

REDACTION KEY

- A. CLASSIFIED FBI INFORMATION RE-REVIEWED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.
- C-1. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT PENDING ONGOING CONSULTATION.
- C-2. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THAT GOVERNMENT'S DIRECTION FOLLOWING CONSULTATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.
- D. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE IS REQUIRED. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION IS OBTAINED WILL BE RELEASED.
- F. ADMINISTRATIVELY DESIGNATED FBI FILE AND/OR SERIAL NUMBERS OR HANDLING INFORMATION.
- G. SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION WITHHELD PURSUANT TO THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIVILEGE.
- J-1. SECTION 102A(i)(1) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED BY THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1).
- J-2. INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE BY THE BANK SECRECY ACT (BSA) AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE BSA. SEE 31 C.F.R. § 5311 ET SEQ; 31 C.F.R. CHAPTER X.
- J-3. INFORMATION DETERMINED BY ANOTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY TO BE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f).
- O-1. INFORMATION WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT.
- P. INFORMATION RESTRICTED FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974. SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE PRODUCED IN MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.) PURSUANT TO THE PRIVACY ACT PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED IN THAT CASE.
- P-1. INFORMATION SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, DATES OF BIRTH, AND OTHER SENSITIVE PERSONAL INFORMATION.
- S. NAMES AND OTHER PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL.

NOTE: Classification markings (classification banners and portion markings) are redacted without a code throughout the release.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/29/2004

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field

Contact: (G) (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)
(F)

Case ID #: (F) (Pending)

Title: (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: Results of meeting with (O-1)
(G)

Full Field Investigation Instituted: 01/22/2003

Enclosure(s): (O-1) reporting regarding MUSAED A. AL-JARRAH.

Details: On 12/21/2004 (S) met with (O-1)
(O-1) (O-1) During that meeting reporting regarding AL-JARRAH. (O-1)
(O-1)

(O-1) the enclosed reporting regarding AL-JARRAH. According to these reports (O-1)
(O-1)

[REDACTED]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 12/29/2004

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

[REDACTED] As of early 2002, the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, D.C., had one of the largest Ministry of Islamic Affairs (MIA) sections in the world. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

[REDACTED] Many Saudi Embassy officials believed the that AL-JARRAH was known to be a GIP officer

◆◆

[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/31/2006

To: Washington Field

Attn: [REDACTED]

(S), (G)

From: Washington Field

(G)

Contact: [REDACTED]

(S)

Approved By: [REDACTED]

(S)

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

(S)

Case ID #: [REDACTED]

(F)

Title: [REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

on 10/19/2006.

[REDACTED]
(G)
[REDACTED]

[Redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: [Redacted] (F) [Redacted], 10/31/2006

[Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
[Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
[Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Enclosure(s) : [Redacted]

- [Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
- [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 10/31/2006

- [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
- [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
- Passport information re Nasir Aiyad Mouatlaq AlJoaid [REDACTED] (F)
- Passport information re Ahmed Al Eisa, including contact information. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
- Contact information for [REDACTED] (P) Defense Industry.
- [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) meeting [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) between Prince Saud Al-Faisal and Prince Turki, and five members of the Jewish Community. [REDACTED] (F)
- [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Details: [REDACTED] On October 19, 2006, Writer and SA [REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] Muzahim Al-Hamoud is still doing a poor job as the Chief of Protocol at EKSA. Alangari hates Al-Hamoud, and stated that Al-Hamoud hired two bodyguards on the weekends in order to feel

[REDACTED]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (F) , 10/31/2006

and look important. (A), (G), (J-1) Al-Hamoud chatting with Khalid Nabhani on several occasions for long periods of time in Nabhani's office. (A), (G), (J-1) for the two of them to speak about EKSA related topics since Nabhani is a part of the GIP and Al-Hamoud is in the Protocol office. (A), (G), (J-1) they are talking because they are friends, (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1).

(A), (G), (J-1) EKSA's debt continues to build, and as of August 25, 2006 totaled \$9,863,648.70 for 2006. (A), (G), (J-1) different companies with large sums owed to them are suffering as a result of unpaid bills, and that it has become difficult for EKSA employees to make bookings because they have been refused by some companies until the overdue bills are paid. (A), (G), (J-1) the Saudi's do not pay their bills and (A), (G), (J-1) the issue is back in Saudi Arabia, but Prince Turki has not been aggressive enough in obtaining the funds from Saudi Arabia. (A), (G), (J-1) outstanding bills detailing what amounts were owed to which payees, but indicated that these are only the bills that are overdue. A summary of the bills is provided below (Writer's note: amounts listed on the summary do not add up to the above total):

Air Transportation (Elite Jet Limited, Monarch Travel)	\$304,976.71
Ground Transportation (ABS Limousine, PRS Transportation, Smith Limousine)	\$ 37,697.25
Hotel Stays (Four Seasons, Fairmont Olympic, Hilton, Windsor, Aspen)	\$ 93,309.68
Allied Organizations (C & O Resources, Foreign Reports)	\$220,000.00
Consulting Services (Argus Int'l Group, Safer Publications)	\$669,349.50
Government Relations ((P) [(P)])	\$675,000.00
Nawaf Obaid (Iran Project, Salary)	\$ 46,750.00
Qorvis Communications	\$7,548,518.93

[REDACTED]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 10/31/2006

Office Account Refunds

\$268,046.63

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) C & O Resources, Foreign Reports, Argus International Group and Safeer Publications [REDACTED] (P). Foreign Reports is the company name. [REDACTED] (P) is in [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) (O-1) [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) together. [REDACTED] (P) on intelligence reports and periodically brings in heavily taped packages [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). [REDACTED] (P) calls [REDACTED] (P) in to help out when he needs him, but he does not work there full-time. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (P) is a "scumbag" because he [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) the Ambassador.

[REDACTED] (P) is the [REDACTED] (P) for the above captioned Iran project is headed by. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (P) met with Prince Turki on [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) and warned him that the [REDACTED] (O-1) has received complaints regarding debts that have not been paid by EKSA. EKSA owes C & O Resources [REDACTED] (P) \$120,000.00 for 2006. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) (A), (G), (J-1) her unhappiness about the outstanding debt [REDACTED] (A), (G), (A), (G), .

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Abdullah Al Ajroush is still here [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) not aware of any contact Al Ajroush has had with the FBI.

[REDACTED] Musaid Al-Jarrah is in the Islamic Affairs department, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1).

[REDACTED] Adel Al-Tahini has permanently departed the United States.

[REDACTED] Colonel Ali Al Rakof, Military Attache, is not returning to Saudi Arabia [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) since Al Rakof has only been Military Attache here in the United States for one year it would not make sense for him to be replaced so soon.

[REDACTED]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 10/31/2006

[REDACTED] Saud Al-Sati is the Counselor Political in the new wing. He has two young men working with him: [REDACTED] (O-1) and Abdul Rahman bin Homaid. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) is westernized and responsible, and Abdul Rahman bin Homaid is useless. Al-Sati is close with Prince Turki as they have known each other for years.

[REDACTED] Qorvis continues to assist with Prince Turki's outreach program, but they have not been involved in any ne projects [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). Although EKSA owes Qorvis a large sum of money, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Qorvis will leave because they know EKSA will eventually pay. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] Nasir Ayyad Mouatlaq Aljoaid, aka Nacir Al-Joadi, is employed at the visa office within EKSA. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). AlJoaid does not travel on official EKSA business, and does not know of any recent personal travel. The visa office is located on the ground floor of the EKSA, accessed through the entrance on the New Hampshire entrance, and is to the right upon entry. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] has been a PhD student through the EKSA for a very long time.

[REDACTED] Hamzah Edrees is a black Saudi and works in the Consul Room, sending classified cables to KSA. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), sweet, but dirty and scruffy with some unappealing habits, such as fondling community food items with his dirty hands when trying to pick what he wants, or picking his nose then touching different community food items while making a selection. Edrees is liked, but often joked about in the office due to his unclean habits. Edrees has stayed in the United States because his children are in school here. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Edrees is a black Saudi, and currently resides in the "Taliban Towers" in Alexandria, Virginia. Hassan Emam works with Edrees in the same office and in the same function.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 10/31/2006

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Hassan Al-Asmi.
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Afshin Molavi, a Pakistani, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) is in charge of the Mabahith Office at this time. [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) is Mabahith which is the FBI equivalent, and he is the boss. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) that [REDACTED] (O-1) and FBI know who he is, so he it is not a secret. [REDACTED] (O-1) is well respected and is spoken very highly of in the embassy.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) contact information for [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) :

Name: [REDACTED] (O-1)
Title: First Secretary, Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia
Tel: [REDACTED] (P)
Direct: [REDACTED]
Cell: [REDACTED]
Fax: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) is Mabahith. [REDACTED] (O-1)
Not GIP. Prince Turki takes Nabhani with him [REDACTED] (O-1)
The Mabahith and GIP offices run somewhat independent of Prince Turki, however, out of respect Nabhani and [REDACTED] (O-1) keep Prince Turki in the loop regarding their activities.

[REDACTED] Khulud Al-Khalaf is currently working on her PhD and is now working for Jamal Khashoggi as a Secretary. Her husband is a doctor, and Asset believes he works at George Washington University Hospital. Al-Khalaf reportedly has a sense of entitlement, and is thick and stupid. She formerly worked in the visa office and took it upon herself to have business cards made up indicating that she was head of Saudi Constituant Affairs. Because she had an aggressive personality, her boss's were afraid to confront her about her activities, or to fire her. EKSA diplomats avoided having her work for them, but she was finally placed with Khashoggi where she is working now.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 10/31/2006

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (P)
was a [REDACTED] (P) that used to work for EKSA while Prince Bandar was
Ambassador. [REDACTED] (P-1) for Prince Bandar.
Prince Bandar gave [REDACTED] (P) a large sum of money to buy new
surgical equipment for his practice. Even though Prince Bandar
helped him by donating the money, [REDACTED] (P) took advantage of the
Saudi's. For example, he charged one of Prince Bandar's family
members \$15,000.00 for a missed dental appointment.

◆◆ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/04/2002

To: Los Angeles

From: Los Angeles

(G) Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: (A), (G), (J-1) ER)

Synopsis: Request opening of a Full Investigation on captioned subject and authorization to conduct physical surveillance on captioned subject.

(G)

Full Field Investigation Instituted: (A), (G), (J-1)

Administrative: Attached with communication, is a copy of a letter from FBIHQ, approved by (S) dated 08/26/2002, (O-1) statement regarding captioned subject. The (O-1) was approved on 09/03/2002.

Reference (s): (F)

[Redacted Reference(s) content]

[Redacted footer content]

[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Details: [REDACTED] The above referenced communications document various interviews of several material witnesses involved in the PENTTBOM Investigation.

[REDACTED] Two of the [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED], Isamu Dyson (DYSON) and Mohdar M. Abdullah (MOHDAR), have given detailed accounts of their involvement with American Airlines Flight #77 hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf AlHazmi, while they were in Los Angeles and San Diego. Portions of Dyson and Mohdar's interviews are listed below to support the opening of a Full Investigation on Fahad Althumairy, captioned subject.

[REDACTED] During October 2001, Dyson was interviewed several times by Boston, Portland Maine RA agents, San Diego agents, and [REDACTED] (D) [REDACTED] (D) [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] During the interviews, it was learned that Dyson knew Mr. OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, subject of San Diego investigation, during late 1999 and early 2000. Dyson indicated he once took a trip to Los Angeles with Omar Al-Bayoumi during this time frame. They went to the Saudi Arabian consulate in Los Angeles and then to a small Mediterranean café/restaurant in the Culver City area. It was at this restaurant that Omar Al-Bayoumi met American Airline Flight #77 hijacker's Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar.

[REDACTED] After this meeting (exact date unknown), the hijackers moved to San Diego. Al-Bayoumi played a major role in getting them established in the community. This included finding them an apartment and providing them with financial assistance. As receiving offices are aware, Al-Bayoumi is being actively investigated, by San Diego, for his role of supporting the hijackers. He is currently in England. He was detained and questioned in September related to the terrorist attacks, but had to be released.

[REDACTED] Investigators brought Dyson to the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles. Dyson indicated that Al-Bayoumi dealt with a representative of the Consulate described as a Middle Eastern male, approximately 5'8" in height, in his 40s, with a black/grey beard down to his chest, wearing a suit. It appeared obvious to Dyson that Al-Bayoumi and the Saudi official knew each other and had met before. Their conversation was in Arabic however, and Dyson did not comprehend it. Al-Bayoumi and this man then went behind closed doors to take care of their "business". They spend up to one hour at the Consulate.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED] es [REDACTED] geles
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 09/04/2002

[REDACTED] After leaving the consulate, Al-Bayoumi suggested that he and Dyson travel to a local restaurant to have lunch. The two first entered the Mediterranean Café. Al-Bayoumi had informed Dyson that he and his family had dined at this restaurant before. Once Al-Bayoumi and Dyson entered the Mediterranean Café, they were informed that the Mediterranean Café did not serve food. Al-Bayoumi asked if this was the Mediterranean Café on Venice Blvd. Al-Bayoumi was informed that another Mediterranean restaurant was located a few yards away. Al-Bayoumi and Dyson walked a short distance west on Venice Boulevard and into the MEDITERRANEAN GOURMET Restaurant, located at 10863 Venice Boulevard, phone number (310)842-8291.

[REDACTED] While at the MEDITERRANEAN GOURMET, Al-Bayoumi and Dyson met with hijackers Al-Mihdhar and Alhazmi. It is unknown at this time whether this meeting between Al-Bayoumi and the hijackers, in LA, was a planned event or a "chance meeting." meeting is believed to have occurred on 02/01/2000, based on [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) and toll record analysis. San Diego investigation has indicated that Al-Bayoumi has extensive ties to the Saudi government. He was being supported in the U.S. with a stipend from his employer, the Saudi Arabian Civil Air Administration, and/or the Saudi government. There is speculation that Al-Bayoumi could be a Saudi intelligence officer based on numerous factors and circumstances. Therefore, there remains the possibility that the meeting was planned or Al-Bayoumi was directed by someone at the Saudi Consulate to meet the two hijackers at the restaurant in LA.

[REDACTED] During the conversation, Dyson learned via Al-Bayoumi that Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar had an apartment in LA and have only been there and in the United States for a short time. They stated that they did not like Los Angeles. They were having a difficult time and didn't know anyone. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar were in the U.S. to learn English. Al-Bayoumi invited them to come to San Diego and check it out. Al-Bayoumi told them they would probably like it in San Diego. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar indicated they were interested. Al-Bayoumi gave his phone number to Al-Hazmi. It is also possible that Al-Bayoumi got their phone number as well, but Dyson was unsure. Al-Bayoumi and Dyson left the restaurant/café and went to the Culver City Mosque, also know as the King Fahad Mosque.

[REDACTED] The next time Dyson met Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar was when they were in the Parkwood Apartments on Mt. Ada Road in San Diego. This was at the welcome/housewarming party Al-Bayoumi had thrown for the hijackers. It was a matter of a few weeks to a month between the meeting at the LA restaurant and the time of the welcoming party for Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar. During this interim period, Al-Bayoumi did mention that he had been in contact with the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Los Angeles ngeles
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 09/04/2002

two men they met at the restaurant in LA. Al-Bayoumi also told Dyson that they even came down to visit San Diego one time and liked it.

[REDACTED] Mohdar stated that he met and became acquainted with Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar in 1999, after an introduction by Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi. Nawaf told Mohdar that they, Nawaf and Khalid, had arrived in Los Angeles via United Airlines into Los Angeles Airport. Mohdar was unaware of the location they stayed in Los Angeles or how they arrived in San Diego. Omar brought Nawaf and Khalid to an Islamic Mosque located in Lemon Grove, CA, to make the introduction to Mohdar. Omar asked Mohdar to become acquainted with Nawaf and Khalid, acclimate them to the area and assist in any way in their affairs. Mohdar noted that Nawaf told him not to tell anyone that they had taken an excursion trip to Malaysia after arriving in Bangkok. Mohdar knew that the hijackers traveled in their Toyota to Los Angeles, however, he did not know the purpose of the trip or the date.

[REDACTED] In approximately the summer on 2000, Mohdar traveled with Nawaf in the Toyota to take Khalid to the LAX Airport in Los Angeles, CA. Khalid was returning to Saudi Arabia to be with his wife and newborn female child. Khalid traveled commercial airlines from LAX on Lufthansa Airline. After dropping off Khalid at the airport, Mohdar and Nawaf visited the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, CA. They returned to San Diego the same day. Nawaf had a gifted voice for leading the prayer at the residence and at the Mosque. FBI Los Angeles Comment: Los Angeles has no explanation as to why Khalid Al-Mihdhar had to travel from San Diego to Los Angeles in order to fly to Saudi Arabia.

FBI Los Angeles Investigative Results:

[REDACTED] Los Angeles has determined that Fahad AlThumairy may be a potential contact of the hijackers and Al-Bayoumi in Los Angeles. AlThumairy is an administrative officer at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and may have diplomatic status. AlThumairy is also believed to be one of the Imams at the King Fahad mosque. AlThumairy also fits the description, as provided by Dyson, of the individual that Al-Bayoumi met at the Saudi consulate prior to Al-Bayoumi's "chance" meeting with the hijackers at the restaurant.

[REDACTED] Los Angeles review of ACS also revealed a communication from Legat [REDACTED] (G) to Counterterrorism and Los Angeles ([REDACTED])

(C-1)

(C-1)

[REDACTED]

To: Los Angeles ngeles
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/04/2002

[REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] (C-1). Los Angeles notes that according to the US Department of State records, Al-Thumairy is listed as an Administrative Officer and does not carry any special religious status within the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles. ACS further indicated that in [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] A review of Al-Bayoumi's home telephone records and cellular telephone records has revealed that Al-Bayoumi had (16) telephonic contacts with AlThumairy. In addition, Al-Bayoumi had (24) telephonic contacts with the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles prior to the events of 09/11/2001.

[REDACTED] Various reliable sources of the Los Angeles have reported that AlThumairy returned to Saudi Arabia in mid-August 2001 and did not return to Los Angeles until 12/24/2001. Los Angeles notes that Al-Bayoumi also left the United States, for England, prior to the events of 09/11/2001. Sources have also reported that AlThumairy's sermons at the King Fahad mosque have a militant, anti-West tone to them. Al-Thumairy is also reported to be anti-United States and Israel.

[REDACTED] According to Mohdar, the hijackers and Mohdar took a trip to Los Angeles in order for Khalid Al-Mihdhar to return to Saudi Arabia for the birth of his daughter. Mohdar stated that they stayed at a hotel close to the mosque. Mohdar also reported that the hijackers met several people at the King Fahad mosque including a person identified as "Khallam". According to Mohdar, Khallam visited the hijackers at the hotel that evening. Upon Khallam's arrival, the hijackers asked Mohdar to wait outside. FBI investigation has determined that Mohdar and the hijackers stayed at Deno's Motel on 06/09/2000. Information from FBI New York has revealed that [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] SAID SALEH BIN ATTASH, aka "KHALLAD" [REDACTED] (O-1). Bin Attash is the alleged mastermind behind the bombing of USS Cole in Aden, Yemen. New York indicated that [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1). New York opined that certain diplomatic arrangements exist at various airports which allow diplomats to meet incoming foreign nationals at the baggage [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1). Los Angeles can not confirm whether "Khallad" and "Khallam" are identical.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED] es From: Los Angeles
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 09/04/2002

[REDACTED] On 03/07/2002, Los Angeles interviewed Mr. Qualid Moncef Benomrane, while in INS custody. Benomrane is a Tunisian national that regularly attended the King Fahad Mosque.

[REDACTED] Benomrane reported that he had heard that two Saudi Arabian men had arrived at LAX and were met by a person unknown to Benomrane. This unknown person then took the two Saudis to an apartment complex that had already been rented for them. Benomrane stated he could not remember the address, but that it was a large white building located on Sepulveda Blvd. between Venice Blvd. and Palm St. FBI Los Angeles Comment: This is the apartment complex whose records were recently search by Los Angeles.

[REDACTED] One or two days after the arrival of the Saudis, Benomrane was at the King Fahad Mosque. While at the mosque Sheik Fahad Al-Thumairy introduced Benomrane to the two Saudis and asked Benomrane if he could help them during their time in Los Angeles because they did not speak English. Benomrane agreed and gave the Saudis his taxi cab business card.

[REDACTED] The next day the Saudis called Benomrane and asked him to pick them up and drive them around Los Angeles. Benomrane picked them up at their apartment complex and then drove them around. They then ate at the Mediterranean Restaurant located on Venice Blvd. At the end of the day Benomrane took them back to their apartment complex.

[REDACTED] Two to three days later the Saudis called Benomrane again. This time they wanted to go to Sea world in San Diego. Benomrane agreed and picked them up at their apartment where he was given \$100 and told he would get the remainder after the trip. Benomrane stated they drove straight to San Diego and the only stop that they made was at a San Diego gas station. Benomrane could not remember the gas stations location in San Diego. One or two days after they returned to Los Angeles Benomrane called them to receive the remainder of his money. The Saudis told him that Sheik Fahad AlThumairy would give him the rest of the money.

[REDACTED] When asked by investigators who else knew about the two Saudis, Benomrane replied that no one at the Kind Fahad Mosque knew about them and that he was told by Sheik Fahad Al-Thumairy to keep the presence of the two Saudis to himself. Benomrane did say that the Saudi Consulate knew about the two Saudis because it was the consulate that told Sheik Fahad to take care of the Saudis.

Benomrane was told by Sheik Fahad that the Saudis were here to see their sick father who was in a local hospital. Benomrane said that the Saudis stayed in Los Angeles for approximately one month and then they returned to Saudi Arabia. When asked if Benomrane

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED] es [REDACTED] ngeles
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/04/2002

knew for a fact that they returned to Saudi Arabia he replied no and that he was just told that they had left Los Angeles.

[REDACTED] Benomrane could not remember the Saudis names, but remembered one was approximately twenty one years old and the other was approximately twenty-five years old. Benomrane stated over and over that the two Saudis came to Los Angeles prior to 09/11/2001.

[REDACTED] During the interview, Benomrane was shown photographs of all the hijackers and numerous photographs of unrelated individuals. Benomrane looked at all the photographs carefully and placed all the photographs in a pile on the left side of the desk. When he viewed the photographs of Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi, he placed the photographs on the right side of the desk. Once he had gone through all the photographs, he mixed the photographs and stated that he did not recognize anyone from the photos. FBI Los Angeles is of the opinion that Benomrane may have been less than truthful with the investigators regarding his recognition of anyone from the photographs.

[REDACTED] As stated earlier, Los Angeles conducted a search of lease/rental records of the apartment complex that was shown to the investigators by Benomrane. The search revealed that Fahad Al-Thumairy and the King Fahad Mosque had an extensive rental history with the apartment complex. Lease records indicated that Al-Thumairy would customarily rent furnished apartments for a 4-6 week period. Lease records also indicated that Al-Thumairy would not personally reside in the apartments rented at the complex. This apartment complex is within ½ mile of the Mediterranean restaurant where Al-Bayoumi and Dyson met the hijackers. The apartment is withing 3/4 mile of the King Fahad mosque and is within one mile from Deno's motel where the hijackers and Mohdar had stayed on 06/09/2000. Additionally, a check of all other hotels in the vicinity of the King Fahad Mosque and Deno's Motel revealed that Al-Thumairy has an extensive rental history with Travellodge Hotel and Sunburst Motel. The hotel searches also revealed that Al-Bayoumi has extensive rental history at the Travellodge Hotel and the Half Moon Motel. All these motels/hotels are adjacent to Deno's motel and within ½ mile of the apartment complex.

[REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] Los Angeles is of the strong opinion that Fahad Al-Thumairy may have known about the hijackers while in the United

[REDACTED]

EO14040-003459

[REDACTED]

To: Los Angeles [REDACTED] ngeles
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/04/2002

States and may have assisted them. Based on the above, Los Angeles has initiated a Full Field investigation on Al-Thumairy in order to determine his association with the tragic events of 09/11/2001 and to disrupt any future terrorist operations that may be planned by Al-Qaeda or its support network in the United States.

◆◆



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Los Angeles, California 90024
August 25, 2003

Fahad Althumairy
(A), (G), (J-1)

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY PREPARED: August 25, 2003

This communication is [redacted] in its entirety.

BASIS FOR INVESTIGATION:

[redacted] The investigation of Althumairy was predicated on information that Althumairy was associated with an individual who had extensive contacts with two of the September 11th terrorist hijackers. FBI investigation determined that Althumairy had substantial contact with Omar Al-Bayoumi, who had contact with the two of the September 11th terrorist hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar.

[redacted] Further, Althumairy was identified [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) as a "hard core extremist" and that his sermons at the King Fahad Mosque appeal to the extremist and militant attendees of the mosque.

INVESTIGATION TO DATE:

[redacted] (P-1) Fahad Althumairy is a non USPER who was born on [redacted] (U-1) in Saudi Arabia. Althumairy was listed in U.S. State [redacted] (O-1) He arrived in the U.S. on 05/21/1996, [redacted] (J-3) [redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] (U-1) The FBI has determined that the Saudi Consulate General in Los Angeles identified Althumairy as consulate liaison with the Culver City Mosque, aka King Fahad Mosque.

[redacted]

Fahad Althumairy

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)
[REDACTED] (O-1)
[REDACTED] (O-1). A review of telephone applications revealed that Althumairy and Al-Bayoumi had numerous contacts between December 1998 through December 2000.

[REDACTED] (O-1) Althumairy espoused radical views and, as a consequence, was ordered expelled from the King Fahad Mosque, where he had served as the Imam. [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) in late August 2002, management at the Mosque had ordered Althumairy and Mohammed Al-Mohanna (a close associate of Althumairy and subject of an FBI International Terrorism investigation) to be expelled from the Mosque due to their militant preaching. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)
Of note, Althumairy, up until his departure from the United States on 02/06/2003, continued preaching at the King Fahad Mosque. [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) Althumairy as a "Salafi Fanatic," and indicated that Althumairy could be a possible source of motivation to incite impressionable youths towards violent or terrorist activity.

[REDACTED] (O-1) after being informed that Althumairy was being expelled from the King Fahad Mosque, his "hardline" followers had established an "underground" mosque, which is located in close proximity to the King Fahad Mosque. [REDACTED] (O-1) Althumairy attends this "underground" mosque and provides militant and fundamentalist teaching to the attendees. [REDACTED] (O-1) that Althumairy exerts a great deal of power and influence on the mosque attendees. Although limited, FBI physical surveillance has observed Althumairy at a house located at [REDACTED] (P) Culver City, California, [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) as the location of the "underground" mosque. Source (G) (a reliable source with good access and a reliable reporting history) reported that this address is referred to as "Dar al Quran" (literally "House of the Koran"). Moreover, Althumairy admitted going to the Dar al Quran one or two times, but stated the location is an Islamic school for young children. Source (G), reported that the Dar al Quran operates as both a religious school and a mosque.

Fahad Althumairy
(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (O-1) Althumairy left Los Angeles in mid-August 2001 for no apparent reason. [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) he needed to return to Saudi Arabia in order to take care of some "official" business and that he would return later in 2001. Althumairy returned to Los Angeles December 25, 2001.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] In addition, a review of Althumairy's Wells Fargo account for the period 06/10/1999 through 11/15/2002 revealed financial connections with the following [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) :

Sharif Moheddin Battikhi [REDACTED] (G) possibly received 14 checks totaling \$66,000 from Althumairy. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Battikhi, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) information that Battikhi was a paid fund raiser for the Holy Land Foundation. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Hassan Mohamed Abukar [REDACTED] (G) possibly received 15 checks totaling \$64,500 from Althumairy. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Abukar [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) suspicious financial transactions carried out by Somalian and Ethiopian nationals. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Hassan Abunar [REDACTED] (G) possibly received 12 checks totaling \$58,500 from Althumairy. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

The nature of the above financial connections are still being explored.

[REDACTED] Althumairy departed Los Angeles on 02/06/2003 and [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) . On 05/06/2003, Althumairy re-entered the United States, unaware that [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) . Althumairy was interviewed by the FBI at the Los Angeles International Airport. No new information was [REDACTED]

Fahad Althumairy

(A), (G), (J-1)

garnered as a result of the interview. However, Althumairy was less than forthcoming and changed his statements when presented with information known to interviewers. Althumairy was refused entry into the United States and was returned to Saudi Arabia on 05/08/2003.

(A), (G), (J-1)

CONCLUSION:

This case, in part, was predicated on Althumairy's connection to Al-Bayoumi and that Al-Bayoumi was associated with two of the 9/11 hijackers. Although the New York investigation of Al-Bayoumi remains ongoing, to date, the investigation of Al-Bayoumi has revealed no direct evidence that he had knowledge of the September 11, 2003 terrorist plot. Since there is no direct evidence that Al-Bayoumi knew of the 9/11 terrorist plot, the contacts between Althumairy and Al-Bayoumi are incidental.

However, there are a number of connections between Althumairy and subjects of FBI investigations. Further investigation is warranted to determine the nature of these connections and whether any terrorist nexus is present. Moreover, it is unclear whether Althumairy remains in contact with persons residing in the US. These possible contacts are still being explored. If no derogatory links are uncovered, Los Angeles intends to close captioned investigation.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/02/2003

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

(G), (S)

Dallas

Los Angeles

From: Los Angeles

(G)

Contact:

(S)

Approved By:

(S)

Drafted By:

(S)

Case ID #:

(F)

Title:

FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY;

(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: Source reporting on various Los Angeles subjects and the SOROORI/SURURI movement.

(G)

Full Field Investigation Instituted:

(A), (G), (J-1)

(Non-USPER)

Administrative:

This communication was produced by FBI Los Angeles and will be reported through channels.

[Redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: [Redacted] (F) [Redacted], 09/02/2003

Details: [Redacted] On 08/20/2003 and 08/28/2003, the writer (G), (S) [Redacted] (G), (S) conducted interviews of (G) [Redacted] (hereafter referred to as Source), (A), (G), (J-1) [Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [Redacted]. The results of the debriefs are outlined below:

[Redacted] (O-1) (O-1)

[Redacted] (O-1)

[Redacted] (O-1)


[Redacted] (O-1)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: [Redacted] (F) [Redacted], 09/02/2003

(O-1)



[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/02/2003

[REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] the Saudi Sunni extremists linked to Al-Qaida who are carrying out terrorist attacks against targets inside Saudi Arabia are of the extreme Salafi Suroori ideology. There are two main groups of Sunni extremists inside Saudi Arabia, the main Suroori group based out of Riyadh and a smaller,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/02/2003

subgroup called "Jamia" based out of Medina that is more secretive and elite than the Riyadh group. Both these groups are violent jihadists involved in the recent terrorist attacks inside Saudi Arabia including the May 2003 bombings of western targets. The Suroori group may have members of the Saudi religious police (Al-Muttawwa) who are sympathetic to their cause. [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] the leadership of the Suroori network tightly controls their clandestine network inside Saudi Arabia by strictly adhering to guidelines on what their young members and recruits can read, watch and hear. Young recruits are isolated from mainstream religious society and their families and indoctrinated into the radical Suroori ideology.

[REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] Suroori have independent cells and structures in different countries in order to maintain compartmentalization and ensure the organization's survival in the face of law enforcement and military actions against the group. The majority of funding for Suroori are obtained from private donations taken in mosques inside Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and Europe. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED]. There is a large Suroori presence in the United Kingdom because the group feels relatively secure and comfortable there and can engage in significant fund-raising operations. Suroori in the United Kingdom are recruiting and training British, American and European converts to Islam and then sending them back to their native countries as part of the Al-Qaida linked Suroori clandestine network in each country.

[REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] Al-Thumairy was part of the Al-Qaida linked extremist Suroori network in Saudi Arabia. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] the Al-Qaida linked Suroori extremist network will continue to grow inside Saudi Arabia and carry out terrorist attacks. Even though the network does not have a large amount of members, they are well-trained and highly motivated. The extremist Suroori network has many small covert paramilitary training camps in the northern desert regions of Saudi Arabia that are used for military and terrorist training.

[REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] as of August 2003, the Islamic bookstore run by the leadership of the Sunni Salafi extremist at overland mosque had been closed in its location and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/02/2003

was re-opened within new space inside the overland mosque. Overland mosque leader [REDACTED] (P), aka [REDACTED] (P) is receiving regular donations and financial assistance from individuals in Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom. These monies are received by [REDACTED] (P) through wire transfers, couriers and checks. During Friday khutbahs in July and August 2003, [REDACTED] (P) strongly attacked the U.S., Israel and Shiia's and also denigrated other Islamic mosques in the area, including KFM.

[REDACTED] The overland mosque is receiving compact discs, books, pamphlets and audio and videotapes from Sunni Salafi extremists Muhammad Al-Muhanna and Fahad Al-Thumairy in Saudi Arabia. These materials, which advocate an extremist Sunni Salafi ideology, are being disseminated and left at moderate, mainstream Islamic mosques throughout the southern California area, almost always without the permission of the management of these mainstream mosques.

(O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) The discs are narrated by Al-Muhanna and contain Islamic sermons. [REDACTED] (O-1) Al-Thumairy and Al-Muhanna recently sent 2000 boxes of the above listed material to [REDACTED] (P) at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles. These items were obtained by Al-Muhanna and Al-Thumairy from the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, who employed both of the individuals while they were in Los Angeles.

[REDACTED] The source reported that in July 2003, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) of the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, and [REDACTED] (P) a Saudi Sunni who follows an extremist Salafi ideology tried to establish their control and gain management of the Islamic center in Long Beach. However, moderate Imam [REDACTED] (P) resisted their efforts and retained the leadership role within the Long Beach Islamic center. [REDACTED] (P) and other Sunni Salafi extremists from southern California then established a "storefront" mosque located at [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) Long Beach, California under the name [REDACTED] (P). The [REDACTED] (P) mosque has alleged direct links to [REDACTED] (P) and the underground "overland mosque" located in Los Angeles, California.

[REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) have established other, small "storefront" mosques in San Diego, Orange County and La Mirada. These mosques are also used as quest houses for visiting foreign Sheikhs and foreign Muslims. [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) are receiving financial support to establish these small mosques from Sunni Salafi extremist Al-Thumairy and Sunni Salafi extremist Al-Muhanna in Saudi Arabia and from other private donations within Saudi Arabia. The objective of [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) is to develop a network of small "storefront" or "underground" mosques in Southern California that maintain a low profile in order to avoid U.S. law

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/02/2003

enforcement scrutiny. They also will use the mosques to raise money for their activities, and identify and recruit new members into their network.

[REDACTED] At the "underground" mosques in Southern California, religious training is being conducted to indoctrinate and teach young members the extremist form of the Sunni Salafi ideology. These newly indoctrinated members are then sent out from the small storefront mosques to larger, mainstream, moderate Islamic mosques in the Southern California area and the rest of the U.S. Their objectives are to form an information reporting network within moderate Islamic institutions, to select and carefully recruit and convert moderate Muslims into their extremist ideology, and to carry out influence activities by trying to guide and influence imams at moderate, mainstream mosques to propagate a more radical message to their mosque members.

[REDACTED] The information provided by the source was obtained through various sources, as well as personal knowledge.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 09/02/2003

Lead [REDACTED]:

Set lead 1:

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

[REDACTED] For informational purposes only.

◆◆

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/20/2008

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

(G)
SSA (S)
IA (S)
LEGAT

(G)

From: Los Angeles

(G)

Contact: SA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F), (G)

Title: FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY;
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: To request authorization from FBIHQ to close captioned case and to provide Counterterrorism with a closing Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) as required by the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). Captioned subject will remain in (G)

(G)

Enclosure(s): Enclosed for the Los Angeles file is the Annual Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) of the captioned case. An electronic copy of the LHM will be sent to FBIHQ via email for passage to DOJ. FBIHQ is requested to review the electronic copy of the annual LHM for passage to (G)

Administrative: This closing EC was coordinated with CTD on 10/01/2008.

Full Investigation Initiated: 11/30/2007

Details: This investigation was originally predicated on information that ALTHUMAIRY was associated with an individual

[Redacted]

who had extensive contacts with two of the September 11th hijackers. FBI investigation determined that ALTHUMAIRY had contact with OMAR ALBAYOUMI, who had substantial contact with 9/11 hijackers NAWAF ALHAZMI and KHALID ALMIDHAR. Further, ALTHUMAIRY was identified [redacted] (O-1) as a "hard core extremist" whose sermons at the King Fahad Mosque appealed to the extremist and militant attendees of the mosque.

[redacted] ALTHUMAIRY departed Los Angeles on 02/06/2003 and returned to Saudi Arabia for his brother's wedding. On 05/06/2003, ALTHUMAIRY re-entered the U.S., unaware that his [redacted] (J-3)

(J-3) ALTHUMAIRY was interviewed by the FBI at the Los Angeles International Airport. [redacted] (C-1)

[redacted] (C-1). No new information was garnered as a result of the interview. ALTHUMAIRY's investigation was closed on 10/31/2005 because he was no longer in the United States, although he [redacted] (G)

[redacted] (F) Per [redacted] (P) who was closely associated with 9/11 hijackers ALHAZMI and ALMIDHAR, was interviewed on 08/29/2007. (P) noted that he personally introduced ALTHUMAIRY to the hijackers, which indicated that ALTHUMAIRY had more direct contact with the hijackers than was previously known.

[redacted] Due to ALTHUMAIRY's prominence in the Los Angeles area and association with the 9/11 hijackers during that time, Los Angeles re-opened the closed investigation on ALTHUMAIRY in order to locate and interview him.

[redacted] (C-1)

[redacted] As set forth in an EC provided by CTD, dated 12/01/2006, "Section 19 of the National Foreign Intelligence Program Manual (NFIPM), or [redacted] (F) policy, is being modified to include policy and procedures when an international terrorism investigation in the [redacted] (F) classification is closed." As requested, information contained within this text is reiterated below:

- a. This was a Full Field Investigation.

[redacted]

- b. The investigation was opened on 11/30/2007.
- c. The investigation was initially opened as a Full Field Investigation.
- d. There is no recent LHM because the case is being closed within a year of opening. The closing LHM is attached.
- e. The subject is a Non-USPER.
- f. The extent to which the subject is aware of the terrorist aims of the foreign power is unknown due to his location in Saudi Arabia and the inability to conduct a subject interview.
- g. A sensitive national security matter exists as FAHAD AL-THUMARY may currently hold diplomatic status in the Saudi Arabian government.

h. Known Identifiers

(U) The following identifiers are being provided for the captioned subject:

- a) Name: FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY; FAHD IBRAHIM ABDULLAH
ALTHUMAIRY
- b) DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)
- c) Non-USPER
- d) Religious affiliation: Sunni

Descriptive Data:

(U) Main Subject

Name -
 Last: ALTHUMAIRY
 First: FAHAD
 Middle:
 Race: W
 Sex: M
 DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)
 POB:
 ARN: Alien Registration #
 DLN: None
 PNO: [REDACTED] (J-3)
 SOC: [REDACTED] (P-1)
 Alias(es) -
 Last: ALTHUMAIRY
 First: FAHD
 Middle: IBRAHIM ABDULLAH
 Address(es) -
 House #: Unknown
 Street Name:
 Street Suffix:
 Unit:
 City:
 State:
 Postal Code:
 Country: Saudi Arabia



Miscellaneous -

Subject is a non-USPER.

- i. Subject has resided in Saudi Arabia since he was refused re-entry into the U.S. on 05/08/2003. LEGAT (G) is aware of ALTHUMAIRY's presence in Saudi Arabia.
- j. Subject is classified as possible direct associate.

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Request concurrence to close captioned investigation. Provide the enclosed LHM, making notification of the closing of this investigation, to DOJ.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

(G)

AT [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] LEGAT: Read and clear.

◆◆



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Electronic Communication

Title: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
Connections to the Attacks of September 11,
2001

Date: 07/23/2021

From: [REDACTED] (G)
Contact: [REDACTED] (S)

Approved By: [REDACTED] (S)

Drafted By: [REDACTED] (S)

Case ID #: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
PENTTBOMB [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] PENTTBOMB [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) MAJOR
CASE (MC) 182 [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] Connections to the
Attacks of September 11, 2001
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 07/23/2021

(F)

[REDACTED]

Synopsis: [REDACTED] To file. To provide summary and historical information for subsequent agents of [REDACTED] (G)

(G)

[REDACTED]

Administrative Notes: [REDACTED] Attached to this EC is a document summarizing the connections between the 9/11 investigation and elements affiliated with the Saudi Arabian government in the U.S. This replaces Serial [REDACTED] (F) which was intended as a draft for review but was serialized. Serial [REDACTED] (F) will be removed at a later date.

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. [REDACTED] Saudi 9/11 Connections

Details:

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this communication is to consolidate information related to the involvement of personnel and entities controlled by the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) and its affiliates within the United States with the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11 Attacks / PENTTBOMB). Such an analysis is deemed essential for future case agents of this program to understand the origin of the investigation. Due to the purpose noted, this document only discusses entities that are part of or closely tied to the Saudi Arabian government. Other aspects of the 9/11/2001 investigation are only noted if related to this purpose. This report should not be considered an intelligence assessment and is not intended as such.

[REDACTED]
Title: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] Connections to the
Attacks of September 11, 2001
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 07/23/2021

An additional purpose of this communication is to document investigations and supporting documentation regarding the Saudi(Wahhabi)/Salafi/militant network that was created, funded, directed and supported by the KSA and its affiliated organizations and diplomatic personnel within the U.S. As Saudi government officials and intelligence officers were directly operating and supporting the entities involved with this network, their involvement with the activities of these organizations/individuals would logically be supposed to have the knowledge or concurrence of the KSA government. This knowledge and/or concurrence by the SAG is related to the 9/11 investigation not only be the direct involvement of some personnel but also via the creation of a larger network for such activities.

In addition, the below analysis will update information available on the ties of some of these entities to Saudi Arabian intelligence services. Much of the publically known information regarding the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks was documented in the 9/11 Commission Report which was published in 2004. Thus much available information from subsequent and ongoing investigations was not noted in the Commission's Report. In addition, the classified "28 pages" was subsequently de-classified and investigations since 2004 shed additional light on the information that was contained within these 28 pages which were created in 2004 as part of the original Commission Report.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] there was located within the EKSA the offices of the Islamic Affairs Department and the office of Dawa (or Propagation). Investigation of the 9/11 hijackers and their support networks identified significant connections to these offices either directly or via the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles. As such, a primary portion of this communication will focus on these offices and connections to the 9/11 hijackers. In addition, the SAG/EKSA was also involved with the funding and creation of a multitude of Islamic organizations, offices, imams and other religious figures within the US – many of which were involved with militant ideology. Several of these were known to be tied directly to Prince Bandar and/or were involved with the collection of information on US based Islamic entities. As the propagation of militant ideology would naturally provide justification for those who were in the hijacker's support network – these organizations will also be listed below (below is not an all-inclusive list as this would be too large.)

Administration:

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] was originally formed as [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] in 2002 as a result of the PENTTBOMB investigation identifying connections between the 9/11 hijackers, their support network and individuals associated with the SAG. As is well known, 15 of the deceased 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia with a possible 20th - Mohammed Alqahtani - subsequently captured in Afghanistan and confined at Guantanamo Bay after unsuccessfully attempting to enter the US. At the time of creation of [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] there was [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] a few investigations of some Saudi Arabian

[REDACTED]
Title: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] Connections to the
Attacks of September 11, 2001
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 07/23/2021

government personnel and organizations had been previously established. [REDACTED] (G) was quickly transferred to the new [REDACTED] (G) and changed to [REDACTED] (G) and then subsequently [REDACTED] (G). During a portion of this time the squad's FBIHQ oversight was within the [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) and much of the squad investigative efforts were focused on Saudi Arabian charities in the [REDACTED] (G) AOR as well as individual subjects with established or alleged AQ or militant connections. After approximately ten years in [REDACTED] (G) the program was again transferred to [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) before returning to [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G).

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] of Saudi Arabian entities before and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under the [REDACTED] (F) classification. Later this designation was changed to [REDACTED] (F) (A), (G), (J-1) investigations prior to and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under [REDACTED] (F) and [REDACTED] (F). These were later combined under [REDACTED] (F) and then [REDACTED] (F) classifications. For the most part, serials noted within this document utilize the case caption of the relevant time period.

[REDACTED] As the purpose of this document is to highlight and encapsulate the connections between the Saudi Arabian establishments and government entities in the U.S. with the 9/11 hijacker support network writer is not investigating or re-investigating the 9/11 investigation. This is particularly relevant due to a lack of resources and analytical assistance. As such, writer has located relevant serials and have copied that information directly within this communication. **The language, spelling, source symbol numbers, grammar, formatting and emphasis of the original serials is retained.**

[REDACTED] As the original language of the referenced serials is retained, a note on how sources were referenced is necessary. During the 9/11/2001 time period, Letter Head Memorandums (LHMs) were necessary for dissemination to DOJ. The LHMs removed the standard source number [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) replaced by a non-standard [REDACTED] (G) designation that was created entirely by the writing agent. Thus research is necessary in order to locate and identify the original source. During this time period, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

◆◆

(F)

The Saudi Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) and their affiliated offices within the U.S.; their connections to the support network for the attacks of September 11, 2001; and the SAG creation of and support and direction for a network of offices and personnel involved with militant Salafi Islamic activities and proselytization within the United States.

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this communication is to consolidate information related to the involvement of personnel and entities controlled by the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) and its affiliates within the United States with the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11 Attacks / PENTTBOMB). Such an analysis is deemed essential for future case agents of this program to understand the origin of the investigation. Due to the purpose noted, this document only discusses entities that are part of or closely tied to the Saudi Arabian government. Other aspects of the 9/11/2001 investigation are only noted if related to this purpose. This report should not be considered an intelligence assessment and is not intended as such.

An additional purpose of this communication is to document investigations and supporting documentation regarding the Saudi(Wahhabi)/Salafi/militant network that was created, funded, directed and supported by the KSA and its affiliated organizations and diplomatic personnel within the U.S. As Saudi government officials and intelligence officers were directly operating and supporting the entities involved with this network, their involvement with the activities of these organizations/individuals would logically be supposed to have the knowledge or concurrence of the KSA government. This knowledge and/or concurrence by the SAG is related to the 9/11 investigation not only be the direct involvement of some personnel but also via the creation of a larger network for such activities.

EO14040-003482

[REDACTED]

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(A), (G), (J-1)

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Administration:

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (G)

before returning to [REDACTED]

(G)

(F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) investigations of Saudi Arabian entities before and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under the (F) classification. Later this designation was changed to (F) (A), (G), (J-1) investigations prior to and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]. These were later combined under (F) and then (F) classifications. For the most part, serials noted within this document utilize the case caption of the relevant time period.

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standard (G) designation that was created entirely by the writing agent. Thus research is necessary in order to locate and identify the original source. During this time period, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Background of Movement of 9/11 Hijacking Team

According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the 9/11 planning and recruitment of personnel for the operation was being developed through 2000 and early 2001. The pilots who were selected were the first to enter the U.S. and the "muscle hijackers", although recruited in 2000, were the last - not arriving until the Spring/Summer of 2001.

According to the 9/11 Commission Report and open source information, Khalid Almihdar and Nawaf Alhazmi (described by the report as the 2nd in command after Mohammed Atta) were two original hijackers involved in the attack planning and, although other known hijackers had prior entries into the US, appeared to be the first to enter the U.S. as an operational component of the 9/11 plan. According to investigation and the 9/11 Commission report, Almihdar and Alhazmi first entered the U.S. via Los Angeles on January 15, 2000. Per the 9/11 Commission Report, neither Almihdar nor Alhazmi were well prepared for the operation, spoke little English and their only qualifications appeared to be their support of UBL and their ability to obtain visas. Although the initial plan may have been for Alhazmi and Almihdar to have been pilots for the plot, neither passed initial flight training and both had problems acclimating to the U.S. Almihdar's difficulties may have resulted in his sudden return to Yemen on June 10, 2000 (or he was possibly working on logistics overseas) that would have left Alhazmi alone in California except for elements of his support network. Almihdar would not return to the US as a "muscle hijacker" until July 2001. Both Alhazmi and Almihdar arrived in the U.S. after having attended what is presumed to be the planning meeting for the attacks that were held in Kuala Lumpur.

It is important to note that both Alhazmi and Almihdar were known AQ operatives. Both were Saudi nationals who had traveled together to Bosnia in 1995. Alhazmi conducted training with KSM in Pakistan in late 1999 and both Alhazmi and Almihdar were present in the planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur in December 1999. Alhazmi was reportedly personally selected by UBL for the operation. Almihdar was from a prominent family and married into a family with extensive AQ connections. Both Alhazmi and Almihdar were known to Saudi and U.S. intelligence as being AQ members. After Almihdar departed the U.S. Alhazmi was left alone until Hani Hanjour was sent in December 2000. The second primary group of hijackers were the "Hamburg Group"

[REDACTED]

(Mohammed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi and Ziad Jarrah (along with Ramzi Binalshibh) who arrived in Afghanistan in November 1999 and began to be selected for the operation. Unlike Alhazmi and Almihdar, these four spoke English and were acclimated for living in the West. Their need for a support network would be minimal.

Due to the lack of preparedness of Alhazmi and Almihdar for the operation and residing in the West without arousing suspicion the existence of a support network would make operational sense. Investigation determined that a significant portion of the network assisting these two hijackers centered on offices affiliated with the KSA to include the Saudi Arabian Los Angeles Consulate, the King Fahd Mosque as well as multiple individuals associated with these locations and/or the Saudi Arabian government.

[REDACTED]

Islamic Affairs Department (IAD) Islamic Affairs Office (IAO)
(Ministry of Islamic Affairs)(MIA) / Dawa Office Connections to Saudi
Arabian Intelligence

[REDACTED] Summary: Within the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, D.C. (as in other Saudi Arabian Embassies throughout the world) was located an Islamic Affairs Office and a Dawa Office (Dawa means proselytizing). The D.C. offices were staffed with both Saudi Arabian diplomats and local hires and their roles were often mixed. The Islamic Affairs Offices worldwide and in the U.S. played a key role in supporting the Saudi Arabian Government's objective to be perceived as the leader of the Islamic world and also played a key role in Saudi Arabia's religious and political competition with Shia Iran. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1), the key personnel within the Islamic Affairs office (A), (G), (J-1) and one of the roles of the Islamic Affairs Office was to provide intelligence on local Islamic populations and to provide cover for the movement of (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). Saudi Arabian "non-governmental organizations" (NGO), ie. "charities", supplemented this activity with large funding streams as well as cover for personnel.

One of the primary speculative questions regarding the PENTTBOMB investigation is whether the SAG was significantly connected to, had prior knowledge of or supported the attacks of September 11, 2001. Due to the involvement of the Islamic Affairs/Dawa Office personnel within the support network of the hijackers it is of possible significance to identify the connections of these offices to Saudi Arabian intelligence.

Relevant Serials:

(O-1) [REDACTED] FBI Serial (F) (F) [REDACTED] reported that as of early 2001 the EKSA had one of the largest Ministry of Islamic Affairs sections in the world with approximately 50 MIA officers. (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] Many Saudi Embassy officials believed that the chief of the MIA section, Majid Aljashaihan (SA (S) NOTE: This would be **Majed Algheshey**an), was either a GIP officer or had some type of special connection to the GIP. The same opinions were held about **Khalil Khalil**, the deputy

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

chief of the MIA section. Musaid Aljarrah (**Musaed Aljarrah**) was one of the known GIP officers in the MIA section.

[SA (S) note: Presumably the above number of "approximately 50" would include both Saudi and non-Saudi personnel (non-diplomatic) in both Islamic Affairs and Dawa. It is unknown if personnel assigned to other offices such as **Muslim World League (MWL)**, **World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)** and the **Institute of Islamic Arabic Sciences of America (IIASA)** would be included (G) [The large number of employees in a national not pre-dominantly Muslim signaled the significance of the activities of this office in the U.S. to overall Saudi Arabian policies and objectives.]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(F) On (A), (G), 2009
(O-1) Sahal Ergesous was the head of
the Islamic Affairs office at the
EKSA. (O-1) the Islamic Affairs Office is active
and is charged with monitoring Indian, Iranian and Egyptian
Islamic societies primarily. Ergesous is a Ministry of Foreign
Affairs employee (O-1)

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

(F) On 08/20/2010
(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

Various serials in indices notes that (A), (G), (J-1) worked at the EKSA as the (A), (G), (J-1) the (A), (G), (J-1) Office and that Musaed Aljarrah was assigned to work (A), (G), (J-1) (see (F) Serial (F)). According to (F) Serial (F) that in February 2005 Aljarrah met with (A), (G), (J-1) and (A), (G), (J-1) . Aljarrah stated that (A), (G), (J-1) ; however, (A), (G), (J-1) insisted that Aljarrah return to head the Islamic Affairs Office and Aljarrah returned in March 2005.

Per the above and information on visas noted below it is known that (A), (G), (J-1) (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) (J-3)

(J-3) . (A), (G), (J-1) Aljarrah was (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Aljarrah's replacement was Abdullah Alajroush (F) (F) . Alajroush was a suspected Intelligence Officer (SIO) who had previously served in Pakistan (O-1) (O-1) (A), (G), (J-1) and had attempted to (A), (G), (J-1) Alajroush's replacement was Sahal Ergesous (Sahl Ergesous) (G) (G) (A), (G), (J-1) discussed (A), (G), (J-1) and (A), (G), (J-1) and (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (F) Serial (F) .

[REDACTED]

The above information helps verify the involvement of the GIP within the MIA offices. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and Aljarrah's subsequent replacement by Alajroush is classic intelligence officer [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). This is significant considering the MIA/Dawa office's involvement, and Aljarrah's in particular, with the support network of the 9/11 hijackers as well as with the creation, funding, direction and support of the extensive Salafi proselytizing network that extended throughout the U.S.

[REDACTED]

Use of MIA/Dawa Offices to Obtain Intelligence

The purpose of the MIA/Dawa offices is also of relevance. The information below clearly indicates that one of the purposes of the offices was to obtain intelligence on individuals and communities of value to Saudi Arabian intelligence or government purposes. Thus at least some individuals assigned to these offices would be working at least partially for Saudi Arabian intelligence.

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] This serial provided excellent information related to one of the purposes of the Dawa/MIA offices and is particularly interesting as it provides information regarding taskings as well as names of personnel during the crucial years before 9/11.

[REDACTED] The communication reported the arrest of Omar Abdi Mohammed (aka Omar Alkhatib) (F) [REDACTED] in San Diego, California on 01/20/2004 and documents obtained during a subsequent search. Omar Abdi Mohamed had been identified (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] as the leader of the Al-Ittihad Al Islamia (AIAI) in the United States. Mohamed was selected as the AIAI leader of the U.S. approximately nine months ago. AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). WFO had previously obtained a list of 50 US based clerics who were supported by the EKSA IFTA (Dawa) office. Alkhatib was one of those listed. On January 20, 2004, he was arrested for immigration fraud. Investigation by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) determined that Mohamed was in charge of the of the "Western Somali Relief Agency" which was a fund raising entity that allegedly provided drought and humanitarian relief to the people of Somalia and Ethiopia. During a US naturalization

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

interview, Mohamed lied about receiving approximately \$350,000 from the Global Relief Foundation (GRF). The United States Treasury Department has frozen the assets of the Global Relief Foundation and accused it of providing financial support to terrorism.

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
(O-1)
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Documents located during searches of Muslim World League identified efforts to recruit within the U.S. military.

[REDACTED] The above documents (there are others within FBI indices) help confirm [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] reporting regarding the functions of the MIA/Dawa offices.

[REDACTED]
EO14040-003493

[REDACTED]

Personnel Assigned to the MIA/Dawa Offices:

[REDACTED] Multiple individuals were employed inside the MIA/Dawa offices within the EKSA. The following is summary information on the most pertinent individuals within these offices that are associated with the 9/11 support network.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

Passport: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Memo on [REDACTED] (J-3)

Employer: **Prince Bandar bin Sultan**

Telephone: [REDACTED] (P-1)

POC: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] Possible USPER [REDACTED] (P) DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1) / [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Summary: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) was an official diplomat assigned to the EKSA and was [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) has been

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] known to
have been employed by Bandar bin Sultan's National Security Council.
(O-1)
[REDACTED]

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] As noted above, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) was
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) to be a GIP [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) at the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) .

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (J-3), (O-1)
[REDACTED] (J-3), (O-1) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (J-3), (O-1)
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Musaed A Al Jarrah (Musaed Aljararah)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Occupation: Accountant

Address: [REDACTED] (P) McLean, Va

Telephone: [REDACTED] (P) (home) [REDACTED] (P) (cell)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Aljarrah was a Saudi diplomat assigned to the EKSA and was a high level employee in the Islamic Affairs Office. Aljarrah was [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and was heavily involved with the movement and support of the Saudi Salafi network within the U.S. to include those members of the 9/11 hijacker support network in Southern California. Aljarrah had numerous contacts with terrorism subjects throughout the U.S. Aljarrah was closely associated with Bandar bin Sultan.

[REDACTED] Aljarrah, an EKSA employee, is one of the key figures of the 9/11 investigation as it pertains to Saudi Arabian government involvement. Per investigation and subsequent affidavits Aljarrah had a "controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Sunni extremist activity in Southern California." Moreover, Aljarrah directed and controlled and funded the activities of **Almuhanna** (herein) and **Althumairy** (herein) who had served as Imams at the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, CA. After Almuhanna and Althumairy were expelled for from the King Fahd Mosque, they and their followers created an "underground" mosque near the King Fahd Mosque. After their departure, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Communication dated November 2000 requesting [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) reported that [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] dated 11/14/2003] [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Musaed Aljarrah was the MIA (officer) at the EKSA and had a similar "Wahhabi line of thinking" as Mohammed Almohanna (see herein). [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Aljarrah was last in LA two years prior.

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Dated 2009] [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) MUSSAED AL-JARRAH was at the EMBASSY OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA (EKSA) starting in the early 1990s. He was assigned to the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. Originally AL-JARRAH started at the EKSA as an administrative person [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) In 1995, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). It was at this point that AL-JARRAH became very engaged with U.S. Islamic centers throughout the U.S. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and also became very involved in the dealing of the **ISLAMIC INSTITUTE OF ARABIC AND ISLAMIC STUDIES (IIASA)**, (see herein) a Saudi university in Falls Church, VA that was sponsored by the EKSA, but was owned and managed by IMAM UNIVESITY in Riyadh. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

of the Islamic Affairs department. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Dated 2007] According to multiple sources, Al-Jarrah returned to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia where he works for Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the former Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., in the Saudi National Security Ministry. However, Al-Jarrah returned to the U.S. on July 11, 2006 using [REDACTED] (J-3) departed on September 19, 2006, and has not returned since. Al-Jarrah reportedly traveled to several U.S. cities and has been associating with [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) assigned to the EKSA. Over the past several months, Al-Jarrah has traveled to Cairo, Egypt; San Paulo, Brazil; Beirut, Lebanon; Demascus, Syria; Tokyo, Japan; and Hong Kong, China. It is unknown what Al-Jarrah is doing during his travel. (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) (G) [REDACTED] that Al-Jarrah [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) actually works for Prince Bandar's National Security Ministry in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[Redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(O-1) (O-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

Southern California Based Investigations

[REDACTED] A portion of the PENTTBOMB investigation focused on the support network for 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi and this was also a focus of the subsequent New York investigation Operation Encore. During the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) as well as the King Fahd Mosque were noted to be involved. The individuals in these locations were known to have contact with individuals assigned to the MIA/Dawa offices in the EKSA. As noted above, Fahad Althumairy was employed at the Saudi Arabian Consulate in LA in addition to being listed as employed in the EKSA Dawa office. The following additional persons of interest were working at the Consulate:

[REDACTED]

Fahad bin Ibrahim Al Thumairy

Fahad I A Al Thumairy (Fahad Althumairy)

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

Abdullah Fahad Althumairy DOB: (P-1), believed to be Althumairy's son, was initially (J-3) to visit California (google was listed) in 2013 but was later revoked.

(F)

[REDACTED]

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

Summary: Fahad Althumairy was a Saudi Arabian diplomat assigned to EKSA as well as the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles. Althumairy was a representative of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and FBI queries were of interest to the highest levels of the Saudi government. Althumairy was a close contact of the 9/11 hijackers support network and may have known Alhazmi and Almihdar and/or arranged for their meeting key members of the support network. Althumairy was an imam at the King Fahad mosque.

[REDACTED] Investigation was opened on Althumairy by LA in 2002 under (F) [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] This investigation was originally predicated on information that ALTHUMAIRY was associated with an individual who had extensive contacts with two of the September 11th hijackers.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FBI investigation determined that ALTHUMAIRY had contact with OMAR ALBAYOUMI, who had substantial contact with 9/11 hijackers NAWAF ALHAZMI and KHALID ALMIDHAR. Further, ALTHUMAIRY was identified [REDACTED] (O-1) as a "hard core extremist" whose sermons at the King Fahad Mosque appealed to the extremist and militant attendees of the mosque.

[REDACTED] ALTHUMAIRY departed Los Angeles on 02/06/2003 and returned to Saudi Arabia for his brother's wedding. On 05/06/2003, ALTHUMAIRY re-entered the U.S., [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3)

ALTHUMAIRY was interviewed by the FBI at the Los Angeles International Airport. ALTHUMAIRY was refused entry into the U.S. and was returned to Saudi Arabia on 05/08/2003. Subject was interviewed in February 2004 [REDACTED] (C-1) [REDACTED] (C-1) in Riyadh, [REDACTED] (C-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] ALTHUMAIRY's [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) because he was no longer in the United States, although he [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED].

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] A communication from Legat [REDACTED] (G) to Counterterrorism and Los Angeles [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] dated 12/17/2001 [REDACTED] (C-1) [REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] On 03/10/2020 Operation Encore agents interviewed [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] regarding any knowledge that he may have regarding the relationship between [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] and the two 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Al-Mihdhar (Al-Mihdhar) and Nawaf Al-Hazmi (Al-Hazmi). [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] stated that he was told by [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] that Fahad Al-Thumairy, the Imam of the King Fahad Mosque, had asked him to look after two very "significant" people. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] did not inquire into the word "significant" or why he referred to them this way, other than to say, that if Thumairy assigned him to look after someone it meant that they were important. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] did request [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] to meet the two men, (Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi), whenever they came across each other at the mosque. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] would see [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] with the two men at the mosque almost every day, even sometimes in the company of Al-Thumairy in the library of the mosque.

[REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] states he was told by [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] that the two men were living at his house on [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] stated to [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] that he had asked his sister, who was living there at the time, to move out and stay with [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] other sister for a couple of weeks, that he was having visitors stay with him and needed the space in the house. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] was unaware when [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] had requested that of his sister.

[REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] recalls a conversation that he had with [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] shortly after the Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi arrived in L.A. regarding the Mediterranean Restaurant on Venice Blvd. He states that [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] that he needed to take the two men to the Mediterranean Restaurant on Venice Blvd. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] asked why he was taking them to that restaurant because the food was not very good, and the service was poor. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] stated to [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] that he just needed to take them there. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] did not question him any further about this topic, but advised the interviewing agents that people would go to that restaurant to have private meetings. [See **Bayoumi**]

[REDACTED]

Mohammed S Almuhanha (Mohammed Almuhanha / Mohammed Almohanna)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Phone #: [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P),
[REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Almuhanha was a Saudi diplomat and employee of the Saudi Arabian Consulate in LA. Almuhanha was known to be a leader and spiritual guide amongst a militant group that separated from the King Fahd Mosque. Almuhanha was a close associate of Althumairy.

[REDACTED] Investigation was predicated on MOHAMMED ALMUHANNA's direct ties to FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, a Sunni Salafi extremist with ties to 9/11 (subject of [REDACTED] (F)).

ALMUHANNA was previously a consular official at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, and is reported to have founded, with ALTHUMAIRY, the King Fahad Mosque. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) "ALMUHANNA is a Sunni Islamic extremist associated with a radical form of the Salafi ideology...and a graduate of the Ibn Mohammad Islamic University in Riyadh" [REDACTED] (F)
[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Almuhanha is the son of prominent Saudi judge - Sulaiman Almuhanha (DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED]).

[REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) A brother is most likely Abdulmajed Almohna (DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED]).

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] dated 11/13/2003] [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] that Almuhanha had made an inflammatory speech at the King Fahd Mosque on 01/11/2002 calling for jihad.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Per interview of **Mohammed Alqudhaieen** (see herein) Almuhanhad was invited by Alqudhaieen to provide sermons while in Tucson. [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Interviewee stated that al-Muhanna was a virulent critic of America and American society. According to [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] al-Muhanna was disdainful of Western values and was openly hostile to non-Muslims and Muslims who did not meet al-Muhannas religious standards. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] stated that many people in the Muslim community were surprised when al-Thumairy was not allowed to re-enter the United States, but no one was surprised that al-Muhanna was excluded.

[REDACTED]

Sultan Mehmas Sultan Alkahtani (Sultan Alkahtani)

[REDACTED] (F)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Alkahtani was a Saudi Arabian diplomat and employee of the Saudi Arabian Consulate in LA. Alkahtani was a close associate of Almuhanha. Alkahtani's brother was identified as having been killed fighting for ISIS.

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) : [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Al-Muhanna is the subject of Los Angeles [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) (F) based on the extremist ideology which he has preached at the King Fahd Mosque in Los Angeles and a smaller mosque/madrassa school Al-Muhanna helped create known as the Dar Al Quran Education Center. Al-Muhanna has been associated with **Fahad Althumairy**, another religious mullah from the Consulate, who is the subject of Los Angeles FFI [REDACTED] (G). Al-Muhanna also gives religious guidance to the Islamic Center of Long Beach where he is in

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

contact with Hamad Al-Badr, [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G).

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Prior FBI investigation has determined that Alkahtani's brother - Fahad Mihmas Alqahtani - [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) prior to traveling to Syria to join ISIS where he subsequently was killed. [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Mutaib Alsudairi (Mutaib Alsudairy)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] Asudairi's Virginia DMV photo that lists place of residence of [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va in September 1999.

[REDACTED] Summary: Mutaib Alsudairy and Adel Alsadhan were two Saudi clerics and Saudi Arabian officials who entered the U.S. in 1999 and met with Omar Albayoumi. These individuals later attempted to reenter the U.S. Alsudairy is known to have lived with AQ facilitator Ziyad Khaleel.

[REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

DC and had [REDACTED] (J-3). (FBI Comment: This was the same arrival date as al-Sadhan and both men listed [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3). Al-Sudairy was an administrative officer at the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC. He assumed duty on 14 June 1999. Al-Sudairy's position was terminated on 11 April 2001. Prior to this he worked at the Ministry of Islamic Affairs in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia from March 1998 to June 1999. Al-Sudairy was reported to be the nephew of Doctor Abdullah bin Turki, former head of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Muslim World League president.

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] FBI TA shows that al-Bayoumi called al-Sudairy five (5) times while the hijackers were in San Diego with al-Bayoumi. The dates

of the calls are significant. The first set of calls are 24 January, 26 January, and 30 January 2000 - on these particular days al-Bayoumi met the hijackers in Culver City, CA and talked to them about coming to San Diego. The next call occurred on 2 February 2000. On 4 February 2000 al-Bayoumi co-signed a loan agreement for the apartment he obtained for the hijackers and brought them to a Bank of America to assist them in opening a bank account. The last call occurred on 7 February 2000. A "welcoming party" for the hijackers was coordinated by al-Bayoumi and likely held on 17 February 2000.

[REDACTED] Al-Sudairy subsequently moved to Columbus, Missouri and al-Sadhan moved to Lawrence, Kansas. While in Missouri, al-Sudairy lived with **Ziyad Khaleel** (see herein) for about four months in 2000. Khaleel was a known key communications equipment procurement officer for Usama bin Laden and provided satellite phones used in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Africa. The two men opened a joint Post Office Box in Columbus, Missouri. Following al-Sudairy's return to Saudi Arabia he met with Khaleel twice. (FBI Comment: Khaleel was reportedly killed in a car accident in Saudi Arabia in March 2002)

[REDACTED]

EO14040-003509

[REDACTED]

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

SA (S) note: Mutaib Alsudairy is the brother of long term LA Saudi Consulate employee Faisal Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)) (confirmed via review of applications that confirmed same father and mother). (J-3)

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (F) Faisal Alsudairy was the subject of an LHM to (J-3) as well as (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)
(J-3)

(J-3) Another brother, Saud Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)) was a brother assigned as a diplomat at the EKSA. Another brother, Turki Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)) is noted in early New York Saudi investigative file and in PENTTBOMB files for unknown reasons.

Another brother Ahmad Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)), an MOI officer, (J-3) Ahmad was the

(G) communication is unclear.

Another brother Mishaal Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)) appears to have been (G) (G). Another brother Bandar Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)) is an MOD police officer.

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

Faisal Alsudairy, Mutaib Alsudairy's possible brother, (J-3)

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Adel Alsadhan

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (O-1) Captioned investigation was opened based on [REDACTED] (O-1) AL SADHAN works under WFO FI subject **MUSAED AL-JARRAH** [REDACTED] (F)) at the Islamic Affairs Section of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia (RESA) and helps AL-JARRAH coordinate/direct all Saudi Imams assigned to and/or financially supported by the Saudi government in the United States. AL SADHAN is believed to help AL-JARRAH support extremist Saudi Sunnis in the United States. AL SADHAN [REDACTED] (O-1) a believer in a radical form of Sunni Salafiyism and reportedly travels frequently within the United States.

[[REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F) dated 09/26/2001] Interview of Doctor Abdussattar Shaikh: **Omar Albayoumi** introduced Shaikh to Mat'Ab Alsudairy and Adil Al'Sadhan, two scholars visiting from Saudi Arabia. They did not seem to know Albayoumi very well. Albayoumi was looking for somewhere for these two visitors to stay. Shaikh allowed them to stay with him. They stayed with him for approximately six or seven

[REDACTED]

weeks. [NOTE: Alhazmi and Almihdar also lived at Shaikh's residence at a later date. (F) This serial also noted that both Alsudairy and Alsadhan were imams at the Kurdish Mosque in El Cajon (San Diego) (See Albayoumi).

(J-3) [REDACTED] Attempted to enter the US in 2013 as (J-3) [REDACTED] but was refused. (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(P)

(P)

DOB: (P-1)

SSN: (P-1)

Possible phone prior to 9/11/2001: (P) (LA) / (P)

Possible present address:

(P)

Anaheim, CA

May be USPER of (P) origin

Summary: (P) was a local hire as an employee of the Saudi Arabian Consulate in LA. (P) was a close associate of Alhtumairy and may have met Albayoumi prior to his supposed chance encounter with Alhazmi and Almihdar. A phone associated with (P) later had contact with the support network of the hijackers in Virginia.

Relevant Serials:

(F) Listed employees of the Saudi Arabian Consulate as of 09/1999 which listed (P) as a translator with a US arrival date of 10/23/1991 although the biographical section noted he was an employee of the Saudi Cultural Attache in LA from 1979-1983.

[REDACTED] In February of 2000, **Omar Al-Bayoumi** and Kaysan Bindon, aka Isamu Dyson, traveled from San Diego to the Saudi Consulate where Al-Bayoumi handled paperwork for passports for his family and picked up some religious materials. Afterwards they went to a restaurant near the King Fahd mosque where they met 9/11 hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hamzi. When later interviewed, Al-Bayoumi and Bindon characterized this initial meeting as a chance encounter. On 08/03/2004, Bindon identified a photograph of (P) as the person at the Consulate who gave religious materials to Al-Bayoumi.

[REDACTED]

During the investigation of the 9/11 attacks by FBI personnel an associate of the hijackers identified as Isamu Dyson was interviewed and advised that he knew Omar Albayoumi from 1999. Dyson indicated that he once visited the Saudi Consulate in LA with Albayoumi and while there Albayoumi met separately with an unknown individual. [During an interview on 08/18/2003 Albayoumi described this person as follows: a tall individual, heavier than AL-BAYOUMI, with a long black/gray beard and not from Saudi Arabia. After this meeting they traveled to a cafe in Culver City where Albayoumi met with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdar. At the time, investigators believed this meeting occurred in February 2000.

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Dated 04/2016] This serial details investigation of [REDACTED] (P) as part of Operation Encore. Contrary to [REDACTED] (P) claims of not discussing 9/11, a source reported that after the attacks [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (O-1) stated "Isn't it great that our brothers are fighting?"

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Dated 04/2016] [REDACTED] (P) known telephone number ([REDACTED] (P)) was also known to have one contact (06/14/2001) with telephone [REDACTED] (P) which was registered to an apartment used by Eyad Alrababah and [REDACTED] (P) who both also provided significant logistic support to Mihdar, Hanjour and two additional hijackers. According to Alrababah, he met Hanjour and Hamzi at a 7-11 store "by chance" (similar to the story made by Albayoumi). In May 2001, Alrababah drove four of the hijackers to Connecticut and New Jersey. [REDACTED] (D)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Dated 04/2016] [REDACTED] (P) was a close associate of **Althumairy** and led prayers and handled administration at the King Fahad Mosque. Althumairy also served as an admin officer at the Saudi LA Consulate and held an office at that location.

[REDACTED]

Omar Albayoumi

Alternate names found: Omar Al Bayoumi / Omar A M Al Bayoumi / Omer Bayoumi / Omar Bayoumi / Omar Bayayoomi / Umar Albayoumi

Omar Abu Emad)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

(J-3) It is known that Albayoumi, a Saudi national, had entered the US in the decade before 9/11 and remained.

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: [REDACTED] Omar Albayoumi was directly involved with day to day support of the Alhazmi and Almihdar. (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)

Albayoumi was known to be paid by a Saudi affiliated company as a "ghost employee" while in the U.S. After Almihdar departed the U.S. in June 2000, a nephew of Albayoumi's supposed employer moved into the home.

Relevant Serials:

Omar Albayoumi was originally opened as [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (F) Provided synopsis of Saudi official links to Albayoumi:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Omar Albayoumi was a major subject of interest due to his close and confirmed contact with several of the 9/11 hijackers. The 9/11 Commission report speculated that Albayoumi worked for Saudi intelligence; however, [REDACTED] could not locate any evidence and Albayoumi claimed his association with the two hijackers was based on a chance meeting. Information contained herein, [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)

This is significant as Albayoumi (as well as others) was almost immediately available to Hazmi and Mihdar upon entry into the U.S. during a time period that both of these ill-prepared operatives were most vulnerable to possible detection. Albayoumi was being paid as a "ghost employee" of a Saudi company during his time in California. A relative of Albayoumi's boss within this company would later move in to the same apartment with Alhazmi after Mihdar's departure.

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (O-1)
[REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] The earliest reference to Albayoumi in electronic indices noted by writer were from 1998.

[REDACTED] [(F) Serial (F)] On (A), (G), (J-1) 1998, [REDACTED] (F) (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) new

property has been purchased for a mosque, located at [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) in El Cajon. The mosque will cater mainly to the Kurdish people. The person in charge is a Saudi (Egyptian descent), Omar Bayoumi, aka Abu Emad. The mosque number is [REDACTED] (P), Bayoumi's residential number is [REDACTED] (P) and his cellular phone is [REDACTED] (P). The property cost \$580,000.00 and is going to be renovated. Saudi financing appears to be the means by which the property was bought and renovated.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Date 04/01/1999] In this communication an interviewee advised that Omar Bayayoomi (phonetic), user of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) had delivered \$400,000 to the Islamic Kurdish community in El Cajon, CA for the purpose of building the Al Medina Mosque. The money originated from the neighbors of Sheikh Al Zamel, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interviewee also opined that Bayayoomi must be an agent of a foreign power or of Saudi Arabia. Omar Al-Bayoumi, pdob [REDACTED] (P-1), [REDACTED] (P-1) address [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] San Diego, CA (Villa Balboa Apt. Complex), wife Manal Bagader, telephone [REDACTED] (P), may be identical to the "Omar Bayayoomi"

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]] An interview of an employee of Dallah Al Baraka in Saudi Arabia noted that Albayoumi first appeared to his knowledge in early 1995 as a result of AVCO Overseas Services dropping its contract with the Saudi Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA) in part for the presence of "ghost employees" which AVCO was forced to pay for under the contract. The employee stated that the Director General of PCA at that time, [REDACTED] (P) (DOB [REDACTED] (P-1) , had "side deals" regarding some of the ghost employees with AVCO whereby AVCO paid the expenses related to these individuals. Omar Albayoumi was one of the ghost employees. The interviewee estimated that there were approximately 50 such individuals on the books who were being paid for doing no work (for AVCO). When the contract was moved to ERCAN [REDACTED] (P) assured the interviewee that he [REDACTED] (P) wanted to Albayoumi to stay in the US and that the interviewee should not pry for information. The interviewee thought that Albayoumi was a huge financial drain on the program. The interviewee advised that whenever Albayoumi needed additional money beyond his salary that a purchase order would appear which was devoid of information on the item to be purchased but was already approved by [REDACTED] (P). These purchase orders were controlled by Mohammed Basharil (Mohamed Basharahil)(PCA). Basharil and a Hamid Alrashid (PCA) would take the payment and wire transfer the money to Albayoumi's account.

[REDACTED] [9/11 Commission Report] Saudi student Yazeed Alsalmi moved into the home in which Alhazmi resided after the previously noted departure of Almihdar. Yazeed Alsalmi (Yazeed S A Alsalmi) DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] was the [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] .

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]] [REDACTED] Anwar AULAQI and BAYOUMI clearly knew each other, as would be expected since each was a well-known member of the local Muslim community. While they may not have liked each other, they appear to have had an instrumental relationship in regard to the

[REDACTED]

hijackers, with phone calls between them becoming necessary for the support network's functioning and effectiveness. [Anwar Aulaqi, Yemeni-American AQ operative, was associated with the hijackers while in San Diego and later moved to Northern Virginia (Dar Alhijra mosque) at the time that the hijackers were in Northern Virginia. Aulaqi allegedly later met with several hijackers to include Alhazmi while working at the Dar Alhijra. Aulaqi was later killed by U.S. forces in Yemen while a part of AQAP.] [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F) dated 10/03/2001 Interview of [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G)] [REDACTED] (G) noted that Khadib has a "tight" connection to Omad Ahmed Albayoumi. Albayoumi is a braggart from a low status Egyptian family that migrated to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Albayoumi has access to Saudi money, more than \$800,000, to build Mosques and Islamic schools. Albayoumi is considered by many in the Muslim community to be a Saudi Arabian intelligence officer, as he would come to the Mosque and video tape everything. [REDACTED] (G) noted that Albayoumi is described as a social animal who has connections everywhere including the Minister of Islamic Affairs, the Saudi Consulate and even with known crooks.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F) Dated 04/2016] Operation Encore analysis: [REDACTED] (P) described Bayoumi as a Saudi citizen with great respect inside the Saudi Consulate, well regarded by Consulate personnel who held a "very high status" when he entered the building. Bayoumi's status was higher than many of the Saudi persons in charge of the Consulate.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F)] On September 27, 2001, execution of a federal search warrant was conducted by the San Diego Division in a room utilized by Al-Bayoumi as an office within the Kurdish Community Islamic Center (Masjid Al-Madina Al-Munawara), located at 511 S. Magnolia Avenue, El Cajon, California. As a result of that search a copy of Al-Bayoumi's phone book, dated October 4, 2000 was seized.

[REDACTED] Listed in Al-Bayoumi's phone book were the following names and telephone numbers:

[REDACTED] (P) Dr. Jameel Alshami [REDACTED] (P) ; Saudi Embassy WA. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P), AbdulAziz Assaleh [REDACTED] (P) and F [REDACTED] (P) **Khalid Asswailem** [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) and C [REDACTED] (P) . **Saudi Consulate** [REDACTED] (P) F [REDACTED] (P), **Islamic Affairs** [REDACTED] (P) Abdullah Awaad [REDACTED] (P) Sami Assadhan [REDACTED] (P) and Saad Al Jebreen, [REDACTED] (P) LA, CA

[REDACTED]

90025. [REDACTED] From January 2000 through May 2000, two known cellular telephones associated with Al-Bayoumi showed 32 calls placed to the Embassy, 24 calls placed to the Consulate in Los Angeles and 37 calls placed to the Cultural Mission.

[(F) [REDACTED] Serial (F) [REDACTED] Al-Bayoumi is also linked to **Abdolrahman Barzanjee**. Barzanjee is a possible Al-Oaida associate, [REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1)

[SA (S) [REDACTED] Note: Bayoumi's association with the Kurdish Mosque, reportedly paid for with Saudi money, and his association with Barzanjee may be of interest. According to open source reporting, AQ was exploring its associations with Iraq during this same time period which resulted in the organization of Ansar Al Islam in Northern Iraq's Kurdish areas. See [REDACTED] (F)

[SA (S) [REDACTED] note: Possible brother Ahmed Albayoumi has a more recent [REDACTED] (J-3) .]

[REDACTED]

Osama Basnan (Osama Bassnan / Osama Yousef Bassnan / Usama Basnan)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

SSN: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Osama Basnan was also a known associate of the hijackers in Southern California. A prior Saudi Arabian employee, Basnan was also known to have connections to the "Blind Sheikh." Basnan and his wife were close friends of Bayoumi. Basnan's wife, who was known to have sympathy for Hamas, was paid money by Saudi Ambassador Bandar's wife.

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) This serial noted
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (F) This investigation was predicated based on interviews conducted during the PENTTBOMB investigation. Information was developed that identified Osama Basnan as having a very close relationship with **Omar Al-Bayoumi**, who provided support to hijackers Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar in San Diego. Basnan was also reported to be the "Omad," or informal

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

mayor, of the Saudi Arabian Community in San Diego. Individuals in the Middle Eastern community opined that Al-Bayoumi was a Saudi Intelligence Officer and that Basnan came to San Diego to take his place. Basnan was living in the same apartment complex on 09/11/2001 where Al-Bayoumi and the hijackers had resided and Al-Bayoumi's mail was being forwarded to Basnan's apartment. Basnan harbors anti-American sentiments and espouses pro-UBL opinions.

Basnan entered the U.S. in 1980 [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] believed to be associated with the Saudi Embassy. Also in 1992, he hosted a party for the blind Sheik Omar Rahman in Washington, D.C. prior to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. In 1998, he moved to San Diego and became the Omad. In January of 1999, he began to receive \$2,000 per month in his wife's name from the Princess Haifa Bint Faisal, the wife of Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar. The checks were endorsed by Basnan and Al-Bayoumi's wife. In April of 2001, Al-Bayoumi's wife and Basnan's wife were arrested together for shoplifting. In June of 2001, Al-Bayoumi and his wife claimed to leave the U.S. to return to Saudi, but actually went to London.

[REDACTED] In July of 2001, Basnan moved into the same apartment complex where Al-Bayoumi and the hijackers lived. In August of 2001, the U.S. Post Office began to forward Al-Bayoumi's mail to Basnan's residence. On [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) was [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) who has provided extensive [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) of Basnan and his associates [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] According to a witness, on October 17, 1992,

BASNAN hosted a party at the [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) Washington D.C. for the blind Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman. The party was hosted in a common area party room located in the [REDACTED] (P) complex where BASNAN lived. BASNAN's name was the tenant name on the reservation sheet for the party room the night the party was held. The witness identified Sheik Rahman from television photos. Sheikh Rahman attended the party along with a large entourage.

On [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Basnan [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) he hosted a party at his house for Sheik Omar Rahman. After Rahman was jailed, Rahman dispatched a

[REDACTED]

messenger to Basnan to instruct him not to contact Rahman in jail. Basnan stated [REDACTED] (O-1) came to interview Basnan regarding his association with Rahman. Basnan lied to [REDACTED] (O-1) about his association with Rahman and acted like he didn't speak any English.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Basnan [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) was questioned about Omar Abdel Rahman and the first World Trade Center bombing. Basnan acted like he did not understand the questions by [REDACTED] (O-1) and the he played stupid putting on a production. Basnan stated .. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Basnan was told by another [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[[REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F)] In 1980, BASSNAN, a Saudi Arabian citizen, enters the United States [REDACTED] (J-3) BASSNAN may be an operative for Saudi Arabian government and is in the United States illegally.

2. [REDACTED] On October 17, 1992, BASSNAN hosts party for Sheik Omar Rahman, mastermind of 1993 bombing of World Trade Towers. [SA [REDACTED] (S) Note: [REDACTED] (F) noted the specific date to be 10/17/1992]

3. [REDACTED] Since 1998, BASSNAN is considered the "Omad," or informal mayor of Saudi Arabian's living in San Diego, California.

Payments from Princess Haifa to Majeda Dweikat (Basnans wife), 1999-2001. Manal Bagader (Al-Bayoumis wife) co-endorsed three of the checks. Of the three co-endorsed checks, one check was deposited by Yasser Hijazi (Basnans associate) in Maryland; an attempt was made to deposit one check into Bagaders account, but the check was returned as payee not verified; and one check was deposited into an unknown account. FBI information indicated that from at least April 1999 through at least September 2001 Princess Haifa, the wife of Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar, provided \$2,000 monthly payments totaling \$40,000 in checks and wire transfers to the wives of al-Bayumi and Basnan. Note: There is no indication of direct payments to Manal Bagader, the wife of Al-Bayoumi.

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] On February 10, 2002, ABDULRAZAQ ALI A. ALTURKI, Managing Director, Namma Cargo Services was interviewed in Riyadh. ALTURKI worked as an assistant to Ambassador PRINCE BANDAR at the Saudi Embassy in DC and while working there in

[REDACTED]

about 1991 he met OSAMA BASSNAN. ALTURKI established numerous contacts at the Embassy which led him to his current professional status. ALTURKI's relationship with the Saudi government is very strong. ALTURKI is friendly with Saudi government officials and members of the Royal Family, particularly PRINCE BANDAR. ALTURKI travels to Houston, Texas where [REDACTED] (P-1)

(P-1) In August 2001, ALTURKI departed the United States somewhat hastily, but because of pressure from work. ALTURKI did make stops in Washington DC and Boston on his return trip to Saudi Arabia, visiting friends in the Saudi Embassy. ALTURKI stated he has not provided money to BASSNAN. [REDACTED] (F), Serial (F) and [REDACTED] (F), Serial (F)

[REDACTED] On May 14, 1992, [REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1)

[REDACTED] For financial activity: [REDACTED] (F) Serial (F). For summary see [REDACTED] (F) Serial (F)

[REDACTED] (F) Serial (F)] [REDACTED] On (A), (G), (J-1) 2002, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) (F), [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) BASNAN recently obtained a large unspecified amount of money during his recent travel to Houston, Texas. BASNAN's friend, ABDULRAZAQ ALTURKI introduced BASNAN to MOHAMMED TURKI AL SAUD, a member of the Saudi Royal Family and part of the Saudi Arabian government delegation that was in Houston for a summit meeting with President Bush. AL SAUD was the person who gave BASNAN a large sum of money. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) BASNAN received money in excess of \$10,000. BASNAN (A), (G), (J-1) gave a large portion of the money to his wife to give to her family who lives in the West Bank area of Israel. [REDACTED] (F), Serial (F). [SA (S) note: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Mohammed Alsaud [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) may have been Turki bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Alsaud (NFI).]

[REDACTED]

(F) [REDACTED] On (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] 2001, Basnan asked (G) [REDACTED] specific questions about how Anthrax and Small Pox are transmitted and what affects infection has on the human body. On (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] 2001, Basnan asked (G) [REDACTED] specific questions about how Small Pox infection advances through the human body. Basnan (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] was true that just prior to dying a Small Pox victim suffers extreme abdominal pain. On (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] 2001, (G) (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] Basnan's wife, Majeda Dweikat, in possession of a book titled "Chemical and Biological Weapons: Anthrax and Sarin." The book was in Basnan's residence. (G) (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] Dweikat had tabbed a section of the book that showed the skin coming off the body.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Abdullah A S Al Jraithen (Abdullah Aljraithen)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] As outlined by writer in referenced serial, ABDULLAH ALJRAITHEN registered at the Travelodge Hotel in Culver City, California with **OMAR AHMED ALBAYOUMI** on 12/20/1999 and checked out the following day. Little additional information was located regarding ALJRAITHEN at the time referenced serial was written.

[REDACTED] After the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks, ALBAYOUMI was detained by New Scotland Yard (NSY), his apartment was searched and documents were seized. A recent review by NYPD Intelligence Research Specialist (IRS) [REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED] (S) of documents obtained by NYO-JTTF from NSY yielded further information regarding ALJRAITHEN (this information is also described on [REDACTED] (F) ALBAYOUMI's telephone book contained an entry for Dr. ABDULLAH ALJOAITHEN, with the numbers [REDACTED] (P-1) and C (cell) [REDACTED] (P-1). (Analyst note: the first number is presumed to be a Saudi number, the second number appears to be a Saudi cell phone number given the code "5" followed by a 7-digit number; neither number was found in the Telephone Application.)

[REDACTED] ECF searches on [REDACTED] (P-1) and [REDACTED] (P-1) both yielded a hit on [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (O-1), which describes reporting from a foreign government service regarding "names and telephone numbers

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

appearing on a laminated card retrieved from the villa in Madinah, Saudi Arabia, where SHAYKH 'ALI KHUDAYR FAHD ALKHUDAYR AND SHAYKH AHMAD HAMUD MUFARRIJ ALKHALIDI were arrested during a raid conducted in late May 2003. The relevant entry on this contact list was for ABDALLAH BIN 'ALI AL-J'AYTHAN (P-1) and cell (P-1). An IDW search on (P-1) yielded additional other government service information (O-1): "DR. 'ABDALLAH AL-JUHAYN (P-1)" was found on a confiscated hard-drive from an October 6, 2001 raid on the Al-Haramayn offices in (O-1)

[REDACTED] According to a (G) report on ABDALLAH BIN ALI ALJAYTHAN: (G) Intelligence Assessment: Shaykh Ali KHUDAIR is a probable terrorist supporter (Financier). KHUDAIR was believed to be the source of weapons, passports, money and supplies for ANSAR AL-ISLAM operations in Iraq. Ali KHUDAIR is believed to be detained in Saudi Arabia.

[REDACTED] Also according to the (G) report, a 22-page Arabic language document containing instructions for making a variety of improvised explosives devices (IEDs) was found on a hard drive seized during the 05/27/2003 arrests of radical clerics and extremist shaykhs Ali KHUDAIR and Ahmad Humud AL-KHALIDI in Medinah, Saudi Arabia. Much of the material in the document closely parallels that in an explosives manual handwritten by Abu Khabab AL-MASRI, the former explosives and poisons trainer at the AL-QAIDA associated DERUNTA TRAINING CAMP in Afghanistan. (Source: (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) AITHREAT@00001 NON-RELEASABLE)

[REDACTED]

Islamic Foundation of Sheikh Ibn Taimmiyyah

11004 Washington Blvd, Culver City, CA

(King Fahd Mosque)

10980 Washington Blvd, Culver City, CA

[REDACTED] Ibn Taimmiyyah was a medieval Islamic jurist who's teachings formed the basis of Wahhabi doctrine (Ibn Al Wahhab). Ibn Taimmiyyah's teachings included the believe that Muslims could kill other Muslims (Takfir) which is utilized by AQ to justify attacks. The Saudi Arabian foundation that supports the King Fahd Mosque is named for Ibn Taimmiyyah.

[REDACTED] The associations between Saudi Arabian diplomats who worked at the King Fahd Mosque and the hijacker support group are otherwise noted above. An additional person of interest is listed Chairman of the Ibn Taimiyyah Foundation Khalil Alkhalil.

Khalil Alkhalil (aka Khalil Khalil / Khalil Alkhaleel)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[(F) Serial (F) [REDACTED] For the information of Los Angeles, (O-1)
(O-1) [REDACTED]
(O-1) [REDACTED] KHALIL al-KHALIL, who was head of the Islamic
Affairs Section at the EMBASSY OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA
(SAEMB), Washington, D.C. about ten years ago, resides in
California (O-1) [REDACTED] al-KHALIL set up the BIN (possibly
IBN) TAIMIYAH mosque in Los Angeles. (O-1) [REDACTED] al-
KHALIL had access to a lot of money.

(F) [REDACTED] Serial (F) [REDACTED] On December 6, 1999, (P) [REDACTED]
(ALTHUMAIRY)
called (P-1) [REDACTED] at 22:05:00 for 2 minutes. (This number is KHALIL
ALKHALIL's cell phone according to an FBI interview with FAHAD
ALQAHTANI.) At 22:58:00, (P) [REDACTED] (ALTHUMAIRY) called (P) [REDACTED]
(ALBAYOUMI), duration 1 minute (note: this is believed to be the
first call between ALTHUMAIRY and ALBAYOUMI since the previous
year).

(F) [REDACTED]


(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



(A), (G), (J-1)



[Redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

Other Offices Associated with EKSA

[REDACTED] Investigation of [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) activities within the US prior to and especially after 9/11 identified numerous "charities" and "non-governmental organizations" (NGO). Several of these organizations were [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) prior to 9/11. Although the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) as an element many were [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) due to suspected funding of association with HAMAS. The connections of these "charities" and "NGOs" to terrorism is well documented both in open source and within [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) communications.

[REDACTED] The primary NGO of Saudi Arabia was MWL under which operated the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), Sana Bell (Sanabel Alkheer "Seeds of Charity") (an investment arm), Alharamain and World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). The Saudi charities such as MWL and IIRO were also affiliated with the Virginia based offices of the "Herndon charities" of which Sanabell (Sana Bell Alkheer) was a part as well as the SAAR Foundation. These were collectively run out of offices at [REDACTED] (P) in Herndon, Va. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[See [REDACTED] (F)] This serial documents the extensive ties to the Saudi Arabian government as well as extensive ties to terrorism - specifically AQ. AQ members were employed within these organizations and utilized funding for terrorism support and used the offices for cover for movement of personnel. Extensive open source information and court documents are also available detailing this same information.

[REDACTED] (F) A telephone directory obtained by the FBI in 2002 listed the following additional offices under the title " Saudi Arabian Offices":

International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO)

[REDACTED] (P)

Falls Church

[REDACTED]

Muslim World League (MWL)

134 West 26th Street

New York, NY

World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)

4516 Old Columbia Pike

PO Box 8096

Falls Church, Va

Telephone: [REDACTED] (P)

The Islamic Center

2551 Massachusetts Avenue NW

Washington, DC

Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences of America (IIASA)

8500 Hilltop Road

Fairfax, Va

Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences of America (IIASA)

(F)

Summary: Per above, the IIASA, located at 8500 Hilltop Road, Fairfax, Va., was affiliated with the EKSA. The school was a U.S. subsidiary of the Imam Mohammed bin Saud University in Saudi Arabia. The EKSA was known to finance the IIASA and its primary administrators and teachers were Saudi Arabian diplomats. The IIASA was one of the many pieces of Saudi proselytizing activity in the U.S.



Mohammed Alsaud is believed to be on left. Bandar Bin Sultan Alsaud on right (seated).



Seated in front row of the above noted opening ceremony (left to right): Abdullah Alsaif (Saudi (J-3) (A), (G), (J-1) as hating

[REDACTED]

America); Abdullah Alnoشان (see herein) and Salah Albakhit (Saleh Albakheet - PhD student).

[REDACTED] (F) Serial (F)]According to its website, IIASA is a non-profit educational institution affiliated with the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University (IMSIU) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. IIASA is one of six overseas institutions affiliated with the IMSIU. IIASA was established in 1988 in Fairfax, Virginia. The stated goals of IIASA are; to introduce the Arab-Islamic civilization to America and encourage the fruitful exchange between the two sides; to coordinate the efforts of scholarly exchange between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United States of America; to offer workshops, undergraduate and graduate degrees in the fields of Islamic education and Arabic language teaching; to cooperate with North American universities and educational centers in teaching Islamic studies and Arabic language; to conduct and publish research; and to hold a series of annual academic and educational seminars.

[REDACTED] (F) Serial (F)] [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) was initiated in October 2002 based on information indicating that the IIASA was one of seven "Saudi Arabian Offices" located in the United States and on information indicating that an address found during a 05/30/2002 joint CIA/FBI [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) raid of an Al-Qaeda safe-house in [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) included an address utilized by an individual that listed their employer as the IIASA and their supervisor as being ABDULLAH BIN LADEN.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) the IIASA was associated with the WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH (WAMY), in Alexandria, Virginia and [REDACTED] (P) with the ISLAMIC ASSEMBLY OF NORTH AMERICA (IANA) in Michigan, which are also funded by the Saudi Government. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) not aware if IIASA provided any monetary support to terrorist organizations or groups; however, the individuals that worked at the IIASA were obviously recruiting individuals into extremist views.

[REDACTED] (D)
[REDACTED] (D)

(D) Information provided by [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (O-1)
[REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED]

(O-1) [REDACTED] NADWI was involved in facilitating the movement of Al Qaeda operatives involved in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa.

[REDACTED] In 2003, NADWI's [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] in Mombasa, was linked to telephone numbers connected to 2002 Mombasa bombing suspect SALAH ALI SALAH NABHAN. (O-1)

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Another individual associated with IIASA, ABDULLAH ALNOSHAN (A), (G), (J-1), (D) [REDACTED] and financially to (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] subject MUTAIB AL-SUDAIRY (F) [REDACTED] (F)). ALNOSHAN was "employed at the IIASA as [REDACTED] (J-3) " with the SAE and at the end of 1998 became the head of MUSLIM WORLD LEAGUE (MWL) [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] During January 2004, [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) Ten of those individuals returned to Saudi Arabia. The six that remained in the United States claim to have the legal status to do so. The Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement was notified that these six remain in the United States.

(D)

[REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED]

Below are some observations supporting the above:

(D)

[REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] According to its website, IIASA is a non-profit educational institution affiliated with the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University (IMSIU) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. IIASA is one of six overseas institutions affiliated with the IMSIU. IIASA was established in 1988 in Fairfax, Virginia. The stated goals of IIASA are; to introduce the Arab-Islamic civilization to America and encourage the fruitful exchange between the two sides; to coordinate the efforts of scholarly exchange between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United States of America; to offer workshops, undergraduate and graduate degrees in the fields of Islamic education and Arabic language teaching; to cooperate with North American

[REDACTED]

universities and educational centers in teaching Islamic studies and Arabic language; to conduct and publish research; and to hold a series of annual academic and educational seminars.

[REDACTED] During January 2004, [REDACTED] (J-3)
[REDACTED] (J-3)

(J-3) Ten of those individuals returned to Saudi Arabia. The six that remained in the United States claim to have the legal status to do so. The Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement has been notified that these six remain in the United States.

(D)

[REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(D)

(O-1)

(D)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) that between
(A), (G), (J-1) and
(A), (G), (J-1) 2003 the IIASA deposited approximately \$23,318,623 into
its accounts. The primary source of these funds was the Saudi Embassy
and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Association (SAMA).

(O-1)

A review of Virginia Corporation and Limited Partnership Records indicates that the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America was incorporated on 10/26/1993 and voluntarily terminated on 08/18/1995. According to public source information, the President of this corporation was listed as His Excellency PRINCE BANDAR BIN SULTAN and the Executive Director was SULAIMAN ALJARALLAH.

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Those requested to be removed from the U.S. by USDS were the following who were listed as Saudi Arabian diplomats:

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[Redacted]

(O-1), (J-3)



[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

Muslim World League (MWL)

[REDACTED] (F)

Abdullah Alnoshan (Abdullah Alnushan / Alnoashan)

(Director) [REDACTED] (G)



[REDACTED] The Muslim World League (MWL) was created by the Saudi Arabian government in 1962 in order to combat the influence of Egyptian President Gamal Nasser's nationalist influence in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia has used this organization to spread the Wahhabist faith throughout the Islamic world as well as spread Islam in areas that were not known to be heavily Islamic. Saudi Arabia has financed many charity projects through MWL and other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) in order to gain leadership over the Islamic community. Many of these charities were known to have supported AQ and related groups both financially and operationally throughout the world. MWL was the organization under which the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and other such as World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) operated at an international level.

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] The US based office(s) of MWL and its director, Abdullah Alnoshan, were extensively connected to [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) See [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED]

(F) [REDACTED] for connections to [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) - the connections being too extensive to summarize herein. Alnoشان was known to have been a "purchasing agent" for the EKSA (see [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Alnoشان was an associate of Musaed Aljarrah.

[REDACTED] The address listed for MWL within the phone roster noted above, the New York address, was formed into a sub-office by the time of the creation of [REDACTED] (F). The main office had been moved to 360 South Washington Street, Suite 300, Falls Church, Va. This address is listed as the office of IIRO on the phone roster - however, by this same time IIRO had relocated to another office (see below). The South Washington address was owned by Sanabal Alkheir (a "Herndon Charity") and was also, subsequent to 9/11, the location of the Dar Al Arqum mosque which hosted many of the convicted "Northern Virginia Jihad Group." (see more below)

(F) [REDACTED] During the search of MWL's office space in New York in 2005 the FBI found a document titled "First Annual Ijtima of Mujahideen and Jihaad Conference" dated 1991. This document was from Tehreek-E-Jihaad, Sherpur House, Karachi, Pakistan, and included sign-up sheets. The conference was: "To publicize Jihad on an international and inter-Islamic level."

[REDACTED] The [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) connections with MWL are extensive and are best viewed within [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED]

World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)

[REDACTED] (F)

Abdullah Bin Laden

[REDACTED] (G)

Related: [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Relevant Serials:

[(F) [REDACTED] Serial (F)]: [REDACTED] Analysis revealed that the WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH, aka al-Nadwa al-'Alamiyya lil Shabab al-Islami, is headquartered out of Mecca, Saudi Arabia. WAMY's U.S. headquarters is located at POB 8096, Falls Church, VA 22041, telephone number [REDACTED] (P) WAMY's U.S. business address is 4300 Evergreen Lane, Annadale, Virginia 22003. Further analysis revealed that WAMY presents itself as an individual and family services organization and youth center. Additional analysis revealed that WAMY's U.S. director is a member of the BIN LADIN family, nfi.

Also, analysis has revealed that [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAMY is believed to be a subsidiary or affiliate of the MUSLIM WORLD LEAGUE, aka Rabitat al'Alam al-Islami, headquartered in Mecca, Saudi Arabia; the INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC RELIEF ORGANIZATION, aka Hay'at al-Igathat al-Islamiyya al-'Alamiyah, headquartered in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; ISLAMIC STUDENTS ORGANIZATION, headquartered in Mecca, Saudi Arabia; ISLAMIC CHARITY COMMITTEE, aka Lajnat al-Birr al-Islami, headquartered in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; ISLAMIC CENTER SOCIETY, headquartered in Saudi Arabia; AL-WAIF FOUNDATION, aka al-Waif al-Islami, headquartered in Saudi Arabia; the SAUDI HIGH COMMISSION FOR RELIEF, headquartered in Saudi Arabia; and, the KUWAITI JOINT RELIEF COMMITTEE, headquartered in Kuwait.

WAMY first appears in FBI electronic indices as a lead to FBI from Legat (G) [REDACTED] from 1995/1996:

(F) [REDACTED] : [REDACTED] (C-1)
[REDACTED] (C-1)

(C-1) [REDACTED] This organization has an office in the U.S., at the address: WAMY Regional Office in VA--America, P.O. Box 8096, Falls Church, VA 22041-8096; telephone [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P); fax [REDACTED] (P)

(C-1)
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(C-1)
[REDACTED]

(A),(G), (J-1)
[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1) (G)
(G) (G)
(G) . According to ACS/TA, BINLADEN has been in
contact with the telephone number for (P)

(G) . One of the
telephone numbers used by (P) at his current address is
registered to the AOU. THE AOU is a correspondence school for
Islamic studies which may be connected to the Muslim Brotherhood.

(C-1) that the AOU allegedly
arranges paramilitary training in Pakistan and is partially
funded by the Saudi Club (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED]

[SA (S) Note: (G) (G) . (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1) (see (F)
(F)

(F) (G) Mohammed Harunani]

[See page 432 of 9/11 Commission Report - " 28 pages "]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

(O-1)

[REDACTED] FBI toll records indicate that on June 21, 2000, TRANSCOM INTERNATIONAL was in telephonic with a telephone number in Hamburg, Germany. This German telephone number was listed in FBI telephone applications (ACS) from toll records taken from the PENTTBOMB investigation. [REDACTED] (C-1)

(C-1)

(C-1)

(O-1)

(O-1)

[REDACTED] On 10/12/2001, [REDACTED] (P) who is a Teacher's Assistant at [REDACTED] (P) School, told the FBI she recognized one of the 09/11/2001 hijackers after his picture was displayed on television. [REDACTED] (P) was introduced (in early June 2001) to Marwan Al-Shehhi by Harunani. Harunani's children had been enrolled at the school. MARWAN Al-Shehhi had accompanied Harunani as he was picking his children up from school. [REDACTED] (P) stated she remembered the name because the name was so unusual.

[REDACTED] On 10/15/2001, [REDACTED] (P) was shown a photographic lineup which consisted of only the photographs of MARWAN AL-SHEHHI, HAMZA S. ALGHAMDI, MOHAND AL-SHERRI, and AHMED AL-GHAMDI from United Flight 175 with no names or any other identifying data. [REDACTED] (P) immediately, and without hesitation, pointed to the photograph of MARWAN AL-SHEHHI as being with the man she saw with Mohammed Harunani at the [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Virginia in early June 2001.

[REDACTED]

International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO)

(G)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Summary: The IIRO office [REDACTED] (G) morphed into an [REDACTED] (G) into the Success Foundation (Mohammed Salem Omeish) which did not note a confirmed tie to the EKSA. It is believed that this organization was originally created as IIRO within the same offices of MWL but then some of the personnel moved and created a separate organization. Listed herein as it was originally listed as an office of the EKSA [REDACTED] (G). The history of IIRO related to the purpose of this document focuses more on the time period prior to the 9/11 attacks.

[REDACTED] IIRO was established in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 1978. The IIRO has been identified as the "social arm" or "operating arm" of the Muslim World League. The Secretary General of the Muslim World League said it provides "humanitarian assistance" through the IIRO. (FTAT-G)

[REDACTED] As noted above (see under MWL), the IIRO was originally listed as being located at the [REDACTED] (P) address which was later assumed by MWL. Although listed herein, the relevance of the IIRO office to the 9/11 investigation would most likely be from the 1990s and prior to its move to the [REDACTED] (P) address [REDACTED] (G) Mohamed Salem Omeish [REDACTED] (G) appeared to alter IIRO into the Success Foundation [REDACTED] (G). Thereafter it appeared to be primarily associated with HAMAS/MB support. Its alienation away from Saudi Arabia is highlighted by the fact that Omeish shared office space with Abdulrahman Alamoudi who was convicted of attempting to assassinate then Crown Prince (later King) Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in coordination with Libya. Prior to the Omeish, the director of the IIRO office appeared to be Kuwaiti Tariq Alsuwaidan.

Tareq AlSuwaidan - per Wikipedia, Tareq Al-Suwaidan is a Kuwaiti writer, historian , businessman, and Muslim scholar. Al-Suwaidan is believed to be the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and has "extremist inclinations." Al-Suwaidan was banned from the US in 2000 following his comments "Palestine will not be liberated but through Jihad. Nothing can be achieved without sacrificing blood. The Jews

[REDACTED]

will meet their end at our hands." In 2007, Al-Suwaidan was listed by the U.S. federal prosecutors, along with a group of U.S. Muslim Brotherhood members, as an unindicted co-conspirator in the terrorism financing case against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development which was convicted along with its leaders of financing Hamas. Al-Suwaidan is known for his anti-Semitic remarks, hate for Jews, and push for electronic Jihad among youth.

[REDACTED] AlSuwaidan is listed in Public Records as the Secretary/Treasurer for the International Relief Organization' (IRO) [REDACTED] (G) located in Falls Church, VA, (with the President listed as Sulaiman AlAli and the Vice President as Abdullah M. AlMahdi). Chicago provided information in [REDACTED] (F) (an ec dated 11/7/96 to OKC) that AlSuwaidan is known to have received at least \$11,000 from the IRO and that ABRAR Investments, of which AlSuwaidan was once an officer, provided \$60,000 to the IRO.

[REDACTED] Finally, [REDACTED] (F) indicates potential ties by AlSuwaidan to Mohammed Saleh [REDACTED] (G) incarcerated in Leavenworth, KS for his part in the TERRSTOP case which involved plans to bomb the United Nations building and other targets in New York. "Umar Al-Utaibah / Tariq Suwaidan" (believed to be a reference to Tareq AlSuwaidan) was found (during the period March 14 - May 8, 1997) on a document in Saleh's cell written in Arabic with telephone number [REDACTED] (P) beside the entry. Saleh also had ABRAR Investment Inc.', (for which AlSuwaidan was alleged to be an officer) listed in the documents with telephone number [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED] Tareq Mohammad AlSuwaidan, aka Tariq Mohamed AlSuwaidain; Tariq Swidan; DOB [REDACTED] (P-1) is of Kuwaitian nationality and is a non-US person. His SSAN is [REDACTED] (P-1). According to the address book of Marzook, AlSuwaidan "heads a group of gulf companies that belong to the Muslim Brotherhood." He was formerly affiliated with the Islamic Relief Organization (IRO), Falls Church, VA; Abrar Investments; and Solidarity International for Kuwait. He allegedly has a cousin who was the Deputy Head of the Kuwaiti Air Force in 1990. AlSuwaidan is credited with providing the money for the land purchase on which the Tulsa mosque and school now stand. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) AlSuwaidan currently provides \$50,000 per month to the Tulsa mosque, 20% of which is taken off the top for the benefit of HAMAS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It is known from [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] that IIRO was located for a period of time at [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) Washington, D.C. During this time it was co-located with the organization Solidarity International for Kuwait that was started by Tareq Al-Suwaidan.

1. Incorporation Records:

[REDACTED] A 1992 Annual Report for IRO [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] listed the following:

Sulaiman Al Ali President [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Falls Church, Va.

Abdullah M. Al-Mahdi VP [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Falls Church, Va.

Tareq M. Al-Swaidan S/T [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Alex, Va.

Principal Address: [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Falls Church, Va.

[REDACTED] A 1993 Annual Report for IRO [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] listed the following:

Sulaiman Al-Ali President [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Falls Church, Va.

Abdullah M. Al-Mahdi Vice President [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Falls Church, Va.

Tareq M. Al-Swaiden S/T [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Alex, Va.

Abdul Al-Moslah Officer [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Falls Church, Va.

Freed Qurash Officer [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Falls Church, Va.

Salah Badahdh Officer [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Falls Church, Va.

[REDACTED] A 1994 Annual report for IRO was similar to the 1993 report except listing all addresses as [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], Falls Church, Va.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A 1995 Annual Report for IRO [REDACTED] (P-1) listed the following:

Sulaiman Al-Ali President [REDACTED] (P)
Falls Church, Va.

Abdullah M. Al-Mahdi Vice President

Tareq M. Al-Mahdi S/T

Abdul Al-Moslah Director

Salah Badahdh Director

Freed Qurashdi Director

Principal Address: [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va.

[REDACTED] In 1998, IRO offices were searched in relation to Chicago FBI's [REDACTED] (G) with which IRO had invested. Shortly afterward, Sulaiman Al-Ali suddenly returned to Saudi Arabia in August 1998.

[REDACTED] The IRO was ordered dissolved on 08/19/1998. All asset and liabilities were transferred to the Success Foundation, Inc.

[REDACTED] On 03/23/1999, IRO (corporate ID [REDACTED] (P-1), primary address [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va., was ordered re-instated. The new officers were listed as follows:

Sulaiman Al Ali Removed [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va.

Mohamed S. Omeish President [REDACTED] (P)
Alexandria, Va.

Abdullah M. Al-Mahdi Vice President [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) Falls Church,
Va.

Tareq M. Al-Suwaiden S/T [REDACTED] (P)

Abdul Al-Moslah Director [REDACTED] (P)

Salah Badahdah Director [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A filing dated 07/22/2000 for IRO [REDACTED] (P-1) listed the primary address as [REDACTED] (P) and the only officer as Mohamed S. Omeish, [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Sulaiman Alali (Soliman Ali Elay / Sulaiman Ali Alali / Sulaiman Kabbala / Sulaiman Kabrara / Soliman Elay)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3) Va ID and two SSNs.

Per PPT entered the US as Elay on 09/03/1998 on Saudi Airlines and last departed as Elay on 08/08/1999 on Malaysian Airlines.

Va Drivers license was issued in 1995 under Sulaiman Alali

Associated with Sanabell, IIRO, Global Chemical and Albayoumi.

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Sulaiman Alali was associated with IIRO and other "charities" and global investment entities such as Global Chemical [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G). Alali was paid by Sanabell and had a physical and financial connection to Omar Albayoumi. Alali returned to Saudi

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Arabia prior to 9/11 but has at least one son, Amro, who joined Al Qaeda. According to open source, Alali was the president of IRO and a major shareholder of Global Chemical. Alali's son Amro is a known AQAP member.

[(F) [REDACTED] dated 05/23/1997] [REDACTED] Reference Butel advised of the possible location of Suleiman Al-Ali, who is the Director of the International Islamic Relief Organization's (IIRO) in the United States. Al-Ali is believed to be a friend of Al-Gama al-Islamiyya supporter Zahir 'Abd Al-'Aziz, who reportedly has ties to Islamic extremist circles throughout the Balkans. Al-Ali reportedly maintains a telephone number of [REDACTED] (P), which is subscribed to by the "International Relief Organization," [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, VA 22046-4417.

[(F) [REDACTED]] [REDACTED] A corporate record for INTERNATIONAL RELIEF ORGANIZATION INC., at [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, VA 22041 with [REDACTED] (G) (Alali) listed as President. Incorporated 7/22/91 in Virginia, status is active. Enclosed is a D & B report for INTERNATIONAL RELIEF ORGANIZATION INC., [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, VA 22046, Telephone number [REDACTED] (P) This organization provides humanitarian aid.

[(F) [REDACTED] Serial [REDACTED] (F) Dated 11/02/2001] [REDACTED] Alali used an address associated with Albayoumi on banking information in 1998. At a business in La Jolla, CA Alali listed Albayoumi (Omar Baymi) as his emergency POC. While residing in California at one address Albayoumi was listed on Alali's rental application as a co-tenant/friend. During this time Albayoumi and Alali listed their employment with Dalla Company, Saudi Arabia.

[(F) [REDACTED] Serial [REDACTED] (F) dated 11/21/2002 as well as above serial] [REDACTED] Banking records from 10/21/1998 to 08/05/1999 noted that Alali deposited 32 checks from Sanabell totaling over \$128,000. Sanabell also directly paid rent and other expenses. During same period Alali paid Albayoumi almost \$7000.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Alali has multiple children who were [REDACTED] (J-3) Alali's son Amro Syliman Alali (Amro Alali) was a known AQAP member (see [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). After a short incarceration, Amro Aalali was released by Saudi authorities.

(J-3)
[REDACTED]

Amro Alali - AQAP Member / Son of Sulaiman Alali

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

U.S. Based Clerics Paid by Saudi Arabia

Summary: As part of Saudi proselytizing efforts, Saudi Arabia supported many U.S. based clerics either directly via training and funding (via the EKSA) or via charities and schools (IIASA).

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] dated 2003] The original list provided the following names:

[REDACTED] Names Salary

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] At the time this list was provided [REDACTED] (G) had [REDACTED] (G) Abuelgasim Osman Ramadan [REDACTED] (G), KHALED I. Al-SOWEILEM [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) Abdel-Moniem M. El-Hillali [REDACTED] (G), Abdullah Arafa [REDACTED] (G), Nasser F. Almogbel [REDACTED] (G), and Fareed S. Ajlan [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) were identified as employees at the EKSAB in the Islamic Affairs Office. Preliminary Inquiries were conducted on [REDACTED] (G) to better identify their function at the EKSAB. All were confirmed as employees at the SAEMB by the United State Department of State list of Embassy employees. [REDACTED] (G) has [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) will continue with [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] The list of individuals were all queried through ACS revealing [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G). The following are possible matches with individuals [REDACTED] (G): Ali Sulaiman Ali [REDACTED] (G), Jamal Mohammad Abdellatif [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G), Tajuddin Bin Shu'aib [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(G) [REDACTED], Omar Abdi Mohamed (G) [REDACTED] Nizam
A. Rouf Zaman (G) [REDACTED] Salah Al-Rashood (G) [REDACTED]
Monir Yasin Al Farra (G) [REDACTED] Jameel A. Ahmen (G) [REDACTED]
Mohammed Al Mohanna (G) [REDACTED] and Abdulaziz Ahmed (G) [REDACTED]
(G) [REDACTED] Omar Al-Khatab (G) [REDACTED] Ridwan Aremu
Yussuf (G) [REDACTED] Mohamed Munaf Mohamed (G) [REDACTED]
(G) [REDACTED] Sulaiman Al-Bali (G) [REDACTED]

(G) [REDACTED] revealed the following additional names of interest as receiving a stipend from the EKSA (only relevant individuals are noted herein):

[REDACTED] FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY departed the USA for Saudi Arabia on 02/14/2002. While in the USA he resided at (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Culver City, CA. In 1998, per direction of the Da'wa Office of EKSA, AL-THUMAIRY owned and operated a bookstore near the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, CA, in an effort to oversee Islamic propagators in California. AL-THUMAIRY was also a member of the KFM.

Name: FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
Aliases: Fahd Ibrahim Abdullah Althumairy,
Sheikh Fahd Bin Ibrahim Al Thumairy
SSN: (P-1) [REDACTED]
DOB: (P-1) [REDACTED]
POB: SAUDI ARABIA
INS Status: (J-3) [REDACTED];
(J-3) [REDACTED]
Case #: (F) [REDACTED]
IFTA funds: \$4,837.31 (2002)
\$4,305.13 (2003)

(P) [REDACTED], (P) [REDACTED] San Diego, CA, (P) [REDACTED] Islamic Center of San Diego and (P) [REDACTED] the Islamic Services Foundation. (P) [REDACTED] is a member (P) [REDACTED] of the Muslim Brotherhood in the USA, and (P) [REDACTED] the HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT (HLF). The HLF was shut down by the US government on 12/04/2001 due to its fund-raising connections to Harakat Al-Mugawamat Al-Islamayya (HAMAS). (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] for HLF, traveling throughout the US for this purpose. (P) [REDACTED] was interviewed on 7/8/04, prior to the arrest of several HLF leaders for material support to terrorism ((F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). (P) [REDACTED] has received various checks from FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, and is (P) [REDACTED] in the San Diego (P) [REDACTED] system.

[REDACTED]

Name: [REDACTED] (P)
Aliases: [REDACTED] (P)
SSN: [REDACTED] (P-1)
DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)
[REDACTED] (P-1)
POB: [REDACTED] (P-1)
INS Status: USPER since 1991
Case #: [REDACTED] (F)
IFTA funds: \$533.33 (2002)

[REDACTED] ADEL M. AL-SADHAN departed the USA on 10/25/01. While in the USA, AL-SADHAN resided at [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) LAWRENCE, KS; and shared a post office box address with MUTAIB AL-SUDAIRY, [REDACTED] (P) Columbia, MO. AL-SADHAN was employed at the EKSA until [REDACTED] (J-3). Choicepoint now shows a possible new address, as of 1/1/05, as [REDACTED] (P) JERSEY CITY, NJ.

Name: ADEL M. AL-SADHAN
SSN: [REDACTED] (P-1)
DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)
POB: SAUDI ARABIA
INS Status: [REDACTED] (J-3) Departed USA (?)
Case #: [REDACTED] (F)
IFTA funds: \$100.55 (2002)

[REDACTED] MUTAIB A. AL-SUDAIRY resided at [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) Fairfax, VA, and was employed as an Administrative Officer for EKSA until [REDACTED] (J-3). [REDACTED] (J-3) AL-SUDAIRY departed the USA on 5/1/01 and re-entered on 6/6/01. AL-SUDAIRY was detained and charged as an immigrant without documents subject to deportation. AL-SUDAIRY departed the USA on 10/25/01. [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) and has since been linked to suspected Al-Qaeda operatives in Saudi Arabia.

Name: Mutaib A. Al-Sudairy
Alias: Mutaib A. Al-Sudairi
Muteb Al-Sudairy
Moteb Al-Sudairy
Motaib Alsudairy
SSN: [REDACTED] (P-1)
DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Other Saudi Arabian entities and personnel who formed the core of the Saudi proselytizing and intelligence gathering community during the time period leading to 9/11.

Islamic Foundation of America (IFA)

Ibrahim Binkulaib (Ibrahim Almogherah)

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

(F)

[REDACTED]

Abdullah Alkhwyter

(G)

[REDACTED]

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The IFA was first known as the GLORIOUS KORAN, originally located on George Mason Drive, Falls Church, VA, was established in 1996 in order to teach the Koran in the

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Northern VA area. The school subsequently relocated and began to rent a space located at 6606 Electronic Drive, Springfield, VA 22151. This building was later purchased by the EKSA for \$6,000,000 and taken over by ZAM ZAM INTERNATIONAL INC. which is synonymous with the IFA. Source further reported that the IFA had routinely received funding from the EKSA.

[REDACTED] The IFA was operated by Ibrahim Almogherah (aka Ibrahim Binkulaib) who also operated alongside of [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Saudi Naval Attache Abdullah Alkhwyter. Alkhwyter was known to be associated with the address of Alelm (Al Elm Research and Development) in Norfolk, Virginia - [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). [NOTE: Alajroush (herein) was also listed as an officer of Alelm. (The uses [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) may be similar to Albayoumi's use of a [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) for his expenses/payments during his time in California.) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] IBRAHIM A. ALMOGHERAH, DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1), was listed under the Administrative and Technical Staff as an Administrative Officer of the Embassy of the Government of Saudi Arabia (EKSA), who assumed his duties on 05/13/1991, but was named (by the names of AL-KULAIB, BINKULAIB and AL-MOGHERAH) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) was [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3)

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) the primary Saudi based financier of the IFA was Abdulaziz bin Fahad Alsaud. [REDACTED] (F) Abdulaziz bin Fahad was known to support the funding of students at the IIASA.

[REDACTED] In March, 2006, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) BINKULAIB and AL SAWY are still in negotiations regarding the future of IFA, however, AL-SAWY is losing faith in the possibility that it will work out. iIn the meantime, the IFA is being run by GAMAL HELMY and MOHAMED AFIFI (aka HUSSEIN AFEEFY). SAUD AL-SUWELIM, head of Islamic:Affairs at the EKSA, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) who runs Friday

[REDACTED]

prayers, was in Sudan caring for his sick father, MOHAMED IBRAHIM was still teaching the small kids Quranic Studies, and SAEED AL HURAIISHI (aka SAID AL-HURCHI) was active behind the scenes during prayers. AL-HURAIISHI is Syrian and owns an Islamic publishing company on Edsall Road in Springfield, VA.: A-HURAIISHI is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] On 01/08/2013 [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) tweets for Alsaud (using [REDACTED] (G) account) in which he spoke with Sulaiman Ahmed Aldweesh during which Alsaud stated that the death penalty should be applied to the arrested Saudi writer Turki Alhamad. In another tweet Alsaud stated that jihad was the greatest pinnacle of Islam. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Ayed Alqarni is a personal sheikh of Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahad Bin Abdulaziz Alsaud.

[REDACTED]

American Open University (AOU)

[REDACTED] (G)

Jaafar Sheikh Idris

[REDACTED] (G)

Jaafar Sheikh Idris (Jaafar Idris / Gafar Idris)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

Under Gafar Idris and Jaafar Idris, Idris had [REDACTED] (J-3)
[REDACTED] (J-3)

Sons Yousef Idris [REDACTED] (G) and Abdulrahman Idris and
Abdulmoneim Idris.

Associated with MWL and Ali Altimimi.

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] Jaafar Idris is the father of Yousef Idris (an associate of the Northern Virginia Jihad group) and Abdulrahman and Abdulmoneim Idris. Abdulrahman was utilized to teach Arabic culture/language to US Special Forces in Limerick, Maine. Jaafar Idris, [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) was a close associate of jihadi groups operating within the U.S. such as Ali Altamimi and the "Northern Virginia Jihad Group."

[REDACTED]

(S)

(F)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

according to an

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

American Open University, 3400 Payne Street,
Suite 200, Falls Church, Virginia, 22041; telephone

(P)

(P), fax

(P)

, is connected to the Moslem Brotherhood and arranges for paramilitary training in Pakistan. At the time, Salah El-Sawi, PHD, was the President of American Open University.

[REDACTED] In 1998, a group of individuals began attending lectures provided by Sheikh Jaafar Idris (hereinafter Sheikh Jaafar). These lectures were typically provided at the residence of Sheikh Jaafar and occasionally featured a guest lecturer named Sheikh Ali Al-Timimi (Al-Timimi). Over time these lectures attracted large crowds and were eventually moved to a more accommodating location, American Open University (AOU), located in Falls Church, Virginia. After the lectures were moved to AOU, Sheikh Al-Timimi started offering more frequent and regular lectures. Sheikh Al-Timimi's lectures became so popular and so well attended that in 1999, some of Al-Timimi's followers opened the Dar al Arqam Islamic Center. Once at the Dar al Arqam, Sheikh Al-Timimi assumed the role of the primary lecturer. Al-Timimi became very popular and was well-respected for his knowledge about the topic of jihad and his outspoken views. Al-Timimi was willing to discuss the topic of jihad openly while other speakers were not. Once the lectures were moved to the Dar al Arqam, a smaller core group of followers emerged. After Al-Timimi's lectures, typically delivered on Friday nights at the Dar al Arqam, this small group of individuals would meet for hours into the night to discuss various topics with Sheikh Al-Timimi.

During these closed discussions, Sheikh Al-Timimi frequently would provide his personal opinions on the topic of jihad, particularly the need for his followers to prepare themselves so that they would be ready for the day when their service in support of jihad would be needed.

In response to Sheikh Al-Timimi's guidance on the topic of jihad, a few members from the core group decided to organize regular paramilitary training using the cover of apparently innocuous endeavor, recreational paint-ball activities. The organizers of the jihad training group (Yong Kwon, Nabil Gharbieh, Ibrahim Hamdi, and Hammad Abdur-Raheem) established rules and procedures to ensure operational security and secrecy. Members of the group were

██████████

well versed on the rules, and new members were required to acknowledge their acceptance of such rules. Weekly jihad training sessions were organized and conducted on private land owned by the uncle of Abdullah Zikria, one of the jihad training group members. The weekly training consisted of physical para-military training using paint-ball as a means of instruction and religious instruction on the topics of jihad, typically through the readings of certain hadith related to jihad. The jihad training sessions were led primarily by those with prior United States military experience, such as Idris Surratt (USMC), Saif Chapman (USMC), and Hammad Abdur-Raheem (U.S. Army), and those with prior jihad military training, such as Ismail Royer and Ibrahim Hamdi. In addition to the weekly jihad training sessions, many of the group's members purchased AK-47 type rifles, the primary weapon used by mujahideen throughout the world, and began to practice their firearms proficiency and marksmanship. The group also kept abreast of the current events related to ongoing jihad, in areas such as Chechnya or Kashmir, and discussed these events during their weekly training sessions.

Interviews have revealed that the core group of participants in the jihad training group had aspirations of eventually fighting in actual jihad and dying shaheed (a martyr). The lectures at Dar al Arqam became a common meeting place for those participating in the jihad training. Members of the group would meet at the Dar al Arqam on Friday night and would discuss their plans for meeting the next morning and traveling to the jihad training. Members of the jihad training group would often meet at members' homes and watch video tapes depicting jihad in regions such as Kashmir and Chechnya. Soon after Sheikh Al-Timimi's lectures moved to the Dar al Arqam, many member's of the core group became acquainted with an individual named Ismail Royer (aka Randall Todd Royer). Royer would attend Al-Timimi's lectures and would sometimes stay for the closed discussions with Al-Timimi. Royer became well known for his experiences fighting jihad in Bosnia. In April 2000, believed to be prior to the initiation of the weekly jihad training activities, Royer traveled to Pakistan to attend an Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) training camp. As of the current date, it is unclear who facilitated Royer's travel to the LET camp. Investigation indicates that Royer may have used his own contacts, possibly developed through his past experiences in Bosnia; may have used contacts provided by Shiekh Al-Timimi; or may have used others, yet unknown, to facilitate his travels. Sometime around July 2001, Saif Chapman embarked on his own trip to the same LET training camp that Royer had attended. It is unclear at this time who facilitated Chapman's travel to the camp. Chapman is believed to have been at the LET camp on September 11, 2001. Travel records indicate that Chapman returned to the United States on September 19, 2001. Upon his return to the United States, Chapman discussed his travels with

[REDACTED]

several others from the jihad training group. Chapman indicated to some that he had purchased some land near the camp so that he and his family could move there. In August, 2002, Chapman left the United States for Saudi Arabia, apparently at the guidance of Sheikh Al-Timimi. Chapman is a current resident of Saudi Arabia and is believed to be working for the Saudi Ministry of Education as an English teacher. As a result of his activities in this investigation, Chapman was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury of the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on June 25, 2003. Chapman has been detained by the Saudi government. During the year 2000, the paint-ball group used to meet in the parking lot of the **INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC AND ARABIC STUDIES IN AMERICA (IIASA), aka THE MAHAD.**

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

IDRIS is of Sudanese origin who came to the U.S. in the 1980's as a student when Dr. HASSAN TURABI, an Islamic fundamentalist, became Minister of Justice in Sudan. Sudan was proclaimed an Islamic state abolishing the Constitution and implementing Sharia (Islamic) laws. He was sent to the U.S. along with 14 other individuals for post-graduate studies in Islam. They joined the Islamic center in Houston, Texas, which later was transferred to Fairfax, Virginia [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) this is the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences of America). These students were a back-up for TURABI who had dreams of becoming a leader in the Islamic world. The 15 obeyed TURABI blindly as he gave them the scholarships in the U.S. Many of the 15 worked in the Saudi embassy as the Saudis trusted the Sudanese.

[REDACTED] (G) had contact with OMAR AHMED ALI ABDEL RAHMAN (aka: the blind Sheikh) who was found guilty of being involved with the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993.

(G) [REDACTED] was in contact with a Sudanese intelligence officer under [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

NOTE: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) that revealed that several [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) were involved with the first attack on the World Trade Center as well as a plot to bomb several prominent New York City landmarks [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] IDRIS and ALI AL-TIMIMI [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) co founded the DAR AL-ARQAM mosque which grew out of Muslim Student's Association at George Mason University and Northern Virginia Community College. This mosque now operates out of 360 South Washington Street, Falls Church,

[REDACTED]

Virginia which is also the home of several Hamas front organizations as well as the Muslim World League (MWL) the subject of another FBI full investigation. This building is also owned by Sanabel Al-Kheer which is the investment arm of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) [REDACTED] (G)
[REDACTED] (G) AL-TIMIMI is a known radical Islamist [REDACTED] (G) supporting several individuals who are believed to have left the U.S. shortly after 09/11/2001 to fight for the Taliban against the U.S.

[REDACTED] Al-Timimi started weekly Islamic study sessions Friday evenings after general prayer at Dar Al Archem. The study sessions evolved into in depth discussions of jihad, or holy war, against unbelievers. The sessions, were originally held at the Dar al Arqam, 360 South Washington Street, Falls Church, VA (a two-story office building) and began around 8:00 PM. The study session would meet after the general session, after most of the congregation had left, around 11:30 PM. The study sessions were not open to the public and only certain members were invited. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) The meetings are now even more private and held at the individual residences of the members, not at the mosque.

[REDACTED] This group/study session identify themselves as "wahabi's", though they do not state that publically. The 'wahabi" group is lead by Ali Al-Timimi, Yousef Idris and Mohamed Al-Kahtani. Other members of the group include: [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P)

Select members of this group have also participated in Jihad training exercises. On [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) chart depicting the primary leadership and participants in jihad training exercises which included the following:

ADMINISTRATORS:

[REDACTED] (P)

VISITOR:

[REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (Alharamain)

Suliman Al Buthe (aka Soliman Albuthe / Suliman Albuthe / Soliman Albutti)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (G)

Related: [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (F) herein)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Alharamain foundation is a Saudi Arabian Islamic "NGO" or "charity" who had multiple offices worldwide designated as terrorist supporting entities by the United States for their support of AQ related groups. Within the U.S. the Alharamain office was located in Portlan, Oregon and was later specifically designated along with its primary operator Suliman Albuthe.

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] The Al Haramayn or Al Haramain Islamic Foundation(AIF) has been reported as a Saudi Arabian funded Islamic charitable organization that distributes books, video/cassette tapes and leaflets which espouse radical Islamic thoughts. AIF has been utilized as a front organization for supporting and facilitating

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

the movement of Islamic Mujahadin into areas of Kosovo, Chechnya, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bosnia. (C-1)

[REDACTED] (C-1)

In [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) is identified as [REDACTED] (P) of the Al Haramain Foundation. It is further stated in [REDACTED] (P) that "an African chapter of the Jedda, based group was identified in a 1999 State Department report as one of the suspect terrorist groups operating in Nairobi, Kenya, before the bombing of the U.S. Embassy there in 1998." [REDACTED] (P) also states the group has a chapter in Ashland, Oregon and has an account at the Bank of America.

[REDACTED] An inquiry through the Oregon Secretary of State Corporate Records database revealed the Al Haramain Foundation, 1257 Siskiyou Blvd, #224, Ashland, Oregon, Business Identification Number, 60062388, is an assumed business name with an active status. The original filing date for the entity was 10/22/97. The business license was renewed on 10/18/99 and changed with renewal on 10/27/99. [REDACTED] (P) is listed as [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) using the same address as the foundation. Soliman H. Albut'he was [REDACTED] (P) as a [REDACTED] (P) using the same address.

[REDACTED] On 12/31/97, the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation purchased the residence at [REDACTED] (P) Ashland, Oregon, for \$190,162 in cash. Review of documents obtained from Jackson County Title pursuant to the issuance of a grand jury subpoena revealed the registered agent signing on behalf of the foundation was Soliman Al Buthe.

[REDACTED] For information, as described in referenced [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) Soliman H. Albut'he is further identified in [REDACTED] (F) as being Soliman Albut'he, aka Soliman H. S. Albut'he, date of birth [REDACTED] (P-1) citizen of Saudi Arabia, passport number [REDACTED] (P-1) using [REDACTED] (P) 's mail drop address of [REDACTED] (P) and the address of [REDACTED] (P) 's residence and local mosque at [REDACTED] (P). This serial referenced a [REDACTED] (O-1) document identifying Albut'he as a Saudi national entering the United States with \$200,000 in U.S. Currency in 1997.

[REDACTED] Soliman H. Albut'he is believed to currently be in Saudi

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Arabia and in daily telephonic contact with (P) Based on source information, it is believed that Albut'he is utilizing Saudi Arabia cellular telephone number (P-1) and is associated with (P-1) (P-1) Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. It is further believed that Albut'he is the money supply for the Al Haramain Foundation, (P) (P) Albut'he is further believed to be involved with (P) an ISP with access to a high speed data line. Albut'he has been identified with website (P-1) Reportedly, Albut'he is the source of income related to (P) (P) which was co-owned by (P) and Ferhad Erdogan. Erdogan indicated in a recent interview that (P) is now in complete control of (P).

[REDACTED]

Other Individuals Associated with Saudi Arabia as well as the 9/11 Investigation:

Saleh Alhussayen (Saleh A A Al Husayen / Saleh Alhusayen)

DOB: (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Saudi cleric and Saudi government official Saleh Alhussayen entered the U.S. prior to the 9/11 attacks. According to statements by he and his wife, Alhussayen was in the U.S. to visit mosques and Islamic organizations who were provided funding from Saudi Arabia. According to an interview of Alhussayen's wife, Alhussayen was invited by and visited Mohammed Alahmari. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Alhussayen was staying at the same Northern Virginia hotel as Nawaf Alhazmi on the evening prior to the attacks. Alhussayen's nephew, Sami Alhussayen, was a Saudi Arabian student arrested for providing material support to AQ.

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] dated 2002] [REDACTED] As a matter of background, FBI Seattle has identified

[REDACTED]

EO14040-003570

[REDACTED]

SALEH ALHUSSAYEN as an official or employee of the Saudi (government). SALEH ALHUSSAYEN and his wife, FADDIAH PETERSEN, traveled to the United States from Saudi Arabia in August, 2001 and remained in the U.S. until mid-September. On 9/17/2001, both ALHUSSAYEN and his wife were interviewed by FBI WFO. This interview and [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) was prompted by the fact that hijacker NAWAF AL-HAZMI had checked into the same Marriott Residence Inn in Herndon, Virginia on 9/10/2001 in which SALEH ALHUSSAYEN was staying. During said interview, SALEH ALHUSSAYEN advised that he had only traveled to the U.S. on one other occasion approximately twenty two (22) years ago. **He claimed no knowledge of the hijackers and stated that he had come to the U.S. via JFK IA on 8/20/2001 at the request of his friend IANA leader MOHAMMED AL-AHMARI. (See below Salah Alrashood)**

[REDACTED] As part of our investigation into the attacks of September 11, 2001 FBI Agents from Washington Field Office interviewed SALEH AL-HUSSAYEN. The interview was conducted due to the fact that he was a registered guest in the same hotel the hijackers from Flight 77 stayed in on September 10, 2001, the night before the attacks. SALEH AL-HUSSAYEN informed the Agents he was a retired Saudi Government Official and currently worked at fund raising for charity organizations. SALEH AL-HUSSAYEN informed the Agents he was in the United States to visit some Mosques that had been built with charity funds. He stated he did not know the hijackers and was only staying at that hotel because it had a kitchen which allowed him to make his own food.

(F) [REDACTED] An interview was conducted of Alhussayan's wife (Faddiah Peterson) after Alhussayan experienced the medical emergency. Peterson advised that Alhussaysn had visited while in the US the offices/personnel of IANA, Global Relief Foundation and IIIT. Peterson advised that they visited Michigan, Chicago, Pittsburgh and Canada prior to Virginia.

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (The above mentioned) Mohamed Al-Ahmari, the leader of the Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA) in Ypsilanti Twp., Michigan, is a leading Salafi figure and Saudi dissident. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Of interest is that Saleh Alhussayen is the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) a Saudi student living in the U.S.

Sami Alhussayen

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Related: islamtoday

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] FBI Seattle identifies Sami Al-Hussayen as a citizen of Saudi Arabia and a non-USPER currently enrolled in the College of Graduate Studies, Department of Computer Science at the University of Idaho (U of I) in Moscow, Idaho. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It is also important to note that a connection between Al-Timimi and **Mohammed Al-Ahmari** has been established (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). Al-Ahmari is a close associate of Al-Hussayen. Al-Ahmari is a leading Salafist and former president of the IANA. Al-Ahmari is very supportive of USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL) and [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) that actively support Jihad against the United States. AL-AHMARI (recently departed the United States for Qatar in an effort to start an IANA branch there.

[REDACTED] On September 24, 2001, the Washington Field Office (WFO) received documents from a search related to a visit to the U.S. of Saleh Al-Husayen. The documents indicate that Al-Husayen is promoting the use of the media to present the Arab world in a favorable view. He is also promoting the formation of Islamic organizations in the U.S. to pursue political agendas.

[REDACTED] On page 1 of the document, under Page 3, the name Saleh Al Husayen appears. A review of ACS indicates one reference to Al Husayen, indexed on 9/27/01. He was born on 1/1/31 in Sharqua, Saudi Arabia and has Saudi Arabian passport number [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (P-1) Special/Official passport. A review of serial [REDACTED] (F), an FD-302, indicates Al-Husayen was interviewed by the FBI in Herndon, Vi(S) The next name on the document is Shaikh Khalid Al-Swailim, Washington, D.C., work telephone [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) and fax number [REDACTED] (P). A review of ACS was negative on Al-Swailim. A review of Telephone FOIMS indicates [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The second name on page 78 of the document is [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) Springfield, Virginia, work telephone [REDACTED] (P), fax
number [REDACTED] (P) and mobile number [REDACTED] (P). A review of
ACS indicates an [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (G)
[REDACTED] (G) indexed on 10/13/98.

[REDACTED]

Salah Alrashood

Name: Salah Alrashood

SSN: [REDACTED] (P-1)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Phone: [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Per above, Alrashood is a Saudi Arabian diplomat and paid cleric who operated in the Pittsburgh area. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (G) SALAH AL-RASHOOD, dob [REDACTED] (P-1), the

Executive Manager of the ATTAWHEED FOUNDATION (AF), revealed his association with many individuals who have been the subjects of FBI full field terrorism investigations in the US including

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) After the September 11, 2001, attacks, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(F)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SALAH AL-RASHOOD departed the USA on 12/15/2002; he later attempted to return but was denied re-entry into the USA. While in the USA, AL-RASHOOD resided at [REDACTED] (P) Pittsburgh, PA, and was the head of the AL-TAWHEED ISLAMIC CENTER, a/k/a ATTAWHEED FOUNDATION, which provided financial support to the Mujhadeen in Chechnya. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Alrashood was paid approximately \$55,000 in 2002 by the EKSA.

[REDACTED] The number [REDACTED] (P) is subscribed to Salah AL-RASHOOD, [REDACTED] (P) Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. AL-RASHOOD is [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] The word "marriage" is a word used by terrorists to denote martyrdom or attack. FBIHQ

[REDACTED]

reported that an [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

(F) [REDACTED] ALRASHOOD [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1) which has had [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Ahmed Kattan (Ahmed Qattan / Ahmad Kattan / Ahmed Khattan)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] Summary: Ahmed Kattan was [REDACTED] (J-3) and high level official at the EKSA. Presently he is the Minister of African Affairs. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] : [REDACTED] KATTAN has been identified as a [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) who works closely with Ambassador Prince BANDAR. KATTAN, [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] : Kattan was from a poor family but had been with Prince Bandar for 20 years (as of 2003). [REDACTED] (O-1) Kattan was responsible for the departure of the Bin Laden family members following 9/11.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[(F)] (O-1)
(A), (G), (J-1) (O-1)
(O-1)
(O-1) | (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

(D)

(D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED]

(F)

[REDACTED] Hassan Noor

Malim Kumbi was involved sometime around 09/10/1998 with planning a terrorist attack against U.S. interests in Kampala. Kumbi was arrested after KENBOMB and had explosive residue at his residence.

[REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED]

According to [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] a Ali

Humeid, brother in law of 2002 bombing suspect Hassan Said Omar, is a teacher at Kisauni Islamic Institute.

According to [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] a Shaykh

Siraj Rahman Nadwi Al-Qadhi - a principal at the Kisauni Islamic Institute - helped facilitate the movement of students to Afghanistan.

According to [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Shaykh

Rahman Nadwi Al-Qadhi assisted in the placement of a member of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) - Shaykh Ahmad LNU - as the director of the Tawhid Islamic Center. Prior to his arrival, Ahmad reportedly trained and fought in Afghanistan. Based on recommendations from Saudi financiers of the Al-Haramain organization.

[REDACTED] The above is deemed important as it shows a direct transfer of funds from a Ministry of the Government of Saudi Arabia, through the EKSA, to the IIASA for forwarding to a foreign entity associated with terrorism. It should also be

[REDACTED]

EO14040-003580

[REDACTED]

noted that the Ministry of Defense and Aviation has been associated with the financing of other "charities" such as MWL and IIRO (see [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] which provides more evidence against the Saudi claim that these organizations are NON-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

[REDACTED]

Khaled Alsowailem (Khaled Al Sowailem)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Memo: works at the Ministry of Islamic Affairs

Telephone: [REDACTED] (P-1)

Email: [REDACTED] (P-1) [NOTE: In the past writer has noted the use of 911 in various emails of [REDACTED] (J-3) Writer cannot confirm if this is a reference to the 9/11 attacks.]

Wife: Bushra Alkhamais

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Telephone [REDACTED] (P) Mobile [REDACTED] (P) Fax [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Alsowailem was a high level employee of the Saudi Dawa office as a diplomat at the EKSA.

[REDACTED] Alsowailem was interviewed by FBI on 10/08/2001 but claimed diplomatic immunity.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In November, 2004 FBIHQ requested that a [REDACTED]
(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

AL-SOWAILEM left

Washington, DC in June 2003

to take a position as the General Director of Da'wa Abroad in Saudi Arabia effective 8/30/2003.

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] detail that DA'WA is an Arabic word which means "the calling" as in the preaching of Islam, in this case, Wahhabi Islam. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) head of the DA'WA office at the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a posting which he held until June 2003 at which time he departed for Saudi Arabia. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

the DA'WA office, one of their responsibilities was to handle the logistics for the annual Muslim pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia. DA'WA was also responsible for the salaries of Islamic preachers in the United States and for the shipment of religious books and copies of the Koran to those that request them. The majority of those requesting copies of the Koran were affiliated with the prison chaplain program. Investigation has shown that the DA'WA responsibilities are now handled by the Islamic Affairs office at the EKSA.

[REDACTED] From the time AL-SOWAILEM left the EKSA until March 2005, he kept in contact with MUSAED AL-JARRAH [REDACTED] (G) who began handling the business previously handled by AL-SOWAILEM at the EKSA.

[REDACTED]

Possible Pre 9/11 Test of Airline Security

Muhammad Alqudhiien

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Hamdan Alshalawi

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] Summary: Mohammed Alqudhaieen and Hamdan Alshalawi were Saudi nationals and [REDACTED] (J-3) who conducted activities on a U.S. based flight that were deemed by FBI Phoenix as being potential case activity for the 9/11 attacks. Alshalawi is a known AQ operative.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Muhammad Abdullah Ibrahim Al-Qudhaieen, DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1), [REDACTED] (P) Tucson, Arizona; [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Al-Qudhaieen at that time utilized a slightly different DOB of [REDACTED] (P-1). Al-Qudhaieen is [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) on 11/19/1999, Al-Qudhaieen and his associate Hamdan Ghareeb Al-Shalawi, address [REDACTED] (P) Tempe, Arizona

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

85283, telephone [REDACTED] (P), were aboard America West Airlines flight #90 from Phoenix to Washington D.C. with one stop in Port Columbus, Ohio. During the flight, Al-Qudhaieen, according to the flight crew, acted agitated, spoke very loudly in Arabic and asked repeated specific questions about flight times, stop times on the flight and the plane causing the flight crew to become suspicious of him. Flight Attendant [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) advised Al-Qudhaieen tried to open the cockpit door "on two occasions." The pilot, Captain [REDACTED] (P) ordered an emergency runway evacuation, notifying ground personnel of two suspicious men on board, before they reached the Columbus airport. In accordance with the pilot's wishes, security teams and the local police removed the two men in handcuffs from the plane and swept the plane with bomb sniffing dogs. Both men were interviewed separately by Cincinnati FBI. Al-Qudhaieen said he believed he never touched the pilot's cockpit door but that he was searching for a bathroom and he might have inadvertently touched the pilot's cockpit door. In a separate interview, Al-Shalawi advised Cincinnati FBI that Al-Qudhaieen did ask him where the bathroom was and Al-Shalawi related that he told Al-Qudhaieen to go to the rear of the aircraft to use the bathroom. However, Al-Qudhaieen disappeared from Al-Shalawi's view toward the front of the plane and was gone for several minutes.

[REDACTED] U.S. District Court transcripts revealed the following information: Al-Qudhaieen and Al-Shalawi were traveling to Washington D.C. to a reception being hosted by the President of Imam University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Both men are alumni of Imam Mohammed Bin Saud Islamic University, [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (P-1) Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, telephone: [REDACTED] (P-1). Al-Qudhaieen graduated with a B.A. in English and then spent several years on staff there as a teacher's assistant.

[REDACTED] On 10/22/2001, the [REDACTED] (O-1) following information: In late 2000, Hamdan Bin Ghareeb Abdullah Al-Shalawi, DOB [REDACTED] (P-1), POB [REDACTED] (P-1) Saudi Arabia, married with five children; was traveling to Saudi Arabia through Pakistan. **Al-Shalawi is known to have received training in Afghan terrorist camps and intended to conduct Al-Khobar type bombings.** No further specifics were available [REDACTED] (O-1) Al-Shalawi left the U.S. to return to Saudi Arabia in August 2001. [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3) Based upon this information received on Al-Shalawi, he was designated [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) In light of the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, this incident is being re-examined to determine whether Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen were conducting a dry run and/or test of

[REDACTED]

America West Airlines in-flight security procedures.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] Based on analysis of reporting that AL-QAEDA operatives do extensive research and testing prior to actual terrorist attacks, and Al-Shalawi's terrorist training, Phoenix believes this represented a test or trial run in preparation for 09/11/2001.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Militant proselytizing within the U.S., the movement of individuals involved in such activity into the U.S. and the existence of AQ members amongst identified Saudi Arabian government personnel [REDACTED] (J-3) continued post 9/11.

[REDACTED] (G) identified extremist Saudi clerics attempting to or having entered the U.S. and were involved with Saudi Arabian student gatherings in the United States. Despite open social media posts advocating jihadi activity [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (G) were forwarded to [REDACTED] (J-3) - thus eliminating the threat posed by these individuals to the U.S.

Mohammed Mousa

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] WFO identified Mousa based [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and subsequent review of open source social media information identifying Mousa as a pro-AQ Saudi Airlines pilot. Mousa also appeared to be entering the U.S. for training and to visit Saudi Arabian students. WFO [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) and forwarded requests for information to various foreign governments.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(F)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] One of the attendees to the ABAAD organized event was Mohammed Hassan Mousa (who uses the name Alshareef to denote a possible relation to Mohammed). Mousa is a Saudi Arabian airlines pilot but also a religious scholar who has openly advocated jihad in Mali/Israel/Iraq and has eulogized UBL. [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

(F)

[REDACTED] Saudi cleric named Mohammed Hassan Mousa (who utilizes Internet name Mohammed Musa Aqeel Alshareef) (NOTE: Alshareef is a term utilized by descendants of Mohammed and may or may not be an official last name utilized on a passport) (DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)), a Saudi airlines pilot who had studied in Florida (according to article "Days in America"), had entered the US and had attended the Dar Alhijra as well as a Saudi student meeting in Chicago. Mousa supports jihad in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Mali and other countries against "Crusaders" and claimed to have wanted to go to fight in Iraq but was persuaded by Iraqi fighters not to go but to raise money in Saudi Arabia instead. Mousa was once in WAMY magazine stating that he would not return to the US as the US was an enemy of Islam. [NOTE: Based on an initial review of the websites [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) identified Mousa as Mohammed Musa Aqeel Alshareef but writer was able to later determine that name Mohammed Mousa and DOB of [REDACTED] (P-1) .]

[REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1)

INFORMATION

INDICATING A DIRECT CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TRAINING OF THE TERRORIST AIRPLANE HIJACKERS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 11 SEPTEMBER

[REDACTED]

EO14040-003588

[REDACTED]

ATTACKS IN THE U.S. AND A CERTAIN MOHAMED MOUSSA. MOUSSA, AGE 35-38, DOB [REDACTED] (P-1), A SAUDI, DOCTOR OF ISLAMIC RELIGION AND IMAM OF A MOSQUE IN SAUDI ARABIA, WHO [REDACTED] (O-1) COMPLETED HIS STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF RIYADH, WAS A PILOT INSTRUCTOR WITH SAUDIA AIRLINES. MOUSSA WAS A CONVINCED FUNDAMENTALIST WHO PARTICIPATED IN 2000 IN A SAUDI TELEVISION PROGRAM ON WHICH HE HOSTED DEBATES (A SORT OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE/DEBATE). HE REFUSED TO FLY HEAVY AIRCRAFT IN ORDER TO REMAIN ON AIRBUS TYPES. THIS ALLOWED HIM TO REMAIN IN SAUDI ARABIA AND AVOID CONTACT WITH "IMPIOUS" WESTERNERS. AT THE SAME TIME THIS ALLOWED HIM TO DEVOTE HIMSELF TO HIS RELIGION AND TO THE MOSQUE OF WHICH HE WAS THE IMAM.

PROBABLY IN THE MONTH OF JULY 2000, MOUSSA WAS AN INSTRUCTOR ON FLIGHT SIMULATORS IN JEDDAH, SAUDI ARABIA. SEVERAL MONTHS LATER, (NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2000), [REDACTED] (O-1) MOUSSA LEFT FOR THE UNITED STATES FOR TRAINING ON HEAVY AIRCRAFT (747-400) AT BOEING IN SEATTLE.

[REDACTED] A review of travel noted that Mousa was reportedly encountered entering the U.S. as airline crew from 1998 to 2001 with the last encounter as inbound on 08/27/2001.

[REDACTED]

Ayid Alqarni

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] On [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) 2012 [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) a known extremist Saudi cleric named

Ayid Abdullah Alqarni (ph) would be traveling to the US to attend the ICNA/MSA Conference in Chicago in December 2012. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Alqarni had a DOB [REDACTED] (P-1) On 12/12/2012 [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Alqarni could be located on the following youtube videos:

<http://youtu.be/wrEEu-Fjzqk>

<http://youtu.be/L2Q3A5XaTxE>

[REDACTED] The first video is titled "Ayid Alqarni - Jihad the Path to Victory" and is dated 2004. In this video Alqarni - recognizable as the individual [REDACTED] (J-3) - laments the death of Abdalaziz Alrantisi and Ahmad Yassin and praises jihad in Iraq against the "occupiers".

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) open source information found on the ICNA website, exact matches of biographical information as well as a review of the available video writer concludes that the Ayid Abdullah Alqarni who [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(J-3) [REDACTED] is the same as the Ayid Abdullah Alqarni who is noted in the videos calling for jihad against American soldiers in Iraq and the "slitting of throats". In addition, the confirmed telephone numbers of Alqarni are described as having Alqaeda connections and have contacts with multiple FBI terrorism investigations.

[REDACTED] According to (G) [REDACTED] Alqarni is a personal sheikh of Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahad Bin Abdulaziz Alsaud. [Noted herein]

[REDACTED]

Other Saudi Arabian Government Officials - Known or Suspected AQ Members

[REDACTED] Summary: The influence of militant AQ ideology within Saudi government personnel can also be demonstrated by the identification of AQ members within Saudi Arabian military members who entered the U.S. for military training. Among these are Faisal Alshehri, Mohammad Alkahtani, Naif Alfallaj and the recent student Mohammed Alshamrani (Pensacola). [This is in addition to the known 120 or more Saudi Arabian (J-3) who departed the U.S. to join ISIS.] Saudi naval officers lafi Alharbi (DOB: (P-1)) and Osama Nooh (possible DOB: (P-1))((F)) were in contact were in contact with Alhazmi and Almihdar.

Mustafa Alshehri

(aka Mustafa Mohammed Mubarak Alshehri / aka Mustafa Aljubairi)

DOB: (P-1)

Entered US on (J-3) July 2001

(G)

(J-3)

[REDACTED] Summary: Mustafa Alshehri was a Saudi Arabian national and government official in the Saudi Ministry of Interior passport office.

(C-1)

(C-1) Alshehri entered the U.S. just prior to the 9/11 attacks and visited New York along with other individuals of the Saudi Embassy.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] and other serials] Mustafa Alshehri was a Ministry of Interior employee in the passport section and [REDACTED] (C-1)
[REDACTED] (C-1)

Subsequently he was utilized to transfer large sums of money to other AQ members. [REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] (C-1) [REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] (C-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1) Yousef was subsequently released and became a leader of AQAP before being killed in 2009.) According to records and Alshehri's statements he traveled to the US for medical reasons [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) and actually entered on 09/01/2001 with intended stay [REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (C-1) [REDACTED] (C-1)

(C-1) Alshehri had several associates in the EKSA to include Yousef Zakri [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] who was a long term EKSA employee who had a close relationship with known AQI member Shawki Omar [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] who was subsequently arrested in Iraq. Another associate was believed to be Fahad Alotaibi (DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)) of the Military Attache office. While in the DC area Alshehri lived with Mohammed Ali Alqahtani [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Mohammed Amer Alshehri [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] a diplomat at the EKSA, is a known relative and [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] noted his association with multiple [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and that he was involved with retrieving Yousef Alshehri's body. Ali Al Nafisah [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED], another EKSA diplomat, was a close associate of both Omar, Zakri and Alshehri.

[REDACTED]

Faisal Ahmed Alshehri

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] On May 9, 2003, FBIHQ notified the Dallas Division
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Initial investigation revealed that the user of the email address was located at Sheppard Air force Base, Wichita Falls, Texas. Soon thereafter, this individual was identified as Faisal Ahmed Al-Shehri. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) (O-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] At approximately 6:00 p.m., Al-Shehri was approached by Dallas FBI agents. The agents advised Al-Shehri that there was a possible security issue with his luggage and wanted to talk to

[REDACTED]

him for a couple of minutes. Al-Shehri and the interviewing agents went to the business lounge area and began to question Al-Shehri. After a short time, the interviewing agents questioned Al-Shehri regarding his knowledge of Al-Yari. Al-Shehri denied any knowledge of Al-Yari and advised the interviewing agents that he had never met or seen him before. Al-Shehri was told by the interviewing agents that his phone number had been found on Al-Yari's body after he had been killed in a shootout with Saudi authorities. Al-Shehri continued to deny his knowledge of Al-Yari. During this time, Al-Shehri provided biographical information and consented to a search of all his carry-on items. After approximately six hours, Al-Shehri finally admitted that he had designed and built a computer for Al-Yari several years ago. Also, Al-Shehri advised that he had a long standing and close relationship with Al-Yari. Al-Shehri explained how he was recruited by Al-Qa'ida and eventually became a financial supporter and recruiter for the organization. Also, Al-Shehri explained how he frequently communicated with Al-Yari and had traveled to meet him on many occasions. Al-Shehri was debriefed from June 5, 2003 until July 8, 2003. During this time, Al-Shehri provided invaluable intelligence information regarding Al-Qa'ida members, Al-Qa'ida trade craft, and Al-Qa'ida recruitment within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

(A), (G), (J-1)

(F)

(A), (G), (J-1)

On December 8, 2001 a search was conducted of AlMari's apartment which revealed photocopies of what appeared to be valid passports assigned to many different individuals. The passports were issued in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Also discovered during the search was flight training literature, literature detailing seating capacities and fuel capacities for large jetliners, several photographs of the World Trade Center towers, an aerial photo of the Pentagon, and overdue video tapes borrowed from the Boston Public Library. One of the video tapes was entitled "Major Air Disasters" and another was entitled "Major Water Disasters". Many documents were discovered during the search of the apartment

[REDACTED]

to include telephone bills, bank statements, shipping receipts,
hotel receipts, airline receipts, and many handwritten notes. [REDACTED] (F)
[REDACTED] (F) noted some secondary connections between phone
numbers within this case and phone numbers in contact with Albayoumi.]

[REDACTED]

Mohammad Alkahtani

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) that AL-KAHTANI indicated he has friends in Saudi Arabia with connections to AL-QAEDA.

Furthermore AL-KAHTANI has indicated he has TALIBAN contacts in Saudi Arabia who came from Afghanistan. In private settings, AL-KAHTANI has expressed his support of violent jihad for the propagation of Islam. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Virginia home, AL-KAHTANI has been vocal about his support for AL-QAEDA and UBL.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Investigation has revealed Al-Kahtani, a citizen of Saudi Arabia, is in the United States [REDACTED] (J-3) and is working on his PhD in Information Technology at George Mason University (GMU). He teaches a Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) class at GMU and is a prominent lecturer and leader at the Center For Islamic Information and Education (CIIE), aka Dar al Arqam Islamic Center, in Annandale, Virginia. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Al-Kahtani has indicated he is planning on returning to Saudi Arabia as soon as he completes his PhD, probably sometime before the end of this year.

[REDACTED] Several regular attendees of Dar al Arqam conducted paintball training in Northern Virginia in preparation for participation in jihad and/or jihad training overseas. Several members of the group traveled to Pakistan prior to, and after 09/11/2001, to attend Lashkar-E Taiba jihad training camp. Among those involved in the jihad group are [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Ali Al-Timimi, a former lecturer at Dar al Arqam, has been a spiritual advisor to many in this group and has publically advocated violent jihad. The activities of [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) . [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (G) two of Al-Kahtani's sons attended the paintball training, however they were not part of the core jihad group. Additionally, after 09/11/2001 Al-Timimi was asked to leave Dar al Arqam by the Dar al Arqam leadership (Haythem Abu Hantash, Jaf'far Idris and AL-Kahtani) because Al-Timimi openly supported the 09/11/2001 terrorist attacks against the U.S. As a result, Al-Kahtani took a greater leadership/lecturer role at Dar al Arqam.

[REDACTED] Alkahtani [REDACTED] (J-3) despite the above information. Alkahtani noted that he was traveling with a "prince" and was working for Saudi Military Industries. Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) is a state owned [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3) defense company launched in May 2017 by Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund (PIF). SAMI is lead by Ahmed Alkhateeb and Walid Abukhaled. Its subsidiaries is Advanced Electronics Company and Military Industries Corporation (MIC) per Wiki which is lead by Mohamed Almaday. [REDACTED] (J-3) .

[REDACTED]

Abdullah Mohamed Alshehri

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] Alshehri is mentioned herein due to the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) officer being affiliated with Islamic militants and also being utilized as a local POC for the Saudi population. Alshehri was conducting this business while a student.

[REDACTED] (G)

(G) ALSHEHRI was favorable toward USAMA BIN LADEN and upon his documented connection to MULHIM ELTAYEB [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G). While in Pittsburgh, ALSHEHRI apparently acted as liaison between the Saudi Arabian embassy and the Saudi community in Pittsburgh.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
On 03/18/2002, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) a young Yemeni immigrant to Pittsburgh had recently been invited to an apartment with a group of Saudi Arabians. The immigrant had been invited by "ABO NORA" (or ABU NORA) (determined [REDACTED] (G) to be [REDACTED] (G) ABDULLAH ALSHEHRI). While at this gathering, the Saudis were speaking favorably about USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL). When the Yemeni immigrant voiced his opinion that the events of September 11th were murder, "ABO NORA" indicated to the group to

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

change the subject and not speak further about it in front of the Yemeni.

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (G)

Investigation at the CARRIAGE PARK APARTMENTS determined that MULHIM ELTAYEB, a Sudanese national, departed Pittsburgh in January 1999, allegedly to return to the Sudan. On his exit papers with CARRIAGE PARK APARTMENTS, ELTAYEB gave a forwarding address of [REDACTED] (P) Pittsburgh, telephone [REDACTED] (P). Follow-up investigation at the GREENBRIAR APARTMENTS determined that, at the time of ELTAYEB's departure, [REDACTED] (P) was leased by ABDULLAH MOHAMMED ALSHEHRI, with the same telephone number. ELTAYEB was obviously using ALSHEHRI's address as a mail forwarding point. MULHIM ELTAYEB re-surfaced on 09/09/2001 at Timber, OR, where he was found engaged in paramilitary training with other Arab males. Portland believes that ELTAYEB is part of a suspected Al Qaeda cell operating in the Portland area.

[REDACTED]

Islamic Saudi Academy (ISA)

King Abdullah Academy

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] The Islamic Saudi Academy, now known as the King Abdullah Academy, is a K-12 school located in Northern Virginia that provides education for the children of Saudi Arabian diplomats as well as other individuals. The school is supported by the Saudi Arabian government and the Embassy and the SACM Director and Saudi Ambassador are known to sit on the board of directors. The school has faced charges of teaching hatred within its Islamic education department and one of its students, Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, was convicted of being an AQ operative planning to assassinate President George Bush. [REDACTED] (P) was a teacher at the Islamic education department.

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Since 2001 there have been many independent analysis conducted of the teaching curriculum in Saudi Arabia and at the ISA. These reports include the Freedom House report and the recent report from the United States Commission of International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). In addition, reports have been written on similar schools in foreign nations such as a report in Britain on the King Fahd Academy in London (a school similar to the ISA) titled "The Hijacking of British Islam".

[REDACTED] All of the reports by independent scholars and linguists have arrived at similar conclusions. The specific statements listed in these reports have been well documented in the press and need not be mentioned in this memorandum. However, these multiple and independent analysis have been confirmed via translations done by the FBI. Many of the passages in question were Saudi interpretations of Koranic passages or of the Hadith and were similar to the interpretation provided by Elyacoubi mentioned above.

[REDACTED] According to open source reporting, in 2002, Saudi Foreign

[REDACTED]

Minister Prince Saud

Al-Faisal stated that "our schools and our faith teach peace and tolerance." In March 2006, Prince

Turki Al-Faisal stated that the Saudis had removed all of the inflammatory content in their school textbooks but quickly backed off and stated they needed more time after the Freedom House report.

Recent open source reporting noted that Saudi Embassy officials have denied the existence of derogatory material in the ISA's present curriculum.

■ The 2007/2008 USCIRF study revealed that the changes have not been completed. An FBI review of the 2007 curriculum textbooks also revealed the continuing use of passages that are considered to be defamatory to other religions and that could be construed to encourage violence.

[REDACTED]

Saudi Arabian Student Population

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (F)

Serials with LHMS to USDS:

[REDACTED] (F) (2014/2017/2018)

[REDACTED] (F)

Summary: The effect of the Saudi Arabian education system is evident within high number of terrorism investigations related to the Saudi Arabian student population. This population has fluctuated over the years but increased greatly after 2005 but has recently sharply declined. Various AQ related terrorism investigation was opened prior to and following the 9/11 attacks such as (A), (G), (J-1) ([REDACTED] (F) and [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (F). Following the creation and growth of ISIS there were at least 120 Saudi students who traveled to Syria from the U.S. to join AQ and/or ISIS forces.

(J-3)
[REDACTED]

Homaidan Alturki Saudi [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] As is known, the 9/11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 individuals - 15 of them being of Saudi nationality (the possible 20th - Alqahtani who is held in GTMO - is also of Saudi origin). Saudi Arabian

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

perception management campaigns have worked to convince Americans that UBL used the 15 Saudis in order to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia - thus presenting the case for closer bonds and more lax requirements for entry into the U.S. Per the 9/11 Commission Report, the interrogations of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed revealed that the true reason for the use of so many young Saudi males for the 9/11 attacks was due to the large numbers of willing participants amongst the Saudi population as well as the easy visa requirements then in place for Saudi Arabian citizens to obtain visas to travel to the U.S. Prior to 9/11 it was much harder for a citizen of Yemen or Sudan to obtain a visa whereas citizens of Saudi Arabia were not viewed as a "security risk" and obtained their visas under the Visa Express program. (See 9/11 Commission Report - Pages 232-233 and 9/11 and Terrorist Travel Pages 116-130.)

[REDACTED] Shortly after 9/11 a spotlight was shown on the teaching material utilized in Saudi K-12 schooling as well as within Saudi schools and Saudi funded and run mosques in the U.S. and elsewhere. Facing strong criticism the Saudis launched various public relations campaigns to discredit these reports. Despite repeated promises and claims to the contrary, within the U.S. the teaching material at the Saudi funded Islamic Saudi Academy (ISA) was not altered until approximately eight years after 9/11. An unclassified report [REDACTED] (O-1) regarding Saudi education and textbooks utilized within Saudi Arabia (elementary and middle school curriculum 2009-2010) revealed that - despite claims to the contrary - that the Saudi Arabian Government had not removed or altered the offensive material found in previous editions. According to the CIA report "the monotheism texts teach hatred as part of the doctrine of disavowal which promotes hostility toward non-Muslims. This doctrine, which jihadists often advocate, is included throughout many other books in the curriculum." The report continues: "The monotheism textbooks for all five grades also stress the theme of religious violence". The report concludes "Even if the Saudis moderate some of the offending passages in the higher-grade textbooks, the youngest and most impressionable segment of Saudi society will still have been exposed to this incitement to religious hatred and violence, and many will have already internalized these teachings." This analysis as well as more recent open source reports regarding the Saudi clerical establishment highlight that the extremist nature of Saudi society is still prevalent. For example, in December 2013 a large group of Saudi clerics publicly endorsed the Islamist Front in Syria. These clerics are increasingly using social media to reach out to Saudi society - in Saudi Arabia or overseas. The recent edict by King Abdullah to criminalize the participation of Saudi citizens in fighting with the jihadi groups in Syria is believed to have little effect on those individuals who are motivated by the AQ element within these clerical establishments.

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) This was highlighted by the recent death in Saudi Arabia of an ISIS bomb maker who was a student in New Zealand. Additional Saudi Arabian students are voicing encouragement and support and multiple Saudi Arabian students are under terrorism investigation by the FBI. In addition, it is known via FBI investigation, that radical Saudi based clerics and religious authorities are traveling to the U.S. to visit with the U.S. based Saudi population. In December 2012 a Saudi cleric who had openly called for jihad against the U.S. was granted a visa to enter the U.S. FBI investigation prevented his entry and his intended destination was an Islamic conference in Chicago. In December 2013 investigation revealed a large student gathering in Chicago that included a presentation by a Saudi cleric who has openly supported jihad activities and who eulogized Osama Bin Laden. This cleric is also a Saudi Airlines pilot and wrote of meeting Saudi Arabian students in various locations in the United States. In December 2016 a Saudi Arabian national who was a professor for a Saudi military academy and a supporter of militant ideology was granted a visa to the U.S. [REDACTED] (J-3).

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Homaidan Alturki is noted above due to his operating an Islamic bookstore (Albasheer Publications) while on [REDACTED] (J-3) status; his connections to Anwar Aulaqi (aka Abu Attiq) ([REDACTED] (F) (see [REDACTED] (F) (see herein)' Mohammed Alahmari (IANA) (see herein); and the EKSA's/SAG's attempts to obtain his release from prison despite his being convicted of abuse of an [REDACTED] (J-3) holder.

[REDACTED] (A),(G), (J-1) is noted herein due to the [REDACTED] (A),(G), (J-1) centering on a group of Saudi Arabian students who were committing [REDACTED] (J-3) fraud. During a search of their apartment photocopies of what appeared to be valid passports assigned to many different individuals. The passports were issued in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Also discovered during the search was flight training literature, literature detailing seating capacities and fuel capacities for large jetliners, several photographs of the World Trade Center towers, an aerial photo of the Pentagon, and overdue video tapes borrowed from the Boston Public Library. One of the video tapes was entitled "Major Air Disasters" and another was entitled "Major Water Disasters".

[REDACTED]

Ziyad Khaleel (Ziyad Sadaqa)

(G) [REDACTED]

Summary: Noted herein due to references above.

(A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The above referenced serial

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1) Investigation by Phoenix has indicated that all of these individuals may have a current or former association with Michigan State University (MSU).

[REDACTED] Al-Shalawi

(G) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(G) [REDACTED] and is believed by Phoenix to be an operative of Al Qaeda. Al-Shalawi obtained a PhD in Linguistics from Arizona State University (ASU).

[REDACTED] Al-Shalawi and Muhammad Al-Qudhaieen (G) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] were involved in an incident aboard an America West airlines flight on November 19, 1999. Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen were traveling from Phoenix to Washington, DC via Columbus, Ohio. During the flight, Al-Qudhaieen was observed by the flight crew attempting to access the cockpit. When the flight landed in Columbus, Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen were detained by FBI Cincinnati and interviewed (F) [REDACTED]. No charges were filed against Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen.

[REDACTED] Based on (G) [REDACTED] regarding the association of Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen with Al Qaeda subjects and the terrorist attacks of 09/11/2001, Phoenix has developed an investigative theory that this incident was an intelligence gathering mission for use in future terrorist operations.

(O-1) [REDACTED] Al-Shalawi obtained training at an Afghanistan terror camp in late 2000.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/07/2012

On 03/05/2012, (P) (hereinafter referred to as (P)), date of birth (P-1), phone number (P), was interviewed by SA (S), SA (S) and SA (S) at a public restaurant in San Diego, California (CA). On a previous meeting with SA (S), (P) had been shown a handwritten document (hereinafter referred to as the document) that was seized pursuant to a search conducted by Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in the United Kingdom at the residence of OMAR AL-BAYOUMI (BAYOUMI) in late September 2001. The document contained a handwritten equation along with other handwritten calculations. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and that the purpose of the interview was to have (P) review the document again this time in conjunction with a theory developed by SA (S) and SA (S), (P) provided the following information:

(P) is a pilot who flew for (P) (P) for (P) years and commercially for (P) for (P) years. He retired from (P) in (P) (P) flew the (P) from (P) to (P) on several occasions. (P) had identified MOHAMED ATTA as a person posing as a pilot seated in one of the jumpseats in the cockpit on one of his flights originating out of Boston. ATTA had asked a lot of questions about the instrumentation and specifically about changing course to New York. He also told (P) that he was going to mainline Delta to fly 767s. (P) thought that it was odd that a young pilot would go straight to flying 767s, since those spots are typically reserved for those with seniority.

The first time (P) had reviewed the document, he had not seen any correlation between the equation on the document and piloting a plane. However, after reviewing the theory by SA (S) and SA (S), (P) admitted that Diagram 2, associated with the theory, provided him more insight into the equation and that it could be used to calculate a rate of decent when flying a plane. Given a distance from a target, the altitude at that location, and the current airspeed one could calculate the rate of decent and plug it into the computer on the plane in order to initiate a decent to that target. It

Investigation on 03/07/2012 at San Diego
 File # (F), (F) Date dictated Not Dictated
 by SA (S), SA (S)

(F) , (F) , (F)

Continuation of FD 302 of

(P)

, On 03/07/2012 , Page 2

would be reasonable to use the equation in the document in order to calculate the decent rate of an aircraft.

All large airports have GPS plates located in their runways that send a signal to an aircraft relaying the latitude and longitude (GPS coordinates) of that runway. This signal provides pilots the information they need to set an accurate decent rate to the runway from a given location in the sky. However, if somebody wanted to land a plane at a location where there are no GPS plates, they would need to plug in a decent rate into the computer and they would need to know either the GPS coordinates of that location or how far the aircraft was from that location. With a known distance from a given location and the altitude of the plane, a decent rate could be calculated by the pilot. This calculation that would have be done by hand since there is not a way for the plane's computer to perform this calculation. It is not likely that the use of the aircraft computer for navigation would not have been known by a person who had taken only minimal flight lesson, since that type of instruction was only taught in advanced training. In commercial aviation, a typical decent rate would be approximately 2,000 to 2,500 feet per minute.

In 2001 it may have been difficult for an average citizen to establish the latitude and longitude of a certain location. As a pilot, (P) had access to a Mark 6 plotting board-map, which provided calculations based on a known location, where if the latitude and longitude of a certain location was known, then one could calculate the latitude and longitude of a nearby location using the this board-map.

(P) was familiar with the flight path between (P) and (P). Due to the air traffic in the vicinity of (P) not all planes taking off from (P) would immediately climb to an altitude of 35,000 feet. It was not unusual for commercial flights out of (P) to level off around 8,000 to 10,000 feet in that area for as far as 100 to 150 miles, in order to avoid traffic. The airspeed of a commercial airliner flying from (P) to (P) would be approximately 360 to 380 nautical miles per hour (knots) due to head-winds experienced by an aircraft when flying west. However, from (P) to (P) a plane may experience tail-winds up to 120 to 140 knots, which would significantly increase the plane's airspeed going from west to east (FBI note: (P) was speaking of airspeed and not speed over the ground, where airspeed is the speed of the aircraft

(F) , (F) , (F)

Continuation of FD 302 of (P) , On 03/07/2012 , Page 3

relative to the air, taking into consideration head-winds and tail-winds which can be significant at high altitudes). At an altitude of 8,000 to 10,000 feet, one would be able to see for approximately 100 miles on a clear day and even be able to identify various landmarks.

As a pilot, (P) had access to maps that had the mileage listed on the legs between various waypoints along flight paths. These waypoints typically had a latitude and longitude associated with them. If one wanted to get the mileage (in nautical miles (nm)) along a flight path, one could either add the mileage of the legs between the waypoints or measure by hand the distance of the flight path. If he were to calculate the distance along a flight path by hand using these waypoints, he would have started from the beginning and not worked backwards starting from the destination. When measuring a distance by hand between waypoints on these maps, one could be accurate within 0.5 nm or better.

In a case where a pilot would have to change a plane's course, such as on 9/11, the pilot would not necessarily need to disable the autopilot for this type of course redirection, and could even utilize autopilot after the change in course.

(P) could not think of any other reason for the equation given the parameters set forth on the document than to calculate a decent rate from a given altitude.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Confidential Human Source (CHS) Reporting Document

Reporting Date: 01/30/2008

Case ID: [redacted] (F)

Contact Date: [redacted] (G)

Type of Contact: In person

Location: Los Angeles, California

Written by: SA [redacted] (S)

Other(s) Present: [redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] (G)

Source Reporting: [redacted] (O-1) On 01/25/2008, SA [redacted] (S) and [redacted] (O-1) met with [redacted] (G) (CHS)

[redacted] (G). CHS provided the following information:

[redacted] (O-1) when FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY was Imam at the King Fahad Mosque (KFM) he rented apartments [redacted] (O-1) in the name of the KFM Foundation. [redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1) at KFM (O-1) there was a phone call from overseas, possibly from Malaysia or Indonesia, and someone asked for ALTHUMAIRY and stated that "the guys" were coming in and needed to be picked up at the airport. "The guys" in the community meant the two 9/11 hijackers that passed through Los Angeles before going to San Diego. [redacted] (O-1)

(O-1)

ALTHUMAIRY directed a taxi cab driver known as (P) to pick the guys up and take them to the apartment complex that ALTHUMAIRY was renting rooms, and drive them around. (O-1) (P) as Egyptian or Yemeni, tall and skinny, not real dark-skinned, but had a beard and was in his mid-30's. (P) spoke Arabic and was ALTHUMAIRY's man for running errands. In addition (P) was known as the "taxi driver" in the community. (O-1) (P) is part of the Dar Ul-Quran (DQ) mosque (O-1)

(O-1) (P) took "the guys" to (P)'s (aka (P)'s) restaurant, but they were very seldom seen at the mosque. The guys also may have been taken to a Starbuck's on Washington and Overland Streets.

(O-1) ALTHUMAIRY knew who "the guys" were and was sympathetic to Al-Qaeda's cause. (O-1)

ALTHUMAIRY recently had a baby. (O-1)

(O-1) ALTHUMAIRY was very smart and everything he did was camouflaged. MOHAMMAD ALMUHANA was trained by ALTHUMAIRY, but was not as savvy. MUHANNA was very outspoken and aggressive. (O-1)

(O-1) (P) (date of birth (P-1)) . (P) was Yemeni and helped KFM from time to time with (P) . (O-1)

(O-1) OUALID BENOMRANE, (date of birth (P-1)), and (O-1) this person was a cab driver too, but not the same as (P) .

(O-1) of (P) (aka (P)) . (O-1) (O-1)

(O-1)

ALKHALIDI. (O-1) SALMAN (O-1) (O-1)

(O-1) (P) (date of birth (P-1)) as an Egyptian individual who attended KFM. (O-1)

(O-1) (P) (date of birth (P-1)) as a taxi driver. (O-1)

(O-1) (P) (date of birth (P-1)) he was in films.

(O-1) MOAHMED ALMANSOORI (O-1) (P-1) he was a taxi driver.

(O-1) FAISAL (P-1) (date of birth (P-1)) .

(O-1) (P) (O-1) , (O-1)

(O-1) (O-1) KHALLAD BIN ATTASH (O-1) this person walking with a limp during the summer of 2000. KFM used to serve lunches after prayers on Friday and Saturday (O-1) this individual on one of these occasions with two to three other people (O-1)

(O-1) this individual was an important person. (O-1) ALTHUMAIRY interacting with this individual.

(O-1)

Information regarding DQ Mosque

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The DQ mosque is open at a new location and they are paying \$2,500 a month for rent. [REDACTED] (O-1) the congregation at DQ is approximately 100 people. [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] were back in town. The Egyptian Imam at DQ [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] individuals connected to the DQ mosque are attempting, through their contacts in Saudi Arabia, to tie KFM to the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs. The individuals hope that their contacts at Religious Affairs will be able to use their influence in Saudi Arabia to kick out the current administration so that they may be able to take over KFM. The individuals at DQ believe that they were unjustly kicked out of KFM years ago and now is there time to return. The administration at KFM is fighting DQ's strategy. KFM just sponsored a Hajj trip for 10-12 people at the personal invitation from Prince Abdulaziz.

[REDACTED] (P)
at DQ. [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] Information regarding the Saudi Consulate and Saudi Students in Los Angeles

[REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] new Saudi Students started coming to the Los Angeles area during the summer of 2007. Through the community, [REDACTED] (O-1) a couple of Saudi Students attend KFM, but that there were 10-15 going to DQ. [REDACTED] (O-1) someone in Saudi Arabia is orientating the new arrivals to the DQ mosque.

[REDACTED] The Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles does not keep track of the students on the West Coast. All student affairs are coordinated through the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC. Saudi Students attend UCLA, USC, Santa Monica College, Loyola Marymount, and possibly a mechanical school run by Northrup Grumman.

[REDACTED] There may be an individual in the Saudi Consulate that is in the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. This individual replaced Sultan Last Name Unknown (LNU). This person may be going around to check up on various mosques in Los Angeles.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Information concerning [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (P) is now working in San Diego, but still has some items in the basement of the Saudi Consulate. (P) is allowed into the Consulate from time to time [REDACTED] (P). (P) is considered by certain members of the Saudi Consulate a nice old man who [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) and is paying for [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (O-1) how (P) is financially able to afford a house and pays tuition for his children.

[REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (O-1) were close to ALTHUMAIRY. [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1)

♦♦

[REDACTED]



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Newark, N.J. 07102

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

April 21, 2008

(P)
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM - (A), (G), (J-1)

Full Investigation Initiated: (A), (G), (J-1)

Annual Letterhead Memorandum

This document is classified [redacted] in its entirety.

Office of Origin:

Newark, New Jersey

Date Investigative Summary Prepared: 04/21/2008

Basis of Investigation:

[redacted] Captioned investigation is based upon specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) is engaged in international terrorism, or activities in preparation therefor, pursuant to FCIG, Section III.C.1.b.6. AL-QAEDA is considered a "foreign power" as it engages in "international terrorism" or activities in preparation thereof.

[redacted] (P) [redacted] was the subject of a Preliminary Investigation by the Newark Division opened on or about [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) subsequent investigation under the PENTTBOM case which revealed some of [redacted] (P) involvement with several of the known hijackers responsible for the events on 09/11/2001. [redacted] (P) is believed to have had contact with HANI HANJOUR, NAWAF ALHAZMI, MAJED MOQED, and AHMED ALGHAMDI. The former Preliminary Investigation expired on [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) and was subsequently closed.

[redacted] A Preliminary Investigation was opened on or about [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) due to the belief that [redacted] (P) had provided false information [redacted] (O-1) to United States (U.S.) authorities and had not cooperated with the U.S. government concerning his relationship with the aforementioned

[REDACTED]

hijackers. The second Preliminary Investigation was set to expire on or about (A), (G), (J-1).

[REDACTED] On or about (A), (G), (J-1), a Full Investigation was initiated due to (P) false statements (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1), lack of cooperation with U.S. authorities in regards to his knowledge of the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001 and his knowledge of the individuals responsible for those attacks, and (P) association with individuals known to be members of terrorist organizations or supporters of terrorist organizations.

[REDACTED] For background information the following information is provided: (P) arrived in the U.S. on 07/03/2000, with a tourist visa. His Syrian passport [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (P) stayed in the U.S. past the expiration of his U.S. visa and was subsequently arrested by what is now known as the Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for being "out of status" in the U.S.

[REDACTED] (P) was later arrested as a Material Witness in connection with the PENTTBOM investigation, but he only agreed to be interviewed and [REDACTED] (D) [REDACTED] (D). [REDACTED] (P) was also subjected to a polygraph on 01/24/2002, in which he appeared to be deceptive when answering questions about his prior knowledge of the terrorist attacks of 09/11/2001.

[REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] A number of requests have been sent to the Syrian government, via Interpol, for any information that illustrated that (P) was wanted by the Syrian authorities. [REDACTED] (C-2) [REDACTED] (C-2)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Subsequent investigation of [REDACTED] (P) has revealed that he is believed to have had contact with other individuals of interest to the FBI:

1. [REDACTED] (P), also known as (aka) [REDACTED] (P), aka, [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] During the TERRSTOP investigation, communications occurring over CLEMENT HAMPTON-EL's [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) The TERRSTOP investigation pertained to individuals involved in a conspiracy to blow up New York City landmarks, including the Holland Tunnel and the New York Office of the FBI. The [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) that occurred over HAMPTON-EL's telephone were [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) used at trial.

[REDACTED] Portions of the aforementioned declassified telephone communications occurred between the following subjects of investigation; HAMPTON-EL and [REDACTED] (P) HAMPTON-EL and [REDACTED] (P), and HAMPTON-EL and [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) The aforementioned communications illustrated that HAMPTON-EL, [REDACTED] (P), and [REDACTED] (P) were involved in money transfers intended to support training and the purchase of weapons in support of terrorist acts. HAMPTON-EL's communications with [REDACTED] (P) illustrated that [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) was interested in training in support of violent jihad.

2. [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] The entry, [REDACTED] (P), was noted in the [REDACTED] (P) address book and is of interest to the Newark Division. A query of the ACS database revealed that the telephone number, [REDACTED] (P), is subscribed to by [REDACTED] (P), the father of [REDACTED] (P), a self admitted member of AL-QAEDA and [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1).

[REDACTED] (C-1)
[REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED]

(C-1)

(S) [REDACTED]. Subsequent investigation revealed [REDACTED] (P) involvement in activities on the behalf of AL-QAEDA and he was charged and convicted in U.S. federal court on 9 terrorism charges. [REDACTED] (P) was later sentenced to 30 years in prison and 30 years probation.

3. [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] On 01/14/2002, [REDACTED] (P) was interviewed as part of a proffer agreement at the United States Attorneys Office (USAO), Eastern District of Virginia. The interpreter for 1 of the proffer sessions was [REDACTED] (S). [REDACTED] (P) was not cooperative in that he did not provide any specifics concerning his interaction with the aforementioned hijackers.

[REDACTED] Toll records for [REDACTED] (P) cellular telephones, past and present, have been obtained by the writer from T-MOBILE INC. via Grand Jury subpoena. A review of [REDACTED] (P) toll records has revealed that [REDACTED] (P) has been in contact with at least 2 cellular telephones possibly utilized by [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) appeared to have had contact on numerous occasions.

[REDACTED] It should be noted that [REDACTED] (P) is currently a [REDACTED] (P) of the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Federal Courts in Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Federal Courts in New York, New York.

[REDACTED] (P) was interviewed by agents from the Washington Field Office of the FBI on the morning of 07/20/2006 and questioned about her associations with a number of individuals including [REDACTED] (P). It is believed that [REDACTED] (P) contacted [REDACTED] (P) subsequent this interview and advised him about the FBI interest in him.

[REDACTED] On 07/24/2006, [REDACTED] (P) contacted the Newark Division of the FBI asking "if there was anything going on" and appeared to be extremely nervous on the telephone to the agents who spoke with him.

[REDACTED] Newark's investigation has determined that [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

4. [REDACTED] (P)

The [REDACTED] (O-1) in Iraq reviewed documents recovered from government offices in Iraq. One recovered document, marked "Top Secret" with heading "[REDACTED]" (A), (G), (J-1) listed (P) or (P) (O-1)

[REDACTED] (P) was [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (P), a (then) [REDACTED] (P) to the United Nations, offered to provide an Iraqi Intelligence Officer with any information she obtained related to then US Secretary of State Warren Christopher's meeting with various Arab countries regarding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. [REDACTED] (P) had also worked at the [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED] During an interview of [REDACTED] (P) on 12/04/1998, [REDACTED] (P) acknowledged providing various newspapers to Iraqi officials when she was a [REDACTED] (P), however, she never admitted to providing information regarding the Secretary of State's meetings, or engaging in any such illegal activity during her employment at the [REDACTED] (P). She stated that she no longer worked at any of the [REDACTED] (P) and was employed by [REDACTED] (P) located in [REDACTED] (P) New Jersey. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] Subsequent investigation has revealed that [REDACTED] (P) is associated with [REDACTED] (P) and members of [REDACTED] (P) family. It is unknown how these relationships developed or what is the true nature of the relationships.

5. [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 08/04/2006, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (P-1)
[REDACTED] (P-1) and [REDACTED] (P-1). Both number were provided to
the source [REDACTED] (O-1) and were reported to be associated with
an individual named ABU MUTHANNA. ABU MUTHANNA is believed to
be ABDULLAH AL-ARIFI, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and an alleged leader
of an AL-QAEDA cell in Iraq.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (P) is believed to be an alias for
[REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P), SSN [REDACTED] (P-1), DOB [REDACTED] (P),
address [REDACTED] (P) Alexandria, VA.

[REDACTED] The Newark Division has not determined the true
purpose for the aforementioned contacts of [REDACTED] (P). It
appears that [REDACTED] (P) maintains contact with individuals that
potentially have access to information that may be of interest
to terrorist organizations. It also appears that [REDACTED] (P)
maintains contact with individuals that are either associated
with terrorist organizations or foreign intelligence services.

6. [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] Another contact of [REDACTED] (P) that should be
noted is an individual named [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P), date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED] (P-1), has been interviewed by
the FBI on several occasions. [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), became a
subject of interest to the FBI due to his association with
[REDACTED] (P) and recent activity.

[REDACTED] In early 05/2005, [REDACTED] (P) was stopped by the
police in Clifton, New Jersey because of traffic violations.
At the time, he claimed to be too poor to afford an apartment
and was living in his vehicle. [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) used to
work together selling ice cream out of trucks with another
individual named [REDACTED] (P). [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P), and [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) have lived together at a number of locations in the
past. [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) were questioned by the FBI

[REDACTED]

subsequent the events of 09/11/2001. As stated above, (P) was questioned about his contact with a number of the 19 hijackers.

On 06/19/2001, at approximately 11:03 pm, HANI HANJOUR conducted a transaction at the aforementioned PNC Bank ATM. A review of all transactions conducted 30 minutes prior and 30 minutes after HANJOUR's transaction, revealed four individuals who were believed to possibly be associated with HANJOUR. The individuals were (P), DOB (P-1), FAYEZ I.A. ABUTALEB, aka FAYEZ ABUTALEB, DOB (P-1), (P) (P), aka (P), DOB (P-1), and (P), DOB (P-1).

(P), ABUTALEB, (P), and (P) all lived together at one time. (P) was interviewed by the FBI because of the aforementioned automatic teller machine (ATM) transaction at the PNC Bank in Paterson, New Jersey. (P) was present at the time of (P) interview with the FBI, but portrayed himself as an associate that was present to assist with interpretation, if needed. (P) speaks sufficient English and did not need an interpreter at the aforementioned interview.

On 05/29/2005, (P) was stopped by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) while attempting to cross the border into Canada. (P) was denied entry by the Canadian authorities and subsequently interviewed by SA (S) from the Seattle Division and CBP agents. (P) advised the interviewers that he was on his way to Alaska to fly and he had a number of flight training materials in his possession.

On 10/12/2005, (P) was interviewed by SA (S) and Port Authority Police Detective (S) from the New York Division at his parent's home in (P), New York. (P) advised the interviewers that he had worked on a commercial fishing boat in Alaska fishing for salmon. (P) had advised the interviewers that he had gone to Alaska to fish and did not reiterate his previous reason for his travel to Alaska.

On 11/02/2005, (P) was interviewed by SA (S), FBI Language Specialist (LS) (S), SA (S) from the Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Detective (S) at (P) residence, (P) (P), (P), New York. During the interview, (P)

[REDACTED]

advised the interviewers that he had traveled to Alaska to fish. After being reminded that he was detained en route to Canada with flight materials, (P) advised that he has always wanted to fly and threw away the flight materials after being detained.

(P) did not have a consistent or logical story concerning his travel to Alaska and the purpose for the trip. (P) was also not cooperative when discussing his past activities and appeared to have had a selective memory for things he was willing to discuss. Subsequent investigation revealed that (P) also had computer disks and satellite installation equipment with him when he was detained at the Canadian border.

Additionally, investigation revealed that (P) utilized a laptop computer while on board the fishing boat, expressed interest in and studied the nautical charts on the boat, and attempted to steer the boat on at least 1 occasion. (P), by his own admission, has no prior fishing experience and was apparently out of his element. Additionally, the boats that (P) worked on utilized routes frequented by a number of cruise ship lines.

(P) had a pamphlet from the HOLLAND AMERICA CRUISE LINE in his possession when he was detained at the Canadian border. When questioned as to why he possessed the HOLLAND AMERICA pamphlet, (P) advised that he contacted the cruise line to ask questions about Alaska.

In the past, (P) has made his living selling ice cream in New Jersey with (P) and others. (P) aforementioned trip took place at a time when he would have been in the middle of the season for selling ice cream. In fact, (P) was interviewed just prior to his departure for Alaska and he was selling ice cream at the time. (P) did not appear to make any profit from the aforementioned trip which appears significant in that he supports his family that resides in (P).

At the present time, it is not known why (P) took the aforementioned trip. However, considering the fact that (P) was a close associate of (P) at the time (P) interacted with the hijackers and that (P) has not been cooperative with law enforcement when questioned about the aforementioned trip necessitated further investigation of (P).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Further investigation of [REDACTED] (P) has revealed strange behavior and has not revealed a logical reason for his trip to Alaska. During the 11/02/2005 interview, [REDACTED] (P) advised that he lived with [REDACTED] (P) after his return from the Falls Church area of Virginia and before the attacks on 09/11/2001. [REDACTED] (P) also advised that 2 unknown men arrived at the residence one day and that there was discussion of [REDACTED] (P) moving out so that the 2 men could stay at the residence. [REDACTED] (P) discussion of the 2 men was in response to questions associated with the 19 hijackers responsible for the attacks on 09/11/2001.

7. [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (P), DOB [REDACTED] (P-1), is an [REDACTED] (P) that formerly worked for [REDACTED] (P) at [REDACTED] (P) in New York, New York. [REDACTED] (P) represented [REDACTED] (P) pro bono during the BIA appeal process concerning his possible deportation [REDACTED] (O-1).

[REDACTED] (P) was interviewed by the FBI on 06/19/2006 and he advised that he was contacted by [REDACTED] (P) a number of times at his office at [REDACTED] (P). [REDACTED] (P) advised that his office number was the only contact number [REDACTED] (P) had for him and this was the only way he contacted him. [REDACTED] (P) also advised that the only outside contact he had with [REDACTED] (P) was he had dinner with [REDACTED] (P) one night and he brought [REDACTED] (P) to the hospital on several occasions.

[REDACTED] (P) was asked if he traveled to the Syrian Consulate in New York with [REDACTED] (P) in the past. [REDACTED] (P) advised that he could not recall if he had done that. [REDACTED] (P) was advised that [REDACTED] (P) had told the FBI that they had both gone to the Syrian consulate to renew [REDACTED] (P) Syrian passport. [REDACTED] (P) again advised that "he could not recall" if he had gone to the Syrian consulate with [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED] Subsequent investigation revealed that [REDACTED] (P) had been in contact with [REDACTED] (P) via [REDACTED] (P) work telephone number, cellular telephone number, and home telephone.

[REDACTED] (P) was re-interviewed on 03/26/2008 regarding [REDACTED] (P). [REDACTED] (P) advised that he now worked at the [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) located at [REDACTED] (P) Street, New York, NY 10021, telephone [REDACTED] (P). [REDACTED] (P) described the [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) as a "think tank" type of organization.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (P) was advised that the FBI had reviewed phone records and that it appeared that he had previously lied to FBI agents when he advised that he only spoke to [REDACTED] (P) from his office on several occasions. [REDACTED] (P) advised that he did not recall giving [REDACTED] (P) his home number or his cellular telephone number and that he did not recall more extensive contact between [REDACTED] (P) and himself.

[REDACTED] (P) was asked if he went to the Syrian Consulate with [REDACTED] (P) in the past. [REDACTED] (P) reiterated his past answer to this question and advised that he did not recall going to the consulate with [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED] (P) appears to be lying to cover some actions that he and/or [REDACTED] (P) have conducted. [REDACTED] (P) was advised that stating that "he did not recall" something was not the same as saying he didn't do it. [REDACTED] (P) answer to this statement was that he did not recall doing it. The Newark Division believes [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and will document this in an EC and forward the information to the New York Office to pursue.

[REDACTED] On or about 03/27/2007, [REDACTED] (P) was arrested by the Paterson Police Department for [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (P-1) The final disposition is unknown at this time.

[REDACTED] The FBI was advised by ICE representatives that on or about 12/13/2007, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) made a decision [REDACTED] (O-1) based on new evidence presented to them from the FBI and [REDACTED] (G) BIA decided to "reopen the proceedings and remand the record to the Immigration Court for a new hearing before a different Immigration judge".

[REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1). The order goes on to state that ICE submitted a declaration submitted to them by the FBI which indicates that [REDACTED] (P) lived with EYAD ALRABABAH who assisted 2 of the hijackers responsible for the events on 09/11/2001.

[REDACTED] The order continues in which it states that ALRABABAH introduced the aforementioned hijackers to [REDACTED] (P) in Falls Church, Virginia. The aforementioned facts along with the fact that the FBI had advised that it is unable to rule out [REDACTED] (P) as a threat to security [REDACTED] (O-1).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Additionally, the order states that there were accusations that the Immigration Judge was not conducting the hearings in a generally fair manner and indicated that there are instances in the record that are sufficient to justify a remand to another Immigration Judge. Ultimately, BIA also ruled to remand the record to the Immigration Court for a new hearing before a different Immigration Judge.

[REDACTED] The declaration mentioned in the BIA order advised that [REDACTED] (P) should be removed from the U.S. and could not be ruled out as a threat to national security for the following reasons:

1. [REDACTED] (P) was encountered by the FBI investigating the terrorists attacks that took place on 09/11/2001.
2. [REDACTED] (P) had direct contact with several of the hijackers responsible for the attacks that took place on 09/11/2001.
3. [REDACTED] (P), through a number of documents and interviews, misrepresented facts and deceived the government.
4. [REDACTED] (P) illegally remained in the U.S. after he was supposed to depart the U.S. and he has admitted that he is an overstay.

[REDACTED] The preceding information suggests that the captioned subject has associations with members of and/or supports the terrorist activity associated with AL-QAEDA and other terrorists organizations. As a result of the relationships, circumstances and information set forth, [REDACTED] (G), Newark authorized a Full Investigation to fully identify [REDACTED] (P) and investigate the level of his involvement in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof and/or his knowingly aiding or abetting any person in the conduct of these activities.

Objective(s) :

[REDACTED] The captioned investigation was authorized to further investigate the level of [REDACTED] (P) involvement in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof and/or his knowingly aiding or abetting any person in the conduct of these activities.

[REDACTED] At the current time, the Newark Division is continuing to investigate [REDACTED] (P) activities and contacts. The Newark Division has also been working with ICE to facilitate the deportation of [REDACTED] (P). Additionally, the Newark Division will attempt to [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)



█ Current and future investigative objectives seek to further characterize the United States based AL-QAEDA support network. Investigative targets include, but are not limited to, the United States based AL-QAEDA core leadership and membership structure, AL-QAEDA logistical and financial networks, and overseas connections with AL-QAEDA political/military elements. The captioned investigation will continue to further identify █ (P) █ role in the identified United States based AL-QAEDA support network as well as his role in other international terrorist organizations.



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/08/2010

To: (G)

International Operations
Counterterrorism

New York

Oklahoma

San Diego

Attn: (G), (S)
Attn:
Attn:
Attn:

From: Counterterrorism
(G)

Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: ADEL AL SADHAN
(A), (G), (J-1)

MUTAIB AL SUDAIRY
(A), (G), (J-1)

OPERATION ENCORE
(A), (G), (J-1)



[REDACTED]

To: (G) [REDACTED] From: Counterterrorism
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 12/08/2010

[REDACTED] DESIGNATED INTELLIGENCE DISCLOSURE OFFICIAL
DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] FOREIGN DISSEMINATIONS [REDACTED] (G)

(G)

Synopsis: [REDACTED] (G) Section Chief [REDACTED] (S) provides
authority to disseminate the enclosed [REDACTED] (G)
[REDACTED] (G) tear-line to [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) of
the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

(G)

[REDACTED] **Full Investigation Initiated:** [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Administrative: [REDACTED] Pursuant to Attorney General
Guidelines, for Domestic FBI Operations (AGG-Dom), Part
VI.B.1.d., the dissemination of the enclosed information is in
the interest of national security of the United States. The
information is relevant to the recipient's authorized
responsibilities, its dissemination is consistent with the
National Security interests of the United States, and the FBI
has considered the effect such dissemination may reasonably be
expected to have on any identifiable U.S. person.

[REDACTED] (G) has reviewed the information
contained in the enclosed communication. Passage of this
information is consistent with the standards for dissemination
of U.S. person and non-U.S. person information to foreign
authorities as authorized in the AGG-Dom.

[REDACTED] The FBI will undertake reasonable steps to
ensure that any intelligence information that the FBI
disseminates to [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) of the
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) pursuant to this authorization is not
and will not be used for either assassination prohibited under
Executive Order 12333 or torture, as defined in U.S. criminal
law. To this end, the FBI shall take the following actions:

1. The FBI shall notify the recipient agency that the
information in this document is for intelligence and lead
purposes only. The information in this document may not be
used in any legal proceedings or disseminated to any other

[REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED] (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 12/08/2010

agency within the recipient's government without the advanced authorization of the FBI. The FBI shall direct the recipient agency to not take any overt investigative steps (including but not limited to any type of formal legal process or direct contact with the subject) based on the information in this communication without first coordinating with the FBI;

2. As required by the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Concerning [REDACTED] (O-1) of the Central Intelligence Agency and the FBI MOU, [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)

3. LEGAT shall report to CTD and OIO any indication that the recipient agency to whom this information has been provided did not honor the caveat regarding use or dissemination of this information, or used the information for either assassination or torture.

Details: [REDACTED] FBI New York requested CTD provide [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) authority to disseminate [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) derived information to [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) of the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) to provide information on captioned subjects and request any derogatory information the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) may have on them.

[REDACTED] For background, Operation Encore is an FBI New York investigation of Fahad al-Thumairy, Omar al-Bayoumi, and Musaed al-Jarrah due to their past association with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. Information uncovered through phone analysis, financial analysis, and numerous interviews suggests the aforementioned subjects assisted the hijackers, wittingly or unwittingly, in a support/logistics role while they were in the United States.

[REDACTED] FBI investigation conducted through Operation Encore uncovered two additional individuals, Adel Al Sadhan and Mutaib Al Sudairy, with a past connection to the subjects of Operation Encore. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) along with telephone and financial analysis, indicates Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy may have assisted in laying the groundwork for the arrival of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in southern California and served as an advance team to vet those who would later assist both hijackers.

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: (G) [REDACTED] From: Counterterrorism
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 12/08/2010

(J-3) [REDACTED]
(J-3) [REDACTED] FBI (G) [REDACTED] initiated (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] to investigate both subjects' (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED].
The FBI has no information to suggest that either Al Sadhan or Al Sudairy is an operator - that is, that they present a direct threat of violent terrorist activity. However, if Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy are currently involved with facilitation efforts on behalf of al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda affiliates, (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED]
(A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED]

(J-3) [REDACTED]
(J-3) [REDACTED]

The FBI is releasing the below information to the (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] to request their assistance with any derogatory information the (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] may possess on Al Sadhan or Al Sudairy.

(O-1) [REDACTED]

(G) [REDACTED] FBIHQ provides (G) [REDACTED] authority for LEGAT (G) [REDACTED] to disseminate the enclosed CTD approved tear-line to (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] of the (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED]
(A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED]

-----Begin Tearline-----

[REDACTED]

(F) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: (F) 12/08/2010

[REDACTED] The FBI would like to inform your service of two Saudi Arabian individuals of investigative interest to our agency. The two are identified as follows:

Adel M A Al Sadhan
D/POB: (P-1), (P-1)
Passport number: (P-1)
Employer: Ministry of Islamic Affairs

Mutaib A A Al Sudairy
D/POB: (P-1), (P-1)
Passport number: (P-1)
Employer: Ministry of Islamic Affairs

[REDACTED] Sadhan and Sudairy came to our agency's attention when they [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3) Subsequent FBI investigation surfaced information that Sudairy previously lived in the U.S. in 2000 and at that time was roommates and associates with an individual named Ziyad Hilmy Khaleel, aka Ziyad Sadaqa. Khaleel was assessed to be an al-Qaeda procurement officer who provided Usama Bin Laden with satellite phones used in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa. Khaleel also ran several extremist web-sites and was a fundraiser for the Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA), which was shut down by our government for its affiliation with al-Qaeda. Following his return to Saudi Arabia in 2001, Sudairy maintained a relationship with Khaleel. In addition, in 2001 Sudairy's U.S.-based [REDACTED] (P) became suspicious of him and reported him to U.S. authorities because Sudairy missed a considerable number of classes due to frequent travel and had significant amounts of money.

[REDACTED] (J-3)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (U) assessed to be a radical Imam living in California.

[REDACTED] Additional FBI investigation uncovered telephone contact in 2000 between Sudairy and Omar al-Bayoumi while al-Bayoumi was living in California. As your agency is aware, al-Bayoumi was an associate of 9/11 hijackers

[REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED] (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 12/08/2010

Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi while the hijackers lived in California.

[REDACTED] Given Sudairy's past association with Ziyad Khaleel and his [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) [REDACTED], as well as his [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) with Sadhan, we respectfully request any derogatory information your service may have on either individual. In addition, we ask that your agency take no overt investigative steps with regard to Sadhan or Sudairy and that they be allowed to [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As always, your assistance in counterterrorism matters is greatly appreciated. We would welcome any additional information your Government has developed in regards to this matter.

[REDACTED]

-----End Tearline-----

[REDACTED] Questions regarding this communication should be directed to [REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED] (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 12/08/2010

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

[REDACTED] (G)

AT [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (G) requests LEGAT [REDACTED] (G) to pass the enclosed tear-line to [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) of the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and to report any non-compliance with the tear-line caveat, in accordance with the instructions set forth in the Administrative Section of the EC.

[REDACTED] As required by the Memorandum of Understanding [REDACTED] (O-1) of the [REDACTED] (O-1) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (MOU), [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED]

Set Lead 2: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

[REDACTED] Read and clear.

◆◆

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

(G) [REDACTED]

Form Classification: [REDACTED]

Source Id: [REDACTED]

(F)

Date:

2010-12-08

Case Agent Name:

[REDACTED] (S)

Field Office:

San Diego

Squad:

[REDACTED] (G)

Date of Contact:

2010

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Participants/Witnesses:

SA [REDACTED]

(S)

, SA [REDACTED]

(S)

(ICE), [REDACTED]

(O-1)

Type of Contact:

In Person

Location

Country:

UNITED STATES

City:

San Diego

State:

California

Date of Report

2010-12-08

Substantive Case File Number: [REDACTED]

(F)

[REDACTED] (F)

(G)

Reporting:

(F)

NAWAF AL-HAZMI amp KHALID AL-MIHDAR, (F)

(G) was shown two photographs of NAWAF AL-HAZMI. One photograph showed AL-HAZMI clean-shaven and the other showed AL-HAZMI with a mustache (G) was not told that both photographs were of the same individual. (G) reviewed the two photographs of AL-HAZMI and concluded that (O-1)


(O-1)

(O-1) (G) could not remember either individual's name, but later learned that both were involved in the attacks of 9/11.

(G) identified the photograph of the clean-shaven AL-HAZMI as the individual (O-1)

(O-1)

(O-1)



(O-1)



(O-1)




(O-1)




(O-1)



(O-1)



(O-1)



(O-1)

(O-1)

(O-1)
(O-1)

(O-1)

(O-1) AL-HAZMI and
AL-MIHDAR were in their mid-20's and (P) was the one who
introduced them to "everybody."

ANWARAULAQI, (F)

(O-1)

(O-1) first met AULAQI in 1996 or
1997. ANWAR walked most places, or (P) would drive him (O-1)

(O-1)
(O-1)

(O-1)

MOHDAR ABDULLAH, (F)

(G) was shown a photograph of MOHDAR ABDULLAH (MOHDAR), (A), could not remember MOHDAR's name, but remembered that (G) (O-1)

(O-1)

Before leaving

to travel overseas, (G) specifically remembers (O-1)

(O-1)

(O-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(O-1)

(O-1)

(O-1)

OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (G) was shown a photograph of OMAR AL-BAYOUMI (AL-BAYOUMI). (G) stated that h/she "thinks" that h/she knows this individual from the Masjid Al-Ribat. (G) does not remember AL-BAYOUMI's name, but seems to remember that AL-BAYOUMI was Eritrean, Somali, or Egyptian. In or about 1999, AL-BAYOUMI was in his early 30's and had [REDACTED] (P-1). (G) seems to remember that AL-BAYOUMI drove a taxi, but (G) was not certain. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)

MUTAIB AL-SUDAIRY, [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (G) was shown a photograph of MUTAIB AL-SUDAIRY (AL-SUDAIRY). (G) recognized AL-SUDAIRY, but did not remember his name. (G) remembers seeing AL-SUDAIRY with an older Egyptian male at the Masjid Al-Ribat in the late 1990's. AL-SUDAIRY frequently argued with the older Egyptian male, who used to lead prayer at the Masjid Al-Ribat. (G) does not know where AL-SUDAIRY is from

and did not know AL-SUDAIRY or the older Egyptian personally (G) never actually met AL-SUDAIRY, but saw him at the Masjid Al-Ribat (G) recalled that AL-SUDAIRY always prayed on the front row and that AL-SUDAIRY knew (P) and always prayed on the front row. AL-SUDAIRY seemed racist to (G) and only associated with Arabs. AL-SUDAIRY was between 5'8" and 5'10" tall.

PHOTOS NOT RECOGNIZED

(G) was shown photographs of the following individuals, but did not recognize the photographs:

ADEL M. AL-SADHAN, (G)

ABDULLAH AL-JRAITHEN, (G)

(P), (G)

(P), (G)

RAMEZ NOAMAN, (G)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(O-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(P) ADDRESS

(O-1)

(O-1) the exact address of (P) apartment as:

(P)

(P)

La Mesa, California



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: [redacted] (P) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) Date: 05/01/2013
[redacted] (A),(G), (J-1)

To: [redacted] (G)

From: NEWARK
[redacted] (G)
Contact: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F) [redacted] (P)
[redacted] (P)

Synopsis: [redacted] To close captioned Full Investigation.

[redacted] (G)

Full Investigation Initiated: 04/06/2005

Details:

[redacted] Newark opened captioned Full Investigation based on information that [redacted] (P) gave false statements, provided in support of [redacted] (O-1) lack of cooperation with U.S. authorities, and [redacted] (P) association with individuals known to be members of terrorist organizations or supporters of terrorist organizations.

[redacted] A Preliminary Investigation was opened on or about 11/05/2004 due to the belief that [redacted] (P) had provided false information [redacted] (O-1)

[redacted]

[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 05/01/2013

authorities and had not cooperated with the U.S. government concerning his relationship with the aforementioned hijackers. The second Preliminary Investigation was set to expire on or about 05/05/2005.

[REDACTED] On or about 04/06/2005, a Full Investigation was initiated due to [REDACTED] (P) false statements [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) lack of cooperation with U.S. authorities in regards to his knowledge of the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001 and his knowledge of the individuals responsible for those attacks, and [REDACTED] (P) association with individuals known to be members of terrorist organizations or supporters of terrorist organizations.

[REDACTED] (P) arrived in the U.S. on 07/03/2000 with a [REDACTED] (J-3) His Syrian passport contained a visa which was issued on [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (P) stayed in the U.S. past the expiration of his U.S. visa and was subsequently arrested by what is now known as the Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for being "out of status" in the U.S.

[REDACTED] (P) was later arrested as a Material Witness in connection with the PENTTBOM investigation, but he only agreed to be interviewed [REDACTED] (D)

[REDACTED] (P) was subsequently returned to ICE custody and [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (P) made no claim upon his entry into the U.S. or during the first year he was present in the U.S. It is apparent that [REDACTED] (P) had no intentions of returning to Syria and tried to utilize any means possible to stay in the U.S. It is apparent that the only reason

[REDACTED]

Title: [redacted] (P) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
Re: [redacted] (F) [redacted], 05/01/2013

[redacted] (P) [redacted] (O-1) [redacted] he was caught by the U.S. authorities breaking the law by residing in the U.S. past the date he was authorized to do so.

[redacted] (P) [redacted] entered the U.S. on a [redacted] (J-3) [redacted] which does not provide the authorization to work in the U.S., which [redacted] (P) [redacted] did. According to [redacted] (P) [redacted], part of the reason for his travel to Virginia was to secure some form of employment.

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted]

[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 05/01/2013

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] One of the major problems [REDACTED] (O-1) is that a portion of it was filled out by the Immigration Judge (IJ) presiding over the his case, [REDACTED] (P). As per IJ [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P) initially appeared in court on 2 occasions [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) and was rescheduled. On 11/14/2001, [REDACTED] (P) appeared in court [REDACTED] (O-1) form and on this occasion IJ [REDACTED] (P) asked [REDACTED] (P) questions [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1). It should be noted that the form does not reflect that IJ [REDACTED] (P) filled the form out or wrote on the form at all. This is highly unusual and does not appear to reflect the actions of an impartial judge presiding over an immigration hearing.

[REDACTED] ICE filed a motion for recusal of IJ [REDACTED] (P) based on the following:

1. On 10/26/2001, IJ [REDACTED] (P) conducted a bond re-determination hearing IJ [REDACTED] (P) expressed her "personal gratitude" to the respondent for having called the FBI to report what he knew.
2. In a bond memorandum, dated 11/08/2001, the Immigration Judge illustrated her personal interest in the case by urging the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to address the appeal on an expedited basis. She also equated the actions of the U.S. government, referring to the detention of [REDACTED] (P), to the behavior of governments of countries that she usually hears asylum cases from.
3. It was rumored that IJ [REDACTED] (P) told Immigration attorneys that she hoped that ICE lost its appeal of her bond decision.
4. During a hearing on 11/02/2001, IJ [REDACTED] (P) attempted to direct the Immigration service to provide an interpreter for [REDACTED] (P) and to have the interpreter travel to [REDACTED] (P) in jail to assist him [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1). When she was advised that ICE would not do it, IJ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Title: [redacted] (P) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
Re: [redacted] (F), 05/01/2013

(P) stated that if ICE didn't comply with her directive, [redacted] (O-1)
[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1)

6. At the conclusion of the 11/14/2001 hearing, IJ [redacted] (P) adjourned the case for a hearing [redacted] (O-1). However, IJ [redacted] (P) adjourned the case only 6 days to 11/20/2001. The short adjournment did not give ICE a reasonable opportunity to prepare for the hearing. IJ [redacted] (P) did not complete [redacted] (O-1) until after 5:00pm on 11/14/2001. It was only at that time that ICE became aware of the rest of the information [redacted] (O-1). The short adjournment made it impossible for the Department of State to comment [redacted] (O-1).

7. On 11/14/2001, IJ [redacted] (P) was overheard by a ICE attorney recounting the facts of [redacted] (P) case to a private bar attorney. IJ [redacted] (P) expressed her dismay at what she perceived to be unjust treatment of [redacted] (P).

[redacted] (O-1), [redacted] (P) has provided several different statements concerning his time spent in Syria and Saudi Arabia.

[redacted] (P) was interviewed by the FBI on 10/01/2001 where he signed an advise of rights form in Arabic. During this interview, [redacted] (P) advised that he came to the U.S. because he was in great debt. [redacted] (P) advised that he was involved in a business deal in Syria with Saudi Arabians attempting to secure work visas in Saudi Arabia. [redacted] (P) advised that the Syrian government was looking for him with

[redacted]

[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 05/01/2013

regard to the visas which were fraudulent. [REDACTED] (P) estimated that the value of this deal was worth approximately \$70,000 U.S. currency.

[REDACTED] (P) made additional statements as part of a proffer agreement at the U.S. Attorneys Office, EDVA. On 01/14/2002, [REDACTED] (P) advised that he did not do anything wrong in Syria, but he was tricked and money was taken from him. [REDACTED] (P) insisted that he was respected in both Syria and Saudi Arabia and claimed the he was forced to come to the U.S. It should be noted that [REDACTED] (P) traveled to the U.S. on 07/03/2000, on a [REDACTED] (J-3) from Saudi Arabia [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1).

Additionally, [REDACTED] (P) did not offer specifics as to where he resided in Saudi Arabia or who the people in Saudi Arabia were. During the interview at EDVA on 01/14/2002, [REDACTED] (P) advised that he worked for the government of Saudi Arabia as a teacher. [REDACTED] (P) also advised that he worked in tourism in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and he met many diplomats of which a number made contacts on his behalf at the Saudi Embassy in the U.S. It is unclear how [REDACTED] (P) came upon fraudulent visas or why there would have been a need to obtain fraudulent visas if he worked for the government of Saudi Arabia.

[REDACTED] (P) was also polygraphed as part of the aforementioned proffer agreement. [REDACTED] (P) was polygraphed on questions relevant to his participation in, or planning of, terrorists acts. [REDACTED] (P) denied such involvement, but in the opinion of the examiner, [REDACTED] (P) responses were indicative of deception.

Sometime around 04/15/2002, [REDACTED] (P) sent a letter to IJ [REDACTED] (P) advising her that [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1). [REDACTED] (P) also advised that his children had become homeless and he had not known their whereabouts for the past 7 months. [REDACTED] (P) time frame of 7 months prior would be approximately 10/2001 or 11/2001 where he did not know the whereabouts of his children [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED]

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Re: [REDACTED] (F), 05/01/2013

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (P) was also interviewed by the FBI on or about 04/02/2003, where he advised the interviewing agents [REDACTED] (O-1) but the case was under appeal at the time by ICE. [REDACTED] (P) was asked if he could recall anything of further interest that is or was connected to the 09/11/2001 hijackers or their association to Paterson, New Jersey and [REDACTED] (P) advised that he could not. [REDACTED] (P) did not mention that he was being threatened by supporters of terrorism in his country, that he did not know where his children were, or that they were homeless as stated in his letter to IJ [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED] (P) was interviewed by the FBI on or about 02/25/2004 at his residence, [REDACTED] (P) Paterson, New Jersey. [REDACTED] (P) advised that he was working at [REDACTED] (P) located at [REDACTED] (P), Wayne, New Jersey. [REDACTED] (P) did not mention being threatened by the supporters of terrorism in his country or that he did not know where his children were or that they were homeless.

[REDACTED] (P) Subsequent investigation of [REDACTED] (P) has revealed that he is believed to have had contact with other individuals of interest to the FBI and associated with terrorist organizations.

[REDACTED] Due to the aforementioned information a declaration was sent to ICE [REDACTED] (O-1) and brought before the Immigration court again. The Newark office of ICE sent a communication to the Board of Immigration Appeals [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1). On or about 12/13/2007, BIA decided to "reopen the proceedings and remand the record to the Immigration Court for a new hearing before a different Immigration judge".

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

The order goes on to state that ICE submitted a declaration submitted to

[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
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them by the FBI which indicates that [REDACTED] (P) lived with EYAD ALRABABAH who assisted 2 of the hijackers responsible for the events on 09/11/2001.

[REDACTED] The order continues in which it states that ALRABABAH introduced the aforementioned hijackers to [REDACTED] (P) in Falls Church, Virginia. The aforementioned facts along with the fact that the FBI had advised that it is unable to rule out [REDACTED] (P) as a threat to security [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1).

[REDACTED] Additionally, the order states that there were accusations that the Immigration Judge was not conducting the hearings in a generally fair manner and indicated that there are instances in the record that are sufficient to justify a remand to another Immigration Judge. Ultimately, BIA also ruled to remand the record to the Immigration Court for a new hearing before a different Immigration Judge.

[REDACTED] The declaration mentioned in the BIA order advised that [REDACTED] (P) should be removed from the U.S. and could not be ruled out as a threat to national security for the following reasons:

1. [REDACTED] (P) was encountered by the FBI investigating the terrorists attacks that took place on 09/11/2001.
2. [REDACTED] (P) had direct contact with several of the hijackers responsible for the attacks that took place on 09/11/2001.
3. [REDACTED] (P), through a number of documents and interviews, misrepresented facts and deceived the government.
4. [REDACTED] (P) illegally remained in the U.S. after he was supposed to depart the U.S. and he has admitted that he is an overstay.
5. [REDACTED] (P) has lied to Immigration authorities about where he lived subsequent his arrival in the U.S.
6. [REDACTED] (P) was employed while in the U.S. under a [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
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7. [REDACTED] (P) misrepresented his marital status to the Immigration Judge during the prior hearings [REDACTED] (O-1). [REDACTED] (P) advised the Immigration Judge he was divorced and has since applied to Immigration authorities for his wife and children to travel to and reside in the U.S. It is believed that the Immigration Judge would have asked [REDACTED] (P) marital status [REDACTED] (O-1)

8. [REDACTED] (P) had fraudulently obtained a Virginia drivers license with the assistance of his former roommate and later claimed to have acquired it legally.

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The writer has been advised by ICE that the matter concerning [REDACTED] (P) has been assigned to an Immigration Judge at the present time. ICE has advised that the writer will be notified when an Immigration Court date has been established [REDACTED] (O-1).

[REDACTED] On January 7, 2011, referenced case was reassigned to writer, Detective [REDACTED] (S), NK squad [REDACTED] (G).

[REDACTED] On June 21, 2011, [REDACTED] (P) had a hearing in Third Circuit Immigration and Naturalization Services Appeals Court, Newark, New Jersey. Presiding Judges heard the case and advised they would rule on

[REDACTED]

3

[REDACTED]

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the matter and contact INS with their ruling. Newark awaited the results.

[REDACTED] Source reporting indicated, [REDACTED] (F), [REDACTED] (P) was utilizing a new land line telephone number for personal use. Telephone Applications determined telephone number was assigned to AT&T. As a result, Newark [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) to AT&T, for subscriber information and call detail records.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) for telephone number [REDACTED] (P), and served to [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) Kansas City, MO 64106.

[REDACTED] (P) tasked [REDACTED] (P), to conduct a search in AT&T's database, for subscriber information and call detail records, for telephone number [REDACTED] (P). AT&T's database indicated referenced telephone number, was assigned to Cablevision, a company owned and operated by OPTIMUM/LIGHTPATH services. Database determined, call detail records associated with referenced telephone number, were calls that hit on AT&T's land line network. All other call detail records and subscriber information belong to Cablevision NJ. Therefore, AT&T did not have subscriber information, nor call detail records for referenced telephone number.

[REDACTED] As a result of the findings, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and issued to Cablevision/LightPath Inc., in reference to telephone number [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED] Limited surveillance had been conducted periodically. Subject was observed during spot checks at his residence in Paterson, as well as his place of employment, in Paterson, NJ.

[REDACTED] Newark continued to [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) the [REDACTED] (P), and had indicated that the subject remained in the Paterson, NJ area. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) has provided Newark with an email address,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] (P), that has been utilized by the subject.
Preliminary analysis of the email address did not yield any significant results.

[REDACTED] Throughout the course of this investigation, toll records and subscriber information were obtained for all pertinent phone numbers, and thorough analysis of the telephone data was conducted.

[REDACTED] (G) and [REDACTED] (G) had conducted extensive physical surveillance of the subject as well. [REDACTED] (G) also utilized a GPS tracking device on the subject's vehicle, with negative results for derogatory information.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) that [REDACTED] (P) was frequently drinking heavily and hanging out with friends. He has contacted [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) numerous times in his intoxicated state.

[REDACTED] On 09/08/2011, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) was served personally to [REDACTED] (P) CSC Holdings Inc. Cablevision Lightpath Inc., 1111 Stewart Avenue, Bethpage, New York, for telephone number [REDACTED] (P). Cablevision confirmed land line telephone number was registered to [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] On 09/30/2011, New York IOA, [REDACTED] (S) received the results of [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Results were mailed to the Newark FBI Office.

[REDACTED] On 10/14/2011, Newark received [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) via inter-office mail. Results were submitted for toll records upload. Results were analyzed accordingly, with negative results.

[REDACTED] On April 4, 2012, Newark received the following information from INS Attorney [REDACTED] (S): DOJ, in hearing [REDACTED] (P) Immigration case, [REDACTED] (P) VS [REDACTED] (P), et al., No 10-2995 (3RD Circuit, January 11, 2012), DJ 39-48-3912, A078-573-513, determined they will file a petition for a rehearing on the case. Results, to be determined.

[REDACTED] On June 22nd, 2012, INS Attorney, [REDACTED] (S) notified writer

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
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that INS lost it's recent appeal on [REDACTED] (P) case, 2-1. INS moved for En Banc hearing, which was also denied. As it stands, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is considering whether to file a Cert Petition.

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 10/19/2012, writer contacted DOJ INS/CIS attorney, [REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED] (S) who represented the US Government against [REDACTED] (P) in his

[REDACTED]

Title: [redacted] (P) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
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hearing before the 3rd Circuit of Appeals INS Court in Newark, NJ, on June 21st 2011. Contact was to determine INS's present case status against [redacted] (P) [redacted] (S) advised the following on INS's present case against [redacted] (P):

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1). [redacted] (P) filed a motion opposing that decision.

[redacted] The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), made a decision on the last motion filed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), concerning [redacted] (P). In short, they reversed their prior decisions on 12/13/2007 and 10/21/2008, which reopened proceedings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) [redacted] (O-1).

[redacted] BIA concluded that the DHS did not establish an exceptional situation that warranted reopening proceedings, many years after the DHS's appeal of the Immigration Judge's decision had been dismissed.

[redacted] It appears that the BIA did not really look at the record concerning [redacted] (P) and didn't like what the 3rd Circuit said. ICE is going to appeal this decision, in that it did not address a number of things in their recent motion, [redacted] (O-1) [redacted] (O-1). So, in short, the matter is still pending .

[redacted] On 4/22/2013, Newark received a copy of the Boards's final decision, in reference to [redacted] (P) DHS/ICE present appeals case. The BIA stated that DHS has filed a motion requesting the Board reconsider their previous decision, dated November 14, 2012, subsequently denying their appeal. The respondent (DHS/ICE) has filed a statement of opposition to the motion. The motion was denied by the Board. No further action is taking place. In short DHS/ICE, lost their appeal.

[redacted]

[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 05/01/2013

[REDACTED] As a result Newark is closing it's case on [REDACTED] (P), and transferring the case to the NY FBI [REDACTED] (G). NY FBI [REDACTED] (G) is incorporating [REDACTED] (F) into their present case file [REDACTED] (F) (Operation Encore).

Watchlisting:

[REDACTED] Due to the case being transferred to the NY FBI FO, subject should remain [REDACTED] (G) and all supported systems.

Summary/Conclusion

[REDACTED] To date, [REDACTED] (P) is a loose associate of other predicated terrorism investigations, but based on investigation to date there is no evidence indicating he is involved in criminal or terrorist activities.

[REDACTED] Newark has completed baseline collection against this subject in accordance with established CTD guidance. To date, no potential criminal violations or priority threats to national security warranting further investigation have been identified. Newark is closing captioned matter, and transferring it to the NY FBI [REDACTED] (G), to be incorporated into their present case, "Operation Encore" [REDACTED] (F). In the event additional derogatory information is discovered regarding captioned subject, FIELD OFFICE will consider re-opening this investigation.

◆◆

[REDACTED]