FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
AND
PRIVACY ACTS

Subject: Julius Rosenberg

File Number: 65-15348

Section: Sub 18 (A)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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FILE DESCRIPTION

NEW YORK FILE

SUBJECT Julius Rosenberg

FILE NO 65-15348
Sub Sec. A

VOLUME NO. 18

SERIALS 1511
Thru
1530

Inventory Worksheet
FD-505 (2-18-77)

VOLUME 18 NEW YORK FILES REVIEWED BY [illegible]

File No: 65-15348 SUB A Re: Julius Rosenberg Date: 2/78 (month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages Actual	No. of Pages Released	Exemptions used or, to whom referred (identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
1511	12-5-75	NEWS CLIPPING FROM N.Y. TIMES	2	2	
1512	12-5-75	NEWS CLIPPING FROM N.Y. POST	2	2	
1513	12-6-75	NEWS CLIPPING FROM N.Y. POST	1	1	
1514	12-6-75	NEWS CLIPPING FROM N.Y. TIMES	1	1	
1515	12-8-75	NEWS CLIPPING FROM N.Y. TIMES	2	2	
1516	12-15-75	NEWS CLIPPING FROM N.Y. POST	3	3	
1517	12-8-75	NEWS CLIPPING FROM N.Y. POST	4	4	
1518	1-7-76	NEWS CLIPPING FROM N.Y. TIMES	1	1	
1519	1-7-76	NEWS CLIPPING FROM N.Y. TIMES	1	1	
1520	1-8-76	NEWS CLIPPING FROM N.Y. TIMES	1	1	
1521	1-9-76	NEWS CLIPPING FROM N.Y. TIMES	3	3	
1522	1-10-76	NEWS CLIPPING FROM DAILY NEWS	1	1	

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Inventory Worksheet
FD-503 (2-18-77)

VOLUME 18 NEW YORK FILES REVIEWED BY [illegible]

File No: 65-15349 SUB A Re: Julius Rosenberg Date: 2/78 (month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages Actual	No. of Pages Released	Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
1523	1-8-76	NEWS CLIPPING FROM N.Y. TIMES	1	1	
1524	1-14-76	NEWS CLIPPING FROM N.Y. TIMES	1	1	
1525	1-19-76	NEWS CLIPPING FROM DAILY NEWS	1	1	
1526	3-13-76	NEWS CLIPPING FROM LONG ISLAND PRESS	2	2	
1527	2-14-76	CLIPPING FROM THE NEW REPUBLIC	5	5	
1528	6-11-76	NEWS CLIPPING FROM N.Y. TIMES	1	1	
1529	6-2-76	NEWS CLIPPING FROM N.Y. TIMES	1	1	
1530	11-16-76	NEW CLIPPING FROM N.Y. TIMES	1	1	
			35	35	

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Bureau File Number

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

ROSENBERG FILES OF C.I.A. RELEASED

Growth of Soviet Atomic Research and Reports on Klaus Fuchs Described

By PETER KIHSS

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 4—An initial batch of 834 pages of Central Intelligence Agency files has been released on the 25-year-old case that sent Julius and Ethel Rosenberg to their deaths for plotting atomic spying in behalf of the Soviet Union.

A look at the documents, released under the Freedom of Information Act suit brought by the Rosenbergs' two sons hoping to clear their parents' names, supplied some footnotes to history today at a Rosslyn, Va., C.I.A. office.

They included the following:

¶Two pages of a study of Soviet military intelligence, contending that the Soviet's atomic quest started relatively unplanned as a result of pre-World War II Comintern recruitment of scientists for foreign Communist fronts. By 1943, the study said, Soviet officers were receiving detailed information on atomic research by their allies—England, Canada and the United States.

¶A 1960 report from a source in East Germany on Dr. Klaus Fuchs, termed in the other study the first atomic spy for the Soviet military, asserting that he carried out "extensive calculations for a breeder reactor with a relatively high burn-out of about 60 percent" while in prison in Britain.

¶A C.I.A. report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated May 19, 1950, citing a Nazi security booklet as having listed Dr. Fuchs before the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union as an "extremely dangerous security risk" who might be used by the Russians.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

NEW YORK Times

P9

Date: DEC 5 1975

Edition: Late City

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65-15348-Sub A 1511

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38 DEC 05 1975

FBI — NEW YORK

START of INVESTIONS

Dr. Fuchs had worked at the Los Alamos, N.M., atomic bomb project, as a German refugee with the British scientific mission. His volunteered spy confession led to his arrest in England Feb. 2, 1950, and a 14-year prison term, and set off American investigations that led to the Rosenberg case.

Harry Gold, a Philadelphia chemist, was arrested as the agent to whom Dr. Fuchs gave information. This led to the arrest of David Greenglass, a wartime Army machinist at Los Alamos, for giving data to Mr. Gold. Mr. Greenglass identified Julius Rosenberg, his brother-in-law, and Ethel Rosenberg, his sister, as other contacts.

The newly released documents showed that the C.I.A. tried to trace Anatoli A. Yakovlev, against whom the Rosenberg indictment is still outstanding as Mr. Gold's spy superior. The agency reported Mr. Yakovlev, who left the United States after serving as Soviet vice consul in New York from 1941 to 1946, had become vice consul in Paris.

A June 29, 1962, C.I.A. report, long after the 1953 electrocutions of the Rosenbergs, said that the Soviet official's true name was Yatskov, that he served in France from 1946 to 1948 as a scientific and technical intelligence officer, and that he then returned to the Soviet Union, where he got into some unexplained troubles "because of relatives" and then wound up in an intelligence "illegals directorate."

Fuch called Bitter

Fuchs Called "Bitter"

An April 3, 1969, C.I.A. document said that Dr. Fuchs had recently been appointed deputy director of the Central Physics Institute for Nuclear Physics in Dresden, East Germany.

He was termed "still a brilliant scientist...dedicated politically to communism...now married to a devout Communist, seven years his senior."

"Fuchs is now very bitter as a result of his years in British prison and has completely withdrawn himself from social contacts in Dresden," the report said.

The winding trails of the investigations were indicated by a Feb. 21, 1950, C.I.A. memorandum to the F.B.I., reporting that an informant whose name is blanked out had told of an incident of Dr. Fuchs's last trip to the United States which he "now considers important."

"Fuchs had borrowed a hat from an acquaintance," the memorandum related. "When Fuchs forgot it, the acquaintance refused to pick up the hat at a certain restaurant and insisted that it be brought over by [the blanked-out name]."

Newly released F.B.I. documents here include an interview with Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the Los Alamos atomic bomb project, calling Dr. Fuchs's wartime scientific contributions commendable."

A March 9, 1964, C.I.A. memorandum reported that an "usually reliable" informant had reported that "all the Soviet state security personnel involved in the Fuchs case in England received awards."

The material was obtained by the Rosenberg sons, Michael and Robert Meeropol, who won the release yesterday of 29,000 pages of F.B.I. data on the case.

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

Bare Rosenberg Cellmate's Tip on Key Witness

By WILLIAM CHAPMAN
Washington Post

WASHINGTON — A key witness against Julius and Ethel Rosenberg was uncovered by the Government through a tip from the FBI informant who was Rosenberg's cellmate during the trial, according to government documents.

The documents also portray the informant, Joseph Eugene Tartakow, as an intelligent, clever prisoner playing a cat-and-mouse game in which he tried to win an early parole by digging information out of Rosenberg both before and after Rosenberg was sentenced to death.

The material, released earlier this week, is the first to show definitely that the FBI's jailhouse informant was useful to the government in prosecuting the Rosenbergs on charges of conspiring to steal atom bomb secrets for the Soviet Union. Tartakow never testified in the trial and his role was not known outside the Government at the time.

The Rosenbergs were executed in 1953. The FBI documents were made public as a result of a freedom-of-information suit brought by their sons, Robert and Michael Meeropol.

The key witness produced by Tartakow's tip was a passport photographer named Ben Schneider, who testified that the Rosenbergs had had photos taken in his New York City shop in June 1950. His testimony was brought out to show that the Rosenbergs had considered fleeing the country just after the FBI first questioned Julius that month. It also was used to attack Rosenberg's credibility—he had denied on the witness stand having passport photos taken at Schneider's shop, at 99 Park Row.

Authors who have written about the celebrated Rosenberg trial have described Schneider's testimony as both "startling" and "devastating." Writers sympathetic to the Rosenbergs cite his statements as one of the few bits of corroborating evidence produced against them by the government.

Schneider was a surprise witness, whose name was not on the government's witness list submitted to Rosen-

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

N.Y. Post
P. 4

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berg lawyers before the trial began. The government said at the time it had not known of Schneider's existence when the trial started in March of 1951, and the new documents show that it was on Tartakow's tip during the trial that the photographer was found in time to testify as the last of the government's 23 witnesses.

Tartakow obtained the information, according to the documents, because Rosenberg worried aloud in his cell that the photographer might be discovered and used in the trial against him.

A memo from FBI official A. H. Belmont, written in April 1951, says that Tartakow "furnished us with information obtained from Rosenberg that Rosenberg was apprehensive lest the FBI learn of his obtaining passport photographs in June 1950 for himself and family, and use such information in the trial.

"This information was furnished [by Tartakow] during the trial and we were successful in locating a photographer who had made the passport photographs for Rosenberg and his family and the photographer furnished evidence at the trial."

Other documents released earlier have indicated that Tartakow obtained from Rosenberg a jailhouse confession of espionage activities and accounts of other espionage figures the government wanted to arrest.

Marshall Perlin, an attorney for the Rosenberg sons (who took the name of their adoptive parents), has dismissed these reports as a "fantasy" created by the government.

In one document made public earlier this week, Tartakow depicted Rosenberg as a man shaken by the guilty verdict, worried about his wife, and hoping for some help from his friends.

A memo Tartakow wrote said: "He [Rosenberg] is in such a complete state of emotional stress that he discusses nothing but his wife, his need to be with her, the children, the fear of losing them, and the work that must be done in his behalf.

"Several times he mentions his quote friends unquote. But only in some fleeting expression of hope."

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

FBI's Rosenberg Informant Called a 'Confidence Man'

By WILLIAM CHAPMAN
Washington Post

WASHINGTON—The FBI informant who was Julius Rosenberg's cellmate during his celebrated espionage trial is pictured in government documents as a "confidence man" who tried to parlay his relationship with Rosenberg into an early parole.

A memo from FBI official A.H. Belmont, written in April 1951, said the informant—Jerome Eugene Tartakow—actually may have obtained much of his information on Rosenberg from newspapers or other prisoners.

Rosenberg and his wife, Ethel, were executed in 1953. The FBI documents were made public as a result of a freedom-of-information suit filed by the couples's sons, Robert and Michael Meeropol.

'A Confidence Man'

Tartakow, Belmont wrote, "is definitely a confidence man... He is intelligent and has the confidence man's ability to capitalize on his knowledge of information which may be available to the press, prison sources, etc., to present a convincing story regarding the scope of his knowledge of Rosenberg's activities.

"It is not possible to state that any information which he has furnished to us is definitely false. On the other hand, undoubtedly much of the information he furnished he obtained from sources other than Rosenberg . . . He has furnished us definite, original information; for example, the passport photograph information."

That was a refernce to information Tartakow received from Rosenberg that led to passport photographer Ben Scheider, who turned out to be a key witness at the trial.

Belmont's memo and other material provide an intimate picture of how Tartokow tried to use the FBI to obtain a parole at the same time the FBI was using him to extract information from Rosenberg.

Desparate for Parole

Tartakow desparately wanted the FBI to recommend him for parole, the FBI material shows. A teletype message from New York agents to Washington says that on April 16, 1951, Tartakow was informed "that the bureau could take no active role whatsoever in recommending him for parole . . . (Tartakow) appeared very upset over receiving this news and stated that he does not stand 'a ghost of a chance for parole without bureau recommendation.'"

Other documents show that the U. S. prosecutor, Irving Saypol, now a New York Supreme Court justice, recommended early release for Tartakow because of his cooperation. Tartakow was released about three months before his sentence was to expire, but it is not clear whether the release was due to Saypol's intervention or because of the good behavior credits Tartakow had built up during his days in the Federal House of Detention in New York.

One reason the FBI did not want Tartakow released was his potential usefulness in befriending Morton Sobell, another convicted atom spy.

The FBI's Belmont wrote that Tartakow's value to the bureau "will carry over after Rosenberg's removal . . . through Tartakow's access to Sobell who will be incarcerated at the Federal House of Detention until removal to Atlanta.

"Parole for (Tartakow) at this time in this connection would thwart our principal objective in having Tartakow have access to Sobell and Rosenberg."

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

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P.6

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FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Report in Rosenberg Files Held Harry Gold Neurotic

By PETER KIHSS

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 5—Harry Gold was described as a neurotic and hostile personality with traits adding up to "imbalance" in a court-ordered psychiatric report six months before his testimony in the trial of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.

The testimony of Mr. Gold, a confessed atomic-spy courier for the Soviet Union, helped bring about 1951 death sentences for the Rosenbergs and a 30-year prison term for Morton Sobell for conspiracy to commit espionage.

A summary of the psychiatric report turned up today among 29,000 pages of Federal Bureau of Investigation files released on petition of Michael and Robert Meeropol, the Rosenbergs' sons, who hope to demonstrate their parents' innocence.

Mr. Gold testified in March 1951 that he had obtained atomic information from David Greenglass, another major prosecution witness, but he was never cross-examined by defense counsel.

Psychiatric reports had been ordered in Philadelphia by Federal Judge James P. McCranery before he sentenced Mr. Gold Dec. 9, 1950, to 30 years in prison as a spy conspirator with Dr. Klaus Fuchs, the British atomic scientist.

A 1966 effort by Mr. Sobell to challenge Mr. Gold's credibility in a bid by Mr. Sobell for a new trial led the Federal Bureau of Investigation in New York to ask whether Mr. Gold has ever undergone psychiatric examination, and an F.B.I. reply from Philadelphia dated July 8, 1966, noted two 1950 tests.

Summary of Findings

They were reported in the file of the Federal court probation officer in Philadelphia.

One, by a five-member team, concluded that "Gold showed no latent or potential psychopathic tendencies," the Philadelphia agents said.

The other summarized the findings of Dr. Samuel Leopold, director o fthe Neuropsychiatric Division of the Philadelphia Municipal Court, as follows:

"The report indicated that Gold has above-normal mentality. He is not insane but shows a neurotic personality characterized by extreme orderliness and compulsions. He has poor relationship to the world, dominated by resentful ideas and with immature psychosexual development.

"His early history with economic difficulties and racial prejudices, poor religious influence and a mother with early radical political ideas—all have added to his imbalance.

Other documents showed repeated but unsuccessful efforts by the F.B.I. in the early years of Mr. Sobell's imprisonment—he served nearly 18 years—to induce him to give up his protestations of innocence.

Mr. Sobell was released in 1969, and is now a medical electronics engineer living in New York. Mr. Gold, who had been a Philadelphia chemist, served 15 years and was released in 1966; he died in August 1972.

A July 1, 1952, New York memorandum quoted a confidential prison informant as asserting that Mr. Sobell told him:

"I was the fall guy in this whole thing. I am innocent. I was around when a lot of things happened and a lot of people were involved in it. I've got a story to tell—a good story to tell, and they'll listen to me!"

But the memorandum went on:

"During recent conversation [name blanked out] had with [apparently the informant] and the reading of the letters of Mrs. Sobell to her husband, it has become quite evident that Sobell would like to cooperate with the Government but is being prevented from doing so because of the influence his wife exercises over any decision in this matter."

'Arrogant' and 'Stubborn'

By March 30, 1954, another F.B.I. document said, "Sobell is arrogant, stubborn, proud, self-centered and egotistical," although the agency went on with at least four interviews with him in Alcatraz Pentitentiary during the year.

An F.B.I. response from New York on April 24, 1951, to a request for an appraisal of Mr. Sobell's personality, shortly after his sentence, said, "Sobell lives in a world of electricity and electronics," with classical music and photography his only diversions.

The document said that Mr. Sobell's father had gone bankrupt running a drug store and had "blamed his failure on "capitalism and big business." Mr. Sobell, the report said, "was indoctrinated in communism at an early age," working summers at a Communist camp and remembered as a City College "soap box orator" for the Young Communist League and in Washington as chairman of a cell.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

New York Times

P. 15

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FBI—NEW YORK

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FD-360 (Rev. 7-16-63)

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Rosenberg Files Show F.B.I.

Pressed Hard to Expand Spy Trial

WASHINGTON, Dec. [illegible]

[illegible]

Corrected the Grammar

At the Federal court trial in New York on March 12, 1951, Mr. Greenglass [illegible]

[illegible]

Tawyers and scholars say it [illegible]

[illegible]

Prosecutors Called Signature

[illegible]

[illegible] Mr. Sobell, [illegible] "Mark 36 project," [illegible] a classified [illegible] on which Mr. [illegible] working.

[illegible]

[illegible] Mr. Theodore Von Harman, a Columbia [illegible] [illegible] Advisory Committee [illegible]

[illegible] Mr. Perl was [illegible] June 25 to July [illegible] [illegible] A third man asserted [illegible] [illegible] Mr. Perl was arrested during the Rosenberg trial [illegible] [illegible] Mr. Rosenberg and Mr. Sobell, and was [illegible] to five years' [illegible]

[illegible] Mr. Greenglass [illegible] Julius Rosenberg [illegible] [illegible] Mr. Greenglass [illegible] Julius Rosenberg [illegible] [illegible] Another [illegible]

[illegible]

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

NEW YORK times

P 36

Date: DEC 3

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FBI — NEW YORK

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[illegible] to make "pickups" from [illegible] Alfred Sarant, a Cornell [illegible] [illegible] memorandum said the informant [illegible] had reported that Mr. R[illegible] [illegible] quarters of his organization."

A report on the Tarakow[illegible] [illegible] said the [illegible] had [illegible] and [illegible] told him that he and Sobell [illegible] had [illegible] had delivered to him [illegible] work."

[illegible] told the inform[illegible] [illegible] the memorandum said, "that Sobell's flight [illegible] [illegible] and that Sobell became frightened and fled without consulting him."

Mr. Sobell has contended that he went to Mexico in part because of fear of a perjury charge for falsely denying his Communist background to keep a wartime defense job.

The F.B.I. files include a statement that since Mr. Sobell's [illegible] from prison in 1969 after serving 18 years, [illegible] given indications of [illegible] strong support for the Communist movement."

A memorandum dated [illegible] 11, 19[illegible], said that "New York [illegible] F.B.I. [illegible] noted that he has not been engaged in overt [illegible] his conditional release but it is believed that in the event of a national emergency [illegible] could constitute a threat to the national security."

[illegible]

FD-340 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Rosenberg: FBI Stayed Near in Case

By WILLIAM CHAPMAN
Washington Post

WASHINGTON—If Julius Rosenberg had volunteered a last-minute confession of his espionage activities to save his life in 1953, the FBI was prepared with a minutely synchronized prison plan to encourage his cooperation.

FBI agents were to be hidden in an unused garage 200 yards from Sing Sing's death house on the night of the execution. If Rosenberg had signaled a willingess to talk, word would have been passed in code to the concealed agents, who would then have speeded by station wagon to Rosenberg's cell.

"Julius Rosenberg will be first interviewed in his pre-execution cell," says an FBI memo wired to bureau director J. Edgar Hoover a few days before the execution, "and if ostensibly cooperative will be immediately removed to a cell on the second floor, which is in an unoccupied wing."

The agents were prepared for a long siege.

They planned first to put four questions to Rosenberg as a test of his willingness to talk.

Question No. 1 was: "Name the individuals who furnished you information to give to the Russians."

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

N.Y. Post

P 4

Date: DEC 15 1975

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DEC 15 1975

FBI—NEW YORK

test, the agents had arranged to spend months with him in the death house to extract a confession. Meals and bedding would have been provided by the warden and typewriters and recording equipment would have been moved in quickly.

Julius Rosenberg and his wife, Ethel, never broke, and they went to the electric chair early the evening of June 19, 1953, still insisting they were innocent.

Their deaths ended the government's fervent, almost obsessive hope for confession.

Records made public by several agencies in the past few weeks show that, from the beginning of the celebrated case, the government hoped that the Rosenbergs would crack under conviction and heavy sentences and lead agents to other spies.

Hoover, for example, believed from the first that an indictment of Ethel Rosenberg might induce her husband to cooperate.

In July, 1950—after Rosenberg's arrest but before his wife's—Hoover suggested to Attorney General J. Howard McGrath that proceedings be brought against Ethel Rosenberg. If Rosenberg could be induced to talk, Hoover wrote, his confession would open the door to cases against other suspects.

"I feel," Hoover wrote, "that proceeding against his wife might serve as a lever in this matter."

Approximately three weeks later, Ethel Rosenberg was

arrested and charged with conspiring with her husband to commit espionage.

In the files of the Energy Research and Development Administration, successor to the Atomic Energy Commission, is another memo indicating that a confession was nigh on the list of Justice Dept. goals in prosecuting the Rosenbergs.

A memorandum from an official in the AEC's Division of Security explains why the Justice Dept. believed the case was important to national defense.

"The [Justice] department believes if Rosenberg [is] given death sentence and his wife 30 years, he may be inclined to talk. If so, Justice believes others in the espionage ring . . . may be disclosed."

In December 1952, as the initial date for the Rosenberg's execution approached, the Justice Dept.'s internal security chief, William E. Foley, proposed having government agents handy at Sing Sing to await a confession. Foley named three other pending espionage cases he thought likely to be broken if the Rosenbergs talked.

In 1953, with the Rosenbergs' second execution date approaching, the FBI apparently went to the unusual extent of urging one of its former informants, who had befriended Julius Rosenberg, to beg him to cooperate.

The informant was Jerome E. Tartakow, who, before the trial in 1951, had relayed some of Rosenberg's alleged confidence to the FBI. Tartakow, a convicted car thief, had been in a cell with Rosenberg in New York.

A Letter

In a recent letter to the Washington Post, a man identifying himself as Tartakow recalled that FBI agents visited him shortly before the execution and suggested that he urge Rosenberg to cooperate with them.

Tartakow said he did not ask Rosenberg to "confess his guilt" but suggested that he "somehow cooperate with the authorities so that his life and Ethel's might be spared."

Tartakow added: "Unlike Julie, I am an ordinary man and the thought of death is frightening to me."

In the final months, a variety of plans surfaced in the government for obtaining the Rosenberg's confession.

An aide to President Eisenhower proposed employing a "Jewish psychiatrist" to "crack" them by psychological persuasion. President Eisenhower was urged by others to commute the death sentences and hope for a confession later.

FD-350 (Rev. 7-18-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Greenglass Told It — Two Ways

By WILLIAM CHAPMAN
Washington Post

WASHINGTON — David Greenglass, the key witness whose testimony sent Julius and Ethel Rosenberg to the chair 22 years ago, changed his story of their involvement in espionage several times before taking the stand, newly released government records show.

In one pretrial interview, Greenglass said his sister, Ethel Rosenberg, was not present when he turned atomic bomb secrets over to her husband, Julius. He later was to testify that she not only was present but had typed up the information during a meeting in the Rosenbergs' living room.

At one point in an FBI interview, Greenglass said he had no espionage contacts with Julius Rosenberg. Later, he testified about several meetings in which he said he passed along sketches and descriptions of the bomb's triggering device.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

New York Post

P5

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Identification Switch

In his first encounter with the FBI, Greenglass identified his own wife, Ruth, as the one who recruited him for espionage. Later, in the same interview, he said that Julius Rosenberg had put Ruth up to the recruiting.

Transcripts of Greenglass' pretrial statements are included in nearly 30,000 pages of documents made public by the FBI as a result of a Freedom of Information Act suit brought by the Rosenberg's sons, Michael and Robert Meeropol.

The Rosenbergs were convicted March 29, 1951, for conspiring to transmit secrets of the atom bomb to

Soviet agents. They were executed in New York's Sing Sing prison on June 19, 1953.

Greenglass pleaded guilty to a conspiracy indictment and eventually received a 15-year sentence. Critics of the government's case have contended over the years in books and articles that Greenglass' story was fabricated to frame the Rosenbergs.

Greenglass had been an Army machinist at the Los Alamos, N. M., atomic bomb laboratory in 1944 and 1945 when, the government proved, he was recruited by the Rosenbergs to supply information for the Russians and subsequently provided sketches and descriptions of the bomb's detonating device.

Prior to the trial, Greenglass was interviewed by an assistant U. S. Attorney in New York about meetings in 1944 and 1945 during which he had passed information to Rosenberg. A transcript of that interview shows this exchange:

Q. Was Ethel present in any of these occasions?

A. Never.

Q. Did Ethel talk to you about it?

A. Never spoke about it to me and that's a fact. Aside from trying to protect my sister, believe me that's a fact.

At the trial, Greenglass testified that at one meeting in the Rosenbergs' apartment he submitted secret information to Julius, who insisted that it be typed up. Ethel did the typing . . . Greenglass testified.

When first arrested on June 15, 1950, and questioned

intermittently for nearly 12 hours, Greenglass at first appeared to say that it was his own wife, Ruth, who recruited him.

A memorandum written by a Washington FBI official, A. H. Belmont, while the questioning was under way in New York, reported this about Greenglass' initial response: "Greenglass admits that he worked on the atom bomb and that his wife, a Communist, recruited him to give information to 'our allies' [the Soviet Union]."

Later, during the same questioning, Greenglass told FBI agents that it was Julius Rosenberg who had asked Ruth to recruit him. The two FBI agents who questioned him wrote in a footnote that "Greenglass said he admitted this because he felt investigation would reveal the true facts."

Another Memo

Another FBI memo on the first interview states: "It should also be noted that at that time Greenglass claimed that he had no personal contact with Rosenberg concerning espionage activities."

Subsequently, the memo states, Greenglass implicated Rosenberg as the one who got his wife Ruth to recruit him.

In none of the early Greenglass interviews with the FBI does he indicate that his sister, Ethel, was involved. In a full statement on July 17, 1950, a month after his arrest, Greenglass implicated Rosenberg in detail, but did not mention Ethel. But two days later, in another statement to the FBI, Greenglass said that Ruth had told him that Ethel had also asked her to encourage Greenglass to supply the secret information.

Other FBI memos make it clear that Greenglass' lawyer, O. John Rogge, hoped his client would be treated with leniency if he cooperated. Rogge told the government that Greenglass was prepared to implicate Rosenberg.

A memo by FBI official D. M. Ladd quotes Rogge as saying that ". . . his client might be able to furnish some helpful information concerning another subject, namely his own brother-in-law."

Turned Down Requests

Critics have charged that the government agreed before the trial to request leniency for Greenglass if he cooperated. But memos indicate that both the FBI and the Justice Dept. turned down specific requests for lenient sentencing recommendations.

Ladd wrote in his memorandum that he told Rogge any deal on leniency would have to be made by the Justice Dept., not by the FBI.

In another FBI memo, assistant Attorney General James H. McInerney is quoted as saying he never agreed that the government would recommend a three-year sentence for Greenglass in exchange for his cooperation. But McInerney had promised that his cooperation would be brought to the attention of proper authorities when Greenglass appeared for sentencing. Prosecutors recommended the 15-year sentence that was imposed.

McInerney also had agreed to recommend an early parole for Greenglass because of his testimony against his sister, Ethel, according to the FBI memo.

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

NYT 1-7-76

Rosenberg Sons Say F.B.I. Bars Data

WASHINGTON, Jan. 6 (UPI) —The sons of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg have chargged the Federal Bureau of Investigation with holding back thousands of page of the Rosenberg spy case records in a "willful" violation of a court order that most of them be made public, court records showed today.

The United States District Court in Washington was asked to hold the F.B.I. director, Clarence M. Kelly, and two agents of the bureau in contempt for failing to comply with a court order to release all records not exempted by law.

As a result of two suits filed under the Freedom of Information Act, the F.B.I. had released 29,900 pages of records concerning the events that led to the execution of the Rosenbergs as atomic spies in 1953.

The two F.B.I. agents, Thomas H. Bresson and Cornelius Sullivan, filed affidavits saying that 7,000 pages had been withheld, entirely or in part, because they contained national security information, involved personal privacy or were exempt on other grounds.

But attorneys for Robert and Michael Meeropol, the Rosenberg sons, charged that the F.B.I. had withheld 800,000 pages, not 7,000 and had not given detailed justification required by the court.

In a motion filed in the court, here they asked Judge June L. Green to hold Mr. Kelley and the agents in contempt and order them jailed if—as the Meerpols charged—to disobey her orders of last Aug. 1 and Aug. 27 to release material to the Meerpols, who took the name of their aadoptive parents.

The motion had been unnoticed since it was filed Dec. 22. A spokesman said that the Justice Department wanted to extend its time to reply until next Monday.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

New York Times

1-7-76

Date:

Edition:

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FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

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Rosenberg Sons Say F.B.I. Bars Data

WASHINGTON, Jan. [illegible] —The sons of Julius and [illegible] Rosenberg have charged the Federal Bureau of Investigation with holding back thousands of pages of the Rosenberg spy case records in a "[illegible]" [illegible] of a court order that most of them be made public, court records showed today.

The United States District Court in Washington was asked to hold the F.B.I. director, Clarence M. Kelley, and two agents of the bureau in contempt for failing to comply with a court order to release all records, not exempted [illegible].

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(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

— N.Y.Times

— P 34

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JAN 8 1976

FBI — NEW YORK

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FD-350 (Rev. 7-18-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Opening the Rosenberg Files

By Michael Meeropol and Robert Meeropol

SPRINGFIELD, Mass.—Contrary to the impression one might get from the press, our Freedom of Information Act request for the files on our parents, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, has brought about the release of less than 30 percent—a conservative estimate—of the Federal Bureau of Investigation material. Every page has been released at the Government's discretion.

In other words, the Government is still determined to control what Americans can and cannot see about the Rosenberg-Morton Sobell case. It is fighting tooth and nail to prevent the release of most of the Rosenberg files.

After months of Government stalling on our initial requests, in 1975 we initiated a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit in Federal District Court in Washington against the F.B.I., Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Justice, United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and for New Mexico, and the Energy Research and Development Administration (formerly the Atomic Energy Commission).

Knowing that the New Mexico file on David Greenglass, the chief prosecution witness, had been "gulped" in 1969, Judge June L. Green of the Federal District Court issued an injunction against the defendant agencies that barred any further destruction of documents.

She rejected requests for up to eight months of delays, ordered detailed inventories, and set a timetable for the release of material for which none of the Act's exemptions were claimed. New efforts to stop us came concurrently with the production of the inventories.

The Energy Research and Development Administration asked the court to declare that the Energy Administration had fully complied with the Act even though it had refused to release some of the most important material. The other agencies asked that their inventories be declared complete and that we be blocked from investigating if this were true.

When the F.B.I. released 29,000 pages with many blacked out sections, it sought briefly to charge us outrageous $29,000 "search" fee but public and press pressure forced a retreat. However, less well publicized has been its exemption claims on 10,000 complete pages and approximately one third of the 29,000 pages.

Even more startling are its affidavits that admit that the Rosenberg "main file" holds at least 70,000 pages, over half of which are not covered by the "complete" inventories it claims to have filed.

For example, William Perl, accused as an accomplice of our father and thoroughly investigated, has no F.B.I. file if the inventories are to be believed.

Clearly, the F.B.I. is hiding significant amounts of its Rosenberg files although Justice Department press releases are implying that virtually all the files are being released.

The American people must know that the 29,000 F.B.I. pages represent only 30 percent of all the estimated files in all Government agencies—only 30 percent of what the F.B.I. has admitted to having. Until we all see what they do not wish to release (remember Richard M. Nixon's edited transcripts) the story of the Rosenberg-Sobell case will remain covered up.

Some material that the Government willingly released has been considered by some observers as damaging our claim that our parents were framed.

The F.B.I. says our father told one Jerome Eugene Tartakov of his espionage activities while they were incarcerated together before and during the Rosenberg-Sobell trial. But according to a 1956 Justice Department memorandum, Mr. Tartakov was of "unknown reliability." The Government did not use him against our father at the trial. The memorandum indicated that five years of attempts to exonerate Mr. Tartakov's fantasies had only succeeded in refuting them.

Mr. Tartakov's mention of some alleged members of the "spy ring," William Perl and Ann Sidorovich, further destroyed his story's credibility. Under oath they denied being spies. The Government never contested their denials with espionage or perjury indictments. Mr. Perl was indicted for perjury unrelated to espionage.

We reiterate that our fight for the files has only just begun.

The Government is resisting compliance with the law because, as Judge William B. Jones of the Federal District Court in Washington recently said, "The F.B.I. just doesn't like the Freedom of Information Act."

You can well imagine why, considering what we strongly believe it is hiding in our parents' case.

Michael Meeropol teaches economics at Western New England College, where Robert Meeropol taught anthropology. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were convicted on March 29, 1951, of conspiracy to commit espionage by communicating information on the manufacture of atomic bombs to the Soviet Union. They were electrocuted in 1953.

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N.Y. Times

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38 JAN 8 1976

FBI—NEW YORK

FD-350 (Rev. 7-18-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Files Show F.B.I. Got Reports On Rosenberg-Lawyer Meetings

By PETER KIHSS

Files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation show that during and after the espionage trial of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, an informant reported to the bureau on talks, traditionally confidential and protected, between the defendants and their attorney.

Walter Schneir, an author-researcher who has specialized in the Rosenberg case, contends that if the existence of such information had been known and if the Rosenbergs could have shown this to a Federal court, "they might very well have been granted a new trial."

The Rosenbergs were electrocuted in 1953.

Mr. Schneir, who turned up much of the new data, was co-author with his wife, Miriam, of "Invitation to an Inquest," a book published in 1965 that concluded that the Rosenbergs had been "punished for a crime that never occurred."

The documents cited by Mr. Schneir are among 29,000 pages made available after the executed couple's sons, Michael and Robert Meeropol, sued to see files under the Freedom of Information Act. The sons hope to demonstrate their parents' innocence.

Mr. Schneir cited F.B.I. documents dated Nov. 19, 1951, referring to an informant's re-

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

N.Y. Times

P 1

Date: 1/3/76

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JAN 8 1976

FBI — NEW YORK

ports on "visits to the Rosenberg by their attorney Emanuel Bloch" in Sing Sing Prison and Feb. 29, 1952, on the informant's "contact on various occasions with Emanuel Bloch, attorney for the Rosenbergs."

"For example," Mr. Scherer said, "on Oct. 22, 1951, Emanuel Bloch and the two young sons of the Rosenbergs drove to Sing Sing for a visit. Their chauffeur was a source F.B.I. informant.

"Inside the death house, the discussion of Bloch with his condemned clients was assessed to and duly reported to the F.B.I.

"Homeward bound, the driver tried to engage Bloch in talk, hoping to pick up a few additional scraps for his F.B.I. masters."

The informant, as had previously been made known, was a prisoner with Mr. Rosenberg in the Federal House of Detention in Manhattan. He continued his relationship with the Rosenbergs and Mr. Bloch after being released from prison and was a free man when the incident cited by Mr. Scherer occurred.

Asked for comment on Mr. Scherer's assertions, an F.B.I. spokesman in Washington said that the bureau could not go beyond the information contained in the documents.

Captive Case

Mr. Scherer asserted that a defendant's constitutional right to counsel "is violated if the prosecution intrudes into the lawyer-client relationship." Such an intrusion, he said, had earlier helped upset the Judith Coplon spy conviction, which was not related to the Rosenberg case.

In one of the most celebrated criminal cases in the period of cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union that followed World War II, the Rosenbergs were executed on March 29, 1953, of conspiracy to commit espionage by communicating information on the manufacture of atomic bombs to the Soviet.

Despite their protestations of innocence, and despite world-wide protests [illegible] June 19, 1953.

The war prosecution witness, [illegible] Greenglass, testified that he turned over secrets and sketches of the atomic bomb to the Rosenbergs in the fall of 1945 while he was a [illegible] Los Alamos Army [illegible] early parole, a memorandum dated April 16, 1951, said that the Bronx Probation Agency had granted a "deferral" on him for some unspecified offense.

An April 23, 1951, memorandum reported that two Bronx grand jury indictments charging Mr. Tartakow with possession of narcotics and assaulting officers of a prostitute were no longer pending, having been dismissed in September 1950.

New York prosecutors then dated April 17, 1951, reported F. B. I. agents were urging early parole for the prisoner, who was free on a bond pending appeal, to force him to resume his "passing information regarding Rosenberg."

Mr. Scherer said that the Nov. 19, 1951, F.B.I. computer print of data reported that the "confidential informant" had been "discharged in his conversation with Bloch" when discussing the defense law suit in Sing Sing Oct. 22 1951, "because of the presence of the children in the car."

The document said that "Bloch told Julius that 'Jerry drove them up'" including material from other sources, it said a "guard's report" indicated that "Jerry" was a fellow prisoner, "now a great friend of Rosenberg and trying in any way he can to help."

Lawyer's Prison Report

One reference in the computer print was to a visit to Sing Sing Aug. 3, 1951, when Mr. Bloch reportedly told the Rosenbergs that "Jerry" had collected $20 which was being deposited at the commissary fund of the Rosenbergs." Mr. Bloch was quoted as saying he was "having the photographs investigated."

Mr. Scherer said the computer print indicated that Sing Sing conversations between Mr. Rosenberg and his sons had somehow been recorded. One passage read as follows:

"On Sep. 7, 1951, Bloch brought the Rosenberg children to Sing Sing to visit their parents. On this occasion the children first visited with their father alone and later visited with their father alone. [illegible] with the children [illegible] from gorgeously for [illegible] and leaving with Bloch.

"[illegible] children, Michael, the older boy, 1 yrs & years old said to his father, 'You say Uncle Dave and Aunt Ruth [illegible] you and Mama. How is it that

[illegible] Capone, who had been a [illegible] employee, was [illegible] with [illegible] Government [illegible] and [illegible] over to the Secret Service. She was [illegible] in Washington, D.C., in 1948 on the charge of stealing documents and on [illegible] Nov. 1, 1950, on the assumption charge. [illegible] on the 3, 1950, a Federal Appeals Court of Appeals here set aside the New York Federal Court conviction because F.B.I. agents had arrested her without a warrant.

On June 2, 1951, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled in the district upheld their case that she was entitled to a new hearing to determine whether her telephone conversations with her lawyer before and during trial had been wiretapped.

Charges Finally Dropped

The Department of Justice never sought a hearing or new trial, and on Jan. 6, 1953, it formally dropped the 17-year-old charge. Miss Coplon had denied spying, contending that she had met a Soviet diplomat only because of love and that she had been carrying papers to prepare for a civil service test and write a novel.

Much of the material in the Rosenberg case involves statements from what the F.B.I. described as "confidential informant T-1, of unknown reliability," who Mr. Schneir said appears to have been Jerome Tartakow, a name inadvertently disclosed in a separately released Justice Department memorandum on the Rosenberg case.

The F.B.I. position appears to be that Mr. Tartakow was a volunteer informant, rather than a person placed in the trap against one else. Other documents show that he was a fellow prisoner with Julius Rosenberg in the Federal House of Detention in New York during and after the trial. He was credited by the F.B.I. with supplying information that helped lead the final witness prosecution witness, Ben Schneider, a passport photographer.

Why Mr. Rosenberg should have taken Mr. Tartakow for a friend is not stated in documents turned up in random earlier searches for secession [illegible] other comments from an F.B.I. memorandum of April 29, 1953, stating that the inmate had said that his father had been in Communist activity more than 15 years.

Daily Visits to Cell

An F.B.I. memorandum of April 8, 1953, said that Mr. Tartakow [illegible] to visit Mr. Rosenberg on his cell several [illegible]

Rosenberg was otherwise in solitary confinement following his deposition [illegible] was [illegible] a 15-year Federal sentence for [illegible] transportation of stolen [illegible]

[illegible] said [illegible] Ethel Rosenberg was quoted [illegible] telling [illegible] "Men are crooked, but they have sold a bill of goods by Julius and Ethel," referring to Mr. Greenglass's wife.

Younger Boy's Query

According to the F.B.I. report "Robert the younger son (then 4 years old) then said to Julius that 'Mama is a Greenglass and how is it that her people are against her?'"

On a Sept. 28, 1951 visit, the compilation said, "Ethel Rosenberg instructed her lawyer that any party member wishing to maintain contact with her should do so through him." At the trial, the Rosenbergs declined to answer questions on possible Communist party relationships.

On a Nov. 2 visit, the compilation went on, "Bloch read excerpts from his brief." The defense lawyer was also told to have "indicated that someone had stolen $1,000" that had been promised for the defense fund by a federal House of Detention inmate.

"Mrs. Rosenberg," the document continued, "asked Bloch if he suspected 'Jerry.' Bloch said no."

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-62)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Panel to Eye Publicity on Rosenbergs

By STEVEN MATTHEWS

Reacting to what he described as "persistent propaganda" that the trial of convicted atom spies Ethel and Julius Rosenberg was unfair, former Federal Judge Simon H. Rifkind has announced the formation of an American Bar Association committe to "scrutinize the unfolding publicity" generated by a revival of interest in the 26-year-old case.

The aim is to "counteract unwarranted criticism" of Chief Court of Appeals Judge Irving R. Kaufman, who as a U.S. district judge presided over the trial and sentenced the Rosenbergs to death.

"The fact is that the conduct of the Rosenberg trial was meticulously reviewed and repeatedly found proper, declared Rifkin.

Kaufman's "conduct of the trial has been more extensively and more carefully scrutinized by the appellate courts than any other case in American history," said Rifkind, who will head the four-man panel.

"It has been found flawless," he added and "since judicial ethics prevent him (Kaufman) from speaking for himself, it is the duty of the bar to defend him against charges that are devoid of merit."

The committee, actually a subcommittee of the Bar Association's task force on courts and the public, will also "make certain that public respect for the judicial process is not subverted by unfounded charges," continued Rifkind. He is a member of the task force.

He said that he believed that many of the critics of the case "have an affirmative interest in destroying confidence" in the judicial system.

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Daily News

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BAR GROUP BACKS ROSENBERG JUDGE

Unit Formed to Counteract Criticism Over Spy Trial

By PETER KIHSS

Formation of an American Bar Association subcommittee "to counteract unwarranted criticism" of Judge Irving R. Kaufman for his conduct of the 1951 atomic spy trial of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in Federal Court here was announced yesterday by a former Federal judge, Simon H. Rifkind.

Mr. Rifkind, chairman of the subcommittee, said it would also "scrutinize the unfolding publicity" on the case, resulting from the newly released Federal files, "to make certain that public respect for law and for the judicial process is not subverted by unfounded charges."

Incomplete reviews of the newly opened files so far "indicate that the Government possessed additional evidence indicating the guilt of the Rosenbergs," Mr. Rifkind said. He asserted, "Not one shred of exonerating evidence has been discovered from the materials released to date."

"It is now clear," he added, "that the Atomic Energy Commission was deeply concerned that disclosures pertaining to the materal obtained by the Rosenbergs might pose grave dangers to national security."

Others on the Panel

Mr. Rifkind said the subcommitte of the association's Task Force on Courts and the Public included the task force's own chairman, Donald R. Fretz, a judge of the California Superior Court; G. William Shea, of Los Angeles, and William B. West 3d, of Dallas.

Its creation, he said, was initiated by the association's president, Lawrence E. Walsh, also a former Federal judge.

Mr. and Mrs. Rosenberg were electrocuted June 19, 1953, for conspiracy to communicate information to the Soviet Union, including secret data on the atomic bomb.

[illegible], Mr. [illegible] said, were "not unusual" in [illegible] that period. He said 413 persons were put to death in the United States from 1950 through 1954, but he conceded that sentiment had since turned against such sentences.

Mr. Rifkind said there had been no violation of the privilege of confidentiality in lawyer-client relationships as a result of an informant's reports on talks with the Rosenbergs and their lawyer, Emanuel Bloch, on trips to Sing Sing Prison and in the death house. He said the informant had volunteered reports to the Federal Bureau of investigation, and that documents quoted by an author-researcher, Walter Schneir, had followed the trial.

Separate random searches by newsmen — aside from Mr. Schneir's data—had also turned up a March 16, 1951, F.B.I. report—midway in the trial—on the informant's asserted conversations with Mr. Rosenberg starting the previous December.

These, the F.B.I. report said, cited lawyer-client talks over a concern that a physician might describe talks with Mr. Rosenberg about smallpox inoculations, implying plans for travel; the defense lawyer's plans for refuting testimony of a confessed spy courier, Harry Gold, as a prosecution witness, and a hope to induce "some reversible error" to allow an appeal.

Extensive Scrutiny Cited

Mr. Rifkind said that Judge Kaufman's conduct of the trial "has been more extensively and more carefully scrutinized by the appellate courts than any other case in American history," and "found flawless."

"Since judicial ethics prevent him from speaking for himself," Mr. Rifkind went on, "it is the duty of the bar to defend him against charges that are devoid of merit."

After conviction, Mr. Rifkind said, the Rosenbergs filed 16 petitions for District Court reconsideration, seven appeals in the Court of Appeals and seven more in the Supreme Court and two clemency applications to President Eisenhower.

"Altogether 112 judges dealt in one form or another with the Rosenberg case," Mr. Rifkind said. "Not one saw fit to question their guilt or their conviction."

REMEMBER THE NEEDIEST!

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

New York Times

P. 28

Date: 1/8/76

Edition: Late City

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NEW YORK

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(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Judge to Examine Rosenberg Papers That U.S. Withheld

WASHINGTON, Jan. 13 (AP) —A Federal judge said today that she wanted to inspect all documents the Government has refused to release from its files on the case of the convicted atom spies, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.

District Judge June Green said she would examine the documents to determine whether the Government had a right to withhold them on the ground that they would violate individual privacy or were not relevant.

The Government last month made public about 30,000 pages of documents related to the celebrated spy case.

The material was released as a result of lawsuits filed under the Freedom of Information Act by Robert and Michael Meeropol, the Rosenbergs' sons.

The Meeropols use the name of the couple who adopted them after their parents were executed in 1953. The Rosenbergs were convicted of conspiring to give atomic bomb secrets to the Soviet agents.

The Meeropols returned to court to contend that the Government had failed to turn over all the Rosenberg material.

Jeffrey Axelrad, a Justice Department lawyer, denied that contention and told the court, "In fact, the F.B.I. has done far more than is required."

Mr. Axelrad said the Government would be happy to comply with Judge Green's request but said, "It is going to be a massive task."

Marshal Perlin, lawyer for the Meeropols, argued that the Government had altered some documents and had failed to comply with a court order to supply an inventory of all the pertinent files.

Mr. Perlin said the files of at least 10 witnesses called in the Rosenberg trial had not been inventoried.

Mr. Axelrad responded that all pertinent material would have turned up in the Government's inventory of the main Federal Bureau of Investigation file on the Rosenbergs. That file, he said, would contain references to all material filed elsewhere by the F.B.I.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

New York Times

P7

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FANTASY vs. FACT

The slick campaign to portray executed atomic spies Julius and Ethel Rosenberg as innocent lambs led to the slaughter in a gigantic frame-up has reached the point where the American Bar Association has had to set up a committee to defend the principal judge in the case, Irving R. Kaufman. Judicial ethics prevent him from speaking for himself.

Despite the efforts of the Rosenbergs' family and friends to rewrite history, not one single shred of evidence has been unearthed to suggest they did not get anything but a meticulously fair trial.

We hope the bar association will be quick to counter all unwarranted accusations against Judge Kaufman in the most emphatic terms.

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Daily News

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FBI — NEW YORK

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Denigration of 'rights'

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Rosenberg's son says spy agencies still at it

By LORI COOKE

Yes, he was a victim of Cold War hysteria at its height, the younger son of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg said last night but so were you and I — and the secret service agencies that carved up our rights then are still at it.

"People come to me and say how terrible it was I was victimized in that period," Robert Meeropol told 700 people at Calhoun High School in Merrick. "They say it like 'you're a victim and I'm not.'"

But all of us were victimized, Meeropol said, "because we all abdicated our own rights." He added, "It's my contention that these secret service agencies do more to control us, to keep us in the dark," than they do to protect us from other countries."

His parents, who were executed in 1953 for conspiracy to commit espionage after allegedly taking part in a plot to pass the secret of the atomic bomb to the Soviet Union, were victims of these agencies and the temper of the times, Meeropol believes.

* * *

WHILE THE ATMOSPHERE today is different, the operations and attitudes of the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation haven't changed "and are not going to change," Meeropol said.

In the fear of a monolithic communism born during the McCarthy period, these agencies "were given a blank check" to stop communist aggression here and abroad "and they cashed it in again and again," Meeropol said.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

Long Island Press

SATURDAY, MARCH 13, 1976

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Recent revelations about CIA and FBI plots here and abroad are part of the same trend, he feels.

These feelings were forged in a period when the U.S. government was selling the image of a monolithic communist conspiracy, "an octopus whose object was to enslave the world," Meeropol said.

* * *

WHEN THE SOVIET UNION exploded its first atomic bomb, "the general feeling was that somebody must have stolen the secret," Meeropol told a sympathetic audience.

Along with his brother, Michael, Meeropol is seeking a reopening of the trial and vindication of his parents. He discussed the discrepancies of evidence and apparent perjury by witnesses at his parents' trial.

"The question is whether you believe the Greenglasses or you believe the Rosenbergs," Meeropol said. Ethel Rosenberg's brother, David Greenglass, named Julius Rosenberg as the person to whom he passed the secret of the atomic bomb.

Meeropol believes that Greenglass, already under investigation for alleged communist connections, was told to name his brother-in-law by government investigators, in return for a deal where he would get leniency and his wife would go free.

* * *

GREENGLASS, MEEROPOL THINKS, believed Rosenberg would work the same kind of deal for himself by naming someone higher up.

As for Harry Gold, the supposed "master spy" and go-between from Rosenberg to Greenglass, "Gold is questionable in his entirety," Meeropol said. Gold was "witness at quite a few of these trials," he added, and at a later one said he had created an entire fantasy life for himself, deceiving his friends for 16 years.

At the time of his death, Gold was described by his employer as a man with a "difficult time distinguishing fantasy from reality," Meeropol said.

He believes the people who investigated and prosecuted the Rosenberg case "were the tools of other people" higher up in government. But more important that naming names is an understanding of the atmosphere of the time and "the trust of where government was going."

* * *

THE MEEROPOL BROTHERS are trying to get all the papers relating to the case released, and are involved in a Freedom of Information suit to get them.

So far, Meeropol said, only 10 per cent of the papers have been released, and those have large sections of information blanked out.

His appearance was sponsored by the Long Island Committee to Reopen the Rosenberg Case, based in Huntington.

Susan Shilling, co-organizer of the committee, said the group is attempting to raise money to defray the Meeropols' legal expenses, get the papers relased, and "make definite ties to government abuse of power and government repression today."

The Ties and Rosenberg Ties — Allen Weinstein

THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Politics and the Arts—February 14, 1976, 60 cents

Campaign Spending

Nathan Lerner

Plastic Jimmy Carter — Reg Murphy

Dealing with Gringos — David Binder

Dylan's "Desire" — W. T. Lhamon, Jr.

Sidney Blauk — Irving Howe

Moore on Kissinger — John Osborne

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FBI — NEW YORK

associated with Carter's personal and politics. He had so little popularity left at that they all thought his public support would h rather than help, even though he was still in office. But plastic surgeons have made him a national figure. The boys in the bus haven't had a chance to look into his background and administration yet. When they do they won't be quite as tempted to produce a papier-mâché mask because political campaigns aren't covered that way anymore—thank goodness.

On the Search for Smoking Guns

The Hiss and Rosenberg Files

by Allen Weinstein

Now that the FBI has opened its files on the Rosenberg and Hiss cases, the search for "smoking guns" has started in earnest. Researchers are pouring over the files in a special "reading room" at the bureau's new J. Edgar Hoover building. The significance of this new FBI policy of releasing masses of documents on such historically important cases remains to be determined. Bureau officials insist that their investigations into the Hiss and Rosenberg cases were honest and professional; therefore it has nothing embarrassing to hide. On the other hand the Rosenbergs' sons Robert and Michael Meeropol, and Alger Hiss, and their respective supporters insist that hidden within either the tens of thousands of pages already released—or, more probably, in the thousands of unreleased pages on which the FBI claims Freedom of Information Act exemptions—there can be found evidence of conspiratorial actions that helped to convict innocent people in both cases. Whatever the truth of these claims, at least one thing seems obvious: Never before in its history has the FBI or any other government investigative agency exposed such controversial files to general scrutiny. Therein lies a tale.

Several years ago, I began work on a study dealing with internal security in the United States during the 1940s and 1950s, in particular, the domestic impact of the Cold War during the McCarthy period. Under the Freedom of Information Act I sued the FBI and Justice Departments in November 1972, assisted by the American Civil Liberties Union, initially requesting only the Hiss files. The complaint I filed quoted extensively from FBI materials that had been released to selected writers sympathetic to the FBI. I asked the courts to replace the bureau's standard operating procedure of "selective access" with a policy of "general access," that is, to release documents to all interested researchers. At the time I filed the suit, I thought it had little chance of success.

Along came Watergate, however, bringing Elliot Richardson briefly to the Justice Department. Richardson issued a directive in August 1973, Executive Order 528-73, opening FBI and departmental records more than 15 years old to inspection by "qualified historical researchers." Richardson's order, although limited mainly to those with academic union cards, involved an important liberalization of the Freedom of Information Act, which had so far failed to relax significantly the restrictions on access to previously classified government records.

Soon after Richardson's order appeared, I asked the FBI for both the Hiss and the Rosenberg files. The following month, September 1973, director Kelley wrote back to say that the two sets of records—a 25,000-page Rosenberg dossier and a 53,000-page Hiss file—would be processed for me. The FBI's estimated charges for "processing" (an apposite word for the heavy-handed blue-penciling and outright deletions in much of the material subsequently released) came to $18,000. Although the Justice Department released several thousand pages of material from its files on the two cases quickly, the bureau continued to stall, despite intermittent pressure from three attorneys general (Richardson, Bork, Saxbe). Finally, in August 1975, Deputy Attorney General Harold Tyler ordered the files released in the near future, and with a minimal number of deletions because of their historical significance. (In a later action, he prevented the FBI from imposing stiff "search fees" for the files, allowing only xeroxing charges to be levied.) Up to that point, I had received only a few hundred pages of the Hiss files

Allen Weinstein, who teaches history at Smith College, is the author of *Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Conflict*, which will be published this year by Knopf.

and none of the Rosenberg re[illegible]. Shortly after Tyler's order, the two rolls of "pu[illegible]in papers" unused at Alger Hiss' trials were released, along with the first batch of Rosenberg documents. Then last fall the FBI was slapped with two stern federal court orders in the District of Columbia. The first was issued by Judge June Green in Michael and Robert Meeropol's suit for the Rosenberg files. The second, more sweeping order was issued last October by Chief Judge William B. Jones in my own suit; it covered both the Hiss *and* the Rosenberg files. Both judges directed the FBI to release immediately the files in question, and by mid-January the bureau has already opened more than 28,000 pages of material on the Rosenberg case and an additional 11,000 pages of the Hiss dossier. The remainder were scheduled for release by January 31. Further Judges Green and Jones directed the FBI to produce an index of every document in their files in both cases. It should soon be possible for the first time, therefore, to challenge the FBI's withholding of specific documents under the national security, privacy and other exemptions allowed by the amendments to the Freedom of Information Act passed by Congress in November 1974 over President Ford's veto. The struggle to secure scholarly access to dated FBI records has hardly been won. But at least with regard to files of special historical interest, such as the Hiss and Rosenberg dossiers, the battle has entered a new and promising phase.

The difficulties I encountered in attempting to examine FBI materials were not unusual. Other security agencies, among them the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of Naval Intelligence and Army Intelligence have all deposited at least portions of their older files in the National Archives; there, declassification proceeds on a slow but regular basis. The FBI, however, has no archival policy whatsoever beyond that of protecting *all* its records, however ancient, from public disclosure. Thus, in the past few years, scholars studying subjects a half century old—the government's campaign against the IWW during World War I, for example, or the "Palmer Raids" during the 1919-1920 Red Scare, the investigation of Harding's attorney general, Harry Daughterty, or the Sacco-Vanzetti case— have regularly been denied access to the bureau's files. (There may have been some changes in this situation since Tyler's directive on the Hiss-Rosenberg files.) J. Edgar Hoover's ghost still haunts the bureau's personnel and practices, and it may not be farfetched to suggest that until the late director's death the bureau never really had a historical "past." Even events as distant as World War I radical raids and the 1919-20 Red Scare, after all, involved episodes in which Hoover himself had participated. In that sense, they remained current events—not "history"—in the mind of the director. When Hoover died, the FBI acquired overnight a half-century-old history, one that scholars can begin to probe intelligently only when they are guaranteed more regularized means of access to the agency's files. Yet [illegible]n today, Congress, the Justice Department and t[illegible] courts have failed to tackle the complex problem of rationalizing the administration of FBI records.

The bureau's files contain valuable and irreplaceable materials, not only on matters of internal security but also on a variety of other historically important subjects, ranging from labor history to women's history, from black history to the peace movement. Even more important than the issue of whether particular scholars receive the specific materials they seek, therefore, is a broader and more urgent need. Under the supervision of a joint committee consisting, perhaps, of FBI officials, historians and archivists, all files more than a generation old should be removed from direct bureau control. They should be deposited, with appropriate safeguards, in the National Archives, if only to preclude their being "lost" (the fate of certain Rosenberg files I requested), burned (as Hoover's successor, L. Patrick Gray, did with Watergate records), or otherwise misplaced, given the general confusion that appears to be the normal condition of the bureau's allegedly efficient filing system. Efforts now underway by Congress and the Justice Department to supervise more closely the agency's operations provide an excellent opportunity to begin the process of reorganizing the FBI record-keeping procedures.

Only the gullible and the ultra-partisan truly believe that some "smoking gun" will emerge from these records, some single and unique piece of evidence that will prove a specific theory of either the Hiss or the Rosenberg case. The FBI files, important as they are, can be only a part of any serious attempt to understand these episodes. Many other sources of information must be studied—files from the Justice Department, the State Department and other government agencies; materials contained in public repositories such as the Hoover Institution, the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, the Truman Library at Independence and the Library of Congress; and, of course, the basic printed primary sources. Also, for any serious study of an event in modern history, the participants must be interviewed extensively. Historians, even those armed with FBI files, must recognize that there are no shortcuts to the normal research process.

The concern of the historian must be to avoid the certainties voiced by partisans of the government, of Hiss or of the Rosenbergs and to *de*-mythologize the episodes for those who are open to persuasion by the weight of evidence. Major and unresolved questions remain in both cases, and the FBI materials have already begun to clarify these. But no substantial evidence has *yet* emerged to demonstrate that either Alger Hiss or the Rosenbergs were—as their more vociferous defenders insist—victims of callous conspiracies designed by FBI officials and others highly placed in government. Material still to be gleaned from the FBI

files may or may not bear out such conspiracy claims. The danger is simply that, given this post-Watergate mood, American public opinion today will accept such charges far more readily than it would have in the past, with or without adequate proof.

Alger Hiss and the Meeropols (on behalf of their parents) seek historical vindication. They have been candid in recognizing that Watergate, here as elsewhere, was a watershed in the campaign to reawaken public interest in their cases. Hiss, in this view, was Richard Nixon's "first victim," and Nixon's downfall has done more to legitimize public interest in Hiss than the uncovering of any new and substantial evidence to demonstrate his innocence. As for the Rosenberg case, Robert Meeropol aptly observed last year: "The biggest obstacle we have to overcome is the public's unwillingness to believe that the government could have been dishonest." The recent revelations of deceit, dishonesty and disreputable practices at the highest levels of American government over the past few decades—beginning in the Oval Office and extending to both the FBI and the CIA—have largely removed this obstacle. Given the condition of belief—or, more precisely, *dis*belief—that presently prevails in the United States on such matters, it is little wonder that every actual, possible or conceivable "conspiracy" within recent memory has been reopened for scrutiny. This relatively recent exposure of the extent of official deception has eroded among normally cautious Americans the will to challenge even the most fantastic charges.

As both a Jew and a historian, I am regularly reminded—by the ultra-right as well as by the extreme left—of my responsibilities in dealing with such alleged conspiracies. One energetic defender of the Rosenbergs warned me that unless my book confirmed the couple's innocence, I would promptly join an apparent list of "Jewish kapos" alongside Irving Saypol and Judge Irving Kaufman. Presumably I (like Judge Kaufman) would lose my right to speak without harassment before a public audience. At the other, equally virulent, end of the spectrum, certain anti-Semitic correspondents remind me regularly that (in the words of one) "a movement is afoot to rehabilitate the Rosenbergs, Hiss, etc., not because you seek justice but because they were Jews [a claim that would surprise Hiss]. . . . the pillars of Communism [are] Marx [and] Trotsky, and underneath every Jew whether he knows it or not beats a collective heart." Although lunatic fringes, left and right, have lost their earlier monopolies on the paranoid style in today's more widespread climate of suspicion, my own mail suggests that for many people, the old conspiracies are still the best.

Not that all charges of conspiracy are necessarily frivolous. The FBI files, once available, may indeed reveal a clear pattern of bureau tampering with evidence or with testimony of witnesses in these cases. *Asserting* a conspiracy, however, and *proving* one are quite different things. Serious writers will scrutinize the FBI files carefully before presenting any systematic or comprehensive statement on what they may demonstrate when studied along with other sources of information on a case. But all charges of perjured testimony, doctored evidence and official cover-ups—charges that have been raised—must be examined thoroughly. Otherwise the credulous will simply assume the truth of *all* such charges. "What are *they* hiding?" runs the ubiquitous question. It would be a reckless scholar who, in the aftermath of Watergate, could confidently respond, "Nothing," without first carefully examining each specific question.

My own scrutiny to this point of the FBI's Hiss case file indicates, at times, the bureau's *incompetence* in that investigation but not its malevolence. It has failed, to cite only one example, to check adequately on Whittaker Chamber's charges against Hiss until the House UnAmerican Activities Committee raised the case in 1948, although the FBI first received information about Chambers' work in the Communist underground in 1940 and first interviewed him two years later. The files also detail both the extraordinary degree of suspicion with which the FBI viewed HUAC's competing investigation of the Hiss case and the difficulties faced by director Hoover in dealing with Attorney General Tom Clark. The FBI documents show that, even after Whittaker Chambers produced the "pumpkin papers," the Justice Department still hoped to secure a perjury indictment against him rather than against ex-New Dealer Alger Hiss, apparently because of President Truman's insistence that the case could be explained largely as a "red herring" directed against his administration by the Republican-controlled HUAC. Only in mid-December 1948, days before Hiss' indictment by a federal grand jury in New York City, did the FBI receive authorization from Justice (quoting Assistant Attorney General Campbell) to "let the chips fall where they may."

FBI interviews during the month with Henry Julian Wadleigh, Franklin Victor Reno and others who had supplied Whittaker Chambers with government documents during the mid-1930s confirm the latter's importance as a Communist courier. They undermine the frequently raised argument that Chambers may have concocted or exaggerated his role within the party's underground. In this connection, the bureau has released a number of interviews it conducted with another member of Chambers' underground network whose activities have been kept secret until now. This unsuspected informant, a photographer named William Edward Crane (code name "Keith"), verified a great deal of Chambers' testimony.

Shifting to the Rosenberg case, both FBI and Justice Department documents suggest the degree to which the prosecutor's decision to ask for a death penalty in

that trial emerged only after a period of heated bickering between the prosecution (who initially opposed such a move) and the Atomic Energy Commission (which favored it and won out in the end). The files also sustain the charge raised by attorneys for the Rosenbergs that the chief government witness, Ethel's brother David Greenglass, had stolen a chunk of uranium from Los Alamos after the war, an incident that the FBI was investigating even before it shifted its attention to a broader probe of the Fuchs-Gold-Greenglass-Rosenberg connection. At the same time a significant body of evidence emerges from the files—in letters exchanged between the Greenglasses during World War II and in Julius Rosenberg's one interview with the FBI prior to his arrest—to suggest that Greenglass tried to inform Rosenberg about the secret work he was engaged in and that the latter knew the general nature of that work. A surprising revelation was that J. Edgar Hoover and other high government officials close to the case had recommended clemency for Ethel—but not Julius—Rosenberg. FBI records on the case released thus far also suggest that Greenglass implicated his sister Ethel in his account of the spy ring far less (at first) than he did Julius. Finally, a new character emerged from the files to assume an immediate position of prominence in the case, a mysterious informer named Jerome E. Tartakow, who supplied the FBI with information about the alleged Rosenberg spy ring gathered (he claimed) during jailhouse conversations with Julius Rosenberg. Although the bureau remained uncertain about Tartakow's reliability, he did apparently provide them with leads that led to the last-minute discovery of a Manhattan photographer who testified, with devastating effect, at the couple's trial that he had made passport photos for them shortly before their arrest. Apparently the FBI could not verify much of Tartakow's other information, but—until he is discredited—he still remains a significant link between the Rosenbergs and the crimes of which they were accused.

What these and the other hard nuggets of information that can be obtained from the files add up to remains arguable. It is evident, however, that there has yet to emerge from the FBI files a coherent body of usable material that would validate the guilt or vindicate the innocence of either Alger Hiss or the Rosenbergs. Whether a more conclusive story will emerge after carefully examining the bulk of the files (remembering that the bureau will always hold back a certain number of documents) remains to be seen. Certainly partisans on both sides will find evidence to validate their previous claims; but historians uncommitted to any initial version of events may not be equally satisfied. Once the "smoking guns" have been returned to their holsters, scholars will still be left with the slower, more tedious job of sifting *all* the evidence, FBI files included.

The most reasonable objection to releasing these quarter-century-old FBI records on the Hiss and Rosenberg cases has been that such release violates the privacy of people mentioned in the files. Even the FBI has abandoned the argument that *most* of the documents involved should be withheld on national security grounds, but it has grasped like a drowning man to the anchor of privacy. Ignoring, for the moment, any possible irony in the FBI's belated argument against release on grounds of privacy, the argument itself has merit, especially when applied to anonymous informants or others only peripherally connected with the two cases. I have raised no objection to having such names removed from the files before release. (It should be noted, however, that the FBI has been far less concerned over the possible injury to be suffered by such barely known individuals than it has been over protecting the privacy of key government witnesses, such as David and Ruth Greenglass, who live today under different names and whose private interrogations by the bureau are integral pieces of historical evidence.) I share the bureau's professed concern over legitimate limitations to the "right to know" in a democratic society. Although secrecy has abused its claims during the past quarter century, privacy has not. The two must be held in delicate balance, even in connection with the records of public officials, although in practice it can be painfully difficult to define the "private" part of the life of a public person.

My own rule of thumb in dealings with government agencies has skirted the general issue by arguing, instead that most people involved in these particular cases, either as principals or as major witnesses, not only testified in open court; they also testified before congressional committees or published articles and books based upon their stories. Such actions might be interpreted to mean that the individuals themselves have voluntarily waived their demand for privacy—at least insofar as their knowledge of the evidence is concerned. Deputy Attorney General Tyler, in ordering the FBI to expedite release of the files, accepted my basic argument on this point.

The danger of abuse remains present at all times. As someone who values his own privacy highly, I find myself uncomfortable even with my own working compromise on the matter of privacy and FBI records, a compromise that now governs the bureau's processing of the Hiss and Rosenberg files. Historians using such material bear a special responsibility to ensure that—at least in their hands—the pursuit of documentary "smoking guns" does not become all-consuming, abusive, and headline-hunting. The great danger in using FBI files and other previously classified government records is that a scholarly variant McCarthyism will replace the careful assessment of new data—data that must be correlated with all the other available evidence if they are to provide answers to the many unresolved questions in such controversial cases.

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Rosenberg Lawyers Alleging Judicial Impropriety in Case

By PETER KIHSS

Lawyers for the two sons of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, electrocuted as atomic spy plotters in 1953, charged yesterday that now-released reports by Federal Bureau of Investigation agents—if accurate—indicated the trial judge had violated canons of judicial ethics and constitutional separation of powers.

In a news conference, Marshall Perlin, chief counsel for the sons, cited F.B.I. reports that he contended reported improper contacts between the judge, Irving R. Kaufman, and agents and prosecutors. Mr. Perlin, who distributed 30 reports obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, proposed "a special committee of inquiry" made up of "independent" lawyers and legal scholars to look into the entire matter.

Judge Kaufman, now chief judge of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, maintained a 25-year practice against public statements on the Rosenberg case.

But former Federal Judge Simon H. Rifkind, chairman of an American Bar Association subcommittee named last year "to counteract unwarranted criticism" of Judge Kaufman, said yesterday that a first glance indicated nothing to impugn "the validity of the verdict." He said the Court of Appeals had held the trial "fair and flawless."

Mr. Rifkind said the lawyers for the Rosenberg sons, Robert and Michael Meeropol, had not given his committee a look at the documents before a "grab" for headlines on the eve of a June 15 Carnegie Hall fund-raising rally.

He said the F.B.I. reports included "triple and quadruple hearsay" and "courtroom scuttlebutt," which he called "rarely accurate." Post-trial communications between the judge and Government, he said, would violate no rule and some undoubtedly related to threats received by the judge.

Substance of Ethics Canon

The ethics canon cited by the Rosenberg supporters says a judge should not permit private communications designed to influence his judicial conduct when affected interests are not represented. Ordinarily, all communications by one side's lawyers to him are to be made known to the other.

Only one document made public by Mr. Perlin in a Biltmore Hotel news conference was dated during the March 6-29, 1951, trial. This quoted Raymond Whearty, a Justice Department official, as saying March 16 that he knew Judge Kaufman would impose a death sentence "if he doesn't change his mind."

An F.B.I. report dated April 3, 1951, two days before sentencing, quoted an assistant United States attorney, Roy M. Cohn, as saying Judge Kaufman had consulted other judges and favored a death sentence. Mr. Cohn was said to believe a prison sentence might induce Mrs. Rosenberg to talk and open the way to other prosecutions.

In a March 13, 1975, letter to the bureau, Irving H. Saypol, who had been chief prosecutor, recalled that Judge Kaufman had asked for Justice Department views, and then, learning these differed, asked that Mr. Saypol refrain from any recommendation in court.

A Feb. 19, 1953, report said Judge Kaufman had urged the Justice Department to expedite Supreme Court action on the Rosenbergs' appeal rather than let the case go past a June recess until that autumn.

A June 17, 1953, report said Judge Kaufman had "very confidentially advised" an agent that Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, in a meeting with Attorney General Herbert Brownell at 11 o'clock the previous night, had said he would call the full court into session immediately to "vacate" any individual justice's stay of execution. (The Rosenbergs were executed June 19).

The files included a letter by Judge Kaufman to Attorney General Brownell dated Oct. 15, 1957, saying, "I have not uttered a word—as indeed I should not—in answer to these horribly concocted Communist charges concerning my conduct in the trial." The letter commended the Justice Department for aiding a Look magazine rebuttal to critics.

A top F. B. I. official, Cartha D. DeLoach, reported Dec. 21, 1962, that Judge Kaufman, in a telephone call, had asserted that he "raised hell" with Thurgood M. Marshall, then a new member of the Circuit Court of Appeals, for a question during an appeal hearing for Morton Sobell. Mr. Sobell had been convicted of non-atomic espionage conspiracy with the Rosenbergs.

'57 Opinion Is Cited

The appeal had cited a 1957 Supreme Court decision —the so-called Grunewald decision—holding it improper for a prosecutor to question a defendant about invoking constitutional privileges against self-incrimination before a grand jury—as Ethal Rosenberg long before had been cross-examined.

Justice Marshall, the report said: had asked "if Sobell had been tried last spring and we had him before us today, wouldn't it be necessary for the court to reverse the decision, particularly in view of the Grunewald decision?"

The DeLoach report said an assistant United States attorney replied, "probably." Judge Kaufman was quoted as saying this was a "stupid answer" that "might very well be the straw that breaks the camel's back and as a result obtain Sobell's freedom."

The latest document was dated May 4, 1975, and said Judge Kaufman had told the F.B.I. that "some counteraction should be taken to combat" publicity by the National Committee to Reopen the Rosenberg Case.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

N.Y. Times

Pg. 20

Date: JUN 11 1975

Edition: LATE CITY

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F.B.I. TRIED TO BAR SPY BOOK FROM TV

Memo Lists Measures Taken Against Rosenberg Story

By JOHN M. CREWDSON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 1—The Federal Bureau of Investigation took steps in the mid-1960's to prevent the authors of a book about Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, the convicted atomic spies, from discussing their work on television interview programs, according to newly released bureau documents.

In a memorandum written on Oct. 16, 1965, William C. Sullivan, then an assistant F.B.I. director, reported to his superiors that Walter and Mariam Schneir, the authors, had approached "a leading television man in Chicago" with a request to discuss on his program their book, "Invitation to an Inquest."

Mr. Sullivan said he believed that the Schneirs intended not only to "exonerate the Rosenbergs," who were executed in June 1953 while continuing to maintain their innocence, but also "to attack and undermine the F.B.I. in its investigations."

Sullivan's 'Instruction'

"In view of this," Mr. Sullivan wrote, he had told an intermediary, a Chicago lawyer, "to instruct" the unnamed television personality "n otto permit the Schneirs to go on his television program for no good wouccrue from it."

Mr. Sullivan, now retired, recommended that the bureau "take careful steps to secure the cooperation of friendly television stations and prevent this subversive effort from being successful. It should be kept off television programs and smothered and forced out of the public eye," he said in the memorandum.

Mr. Schneir said in a telephone interview that he recalled having been rebuffed in an attempt to appear on a television program in Chicago conducted by Irv Kupcinet, a columnist for the Chicago-Sun Times, but he could not say whether that was the program to which Mr. Sullivan referred.

Mr. Kupcinet, reached at his Chicago office, said that the Schneirs had asked for an appearance, but that he had decided that "there was no way we could use them," and that he had never sought guidance on the matter from the F.B.I.

Request by Sons

The Sullivan memorandum and other documents were released by the bureau in response to a request under the Freedom of Information Act by Michael and Robert Meeropol, the Rosenberg's sons.

Some details were made public recently by the Senate Intelligence Committee relating to the bureau's use of informants and friendly "contacts" in the media and elsewhere in its attempts to manipulate public opinion, but this is the first documented example of the bureau's response to a particular publication.

Mr. Sullivan also suggested that the bureau take steps to refute and expose the Schneir's book thereby "putting the authors in proper perspective."

Another F.B.I. document that accompanied the Sullivan memorandum noted that "steps have already been taken in New York and by various "contacts" of ours to refute the book written by the Schneirs."

That document reported that Irving R. Kaufman, the judge in the Rosenberg case and now Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which includes parts of New York, "has been furnished certain public source information" by the bureau.

Judge Kaufman, the report said, "is having a lengthy letter written to the editor of The New York Times" regarding the Rosenberg case, and it noted that another "syndicated columnist," whose name was not given, "is also doing this."

"A number of Catholic publications will also assist in this matter," the report said.

Also, a letter was sent to all bureau field offices in November 1965 advising agents that "attempts will be made to get the Schneirs on television programs throughout the country."

"All offices should be alert to any indication of such action and immediately notify the bureau in the event information is received indicating such an attempt on the part of the authors," it said.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

New York Times

Date: 6/2/76
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F.B.I. No Longer Exhibits 'Crime of the Century'

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 15—One of the prize exhibits of the Federal Bureau of Investigation—entitled "The Crime of the Century" on the way Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were convicted as atomic spy plotters—is no longer being displayed.

Attention was called to the exhibit's absence today by the National Committee to Reopen the Rosenberg Case. The exhibit had included such items as a torn Jello box, recalling testimony that two pieces of such a box had been a recognition signal for two participants in the alleged conspiracy for which the Rosenbergs were electrocuted in 1953.

An F.B.I. spokesman said that the exhibit was "not on the tour route now" because it was "not rebuilt" when the bureau moved from the Justice Department Building into the new J. Edgar Hoover Building, which was opened Oct. 1, 1975.

The committee, led by Robert Meeropol, one of the Rosenbergs' two sons, and Marshall Perlin, counsel, presented a petition reportedly bearing 30,000 signatures, asking that Attorney General Edward H. Levi "immediately release all files" on the case under the Freedom of Information Act. Mr. Meeropol told the Justice Department that a son of Mr. Levi was a signer. About 29,000 pages of F.B.I. documents had been released last December.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

N.Y. TIMES

pg. 18

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Author: LATE CITY
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