

16. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that Donald Maclean attended all meetings of the Combined Development Trust from 1947 until he left the U.S. This trust was composed of United States, United Kingdom and Canadian representatives and its purpose was to develop information about the location and availability of materials suitable for atomic energy and to acquire same. He advised Maclean attended a three-day declassification conference held in October, 1947. [REDACTED] stated he did not know Maclean well and met him casually at cocktail parties in Washington.

The above are considered the known pertinent contacts of Burgess while in this country and do not include all known contacts while in the United States.

VII BACKGROUND OF GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY
BURGESS

A. Birth

Born April 16, 1911, England. ()

B. Education

1930-34 Cambridge University ()

C. Employment

1934-35 Lecturer, Cambridge University.

1935-38 British Broadcasting Service (anti-Nazi propa-
ganda)

[REDACTED]

1941-44 British Broadcasting Service

1944-46 temporary appointment in News Department of
Foreign Office, London

1946-48 employed in private office of the Minister of
State

1948-50 Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office

August, 1950 - May, 1951, assigned British Embassy,
Washington, D. C., Second Secretary. His recall to London
in early May, 1951, resulted directly from a protest by
the Governor of Virginia to the State Department because
of Burgess' violation of the State of Virginia speeding
regulation. [REDACTED]

D. Homosexual Tendencies

Burgess is a known homosexual. This has been substantiated
from many sources. ()

[REDACTED] advised that he could state
with certainty that Burgess was known to be a homosexual.
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], a hitchhiker picked up by Burgess in April, 1951,
both advised that Burgess had made homosexual advances to
them. [REDACTED]

E. Communist and Soviet Sympathies

[REDACTED] a hitchhiker of questionable character who
was picked up by Burgess in April, 1951, and who was with
him when Burgess was stopped by the Virginia State authorities
for speeding, claimed that Burgess said he would never again
fight for freedom and that the United States or United Nations
had no reason to enter the Korean war. According to [REDACTED],
Burgess said he intended to return to England in the fall
and that he would like to be sent to Russia where he could
learn and do many interesting things. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

VIII. ASSOCIATES OF BURGESS IN UNITED STATES

The following interviews, unless otherwise indicated, were conducted in 1951 following the disappearance of Maclean and Burgess.

1. [REDACTED], was contacted by Burgess in January, 1951, in relation to Far East questions. [REDACTED] saw him four or five times between January and March, 1951. He described Burgess as agreeable but restless and agitated; a heavy drinker, but not sympathetic to Soviet Russia. [REDACTED] advised that Burgess expressed dislike of Congressional inquiry being made into homosexuality, and from this [REDACTED] gathered the impression that Burgess had homosexual tendencies. He advised on interview by the Bureau that they had no discussions concerning communism. ()
2. [REDACTED], upon interview by the Bureau advised that they first met Burgess in April, 1951, approximately two weeks before Burgess departed for England. They advised they were introduced to Burgess by [REDACTED], and that they met Burgess about three times in New York City. They had no information concerning any pro-Soviet or pro-Communist sympathies on the part of Burgess. ()
3. [REDACTED] was interviewed by Bureau agents. He advised he met Guy Burgess socially in England about 1949 and has had a slight social acquaintance with him since that time. [REDACTED] stated he had no reason to believe Burgess was sympathetic to Russia or the Communist Party. [REDACTED] advised that he had Burgess and one [REDACTED] to supper at his home on the Sunday prior to the disappearance of Burgess and Maclean. Following the disappearance, [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that during that evening Burgess told her he was hoping to take a Mediterranean cruise. [REDACTED]
4. [REDACTED] advised that he has known Donald Maclean and his brother since 1939 and has known Burgess for a few years. He advised he saw Burgess in New York City in April, 1951, and that Burgess was drunk the last few days he was in New York City. He stated he knew of no disloyal statements made by Burgess. ()

advised that he had attended college with Burgess. He had lived in the same home with him during that time. He described himself as a close friend of Burgess and stated he was fond of him. [redacted] advised that he was in London during 1943-44 in the United States Navy, during which time Burgess admitted to him that he was a homosexual. He stated this did not stop his friendship with Burgess as, "One's morals are his own business." He stated he had no reason to suspect that Burgess had pro-Communist or pro-Soviet views.

6. [redacted] advised that he met Burgess in New York City. [redacted] advised he had no knowledge of any Communist sympathies on the part of Burgess nor did he know of any friends or relatives of Burgess.

7. [redacted] she met Burgess at several parties in 1950. She had no information concerning his pro-Soviet or pro-Communist sympathies.

8. [redacted] advised he met Burgess in London in the late 1930's. He said he also met Burgess again in 1947. [redacted] described Burgess as a drunkard, a homosexual and an emotionally unstable person. He stated he knew of no pro-Soviet acts on the part of Burgess other than his support of the Loyalists during the Spanish Civil War, in 1937.

9. [redacted] advised that he met Burgess in England in 1936. [redacted] Burgess was a social acquaintance of the [redacted] family. He stated he exchanged letters with Burgess during 1937-38 while [redacted] was in South America and upon his return to England again had personal contact with Burgess. He advised the last personal contact with Burgess occurred between 1938 and 1940. [redacted] stated these contacts were all of a social nature.

11. [REDACTED], advised he was contacted in March, 1951, by Burgess who furnished a letter of introduction from [REDACTED]. At the time of this first meeting, [REDACTED] advised that Burgess was intoxicated. He stated Burgess and his mother later recontacted him in April, 1951, at which time Burgess was apologetic for his condition at their prior meeting. ([REDACTED])
12. [REDACTED] advised he first met Burgess at Cambridge University in 1939 and knew him for about three years. He next saw Burgess when Burgess came to Paris as Secretary to Hector MacNeill, British Minister of State. [REDACTED] stated he next heard of Burgess in the Fall of 1949 when Burgess contacted him in New York City. His next contact was when Burgess called him to say good-bye, indicating he was returning to England. He said in his contacts with Burgess there was no indication Burgess had Communist sympathies or could be a Russian agent. He stated Burgess was an intellectual who was considered brilliant by some and that he had written many speeches for politicians in England. ([REDACTED])
13. [REDACTED] advised he had known Burgess since 1938. He advised he knew Burgess had a reputation as a homosexualist but had no reason to doubt his loyalty. He stated Burgess studied Marxism but never indicated any sympathy for it. [REDACTED] advised he saw Burgess three times in the United States and had no knowledge of his contacts. ([REDACTED])

15. [REDACTED] Mayflower Motors, Washington, D. C., advised that Burgess bought a 1941 Lincoln Continental from him for \$1,195 on August 31, 1950. He further advised Burgess always seemed to have plenty of money and purchased a lot of gadgets for the car which he, [REDACTED], considered to be unnecessary. [REDACTED]
16. [REDACTED] advised he met Guy Burgess on the Queen Mary en route to England in May, 1951. [REDACTED] advised he debarked Cherbourg, France, but later met Burgess in London, where he also met a number of Burgess' friends. He advised Burgess gave no indication of being disloyal or pro-Russian. [REDACTED]
17. [REDACTED] advised he met Burgess while visiting at the South Carolina ranch of [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said that he was impressed by Burgess' "crackpot" economic ideas, such as holding that a country could spend itself to prosperity by unlimited borrowing. He said he had no reason to question the loyalty of Burgess to his own country. [REDACTED]
18. [REDACTED] advised she met Burgess on his two trips to Charleston in the Spring of 1951. On one of these trips she gave a cocktail party in his honor. She advised that at no time did Burgess express any political ideologies. [REDACTED]
19. [REDACTED] when interviewed, advised that Burgess had visited them in 1950 and 1951 at their home in Pennsylvania and also their South Carolina ranch. They met Burgess many years previously in London through [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] described Burgess as brilliant, very nervous, emotionally unstable and a heavy drinker; that Burgess defended the British-China policy and indicated he was a member of the Labor Party and favored British socialism. They knew of no derogatory data concerning Burgess. [REDACTED]
20. [REDACTED] met Burgess in September, 1950. He advised Burgess made homosexual advances toward him which he, [REDACTED], resisted. He described Burgess as bordering on having a psychopathic condition. Burgess did not express to [REDACTED] any sympathies for communism but did say that he thought the Western world was very muddled and would like to get away from it. Also, that things he had hoped for in the way of peace and generally improved world conditions had not come to pass. [REDACTED]

22. [REDACTED] advised that he was picked up as a hitchhiker by Burgess in April, 1951, at Fredericksburg, Virginia, and Burgess offered to drive him to Charleston, South Carolina. [REDACTED] accompanied Burgess to Charleston, spending a night en route. During this trip, Burgess made homosexual advances toward [REDACTED]. According to [REDACTED], Burgess said that he would never fight for freedom again; that the United Nations had no reason to enter the Korean War; that he intended to return to England in the fall and would like to go to the USSR as a representative where he could learn and do many interesting things. [REDACTED] During this trip to Charleston, Burgess and [REDACTED] were arrested by the Virginia State Police for speeding which resulted in a protest by the Governor of Virginia. This protest was the direct cause of Burgess being recalled to England. [REDACTED]
23. [REDACTED], advised on interview he met Burgess at a cocktail party in Charleston, South Carolina, in March and again in April, 1951. He advised Burgess made no unfavorable comments about the United States nor did he make any pro-Russian statements. [REDACTED]
24. [REDACTED], Bayliner Motor, described Burgess as a "bit" on cars. When interviewed, [REDACTED] stated Burgess spent a great amount of money on his car and at times he attempted to discourage Burgess from spending this money. He advised on one occasion Burgess spent \$400 on his car and also spent \$600 at another garage. He advised Burgess was always drunk when he saw him. He also stated he saw [REDACTED] with Burgess on many occasions. It is noted [REDACTED] was secretary to Kim Philby. [REDACTED] knew of no pro-Communist or pro-Soviet statements made by Burgess. [REDACTED]

The above are considered the known pertinent contacts of Burgess while in this country and do not include all known contacts while in the United States. [REDACTED]

IX. HAROLD ADRIAN RUSSELL PHILBY

D. Background

Harold Adrian Russell Philby, better known as Kim, was born Ambala, Punjab, on January 1, 1912, the son of Harry Saint John Bridger Philby, member of the Indian Civil Service. The elder Philby spent much of his adult life as advisor to King Ibn Saud of Arabia. The elder Philby was interned for a short time during World War II due to his anti-British and pacifist statements.

Philby attended Westminster School from 1927 to 1929 and then obtained a scholarship to Trinity College of Cambridge University from which institution he received an A.B. degree in 1935.

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As stated above, Philby married Alice Friedman in Vienna in February, 1934. On September 1, 1940, he notified his employers he had married Aileen Amanda Luroe who was born in India August 24, 1910. On September 17, 1945, Alice Friedman obtained a divorce from Philby and on September 26, 1946, Philby married Aileen Luroe. ~~_____~~
~~_____~~

Since their marriage at least two more children have been born.

J. Association of Burgess with Philby's Secretary

[REDACTED] was secretary to Philby both in Istanbul and Washington. She first met Burgess when he visited Philby in Istanbul in 1950. While in Washington both Burgess and [REDACTED] lived with the Philbys jointly and by [REDACTED] own statement they were "close friends." [REDACTED] has denied furnishing any information to Burgess concerning the investigation to identify Maclean. She claims she never heard the slightest rumor in the British Embassy, Washington, D. C., to the effect that any such investigation was being conducted. [REDACTED] (S)

XIV: ALLEGATIONS OF VLADIMIR PETROV,
SOVIET DEFECTOR IN AUSTRALIA

Vladimir Petrov, Soviet agent who defected in Australia in April, 1954, in an article published in the "United States News and World Report" issue of September 23, 1955, alleged that Maclean and Burgess were long-term Soviet agents. According to this article, Petrov learned through his colleague, one Kislytsin, Second Secretary of the Russian Embassy in Australia, that Maclean and Burgess had been independently recruited to work for Soviet intelligence during their student days at Cambridge University. According to Kislytsin, who was in London from 1945 to 1948, Burgess brought brief cases full of Foreign Office documents to the Soviet Embassy where they were photographed and returned to him. The flight of Maclean and Burgess was planned from Moscow upon being advised by the subjects that they were under investigation. Kislytsin reportedly assisted in planning their escape and met them upon their arrival in Moscow. He was responsible for their welfare and visited them often in a comfortable home outside of Moscow. Kislytsin told Petrov that Maclean and Burgess were acting as advisers to the Foreign Office on Anglo-American affairs. Kislytsin was also aware of their plan to get Mrs. Maclean to Moscow and when he read of her escape in the Australian newspaper, he recognized some of the details.

The first publication of Petrov's allegations appeared in the London newspapers on September 18, 1955. Such publication resulted in extensive criticism of the British officials.

XV: WHITE PAPER

In view of the wave of criticism which arose in England following Petrov's revelations that Maclean and Burgess were Soviet agents, the British Government issued a "White Paper" on September 23, 1955. This "White Paper" contained the background, circumstances surrounding their disappearance and also that of Maclean's wife, Marina, correspondence received by relatives subsequent to their disappearance and allegations of Vladimir Petrov, Soviet defector.

Additionally, the paper pointed out that in 1949 information was received indicating that certain Foreign Office

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3

[REDACTED]

information had been leaked to the Russians some years earlier. Investigation by May, 1951, indicated Maclean to be the principal suspect, although insufficient evidence had been obtained to permit his arrest. On Friday, May 25, 1951, Herbert Morrison (the Foreign Secretary) authorized interview of Maclean; however, Maclean was on leave Saturday, May 26, and the Foreign Office was not aware of his disappearance until Monday, May 28. Steps taken to locate Maclean and Burgess and correspondence received by their relatives subsequent to their escape was set forth. (U)

The conclusion is set forth in the paper that Maclean became aware that he was under investigation. This was accomplished either through a warning or on his own deduction when certain papers were held from him. (U)

It is pointed out that at the time of Maclean's and Burgess' appointments to the Foreign Office nothing was in the record to show either man was unsuitable for public service, although their subsequent personal behavior was unsatisfactory and resulted in action in each case.

The paper pointed out that information concerning this case was not made available to the press because espionage is carried out in secret. Counterespionage equally depends for its success upon the maximum secrecy of its methods. [REDACTED]

**SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY
SUBCOMMITTEE INTERVIEW**

An Associated Press article appeared in the "Washington Post" on September 20, 1951, stated the Maclean and Burgess case had been brought under investigation by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Senator McClellan, Chairman of this Subcommittee, said one point of the inquiry was to determine if Maclean and Burgess could have tipped Red China that its own bases would be immune from attack if the Chinese troops were drawn into the Korean war. Senator McClellan was quoted as saying he had written to the State Department asking Secretary Acheson about the two men's relations with the Chinese government and the basic activity in connection therewith. The article further stated the subcommittee was expected to try and find out what information Burgess and Maclean had access to and what contacts they had in this country.

The "Washington Post and Times Herald" of October 18, 1951, contained an article reflecting that Senate investigators had asked Secretary of State Acheson if he had any information on whether British sources leaked secret information to Communist China during the Korean war.

The inquiry was in a letter from Chairman James O. Eastland of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. The Senator asked fifteen specific questions, most of them involving Maclean and Burgess. One of the questions asked of the State Department if it had any information that Maclean or others had given the "Reds" assurances that American forces would not use the Taikung base in the event the Chinese Communists invaded Korea.

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A. "U.S. News and World Report" dated September 30, 1955.

The above magazine has an article on page 21 entitled "Can The Sino-Soviet U. S. War." This article is worthy of note since it indicates that Maclean and Burgess aided the Chinese invasion of Korea. Briefly, it states that on September 24, 1950, the decision was sent to General Douglas MacArthur that his forces--airplanes as well as troops--"would not cross the Soviet or Manchurian borders under any circumstances." On November 6, 1950, Maclean became head of the American desk in the British Foreign Office. On November 24, 1950, the Chinese Communists attacked across the border the U. S. forces in Korea. The implication is strong that Maclean learned that U. S. forces would not cross the Yalu River and so advised the Soviets. On the strength of this, the Chinese Communists entered the Korean peninsula.

This article also indicates that Burgess was second secretary of the British Embassy in Washington, D.C., during nine months which were critical in Korea, from August, 1950, to early May, 1951. The article states, "Burgess was one of the echelons who learned and that was going on."

XII. MACLEAN AND FUCHS

During 1947-48, Maclean served as the United Kingdom Secretary to the Combined Policy Committee concerned with atomic energy matters. This committee was composed of representatives of the United States, United Kingdom and Canada. Maclean attended a three-day declassification conference held in October, 1947, which included a discussion on atomic weapons. Another British representative at this conference was Sir Julius Klaus Fuchs, confessed Soviet espionage agent. ()

Fuchs was interviewed at Stafford Prison on July 11, 1951, and was shown photographs of Maclean and Burgess. He denied knowing either of them and claimed to have no recollection of attending a declassification conference with Maclean in October, 1947. ()

XXI, DISSEMINATION

Following the disappearance of Maclean and Burgess details concerning the disappearance, their background and information reflecting these men were in a position to furnish valuable information to the Soviets were disseminated on June 18 and 19, 1951, to [REDACTED] Special Consultant to President Truman; the then Attorney General; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Inspector General, Department of the Air Force; [REDACTED] the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission; Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; [REDACTED] Division of Security, Office of Consular Affairs, Department of State and [REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency. [REDACTED]

SUBSEQUENT DISSEMINATION

(1) Central Intelligence Agency

Because of this Agency's interest in this case they were kept currently advised of information received by this Bureau which appeared to be of interest to that Agency. This included copies of pertinent reports [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(3) Attorney General

By letters of January 5 and 12, 1954, the Attorney General was advised of Maclean's reported access to Atomic Information, and Atomic Energy Headquarters, Washington, D. C. He was also advised that our records do not reflect Burgess had access to any atomic information while in this country. In addition to the above copies pertinent reports were disseminated to Records and Administration Branch. [REDACTED]

(4) State

By letter of August 1, 1951, [REDACTED] Office of Consular Affairs, Department of State, was furnished information received relating to possible association between Burgess and [REDACTED]

By letter of July 23, 1954, [REDACTED] Department of State, was furnished the results of an interview with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] concerning Donald Maclean. In addition to the above, copies of pertinent reports were furnished. [REDACTED]

(5) Atomic Energy Commission

By letter of February 12, 1953, to [REDACTED] Atomic Energy Commission, additional information was furnished relating to the subjects' background and activities, also that it was the belief [REDACTED] that Burgess and Maclean had been engaged in Soviet intelligence activities and their flight from England related to these intelligence activities. [REDACTED]

XXVI. IT DID NOT DISSEMINATE IN AFRICA 1949

The information was not disseminated prior to the identification of Moleau in June, 1951, as the Soviet agent was operated in the British Embassy in Washington [REDACTED] for the following reasons:

- 1) The information was extremely sparse and contained insufficient data to identify the agent. ()
- 2) The information pertained to British citizens and British subjects in the British Embassy [REDACTED] prior to 1949. ()
- 3) An active investigation was launched by the British, most of which was carried on in London. ()
- 4) The information was furnished by [REDACTED] ()
- 5) We were most anxious to discover any possible American angles prior to a leak that could have resulted from dissemination of the information. ()

XXIII. DESCRIPTIONS

A. CUY FRANCIS LE MONTE DUNCAN

Born	April 10, 1911
Height	5' 11"
Weight	175 pounds
Hair	Brown, wavy
Complexion	Ruddy
Eyes	Blue
Sex	Male
Marital status	Single
Accumulations	Slovenly, excessive drinker, chain smoker, homosexual

B. LORELL ELMER MACLEAN

Born	May 25, 1911
Height	6' 4"
Weight	125 to 130 pounds
Build	Slender
Hair	Light brown
Teeth	Delayed
Eyes	Blue
Sex	Male
Complexion	Medium
Marital status	Married-wife, Melinda Maclean; three children.
Accumulations	Very nervous, high strung, heavy drinker, brilliant writer reportedly homosexual

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SECTION II

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
American Embassy
Paris 8, France

4/2
Date: November 28, 1955
To: Director, FBI (b6) (b7C)
From: Legat, Paris (b6) (b7C)
Subject: DONALD DUART MacLEAN (b6) (b7C)
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

1 R. 3
K 2-1
K 7-1
(mcc)

Re Paris cable 11/17/55.

Page 5, paragraphs 16 and 17, of the British "White Paper", known as the "Report Concerning the Disappearance of Two Former Foreign Office Officials, Miscellaneous No. 17 (1955), London, September 1955, presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Parliament by Command of Her Majesty", a copy of which is in the files of this office, reads as follows:

"16. According to information given to the Foreign Office in confidence by Mrs. DUNBAR, MacLEAN's mother-in-law, who was then living with her daughter at Tatsfield, she received on August 3, 1951, two registered letters posted in St. Gallen, Switzerland, on August 1. One contained a draft on the Swiss Bank Corporation, London, for the sum of 1,000 pounds payable to Mrs. DUNBAR; the other, a draft payable to Mrs. DUNBAR for the same sum, drawn by the Union Bank of Switzerland on the Midland Bank, 122 Old Broad Street, London. Both drafts were stated to have been remitted by order of a Mr. ROBERT BECKER, whose address was given as the Hotel Central, Zurich. Exhaustive enquiries in collaboration with the Swiss authorities have not resulted in the identification of Mr. BECKER and it is probable that the name given was false.

"17. Shortly after the receipt of these bank drafts Mrs. MacLEAN received a letter in her husband's hand-writing. It had been posted in Reigate, Surrey, on August 5, 1951, and was of an affectionate, personal nature as from husband to wife. It gave no clue as to MacLEAN's whereabouts or the reason for his disappearance but it explained that the bank drafts, which for convenience had been sent to Mrs. DUNBAR, were intended for Mrs. MacLEAN.

ROL:CM

2 DEC 7 1955

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Director

11/28/55

Reportedly, [REDACTED] went to the British Embassy with this information but received a "cold shoulder." The complete significance of this information is unknown to this office; however, the Bureau is already aware of the fact that [REDACTED] was investigated by the DST after Mrs. MacLEAN disappeared with her children in September 1953. Prior to her disappearance, Mrs. MacLEAN spent a vacation with [REDACTED] at Majorca.

[REDACTED]

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: Nov. 7, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

CC:

SUBJECT: DONALD DUART MACLEAN
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

The Director's memo of 10/28/55 stated a carefully indexed brief should be prepared in the Maclean-Burgess-Philby matter and it may be desirable to disseminate same to high-level officials in the Government. The Director asked that we try to have it ready for his meeting with the Attorney General on 11/9/55.

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman [REDACTED]

The brief also contains information regarding the speech made in the British House of Commons by the Foreign Secretary on 11/7/55.

ACTION:

If you approve, copies of the brief are attached for dissemination to [REDACTED] White House; the Attorney General, and the Secretary of State. It is suggested that the copies for [REDACTED] and the Secy. of State be delivered via Liaison and the copy for the Attorney General be delivered by hand.

SUMMARY BRIEF

**DONALD DUART MACLEAN;
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS;
HAROLD ADRIAN RUSSELL PHILBY**

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- May, 1944.** Maclean assigned British Embassy, Washington, D. C. as Second Secretary.
- October, 1944.** Maclean promoted to First Secretary, British Embassy Washington, D. C. After the war became head of Chancery (includes code room) at British Embassy.
- October, 1948.** Maclean departed U.S. for assignment in Egypt.
- October 1, 1949.** [REDACTED]
- August, 1950.** Burgess assigned British Embassy, Washington, D. C., as Second Secretary. Took up residence at Philby's home where he stayed until recalled to London.
- May, 1951.** Burgess recalled to London as result of protest by Governor of Virginia to State Department because of violations of Virginia's speeding regulations.
- May 25, 1951** Burgess and Maclean disappeared from London.
- June 11, 1951.** Philby recalled to London and interrogated by KI-5 because of close association with Burgess.

II. DISAPPEARANCE OF MACLEAN and BURGESS

After his return from Washington, D. C., to London on May 7, 1951, Burgess is known to have lunched with Maclean on several occasions. On May 25, 1951, Burgess is known to have told friends that he was leaving London, but he gave conflicting accounts of his destination. He packed clothes sufficient for a weekend. On the evening of May 25, 1951, Maclean left London alone but arrived at his house accompanied by a man calling himself Roger Stiles. It is believed that Stiles is identical with Burgess. Between 9 and 10 p.m. Maclean and Stiles left the former's home in a hired car. Shortly before midnight, Maclean and Burgess boarded the SS. "Salaise" at Southampton, bound for St. Malo, France, on a weekend cruise. Two tickets had been booked in the names of Burgess and Miller. On arrival at the ship, Burgess explained that Miller had been prevented from making the journey and Maclean had taken his place. The ship docked at St. Malo at 10 a.m. on May 26, 1951. Burgess and Maclean disembarked, leaving in their cabin two suitcases containing clothes and one overcoat. They did not return to the ship.

At Rennes they could have caught a train connection for Paris, but there is no positive evidence that they did so.

A. Communications from Maclean

Maclean reportedly sent telegrams from Paris on June 6, 1951, to his mother and wife. On August 8, 1951, Melinda Maclean's mother, Melinda Dunbar, received two checks for 1000 pounds each. These checks were sent from St. Gaul, Switzerland, and were drawn under the name of Robert Becker, Hotel Central, Zurich, Switzerland. This individual also furnished an address of 302 West 22nd Street, New York City. This was a fictitious address and apparently an assumed name as no individual was ever located who might be identical with this Robert Becker. Maclean sent a letter to his wife, postmarked August 5, 1951, in England, in which

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[REDACTED]

he informed her that the 2000 pounds sent to her mother were for her. Maclean stated in his letter that the letter had been brought to England by a friend. He told his wife that he could not tell her why he left or where he was.

B. Communications from Burgess

Burgess reportedly sent two communications to his mother, Mrs. Eva Bassett, in London. One was a telegram postmarked June 8, 1951, at Rome, Italy. The other was postmarked London, England, December 21, 1953.

III. DISAPPEARANCE OF MACLEAN'S WIFE AND CHILDREN

On September 11, 1959, Melinda Maclean and her three children left her mother's house in Geneva, Switzerland, where they had moved from England. Later the same evening, Mrs. Maclean's automobile was located in a garage in Lausanne, Switzerland. She and the three children were reportedly observed leaving a train at Schwyz, St. Veit, Austria, where they disappeared without leaving a trace.

(A) Communications Received after Disappearance

On November 3, 1959, Melinda Maclean's mother received a letter from her, postmarked Cairo, Egypt, October 24, 1959. In this letter she stated that she could not do other than what she had done.

RONALD BOURT

IV. BACKGROUND OF MACLEAN

Summary

A. Birth

May 25, 1918, London, of a prominent British family.

B. Education

Graduated from Cambridge University, 1934, where he was a close friend of Burgess.

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[REDACTED]

C. Employment

Entered foreign service, London, 1935.

September, 1938, to June, 1940, served in British Embassy, Paris.

June, 1940, to April, 1944, assigned to Foreign Office, London.

May, 1944, assigned to British Embassy, Washington, D. C., as Second Secretary.

October, 1944, promoted to First Secretary. Remained in Washington, D. C., until September, 1948. From October, 1948, to May, 1950, assigned to British Embassy, Cairo, Egypt. In October, 1950, assigned as head of American Department of the Foreign Office, London. He remained at this post until his disappearance.

D. Health

While in Egypt, Maclean had a nervous breakdown and was under the care of a psychiatrist from May, 1950, until October, 1950. While in Cairo, he and [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) were drinking heavily and broke into the apartment of two American girls. This resulted in Maclean's recall to London. The psychiatrist who treated Maclean claimed that his condition was a result of excessive use of alcohol.

E. Homosexual Tendencies

[REDACTED] said "family grapevine" had it that Maclean was a homosexual.

[REDACTED]

F. Communist and Soviet Sympathies

While at Cambridge University, Maclean was a close friend of Burgess, who was reported to be an active Communist while at the university. During his university days, Maclean admitted to his mother that he had some Communist leanings, but he subsequently told her he had changed his mind.

1. [REDACTED], advised that he had frequent contact with Maclean.

[REDACTED]. He advised his contacts with Maclean were mainly on business and he never observed any indication of pro-Soviet sympathies on the part of Maclean.

2. [REDACTED] advised he had contacts with Maclean in 1944 and never suspected that Maclean was more than a liberal.

3. [REDACTED] She advised she met both Maclean and his wife. She stated there was no indication on the part of Maclean of Soviet or Communist sympathies. She described Maclean as liberal, meaning that he favored the Labor Government in England and moderate reforms.

[REDACTED] advised that while in Cairo she shared an apartment with [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]. The adjoining apartment was occupied by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. She advised that one afternoon

in May, 1950, Maclean and [REDACTED] became drunk and called at the apartment house in which she lived. On this afternoon [REDACTED] was sleeping alone in the apartment and Maclean and [REDACTED] entered the apartment but did not cause any disturbance. Thereafter they went to the adjoining apartment occupied by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and ransacked the premises. She said they emptied drawers, upset furniture, threw dishes in the bathtub and generally made a mess of the apartment. After causing this damage, the two men left. Neither [REDACTED] nor [REDACTED] was at home at the time.

[redacted] stated that when they learned of the damage, they agreed not to make any official protest nor to discuss the matter with representatives of the British or U. S. Embassies. She advised that probably on the following day [redacted] received a written apology from Maclean, at which time he offered to pay for the damages and informed her he intended to see a doctor. [redacted]

4. [redacted] advised he has known Donald and Alan Maclean since 1939. [redacted] advised he had no contacts with either of the Macleans in the United States. He advised he regarded Maclean as a loyal British subject. (S)

5. [redacted] and in about April, 1949, he met Maclean at a golf tournament between members of the American and British Embassies in Cairo. He advised he played golf with Maclean on three occasions and lunched at the latter's home, where he also met Mrs. Maclean. He advised that at no time did he discuss political matters and he could furnish no information about Maclean's political sympathies. He advised Maclean appeared to be well-regarded in Cairo and he had heard nothing which would reflect unfavorably on his character or reputation. (S)

6. [redacted] advised that he was assigned in Cairo, Egypt, with the State Department in 1948, while Maclean was assigned there. [redacted] stated Maclean was criticized by the French-language newspaper in Cairo for associating with Philip Toynbee, who had been accused by an Egyptian newspaper of being a Communist. [redacted] discussed this matter with Maclean and the latter denied that Toynbee was a Communist. According to [redacted] Maclean, while in Cairo, associated with a fast group which centered its activities around the King of Egypt's sister, Princess Faiza. He described this group as not particularly immoral but merely "fun-loving." [redacted] knew of no subversive information relating to Maclean. (S)

297-8-

7. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] She stated she only met Donald Maclean on a few occasions, including a visit to his Washington home in 1946. The only friend or acquaintance of Maclean she recalls was [REDACTED], a secretary at the British Embassy. [REDACTED]

8. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] on interview advised he had been in the British diplomatic service for a number of years and was stationed in Paris in 1938-39 with Maclean. He stated he saw Maclean once in the United States at the Plaza Hotel, New York City, at which time Maclean told him he and his wife were going to Cairo, Egypt, for a new assignment. [REDACTED] advised he never heard that Donald Maclean had Communist sympathies or pro-Soviet views.

9. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised he first met Donald Maclean in Washington in 1944. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He felt certain that Maclean entertained no Communist feelings. He stated, however, that Maclean appeared to be continually under pressure and great strain caused by the demands on his work at the Embassy. He was unable to furnish any other pertinent information concerning Maclean.

10. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] They advised they knew Maclean both in Cairo and in the U.S. and they had never heard him make any pro-Soviet or pro-Communist statements. [REDACTED] rented their home in Washington to [REDACTED]

[redacted] which home was across the street from that occupied by the Macleans. Later, at a party in Cairo, Maclean asked [redacted] if she knew that the man to whom she rented her house in Washington was a Communist. [redacted] advised this was made in a tranquil manner and was made while Maclean was drinking. [redacted] stated she later determined that Maclean had received invitations to visit [redacted] home in Washington and he had refused to go. [redacted] both stated that although Maclean drank heavily in Cairo, to their knowledge he had not associated with anti-British or anti-American people and never attended any Soviet parties.

[redacted] advised he believed Melinda Dunbar, mother of Melinda Maclean, knew more about Melinda Maclean's disappearance than she had told. He based his opinion on the following:
1) She would not discuss the case; 2) Mrs. Dunbar evidently knew that her daughter had placed the authority for disposal of her home in the hands of an attorney with instructions concerning its disposition prior to her disappearance; 3) He had heard that Melinda's boys were expecting to see their father at least a month before they disappeared; 4) Mrs. Dunbar stalled for a couple of days before notifying the authorities that her daughter was missing.

[redacted] advised that [redacted] had been assisting the Foreign Office in its attempt to locate Donald since the latter first escaped. [redacted] stated she and her husband arrived at Donald Maclean's home on May 26, 1951, the day after his disappearance. Upon arrival, Melinda Maclean made excuses for Donald not being there, stating he was late coming from London. However, it appeared obvious that he was not expected as no place at the table had been set for him. The following morning the Maclean children came into the [redacted] bedroom and stated their father would not be coming home. Melinda Maclean later in the day advised that Donald had disappeared but she did not know where he had gone. She said that she was not going to advise the Foreign Office and would wait until they contacted her.

[REDACTED] said she remembered [REDACTED] stating that Donald had "flirted" with Communism while at Cambridge. The only Communist friend of Donald Maclean with whom she was acquainted was one [REDACTED], who assisted Maclean to pass his examinations at Cambridge. He also visited the Maclean home during this period.

12. [REDACTED], advised that he became acquainted with Donald Maclean when Melinda Maclean, her sisters, and their respective husbands rented a house next to his on Long Island. Page said he played tennis with Maclean on several occasions but never engaged in any political discussions with him. He had no reason to suspect Maclean as being pro-Communist or pro-Russian. ()

13. [REDACTED], advised that in September, 1948, he rented a home at 3326 P Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., and the prior tenant of that house was Donald Maclean. He stated he had two social contacts with Maclean and the latter said nothing to indicate that he was communistically inclined. [REDACTED], after consulting with his daughter, [REDACTED], advised that when they moved into the house, they found a letter on the premises addressed "Dearest Melinda." [REDACTED] recalled the letter had a very grim text, indicating the writer was either going away or contemplating suicide. She advised she could not recall any of the passages in the letter indicating the identity of the writer, and the page containing the signature, if there was one, was missing. She further advised the letter had been destroyed. ()

14. [REDACTED] advised the "family grapevine" was that Donald Maclean was a homosexual. He stated Maclean never exhibited Communist or Soviet sympathies but did hold liberal views. ()

15. [REDACTED]

18. [REDACTED], advised that Donald Maclean attended all meetings of the Combined Development Trust from 1947 until he left the U. S. This trust was composed of United States, United Kingdom and Canadian representatives, and its purpose was to develop information about the location and availability of materials suitable for atomic energy and to acquire same. He advised Maclean attended a three-day declassification conference held in October, 1947. [REDACTED] stated he did not know Maclean well and met him casually at cocktail parties in Washington.

VI. BACKGROUND OF GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS

Summary

A. Birth

Born April 16, 1911, England. *Eng*

B. Education

1930-34 Cambridge University

C. Employment

1934-35 Lecturer, Cambridge University

1935-38 British Broadcasting Service (anti-Nazi propaganda)

1941-44 British Broadcasting Service

1944-46 temporary appointment in News Department of Foreign Office, London

1946-48 employed in private office of the Minister of State

1948-50 Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office

August, 1950 - May, 1951, assigned British Embassy, Washington, D. C., Second Secretary. His recall to London in early May, 1951, resulted directly from a protest by the Governor of Virginia to the State Department because of Burgess' violation of the State of Virginia speeding regulations.

D. Homosexual Tendencies

Burgess is a known homosexual. This has been substantiated from many sources.

[REDACTED], advised that he could state with certainty that Burgess was known to be a homosexual.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] a "hitchhiker" picked up by Burgess in April, 1951, both advised that Burgess had made homosexual advances to them.

E. Communist and Soviet Sympathies

[REDACTED], a "hitchhiker" of questionable character who was picked up by Burgess in April, 1951, and who was with him when Burgess was stopped by the Virginia State authorities for speeding, claimed that Burgess said he would never again fight for freedom and that the United States or United Nations had no reason to enter the Korean war. According to [REDACTED] Burgess said he intended to return to England in the fall and that he would like to be sent to Russia, where he could learn and do many interesting things.

VII INTERVIEWS CONCERNING BURGESS

As previously mentioned following the disappearance of Maclean and Burgess considerable publicity ensued and this Bureau advised [redacted] that it was going to conduct interviews of acquaintances of Maclean and Burgess in the United States. Following is set forth such interviews wherein pertinent information was received. The following does not represent all the interviews which were conducted in this case in the United States. [redacted] Unless otherwise indicated, these interviews were conducted in 1951. [redacted]

1. [REDACTED] was contacted by Burgess in January, 1951, in relation to Far East questions. [REDACTED] saw him four or five times between January and March, 1951. He described Burgess as agreeable but restless and agitated, and as a heavy drinker but not sympathetic to Soviet Russia. [REDACTED] advised that Burgess expressed dislike of the congressional inquiry being made into homosexuality and from this [REDACTED] gathered the impression that Burgess had homosexual tendencies. He advised on interview by the Bureau that they had no discussions concerning Communism. ()

2. [REDACTED], upon interview by the Bureau advised that they first met Burgess in April, 1951, approximately two weeks before Burgess departed for England. They advised they were introduced to Burgess by [REDACTED], and that they met Burgess about three times in New York City. They had no information concerning any pro-Soviet or pro-Communist sympathies on the part of Burgess. ()

3. [REDACTED] was interviewed by Bureau agents. He advised he met Guy Burgess socially in England about 1949 and had had a slight social acquaintance with him since that time. [REDACTED] stated he had no reason to believe Burgess was sympathetic to Russia or the Communist Party. [REDACTED] advised that he had Burgess and one [REDACTED] to supper at his home on the Sunday prior to the disappearance of Burgess and Maclean. Following this disappearance, [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that during that evening Burgess told her he was hoping to take a Mediterranean cruise. ()

4. [REDACTED] advised that he had known Donald Maclean and his brother since 1939 and had known Burgess for a few years. He advised he saw Burgess in New York City in April, 1951, and that Burgess was drunk the last few days he was in New York City. He stated he knew of no disloyal statements made by Burgess. ()

Day 7, 1955

6. [REDACTED] advised on interview that he had attended college with Burgess and had lived in the same house with him during that time. He described himself as a close friend of Burgess and stated he was fond of him. [REDACTED] advised that he was in London during 1943-44 in the United States Navy, during which time Burgess admitted to him that he was a homosexual. He stated this did not stop his friendship with Burgess as "One's morals are his own business." He stated he had no reason to suspect that Burgess had pro-Communist or pro-Soviet views.

6. [REDACTED] advised that he met Burgess in New York City. [REDACTED] advised he had no knowledge of any Communist sympathies on the part of Burgess nor did he know of any friends or relatives of Burgess.

7. [REDACTED] advised she met Burgess at several parties in 1950. She had no information concerning his pro-Soviet or pro-Communist sympathies.

8. [REDACTED] advised he met Burgess in London in the late 1930's. He said he also met Burgess again in 1947. [REDACTED] described Burgess as a drunkard, a homosexual and an emotionally unstable person. He stated he knew of no pro-Soviet acts on the part of Burgess other than his support of the Loyalists during the Spanish Civil War in 1937.

9. [REDACTED] advised that he met Burgess in England in 1936. [REDACTED] Burgess was a social acquaintance of the [REDACTED] family. He stated he exchanged letters with Burgess during 1937-38, [REDACTED] and upon his return to England again had personal contact with Burgess. He advised the last personal contact with Burgess occurred between 1939 and 1940. [REDACTED] stated these contacts were all of a social nature. [REDACTED]

11. [REDACTED] advised he was contacted in March, 1951, by Burgess, who furnished a letter of introduction from [REDACTED]. At the time of this first meeting, [REDACTED] advised that Burgess was intoxicated. He stated Burgess and his mother later recontacted him in April, 1951, at which time Burgess was apologetic for his condition at their prior meeting.

12. [REDACTED] advised he first met Burgess at Cambridge University in 1930 and knew him for about three years. He next saw Burgess when Burgess came to Paris as Secretary to Hector McNeill, British Minister of State. [REDACTED] stated he next heard of Burgess in the Fall of 1950, when Burgess contacted him in New York City. His next contact was when Burgess called him to say good-bye, indicating he was returning to England. He said in his contact with Burgess there was no indication Burgess had Communist sympathies or could be a Russian agent. He stated Burgess was an intellectual who was considered brilliant by some and that he had written many speeches for politicians in England.

13. [REDACTED] advised he had known Burgess since 1936. He advised he knew Burgess had a reputation as a homosexual but he had no reason to doubt his loyalty. He stated Burgess studied Marxism but never indicated any sympathy for it. [REDACTED] advised he saw Burgess three times in the United States and had no knowledge of his contacts.

15. [REDACTED], Mayflower Gardens, Washington, D. C., advised that Burgess bought a 1941 Lincoln Continental from him for \$1,195 on August 31, 1950. He further advised Burgess always seemed to have plenty of money and purchased a lot of gadgets for the car which he, [REDACTED], considered to be unnecessary.

16. [REDACTED] advised he met Guy Burgess on the "Queen Mary" en route to England in May, 1951. [REDACTED] advised he debarked at Cherbourg, France, but later met Burgess in London, where he also met a number of Burgess' friends. He advised Burgess gave no indication of being disloyal or pro-Russian.

17. [REDACTED], who was interviewed at his home in Philadelphia, advised he met Burgess while visiting at the South Carolina ranch of [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said that he was impressed by Burgess' "crackpot" economic ideas, such as holding that a country could spend itself to prosperity by unlimited borrowing. He said he had no reason to question the loyalty of Burgess to his own country.

18. [REDACTED], advised she met Burgess on his two trips to Charleston in the Spring of 1951. On one of these trips she gave a cocktail party in his honor. She advised that at no time did Burgess express any political ideologies.

19. [REDACTED], when interviewed, advised that Burgess had visited them in 1950 and 1951 at their home in Pennsylvania and also at their South Carolina ranch. They met Burgess many years previously in London through [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] described Burgess as brilliant, very nervous, emotionally unstable and a heavy drinker; they said Burgess defended the British-China policy and indicated he was a member of the Labor Party and favored British socialism. They knew of no derogatory data concerning Burgess.

20. [REDACTED] met Burgess in September, 1950. He advised Burgess made homosexual advances toward him which he, [REDACTED], resisted. He described Burgess as bordering on having a psychopathic condition. Burgess did not express to [REDACTED] any sympathies for Communism but did say that he thought the Western world was very muddled and would like to get away from it. Burgess said the things he had hoped for in the way of peace and generally improved world conditions had not come to pass.

22. [REDACTED] advised that he was picked up as a "hitchhiker" by Burgess in April, 1951, at Fredericksburg, Virginia, and Burgess offered to drive him to Charleston, South Carolina. [REDACTED] accompanied Burgess to Charleston, spending a night en route. During this trip, Burgess made homosexual advances toward [REDACTED]. According to [REDACTED], Burgess said that he would never fight for freedom again; that he intended to return to England in the fall and would like to go as a representative to the USSR, where he could learn and do many interesting things. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. During this trip to Charleston, Burgess and [REDACTED] were arrested by the Virginia State Police for speeding. This resulted in a protest by the Governor of Virginia. This protest was the direct cause of Burgess being recalled to England. ()

23. [REDACTED], advised he met Burgess at a cocktail party in Charleston, South Carolina, in March and again in April, 1951. He advised Burgess made no unfavorable comments about the United States nor did he make any pro-Russian statements. ()

24. [REDACTED] Mayflower Motors, described Burgess as a "nut" on cars. When interviewed, [REDACTED] stated Burgess spent a great amount of money on his car and at times he attempted to discourage Burgess from spending this money. He advised Burgess was always drunk when he saw him. He also stated he saw [REDACTED] with Burgess on many occasions. It is noted [REDACTED] was secretary to Kim Philby. [REDACTED] knew of no pro-Communist or pro-Soviet statements made by Burgess. ()

VII. HAROLD ADRIAN RUSSELL PHILBY

B. Background

Summary *Sp*
Erq
Harold Adrian Russell/Philby, better known as Kim, was born in Ambala, Punjab, on January 1, 1912, the son of Harry Saint John Bridger Philby, member of the Indian Civil Service. The elder Philby spent much of his adult life as advisor to King Ibn Saud of Arabia. The elder Philby was interned for a short time during World War II due to his anti-British and pacifist statements. *7*
CC

Philby attended Westminster School from 1924 to 1929 and then obtained a scholarship to Trinity College of Cambridge University, from which institution he received an A.B. degree in 1933.

Philby traveled to Vienna, Austria, in the Summer of 1933, where he remained until May, 1934. During this time, he married Alice Friedman, nee Kollman. In November, 1934, he was briefly connected with a business enterprise to form

[REDACTED]

a news service in London. Late in 1934 he became assistant Editor of "Review of Reviews" and in 1936 he became editor of "Britain and Germany," a magazine designed to stimulate trade with Germany. In February, 1937, he traveled to Spain as a free-lance journalist and in April, 1937, became "London Times" correspondent. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In October, 1939, he was chief correspondent for the "London Times" with the British Expeditionary Forces in France. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

As stated above, Philby married Alice Friedman in Vienna in February, 1934. On September 1, 1940, he notified his employers he had married Aileen Amanda Furse, who was born in India, August 24, 1910. On September 17, 1946, Alice Friedman obtained a divorce from Philby and on September 26, 1946, Philby married Aileen Furse. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Since their marriage, at least two more children have been born. [REDACTED]

I. Association of Burgess with Philby's Secretary

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ was secretary to Philby both in Istanbul and Washington. She first met Burgess when he visited Philby in Istanbul in 1949. While in Washington, both Burgess and ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ lived with the Philby family and by ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~'s own statement they were "close friends." ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ has denied furnishing any information to Burgess concerning the investigation to identify Maclean. She claims she never heard the slightest rumor in the British Embassy, Washington, to the effect that any such investigation was being conducted.

X
6-20-55
100-50

XII. ALLEGATIONS OF VLADIMIR PETROV,
SOVIET DEFECTOR IN AUSTRALIA

Vladimir Petrov, Soviet agent who defected in Australia in April, 1954, in an article published in the "U. S. News and World Report" issue of September 23, 1955, alleged that Maclean and Burgess were long-term Soviet agents. According to this article, Petrov learned through his colleague, one Kislytsin, Second Secretary of the Russian Embassy in Australia, that Maclean and Burgess had been independently recruited to work for Soviet intelligence during their student days at Cambridge University. According to Kislytsin, who was in London from 1945 to 1949, Burgess brought brief cases full of Foreign Office documents to the Soviet Embassy, where they were photographed and returned to him. The flight of Maclean and Burgess was planned from Moscow upon being advised by them that they were under investigation. Kislytsin reportedly assisted in planning their escape and met them upon their arrival in Moscow. He was responsible for their welfare and visited them often in a comfortable home outside of Moscow. Kislytsin told Petrov

[REDACTED]

that Maclean and Burgess were acting as advisers to the Foreign Office on Anglo-American affairs. Kislytsin was also aware of their plan to get Mrs. Maclean to Moscow and when he read of her escape in the Australian newspaper, he recognized some of the details.

The first publication of Petrou's allegations appeared in the London newspapers on September 18, 1955. Such publication resulted in extensive criticism of the British officials.


XIII. WHITE PAPER

In view of the wave of criticism which arose in England following Petrou's revelations that Maclean and Burgess were Soviet agents, the British Government issued a "White Paper" on September 23, 1955. This "White Paper" contained the background, circumstances surrounding their disappearance and also of Maclean's wife, Melinda, correspondence received by relatives subsequent to their disappearance and allegations of Vladimir Petrou, Soviet defector.

In addition, the paper pointed out that in 1949 information was received indicating that certain Foreign Office information had been leaked to the Russians some years earlier. Investigation conducted up to May, 1951, indicated Maclean to be the principal suspect, although insufficient evidence had been obtained to permit his arrest. On Friday, May 25, 1951, Herbert Morrison (the Foreign Secretary) authorized interview of Maclean; however, Maclean was on leave Saturday, May 26, and the Foreign Office was not aware of his disappearance until Monday, May 28. Steps taken to locate Maclean and Burgess and correspondence received by their relatives subsequent to their escape was set forth.

The conclusion is set forth in the paper that Maclean became aware that he was under investigation. This was accomplished either through a warning or on his own deduction when certain papers were held from him.

It is pointed out that at the time of Maclean's and Burgess' appointments to the Foreign Office, nothing was


in the record to show either man was unsuitable for public service, although their subsequent personal behavior was unsatisfactory and resulted in action in each case.

The paper pointed out that information concerning this case was not made available to the press because espionage is carried out in secret. Counterespionage equally depends for its success upon the maximum secrecy of its methods.

- 33 - 33

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A. "U.S. News and World Report" dated September 30, 1955.

The above magazine has an article on page 21 entitled "How Two Spies Lost U. S. a War." This article is worthy of note since it indicates that Maclean and Burgess aided the Chinese invasion of Korea. Briefly, it states that on September 27, 1950, the decision was sent to General Douglas MacArthur that his forces--airplanes as well as troops--"would not cross the Soviet or Manchurian borders under any circumstances." On November 6, 1950, Maclean became head of the American desk in the British Foreign Office. On November 24, 1950, the Chinese Communists attacked across the border the UN forces in Korea. The implication is strong that Maclean learned that UN forces would not cross the Yalu River and so advised the Soviets. On the strength of this, the Chinese Communists entered the Korean conflict.

This article also indicates that Burgess was Second Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington, D.C., during nine months which were critical in Korea, from August, 1950, to early May, 1951. The article states, "Burgess was one of the echelon who learned all that was going on."

XVI. MACLEAN AND FUCHS

During 1947-48, Maclean served as the United Kingdom secretary to the Combined Policy Committee concerned with atomic energy matters. This committee was composed of representatives of the United States, United Kingdom and Canada. Maclean attended a three-day declassification conference held in October, 1947, which included a discussion on atomic weapons. Another British representative at this conference was Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, confessed Soviet espionage agent.

Fuchs was interviewed at Stafford Prison on July 11, 1951, and was shown photographs of Maclean and Burgess. He denied knowing either of them and claimed to have no recollection of attending a declassification conference with Maclean in Washington, D. C.

XVIII. SPEECH IN BRITISH PARLIAMENT 11/2/55

The Foreign Secretary delivered a speech in the House of Commons on November 2, 1955, in which he stated that it had rarely happened in parliamentary history that the political head of a department had to unfold such a tragic story as was necessary to consider at this time.

The Foreign Secretary pointed out the change in thinking which had occurred regarding communism and security measures from the 1930's to the present time. He remarked that freedom must not be destroyed to preserve it. He enumerated the changes which had been made in the investigation and methods of appointment of Foreign Service personnel and was of the opinion that under the present system there could be no repetition of the Maclean-Burgess case.

Reference was made to H.A.R. Philby who had been mentioned in the House of Commons as the "Third Man." The Foreign Secretary said that after thorough investigation of Philby, no evidence has been found to show that he was responsible for warning Burgess or Maclean. While in the Foreign Service Philby carried out his duties ably and conscientiously. The Foreign Secretary concluded his remarks concerning Philby by saying, "I have no reason to conclude that Mr. Philby has at any time betrayed the interest of this country or to identify him with the so-called 'Third Man,' if, indeed, there was one."

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI [REDACTED]

DATE: December 13, 1955

FROM : Legal Attache, London [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: DONALD DUART MacLEAN, ET AL
ESPIONAGE - R

Reference is made to the news clipping from the London "Daily Express" of 12/7/55, captioned "ENTER 2 VILLIANS", which was forwarded to the Bureau on 12/9/55.

As noted, the article alleges that PETER BROOK, who recently produced "HAMLET" in Moscow, returned to London stating that subjects had been seen in that city. He attributed this story to the wife of the U. S. Ambassador in Moscow, Charles Bohlen.

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[REDACTED] 76R
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
BY COURIER SERVICE

EX - 124

Date: January 4, 1956

To: [REDACTED]

Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: DONALD DUART MACLEAN;
GUY FRANCIS BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

The London "Daily Express" of December 7, 1955, contained an article captioned "Enter 2 Villains." This article alleged that Peter Brook, who recently produced "Hamlet" in Moscow, returned to London stating that subjects had been seen in that city. This story was attributed to the wife of the United States Ambassador in Moscow, Charles Bohlen.

320

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : gm

Director, FBI

DATE: December 23, 1955

FROM :

Legal Attache, London

SUBJECT:

DONALD DUART MacLEAN, ET AL
ESPIONAGE - R

10110

Teen of Maclean

There is attached for the information of the Bureau a copy of the book entitled "THE GREAT SPY SCANDAL," which has just now been published under the auspices of the DAILY EXPRESS, one of the leading London newspapers.

321

Belmont
Payne

The Attorney General (Original)

January 4, 1956

Director, FBI

A. I. R. ①
DONALD DUART MACLEAN;
GUY FRANCIS BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

Cs
The London "Daily Express" of December 7, 1955, contained an article captioned "Enter 2 Villains." This article alleged that Peter Brook, who recently produced "Hamlet" in Moscow, returned to London stating that subjects had been seen in that city. This story was attributed to the wife of the United States Ambassador in Moscow, Charles Bohlen. (b) 7-1 2-1

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: December 29,
1955

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

SUBJECT: DONALD DUART MACLEAN et al
ESPIONAGE - R

During a recent review of all references in Bufiles on Harold A. R. Philby, abstracts were made and placed on 3x5 cards. Philby, [REDACTED] is suspected of tipping-off subject that he was under investigation. From this review there does not appear to be any basis on justification for an investigation of Philby. (b)(1)

ACTION:

Authority is requested to retain these abstracts for ready reference in the event of future inquiries from Bureau officials or other Government agencies concerning Philby. (b)(1)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: January 10, 1956

FROM : A. H. Belmont

cc -

SUBJECT: DONALD DUART MACLEAN
GUY FRANCIS DEMONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

Legat, London, by letter received 12-29-55, furnished a copy of a new book entitled "The Great Spy Scandal," just published under the auspices of the "Daily Express," one of the leading London newspapers. The book is described on its cover as the "Inside story of Burgess and Maclean."

The story begins on June 6, 1951, (Burgess and Maclean disappeared from England 5-25-51) when the chief correspondent of the "Daily Express" in Paris, France, received a warning by an unknown person to stop asking questions about missing persons. Reportedly, this correspondent had received a tip about a week previously, that two British diplomats were missing. This book contains the story of Burgess and Maclean in chronological order (including their backgrounds) and concludes with the recent debates in the Houses of Parliament.

This book continues the critical policy of the "Daily Express" toward the British Foreign Office and Security Services. The following are the chief points of criticism:

(A) Foreign Office.

(1) Failure to release facts concerning Burgess and Maclean until forced to do so by pressure from newspapers and other sources and even as yet have not furnished all the facts in this case to which the public are entitled.

(2) As of June 11, 1951, neither Burgess nor Maclean had been dismissed from the Foreign Service.

(3) Foreign Office retained the subjects in spite of their Communist sympathy and undignified conduct which should have been known to their superiors.

(4) Public was not aware of disappearance of subjects until June 7, 1951. Pictures and descriptions, as well as all known facts concerning their disappearance, should have been released immediately. Indication of lack of coordination between the Foreign Office and Security Services.

(B) Security Services.

(1) Criticized delay of six days after subjects' disappearance

100-374183

DP:nlh

60 JAN 18 1956

INDEXED - 91

20 JAN 13 1956

32-1

EST-100

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

before notifying French authorities.

(2) Failure to have close surveillance of Maclean after he became principal suspect.

(3) Failure to search Maclean's home.

(4) Failure to establish an informant in Maclean's home.

(5) Failure to confiscate passports.

(6) Failure to keep abreast of the movements of Melinda Maclean prior to her disappearance from Switzerland.

(7) Failure to surveil Burgess.

The FBI was not mentioned. Reference was made to the U.S. News and World Report article alleging that the subjects may have been responsible for the entrance into the Korean War of the Red Chinese. It stated that the American Senators were not certain that the charge was unfounded.

ACTION:

For information.

✓

325

Legal Attache (██████████) ██████████
Paris, France (██████████)

January 27, 1956

RECORDED - 76 Director, FBI (██████████) ██████████

DONALD DUART MACLEAN;
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

Reurlet 1-10-56.

In accordance with your request, following background information on Harold Adrian Russell Philby, better known as "Kim" Philby, is being furnished to you. Philby was born 1-1-12, the son of Harry Saint John Philby. He received an A.B. degree in 1933 from Trinity College of Cambridge University.

Philby married Alice Friedman in Vienna in February, 1934. On 9-1-40, he notified his employers he had married Aileen Amanda Furse who was born in India, 8-24-10. On 9-17-46, Alice Friedman obtained a divorce from Philby and on 9-26-46, Philby married Aileen Furse.

Since their marriage, at least two more children have been born.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI ([REDACTED])

DATE: 1/19/56

FROM : SAC, WFO ([REDACTED])

SUBJECT: DONALD DUART MACLEAN; et al
ESPIONAGE - R

Rebulet 11/28/55 transmitting two photographs of HAROLD ADRIAN RUSSELL PHILEY for display purposes.

Also ref NY tel 11/18/55 and Butel 11/17/55 referred to in the NY ref tel.

The above photographs of PHILEY were displayed on 12/28/55 to [REDACTED] by SA's [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Source advised he was unable to identify the pictures with anyone known to him.

The same photos were shown on 1/6/56 to [REDACTED] by SA's [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. This source also advised that PHILEY's pictures did not resemble anyone known to him.

Available information does not indicate that [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] is identical with ROBERT BECKER, or that [REDACTED] has any relative by the name of ROBERT BECKER.

New York is requested to advise if any further investigation is contemplated in this matter. New York is also requested to furnish WFO with copy of Bureftel of 11/17/55 as this Office apparently does not have such copy.

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Legal Attache
London

(orig and 1)

January 18, 1956

Director, FBI

DONALD DUART MACLEAN
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

Enclosed is a copy of a Summary Brief in
captioned matter.

This Brief is furnished to you for your
information only.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: *January 27, 1956*

FROM : MR. C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: DONALD DUART MACLEAN, et al
ESPIONAGE - R

The attached cable from [REDACTED] reflects that the main findings of the Special Committee set up following the debates on the Maclean case in the British House of Commons to probe into the adequacy of government security measures were given to the Prime Minister just before sailing for the United States on January 24th.

Professore

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (██████████)
FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (██████████)
SUBJECT: DONALD DUARTO MAC LEAN;
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R
(OO:WASHINGTON FIELD)

DATE: 1/30/56

Re Bureau telephone call 11/4/55, requesting interview of ██████████ and Butel 11/17/55, requesting identification of BECKER, ██████████, to determine if he were identical with ROBERT BECKER who sent several drafts to Mrs. DUNBAR in 1951.

The investigation conducted by this office has been furnished to the Bureau and the WFO in various teletypes. Inasmuch as no active investigation is being conducted concerning the subjects and the inquiries conducted by this office produced no information of material value, UACB this office is placing this case in an RUC status.

Re WFO letter 1/19/56, no further investigation is contemplated in this matter. Enclosed for the WFO is one copy of Butel 11/17/55.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI ([REDACTED])

DATE: 2/9/56

FROM : SAC, WFO ([REDACTED])

SUBJECT: DONALD DUART MACLEAN; et al
ESPIONAGE - R

Re my letter dated 1/19/56 and New York letter dated 1/30/56.

Examination of the file in this case indicates there are no leads outstanding at this time. For the above reason this case is again placed in a closed status. C.

332

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: Feb. 13, 1956

FROM : A. H. Belmont

CC -

SUBJECT: DONALD DUART MACLEAN
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

"Washington Sunday Star" of 2/12/56 contained text of statement issued by subjects at news conference in the National Hotel, Moscow, 2/11/56. Conference attended by representatives of Russian and British press. Subjects merely handed a prepared statement to the press and did not answer questions. The statement alleged subjects went to Soviet Union to contribute to the policy aimed at greater understanding between Russia and the West, having become convinced on the basis of official information at their disposal that neither the British, nor still more the American, policy at that time was pursuing such a course. They had every possibility to know plans of a small but powerful group opposed to mutual understanding between the East and West. Both subjects admitted being Communists at college, although they engaged in no political activities while serving their government, feeling they could put into practice their ideals. They denied ever acting as Soviet agents. Maclean said that after the war it was difficult to find anyone who thought of anything other than the Communist menace or to understand the senseless danger of American policy in the Far East or Europe. Maclean said in May, 1951, his phones were tapped and he was surveilled wherever he went and one of his colleagues was sent to him for provocative purposes. A week or so after Burgess returned to London from Washington, in early May 1951, he visited Maclean at the Foreign Office. Maclean, being under surveillance, Burgess agreed to make all plans for their escape from England. Burgess claimed he never made a secret of the fact to his friends or colleagues that he had been a Communist. Burgess also indicated he had been connected with MI-5.

Observations:

Actually, the statement contains little new info except that it does remove all doubt as to subjects' whereabouts. They admitted having been Communists since their college days. According to their statement, Maclean became aware of the investigation of him

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

and decided to leave England and so advised Burgess who agreed to make all plans for the two of them to escape. [REDACTED]

The reason for the Russians' selecting this time for subjects to issue their statement is unknown. The "Washington Post and Times Herald" 2/13/56 contains article from London stating the British officials believed the Russian purpose in presenting Burgess and Maclean at this time was to drive a wedge between the U. S. and Britain. Vladimir Petrov, Soviet MVD agent who defected in Australia in 1954, revealed the subjects were long-time Soviet agents and their flight from England was planned by Moscow. Petrov in a statement issued in Australia 2/12/56 calls subjects liars in saying they never acted as Soviet agents.

FEBRUARY 14, 1956

LEGAL ATTACHE
LONDON, ENGLAND

DONALD DUART MACLEAN, ET AL, ESPIONAGE - R. REURCABLE THIS
DATE. OBTAIN COPY OR FULL CONTENTS OF MACLEAN LETTER AND
FORWARD BUREAU IMMEDIATELY.

HOOVER

REURCABLE THIS
DATE
OBTAIN COPY OR FULL CONTENTS OF MACLEAN LETTER AND
FORWARD BUREAU IMMEDIATELY.

The Attorney General (orig & 1)

February 14, 1956

Director, FBI

D
DONALD DUART MACLEAN
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE F R
(FBI file [REDACTED])

7-1
2-1

The "Washington Post and Times Herald," issue of February 14, 1956, contains an article reporting the discovery of a letter addressed to Donald Maclean while he was assigned at Cairo, Egypt, in May, 1950. According to this article, the letter indicates that in 1950 Maclean was receiving secret American documents from a contact in the American Embassy in Cairo. The news article notes that early in November, 1955, a user of the British Embassy library in Cairo found the letter while leafing through a library book. The letter was described as a series of cryptic sentences. One sentence only of the letter was quoted in the article, as follows: "David is very cautious about Donald's replacement and doesn't know what he is like." Purportedly, the letter also carried a reference to shirts and towels. The article recounts in some detail the circumstances known to the Bureau wherein Maclean, during assignment in Cairo and while in an intoxicated condition, broke into the apartment of an American girl. At that time, Maclean and a British companion, [REDACTED], did damage to the girl's apartment. Information about the Maclean-[REDACTED] episode was previously furnished to you in the Summary Brief dated November 8, 1955.

According to the news article, the letter which was found last November was turned over to British Intelligence (MI-5) and the article also notes that the American Embassy in Cairo knows of the discovery of the letter.

U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
FBI

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 14, 1956

FROM : MR. BELMONT

SUBJECT: DONALD DUART MACLEAN, et al
ESPIONAGE - R

The attached article, which appeared in this morning's "Washington Post and Times Herald" reports the discovery of a letter addressed to Donald Maclean while he was assigned in Cairo, Egypt, in May 1950. According to the newspaper article, the letter indicates that in 1950 Maclean was receiving secret American documents from a contact in the American Embassy in Cairo. The news article notes that early last November, a user of the British Embassy Library in Cairo found the letter while leafing through a library book. The letter was described as a series of cryptic sentences. Only one sentence of the letter was quoted in the article as follows: "David is very cautious about Donald's replacement and doesn't know what he is like." Purportedly the letter also carried a reference to shirts and towels. The article recounts in some detail the circumstances previously known to the Bureau wherein Maclean, while assigned in Cairo, while intoxicated broke into the apartment of an American girl. At that time Maclean and a companion did damage to the girl's apartment.

According to the news article, the letter which was found last November was turned over to MI-5 and the article also notes that the American Embassy in Cairo knows of the discovery of the letter.

1 03 14 36

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Associated Press

DONALD MACLEAN
... left "Cairo letter"

Maclean Link To U. S. Cairo Aide Revealed

N. Y. Herald Tribune News Service

LONDON, Feb. 13—The re-appearance in Moscow of missing diplomats Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess brought the first reference in the British press today to yet another hitherto secret aspect of the case—the existence of a "Cairo letter" which indicates that in 1950 Maclean was receiving secret American documents from a contact in the American Embassy in Cairo.

On assignment in Cairo three months ago, this correspondent was told the story of the discovery of the "Cairo letter," which had only recently occurred.

Early last November, a user of the British Embassy library in Cairo was leafing through a library book when out dropped an envelope containing a letter addressed to Donald Maclean.

Maclean had been head of the political department of the British Embassy in Cairo from 1948 until he was abruptly sent home on the first available aircraft after wrecking the apartment of an American girl in a drunken brawl in May, 1950.

The letter was dated that month, and clearly Maclean had left Cairo without having time to "pick up his mail."

The letter was turned over to MI-5, the counter-intelligence branch of the Embassy. Of apparent significance was the fact that the letter was signed by an American, with indications that it may have been an employee of the American Embassy immediately across the street from the British Embassy.

Letter was a series of sentences with references of a conspiratorial sort that only the recipient would fully understand. One sentence ran: "David is very cautious about Donald's replacement and doesn't know what he is like."

The letter also carried a reference to shirts and towels. Even a superficial appraisal led to the conclusion that Maclean had an American contact and the two were using the British Library for their "communications drop"—a favorite device of espionage.

One other odd circumstantial aspect of the affair is the fact that the American girl whose flat Maclean wrecked while drunk that night in May, 1950, was employed in the American Embassy library.

Maclean arrived at the girl's apartment very late, having seen her earlier in the evening at a cocktail party. By this time he and a friend with him were

See MACLEAN, Page 13, Col. 4

MacLEAN—From P. 1

Maclean Tie to U. S. Aide In Cairo Embassy Aired

quite drunk, and they burst in and began pulling down curtains, smashing pictures, turning out drawers, etc.

The girl fled and telephoned for help, and by the time the police arrived the apartment was a wreck and the two men had passed out cold.

American Ambassador Jefferson Caffery next morning walked across the street to British Ambassador Sir Ralph Stevenson and formally declared Maclean to be "persona non grata" to the American Embassy, and demanded damages for the girl's effects.

Sir Ralph ordered Maclean put on the first airplane leaving Cairo and did not even per-

mit him to come into the Embassy to clean up his desk. He was airbound for London by 2 o'clock that afternoon.

Hence there was scarcely an opportunity for him to pick up any conspiratorial mail in the Embassy library.

The American Embassy in Cairo knows of the discovery of the "Cairo Letter," but the extent to which the British may have communicated the details to the American Embassy or have examined with American authorities the question of who the American author of the letter to Maclean might have been is not, of course, known to this reporter. In any case, such a decision would have been taken secretly in London, and not Cairo.

As a footnote to the affair, Maclean in Cairo occupied a large residence owned by the British government, and as of December telephone bills were still coming in in his name. It takes a long time to get directories changed in Cairo.

Wash. Post and Times Herald _____
Wash. News _____
Wash. Star _____
N. Y. Herald Tribune _____
N. Y. Mirror _____
Daily Worker _____
The Worker _____
New Leader _____

Date _____

ENCLOSURE

338

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: Feb. 10, 1956

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: DONALD DUART MACLEAN
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

Observation: It is noted that our question as to whether subjects had access to such information was not answered directly. From the nature of the answer it might be assumed that the subjects would have access to such data. They certainly could not have obtained the official UN policy re Korea from reading newspapers and listening to the wireless.

The "Washington Evening Star" of 2/9/56 contained an article from London quoting a British Foreign Office spokesman, stating that no evidence had been received showing that Maclean or Burgess had betrayed the Korean war secrets to the Reds. This statement was in reply to questions prompted as a result of General Douglas MacArthur's article in Life Magazine issue of 2/13/56 to the effect that subjects were undoubtedly links in the chain to our enemy in Korea through Peiping by way of Moscow.

URGENT

DONALD DUART ⁰MACLEAN ET AL, ESPIONAGE - R. TODAY NEWSPAPERS
HEADLINE THAT BOTH SUBJECTS HELD SURPRISE PRESS CONFERENCE
IN MOSCOW YESTERDAY. ISSUED JOINT STATEMENT BUT REFUSED TO
ANSWER QUESTIONS. IN STATEMENT, SAID THEY CAME TO RUSSIA
TO WORK FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND THE
WEST; THAT BURGESS FORMERLY WORKED FOR MI-5 BUT NEVER CONCEALED
FACT THAT HE HAD BEEN A COMMUNIST.

0 11
DONALD DUART MACLEAN, ET AL; ESPIONAGE - R. REMYCABLE
FEBRUARY 12 LAST. IN HOUSE OF COMMONS TODAY, FOREIGN
SECRETARY SAID NO CREDENCE IN SUBJECTS' STATEMENT CAN BE
PLACED ON THEIR WORDS; FURTHER, SUBJECTS' APPEARANCE IN
MOSCOW SHOWS LACK OF CANDOR OF SOVIET AUTHORITIES WHO WERE
QUESTIONED FREQUENTLY IN PAST ABOUT SUBJECTS' WHEREABOUTS.
RE BURGESS' ALLEGED EMPLOYMENT BY BRITISH SECURITY SERVICE
(MI-5), FOREIGN SECRETARY SAID HE WAS EMPLOYED IN DEPARTMENT
AT BEGINNING OF WAR DEALING WITH PROPAGANDA TO NEUTRAL COUNTRIES,
LATER KNOWN AS SOE. REASON FOR SUBJECTS' STATEMENT MIGHT BE
TO AVOID EMBARRASSING QUESTIONS TO SOVIET LEADERS DURING APRIL
VISIT TO UNITED KINGDOM AND TO CREATE DISTRUST BETWEEN UNITED
KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES. 4

URGENT

DONALD DUART MACLEAN, ET AL; ESPIONAGE - R. LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH, UNDER CAIRO DATE LINE, REPORTS THAT IN BRITISH EMBASSY LIBRARY IN AUTUMN 1955, LETTER WHICH HAD BEEN IN BOOK SINCE MAY, 1951, WAS FOUND. ALLEGEDLY WRITTEN BY AMERICAN FRIEND OF MACLEAN AT TIME OF HIS DISAPPEARANCE. RECIPIENT OF LETTER NOT IDENTIFIED. ONLY SENTENCE QUOTED READS AS FOLLOWS QUOTE DAVID IS VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT DONALD'S REPLACEMENT AND DOES NOT KNOW WHAT HE IS LIKE UNQUOTE [REDACTED]

URGENT

DONALD DUART MACLEAN, ET AL; ESPIONAGE-R. REMYCABLE FEBRUARY 14, 1956. DON COOK, LONDON BUREAU OF NEW YORK HEARLD TRIBUNE, HAS ARTICLE INSTANT DATE RE CAIRO LETTER, IMPLYING THAT IN 1950 *England* MACLEAN WAS RECEIVING UNITED STATES DOCUMENTS FROM CONTACT IN UNITED STATES EMBASSY, CAIRO. CLAIMS LETTER, DATED MAY 1950, *NY* ADDRESSED TO MACLEAN, ALLEGEDLY BY AN AMERICAN IN UNITED STATES EMBASSY THERE, CONTAINED CRYPTIC REFERENCES OF A CONSPIRATORIAL SORT. COOK CONCLUDES MACLEAN HAD AMERICAN CONTACT AND THE TWO WERE USING LIBRARY AS DROP. ~~REDACTED~~

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February 15, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BOARDMAN
MR. BELMONT
MR. NICHOLS

721d
[redacted] likewise mentioned to me the ^{Gay}Burgess and Maclean matter with particular reference to the story which appeared in yesterday morning's Washington Post concerning a letter found by the British in Cairo, Egypt, [redacted] inquired whether we had ever been advised of this matter and I told him I would have appropriate inquiry made and see that he would be briefed upon the same. I asked [redacted] to handle this for me.

Very truly yours,

JEH
John Edgar Hoover
Director

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The Attorney General (orig & 1)

February 15, 1956

Director, FBI

**DONALD LUART MACLEAN,
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R
(FBI file [REDACTED])**

Reference is made to my letter of February 14, 1956, concerning an article which appeared in the "Washington Post and Times Herald" of that date, reporting the discovery of a letter in the library of the British Embassy, Cairo, Egypt, addressed to Donald Maclean.

() 2-1

B-11

VIA LIAISON

Date: February 15, 1956

To:

**Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.**

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: DONALD DUART MACLEAN;
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

Reference is made to our oral inquiry of you, through liaison, on February 14, 1956, to determine if the Department of State or the American Embassy in Cairo were aware of the discovery of the Donald Maclean letter in the British Embassy, Cairo, Egypt. As you were informed, an article in "The Washington Post and Times Herald," February 14, 1956, contained a story about the discovery of such a letter and alleged that the American Embassy in Cairo, Egypt, was aware of the above-mentioned letter. We desired to know the action taken by the American Embassy at Cairo upon learning of the letter.

340

Letter to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Office of Security
Department of State

It would be appreciated if you would keep this
Bureau promptly advised of any information you receive
concerning the alleged letter.

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Tic

Liaison

VIA LIAISON

Date: February 15, 1956

To:-

(Orig. & 1)

Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: DONALD DUART MACLEAN;
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

On February 14, 1956, you were orally furnished the information, through Liaison, relating to an article in the "Washington Post and Times Herald" of the same date reporting the discovery of a letter addressed to Donald Maclean while he was assigned in Cairo, Egypt, in May, 1950.

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
The Attorney General (orig & 1)

February 16, 1956

Director, FBI

g
DONALD DUART MACLEAN
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R
(FBI file [REDACTED])

Memorandum for the Attorney General

Apparently the only reference to Donald Maclean is in paragraph two of the letter wherein the writer refers to the affairs of Donald. Maclean was assigned to the British Embassy in Cairo from October, 1948, until May, 1950. It is noted that Maclean and Burgess disappeared on May 25, 1951, and the letter was written on June 7, 1951.

In view of the above, no independent action is being taken by this Bureau in this matter.

(BURGESS-MACLEAN)

THE STATE DEPARTMENT SOON WILL TELL SENATE INVESTIGATORS WHETHER IT HAS ANY INFORMATION THAT BRITISH TURNCOATS DONALD MACLEAN AND GUY BURGESS LEAKED SECRETS TO RED CHINA DURING THE EARLY DAYS OF THE KOREAN WAR.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS REVEALED THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S REPLY TO A SERIES OF QUESTIONS ON THE MACLEAN-BURGESS CASE WILL BE SENT TO THE CAPITOL "IN A FEW DAYS." THE QUESTIONS WERE PUT TO THE DEPARTMENT SEVERAL MONTHS AGO BY CHAIRMAN JAMES O. EASTLAND (D-MISS.) OF THE SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE.

2/15--WM935A

URGENT

0
DONALD DUART MACLEAN, ET. AL, ESPIONAGE - R. TODAY SUNDAY
EXPRESS CARRIES 800 WORD MESSAGE FROM BURGESS TO THIS
NEWSPAPER IN REPLY TO THEIR CABLE TO BOTH SUBJECTS REQUESTING
FURTHER QUOTES FOLLOWING THEIR RECENT PRESS CONFERENCE.
MESSAGE IS RESTATEMENT OF COMMUNIST APPROACH TO EAST - WEST
DIFFERENCES. SIGNIFICANT IS FACT THAT BURGESS IS THE ONE WHO
REPLIED; IS APPARENTLY IN POSITION TO STUDY BRITISH PRESS;
AND STATES HAS MET MANY PEOPLE AND OFFICIALS AT ALL LEVELS
EXCEPT HIGHEST OFFICIAL LEVEL. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
American Embassy
Paris 8, France

Date: February 27, 1956

To: Director, FBI ([REDACTED])

From: Legal Attache, Paris ([REDACTED])

Subject: DONALD DUART MacLEAN;
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

Reourlet 11/28/55.

It would be appreciated if the Bureau could advise whether investigation in the United States disclosed any relationship between [REDACTED] and ROBERT BECKER whose name appeared in the British White Paper concerning captioned matter.

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(Original & 1)

Legal Attache, Paris, France

March 9, 1956

Director, FBI

DONALD DWART MACLEAN;
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

Reurlet 2-27-56 in which you desired to know if investigation in the United States disclosed any relationship between ~~James Earl Ray~~ and Robert Becker whose name appeared in the British White Paper concerning captioned matter.

For your information, investigation in this country did not reflect any connection between ~~James Earl Ray~~ and Robert Becker referred to in the British White Paper.

NOTE: The British White Paper mentioned two drafts of one thousand pounds each sent to Mrs. Melinda Dunbar, mother-in-law of MacLean, by order of Robert Becker, Hotel Central, Zurich, Switzerland. The New York address given to the hotel by Robert Becker was non-existent.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE 2-28-56

FROM : L. B. Nichols

SUBJECT: BURGESS AND MAC LEAN

[REDACTED] of the Cowles Publications called me to advise that he has been told that Alger Hiss' desk calendar was put into evidence in the New York trials, that the calendar contains notations pertaining to calls to MacLean. [REDACTED] wondered if I had heard of this and I told him that I did not know anything about it and that if it was put into evidence it would be put on the record of the case in New York.

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Tickler (2)

(Original & 1)

SAC, New York

March 2, 1956

Director, FBI

DONALD DUART MACLEAN;
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

[redacted] of the Cowles Publications has advised a Bureau official that he has been told that Alger Hiss' desk calendar was put into evidence in the New York trials, and that the calendar contained notations pertaining to calls to Maclean.

You are requested to advise the Bureau promptly as to the accuracy of the above story. [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

HDP:kg
(5)

NOTE:

The story concerning desk calendar was given to [redacted]

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THESE DAYS:

Burgess, Maclean Vaudeville Act

By GEORGE E. SOKOLSKY

KHRUSHCHEV has a typical Russian sense of humor, the basis of which is always raw impudence. He inhibited Burgess and Maclean for five minutes just say, "Nu! What the hell!"

Obviously they were not free men or they would have stayed 10 minutes or half an hour. Their schedule was five minutes and that is all they had. That they were treated as slaves—intellectual slaves—is apparent from the nature of their interview.

For several years now, I have been writing about these fellows and I have been seeking out their relationships in our State Department. The Communist Party universal and a member is under Party discipline within his own cell. While they were in the United States, Burgess and Maclean were undoubtedly in a cell in Washington which reported to a commissar who received direct orders from Moscow or from a Moscow courier. Sooner or later, some Congressional Committee, more by accident than by keen investigation, will trip across some American member of that cell and we shall have the picture of an espionage system involving our State Department and the British Foreign Office. When that cell is found, it will startle many complacent Americans who insist that such things are not possible.

Spies in High Places

They are not only possible but they have happened and Burgess and Maclean, like a vaudeville team popped up for five minutes just to show to the world that the Russians have spies in high places and no two could have been higher than Burgess and Maclean except Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White, who, for all we know, may have been part of the same cell.

The British have always been proud of their Civil Service and of their Intelligence Services. They used to boast that their Intelligence was the best in the world. It certainly was good. During World War II, they fell down. Dr. Klaus Fuchs, Dr. Allan Nunn May, the Canadian Spy Ring, the Australian Spy Ring and Burgess and Maclean are examples—and examples only—of defective Intelligence. The British will now take this situation in hand, too late, but with singular efficiency and they will clean it up. They will discover exactly what happened. There will be no cry of McCarthyism because they will do it quietly and when it is all over, a White Paper will be issued to Parliament which will have to be truthful because the opposition party will accept nothing less.

Meanwhile, our own Eastland Committee will get onto the job or trying to discover who in the State Department was the partner of Burgess and Maclean. It will be very unwise for the State Department, in an election year, to try to cover up. The arguments between the Department and the Committee over documents and Executive Orders will do the Republicans no good politically. The people will wonder why anybody should want to protect a partner of Burgess and Maclean no matter who it might be. And there is always the danger that what they are trying to hide in this country will come out in some other country.

Truth's Powerful Light

That is the essential weakness in all the suppressions of the news, in the hiding of facts, in the slanting of history that goes on these days. What is suppressed in one country, comes out in another. Slanted history does not stand up against exposed facts. Millions of dollars can be spent to confuse the peoples' minds, but a little event occurs, like Burgess and Maclean showing up for five minutes in a dramatic presentation of their betrayal of their country and ours and all the propagandistic lies of several years fade before the powerful light of truth.

So it will be with this entire question of Communist infiltration of American life. Many say, "Why not drop the subject? We have heard enough about it. Let us turn to something else." But the subject persists because of the great damage that has been done. As it is disclosed, it becomes necessary to know how these people managed to do the damage. How did men like Burgess and Maclean, Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White get into positions where they could do so much harm to two such powerful nations? It is this search that does not stop because it is impossible for it to cease.

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7 MAR 2 1956

URGENT

DONALD DUART MACLEAN, ET AL, ESPIONAGE-R. REMYCABLE FEBRUARY 19
LAST. TODAY DAILY HERALD EVADES ARTICLE BY MACLEAN IN REPLY TO
EARLIER REQUEST TO AMPLIFY VIEWS. HE CRITICISES BRITISH FOREIGN
POLICY RE INITIATING NATO AND STATES RUSSIA DOES NOT WANT WAR
BUT ONLY DESIRES TO BE FRIENDLY.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI [REDACTED]

DATE: March 9, 1956

FROM : Legal Attache, London [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: DONALD DUART MACLEAN; ET AL
ESPIONAGE - R

REMYCABLES 1/26/56 and 3/9/56.

There is attached a copy of the British White Paper on the report of the Privy Councillors who probed into the adequacy of Government security measures, and which was published on 3/8/56.

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Statement on the Findings of the Conference of Privy Councillors on Security

*Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister
by Command of Her Majesty
March 1956*

LONDON

HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

SIXPENCE NET

Cmd. 9715

315

MARCH 1956

1. On 23rd November, 1955, the Prime Minister informed the House of Commons that a Conference of Privy Councillors had been set up with the following terms of reference:—

"To examine the security procedures now applied in the public services and to consider whether any further precautions are called for and should be taken."

The Conference consisted of the following Privy Councillors:—

The Lord President of the Council;

The Lord Chancellor;

The Secretary of State for the Home Department;

The Lord Jowitt;

The right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison);

The right hon. Member for Vauxhall (Mr. G. R. Strauss);

The Permanent Secretary to Her Majesty's Treasury.

2. The Conference have presented their Report and their recommendations have been considered by Her Majesty's Government.

3. The Prime Minister stated on 29th November last that if there were steps which could be made public as a result of the Conference, there would, of course, be a report to Parliament. The Report of the Conference includes a close examination of the security procedures in the public services, and it would not be in the public interest to publish the full text of the Report or to make known all its recommendations. But in compliance with the undertaking given by the Prime Minister, this White Paper gives the substance of the Report in so far as it can properly be made public, including a number of specific recommendations.

4. The report starts by an analysis of the general nature of the security risks with which this country is faced to-day. The Conference point out that, whereas once the main risk to be guarded against was espionage by foreign Powers carried out by professional agents, to-day the chief risks are presented by Communists and by other persons who for one reason or another are subject to Communist influence. The Communist faith overrides a man's normal loyalties to his country and induces the belief that it is justifiable to hand over secret information to the Communist Party or to the Communist foreign Power. This risk from Communists is not, however, confined to party members, either open or underground, but extends to sympathisers with Communism.

5. At one time the Fascist ideology also presented considerable security risks. Although to-day the chief risk is that presented by Communism, the security arrangements instituted in 1948 were directed, and will continue to be directed, against Communism and Fascism alike. In this paper for convenience and brevity the term "Communism" is used to cover Communism and Fascism alike.

6. One of the chief problems of security to-day is thus to identify the members of the British Communist Party, to be informed of its activities and to identify that wider body of those who are both sympathetic to Communism, or susceptible to Communist pressure and present a danger

security. Thereafter steps must be taken to see that secret information not handled by anyone who, for ideological or other motives, may betray it.

7. Her Majesty's Government agree with this broad analysis and will continue to base their policy on preventing persons of this nature from having access to secret information.

8. Against the background of this general analysis, of which only a very brief outline has been given, the Conference address themselves to an examination of the Government's security arrangements. Their main conclusion is that there is nothing organically wrong or unsound about those arrangements. They make, however, certain recommendations, the purpose of which is to strengthen the system in some respects. Her Majesty's Government propose to give effect to all the recommendations which the Conference have made.

9. The Report of the Conference deals with the public services generally. But it is implicit in the Report that the Conference recognise that in certain areas of the public service—notably in the Foreign Service, the Defence field and the Atomic Energy Organisation—the need for stringent security precautions is greater than elsewhere. Her Majesty's Government accept this view.

10. Some of the recommendations of the Conference deal with what may be called the relation between security risks and defects of character and conduct. The Conference recognise that to-day great importance must be paid to character defects as factors tending to make a man unreliable or expose him to blackmail, or influence by foreign agents. There is a duty on Departments to inform themselves of serious failings such as drunkenness, addiction to drugs, homosexuality or any loose living that may seriously affect a man's reliability.

11. There is a natural reluctance to make adverse reports on colleagues and nothing could be worse than to encourage tale-bearing or malicious gossip. Nevertheless, it is important to impress not only on Heads of Departments but on supervisory officers generally that it is their duty to know their staff and that they must not fail to report anything which affects security. This covers both evidence which suggests Communist associations or sympathies, and also serious defects or failings which might jeopardise the security of the section of the public service in their charge. The Government accept this recommendation, although they recognise that the measures necessary to give effect to it will require very careful consideration.

12. While confining themselves to the security aspect of these defects of character and conduct, the Conference also record the view that in individual cases or in certain sections of the public service, a serious character defect may appropriately be the determining factor in a decision to dismiss a particular individual or to transfer him to other work.

13. The Conference also recommend that it should be recognised that the fact that a public servant is a Communist not only bars his employment on secret duties, but may also in some Departments have an unfavourable effect on his prospects of promotion.

14. The Conference also make a series of recommendations which turn on the risk presented by those in regard to whom there is no evidence that they are themselves members of the Communist Party, but evidence exists of Communist sympathies or of close association with members of the Communist Party.

15. The Conference is of the opinion that in deciding these difficult and often borderline cases, it is right to continue the practice of tilting the balance in favour of offering greater protection to the security of the State rather than in the direction of safeguarding the rights of the individual. They recommend that an individual who is living with a wife or husband who is a Communist or a Communist sympathiser may, for that reason alone, have to be moved from secret work, and that the same principle should be applied in other cases of a like nature.

16. The Conference recognise that some of the measures which the State is driven to take to protect its security are in some respects alien to our traditional practices. Thus, in order not to imperil sources of information, decisions have sometimes to be taken without revealing full details of the supporting evidence. Again, it is sometimes necessary to refuse to employ a man on secret duties, or in those cases where no alternative work can be found for him in the public service, to refuse to employ him at all, because after the fullest investigation doubts about his reliability remain, even although nothing may have been proved against him on standards which would be accepted in a Court of Law. The Conference agree regretfully that these counter-measures, although they are distasteful in some respects, are essential if the security of the State is to be ensured. But they recognise that it is also important to convince public opinion that the measures taken and the procedures in force will not be exercised unreasonably. For this reason the Conference approve the Tribunal (commonly known as the Three Advisers) set up in 1948 to hear appeals from civil servants threatened on security grounds with transfer from secret duties or, when that is not practicable, with dismissal from the Service. This machinery should continue; and the person whose continued employment in Government Service is called in question on account of Communist association or sympathies will be able to have his case considered by it. The Conference also recommend that the terms of reference of the Three Advisers should be widened so as to enable them to present a fuller report to the responsible Minister.

17. The measures necessary to carry out these recommendations will involve alterations in existing procedures. These alterations will be notified to the staff associations concerned and an opportunity given for representation to be made before the alterations are promulgated in full. This paper is therefore confined to giving the broad details of the decisions reached on those recommendations which can be properly made public.

18. Two other matters should be mentioned. The first is that the Conference considered whether additional statutory powers should be sought to enable the Government to detain suspects or prevent them from leaving the country.

19. The Conference point out that, while an individual can be arrested on suspicion that he is about to attempt to convey secret information to a foreign Power, he must be brought before the courts on a charge without delay. The time required to collect evidence upon which a charge can be based is often long, and the Conference dismiss any suggestion that power should be sought to detain persons for an unlimited period without preferring charges against them, on the grounds that this would run counter to this country's traditional principles of individual freedom, and would be most unlikely to be approved by Parliament in time of peace. They also come to the conclusion that legislation which would permit arrest and detention, without a charge being preferred, for a short specified period, say, fourteen days, would not be much help. The Conference also consider that the

withdrawal of a passport could not be relied upon to prevent a United Kingdom citizen in connivance with a foreign Power from leaving the country.

20. For these reasons the Conference recommend that no additional powers should be sought to detain suspects or prevent them leaving the country.

21. The second matter is that the Conference reviewed the existing procedures for the security of secret Government contracts involving persons outside Government employment. The Conference have considered whether persons subject to these procedures should be given the same right as is enjoyed by persons in the public service of having their case considered by the Three Advisers. The Conference recognise that this is a difficult matter, but are in favour, if suitable arrangements can be made, of access being given to the same tribunal in certain types of cases. They recommend, however, that in the first instance this matter should be discussed with the National Joint Advisory Council. Arrangements for such discussion to take place are being made.

HEA

Cmd. 9715

9746 WL 1623/1108 K.00 2/54 P.B.

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3-5

Coded Letter From Louisville Sets Off Probe of The British Embassy In Cairo

WASHINGTON—The British Secret Service is investigating the entire British Embassy staff in Cairo, in an effort to track down a Russian agent believed to have been collaborating with one of the two British spies, Donald MacLean, who is now behind the Iron curtain.

The investigation came about as the result of a coded letter from Louisville that slipped out of a book in the Embassy library.

The incident is taken so seriously that American intelligence agents have been brought into the case.

What happened was that the British librarian, a girl, and an American visitor in Cairo discovered the strange letter in a copy of one of Lord Cromer's books. The letter fell out when the book was opened for checking some reference material late last November.

The letter, sent from Louisville, was dated June, 1951, and is believed to have been placed in the book by an agent to be picked up from the book by another agent. The letter read in part:

"As I am writing, the news of Donald's disappearance is coming over the air. . . . He must be given a longer breakdown period in the future. . . . Ten days is a long time to howl. . . . Donald is very cautious about David's replacement chap and hasn't decided what he is like. . . . Am sending over for those who understand Runyonese a lot about guys and dolls. . . . Ever hear about a British consular man named Tyrrell? . . . I



DONALD MacLEAN
Letter about him?

bought two shirts and some towels off him in a Cincinnati store."

American agents believe the letter was a coded message between two Communist agents reporting on MacLean. They also believe there have been serious leaks in the British Embassy.

Every book in the library has now been pulled down and searched to see if any more letters can be found. The F.B.I. has been involved in the check, and efforts have been made to locate the person who mailed the letter from Louisville. This, however, is like looking for a needle in a haystack.

THE LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL
MARCH 16, 1956

ENCLOSURE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 3/16/56

FROM : ^{TS/A} SAC, LOUISVILLE [REDACTED]

SUBJECT:

why

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] recalled reading an article which appeared in the U. S. News Report approximately one month ago concerning the activities of BURGESS and MacLEAN, the two British diplomatic employees who defected to the Russians. The article mentioned contained information that BURGESS' roommate, who first furnished the information to British authorities, telephoned ANTHONY BLUNT reporting BURGESS' disappearance. This telephone call was the first indication of the defection on the part of MacLEAN and BURGESS.

DONALD DUART

On the morning of March 16, 1956, an article appeared on the editorial page of the Louisville Courier-Journal in Louisville, Kentucky, with a Washington by-line written by DREW PEARSON, in which reference is made to a certain book in which was found a letter believed to be a communication between Communist Agents. The letter was recovered in the British Embassy in Cairo, Egypt, and was postmarked from Louisville, Kentucky, dated 1951/.

LS [REDACTED]

A small portion of the letter is quoted in the article in which reference is made to a British Consular man named TYRRELL. [REDACTED]

Louisville has no information concerning the letter mentioned in the DREW PEARSON Column and is furnishing the above for information of the Bureau. No further investigation is being conducted at Louisville.

Enclosed for the further information of the Bureau is the DREW PEARSON article mentioned by [REDACTED]

The Attorney General (orig & 1)

March 15, 1958

4f
Director, FBI

DONALD DUART MACLEAF
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

In line with your request this morning, I have secured a copy of "Statement on the Findings of the Conference of Privy Counsellors on Security" which was published on March 8, 1958. This study was the result of the Parliamentary debates in November, 1955, of the Burgess-Maclean case.

A Photostat of the above study is being forwarded pursuant to your request. I am also making available a Photostat of this study for the attention of [REDACTED], Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. In this regard, in November, 1955, this committee was requested by you to conduct a study concerning British security practices.

URGENT

0
DONALD DUART MACLEAN, ET AL, ESPIONAGE - R. REMYCABLE
JANUARY 26 LAST RE COMMITTEE SET UP TO PROBE INTO ADEQUACY
OF GOVERNMENT SECURITY MEASURES. WHITE PAPER ON REPORT OF
COMMITTEE WHO INVESTIGATED THIS MATTER SUBMITTED YESTERDAY.
COPY BEING FORWARDED BUREAU TODAY.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (██████████)

DATE: 3/20/56

FROM: SAC, WFO (██████████)

SUBJECT: DONALD DUART MACLEAN,
GUY FRANCIS de MONCY
BURGESS.
Espionage - R
(OO: WFO)

bc / 7-1
2-1

On 3/15/56 Miss ██████████, telephonically contacted the WFO and requested that she be contacted by an agent, as she had some information to report concerning GUY BURGESS. D.C.

On 3/16/56, ██████████ was interviewed by SA ██████████ in her office. ██████████ at that time advised that about two weeks ago in the Washington Star newspaper, she for the first time saw a photograph of GUY BURGESS and thought the picture looked familiar. The photograph recalled to her mind an incident of 1949, while she was employed in the ██████████, State Department. ██████████, when she noticed a group of State Department men either in the building corridor or at the auto entrance at the rear of the building. She said that she recalls that at the time she noticed one of the men was "a nice looking young fellow," whom she did not know. She stated that she thinks this man looked somewhat like the photograph of BURGESS that she had seen in the newspaper and thought possibly it was BURGESS whom she had seen in 1949. She stated that she could not recall who any of the State Department men were, and could furnish nothing additional concerning the above incident.

The above is being furnished for the information of the Bureau. C.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI ()
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK ()
 SUBJECT: DONALD DUART MAC LEAN, et al
 Espionage-R
 (OO:WFO)

DATE: 3/21/56

ReBulet, 3/6/56, requesting New York to ascertain whether ALGER HISS' desk calendar, containing notations pertaining to calls to MAC LEAN, was put into evidence at the New York trial of HISS.

This matter was discussed with SA () who handled the exhibits at the HISS trial, and with SA (), who handled many phases of the HISS case. Neither of these agents were able to recall that HISS' desk calendar was placed in evidence at the trial.

A review of New York exhibits in the HISS case failed to reflect any record of a desk calendar.

() U.S. District Court, S.D.N.Y., made available his copy of the Transcript of Record in the case entitled, "United States of America, Appellee, against Alger Hiss, Appellant" in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. A review was made of the exhibits presented by the Government and the Defendant in this case, but no record of a desk calendar was found.

()

NYO indices on MC LEAN contain no reference to the HISS case. RUC.

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: March 16, 1956

FROM : A. H. Belmont

CC -

SUBJECT: DONALD DUART MACLEAN;
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY/BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

Attached is copy of "Statement on the Findings of the Conference of Privy Councillors on Security" (White Paper), published 3/8/56. This study was the result of the Parliamentary debates in Nov. 1955 of the Burgess-Maclean case. The Paper states it would not be in the public interest to publish full text of the report made by the conference or to make known all its recommendations although the Paper gives the substance of the report insofar as it could be made public. It states the chief risks today are from Communists and persons who are under Communist influence as the Communist faith overrides a man's loyalty to his own country and induces belief that it is justifiable to hand over secret information to a Communist power. The risk from Communists extends to their sympathizers. The chief problem of security today is to identify and keep informed of the activities of members of the British CP and their sympathizers.

The main conclusion of the conference was that there is nothing organically wrong or unsound with the Government's present security "arrangements"; however, certain recommendations are being made to strengthen the system in some respects. Such recommendations are as follows:

- 1) Departments should be kept informed of employees character defects such as homosexuality, drunkenness, drug addiction or other loose living that may affect a man's reliability.
- 2) Department heads and supervisors should know their staffs and report anything that affects security.
- 3) A serious character defect may be the determining factor in a decision to dismiss an employee or transfer him to other work.
- 4) A Communist should be barred from employment on secret work and in some departments being Communist may have an unfavorable effect on his prospects of promotion.
- 5) The Paper referred to recommendations of the conference re relatives and associates of employees who are Communists even though the employee is not. It did not state what the recommendations were.

HDP:emb (5)

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

21 MAR 27 1956

2M

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

6) In borderline cases security of State is considered above the safeguarding of individual rights. Employees residing with husbands or wives who are Communists should be removed from secret work.

7) In order to insure the security of State it is necessary in some cases to refuse employment after full investigation where doubts of reliability remain, even though no legal evidence acceptable to a court of law was obtained. Also, in order not to imperil sources of information it is sometimes necessary to make decisions without revealing full details of supporting evidence. Employees may appeal to a board of three advisors set up in 1948 to hear appeals of employees threatened with removal or transfer from secret duties on security grounds.

8) No recommendations were made for legislation to permit arrest and detention without warrant or to detain suspects or to prevent them from leaving the country, although these items were considered.

The Paper pointed out that the report of the conference is concerned with the public services but it was recognized that in certain areas of public service--notably the Foreign Service, the Defense Field and Atomic Energy Organization--the need for stringent security precautions is greater than elsewhere.

[REDACTED]



Statement on the Findings of the Conference of Privy Councillors on Security

*Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister
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LONDON
HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

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1. On 23rd November, 1955, the Prime Minister informed the House of Commons that a Conference of Privy Councillors had been set up with the following terms of reference:—

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The Lord Jowitt;

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2. The Conference have presented their Report and their recommendations have been considered by Her Majesty's Government.

3. The Prime Minister stated on 29th November last that if there were steps which could be made public as a result of the Conference, there would, of course, be a report to Parliament. The Report of the Conference includes a close examination of the security procedures in the public services, and it would not be in the public interest to publish the full text of the Report or to make known all its recommendations. But in compliance with the undertaking given by the Prime Minister, this White Paper gives the substance of the Report in so far as it can properly be made public, including a number of specific recommendations.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]

DATE:

MAR 21 1956

FROM :

SAC, NEW YORK [REDACTED]

SUBJECT:

DONALD DUART MAC LEAN, Et Al
ESPIONAGE - RUSSIAN

[REDACTED] The informant stated that [REDACTED] admitted to him being on friendly terms with subjects BURGESS and MAC LEAN and confided to the informant that he had frequently gone to Washington, D.C. and had "partied" with those two individuals. According to the informant the [REDACTED] had indicated that he was a classmate of BURGESS and MAC LEAN in England when they attended college there. [REDACTED]

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI [REDACTED]
FROM : Legal Attache, London [REDACTED]
SUBJECT: DONALD DUART MACLEAN
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

DATE: March 19, 1956

Remycable 2/12/56 advising that newspaper headlined subjects' surprise conference in Moscow on 2/11/56. At this conference was [REDACTED]

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI [REDACTED]

FROM : Legal Attache, London [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: DONALD DUART MACLEAN;
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

DATE: March 16, 1956

There is attached a copy of an article regarding subject BURGESS who is currently being serialized in "The People," a Sunday newspaper, and which appeared in the 3/11/56 issue.

LONDON ENGLAND

The remainder of the articles will be forwarded the Bureau as they are published.

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**'Now I will show how he was
the greatest traitor of them all!'**

**GUY
BURGESS**

stripped bare!

LONDON, ENGLAND
"THE PEOPLE"
3/11/56
P.3,C.1-6

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ENCLOSURE

HIS CLOSEST FRIEND SPEAKS AT LAST

● *This is the first of a profoundly disturbing series of articles. They reveal appalling facts about Guy Burgess, the missing diplomat, that the authorities HAVE NOT DARED TO LET THE PUBLIC KNOW.*

● *These disclosures come from the one man in a position to know the complete story. He was Burgess's closest friend for more than 20 years and now occupies a high academic post.*

● *Only he can reveal the full depth of corruption that lay behind Guy Burgess's treachery. Now he speaks about the friend who was the greatest traitor of all.*

FOR 20 years one incredibly vicious man used blackmail and corruption on a colossal scale to worm out Britain's most precious secrets for the rulers of Russia.

That is the truth about Guy Burgess, the missing diplomat, that even today the men whose duty is to protect us from foreign spies dare not admit.

Only last week a committee appointed by the Prime Minister presented a report on the state of our security services that dodged this shameful truth.

The report spoke of the danger of employing in confidential posts men with "serious failings" such as "drunkenness, addiction to drugs, homosexuality, or any loose living."

But it failed to disclose how one man who was guilty of all these failings—Guy Burgess—wrought more damage to Britain than any traitor in our history.

And it failed to warn the nation that men like Burgess are only able to escape detection because **THEY HAVE FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES WHO PRACTISE THE SAME TERRIBLE VICES.**

It is the failure of the Government on these two grave counts that has at last prompted me to tell all I know about Burgess and so place the public in possession of facts that ought never to have been concealed.

I am not going to express any opinion about the legal and moral guilt of homosexuals. I am only concerned to tell you here about how one of them was able to betray his country and get away with it for so long.

We shared

And there is no one apart from me who has the knowledge to do so.

For I have known Guy Burgess for 24 years. We were constantly in each other's homes. We shared anxieties and joys.

We went to parties together. We had the same friends.

He is godfather to one of my children. He wrote to me frequently when we were separated. He has even sent me messages of friendship from Moscow.

He deceived me about only one thing—his treachery to Britain. And it is the way he duped me, his other friends, the Foreign Office and our Security chiefs that is the most astounding and terrifying part of my story.

Guy Burgess is the greatest traitor in our history. Yet for 20 years he played the part of a stalwart Briton.

He was a Communist of the deepest Red. Yet for a long time he convinced everybody that he had Nazi sympathies.

His Jekyll and Hyde career was a masterpiece of duplicity. And there can be no better start to my story than to tell of one of the most fantastic incidents of his truly amazing double life.

In 1949 he set out for a holiday. It was supposed to be a quiet break from his duties at the Foreign Office, where he was Personal Secretary to Hector McNell, Minister of State and second-in-command to Ernest Bevin.

But his trip to North Africa in search of sunshine turned out to be one long alcoholic carousal.

He drank his way through France and Spain. He stopped off for special celebrations in Madrid and Gibraltar.

Then he capped the lot with a party in Tangier that made alcoholic—and diplomatic—history.

For he drank so much that he scandalised both his fellow guests and—when they got to hear of the party—his chiefs at the Foreign Office in London.

It was not his nauseating display of drunkenness that upset the Foreign Office. They knew Guy Burgess already as a champion alcoholic.

He blabbed

No—Whitehall's concern was over one appalling crime that he committed in his cups.

HE BLABBED THE NAMES OF TWO TOP BRITISH SECRET SERVICE MEN IN SPAIN.

The storm broke over Burgess when he returned to London. His chiefs had received bitter protests from our Secret Service agents that Burgess had exposed them and gone a long way towards ruining their confidential work.

Yet he was charged—believe it or not—with mere "indiscretion."

What was his purpose in making contact—as I can now disclose he did—with our leading secret agents in Gibraltar and Tangier?

There can be no doubt now that Guy Burgess was, in fact, simply carrying out his treacherous work as a Russian spy.

He was attempting to gather information about our Secret Service network in Western Europe for transmission to Moscow.

His "indiscretion" in disclosing the names of our agents at the party in Tangier was sheer accident. He had drunk so much that he was incapable of controlling his tongue.

It was on this humdrum level that the Foreign Office handled the Tangier affair.

Nevertheless it should have meant the end of Burgess as a diplomat. Even the tolerant men who ruled the Foreign Office realised that a blabber like Guy Burgess was hardly the type of man to hold a post in one of our key Government departments.

Terrified

And Burgess himself was terrified of being sacked. He told me so.

Indeed, I can claim the doubtful credit of having saved Guy Burgess from dismissal and so—without realising it—helped Britain's most dangerous spy to carry on his monstrous betrayals.

I came into the affair when Guy showed me the memorandum he had drawn up in reply to the charge of indiscretion. He asked me what I thought of it.

"It is too long, complicated and argumentative," I said. "Cut it down, write as little as possible about the charge if you can—and say you reserve the right to ask for a board of inquiry."

This last point was, in my view, the most powerful. I now a good deal about the Foreign Office bureaucrats.

They will do almost anything to avoid a formal board of inquiry, which takes up everybody's time, often involves bringing witnesses from long distances and produces endless paper wrangles.

Certainly the threat of a board of inquiry worked this time.

GUY BURGESS. THE RUSSIAN SPY. WAS JUST GIVEN A "REPRIMAND."

Now it is possible to find excuses for the Foreign Office men who let Burgess off so lightly. They did not know, after all, that he was a Soviet agent.

But they, or the Security officers who advise them, should have known. They had every reason to know.

For I must now inform the public of some breath-taking facts that no spokesman of the British Government has dared to disclose.

Guy Burgess was on intimate terms with a number of the

When Burgess "doodled" the nightmare fantasies of his monstrous life came to the surface. This is the repulsive drawing he made of a double-bodied monster while he listened to speeches at a Foreign Ministers' conference. WAS HE DRAWING HIS OWN SECRET SOUL?

highest officers of our Secret Services.

He knew many of our leading agents all over the world.

HE CERTAINLY DISCLOSED TO HIS RUSSIAN MASTERS THEIR NAMES AND SECRET FUNCTIONS.

He penetrated the secrets of our security system — without himself ever being suspected by the British spy and counter-spy chiefs who were his friends.

To understand how he achieved all this I must take you right back to the beginning when Guy Burgess was a Communist at Cambridge University. It was there that I first met him in 1932.

I was a Fellow of one of the most famous Oxford colleges. Guy was on a visit from Cambridge, where he was the most brilliant undergraduate of his time.

He was not only brilliant; he had compelling charm. He was the most fascinating conversationalist I had ever come across.

And, since I am going to be perfectly frank, I want to avow here and now that I was exceedingly fond of this strange and in many ways terrible man.

'Trip to Russia

During our very first talk he persuaded me to join him on a holiday to Russia. When the summer vacation came round I found that I was unable to go. Guy made the trip with a Communist friend.

It proved to be the decisive event in his life. It marked the beginning of his long and treacherous service in the Soviet cause.

For the central feature of that stay in Moscow 24 years ago was a long, secret interview with Nikolai Bukharin, one of the most famous leaders of the Communist International.

When he returned to London, Guy told me very little of what was said at that fateful interview. But its fruits were not long in ripening.

And strange fruits they were! For this convinced Communist suddenly resigned from the Party and quarrelled violently

with all his Red friends.

He declared that Communism was a reactionary movement, that the real progressives were on the extreme right and that his sympathies now lay with the German Nazis and the Italian Fascists.

To me he trotted out a confusing set of arguments to account for his astonishing change of front. I did not follow all of them, but I was at any rate convinced of his sincerity.

For on leaving Cambridge he did not associate with his old friends of the left. Instead, he sought out, first Victor Rothschild, now Lord Rothschild, who had been a fellow undergraduate.

Banker!

He asked for a job at the famous private bank of the Rothschild family. And, so Guy told me, he advised the bank on political matters!

His next move took him much further to the right. He became private secretary to a Conservative M.P.

By now I had become more than a little distressed at Guy's swing to Nazism. But during a conversation that I shall never forget he gave me remarkable evidence that the "swing" was not all it seemed.

Our talk took place in my London flat. I was then working as a journalist on the Conservative weekly "The Spectator." Guy turned the conversation to a long review I had written of a book on the distressed areas.

Guy praised the review in extravagant terms. I thought it was pretty good, too, but hardly the masterpiece Guy seemed to believe it.

I asked him why he thought it so brilliant. He paused for a moment. Then, with a portentous note in his voice, he replied:

"I think it shows that you have the heart of the matter in you."

For a moment I was mystified. Then I guessed what he meant. My review had dealt with the problem of the distressed areas in a way that could have commanded the assent of Left wingers.

I am an agent

Guy seemed to be hinting that, at heart—and in spite of his open Nazi sympathies—his views were still left!

Before I could put this startling deduction to Guy, he gave me an even greater shock by saying very slowly and with the utmost gravity:—

"I WANT TO TELL YOU THAT I AM A COMINTERN AGENT AND HAVE BEEN EVER SINCE I LEFT CAMBRIDGE."

I was stunned. There was a long silence. Then I recovered myself sufficiently to say: "I don't believe you."

"Why not?" said Guy. "Why else do you think I left the Communist Party and took an absurd job with that M.P.?"

"Do you think I really believed all that rigmorole about the 'progressive' Nazis?"

"I invented all that. I had to. The Party told me to break off all connection with them, to quarrel with all my Communist friends. So I pretended to become a Fascist."

It was utterly incredible. But, even supposing it was all true, why was Guy telling his monstrous secret to me?

I asked him just that. His reply sent a tremor of dismay down my spine.

"Because I want you to work for me," he said.

NEXT WEEK: How Burgess named a famous British scholar as his fellow Soviet agent. His spying work during the war. How he got a blackmail hold on some of his highly placed friends.



Two monsters that sprang from a monster's brain

Eden Vows Purge Of 'Undesirables'

By HENRY MAULE

(Special Correspondent of THE NEWS)

London, March 8.—Britain tonight announced a purge of drunks, drug addicts, homosexuals and anyone with known Communist leanings from the Foreign Office and other government departments handling classified work.

Prime Minister Eden told Commons the government would follow all the recommendations in a



Prime Minister Eden

White Paper issued tonight by the "seven wise men"—a Privy Council committee set up to prevent any new Burgess-Maclean case.

After three months of investigation, the committee suggested a general housecleaning to weed

out anyone in any way like diplomats Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, known Communists who in 1951 were able to flee to Russia.

One recommendation was that anyone living with a Communist or having a fellow-travelling wife

or husband must for that reason alone be removed from secret work.

The committee would shelve the long-standing British judicial tradition that every man is innocent until proved guilty. It recommended that "in deciding difficult and borderline cases," the balance should be tilted "in favor of offering greater protection to the security of the state than safeguarding the rights of the individual."

Information Asked

All government workers would be requested to report suspicious behavior by their colleagues.

The White Paper insisted that "in certain areas of public service—notably the Foreign Office, defense field and atomic energy organization—the need for stringent security precautions is greater than elsewhere."

"Today great importance must be paid to character defects as factors tending to make a man unreliable or to expose him to blackmail or influence by foreign agents. There is a duty on departments to inform of serious failings such as drunkenness, addiction to drugs, homosexuality or any loose living that may seriously affect a man's reliability."

The committee admitted it might often be difficult to identify Communists, sympathizers, and those susceptible to Red pressure. But it said no chances must be taken in allowing suspects near secret work.



Guy Burgess



Donald Maclean

Wash. Post and Times Herald _____
Wash. News _____
Wash. Star _____
N. Y. Herald Tribune _____
N. Y. Mirror _____
N. Y. Daily News 6
Daily Worker _____
The Worker _____
New Leader _____

Date MAR 9 1956

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STEPS TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY SYSTEM

WHITE PAPER WARNING ON CHARACTER DEFECTS

From Our Political Correspondent

The conference of Privy Councillors, set up at the time of the House of Commons debate on Burgess and Maclean last November, to examine security procedures in the public service, have found that there is nothing organically wrong or unsound in the Government's security arrangements.

They make, however, certain recommendations designed to strengthen the system, and the Prime Minister told the House of Commons yesterday that the Government have decided to give effect to all the proposals. The conference recommend that no additional powers should be sought to detain suspects or prevent them from leaving the country.

A statement of the findings of the conference was published yesterday as a White Paper. This summarizes the contents of the report in so far as it can properly be made public, and it therefore fulfils an undertaking given by the Prime Minister last November that if there were steps which could be made public as a result of the conference, there would be a report to Parliament.

Some of the proposals deal with what may be called the relation between security risks and defects of character and conduct. The conference recognize that to-day great importance must be paid to character defects, as factors tending to make a man unreliable or expose him to blackmail or influence by foreign agents. They say there is a duty on departments to inform themselves of serious

failings such as drunkenness, addiction to drugs, homosexuality, or any loose living that may seriously affect a man's reliability.

COMMUNIST FAITH NORMAL LOYALTIES "OVERRIDDEN"

The White Paper continues: "There is a natural reluctance to make adverse reports on colleagues and nothing could be worse than to encourage tale-bearing or malicious gossip. Nevertheless, it is important to impress not only on heads of departments but on supervisory officers generally that it is their duty to know their staff and that they must not fail to report anything which affects security."

"This covers both evidence which suggests Communist associations or sympathies and also serious defects or failings which might jeopardize the security of the section of the public service in their charge. The Government accept this recommendation, although they recognize that the measures necessary to give effect to it will require very careful consideration."

The conference recommended that it should be recognized that the fact that a public servant is a Communist not only bars his employment on secret duties but may also in some departments have an unfavourable effect on his prospects of promotion.

They also make a series of recommendations which turn on the risk presented by those in regard to whom there is no evidence of Communist party membership, but evidence of Communist sympathies or of a close association with party members. The conference are of the opinion that, in these difficult and often borderline cases, it is right to continue tilting the balance in favour of State security rather than individual rights.

They recommend that an individual who is living with a wife or husband who is a Communist or a Communist sympathizer may for that reason alone, have to be moved from secret work, and that the same principle should be applied in other cases of a like nature.

LONDON, ENGLAND

"THE TIMES"

3/9/56

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ENCLOSURE

PREVENTIVE POLICY

The report begins with an analysis of the general nature of the security risks facing Britain. The conference point out that whereas once the main risk to be guarded against was espionage by foreign Powers carried out by professional agents, to-day the chief risks are presented by Communists and by other persons who for one reason or another are subject to Communist influence.

"The Communist faith overrides a man's normal loyalties to his country and induces the belief that it is justifiable to hand over secret information to the Communist Party or to the Communist foreign Power," the White Paper continues.

One of the chief problems of security to-day, says the report, is to identify the members of the British Communist Party, so be informed of its activities, and to identify that wider body of those who are sympathetic to Communism or susceptible to Communist pressure and present a danger to security.

Thereafter, steps must be taken to see that secret information is not handled by anyone who, for ideological or other motives, may betray it. The Government agree with this broad analysis and will continue to base their policy on preventing people of this nature from having access to secret information.

The report deals with the public services generally. But it is implicit in the report

that the conference recognize that in certain areas of the public service—notably in the Foreign Service, the defence field, and the Atomic Energy Authority—the need for precautions is greater than elsewhere. The Government accept this view.

The conference recognize that some of the measures which the State is driven to take to protect its security are in some respects alien to our traditional practices. Thus, in order not to imperil sources of information, decisions have sometimes to be taken without revealing full details of the supporting evidence.

RIGHT OF APPEAL

APPROVAL OF 1948 TRIBUNAL

Again, it is sometimes necessary to refuse to employ a man on secret duties, or to refuse to employ him at all if, after the fullest investigation, doubts about his reliability remain, even although nothing may have been proved against him on standards which would be accepted in a court of law.

The conference agree regretfully that these counter-measures, although they are distasteful in some respects, are essential if the security of the State is to be ensured. But they recognize that it is also important to convince public opinion that the measures taken and the procedures in force will not be exercised unreasonably.

For this reason the conference approve the tribunal (commonly known as the "Three Advisers") set up in 1948 to hear appeals from Civil servants threatened on security grounds with transfer from secret duties or dismissal from the service.

This machinery should continue and the conference also recommend that the terms of reference of the "Three Advisers" should be widened, to enable them to present a fuller report to the responsible Minister.

According to the White Paper the measures necessary to carry out these recommendations will involve alterations in existing procedures. These alterations will be notified to the staff associations concerned and an opportunity given for representation to be made before the alterations are promulgated in full.

The conference point out that while an individual can be arrested on suspicion that he is about to attempt to convey secret information to a foreign Power, he must be brought before the courts on a charge without delay.

The time required to collect evidence upon which a charge can be based is often long, and the conference dismiss any suggestion that power should be sought to detain persons for an unlimited period without preferring charges against them. They say that this would run counter to this country's traditional principles of individual freedom and would be most unlikely to be approved by Parliament in time of peace.

CONTRACT WORKERS

ACCESS TO TRIBUNAL FAVoured

They also come to the conclusion that legislation which would permit arrest and detention without a charge being preferred, for a short specified period of, say, 14 days, would not be much help. The conference also consider that the withdrawal of a passport could not be relied upon to prevent a United Kingdom citizen in connivance with a foreign Power from leaving the country.

The conference reviewed procedures for the security of secret Government contracts involving persons outside Government employment. They have considered whether persons subject to these procedures should be given the right of having their case considered by the "Three Advisers."

The conference recognize that this is a difficult matter, but are in favour, if suitable arrangements can be made, of access being given to the same tribunal in certain cases. They recommend, however, that in the first instance this matter should be discussed with the National Joint Advisory Council. Arrangements for such discussion to take place are being made.

The White Paper, *Statement on the Findings of the Conference of Privy Counsellors on Security*, is published by the Stationery Office (Cmd. 9,715) price 6d.

The chairman of the conference was Lord Kilmuir, the Lord Chancellor, and its other members were Lord Salisbury, Lord President of the Council, Major Lloyd-George, Home Secretary, Lord Jowitt, Mr. Herbert Morrison, Mr. George Strauss, and Sir Edward Bridges, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury.

The tribunal, known as the "Three Advisers," was established by the Labour Government in 1948. Its first three members were Sir Thomas Gardiner, formerly Director-General of the Post Office, who is the chairman, Sir Maurice Holmes, formerly Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Education, and Sir Frederick Leggett, formerly deputy secretary at the Ministry of Labour. Sir William Bowen, formerly general secretary of the Union of Post Office Workers, was later appointed an additional member.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 4/4/56

FROM : W. A. Branigan *y.65*

SUBJECT:

DONALD DUART MACLEAN
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

Re memo from Mr. Nichols to Mr. Tolson 2/28/56, wherein it was pointed out that ~~_____~~ of the Cowles Publications advised Mr. Nichols he had been told that Alger Hiss' desk calendar was put into evidence in the New York trial and contained notations pertaining to calls from Maclean.

NYO has advised by letter 3/21/56 that a review of the exhibits in the Hiss case failed to reflect any record of a desk calendar. The review of the transcript of the records relating to exhibits presented by the Government and Hiss failed to locate any record of a desk calendar.

~~_____~~

ACTION:

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CC- [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

(DONALD DUART MACLEAN;
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R)

Commission on Government Security
General Accounting Office Building
Washington 25, D. C.

In view of our conversation on April 4, 1956, I thought you would be interested in the enclosed Photostat of an article which appeared in "The New York Times" of April 1, 1956.

The comments in this article relate to the current British security standards as reflected in the White Paper presented to the British Parliament by the Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, March 8, 1956.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

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Tighter British Security Tests Said to Match Th

Washington Finds in London's New Code Vindication of Standards Long Used for U. S. Government Employees

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 31—Britain has come a long way toward matching the United States in the severity of its security arrangements for Government employees.

Administration officials have read with great interest the White Paper presented to Parliament three weeks ago by the Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden. They find in the new British security code a clear vindication of standards long applied here.

The tightening of British security arrangements was agreed to by the Eden Government on the recommendation of the Conference of Privy Counsellors, goaded by bitter criticism over the flight to the Soviet Union of Donald MacLean and Guy Burgess, British diplomats.

New British Standards

Among the new British standards paralleling those long applied here United States officials cited today the following:

DEFECTS OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT. Britain has discarded the principle that a civil servant's character is his own business. The White Paper signals the change in these words: "Today great importance must be paid to character defects as factors tending to make a man unreliable or expose him to blackmail, or influence by foreign agents. There is a duty on departments to inform themselves of serious failings such as drunkenness, addiction to drugs, homosexuality or any loose living that may seriously affect a man's reliability."

ASSOCIATIONS. The Privy Counsellors upheld the practice of "tilting the balance in favor of offering greater protection to the security of the state rather than in the direction of safeguarding the rights of the individual." They went so far as to recommend that a civil ser-

vant be removed from secret work if married to a Communist or Communist sympathizer.

ABRIDGEMENT OF DUE PROCESS. While acknowledging that "some of the measures which the state is driven to take to protect its security are in some respects alien to our traditional practices," the White Paper found that decisions might have to be taken in some security cases without revealing full details of supporting evidence in order to safeguard official sources of information. In addition, the White Paper conceded that there might be cases in which a job would be barred to a man because of lingering doubt about his reliability, "although nothing may have been proved against him on standards which would be accepted in a court of law."

Security Paramount

The Privy Counsellors held that these counter-measures were essential to the state, however distasteful they might be to the English public.

Washington officials who have spent years grappling with the security problem said today that the British Government had evidently come to conclusions similar to theirs about the means of dealing with potential subversion or disloyalty by government employees.

The new British security system differs markedly, however, from the United States practice in some respects. It sets higher standards for the most sensitive sectors of government—the Foreign Office, the defense services and the atomic energy establishment—than for other departments.

It also regards outright dismissal from the public service as a last resort, suggesting that in many cases it may be enough to transfer a suspected individual to less sensitive work or to hold up his promotion.

N. Y. TIMES
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The Attorney General (orig & 1)

April 6, 1956

Director, FBI

DONALD DUART MACLEAN;
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

There is enclosed for your information a Photostat of an article which appeared in "The New York Times" of April 1, 1956.

I thought you might be interested in the comments in this article relating to the current British security standards as reflected in the White Paper presented to the British Parliament by the Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, March 8, 1956.

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OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

April 9, 1956

The attached anonymous
letter was sent to the Director's
home address and is postmarked
in Palo Alto, California.

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Palo Alto, Calif.
Apr. 4, 1956

MEMORANDUM to

Sen. Knowland
Sen. George
Sen. McClellan
David Lawrence
J. Edgar Hoover

~~_____~~ today said, among other things, (but loudly silent in the main) that we should give the British credit for knowing the weaknesses of Burgess and Maclean, and for putting them in positions where they could do no harm; and for watching them instead of firing them.

He was interviewed by Mike Wallace, during "Week-Day" on KNBC about 2:45 p.m. San Francisco time.

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