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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 01/12/2007

On January 12, 2007, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security number [redacted] was interviewed telephonically via United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), telephone number [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the agent and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] several fermentors which are no longer at USAMRIID. [redacted] explained that sometime [redacted]

[redacted] and that in reality [redacted] never used these fermentors. [redacted] further explained, with regards to the 5 liter (L) Bio Flow III fermentor, [redacted]

[redacted] advised that this was the first of two contracts with KBI which entailed the transfer of fermentors [redacted]

[redacted] reiterated that [redacted] never used the 5 L Bio Flow III fermentor mentioned above. [redacted] could not recall the exact physical location for this fermentor but was sure it was not located in [redacted] area in Building 1425. [redacted] opined that the fermentors would have been decontaminated before being transferred to KBI. [redacted] could not recall who the actual receipt holder for this fermentor was [redacted]

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[redacted] stated that other individuals at USAMRIID, [redacted] may also be able to provide that precise information. [redacted] could only provide a general time frame of [redacted] as a time reference as to when [redacted]

[redacted] suggested that USAMRIID [redacted] should also be able to provide a more accurate and detailed historical trail regarding this fermentor.

Investigation on 1/12/2007 at Frederick, Maryland (telephonically)File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1657 Date dictated January 12, 2007by PI [redacted]b6
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File #

123. WPD

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 1/12/2007, Page 2b6
b7C_____ recalled that _____

_____ was of the belief that _____

Since _____ never used the 5 L Bio Flow III fermentor, questions pertaining to its usage _____ indicated could best be answered by contacting _____

After the initial telephone conversation with _____ ended, _____ called this agent approximately 25 minutes later and volunteered the following information:

_____ relayed that _____ spoken to BRUCE IVINS concerning the 5 L Bio Flow III fermentor issues raised in the earlier telephone conversation. IVINS suggested _____ that he would assist investigators _____ in going to the library at USAMRIID and identifying those lab notebooks possibly associated with research involving the 5 L Bio Flow III fermentor in question. _____ advised that IVINS volunteered his assistance but that he would not be able to speak directly with investigators, and that communications would have to be through his attorney. _____ advised that IVINS also recalled having discussions and input with _____ before the 5 L Bio Flow III fermentor was purchased. The discussions dealt with the justification and/or logic behind purchasing the fermentor. IVINS also relayed to _____ that he recalled _____ having some difficulty operating the new fermentor once the purchase went through and that this resulted in _____ having to call the manufacturer, New Brunswick, and resolve the issues.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/17/2007

[redacted] Social Security Account Number (SSAN): [redacted] was interviewed, as pre-arranged, at [redacted] place of employment, [redacted] at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, work telephone number: [redacted] on the afternoon of January 17, 2007. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agent (SA) and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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(WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with communication are USAMRIID floor plans [redacted] was provided for review.)

[redacted] advised there was a five (5) liter (L) fermentor located within the [redacted] hot suite in USAMRIID building 1425. [redacted] further advised this 5 L fermentor was located in room [redacted] on the provided USAMRIID floor plans. [redacted] opined the 5 L fermentor was manufactured by New Brunswick.

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[redacted] was knowledgeable of the 5 L fermentor pursuant to [redacted] the hot suites in USAMRIID 1425 and 1412 [redacted] [redacted] indicated [redacted] [redacted] would be knowledgeable of the 5 L fermentor's use; however, [redacted] was unaware of anyone using it, and opined the 5 L fermentor just sat there. [redacted] reiterated to the best of [redacted] recollection [redacted] never recalled observing the 5 L fermentor in use [redacted]

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[redacted] advised [redacted] had no derogatory information pertaining to the following USAMRIID employees who were in the [redacted] [redacted] on similar days and/or times [redacted]

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Investigation on 01/17/2007 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1658

Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 01/17/2007, Page 2

_____ recalled _____ entered the _____ suite on one occasion in _____. _____ could not recall if _____ ever observed a lyophilizer in the _____ suite. _____ advised _____ had no knowledge of any bacterial contamination issues or concerns specific to the _____ suite.

_____ advised _____ had also been in the B3 hot suite in USAMRIID 1425. _____ advised to the best of _____ recollection there was no lyophilizer in the B3 hot suite; however, _____ opined the lyophilizer was located in the B5 suite. _____ advised _____ had no derogatory information pertaining to the following USAMRIID personnel who were in the _____ suite on days and/or times similar to _____

_____ BRUCE IVINS, _____

_____ advised _____ had no knowledge of when the 5 L fermentor was purchased by USAMRIID, nor who at USAMRIID purchased it; however, _____ paper work that would help to document the same. _____ agreed to contact writer at a later date and advise the results of _____ search.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 01/16/2007

On January 12, 2007, [redacted] date of
birth: [redacted] SSAN: [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] After being advised of the identity of the
interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted]
provided the following information:

[redacted] works at the United States Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in the [redacted]
[redacted] under [redacted] is in Building [redacted]

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[redacted] indicated that recently there is very little talk of the AMERITHRAX
investigation throughout USAMRIID.

When referring to the dry aerosol study that was
conducted by the [redacted] described it as a
side project which occurred over a relatively short time period.

[redacted] believes it was [redacted]
[redacted] explained
that [redacted]

The purpose of this project was to bridge the gap between use of
wet aerosolization techniques as the model for studying a disease
which in the real world would be caused by a dry aerosol. [redacted]
elaborated that if conducting aerosol vaccine challenges using a
wet suspension of Ba spores did not accurately reflect a disease
(e.g. inhalational anthrax) caused by a dry aerosol then the
results of the model had limited value. The purpose of the
bridging study was to demonstrate that a wet aerosol vaccine
challenge was a suitable model. [redacted]

USAMRIID [redacted]
was directed by [redacted] to attempt to aerosolize [redacted]
[redacted] Work performed by [redacted] on this project was
conducted in room [redacted] of building [redacted]
[redacted] designated area at the time.

[redacted] explained that during this project [redacted] inquired
about possibility of using a dried biological agent. However, the
administration at the USAMRIID denied the use of dried biological
agents due to their dual use perception. [redacted]

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b7CInvestigation on 01/12/2007 at [redacted]File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1662Date dictated 01/16/2007by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]b6
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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 01/16/2007, Page 2

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_____ considered this project just another of _____

_____ conveyed that there were discussions _____ about attaining dried *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba). Discussions detailed that _____ could be contracted to provide this material. There was also discussion as to whether or not the material acquired would need to be milled, and if so, from where would a mill be obtained. _____ described that the use of dried biological agents was deemed out of the question by the administration due to its dual use implications.

_____ has no recollection of discussions about dried agents between _____ at USAMRIID. _____ spoke about the dry aerosol project, but to _____ knowledge this was the only individual from _____ spoke to about this project. _____ believed the project was shut down _____ believes that _____ got along well because both _____

_____ furthered this by explaining that _____

_____ amongst some of the individuals at USAMRIID.

_____ believes that _____ working on the dried powder aerosolization project, specifying that _____

Because, _____ background was in the _____

_____ does not recall there being a cease and desist order, however the project died on its own when the word came down that there would be no dried biological agents used. _____ admitted that _____ due to the applicability and relevance that this project had with actual threat dynamics.

_____ knew of some *Bacillus globigii* (Bg) that was on site for use with the Ultra Violet Aerodynamic Particle Sizer, which is a component of the bio-detectors used throughout

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 01/16/2007, Page 3

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Washington, D.C. This particle sizer used UV light fluoresce to detect biological agents. This machine was tested with both live aerosolized Bg as well as Bg that had been killed using formaldehyde. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had a vague recollection of the acquisition of dried Bg for the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has limited contact with [REDACTED] after having an [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] believes that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] described [REDACTED] as a [REDACTED] who
[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 01/16/2007, Page 4

_____ however, _____ does not recall _____ ever speaking of the AMERITHRAX investigation, interviews, or polygraphs. _____ believes _____ took issue or offense to the investigation, mainly due to its ability to tarnish _____ reputation, but also due to _____ belief that _____ was above those involved in the investigation. _____ expressed that _____ would be "shocked" if _____ had any involvement in the anthrax mailings.

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_____ has no recollection of anyone in the _____ at the time mailings who growing or preparing bacteria. _____ does not recall any large quantities of *Ba* in being stored in building _____ at or around the time of the mailings aside from particular batches brought over for specific aerosol challenges (these samples were autoclaved in the hood-lines when the challenge was complete).

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_____ has no knowledge of any *Ba* fermentation being performed, but believes the current spore production procedure and acquisition of wet spore preparations is perceived as an issue. _____ elaborated by saying that spore preparations provided by BRUCE IVINS lack overall consistency in preparation parameters between batches. This consistency diminished along with the Dugway produced spores (writer believes these Dugway sopres to be RMR 1029). _____ believes that IVINS grows batches of spores in order to meet the quantitative demand, with little parameter consistency between batches.

_____ was not involved in providing samples for the 2002 subpoena of *Ba* stocks, nor does _____ recall anyone from the _____ being involved either.

_____ believes _____ and _____ However, _____ describes _____ believes compared to _____

However, _____ does not believe these individual were involved with the mailing and restated that _____ could not believe that _____ was involved.

_____ described _____

However, _____ believes _____

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 01/16/2007, Page 5b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] believes that in the wake of the 2001 anthrax attacks that there has been a steady decline in funding to biological programs at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] could not remember any specific programs which were in jeopardy at the time of the mailings, but knows that tularemia (caused by *Francisella tularensis*), Q fever, and Rift Valley Fever research had all been tabled [REDACTED] at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] was asked if any of [REDACTED] co-workers were big Star Trek fans and indicated that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

At approximately 2:07 pm on the same afternoon, [REDACTED] re-contacted SA's [REDACTED] in order to provide information about [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In [REDACTED] absence, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Original notes from this interview will be kept in the FD-340 section of the file, Serial 1A-7123.

[REDACTED] 01606a.302

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 01/16/2007

On January 12, 2007, [] date of birth:

SSAN: [] Email: []

[] was interviewed at [] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), located at Fort Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [] provided the following information:

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[] began working at USAMRIID in [] Before [] was not quite qualified at USAMRIID (between the dates of [] [] initiated a project using a [] together with a particle sizer, in Room [] Building 1412, in order to characterize aerosolized particulate of [] [] explained that upon initiation of this project by [] [] was given []

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[] expressed that [] working on this project due to [] for this work. [] only worked on this project [] does not believe an SOP was written up for this project, but does believe that []

[] had the notebook for this project transferred to [] [] was not sure if [] possibly furthered this project using *Bacillus globigii* (Bg). [] believed that [] is currently working at []

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[] does recall the 2002 subpoena request for *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) strains as hallway talk during [] along with SA [] went through stocks of samples during the subsequent consent search of USAMRIID in [] did not know [] or whether or not [] was made aware of, or complied with the 2002 subpoena.

[] explained that [] was provided Ba in individual aliquots by BRUCE IVINS. [] does not recall ever seeing stocks of Ba being stored in building 1412. These aliquots

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b7CInvestigation on 01/12/2007 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1663 Date dictated 01/16/2007

by SA []

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 01/12/2007, Page 2

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were used during the aerosol challenge and subsequently destroyed prior to being removed from the hoodline.

[REDACTED] grew [REDACTED] in room [REDACTED] back in

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[REDACTED] could not recall anyone else in the [REDACTED] who grew any micro-organisms. [REDACTED] has not seen a fermentor used in Building [REDACTED] by researchers in either the [REDACTED] or the [REDACTED] knew fermentors were located in building [REDACTED] but he didn't believe they were used in 2001.

After the September 11, 2001 attacks [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] After the Ba attacks of 2001 researchers were required to enter the containment suites with another person (i.e. the buddy system) and the Elite Roaming Observation Force (EROF) was instituted. The EROF was tasked with performing random checks of the containment suites. [REDACTED] during the post September 11, 2001 attacks, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] explained that [REDACTED] aerosol research was mainly to take the existing systems used for aerosolizing agents and attempt to improve them. [REDACTED] explained that [REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] was able to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] identified IVINS as someone in the [REDACTED] division who had the expertise to produce the Ba used in the 2001 mailings, however, [REDACTED] believes that IVINS only works with wet

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Continuation of FD-302 of , On 01/12/2007, Page 3

spores. explained that IVINS supplies the *Ba* spores for the Aerobiology division, most of which believes were produced by Dugway Proving Ground and purified by IVINS.

 has heard IVINS' name used by interviewing agents in relation to the mailings.

Original notes from this interview as well as a Non-disclosure Agreement signed by on January 12, 2007 will be kept in the FD-340 section of the file, Serial 1A-7122.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 01/26/2007

On January 23, 2007, [redacted] date of birth: [redacted]
[redacted] SSAN: [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place
of employment, [redacted]

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[redacted] work telephone: [redacted] After being advised of the
identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the
interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] began working at the United States Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) on [redacted]
[redacted] was originally hired as [redacted]
[redacted] immediate supervisor at USAMRIID was [redacted]
supervisor and thus indirectly oversaw [redacted] as well.

Due to [redacted] previous experience with the [redacted]
[redacted] was originally tasked by [redacted]
[redacted] believes that [redacted] worked on this
project for about [redacted] that they had to
stop working with dried powder aerosolization due to its dual use
implications. [redacted] worked on this project alone in building
1412, suite [redacted] (only parts of this suite are classified as a
containment area). [redacted] did not actively work or even
corroborate with [redacted] nor was [redacted]
informed that [redacted]

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[redacted] did not have any knowledge of discussions taking
place over the use the [redacted]
[redacted] received all direction on this project from [redacted]
[redacted] had no interaction with [redacted] on this project.
Consequently, [redacted] believes the [redacted]
[redacted] believes that all notebooks created in reference to this
project would have been property of USAMRIID and thus would still
be at that facility.

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While at USAMRIID, [redacted] knew of a bottle of dried
Bacillus globigii (Bq) that was kept in a walk-in refrigerator in
building 1412. [redacted] indicated [redacted]

Investigation on 01/23/2007 at [redacted] Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1665 Date dictated 01/26/2007

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 01/23/2007, Page 2

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] worked with *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] while at USAMRIID. Additionally,
[REDACTED] worked on [REDACTED] studies for
[REDACTED] used a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] had no knowledge of any Ba being stored in building 1412 while [REDACTED] was at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] stated that all Ba was provided by BRUCE IVINS for individual studies, at the time the experiments were to take place.

[REDACTED] believes that, of the scientists at USAMRIID, IVINS has the knowledge to perpetrate the 2001 anthrax mailings. [REDACTED] believes that many of the individuals at USAMRIID could be considered odd, but added that [REDACTED] individual.

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[REDACTED] was approximately [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] worked with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] characterized [REDACTED] as a
[REDACTED] has continued contact with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] has heard nothing about the Amerithrax investigation through these contacts.

Original notes from this interview will be kept in the FD-340 section of the file, Serial 1A-7132.

[REDACTED] 02607a.302

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 01/31/2007

[redacted] date of birth: [redacted]
[redacted] social security account number [redacted] work telephone number [redacted]
[redacted], was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the U.S. Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) located at [redacted] Porter St. Frederick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] a project aimed at evaluating the feasibility of conducting a dry aerosol *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) vaccine challenge was initiated. The purpose of the study was to determine the breakthrough point for the recombinant protective antigen (rPA) Ba vaccine, in other words, what concentration of Ba spores would cause the vaccine to fail. Using the wet aerosol systems in place at the time, a high enough concentration of Ba spores could not be achieved. However, generation of a dry aerosol of Ba spores was expected to provide a sufficient concentration of spores thus achieving this breakthrough point. Additionally, a dry aerosol more closely resembles the type of Ba exposure a soldier on the battle field would likely encounter. For these reasons, [redacted] felt that to demonstrate the true efficacy of the vaccine, they needed to evaluate it against this more applicable threat.

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[redacted] indicated that the dried aerosol project never got off the ground. Some equipment was purchased and only preliminary experiments were performed using inert dusts or avirulent simulants. The project was ended because [redacted]

[redacted] and as a result, the dry aerosol work didn't need to be completed. Discussions about possible sources for dried Ba took place. Specifically, discussions as to whether spores would be produced at USAMRIID or obtained externally through DUGWAY PROVING GROUND ensued. [redacted] recalled no discussions with other departments at USAMRIID about producing dried Ba. [redacted]

Investigation on 01/30/2007 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1668 Date dictated 07/31/2007by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]b6
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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 01/30/2007, Page 2 b6 b7C

_____ was good at "playing with equipment" and was interested in trying to develop the capability to generate dry aerosols at USAMRIID.

_____ may have helped _____ with this work. _____ may have also been involved with the project. _____ believed that this work was conducted in the _____ located in building _____

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_____ dried *Bacillus globigii* (Bg) from Dugway Proving Ground and indicated that _____ indicated that some preliminary work may have been done with the Bg from Dugway.

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_____ was shown a copy of the _____ which lists _____ as an accomplishment for fiscal year _____ indicated that _____ meant they _____ [A copy of this document will be placed in the 1A section of the file.]

_____ described _____ as: _____

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 01/30/2007, Page 3

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Ba spores used by the Aerobiology group were always provided by BRUCE IVINS, who was known as the "star spore grower." The spores would be brought to building 1412 just before the challenges and were not stored in building 1412. If a challenge was going to span a few days then the spores were brought to building 1412 before the challenge and stored in the Aerobiology laboratory until needed. If material intended for a challenge went missing it would not be noticed. There were only a few shaker/incubators in building 1412, so if someone were growing large quantities of Ba it would stand out. [REDACTED] knew that some Ba Ames was stored in building 1412 [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Growth of bacteria in building 1412 would most likely be done [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

No one in [REDACTED] grew bacteria except [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] No fermentation took place in building [REDACTED]

Regarding the Federal Grand Jury subpoena requiring the submission of all samples of Ba Ames to the FBI in the spring of [REDACTED] a discussion as to which samples

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 01/30/2007 , Page 4

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needed to be submitted. The discussions centered on the definition of the language in the subpoena for the terms stock and "working stock." [REDACTED] indicated that the sample [REDACTED] had would fall under a "working stock" and therefore it would not need to be submitted to the FBI because the stock from which it came would have been submitted by IVINS.

[REDACTED] recalled first hearing that small amounts of dried Ba were either made or kept at USAMRIID during a meeting after the anthrax mailings occurred. [REDACTED] explained these spores were used [REDACTED] [Other sources indicate that these spores were irradiated prior to being dried.] Upon hearing this [REDACTED] at the time, became very upset.

[REDACTED] opined that the Personal Responsibility Program (PRP) instituted at USAMRIID "sucks," and it is difficult to apply the rules of the PRP, which was intended for research in the nuclear field, to the biological field. [REDACTED] indicated that the PRP is not functional for civilian employees because they can't force employees to submit to a drug test. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had their access to the containment suites revoked due to the PRP.

[REDACTED] would not provide names of individuals at USAMRIID whom [REDACTED] believed had the capabilities to perpetrate the anthrax mailings. [REDACTED] indicated that there were a lot of weird scientists at USAMRIID and would not want to see an innocent person held responsible for the anthrax mailings.

[REDACTED] obtained [REDACTED] from the University of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] obtained [REDACTED] from the University of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] expressed concern that if it is shown that the perpetrator of the anthrax mailings was a USAMRIID employee or the Ba spores used in the mailings came from USAMRIID that it would

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Continuation of FD-302 of , On 01/30/2007, Page 5

destroy the institute and that the new USAMRIID building would be
"down the tubes."

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was presented with a non-disclosure agreement which
 signed. This will be placed in the 1A section of the file.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 02/15/2007

On 02/08/2007 Special Agent [redacted] received a telephonic voice mail message from BRUCE EDWARD IVINS, of the Bacteriology Division of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. IVINS relayed, for information, that [redacted] of the USAMRIID, [redacted] telephone [redacted] [redacted] might be a person to speak with regarding [redacted] [redacted] at USAMRIID. According to IVINS, [redacted]

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b7CInvestigation on 02/08/2007 at Fort Detrick, Maryland (telephonically)File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1673 Date dictated 02/15/2007by SA [redacted]
[redacted] 04602.wpdb6
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 01/28/2007

On January 25, 2007, Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and Postal Inspector (PI) [redacted] of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, interviewed [redacted] Social Security account number [redacted] date of birth [redacted] current address: [redacted]

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[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]

[redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

In [redacted] from the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), [redacted] BRUCE E. IVINS, is aware of [redacted] [redacted] occasionally had spoken with the FBI regarding [redacted] former employment at USAMRIID and [redacted] corresponding responsibility to [redacted] According to [redacted] had not informed any [redacted] of [redacted] scheduled meeting with the FBI for January 25, 2007.

[redacted] was asked to relay the perceived impressions from [redacted] former USAMRIID coworkers in regards to the investigation into the anthrax mailings of 2001. [redacted] IVINS found it stressful to meet with the FBI, but since he hired a lawyer, it had been better. [redacted]

[redacted] had not talked about the investigation in a while and was glad to be out of USAMRIID. [redacted] had not said anything to [redacted] regarding the investigation.

[redacted] relayed to the interviewers that [redacted] was [redacted]

During [redacted] time in the hot suites at USAMRIID, [redacted]


[redacted] IVINS had figured out how to make good spores.


Investigation on 1/25/2007 at [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1674

Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]
PI [redacted]b6
b7C

 0704ea.wpl

SA 

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BACK PAGE

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 1/25/2007, Page 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] believed there might have been a project that IVINS was involved with requiring the growth of a large amount of *Ba* spores, however, did not remember the details.

Most of the projects [REDACTED] worked were geared for publications, although since USAMRIID was a military institution not all of the projects would be published. Occasionally [REDACTED] worked on Good Laboratory Practice (GLP) projects, but didn't remember what they were. [REDACTED] could not remember all of the details to the projects because of the time lapse, but believed [REDACTED] could remember more details if [REDACTED] looked at [REDACTED] laboratory notebooks.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Besides laboratory notebooks, [REDACTED] did not believe there was a system for tracking the amount of *Ba* spores made, then used or destroyed.

[REDACTED] perceived the normal laboratory hours to start between the morning hours of 7:00AM to 9:00AM and last through 5:00PM, although there would be occasions when someone would come in later. If someone came in on the weekend it was to look at the animals/count the dead animals. This could take approximately two hours and was usually a one-person job.

[REDACTED] was shown a 28-page graphic representation of the [REDACTED] hot suite usage from September 11, 2001 through October 8, 2001. Each page represented a individual day, marked

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 1/25/2007, Page 3

with the date and the identity of the persons who accessed the suite along with their corresponding time of access and duration. 15 of the 28 days depicted IVINS accessing the laboratory outside of the normal work hours _____ described above.

_____ was asked to comment on why _____ believed this would occur.] _____ could not say if the above would be out of the ordinary _____

_____ described IVINS as having weird behavior. IVINS liked to take showers in the suites on days that he was not working. He did this to get away from his home or use the internet, etc. _____ acknowledged IVINS was quirky with unusual social skills and depression, but didn't believe he did it [anthrax mailing]. IVINS thought of his office and the hot suite as a safe place.

_____ stated that even prior to September 11th IVINS struggled with depression, family issues, and coped with being himself. _____

_____ It was common knowledge that he was odd. He was also slightly paranoid and prone to fluctuations in his mood. _____

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 1/25/2007, Page 4

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was shown a highlighted portion in an email from IVINS [REDACTED] dated 03/04/01. The portion read: "(Obviously if someone says that he or she is about to commit a crime, you should share it with the right people.) Confidentiality is to much to ask of you, so perhaps I should just take the Celexa and let whatever is going to happen take its course." [REDACTED] stated that this didn't raise any red-flags with [REDACTED] because he had a guilty conscious about everything, including old memories, etc.

[REDACTED] was asked about IVINS' attention to sorority girls. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

When [REDACTED] first met IVINS, he was more conservative, but over time his views became more liberal. He recognized that there was a grey area, not just black and white.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 1/25/2007, Page 5

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was asked who the FBI should look toward at USAMRIID in regards to the investigation. [REDACTED] replied that obviously IVINS should be looked at.

[REDACTED] was not familiar with [REDACTED] only knew [REDACTED] by face.

[REDACTED] was asked how [REDACTED] believed a person at USAMRIID could have accomplished this crime. [REDACTED] believed that getting *Ba* to aerosolize for the challenges was difficult enough. [REDACTED] believed that the most difficult aspect of growing enough spores to commit the mailing would be finding enough space in the shakers. There was one shaker in [REDACTED] one in [REDACTED] and one in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] believed that in order to obtain the room needed to accomplish such a growing, someone would have to borrow other laboratory space. [REDACTED] also offered that *Ba* could have been grown in smaller frames of time and then stored in a freezer until it was needed. [REDACTED] does not know how to dry *Ba* or how to use a Lyophilizer. [REDACTED] also thinks that removing such a large amount of *Ba* from the suites would be a big task.

[REDACTED]

He had an email account that was not work related. [REDACTED] will provide that to the interviewers in the future. [REDACTED] had been in contact with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 1/25/2007, Page 6

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] signed a non-disclosure agreement at the beginning of the interview. [REDACTED] also initialed and dated the back of the two documents previously mentioned in the interview. All of these items were placed in the 1A section of the file at 1A-7147.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 12/11/2006

Individual who is in a position to testify, provided the following information:

On occasion, [redacted] individual receives an e-mail from former United States Army Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) employee [redacted]

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[redacted] Individual alleges that e-mail communications are strictly work related in nature. Individual acknowledged that he/she has in the past [redacted]

[redacted] Individual recalled [redacted]

Individual acknowledged that at some point during the [redacted]

Investigation on 11/28/2006 at Washington, D.C.
File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID [redacted] Date dictated 12/10/2006
by PI [redacted]
SA [redacted]

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FILENAME: [redacted] 123.WPD

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Continuation of FD-302 of Individual, On 11/28/2006, Page 2

Individual recalled that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Through the many conversations Individual [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Individual recalled that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Individual recalled that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

IVINS, despite USAMRIID's disapproval [REDACTED]
conducted environmental swabbing of his various administrative work
areas at USAMRIID. IVINS was concerned about contamination because
of concerns expressed to him [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IVINS had an
obsessive/compulsive personality. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of Individual, On 11/28/2006, Page 3

[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 02/26/2007

On 02/23/2007 Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] received a telephone call from BRUCE EDWARD IVINS of the Bacteriology Division of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Maryland, regarding an e-mail he had received from [REDACTED] of USAMRIID. The e-mail was sent to several USAMRIID employees (including IVINS) and provided guidance to USAMRIID personnel regarding interactions with FBI Agents. IVINS forwarded the e-mail, which is attached hereto and considered a part of this document, to SA [REDACTED]

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b7CInvestigation on 02/23/2007 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1676 Date dictated 02/26/2007by SA [REDACTED] (Telephonically)[REDACTED] 05701.wpdb6
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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 02/08/2007

On February 1, 2007, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] cell phone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] residence located at [redacted] telephone number [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement form which was placed in a FD-340 and maintained in the 1A subfile. [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] confirmed that [redacted] was previously employed as a [redacted] at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) from [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] received a [redacted] degree in [redacted] from the University [redacted] prior to [redacted]

[redacted]

During [redacted] at USAMRIID, [redacted] advised [redacted]

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[redacted] advised that much of [redacted] work while at USAMRIID dealt with immunological studies involving *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) toxins in relation to anthrax vaccine research. [redacted] indicated that most of [redacted] time spent at USAMRIID was spent in Building [redacted] in the [redacted] suite [redacted]

Investigation on 02/01/2007 at [redacted]File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-1679 Date dictated 02/08/2007by SA [redacted]
PI [redacted]b6
b7C

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FILE NAME: [redacted] 302

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 02/01/2007, Page 2

[REDACTED] advised that it wasn't until [REDACTED] at USAMRIID that [REDACTED] was assigned work in Building [REDACTED] whereby [REDACTED] participated in a [REDACTED] study pertaining to the [REDACTED] primarily assisted with research involving [REDACTED] never grew or harvested Ba.

[REDACTED] explained that, except on one or two occasions, [REDACTED] conducted all of [REDACTED] work in [REDACTED] at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] advised that incident to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There was a period in time when [REDACTED] was required to assist with some aerosol animal challenges in building 1412 and [REDACTED] needed to be fully immunized. [REDACTED] explained that building 1412 was not compartmentalized like building 1425 and that the entire building was treated as if it were hot.

[REDACTED] recalled that [REDACTED] may have been asked on one or two occasions, in [REDACTED] to conduct research in the [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] suites but only to fill in for an absent or sick researcher. [REDACTED] recalled that [REDACTED] may have done this on an occasion or two for [REDACTED] but could not provide any specifics about the nature of [REDACTED] activity other than the work most likely involved [REDACTED] explained that this was a basic fundamental task. [REDACTED] would simply follow the instructions which were left for [REDACTED] to follow.

[REDACTED] simplistically categorized the various lab areas in building [REDACTED] as the following:

- lab area where botulism research was conducted.
- lab area where tularemia research was conducted.
- lab area where anthrax research was conducted.
- lab area where anthrax research was conducted .
- which also housed various fermentors.
- BSL-1 lab area, not a hot suite.

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[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] in Building 1425 which was located in the [REDACTED] between the [REDACTED] suites. [REDACTED] recalled that [REDACTED] desk was located [REDACTED] [REDACTED] advised that there were

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 02/01/2007, Page 3

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] further volunteered that [REDACTED] maintained a locker in the locker room located in the cold side of the [REDACTED] suites. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] entered the locker room and adjacent change/shower room to take a shower and/or use the toilet. [REDACTED] explained that in order to access the shower room, [REDACTED] had to enter [REDACTED] digit personal identification code. [REDACTED] intimated that access to just the locker area did not require the use of a unique personal identification code. [REDACTED] advised that initially access to the shower areas could be gained via the cold side locker room but at some point, [REDACTED] could not recall when, access to the showers was curtailed in a way that access could only be gained to the showers by entering from the hot suites. To enter the hot suites one must enter their personal identification code.

When given an opportunity to view [REDACTED] USAMRIID key card access records [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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When asked to explain [REDACTED] response to a question during an interview with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on [REDACTED] whereby [REDACTED] responded that [REDACTED] does not go into the [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 02/01/2007, Page 4

Questioning of [REDACTED] continued as [REDACTED] was asked a variety of questions dealing with background related issues.

Regarding a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] could not recall or confirm the circumstances surrounding this purchase.

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Upon questioning pertaining to a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] provided the following information:

[REDACTED] confirmed that [REDACTED]

Subsequent to being advised that significant information has been developed which indicates a strong possibility that the perpetrator of the anthrax laced letter mailings in 2001 may have at one time or another worked at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] volunteered that the only two USAMRIID employees [REDACTED] could opine as having something to do with the anthrax letters would be [REDACTED] or BRUCE IVINS. [REDACTED] suggested these two individuals partly because of their expertise with Ba and partly because of their personality traits.

[REDACTED] characterized IVINS as being eccentric, funny, and simply different, always appearing to be in a good mood. IVINS is one of the foremost anthrax vaccine experts at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] further volunteered that IVINS has in the past written letters to the editor of the Frederick News Post. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] also advised that IVINS is quite a good juggler and unicycle rider as well. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] was not aware if IVINS favored a particular political view but had heard a rumor that he had shipped a sample of Ba to the Iraqis. [REDACTED] could not provide any further

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 02/01/2007, Page 5

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information pertaining to this rumor. [REDACTED] also advised that IVINS does not have a harmful bone in his body.

As far as suspecting [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] derived a lot of [REDACTED] information about the anthrax-laced letter mailings from a book titled Biohazard and from various rumors floating around.

[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] while [REDACTED] was employed at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED]

As a follow-up to a previous question pertaining to

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] stated that sometime around [REDACTED] Fort Detrick shut down the old athletic facility while they began construction on a new facility. During the construction of the new athletic facility, Fort Detrick erected a temporary athletic facility which they nicknamed the "Hot Dome." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 02/01/2007, Page 6

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When asked if [REDACTED] would be willing to submit to a polygraph examination, [REDACTED] initially expressed doubts about the reliability of polygraph examination results and expressed a hesitancy to submit to one. [REDACTED] expressed concern that the line of questioning during a polygraph examination would extend into other personal areas of [REDACTED] life that would have no correlation as to whether or not [REDACTED] was involved with the anthrax laced letter mailings in 2001. After being informed that the line of questioning during a polygraph examination would not stray from the topic of the anthrax mailings, [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] would probably submit to the examination but would need more time to think about it.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 02/23/2007

On February 21, 2007, [redacted],
date of birth: [redacted] SSAN: [redacted] was
interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] After being advised
of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the
interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] worked in the [redacted] at the United
States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
(USAMRIID) from [redacted] worked with [redacted]

[redacted]

During the [redacted]

[redacted]

This work did not continue for two reasons, dried agents are
difficult to contain and decontaminate and dried agents have dual
use implications. Ba simulants were not considered by Aerobiology
due to the fact that their facility had the capability to use
virulent agents. [redacted] was mainly interested in
the physiological effects of an agent on the animal, and because an
animal's physiological response was achievable using either wet or
dry agent aerosols, the dried project was not initiated.

[redacted] worked for [redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 02/21/2007 at [redacted]File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1680Date dictated 02/23/2007

by [redacted]

[redacted] 05407a.302

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/21/2007, Page 2

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] may have talked about the use of dried aerosols, but [REDACTED] had little time for deviation from [REDACTED] research to delve into new/side projects. [REDACTED] does not remember anything about the purchase or preliminary use of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

As a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] However, [REDACTED] does not know of any discussions with individuals outside of the [REDACTED] regarding the use of dried agents.

[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/21/2007 , Page 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] indicated that all the scientists at USAMRIID were peculiar. [REDACTED] informed that short periodic visits to the lab after hours was necessary to check on experimental animals. These usually involved animal caretakers. However in the case that a PI was checking animals, any prolonged durations for these purposes involved the death of an animal and a pathologist for necropsy and tissue sampling. According to [REDACTED] prolonged off-hour access to suites (over two hours in the middle of the night), especially a Bio-Safety Level-3 (BSL-3) suite is abnormal, as well as a safety violation. Because fatigue could lead to accidents, entering into a BSL-3 environment alone for extended periods of time in the middle of the night was a significant safety issue.

[REDACTED] office was in building [REDACTED] but [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] believed that while at USAMRIID, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] believes that [REDACTED] does not have the skills or experience to perpetrate the anthrax mailings.

[REDACTED] dealt with BRUCE IVINS extensively while at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] described IVINS as a workaholic, who was easily stressed, had health issues, and had a good sense of humor. Due to IVINS' nature and close proximity to USAMRIID, [REDACTED] would not be surprised if IVINS worked in his office at off hours. However, [REDACTED] could not imagine anyone would be in the suites late at night.

[REDACTED] knew [REDACTED] worked for IVINS, however, in dealing with IVINS directly [REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 02/21/2007, Page 4

[REDACTED] suggested that [REDACTED] who often worked with [REDACTED] would be someone to talk to about [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] recalls Ba samples being kept in the walk-in freezer for very short periods of time surrounding experiments. However, these samples were usually already diluted for aerosolization. [REDACTED] believes that all glass impingers containing Ba may have been stored in this walk-in, but only for very short periods. [REDACTED] does not recall storage of any larger stocks (e.g. 500ml flasks) of Ba.

[REDACTED] interacted with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had no discussions with [REDACTED] personnel as to who perpetrated of the anthrax attacks.

Original notes from this interview as well as a Non-disclosure Agreement signed by [REDACTED] on February 21, 2007 will be kept in the FD-340 section of the file, serial 7170.

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/31/2007

To: Washington Field

Attn: IIC [REDACTED]

AMERITHRAX SSAs

SSA R. [REDACTED]

SSA [REDACTED]

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From: Washington Field

AMX-2

Contact: [REDACTED]

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Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

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Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending) -1681

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184.Synopsis: To document information obtained from [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]b6
b7C

Details: During an interview of Bruce Ivins on 01/23/2002, Ivins provided Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] with two images he had captioned with a description of the image. The images were placed in an FD-340 and submitted to the file as item 279A-WF-222936-1A 1037. Each image bears a date and time stamp in the bottom right side of the image, an alpha-numeric label in the upper left side of the image, and displays a sheep's blood agar (SBA) plate labeled with typewritten identifiers to the left of the plate. Each caption describes the *Bacillus anthracis* Ames material used to inoculate the respective plate.

[REDACTED] One caption describes: "Ames strain - From [REDACTED] culture collection at USAMRIID. Similar in appearance to *Bacillus anthracis* colonies from mail. Sent to Porton Down, who sent it to [REDACTED] who sent it to [REDACTED]. This version of the Ames strain was serially passaged before freezing down and storing in the culture collection".

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 01/31/2007

The second caption describes: "Ames strain - from original agar slant from Ames, Iowa, USDA. This is the version of the Ames strain used by [redacted] Bruce Ivins. This version of the Ames strain given to Dugway Proving Ground, Battelle Memorial Research Institute, DRES, and U. of New Mexico."

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During the interview with SA [redacted] Ivins further describes the image of the [redacted] material to have been inoculated with a stock that had been prepared subsequent to multiple growths, during which the organism was transferred from one plate to the next, instead of starting from the original material. Ivins further explained that this process can result in the introduction of mutations that can cause differences in morphology.

Ivins further describes the image of the "original" material to have been inoculated using a culture that is "just a slant away from the cow". Ivins explained, "The Ames stock from the original slant was sent to "Dugway Proving Ground, Battelle Memorial Research Institute, [redacted] D.R.E.S (the Defense Research Establishment at Suffield, Canada), and to [redacted] the University of New Mexico."

When material is shipped from the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), the researcher preparing the shipment describes the items to be shipped on a USAMRIID shipping document, known as a Form 11-R, which is used during the approval process for the shipment, and ultimately maintained in the USAMRIID Safety Office. The 11-R must be signed by the Principle Investigator (PI) responsible for the shipment, the PI's Division Chief, and the Safety Office prior to shipment. Review of 11-R documents from the USAMRIID Safety Office show that the only shipments to the University of New Mexico and Battelle were described to be samples taken from RMR-1029, which is a large preparation of *Bacillus anthracis* Ames spores compiled from multiple productions grown in both, shaker flasks at USAMRIID and fermentors at Dugway Proving Ground. Analysis to date has found RMR-1029 to be the only *Bacillus anthracis* Ames material to have matching genetic signatures identical to the evidentiary spore material from the anthrax attacks of 2001.

Since RMR-1029 was the only material described to have been shipped to Battelle and the University of New Mexico, AMERITHRAX Investigators were confused with regard to the source material descriptions, and the analysis of the morphological variations depicted in the images provided by Ivins.

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 01/31/2007

Evidence item 1B 1308 consists of a CD containing an image labeled "Ivins' spore culture.jpg". The image, [REDACTED] is identical to the image Ivins describes to be from the "original agar slant", having the same date and time stamp and alpha-numeric label.

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On 01/30/2007, SAs [REDACTED] met with [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] place of employment, USAMRIID, Fort Detrick, Maryland, to obtain clarification regarding the image, which had been produced by [REDACTED] confirmed the image to be an SBA plate [REDACTED] a spore culture obtained from Bruce Ivins prior to 1991. [REDACTED] believed the culture to be one of Ivins' first spore preparations of *Bacillus anthracis* Ames spores.

[REDACTED] related that the image identified by Ivins to be [REDACTED] identified the [REDACTED] material to have originated from a frozen stock of *Bacillus anthracis* Ames spore material acquired from [REDACTED] stock samples, subsequent to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] further explained that the images were prepared from material [REDACTED] had in [REDACTED] possession prior to the anthrax attacks of 2001.

♦♦

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS


Date of transcription 03/26/2007

On March 03, 2007, and individual who is not in the position to testify provided the following information:

This individual [REDACTED] BRUCE E. IVINS of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. This individual informed SA [REDACTED] FBI, that

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Investigation on 05/03/2007 at Washington, D.C.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID; -1688

File #

Date dictated N/A


by

SA [REDACTED]

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID
MDC:mdc

-1694

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

1

The following investigation was conducted by Postal
Inspector [redacted] between the dates of February 28, 2007 and
March 22, 2007 in Frederick, Maryland:

Subsequent to an interview conducted on January 31,
2007 with [redacted]
[redacted] to Postal Inspector [redacted]

[redacted] BRUCE
IVINS is currently a civilian research scientist employed at the
United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases (USAMRIID) located in Frederick, Maryland.

Attached herewith are [redacted]
[redacted] during the time periods mentioned above. In summary,


[redacted]

Copies of the [redacted] are attached.

FILENAME: 302 [redacted] S

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57  (for LISA)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

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