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- F. ADMINISTRATIVELY DESIGNATED FBI FILE AND/OR SERIAL NUMBERS OR HANDLING INFORMATION.
- G. SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION WITHHELD PURSUANT TO THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIVILEGE.
- J-1. SECTION 102A(i)(1) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED BY THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1).
- J-2. INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE BY THE BANK SECRECY ACT (BSA) AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE BSA. SEE 31 C.F.R. § 5311 ET SEQ; 31 C.F.R. CHAPTER X.
- J-3. INFORMATION DETERMINED BY ANOTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY TO BE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f).
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- P-1. INFORMATION SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, DATES OF BIRTH, AND OTHER SENSITIVE PERSONAL INFORMATION.
- S. NAMES AND OTHER PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL.

NOTE: Classification markings (classification banners and portion markings) are redacted without a code throughout the release.

FBI-CIA Joint Assessment

Issued December 2004

The following document was previously produced in discovery in MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.) pursuant to the protective order with redactions for classification and the cover page, scope note, and the full executive summary were produced pursuant to Executive Order 14040 in November 2021 (EO14040-000488-491). At that time, the remainder of the document remained subject to the declassification review by other U.S. government agencies and departments.

Those U.S. government agencies and departments have completed the declassification review of the remainder of the document, consistent with Executive Order 14040, and those pages are released in the pages that follow.



COLLABORATIVE
Intelligence
ASSESSMENT

**Assessment of Saudi Arabian
Support to Terrorism and the
Counterintelligence Threat to the
United States**



Joint Intelligence Report
Prepared by

December 2004

Federal Bureau of
Investigation

Central Intelligence
Agency

[REDACTED]

Assessment of Saudi Arabian Support to Terrorism and the Counterintelligence Threat to the United States

Scope Note

This is a joint FBI-CIA intelligence report as prescribed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the FY 2004 Classified Annex S.1025/S. Report 108-44. This report provides the intelligence oversight committees with an assessment of the nature and extent of Saudi Government support of terrorism as well as the Saudi intelligence threat to the United States. In addition, this report

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

This assessment was prepared by the FBI and CIA. Comments and queries may be addressed to the FBI, attention Deputy Assistant Director [REDACTED] (P) Counterterrorism Analysis Branch, at [REDACTED] (S) or Section Chief [REDACTED] (P) Counterintelligence Analysis Section, at [REDACTED] (P) or to the CIA, Chief, Middle East North Africa Branch in the Counterterrorist Center [REDACTED] (O-1)

Executive Summary

Since the 11 September 2001 attacks, the United States Intelligence Community (USIC) has been working to assess Saudi Arabia's ties to terrorism, including the 2001 terrorist acts, in order to address questions arising about the country's support for organizations that may have provided support for previous al-Qa'ida attacks. Our assessment to date is as follows:

- There is no evidence that either the Saudi Government or members of the Saudi royal family knowingly provided support for the attacks of 11 September 2001 or that they had foreknowledge of terrorist operations in the Kingdom or elsewhere.
- There is evidence that official Saudi entities, chiefly the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and associated nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), provide financial and logistical support to individuals in the United States and around the world, some of whom are associated with terrorism-related activity.
- The Saudi Government and many of its agencies have been infiltrated and exploited by individuals associated with or sympathetic to al-Qa'ida.
- Suspected Saudi intelligence officers and cooptees appear to be engaged in collecting intelligence in the United States. Saudi-funded clerics have been found to be collecting on Saudi-Americans and other communities in the United States.
- Suspected Saudi intelligence officers and cooptees in the United States, including diplomats, are engaged in a campaign to influence public perception and policy.
- The Saudi Government and private Saudi individuals support the propagation of the conservative Wahhabi-Salafi sect of Sunni Islam in the United States. Jihadists adhere to and interpret this sect's beliefs to justify their actions.
- There is no information to indicate that either Omar al-Bayoumi or Osama Basnan materially supported the hijackers wittingly, were intelligence officers of the Saudi Government or provided material support for the 11 September attacks, contrary to media speculation.

Recent cooperation between Saudi intelligence and the USIC is largely driven by the Saudi royal family's recognition of the domestic threat posed to it by al-Qa'ida following several bombings by the group inside Saudi Arabia, starting in May 2003.

- In the past, the Saudi Government found itself in a precarious position, on the one hand it was denouncing al-Qa'ida as a threat, yet on the other hand it was underestimating al-Qa'ida's vitality within the Kingdom and treating the group with special consideration. Recent raids by the General Directorate for Investigations (Mabahith), which have resulted in the death or arrest of al-Qa'ida members in Saudi Arabia, demonstrate how this policy has changed.

The Government of Saudi Arabia and Terrorism

Assessment of Official Saudi Government Support to Terrorism

A review of intelligence over the past two years indicates that the Government of Saudi Arabia (GSA) was neither complicit in nor had foreknowledge of terrorist acts perpetrated by al-Qa'ida against the United States or other Western interests. Furthermore, no information indicates that the Saudi Government as an institution provides financial support to al-Qa'ida. It is difficult to discern, however, the extent to which individuals in the Saudi Government or royal family have provided donations to clerics or NGOs that funnel money to al-Qa'ida; in such cases, the donor may not be aware that al-Qa'ida is the end recipient of some of the funds.

- Given the large size of the Al Saud family—approximately 15,000 princes—and the Saudi Government, it is likely that some individuals may have provided and possibly continue to provide direct or indirect support to al-Qa'ida without detection by Saudi or US intelligence or law enforcement agencies.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) fears al-Qa'ida and has for years viewed the organization as a threat to the security and survival of the Al Saud. Several concurrent factors have recently put pressure on the Saudi royal family and strained its relationship with the religious community, which underwrites their legitimacy. Many Saudis perceive the royal family as increasingly corrupt, westernized, and less devoted to Islam. This is due in part to the presence of Western military, particularly American forces, in the Kingdom with the blessing of the Al Sauds.

- The deterioration of the Saudi financial situation in recent years meanwhile has disenfranchised a significant portion of the population, which appears to be turning to conservative Islamic sectors for relief.

Saudi Arabia's primary course of action to counter al-Qa'ida prior to 11 September was to co-opt or coerce extremists in an effort to bring them into the fold, possibly with an implicit or explicit understanding that al-Qa'ida would not strike on Saudi soil. USIC reporting indicates some al-Qa'ida members sought to conduct terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia, but were banned from doing so at the direction of Usama Bin Ladin. Saudi authorities continue to use cooptation and accommodation with individuals they have detained, seeking the assistance of family members and other Saudis to turn in wanted suspects. For instance, one terrorist's surrender was facilitated by a cleric and members of the terrorist's family in June 2003.

The Saudi Government has been at war with al-Qa'ida since the May 2003 bombings against three residential housing compounds in Riyadh and the November 2003 attack on another compound, and has taken significant steps to mitigate the threat and curb support for terrorism among its population. Saudi Government action since the bombings in May underscores its commitment to destroying al-Qa'ida—a commitment that has cost the lives of dozens of Saudi security officials who died at the hands of the terrorists.

- The GSA has aggressively hunted members of the Saudi-based al-Qa'ida network, stripping it of its senior ranks and disrupting plots aimed at Western targets, including the

[REDACTED]

US and British Embassies. Its success over the past year has created a hostile operating environment for the terrorists, forcing them to adapt and to scale back operations, as shown by their recent focus on targeting individual Westerners.

- On 18 June Saudi authorities killed the network's leader, Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin (aka Abu Hajir al-Najdi), and three other wanted operatives. Al-Muqrin was the last of the original senior cell leaders remaining in the Kingdom. This past year two other cell leaders, along with the former chief of operations, died at the hands of Saudi security services. (O-1)

(O-1)

(C-1)

Both the FBI and CIA have noted that NGOs receiving money from the GSA and supporting Islamic extremism pose a serious threat to US interests. The GSA has provided funds to a variety of Islamic groups and NGOs in the United States and around the world. These groups are, by and large, globally networked religious organizations and NGOs involved in legitimate charitable activities. However, extremists have exploited many of these NGOs for their own purposes.

The Saudi Government has been accused of negligent oversight of these organizations. It is likely that the KSA ignored the organizations' activities because of their close association with the religious partners of the Al Sauds, the Al Shaykhs, who control the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, and Da'wah (MIA) and its associated religious entities, and are committed to spreading Wahhabi Islam.

While senior Saudi royals oppose al-Qa'ida, it is likely that at least some royal family members, government officials, or other prominent citizens share al-Qa'ida's anti-American sentiments on an individual basis and support organizations with ties to al-Qa'ida or other extremist organizations. The CIA and FBI have no information indicating that the Saudi Government as an institution provides financial or other support to al-Qa'ida. The CIA has limited, fragmentary intelligence suggesting that two individuals—one senior and one minor member of the Saudi royal family—may have provided financial support to al-Qa'ida. In both cases, we have no information to suggest that other members of the Saudi Government or royal family were aware of their activities. A limited body of uncorroborated CIA reporting from (O-1) separate sources suggests (O-1) the youngest of (O-1) full brothers, and Turki Bin Fahd Jiluwi, have had contact with individuals tied to al-Qa'ida and other terrorist organizations. The specific nature of their contacts is unknown.

- According to a sensitive source, (O-1) Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the largest Islamic insurgent group in the Philippines.

- [REDACTED]
- Senior al-Qa'ida detainees Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM) and Walid bin 'Attash claim that [REDACTED] (O-1) is sympathetic to the extremist cause. KSM stated that [REDACTED] (O-1) was an al-Qa'ida sympathizer and possible fundraiser and that he maintained a close relationship with Bin Ladin at an unspecified time. Bin 'Attash has told us that [REDACTED] (O-1) helped Bin Ladin escape the Kingdom in 1992.
 - In early 2003, KSM identified an individual named Bin Jiluwi, who may be identifiable with Turki Bin Fahd Jiluwi, an important al-Qa'ida donor who hails from a minor line in the Saudi royal family. Separate sensitive reporting indicates that Bin Jiluwi is a key leader of the Eastern Province office of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), an NGO. According to foreign government service sensitive reporting, Riyadh suspects Bin Jiluwi has embezzled more than \$3 million from IIRO. The Mabathith has been investigating his activities.

[REDACTED] A variety of intelligence reporting indicates that jihad operatives with ties to al-Qa'ida continue to seek funding for their activities from private sources in Saudi Arabia. The USIC is working in conjunction with Saudi authorities to trace and stop these funds.

[REDACTED] Riyadh's efforts against al-Qa'ida, meanwhile, have revealed instances of sympathizers in the security services, but Mabathith is working with us to contain the problem. Limited reporting suggests that al-Qa'ida operatives have obtained information and assistance from family members or other individuals within the security services who are sympathetic to their cause.

- Sympathizers' efforts delayed but did not derail some Mabathith operations. The discovery of sympathizers spurred a major reassignment of personnel at the Ministry of Interior in mid-2003 to protect counterterrorism operations. Members of certain tribes have been removed from positions wherein they could access sensitive information that might be passed to terrorists. Mabathith is often unwilling to watchlist individuals for fear of leaks and employs strict compartmentalization to avoid compromise.
- Al-Qa'ida's Saudi-based network has altered the appearance of trucks to resemble official vehicles and has used military or police uniforms, notably in the bombing of the al-Muhayya compound in November 2003 and in the kidnapping of American Paul Johnson, respectively. We cannot corroborate press reporting and statements by the al-Qa'ida network claiming that the uniforms used in the kidnapping were provided by sympathizers in the military. According to foreign government service sensitive reporting, Mabathith investigated a tailor in November 2003 who had been tasked to make 15 military jackets without trousers by an individual who fit the description of Abu Hajir.

[REDACTED] Various press reports suggest that Saudi authorities negotiated with or facilitated the escape of the perpetrators of the 29 May 2004 massacre at al-Khobar. The CIA is unable to corroborate these claims, and reporting on the subject has been contradictory. The Saudi Government has officially disputed this claim, but a sensitive source reported [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The Saudi Government Cracks Down

The KSA's efforts to crack down on al-Qa'ida's financial network and stem the flow of funds to terrorists abroad have improved dramatically since the 12 May bombings. These efforts include actions against Saudi-based al-Qa'ida fundraisers and facilitators, intelligence sharing and cooperation, and legislative and regulatory actions.

- [REDACTED] (O-1)
- In early 2004, in response to US and international pressure for the GSA to improve oversight of Islamic charities and their activities, Riyadh announced the formation of a new commission to regulate the finances of Saudi charities with an international presence. Riyadh has since given few additional details of how and when the entity will be implemented. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] Demonstrating its commitment to destroying al-Qa'ida in the Kingdom, Riyadh also launched a propaganda effort aimed at undercutting the legitimacy of the organization on Islamic grounds in the aftermath of the 2003 attacks. The government has publicized the names of its most wanted terrorist suspects and has offered substantial rewards to individuals who provide any information regarding the whereabouts of the suspects or possible planned operations. Riyadh has also responded immediately to and has shared threat information with the USIC regarding possible operations.

- In early April Riyadh shared detainee reporting describing a plot to target US and British diplomatic facilities. Mabahith also seized five truck bombs in early April likely associated with the operation, unilaterally disrupting what would have been a catastrophic attack.

[REDACTED] Riyadh's abilities and the pace of its support do not always meet the USIC's expectations. However it is the judgment of both the FBI and the CIA that in most instances Saudi security shortcomings have been failures of capability rather than will. Raids and arrests continue almost daily in Saudi Arabia and Saudi forces have lost a considerable number of men in confrontations with al-Qa'ida operatives.

Saudi Arabia's Intelligence and Security Services and their Activities

Saudi Intelligence Activities Inside the Kingdom

When they operate overseas, the Saudi intelligence services tend to devote most of their resources to monitoring perceived threats to the regime, including Islamic extremists, dissidents, and critics of the royal family. As a general rule [REDACTED] (O-1)

- [REDACTED]
- The capabilities of the three main services are sufficient [REDACTED] (O-1)
[REDACTED] (O-1)
 - The intelligence arm of the Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA-J2) focuses on collecting traditional military intelligence such as order of battle in neighboring countries. In January 2004 the MODA officials established a Counterintelligence Division within the Military Security Directorate. According to military reporting, this division is responsible for conducting internal MODA investigations on suspected criminals and al-Qa'ida sympathizers in addition to enhancing security within the workplace.
 - The Saudi Government recently [REDACTED] (O-1)
[REDACTED] (O-1)

Partnerships Bearing Fruit

Since the early 1970s [REDACTED] (O-1)
[REDACTED] (O-1)

The FBI has had a Legal Attaché office in Saudi Arabia since 1996. Although legal issues continue to hamper some cooperative efforts on both sides, cooperation from Saudi authorities has increased greatly since the 12 May 2003 bombings.

- [REDACTED] (C-1)
- The FBI continues to investigate major terrorist events in Saudi Arabia in which a US person or interest is a victim or target and has deployed investigative teams to the Kingdom for this purpose. The terrorist attacks in Yanbu and the Kenneth Scroggs/Paul Johnson, Jr. kidnapping and murders in Riyadh are recent examples.

[REDACTED] (C-1)
[REDACTED] (C-1)
[REDACTED] (C-1) FBI presence in the Arabian Peninsula has been expanded since 11 September 2001 by the addition of Legal Attaché offices to the US embassies in Yemen and the United Arab Emirates.

[REDACTED]

The FBI has a Special Agent (SA) assigned to a [REDACTED] (O-1) at the Embassy in Riyadh. The FBI SA is the counterterrorism point of contact [REDACTED] (O-1) and participates [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) by adding FBI subject expertise. The SA [REDACTED] (O-1) is also responsible for keeping the FBI's Legal Attaché (LEGAT) fully informed about intelligence pertaining to FBI investigations or US subjects as they arise in the work [REDACTED] (O-1). The FBI LEGAT remains the FBI representative for all investigative programs in country and is the spokesperson for the FBI in dealing with the Ambassador and the Country Team.

Mabahith, the preeminent domestic service, and the General Intelligence Presidency (GIP), which performs most foreign intelligence tasks, both share CI responsibilities. [REDACTED] (O-1) in the aftermath of the 12 May 2003 terrorist attacks in Riyadh, Saudi cooperation against terrorism, including willingness to share critical terrorism-related information with US counterparts, has improved. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) citing the capture or death of most of the Kingdom's senior al-Qa'ida cell leaders, recovery of caches of weapons and explosives, and disruption of extremists' financial support and operational planning.

Mabahith Cooperating More

Deputy Interior Minister for Internal Security Affairs Prince Muhammad bin Nayif, who since 2002 has been in charge of Mabahith, has attempted to play a balanced role in his interaction with US intelligence officials. Immediately following the 12 May 2003 bombings, Crown Prince Abdallah gave Muhammad a mandate to work closely with the CIA on internal security issues and promised him the resources he needed. Muhammad has become the major player in the Saudi antiterrorism campaign, but he walks a fine line with his father, Minister of Interior Prince Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz, who has resisted Abdallah's efforts since 2001 to reform Saudi political and social life. [REDACTED] (O-1) provides some of his interactions with the CIA from Nayif, according to a senior CIA officer.

- In 2003 [REDACTED] (O-1) told a senior CIA officer that he wants to insulate Mabahith's relationship withUSIC from the ups and downs of bilateral political relations. Muhammad more recently told other US officials and members of Congress that he wants to keep the fight against terrorism separate from politics.

Using Enhanced Intercept Capabilities

Mabahith has been expanding its technical intercept capabilities to bolster its ability to identify and track CT threats. [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

[REDACTED] Mabahith is competent in using technical surveillance equipment, including [REDACTED] surveillance and GSM tracking and monitoring. In 2001 Mabahith [REDACTED] (O-1)

Against a Backdrop of Problems

[REDACTED] Nonetheless, significant short- and long-term concerns remain, including possible penetration of the Saudi intelligence community, lingering resistance by the MOI, technical tradecraft and skills limitations, and ties to services that may be more hostile to the United States. Cultural factors, including a weak work ethic, a high premium on self-esteem that limits learning, and centralized authority, play a large part in the services' shortcomings.

Foot-Dragging by Minister of Interior

[REDACTED] Prince Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz, who has led the MOI since 1975, has oversight over Mabahith. Nayif, a full brother of King Fahd and a member of a powerful circle of regime insiders, is a prime defender of the political status quo. In mid-April, Nayif warned a group of moderate Saudi reformers that the royal family would not tolerate continued calls for political or social change. [REDACTED] (O-1) Nayif is deeply suspicious of US intentions and resisted cooperation with the FBI during the investigations of the 1995 Office of Program Manager/Saudi Arabia National Guard and 1996 Khobar Towers bombings that together killed 24 US military personnel. He maintained for months after 11 September 2001 that no Saudis or Arabs had been involved in the attacks, but rather that the attacks were plots by the CIA and Israel's Mossad.

- [REDACTED] (O-1) the May 2003 bombings, [REDACTED] (O-1) Nonetheless, in an interview published on 17 June 2004 by *Le Figaro*, Nayif reiterated his view that the causes of terrorism do not lie within the Saudi system.

[REDACTED]

Leaks and Compromises

[REDACTED] An immediate concern is highlighted by several instances since mid-2003 involving the compromise of impending raids against alleged terrorists and leaked information about Mabath officers, documented in [REDACTED] (O-1) and open-source reporting. The intelligence services reportedly tend to recruit young men from rural areas—particularly from the relatively poor, neglected southwestern region of the country, which is also home to tribesmen who are sympathetic to al-Qa'ida and other Islamic militants. Mabath leadership suspects that Islamist sympathizers have penetrated the security services or that Islamists take advantage of family and tribal ties to glean information from service members.

Inadequate Training and Skills

[REDACTED] Saudi security officials' weak tradecraft in disciplines such as physical surveillance, and their reliance on foreign technical advice create counterintelligence problems and vulnerabilities.

- Saudis' use of technology is constrained by a lack of training, leaving the Kingdom dependent upon foreign technicians to operate and maintain the equipment. Moreover, existing capabilities are sometimes degraded when security personnel are shifted to handle new priorities. (O-1)

- Mabath's ability to exploit its intercepts is hampered by its lack of sophisticated data management and reluctance to rely on computer technology. (O-1)

Dangerous Liaisons

[REDACTED] Although the United States is probably the Kingdom's primary intelligence partner, Saudi leaders as of March 2004 had intelligence liaison relations with 48 other countries, according to sensitive special intelligence. (O-1)

(O-1) Saudi leaders' efforts to balance their dependence on the United States by cultivating security and military ties to such countries as China, Pakistan, Iran, and Russia increase the risk to US intelligence activities.

(O-1)

- [REDACTED]
- Both the GIP and Mabahith have liaison relationships with their Pakistani counterparts, reflecting the close military and political ties between Riyadh and Islamabad. (O-1)
 - Both the Russians and the Chinese have intelligence officers assigned to diplomatic locations in Saudi Arabia. (O-1)
 - In part to end Iranian meddling with Saudi Shi'a, Crown Prince Abdallah initiated a rapprochement with Iran in 1997, and Interior Minister Nayif signed a security agreement covering bilateral cooperation on countering narcotics, smuggling, and extradition of criminals during a visit to Tehran in 2000. Saudi-Iranian relations took another step forward when assistant GIP director Prince Faisal bin Abdullah bin Muhammad met with his Iranian counterpart in February 2004 and agreed to exchange liaison officers, according to sensitive special intelligence. In an effort to encourage better ties to the GIP, on 25 April 2004 Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security provided the GIP with copies of the passports and visa applications of four Saudis suspected of belonging to al-Qa'ida who had attempted to obtain visas to Iran, according to sensitive special intelligence. Sensitive special intelligence indicates that Iran has intelligence stations in Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, that actively collect on US targets in the Kingdom (O-1)

The Saudi Presence and Influence in the United States

The overlap of public and private funds, politics and religion, and the intersection of foreign intelligence and terrorism matters make for a complex web of issues and relationships involving Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Diplomatic Presence in the United States

The GSA currently has approximately 926 officials posted to diplomatic establishments in the United States. Saudi diplomatic and affiliated establishments are located throughout the United States. Establishments include the Embassy in Washington, DC, the Saudi Arabian Mission to the United Nations (UN), in New York, NY, and three Consulate Generals, in New York, NY; Houston, TX; and Los Angeles, CA. (A), (G), (J-1), (O-1)

(A), (G), (J-1), (O-1)

The Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC

The bulk of Saudi Arabia's 926 diplomats in the United States, and their 1,093 dependents and domestics, are at its Embassy in Washington, DC. Complicating FBI

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) Several NGOs are controlled and/or funded by the Embassy. Additionally, it has been determined that particular NGO leaders and "friends" of the royal family have come to the United States on Saudi diplomatic passports and visas, although they have never physically worked at Saudi diplomatic establishments. The FBI has been working closely with the US Department of State (USDS) and the USIC to identify individuals of concern who have diplomatic status.

- The USDS has directed the Embassy to review and update its diplomatic roster and made this a prerequisite to the GSA opening any new consulates. The USDS has issued new diplomatic license plates based on the updated diplomatic list to restrict abuses of the licenses. The Embassy appears to be cooperating in this effort, but it is too early to tell how long it will take to completely review and revise the Saudi diplomatic list and ensure that its citizens who are in the United States on diplomatic visas are actually serving in diplomatic capacities.

[REDACTED] Non-diplomatic Saudi Presence in the United States

[REDACTED] In addition to the significant diplomatic presence, there are a considerable number of Saudi military officials and private citizens studying, training and working in the United States. Some of these individuals are suspected of engaging in intelligence- and terrorism-related activity.

[REDACTED] Saudi Intelligence Activities in the United States

[REDACTED] The GSA conducts intelligence activities within the United States using both traditional and nontraditional methods principally to maintain the reign of the Saudi royal family in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (GSA). Toward this end, the GSA and its intelligence services are engaged in promoting US-Saudi relations, influencing public perception, and countering dissidents.

[REDACTED] For several decades, the GSA has maintained an alliance with the United States based on shared geopolitical interests. [REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1)

- There is no declared Saudi intelligence presence in the United States. The FBI [REDACTED] (O-1) is investigating a number of suspected IOs, cooptees, and agents operating in Washington, DC.
- At present, the FBI is investigating [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) based on suspected intelligence affiliation and/or intelligence collection. Of those, nearly half are affiliated with the Embassy's [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) which oversees proselytizing activity across the United States.

[REDACTED]

The organizational divisions of the Embassy include Military, Congressional and Public Affairs, Political and Economic, Islamic Affairs/Da'wah, and NGOs. Each division engages in the movement of significant amounts of cash through local banking institutions. The extent to which [REDACTED] (O-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(O-1)

- [REDACTED]
- The Congressional and Public Affairs Division is responsible for perception management, public policy, and foreign relations. The Political and Economic Division is responsible for open source reporting.
- For the most part, the Islamic Affairs/Da'wah Division manages its intelligence collection activities on Saudi-Americans, dissidents and NGOs, independently from the GIP or the Mabahith.

A primary function of Saudi Government officials in the United States has been to quiet dissident voices within the US émigré population. Investigative findings indicate that the GSA monitors local Saudi dissidents and dispenses money to various charities and individuals in exchange for halting anti-government or anti-royal family rhetoric.

- [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Abdulaziz Aseel, an in-status, (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) from Saudi Arabia who is an attaché at the Embassy to squelch the activities of at least one leading dissident by offering him a large sum of money. This appears to be a common method of influencing dissidents, while more heavy-handed methods are also used to pressure family members still in Saudi Arabia to influence dissidents.
- The GSA has repeatedly reproached the USG for providing asylum to a Saudi oppositionist but has not been able to provide the FBI with any incriminating information on him to support requests for his extradition.

(A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] the GSA also uses a decentralized system of coordinators in the United States who communicate with the Saudi Services' headquarters in the Kingdom. The GSA and its coordinators use local resources to obtain information, including hiring private contractors to investigate individuals, among them US persons, believed to be dissidents or anti-Saudi. It has also been reported that the GSA utilizes [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) to report on Saudi dissidents and opposition groups.

Military Personnel

Due to the close alliance between the GSA and USG, especially in defense matters, Saudi military personnel are routinely assigned as foreign liaison officers at US bases and receive training at US military installations or defense contractor facilities. The FBI [REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1) [redacted] in the United States. Unfortunately (O-1) [redacted] and FBI investigations identified several Saudi military personnel who failed to report their military affiliation when applying for an F-1 visa, as required through US-sponsored training programs.

(O-1) [redacted] Saudi foreign liaison officers (O-1) [redacted] their lengthy postings to military installations in the United States—some for periods of 10 or more years. This unusual longevity, as compared to other military foreign liaison officers, and its associated familiarity with the personnel and facilities to which the officers are assigned (O-1) [redacted]

(O-1) [redacted] The GSA places great emphasis on the identification and acquisition of cutting-edge military technology. Despite the limited capability of the Saudi Services, the FBI assesses that the GSA would take whatever steps necessary to remain on par with or exceed the military abilities of its regional neighbors.

(O-1) [redacted] Extremist groups can also exploit the Saudi military presence in the United States. A recent counterterrorism investigation identified a Saudi officer who was in the United States for training who actively supported a known al-Qa'ida terrorist.

- Faisal al-Shehri, a Saudi citizen and non-commissioned officer in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Air Force who worked as a data maintenance analyst, routinely communicated with al-Qa'ida propagandist and operational planner Yusef al-Iyari (aka Swift Sword), who died in a gun battle with Saudi authorities in mid-2003.
- Al-Shehri, who was detained, interrogated, and then handed over to Mabath in July 2003, was attending maintenance data systems analysis training at Lackland Air Force Base, TX.
- Al-Shehri provided Swift Sword with information (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]
- After his arrest, al-Shehri provided the FBI with the names of many of his associates, including 50 members of a Dhahran Air Force Base Da'wah (proselytizing) group, whom he identified as pilots. The GSA was alerted to al-Shehri's activity, cooperated with US authorities, and arrested 31 of those named by al-Shehri.

(O-1) [redacted] Saudi Students in the United States

(O-1) [redacted] The number of Saudi national F-1/student visa requests has (O-1) [redacted] percent since 2001, and (O-1) [redacted] visas were issued to Saudi students in 2002. The GSA and the Embassy financially and/or logistically support Saudi students in the United States. Historically, these students have been tasked to report back on local Saudi and Saudi-American dissidents.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] FBI investigations indicate that, in some instances, extremists who are troublesome to the regime in the Kingdom but not involved in punishable offenses are sent overseas on proselytizing or education missions. The GSA has begun to recognize that a number of these individuals have remained involved in anti-government activity, but it is unclear if it will change its method of dealing with extremists.

[REDACTED] In late 2003 the Embassy provided the FBI with a list of (O-1) Saudi students who are sponsored by various Saudi entities for study in the United States. The FBI is currently investigating a number of these students. Preliminary investigation indicates that many of the students have connections to subjects of ongoing FBI investigations.

- Ibrahim al-Zkeri, a Saudi Government-funded student in Ohio, is managing a proselytizing program aimed at federal and local correctional facilities. Al-Zkeri has been in contact with a number of extremist clerics in Saudi Arabia as well as US-based subjects of FBI investigations.
- Ibrahim S. Abdullah, until recently the director of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) US office in Annandale, VA, was a Saudi-funded graduate student at George Mason University. FBI investigation determined that Abdullah holds a Saudi passport and is associated with subjects of FBI al-Qa'ida and Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) investigations through his WAMY activities and phone records. Abdullah recently departed the US following a search of WAMY's northern Virginia headquarters.
- The spouse of a Saudi scholarship student in the United States appears to have been providing computer technology support to al-Qa'ida affiliated terrorists in Saudi Arabia with whom he has been in contact, according to FBI investigation.

[REDACTED] The FBI is also examining the possibility that al-Qa'ida or other radical Islamic extremists are recruiting at US schools and universities. State-sponsored Islamic student organizations, such as WAMY, are specifically targeting students at universities and public schools in the United States to promote their Islamic ideology. Several of these organizations and individuals are subjects of FBI terrorism investigations. Islamic extremists or al-Qa'ida members participating in these types of organizations could recruit new members, who could then become targets for extremist recruiters.

- Since September 2001 WAMY operated what appears to be an Orlando chapter from an unmarked storefront near the University of Central Florida. While this storefront is still operational, its links to WAMY in Saudi Arabia appear to have been severed in the past year.
- Mohammed Rafique Quadir Harunani, who is associated with WAMY and several Saudi individuals and NGOs, was working on a proselytizing plan that calls for establishing Centers for Peace (C4Ps) on major university campuses and near major mosques throughout the United States. Only one C4P is known to have been established, at a mosque in Orlando, Florida.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Al-Qa'ida terrorist operative Khaled al-Buluwi, who was detained in 2003 in Saudi Arabia, was a student at universities in New Mexico and Texas in the early 1990s. Al-Buluwi made multiple attempts to force his radical views onto the student members of the local Islamic Center and repeatedly sent the director anti-Saudi literature and pro-jihad propaganda in an attempt to influence his beliefs.

Saudi Money in the United States: Where Politics and Religion Converge

[REDACTED] Much of the Saudi money and energy in the United States appear to have focused on spreading the conservative form of the Wahhabi-Salafi Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia. Salafism, which follows a rigid interpretation of seventh-century Islam, calls for a rigorous and literal application of Shari'ah (Islamic law) and espouses breaking with Western values and modernization.

[REDACTED] The Saudi Government sponsors and funds a number of NGOs operating in the United States for this purpose. (See Appendix A) Among these are the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) (currently operating as the Success Foundation in the United States), WAMY, and the Muslim World League (MWL). FBI investigation of both IIRO/Success and WAMY has brought to a halt the operations of both organizations. Also, following (O-1) FBI-
(O-1) [REDACTED] search, a portion of the US branch of the al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (HIF) was designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the US Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control, and its US assets were frozen. Overseas, these NGOs have wittingly or unwittingly provided support to terrorism. For example, they have provided assistance to fighters traveling to and from jihad areas, employed individuals directly involved in terrorist acts against the United States and other countries, and provided lodging and other logistical support to individuals training for or involved in jihad.

[REDACTED] We are encouraged by recent Saudi efforts to reorganize their international charities and regulate their activities. In 2003 the GSA ordered Al-Haramain to close all of its overseas branches. In January 2004, four branches of the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation were jointly designated as terrorist organizations by the US Department of the Treasury and the Saudi Arabian government for their alleged links with terrorist groups. The branches in Indonesia, Kenya, Tanzania and Pakistan are alleged by the US to have provided financial, material and logistical support to the al-Qa'ida network and other terrorist organizations. The Saudi government announced the closing of the al-Haramain organization altogether in early June 2004, and the consolidation of its remaining overseas branches into the newly-established Commission for Relief and Charitable Work Abroad.

[REDACTED] The Saudi Government maintains significant financial holdings in the United States in order to fund Saudi weapons purchases from American companies, Embassy operating expenses, medical assistance to Saudi nationals, student scholarships, and select NGOs. Until recently the Saudi Embassy maintained 112 accounts at Riggs Bank in Washington, DC.

- The FBI's ability to quickly track all aspects of Saudi financial operations is hampered by the significant amount of cash transfers and withdrawals, large number of accounts, and large volume of transactions that occur.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Money also appears to be used to influence business and other relationships and to support religious propagation. Largesse by royals affiliated with the Embassy toward petitioners they do not know is also common.

[REDACTED] Following investigation by the USG, Riggs Bank closed all Saudi Embassy accounts. The Saudi Embassy is currently seeking a new financial institution for its US holdings.

[REDACTED] Religious Propagation

[REDACTED] FBI investigations indicate that the GSA is providing regular financial support—every two to three months, on average—to Sunni Muslim preachers in the United States. (See Appendix B.) A number of them are either subjects of or are tied to counterterrorism investigations involving al-Qa'ida, Jama'at al-Tabligh (JT), or HAMAS.

[REDACTED] An FBI review indicates that the individuals receiving funds from the Embassy were being paid from accounts that receive regular deposits from the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, and Da'wah in Saudi Arabia. All the US persons receiving payments have been or are being investigated for possible connections to terrorism. Two of these investigations are detailed below.

[REDACTED] Musaed al-Jarrah, an in-status, (J-3) [REDACTED] from Saudi Arabia, is the Assistant Director for Islamic Affairs at the Embassy responsible for disbursing stipends to individuals in the United States. FBI investigations indicate that some of the stipend recipients have ties to terrorism. (O-1) [REDACTED] Al-Jarrah's official position is listed in USDS records as embassy accountant, but his responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas for these individuals.

[REDACTED] In January 2004 Omar Abdi Mohamed, a legal permanent resident alien from Somalia, was arrested for lying during his naturalization interview. Mohamed had received a monthly stipend of \$1,750 and was one of 50 individuals that the Saudi Embassy admitted to paying for preaching and proselytizing activity in the United States:

- A search of Mohamed's San Diego residence uncovered several letters addressed to him from the Islamic Affairs Office at the Saudi Embassy and tasking him to collect and report information on the structure of immigrant communities and their organizations, financial conditions, education levels, and religious leanings. Converting professional Americans to Islam was urged as a priority in order to help make inroads into American society and gain influence. Information on prominent American converts was also requested, most likely to help recruit individuals who might be helpful to Saudi interests.

[REDACTED] Saudi officials in Washington, DC, apparently were either unaware of or were turning a blind eye to the radical connections of the US-based individuals on their payroll. Recent developments indicate an effort is currently under way at the Embassy to lower the profile of the Islamic Affairs Office, indicating an awareness of the controversial nature of its activities. (O-1) [REDACTED] recently indicated that Embassy officials may be moving the Islamic Affairs Office, out of the Embassy altogether. If the move takes place, future payments to the

[REDACTED]

employees of these offices will come directly from Saudi Arabia rather than through the Embassy's accounts. We have already seen evidence that payments that used to come from the Embassy are now originating from Saudi-based bank accounts.

Lobbying

[REDACTED] The GSA is clearly concerned about maintaining US-Saudi relations and countering negative US public opinion and expends considerable effort on public relations. FBI investigations suggest that the Embassy may have overstepped the bounds of normal diplomatic activity when it retained a US public relations firm, Qorvis Communications, to mount a pro-Saudi campaign while concealing the GSA's participation and financial support.

(A), (G), (J-1)

Gifts to Individuals

[REDACTED] FBI investigations have revealed that the Saudi Embassy receives frequent requests for financial assistance from Saudis living in the United States. These requests are often referred to the ambassador's wife, Princess Haifa. The princess and her staff make decisions as to who will receive the donations based on each individual's need. The donations are usually in the form of one-time payments but have on occasion been provided as a monthly stipend. As with religious propagation payments, there is little oversight for gifts to individuals.

- The wife of Osama Basnan, a Saudi national residing in California, received one of these stipends. Basnan's associate, Omar al-Bayoumi, had contact with two of the 11 September hijackers, and his name was discovered on their apartment lease. Basnan came to the FBI's attention [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] after 11 September; al-Bayoumi came to the FBI's attention through investigation into the hijackers' activity in San Diego.
- Extensive investigation by the FBI has not found any record of financial support to the hijackers from al-Bayoumi or Basnan, or that either man was aware of the hijackers' plans.

[REDACTED] The FBI has no information to indicate that either al-Bayoumi or Basnan was an intelligence officer or agents of the GSA, or that either knowingly provided support for the 11 September attacks. (See Appendix C for details of the investigation of al-Bayoumi and Basnan in support of FBI conclusions.)

Strengths and Shortcomings in Collection and Analysis

[REDACTED] Following the 11 September attacks, it became apparent to the USIC that the role of Saudi Arabia and its citizens in the support of terrorism, whether direct or indirect, warranted a much closer look and a refocusing of our intelligence collection and analysis methods. Although the GSA is cooperating much more robustly with the United States on counterterrorism matters, continued strong al-Qa'ida activity in the Kingdom, sympathy for Islamic extremists among

[REDACTED]

many groups in Saudi society, and the fragility of the Saudi Government will require the continued devotion of intelligence resources to the Saudi issue.

In recognition of the complexity of Saudi issues and the closed nature of the Kingdom.
(O-1)

[REDACTED]

(O-1) particularly over the past year.

(O-1) reporting is critical on political and economic topics.

(O-1) and USDS officers'

(O-1) analytic efforts.

(O-1) Open-source exploitation continuously proves invaluable to (O-1)

(O-1) improve our analyses.

[REDACTED] The CIA's Counterterrorist Center conducts analysis of terrorism overseas, including Saudi-based terrorism. CIA's Directorate of Intelligence's cadre of political, military, economic, and leadership analysts of Saudi Arabia routinely monitor the issue and contribute analysis. CIA experts on transnational issues, such as illicit financial flows, are important to the overall analytic effort. CIA has also just recently established a Political Islam Strategic Analysis program. The Defense Intelligence Agency and J-2 have a host of military analysts who emphasize the general counterterrorism issue and [REDACTED] (O-1) USDS's Bureau of Intelligence and Research analysts similarly contribute to analysis on political developments, al-Qa'ida structures and activities, and illicit financial flows. The FBI employs a

[REDACTED]

number of all-source and operational support analysts who monitor Saudi activities in the United States.

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

(O-1)

Unofficial Saudi support to terrorists by government employees but not sanctioned by the regime, for example, is difficult to uncover or measure. Even Saudi intelligence finds this to be a difficult task, because the number of individuals potentially to be targeted for collection is large, and individual support activities, such as contributing cash or passing information to someone linked to terrorism, may be small.

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

(O-1)

[REDACTED] analysts under the Directorate of Intelligence's Analysis for the Global Mission Initiative, some of whom would focus on Saudi Arabia.

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

[REDACTED] The FBI has enhanced its analytical and investigative capabilities in a variety of ways. Directly following 11 September 2001, the FBI created the Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS) to investigate, prosecute, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist-related financial and fundraising activities. Much of TFOS's activity has been focused on Saudi financing of terrorism. The FBI also plays a prominent role on the National Security Council's Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on Terrorist Financing, which has been focused on joint US-Saudi cooperation issues in the area of terrorist financing.

[REDACTED] In 2002 the FBI formed a Saudi Task Force to undertake a comprehensive review of all Saudi-related matters. Shortly after the Saudi Task Force began its work, the FBI's Washington Field Office (WFO) established a Middle East (Arabian Peninsula) Squad dedicated to the Saudi target. The WFO squad has since initiated more than 100 investigations on individuals and entities suspected of criminal, intelligence-related, and terrorism-related activity.

[REDACTED] In mid-2003 the Arabian Peninsula Unit (APU) was established within TFOS at Headquarters to provide program guidance to FBI field offices related to Saudi intelligence and terrorism investigations, supply technical coverage of Saudi diplomatic establishments and individuals, and coordinate with other USG [REDACTED] APU coordinates with TFOS's operational units, FBI Field Offices, and the USIC in order to cover the financial investigation of Saudi issues. APU also tracks requests to and from Saudi law enforcement entities to ensure the flow of information.

[REDACTED]

Appendix A: Saudi Nongovernmental Organizations in the United States

Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation

The al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (HIF) is a Saudi-based NGO whose stated goals are to spread Islam, aid Muslims in difficulty, propagate the faith among non-Muslims, and establish the Salafist Wahhabi fundamentalist form of Sunni Islam. Two Saudi cabinet members officially supervise HIF's activities. The Minister of Islamic Affairs, Sheikh Saleh Bin AbdulAziz Bin Mohammed Bin Ibrahim Al Shaykh, is the titular head and superintendent of HIF. The foundation is part of the Saudi Joint Relief Committee, which is headed by the Minister of Interior, Prince Nayif bin Abdul-Aziz al-Sau'd, a member of the Saudi royal family and head of Mabathith. HIF has offices and representatives in more than 50 countries, including the United States and Canada. (O-1) indicates that some HIF offices have provided material support to the terrorist activities of al-Qa'ida around the world. HIF has been used as a front organization to support and facilitate the movement of Islamic *mujahidin* into areas of Kosovo, Chechnya, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bosnia. Furthermore, HIF offices in Tanzania and Kenya are reported to have aided the al-Qa'ida cells responsible for the 1998 US Embassy bombings.

HIF opened an office in Ashland, OR, in 1997. Pirouz Sedaghaty (aka Pete Seda) is the head of the US office. Soliman al-But'he, an officer of al-Haramain US, is also a ranking official of al-Haramain international; Saudi-based individuals, including al-But'he, have provided over \$700,000 to the US-based offices of HIF. Approximately \$600,000 of these funds came from al-But'he's personal account at the al-Rajhi Bank and Trust.

- Portland's investigation has established no direct link between US-based HIF officials and Saudi Government officials. There are, however, financial links with extremist individuals in Saudi Arabia.

(O-1)

An American convert to Islam who was employed by al-Haramain as an Imam came under investigation in North Carolina after his name, phone number, and address were found on a business card recovered during a raid of the home of an al-Qa'ida operative in Pakistan.

- Deya Ud-Den Eberle (aka Abu Salman and Richard Eberle), a US person who lived in the Middle East for 12 years and obtained a Ph.D. in Islamic studies from Medina University in Saudi Arabia, is believed to have attended a Lashkar-e-Tayiba training camp in Pakistan in the late 1990s.
- Eberle currently resides in Raleigh, NC, and works for HIF as a translator. He also teaches at American Open University, which has strong ties to al-Qa'ida.

[REDACTED]

Dar Makkah and the Islamic Center of Portland

The investigation of six individuals in Portland who attempted to travel to Afghanistan and support Taliban and al-Qa'ida operations against the United States in late 2001 led to another investigation of the Islamic Center of Portland; its Imam, Mohammed Kariye, and Dar Makkah, an Islamic nonprofit organization headed by Ala'a Abunijem. Kariye is suspected of recruiting and funding the travel of the Portland Six. Financial investigation revealed that Abunijem, who was financing Kariye, received a significant amount of money from three Saudi citizens believed to be former students at Colorado State University who were associated with the Saudi Student House in Fort Collins, CO. A preliminary review of the Saudi Student House's finances indicates that its main source of funds is the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Culture. Investigation has also linked individuals associated with the Saudi Student House to Abdullah Bin Ladin, a relative of Usama Bin Ladin and a former longtime President of WAMY in the United States. Kariye is being prosecuted for social security fraud. The Portland Six have been indicted for material support of terrorism.

The Muslim World League, the International Islamic Relief Organization, and the Success Foundation

The GSA created the Muslim World League (MWL) in 1962. Saudi Arabia has used this organization to spread Wahhabi ideology throughout the world. Saudi Arabia has financed many charity projects through MWL and other NGOs in order to gain status as the leader of the international Islamic community.

In 1978 MWL created the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), with a stated objective to provide relief and aid to Muslims. IIRO's offices in more than 90 countries distributed more than \$400 million in aid between 1987 and 1995, according to public statements. FBI investigation has established that the International Relief Organization (IRO), the American branch of IIRO, has been operating in the United States as the Success Foundation.

The FBI is currently investigating the Success Foundation, the nature of its support by the GSA under the MWL umbrella, and its suspected ties to various US-based Islamic fundamentalists and other suspect NGOs, including the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies in America (IIASA), located in Virginia.

The Success Foundation and its management, like many Saudi-based charities operating in the United States, appear to be connected to a number of individuals and organizations associated with subjects of al-Qa'ida investigations, and with individuals associated with militant Palestinian causes. According to USIC reporting, the foundation may also be involved in money laundering for HAMAS.

- Success Foundation chairman Abdurahman Alamoudi, a naturalized US citizen, has numerous ties to HAMAS leaders, and [REDACTED] (J-2) [REDACTED] (J-2) He is currently under arrest in the United States and has admitted to being involved in a Libyan-sponsored plot to assassinate Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah. He was sentenced to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

23 years in jail after he pled guilty on separate charges relating to business transactions he conducted with the government of Libya. Alamoudi is cooperating with the USG as part of his plea agreement and has been providing information regarding international terrorism. As a result of Alamoudi's incarceration, the Foundation is to be dissolved.

- Success Foundation president Mohammed Omeish, a Libyan national who holds a green card, has traveled to Chechnya on behalf of the Foundation. [REDACTED] (O-1) the purpose of his travels was possibly to deliver cash to *mujahidin* fighters. Our investigation also reveals that Omeish participated in a covert videotaping of security practices at Dulles International Airport in 1996. Omeish is suspected of being involved along with Alamoudi in the plot against the Saudi Crown Prince.
- Jamal Badawi, a member of the Success Foundation's board of trustees based in Halifax, Nova Scotia, is a known associate of the international Islamist Muslim Brotherhood (MB) movement and HAMAS.

[REDACTED] The Success Foundation has been associated with Sanabel al-Kheer of Herndon, VA (aka Sana Bell, Inc.), which invests money in businesses in order to raise money for charities, including the Success Foundation. Yaqub M. Mirza, a naturalized US citizen, and Abdullah A. al-Noshan, a Saudi national and Embassy employee, are both on the board of Sanabel al-Kheer. Both men are also affiliated with a number of Saudi charities under investigation, including MWL, whose registered president in the United States is al-Noshan.

- Al-Noshan, who has an [REDACTED] (J-3) has been observed by FBI surveillance acting in a manner consistent with a foreign intelligence officer.
- Al-Noshan is connected through monetary transactions and telephone calls to an FBI subject in Kentucky whose name, address, and telephone number were found in an al-Qa'ida safehouse in Karachi.

[REDACTED] The Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America

[REDACTED] The Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America (IIASA) is a branch of the Imam Muhammad Bin Sa'ud University in Riyadh and maintains links to suspected terrorist organizations and their supporters according to FBI investigation. Several of IIASA's staff members have been Saudi nationals employed in an official capacity as administrative officers at the Embassy. IIASA is funded by the Embassy.

- During a one-month period in late 2002, an FBI source reported that approximately \$2 million in cash was delivered to IIASA. FBI was able to substantiate the corresponding financial transactions in the organization's accounts.
- Mohammed Y. al-Raei, a Saudi IIASA instructor of Pakistani origin, has recently been charged with a number of Bureau of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) violations and will be deported. In addition to his IIASA association, al-Raei was a professor of aeronautics at the University of the District of Columbia.

- [REDACTED]
- The FBI has learned that IIASA has a new management team. Funding by the Embassy has ceased, and the institute's funding is now believed to come from its parent organization in Riyadh.

- [REDACTED] (O-1)
[REDACTED] (O-1)
and ICE has investigated immigration violations by former IIASA staff members.

[REDACTED] The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)

[REDACTED] The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) is a Saudi Arabia-based NGO with ties to Abdullah Bin Ladin (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) WAMY's 2002 US plan called for approximately \$5 million in spending over 18 months.

[REDACTED] (O-1) the plan originated in Jeddah in November 2002. An FBI source reports that Mohammed Rafique Quadir Harunani, of Orlando, FL, is expected to manage and lead the five-year plan's implementation in the United States.

- Harunani, a Uganda-born Kenyan citizen of Pakistani origin, is under investigation for his ties to WAMY and al-Qa'ida subjects in the United States.
- FBI information also links Harunani to Abdullah Bin Ladin and WAMY through his company, Discover Islam, reportedly one of the linchpins of the five-year plan.
- Harunani's activities have been limited following several FBI interviews on a variety of matters.

[REDACTED] WAMY offices in other countries are directly funding HAMAS-affiliated NGOs, including the UK-based charity Interpal and the Palestinian *zakat* (tithing) committees. The FBI is monitoring WAMY's US activities, which appear to have been severely curtailed since the FBI conducted a search of the organization's Northern Virginia office in conjunction with the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement earlier this year.

[REDACTED] Sulaiman Abdul-Aziz al-Rajhi Foundation

[REDACTED] The Saudi Arabian-based al-Rajhi family established the Sulaiman Abdul-Aziz al-Rajhi (SAAR) Foundation in the 1980s to manage the family's charitable contributions. SAAR is a complex web of overlapping companies with parallel ideologies, personal relationships, and financial associations that has exhibited numerous affiliations with entities known to support terrorism. [REDACTED] (O-1) the SAAR Foundation, in concert with its subsidiary companies, provided monetary support and other assistance to organizations linked to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and HAMAS.

[REDACTED]

Appendix B: US-Based Muslim Clerics Funded by the Saudi Government

Several radical Imams preaching in the United States who are mostly Arab or African nationals are paid a salary or stipend by the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA), on an irregular but almost bi-monthly basis. More than a dozen of these individuals are or have been subjects of FBI counterterrorism investigations, with HAMAS and/or al-Qa'ida links. Investigations are ongoing to further identify these individuals, their associates, and the nature of their relationship with the GSA. The following are some of the individuals who have received stipends:

Abdirahman S. Ahmed (aka Ahmed), who receives a stipend of \$800 from the Embassy, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) he organized a fundraiser on behalf of Al-Ittihad Al-Islami (AIAI) in 2001 that raised \$167,000. Ahmed, a naturalized US citizen, is believed to be AIAI's current leader in the United States. AIAI is a Somalia-based terrorist organization with ties to al-Qa'ida.

Jamal Mohammed Abdellatif (aka Jamal M. Said), who receives a stipend of \$1,948.54 from the Embassy, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) for his connections to HAMAS. Said was born in Jordan and became a naturalized US citizen in 1988. He is the Imam at the Mosque Foundation of Chicago in Bridgeview, IL. Said is under investigation for his involvement with HAMAS.

Monir Yasin al-Farra, who receives a stipend of \$1,150.93 from the Embassy, is under investigation for ties to Muslim extremists. A Saudi national living in the United States as a permanent resident alien, al-Farra is the Imam at the Little Rock Islamic Center in Little Rock, AR. Al-Farra is involved with Jamaat al-Tabligh (JT) activities in the United States, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) JT, an international Muslim missionary organization, has been infiltrated by Islamic extremists.

Melvin Eckless Perkins (aka Umar I. al-Khattab), who receives a stipend of \$637.60 from the Embassy, is a US-born African-American convert to Islam. He is the Imam at the Al-Fajr Mosque located in Indianapolis, IN. Perkins is associated with Abdul Salam, an FBI investigation subject who [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] is tied to the al-Qa'ida network based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Salaam has met with Perkins in Indianapolis.

[REDACTED]

Appendix C: Omar Al-Bayoumi and Osama Basnan

[REDACTED] At this time the FBI has no information to indicate that either al-Bayoumi or Basnan were intelligence officers of the Saudi Government or that they provided material support for the 11 September attacks.

Omar Al-Bayoumi

[REDACTED] Omar al-Bayoumi unwittingly assisted hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi following their arrival in the San Diego area in early February 2000. Al-Bayoumi helped the hijackers secure an apartment by obtaining a cashier's check for them and signing as a guarantor on their lease application. He also assisted al-Mihdhar in the opening of a bank account. There is no evidence that al-Bayoumi provided financial support to the hijackers.

[REDACTED] Al-Bayoumi was employed by the Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA) from 1975 until 1995. From 1995 employment records indicate that al-Bayoumi was paid as a "ghost employee" of Dallah (a Saudi subcontractor of PCA).

[REDACTED] Many Arab individuals in the San Diego area, including [REDACTED] (O-1) as well as al-Hazmi himself, suspected al-Bayoumi of being a Saudi intelligence officer because he was frequently observed videotaping events at the local Islamic center. To date the FBI has not received any information to corroborate this assertion.

[REDACTED] According to FBI interviews of Isamu Dyson, in late January 2000, al-Bayoumi and Dyson went to the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles, where al-Bayoumi met with an unknown consular officer. After visiting the Consulate, al-Bayoumi and Dyson went to a restaurant and discovered that it was now a butcher shop. The butcher shop employees recommended another *halal* restaurant nearby. At this second restaurant, al-Bayoumi and Dyson met Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, who both stated that they did not like living in Los Angeles, to which al-Bayoumi suggested that they come to San Diego.

[REDACTED] Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi arrived in San Diego shortly thereafter. Investigation has determined that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi initially attempted to obtain an apartment on their own with cash. Because they did not have a credit history and because the leasing company did not accept cash payments, al-Bayoumi signed as a guarantor and obtained a cashier's check for them. Financial records indicate that a cash deposit of the same amount as the cashier's check was deposited into al-Bayoumi's bank account on the same day.

[REDACTED] Al-Bayoumi departed the United States in the summer of 2001 to attend school in England. When his association with the hijackers was determined after 11 September, New Scotland Yard (NSY) detained al-Bayoumi on 21 September 2001 under the United Kingdom Terrorism Act of 2000. Al-Bayoumi's residence, office, and automobile were searched. Evidence recovered in the search of his residence revealed various documents and correspondence that can be interpreted as extremist in nature. Al-Bayoumi was interviewed by NSY between 22 and 28 September 2001.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] An arrest warrant for al-Bayoumi was issued on 27 September 2001 in the Southern District of California based on a criminal complaint alleging fraud and misuse of US immigration documents. A provisional US arrest warrant was not secured, however, because the immigration-related offense did not fall within the regulations of extradition from the United Kingdom to the United States.

[REDACTED] On 28 September 2001 al-Bayoumi was released from custody since NSY did not have enough evidence to charge him with any criminal violation. (C-2)

[REDACTED] (C-2) Al-Bayoumi moved from the United Kingdom to Saudi Arabia in August 2002; he was interviewed by the Saudi Mabathith sometime during October 2002.

[REDACTED] Osama Basnan

[REDACTED] Osama Basnan came to the attention of the FBI as the result of an interview conducted by the San Diego Field Office immediately after the 11 September attacks. The interviewee alleged that Basnan was a supporter of Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) and had espoused anti-American rhetoric. Basnan, a 44-year-old citizen of Saudi Arabia, entered the United States in 1980 on a visitor's visa. In 1992 Basnan listed his place of employment on apartment rental records as the Saudi Arabian Educational Mission in Washington, DC, which is associated with the Saudi Embassy in Washington. Uncorroborated source reporting alleged that on 17 October 1992, Basnan hosted a party in Washington, DC, for Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman, aka the "blind sheikh," convicted in 1995 on multiple terrorism-related charges stemming from his involvement with the conspirators in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and additional plots to attack landmarks in New York City, NY. However, a review of Basnan's financial records from the relevant time period fails to corroborate that allegation.

[REDACTED] Prior to 11 September, some considered Basnan a prominent member of the San Diego Saudi émigré community. He claims to have been in contact with UBL family members and may also have ties to the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, a Sudanese-based terrorist group. He was also a close associate of Omar al-Bayoumi. In April 2001 the wives of both al-Bayoumi and Basnan were arrested together in San Diego for shoplifting. Prior to and after the 11 September attacks, Basnan had significant telephonic contact with the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC, the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles, and Princess Haifa, the wife of Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador to the United States.

[REDACTED] Basnan's wife has received significant payments from the Saudi government. Between January 1999 and May 2002, Basnan's wife received 34 checks from Princess Haifa, most in the amount of \$2,000 per month, totaling \$82,000. Other payments were also made to Basnan or his wife from Prince Bandar's or the Embassy's account. In total, Basnan and his wife received \$127,469.29 from the Saudi government between January 1998 and May 2002. When interviewed by the FBI, Basnan explained that these payments were scholarships and charitable contributions he had solicited to help pay for his wife's thyroid surgery and support his family. Princess Haifa reportedly provided the money to help cover the family's medical and daily living expenses. (C-1)

[REDACTED] (C-1)

(C-1)
(U-1)

To date, no information developed by the FBI indicates that Basnan ever had any contact with al-Mihdhar or al-Hazmi other than being introduced to al-Hazmi by al-Bayoumi.

(A), (G), (J-1) Basnan said he "met" al-Hazmi through al-Bayoumi. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) Basnan denied that he "knew" al-Hazmi or al-Mihdhar. Basnan also told the asset that he "saw" (that is, "observed") al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, who lived in the Parkwood apartment complex located across the street from the apartment complex where Basnan resided. Although Basnan had significant telephonic contacts with al-Bayoumi and Omar Bakarbashat, both of whom were close associates of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, there is nothing to indicate that Basnan ever interacted with al-Hazmi or al-Mihdhar other than his introduction to al-Hazmi. In an interview with the FBI in August 2002, Basnan said he saw al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar at the mosque but never met them.

During the Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry, there was much speculation as to the meaning of a consensually recorded Arabic conversation between Basnan and an FBI asset. During their discussion the asset referred to al-Bayoumi and his relationship with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. Basnan told the asset that al-Bayoumi was "nothing compared to what I used to do." The Joint Intelligence Committee construed Basnan's comment to mean that Basnan did more for the hijackers than al-Bayoumi did; however, a studied examination of the entire conversation reveals otherwise. In this conversation Basnan compared his religious activities seven or eight years ago to what al-Bayoumi did for al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in helping them to get established in San Diego. In the conversation the asset brought up al-Bayoumi, saying that al-Bayoumi did a favor for al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar by arranging for their apartment and, as a result, was now the subject of law enforcement scrutiny. Basnan responded that al-Bayoumi collected a lot of funds from a rich person and bought a mosque. Basnan advised that al-Bayoumi had stopped all of his religious activities and was now with his family. He told the asset that if the asset had come to the United States (A), (G), (J-1) years ago, he would have seen how active Basnan was in the Muslim community, visiting Muslims in prison and giving the Friday liturgy at the mosque. The language specialist who translated this conversation believes it is clear that Basnan was boasting about his religious activities in the Muslim community seven or eight years ago and comparing it to al-Bayoumi's activities. There is nothing in the conversation to indicate that Basnan was suggesting he helped al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar more than al-Bayoumi did.

As a result of FBI investigation, Basnan and his wife were charged with visa fraud in August and September 2002 and pleaded guilty. Basnan was deported to Saudi Arabia in October 2002, and his wife was deported to Jordan a month later.

- There is no indication that any of the money Basnan or his wife received from the Saudi government ever went to al-Hazmi or al-Mihdhar.
- Based on his overt contacts with the Saudi Embassy, the Saudi consulate, and members of the royal family, it does not appear that Basnan was a Saudi intelligence officer.