [REDACTED] left USAMRIID.

24. Did you ever attend any presentations given by [REDACTED]
Do you recall any controversial issues being discussed?

Answer: No

25. [REDACTED] has anyone made
any comments to you about [REDACTED] or about having given [REDACTED]
access to certain areas or to Ba?

Answer: No

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/27/2004 , Page 12

26. Is there anything we have not asked you that you could tell us which could be related to the anthrax letter mailings?

Answer: No

[REDACTED] then went on to say that [REDACTED] does not believe that [REDACTED] had anything to do with the mailing of the anthrax letters and does not believe [REDACTED] could kill anyone.

If interviewee hosted foreign visiting scientists:

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] never hosted a foreign visiting scientist while employed at USAMRIID. Therefore the listed questions were not asked of [REDACTED]

If interviewee was an [REDACTED] member:

1. Did [REDACTED] spend time with the [REDACTED]

Answer: [REDACTED]

2. What conversations do you remember having with [REDACTED]

Answer [REDACTED] does not remember ever having any conversations with [REDACTED]

3. Were you aware of any political issues [REDACTED] which [REDACTED] was involved in?

Answer: No

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Continuation of FD-302 of

[Redacted]

, On 02/27/2004 , Page 13

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4.

[Redacted]

Answer: [Redacted] never attended [Redacted]

[Redacted]

5.

[Redacted]

Answer: No

6.

[Redacted]

Answer: No

7.

[Redacted]

Answer: No

8.

[Redacted]

Answer: No

9.

[Redacted]

Answer: No

10.

[Redacted]

Answer: No

11.

[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of

[Redacted]

, On 02/27/2004 , Page 14

Answer:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 01/15/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]
Social Security Account Number [redacted], who resides at [redacted]
[redacted] telephone number [redacted]
[redacted] and who is currently an [redacted]
[redacted], was
interviewed, [redacted]
Resident Agency of the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. After
being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the
nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following
information:

[redacted]

[redacted] worked in a [redacted] laboratory at USAMRIID,
where [redacted] worked primarily with [redacted]
[redacted] did not work with bacillus
anthracis (BA). [redacted] was trained to work with BA, but was never
required to. [redacted] was aware that "tons of BA samples" came in
after September 11, 2001; however, [redacted] never handled any of them.

[redacted]

[redacted] never used the modified G sporulation media.
[redacted] did not grow active cultures and, therefore, did
not use any culture techniques.

When asked if the strains of BA used were fully
characterized, [redacted] said that [redacted] did not know and again
reiterated that [redacted] never worked with BA.

[redacted] did not know ~~BRUCE~~ IVINS. [redacted]
[redacted] stated that most of the professors who worked at
USAMRIID have expertise in weaponization techniques, spore
production, and lyophilizing. [redacted] listed [redacted]

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Investigation on 12/24/2003 at [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936 - UJAMRIID-569

Date dictated 01/14/2004

by SA [redacted]

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_____ personally knew who had expertise in weaponization techniques and spore production of BA.

_____ was shown a copy of the floor plans for buildings 1425 and 1412 of USAMRIID. _____ identified the _____ area located on the _____ floor plan, as the area where _____ worked. When asked to identify any areas of USAMRIID which had problems with bacterial contamination, _____ stated the only ones _____ was aware of would have taken place in _____ said

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_____ never used the hot areas of building 1412 and _____ was never on the _____ floor.

_____ said that people did piggyback in and out of some areas at USAMRIID, but _____ had no knowledge about the hot areas. _____ was surprised at how easy it was to get in and out of the building. _____ believes the facility is "not that secure". _____ said that people who are cross training between virology and bacteriology had access to both areas and the security soldiers had access to everywhere.

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When asked how someone could remove select agents from the hot areas covertly, _____ said _____ had never been in the labs, but _____ thought it would be easy and that people could possibly pipette it into a tube. _____ is not aware of any individuals who attempted this.

_____ is not aware of anyone who said they might make a select agent for use in some improper fashion.

_____ is not aware of anyone with the access and ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents, who expressed hostile attitudes towards any political organization, the media, or others.

_____ does not know any person that _____ believes to be, or suspects of, possibly being associated with the mailings of the anthrax letters.

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 12/24/2003, Page 3

_____ did not know of anyone at USAMRIID who was rumored to be interested in gaining access to anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents, or the means to produce them without a specific need or responsibility to do so.

_____ had no idea how to go about preparing dried BA and sending it through the mail.

_____ is not aware of anyone who expressed a special interest in being able to get around forensic techniques.

When asked if _____ or any of _____ associates have any personal or professional association with Trenton, Princeton, or other areas of New Jersey, _____ stated that _____ but _____ did not have access to any hot areas.

_____ said that neither _____ any of _____ associates traveled to New Jersey in September or October, 2001.

_____ was asked if there are Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for _____

When asked if _____ had ever smelled bacterial decontamination agents in the virology suites, _____ said _____ did not know, as _____ had not been in there; however, you could smell autoclaves at work near those areas.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 12/24/2003, Page 4

When asked if [REDACTED] had ever used plastic storage containers, such as Sterilite boxes, for storage of materials at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] had and that most of the time it was for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is not aware of any work being conducted with BA or its simulants, which was unofficial or not recorded.

[REDACTED] said all of [REDACTED] work was recorded in lab notebooks, which are stored [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] never purchased pre-stamped envelopes like the ones used in the mailings for [REDACTED] own use or for anyone else, because [REDACTED] did not do mailings for [REDACTED] never used any of the vending machines in Frederick to purchase pre-stamped envelopes. [REDACTED] purchased [REDACTED] stamps at a store near [REDACTED] home.

[REDACTED] said [REDACTED] did not personally handle any of the anthrax laced letters or envelopes.

[REDACTED] did know who [REDACTED] saw [REDACTED] at USAMRIID on a weekly basis in [REDACTED] and in some of the hallways in the rest of the building. [REDACTED] saw [REDACTED] very regularly. Sometimes [REDACTED] was escorted and other times [REDACTED] was not. [REDACTED] was not aware of what type of badge [REDACTED] was wearing and using. [REDACTED] was in many different areas inside USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] did not recall ever letting [REDACTED] piggyback into any areas with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not ever see [REDACTED] taking any equipment out of USAMRIID or moving equipment to a place where [REDACTED] could use it unobserved, with the exception of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was aware that [REDACTED] worked with anthrax at USAMRIID. It was common knowledge that [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 12/24/2003, Page 5

_____ never saw _____ working with bacterial cultures or lyophilizers.

_____ was not aware of _____ ever removing or borrowing any equipment from USAMRIID, or ever trying to obtain discarded lab equipment.

When asked if _____ had ever seen _____ near the _____ room _____, in the hot side of building _____ stated _____ may have, but _____ does not remember. However, _____ did see _____ in the hallways a lot.

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_____ said _____ never asked _____ for any isolates, equipment, or access to any USAMRIID locations. Everything _____ had access to, _____ did as well.

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_____ said there was lots of public relations work going on at USAMRIID and people from all over the world were given tours of some of the suites.

_____ did not know where _____ stored samples or materials, but stated that there are storage areas all over USAMRIID.

_____ is not aware of any samples _____ may have brought with _____ from prior research or employment.

_____ said that _____ never discussed _____

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 12/24/2003, Page 6

_____ never heard _____ make any reference to _____

_____ did not recall _____ ever complaining about any political issues or other issues, particularly involving Senators or media personnel.

_____ said _____ never mentioned ways to avoid forensic detection in bio-weapons cases.

_____ did not know if _____ had any connections in New Jersey or at Princeton.

_____ does not know if _____ ever visited the _____

_____ does not know with whom _____ socialized or spent time with at work. When asked if _____ could identify any of _____ said _____ never saw _____ with _____ is aware that _____ lived at _____

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 12/24/2003, Page 7

[REDACTED] does not know anything about [REDACTED] activities

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had heard about a [REDACTED] which involved a suspicious type package, but [REDACTED] is unaware if it could be related to the anthrax letter mailings, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was not aware if any of the visitors were given access to any hot suites or any locations where live, virulent BA was stored or utilized, but [REDACTED] was aware that many visitors did go through those areas.

[REDACTED] said that all the visitors coming through [REDACTED] area were escorted at all times and were never left in the lab alone. [REDACTED] said that on [REDACTED] tours, there was never any opportunity during the visits for the visitors to have removed samples from USAMRIID without being observed. [REDACTED] said that many people on staff participated in or assisted with visits.

When asked if any of the visitors made any requests to obtain samples of any type from USAMRIID, [REDACTED] said they did not but many of them wanted of pictures and literature. [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 12/24/2003, Page 8

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described a picture of the BA spore, which had been enlarged many hundred times, _____

_____ said that none of _____ visitors showed any particular interest in anthrax, the Ames strain, weaponization techniques, or lyophilizing methods.

_____ was unaware if any of the visitors to USAMRIID had access to a lyophilizer while they were there. _____ said the visitors _____ at USAMRIID did not work or use any rooms at the facility.

_____ said there were not any foreign visitors ever observed in the possession of pre-stamped envelopes like the ones used in the mailings. _____ said that none of the visitors ever asked about locations in Frederick where they could purchase stamped envelopes for personal use during their visits.

_____ said that none of the visitors _____ ever showed any anti-American sentiments during their visit.

_____ said that _____ did spend time with _____

_____ had many conversations with _____ but none were alarming and all were work related.

_____ is not aware of any political issues, _____ which _____ was involved in but was aware that it was always a problem getting funding.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] could not think of any other information about
[REDACTED] interactions with [REDACTED] which might potentially relate
to the case.

[REDACTED]

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