

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Date of transcription 03/16/2004

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On 3/16/04, [redacted] born on [redacted] social security number [redacted], residing at [redacted] home telephone number [redacted] work telephone number [redacted], mobile telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at the [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following:

[redacted] mailing address [redacted] is [redacted] address is [redacted] telephone number [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] was assigned to [redacted] at [redacted] from [redacted] to [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] obtained [redacted] degree in [redacted] from [redacted] in [redacted] then [redacted] began working full time at USAMRIID. [redacted] worked at the [redacted] Division [redacted] and

[redacted]

[redacted] explained that while at USAMRIID [redacted] did not work directly with "bench top Bacillus anthracis" (Ba), however [redacted] did have access to rooms where research and experiments with Ba

Investigation on 3/16/04 at [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-602

Date dictated 3/16/04

by [redacted]

279A-WF-222936

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 3/16/04, Page 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] never worked with Ba on living organisms or DNA. [REDACTED] did not have any knowledge of any Ba distribution, but [REDACTED] was around individuals who worked with Ba on a daily basis. [REDACTED] advised that most of the people at USAMRIID who dealt with Ba would be able to easily dry Ba, and if someone was curious they can learn how to dry Ba by conducting minimal open media research. Since [REDACTED] never dealt with Ba directly [REDACTED] had no need to learn any techniques on how to dry Ba.

[REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] worked with Bruce Ivins on many occasions, however none of [REDACTED] work with Ivins involved Ba. [REDACTED] could not recall working with [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] name sounded very familiar.

[REDACTED] has no expertise in Ba weaponization techniques. It was [REDACTED] opinion that any person who worked with Ba, could learn how to weaponize Ba if they wanted to. [REDACTED] could not identify anyone specifically who might be involved in Ba weaponization. [REDACTED] remembered that after the Anthrax letters were sent, USAMRIID decided to increase safety procedures at the facility. Safety personnel conducted swabbing inside and outside of suites and determined that there was contamination outside certain suites, however [REDACTED] could not recall which suite had been identified as being contaminated. [REDACTED] further advised that one of the buildings on USAMRIID grounds is boarded up and is not being used as it was contaminated from a laboratory accident dating back almost 30 years ago. Every once in a while safety personnel conduct tests and swabs on this building, but to date the contamination rate still at a high level and the building remains vacant.

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[REDACTED] explained that [REDACTED] had full access to buildings [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Building [REDACTED] was referred to as [REDACTED] as it contained [REDACTED] among other things [REDACTED] office was also [REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 3/16/04, Page 3

located in this building. Looking at the maps for [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] often frequented the [REDACTED] as [REDACTED] [REDACTED] also visited the [REDACTED] any time [REDACTED] needed to check with the technician officers. [REDACTED] visited the [REDACTED] on the first floor any time [REDACTED] was called to [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] [REDACTED] or to examine [REDACTED] explained that when [REDACTED] needed to visit the [REDACTED] entered the building, changed into [REDACTED] lab outfit in the [REDACTED] changing area [REDACTED] and then accessed the [REDACTED] visited the [REDACTED] of the first floor on a daily basis as a [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] used to store [REDACTED] in a walk-in cooler, however this cooler was not located in room [REDACTED] it was located in the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] does not recall seeing anyone entering the cooler in room [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] does not know what was stored in this cooler. Looking at the map, [REDACTED] advised that the location of the cooler in room [REDACTED] would possibly contain non-food items.

[REDACTED] explained that "Piggy Backing" is against the rules at USAMRIID, however it was being done [REDACTED] advised that each person should swipe his ID prior to entering a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] could not recall any instance where [REDACTED] let anyone "Piggy Back" into a [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] stated that visiting scientists were allowed access to [REDACTED] however prior permission was to be obtained. [REDACTED] advised that no "Piggy Backing" took place with visiting scientists.

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[REDACTED] explained that if any employee with the right access wanted to, it would not have been difficult to take agents out of the [REDACTED] at USAMRIID [REDACTED] explained that if one had the intention of doing harm, all he/she would have to do is [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] explained that after the mailing of the laced letters, more security procedures were being implemented.

[REDACTED] did not know of anyone who had access to dangerous agents with hostile attitudes towards the government or any political organizations. [REDACTED] expressed [REDACTED] concern regarding a [REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 3/16/04, Page 4

_____ hire _____ Last name unknown (LNU), _____

_____ recalls _____ to have the same access to all areas of the building as _____ did. _____ spent most of _____ time in building _____ also spent a lot of time using the internet. _____ had a discussion with _____ after _____ was removed from _____ for harassment. _____ was unhappy with his removal and _____

_____ stated that _____ would know more details about _____ as _____ knew _____ for a long time.

_____ did not recall any employees _____ associated with who were lax in handling dangerous items or interested in materials that could be turned into harmful agents. _____ advised that _____ was at USAMRIID during the time the laced letters were being sent. _____ stated that _____ never handled any of the laced letters for evidentiary or testing purposes. _____ advised that after the incident, USAMRIID was working 24 hour shifts (duty call) but during _____ shift no letters were received. _____ was not aware that the letters were sent in pre-stamped envelopes. _____ further explained that _____ never purchased any pre stamped envelopes, however _____ once did purchase some stamps from a post office near USAMRIID. _____ did not recall pre-stamped envelopes being kept at USAMRIID as _____ remembers being handed stamps when mailing business letters.

_____ never traveled to Trenton NJ, and did not know any of _____ associates to have traveled there. _____ explained that there is an SOP in place for decontamination, but it was safety's responsibility to conduct decontaminations and _____ was never involved. _____ recognized paraformaldehyde and glutaraldehyde as decontaminates. _____ explained that they were used by caretakers to decontaminate large cages or equipment leaving the suites. _____ did not remember smelling any of the above listed decontaminates as _____ explained the decontamination took place at night in a "lock air" space. The only decontaminate _____ remember smelling in the virology suites were table decontaminate such as Ethanol.

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 3/16/04, Page 5

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_____ used plastic containers for storage and _____ was not aware of any plastic containers missing. _____ was not familiar with the term Sterilite boxes.

_____ explained that _____ never met _____ and _____ never saw _____ in person anywhere. After _____ heard from several USAMRIID employees, that if _____ was convicted it won't be a surprise. _____ knew from colleagues that _____ worked with Ba while at USAMRIID. _____ advised that civilian workers would probably know _____ better than military personnel as military employees rotate out of USAMRIID facilities every two to three years. _____ suggested that the following as individuals who knew _____ the most: _____

_____ never hosted any foreign visiting scientists while working at USAMRIID.

_____ stated that _____ would like to assist the FBI in its investigation and _____ would be available for further questioning if needed. _____ further advised that between _____, _____ will be visiting at the aforementioned address in _____ and _____ will be available to answer any further questions we might have.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/21/2004

[redacted]
Division, date of birth [redacted] social security account
number [redacted] was interviewed on [redacted] at [redacted] place
of employment at the United States Army Medical Institute of
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). After being advised of the
identity of the agent and the purpose of the interview, [redacted]
provided the following information:

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[redacted] stated that [redacted] was incorrect in telling the
interviewing agent on [redacted] that some of the post-
challenge plates used by BRUCE IVINS were made with blood agar.

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[redacted] said that the plates used by IVINS were made of Tryptic
Soy Agar (TSA) made by the Cell Culture group at USAMRIID, and
blood agar plates were not used. [redacted] noted that the water
used in the all glass impingers (AGI) was purchased commercially.

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[redacted] stated that blood agar plates were used by [redacted]
[redacted] who had worked in room [redacted]

[redacted] stated that there was a lyophilizer located
in room [redacted] of Building [redacted] at USAMRIID. The unit was older,
large, and on wheels. The lyophilizer in room [redacted] was sometimes
used in room [redacted] of Building [redacted]. The unit was used by [redacted]
as part of [redacted] studies on [redacted]

[redacted] said that the dilutions, that were prepared
as part of the post-challenge plates, were stored in the walk-in
cooler on the first of Building [redacted] because there was not enough
room in the refrigerator in room [redacted]. [redacted] noted that the
fifteen (15) milliliter (ml) AGI conicals and the dilutions were
disposed of after the post-challenge plates had been read. Most of
the AGI samples were autoclaved in room [redacted] of Building [redacted] by
IVINS prior to disposal.

[redacted] stated that IVINS brought over a large flask
containing the liquid preparation of *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) to
be used in the aerosol challenges to Building [redacted] from Building
[redacted] the day before a challenge was to occur. The flask would be
stored in room [redacted] of Building [redacted]. The material that was not

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b7CInvestigation on 03/18/2004 at Frederick, MDFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 616Date dictated N/Aby SA [redacted]
[redacted] 040801.wpd

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 03/18/2004, Page 2

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used in the challenge would be stored in the refrigerator in room _____ of Building _____

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_____ stated that the trash bags of material removed from room _____ of Building _____ and taken to the basement of Building _____ would remain there for several days if not over a week before being autoclaved by the animal caretakers.

_____ stated that _____ did not know of any association that _____ had in _____ was unaware of any travel of _____ to _____ or any personal or business contacts there. _____ stated that _____ may have heard of a connection between _____ and _____ following the investigation of _____ by the Amerithrax Task Force.

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_____ provided writer with a previously handwritten page of notes regarding information _____ wanted to convey during the interview. _____ note will be maintained in the 1A along with the notes taken during this interview.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Date of transcription 03/17/2004

On March 17, 2004, [redacted]

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]

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[redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed telephonically. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] stated that the conicals used by BRUCE IVINS to transport the *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) from Building [redacted] to Building [redacted] at the United States Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland, were fifty (50) milliliter (ml) in size. The conicals used in the all glass impingers (AGI) were fifteen (15) ml. The B.a. Ames that was used in the post-challenge plates came from the fifteen (15) ml AGI conicals. Following the aerosol challenges, the fifteen (15) ml AGI conicals would be stored in racks, in the refrigerator for one (1) or two (2) days, in room 115. The AGI conicals were disposed of in the same bags that contained the discarded post-challenge plates. Sometimes, but not always, prior to disposing the liquid contained in the AGI conicals, IVINS would pour the material into a water and bleach solution.

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[redacted] stated that it was [redacted] impression that the [redacted], described in [redacted] interview, were killed by [redacted] as well as by others. This took place while [redacted] was in [redacted]

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[redacted] stated that the diameter of the hole in the plexiglass plates located in the exposure boxes that were used for the aerosol challenges was at least six (6) to eight (8) inches. [redacted] described the plexiglass plate as being rectangular and having dimensions of six (6) inches by eight (8) inches. The plate has four (4) holes which were used to insert screws to fasten the plate to the box.

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[redacted] said that [redacted] had seen the post-challenge plates of B.a. Ames after they had been sitting in room [redacted] of Building [redacted] at USAMRIID for an extended amount of time in the [redacted]

Investigation on 03/17/2004 at Washington, DC (Telephonically)b6
b7CFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 617Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]

[redacted] 040771.wpd [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 03/09/2004, Page 2

trash bags. [REDACTED] described the plates as being completely covered with growth.

[REDACTED] stated that some of the post-challenge plates were made of blood agar and a lot of the times they were made of Tryptic Soy Agar (TSA). The plates were either purchased by IVINS from a commercial source or they were made by the Cell Culture group at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] said that from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] while still working for [REDACTED] had worked on some [REDACTED] immunological studies in room [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED] at USAMRIID with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] room [REDACTED] was turned over to [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] Division at USAMRIID. The room was used as a cold laboratory used to work on [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Room [REDACTED] had a hood, centrifuge, and water bath in it.

[REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] had a lyophilizer in room [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED] at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] did not see [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] in room [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED] at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] does not remember seeing a sterilite container in Building [REDACTED] at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] did not see [REDACTED] carrying or using a sterilite container at USAMRIID.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Date of transcription 01/22/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] social security number [redacted]
[redacted] telephone number [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of business, the United
States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
(USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone number [redacted]
[redacted] After being advised the identity of the interviewing agents
and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following
information:

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[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] worked at USAMRIID [redacted] from [redacted]
until [redacted] came back to USAMRIID as a [redacted]
[redacted] in [redacted] works for [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] has a [redacted] Degree [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] primary work areas are Suites [redacted] and [redacted]
also works in Suite [redacted] and building [redacted] Rooms [redacted]

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[redacted] *Bacillus anthracis*
(Ba), Ames strain. [redacted] these stocks for (BRUCE/IVINS) and
[redacted] These are utilized in aerosolization challenges that
the Investigators conduct. [redacted] has not had to [redacted] any Ames
in approximately [redacted]

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b7CInvestigation on 1/22/04 at Frederick, MD

USAMRIID-630

File # 279A-WF-222936 / 279A-BA-C101392 - 142sDate dictated 1/22/04by SA [redacted]
Postal Inspector [redacted]

279A-WF-222936 / 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 1/22/04, Page 2

The process for harvesting is as follows: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] would then label it and place it into the refrigerator [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The label would list the strain, date, purified and
[REDACTED] initials.

[REDACTED] IVINS and [REDACTED] shared a lot of stock, therefore
[REDACTED] assumed both used [REDACTED] had prepared. The
origination of the Ames strain was in a bottle in the refrigerator
and [REDACTED] did not know beyond that how it entered USAMRIID or
where it came from. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] does not know how to dry Ba and was told that
USAMRIID does not have the capabilities to dry Ba.

279A-WF-222936 / 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 1/22/04

, Page 3

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[REDACTED]

There were occasions that BRUCE IVINS, [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] would autoclave [REDACTED] items if they saw them under the hood. [REDACTED]

The only lyophilizer [REDACTED] knew of was in the hallway of building [REDACTED] outside [REDACTED]. In [REDACTED] found out that the lyophilizer was IVINS. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] does not know how to operate a lyophilizer and [REDACTED] did not know how long it had been in the hallway.

Individuals that [REDACTED] identified as persons who have expertise in weaponization techniques, spore production and lyophilizing are BRUCE IVINS, [REDACTED] and most of the investigators in the [REDACTED] Division.

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Shortly after USAMRIID handled the anthrax letters (FBI evidence), [REDACTED] was told that the hallway between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] the change room in [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had all been contaminated with anthrax spores. Swabbings were conducted in all of these areas.

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[REDACTED] does not have knowledge of what actually took place however, there are several rumors regarding this incident. [REDACTED] heard that [REDACTED] brought the spores through a passbox from the letters prior to locks being placed on the pass box. [REDACTED] also heard that BRUCE IVINS brought the spores through the passbox. Another rumor [REDACTED] heard was that [REDACTED] who was helping handle the letters did not wash properly upon leaving the suite therefore, contaminating the areas.

If someone wanted to remove a Select Agent from the hot areas covertly, they could walk out with it in their possession prior to September 11, 2001 explained [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] someone come out of a hot suite dry indicating that they had not showered.

[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936 / 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 1/22/04, Page 4

[REDACTED]

In 1999, soldiers were arrested and discharged for stealing Ketmine out of the laboratories. Ketmine is a drug used to tranquilize the animals prior to them being bled out. The soldiers were placing vials of the liquid into their coat jackets and walking off base. The Army found out about this when a roommate of one of the soldiers told on [REDACTED] believed that only Army CID was notified about this.

In 2000 [REDACTED] traveled through New Jersey but never stopped. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were traveling from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] and missed a detour thus winding up in New Jersey by accident. [REDACTED] does not have any connections to New Jersey.

[REDACTED] has bought stamps from the vending machine at the 7th street post office in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] could not recall if he ever purchased pre-stamped envelopes and believed [REDACTED] had not.

[REDACTED] agreed to be polygraphed which is scheduled for [REDACTED]

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Date of transcription 04/01/2004b6
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[redacted]
[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account
number [redacted] work telephone number [redacted] was
interviewed telephonically on April 1, 2004 while at [redacted] place of
employment at the United States Army Medical Institute of
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). After being advised of the
identity of the agent and the purpose of the interview, [redacted]
provided the following information:

[redacted] stated that the seven (7) milliliters (ml) of
material that remained at the end of an aerosol exposure would be
poured back into the fifty (50) ml conical provided by the
investigator. [redacted] confirmed that at the end of each day,
when thirty (30) animals were exposed, 210 ml of material, or 105
ml per hood, would be left over. [redacted] stated that the
nebulizers would not be cleaned between aerosol runs. Normally at
the end of the day the nebulizers would be autoclaved in
preparation for the next days challenges along with the trash.
Occasionally there would not be enough time to autoclave the
nebulizer and they would just be decontaminated and cleaned with a
bleach solution and then with a water solution.

There were three custom nebulizers in Building [redacted] at
USAMRIID. The nebulizers were labeled [redacted] The
three custom nebulizers should still be in building [redacted]

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[redacted] stated that the concentration of the material
provided by the investigator would be [redacted]
units per ml. [redacted] said that [redacted] of material was
added to the nebulizer from the [redacted] container.
Prior to [redacted] IVINS would
heat shock the material in a water bath at 45° Centigrade.

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[redacted] stated that it was rare that the lipid
emulsion was used in the anthrax studies. The emulsion was used
when the jets would get clogged which sometimes would occur at the
end of the day. [redacted] believes that one (1) out of ninety
(90) runs would require the use of the emulsion.

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b7CInvestigation on 04/01/2004 at [redacted] Virginia (Telephonically)File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 640Date dictated N/Aby SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]
[redacted] 040922.wpd

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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b7CContinuation of FD-302 of _____, On 04/01/2004, Page 2

_____ stated that all of the material in the hoods would be placed into the same garbage bags, including the tubes, markers, pipettes, towels, animal hairs, any containers, as well as the all glass impingers (AGI). Sometimes the garbage was placed into one (1) or two (2) gallon bio hazard bags, however, most of the time full sized bags were used. Through one of the hoods, the garbage was bagged up and set under the UV light and then sprayed with bleach prior to being removed from the hood. Through the other hood, the garbage was autoclaved out of the hood. All of the garbage was eventually autoclaved in the basement of Building 1412. After the material had been autoclaved, it was placed into the dumpster in the back of Building 1412.

_____ said that the air passing through the bottom of the exposure box would go into the house vacuum system. The vacuum attached to the AGI was also connected to the house system. Both vacuum supplies would pass through a control unit located within the hood. Within the control unit is a ball 0.2 micron HEPA filter. The filters would be replaced approximately every six months. The lab technicians would change the filters inside of the hoods. The house vacuum system also had a series of different filters, located in the penthouse of Building 1412. When the hoods were decontaminated with the paraformaldehyde, the vacuums would be run. The vacuums would draw the paraformaldehyde into the system, thus decontaminating the HEPA filter in the control panel. Some of the paraformaldehyde would also be drawn into the rest of the house vacuum system.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/29/2004

[redacted] date of birth: [redacted]
social security account number: [redacted], address: [redacted]
Place, Frederick, Maryland 21702, home phone: [redacted] was
interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army
Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort
Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of the
interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted]
provided the following information:

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[redacted] holds [redacted] degree in [redacted] from
[redacted] College, [redacted]

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[redacted] first worked at USAMRIID [redacted]
[redacted] in [redacted] and was [redacted]
[redacted] is a [redacted] in the [redacted] Division of
USAMRIID. [redacted] works primarily in room [redacted] of building [redacted] as a
[redacted] works on projects related to the [redacted]

[redacted] is not
[redacted] or [redacted] certified.

[redacted] has not participated in any hot suite work and has
never been around live Ames strain that [redacted] is aware of. [redacted] has
been involved in the growing of [redacted] and [redacted] but
not in a "hot suite" environment. [redacted] does not have [redacted]

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[redacted] did not know where strains of Ames might be stored
and is not sure where Ames stock may come from. [redacted] understands
that BRUCE IVINS probably had control over the Ames stock.

[redacted] did not ever know of any undocumented projects to
be performed and has never known anyone to attempt to dry Ba.

[redacted] did not have any knowledge of there being a cooler
in room [redacted] of building [redacted]

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[redacted] did not know of anyone who might have any knowledge
in the weaponization of biological agents. A biological agent

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Investigation on 3/24/04 at Frederick, Maryland

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File # 279A-WF-222936 USAMRIID - 645 279A-BA-C101392 - 1438

by SA [redacted] Postal Inspector

Date dictated N/Aby SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 3/24/04, Page -2-

might be removed secretly by showering out with it or stashing it on one's person and leaving with it.

[REDACTED] did not suspect anyone of being involved in the mailing of the anthrax-laced letters.

[REDACTED] did not have any interaction with foreign visiting scientists at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] has no personal or professional relationships with anyone in the state of New Jersey.

[REDACTED] did not purchase nor use any pre-stamped postal envelopes.

[REDACTED] had no recollection of any plastic "Sterilite" containers ever being used at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] had never met [REDACTED] and only knew of him from the media coverage of the anthrax case.

[REDACTED] was not involved in the mailings of the anthrax-laced letters and is willing to take a polygraph examination if deemed necessary.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/09/2004

On March 9, 2004, [redacted] Division, date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed at his place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland by Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] and Special Agent [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] did not recognize the name of [redacted] or [redacted] did recognize the name of [redacted] but does not recall from where.

[redacted] did not have any foreign visitors as part of his employment at USAMRIID. [redacted] recalled visitors from Porton Down and from Canada observing aerosol challenges from the "cold" side of Building [redacted] at USAMRIID. The challenges observed were of Ricin and Staphylococcus enterobacteria toxin (SEB) in a Bio Safety [redacted] suite. [redacted] never observed any foreign visitors on the "hot" side of Building [redacted].

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[redacted] left the [redacted] in [redacted] when [redacted] In [redacted] USAMRIID began using rabbits in Anthrax studies instead of mice. The quantities used were between three hundred (300) and four hundred (400) rabbits per study. [redacted] stated that rabbits were used more often than primates were used in Anthrax challenges. Challenges were run three (3) days per week with thirty (30) rabbits per day. Two (2) dilutions of Anthrax were prepared per rabbit for each challenge, and three (3) Tryptic Soy Agar (TSA) plates were cultured per dilution. [redacted] noted that a total of approximately 180 TSA plates were cultured per day when animal challenges were being conducted. The TSA plates were obtained from the [redacted] group at USAMRIID.

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The rooms in Building [redacted] at USAMRIID that were used for Anthrax challenge work were [redacted] and [redacted] Room [redacted] was used to prepare the Anthrax for the challenges. Room [redacted] was used as [redacted]

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b7CInvestigation on 03/09/2004 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 648Date dictated N/Aby SSA [redacted]
SA [redacted]
[redacted] 040691.wpd

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 03/09/2004, Page 2

the aerosol preparation laboratory where the nebulizers and all glass impingers (AGI) were prepared. Room [REDACTED] contained the aerosol hood line. No other rooms were used for aerosol work with Anthrax in Building [REDACTED] noted that the door between rooms [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was locked and closed by screws put into place on the room [REDACTED] side. [REDACTED] said that in 1995, Ames work was done in suite [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED] at USAMRIID while renovations were being done to Building [REDACTED] recalled Ames aerosol challenges being conducted there during that period in suite [REDACTED]

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The *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) Ames used in the challenges was grown in suite [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED] at USAMRIID. The investigators would prepare [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] of solution is used per aerosol challenge. The conical tubes were kept in the refrigerator in room [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED] noted that if any conical tubes were missing from room [REDACTED] someone would notice, however, no one would notice if liquid was taken out of the tubes. BRUCE IVINS would place tape on top of the conical tubes, however, the tape could be easily replaced. No agents for the aerosol challenges were kept in the walk-in cooler on the first floor of Building [REDACTED]

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At the end of the aerosol challenge approximately six (6) or seven (7) ml of B.a. would remain. The B.a. that was not used in the challenges was normally autoclaved prior to being removed from the hood. The remaining material, except for the AGIs, that was used in the challenge would be placed into a bag and autoclaved at the end of the day. The AGIs were sprayed with bleach prior to being removed from the hood line, and then taken to room [REDACTED] for plating. After the plates had been left in the incubator overnight, they would be completely covered with growth. The plates were then read in the morning following a challenge. After the plates were read, they were placed into a bag and clearly marked with what pathogen was in the bag, what strain the pathogen was, and who the investigator was. The bags would remain in room [REDACTED] until nearly overflowing, or until the number of bags in the room became an obstruction. The bags often sat in room [REDACTED] for several days or weeks prior to being removed. [REDACTED] noted that [REDACTED] was fascinated with how much growth appeared on the plates after several days or weeks. The bags were then taken to the basement to be autoclaved. The bags were placed into metal garbage cans in the basement, next to the autoclave, in case there was a leak in the bag. The animal caretakers at USAMRIID would autoclave

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 03/09/2004, Page 3

the bags which contained the TSA plates of Ames and the tubes of Ames solutions.

[REDACTED] believes that [REDACTED] would know the process for plating out the B.a. samples after an aerosol challenge. [REDACTED] recalls [REDACTED] observing the entire process of the B.a. aerosol challenges from the beginning to end. [REDACTED] is not aware of [REDACTED] having been present during the reading of the plates after the plates were left in the incubator overnight. [REDACTED] stated that by deduction, [REDACTED] would know where the post-challenge material would go to be destroyed in the basement of Building [REDACTED] would have used the same autoclave in the basement for [REDACTED] own work and would have noticed the bags from the Ames challenges. [REDACTED] never observed [REDACTED] holding any of the bags containing the post-challenge material or carrying them out of Building [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] stated that there were parking spots near the loading docks in the basement and rear of Building [REDACTED] [REDACTED] said that the parking spots were close enough to the docks that bags could be removed from the building without looking suspicious. The dumpster used for trash, including autoclaved trash, was located beside the parking area. [REDACTED] recalled removing empty boxes through the rear of Building [REDACTED] without being inspected by security. [REDACTED] said that there were video cameras located [REDACTED] however, they were not monitored. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was aware that [REDACTED] would drive a [REDACTED] or something similar [REDACTED] and probably parked in the spots in the rear of Building [REDACTED] since they were very close to the laboratory space that [REDACTED] used.

[REDACTED] had observed [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED] at USAMRIID. While in the [REDACTED] mostly saw [REDACTED] in the area of the animal holding rooms.

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The sterilized water used in the aerosol challenges was provided from the Cell Culture Department at USAMRIID. Occasionally IVINS would provide the sterile water to be used in the challenge. The sterile water used was purchased from a commercial source. The water was stored in suite [REDACTED] of Building 1425. Occasionally, IVINS may have autoclaved the water to make sterile water for the challenge.

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 03/09/2004, Page 4

Located in room _____ was a table-top centrifuge and a super-speed floor model centrifuge as well as an incubator. Room _____ had a table-top centrifuge and two (2) incubators located in it. Room _____ did not have any centrifuge or incubators. One (1) speed vacuum was located in room _____. There was a lyophilizer in _____ area in _____.

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Room _____ was previously used for work on _____ by _____ from _____. The material used by _____ was stored in the ultra low freezer in room _____. Upon completion of _____ work, the remaining samples were taken back to _____.

The animals used in different agent studies were always kept separate.

Room _____ in Building _____ was used to house the animals, mostly mice, to be used in Pox challenges. The animals housed in room _____ were used in the challenges conducted by _____. _____ had watched the aerosol challenges of many different agents. The Monkey Pox studies were done in room _____ of Building _____. The Monkey Pox challenges were either aerosol or intramuscular, but both types were conducted in suite _____.

_____ in room _____ to be used as part of _____ stated that _____ believed that _____ was the type of person to _____ for work outside of USAMRIID even though it was against regulation.

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_____ recalled _____ asking if _____

The post challenge plating was conducted in the hoods located in room _____ by IVINS or _____ but never plated B.a. Ames. Hoods one (1) and two (2) in room _____ were mainly used for B.a. work and were kept "hot" most of the time. IVINS and _____ were

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 03/09/2004 , Page 5

the only scientists doing aerosol challenges with B.a. [REDACTED] was the lead for a lot of work on B.a. [REDACTED] would assist in the challenges by holding the rabbits during the challenges.

[REDACTED] noted that [REDACTED] was an [REDACTED] working on B.a. and may have done some challenges. There would sometimes be eight (8) or ten (10) people working in the laboratory during a challenge.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] never did any of the aerosol challenges for [REDACTED] was very "hands on" in 1992 before the department grew, however, became more of [REDACTED] as staff were added.

[REDACTED] saw [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in front of the change room on the "hot" side of Building [REDACTED] outside of the aerosol exposure laboratory. [REDACTED] did not see [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] together in room [REDACTED] or in room [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] saw [REDACTED] at a [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] had organized. [REDACTED] recalled that [REDACTED] was at the party as well. [REDACTED] remembered that he was surprised to see [REDACTED] at the party. [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] as having interesting stories regarding [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] never knew what side [REDACTED] was working for [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] remembered [REDACTED] talking about [REDACTED].

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[REDACTED] never mentioned working on bio-warfare. [REDACTED] never mentioned the Anthrax outbreak in [REDACTED] however, [REDACTED] recalled reading about it. [REDACTED] never mentioned any scenarios that [REDACTED] used as part of the training [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] never mentioned making any simulants for training exercises. [REDACTED] was aware that [REDACTED] was involved with [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] remembered a rumor that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that it would have been known if someone was growing B.a. in room [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED]. In the mid-1980's to the late 1990's room [REDACTED] was used as a storage room. From 1997 through 1999 room [REDACTED] was being renovated to be used [REDACTED]

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 03/09/2004, Page 6

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again as laboratory space. There was no incubator or lyophilizer in room [] during that time.

[] is unaware of [] performing any necropsies on animals which had been exposed to B.a. Ames. [] stated that [] might have been present during some primate necropsies, however, there were not many primates that were exposed to B.a. [] noted that there were only a few necropsies performed on rabbits exposed to B.a. After any necropsies were performed, the remains would be bagged up, placed into boxes, and autoclaved in the basement of Building []. The same procedure was done for necropsies in Building []. The work done in suite [] of Building [] would be autoclaved in suite [].

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[] never mentioned an improvised hood or glove box to []. [] recalled [] taking a hood from Building [] at USAMRIID in the late 1990's, []

[] Everybody was taking items out of Building [] at USAMRIID. []

[] is unaware of [] taking any other equipment from USAMRIID. []

[] noted that during the period when [] was employed at USAMRIID, an exposure box was found to be missing and was never located. [] would know more details about the missing exposure box. []

[] has no contacts in the state of New Jersey or with anyone associated to the Princeton, New Jersey area. [] never mentioned New Jersey to [] is not

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 03/09/2004, Page 7

aware of any researchers or studies associated with New Jersey or the Princeton, New Jersey area.

_____ never mentioned to _____ an envelope permeability study.

_____ has been to _____ in Frederick, Maryland. _____ never mentioned _____ to _____ and _____ never saw _____ at the _____

_____ never mentioned anything about B.a. simulants to _____

_____ recalled going to the Department of Energy facility in _____ for training in _____ or _____ saw an old screw-type device that was shaving a block of soap to make a powder. _____ did not attend the training, however, _____ and _____ did attend the sessions.

_____ never mentioned being at the University of _____ to _____

_____ is current on all of his vaccinations. _____ is vaccinated for entry into the _____ suites at USAMRIID.

_____ is not aware of _____ having accessed any classified documents at USAMRIID.

_____ has never been into the area where classified documents are stored at USAMRIID. _____ is aware that only a pencil and paper are allowed to be taken into the room and no other material is allowed to be taken out of the room.

_____ never saw _____ at USAMRIID after _____ employment ended. _____ is not aware of _____ having been in the challenge areas after _____ departure. _____ recalled seeing _____

_____ has never seen _____ again following this incident.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 03/09/2004, Page 8

[REDACTED] recalled [REDACTED] stating that when [REDACTED] was around, they should do things "by the book". [REDACTED] felt that

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] expressed willingness to provide additional information to agents including any documentation that [REDACTED] could find regarding his whereabouts during the anthrax letter mailings in September and October 2001. [REDACTED] also agreed to meet with the Assistant United States Attorney in Washington, DC.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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b7CDate of transcription 04/01/2004

[redacted]
[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account
number [redacted] work telephone number [redacted] was
interviewed on March 31, 2004, at [redacted] place of employment at the
United States Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases
(USAMRIID). After being advised of the identity of the agents and
the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following
information:

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b7FInvestigation on 03/31/2004 at Frederick, MDb6
b7CFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 649Date dictated N/Aby SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

40921.wpd

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 03/31/2004, Page 10

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was advised by the interviewing agents regarding the sensitivity of the information queried during the interview. It was requested that [REDACTED] not discuss the subject matter of the interview with anyone else.

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- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Date of transcription 04/12/2004

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[redacted] born [redacted] social security number [redacted] phone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, UNITED STATES ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland, phone number [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] is employed at USAMRIID as [redacted] and has worked in the same position since being hired in [redacted] has [redacted] and received training from USAMRIID for [redacted] is vaccinated for entry into the [redacted] of Building [redacted] and [redacted] of USAMRIID and has received the standard training regarding proper safety precautions when working in these areas. [redacted] does not have the training or access to enter any [redacted] suite. [redacted] has received no formal training in handling any specific select biological or chemical agent beyond what USAMRIID requires for entry in any [redacted]

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[redacted] worked predominantly in Building [redacted] from approximately [redacted] to [redacted]. Since [redacted] mostly works in suite [redacted] of Building [redacted] occasionally works in Building [redacted]. [redacted] also occasionally works in suites [redacted] and [redacted] of Building [redacted]. [redacted] has worked in almost every [redacted] at USAMRIID during the course of [redacted] employment.

[redacted] has no knowledge of any research of *Bacillus anthracis* being conducted at USAMRIID and does not know where stocks of any strain of anthrax are stored. [redacted] has worked with [redacted]

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[redacted] has not autoclaved anything in Building [redacted] has done all of [redacted] autoclaving in Building [redacted] would autoclave [redacted]

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Investigation on 04/07/2004 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated

SA [redacted]
by SA [redacted]

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 04/07/2004, Page 2

suites, but had no knowledge of what was inside them. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not recall any specific individuals who violated USAMRIID security protocol by improper use of their access badges or "piggy backing" into laboratory areas of USAMRIID. [REDACTED] was sure that this practice occurred, but had no first hand knowledge.

[REDACTED] does not associate with [REDACTED] at USAMRIID and has no knowledge of any activities surrounding any laboratory areas. [REDACTED] does not know what select agents are used at USAMRIID or where they are stored unless specifically indicated on the entry door of a particular "hot" suite. [REDACTED] believes that [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED] contains anthrax because it is listed on the door. [REDACTED] and stated that BRUCE IVINS and [REDACTED] work in that laboratory. [REDACTED] thought that [REDACTED] worked with anthrax and [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] had no specific information.

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[REDACTED] has never removed any item from a "hot" suite nor has [REDACTED] ever been asked to do so. [REDACTED] has no knowledge of anyone removing biological agents from any "hot" suite.

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[REDACTED] has moved cultures for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This occurred about [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was working on a weekend. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had been asked to do this on a couple of occasions when [REDACTED] worked over the weekend. [REDACTED] had no knowledge of what may have been on the cultures [REDACTED] handled.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 04/07/2004, Page 3

[REDACTED] did not know [REDACTED] on a personal level, but recognized [REDACTED] in the hallway. [REDACTED] was usually seen in [REDACTED], Suite [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED] had no knowledge of [REDACTED] work at USAMRIID.

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[REDACTED] has never worked with and has never had any contact with the letters containing anthrax which were mailed to the NEW YORK POST, TOM BROKAW and UNITED STATES SENATORS TOM DASCHLE and PATRICK LEAHY, and does not know anyone who has.

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[REDACTED] does not know anyone who has expressed anti American views or hostile attitudes toward any individual or organization. [REDACTED] does not know of anyone who expressed interest in gaining access to anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents without a specific need or responsibility to do so. [REDACTED] has no knowledge of anyone who would be capable of being involved in the anthrax attacks.

[REDACTED] was not aware of any visiting scientists who may have worked at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] has never used pre-stamped envelopes like the ones used in the anthrax mailings and has no knowledge of anyone who does.

[REDACTED] was working at USAMRIID during the time of both anthrax mailings in September and October of 2001 and did not visit New Jersey during that time-frame.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Date of transcription 04/15/2004

[redacted] date of birth: [redacted]
[redacted] social security account number: [redacted] home
address [redacted] home
phone: [redacted] was interviewed at the FBI off-site office in
Frederick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of the
interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted]
provided the following information:

[redacted] holds a [redacted] degree from the University of
[redacted] in [redacted] and is employed at the United
States Army Medical Research Institute for infectious Diseases,
(USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick, Maryland. [redacted] is [redacted]
[redacted] in the [redacted] Division.

[redacted] felt very strongly that the Bio-Port Corporation
of Michigan had something to do with the mailings of the anthrax-
laced letters. Thirty to forty years ago the Anthrax Vaccine
Absorbed (AVA) went to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for
licensure. A Michigan Senator had ear-marked funds for the
creation of a production contract for Dimeport or Bio-port in
Michigan. Bio-Port began production of AVA in large quantities for
its sole customer, the United States government. The United States
also shares its vaccine with other countries. Bio-Port eventually
amassed several FDA production quality violations (known as 483's)
and in 1999 or 2000 Bio-Port's license was suspended and they were
ordered to stop production of AVA. Shortly after the anthrax-laced
letters were mailed, Congress ordered the FDA to lift Bio-Port's
suspension and re-issue Bio-port's production license.

[redacted] knew that BRUCE IVINS and [redacted]
[redacted] at USAMRIID, were told to help get Bio-Port
back online for vaccine production.

[redacted] believed that someone closely involved with Bio-
Port's financial interests may have hired someone to produce the
anthrax-laced letters to specific targets in order to create a
scare and the need for increased production of the AVA anthrax
vaccine. This would also slow the development of a new vaccine
called Recombinant Protective Antigen (RPA) which would eventually
render AVA obsolete.

Investigation on 4/15/04 at Frederick, Maryland

USAMRIID-673

File # 279A-WF-222936, 279A-BA-C101392 - 1482

Date dictated n/a

by SA [redacted] Postal Inspector

by

SA [redacted]

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Date of transcription 03/31/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social
Security Account Number [redacted] home address [redacted]
[redacted] home telephone number [redacted]
cellular telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place
of employment [redacted]
[redacted] work telephone number [redacted] After
being advised of the nature of the interview and the identity of
the interviewing agents, [redacted] provided the following
information:

[redacted] graduated from [redacted] High School, [redacted],
[redacted] in [redacted]
[redacted] In the Fall of [redacted]
[redacted] enrolled in [redacted] University and graduated in [redacted]
with a [redacted]

From January [redacted] to [redacted] was employed with

[redacted]

From [redacted] to [redacted] was employed at

[redacted]

From [redacted] to [redacted] was employed
with the United States Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Bacteriology Division. [redacted] was

Investigation on 03/26/2004 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID ⁶⁷⁵ 279A-BA-C101392 ¹⁴⁵⁴ Date dictated 03/31/2004

by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 03/26/2004, Page 2

[REDACTED] and reported to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] in Building [REDACTED]
was a [REDACTED] and was responsible for [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] also participated on the [REDACTED] Project with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] never worked with the Ames strain of B.a. [REDACTED]
never worked on any projects with B.a., however [REDACTED] was aware that
BRUCE IVINS, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] worked with B.a.
[REDACTED] was responsible for growing and harvesting [REDACTED]
strain which is used in the anthrax vaccine. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not do any work involving the drying of B.a.
and has never used a lyophilizer. *gfc*

[REDACTED] stated that BRUCE IVINS, [REDACTED] AND
[REDACTED] may have had expertise in weaponization techniques,
spore production and lyophilizing of B.a.

[REDACTED] was not aware of any areas at USAMRIID that had
problems with bacterial contamination.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] primarily used the following areas
in Building [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] never used the hot areas in
Building [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] does not recall ever going into the cold
storage room [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was not aware of anybody piggybacking through
doorways at USAMRIID, however [REDACTED] stated that it probably occurred.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 03/26/2004, Page 3

_____ stated that it would be easy to remove select agents from the hot areas because security was lax. Also, _____ stated that it would be easy to conceal select agents on a persons body without anyone detecting it.

_____ was not aware of anyone that stated they might make a select agent for use in an improper fashion.

_____ is not aware of any persons, with hostile attitudes against the United States of America or any of its interest, that had the ability and willingness to use biological agents against the United States of America or its interest.

_____ is not aware of any persons that may be a suspect or may be associated with the mailings of the anthrax letters.

_____ is not aware of any people who _____ has worked with that were lax in handling dangerous items or inappropriately interested in agents that could be turned into harmful agents.

_____ was not aware of anyone at USAMRIID who was rumored to be interested in gaining access to anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents or the means to produce them without a specific need or responsibility to do so. _____ is not aware of anyone who expressed a special interest in being able to get around forensic techniques.

_____ does not have any connection with Trenton, New Jersey or any other areas in New Jersey. However, _____ was in _____ in approximately _____ at a conference being held by _____. The theme of the conference was _____

_____ is not aware of any work being conducted with B.a or its simulants which were unofficial or not recorded.

_____ work was recorded in laboratory notebooks and _____ believes said laboratory notebooks are maintained in the USAMRIID library.

_____ never purchased pre-stamped envelopes similar to the type used in the anthrax mailings.

_____ did not personally handle any of the anthrax-laced letters or envelopes and _____ did not do any analytical work on the evidence in this case.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 03/26/2004, Page 4

From [REDACTED] to present, [REDACTED] has been working
with [REDACTED]
is responsible for production of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Enclosed in the 1A envelope is [REDACTED] curriculum vitae
and a disk containing a power point presentation on [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/30/2004

[redacted] date of birth: [redacted]
[redacted] social security account number: [redacted] home
address [redacted] home
phone: [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the
United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious
Diseases (USAMRIID). After being advised of the identity of the
interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted]
provided the following information:

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[redacted] is a [redacted] at USAMRIID in the
[redacted] Division, building [redacted] has been employed at
USAMRIID since [redacted] previously worked at the
[redacted] is a [redacted]
[redacted] and has a [redacted] degree in [redacted] from the
University of [redacted] has worked primarily in
[redacted]

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[redacted] has worked with studies involving [redacted]
[redacted] has not worked in building
[redacted] has only accessed [redacted] to [redacted]
[redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted] is not [redacted] certified but is
[redacted] certified.

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[redacted] has not worked with *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba)
directly. [redacted] has [redacted]

[redacted] has never grown a culture but understands that
animal free media is used. [redacted] may grow Delta strain Ba for
characterization studies.

[redacted] may have Ames strain Ba in [redacted] freezer.

[redacted] has seen a lyophilizer in [redacted] but has never
known anyone to dry Ba.

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[redacted] knew that [redacted] and BRUCE IVINS would have
grown Ames spores for research. A contractor, [redacted]
[redacted] was involved in spore research.

b2
b7EInvestigation on 3/26/04 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-222936 USAMRIID-676 279A-BA-C101392 - 1455Date dictated N/Aby SA [redacted] Postal Inspectorb6
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4/28/04

279A-222936 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____

, On 3/26/04, Page 2

_____ has never seen anyone "piggy-back" at USAMRIID.

_____ knew that before security was tightened at USAMRIID, it would be easy to remove a select agent from the hot suites via the pass-box and airlock or by showering out with it.

_____ did not know of anyone who had hostile attitudes towards the government, political organizations, or the media.

_____ did not know anyone with specific knowledge of the weaponization process for biological agents.

_____ felt that the mailings may have been committed by someone closely associated with Bio-Port (formally Dimeport) of Michigan. Bio-Port had a contract to produce the anthrax vaccine for the United States Government and other countries. Bio-port's production was suspended in 1999 or 2000 by the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for quality control issues. Bio-port risked losing the government contract. After the anthrax mailings, the United States Congress ordered the FDA to withdraw the Bio-ports suspension so that Bio-port could again continue producing the anthrax vaccine.

_____ felt that the anthrax-laced letters could have been produced in a home made glove-box if properly sealed.

_____ thought that to prepare the spores one might need to use acetone extraction and good filtration to get rid of any cellular debris or it would not work.

_____ did not see any Sterilite-type containers at USAMRIID.

_____ recalled that an old glove box sat outside of building 1412 for awhile but _____ did not know what happened to it.

_____ did not know of any research being conducted "off the books".

_____ has not ever purchase pre-stamped envelopes from the Post Office or vending machines.

_____ did not know _____ knew of the name and understood that _____ had a record of _____

279A-222936 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 3/26/04, Page 3

_____ did not host any foreign visiting scientists.

_____ has not worked with the Aeromedical Isolation Team.

_____ strongly believes ~~Dimeport~~ or ~~Bio-Port~~ had some involvement in the mailings of the anthrax-laced letters.

_____ is willing to take a polygraph examination relative to this case.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6
b7cDate of transcription 04/06/2004

On April 6, 2004, [redacted]
born [redacted] with social security account number [redacted]
was interviewed at the United States Attorney's Office, District of
Columbia, in the presence of [redacted] (telephone
[redacted]). The interview was conducted by Supervisory Special
Agent [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
and Assistant United States Attorney Kenneth C. Kohl of the
District of Columbia. After being advised of the identity of the
interviewers and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided
the following information:

In [redacted] current employment at [redacted]
[redacted] is a [redacted]
and [redacted]
official title is [redacted]

[redacted] worked at the United States Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) from [redacted]
until [redacted] left [redacted] on [redacted] When [redacted]
[redacted] went directly to
USAMRIID where [redacted] was assigned to the [redacted] Division. [redacted]
worked in [redacted] for the duration of [redacted] assignment at
USAMRIID.

USAMRIID offered greater opportunities for research in
the genetics field than some of the other places [redacted]

[redacted] conducted research on [redacted]
[redacted] liked

Investigation on 04/06/2004 at Washington, DCFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 681Date dictated N/A

by SSA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 04/06/2004, Page 2

the science atmosphere and the budget situation at USAMRIID. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] perspective on [REDACTED] work at USAMRIID began to
change after [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

After the anthrax attacks in 2001, [REDACTED] realized that working
in biodefense had lots of liability in addition to health risks. A
researcher who was mentoring someone else would have to worry about
whether they were training the next "anthrax bomber".

The research [REDACTED] conducted at USAMRIID involved
[REDACTED]

It was in this project that [REDACTED] worked with *Bacillus*
anthracis (Ba) at USAMRIID. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] asked BRUCE IVINS to provide a collection of
geographically diverse Ba strains for the anthrax part of the
study. [REDACTED] spotted the Ba strains on the media and destroyed
the cultures IVINS had provided. [REDACTED] does not recall the exact
number of strains used in the study. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 04/06/2004, Page 3

_____ and _____
assisted in the project.

_____ work area was in building _____ suite _____ Room _____ but most of the work was conducted on the _____ side. Suites _____ and _____ during the time _____ worked at USAMRIID, and it was common for people to _____. The researchers and technicians who worked in the two suites were organized as teams, and the research problems were specific to those teams.

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_____ does not know where IVINS' collection of Ba was stored. There were _____ freezers in Suite _____ and _____ freezer in _____. The freezers were not in _____ and _____

_____ moved _____ interests on to _____ when Ba was found not to have _____ properties. The aerosol studies _____ conducted were with _____ not Ba.

In order to get access to building _____, the smallpox vaccine was required. _____

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

b6
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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 04/06/2004, Page 4

in the aerosol challenge labs and never entered the hot side of building _____

_____ moved the cultures in _____ project from Suite _____ to building _____ called ahead to _____ and was met at the airlock door to _____. The technician changed clothes and entered the hot suite. Mice were used exclusively for the aerosol challenges, and hamsters for IP.

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b7C
b7F

_____ never saw _____ at USAMRIID. The work at USAMRIID was very compartmentalized, and _____ would not have had a reason to interact with _____. _____ is not aware of any coworkers who have claimed to have known _____.

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Immediately after the DASCHLE letter was opened in the Senate office building, _____ got a call from _____. _____ recalls that the call was _____ asked _____ and _____ asked if _____ meant for _____. _____ replied with something to the effect of, _____.

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_____ never handled any of the anthrax-laced letters in the case and was never in the same room as any of the letters. After looking at a copy of the USAMRIID floor plans, _____ thought the letters were taken to _____ and _____ because _____ office was in Room _____.

Subsequently, _____ learned that one of the letters had been analyzed in a laboratory _____.

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

b6
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 04/06/2004, Page 5

believes the room was in Suite _____ Rooms _____ and _____ but the _____ maintained the area. It was the same room where _____ initially opened the letter. _____ thinks _____ learned this information from _____. _____ also had another _____. The employees were not told much during the letter investigation.

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_____ did not handle any of the powder from any of the envelopes. _____

_____ had given _____ a nearly impossible turn-around time for the testing of the swabs. Each swab was solubilized in a "special juice" to lift the spores, then the juice was subsampled. Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR), was conducted, followed by gamma phage confirmation and radio-immuno assays (RIA).

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_____ was a _____. _____ told _____ that USAMRIID had to _____

_____ has not thought of anyone else, since the first interview in which _____ mentioned _____ who might have been involved in the mailings of the anthrax-laced letters.

_____ was asked about several foreign visiting scientists to USAMRIID for whom _____ in the USAMRIID records. _____ provided the following information about each listed individual:

_____ was a _____. _____ came to USAMRIID and was vaccinated by USAMRIID. _____

_____ may never have actually come to USAMRIID. USAMRIID was in negotiations with a British company to develop a way to use signature tag mutagenesis to knock out bacterial genes. _____ recognized the name _____ as the British company. If _____ came to USAMRIID, _____ would only have given a seminar and would not have been granted access to any hot suites.

_____ was _____. _____ visited USAMRIID, but _____ so _____ did not

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 04/06/2004, Page 6

have access to the hot suites. [REDACTED] did attend the annual glanders meeting.

[REDACTED] did not recognize the names of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] thought [REDACTED] might have been [REDACTED] for [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was probably listed for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] simply because [REDACTED] might have [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] from [REDACTED] was in charge of the whole [REDACTED] section of [REDACTED] was never in a hot suite with [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] does not know if [REDACTED] ever had access to any hot suites.

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[REDACTED] was [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] on the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was never in the suites unescorted. [REDACTED] used [REDACTED] own badge (swipe card) and Personal Identification Number (PIN) to get [REDACTED] into suites [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Visiting scientists were given swipe cards which would only allow them into the administrative areas of USAMRIID. Different badge access was needed for the hot suites. The [REDACTED] hallway had its own coding.

[REDACTED] did not recognize the names of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] thought they may have attended the glanders meeting at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] described glanders as an obligate pathogen of horses which had been eliminated from the United States through quarantine procedures. Veterinarians sometimes died from it. Glanders is considered a biological weapon pathogen. [REDACTED] saw an article about a clandestine lab in Bethesda which was to infect horses being sent overseas during World War I.

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During the time period encompassing September 17 and 18, 2001, [REDACTED] was in USAMRIID [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] does not recall traveling through or in New Jersey during September or October 2001. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] have no connections to New Jersey. For [REDACTED] the "normal work day starts when you get there and ends when you leave".

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 04/06/2004, Page 7 b6 b7C

[REDACTED] does not recall specific instances in which [REDACTED] followed someone else through a door after they swiped their card. [REDACTED] does not recall anyone else in particular following [REDACTED] through a door after [REDACTED] swiped [REDACTED] card. But, it was common practice for enlisted soldiers to stand aside and let officers key in. They may have piggy-backed. Officers who went into the hot suites at USAMRIID included [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]. While [REDACTED] was at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] was the Commander, and [REDACTED] was the Deputy Commander.

To [REDACTED] knowledge, there was never any stabilization of powdered Ba at USAMRIID.

There could have been large numbers of agar plates in labs at a given time without sending up a red flag. Serial sacrifice experiments were frequently conducted and would require large numbers of plates. In serial sacrifice experiments, a group of animals was exposed to a pathogen. A few animals were removed and sacrificed on a time table to determine the bacterial load over time. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Ten-fold dilutions were prepared for each organ. Five to seven plates were prepared per organ. They would sacrifice three to five animals per time point, so there were hundreds of plates per serial sacrifice experiment.

[REDACTED] was not aware of any large volumes of spore preparations of Ames in suite [REDACTED]. There was a lyophilizer in suite [REDACTED] non-containment suite, but [REDACTED] was not aware of any hot suites which contained a lyophilizer. [REDACTED] was the most common user of the lyophilizer in the [REDACTED] area. Flasks of organisms were only left sitting out alone if they were sterile. There were no "live bugs" out in the suite. Users of the areas [REDACTED] worked in were [REDACTED] IVINS, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] may not have ever seen [REDACTED] in the suite.

[REDACTED] is not aware of any visitors having hand-carried any samples into USAMRIID "under the radar".

[REDACTED] is still in touch with [REDACTED] of USAMRIID [REDACTED]. They did experiments together.

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

b6
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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 04/06/2004, Page 8

[REDACTED] employees have been polygraphed by the FBI, but [REDACTED] does not receive any real updates from anyone.

[REDACTED] did not work closely with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] not to work with anthrax at USAMRIID because there was a harsh political environment about anthrax. There was a feeling of "civilians against the military" because of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] leadership style is like a wagon wheel - "tell them only what they need to know". It does not encourage networking within the workplace. The civilian scientists thought the military scientists' "intelligence was proportional to their hair length". [REDACTED] did not talk with or interact with [REDACTED] because [REDACTED] had been told about this sentiment.

[REDACTED] never dried Ba or produced spores from Ba. [REDACTED] was trained as a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] recalled working an all-nighter early in the [REDACTED] worked all night, and the work was done under supervision. For a while, [REDACTED] was glad to have night shifts. The only times [REDACTED] can remember being at USAMRIID at 1:00 am occurred during the [REDACTED]. The only other all-nighters [REDACTED] worked were during [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] work was documented in laboratory notebooks which should be in the USAMRIID library archive or in the possession of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was shown a printout of [REDACTED] key card access records from USAMRIID which showed an entry at approximately 1:00 am into the hot suite change room. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] does not remember specifically where [REDACTED] was or what [REDACTED] did on the Columbus Day holiday weekend, October 6-9, 2001.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 04/06/2004, Page 9

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On October 1, 2001, there were several swipes of
[REDACTED] card to which the system replied "invalid card".
[REDACTED] thinks this may have been [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The level of sophistication used in the anthrax-laced letter mailings would have required experiments, and [REDACTED] believes someone would have been caught during such experiments. [REDACTED] knows that Dugway prepared dried *Bacillus globigii* simulant, but [REDACTED] does not know of any other people with the knowledge of how to weaponize anthrax.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

b6
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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 04/06/2004, Page 10

[REDACTED] will discuss with [REDACTED] the request for [REDACTED] to submit to a polygraph regarding the anthrax-laced letter mailings. [REDACTED] is willing to provide additional information in the future if requested to do so, but agents should contact [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is further described as follows:

Race:
Sex:
Date of Birth:
SSN:
Home address:
Home telephone:

[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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Page 47 ~ b6, b7C, b7F

Page 48 ~ b6, b7C, b7F

Page 49 ~ b6, b7C, b7F

Page 50 ~ b6, b7C, b7F

Page 51 ~ b6, b7C, b7F

Page 52 ~ b6, b7C, b7F

Page 53 ~ b6, b7C, b7F

Page 54 ~ b6, b7C, b7F

Page 56 ~ b6, b7C, b7F